West European Politics

ISSN: 0140-2382 (Print) 1743-9655 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fwep20

Religion and Euroscepticism: Cleavages, Religious Parties and Churches in EU Member States

Michael Minkenberg

To cite this article: Michael Minkenberg (2009) Religion and Euroscepticism: Cleavages, Religious Parties and Churches in EU Member States, West European Politics, 32:6, 1190-1211, DOI: 10.1080/01402380903230660

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/01402380903230660

West European Politics,
Vol. 32, No. 6, 1190–1211, November 2009

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

Religion and Euroscepticism: Cleavages, Religious Parties and Churches in EU Member States

MICHAEL MINKENBERG

Taking into account the attempts to render the European integration process a new cultural and value-based quality on the one hand, and the prevalence of sceptical positions on the other, the role of religion as a factor shaping the process of European integration and its accompanying features such as Euroscepticism deserves special attention. It may be argued that the entire EU is a project inaugurated and pushed along primarily by Christian Democratic forces and inspirations. However, the EU is currently characterised by an advanced state of secularisation in most of its member states and high levels of religious and cultural pluralisation. This article raises the question to what extent religious, in particular Christian, actors such as religious parties and the churches have strayed from this integrationist past and contributed to Euroscepticism. Furthermore, the second question is whether a confessional pattern of Euroscepticism can be identified. The paper addresses these questions by empirically and comparatively analysing the positions and influence of religious actors on Euroscepticism in a selected group of EU member states.

It has been argued that the EU is a project inaugurated and pushed along primarily by Christian Democratic forces. The Catholic 'founding fathers' Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer and Alcide de Gasperi illustrate this, and one might add additional Catholic leaders such as Jean Monnet, Jacques Santer and Jacques Delors. In this vein, Philpott and Shah point to a 'pro-integrationist nexus of the Catholic hierarchy and Catholic politicians' at the core of the European project (Philpott and Shah 2006: 63; see also Thomas 2005: 167–9; Kaiser 2007: 302; for a critical view, see Greschat 1994; Madeley 2007). This view, however, is countered by assertions that the EU has failed in its forays into the cultural, and in particular religious, realm. The EU is described as representing a spiritual wasteland in the context of a thorough and irreversible secularisation process, 'a post-Christian Europe' (Casanova 2006: 65) which became victim to its self-fulfilling secularist prophecy. Whether Europe is truly secularised

Correspondence Address: mm1807@nyu.edu

ISSN 0140-2382 Print/1743-9655 Online
DOI: 10.1080/01402380903230660

or not, a new cultural–religious differentiation has emerged which challenges some of the commonly held assumptions and inspirations of both the founding generation and the current European elites. This is particularly relevant for the post-Cold War era, as the EU has reached unprecedented levels of cultural and religious pluralism (see Table 1 in de Vreese *et al.* 2009), therefore having to deal with a variety of new actors and interests within old and new member states.

This article raises the question to what extent religious, in particular Christian, actors such as religious parties and the churches have strayed from their integrationist past and contributed to Euroscepticism. Furthermore, considering the EU as a project initially inspired and still led by many politicians with a Catholic background, a related question is whether a confessional pattern of Euroscepticism can be identified among these actors against the backdrop of the new religious pluralism. In line with the multidimensional concept of religion as used in this article (see below), such a confessional argument must be complemented by the analysis of the broader religious context.

The argument on a structural and actor-related level is that the confessional cleavage persists but mixes with another dimension of the religious cleavage – the dividing line between religious and secular actors and interests. When Euroscepticism is found in the religious field, it appears to be more radical with churches than with religious parties. If Euroscepticism among (religious) parties is based on anti-establishment protest rather than on ideology, as some argue (see Taggart 1998; Madeley and Sitter 2003), then it may be inversely argued that Euroscepticism of churches is more ideological than motivated by protest. Moreover, due to the stronger power resources of Catholic Churches, which generally have been less Eurosceptic than Protestant ones, Euroscepticism is expected to be politically less relevant in Catholic societies. Also, it is assumed that, over time, a shift has taken place from a general EU critique to issue-related criticism, depending on the status of the country (full member, recent member, candidate) and the salience of the issues at hand (e.g. the constitutional treaty).

These matters will be addressed by providing an overview of the debate and a religious contextualisation, i.e. by establishing some parameters of the religious context (confessional patterns, degree of secularisation, church–state regimes) in the countries under consideration, and by an in-depth analysis of religious parties' and churches' positions towards European integration over time. The country selection follows the reasoning that there should be contrasts on key parameters of religion (the existence of state churches or separation, predominantly Catholic or Protestant legacies, strong Christian Democratic parties) and that there should be countries from each round of EU enlargement, from the founding group and the enlargement waves in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, to post-socialist countries joining in 2004. Consequently, the country cases are Denmark, Finland and Sweden (shaped by Lutheran Protestantism and a long history of state

churches), the United Kingdom (also a Protestant country with a state church, but with less religious homogeneity), Germany and the Netherlands (bi-confessional countries with a Protestant national legacy, a significant Catholic minority and a strong Christian Democracy), Ireland, Italy and Portugal (Catholic countries with more or less separatist church–state regimes), and Poland and Estonia (post-socialist member states, one Catholic, the other historically Protestant).

The State of the Debate: What Can Be Learned for Comparative Analyses?

With the growing relevance of cultural issues in the European integration process, it should not come as a surprise that scepticism towards the EU as a whole or towards particular policies continues to mobilise people in all member states. 'Euroscepticism' will be defined in a simplified way of a measured 'distance' to the EU and European integration, here understood primarily as 'deepening' rather than 'widening', and in terms of 'hard' and 'soft' versions (see also Beichelt 2004; Kopecky and Mudde 2002; Taggart and Szerszerbiak 2004). The nature of Euroscepticism spans from rejecting the integration process altogether to being supportive of the overall project, but critical of specific elements and/or the EU's current situation (see Taggart and Szerszerbiak 2004). Accordingly, in the qualitative case analyses to follow (of parties and churches as actors) we apply the distinction between 'hard' and 'soft' Euroscepticism and in the tabular analysis employ a threefold category: hard, soft, and none (or pro-integration). Taking into account the various attempts to render the EU and the integration process a new cultural and value-based quality (e.g., Jacques Delors' call in 1992 to give Europe a 'soul') on the one hand, and the prevalence of sceptical positions on the other, the role of religion as a factor shaping the process of European integration and its accompanying features such as Euroscepticism deserves special attention.

Like European integration and Euroscepticism, religion and the accompanying concept of secularisation are multidimensional concepts. These concepts and underlying theories, however, will not be reviewed here. It suffices to state that secularisation theory's core claim regarding the ongoing differentiation of religious and non-religious values and institutions will not be contested (see Casanova 1994: 212; see also Minkenberg 2002; Norris and Inglehart 2004). Secularisation represents a variant of theories of rationalisation and modernisation that postulates a continuing functional differentiation of modern societies along with a growing autonomy of the self, or individualisation (Weber 1920: 536–73). But this modernisation process reflects separate 'moments of secularization' (Casanova 1994: 19–39) which must be clearly distinguished: secularisation as 'institutional differentiation', in particular the separation of state and church, the emancipation of social and political forces from religion, and the growing autonomy of churches in a liberal democracy; secularisation as 'decline', i.e.,

the loosening ties of the individual to the values and institutions of religion (in Max Weber's terminology *Entzauberung*, or disenchantment); and secularisation as 'privatisation', i.e. the retreat or religion from the public sphere and its subsequent marginalisation. Hence, religion as a politically relevant factor must be distinguished on three aspects: religion as denomination, religion as religiosity, and religion as an institutional actor.

