Rethinking France's "Memory Wars"
Harki Collective Memories, 2003–2010

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On 23 February 2005, the National Assembly ignited controversy when it passed a law defending France's colonial past.* The polemic centered on Article 4 of the law, which stipulated that school curricula would "acknowledge in particular the positive role of the French overseas presence."[1] This legislation triggered such a backlash from anticolonialists on the Left, descendants of colonial subjects, and educators, that the government repealed the offending article in November of 2005. The political and legal debates about the law revealed the limits of the French state's power to impose a national memory of colonialism. To scholars observing the particular vehemence of the polemics over the past, this incident also signaled a new degree of political and social polarization in France.[2] Throughout the fierce debates over the 2005 law, issues of immigration and cultural difference were deliberated through the discourses of memory and history.[3] The memory disputes thus not only reflected lingering colonial tensions in French society,[4] but also appeared to exacerbate and reinforce them.[5]

To make sense of the current state of colonial memory, some scholars have employed the paradigm of "memory wars."[6] This conceptual framework was first introduced by Daniel Lindenberg in 1994 to describe how political and social movements since the French Revolution have used, and often misappropriated, conflicting historical symbols and analogies for legitimizing purposes.[7] Lindenberg did not fully define the concept of "memory wars" in his article, and it has remained a highly ambiguous, if evocative, term. Those who employ the phrase tend to understand "memory wars" in France as patterns of memory conflict in which various groups proclaim competing memory narratives and fracture the republican ideal of a single shared history.[8] For historians such as Benjamin Stora, Eric Savarese, and Pascal Blanchard, the colonial

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past, including the Algerian War, has constituted a particularly divisive "battlefield" of French memories.[9]

This article focuses on one group, the Harkis[10] and their descendants, that scholars of memory have identified as key participants in the "memory wars."[11] Harkis were Algerians who fought with the French Army during the Algerian War and came to France following Algerian independence. Harkis and their families have long had a stake in how France has remembered this conflict and have engaged in highly visible memory practices over the past decade. The particular case of the Harkis, however, challenges basic features of the "memory wars" paradigm and shows the limitations of using it to interpret memory conflicts. The war metaphor presents these conflicts as battles between monolithic identity groups—Pieds-Noirs, Harkis, former combatants, members of the OAS,[12] and *les porteurs de valises*[13]—divided by highly codified collective memories. A war, after all, requires the existence of distinct "rival camps."[14] Yet while scholars have interpreted the "memory wars" as conflicts *between* groups over the memory of the Algerian War, they have overlooked the battle lines drawn *within* groups. In analyses of the conflicts over the February 2005 law, some scholars positioned the Harkis in the "camp" of those who are "nostalgic" for French Algeria.[15] Harkis have participated in Pied-Noir organizations, including those that express nostalgic sentiments toward French Algeria,[16] and Article 5 of the law specifically protects the Harkis from insults and defamation.[17] And yet, children of Harkis were among the most outspoken opponents of the law's procolonial stance,[18] hinting at deep divisions among Harkis over how to understand the colonial period.

The first section of this article shows how the memory practices of Harkis' descendants, most of who came of age during the 1970s, have evolved over time. The next two sections identify and contextualize two significant debates among the children of Harkis over how to interpret the past, and, by extension, how to understand their place in France. These debates focus on two key historical issues: the nature of French colonialism in Algeria and the Harkis' motivations for supporting France during the war. Among second-generation Harkis, two separate interpretations emerge. The first narrative, expressed through popular memoirs written mainly by Harki daughters, takes an anticolonial stance and presents the Harkis as victims of France's exploitative regime in Algeria. These memoir writers describe Algerian immigrants to France as the victims twice over of colonialism.[19] The other narrative, presented mainly on websites by Harki sons, sees the Harkis as defenders of French republican values in French Algeria and situates them within a French tradition of military commemoration.

The Harkis and their descendants thus do not constitute a unified memory camp. At the same time, this research reveals that intracommunal debates among Harki children ultimately center on how to situate themselves within France, a country coming to terms with its colonial legacy. The efforts of second-generation Harkis to incorporate their past into competing national

understandings of the Algerian War demonstrate their desire to create a place for themselves in French history, not to deny others a place in the national community. In this way, the case of the Harkis calls into question the utility of interpreting collective memory through an analytical framework of "warfare." My critique aligns with that of Michael Rothberg, who has argued "against the framework that understands collective memory as *competitive* memory—as a zero-sum struggle over scarce resources—I suggest that we consider memory as *multidirectional*: as subject to ongoing negotiation, cross-referencing, and borrowing: as productive and not privative."[20] While French citizens had vastly different experiences of colonialism and the Algerian War, framing their discordant acts of memory as acts of war obscures the productive work of memory. Hyperbolic claims about the destructive power of "memory" overlook the basic function of *collective* memory—to create a basis for social cohesion. This article therefore identifies the efforts of Harki children to construct solidarity, or some shared sense of belonging, through acts of memory.

Harki Memory Practices

From 1954 to 1962, between 200,000 and 500,000 Harkis helped the French fight against the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN).[21] Most recruits were temporary civilian auxiliaries assigned to various army units, and French state officials presented the Harkis' service as evidence that they had the support of the Algerian population.[22] Following Algerian independence in 1962, the French Army withdrew their forces and disarmed the Harkis. In the first three years following the war, between 10,000 and 150,000 Harkis and other pro-French Muslims were tortured and killed in reprisal violence.[23] Of the 60,000 to 88,000 Harkis and their wives and children who fled to France, approximately 25,000 arrived through government repatriation plans and were placed in internment camps.[24] Conditions in the Harki camps varied, but were often appalling. Although these camps were originally intended as a temporary measure for managing the installation of the Harkis and their families, some remained open until at least 1975, when unrest among second-generation Harkis prompted the French state to close them. The rest of the Harkis and their families left the camps through their own means or with the aid of sympathetic military officers and were either set up in communities near the officers, who could assist them, or integrated individually into different regions of France.[25]

Following the Algerian War, Harkis fell victim to memory politics on both sides of the Mediterranean. France pursued a forty-year policy of active forgetting regarding the conflict. In Algeria, the war has been subject to the mythologizing common to nation-building projects.[26] The Harkis themselves did little to challenge their marginalization or the connotations of "traitor" assigned to their identity by other French of European and North African origin. On the whole, they wanted, or needed, to forget this traumatic past.[27]

Many also believed their silence would shield their children from this historical burden and enable them to integrate into postcolonial France. Nevertheless, although the Harkis' children did not make the defining choice to fight for the French, they inherited the implications of this decision from their fathers. Some of them experienced the trials of the war and internment camps. Many have faced the same forms of exclusion as their parents.

