The Mirror Crack'd: The *Speculum Principum* as Political and Social Criticism in the Late Middle Ages

CARY J. NEDERMAN

Among the numerous literary genres pioneered during the Latin Middle Ages, perhaps none was as typical or as pervasive as the so-called "mirror" or *speculum*. The medieval "mirror" was, most essentially, a book of advice addressed to an individual or (more commonly) a group, detailing a code of conduct or set of values appropriate to its addressee's social position or standing.[1] *Specula* contained many different forms of instruction, and almost no category of persons escaped the notice of some "mirror" writer: virgins, wives and widows, priests and laypersons, courtiers, lawyers and merchants—all were among the audiences for whom various advice books were designed. In some cases, these *specula* were highly moralistic in tone, while in other instances, their subject matter followed a more practical route. And *speculum* literature did not die out with the waning of the Middle Ages; works employing some variant of the "mirror" theme and title persisted well into early modern times.[2]

One of the most popular subsets of *speculum* writing was the political advice book, the *speculum principum* (otherwise known as the *Fürstenspiegel* or "Mirror for Princes"). Commonly cobbled together out of raw materials provided by the pagan classics, scripture, and the Church Fathers,[3] the *speculum principum* seems to have made its initial appearance during the Carolingian epoch, and became a fixture of political discourse after the middle of the twelfth century.[4] Scholars tend to regard medieval political "mirrors" as highly conventional works containing moralistic advice to rulers about the appropriate duties and virtues of the royal office, as well as about the education of the prince and his offspring.[5]

The scholarly fortune of the *speculum principum* has waxed and waned during the twentieth century. A flurry of important studies appeared (primarily in German and English) during the years between the World Wars.[6] This research had the primary aim of charting the main contours of the political "mirror" tradition and cataloguing the texts properly belonging to it. Thereafter, a period of pronounced intellectual disinterest occurred, as historians of medieval thought became "discouraged . . . by works thought to be stereotyped and conventional, with no visible relation to concrete political life."[7] Most recently, however, scholars have directed renewed attention to the genre, this time in an attempt to understand how the *speculum principum* reflected *mentalités* of medieval life and why it retained such vast appeal throughout the Middle Ages and into the Renaissance.[8] One of the most promising consequences of these latest examinations of such "mirror" writings is the recognition that they contain a rich and complex discourse

Department of Political Science, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721, U.S.A.

The European Legacy, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 18–38, 1998

about political affairs, the significance of which was far more apparent to medieval and Renaissance than to modern readers.[9] Rather than dwelling on the sameness and abstractness of the tracts, current scholarship stresses their diversity, recognizing that *specula* were not universally written in the Latin language, nor were they exclusively prose works, nor did they always address the same audience or offer identical advice about the ruler and his office.[10]

It seems likely that one factor contributing to the longevity of the *speculum principum* genre was its adaptability as a tool for criticizing the faults of particular rulers. Judith Ferster has recently detected telling ambiguities in even the most rigidly conventional *specula*, ambiguities that suggest a submerged level of criticism even when such works embrace and affirm the traditional language of the medieval "mirror." She argues that

> the manuals' dullness is a disguise necessitated by the danger of writing frankly about contemporary political issues, but not a total avoidance of them. The mirrors for princes are not only more topical than they appear to be but also more critical of the powerful than we might expect.[11]

Although she concentrates on late fourteenth- and fifteenth-century England, Ferster believes that such camouflaged criticism was an enduring feature of the *speculum principum*, explaining its wide audience up through the 1500s. Indeed, she claims that Machiavelli's *Il Principe* was highly conventional in this regard, not a subversion of the "mirror" genre, as some have suggested,[12] but a continuation of a long-standing tension within the tradition itself.[13]