The relationship between Euroscepticism and religion is approached by emphasising different aspect such as Euroscepticism and religiosity (Nelsen *et al*. 2001; Hagevi 2002), Euroscepticism and the Western European party system, in particular the role of Christian parties (Taggart 1998; Ray 1999), the role of churches within the integration process (Byrnes and Katzenstein 2006; CEI 2004) and a comprehensive overview which encompasses these different aspects of religion and Euroscepticism (Madeley 2007; for regional case studies see also Madeley and Sitter 2003; Vollaard 2006).[1]

A few contextual characteristics of the religious landscape in Europe are highlighted. This landscape can be structured in line with the three aspects of religion as outlined above: the confessional patterns, the level of 'disenchantment' or religiosity, and the role of the churches in the respective church–state regimes (see also Minkenberg 2002, 2003a; Fox 2008). The first is measured by the historical patterns of the Protestant–Catholic divide, the second by survey data measuring church-going rates, i.e. the individual attachment to the dominant churches and religious communities in the 1990s, and the last by a measure of church–state separation that includes constitutional, political, personal and financial aspects of deregulation of churches from the state. Table 1 provides an overview of these patterns for the EU member states under consideration here.

The patterns in this table underline that only Protestant countries exhibit the phenomenon of fully established state churches – the Irish case with the hegemony of the Catholic church does not constitute an *institutional* privileging as in Scandinavia – although according to Fox (2008), the country ranges more in the middle compared to Minkenberg (2002, 2003a). On the one hand, a clear church–state separation occurs only in very few cases, irrespective of the dominant confessional tradition. The Scandinavian countries typically cluster at the end of low religiosity, Protestantism (Lutheranism) *and* full establishment of their state church (with Sweden having diverged from the full establishment group after 2000; see Gustafsson 2003; Fox 2008: 128). These are also countries for which rather high levels of Euroscepticism are reported among the general public (see e.g. Eurobarometer 66, 2006; Minkenberg 2008: Table 1). On the other hand, the majority of Catholic countries have a somewhat privileged status for their Catholic churches and exhibit comparatively high levels of religiosity. These are also countries with rather low levels of Euroscepticism (Eurobarometer 66, 2006; see also Boomgaarden and Freire 2009).

Against this backdrop, a review of the literature cited above provides two somewhat contradictory results: with regard to public opinion in Western Europe it is argued that Euroscepticism prevails particularly among

TABLE 1
CONFESSIONAL LEGACIES, RELIGIOSITY AND CHURCH–STATE REGIMES IN SELECTED EU MEMBER STATES AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY

	Church–state separation	**Partial establishment**	**Full establishment**
Protestant	*Estonia* (./3)	Great Britain (6/6)	*Denmark* (8/8) *Finland* (8/8) *Sweden* (8/5)
Mixed Protestant Catholic	Netherlands (2/2) **Ireland** (3/5)	Germany (6/5) **Austria** (5/5) **Italy** (4/5) **Poland** (./5) **Portugal** (5/5)	

Notes: In parentheses: church–state regime scores by Minkenberg/separation of religion and state scores by Fox. Countries with high religiosity (more than 40% saying they go to church 'at least once a month') are in **bold**, countries with low religiosity (less than 20%) are in *italics*. 'Mixed Protestant' means a historical predominance of Protestantism along with a sizeable Catholic minority according to the 60:40 ratio (Martin 1978).

Scores for church–state regimes are based on the following criteria/taxonomies:

- Minkenberg (2003a: 123): from 1 (nearly full separation) to 9 (full establishment of a state church) based on eight criteria: whether or not (1) there is a single, officially recognised state church, (2) there is official state recognition of some denominations but not others, (3) the state appoints or approves the appointment of church leaders, (4) the state directly pays church personnel salaries, (5) there is a system of ecclesiastical tax collection, (6) the state directly subsidises, beyond mere tax breaks, the operation, maintenance, or capital expenses for churches, (7) the state subsidises religious schools, and (8) there is religious instruction in state schools (see also Chaves and Cann 1992: 280).
- Fox (2008: 147): the separation of religion and state scale ranges from 1 to 9, with the following types and scores (1) hostility, (2) nearly full separation, (3) moderate separation, (4) general support, (5) preferred treatment for some religions, (6) historical/cultural state religion, (7) state-controlled religion, (8) active state religion, and (9) a religious state.

Sources: See Minkenberg (2003a: 122–3); also Minkenberg (2002, 2003b); Fox (2008: 114, 147); for CEE countries, see also Pollack (2003: 443, 446).

Protestants, while Catholics are more in favour of the project. Furthermore, fundamentalists and evangelicals are decisively more Eurosceptical than mainstream Protestants (Nelsen *et al*. 2001; Hagevi 2002; Madeley 2007). To a certain extent, this also holds true for the orientation of political parties with religious affiliation (Taggart 1998; Ray 1999). But if we consider those studies that discuss the political role of churches during the recent course of integration, data show that churches of both major confessions were rather supportive, as the final report from a project on Churches and European Integration (CEI 2004) concludes.[2] They also engage in new activities on the supranational level (Byrnes 2006). This process is the object of a semi-scientific group under the tutelage of the European Commission, which discusses the 'spiritual dimension' of European integration and, with its call for a 'Soul for Europe', has shaped the debate about ethical and religious inspirations in Europe (see Santer 1998; Hassemer 2007; Silvestri 2009).

Both findings, the confessional cleavage of Euroscepticism in the mass public and the rather supportive stance of both major Christian churches

illustrate the need for a more systematic, in-depth and comparative analysis. The findings might become less contradictory if we take into consideration that the integration process from 1990 to 2007 is characterised by different phases, each marked by particular policies or events. It can be assumed that opinions and positions of religious individuals, Church representatives, or party leaders have changed over the course of these phases. Furthermore, the aforementioned studies lack a substantial definition and mapping of Euroscepticism. Madeley discusses three hypotheses, which help to explain the particular prevalence of Euroscepticism among Protestants. But these explanations are very much related to 'the nature' of Protestantism and Catholicism, such as 'Protestant individualism' and 'Catholic universalism' or as particular confessional views of the state (Madeley 2007: 13–14). This argument rooted in 'historical institutionalism' with reference to Catholicism holds that 'a religious body whose (1) theology of ecclesial and political authority and (2) institutional structure and relationship to the state together favour the circumscription of the sovereign state and the creation of continent-wide institutions tends to support European convergence' (Philpott and Shah 2006: 35; see also Sundback 2002).

