

3 Religion, European secular identities, and European integration

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Since the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 that established the EEC and initiated the ongoing process of European integration, Western European societies have undergone a rapid, drastic, and seemingly irreversible process of secularization. In this respect, one can talk of the emergence of a post-Christian Europe. At the same time, the process of European integration, the eastward expansion of the European Union, and the drafting of a European constitution have triggered fundamental questions concerning European identity and the role of Christianity in that identity. What constitutes “Europe”? How and where should one draw the external territorial and the internal cultural boundaries of Europe? The most controversial, yet rarely openly confronted and therefore most anxiety-producing, issues are the potential integration of Turkey and the potential integration of non-European immigrants, who in most European countries happen to be overwhelmingly Muslim. But the eastward expansion of the European Union, particularly the incorporation of an assertive Catholic Poland, and the debates over some kind of affirmation or recognition of the Christian heritage in the preamble of the new European constitution, have added unexpected “religious” irritants to the debates over Europeanization. It is the interrelation between these phenomena – the role of Catholic Poland, the incorporation of Turkey, the integration of Muslim immigrants, and references to the Christian heritage in the European constitution – and the European secular mindset that I would like to explore in this chapter.¹

The progressive, though highly uneven, secularization of Europe is an undeniable social fact (Martin, 1978; Greeley, 2003). An increasing majority of the European population has ceased participating in traditional religious practices, at least on a regular basis, while still maintaining relatively high levels of private individual religious beliefs. In this respect, one should perhaps talk of the *unchurching* of the European population and of religious individualization, rather than of secularization. Grace Davie (1994b, 2000) has characterized this general European situation as “believing without belonging.” At the same time, however, large numbers

of Europeans even in the most secular countries still identify themselves as “Christian,” pointing to an implicit, diffused, and submerged Christian cultural identity. In this sense, Danièle Hervieu-Léger (2003) is also correct when she offers the reverse characterization of the European situation as “belonging without believing.” “Secular” and “Christian” cultural identities are intertwined in complex and rarely verbalized modes among most Europeans.

The most interesting issue sociologically is not the fact of progressive religious decline among the European population, but the fact that this decline is interpreted through the lenses of the secularization paradigm and is therefore accompanied by a “secularist” self-understanding that interprets the decline as “normal” and “progressive,” that is, as a quasi-normative consequence of being a “modern” and “enlightened” European. It is this “secular” identity shared by European elites and ordinary people alike that paradoxically turns “religion” and the barely submerged Christian European identity into a thorny and perplexing issue when it comes to delimiting the external geographic boundaries and to defining the internal cultural identity of a European Union in the process of being constituted.

There is a certain irony in the whole debate, since the initial project of a European Union was fundamentally a Christian Democratic project, sanctioned by the Vatican, at a time of a general religious revival in post-World War Two Europe, in the geopolitical context of the Cold War when “the free world” and “Christian civilization” had become synonymous. But this is a forgotten history that secular Europeans, proud of having outgrown a religious past from which they feel liberated, would prefer not to remember. “Religious” issues serve as irritants to secular Europeans precisely because they serve to fuel the “glimmering embers” (Katzenstein, this volume) of Christianity, while at the same time confirming the widely shared secularist assumption that it is best to banish religion from the public sphere in order to tame the passionate conflicts and irrational attitudes which religion is assumed to bring into politics. Any public recognition of the Christian heritage or of the living religious traditions of contemporary Europeans, it is assumed, would make liberal political coexistence and pluralist toleration in a united Europe nearly impossible. Rather than recognizing the “really existing” religious and secular pluralisms and the multiple European modernities, the dominant discourses in Europe prefer to hold on to the idea of a single secular modernity, emerging out of the Enlightenment. Only secular neutrality is supposed to guarantee liberal tolerance and pluralist multicultural recognition in an expanded European Union. Thus, the secularist paradox, that in the name of freedom, individual

autonomy, tolerance, and cultural pluralism, religious people – Christian, Jewish, and Muslim – are being asked to keep their religious beliefs, identities, and norms “private” so that they do not disturb the project of a modern, secular, enlightened Europe.

Catholic Poland in post-Christian Europe: secular normalization or great apostolic assignment?

The fact that Catholic Poland is “rejoining Europe” at a time when Western Europe is forsaking its Christian civilizational identity has produced a perplexing situation for Catholic Poles and secular Europeans alike. Even though as a Roman Catholic country Poland has generally followed Western European religious developments, it has also manifested long-term historical patterns of divergence from Western developments (Casanova, 2003b; Kloczowski, 2000). It suffices to state here the most significant patterns.

Prince Mieszko’s decision to adopt Latin Christianity as the official cult of the Piast court in 966 was to determine the civilizational identity of Poland as an integral part and borderland of Western European civilization, particularly after the Prince of Kievan Rus, Volodymyr, adopted Byzantine Christianity two decades later. Medieval Poland followed general Western European religio-political developments.

In the early modern era, however, the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth followed a noticeably divergent development as a decentralized and religiously pluralistic “aristocratic *res publica*” at a time when Western European monarchies were consolidating their centralized absolutist rule and subjecting the national churches to state control. At a time of generalized religious warfare and state repression of dissenting religious minorities in the rest of Europe, the Commonwealth offered a striking example of peaceful coexistence of various Christian churches (Catholic, Lutheran, and Orthodox), of toleration of dissenting Christian sects (Calvinists, Anabaptists, Brethren, Anti-Trinitarians, and Armenian Monophysites), and of religious freedom for non-Christian minorities (Jews, Karaites, and Muslim Tatars). In fact, early modern Poland became a haven for dissenting faiths fleeing generalized religious warfare in Europe. It was at this time that Poland emerged as the largest center of Jewish settlement in the world and remained so until the Holocaust.

The nationalization of Polish Catholicism took place in the nineteenth century not as a process of state formation from above, but as a process of resistance from below to foreign state power. Church and nation became identified at a time when the Catholic Church became the only institution able somewhat to cut across the partition of Prussian, Russian, and

Austrian Poland. During the nineteenth century, Catholicism, romantic nationalism, and Slavic messianism fused into a new Polish civil religion. Nineteenth-century Poland avoided the typical Western European patterns of conflicts between the Catholic Church and the secular liberal state, between the Church and a secular humanist intelligentsia becoming increasingly anti-clerical, and between the Church and a socialist workers' movement turning first anti-clerical and then militantly atheist. In fact, the first generations of Polish workers were neither dechristianized nor denationalized, at least not to the extent that was common elsewhere. On the contrary, often there was a fusion of class, religious, and national identities, a pattern that re-emerged with the Solidarity movement in 1980.

Throughout the communist era Polish Catholicism underwent an extraordinary revival at the very same time when Western European societies were undergoing a drastic process of secularization. But, it is important to view Polish Catholicism not as a vestigial residue of a traditional society, as theories of modernization and secularization tend to imply, but as the result of modern processes of religious revitalization. Indeed, with the establishment of a Polish independent state after World War One, the unity of Church and nation began to dissolve, and in the interwar era, despite the nostalgia with which, according to Ramet (chapter 5), the Church hierarchy may view this period, Catholic Poland began to approximate more general European religious–secular developments. The unity of Church and nation began to dissolve. There appeared the standard cleavages between classes, parties, and ideologies. Anti-clericalism, though mild by Latin standards, also began to emerge. It appeared in the quarrels between the non-confessional Polish state and the Church. It appeared among large sectors of the intelligentsia, which had finally incorporated the Enlightenment as well as the positivist and Marxist critiques of religion. It appeared within the socialist left and within the peasants' movement led by Wincenty Witos. It was the Nazi occupation and the clumsy attempts of the communist regime to impose the Soviet model of forced secularization from above that created the conditions for the revitalization of Polish Catholicism and the persistence of Polish “exceptionalism.”