Beginning in the late 1990s, social and political developments in both France and Algeria, including the trial of Maurice Papon, revelations of torture, and the opening of the archives concerning the Algerian War, prompted the French to confront their colonial legacy and to begin evaluating its contemporary significance.[28] The turn of the millennium has not only marked the end of amnesia regarding the Algerian War,[29] but has also seen the colonial past become "completely visible and recurrent in the heart of French society."[30] This engagement with the past has brought attention to the plight of the Harkis in France. In 2001 the French state formally recognized the Harkis' contributions during the Algerian War in the form of a plaque in the Invalides in Paris and a national day of remembrance, September 25, which has since become an annual commemoration.[31] Children of Harkis have taken advantage of this shift in memorial climate to publicize their history and rehabilitate Harki identity, producing over a dozen memoirs and films, and creating more than twenty websites.

Memoirs, particularly those written by daughters of Harkis, were one of the first important ways of making the Harki past known to the rest of French society. As cultural vectors of memory, these texts present individual narratives of the past, with the goal of contributing to a collective memory.[32] Dalila Kerchouche and Fatima Besnaci-Lancou paved the way with their respective memoirs, *Mon père, ce harki* (2003) and *Fille de harki* (2005). These Harki daughters have become particularly influential architects of Harki memory and public representatives of the Harki community, due to the significant media coverage their works received in France.[33] Kerchouche, a journalist at *L'Express*, followed up this memory work by contributing to a collection of life histories from Harkis, their wives, and children,[34] as well as producing a memoir based on her sister's life.[35] The latter was made into a TV film, entitled *Harkis*.[36] Since 2005, Besnaci-Lancou has published three collections of Harki life stories,[37] founded an association, Harkis et Droits de l'Homme,[38] organized conferences, and edited scholarly works on the Harkis. Other Harki daughters have followed in their footsteps. Novelist Zahia Rahmani wrote her own memoir in 2006[39] and Socialist politician Saliha Telali published her memoir in 2009 through the major French publishing house, L'Harmattan.[40] Two Harki sons[41] and four Harkis[42] themselves have published memoirs, either privately or through smaller publishing companies, but these works have received little to no media coverage.[43]

The popularity of the Harki daughters' memoirs reveals how the legacy of colonialism has continued to shape French understandings of gender roles

among French of North African origin. As Joan Scott has explained in the context of debates over the headscarf in France, Muslim women have often been perceived as victims "of Muslim patriarchy in general and of predatory Muslim boys in particular. In this way, the picture of the Muslim community as a homogeneous entity, dictating the lives of its female members, was systematically developed; its counterpoint was the individualism and gender equality of republican France."[44] Harki daughters' victim narratives, then, have been embraced by a wider French public as acts of emancipation from their fathers and brothers.

Since 2005 some Harki children have used the Internet to transmit their understandings of the colonial past. This article focuses on websites that have been designed for discussion and participation directly on the site because they most clearly reveal the process of negotiating collective memory.[45] These sites either have an open discussion forum or invite potential participants to post articles or comments, and they are run by a moderator or webmaster who regulates the content. The four Harki discussion-oriented websites are *Harkis.info*,[46] *Le Blog de Harkis*,[47] the *Coalition nationale des Harkis et des associations de Harkis*,[48] and *MonHarki.com*.[49] All four sites are run by male descendants of Harkis who either describe themselves as apolitical or are equally critical of leaders from both sides of the political spectrum in France. They have created these sites, they state expressly online, in response to the sense that no political organization or party addresses their needs and concerns. The number of visits to each site varies widely, and it is not possible based on data available to identify who accesses the sites. For this article, the sites' significance is rooted in the ways they publicize dissenting views of Harki history and are used to mobilize Harki children.

Previous studies have not examined how groups use websites to construct and transmit their collective memories. They have also not compared how this new media differs from the more traditional form of memory work embodied in memoir writing. The Internet offers a way of representing the past without the filters of French media, publishers, and state, allowing more people to act as architects of collective memory. For Harki children who cannot or do not want to publish a memoir or make a film, the Internet has provided a place to publicly disseminate a historical narrative. Moreover, as free and easily accessible means of communicating information, these websites reach an audience "that is different and potentially larger than that of traditional audio-visual media."[50] At the same time, websites do not have the same authority that more traditional media afford. Whereas Harki daughters' memoirs have received national press, the Harki websites are less well known among non-Harkis. On their websites, Harki children tend to present arguments that have fallen out of favor or more radical narratives that have never been mainstream. They use these sites to challenge representations of the Harkis, the Algerian War, and colonialism that do not conform to their own understandings of the past, including those put forward by the memoirists. These websites thus offer

a way of observing conflicts among Harki descendants over their shared history, conflicts that tend to be marginalized by the "memory wars" paradigm.

Comparing how Harki descendants use memoirs and websites as memory vectors reveals that there are at least two competing ways of constituting and disseminating collective memory at work among them. In writing memoirs and collecting oral histories, authors claim to speak for individuals. The Harki memoir writers assert that Harkis are constituted by a number of individuals and therefore marked by diversity. For this reason, they are more comfortable with a plurality of memories—of co-existing, competing memories. On the Harki websites, however, some webmasters claim to speak for a collectivity and have stricter notions about what constitutes the "true" Harki history. Administrators establish a specific interpretation of the past on the site, which they update through various articles announcing appropriate views on current events. They regulate what is posted in the discussion board forums both by removing posts deemed offensive and policing diversions from the established interpretation. Webmasters do not provide information on their own family histories, which they may consider tangential to the collective history of the group. In fact, at times they contest the authority given to memoir authors as representatives of Harki collective memory, on the grounds that the memoirs only offer individual experiences. Thus, disputes occur among Harki offspring not only over the nature of the colonial past and the Harkis' role in it, but also over the politics of collective memory.

The case of the Harkis offers the opportunity to examine the role that the Internet, as a new memory technology, has played in conflicts over the colonial past.[51] Certain features of "cyber" carriers of memory have contributed to the emergence and dominance of the competitive memory model in France. The "memory wars" metaphor emerged from the perception that disputes over the past had progressively invaded the public sphere. This impression has been due in large part to the rising influence of new media, which diffuse information more quickly and accelerate disputes.[52] The anonymity afforded by the Internet may have also contributed to the sense of fierce conflict in debates about the colonial past. Behind the protective veil of a pseudonym, online participants are less inhibited in their speech and their exchanges take on a more aggressive tone, thereby heightening tensions. This phenomenon is compounded by the ability to react almost instantaneously, without the filters of time or institutions. Since the Internet affects the speed, tone, and pervasiveness of confrontations over the past, it produces extreme versions of what are normal collective memory processes.

