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SOFT POWER, CIVIC VIRTUE AND WORLD POLITICS[1] (SECTION OVERVIEW)

Naren Chitty

Machiavelli emphasizes the antagonistic element in man's natural endowment. Men are prone to violence and combat; they are antisocial by nature. However, necessity (chiefly the demands of survival) impels men to associate with each other, to constitute themselves into a series of rival groups. Within these groups, which evolve into complex and interdependent societies, men learn to cooperate, to restrain their demands, to solve by speech and law issues that have formally been solved by brute strength, and the sword. In a word, they become civilized – that is, accustomed to living with their fellow men in a *civitas*. They are taught the meaning of justice and to distinguish between their particular good and the common good.

(Germino 1972, pp. 40–1)

Introduction

This chapter is an overview for the theory section of this book and also prepares the theoretical ground for the volume. The first of four substantive parts discusses power (soft and hard) in the context of world politics. The second unfolds an academic genealogy for soft power, relating soft power to positivist and post-positivist moments in IR and selected post-positivist interests such as cooperation, civil society and civic virtue.[2] A weak global republican confederacy is posited, to give shape to the contemporary world governance framework in relation to which cooperation and conflict take place. Civic virtues, for governing elites, influentials in civil society and ordinary citizens, provide the interactional framework for the confederacy.[3] The third section examines moral constructions of soft power. Whether soft power and public diplomacy overlap in part or are interchangeable is also addressed[4]. The contingent relevance of high and low politics to soft power is discussed and definitions of public diplomacy and subsets of cultural and civil diplomacy are provided. The role of civic virtue in soft power aspirations is dealt with. Fourth, soft power's passive and active forms are broken analytically into traditional and contemporary categories and three categories of multiplier mechanisms – mobility, media and cultural industrial. Following on from the humanist tradition of a republican political organization, qualitative values for soft power are proposed. This is followed by a conclusion.

Power in world politics

Power in the collocation 'soft power' suggests use of a political lens. Born in the junction of biosphere and infosphere, the powerful, though somewhat unruly, meme evolves in the latter (Gleick 2011). Nye (2011, p. 14) points out that power can be defined as resources or behavioral outcomes. He further describes each of three faces of power, faces that allow both hard and soft methods (2011, p. 91). The hard methods are the use of coercion or inducement: to change a subject's strategies (first face); to curtail a subject's agenda (second face); to shape a subject's first preferences (third face). The soft methods are the use of attraction or persuasion to change a subject's preferences in the first face (inducing behavioural change); or attraction or institutions to convince a subject of the legitimacy of one's agenda in the second face (framing and agenda-setting); and to shape a subject's first preferences through priming in the third face (Nye 2011, pp. 42, 91).

There are "complex structures of culture, social relations and power that affect and constrain" people that Nye (2011, p. 14) includes in power's second and third faces. Wendt (1996, pp. 57–8) notes that it is rhetorical practice that is employed as third face power to manipulate "shared meanings and significations". For Foucault power, including disciplinary power, "forms a dispersed capillary woven into the entire social order" (Barker 2004, p. 103). Lukes (2005), who added the third face of power to the first (Dahl 1961) and second (Bachrach and Baratz 1963), relates Nye's soft power to his third face but faults both Nye's strategic agent-centrism and Foucault's subject-centered structuralism for failure to address empowerment. If Lukes found these two approaches wanting in this respect, one might discern in the constructivist approach to world politics the inhabiting of structure by agency (Chitty 2005). From within sociolinguistics Fairclough (1989, p. 46) described power in discourse as "powerful participants controlling and constraining the contributions of non-powerful participants" through manipulating content, social relations and subject positions. There is little wiggle room for agency in the Foucauldian capillaries where power is omnipresent in discourse (Foucault 1998, p. 63). Nye's position is that soft power is a kind of power, this omnipresent power. A syllogistic treatment will lead to consideration of soft power as being everywhere in discourses. Where soft power is at play there should be greater potential for agency. Where discourses are inherently attractive due to virtuosity in crafting of content or inherent virtue of content or communication style, I would say such rhetoric of human interaction will exercise soft power.

While power is central to Nye's conceptualization of soft power, soft should not here signify modulated power, or refer to a grade of intensity as in a spectrum ranging from very soft, through soft, medium intensity, to hard and very hard power. Rather it is power that is qualitatively different in that it is on the co-optive (soft) side of a spectrum that has command or coercive (hard) power behavior on the other side (Nye 2011, p. 21). Nye (2011, p. 10) distinguishes between power defined as (1) resources and (2) behavioural outcomes, emphasizing the importance of the latter, dependent as they are not just on the former but also on contexts and strategies. He also makes a distinction between passive and active soft power, direct and indirect use of soft power, "the passive approach to soft power" being described briefly in terms of the attraction of an actor's exemplary values (Nye 2011, p. 94). Soft power can be non-instrumental or passive but may be used instrumentally (Chitty 2015a). A second feature is its elasticity; it is not reduced as a resource by use.[5] Soft power can also be generated by cultural industries, but consumption of cultural products thus generated does not deplete soft power either. Dissemination of political propaganda does erode it. Finally, soft power can be bidirectional.[6]

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Context for soft power in world politics

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Human interaction brings into play differentials in economically, cognitively or militarily generated value balances that give the participant or participants, in the context under consideration, an ascendancy over the others. In human interaction action or non-action leads to reactions in succession, so where power is action or non-action leading to a complex actor's interests being served, power is the sustainability of the complex actor's interests being served in continuous longitudinal and horizontal action-reaction chain networks through a complex social system over a defined period. If "[f]or Machiavelli the cosmos is not an ordered whole, but rather a field of unpredictable forces into which a masterful intelligence can inject some degree of order and purpose", post-bellum intelligence in the twentieth century has attempted to create order around the "anthropocentric humanist" notion of human security (Germino 1972, pp. 16, 21). The growth of soft law in the international sphere and normativization of correct uses of violence, force and dark deeds and the influence of public opinion on policy communities has led to, arguably, a containment of the use of force and violence. The quarantining of the use of hard power has made space for soft power, reification and growth of soft law and the normativization of practices of good governance. Indeed, Wolin (1960, pp. 223–4) believes that Machiavelli even in his time believed that his political science "made brutality and cruelty unnecessary" and prescribed an "economy of violence"; Germino (1972, pp. 27, 54) went further in suggesting that Machiavelli's "new way" looked towards a politics that was in the "framework of anthropocentric humanism". While there can be no violence in soft power, violence, as in theatres of war, can beget world orders invested with power relations based on war outcomes but that are hospitable to soft power. That said, before its defraction to hard and soft power, power was a compound of these two elements – and continues to be so in many ways.

The focus here will be on soft power in a contemporary construction of world order that includes "a condition of rule" or "no anarchy"[7] (Onuf 2014), global civil society (Onuf 2004, Kaldor 2003) with its moral economy (Calabrese 2005) – that I have characterized as a weak global confederacy, republican in nature.[8] Confederacies are more autonomous than federations. World confederacy does not here refer to the United Nations (UN) as an institution standing apart; it refers to evolving institutions of world governance, actors and cultures that include both rule-making and ruling elites as well as the ruled and recusants. The global polity, tighter here and looser there, is based on internationally accepted rules and states and non-state actors adhering to the consensual rule-making and rule framework – as well as outlaws and recusants and polities that have not been accredited by the system. Outlaw behavior (crime) is seen as offensive but normal, in domestic society, by Durkheim (1895 [1950]). May not such behavior be seen as offensive but normal in international society as well? As soft law grows and hardens over time and international society becomes more rule-oriented and shows some homonomy in at least discrete theaters of international activity, the anarchy problematique perchance will become less consequential. Conversely, international institutions may weaken at times and be engulfed by a wider heteronomy.[9] There is also the possibility that Machiavelli was right in believing "that man can acquire a second nature through civil society" (Germino 1972, p. 53).