By confining her attention largely to mainstream *specula*, however, Ferster takes for granted that the flexibility of the genre (and hence its appeal) could extend only to implicit, muted criticism. If one casts a somewhat broader net, it is possible to identify medieval "mirrors" that step out from behind the camouflage. In particular, I propose to examine three distinct contributions to late medieval political literature that reside in the border lands of the *speculum*: the anonymous English *Speculum Justiciariorum*, which probably dates to the early fourteenth century; the two versions of a work known by the title *Speculum Regis Edwardi III*, most likely composed by William of Pagula in the 1330s; and several early fifteenth-century treatises from the hand of the Valois courtier Christine de Pizan. I argue that these texts have an important dimension in common that they manifestly do not share with other "mirrors": they single out for overt criticism some existing political and social practice or practices of their time. Unlike the mainstream of "mirror" literature, these writings do speak directly to current issues in a manner that does not merely reaffirm on the surface a pat set of values and attitudes. The explicit nature of this criticism must be stressed. The works with which I am concerned throw off the cloak of ambiguity and direct their attacks overtly, while also adhering to intellectual and linguistic constructions affiliating them with other *specula*.

One might well ask whether these works truly deserve to be counted as "Mirrors for Princes," given their explicitly critical nature. Obviously, the answer depends upon how one defines the genre itself. Berges, for one, was convinced that the *Speculum Regis Edwardi III* "stands beyond the border of the tradition of *speculum* literature" on account of its overt condemnation of royal conduct.[14] Berges failed, however, to provide a precise definition of the genre on which to rest this conclusion. By contrast, more recent scholars,

concerned about the breadth of works that have come to be termed "Mirrors for Princes," have tried to provide a more exact formulation.[15] Einar Már Jónsson asserts:

> A "Fürstenspiegel" is a tract written for a prince—and in general dedicated to him in one fashion or another—which has the principal object of describing the ideal prince, his comportment, his role, and his situation in the world."[16]

Jónsson's purpose in offering "a clear and simple definition of the genre" is to ensure that it is not confused with other forms of medieval political writing, such as "political ethics."[17] Yet in Jónsson's definition, as well as in her further quadripartite classification of the specific forms of *specula*,[18] there is nothing to suggest that works of overt social criticism lack a place within the genre. In turn, this accords with Herbert Grabes's insistence that among the subcategories of *speculum* literature one must include the "admonitory mirror," in which "a blatant evil is depicted in such a forceful (or exaggerated) manner that the reader will endeavor to keep his distance and improve his conduct."[19] Such *specula* often employ religious or moralistic concepts in their condemnation of human follies, but they may include a polemical component.[20]

Perhaps the most plausible conclusion is that the writings under examination in the present essay stand in an ambiguous relationship to the core elements of the *speculum principum* genre: in certain ways, they are wholly conventional, but in others, they contravene convention. It is therefore possible to describe these works as subversive in a dual sense: they simultaneously subvert some conventional aspects of "mirror" texts and explicitly challenge the dominant self-images of the powerful. Yet inasmuch as the subversion is not complete—as it may be in the instance of, say, Machiavelli's *Il Principe*—these works represent important test cases of the elasticity of the *speculum principum* genre. They reside at what one may call the critical fringe of the medieval "Mirror for Princes" tradition.

Prince as Judge and Judged

It may seem odd to include the *Speculum Justiciariorum* within the genre of the "Mirror for Princes" book. Neither Berges in his magisterial survey of the topic, nor Kleineke in his specialized examination of the English *Fürstenspiegel*, makes any mention of the work.[21] Indeed, modern scholars generally have regarded the *Speculum Justiciariorum* to be idiosyncratic, if not sui generis; the adjective most frequently employed to describe it is "curious."[22] Although it evidently dates to ca. 1300, its authorship remains in dispute and may never be established with confidence.[23] What renders the *Speculum Justiciariorum* so problematic is its defiance of a clear classification. On the surface, it appears to be a version of the common law compendium that appeared regularly in thirteenth- and fourteenth-century England, comparable to "Bracton" and *Fleta*.[24] (Its author clearly knew and relied upon the Bractonian *De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae*.) Unlike these works, however, the *Speculum Justiciariorum* was written in French, and contains claims about contemporary legal principles and practices that conflict with independent historical knowledge. Therefore, it is not to be trusted as a reliable source for the history of English law and institutions. When the *Speculum Justiciariorum* was first rediscovered and translated in early modern England, it received wide attention and caused a political stir because of some of its assertions about the antiquity of parliament, as well as the role played by

parliamentary assemblies.[25] (John Locke, for instance, knows of and cites the work in his *Second Treatise of Government* as support for his own views about parliamentary sovereignty.)[26] The treatise thus claims attention as a contribution to political theory, although in this connection, too, it has received little examination.