The reintegration of Catholic Poland into secular Europe can be viewed therefore as “a difficult challenge” and/or as “a great apostolic assignment.” Anticipating the threat of secularization, the integralist sectors of Polish Catholicism have adopted a negative attitude toward European integration. Exhorted by the Polish Pope, the leadership of the Polish Church, by contrast, has embraced European integration as a great apostolic assignment.²

Looking at Polish attitudes (Stadtmüller, 2000) toward European integration one can distinguish four different types of “europhobes,” i.e. those who are against integration because of what “Europe” represents. First, there are those on the communist left who are not against European integration *per se*, but only against integration into capitalist Europe, and who would therefore be ready for integration after a European social revolution. Second, there are those who on nationalist grounds are against any type of multinational integration because it limits national sovereignty and is dangerous for national identity and Polish national values. Third, there are those who are still afraid of German expansionism and view the EU as a front for such expansionism, and may therefore be regarded as a particular variant of the nationalist “europhobes”. Finally, there are the Catholic “europhobes”, those who are against European integration because today’s Europe has lost its Christian identity and therefore its secular, materialist, hedonist values represent a threat to Poland’s Catholic identity and values. This is the view held by integralist sectors of Polish Catholicism, such as Radio Maryja, father Tadeusz Rydzyk or Bishop Stanisław Stefanek. What Catholic “europhobes” fear is the threat of secularization inherent in cultural Europeanization.

The anxieties of the “europhobes” would seem to be fully justified since the basic premise of the secularization paradigm, namely, that the more modern a society the more secular it becomes, seems to be a widespread and taken-for-granted assumption in Poland also. Since modernization, in the sense of catching up with European levels of political, economic, social, and cultural development, is one of the goals of European integration, most observers tend to anticipate that such a modernization will lead to secularization also in Poland, putting an end to Polish religious “exceptionalism.”³ Poland becoming at last a “normal” and “unexceptional” European country is after all one of the aims of the “Euroenthusiasts.” But the European “norm” of secularization warrants some more critical scrutiny, as I will try to show in the final section of this chapter.

The Polish episcopate, nevertheless, has accepted enthusiastically the papal apostolic assignment and has repeatedly stressed that one of its goals once Poland rejoins Europe is “to restore Europe for Christianity.” While it may sound preposterous to Western European ears, such a message has found resonance in the tradition of Polish messianism. Barring a radical change in the European secular *Zeitgeist*, however, such an evangelistic effort has little chance of success. Given the loss of demand for religion in Western Europe, the supply of surplus Polish pastoral resources for a European-wide evangelizing effort is unlikely to prove effective. The, at best lukewarm, if not outright hostile, European

response to John Paul II's renewed calls for a European Christian revival, points to the difficulty of the assignment.

One could propose, perhaps, a less ambitious, though no less arduous, apostolic assignment with equally remarkable effects. Let Poland prove the secularization thesis wrong. Let *Polonia semper fidelis* keep faith with its Catholic identity and tradition while succeeding in its integration into Europe, thus becoming a "normal" European country. Such an outcome, if feasible, could suggest that the decline of religion in Europe might be not a teleological process necessarily linked with modernization but a historical choice which Europeans have made. A modern religious Poland could perhaps force secular Europeans to rethink their secularist assumptions and realize that it is not so much Poland which is out of sync with modern trends, but rather secular Europe which is out of sync with the rest of the world. The delineation of such a provocative, though unlikely, scenario here is only meant to break the spell which secularism holds over the European mind and over the social sciences.

Granted, even this more modest apostolic assignment of keeping faith with the Polish Catholic tradition may prove too lofty a task. To maintain a tradition under modern conditions demands a constant renewal of this tradition and creative responses to the changing challenges, and not just a traditionalist defense of the faith against the threats of liberalism, hedonism, and relativism. Religious trends in post-communist Poland are not encouraging. The Polish Church has squandered much of its authority with its protectionist defense of its institutional power, with its heavy-handed interventions in parliamentary proceedings, in electoral processes, and in public debates, with its clerical resistance to giving greater autonomy to the laity, and with its mistrust of modern individual freedoms, of freedom of conscience as well as of intellectual, artistic, and moral freedoms, particularly, as pointed out by Ramet in chapter 5, with its fundamentalist resistance to modern transformations in gender relations and sexual morality.

Obviously, only the future will tell whether Polish Catholicism has been up to the opportunity and the challenge presented by European integration. Western European observers are accustomed to discount manifestations of Polish religious effervescence and Polish messianism as annoying and hopelessly anachronistic, if not reactionary, expression of the Polish romantically heroic, yet desperate, penchant to resist the march of history. It happened during the nineteenth-century Polish uprisings and it happened during the Solidarity movement. Polish and Western European developments appeared seriously out of sync. Yet, in both cases the Poles confounded the prevailing *Zeitgeist*. The surprising, some would say miraculous, elevation of Cardinal Wojtyła to the papacy

as John Paul II, his triumphal visit to Poland in 1979, the rise of Solidarity a year later, and the collapse of the Soviet system in 1989, bringing to an end the Cold War and the division of Eastern and Western Europe, altered radically the march of history and global geopolitical configurations.⁴ The repeatedly demonstrated power of renewal of Polish Catholicism, which should not be confused with a residual and recessive tradition, has confounded skeptics and critics before. It could happen again.

Could a democratic Muslim Turkey ever join the European Christian club or which is the torn country?

While the threat of a Polish Christian crusade awakens little fear among secular Europeans confident of their ability to assimilate Catholic Poland on their own terms, the prospect of Turkey joining the European Union generates much greater anxieties among Europeans, Christian and post-Christian alike, but of a kind which cannot be easily verbalized, at least not publicly. Turkey has been patiently knocking on the door of the European club since 1959, only to be told politely to keep waiting, while watching latecomer after latecomer being invited first in successive waves of accession.

The formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 by the six founding members (Benelux, France, Italy and West Germany) and its expansion into the European Economic Community (EEC) or “common market” in 1957 were predicated upon two historic reconciliations: the reconciliation between France and Germany, two countries which had been at war or preparing for war from 1870 to 1945, and the reconciliation between Protestants and Catholics within Christian Democracy. Indeed ruling or prominent Christian Democrats in all six countries played the leading role in the initial process of European integration. The Cold War, the Marshall Plan, NATO, and the newly established Washington–Rome Axis formed the geopolitical context for both reconciliations. Greece in June 1959 and Turkey in July 1959, hostile enemies yet members of NATO, were the first two countries to apply for association to the EEC. That same July, the other Western European countries formed EFTA as an alternative economic association. Only Franco’s Spain was left out of all initial Western European associations and alliances.