The global confederacy, extant around a plethora of states and international institutions, is weak because sovereignty is not shared between an organizational centre and members. "At global and regional levels, institutions that have states as members – commonly

known as international regimes – link public offices in administering the global system of needs" (Onuf 2004). The polity is republican in values for two reasons. First, its members have espoused humanist republican values, to varying degrees, through the European historical tradition – on republican, liberal or socialist models. Second, the institutions themselves incorporate humanist norms and mixed government (Pettit 1997). Democracy in general assemblies and republicanism in managing councils is facilitated by multilateralism and major interest norms of international regimes (Finlayson and Zacher 1983 pp. 296–304). Mixed government forms are vertical within the UN and horizontal when incorporating its members and family of agencies. Policy vectors are directed, at least professedly, at the public good rather than the interest of rulers – increasingly seeking cooperation with the private interests of the corporate world. The preferment of civic virtue is evident in the evangelism of good governance and the "deference value" of rectitude, the latter comprised of "the moral values – virtue, goodness, righteousness, and so on" (Lasswell and Kaplan 1950, p. 56). Onuf (2013, p. 509) makes a distinction between Pocock's (1975) Aristotelian Atlantic republicanism that "directs attention to human agency, action and the effects of time" and his own Grotian–Pufendorfian "Continental republicanism [that] offers general conclusions about spatial relations, the satisfaction of needs and the conditions favoring order and stability". He sees a distinct theoretical divide between republicanism and liberalism. In practice republics such as that of the United States (US) are crucibles of competition between liberal and conservative thought; the confederacy is a republic that is a crucible of competition between republics and republic-like monarchies with the monarchic, aristocratic, democratic mix favored by Machiavelli (Germino 1972, p. 37), hosting variously conservative, liberal, socialist, communist and even theocratic thought. Drawing on socialist republican thought rather than theory, republics of a socialist color can be seen to favor a working class republicanism that "is distinguished from middle class or 'pure republicanism' in that it pursues democratic political aims as the means to social and economic transformation. This could be called the 'republican road to socialism', a kind of popular socialism 'from below' which historically came from the people themselves with its roots in workers' struggles for democracy and social justice. It is the political complement to militant trade unionism" (Freeman 2011). We find everywhere a smoldering tussle of powers, rather than a stasis of balance, or the occasional explosive revolution. For civic republicans "the constitution provides the framework for an organic community composed of socially constructed individuals, who join together in government to identify and pursue civic virtue" and civic virtue is "the leitmotif of all civic republican theory" (Gey 1993, p. 806). However, its advocacy of individual freedom is viewed as compromised by its privileging of collective determination (Gey 1993, p. 825). I take the view that a broadened republican thought today, whatever its republican theoretic origins, is a theatre of contestation between liberal and republican thought; republics too host such contestation.

The weak international republican confederacy (referred to hereafter as the world confederacy or simply the confederacy) has goals aligned with enhancing human security. Apart from multilateral institutions the confederacy is invigorated by a plexus of bilateral relations. Periodically, like-minded states characterize some others as rogue states and their leaders as tyrants who terrorize their citizens or resort to unsanctioned military excursions abroad. There are systemic processes for incorporation, proscription, containment or destruction of out-groups. Militarized non-state actors are also viewed as outlaws or renegades. Rebel groups may be viewed variously by factions in the confederacy as terrorists or freedom fighters. The confederacy itself may be viewed as a political

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Constructing world politics

Communication skills and ordering

Description, strategization and imagination are important to the discussion on soft power. The historian Harari (2011, pp. 22–44) points to a triad of new communicative abilities that arose in the cognitive revolution 70,000 years ago; we might say today they cast a long linguistic shadow on soft power (power of attraction) and hard power (power of coercion or economic inducement) – the phrases in parentheses being Nye's short-hand definitions (2008a, p. 107). It was the cognitive revolution from which the symbolic environment ballooned – ever-growing in volume and complexity through symbolic interaction (Blumer 1969). The new communicative abilities were the skills to describe the environment, social relationships and concepts not found in the environment. These may have been descriptive but they also became rhetorical skills. The latter imagined realities could persuade individuals to join large groups (Harari 2011, pp. 3, 41). The first skill allows cooperation in resource securement, production and distribution. The second facilitates political organization and the third type allows frame creation that organizes society over time. Fearful images of malevolent spirits, tribes or predators or attractive ones of benevolent spirits fit into type three. The first and second could be communicated in coercive or co-optive ways drawing on the third, initially at least, and on the threat of violence. Harari's threefold social constructions were environmental (here referring to narratives based on symbolic interaction about material objects), social ontography and imagination. Frames are used in political organization and strategic communication, elaborated as ideology, and for generating prescribed action. The kind of frame creation noted by Harari (2011, pp. 3, 41) allows influentials to describe world politics as having benevolent or malevolent features – malevolent features that necessitated dark responses, hence the inhospitality of realism towards morality. Morgenthau (1948) warned about virtuous aspirations, prosecuted intemperately, ending even in violence: "Robespierre was one of the most virtuous men … [y]et it was the utopian radicalism of that very virtue that made him kill those less virtuous than himself."

Machiavelli recognized that dark deeds are sometimes necessary, especially in establishing a regime (Germino 1972, p. 32). While narratives of war and glory have dominated the discourse of ruling elites in the past, some empires, Indian emperor Ashoka's for one, having been established, disavowed hard power narratives in favor of soft power, replacing territorial capture with captivation of hearts and minds (Chitty 1994). The doctrinal message had been crafted by Prince Gautama who had eschewed power to become a contemplative. Discourses around rule of doctrine, such as Kautilya's (1915) discussion of *dharmachakra* (wheel of doctrine), anticipate good governance and rule of law. Confucianism privileges the compound virtues of benignity and rectitude (*ren-yi*) respectively (Chitty 2011). The notion of rule of law is inexorably linked to fairness and equity but their meanings have varied under different elite-generated myths of social organization (Harari 2011). The hierarchical Indian caste system and the Mandate of Heaven in China would have been viewed as fair and equitable in earlier times and perpetuated through an expectation of top-down violence. The Indian elites or influentials are echoed in the Lasswellian triad of symbolic, military and mercantile elites (Chitty 1992, p. 29).[10]

These groups later discovered a new theatre wherein their interests could be furthered through struggle in the polity of the Republic of India. Machiavelli believed that "the struggle between the few and the many could lead to results that could further the interests of both groups", a dynamic seen in contradictions of power that continue to inhabit the capillaries of world politics today and jostle humanity towards new constructions of humanist polity (Germino 1972, p. 50). The republic becomes the institution that maintains equitability[11] (a mutually accepted balance that may not be equal) while facilitating change and progress. Onuf (2013, p. 515) notes that Aristotle had no familiarity with rule of law; that the term "broadly if metaphorically describes those forms of rule that Aristotle considered good because those who rule are constrained by law to rule for the common good". For Machiavelli the common good "was virtually identical with the good of the common people" and he favored the cause of the common people as being more just because they sought to avoid domination by others rather than to dominate (Germino 1972, pp. 28, 50–1).

Machiavelli (Germino 1972) further advised that law may be used to control but can be toothless if compliance cannot be enforced – a condition we see in world politics. For theorists who advise a prince, compliance is a condition willed on subjects. Compliance may be initiated through force and sustained by ideology and associated socialization over time. Hard power is institutionalized in, or as, hard law and compliant behavior. When law-compliant behavior is prompted by attractiveness of law (and even love for the law), the original coercion has transubstantiated to soft power. Following principles, truth and virtue associated with a popularized ideology generates moral authority for leaders. Verisimilitude might work for a time but pretense at good governance will soon out. When socially-approved behavior is generated by myths or moral values, costs of social control are lessened.

The coming of cooperation to IR

By the mid-twentieth century realism and idealism were the two main approaches to international relations. The latter was also called utopianism and included the Grotian or legalist approach. Realism has a long history, from Thucydides through Machiavelli and Hobbes to Morgenthau and beyond in the western tradition (Thucydides 1910; Machiavelli 1982; Hobbes 2012; Morgenthau 1948). The orderly Grotian world is generally contrasted with Hobbesian anarchy that requires force to compel order. Realists saw peace as a respite between wars. Potential force (fear-generated) needed to be displayed by an actor prompting (force-generated) fear in the enemy. The characteristics of realism, with its positivist[12] association, are primacy of security, human egotism, anarchic world politics and irrelevance of morality in international relations (Korab-Karpowicz 2013). Idealists, on the other hand, saw the possibility of peace through cooperation, communication, diplomacy, law and trade. And, as seen earlier, realists have not completely disavowed moral considerations (Machiavelli 1982; Morgenthau 1948).