What, then, is the *Speculum Justiciariorum*? I suggest that we ought to count it as a *speculum principum*, a view that has not previously been proposed, to my knowledge. Admittedly, the *Speculum Justiciariorum* is no conventional "mirror," but is perhaps best described rather as a hybrid, a deconstruction and recomposition of medieval English legal theory and practice through the filter of the *speculum principum* genre. This accounts for its distortions of the historical record, as well as for its more vaunted excursions into the realm of politics. The grafting of the "Mirror for Princes" onto the law book in turn challenges some of the standard political and moral convictions endorsed by *speculum* authors.

The genre-bending aspects of the *Speculum Justiciariorum* may in great measure be explained by reference to the explicitly critical stance it adopts in relation to legal practices current in its time. In his prologue, the author frames his intention by way of a complaint against the corruption of judges: "I perceived that diverse of those who should govern the law by rules of right had regard to their own earthly profit, and to pleasing princes, lords and friends, and to amassing lordships and goods."[27] Specifically, he says, justices refuse to refer to law set down in written form, the better to manipulate the powers of their offices; they invoke spurious exceptions to statute when it suits them; they abuse laws by misapplication or misinterpretation; and they too often lack the learning and experience required to judge justly.[28] Indeed, the author of the *Speculum Justiciariorum* claims a personal stake in his charges: "I, the accuser of false judges, [was] falsely imprisoned by their execution." During his incarceration, he reports,

> [I] searched out the privileges of the king and the old rolls of his treasury, with which my friends lent me solace, and there discovered the foundation and generation of the customs of England which are established as law, and the rewards of good judges and punishment of others, and as briefly as I could I set in remembrance what is essential, for which end my companions aided me in the study of the Old and New Testaments, and the canon and written law.[29]

Although the *Speculum Justiciariorum* was received in early modern England as a valid account of the ancient (pre-Norman) laws and customs of the realm, its author admits here to doing much more: he is admixing his research into common law with the traditional sources (scriptural as well as legal) upon which the "mirror" genre depended. His criticism of the "false judges" who condemned him stems not merely from their violation of English legal precepts, but also from their deviation from the moral and spiritual calling of their office (a theme suggestive of *speculum* literature). The *Speculum Justiciariorum* thus has the dual purpose of restoring the allegedly long-forgotten laws of the kingdom and of defining the proper duties of judges.

Clearly, then, the author of the *Speculum Justiciariorum* seeks to offer practical advice for the reform of judicial conduct within England. But to whom does he direct this advice? Who enjoys the competence to undertake such improvements? Although the prologue contains no explicit dedication or encomium, it seems evident that the author is addressing a royal audience:

> For the aid of you and of the community of the people and to the same of false judges, I compiled this little summary. . . . And I pray you to redress and adjust the defaults as best you may be warranted by good warrant, and to procure that the daily abuses of the law may be reproved and brought to naught.[30]

The *vous* here can only refer to that person who has it within his authority to correct justices: the king himself, probably Edward I.

Several features of the main body of the text confirm my supposition. Most obviously, the *Speculum Justiciariorum* directs nearly all of its attention to magistrates within the purview of royal jurisdiction, dissecting the duties of coroners, sheriffs, justices of the eyre, chief justices, and the like. This concentration on the conduct of the king's judicial officers, and the relatively sympathetic attitude evinced towards seigneurial justice, together indicate that the treatise's primary concern is the exercise of the crown's powers. Indeed, at the beginning of the fourth chapter ("De Jugement"), the author declares that "judgment derives from jurisdiction, which is the greatest dignity attached to the king."[31] In its original (or "ordinary") form, jurisdiction arises from the competence of each person to judge his or her fellows; in previous times, all free persons rightfully claimed jurisdiction. The *Speculum Justiciariorum* tells us that in latter days, however, "ordinary" jurisdiction has been arrogated to the king, who enjoys a monopoly on most pleas and who assigns justices to pronounce judgment by delegation.[32] The crown is the fount of adjudication in the realm, and all the decisions of its duly commissioned agents ultimately redound to the person of the ruler. The royal responsibility for the supervision of judges is underscored by the praise heaped on King Alfred, who "in one year had forty-four judges hanged as homicides for their false judgments" (the names and crimes of whom, as well as of other complicitous royal magistrates, the text then details).[33] As in more conventional *specula*, the king is held to account for the actions of his servants; he is implicated in any examination of the judicial process, which explains why the prologue addresses itself to a royal audience.