If speed and tone define the new patterns of memory work being pioneered online, a gendered quality also emerges as distinctive. Indeed, memory narratives and practices appear to be significantly gendered among Harki children.[53] Harki is a male-coded category, since the Harkis were originally soldiers and their families became Harkis by association with this male figure. As such, the Harki history has often been constructed as a male-centered narrative with

women playing supporting roles.[54] Through their memoirs, however, females give a voice to their mothers, whose marriages made them equal victims of the persecution their husbands faced.[55] In their analyses of women's war narratives, the sociologists James Fentress and Chris Wickham found that few women "had any ideological stake in the (male) self-image of the fighter."[56] These findings are corroborated in the case of the Harkis, where sons seem more invested in the legacy of their fathers as soldiers. Several studies have explored the different language and framing techniques men and women use to convey their personal accounts of the past.[57] The "absence of emphasis on choice" that Fentress and Wickham identified in women's memories is echoed in Harki daughters' memoirs. Fentress and Wickham explained this phenomenon by observing that "women, however powerful, have tended to live their lives in environments whose public, external power structures have been under the control of men."[58] The question of choice is central to interpreting the Harki past. This article analyzes how Harki sons and daughters have disagreed on this issue.

Harki children also appeal to competing memorial traditions in France. Here, too, gender appears to be a key element affecting how Harki children position themselves. In the aftermath of World War II, the French republican memorial model, in which citizens were honored for their sacrifices to the nation, was gradually replaced by a "victim-memorial regime," in which groups are memorialized as the nation's victims.[59] The historian Serge Barcellini describes a commemorative shift from honoring "those who died *for* France" to "those who died *because* of France."[60] Within the current memorial context, victim status provides political and social capital that groups can leverage for material and symbolic concessions from the state. On their websites, some Harki sons position the Harkis within the older, republican tradition of military sacrifice, presenting the Harkis as soldiers who suffered and died for France. In their memoirs, the daughters of Harkis tend to portray the Harkis as those who suffered and died because of France, thus situating them within the "victim-memorial regime."

French Algeria

The first significant debate among descendants of Harkis focuses on the nature of the French colonial project in Algeria. The history of French Algeria is of fundamental importance to the self-conceptions of Harki children, whose fathers played a part in maintaining this system. They propose competing narratives that parallel wider arguments in France. A key disputed issue is the initial relationship between France and Algeria. The anticolonial narrative of French Algeria posits France as having conquered Algeria in 1830. This interpretation understands France as a foreign, invading power and situates French Algeria within the traditional patterns of colonization. It highlights the French

invasion and occupation of Algiers and surrounding territories, as well as the brutal, protracted campaigns in the countryside to gain control and quell resistance. On the whole, the Harki memoirs as a genre are more focused on conveying personal experiences of decolonization than on exploring the origins of French colonialism in Algeria. Yet in Fatima Besnaci-Lancou's memoir, *Fille de harki*, she begins her chronology of Harki history in 1830 with the "Conquest of Algeria by France" and thus reflecting this anticolonial narrative.[61]

Participants on all four of the websites explicitly challenge this narrative by arguing that Algeria did not exist as a country before the French arrived and, as the moderator of *Harkis.info* summarizes, "Algeria was a French creation."[62] Khader Moulfi, the moderator of the *Coalition nationale* website, expresses an essentialist understanding of the past when he confronts the conquest narrative by arguing that "the falsification of History resides precisely in considering Algeria as a sovereign and constituted country that was invaded and occupied by a colonial power."[63] On *Le Blog de Harkis* one contributor points out that even the name "Algeria" was given to this territory by the French.[64] While historians would generally agree with this latter statement,[65] Martin Evans and John Phillips have argued that it was the Ottoman period (1529–1830) that "defined the territorial identity of the country and created the basis for the Algerian nation state as a geopolitical entity."[66]

The website participants also emphasize that after France created Algeria, the region was integrated into France as three departments in 1848, making it a unique case in France's colonial history.[67] On *Le Blog de Harkis*, one contributor explains that "Algeria was like Alsace, Brittany or Corsica today. No one thought it was a separate country. People who were born in Algeria at the time were French, their parents were, and their grandparents as well."[68] This statement elides the nuances of citizenship in French Algeria. Although the Second Republic extended department status to the coastal regions of French Algeria and claimed "Algeria was France," the administrative category of "Muslim" excluded most French of North African origin from exercising the same rights as "Europeans" in these departments. Ultimately, these Harki sons are constructing a historical narrative of colonization designed to refute the idea that Harkis were traitors. If France created Algeria and Algeria was part France, then the Harkis cannot be considered to have betrayed their country by fighting with the French Army. An article on *Le Blog de Harkis* echoes the same idea: "That is why the Harkis fought for France. It was their country. It's normal to fight for your country against those we call 'terrorists.'"[69]

Another key question that has divided Harki children concerns the quality of life in French Algeria. Harki daughter's memoirs, when they do discuss the colonial period, tend to stress the wretchedness of life under colonialism. Saliha Telali describes "the suffering of a people that lives under the domination of another country."[70] She challenges the idea that colonialism had a positive effect on the population. "If there was a 'civilizing mission,' it was not apparent in the living conditions of families in the countryside."[71] This theme

is also present in the testimonies that Fatima Besnaci-Lancou collected from Harkis themselves. One Harki blames colonialism for the tragedies all parties experienced during the Algerian War. He declares, "it is the injustice done to Algerians, for 130 years, that is responsible! We walked with bare feet and were starving throughout all the years that Algeria was French."[72]

Participants and administrators on the Harki websites almost never go so far as to praise colonialism. A notable exception is Kader Hamiche, the son of a Harki, who has occasionally guest authored articles for the website *Harkis.info*. In his memoir, one of only two written by Harki sons, Hamiche argues, "it seems to me that no one today questions France's civilizing mission in Algeria, except for the Arabo-Islamist fanatics."[73] Most Harki children posting on the websites, however, defend the colonial period only in contrast to the current state of Algeria, arguing that Algerian misery under the rule of the FLN is worse than any that existed in French Algeria. The moderator of *Harkis.info*, who goes by "Massi," asserts "if Algeria presently suffers (unemployment, misery, massacre...), it is no longer the fault of France and the Harkis, 43 years after the end of hostilities, but that of the 'pseudo heroic resistance' of the FLN, who spoiled all the riches of the country. They live like billionaires ... while the people suffer all kinds of harm."[74]

In their memoirs, Harki daughters suggest that the decolonization of Algeria was inevitable. They argue that most Algerians, including the Harkis, wanted autonomy because, in the words of Saliha Telali, "how could one not imagine an independent Algeria?"[75] In the film *Harkis*, for which Dalila Kerchouche co-wrote the script, Saïd Benamar (a Harki father) declares that even though he fought with the French, he wasn't "for French Algeria."[76] Besnaci-Lancou corroborates this assertion by presenting the testimonies of numerous Harki soldiers who explain that they were generally in favor of Algerian independence. The reason they ended up supporting the French, however, was that they disapproved of the way in which the FLN was fighting for this independence. As one Harki states, "of course I wished for Algerian independence. Only, I refused the violence, especially toward civilians."[77] Another Harki admits to having initially fought for Algerian independence before switching sides. He explains, "I was very enthusiastic about leaving to join the combatants of the FLN. For me, this struggle was a chance to take back our country and to get out of the permanent humiliation that the Arabs and Berbers endured."[78] He concludes, "I could have continued to fight like that until independence, but unfortunately I was disgusted by the behavior of some of my companions."[79] In the aftermath of the devastating Algerian Civil War of the 1990s, positioning the Harkis as "anti-terror" is an effort to increase understanding and respect among the French for their actions.