The terms idealism and utopianism were replaced by liberalism, which argues that cooperation and the development of governance regimes and structures are possible in the international system through sharing of societal values. Today, one speaks of three major paradigms in international relations: neo-realism is a realism that is less exclusionary about economics; neo-liberalism is a liberalism that is less exclusionary about politics; constructivism sees mind (through intersubjective structures) as the shaper of

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international politics – rather than factors such as material conditions, the nature of man or domestic politics (Wendt 1999, p. 48). Carr (1961) described realism and utopianism in international relations as being in a dialectic embrace and believed that a synthesis would become necessary in constructing a new world order (Laqueur 1987, p. 115). The synthesis seems to have been approached first through neoliberalism and neorealism finding a degree of convergence in international regime theory. Keohane and Nye's (1989, 2001) work on complex interdependence, a key element of Nye's neoliberalism, discusses conditions under which cooperation would be a better option than conflict. Cooperation is a strand continuing from idealism/utopianism, through Deutsch (1966) and Burton (1965), to the neoliberals, who, like Burton, associate it with a reclaimed realism. The attraction deficit for cooperation between potential cooperating parties around non-exclusionary public goods is addressed in the discussion on public choice and collective action (Olson 2002) and the "tragedy of the commons" (Hardin 1968). International regime theory shows how, through equitable (rather than equal) distribution of rewards between hegemonic and lesser powers, an international regime can be attractive variously to both groups (Krasner 1983). The old realism and liberalism were within the umbra of a positivist beam, but a beam of post-positivism revealed theorists of the constructivist paradigm in its theoretical umbra and scholars of soft law, feminist IR and environmental IR, and other areas of 'low politics', in its penumbra. I would see myself as persuaded by a constructivism that allows for alternative constructions such as realist and idealist to compete in and shape world politics and which sees the importance of positivist and post-positivist concerns as contingent on the context in which an actor finds itself.

A reading of Burton (1965) reveals that his spectrum has force and influence at the two ends and political and economic power in the middle. Like Nye later on with soft power, Burton challenged orthodoxy from within its battlements, through a long hard examination of it in light of a new reality. He believed that peace can be a goal, whether within a power theory or a peace theory. Burton posited "a system beyond power politics resting on a calculated avoidance of the employment of power as an instrument of foreign policy" – seeing, with Deutsch, the problem to be less of a problem of power and more one of steering in a cybernetic sense (Burton 1965). Deutsch's "fabric of coordinated expectations" is contrasted with threats and described by Mowlana as what "keep[s] things moving and bestow[s] political power" (Deutsch 1966, p. 122; Mowlana 1996, p. 72). This fabric is part of the sphere of intangible power resources that Mowlana contrasts with tangible power resources.

The cybernetic approach and interest in cooperation of Deutsch (1966) were of interest to what could be described as an idealist sub- or co-field of IR – international communication (IC) as a harbinger of soft power. Working within IC, Mowlana made a distinction between tangible and intangible power, the latter being constituted of belief and value systems, ideology, knowledge and religion; Mowlana's tangible resources include cultural and educational products as well as economics, technology, politics and military (Mowlana 1996, p. 78). The initial step towards the delineation of soft power by Nye (2011, p. 21) was also through the concept of intangible power resources from which he identified "institutions, ideas, values, culture and the perceived legitimacy of policies culture, ideology and institutions" but noted that "patriotism, morale, and legitimacy strongly affect the military's capacity to fight and win". He characterizes legitimacy as a power reality (Nye 2011, p. 82). Legitimacy of rule is seen to arise from legal, traditional or charismatic authority or combinations thereof (Weber 1958). Rulers selected through

rules and procedures are invested in legal authority but, like traditional and charismatic rulers, they may still benefit from being seen to be benign rulers.

Mowlana's (1996, p. 179) argument is that there needs to be an examination of "the notion of power as less a problem of governing and more a problem of cooperation, learning and growth" in line with Deutsch's (1966, p. 22) "coordinated expectations" between states. Burton's (1965) notion of mutual understanding between powers and the notions of conflict and cooperation addressed by him in his work on conflict resolution and by Sherif *et al.* (1961) in their work within the realistic conflict theory framework are compatible positions.[13] Moreover, by showing that cooperation contributes to positive mutual images between hitherto conflicting parties, Sherif *et al.* provided a basis for relating cooperation to soft power. Burton (1965), at the time, saw power terminology to be of diminishing value in a world politics where physical force and threats of force were being replaced by influence. In the theatre of world politics the self-confessed idealist without illusions, Kennedy, was already calling for focus "on a more practical, more attainable peace, based not on a sudden revolution in human nature but on a gradual evolution in human institutions – on a series of concrete actions and effective agreements which are in the interest of all concerned … Genuine peace must be the product of many nations, the sum of many acts" (Kennedy 1963). Burton's (1965) emphasis on mutual understanding when coupled with cooperation is suggestive of dialogic rather than strategic cooperation.

The structural limits to wider cooperation posed under realism make defense cooperation attractive in balancing power. Even neo-realists such as Jervis (1992) looked at the notion of cooperation, albeit in security regimes. Wider cooperation is advocated under liberalism to contain the problem of anarchy and create conditions for peace and prosperity. It was Onuf[14] (1989) who introduced constructivism into international relations; constructivism formed the synthesis which allowed societies to construct world politics in realist, liberal or other images through words and deeds. Wendt (1999) also helped develop this area in IR.

Nye (2011, p. 82) points out unequivocally that "soft power is not a form of idealism or liberalism. It is simply a form of power, one way of getting desired outcomes". He argued that realist and liberal strains needed to be hybridized into a new strain of liberal realism. One might ask why there is a need to design a hybrid liberal realist habitat for soft power? Constructivism, after all, focuses on norms, identity and culture and is a natural habitat for soft power even if the latter concept was launched from within neoliberalism (Chitty and Dong 2015, pp. 31–4). The English School too has a hospitable multiperspectival platform. Nye (2011, p. 82) had emphasized co-optive power in contrast with command power, but, further embracing realism into neoliberalism, he noted that "only a truncated and impoverished version of realism ignores soft power". Introducing the concept of smart power or the ability to blend hard and soft power usefully into the lexicon of international relations, Nye (2008a, p. 107) argued that liberal realist foreign policy should recognize the limits of American power, seek an integrated grand strategy based on smart power and evangelize core values of the US polity (Nye 2008b). Nye has not only been successful in making more respectable the concerns of low politics[15], areas of politics considered in the past to be of lesser import than the concerns of high politics and realism – security and sovereignty – but also in mixing soft and hard political strategies into a more palatable option for national security managers on the Democratic side of US politics. Indeed, low and high politics are viewed as a false dichotomy in recent constructions of world politics (Ripsman 2006).

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The changing political topography is to be witnessed in the ascendancy of cybernetics and of telecommunication networks as security concerns. Nye (2011, pp. 17–18) recognizes networks as "important elements of structural power" and involvement in more communication networks than others gives the US "greater opportunity to shape preferences". He further notes the greater facility that non-governmental organisations (NGOs) can have in operating networks under a broader, less state-controlled "new public diplomacy" (2011, p.108). In his work on communication power, network theorist Castells (2009) argues that meaning construction in minds offers a more stable and decisive basis for power than coercion. He identifies four network powers listed here with pithy descriptors: networking power (gatekeeping power), network power (network protocol power), networked power (hierarchical node power) and network-making power (connecting nodes). Castells sees public diplomacy as potentially constructing "a global public sphere around the global networks of communication, from which the public debate could inform the emergence of a new form of consensual world governance" (Castells 2008, p. 91). There has been a convergence of technologies of symbolic, mercantile and military influentials today around telematics and informatics (Chitty 1992). This has coincided with the nascence of noöpolitik based on ideational power (Ronfeldt and Arquilla 2007) and the burgeoning of late modern civil society which Onuf sees seeping out of local and regional spaces onto the wider stage (Onuf 2004).