Yet the mirror that the *Speculum Justiciariorum* holds up to the king is unlike images of the royal dignity proposed by other *specula*. By 1300, it was a well-worn commonplace of the "mirror" books to assert that the ruler is *legibus solutus*, although the good prince ought (in imitation of Christ) to obey the law of the land and to govern in accordance with statute and custom. The standard conception of the royal will, in other words, was *moral* in bearing; the king conformed to law as a result of his virtue and faith. For precisely this reason, authors of advice books placed great emphasis on the instruction of prospective rulers in ethical and religious doctrines and practices. By contrast, the *Speculum Justiciariorum* expressly rejects such a moralistic approach to the maintenance of lawful government. Rather, its author proclaims: "The first and the primary (*soverein*) abuse is that the king is beyond the law, whereas he ought to be subject to it, as is contained in his oath."[34] This mention of the coronation oath refers back to the work's fanciful reconstruction of the institution of the English monarchy that opened its first book:

> The Saxons . . . after great wars, tribulations and pains suffered for a long time elected from amongst themselves a king to rule over them and to govern the people of God, maintaining and defending their persons and goods according to the rules of right. And at his crowning they made him swear that . . . he would guide his people by law without regard to any person . . . and he would submit to justice by suffering right like others of his people.[35]

From the founding moment of royal jurisdiction, therefore, the *Speculum Justiciariorum* insists that the English king was an acknowledged creature of law and could not exempt himself from it. The majesty of the crown is revealed in the strict maintenance of the (pre-existing) law of the realm. The royal will, simply put, added nothing to the substance of the standards of justice already in place.

To the extent that the king (or his family or delegates) step beyond the common law, in turn, the *Speculum Justiciariorum* posits that the members of the royal household are themselves susceptible to judgment. Here the author offers yet another innovation in relation to the conventions of the "mirror" genre (as well as prior English lawbooks). The latter took for granted that only God may judge a ruler, and they presumed that fear of eternal damnation would be sufficient reason for the king to bind himself to the law. The *Speculum Justiciariorum*, on the other hand, argues that

> although the king should have no peer in his land, nevertheless in order that if the king by his fault should sin against any of his people, in which case neither he nor his commissioners could be judge (he being also a party), it was agreed as law that the king should have companions to hear and determine in the parliaments all the writs and plaints concerning wrongs done by the king, the queen, their children, and their familiars, for which wrongs one could not otherwise have obtained common right. These companions are now called counts . . .[36]

Parliament thus offers redress against the ruler and his servants when they violate law: the royal house is subject to the institutionalized judgment of the great men of the realm. The author of the *Speculum Justiciariorum* returns to this assertion throughout the text, declaring, for instance:

> It does not pertain to a judge to act as both judge and party.[37]
>
> If the king does any wrong to any man of his who holds a fee of him in chief, . . . the counts in parliament and the other suitors there have jurisdiction, for the king cannot hear and determine such causes or give judgment in them himself, nor by his judges, because the king is plaintiff.[38]
>
> It is an abuse that no one has any recovery against the king or queen for a wrong except at the will of the king.[39]

In principle, no person in the realm, not even the most powerful and most exalted, may be exempted from the exercise of justice based on legal stricture.

Parliament is clearly the key to operationalizing the submission of the royal household to law (albeit parliament understood as an aristocratic, rather than a popular, body). The *Speculum Justiciariorum* emphasizes the role of parliament by insisting not merely upon the antiquity of its foundation, but also upon the regularity of its gathering.