However, one should also take into consideration those explanations that go beyond the Catholic–Protestant divide. As Madeley (2007) for instance points out, there are also some predominantly Catholic and Orthodox cases that are particularly Eurosceptic, along with large parts of the Muslim minorities in the EU. Furthermore, most studies do not cover recent developments which we consider as crucial for the issues at hand, i.e. the phase of European integration after the largest wave of enlargement in 2004, in particular the accession of eight former state-socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe.[3] Last but not least, apart from Madeley (2007), there is no comprehensive study which takes into consideration Euroscepticism among both Christian/religious parties and churches.

It is obvious that Euroscepticism has been extensively studied in the framework of the party system literature. But churches can also be seen as relevant political actors, which, even in the 'secular age', can exert considerable influence given the right conditions (see Casanova 1994). They have power resources – more or less coherent preferences and internal discipline, organisational and financial resources, networks into the political class, and a political mobilisation potential (i.e. the possibility to drive their faithful into collective action) – which can be put to political use when relevant (see Madeley and Enyedi 2003). Moreover, unlike other interest groups, churches enjoy a particular public recognition and – as 'parapublic institutions' – often have special institutional relationships to the state (see Minkenberg 2002, 2003a, b). Their role in the political process is largely shaped by the institutional arrangement of church and state. Furthermore, we can assume that churches have problems acting as independent interest groups if they are fully established, as they have to attend to their institutional interests. In other words, churches that are relatively

autonomous in the political realm can be expected to pursue a more radical agenda than governments and political parties on issues which they choose to put on their policy agenda (see Minkenberg 2002, 2003b). The probability that they can convert their resources into political power and hence can effectively pursue their own agenda depends on their resources, for instance the degree of religiosity in a given society. Under these conditions, a church's official position on European integration must be seen as a potentially powerful contribution to the political discourse about the EU.

This observation leads to the alternative question of to what extent a strong Christian Democracy in the party system can be attributed with particular effects on Euroscepticism in these countries. Considering the deep involvement of Christian Democratic (CD) parties in the launching of the European integration project (see above) one might expect that a strong CD party constrains the rise of Euroscepticism – or provokes a polarisation around the issue if the party system is polarised in general. This issue is addressed in the following section.

Euroscepticism and Christian Democracy

For the analysis of religious parties, in particular of Christian Democracy, and Euroscepticism, we have singled out a number of religious (typically Christian) parties in line with the mainstream literature on CD and other Christian parties as a distinct family of political parties (see e.g. Hanley 1994, 2003; van Kersbergen 1995; Kalyvas 1996; Kselman and Buttigieg 2003; van Hecke and Gerard 2004; Kaiser 2007). The following remarks concern Western European member states in the EU only, since in the East European countries under consideration, cleavage patterns, party families and party systems are still more in flux than in the Western party systems (for the CD family, see Hanley 2003; see also Almond *et al.* 2006).

Party research distinguishes between traditional Christian Democracy with a strong Catholic imprint (in our case the Dutch, German and Italian parties) and 'newcomers' or 'non-affiliated' parties with a Christian lineage (such as the Scandinavian Protestant parties, or the Polish League for Polish Families). Table 2 provides an overview of voting strength for CD and other Christian parties (data from Hanley 2003). The table also includes two summary measures of parties' EU support or level of Euroscepticism derived from expert surveys (Ray 1999), one being the average value for the 1980s, the other the average value for the 1990s (and the overall average value among all parties in this country for each decade).[4]

This overview shows that overall Christian Democrats enjoy considerable electoral support despite wide fluctuations over time and between countries. In terms of election results, a certain decline can be observed in Christian Democratic core countries (the Netherlands and Italy), which has led observers to postulate an end of the Christian Democratic age (Conway

TABLE 2
CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC AND OTHER RELIGIOUS PARTIES IN SELECTED EU MEMBER STATES (WESTERN EUROPE ONLY) – AVERAGE VOTE SHARE 1945–1990s AND DEGREE OF EUROSCEPTICISM (EUSK) IN THE 1980s AND 1990s

Country	Party	1945–60	1960s	1970s	1980s	EUSk 1980s[a]	1990s	EUSk 1990s[a]
Denmark	KrF	–	–	3.5	2.4	*4.9 (3.51)*	2.2	*5.17 (4.27)*
Finland	SKL	–	0.6	2.9	2.8	*1.57 (2.9)*	3.4	*1.26 (4.08)*
Germany	CDU	33.7	36.8	36.5	35.7	*6.86 (4.69)*	33.1	*6.93 (4.51)*
	CSU	8.4	9.6	10.2	10.2	*6.39 (4.69)*	7.0	*5.43 (4.51)*
Italy	DC	41.6	38.6	38.6	33.6	*6.38 (5.48)*		
	PPI, etc						17.9[b]	*6.38 (5.82)*
Netherlands	CDA	40.4	46.7	33.2	32.5	*6.5 (3.82)*	25.2[c]	*6.38 (4.26)*
Portugal	CDS/PP			8.3	9.1	*4.5 (3.76)*	7.5	*4.5 (3.87)*
Sweden	KDS	–	1.7	0.9	5.7	*2.83 (3.01)*	7.3	*6.34 (4.96)*

[a]EUSk: Average for 1980s: 1984 and 1988 expert survey rankings, 1990s: 1992 and 1996 expert survey rankings, ranging from 1 (very anti-European integration) to 7 (very pro-European integration). (in parenthesis: average for all parties in the decade).
[b]Figure contains DC results of 1992 before collapse of party, but not the CD Center (Berlusconi allies) which scores an average of 4 per cent.
[c]Figure contains average for small protestant parties.
Sources: Hanley (2003: 237), based on T. Mackie and R. Rose, *International Almanac of Electoral History*, 1991, 1997 (http://www.electionworld.com); Ray (1999).

2003: 43). In Scandinavia, a group of smaller Protestant parties has emerged, although their voting strength remains comparatively limited.

With regard to the degree of Euroscepticism it is shown that the core Christian Democratic parties exhibit clear above average support for European integration, with the German CDU leading the group with maximal values. These parties are significantly more pro-European than the national parties on average, both in the 1980s and in the subsequent decade. In the Netherlands, the gap has narrowed somewhat by the 1990s, but this is as much due to the other parties becoming more Europhile as it is to the CDA's slightly declining EU support. In the Netherlands this trend was accompanied by a shift among the small and particularly Eurosceptic orthodox-Protestant parties, the Christian Historical Union (CHU) and the Anti-Revolutionary Party (ARP) as well as the Reformed Political Union (GPV) and the Reformed Political Party (SGP), which by the early 1990s turned from Euro-negativism to Euroscepticism (see Vollaard 2006). In the 2004 European Parliament elections, the joint CU/SGP list even formed an electoral alliance with the pro-European CDA (Vollaard 2006: 292).

There is also less EU support among the smaller and more radical parties in Denmark, Finland (and Portugal) but, except for the Finish case of the SKL, their position can hardly be qualified as outright Eurosceptic. While the Finnish SKL has become even more Eurosceptic in the transition from the 1980s to the 1990s, the case of the Swedish KDS reveals a complete turnaround in the opposite direction. In the 1990s, this party was more pro-European than all other Swedish parties, in contrast to the Finnish case.