Granted, the EEC always made clear that candidates for admission would have to meet stringent economic and political conditions. Ireland, the United Kingdom, and Denmark formally applied for admission in 1961 but only joined in 1973. Spain and Portugal were unambiguously rebuffed as long as they had authoritarian regimes, but were given clear

conditions and definite timetables once their democracies seemed on the road to consolidation. Both joined in 1986. Greece, meanwhile, had already gained admission in 1981 and with it *de facto* veto power over Turkey's admission. But even after Greece and Turkey entered a quasi-détente and Greece expressed its readiness to sponsor Turkey's admission in exchange for the admission of the entire island of Cyprus, Turkey still did not receive an unambiguous answer, being told once again to go back to the end of the waiting line. The fall of the Berlin Wall once again rearranged the priorities and the direction of European integration eastward. In 2004 ten new members, eight ex-communist countries plus Malta and Cyprus, joined the European Union. Practically all the territories of medieval Christendom, that is, of Catholic and Protestant Europe, are now reunited in the new Europe. Only Catholic Croatia and "neutral" Switzerland and Norway are left out, while "Orthodox" Greece as well as Greek Cyprus are the only religious "other." "Orthodox" Romania and Bulgaria are supposed to be next in line, but without a clear timetable. Even less clear is if and when the negotiations for Turkey's admission will begin in earnest.

The first open, if not yet formal, discussions of Turkey's candidacy during the 2002 Copenhagen Summit touched a raw nerve among all kinds of European "publics." The widespread debate revealed how much "Islam," with all its distorted representations as "the other" of Western civilization, was the real issue rather than the extent to which Turkey was ready to meet the same stringent economic and political conditions as all other new members. About Turkey's eagerness to join and willingness to meet the conditions, there could be no doubt now that the new AKP government had reiterated unambiguously the position of all the previous Turkish "secularist" administrations. Turkey's "publics," secularist and Muslim alike, have spoken in unison. The new government is certainly the most representative democratic government of all of Turkey's modern history. A wide consensus has seemingly been reached among the Turkish population, showing that Turkey is no longer a "torn country" on the issue of joining Europe and thus "the West." Two of the three requirements stated by Samuel Huntington (1996: 139) for a torn country to redefine successfully its civilizational identity had clearly been met: "First, the political and economic elite of the country has to be generally supportive of and enthusiastic about this move. Second, the public has to be at least willing to acquiesce in the redefinition of identity." It was the third requirement that apparently was missing: "the dominant elements in the host civilization, in most cases the West, have to be willing to embrace the convert."

The dream of Kemal, "Father of the Turks," of begetting a modern Western secular republican Turkish nation-state modeled after French

republican *laïcité* has proven not easily attainable, at least not on Kemalist secularist terms. But the possibility of a democratic Turkey, truly representative of its ordinary Muslim population, joining the European Union, is today for the first time real. The “six arrows” of Kemalism (republicanism, nationalism, secularism, statism, populism, and reformism) could not lead toward a workable representative democracy. Ultimately, the project of constructing such a nation-state from above was bound to fail because it was too secular for the Islamists, too Sunni for the Alevis, and too Turkish for the Kurds. A Turkish state in which the collective identities and interests of those groups that constitute the overwhelming majority of the population cannot find public representation cannot possibly be a truly representative democracy, even if it is founded on modern secular republican principles. But Muslim Democracy is as possible and viable today in Turkey as Christian Democracy was half a century ago in Western Europe. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) of Tayyip Erdoğan defines itself as a “Muslim Democratic” rather than as an “Islamist” party. Yet it has been repeatedly accused of being “fundamentalist” and of undermining the sacred secularist principles of the Kemalist constitution which bans “religious” as well as “ethnic” parties, religion and ethnicity being forms of identity which are not allowed public representation in secular Turkey.⁵

One wonders whether democracy does not become an impossible “game” when potential majorities are not allowed to win elections, and when secular civilian politicians ask the military to come to the rescue of democracy by banning these potential majorities, which threaten their secular identity and their power. Practically every continental European country has had religious parties at one time or another. Many of them, particularly the Catholic ones, had dubious democratic credentials until the negative learning experience of fascism turned them into Christian Democratic parties. Unless people are allowed to play the game fairly, it may be difficult for them to appreciate the rules and to acquire a democratic habitus. One wonders, who are the real “fundamentalists” here?: “Muslims” who want to gain public recognition of their identity and demand the right to mobilize in order to advance their ideal and material interests, while respecting the democratic rules of the game, or “secularists” who view the Muslim veil worn by a duly elected parliamentary representative as a threat to Turkish democracy and as a blasphemous affront against the sacred secularist principles of the Kemalist state? Could the European Union accept the public representation of Islam within its boundaries? Can “secular” Europe admit “Muslim” democratic Turkey? Officially, Europe’s refusal to accept Turkey so far is mainly based on Turkey’s deficient human rights record. But there are

not too subtle indications that an outwardly secular Europe is still too Christian when it comes to the possibility of imagining a Muslim country as part of the European community. One wonders whether Turkey represents a threat to Western civilization or rather an unwelcome reminder of the barely submerged yet inexpressible and anxiety-ridden “white” European Christian identity.

The widespread public debate in Europe over Turkey’s admission showed that Europe was actually the torn country, deeply divided over its cultural identity, unable to answer the question of whether European unity, and therefore its external and internal boundaries, should be defined by the common heritage of Christianity and Western civilization or by its modern secular values of liberalism, universal human rights, political democracy, and tolerant and inclusive multiculturalism. Publicly, of course, European liberal secular elites could not share the Pope’s definition of European civilization as essentially Christian. But they also could not verbalize the unspoken “cultural” requirements that make the integration of Turkey into Europe such a difficult issue. The specter of millions of Turkish citizens already in Europe, but not of Europe, many of them second-generation immigrants caught between an old country they have left behind and their European host societies unable or unwilling to fully assimilate them, only makes the problem the more visible. “Guest workers” can be successfully incorporated economically. They may even gain voting rights, at least on the local level, and prove to be model or at least ordinary citizens. But can they pass the unwritten rules of cultural European membership or are they to remain “strangers”? Can the European Union open new conditions for the kind of multiculturalism that its constituent national societies find so difficult to accept?

Can the European Union welcome and integrate the immigrant “other”? Can Islam and other non-Western immigrant religions become “public” European religions?

Throughout the modern era Western European societies have been immigrant sending countries, indeed the primary immigrant sending region in the world. During the colonial phase, European colonists and colonizers, indentured servants and penal laborers, missionaries, entrepreneurs, and colonial administrators settled in all the corners of the globe. During the age of industrialization, from the 1800s to the 1920s, it is estimated that around 85 million Europeans emigrated to the New World and to the southern hemisphere, 60 percent of them to the United

States alone (Hirschman et al., 1999). In the last decades, however, the migration flows have reversed and many Western European societies have become instead centers of global immigration. A comparison with the United States, the paradigmatic immigrant society (despite the fact that from the late 1920s to the late 1960s it also became a society relatively closed to immigration), reveals some characteristic differences in the contemporary Western European experience of immigration.

Although the proportion of foreign immigrants in many European countries (United Kingdom, France, Holland, West Germany before reunification), at approximately 10 percent, is similar to the proportion of foreign-born in the United States today, most of these countries still have difficulty viewing themselves as permanent immigrant societies or viewing the native second generation as nationals, irrespective of their legal status. But it is in the different ways in which they try to accommodate and regulate immigrant religions, particularly Islam, that European societies distinguish themselves not only from the United States but also from one another. European societies have markedly different institutional and legal structures regarding religious associations, very diverse policies of state recognition, of state regulation and of state aid to religious groups, as well as diverse norms concerning when and where one may publicly express religious beliefs and practices.