> For the good estate of his realm King Alfred caused his counts to assemble and ordained as a perpetual practice that twice a year (or more often if need be in time of peace) they should assemble at London to hold parliament regarding the guidance of the people of God, how the people may guard themselves against sin, may live quietly, and may receive right according to established practices and holy judgments.[40]

The fact that contemporary rulers gather parliament so infrequently is consequently held as a sign of their disregard for the law of the land.

> It is an abuse that whereas parliaments ought to be held for the salvation of the souls of trespassers at London and twice a year, they are now held but rarely and at the will of the king in order to receive aid and collect treasure. And where ordinances ought to be made by the common assent of the king and his counts, they are now made by the king and his clerks and by aliens and others—who do not dare oppose the king, but desire to please him and to counsel him for his profit, albeit that their counsel is not beneficial to the community of the people—without any summons of the counts and without observance of the rules of right; and so many ordinances are founded more upon will than upon right.[41]

The complaints here about the "evil counsel" afforded to the king and the willful nature of royal decrees are common enough among *specula*.[42] What is distinctive about the grievances voiced by the *Speculum Justiciariorum* is that it offers a cogent (and novel) solution to the problem: the king must turn away from his professional servants, whose own careers depend upon pleasing him and doing his bidding, and he must instead consult with the great men of the realm, who are his true companions and are alone competent to judge him independently. This proposal resolves one of the quandaries of the advice books: how is the king to discern the difference between good counsel and bad, especially if his own inclination is not already directed toward the good of his subjects? The author of the *Speculum Justiciariorum* argues, simply, that the king will never receive just advice within his own court, and he ought instead to look to those persons who share in his jurisdiction and have true cognizance of the needs of the realm.[43]

Themes typical of the "mirror" tradition—the relation of king to law, the proper sources of counsel, and the education of the ruler and his officials—are thus in evidence in the *Speculum Justiciariorum*. But because the work adopts an overtly critical stance in relation to conventional attitudes towards the prince and his government, even going so far as to challenge the validity of recent royal statutes,[44] its author appears to be liberated from proposing standard solutions to the political and legal ills he diagnoses. It is not sufficient to trust in the king's good will, his fear of God's wrath, or his competence to judge between good and evil councillors as remedies for the sins of false judges. Rather, institutional reform is required, albeit reform carefully conforming to the largely imagined practices of a pre-Conquest past. A parliament of noble companions must bridle royal independence, parliamentarians who are uniquely qualified to proclaim the law of the land and who may judge the king in cases where he or members of his administration are charged with breaches of justice. In stepping beyond the expectations of the political "mirror," the *Speculum Justiciariorum* effectively points up one of the limitations of the genre: the unsubstantiated and misplaced confidence that the personal character of the prince may be so shaped and trained that he will require no external guidance or judgment, short of the will of God. In this sense, the work's scriptural citations are largely window dressing, in a way that they were not for other *speculum* authors. The *Speculum Justiciariorum* declines to delay the rectification of royal injustices to the afterlife, and thus sounds a decidedly secular tone that is unimaginable within the mainstream of advice books.

PEASANTS AND PRINCES

By contrast with the *Speculum Justiciariorum*, the two versions of the work grouped together under the title *Speculum Regis Edwardi III*[45] appear to fit more neatly within the conventions associated with the *speculum principum*.[46] The *Speculum Regis Edwardi* explicitly addresses itself to the king, offering praise for his majesty couched in the moral and religious terms that advice book readers have come to expect: God is to be imitated by the ruler in the justice shown by his judgment and will;[47] the king's office and authority derive from the doing of right;[48] the prince ought to bind himself to the law, as a demonstration of his just intent and will;[49] when the king seems to err, it is the consequence of evil counsel, which ought to be banished from the realm.[50] The leading doctrines of the *Speculum Regis Edwardi* thus clearly conform to central features of the preceding "mirror" tradition.

