

3 The view from the Kremlin

We may not accept that the West has tried to engineer regime change in North Africa, the Middle East and Eurasia, that it is committed to hobbling Russia, or that its commitments to the spread of democracy and transparency are hypocrisies, sanctimonious platitudes weaponised for national gain. But so long as the Kremlin sincerely does, then these beliefs will shape its doctrines and policies. In Ken Booth's words:

Unless we attempt to understand the character of different cultures it will be impossible to appreciate the mainsprings of National Strategies. Without knowing about the pride, prestige or prejudice, moral outrage, insistence on survival, vanity, vengeance of different societies how can we begin to appreciate the roles, which such important peoples ... might play in contemporary and future military problems?¹

Today's Russian thinking is a hybrid itself, between context and concept: what happens when a body of thought that dates back to and through Soviet times meets the demands, opportunities and idiosyncrasies of the modern world. This chapter will therefore look not so much on the political agendas and dilemmas of the present as the intellectual antecedents and debates of current thinking.

The mythological Gerasimov Doctrine

The Russians certainly believe the nature of war is changing, and in ways that mean the use of direct force may not always or initially be a central element of the conflict. In 2013, Chief of the General Staff Valerii Gerasimov wrote:

The role of non-military means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness ... The focus of applied methods of conflict has altered in the direction of the broad use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian, and other non-military measures—applied in coordination with the protest potential of the population. All this is supplemented by military means of a concealed character, including carrying out actions of informational conflict and the actions of special-operations forces. The open use of forces—often under the guise of peacekeeping and crisis regulation—is resorted to only at a certain stage, primarily for the achievement of final success in the conflict.²

Gerasimov was not presenting a blueprint for a future without conventional military operations, nor yet hybrid war as understood in the West. Instead, he was expressing Russia's conviction that the modern world was seeing more complex and politically-led forms of contestation alongside regular warfare. To this end, as will be explored below, Russia's supposed 'new way of war' can be considered simply a recognition of the age-old truth that the political has primacy over the kinetic – and that if one side can disrupt the others' will and ability to resist, then the actual strength of their military forces becomes much less relevant, even if not necessarily redundant.

However, this article, written by a tough and competent tank officer whose track record shows no particular interest in, or flair for, military theory, and issued in an obscure publication at that (*Voennopromyshlennyi kur'er*, the *Military-Industrial Courier*), became taken by many precisely as a 'framework for the new operational concept,' with Gerasimov hailed as a 'the architect of Russia's asymmetrical warfare.'³ Before long, there was talk of a 'Gerasimov Doctrine,' even though this is entirely mythical. US Senator Chris Coons wrote that Russia 'enthusiastically—and, so far, somewhat successfully—employed the Gerasimov Doctrine by waging a covert and undeclared hybrid war on the West.'⁴ Even the US Army's Asymmetric Warfare Group's *Russian New Generation Warfare Handbook* uses the term.⁵

Yet there is no such doctrine. I feel comfortable asserting this as, to my shame, I actually originated the phrase, although it was certainly not intended as a serious term of art. This was Gerasimov's take on events in North Africa (especially Libya, where Putin was furious that Moscow's agreement for a limited United Nations response was, in his eyes, abused to allow an all-out exercise in regime change) and then Syria. I used the term as a throw-away line to spice up the title of a blog

post.⁶ Having warned in the text that it was not a doctrine as such, and that this formulation was simply a placeholder for the ideas evolving in Russian military thinking, I thought no more about it. This proved to be a serious error: a snappy phrase that spoke to deep-seated Western fears of a ‘hybrid gap’ – to paraphrase both the Cold War’s ‘missile gap’ and *Dr Strangelove*’s ‘mine gap’ – as well as a concern that war was outgrowing old paradigms, created a myth that overshadowed the reality.⁷