Some Harki children use the Internet as a forum for challenging the historical narrative of colonialism in Algeria that situates decolonization as "the predetermined endpoint."[80] These second-generation Harkis contest the notion that most Algerians favored independence by comparing the number

of Harkis with the number of FLN fighters. On *Harkis.info*, Massi warns "don't let yourself be seduced by the popular myths of the Algerian revolution spread by the FLN and all the Algerian people. The Harkis, far more numerous than the members of the FLN, are the proof that this myth is false and that's what bothers them. Know that up until '61, everyone was behind France."[81] He further argues that out of ten million Algerians, only a few thousand decided to act in favor of it.[82] Historians do not have reliable statistics on the amount of indigenous support for Algerian independence, although the figure is certainly higher than several thousand. In the absence of historical consensus, participants in the war and their descendants employ figures that support their particular ideological stances. The Ministère Algérien des Anciens Combattants has advanced one of the highest estimates, declaring that 132,290 Algerians fought in the ALN, the military branch of the FLN, and 204,458 Algerians supported the FLN in a civilian capacity.[83] In contrast, a contributor on the *Coalition nationale* website states that there were four times as many Muslim soldiers in the French ranks than there were members of the ALN.[84] An additional participant on *Le Blog des Harkis* articulates the significance of these figures: "It's true that colonization is worthy of criticism and fighting for one's independence is legitimate, but you know that in the beginning the nationalists were less numerous, which clearly means that the French presence wasn't all that terrible...."[85]

The narratives that Harki children construct about the colonial past indicate how they want to situate themselves in postcolonial French society. Female memoir writers appear more interested in identifying with Algerian immigrants as common victims of colonialism in Algeria and continued discrimination in France. Many Harki sons and daughters have faced the same discriminatory practices on the basis of their appearance, names, or religion as other Muslim North African immigrants. In her memoir, Saliha Telali explains that being the daughter of a Harki means she too has immigrant origins and therefore faces similar challenges in France. "The feeling of rejection is part of me. Through our family's history, I am the *child* of a Harki. I am the product of immigration. The way I am perceived remains stained by the colonial history despite the years that have elapsed."[86] Dalila Kerchouche observes that her parents clung to their Algerian identity in the face of exclusionary practices in France. She explains that the "certainty of being Algerians never left them. Algerians who were humiliated and detested, but Algerians nonetheless. Better that than nothing at all."[87] Seeking reconciliation with the Algerian immigrant community is challenging, given the historical legacy of the war and the climate of historical memory that positions memory collectives against each other. However, daughters seem to inherit a more flexible relationship to the Harki past that allows them more freedom to successfully seek such reconciliation.

Harki children posting on the websites are generally far more interested in affirming their French identity, even as they acknowledge the discrimination

they have faced in France. As one participant explains, "it's true that France locked us up in Harki camps, we did not go to school, we were discriminated against everywhere, we were treated as Arabs, but it's France. It's like a mother who hits her children, but she's nevertheless our mother and we must pardon her and love her. This is what my father told me. This is why I love this country. Tomorrow will be better, God willing. Long live the Harkis. Long live France."[88] For many of the second-generation Harkis writing on these websites, "my country" refers to France and, unlike some of the Harkis and their families who wrote memoirs, these particular Harki children do not express a desire to return to Algeria. One daughter of a Harki writes on *Harkis.info* that she is not interested in the Algerians and their "FLhaine," declaring instead, "I am going to demand reckoning from MY country, this France that my father calls 'the mother country.'"[89] Their memory work is thus aimed at finding a place for the Harkis and their descendants in the French imagination.

The Harkis' Motivations

The second debate centers on the Harkis' reasons for supporting the French Army. Since Algerian independence, the question of the Harkis' motivations for enlisting has been the keystone to most memory narratives. No one was born a Harki; individuals became a member of this disenfranchised, heterogeneous group through their support of France. Yet the motivations of individual Harkis have remained largely inaccessible to historians, due to a lack of written sources and the Harkis' hesitancy to speak about their past. Did the Harkis make a deliberate choice to help maintain French Algeria? This question moves beyond interpreting the colonial legacy to understanding the Harkis' particular role in the colonial project. How the children of Harkis seek to answer it informs how they relate to the colonial past and situate themselves in the postcolonial present.

In their memoirs, daughters of Harkis engage with this historical question through an interrogation of their particular family's past: why their father supported the French and how this decision affected their own life and identity. They particularly highlight how their fathers' silence on this subject prompted them to search for an answer. In Dalila Kerchouche's memoir, *Mon père, ce harki*, she begins by writing, "I am the daughter of harkis. I write this word with a lowercase 'h', as in *honte* [shame]. During the Algerian War, my father, an Algerian, fought in the ranks of the French Army against the FLN, the National Liberation Front of the country. How could he support colonization against independence, preferring submission to liberty? I don't understand. He has never spoken to me about it."[90] Since she has learned from her peers to be ashamed of her Harki identity, she struggles to understand why her father decided to defend the colonizer. So too does Telali, who writes in her memoir, "I noticed that my father hid the history of his country. He never ref-

erenced the past and ... I held him responsible for our isolation. Wasn't he responsible for this choice? Wasn't he a traitor to his nation? Why this silence about the war?"[91] Thus, many of these Harki daughters entertain the idea that in the absence of any clear explanation or justification from their fathers, perhaps it is logical to believe that they were indeed traitors, an idea that is almost never suggested by Harki sons.

By the end of their memoirs, most of these Harki daughters have exonerated their fathers of the traitor charge by arguing either that the Harkis had no agency, and therefore could not make a deliberate choice of their own free will, or that they had been forced to fight for France in order to protect their families. They demonstrate that this "choice" was not made under normal circumstances and that portraying the Harkis as having "chosen" France implies deceptively that viable alternatives existed. Telali repeatedly calls her father's decision to support the French a "non-choice." She blames colonialism for constructing a situation that restricted her father's agency. Kerchouche echoes this sentiment, saying, "because he 'chose' France, my father has since been considered as a traitor by the Algerians, and has been suspected of becoming one by the French.... Now, in hindsight, I realize [that he] perhaps didn't have a choice."[92]

When the daughters do give a justification, they entertain a variety of possible motivations, but the most common explanation is that their fathers fought with the French in order to defend their families. They explain that their families had been caught between the violence of both the FLN and the French Army toward civilians. Historians of the Algerian War, Francois-Xavier Hautreux, Mohand Hamoumou, and Abderahmen Moumen consider FLN violence to be the principal factor that prompted enlistment.[93] These historians also note that some enlistments were forced or brought about through "pressures" applied by the French Army.[94] Besnaci-Lancou has asked whether the Harkis can be condemned for having fought with the French if they were acting out of necessity to protect their children. She says, "a question haunts me: just how far must one fight for a country? Is it better to defend one's children or one's land?"[95] She concludes that while the FLN members were good independence fighters and Algerian nationalists, the Harkis had no choice if they wanted to be good fathers. Her explanation offers a morally acceptable justification: since the Harkis were acting as good fathers and husbands, they are exonerated from the traitor stigma.