In their dealing with immigrant religions European countries, like the United States, tend to replicate their particular model of separation of Church and state and the patterns of regulation of their own religious minorities. France's *étatist* secularist model and the political culture of *laïcité* require the strict privatization of religion, eliminating religion from any public forum, while at the same time pressuring religious groups to organize themselves into a single centralized church-like institutional structure that can be regulated by and serve as interlocutor to the state, following the traditional model of the concordat with the Catholic Church. Great Britain, by contrast, while maintaining the established Church of England, allows greater freedom of religious associations which deal directly with local authorities and school boards to press for changes in religious education, diet, etc., with little direct appeal to the central government. Germany, following the multiestablishment model, has tried to organize a quasi-official Islamic institution, at times in conjunction with parallel strivings on the part of the Turkish state to regulate its diaspora. But the internal divisions among immigrants from Turkey and the public expression and mobilization of competing identities (secular and Muslim, Alevi and Kurd) in the German democratic context have undermined any project of institutionalization from above. Holland, following its traditional pattern of pillarization, seemed, until very

recently at least, bent on establishing a state-regulated but self-organized separate Muslim pillar. Lately, however, even liberal tolerant Holland is expressing second thoughts and seems ready to pass more restrictive legislation setting clear limits to the kinds of un-European, un-modern norms and habits it is ready to tolerate.

If one looks at the European Union as a whole, however, there are two fundamental differences with the situation in the United States. In the first place, in Europe immigration and Islam are almost synonymous. The overwhelming majority of immigrants in most European countries, the UK being the main exception, are Muslims and the overwhelming majority of Western European Muslims are immigrants. This identification appears even more pronounced in those cases when the majority of Muslim immigrants tend to come predominantly from a single region of origin, e.g. Turkey in the case of Germany, the Ma'ghreb in the case of France. This entails a superimposition of different dimensions of "otherness" that exacerbates issues of boundaries, accommodation, and incorporation. The immigrant, the religious, the racial, and the socio-economic disprivileged "other" all tend to coincide.

In the United States, by contrast, Muslims constitute at most 10 percent of all new immigrants, a figure which is actually likely to decrease given the strict restrictions to Arab and Muslim immigration imposed after September 11, 2001. Since the US Census Bureau, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and other government agencies are not allowed to gather information on religion, there are no reliable estimates on the number of Muslims in the United States (Leonard, 2003). Available estimates range widely between 2.8 million and 8 million. Moreover, it is estimated that between 30 and 42 percent of all Muslims in the United States are African-American converts to Islam, making more difficult the characterization of Islam as a foreign, un-American religion. Furthermore, the Muslim immigrant communities in the United States are extremely diverse in terms of geographic region of origin from all over the Muslim world, in terms of discursive Islamic traditions, and in terms of socio-economic characteristics. As a result, the dynamics of interaction with other Muslim immigrants, with African-American Muslims, with non-Muslim immigrants from the same regions of origin, and with their immediate American hosts, depending upon socio-economic characteristics and residential patterns, are much more complex and diverse than anything one finds in Europe.

The second main difference has to do with the role of religion and religious group identities in public life and in the organization of civil society. Internal differences notwithstanding, Western European societies are deeply secular societies, shaped by the hegemonic knowledge regime

of secularism. As liberal democratic societies they tolerate and respect individual religious freedom. But due to the pressure toward the privatization of religion, which among European societies has become a taken-for-granted characteristic of the self-definition of a modern secular society, those societies have a much greater difficulty in recognizing some legitimate role for religion in public life and in the organization and mobilization of collective group identities. Muslim organized collective identities and their public representations become a source of anxiety not only because of their religious otherness as a non-Christian and non-European religion, but more importantly because of their religiousness itself as the “other” of European secularity. In this context, the temptation to identify Islam with fundamentalism becomes the more pronounced. Islam, by definition, becomes the “other” of Western secular modernity, an identification that becomes superimposed upon the older image of Islam as the “other” of European Christianity. Therefore, the problems posed by the incorporation of Muslim immigrants become consciously or unconsciously associated with seemingly related and vexatious issues concerning the role of religion in the public sphere, which European societies assumed they had already solved according to the liberal secular norm of privatization of religion.

By contrast, Americans are demonstrably more religious than Europeans and therefore there is a certain pressure for immigrants to conform to American religious norms. It is generally the case that immigrants in America tend to be more religious than they were in their home countries. But even more significantly, today as in the past, religion and public religious denominational identities play an important role in the process of incorporation of the new immigrants. The thesis of Will Herberg (1983: 27f.) concerning the old European immigrant, that “not only was he expected to retain his old religion, as he was not expected to retain his old language or nationality, but such was the shape of America that it was largely in and through religion that he, or rather his children and grandchildren, found an identifiable place in American life,” is still operative with the new immigrants. The thesis implies that collective religious identities have been one of the primary ways, race being the other one, of structuring internal societal pluralism in American history. Religion and race and their complex entanglements have served to structure the American experience of immigrant incorporation, indeed are the keys to “American exceptionalism.”

Today, once again, American religious pluralism is expanding and incorporating all the world religions in the same way as it previously incorporated the religions of the old immigrants. A complex process of mutual accommodation is taking place. Like Catholicism and Judaism

before, other world religions – Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism – are being “Americanized” and in the process they are transforming American religion, while the religious diasporas in America are simultaneously serving as catalysts for the transformation of the old religions in their civilizational homes, in the same way as American Catholicism had an impact upon the transformation of world Catholicism and American Judaism has transformed world Judaism.

This process of institutionalization of expanding religious pluralism is facilitated by the dual clause of the First Amendment which guarantees the “no establishment” of religion at the state level, and therefore the strict separation of church and state and the genuine neutrality of the secular state, as well as the “free exercise” of religion in civil society, that includes strict restrictions to state intervention and to the administrative regulation of the religious field. It is this combination of a rigidly secular state and the constitutionally protected free exercise of religion in society that distinguishes the American institutional context from the European one. In Europe one finds on the one extreme the case of France, where a secularist state not only restricts and regulates the exercise of religion in society but actually imposes upon society its republican ideology of *laïcité*, and on the other the case of England, where an established state church is compatible with a wide toleration of religious minorities and a relatively unregulated free exercise of religion in society.

As liberal democratic systems, all European societies respect the private exercise of religion, including Islam, as an individual human right. It is the public and collective free exercise of Islam as an immigrant religion that most European societies find difficult to tolerate precisely on the grounds that Islam is perceived as an essentially “un-European” religion. The stated rationales for considering Islam “un-European” vary significantly across Europe and among social and political groups. For the anti-immigrant, xenophobic, nationalist right, represented by Le Pen’s discourse in France and by Jörg Haider in Austria, the message is straightforward. Islam is unwelcome and un-assimilable simply because it is a “foreign” immigrant religion. Such a nativist and usually racist attitude can be differentiated clearly from the conservative “Catholic” position, paradigmatically expressed by the Cardinal of Bologna when he declared that Italy should welcome immigrants of all races and regions of the world, but should particularly select Catholic immigrants in order to preserve the Catholic identity of the country.