Together, the disestablishment of the Swedish state church (see above) and the 'conversion' of the Swedish Christian Democrats underline the fact that Sweden is diverging from the Nordic group with regard to religion and politics, somewhat followed by Denmark. In their comparative analysis of Protestant religion and parties and Euroscepticism in Scandinavia, Madeley and Sitter (2003) point out that due to their pietistic Lutheran origins and rural background, the Norwegian and Finnish Protestant parties have been more negative towards European integration than their Swedish and Danish counterparts, with the latter becoming more multi- than mono-religious. This, they argue, can be attributed to the sectarian nature of the former's constituencies (see also Raunio 1999, 2007). Finally, in Germany over the 1990s a gap emerged between the continuously pro-European CDU and its less enthusiastic Bavarian sister party CSU. Whether this trend can be attributed to the 'valley mentality' of the Alpine constituents of the CDU and similar parties in Austria and Switzerland (see Vollaard 2006: 295) is an open question.

The relevance of the religious orientation of these parties and their positions on the EU for public discourse as well as policy-making largely depends on the relevance of the religious factor in voting behaviour in general. Hence it must be shown to what extent the religious cleavage still informs European party politics and the profile of particular parties in key policy terms. Overall, research has shown a considerable degree of continuity in confessional voting, with Catholics voting for parties of the right and Protestants or non-affiliated voting for the left or liberals (see e.g. Dalton 2006; see also van der Brug *et al*. 2009). But there are also signs of significant change. As the overview in Table 3 shows, there is considerable variation in the salience of the confessional cleavage (see also Broughton and ten Napel 2000; Knutsen 2004a, b). In Catholic as well as mixed Protestant countries, in particular in the Netherlands, this cleavage is quite robust. In Great Britain and in Denmark, however, it has been rather weak until the turn of the century. A virtual disappearance of the cleavage occurred in Italy where the party system was reconstituted after the breakdown of the *partitocrazia* in the early 1990s.

Table 3 also shows something more fundamental. The weak to moderate decline of confessional voting in many countries may be an indicator for a general decline of religion as a politically relevant factor. In contrast, this trend could also indicate a change in the quality of the religious cleavage. The overall level of religious voting in terms of the secular–religious divide is significantly stronger than that of confessional voting. Moreover, the secular–religious divide has increased during the 1990s in almost every country (see Dalton 2006: 161). Countries with historically strong Christian Democratic parties such as the Netherlands top the list, joined by countries with new Protestant parties or CD newcomers (Denmark, Finland; see Dalton 2006; also van Holsteyn and Irwin 2000; Madeley 2000). In Italy, the trend is particularly striking: the decline of the confessional cleavage is

TABLE 3
THE RELIGIOUS CLEAVAGE IN SELECTED EU MEMBER STATES, 1990s (WESTERN EUROPE ONLY)

Religious denomination and voting				Churchgoing and voting		
1990	**1996**	**1999/2002**		**1990**	**1996**	**1999/2002**
			0.50			Netherlands (0.44)
			0.41			
			0.40	Netherlands (0.37)		Finland (0.31)
			0.31			
			0.30	Denmark (0.29)		Denmark (0.29)
Netherlands (0.29)				Finland (0.27)		
	Italy (0.27)	Denmark *(0.27)*		Italy (0.27)		Ireland (0.27)
				Germany (E) (0.26)	Sweden (0.26)	Italy (0.26)
		Finland *(0.24)*				
		UK (0.23)			Italy (0.23)	
Finland *(0.23)*				Germany (W) (0.22)		
Italy (0.21)		Netherlands (0.21)	0.21			
Germany (E) (0.20)			0.20	Sweden (0.20)		
		Germany (0.17)			Ireland (0.18)	Germany (0.19)
	Germany (0.16)	Sweden *(0.17)*			Germany (0.17)	UK (0.19)
Sweden *(0.15)*	Ireland (0.15)	Ireland (0.16)		Ireland (0.16)		
Germany (W) (0.14)						
Ireland (0.14)						
Denmark *(0.13)*				UK (0.12)		
UK (0.11)	Sweden *(0.11)*		0.11			
	UK (0.10)	Italy (0.08)	0.10		UK (0.08)	
			0.00			

Notes: Values in parantheses are Cramer's V correlation coefficients, measured as the correlation between membership in the Catholic church and voting support for a right-wing/conservative party (left half of table) and frequent church going and voting support for a right-wing/conservative party (right half of table). The survey data are taken from the World Values Survey 1990/91 and the International Survey Programme of 1996.

In the Nordic countries, the minor proportion of non-Protestants (see Minkenberg 2007: 898f.) may have produced spurious relationships between religious denomination and voting (left hand of the Table). Similarly, the data for Ireland and Italy should also be read with caution.

Sources: Dalton (1996: 180; 2002: 158, 2006: 161).

countered by a comparatively high-level stability in the religious–secular cleavage (see also Donovan 2000). When combining the data from Table 3 with that in Table 2 and trends in religious pluralism (see Table 1, in de Vreese *et al.* 2009), the message is this: while there is no clear correspondence between the strength of the religious cleavage (in either version) and Euroscepticism, particularly pro-EU Christian Democratic parties can benefit from a pronounced religious cleavage and operate in a rather Europhile electoral arena. On the other hand, the Eurosceptic Protestant parties in Finland and Denmark are electorally more marginal. In contrast to the highly Eurosceptic Tories in the UK (see Ray 1999), these parties can count on the congruence between their Eurosceptic message and a religious cleavage feeding their stance on the EU. But whether these parties have an effect on Euroscepticism in their respective countries can only be shown if other indicators are taken into account, such as the cultural context and the behaviour of religious actors such as churches.[5] This largely understudied aspect is at the centre of the next section.

The Churches and European Integration: Between Eurosceptic Saul and Europhile Paul?

As a final step, we take a closer look at churches and their positions and politics regarding European integration. Although it is less problematic to identify relevant major Christian churches and smaller denominations than the political parties in each country, the churches' positions on European integration are harder to identify. There are no expert surveys, no manifesto databases, and no systematic gatherings of information on this issue. Even the most comprehensive and detailed account of the nexus between churches and European integration in the age after the 2004 enlargement, i.e. the Byrnes and Katzenstein (2006) volume, omits the multifaceted universe of Protestant churches and denominations and focuses on Catholicism, Orthodoxy, and Islam only.

The following mapping of church-based Euroscepticism is based on qualitative in-depth research of official church documents and related media regarding the positions of religious leaders and organisations ranging from state churches to marginal but visible denominations.[6] We suggest mapping Euroscepticism in two dimensions. The first refers to *what* gets criticised – certain *policies*, certain processes or relations between the EU and member states (*politics*), or the constitutional quality of the EU (*polity*). The second dimension addresses the question *why* certain aspects of the European integration process are criticised (see also Philpott and Shah 2006: 59–61). Here, our studies reveal that we can distinguish between different motifs: defending Christian identity and values, defending the nation state (soft or hardline) and anti-Catholicism and eschatologist beliefs. Concrete issues of concern ('what') do not necessarily relate to specific motifs ('why') (see also Vollaard 2006: 294).

As Table 4 shows, most issues of concern are shared by Catholic and Protestant churches. However, there are some confessional patterns: moral policies are a particular matter of concern among the Catholic and Orthodox Church, anti-Catholic attitudes can be found among Protestant churches and – most notably – fundamentalists, while the demonisation of the EU is a singularity of fundamentalists.