Taken in the round, Gerasimov’s article – which was an encapsulation of previous debates more than a novel exegesis – presented hybrid war (without using the term) not as an end in itself, but as a stage that could or would lead to chaos and the emergence of fierce armed civil conflict into which foreign countries could inject themselves – and that Russia itself was potentially vulnerable.⁸ His aim was to be able to have the kind of forces able to shut out such external intervention and fight and quickly win any conflicts, using massive and precise military force. Of course, Russia – like all nations – was not above using non-military tactics to prepare the battlefield, as discussed below. But in so far as there was anything new in that article, it was of his outlining a vision that was in many ways an essentially defensive one for a chaotic modern era, not of an army of covert saboteurs but rather a high-readiness force able rapidly to mobilise and focus firepower on direct, conventional threats. In this, he was reprising themes that had emerged in much recent military theoretical literature and presenting a sense of the comprehensive threats facing Russia, threats that required an equally comprehensive answer.⁹ After all, as Andrew Monaghan has perceptively observed, facing what appears to be a near-term future of unpredictability and instability, the Russian state has adopted a strategy of mobilisation involving ‘what are in effect efforts to move the country on to a permanent war footing.’¹⁰

It also reflected the political needs of the moment. Having seen revolutions topple or shake friendly regimes in Africa, the Middle East and even post-Soviet Eurasia, the Kremlin itself was getting worried about *gibridnaya voina*. The Chief of the General Staff is not just a military manager, but he is also by definition a bureaucratic advocate. His article was part of a campaign to prove to a leadership suddenly more worried about political threats that they were also military ones that the armed forces had a plan to respond, and a credible claim for its funding. Admittedly, there is a long-established trend of discussing offensive strategies and capacities in Aesopian terms, by ascribing them to the other side. However, both Russian military literature and also conversations with Russian military officers and observers underscore

the extent to which they truly consider *gibridnaya voina* to be an essentially Western – American – gambit, evident even in their adoption of the direct translation of our term. As one recent retiree who had served in the General Staff's Main Operations Directorate put it: 'we only belatedly came to see the weapon you [Westerners] were developing. Even then, first we thought it just applied in unstable, peripheral countries. Then we saw you could point it at us, too.'¹¹

How to square the circle between the lack of any serious Russian thinking and writing about *gibridnaya voina* except relatively recently and in the context primarily of Western operations, and the apparent observable distinctiveness of much Russian activity? Is this another piece of *maskirovka* (deception), whereby Moscow was somehow able to keep an evolving military debate hidden? Hardly, not least because for it to be meaningfully applicable to the Russian military it needs to be discussed and manifested in everything from training programmes to procurement plans. Rather, what has been interpreted as something qualitatively new is instead the product of the Russians' take on the way changes in the world are influencing warfare, mediated through their own particular political, historical and cultural prisms.

Moving the battlefield

So if Gerasimov was not inking out some dramatic new chapter in Russian military thought, what are the intellectual antecedents of current thinking? Much is reminiscent of Western debates, especially as soldier-scholars grapple with changing technological and political contexts. As in so many other ways, the tone was set by General Makhmut Gareev, former Deputy Chief of the General Staff, then president of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences, and still dean of the country's military theoreticians. In 2013, he wrote:

Nations have always struggled with one another with the use of armed forces and warfare capabilities, including intelligence and counterintelligence, deception and stratagems, disinformation, and all other refined and devious stratagems the adversaries could think up. It has always been held that any confrontation without resort to arms is struggle and pursuit of policies by physical force and armed violence is war. Some of our ... philosophers, though, maintain that all non-military practices are a contemporary development and suggest, on this assumption, that following these practices is nothing short of war.¹²

A century-old debate in Russian theoretical circles about the definition of war in many ways echoes Hoffman in his identification of organised armed state violence as the crucial factor distinguishing ‘struggle’ from ‘war.’ Time and again, military writers flirted with the notion of war without open fighting. Back in 1997, for example, V. P. Gulin used the study of information war to suggest that in the modern era, social violence – which could include political struggle – could be considered akin to true war.¹³ Interestingly it was Colonel Vladimir Kvachkov, a controversial ultra-nationalist special forces officer later convicted of attempting to stage a coup, who, in 2004, pushed beyond orthodoxy to suggest that it might actually be worth formally distinguishing between ‘war with the use of armed warfare’ and ‘war with non-military means,’ in effect raising the very division between hybrid/regular and political war that has come to dominate Russian strategy.¹⁴ Nonetheless, the official line remained that war meant war, that it was the domain of the armed forces, even in the post-Ukraine era. Colonel Sergei Chekinov, head of the General Staff’s Centre for Military Strategic Studies, and his colleague Lieutenant General Sergei Bogdanov, for example, two more stars of the theoretical firmament, asserted:

If armed struggle and other actions by armed forces dominate how political objectives are achieved, while all other non-military forms of violence are bent to maximising the effect of using armed forces, this is none other than war. Acting on this premise, political confrontation is not war if the focus is on non-military forms of violence, where the effect of armed forces is due merely to their presence or some action ... confined to demonstrations, threats, etc.¹⁵

This has, after all, long been the official military line. Indeed, the magisterial Soviet *Marksism-Leninism o voine i armii* (*Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army*) concluded that ‘the essence of war is the continuation of politics by armed force.’¹⁶ However, even in Soviet times, while not challenging the military’s ontology, in practice the political leadership held a much more fluid and comprehensive concept of warfighting. The Kremlin’s incumbents then, as today, saw wholly non-military yet essentially assertive and subversive approaches as interchangeable with directly military ones. The military was expected – and did – to adapt to its needs and priorities, just as Gerasimov’s statement was in many ways an attempt to bridge the gap between the soldiers and their political masters.

Steering a path between rejecting and too easily accepting the notion of war by non-military means has been eased not only by the realities

of the post-Soviet balance of power but also a keen awareness of the potentially revolutionary impact of advanced long-range systems. From the smart missiles able to sink aircraft carriers and blast command centres to the computer-guided electromagnetic railguns that could one day claw them from the sky, it is clear technology is creating new weapons of unprecedented range, accuracy and destructiveness. In 2002, for example, the influential military thinker Major General Vladimir Slipchenko suggested that

any future war will be a non-contact war. It will come from the air and space. Guidance and control will come from space, and the strike will be conducted from the air and from the seas using a large quantity of precision weaponry.¹⁷

While pouring what resources they could into developing their own high-tech programmes to fight such a ‘non-contact war’ – with some successes and many more disappointments – the Russians are aware of the technology gap between them and their peer competitors, especially but not only the United States. As one General Staff officer put it, ‘we are still living off upgraded legacy systems, and doing it quite well, but God help us when the new-generation systems really start to spread across the world.’¹⁸ However, the guerrilla state looks to compete on its own terms. Non-contact and network-centric warfare¹⁹ depend heavily on communications, on fast but potentially fragile information substructures. Hence Russia’s particular interest in using jamming, spoofing and hacking to interfere with the enemy’s ability to gather, transmit and use information: if you can’t win the game, you change the rules.

Moscow thus had particular reason to look at ways to use political and information operations to capitalise on a perceived Western reluctance to engage in open hostilities and to undermine any will to resist its encroachments. However, this remained a prickly topic for military theorists, and so discussion of Russian – Soviet – experiences in partisan warfare have become in many ways a way of exploring these options safely by parable, without directly tackling the heretical notion of wars without fighting. In Savinkin and Domnin’s 2007 collection *Groznoe oruzhie: Malaia voina, partizanstvo i drugie vidy asimmetrichnogo voevaniya v svete naslediya russkikh voennykh myslitelei* (*Terrible Weapons: Small War, Partisan and Other Types of Asymmetrical Conflict in Light of the Legacy of Russian Military Thinkers*), for example, they explored how states may use guerrilla-like tactics to bring pressure to bear on enemies while maintaining deniability.²⁰ Such debates can be

located in long-standing Russian discussions about the way that the fog of war and the morale on the home front can be weaponised during the prelude to battle. They also draw on a long tradition of Russian interest in emphasising the political dimension of war.

An historic tradition

Where force is necessary, there it must be applied boldly, decisively and completely. But one must know the limitations of force; one must know when to blend force with a manoeuvre, a blow with an agreement.

(Leon Trotsky)²¹

From the tsars through the Bolsheviks, the Russians have long been accustomed to a style of warfare that refuses to acknowledge any hard and fast distinctions between overt and covert, kinetic and political, and embraces much more eagerly the irregular and the criminal, the spook and the provocateur, the activist and the fellow traveller. Sometimes, this has been out of choice or convenience, but often it has been a response to the usual challenge of seeking to play as powerful an imperial role as possible with only limited resources.