Liberal secular Europeans tend to look askance at such blatant expressions of racist bigotry and religious intolerance. But when it comes to Islam, secular Europeans tend to reveal the limits and prejudices of modern secularist toleration. One is not likely to hear among liberal

politicians and secular intellectuals explicitly xenophobic or anti-religious statements. The politically correct formulation tends to run along such lines as “We welcome each and all immigrants irrespective of race or religion as long as they are willing to respect and accept our modern liberal secular European norms.” The explicit articulation of those norms may vary from country to country. The controversies over the Muslim veil in so many European societies and the overwhelming support among the French citizenry, including apparently among a majority of French Muslims, for the recently passed restrictive legislation prohibiting the wearing of Muslim veils and other ostensibly religious symbols in public schools, as “a threat to national cohesion,” may be an extreme example of illiberal secularism. But in fact one sees similar trends of restrictive legislation directed at immigrant Muslims in liberal Holland, precisely in the name of protecting its liberal tolerant traditions from the threat of illiberal, fundamentalist, patriarchal customs reproduced and transmitted to the younger generation by Muslim immigrants.

Revealingly enough, Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin, in his address to the French legislature defending the banning of ostensibly religious symbols in public schools, made reference in the same breath to France as “the old land of Christianity” and to the inviolable principle of *laïcité*, exhorting Islam to adapt itself to the principle of secularism as all other religions of France have done before. “For the most recently arrived, I’m speaking here of Islam, secularism is a chance, the chance to be a religion of France” (Sciolino, 2004). The Islamic veil and other religious signs are justifiably banned from public schools, he added, because “they are taking on a political meaning,” while according to the secularist principle of privatization of religion, “religion cannot be a political project.” Time will tell whether the restrictive legislation will have the intended effect of stopping the spread of “radical Islam” or whether it is likely to bring forth the opposite result of radicalizing further an already alienated and maladjusted immigrant community.

The positive rationale one hears among liberals in support of such illiberal restriction of the free exercise of religion is usually put in terms of the desirable enforced emancipation of young girls, if necessary against their expressed will, from gender discrimination and from patriarchal control. This was the discourse on which the assassinated Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn built his electorally successful anti-immigrant platform in liberal Holland, a campaign which is now bearing fruit in new restrictive legislation. While conservative religious people are expected to tolerate behavior they may consider morally abhorrent such as homosexuality, liberal secular Europeans are openly stating that European societies ought not to tolerate religious behavior or cultural customs that are morally

abhorrent insofar as they are contrary to modern liberal secular European norms. What makes the intolerant tyranny of the secular liberal majority justifiable in principle is not just the democratic principle of majority rule, but rather the secularist teleological assumption built into theories of modernization that one set of norms is reactionary, fundamentalist, and anti-modern, while the other set is progressive, liberal, and modern.

Anti-immigrant xenophobic nativism, secularist anti-religious prejudices, liberal-feminist critiques of Muslim patriarchal fundamentalism, and the fear of Islamist terrorist networks, are being fused indiscriminately throughout Europe into a uniform anti-Muslim discourse which practically precludes the kind of mutual accommodation between immigrant groups and host societies necessary for successful immigrant incorporation. The parallels with Protestant-republican anti-Catholic nativism in mid-nineteenth-century America are indeed striking. Today's totalizing discourse on Islam as an essentially anti-modern, fundamentalist, illiberal and undemocratic religion and culture echoes the nineteenth-century discourse on Catholicism (Casanova, 2001b).

Does one need references to God or to its Christian heritage in the new European constitution or does Europe need a new secular “civil religion” based on Enlightenment principles?

Strictly speaking, modern constitutions do not need transcendent references nor is there much empirical evidence for the functionalist argument that the normative integration of modern differentiated societies requires some kind of “civil religion.” In principle there are three possible ways of addressing the quarrels provoked by the wording of the preamble to the new European constitution. The first option would be to avoid any controversy by relinquishing altogether the very project of drafting a self-defining preamble explaining to the world the political rationale and identity of the European Union. But such an option would have been self-defeating insofar as the main rationale and purpose of drafting a new European constitution appears to be an extra-constitutional one, namely to contribute to European social integration, to enhance a common European identity, and to remedy the deficit in democratic legitimacy.⁶

A second alternative would be the mere enumeration of the basic common values that constitute the European “overlapping consensus,” either as self-evident truths or as a social fact, without entering into the more controversial attempt to establish the normative foundation or to trace the genealogy of those European values. This was the option chosen

by the signatories of the Declaration of American Independence when they proclaimed *We Hold These Truths As Self-Evident*. But the strong rhetorical effect of this memorable phrase was predicated on the taken-for-granted belief in a Creator God who had endowed humans with inalienable rights, a belief shared by republican deists, establishmentarian Protestants and radical-pietist sectarians alike. In our post-Christian and post-modern context it is not that simple to conjure such self-evident “truths” that require no discursive grounding. The 2000 Solemn Proclamation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union attempts to produce a similar effect with its opening paragraph: “Conscious of its spiritual and moral heritage, the Union is founded on the indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality, and solidarity.” But the proclamation of those values as a basic social fact, as the common normative framework shared by most Europeans, could hardly have the desired effect of grounding a common European political identity. It simply reiterates the already existing declarations of most national European constitutions, of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights, and most importantly of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations. Without addressing explicitly the thorny question of Europe’s “spiritual and moral heritage” and its disputed role in the genesis of those supposedly “universal values,” it is unlikely that such a proclamation can have the desired effect of inscribing those values as uniquely, particularly or simply poignantly “European.”

The final and more responsible option would be to face the difficult and polemical task of defining through open and public debate the political identity of the new European Union: Who are we? Where do we come from? What constitutes our spiritual and moral heritage and the boundaries of our collective identities? How flexible internally and how open externally should those boundaries be? This would be under any circumstance an enormously complex task that would entail addressing and coming to terms with the many problematic and contradictory aspects of the European heritage in its intra-national, inter-European and global-colonial dimensions. But such a complex task is made the more difficult by secularist prejudices that preclude not only a critical yet honest and reflexive assessment of the Judeo-Christian heritage, but even any public official reference to such a heritage, on the grounds that any reference to religion could be divisive and counterproductive, or exclusionist, or simply violates secular postulates.

The purpose of this argument is not to imply that the new European constitution ought to make some reference to either some transcendent reality or to the Christian heritage, but simply to point out that the quarrels provoked by the possible incorporation of some religious

reference into the constitutional text would seem to indicate that secularist assumptions turn religion into a problem, and thus preclude the possibility of dealing with religious issues in a pragmatic sensible manner. In the first place, I fully agree with Bronisław Geremek (2003) that any genealogical reconstruction of the idea or social imaginary of Europe that makes reference to Greco-Roman antiquity and the Enlightenment while erasing any memory of the role of medieval Christendom in the very constitution of Europe as a civilization evinces either historical ignorance or repressive amnesia.