All churches are confronted by and have to deal with the ongoing process of secularisation in Europe (see above and Casanova 2006). At the same time, however, the process of European integration provides them with structures and opportunities to contribute to the building of Europe and to secure their ideals and interests (see Philpott and Shah 2006: 52; also Santer 1998; Hassemer 2007).

With regard to Catholicism, Orthodoxy and Islam, Philpott and Shah (2006) identify several fundamental (political) ideas about Europe. Key explanations for the postures of these religions towards European integration are certain conceptualisations of the sovereign nation state and European unity (see above). In smaller states with a Protestant majority population, a sceptical attitude towards European integration is motivated by the defence of the nation-state. Here, Protestantism and a national Lutheran state-church went hand in hand (see above Table 1; see also

TABLE 4
MAPPING EUROSCEPTICISM: CONCRETE ISSUES AND CONFESSIONAL DIFFERENCES

Level	Concrete issues	Confession
Policy	Migration + asylum, human rights ('incoherent')	Protestant, Catholic
	Enlargement (pro/contra CEE, Turkey), border policy ('against closed doors')	Protestant, Catholic
	Economic policy (+EMU)	Protestant (most notably among 'small states'), Anglican, Catholic, Fundamentalist
	Morality policies (abortion etc.)	Catholic, Orthodoxy
Politics	EU–society relations ('democratic deficit')	Protestant, Catholic
	EU–nation state relations ('power allocation in Brussels')	Protestant small states, Fundamentalist, Anglican (GB)
	EU–national churches	Protestant, Fundamentalist, Orthodox, (+IT)
	EU and Catholic influence	Protestant, Fundamentalist
Polity	EU constitution + invocatio dei/Christian heritage	Catholic, Anglican
	EU + cultural diversity/ interfaith dialogue	Protestant, Catholic, Orthodox
	EU as evil (or devil)	Fundamentalist

Sources: The positions of the relevant churches were taken from official church publications and press releases as well as church-related media (such as those by the Danish KEK, the EKD and Catholic Church in Germany, the Dutch Catholic newspaper *Katholiek Nieuwsblad*, the Polish *Konferencja Epislipatu Polski* and others) (see note 6).

Sundback 2002; Madeley 2007). In other words, churches – as established state churches – were not only the keepers of the faith but also guardians of national identity and sovereignty, and theological elements interlaced with political-strategic perspectives. Moreover, there are indications that church leaders and followers are in congruence regarding their position on European integration, in a reluctant fashion: 'Even leaders and groups that have supported integration have also expressed ambivalence and restrained enthusiasm. This includes George Carey, the former Anglican Archbishop of Canterbury, and the present Archbishop of the Finnish Lutheran Church, Jukka Paarma, as well as the most important network of Protestant churches, the Conference of European Churches (CEC)' (Philpott and Shah 2006: 63).

This reluctance translates into full-blown scepticism among fundamentalist groups. A striking motive among fundamentalists – and to a lesser extent also among some mainstream Protestant churches – was their rejection of a Catholic dominance in Europe, born out of a confessional motivation. Whereas the major churches in most countries defended the EU and its integration process in its spiritual dimension as having a Christian identity and value basis (ranging from strict moral values to universal human rights issues), some currents in mainstream Protestant and especially fundamentalist denominations diverged by expressing eschatological and anti-Catholic sentiments. In Northern Ireland, for example, Presbyterian Ian Paisley combines his anti-Catholic rhetoric with warnings that the EU embodied the tower of Babel and that it was an ally of the Roman Catholic states in Europe.[7] A similar split can be observed in Sweden, where the mainstream Protestant church became increasingly pro-EU whereas evangelical Protestants see the EU as a Catholic-conservative threat to the secular welfare state in Sweden and its liberal political culture (see Hagevi 2002).

On the Catholic side, we find that despite the general pro-European posture of the Catholic Church, similar internal differences became obvious as far as certain policies were concerned. With regard to Turkey's potential accession to the EU, the position of national Catholic churches has been particularly negative in the Netherlands and in Italy (Leenders and van Meurs 2005). The Polish Catholic Church had been decidedly sceptical towards Polish EU accession, but somewhat changed its attitude over the last 10 years, while other Catholic actors in Poland, in particular orthodox Catholic currents and organisations such as the radio station Radio Marija, are still hostile to the EU (see also Jackowska 2003; Ramet 2006). In the debate regarding religious references in the Preamble to the prospective European Constitution, the Polish Catholic hierarchy stressed the need to include a reference to God or Christianity (Ramet 2006: 142). This claim was echoed by the Catholic Church in most other countries under consideration here, with the notable exception of the Portuguese church, which remained silent on this issue (see also Willaime 2004: 97–124). The

final version of the treaty, in which neither God nor Christianity were mentioned, split the Catholic hierarchy in a number of countries. The speaker of the EU Bishops' Commission, Bishop Hohmeier, sharply criticised the lack of the reference to God, yet voiced support for the Constitutional Treaty. The Dutch Cardinal Simonis took a similar position.[8] Overall, with the exception of Poland, the Catholic Church in various EU member states seemed rather united in accepting the prospective Constitution although their leaders voiced their misgivings about the missing reference to God in the Preamble. In marked contrast, the Protestant churches in Europe, in particular the Nordic churches, did not attach the same urgency to the *invocatio Dei*; the Danish Lutheran Church stressed there was no need for an explicit reference to God in the preamble, others were silent (see Krause 2007: 38).

Regarding changes over time, there are general tendencies which also reflect a confessional pattern: While the stance of the Protestant Churches has been turning increasingly positive, the critique of Catholic churches has been increasing, in particular during recent years. This might be due to the fact that also moral issues became a matter of Europeanisation, while Protestant churches realised they could gain new political possibilities, also in terms of counterbalancing Catholic influence in European affairs.

A summary of the degree of Euroscepticism of individual churches or denominational groups is presented in Table 5. Here it becomes obvious

TABLE 5
EUROSCEPTICISM IN EUROPEAN CHURCHES AND RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES

Churches	**High EUSk (0–2)**	**Medium EUSk (3–5)**	**Low EUSk (6–8)**
Protestant		Denmark (5) Netherlands (5)	UK (6) Finland (6) Sweden (6) Ireland (7) Germany (7) Estonia (8)
Catholic		Poland (5)	Italy (6) Netherlands (7) Ireland (7) Portugal (7) Germany (8)
Fundamentalist	UK (1) Sweden (1) Finland (1) Estonia (1) Netherlands (2) Poland (2)		
Orthodox		Estonia (3)	

Note: In this table the position of the respective church (Protestant, Catholic, Fundamentalist/Evangelical, Orthodox) in each country, where applicable, is given on a scale from highly eurosceptic (0) to highly Europhile (8) based on a textual analysis of key documents of the respective churche.
Sources: See Table 4.

that contrary to the general publics in EU member states, European churches do not split according to the confessional divide. Rather, they are almost united in their support for European integration, with a less enthusiastic stance by the Protestant churches in Denmark and the Netherlands as well as the Catholic Church in Poland and the Orthodox Church in Estonia. What is true for the general population, i.e. that publics in Protestant countries with (national) state churches are more Eurosceptic than populations in Catholic countries (see also Boomgaarden and Freire 2009), does not translate into positions of religious actors themselves.