In addition to "fear for one's life" and "forced enlistment in response to threats against one's family," Telali offers additional motivations: economic necessity and family solidarity. She cites "military pay enabling survival in the context of misery" and "enlistment of a family member and family loyalty" as reasons given by the Harkis themselves.[96] Although historians have found that enlistment for economic reasons was rare, it fits into the memoir writers' narrative of fathers doing what was necessary to provide for their families.[97] The contention that Harkis may have enlisted due to family or clan solidarity is rel-

atively new among scholars. Hamoumou and Moumen have argued that "obligations of loyalty encouraged the enlistment of entire families, and even entire villages or tribes, when one of its members were assassinated or when the head of the family, or village, or tribe, enlisted against the FLN."[98] This cultural limitation on Harkis' agency calls into question whether we can consider individual Harkis as having made a decision to support France.

In most of the memoirs, the patriotic explanation, which presents the Harkis as having been motivated by their love of France, is conspicuously absent. Telali explicitly rejects arguments that Harkis chose France for ideological reasons, arguing, "it is easy today to construct a simple history, limiting actors to two camps with ideologically entrenched convictions."[99] She acknowledges, "if certain Harkis' enlistments were the result of a conscious ideological choice, this was not the case for the majority of enlisted volunteers."[100] Besanci-Lancou cites Hautreux's argument that Harkis were not politically motivated when fighting the FLN.[101]

This understanding of their fathers' motivations enables the authors to challenge the historical barriers that have existed between the Harkis and Algerian immigrant communities. They suggest that the Harkis and other Algerians were not ideological enemies during the war, but rather compatriots struggling in the same tragic situation. This interpretation paints the Harkis and their families as victims of the colonial system, a status that gains traction in the current politics of memory in France. Their narratives also blur the lines between the categories of "Harki" and "independence fighter." Historians have argued that thousands of men fought first for the FLN and then became Harkis because they refused to participate in violent attacks against Muslim civilians or Europeans.[102] Besnaci-Lancou affirms this idea, writing, "during the Algerian War, with the blind terror of certain independence fighters, each Algerian was a potential Harki."[103] The reverse scenario undoubtedly occurred as well, as Algerians joined the independence movement in response to French violence against civilians and torture tactics. Kerchouche discovers in the course of her investigation into her family's past that her Harki father had also aided the FLN. Her story suggests that the Harki history is too complex for a simple Algerian/Harki dichotomy, and her interpretation carves out a space for the Harkis in an Algerian collective memory of colonial injustice.

In the discussion forums on the websites, Harki descendants express a wide variety of ideas about why Harkis enlisted, including many of the same motivations discussed in the memoirs. Website moderators, however, tend to emphasize that the Harkis made a choice to fight for France, both in response to FLN violence and for ideological reasons. These Harki sons speak generally about the Harkis, not typically evoking their families' particular cases, and they root Harki identity in the deliberate decision to defend France and French values. On a page entitled, "who are the Harkis?" the website *Harkis.info* describes the Harkis as "those who chose to remain French."[104] The site's administrator, Massi, states that claiming the Harkis did not make a conscious

political choice for France, as some of the memoir writers have, is "an insult to our ancestors."[105] According to Massi, "you cannot say that the Harkis are simply mercenaries. They fought for their families, their villages and their security. And they loved this country that was France."[106] He suggests that no one forced the Harkis to serve, but rather they courageously rose to the occasion and fought to defend both their families and their country.

When one Harki daughter, Nora, dissents from Massi's narrative about the reasons why the Harkis enlisted, we can see how Massi understands the relationship between individual experiences and Harki collective history. Nora first writes on the *Harkis.info* site, "no, our fathers or grand-fathers did not fight out of love for France or contempt for Algeria, far from it! No, I don't believe it for a second!"[107] Massi then corrects her version of the past, replying, "you conflate all the Harkis in reducing it to your particular case. But you are on a Harki site and your History is ours."[108] Massi expresses a fear that presenting contradictory interpretations threatens the integrity of the Harki memory and identity as a whole. He adds, "you don't have the right to say, in taking the example of your father, that the Harkis did not fight out of love for France. You also don't have the right to speak in their name. Everyone knows the motivations of one another, whether it be for love of France, for reasons of security, through necessity. We don't have the right to minimize their engagements or their sacrifice."[109] Thus, the websites' image of the Harkis sacrificing themselves for France reigns supreme over any individual experience that might undermine that of the collective.

Some Harki children posting on websites justify the Harkis' decision by arguing that not only did they make a clear choice in favor of France, but also, based on the course of Algerian history, it is apparent that they made the right choice. Website participants draw attention to the high numbers of Algerian immigrants who came to France following the Algerian War for economic opportunities and suggest that in the end, these Algerians made the same choice for France. On *Le Blog de Harkis*, one participant writes, "the Harkis made a clear choice, one to come live in France; explain to me why there was a large wave of Algerian immigration in the 1970s composed of former members of the ALN and FLN, the same ones who wanted Algerian independence came to France later. There is really something illogical in this process."[110] On the blog *MonHarki.com*, a Harki son declares that the Harkis were wise to have chosen France earlier than their compatriots because they avoided the serious integration challenges that North Africans face in France today. "In light of what is going on in France today with the problems created by immigration, I can say that they were visionaries, and that by their enlistment in the French Army, they anticipated the course of History, which has proven them right."[111] Of course, this argument does not take into account the Harkis' own integration problems, especially for those who had been placed in camps.

Much as the memoir writers exonerated their Harki fathers of the traitor stigma, children of Harkis posting on these websites challenge this label on the

basis that they were defending their country, namely France. Some Harki children also suggest that perhaps the Algerians who immigrated to France in the 1960s and 70s were the actual traitors. As the daughter of a Harki asks on *Le Blog de Harkis*, "who are the real traitors? The Harki who saved his skin or made his choice for the good of everyone? [Or] the immigrant who abandoned everyone, including the most poor who are dying of hunger, to think only of himself."[112] A participant on the forum for the *Coalition national* adds, "I will remind you that the Harkis are not traitors, but rather men who made a choice, whether or not this pleases the fugitives who deserted their country that had gained total independence!"[113] Thus, they draw a clear line between Harkis and Algerian immigrants in France.