Secondly, the inability to openly recognize Christianity as one of the constitutive components of European cultural and political identity means that a great historical opportunity may be missed to add yet a third important historical reconciliation to the already achieved reconciliation between Protestants and Catholics and between warring European nation-states, by putting an end to the old battles over Enlightenment, religion, and secularism. The perceived threat to secular identities and the biased overreaction to exclude any public reference to Christianity belies the self-serving secularist claims that only secular neutrality can guarantee individual freedoms and cultural pluralism. What the imposed silence signifies is not only the attempt to erase Christianity or any other religion from the public collective memory, but also the exclusion from the public sphere of a central component of the personal identity of many Europeans. To guarantee equal access to the European public sphere and undistorted communication, the European Union would need to become not only post-Christian but also post-secular.⁷

Finally, the privileging of European secular identities and secularist self-understandings in the genealogical affirmation of the common European values of human dignity, equality, freedom, and solidarity may not only impede the possibility of gaining a full understanding of the genesis of those values and their complex process of societal institutionalization and individual internalization, but also preclude a critical and reflexive self-understanding of those secular identities. David Martin (2003) and Danièle Hervieu-Léger (2003) have poignantly shown that the religious and the secular are inextricably linked throughout modern European history, that the different versions of the European Enlightenment are inextricably linked with different versions of Christianity, and that cultural matrixes rooted in particular religious traditions and related institutional arrangements still serve to shape and encode, mostly unconsciously, diverse European secular practices. The conscious and reflexive recognition of such a Christian encoding does not mean that one needs to accept the claims of the Pope or of any other

ecclesiastical authority to be the sole guardians or legitimate administrators of the European Christian heritage. It only means to accept the right of every European, native and immigrant, to participate in the ongoing task of definition, interpretation, renovation, appropriation, transmission, or rejection of that heritage. Ironically, as the case of French laic étatism shows, the more secularist self-understandings attempt to repress this religious heritage from the collective conscience, the more it reproduces itself subconsciously and compulsively in public secular codes.

The four issues analyzed in this chapter – the integration of Catholic Poland in post-Christian Europe, the integration of Turkey into the European Union, the incorporation of non-European immigrants as full members of their European host societies and of the European Union, and the task of writing a new European constitution that both reflects the values of the European people and at the same time allows them to become a self-constituent European demos – are all problematic issues in themselves. But the chapter has tried to show that unreflexive secular identities and secularist self-understandings turn those problematic issues into even more perplexing and seemingly intractable “religious” problems.

The secularization of Europe

As stated at the beginning of the chapter, the general secularization of Europe is an undeniable social fact. It is true that the rates of religiosity vary significantly across Europe. East Germany is by far the least religious country of Europe by any measure, followed at a long distance by the Czech Republic and the Scandinavian countries. At the other extreme, Ireland and Poland are by far the most religious countries of Europe with rates comparable to those of the United States. In general, with the significant exception of France and the Czech Republic, Catholic countries tend to be more religious than Protestant or mixed countries (West Germany, the Netherlands), although Switzerland (a mixed and traditionally pillarized country comparable to Holland) stands at the high end of the European religious scale, with rates similar to those of Catholic Austria and Spain. In general, Romania being the most notable exception, former communist countries in East and Central Europe have rates of religiosity lower than the European average, but many of them, most notably Russia, have experienced remarkable religious growth since 1989 (Greeley, 1994).

European social scientists tend to view these European facts through the analytical lenses of the inherited theory of secularization (Wilson,

1966). According to the orthodox model of secularization, most forcefully restated by Steve Bruce (1992, 1996), secularization is intrinsically and structurally linked to general processes of modernization. Social differentiation and other components of modernization, like societalization and rationalization, lead to a decline in the societal significance of religious institutions, which in turn leads eventually to the decline of religious beliefs and practices. As a general rule the theory postulates that the more modern a society the less religious will be its population.

Leaving aside the exceptional cases of oversecularization (East Germany, Czech Republic) or undersecularization (Ireland, Poland), for which one could offer ad hoc historicist explanations, in general the traditional theory of secularization would seem to hold well against the European evidence. The core European countries – Great Britain, France, Holland, Germany – the ones which have led the processes of European modernization, fit well the model of secularization. Yet, even though the drastic secularization of post-World War Two Western Europe may be an incontrovertible fact, the standard explanations of the phenomenon in terms of general processes of modernization, by reference to either increasing institutional differentiation, increasing rationality, or increasing individualism, are not persuasive since similar processes of modernization in the United States and in the cultural areas of other world religions are not accompanied by the same secularizing results.

We need to entertain seriously the proposition that secularization became a self-fulfilling prophecy in Europe, once large sectors of the population of Western European societies, including the Christian churches, accepted the basic premises of the theory of secularization: that secularization is a teleological process of modern social change; that the more modern a society the more secular it becomes; that “secularity” is “a *sign of the times*.” If such a proposition is correct, then the secularization of Western European societies can be explained better in terms of the triumph of the knowledge regime of secularism, than in terms of structural processes of socio-economic development such as urbanization, education, rationalization, etc. The internal variations within Europe, moreover, can be explained better in terms of historical patterns of church–state and church–nation relations, than in terms of levels of modernization.

It is time to abandon the Euro-centric view that modern Western European developments, including the secularization of Western Christianity, are general universal processes. The more one adopts a global perspective, the more it becomes obvious that the drastic secularization of Western European societies is a rather exceptional phenomenon, with few

parallels elsewhere other than in European settler societies such as New Zealand, Quebec, or Uruguay. The collapse of the plausibility structures of European Christianity is so extraordinary that we need a better explanation than simply referring to general processes of modernization. Holding on to the traditional theory of secularization, by contrast, reassures modern secular Europeans that this collapse was natural, teleological, and normal.

What makes the European situation so unique and exceptional when compared with the rest of the world is precisely the triumph of secularism as a teleological theory of religious development. The ideological critique of religion developed by the Enlightenment and carried out by a series of social movements throughout Europe from the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries has informed European theories of secularization in such a way that those theories came to function not only as descriptive theories of social processes, but also and more significantly as critical-genealogical theories of religion and as normative-teleological theories of religious development that presupposed religious decline as the telos of history.

Three dimensions of the Enlightenment critique were particularly relevant: the cognitive critique of religion as a primitive, pre-rational world view to be superseded by the advancement of science and rational thought; the political critique of ecclesiastical religion as a conspiracy of rulers and priests to keep the people ignorant and oppressed, a condition to be superseded by the advancement of popular sovereignty and democratic freedoms; and the humanist critique of the very idea of God as human self-alienation and as a self-denying other-worldly projection of human aspirations and desires, a critique which postulated the death of God as the premise of human emancipation. Although the prominence and pertinence of each of these three critiques may have changed from place to place, each of them in various degrees came to inform modern European social movements, the political parties associated with them, and European theories of secularization (Casanova, 1994).

In this respect, theories of secularization in Europe have functioned as self-fulfilling prophecies to the extent to which a majority of the population in Europe came to accept the premises of those theories as a depiction of the normal state of affairs and as a projection of future developments. The premise that the more modern and progressive a society becomes the more religion tends to decline, has assumed in Europe the character of a taken-for-granted belief widely shared not only by sociologists of religion but by a majority of the population. The postulate of progressive religious decline has become part of the European definition of the modern situation with real consequences for church religiosity. It is the assumed normality of this state of affairs that points to the exceptional character of the European situation, a situation which tends to self-reproduce itself and to appear

increasingly irreversible, in the absence of either a general religious revival or a radical change in the European *Zeitgeist*.