That said, fundamentalist groups, marginal in numbers and social and political relevance, exhibit high levels of Euroscepticism. As has been suggested elsewhere, these groups nurture their beliefs and political opinions in relative distance to the mainstream of society and politics and harbour a strong anti-Catholic bias which they apply to the EU as a Catholic enterprise (see Nelsen *et al*. 2001: 194; Sundback 2002: 196; Madeley 2007: 12). With the notable exception of Poland, these movements are prominent in countries which are characterised by secularisation and Protestantism. In Western European countries with a (Protestant) state church, Euroscepticism among fundamentalists seems even more pronounced – indicating a strong cleavage within Protestantism between the established state (and policy supporting) church and fundamentalist opponents to both, the state church and the European project.[9] This split is replicated in Poland in a different context, i.e. Catholicism and high levels of religiosity (see Ramet 2006).

The overall message stemming from the preceding analyses is the following: if we move from treating the religious factor as a cultural or background variable to a variable of social agency, or if we 'translate' the cultural heritage into actors' resources and preferences, the well-established affinity between Catholicism and the European project and, accordingly, a certain Protestant distance to it (Nelsen *et al*. 2001; Byrnes and Katzenstein 2006; Madeley 2007), dissolves. There is no hard Euroscepticism in any of the Christian mainline churches with the exception of Poland in the 1990s. This runs counter to the assumption that churches – as interest groups – may have a more radical view than political parties because they are not under pressure to make compromises and to compete for public support. Yet this does not hold true for smaller and more radical denominations such as Protestant fundamentalists or orthodox Catholic groups. They – unlike the religious parties which are supported by their constituencies – keep steering a rather dogmatic course on EU issues. This will become clear when taking a closer look at a cross-tabulation of parties' and churches' positions.

Parties and Churches in Comparison

The findings regarding churches' and parties' positions on European integration are summarised in Table 6. This summary shows, for example,

TABLE 6
EUROSCEPTICISM AMONG CHRISTIAN CHURCHES AND PARTIES AMONG SELECTED EU MEMBER STATES: POSITION OF COUNTRIES BY ACTORS' PREFERENCES

		Euroscepticism among Christian parties		
		Hard	Soft	None (pro-EU)
Euroscepticism among Christian churches	Hard	Netherlands (CU/SGP) Poland (LPR)		
	Soft			Denmark Sweden
	None (pro-EU)	Finland (SKL)	Portugal (CDS)	Germany (CDU/CSU) Netherlands (CDA) Finland (KK) Italy (PPI)

Notes: Parties' abbreviations in parentheses. No Euroscepticism among parties is based on a value above 5.0 in the 1990s (see Table 2).
Sources: See Tables 2 and 4.

that with the exception of the League for Polish Families (LPR), Euroscepticism – hard or soft – has no place in Christian Democratic parties in the EU member states researched here. In general, there is a slight decline in support for European integration in a number of major Christian parties, but this does not qualify as Euroscepticism (with some qualifications, the Bavarian CSU can be seen as bordering on soft Euroscepticism but the CSU is not a national party). Euroscepticism in Christian parties can be found in smaller parties with a more fundamentalist following: the Dutch Calvinist parties (CU and SGP), the Finnish fundamentalist party (SKL), along with the Polish LPR. The reason presumably lies in the fact that these parties are supported by electorates linked to churches or communities which, due to their sectarian nature and limited size, allow less internal difference in faith and outlook on life. However, even these Eurosceptic and radical parties have moved away from their former extreme position and have toned down their negativism towards the EU (see Raunio 1999: 151; Sitter 2003: 13; Vollaard 2006: 293).

When combining the data in Tables 3 and 6, one can find a double cleavage factor. In countries, where the religious cleavage is relatively salient (Netherlands, Italy, Finland), the major Christian parties are strongly in favour of European integration. This is also true for Germany and Sweden with a medium-level salience of the religious cleavage. But in these countries, the major Christian parties compete with smaller – and more radical– ones which show a strong hard Euroscepticism (CU/SGP in the Netherlands, SKL in Finland). It may well be that other factors are involved as well, but our data suggest at least the hypothesis that a strong religious cleavage on European integration makes room for more than one Christian party and opens a new competitive space for the definition of religion.

In line with the results from previous research (Sundback 2002; Vollaard 2006; Madeley 2007), hard Euroscepticism prevails among smaller and more radical denominations, such as Evangelicals in the Nordic countries, Calvinists in the Netherlands, and the orthodox wing of Catholicism. However, in no country analysed so far did these positions have political relevance in terms of successful lobbying against the EU. The sources for hard Euroscepticism are religious-doctrinary (for example, the eschatological demonisation of the EU) and economic-nationalistic (see above). In the Nordic countries Euroscepticism mixes with anti-Catholic sentiments. In Poland, the main issue of concern is value decay represented by the West and the national sovereignty issue.

In general, the major Catholic and Protestant churches did and do support the process of European integration and enlargement – the initial tension between pro-integrationist Catholics and nationally oriented, EU-sceptical Protestants has given way to an ecumenical approach to Europe. The respective national regimes of church–state relations do not bear on these positions (see Table 1 above). At the same time, both churches cautiously observe and comment on the integration process. Here, we may identify slightly different perspectives or issues of concern: the Catholic churches pay much attention to the 'threat of secularism', which is represented by liberal legislation in the field of bioethics and reproduction. Another point of critique – and aspect of divergence – is the lack of a reference to God in the European constitution. There is, typically, particular attention by the Catholic Church to morality and symbolism which does not mean, however, that socio-economic problems, issues of inequality etc., are ignored. Protestant churches seem to pay more attention to these socio-economic divides, migration and poverty as (possible) consequences of European integration. Furthermore, particularly in the Nordic countries and in the UK, the activism of the Catholic Church at the EU level is seen with (slight) animosity.

Conclusion

In the context of secularisation processes resulting in 'a post-Christian Europe' (Casanova 2006) and unprecedented levels of religious pluralism, the religiously determined cleavage between Europhiles and Eurosceptics in the EU takes on a reassuring quality. Although the contemporary EU may be rather different from what its Catholic founding fathers had in mind, the article has shown that the EU did not become a victim of the schism between Catholics and Protestants. Rather, in both domains of Christian parties and churches, Euroscepticism is a marginal phenomenon. The answer to the article's initial question to what extent religious, in particular Christian, actors such as religious parties and the churches have strayed from the integrationist path and contributed to Euroscepticism, must be: only minimally, yet importantly. Formerly Eurosceptic Christian parties

have moderated their message, and confessional divides among churches and religious groups do not translate into political camps of Europhiles and Eurosceptics.

The mainstream churches are overwhelmingly pro EU, or at least not Eurosceptic as understood here. Variations of church–state regimes may help explaining churches' position towards the integration process, with established (Protestant) churches apparently having more to lose under a system of multilevel governance, in which limits are imposed on national sovereignty. But the difference between established churches and a regime of separation does not explain the current phase of the trajectory, and as the Swedish case shows, full establishment may give way to a more flexible approach to religious diversity. Only fundamentalist groups stray from the big group of pro-integrationists. More in-depth research should be done with regard to these groups and the sector of anti-EU single issue organisations.