As well as in the experiences of partisan warfare, they have been drawing on discussions about how to fight them. In the West, there has been a habit of treating counter-insurgency and state-to-state warfare as cognate but different. The Russians have long proven more comfortable applying the political lessons of the one to the other. Indeed, their term *malaya voina*, ‘small war,’ which in literal terms means the same as ‘guerrilla,’ has a distinctly different sense. It applies to limited and deniable operations by government forces just as much as the activities of insurgents. Under the Bolsheviks, it also acquired a more explicitly political dimension: the division between the government and the generals expected to accomplish the military dimension of its plans was intentionally blurred. The Party did not necessarily expect to have to spell out all the details: the Red Guard, and then the Red Army, was expected to be fully engaged in addressing the ideological intent of national strategy and be aware of the political intent of its actions.

As a result, the Bolsheviks undoubtedly had a relatively modern take on ‘small wars.’ Although there is literature dating back to the tsarist era,²² contemporary Russian writings about ‘small wars’ tend explicitly to trace their pedigree back to early Soviet works such as M. A. Drobov’s *Malaya voina: partizanstvo i diversii* (*Small War: Partisan Combat and Diversionary Attacks*) from 1931.²³ The Estonians, after all, rightly note that the Soviets used the same kind of mix of forces

as in Crimea – troops without insignia, local proxies and the threat of a full invasion – in a failed but not forgotten operation in 1924.²⁴ Furthermore, the counter-insurgency approach applied in Central Asia by Lenin's Commission on Turkestan Affairs, *Turkkommissiya*, was in many ways ahead of its time in the integration of military and political operations, government troops, militias, co-opted bandits and covert operators.²⁵

Likewise, Soviet military thinkers had been trailblazers in their understanding that warfare was moving beyond the front line and into an enemy's rear. This was central to Mikhail Tukhachevskii's concept of Deep Battle in the 1920s and 1930s, also picked up by his contemporary Georgii Isserson, who argued that past notions of warfare were outdated because 'the neutralisation and attack of the defence were conducted only along the front line of direct combat contact. The defensive depths remained untouched.'²⁶ Ironically, the most radical thinker along these lines was Evgenii Messner, a tsarist officer who fought against the Bolsheviks and fled Russia in 1920. His outspokenly conservative and anti-Communist writings were banned in Soviet times, but today, when one strips away his jeremiads against the decadence and weakness of liberal societies, his words sound prescient.²⁷ In 1931, he wrote that

wars will be comprised not only of the traditional elements of open war, but also the elements of civil war: sabotage, strikes, unrest [and] insurgencies will shake the state's organism ... Disputes will undermine the power of the nation and poison [its] soul, making the severe duty of war even more difficult.²⁸

More striking still was his prediction, in *Myatezh: imya tret'yey vsemirnoy* (*Subversion: the Name of the Third World War*), that

[f]uture war will not be fought on the front lines, but throughout the entire territories of both opponents, because behind the front lines, political, social, and economic fronts will appear; they will fight not on a two-dimensional plane, as in olden days, not in a three dimensional space, as has been the case since the birth of military aviation, but in a four-dimensional space, where the psyche of the combatant nations will serve as the fourth dimension.²⁹

In the modern world Messner felt instead of a war/peace binary, there were four states: war, half-war, aggressive-diplomacy and diplomacy. He saw *myatezhevoina*, 'subversion war,' defined as 'psychological

warfare aimed to conquer the mind and soul of people' as crucial.³⁰ While Messner's writings were banned in Soviet times, that does not mean they were wholly unknown. They were stored in closed archives and undoubtedly read and considered by senior (and politically vetted) ideological and military thinkers. Colonel General Igor Rodionov, for example, an unabashed Party loyalist and for a while head of the General Staff Academy, had read Messner's work (or perhaps a digest) when he attended the academy in the late 1970s,³¹ so these ideas presumably had some traction even then.