Yet to label the *Speculum Regis Edwardi* a conventional *Fürstenspiegel* hardly captures the primary force of its arguments: an open criticism of royal policy, defending the rights of peasants against the exactions of the king. The treatise is now convincingly attributed to the English canon lawyer and priest William of Pagula, who seems to have composed its two recensions in 1331 and 1332 respectively in order to alert the royal court of England to widespread discontent among the rural poor.[51] A parish vicar for much of his career,[52] William was well qualified to recount the complaints of the humblest segments of English society and to record the level of displeasure with, and resistance to, the crown. In several sections of the *Speculum Regis Edwardi*, he claims to have observed directly events from which arose the grievances that he reports.[53]

The primary target of William's wrath is the practice of royal purveyance, the alleged prerogative of the king to provide for his household and troops when touring the realm by confiscating local goods or purchasing them at a fixed, nonnegotiable price. The growing costs of royal military activity during the reigns of the three Edwards seem to have stimulated reliance upon purveyance. To meet such expenses, the king's retinue went into the countryside, where it could lay claim to provisions at a cheap rate or even for free.

Both recensions of the *Speculum Regis Edwardi* argue that the king should dispense with purveyance and other exactions by which he maintains himself and his household at the expense of the poor. Part of this case William defends in terms familiar to any advice book reader. The king is warned that the commission of evil endangers his salvation; and theft, which is taken to be coextensive with purveyance, is precisely the sort of evil about which the king ought to worry.[54] Indeed, what makes purveyance especially dangerous to the health of the king's soul is that it involves stealing from the poor, whom the ruler should be especially concerned to protect,[55] in order to extend his own holdings, which God has already multiplied manyfold. The king therefore proves himself ungrateful to God and unworthy of salvation.[56] William recurrently invokes the frailty of all human life, including the king's; since no one can predict with certainty when his or her death will occur, each should remain in a constant state of repentance.[57] Otherwise, should death transpire unexpectedly, damnation and eternal punishment are the prospects for the ruler who has not corrected evils done to his subjects.

If the *Speculum Regis Edwardi* had confined its attention merely to the moral and religious dimensions of royal misconduct, it would be a largely unremarkable work, noteworthy perhaps only for its conscious extension of the king's responsibilities to the peasantry. William, however, mixes this customary advice with criticisms that reveal a more temporal orientation. He observes that the household supported by the king is more than the royal treasury can bear. Instead of supplementing his already large holdings through forced contracts or confiscation, the monarch should cut back on his retainers and thus his expenditures.[58] William even provides a numerical calculation of the costs arising from the

provisioning of a single war-horse (at 1332 price levels).[59] The savings to be obtained by reduced royal expenditures could be used to pay off the king's considerable debts and to support the destitute and disadvantaged.[60] At the same time, more rational management of the kingdom's resources would be achieved by repealing oppressive levies, since one consequence of purveyance is to remove from peasants the stores they require to plant the following year's crops. Hence, they are forced to abandon their lands and the net agricultural production diminishes.[61] Calling a halt to purveyance, the *Speculum Regis Edwardi* declares, promotes the sustenance of the king's subjects and thus the wealth of the realm.

On William's account, therefore, the crown has a direct responsibility for ensuring the temporal welfare of all subjects, even (or especially) those outside the feudal nexus. Indeed, this at times translates into an assertion of the popular foundations of royal rule. As the *Speculum Regis Edwardi* says to its addressee,

> Carefully consider the honor paid to you by the men of this land. . . . Do not forget how the English people made you king. Therefore, be like one of them. . . . I advise that you should procure food and drink and other things necessary to you just like one of the people (*sicut unus de populo*).[62]

that is, by paying full market value for victuals. The king acquires no special authority to violate the rights of subjects just because he occupies the royal office. William supports his position with reference to recent events, reminding Edward III of his own reliance upon the people:

> Consider diligently and ponder in your heart, when first you came by ship from foreign parts into this land, how humbly, how graciously, how devoutly, how joyously, the English people admitted you and stood by you and aided you in everything you did against your rebels. . . . And do not forget how graciously, how miraculously, you were freed from the custody of your mother and others.[63]

The message here suggests a principle of reciprocity. The king relies upon the good will of subjects to achieve and maintain his power. In turn, he must demonstrate his worthiness to rule by ensuring that he and his minions respect the economic rights legitimately enjoyed by the people within his jurisdiction.