Conclusion

The Harkis and their descendants do not act as a monolithic memory collective. Rather, children of Harkis construct rival interpretations of the colonial past based on how they would like to situate themselves in postcolonial French society. Their use of different media reveals competing ways of contributing to, constructing, and transmitting collective memories. The fact that their memory narratives and practices are gendered indicates that the Harki identity is transmitted in distinct ways to Harki sons and daughters. Whether gender has contributed in similar ways to conflicts in other memory communities merits further study.

This study is about the Harkis, but not only about the Harkis. The case of Harki memorializing calls into question the utility of the "memory wars" paradigm by revealing another level on which memory of the Algerian War has proven divisive. At the same time, it serves as a reminder of the reconciliatory potential of collective memory. The notion of a "war of memories" implies a zero-sum game of irreconcilable narratives and evokes a scenario in which communities want to "have their memories converted into official history—to the detriment of the memories of competing 'groups.'"[114] This understanding of memory wars, however, obscures attempts among groups to reconcile conflicting narratives. Some architects of Harki collective memory do explicitly challenge specific narratives, but others are more comfortable with coexisting competing memories.

The "memory wars" concept thus remains a highly problematic way of interpreting the current memorial climate. Scholars who employ the term "memory wars" have not fully interrogated how their use of the concept may ultimately reify it. In her review of Eric Savarese's *Algérie: La guerre des mémoires* and Pascal Blanchard and Isabelle Veyrat-Masson's *Les Guerres de mémoires: La France et son histoire*, Mary Stevens has noted that "the authors largely accept the concept at face value and in so doing they run the risk of affording it a potentially dangerous credibility."[115] Politicians, including Presidents François Hol-

lande and Abdelaziz Bouteflika, have, since 2005, adopted the "memory wars" terminology to describe memory conflicts in France and Algeria.[116] Scholars note that these politicians have denounced the "wars" as evidence of "communautarisme," the desire to disassociate from the national community.[117] The specter of "communautarisme" provides both a justification for discrediting the memory work of various non-state actors and an excuse to impose a hegemonic interpretation of the past. In this way, the "memory wars" paradigm taps into and perpetuates fears about the potential divisiveness of memory, rather than providing a useful framework for studying memory conflicts.

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Notes

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1. Loi n 2005-158.
2. Johann Michel, *Gouverner les mémoires: Les politiques mémorielles en France* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2010), 157; Nicolas Bancel, "France, 2005: A Postcolonial Turning Point," *French Cultural Studies* 24, 2 (2013): 208–18, 209, 215.
3. Michel, *Gouverner les mémoires*, 73; Bancel, "France, 2005," 208, 212.
4. Pascal Blanchard, Nicolas Bancel, and Sandrine Lemaire, eds., *La Fracture coloniale: La société française au prisme de l'héritage colonial* (Paris: Éditions La Découverte, 2005), 26; Eric Savarese, *Algérie: La guerre des mémoires* (Paris: Éditions Non Lieu, 2007), 7; Mary Stevens, "Visibility, Equality, Difference: Drawing the Battle Lines in France's 'Memory Wars,'" *Journal of Romance Studies* 9, 3 (Winter 2009), 104.
5. Pascal Blanchard and Isabelle Veyrat-Masson, "Introduction," in *Les Guerres de mémoires: La France et son histoire, enjeux politiques, controverses historiques, stratégies médiatiques*, ed. Blanchard and Veyrat-Masson (Paris: Éditions La Découverte, 2010), 28; Bancel, "France, 2005," 208.

6. Daniel Lindenberg, "Guerres de mémoires en France," *Vingtième siècle, Revue d'histoire* 42, 1 (April–June 1994): 77–95; Savarese, *Algérie*; Benjamin Stora and Thierry Leclère, *La Guerre des mémoires: La France face à son passé colonial* (Paris: Éditions de l'Aube, 2008); Blanchard and Veyrat-Masson, eds., *Les Guerres de mémoires*.
7. Lindenberg, "Guerres de mémoires," 94.
8. Blanchard and Veyrat-Masson, "Introduction," 28.
9. Ibid., 21.
10. The meaning of the term "Harki" has changed over time. Today, Harki can be applied to any Frenchman of North African origin seen as having been complicit with the French regime, including drafted recruits, career officers, elected representatives, civil servants, and veterans. This term has even been extended to their spouses and children, although "Harki" remains a primarily male-coded category. At the time of the Algerian War, however, "Harki" had a far more specific meaning: the label was used to designate the largest of four groups of auxiliaries, each of which performed a variety of different functions for the French Army. Many scholars prefer to use the term "auxiliaries," rather than "Harkis," to avoid this confusion. I use the term "Harkis" since I am analyzing the discourses of those who identify themselves and their fathers as such.
11. Savarese, *Algérie*, 10; Stora and Leclère, *La Guerre des mémoires*, 11; Michel, *Gouverner les mémoires*, 153; Nicolas Bancel and Pascal Blanchard, "La colonisation: du débat sur la guerre d'Algérie au discours de Dakar," in *Les Guerres de mémoires*, ed. Blanchard and Veyrat-Masson, 146.
12. OAS stood for the Organisation de l'armée secrète, a French terrorist organization committed to keeping Algeria French.
13. The "suitcase carriers" were French leftists who supported members of the FLN fighting in metropolitan France during the Algerian War.
14. Blanchard and Veyrat-Masson, "Introduction," 38; Lindenberg, "Guerres de mémoires," 93; Bancel and Blanchard, "La colonisation," 142.
15. Ibid., 146; Michel, *Gouverner les mémoires*, 153.
16. Pied-Noir associations emerged shortly after the arrival in France of exiles from French Algeria and most claimed to represent the interests of all rapatriés, including the Harkis and their families. Independent Harki organizations started to develop in the 1970s. Abderahmen Moumen, *Les Français musulmans en Vaucluse: 1932–1991* (Paris: Éditions L'Harmattan, 2003), 139.
17. As Vincent Crapanzano has observed, Article 5 was the result of Harki associations' lobbying efforts. Vincent Crapanzano, *The Harkis: The Wound That Never Heals* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 18.
18. See "Appel d'enfants de Harkis contre les articles 4 et 13 de la loi du 23 février 2005" and "L'Association Harkis et droits de l'Homme dénonce la loi du 23 février 2005" on *Harki.net*. Some were also unhappy with the law because they thought it did not go far enough in protecting the Harkis.
19. Harki daughter and memoir writer, Fatima Besnaci-Lancou, and her association, Harkis et Droits de l'Homme, organized protests that brought together the children of Harkis and of Algerian immigrants against the 2005 law. As Crapanzano has explained, these protests called "for the 'reappropriation of confiscated memories' because 'our parents, whether by choice, chance, or necessity, found themselves in different camps during the Algerian War,' and who condemned 'the simplistic duality that asserts that there was a good and a bad side [in the war].'" Crapanzano, *The Harkis*, 156–57.
20. Michael Rothberg, *Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 3.
21. Francois-Xavier Hautreux, "Les supplétifs pendant la guerre d'Algérie," in *Les Harkis dans la colonisation et ses suites*, ed. Fatima Besnaci-Lanou et Gilles Manceron (Paris:

Éditions de l'Atelier, 2008), 49; Gilles Manceron, "Un abandon et des massacres aux responsabilités multiples," in *Harkis 1962–2012: Les mythes et les faits, Les Temps modernes* 666 (2011), 67 fn 3; Fatima Besnaci-Lancou and Abderahmen Moumen, *Les Harkis* (Paris: Éditions Le Cavalier Bleu, 2008), 17.