After all, Messner was not just writing about how he saw Soviet operations conducted, he was also paralleling behind-the-scenes debates taking place in Moscow. The Soviet military was not only exploring how to strike deep into the enemy rear, but it also maintained a keen interest in political operations, thanks to its aforementioned interest in guerrilla-style operations, and the strong role of both the intelligence services and also the Communist Party's active measures arms.³² No wonder that Messner's writings have enjoyed a considerable revival in post-Soviet times and been cited and discussed by many of today's foremost military scholars as they grapple with the challenges of modern war.

Information war and active measures

At least Russian military thinkers can also draw on an especially rich experience of information operations, in which many have seen the roots of today's activities.³³ Too much is made of Russia's supposed commitment to 'reflexive control' – described as a means of conditioning an opponent 'voluntarily' to make the decision you want him to make – which is neither unique nor actually central to its planning and operational cycles. Nonetheless, the Soviets were especially concerned with propaganda, misinformation and political manipulation, often with the same goal of masking underlying weaknesses.³⁴ This tradition also lives on, enriched by the opportunities in the new, diffuse and lightning-speed media age.

Information operations have thus become all the more central to Russian discussions. In the journal *Voennaya mysl'*, Chekinov and Bogdanov noted in 2011 that

strategic information warfare plays an important role in disrupting military and government leadership and air and space defence systems, misleading the enemy, forming desirable public opinions, organising anti-government activities, and conducting other measures in order to decrease the will of the opponent to resist.³⁵

This well describes the military take on information operations, which also has deep historical roots long pre-dating the internet.³⁶ Western attempts to understand it still too often are based on its own perspectives. To take one specific example, the FSB's 16th Centre and the GRU's 5th Department, believed to be their respective offensive information operations commands, and the FSB's 8th Centre, responsible for information security, all operate in a range of different kinds of activity, from propaganda to direct hacking or even destructive cyberattacks, in defiance of the kind of siloing one would see in the West. This is because 'cyber' as used in the West is not a Russian concept. Rather, the Russians consider information itself, in all its forms, to be a domain of warfare.³⁷ In other words, they are not thinking only in terms of data held within and transmitted between computers and other electronic systems. Instead, they view information as an all-encompassing whole, of which only part is held in electronic media. So, for example, Russian planners will consider propaganda and hacking as part of the same domain, one that spans everything from cyber operations and spin, through to diplomacy and intimidation. Every act or instrument that carries with it an informational weight, and that can be used to compel or deter, is considered within the same discipline.³⁸ To their Western counterparts, this defies their basic notions as to how informational warfighting is structured,³⁹ but it is worth noting that the glossary of key information security terms produced the Military Academy of the General Staff includes no entry for the term 'cyber warfare' as a specific, distinct phenomenon.⁴⁰

This holistic approach to information reflects not simply a tradition of using propaganda in aggressive statecraft dating back to the tsarist times yet honed under the Soviets, but also the Communist Party's determination to try and control information within its realm. The internet was very quickly identified as a potential threat, but it emerged at a time when the security apparatus was relatively weak and in no position to control it.⁴¹ While attempts have been made, especially since 2013, to try and control online activity, instead the security structures had to accept that they operated in an information age and instead looked to means to exploit this.

Both the security agencies and the military began to explore how to extend information warfare, especially to attack enemy decision-making structures and command and control networks.⁴² Through the 1990s and early 2000s, it became clear that the old Soviet means of information warfare, which had depended heavily on subversion and disinformation through ideological fellow travellers and front organisations, would no longer work. The online world became increasingly attractive. As with

so many other aspects of military reform, it was the 2008 Georgian War that accelerated the process. Despite some successes in both manipulating Tbilisi to ‘fire the first shot’ (albeit in response to a carefully orchestrated series of provocations) and also in blocking its communications, the consensus was that Moscow could have done much better. As one Russian assessment put it, the war ‘had shown our incapacity in defending our goals and interests in the global information space.’⁴³

At first, the usual turf wars intruded. Originally, Russia’s information operations capacity had been concentrated in FAPSI (the Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information) but in 2003 it was dissolved as an agency in a cannibalistic takeover that saw most of it transferred to the FSB, with some cryptographic and signals intelligence units going to the GRU and the primary secure communications system in the hands of the FSO (Federal Protection Service).⁴⁴ Even so, the FSB originally seems to have largely considered information operations from a defensive standpoint.