William expresses this reciprocity as a bond of "love" between ruler and people, as a result of which the peace of the realm is assured. Of course, many advice books spoke of how the king must earn the love of his subjects and how they ought to love him. But such love was ordinarily construed to arise from the spiritual and moral rectitude with which the ruler guides his people. By contrast, William consistently equates love with the material welfare of the kingdom. He warns Edward III:

> You will never be loved by the people as long as you wish to seize the things of others. . . But if you wish to buy something out in the provinces, and pay the fair price immediately, then you will acquire the love of the people.[64]

The king merits love and enjoys the fruits of peace when his administration manages its affairs in a manner consonant with the prosperity of subjects.

Concern about the temporal well-being of the realm thus pervades the *Speculum Regis Edwardi*, reflected in William's recommendations that the king curb his expenditures

(especially on the instruments of warfare), pay his debts, keep closer watch over his officials, and use his surplus income to look after the poor and infirm. Yet William is by no means sanguine that simple reasoned argumentation alone will suffice to convince the king and his court to lay aside the prerogative of purveyance. Because he subscribes to the conventional conception of the "mirror" books that no one short of God can proclaim final judgment on the prince's wrongdoing, he does not propose institutional remedies for public grievances against the crown, in the manner of the *Speculum Justiciariorum*. Rather, his criticism of the household contains the thinly veiled threat that continued violation of the rights of subjects will result in danger to Edward's peaceful rule of the realm. The ruler who in effect steals from his people actually makes war on his own people. "Take heed, lord king, because without good counsel you make war every day," the *Speculum* advises, "taking the goods of many men when they are unwilling."[65] There is no tranquility in a land whose king condones the unjust practices of royal officials, since the ruler himself causes the disturbance.[66] The implication is that a king who makes war on his people by employing force in order to rob them may rightfully be opposed, just as one may legitimately repulse the force of a thief in order to protect oneself and one's goods.

Sometimes, the justification of rebellion provoked by the conduct of the royal curia is shrouded in vague terms. William warns Edward that "many evils may happen to you and your kingdom," as a result of which the king and his officials "will perish"; elsewhere, he advises the king to expect the loss of his realm.[67] Such calamity will simply manifest the divine hand at work. "God will arouse war against you in which you will suffer great tribulation"; thereby "the Lord will free the English people from your hands more quickly than you think."[68] In these passages, the precise nature of the danger to royal safety, although of a violent character, remains unspecified. William's point is simply that retribution for the king's theft from his subjects need not be confined to the afterlife, but may occur in the present world as well.

In other sections of the text, however, the threat to the unjust king is clearly explicated in terms of popular rebellion. The first version of the *Speculum* likens Edward's position within the kingdom to that of a head which cannot lead its own body:

> Your people . . . are not of one mind with you, although they seem to be of one body with you; and indeed, if they had a leader, they would rise up against you, just as they did against your father. Then in truth you would not have a multitude of people with you.[69]

The text states the lesson here in no uncertain terms: if the monarch's subjects are not safe from their royal master, then they will not hesitate to replace him with someone who will respect their property. This follows directly from the reciprocal nature of the relationship that binds the people to the ruler. Perhaps William believes that the populace acts as the agent of a divine will in fomenting revolt. But regardless of the source of inspiration for insurrection, his primary point is that kings who "have extended their hand towards the goods and income of others" find that "the people rise up against them and they are almost wiped from the earth. And therefore be warned, and heed, lest you forget what happened to your father."[70] The persistent references to the deposed Edward II are painful reminders that recent precedent exists for the threats of popular revolt made by William.