22. Mohand Hamoumou and Abderahmen Moumen, "L'Histoire des Harkis et Français musulmans: La fin d'un tabou?" in *La Guerre d'Algérie: La fin de l'amnésie*, ed. Mohammed Harbi and Benjamin Stora (Paris: Robert Laffont, 2004), 317–44; Hautreux, "Les supplétifs pendant la guerre d'Algérie," 49–50.
23. Benjamin Stora, "1999–2003, Guerre d'Algérie, les accélérations de la mémoire," in *La Guerre d'Algérie,* ed. Harbi and Stora, 510; Manceron, "Un abandon et des massacres aux responsabilités multiples," 86; Boussad Azni, *Harkis, crime d'État: Généalogie d'un abandon* (Paris: Ramsay, 2001), 43.
24. William B. Cohen, "The Harkis: History and Memory," in *Algeria & France, 1800–2000: Identity, Memory, Nostalgia*, ed. Patricia M. E. Lorcin (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2006), 169.
25. Moumen, *Les Français musulmans*, 15.
26. Benjamin Stora, *La Gangrène et l'Oubli: La mémoire de la guerre d'Algérie* (Paris: La Découverte, 1991), 8.
27. Jo McCormack, *Collective Memory: France and the Algerian War (1954–1962)* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007), 111, 114; Crapanzano, *The Harkis*, 8–9.
28. Joshua Cole, "Massacres and Their Historians: Recent Histories of State Violence in France and Algeria in the Twentieth Century," *French Politics, Culture & Society* 28, 1 (Spring 2010), 107, 108; Raphaëlle Branche, *La Torture et l'armée pendant la guerre d'Algérie: 1954–1962* (Paris: Gallimard, 2001).
29. Harbi and Stora, *La Guerre d'Algérie.*
30. Bancel and Blanchard, "La colonisation,"139.
31. The plaque reads, "La République française témoigne sa reconnaissance envers les rapatriés anciens membres des formations supplétives et assimilés ou victimes de la captivité en Algérie pour les sacrifices qu'ils ont consentis." It was unveiled during the first "Journée d'hommage national aux Harkis" on 25 September 2001. McCormack, *Collective Memory,* 23.
32. Henry Rousso, *The Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France since 1944* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 219.
33. Nina Sutherland, "Harki Autobiographies or Collecto-Biographies? Mothers Speak Through Their Daughters," *Romance Studies* 24, 3 (November 2006), 196 fn 17.
34. Dalila Kerchouche and Stéphan Gladieu, *Destins de Harkis* (Paris: Autrement, 2003).
35. Dalila Kerchouche, *Leïla: Avoir dix-sept ans dans un camp de Harki* (Paris: Seuil, 2006).
36. *Harkis* was shown on 10 October 2006 on France2. It has been released on DVD, Alain Tasma, *Harkis* (France Télévisions Distribution, 2007).
37. Fatima Besnaci-Lancou, *Nos mères, paroles blessées: Une autre histoire de Harkis* (Léchelle: Emina soleil, 2006); Fatima Besnaci-Lancou, *Treize chibanis harkis* (Paris: Tirésias, 2006); Fatima Besnaci-Lancou, *Des vies: 62 enfants de Harkis racontent* (Paris: Editions de l'Atelier, 2010).
38. This association has a website: *Harki.net.*
39. Zahia Rahmani, *France, récit d'une enfance* (Paris: Sabine Wespieser, 2006). She has also published a novel about a Harki and his family entitled *Moze* (Paris: Wespieser, 2003).
40. Saliha Telali, *Les Enfants de Harkis: Entre silence et assimilation subie* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2009).
41. Karim Brazi, *Le Vilain Petit Berbère* (Paris: Société des Écrivains, 2007); Kader Hamiche, *Manifeste d'un fils de Harki fier de l'être* (Édité à compte d'auteur, 2007).
42. Saïd Ferdi, *Un enfant dans la guerre* (Paris: Le Seuil, 1981); Brahim Sadouni, *Français sans patrie: Premier témoignage écrit par un Harki* (B. Sadouni, 1985); Messaoud Kafi,

De berger à harki (Édité à compte d'auteur, 2009); Abdallah Krouk, *Harki* (Toulouse: Édition de l'Ixcéa, 2010).

43. The only male memoir released by a major press is a second version of Sadouni's memoir, which was published by Cosmopole. Brahim Sadouni, *Destin de Harki: Le témoignage d'un jeune Berbère, enrôlé dans l'armée française à dix-sept ans* (Paris: Cosmopole, 2002).
44. Joan Scott, *The Politics of the Veil* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 71.
45. There are different types of Harki websites. All of the sites aim to increase historical understanding of the Harkis. Some are connected to a memorial association, such as the website for Fatima Besnaci-Lancou's association Harkis et Droits de l'Homme, and provide information about the association's activities. Others are intended to encourage participation outside the site, for example in protests and demonstrations. This article focuses on websites that aim to facilitate online discussion. Data for the article comprised online posts from 2005, when the first websites were founded, to 2010, through the height of the so-called "memory wars."
46. This website was active from 1 September 2005 to 7 December 2007. As of 20 February 2013 it had been visited 4,912,596 times. The Webmaster, who uses the pseudonym Massi, is the son of a Harki. Massi wrote most of the articles on the site and he moderated the site's discussion forum. He explains on the website itself that he created it in order to eradicate clichés and delusions about the Harki past. See "Pourquoi ce site?" *Harkis.info*, http://www.Harkis.info/portail/sections.php?op=viewarticle&artid=9.
47. This blog was active from 29 January 2006 to 27 September 2011. As of 20 February 2013 the site has been visited 17,319 times, making it the least frequented site of the four. The moderator, who uses the pseudonym "Harkis," is the descendant of a Harki and was in his mid-thirties during the time that the site was active.
48. This website was active from 10 April 2006 to August 2011. The site does not offer a total count of the visits the site has received, but by 20 February 2013 each of the 296 articles had averaged 1,500 views. The moderator, Khader Moulfi, is the son of a Harki and he describes himself as an apolitical freethinker, full French citizen, and fervent republican. "Khader Moulfi Sur LePost.fr," *Le Post*, http://archives-lepost.huffingtonpost.fr/perso/khader-moulfi/. He explains on the site that he created it in order to "rehabilitate the historical truth" and to create "a link between the Harkis and their Families and the rest of the Nation." Khader, "Bienvenue sur le site de la Coalition nationale des Harkis," *Coalition nationale des Harkis*, 08 April 2006, http://www.coalition-Harkis.com/menu-principal/presentation.html.
49. This blog opened on 25 June 2006 and is still currently active. As of 20 February 2013 it had been visited 217,953 times. The Webmaster, who uses the pseudonym "le petit Harki," is the son of a Harki and is helped by four men and two women in the maintenance of the site. Many different authors contributed articles to the blog and therefore this site offers the widest variety of opinions and narratives. The stated objectives of the blog include "to make the Harki history, which has for too long been concealed and falsified, officially known." "La Charte du Blog," *MonHarki.com*, http://monHarki.com.over-blog.com/.
50. Sutherland, "Harki Autobiographies or Collecto-Biographies?" 200.
51. The relationship between the Internet and the "memory wars" concept has not been sufficiently explored. Louise Merzea proposes questions and theories for approaching its study in "Guerres de mémoires *on line*: Un nouvel enjeu stratégique?" in *Les Guerres de mémoires*, ed. Blanchard and Veyrat-Masson, 287–98.
52. Blanchard and Veyrat-Masson, "Introduction," 25.
53. The question of whether women remember differently than men has been central to the study of the relationship between gender and memory. Sylvia Schraut and Sylvia Paletschek, "Remembrance and Gender: Making Gender Visible and Inscrib-