Especially after Georgia, the potential offensive opportunities of modern information operations came into sharp relief and, in line with the usual duplicative and competitive habits of Russian security services, the military moved aggressively to develop its own capabilities. The FSB spiritedly tried to maintain a near-monopoly, and a 2013 presidential decree tasked it with the primary role in detecting, preventing and mitigating cyberattacks against Russia, but the military’s demand to develop its own ‘Information Troops’⁴⁵ to prosecute ‘information operations, which may encompass broad, socio-psychological manipulation’ had taken fruit by the time of the seizure of Crimea.⁴⁶ As a result, the war in Ukraine has featured an interconnected information campaign involving everything from targeted propaganda, through direct terrorism, to varied cyberattacks.⁴⁷ However, this is essentially active measures in the virtual realm, or Messner’s subversion war taken to the field. Far from new ways of war, in many ways both hybrid and political war can thus be seen as revivals of Soviet-era methods, adapted to the modern context.

Notes

- 1 Ken Booth, *Strategy and Ethnocentrism* (Holmes & Meier Publishers Inc., 1979), p. 144.
- 2 *Voенно-promyshlennyi kur’er*, 27 February 2013.
- 3 A. J. C. Selhorst, ‘Russia’s perception warfare,’ *Militaire Spectator*, 185, 4 (2016), p. 148; CNN, 12 April 2018.
- 4 Chris Coons, ‘Are we at war with Russia?’ Brookings Institution, 7 April 2017 www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/04/07/are-we-at-war-with-russia/.

- 5 Asymmetric Warfare Group, *Russian New Generation Warfare Handbook* (US Army, 2016).
- 6 Mark Galeotti, 'The "Gerasimov Doctrine" and Russian non-linear war,' In *Moscow's Shadows*, 7 June 2014 <https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non-linear-war/>.
- 7 Mark Galeotti, 'The mythical "Gerasimov Doctrine" and the language of threat,' *Critical Studies on Security*, 6, 1 (2018); and 'I'm sorry for creating the "Gerasimov Doctrine",' *Foreign Policy*, 5 March 2018.
- 8 See also Roger McDermott, 'Does Russia have a Gerasimov Doctrine?' *Parameters*, 46, 1 (2016).
- 9 See, for example, Aleksei Kuz'movich, 'Evolutsiya vsglyadov na teoriyu sovremennoi voyny,' *Armiya i obshchestvo*, 33, 1 (2013).
- 10 Andrew Monaghan, *Russian State Mobilization: Moving the Country on to a War Footing* (Chatham House, 2016), p. 3.
- 11 Conversation, Moscow, April 2014.
- 12 Makmut Gareev, 'Voina i voennaya nauka na sovremennom.' *Voyenno-promyshlenniy kur'er*, 3 April 2013.
- 13 V. P. Gulin, 'O novoi kontseptsii voyny,' *Voennaya mysl'*, 6, 3 (1997).
- 14 Vladimir Kvachkov, *Spetsnaz Rossii* (Voennaya literatura, 2004), p. 127.
- 15 Sergei Chekinov and Sergei Bogdanov, 'Evolutsiya sushchnosti i soderzhaniya ponyatiya "voina" v XXI stoletii,' *Voennaya mysl'*, 26, 1 (2017), p. 78.
- 16 S. A. Tyshkevich (ed.), *Marksism-Leninism o voine i armii* (Voenizdat, 1974), p. 387.
- 17 *Vremya Novostei*, 5 October 2002, quoted in Roger McDermott, *Russian Perspective on Network-centric Warfare: the Key Aim of Serdyukov's Reform* (FMSO, 2010).
- 18 Conversation, Moscow, April 2016.
- 19 For an excellent analysis of this, see Roger McDermott, *Russian Perspective on Network-centric Warfare: the Key Aim of Serdyukov's Reform* (FMSO, 2010).
- 20 A. E. Savinkin and I. V. Domnin (eds), *Groznoe oruzhie: Malaya voina, partizanstvo i drugie vidy asimmetrichnogo voevaniya v svete naslediya russkikh voennykh myslitelei* (Russkii put', 2007).
- 21 Leon Trotsky, *What Next?* (1932) www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/germany/1932-ger/.
- 22 Notably including I. V. Vuich, *Malaya voina* (E. Pratsa: 1850), I. P. Liprandi, *Nekotorye zamechaniya po povodu dvukh vyshedshikh pod zaglabiem 'malaya voina'* (MVD, 1851) and F. K. Gershel'man *Partizanskaya voina* (Departamenta Udelov, 1885).
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- 24 Merle Maigre, 'Nothing new in hybrid warfare: the Estonian experience and recommendations for NATO,' *German Marshall Fund of the United States Policy Brief*, February 2015.
- 25 I explore this in more detail in my 'Hybrid, ambiguous, and non-linear? How new is Russia's "new way of war"?' *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 27, 2 (2016), pp. 282–301.