Soft and hard power, high and low politics

Security and sovereignty matters were regarded, in positivist international relations, as high politics; all else being low. While national security remains a core political issue, today issue areas that are linked to national security have proliferated and include cybersecurity, environmental security and food security. In the post-positivist moment, apart from cooperation, civil society and civic virtue, which have been foregrounded here, issues such as ethnicity, gender, human rights, migration and poverty draw attention. Military security, particularly military operations and espionage, continues to be very high politics in a practical sense and one sees a degree of consensus about security emerging in countries during war time. The continuation of high and low political calculus into practical diplomacy is seen in the way "politicians and diplomats, have, in the main, regarded cultural diplomacy as a lesser tool of diplomacy which in its turn is regarded by some as a lesser tool of foreign policy" and how "[m]any diplomats may support cultural diplomacy in principle, but in practice tend to place it at the lower end of their work priorities" (Mark 2009, pp. 2–3). The realist paradigm has been well and truly entrenched in diplomatic perspectives as "a by-product of a long history of viewing international relations in terms of economic and military power" (Melisen 2005, p. 5). One might also remark that, in the diplomatic realm, soft power should not be seen as quarantined to cultural diplomacy within public diplomacy. Even in-camera diplomatic negotiations can be influenced by hard and soft power. Without discounting the insights of post-positivism, one might say that there is realpolitik in differentiating into high, medium and low politics matters that can be defined as being of more or less importance on the basis of contingency. The further away the purpose of public diplomacy is from high politics and the state – as in people-to-people exchanges – the easier it is to associate public diplomacy practice with cultural diplomacy. The closer the association with high politics, the more likely that information would be viewed as sensitive, and open discussion in the public sphere curtailed by states on the grounds of security.[16] Medium politics, in Table 1.1.1.1 below,

Table 1.1.1.1 Types of public diplomacy (PD) context and soft power generation potential

Arena	Character of openness	Examples of issue areas	PD type	Potential for generation of soft power in publics
High politics	Closed	Military intelligence, operations	–	n.a.
	Strategically open	Military intelligence (strategic releases) Battle briefings	Hard	Low among policy sceptics High among policy supporters
Medium politics	Open (information is selectively made available to the public) Open to debate by political parties and in civil society	Energy, environment, human rights, immigration, telecommunications, trade	Medium	Medium
Low politics	Open (information is made available to the public) Open to debate by political parties and in civil society	Culture, education, health, sports	Soft	High (potential for winning the hearts, minds and appetites of policy opponents – without necessarily converting them, in terms of high political and medium political policy)

Source: Professor Naren Chitty, 'Public diplomacy: partnering publics' in A. Fisher and S. Lucas (eds.), *Trials of Engagement: The Future of US Public Diplomacy*, 2011.

refers to issues that are seen increasingly as being of a crucial nature but are not always linked with security and sovereignty (Chitty 2015a). That said, there are many who will argue that environmental, energy, immigration and telecommunications are issues that already impinge on national security.

The potential for public generation of soft power in the high category is lower among policy sceptics and higher among policy supporters. The potential for public generation of soft power in the low category is for winning the hearts, minds and appetites of policy opponents – without necessarily converting them in terms of high political and medium political policy. The low politics domain of soft public diplomacy is the comfort zone of cultural relations or cultural diplomacy. The following broad definitions are offered for public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy in order to differentiate between them:

Public diplomacy is engagement variously between governments and publics (noting their diasporic nature), whether between countries or within one country,

ration potential

Potential for generation of soft power in publics
n.a.
Low among policy sceptics High among policy supporters
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through use of media (including social media), mobility or cultural production (including by prosumers), for purposes of building sustainable and mutually beneficial relationships and generating mutual goodwill. Public diplomacy content and communication style can be based on attraction (soft power), coercion (hard power) or on strategic mixtures of hard and soft power – smart power.

Cultural diplomacy, a subset of public diplomacy, is a set of practices through which state or non-state actors draw on their heritage[17] or contemporary culture, using media (including social media), mobility or cultural production (including prosumption), for purposes of building sustainable mutually beneficial relationships and generating mutual goodwill in groups with which they wish to partner.

So, categories of soft power may be employed in public diplomacy that has high potential for public participation. As much as states would militate against public discussion of high security information, there is the countervailing appetite for information and loquacity in the public sphere. Arising from outside IR, there is the notion of public diplomacy as civil society influencing government; Castells (2008) sees public diplomacy as the diplomacy of the public and a way for civil society to influence government continuously. Such democratic processes can be attractive to publics at home and abroad (Chitty 2014). Publics are able to influence publics abroad using attractive messages projected internationally by social media through clicktivism. Riordan (2005, p. 191) has noted that "[e]ngaging with foreign civil societies is often best done by the nongovernmental agents of our own civil societies".

Where public diplomacy, or for that matter, diplomacy, develops trust, liking and alliances for a country, soft power is generated. While distinguishing cultural diplomacy from public diplomacy as a subset works, the term political diplomacy is not helpful; diplomacy is viewed as political in nature. The soft power associated with civic virtue and its messaging – both in style and content – are examples of political types of public diplomacy, as is the messaging of political leaders and diplomats. To make a distinction between civil and state public diplomacy would be useful.

Civil diplomacy is engagement variously between civil society in a country and the government to further the interests of civil society or promote the interests of the country, or between groups in civil society and civil society groups and/or governments abroad to engage in cooperation in furthering mutual interests or to develop sustainable and cooperative relationships.

Constructing soft power

Normative soft power

This section discusses the moral features of soft power that are invariably derived from ethical traditions and their continuing dialogue with political thought. The cumulative learning process in Europe (including through the influences of Greece; Rome; Judaism; Christianity; Islamic civilization; the Renaissance; the Reformation; philosophical, European and American political and industrial revolutions; imperialism and European integration), has resulted in the distillation of European heritage values as western normative soft power. The UN, in its creation, was a 'normative consequence' of Euro-American speech acts (and their interaction with countervailing speech acts from the Soviet bloc) of the three kinds identified by Onuf (1989) and applied here to a world

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order context – assertives (that describe world order or propose a new description of the present order without calling for transformation), directives (that lead to changes in world order or ordering) and commissives (that commit an actor to a desired world order that it projects). Subsequent to the formation of the UN, actors such as the Non-Aligned Movement have contributed commissives about international relationships and others such as China have contributed directives leading to new financial institutions outside the UN and Bretton Woods system. The UN family of institutions, the Bretton Woods institutions and organizations such as the new international economic institutions proposed by China, are the diplomatic forums wherein legitimate actors of the world confederacy exchange assertives, directives and commissives and seek to retain the shape of or re-shape the confederacy in various ways. Chinese scholars have pointed to the importance of being able to influence international discourse and institutional frameworks, provide leadership and project its culture, a metapower (Li 2009, p. 27).

They seek also to promote preferred national self-images and influence policy discourses; being seen as able to influence policy discourses is, in itself, an expression of soft power.

Nye takes a strategic view of soft power. Because of his instrumental focus, he consistently uses the term 'targets' for the recipients of soft power messages and 'agents' for those who deploy soft power. But he explains that targets' thinking about agents is important to consider, as "[a]ttraction and persuasion are socially constructed" (Nye 2011). This suggests that Nye's targets are more than targets – they are more akin to the active receivers of reception theory (Hall 1980). Note the reception and moral tone in qualifications (in parentheses) in Nye's description of a country's "three basic [soft power] resources, its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when others see them as being legitimate and having moral authority)". There is the aforementioned complementary side to assertives, directives and commissives – the listening[18] – both by influentials at the top of the Lasswellian pyramid[19] and those in the lower reaches.[20] Attractiveness helps: it is more in the vein of soft power to be captivated by compelling messages than to be captured and compelled. When rulers listen to citizens, citizens find that attractive.

Today, more than at any time in history, individuals and communities have access to groups and technologies that can amplify their voices, and if influentials attend they will hear these voices. Without audition the voice of minorities will be obscured in republics by enumeration of vote, of majorities or coalitions of minorities (Chitty 1992, p. 37). This is particularly pertinent to a public diplomacy related to foreign policy where a state seeks to partner variegated publics at home and abroad. Onuf (2014) calls for the *demos* to be listened; listening should be viewed as a civic virtue for rulers and the ruled – as should responsible participation in the public sphere. "[B]eing involved in political processes is an important civic virtue" (Lee 2006) The governance relationship needs to be dialogic with mutual listening and characterized by benignity and rectitude. Benignity and rectitude expressed through humanist, cooperative and dialogic orientation are at the heart of governance in a civil republic. However, in the context of electronic media and social media both rulers and the ruled have developed new forms of rhetoric to attract and influence large numbers of followers, and these may be based less on virtue than on entertainment value.

Political values need to be attractive to others and adhered to by agents; foreign policy needs to be legitimate and have moral authority in the minds of targets. So, even if, as Nye claims, "soft power is a descriptive, rather than a normative concept" (Nye 2011,

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p. 84), in order to be effective it needs to be seen by targets to be legitimate and have moral authority in its foreign policy manifestation. This would be soft power for good. Nye also refers to the soft power of what we would call rogue states and other unlawful actors – soft power for bad? Non-democratic, dictatorial and even criminal leaders, organizations or messages are able to exert "a great deal of soft power in the eyes of their acolytes but that did not make it good" (Nye 2011, p. 81). Habermas' (1987; 1984) strategic communication is characterized by the intent to strategically change the thinking of the other interlocutor, but the content need not be propagandist or untruthful. Nye takes the view that if a message is seen as propaganda by a target, "it loses its persuasive power" (Nye 2011, p. 4). Soft power may be intrinsically amoral but, even so, it needs to be morally deployed in the light of the broadly humanist consensus of the world confederacy around human security.[21]

Nye's model assumes humanistic international values that guide the community of nations. Indeed, the UN system is constructed around language to which there is broad agreement even if interpretations differ; political modernization is viewed as a prerequisite for economic development in the west and vice versa in China. If China has to overcome western public opinion related to human rights, the US has to struggle with its foreign policy being unpopular in segments of populaces at home and abroad.