It is instructive here to look at the contentious and protracted debate between European and American sociologists of religion concerning the validity of the theory of secularization. The disagreements are not so much factual as terminological and theoretical. The first and most basic disagreement is terminological. Europeans tend to use the term secularization in a double sense, switching constantly back and forth between two related meanings. There is, firstly, secularization in the broader sense of secularization of societal structures or diminution in the social significance of religion. There is, secondly, secularization in the narrower sense of decline of religious beliefs and practices among individuals. The broad meaning of social secularization is related to the long-term historical processes of social differentiation and emancipation of the secular spheres (state, capitalist economy, science, etc.) from religious institutions and norms and the concomitant relegation of religion to its own greatly reduced and delimited sphere.

In the European context, secularization is a concept overloaded with multiple historically sedimented meanings which simply points to the ubiquitous and undeniable long-term historical shrinkage of the size, power, and functions of ecclesiastical institutions vis-à-vis other secular institutions. The second, narrower, meaning of the term, the decline of religious beliefs and practices among individuals, is secondary, posterior, and mainly derivative from the primary meaning. Europeans, however, see the two meanings of the term as intrinsically related because they view the two realities, the decline in the societal significance of religious institutions and the decline of religious beliefs and practices, as structurally related. Supposedly, one leads necessarily to the other.

Americans tend to view things differently and practically restrict the use of the term secularization to its secondary and narrower meaning, to the progressive decline of religious beliefs and practices among individuals. It is not so much that they question the secularization of society, but simply that they take it for granted as an unremarkable fact, as a *fait accompli*. The United States, they assume, has always been, at least constitutionally since independence, a secular society, as secular if not more so than any European society. Yet they see no evidence that this unquestionable fact of *desacralization* of society has led to a progressive decline in religious beliefs and practices among Americans. If anything the historical evidence, as historians and sociologists of American religion have amply documented (Butler, 1990; Finke and Stark, 1992; Greeley, 1989), points in the opposite direction of progressive growth in religious beliefs and practices and progressive *churching* of the American

population since independence. Consequently many American sociologists of religion tend to discard the theory of secularization, or at least its postulate of the progressive decline of religious beliefs and practices as a European myth (Stark, 1999; Stark and Bainbridge, 1985).

Indeed, despite some lingering disagreements concerning the factual evidence of the extent of religious vitality on both sides of the Atlantic, there is a relative consensus that religion, in its institutional as well as in its individual manifestations, is doing generally much better in America than throughout most of Europe. Even after discounting the tendency of Americans to inflate their rates of church attendance (Hadaway, Marler, and Chaves, 1993) and to exaggerate the depth and seriousness of their religious beliefs, the fact remains that Americans are generally more religious than most Europeans with the possible exception of the Irish and the Poles. Moreover, the very tendency of the Americans to exaggerate their religiousness, in contrast to the opposite tendency of Europeans to discount and undercount their own persistent religiosity, tendencies which are evident among ordinary people as well as scholars, are themselves part of the very different and consequential definitions of the situation in both places. Americans think that they are supposed to be religious, while Europeans think that they are supposed to be irreligious.

European visitors have always been struck by the vitality of American "salvational" religion. In comparison with Europe, at least since the early nineteenth century, the United States appeared simultaneously as the land of "perfect disestablishment" and as "the land of religiosity par excellence" (Marx, 1975: 217). Yet until very recently Europeans rarely felt compelled to put into question the thesis of the general decline of religion in view of the American counter-evidence. Progressive religious decline was so much taken for granted that what required an explanation was the American "deviation" from the European "norm." The standard explanations have been either the expedient appeal to "American exceptionalism," which conveniently does not require one to question the European rule, or the casuistic strategy to rule out the American evidence as irrelevant, because American religion is supposed to have become so "secular," so "commercialized," or so "privatized" that it should no longer count as authentic religion (Weber, 1946; Luckmann 1967; Wilson, 1979).

It is in reaction to the European failure to confront seriously the evidence of American religious vitality that a new American paradigm has emerged offering an alternative explanation of the American religious dynamics, which challenges the basic premises of the European theory of secularization (Warner, 1993). In and of itself, the explanation of religious vitality in terms of the beneficial effects of the dual clause of

the First Amendment to the US Constitution, “no establishment” and “free exercise” of religion, is not novel. Tocqueville (1990), and Marx (1975) following him, had already maintained this basic insight. The combination of high secularization in the broad primary sense of social differentiation (“perfect disestablishment”) and low secularization in the narrower secondary sense of religious decline (“land of religiosity par excellence”) already put into question the alleged structural relationship between the two dimensions of secularization in the orthodox model. Tocqueville (1990: 309), moreover, had already used the American evidence to question two basic premises of modern theories of secularization which, as he pointed out, had their origins in the Enlightenment critique of religion under the *ancien régime*: that the advancement of rationalism (i.e. education and scientific knowledge) and individualism (i.e. liberal democracy and individual freedoms) would necessarily lead to the decline of religion.

What is new in the American paradigm is the move to turn the European “orthodox” model of secularization on its head and to use the American evidence to postulate an equally general structural relationship between disestablishment or state deregulation, open free competitive and pluralistic religious markets, and high levels of individual religiosity (Finke, 1997; Stark and Iannaccone, 1994). With this reversal what was until now the American exception attains normative status, while the previous European rule is now demoted to being a deviation from the American norm. But it is this very move to turn what is a highly illuminating account of the exceptionally pluralistic and competitive American religious market into a general “supply-side” theory of religious economies that is problematic. As Bruce (2000) has convincingly shown, internal comparative evidence within Europe simply does not support the basic tenets of the American theory. Monopolistic situations in Poland and Ireland are linked to persistently high levels of religiosity, while increasing liberalization and state deregulation elsewhere are often accompanied by persistent rates of religious decline. Thus, the impasse; the orthodox model works relatively well for Europe but not for America, the American paradigm works for the US but not for Europe. Neither can offer a plausible account of the internal deviations within Europe. Most importantly, neither works very well for other world religions and other parts of the world.

Bruce (2000: 40) is correct when he implies that the general “secularization of demand” throughout much of Europe imposes almost insurmountable constraints to “supply-siders.” These constraints work both upon the many new and unsuccessful religious entrepreneurs in Europe attempting to supply “supernatural compensators” for which

there is apparently little religious need, and upon supply-side theories of religion which assume that there is a universal constant demand for supernatural compensators and one only needs to liberalize religious markets in order to generate supply, competitive pluralism, and religious growth (Stark and Bainbridge, 1985). The notion of a constant demand for supernatural compensators is a-historical, a-sociological, and flies in the face of European facts.

The truly puzzling question in Europe, and the explanatory key in accounting for the exceptional character of European secularization, is why churches and ecclesiastical institutions, once they ceded to the secular nation-state their traditional historical function as community cults, that is, as collective representations of the imagined national communities (Anderson, 1991) and carriers of the collective memory (Hervieu-Léger, 2000), also lost in the process their ability to function as religions of individual salvation. The issue of greater or lesser monopoly is relevant but not the most crucial one. We could rephrase the question and ask why individuals in Europe, once they lose faith in their national churches, do not bother to look for, or actually look disdainfully upon, alternative salvation religions. Such a kind of brand loyalty is hard to imagine in other commodities' markets. Why does religion today in Europe remain "implicit," instead of taking more explicit institutional forms? It is this peculiar situation that explains the absence of a truly competitive religious market in Europe. The culprit is not so much the monopolistic laziness of the churches protected by state regulation, but the lack of demand for alternative salvation religions among the unchurched, even in the face of new, enterprising yet generally unsuccessful religious suppliers.