Acknowledgements

The author thanks Anja Hennig (EUV Frankfurt/Oder) and the Viadrina research team for their research of material, their observations and critical suggestions. Many thanks also to the R.E.M. research group and the two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments.

Notes

1. Wolfram Kaiser (2007) has produced a thoroughly researched and detailed analysis of the central role of the Christian Democratic transnational networks in the launching and development of the European integration process. However, it is striking that – except for a brief mention of the Vatican's changing attitudes to Christian Democracy and European integration under Pius XII and the Vatican's broad support for 'core Europe integration' (Kaiser 2007: 180f.), he does so without one single reference to the contribution of (Christian) churches to this process, or their relationship to the Christian Democrats. For a more detailed view on the churches and in particular the Vatican's role in the early ear of European integration, see the contributions to Greschat and Loth (1994), especially Chenaux (1994).
2. The actual process towards European integration was thoroughly discussed only in the British case. The other countries are Estonia, Finland, Germany, and Sweden. A general observation of this project 'Churches and European Integration' is that the churches did more to assist than to hinder the processes of European integration (CEI 2004: 6; see http://www.helsinki.fi/teol/khl/tutkimus/cei/CEIFinalReport.pdf).
3. Concerning the research on parties, Ray (1999) and Taggart (1998) cover the time from 1986 to 1996; the CEI project ends in 2004.
4. In this analysis of party positions on European integration, preference was given to expert surveys over party manifestos. This decision follows the arguments by Leonard Ray in his EJPR article (1999) that some issues such as European integration are treated quite differently in individual party manifestos, that comparisons across time and countries are very difficult on the basis of manifestos, and that manifestos are often not available for small parties, thus reducing the universe of parties to be studied.
5. See note 1.

6. A complete list of sources can be obtained from the author (mm1807@nyu.edu).
7. See Ian Paisley, 'Architect of European Union Advancing to R C Sainthood While the U K is Prepared by Blair to Surrender her Birthright', European Institute of Protestant Studies, 23 June 2003 (http://ianpaisley.org/article.asp?ArtKey=architect; accessed 18 February 2008).
8. For these reactions from Catholic leaders (see http://www.june29th.com/cardinal_sim_int.htm; accessed 12 February 2008; http://www.katholisch.de/13959.html; accessed 31 January 2009).
9. Denmark does not appear in this category simply because of its relatively small fundamentalist currents. Some groups like Danish Association and New Era can be considered Eurosceptic as well but they are part of the radical right political spectrum rather than churches (see Rydgren 2004).

References

Almond, Gabriel, Russell J. Dalton, G. Bingham Powell, and Kaare Strøm, eds. (2006). *European Politics Today,* 3rd ed. New York: Longman.

Beichelt, Timm (2004). 'Euro-skepticism in the EU Accession Countries', *Comparative European Politics*, 2:11, 29–50.

Boomgaarden, Hajo G., and André Freire (2009). 'Religion and Euroscepticism: Direct, Indirect or No Effects?', *West European Politics*, 32:6, 1240–65.

Broughton, David, and Hans-Martien ten Napel, eds. (2000). *Religion and Mass Electoral Behaviour in Europe*. London and New York: Routledge.

Byrnes, Timothy A. (2006). 'Transnational Religion and Europeanization', in Timothy A. Byrnes and Peter J. Katzenstein (eds.), *Religion in an Expanding Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 283–305.

Byrnes, Timothy A., and Peter J. Katzenstein, eds. (2006). *Religion in an Expanding Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Casanova, José (1994). *Public Religions in the Modern World*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Casanova, José (2006). 'Religion, European Secular Identities and European Integration', in Timothy A. Byrnes and Peter J. Katzenstein (eds.), *Religion in an Expanding Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 65–92.

CEI (2004). 'Churches and European Integration, International Research Project. Final Report', Helsinki, available at http://www.helsinki.fi/teol/khl/tutkimus/cei/CEIFinalReport.pdf (accessed 12 February 2008).

Chaves, Mark, and David E. Cann (1992). 'Regulation, Pluralism, and Religious Market Structure. Explaining Religion's Vitality', *Rationality and Society*, 4:3, 272–90.

Chenaux, Philippe (1994). 'Der Vatikan und die Entstehung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft', in Martin Greschat and Wilfried Loth (eds.), *Die Christen und die Entstehung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft*. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 97–124.

Conway, Martin (2003). 'The Age of Christian Democracy. The Frontiers of Success and Failure', in Thomas Kselman and Joseph A. Buttigieg (eds.), *European Christian Democracy. Historical Legacies and Comparative Perspective*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 43–67.

Dalton, Russell J. (1996). *Citizen Politics,* 2nd ed. Catham, NJ: Chatham House.

Dalton, Russell J. (2002). *Citizen Politics,* 3rd ed. Catham, NJ: Chatham House.

Dalton, Russell J. (2006). *Citizen Politics,* 4th ed. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.

De Vreese, Claes H., and Hajo G. Boomgaarden, with Michael Minkenberg, and Rens Vliegenthart (2009). 'Introduction: Religion and the European Union', *West European Politics*, 32:6, 1182–9.

Donovan, Mark (2000). 'Italy: A Dramatic Case of Secularisation?', in David Broughton and Hans-Martien ten Napel (eds.), *Religion and Mass Electoral Behaviour in Europe*. London and New York: Routledge, 140–56.

Fox, Jonathan (2008). *A World Survey of Religion and the State*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Greschat, Martin (1994). 'Der Protestantismus und die Entstehung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft', in Martin Greschat and Wilfried Loth (eds.), *Die Christen und die Entstehung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft*. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 25–98.

Greschat, Martin, and Wilfried Loth, eds. (1994). *Die Christen und die Entstehung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft*. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.

Gustafsson, Göran (2003). 'Church–State Separation Swedish Style', in John Madeley and Zsolt Enyedi (eds.), *Church and State in Contemporary Europe. The Chimera of Neutrality*. London: Frank Cass, 51–72.

Hagevi, Magnus (2002). 'Religiosity and Swedish Opinion on the European Union', *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 41:4, 759–69.

Hanley, David, ed. (1994). *Christian Democracy in Europe. A Comparative Perspective*. London: Pinter.

Hanley, David (2003). 'Die Zukunft der europäischen Christdemokratie', in Michael Minkenberg and Ulrich Willems (eds.), *Politik und Religion*. Special Issue 33/2002 of Politische Vierteljahresschrift. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 231–55.

Hassemer, Volker (2007). '"A Soul for Europe" 2009 – Restructuring and Expansion', Berliner Konferenz, available at http://www.asoulforeurope.eu/uploads/media/Set_of_basic_principles_-_Restructuring_and_Expansion_12_07.pdf (accessed 31 January 2009).

Jackowska, Natalia (2003). 'Polens katholische Kirche und die Europäische Integration', *WeltTrends*, 39, 120–32.