Virtues

Onuf (2013, p. 519) notes "four cardinal virtues (wisdom, justice, courage and seemliness), that individuals naturally possess in varying degrees and exercise in ways reflecting their statuses in society". He also describes virtues as variegated and sees the practice of virtue as being a contribution to the common good (2013, p. 516). Aristotle identified nine core virtues: courage, gentleness, justice, liberality, magnanimity, magnificence, prudence, temperance, wisdom (Aristotle ed. Ross 1959). Machiavelli reduced these to justice (rectitude) and charity (benignity) but warned that a ruler who practices these "where many are not good" will be badly served (Germino 1972, p. 31). For Montesquieu, republican virtue was essentially the love of the republic and the practice of moderation and frugality. Republican, monarchic and despotic governments were based on virtue, honor and fear respectively (Montesquieu 1899).

A congruent triad of composite virtues – civic virtue, corporate virtue (Schudt 2000) and military virtue – resonate with soft, economic and military power, Nye's (2004, pp. 45–9) three power types which he draws from Carr (1987). Civic, corporate and military virtue may be populated within these, with variations in nuance in different locations. In the contemporary peacetime context Aristotle's virtues contribute to governance which I see as a two-way process that today hosts the perennial tussle between social blocs in society. Justice, temperance, prudence and liberality contribute to equitability – or proportional rather than equal outcomes – which is characteristic of republican government and can be expressed as aspects of rectitude. Equitability is akin to Aristotle's "proportional equality" that takes into account "natural differences between kinds of people" (Onuf 2009, p. 3). Gentleness, magnanimity and prudence contribute to humaneness, favor listening and dialogic communication and can be expressed as aspects of benignity. The benignity and rectitude of governing elites, influentials in civil society and ordinary members of civil society are of different orders.

Nye (2011, p. 92) refers to Vuving's "three clusters of agent and action that are central to attraction: benignity, competence and beauty (charisma)". Vuving (2009, pp. 8–12)

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uses the terms benignity, brilliance and beauty, qualities that generate soft power through gratitude and sympathy; admiration; and inspiration respectively. Consideration is given to these below in connection with the polysemous nature of the term 'make-up' – construction, competence, conciliation, composition (cosmetics and concoction)[22] – and these are employed to propose a qualitative soft power typology with composition (normatively rich in terms of heritage), conciliation and composition (having normativizing propensity) being most desirable, composition having ethically acceptable (cosmetic accentuation) and ethically unacceptable (concoction) variations. Lasswell and Kaplan's (1950, pp. 55–6) welfare (enlightenment, wealth, skill) and deference values (power,

Table 1.1.1.2 Relating categories of virtue to welfare and deference values

Aristotle's virtues	Cardinal virtues	Lasswell's Welfare (W) and Deference (D) values	Behavior	Effect
–	–	(D) power	be coercive	feel fear
courage	courage	–	–	feel admiration
gentleness, liberality, magnanimity	–	(D) affection (includes love and friendship)	be benign, cooperate, dialogue, listen	feel friendship, love
justice	justice	(D) rectitude (moral values: virtue, goodness, righteousness etc.)	uphold equality under rules; uphold political equitability	feel admiration
prudence, temperance, wisdom	wisdom	(W) enlightenment (knowledge, insight in social relations)	exercise wisdom	feel admiration
–	seemliness (rectitude/ beauty)	–	exercise veracity	feel admiration inspiration
magnificence (beauty or greatness)	–	(D) respect: status, honor, recognition, prestige, glory, reputation	be an example	feel admiration
–	–	(W) wealth (income: services or goods)	–	–
–	–	(W) skill – proficiency in any practice	virtuosity	feel admiration

Source: Aristotle, *Ars Rhetorica* (1959 edition); H. Lasswell and A. Kaplan, *Power and Society: A Framework for Political Enquiry* (1950); N. Onuf, 'Organizing for Good: Republican Theory in a Changing World', in M. Bassiouni, J. Gomula, P. Mengozzi *et al.*, *The Global Community Yearbook of International Law and Jurisprudence* (2013); and A. Vuving, 'How Soft Power Works', paper presented at the American Political Science Association annual meeting, 2009.

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affection, rectitude, respect) are related where possible to notions of virtue, behavior and effects in Table 1.1.1.2.[23]

If we relate soft power to Aristotelian virtues then an actor's courage, justice, prudence etc., seemliness and magnificence can excite admiration. An actor's gentleness etc. can build positive relationships, partnerships, friendship and love. However, we need to step out of Aristotle's virtues to Lasswell's welfare and deference values to find a locus for cultural production that leads to soft power – through admiration for virtuosity of skills in crafting preferred cultural artefacts – tangible or intangible. And the motivator of all republican virtue is Montesquieuan love of country, a love that could work in tandem with political, economic or military interests.

Heritage and contemporary culture, civic virtue and soft power

The exercise by a social object of an inherent attraction, prior to this being activated by symbolic, mercantile or military influentials (Lasswell 1963 [1935]), is soft power in a passive mode (Nye 2011, p. 94). There are sites, artefacts, practices and ideas, objects of symbolic interaction (Blumer 1969; Mead 1982) and political narrative that exert such attraction. Locational narratives associated with national pride – for instance, the Grand Canyon or "symbolic political accretions such as the Pyramids, the Great Wall of China or the Palace at Versailles" – (Chitty 2015b) convey the soft power of sites. Pictorial, textual and sound images of a nation (such as national flags, anthem lyrics and anthem scores respectively) are invested in soft power to patriots. Often, though not invariably, vast soft power accruals are residue from imperial hard power projects. These are examples of the transubstantiation of traction (hard power) to attraction (soft power) – of the hard power of *anciens régimes* to heritage soft power. Vast deposits of attractive art, architecture, language, literature and music – that had political contexts in the past – have been left behind from ages past. Successor civilizations benefit from the allure of antiquity. Heritage soft power, such as that of the Pyramids, can be post-political, in that the politics that generated them as (once feared and now admired) symbols of pharaonic hard power have long been buried. Their soft power may have remained largely passive prior to the rise of modern international tourism, yet it attracted Napoleon during his military excursion in Egypt (DeSalvo n.d.). Power can be a factor here in two ways; first, as in palaces and tombs containing narratives of power that have ceased to be fearsome over time and are now winsome; second, in the perlocutionary intent associated with the use of these artefacts today. Such soft power can be activated today through tourism promotion strategies and messages. Regardless of what kind of government is in power in Egypt, a military dictatorship or a liberal democratic government, the Pyramids and other Egyptian antiquities will continue to exert attraction. However, the calculus of security, based on hard power of states and terrorists, can lead to tourists, for instance, abandoning an iconic destination.

The soft power of archeological or historical objects may be re-politicized, and activated by influentials. Long-forgotten narratives may be 'discovered' by and politicized by cultural entrepreneurs and political brokers respectively. Young (1976, p. 46) argues that "a distinction is worth making between the cultural entrepreneur, who devotes himself to enlarging the solidarity resources of a community; and a political broker, who mobilizes the social and political realm". The political entrepreneur of Rabushka and Shepsle (1972, p. 60) "manipulates 'politically salient' natural social cleavages", cleavages widened through successful messaging (Chitty 1992, p. 9). Political entrepreneurs latch

themselves onto social reform issues and interest groups (Meydani 2009, p. 29). Cultural and political entrepreneurship is a form of civic participation by these influentials; civil society groups participate by converging around the influentials' messages and cooperating to further shared goals.

The twin founts of soft power are interrelated heritage and contemporaneous passive soft power. It is often Montesquieuan love of country, republican virtue, that motivates participants in civil diplomacy from among influentials and civil society to emphasize heritage or contemporary culture in their country's messaging to the outside world. Republican virtue prompts engagement with one's own government or with civil society or governments abroad to form mutually beneficial relationships that will make prosperity and security sustainable without the use of violence, coercion or inducement. Republican virtue motivates citizens to emphasize heritage or contemporary culture in their cultural diplomacy. And it can be republican virtue that prompts citizens (industrialists or prosumers) to engage in cultural production, not only for profit but also to benefit their country. The same is true about media entrepreneurship for soft power (promoting one's country abroad) or military entrepreneurship in soft power (peace-keeping and military friendship). The corporate entity that invests in schemes to attract students or visitors to its homeland, to popularize aspects of its country overseas through media or cultural production, reveals republican virtue in seeking to benefit while benefiting the country. The NGO that invites youth from other countries to intercultural workshops in its own country is again acting with the public interest at heart in a form of externally oriented civil diplomacy. Table 1.1.1.3 depicts the key virtue-based behavior that should characterize a soft power relationship (see below) in civil diplomacy between citizen and ruler (vertical axis) and between citizens of two countries (horizontal axis).