ing Women into Memory Culture," in *The Gender of Memory: Cultures of Remembrance in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Europe*, ed. Sylvia Paletschek and Sylvia Schraut (Frankfurt and New York: Campus-Verlag, 2008), 272.

54. Bachaga Boualam, *Les Harkis au service de la France* (Paris: France-Empire, 1963); Abd-El-Aziz Méliani, *Le Drame des Harkis: La France honteuse* (Paris: Perrin, 1993); Maurice Faivre, *Les Combattants musulmans de la guerre d'Algérie: Des soldats sacrifiés* (Paris: Harmattan, 1995); François Meyer and Benoît de Sagazan, *Pour l'honneur... avec les Harkis: De 1958 à nos jours* (Tours: CLD, 2005).
55. Sutherland, "Harki Autobiographies or Collecto-Biographies?" 194.
56. James Fentress and Chris Wickham, *Social Memory* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1992), 141.
57. Sylvia Paletschek and Sylvia Schraut, "Introduction: Gender and Memory Culture in Europe—Female Representations in Historical Perspective," in *The Gender of Memory*, ed. Paletschek and Schraut, 7–28, 20; Selma Leydesdorff, Luisa Passerini, and Paul Thompson, *Gender and Memory* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2005), vii, 2.
58. Fentress and Wickham, *Social Memory*, 142.
59. Michel, *Gouverner les mémoires*, 72.
60. Serge Barcellini, "L'État républicain, acteur de mémoire: des morts *pour* la France aux morts *à cause* de la France," in *Les Guerres de mémoires*, ed. Blanchard and Veyrat-Masson, 209–19.
61. Besnaci-Lancou, *Fille de Harki*, 123.
62. Massi, post in response to "[Résolu] - kerchouche Delila," *Harkis.info*, 15 May 2006, http://www.Harkis.info/portail/viewtopic.php?topic=211&forum=5.
63. Khader, post in response to "Le film 'Harkis' avec Smaïn diffusé sur France 2," *Coalition nationale des Harkis*, 17 October 2006, http://www.coalition-Harkis.com/component/option,com_fireboard/Itemid,194/func,view/id,272/catid,4/.
64. Harkis, "Brefs Rappels," *Le Blog de Harkis*, 29 January 2006, http://Harkis.skyrock.com/343396248-Brefs-rappels.html.
65. Todd Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), xiii, 4; Jean-Jacques Jordi, *Les Harkis, une mémoire enfouie* (Paris: Autrement, 2008), 131; Mohamed Benrabah, *Language Conflict in Algeria: from Colonialism to Post-independence* (Bristol: Multilingual Matters, 2013), 29.
66. Martin Evans and John Phillips, *Algeria: Anger of the Dispossessed* (London: Yale University Press, 2007), 24.
67. Harkis, "Brefs Rappels."
68. Zinc, post in response to "Un Crime d'État," *Le Blog de Harkis*, 25 March 2008, http://Harkis.skyrock.com/343398314-Un-crime-d-Etat.html.
69. Ibid.
70. Telali, *Les Enfants de Harkis*, 28.
71. Ibid., 18.
72. Besnaci-Lancou, *Treize chibanis harkis*, 19.
73. Hamiche, *Manifeste d'un fils de Harki fier de l'être*, 35. Although the Berber minority had been privileged by the French under colonialism, many of the Harkis were of Arab origin.
74. "Pourquoi ce site?" *Harkis.info*.
75. Telali, *Les Enfants de Harkis*, 27.
76. Tasma, *Harkis*.
77. Besnaci-Lancou, *Treize chibanis harkis*, 17. In this case, he is talking about the FLN's violence toward civilians. Other Harki testimonies and daughters' memoirs speak extensively about the French Army's violence toward civilians as well.
78. Ibid., 65.

79. Ibid.
80. Ibid., 4.
81. Massi, post on the subject "[Résolu] - kerchouche Delila," *Harkis.info*, 15 May 2006, http://www.Harkis.info/portail/viewtopic.php?topic=211&forum=5.
82. Massi, post on the subject "l'histoire des Harkis expliquée aux enfants," *Harkis.info*, 21 December 2005, http://www.Harkis.info/portail/viewtopic.php?topic=99&forum=5.
83. Manceron, "Un abandon et des massacres aux responsabilités multiples," 67 fn 3. Guy Pervillé, *Pour une histoire de la Guerre d'Algérie: 1954–1962* (Paris: Picard, 2002); 137.
84. Prosunt, post in response to "19 mars... jour de deuil," *Coalition nationale des Harkis*, 23 August 2006, http://www.coalition-Harkis.com/component/option,com_fireboard/Itemid,194/func,view/id,143/catid,4/. This assertion is likely based on historians' largest estimate of 500,000 Harkis having at some point in the war fought for France.
85. EmiGo, post in response to "Un monument de plus," *Le Blog de Harkis*, 29 May 2006, http://Harkis.skyrock.com/398312868-Un-monument-de-plus.html.
86. Telali, *Les Enfants de Harkis*, 92.
87. Kerchouche, *Mon père ce harki*, 29.
88. Zalamit, post in response to "FIERE DE L'ETRE FILS DE HARKIS," *Harkis.info*, 08 March 2006, http://www.Harkis.info/portail/viewtopic.php?topic=174&forum=5.
89. Zalabia, post in response to "Être un(e) enfant de Harki," *Harkis.info*, 11 October 2006, http://www.Harkis.info/portail/viewtopic.php?topic=293&forum=5.
90. Kerchouche, *Mon père*, 13.
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