Kaiser, Wolfram (2007). *Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kalyvas, Stathis (1996). *The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Knutsen, Oddbjørn (2004a). *Social Structure and Party Choice in Western Europe. A Comparative Longitudinal Study*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Knutsen, Oddbjørn (2004b). 'Religious Denomination and Party Choice in Western Europe: A Comparative Longitudinal Study from Eight Countries, 1970–1997', *International Political Science Review*, 25:1, 97–128.

Kopecký, Petr, and Cas Mudde (2002). 'Two Sides of Euroscepticism. Party Positions on European Integration in East Central Europe', *European Union Politics*, 3:3, 297–326.

Krause, Johannes (2007). 'A Soul for Europe? Contributions of European Churches to the Forum of the Convention on the Future of Europe', Unpublished Master's thesis. Helskinki: Helsinki University, Theological Faculty.

Kselman, Thomas, and Joseph A. Buttigieg, eds. (2003). *European Christian Democracy. Historical Legacies and Comparative Perspective*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.

Leenders, Marij, and Wim van Meurs (2005). 'Details zur Entscheidung – Das Volk hat gesprochen . . .', available at http://www.cap-lmu.de/themen/eu-reform/ratifikation/niederlande.php (accessed 5 November 2007).

Madeley, John (2000). 'Reading the Runes: The Religious Factor in Scandinavian Electoral Politics', in David Broughton and Hans-Martien ten Napel (eds.), *Religion and Mass Electoral Behaviour in Europe*. London and New York: Routledge, 28–43.

Madeley, John (2007). 'Grit or Pearl? The Religious Factor in the Politics of European Integration', Paper for the ECPR 35th Joint Session of Workshops, Helsinki, 7–12 May.

Madeley, John, and Zsolt Enyedi, eds. (2003). *Church and State in Contemporary Europe. The Chimera of Neutrality*. London: Frank Cass.

Madeley, John, and Nick Sitter (2003). 'Differential Euroscepticism among Nordic Christian Parties: Protestantism or Protest?', Paper presented at the PSA Scandinavian Politics Specialist Group, Leicester, April.

Martin, David (1978). *A General Theory of Secularization*. New York: Harper & Row.

Minkenberg, Michael (2002). 'Religion and Public Policy: Institutional, Cultural, and Political Impact on the Shaping of Abortion Policies in Western Democracies', *Comparative Political Studies*, 35:2, 221–47.

Minkenberg, Michael (2003a). 'Staat und Kirche in westlichen Demokratien', in Michael Minkenberg and Ulrich Willems (eds.), *Politik und Religion*. Special Issue 33/2002 of Politische Vierteljahresschrift. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 115–38.

Minkenberg, Michael (2003b). 'The Policy Impact of Church–State Relations: Family Policy and Abortion in Britain, France and Germany', in John Madeley and Zsolt Enyedi (eds.), *Church and State in Contemporary Europe. The Chimera of Neutrality*. London: Frank Cass, 195–217.

Minkenberg, Michael (2007). 'Democracy and Religion. Theoretical and Empirical Observations on the Relationship between Christianity, Islam and Liberal Democracy', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 33:6, 887–909.

Minkenberg, Michael (2008) 'Europe and Its Schisms: Religion, the European Project and Euroskepticism', *Europe NYC. Newsletter of the New York Consortium for European Studies*, November, 1, 4–9.

Nelsen, Brent F., James L. Guth, and Cleveland R. Fraser (2001). 'Does Religion Matter?', *European Union Politics*, 2:2, 191–217.

Norris, Pippa, and Ronald Inglehart (2004). *Sacred and Secular. Religion and Politics Worldwide*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Philpott, Daniel, and Timothy Samuel Shah (2006). 'Faith, Freedom, and Federation: The Role of Religious Ideas and Institutions in European Political Convergence', in Timothy A. Byrnes and Peter J. Katzenstein (eds.), *Religion in an Expanding Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 34–64.

Pollack, Detlef (2003). 'Das Verhältnis von Religion und Politik in den postkommunistischen Staaten Ostmittel- und Osteuropas und seine Auswirkungen auf die Vitalität des religiösen Feldes', in Michael Minkenberg and Ulrich Willems (eds.), *Politik und Religion*. Special Issue 33/2002 of Politische Vierteljahresschrift. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 435–55.

Ramet, Sabrina (2006). 'Thy Will Be Done: The Catholic Church and Politics in Poland since 1989', in Timothy A. Byrnes and Peter J. Katzenstein (eds.), *Religion in an Expanding Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 117–47.

Raunio, Tapio (1999). 'Facing the European Challenge: Finnish Parties Adjust to the Integration Process', *West European Politics*, 22:1, 138–59.

Raunio, Tapio (2007). 'Softening but Persistent: Euroscepticism in the Nordic EU Countries', *Acta Politica*, 42, 191–210.

Ray, Leonard (1999). 'Measuring Party Orientations towards European Integration: Results from an Expert Survey', *European Journal of Political Research*, 36, 283–306.

Rydgren, Jens (2004). 'Explaining the Emergence of Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties: The Case of Denmark', *West European Politics*, 27:3, 474–502.

Santer, Jacques (1998). 'Europe under Challenge – Reconciliation and Meaning', Occasional Paper No. 4, Ecumenical Association for Church and Society, Brussels, 25–37.

Silvestri, Sara (2009). 'Islam and Religion in the Political System of the EU', *West European Politics*, 32:6, 1212–39.

Sitter, Nick (2003). 'Euro-scepticism as Party Strategy: Persistence and Change in Party-Based Opposition to European Integration', Paper presented at the EUSA 8th International Biennial Conference, 27–29 March, Nashville, Tennessee.

Sundback, Susan (2002). 'The Nordic Lutheran Churches and the EU Question in 1994', *Temenos*, 37–38, 191–208.

Taggart. Paul (1998). 'A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary Western European party systems', *European Journal of Political Research*, 33, 363–88.

Taggart, Paul, and Aleks Szerszerbiak (2004). 'Contemporary Euroscepticism in the Party Systems of the European Union Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe', *European Journal of Political Research*, 43, 1–27.

Thomas, Scott (2005). *The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Van der Brug, Wouter, Sara Hobolt, and Claes H. de Vreese (2009). 'Religion and Party Choice in Europe', *West European Politics*, 32:6, 1266–83.

Van Hecke, Steven, and Emmanuel Gerard, eds. (2004). *Christian Democratic Parties in Europe since the End of the Cold War*. Leuven: Leuven University Press.

Van Holsteyn, Joop J.M., and Galen A. Irwin (2000) 'The Bells Toll No More: The Declining Influence of Religion on Voting Behaviour in the Netherlands', in David Broughton and Hans-Martien ten Napel (eds.), *Religion and Mass Electoral Behaviour in Europe*. London and New York: Routledge, 75–96.

Van Kersbergen, Kees (1995). *Social Capitalism. A Study of Christian Democracy and the Welfare State*. London: Routledge.

Vollaard, Hans (2006). 'Protestantism and Euro-scepticism in the Netherlands', *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, 7:3, 276–97.

Weber, Max (1920). *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie I* [Collected Essays on Sociology of Religion, I]. Tübingen: Mohr.

Willaime, Jean-Paul (2004). *Europe et Religions. Les enjeus du XXIe Siècle*. Paris: Fayard.