From the point of view of this chapter the interesting issue is not the fact of progressive religious decline among the European population, but the fact that this decline is accompanied by a "secularist" self-understanding that interprets the decline as "normal" and "progressive," and therefore as a quasi-normative consequence of being a "modern" and "enlightened" European. It is this "secular" identity shared by European elites and ordinary people alike that paradoxically turns "religion" and the barely suppressed Christian European identity into a thorny and perplexing issue when it comes to delimiting the external geographic boundaries and to defining the internal cultural identity of a European Union in the process of being constituted.

Moreover, as Katzenstein makes evident in chapter 1, the conception of a single universal secular modernity has serious repercussions for conceptions of the emerging global order, for contested definitions of the West and its multiple modernities, and for the failure to recognize the

plurality of modern interrelated civilizational dynamics. It is not accidental that the discourse of global secular cosmopolitanism is a paradigmatically European discourse, while the discourses which emerge from America are either evangelical imperial callings to eradicate evil and make the world safe for democracy or realist warnings of a global civilizational clash between the West and the rest. The model of cosmopolitan Europeanization is that of expansion of its territorial borders through integration of the external periphery into an internally homogeneous space. As the successive enlargements and the aspirations of Turkey, and most recently of Ukraine, to join the European Union demonstrate, the model has tremendous appeal for neighboring countries which would rather be within this privileged space that guarantees democracy, economic prosperity, and security, than outside its borders. But such a model of cosmopolitan Europeanization must sooner, rather than later, face its internal and external limits. The inability to Europeanize its immigrants is the most obvious manifestation of the internal limits of cultural Europeanization. Externally, the European Union cannot continue expanding unless one imagines the process of cosmopolitan globalization as the enlargement of a single European nation-state until it encompasses the entire globe. Once territorial enlargement comes to an end and Europe closes its borders to further immigration in order to protect its cosmopolitan, universal values what remains is exclusionist “fortress Europe.”

Notes

This chapter is a much expanded version of an article first written for *Transit. Europäische Revue* (Casanova, 2004) within a series of issues dedicated to explore the interrelations between religion and European integration, as a result of the mandate given by the President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, to the Vienna Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen in spring 2002 to form a working group to reflect upon the role and relevance of “values” in the formation and expansion of the European Union.

- 1 This chapter does not aim to offer either a comprehensive analysis of the four issues or a systematic explanation of European secularization. Its sole purpose is to show how the secularist self-understanding built into modern European identities affects the handling of “religious” issues, turning them into paradoxes.
- 2 Sabrina P. Ramet’s contribution in this volume offers a detailed analysis of the tensions between “europhobes” and “euromiles” within Polish Catholicism in the broader context of an extended analysis of the role of the Catholic Church in political conflicts and “culture wars” in communist and post-communist Poland. I have covered some of the same issues from a different perspective in other writings (Casanova, 1994: ch. 4, 2003b). This section is only meant to point out some of the paradoxes of the integration of a still militantly Catholic Poland in a post-Christian secular Europe.

- 3 This expectation is aptly captured in the heading of chapter 1 of George Sanford's (1999) *Poland. The Conquest of History*, which reads: "From God's Playground to Normality."
- 4 In chapter 11, Timothy A. Byrnes makes evident the importance of viewing the Catholic Church as a transnational religious regime, even in order to understand the dynamics of national churches. This is obvious in the complex dynamics between the Roman center headed by the Polish Pope and the Polish Catholic Church. But it is equally important to keep in mind that all the transnational characteristics of the Catholic Church that we take for granted today – papal supremacy, control of the ordination of bishops worldwide, ecumenical councils, transnational religious cadres, transnational religious movements, transnational religious centers, transnational pilgrimages – are relatively recent (post-Vatican I) modern revivals of medieval developments, which had either disappeared or been much weakened throughout the modern era with the emergence of the Westphalian system of states and the control of the Catholic churches by Catholic monarchs (Casanova, 1997). Religious regimes are always embedded in worldly regimes. Contemporary processes of globalization offer opportunity structures for the Catholic Church to reconstitute itself as a transnational religious regime with global reach. Whether Orthodoxy will respond to the transnational challenges and opportunities of Europeanization and globalization is, of course, an open question. But one should also keep in mind that although autocephaly may be a very old ecclesiastical tradition within Orthodoxy, the division of Orthodox Christianity into autocephalus "national," "patriarchal" churches is a "modern" development that accompanies the expansion of the system of nation-states into Orthodox territories, beginning with the establishment of the Moscow Patriarchate in the sixteenth century, a move that parallels the establishment of Protestant and Catholic national churches.
- 5 It should be clear that my analysis here is fully in agreement with M. Hakan Yavuz in chapter 9, rather than with Bassam Tibi in chapter 8. Tibi's argument would only be plausible if indeed one was to assume that the AKP's project of joining the European Union, their new discourse of human rights, democracy, civil society, and rule of law, is only a diversionary tactical move by "pseudo-democrat" Islamists to reach their real strategic goal of imposing an Islamist *sharia* state by instrumentally using legal Europeanization, that is, the adaptation of Turkey's constitutional and legal system to European standards, in order to dismantle the secularist Security Council that is controlled by the military as guardians of the Kemalist order and is the only thing that stands in the way of their conquest of the state. I find such an argument totally implausible. Even if one was to concede that, indeed, all their public statements and their decisive moves toward democratic and legal reforms notwithstanding, this is the true hidden agenda of the Islamists which they adopted after the experience of the 1997 military coup, it should be evident that such a tactic of legal Europeanization could never lead to the strategic goal of establishing an Islamist state. Parallels with the fascist democratic road to power in the 1930s, the communist strategies of the 1940s, or the Algerian FIS in the 1990s are simply misplaced. The AKP are using their electoral victory to

advance legal and cultural Europeanization in order to meet the conditions to join the European Union. The notion that once they are accepted, they will reveal their true intentions and impose an authoritarian Islamic state seems to me preposterous. Yavuz offers a much more plausible argument, buttressed by convincing sociological empirical evidence of the transformation of the AKP from an Islamist to a Muslim Democratic party, that is akin to earlier transformations of the dubiously democratic Catholic parties of the 1930s into the Christian Democratic parties of the late 1940s and 1950s, the very ones which sponsored the project of the EEC. For a comparative analysis of Catholic and Muslim *aggiornamentos* see Casanova (2001b).

- 6 This point was forcefully made by Dieter Grimm at his keynote address, "Integration by Constitution – Juridical and Symbolic Perspectives of the European Constitution," at the conference "Toward the Union of Europe – Cultural and Legal Ramifications," at New School University, New York, March 5, 2004.
- 7 Even in his new post-secular openness to the religious "other" and in his call for the secular side to remain "sensitive to the force of articulation inherent in religious languages," Jürgen Habermas (2003: 109) still implies that religious believers must naturally continue to suffer disabilities in the secular public sphere: "To date, only citizens committed to religious beliefs are required to split up their identities, as it were, into their public and private elements. They are the ones who have to translate their religious beliefs into a secular language before their arguments have any chance of gaining majority support." Only by holding to a teleological philosophy of history can Habermas insist that "post-secular society continues the work, for religion itself, that religion did for myth" and that this work of "translation," or rational linguistification of the sacred, is the equivalent of "non-destructive secularization" and enlightenment.