Such virtues, while shown here in relation to civil diplomacy, may also characterize cultural industrial, governmental, media, military or other entrepreneurship in soft power exchanges that are likely to be mutually beneficial, all else being equal.

Table 1.1.1.3 Contemporary virtue-based behavior associated with soft power relationships in civil diplomacy

	Citizen	
Citizen of country A	Listen Engage in dialogue Exchange values for mutual benefit Develop mutually beneficial relationships Cooperate in humanist projects Eschew violence, coercion or inducement	Citizen of country B
—	*Ruler*	—

Source: Professor Naren Chitty, 'Development is Communication', article in *Telematics and Informatics* (1992); N. Fairclough, *Language and Power* (1989); J. Nye, *The Future of Power* (2011); N. Onuf, 'Rules and Rule in International Relations' (online article 2014, viewed 13 January 2016 at www.helsinki.fi).

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Refracting soft power

A country's policies may be detested in a second country while its cultural exports may be found to be delectable. Soft power capital generated by various kinds of exports collect in different equity accounts; deficits in one sector will not necessarily affect the soft power equity in another. One is attracted to physically and cognitively similar others or those belonging to the same group as oneself (Nye 2011, p. 92). So however well a message is packaged in the first country, policy opponents in the second could find the policy unattractive. At the same time, they could continue to find the first country's cultural exports to be attractive. Australia offers an example of this. There is a great affection for all things American in Australia and the US brand has huge equity. Nevertheless, half of the population is critical of aspects of US foreign policy.[24]

Without elaborating on the ontological relationship between culture, political values and foreign policies, Nye (2011, p. 84) describes culture as "the pattern of social behaviors by which groups transmit knowledge and values, and it exists at multiple levels" of human organization. He identifies "the basic resources that can be converted into soft power by skillful conversion strategies" to "include culture, values, legitimate policies, a positive domestic model, a successful economy, and a competent military" (Nye 2011, p. 99). He includes "public diplomacy, broadcasting, exchange programs, development assistance, disaster relief, [and] military-to-military contacts" as official instruments of soft power (Nye 2011, p. 228). In Mowlana's (1996) model of intangible power, domains such as economic, educational, military and technological arise from a cultural base. The three Lasswellian domains of symbolic, mercantile and military elites all may yield soft power for Nye and intangible power for Mowlana. Zaharna's (2009, pp. 93–7) three tiers of public diplomacy initiatives are useful to consider as states employ these to generate soft power. Zaharna identifies: first, cultural and educational exchange programs and leadership visits; second, cultural and language institutes, aid projects, city and non-political twinning and networking respectively and campaigns; third, policy networking and strategy- and coalition-building. To these may be added salient issue areas such as environment, health, sport and tourism.

Within the symbolic, mercantile and military domains the two broad types of cultural soft power resources – intangible and tangible – can be subdivided into heritage and contemporary categories. Here they will be treated in their passive form in the model at Table 1.1.1.4. Active soft power is to be found in the form of multipliers and channels such as mobility, media and cultural industries.[25] The notion of prosumption is incorporated (Toffler 1980). Prosumption and social media allow ordinary citizens to produce and share media content such that their voices may be heard and virtuosity recognized.

The active soft power resources identified above are areas of public diplomacy around which states, corporations and civil society variously develop policies and programs in order to achieve soft power dividends. Cultural industry is selected for further horizontal defraction below. Additionally, valorization of soft power is attempted through vertical refraction.

Refracting soft power industries horizontally and vertically

We have noted that cultural soft power enhancement (e.g. cultural product popularization) of one country in another does not necessarily result in a sweetening of the former's foreign policy in addition to keeping aspects of relationships and national brand equity

Table 1.1.1.4 Passive and active soft power sources and multipliers

Sources (passive soft power)			Channel and multiplier resources (active soft power)
	Heritage	Contemporary	Mobility: Academic Business Cultural Military Migration Political Scientific Voluntary Tourism etc.
Intangible	Knowledge, behaviour (living culture) and culture including art forms, education, folklore, history, language, law, literature, philosophy, religion, rituals, science, social media, sports, soft technology, etc.	Knowledge, behaviour (living culture) and culture including art forms, education, folklore, history, language, law, literature, news, philosophy, policy, religion, rituals, science, social media, sports, soft technology, etc.	Electronic networked media (including social media)
Tangible	Archaeological and historical sites and artefacts	Books Cultural products Museums Music Movies People	Cultural industries (including prosumers)

Source: H. Mowlana, *Global Communication in Transition: The End of Diversity* (1986); J. Nye, *The Future of Power* (2011); R. Zaharna, 'Mapping Out a Spectrum of Public Diplomacy', in N. Snow and P. Taylor (eds.), *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy* (2009).

sweet. However, the lack of theoretical support for fungibility of soft power between cultural and foreign policy domains has not discouraged governments from spending on soft public diplomacy or cultural diplomacy in the apparent hope of reaping positive outcomes in the foreign policy realm. Cultural industrial, media and mobility channels (depicted in Tables 1.1.1.4 and 1.1.1.5) are the soft power multipliers, tools of cultural diplomacy[26], that have the capacity to reach large numbers in a foreign country, and here is where investments are made. In China, for instance, there is a belief that "the capability and effectiveness in mass communications are also an important part of a state's soft power" (Li 2009, p. 27). It should be pointed out, however, that the development of international media has other soft power benefits in relationship and brand equity sweetening that are not directly linked to attitudes to foreign policy in the short term.

Note in Table 1.1.1.5 that mobility, media and cultural industries can be vehicles and multipliers for policy products in development, economic, environmental, health and other areas as well. Here is where market meets policy in the confederacy and helps to disseminate products (value and values). Assertives, directives and commissives populate

Table 1.1.1.5 Horizontal refractions of soft power products

Cultural subcategory	Cultural industries	Media	Mobility
Actors	Civil society, corporations, prosumers, state agencies	Civil society, corporations, prosumers, stage agencies	Corporations, educational institutions, foreign ministries, immigration ministries, NGOs, tourism actors
Exports	Books, games, movies, music, sports, etc.	Blogs, books, games, movies, music, news, sports, etc.	Academics, aid workers, emergency workers, experts, migrants, officials, scientists, students, tourists, volunteers

Source: Table 1.1.1.4 and *A. Toffler, The Third Wave: The Classic Study of Tomorrow (1980).*

the electronic pathways and screens, incrementally reshaping the confederacy through its members.

Soft power, in the context of civil society within the confederacy, can infuse a communication process or be used in one. Indeed, for soft power to be activated it needs to be cast as a message, be articulated attractively, as assertives, directives or commissives that are intrinsically attractive. Communication processes that seek to be dialogic are likely to be attractive to less powerful participants in the process. The same would be true about compelling arguments rather than directives that compel. If these propositions are correct, a dialogic approach, even when strategically used, could have the desired perlocutionary results. There is, after all, a pragmatic dimension to the use of soft power.

Make-up 1 is construction and resonates with Vuving's (2009, pp. 8–12) beauty. It refers here to core heritage and contemporary values. Regarding core values, these include aesthetic, civic, ethical, philosophical, political and scientific values. The most enduring soft power capital has by definition survived the longest time – treasures from the past, whether architecture, art, literature, language or some other aspect of culture, which may be in passive or active states – heritage soft power. Among these are civic virtues that are informed by philosophical and ethical traditions such as benignity and rectitude. Benignity and rectitude may be viewed as core civic virtues, attractive behavior associated with promoting the public good rather than one's personal interests and doing so at some sacrifice to oneself. Rectitude in a public service setting can translate into good governance.[27] Absence of corruption is one indicator of the quality of rule of law and therefore good governance. Rule of law can be an attractive soft power source and used instrumentally in public diplomacy programs. The proposition is that decreasing corruption in a country should yield both domestic and international soft power dividends, all else being equal.

Soft power has two vectors. One is internally focused in a nation-state and represents the nature of governance, the relationship between the state and the people. We may call this internal soft power or I-soft power. I-soft power is exemplified positively when the relationship between a governing institution and the people

being governed takes on a dialogic approach. Good governance represents high quality I-soft power. The second soft power dividend from instituting a rule of law culture is that it will generate soft power vis-à-vis the external world as well. This is external soft power or E-soft power.