- 26 Georgii Isserson, *Evolutsiya operativnogo iskusstva* (1936), quote from *The Evolution of Operational Art* (Army University Press, 2013), translation by Bruce Menning, p. 98.
- 27 See Ofer Fridman, *Russian 'Hybrid' Warfare* (Hurst, 2018), pp. 49–74.
- 28 Evgenii Messner, 'Gore i pobezhdennym i pobeditelyam,' *Segodnya* 71 (1931), quoted in Ofer Fridman, *Russian 'Hybrid' Warfare* (Hurst, 2018), p. 57.
- 29 Evgenii Messner, *Myatezh: imya tret'yey vseмирnoy* (Golovin Institute, 1960), p. 43.
- 30 Evgenii Messner, *Vsemirnaya myatezhevoina* (Golovin Institute, 1971), p. 78, quoted in Ofer Fridman, *Russian 'Hybrid' Warfare* (Hurst, 2018), p. 67.
- 31 Personal correspondence, 1990.
- 32 Between 1921 and 1939, the euphemistic International Liaison Department (OMS) of the Moscow-based Communist International, Comintern, was a clandestine service engaged in running agents, subversion and, if need be, sabotage. Even before the Comintern was abolished in 1943, the OMS had been disbanded, but the international Communist movement continued to be used as a front and support base for the Soviet intelligence services.
- 33 See, for example, Maria Snegovaya, *Putin's Information Warfare in Ukraine*, ISW Russia Report No. 1 (2015); and Timothy Thomas, 'Russia's reflexive control theory and the military,' *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 17, 2 (2004).
- 34 See Victor Madeira, *Britannia and the Bear: The Anglo-Russian Intelligence Wars, 1917–1929* (Boydell, 2014); Ion Pacepa, *Disinformation* (WND, 2013); Steve Abrams, 'Beyond propaganda: Soviet active measures in Putin's Russia,' *Connections*, 15, 1 (2016).
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- 36 I am especially indebted to Keir Giles for useful input into this section.
- 37 Georgii Pocheptsov, *Informatsionnye voiny* (Refl-buk, 2001).
- 38 There is a rich body of Russian strategic thought on this. See, for example, Sergei Modestov, 'Strategicheskoe sderzhivanie na teatre informatsionnogo protivoborstva,' *Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk*, 26, 1 (2009).
- 39 For good primer, see Ulrik Franke, *War by Non-military Means* (FOI, 2015).
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- 41 Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, *The Red Web* (PublicAffairs, 2017).
- 42 See V. M. Lisovoi, 'O zakonakh razvitiya vooruzhennoy bor'by i nekotorykh tendentsiyakh v oblasti oborony,' *Voennaya mysl'*, 3, 5 (1993).
- 43 *Voенно-promyshlennyi kur'er*, 15 October 2008.
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- 45 Keir Giles, 'Information troops: a Russian cyber command?,' *Third International Conference on Cyber Conflict* (NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 2011).

- 46 Stephen Blank, 'Signs of new Russian thinking about the military and war,' *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, 12 February 2014; Volodymyr Lysenko and Catherine Brooks, 'Russian information troops, disinformation, and democracy,' *First Monday*, 23, 5 (2018).
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