(Chitty 2014)

Additionally, contemporary cultural artefacts, tangible and intangible, can exert soft power, some in a flash-in-the-pan manner as in popular culture that does not endure. Cultural production results in artefacts which if they demonstrate virtuosity will exert attraction on others. Popular culture may show brilliance in its crafting and beauty in the product, eliciting admiration and inspiration respectively and thus be attractive and a soft power resource. The notion of power comes into play here because attractive cultural artefacts carry cultural values from one society to another changing behavior.

Make-up 2 is competence and includes Vuving's beauty and brilliance. "If you have done your job successfully and I am doing a similar work, I will tend to learn from you and I will copy from you something that I think is at the roots of your success or your capability" (Vuving 2009, pp. 8–12). Maintaining healthy rule of law and governance cultures will generate soft power vis-à-vis citizens as these would be viewed as expressions of rectitude and instill appreciation and even gratitude in rule-dominated societies. The greater the perceived equitability, the more attractive would be the system of governance and vice versa. Conversely, taking traction and attraction as antonymic forms of handling power, we can note that the greater the perception of in-equitability within a society, the greater the danger of the use of coercion by non-democratic rulers, unless there is an ideology (with a trumping soft power) that justifies the in-equitability – such as that associated with the Hindu caste system (Chitty 1992). Good governance can have an E-soft power spin-off as well; there could be admiration for competence in this area. I-soft power is measurable in democracies through polling and various social scientific research methods including the use of big data. While E-soft power can also be measured externally by polling and research, migration, refugee and tourist numbers are indicative. Australia was first populated by Europeans through British hard power policies and laws that called for sentencing of transportation for life for minor offences. Later a prospering Australia relied on combinations of soft power (attractive lifestyles arising from good governance and industriousness) and hard power (assisted passages) to draw migrants. Today it relies on the pull of soft power but this has the consequence of the push of hard power in countries affected by war or dictatorship resulting in streams of refugees. The same effect is witnessed in Europe with its conscious deployment of normative soft power (Michalski 2005).

Make-up 3 is reconciliation, a process of harmonizing opposing beliefs, ideas, or contexts, resolution of disputes, rekindling of friendship, encouraging of harmony, compatibility, consistency. These are all positive processes if conducted dialogically without "powerful participants controlling and constraining the contributions of non-powerful participants" (Fairclough 1989, p. 46). Such constraining could lead the less powerful participant to reconcile himself to the situation without feeling gratitude, gratitude being a soft power response. However, a friendly dialogue could lead to the generation of soft power at home (I-soft power) and, through admiration, abroad as well (E-soft power). Recall the case of Mandela in South Africa and the world. I would stretch the meaning of reconciliation here to include processes that engender cooperation through benignity. The term as used here will also capture cooperation and the restoration of

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cooperation where it has been abandoned. An example of engendering cooperation at the international level through reconciliation is the construction and operation of international regimes, for the administration of issue areas (such as health or trade) through a process of attraction of actors to a set of mutually acceptable norms and rules (Finlayson and Zacher 1986). International regimes' exercise of soft power on partic-ipating actors, to retain members and manage conflict *sans* use of hard power, may be an indication of the health of the political culture associated with world politics. But it needs to be said that the web of international regimes that emanate from and nurture the world confederacy is also shaped institutionally by recognition of hard power bal-ances as discernible in the great powers' impact on the shape and rules of international institutions such as the UN Security Council. This is also the location of cooperation and friendship. Friendship can beget cooperation and vice versa. The "primary form of friendship is grounded in excellence or virtue" even though there are Aristotelian forms of friendship "based on excellence, utility, and pleasure" that are generally found in mixed forms (Onuf 2009 pp. 3, 5). Indeed, friendship between nations can be the basis of a soft power relationship that eschews violence, coercion or inducement and where partners have a mutual regard for each other's excellence, the utility of the partnership and their pleasure of association.

Make-up 4 is composition (message and communication styles) that includes posi-tive cosmetic accentuation or the accentuation of beauty, the presentation of content, stories or assets in attractive ways; and negative concoction, invention or fabrication. Positive narratives might come out of centrally-sponsored (or not) mobility programs (migration, tourism, exchanges) or media. It should be noted that with both mediated and mobility-based cosmetics, soft power is a two-way street. While genuinely adhering to codes of benignity and rectitude generates soft power, verisimilitude through adver-tising and fabricated narratives do not (Chitty 2011, pp. 266–7). Nye's (2011, p. 83) view is that "[s]oft power depends upon credibility, and when governments are perceived as manipulative and information is seen as propaganda, credibility is destroyed ... The best propaganda is not propaganda". While he does not draw on Habermas here, he men-tions that a critic has argued that such non-manipulative communication is "but mere dialogue" (Nye 2011, p. 83). Presentation of messages in attractive ways also refers to communication styles. I have argued normatively for "a public diplomacy that sits more comfortably with Habermasian Communicative Action" – a broadly ethical (dialogic) use of soft power in soft public diplomacy (Chitty 2009, p. 316). It is more attractive for citizens when their own government listens to the public sphere and communicates with citizens in a dialogic manner in developing policies. In communications by a state with actors from a second country too, dialogue is more attractive to ordinary people than strategic communication. Strategic communication may, however, be attractive to allies during a crisis situation where leadership is sought. Interpersonal communication between peoples of different countries is more attractive than communication between the people of one country and state actors from another. "Clarity, timing, cultural sensi-tivity and trust" are important diplomatic values applicable here (Eliasson 2016). These types of communications generate soft power variously across national borders. It is posited here that the greater the dialogic intent and practice, the higher the grade of be-havioral soft power, whether at dyadic, organizational, national or international levels. Content and delivery may be at odds and, as Nye (2011, p. 232) advises, "[d]emocracy promotion is better accomplished by soft attraction than hard coercion, and it takes time and patience".

Conclusion

A weak international republican confederacy is flexing its soft power in the turbulence of world politics. Technologically supported social networks link the centers of power and contribute to a measure of homonomy, in flux, in the confederacy, while enhancing effects of countervailing normative impulses that are part and parcel of heteronomy. Normativization occurs through the participation by elites in globalizing civil, educational, trade, media and inter-governmental cultures and systems. The idea of "one who takes an affective interest in the well-being of all human beings" as a friend of the human race (or a *menschenfreund*) harks back to Kant (1996, p. 217). Kantian cosmopolitanism and Montesquieuan love of country embrace and quarrel in the confederacy. The humanist goals of the UN are espoused to various degrees by elites and ordinary citizens and propagated by the connectivity between international organizational, educational, media and civil society nodes. Indeed, the UN actively seeks to foster global citizenship in schools. "Education gives us a profound understanding that we are tied together as citizens of the global community, and that our challenges are interconnected" (UNESCO Global Citizenship Education n.d.). In bettering their own lives (self-interest), citizens often seek to better their country (patriotism) and the world – in one direction or the other.

These goals of betterment are the impelling force for taking action in line with the compound virtues of benignity and rectitude expressed by the UN system as good governance with differential weightage on the two components. The seeking of virtuosity in any sector (e.g. legal, mercantile, scientific), including the cultural industrial sector, for purposes of increasing one's country's soft power, is also fueled by this compound virtue.

The values of the confederacy were influenced at its inception by the European experience of modernization. The venues of governance and the avenues of electronic communication themselves exercise soft power to great and small, rich and poor, eastern and western powers and peoples; they offer opportunities for cooperation in achieving goals of human security and contributing to the co-evolution of values – as well as for dramaturgical action on the world stage. States and peoples operate in an international environment where virtue associated with nurturing the public good and actively engaging in the public sphere is valued, even if adherence to these values is variegated. As much as there are outlaws within states, there are all manner of recusants who contest or refuse to conform to rules of the international community. There are some who use technologies, such as social media, developed by legitimate institutions within the confederacy, to spread countervailing ideologies outside the confederacy's forums for ruling and rule-making. Some of these are clastic, insurgent, intractable, rebellious, recalcitrant; others are gradually assimilated into the peaceful communities and formal councils of the confederacy.

There are two types of theaters we might consider for the operation of soft power in the confederacy. These are the world political and intrastate theaters. Within these we find actors such as intergovernmental organizations, states, corporations, non-government organizations, media, communities, groups and individuals. Humanistic virtues associated with republicanism are formulated into goals, commissives, addressing human security concurrently with a culture of good governance while abiding within the rule-based framework of twenty-first century international relations. Gey takes the view that "[i]n the abstract it is hard to argue against the values of virtue, dialogue, and consensus in government, regardless of one's theoretical approach to political culture. But these terms are very broad, and are susceptible to very different meanings in application" (Gey 1993). Consensus on achieving human security is forever being sought in the confederacy,

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through dialogue and civic virtue, to build peace and prosperity. Homonomy and heteronomy are constantly at odds here in tussles between entropic and disentropic normative forces. Whether the confederacy becomes stronger, weaker or remains the same – or becomes more or less republican or democratic in the long term – remains to be seen, as does the future role of soft power.

This chapter focused on soft power associated with civic virtue of influentials and citizens within countries and on the international stage. It discussed traditional and contemporary categories of passive soft power and the triad of important soft power multipliers – mobility, media and cultural industries. Noting the rich and confusing variety of definitions it has, based on the analysis conducted in the chapter, provided definitions of public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy and civil diplomacy in order to link these with soft power. It has further analyzed soft power and has posited categories such as I- and E-soft power and elaborated on passive (traditional and contemporary) and active (mobility, media and cultural industries) soft power. The following propositions offer opportunities for progressive testing: international civic virtue (including cooperativeness, correctness, fairness, equitability, humaneness, willingness to listen) practiced by international actors is attractive to global publics; civic virtue practiced by international actors is attractive to both citizens and overseas publics; civic and corporate virtues shape the governance values of influentials and are attractive to ordinary people; robust and responsible engagement in civil society, including through e-participation, is a virtue of citizens; e-participation in policy processes by governments or citizens involves agenda-setting, policy preparation, decision-making, policy execution and evaluation (van Dijk 2012, p. 113). Hocking (2005) notes that "[c]hallenged by evermore complex, multi-faceted agendas, there is a necessity to establish policy networks of varying scope and composition, which may, for example, bring together governmental actors, civil society organizations (CSOs) and business". Cooperation in the development of policy aimed at sustainable peace and prosperity is a civic virtue for international actors. Hopefully the practice of these and other relevant civic virtues will continue to generate soft power in the confederacy and provide a bulwark against those groups that militate against it.

Notes

1 I would like to express my gratitude to Nicholas Onuf for reading two drafts of this chapter and providing valuable feedback at a time when he was preparing for a long overseas assignment.
2 The UN Sustainable Development Goals (for the common good) deal with post-positivist issues: poverty; hunger; health and well-being; quality education; gender equality; clean water and sanitation; affordable and clean energy; decent work and economic growth; industry, innovation and infrastructure; reduced inequalities; sustainable cities and communities; responsible consumption and production; climate action; life below water; life on land; peace, justice and strong institutions; partnerships for the goals (United Nations 2015). Positivist issues are the realm of the Security Council. Civil society, NGOs and TNCs contribute to the international dialogue that shapes consensus on governance. It is through communication that partnerships and networks of cooperation are established and values exchanged within and without the UN in pursuing human security goals.
3 Aristotle sees the virtues of rulers and citizens, both being citizens, as temperance and justice. However, the ruler's moderation is moderation in rule whereas the citizen's moderation is personal self-restraint (Aristotle, trans. Jowett 1885).
4 "The Princeton Report simply wrapped-up public diplomacy within soft power" (Fisher and Lucas 2011, p. 10). The terms public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy have been variously defined as having different actors, objectives and interrelationships. See Fisher and Lucas (2011, pp. 1–15), Melissen (2005, pp. 3–27) and Snow (2009, pp. 3–11) for a cross-section of

models of public diplomacy that range from non-governmental to governmental; two-way symmetric to one-way non-symmetric and overseas audience focus and/or inclusion of domestic audience. The government–public debate continues into cultural diplomacy, with Mark (2008) taking the position that "[c]ultural diplomacy is a diplomatic practice of governments."

5 A state may need to replenish its supply of bombs during war, having dropped its inventory over hard power targets, but the more people that are won over by a soft power initiative, the more does soft power expand.

6 Mobility programs such as Fulbright, an instrument of US soft power, allow a visiting scholar from the US to a second country to be exposed to the soft power of that country and become an informal ambassador for it on her return home. Whether mobility programs have a positive effect in either direction will very much depend on the likeability of sojourners and the nature of their reception in the host community and sojourn in the host country. What is soft power for one country or group can be repulsion to others.

7 Onuf introduced constructivism to International Relations and is a Rule Oriented Constructivist.

8 Onuf (1998, pp. 62–3) discerns rules, norms and institutions within the seeming condition of international anarchy (thick anarchy) that "forms a social arrangement with stable patterns of relations" (Devetak, Burke and George 2011, p. 106). Wendt (1996, p. 48) writes about "an 'International State' that is neither anarchy nor hierarchy". If conceived of as a civic republican community it falls short of Gey's (1993, pp. 820–1) requirement that it needs to be "the most powerful collective agency in its designated territory". Jan Eliasson, Deputy Secretary-General of the UN, noted that the UN was a reflection of the world as it is and not as it should be (World Apart_RT 10 January 2016). The UN has been referred to as a confederacy in "A confederacy for confederations" (Box 1999).

9 Onuf's (2004) three rules of functional grounds for world politics are hegemony, hierarchy and heteronomy.

10 Nye (2011, p.82) notes that "Carr described international power in three categories: military power, economic power and power over opinion".

11 Druckman and Wagner (2016, p. 389) make a distinction between equality and equity, proportionality being used as a synonym for the latter.

12 Positivism is seen as having had "androcentric bias in international relations" that is being preoccupied "with the cult of power and destruction" (Sjolander and Cox 1994).

13 Nye (2008c) describes Sun Tzu as believing that engaging in battle signifies political failure.

14 Constructivism in international relations (Onuf 1989) should theoretically allow for alternative world order constructions as well as syntheses such as Nye's (2011) proposed liberal realism to compete in shaping the world.

15 The emphasizing of "'high politics' or military security" is viewed as positivist. The field of international communication has traditionally dealt with what used to be classified as low political areas such as information flows, communication and development and cross-cultural communication and issues such as poverty, human rights and the environment. High and low politics are discussed in the next section.

16 Curtailing may be effected by cryptography as well as secrecy laws.

17 Artefacts of heritage culture may have their genesis in the "via contempliva", broadly interpreted as being associated with contemplative traditions, religious and secular, as well as the "via activa" or active life, in political expressions such as the Pyramids, Forbidden City or Versailles (Germino 1972, p. 10).

18 Cull places an enormous importance on listening in public diplomacy (Cull 2008). Onuf too promotes listening. "Scholars in IR might also profit from listening to the demos. Realists take for granted what I have been calling heteronomy without the slightest sense that this is a global condition of rule, not anarchy, and that its legitimacy is democratic in the largest, most powerful sense possible. Liberals and self-styled constructivists talk about norms, law, institutions and identity without the slightest sense that global governance demands and supports heteronomy as a mighty frame" (Onuf 2014).

19 Lasswell's insight was that societies constantly organize themselves into elites and masses, the former seeking security through gaining ascendancy over the masses by extracting values from them; the masses gain security through the values received in exchange (Lasswell 1963; Chitty 1992, p. 29).

20 Media is attracted by captivating messages and can play a role in making messages captivating.

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21 The UN is a structure of political hope.
22 My original three make-ups were construction by fundamental values; cosmetic accentuation of attractiveness, to heighten magnetism; and invention or concoction.
23 In a private communication dated 29 February 2018 Nicholas Onuf observed the following: "I'd label the second column of the matrix 'the cardinal virtues' or perhaps Cicero's virtues (and they are unchanged by St Thomas). You lump prudence and temperance (seemliness) together in that column, but they are separate (and presumptively equal) virtues in the Stoic/medieval scholastic tradition. And you may have noticed that I attach a great deal of importance to seemliness as a virtue in its own right. I think Lasswell does too, even though you list respect (which I take to be an entailment of the duty of seemliness) under magnificence. In my view, some measure of respect attaches to every station in life, not just high station".
24 48 per cent of Australians disapprove of drone strikes while 44 per cent approve. However, 66 per cent of Australians viewed the US largely with favor while 30 per cent did not (Pew 2013).
25 The manner in which heritage soft power resources can be activated by cultural and political entrepreneurs has been addressed in Section II.
26 These may also be used in security-based public diplomacy as in war propaganda films, political broadcasting and high-level political visits.
27 Good governance "is participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive and follows the rule of law" (UNESCO). The World Justice Project identifies the following features to characterize Rule of Law: (1) constraints to government powers; (2) absence of corruption; (3) open government; (4) fundamental rights; (5) order and security; (6) regulatory enforcement; (6) civil justice; (7) criminal justice; and (8) informal justice (World Justice Project).

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