For all of its apparent dependence upon the conventions of the "mirror" genre, then, the *Speculum Regis Edwardi* distinguishes itself as a work of explicit political criticism,

thereby inverting or dismantling many of the expectations held by readers of advice books. While referring to dangers to the eternal soul of the king, William concerns himself primarily with the bodily, not the spiritual, welfare of subjects. Edward III stands accused not of threatening the salvation of his people, but of damaging their ability to sustain themselves materially. The majesty and dignity of the crown is identified with economic prosperity rather than moral and religious uplift. Nor does William shroud his criticisms in tales about the deeds of the rulers (good and evil) of biblical and classical (or even mythical pre-Conquest) times. Instead, he refers repeatedly to events that he has himself witnessed, or that occurred within recent memory and formed part of Edward III's family legacy. William's readiness to build his case upon contemporary history means that very little reading between the lines is necessary to grasp the force of his arguments. If the king does not reform his administration of the realm, it will not be possible for him to govern his people in peace. Given the public outcry that arose against Edward II when his ministers invoked the prerogative of purveyance,[71] Edward III should hardly be surprised if similar disturbances disrupt his rule. The unrelenting and unambiguous expression of popular discontent and the danger it posed to the safety of the king render the *Speculum Regis Edwardi* exceptional as a work claiming to "mirror" the prince.

COMPLEXITY AND CRITICISM

It is certainly no exaggeration to say that Christine de Pizan was the most prolific, and yet the most overlooked, author of princely "mirror" books in medieval Europe. She is credited with no fewer than nine such treatises—a function, no doubt, of her close association with the Valois court—whereas her male counterparts usually wrote only a single *speculum*. Yet, at least until quite recently, scholars have systematically ignored or dismissed the body of Christine's political writings (a function as much of her gender as of a careful reading of her texts, one suspects).[72] She is even left off Grabes's magisterial list of *specula*, perhaps because none of her works contain mirror terminology in the title. But she does employ "mirror" imagery throughout her corpus in a manner entirely consonant with other texts of the genre.[73]

On the face of it, Christine was no political critic in the manner of the authors of the *Speculum Justiciariorum* and the *Speculum Regis Edwardi III*. Surely, this is because of her financial dependence upon the patronage of the French court, as well as her deep admiration for members of the ruling dynasty.[74] But at the same time, Christine did stretch the limits of the *speculum* genre in ways that place her nearer to the fringes of the advice book tradition than has sometimes been recognized.[75] Unlike the English works I have surveyed, which tend to concentrate on specific events or practices, Christine's *specula* offer a more comprehensive social criticism, derived from her apparent recognition that conventional "mirrors" overlooked the needs and interests of a large portions of the populace, among them women, city-dwellers, and the poor. She thereby awakens her courtly audience to many of the new social realities that were altering the landscape of late medieval institutions and practices.

As with the authors of the *Speculum Justiciariorum* and the *Speculum Regis Edwardi III*, Christine adopts a far more personal tone, rooted in her own experiences and observations, than is usual in conventional books of advice. In her three best known *specula* (*Le Livre de la Cité des Dames* [1405], *Le Livre des Trois Vertus* [1406], and *Le Livre de Corps de Policie* [1406]), she identifies herself as writing from the perspective of a woman, an immigant to France, and an individual of nonnoble birth.[76] She does not hesitate to deplore various mores and practices current in her time, basing her remarks upon her knowledge of historical and geographic variations, as well as her familiarity with scholastic, scriptural, and patristic sources. Throughout Christine's works, the advice she offers has a practical turn, suggestive of someone who has been on intimate terms with many stations of life and the travails they can cause. There are moments in her narrative—such as when she offers advice to widows about coping with their late husbands' creditors[77]—that seem to stem directly from predicaments that she confronted personally.

Yet Christine's most pronounced departures from the contours of the "mirror" genre stem from the striking inclusiveness of the audience she addresses and the social complexity she acknowledges. In one of her two works addressing explicitly a female readership, the *Cité des Dames*, she defends women as a group from various slanders against their intelligence and capacity to achieve moral and political virtue. The other of these writings, the *Trois Vertus*, examines in minute detail the conduct appropriate to women of every social distinction, extending from princesses and the nobility to artisans, prostitutes, and the destitute. Likewise, Christine's *Corps de Policie* discusses in detail the humblest orders within the realm as well as the education and behavior of the king and his well-born companions.

Some might argue that Christine's concentration on this social complexity immediately excludes her writings from the *speculum principum* genre entirely, on the grounds that she moves beyond its confines and into other realms of political reflection. But her work, especially the *Trois Vertus* and the *Corps de Policie*, manifestly addresses a royal audience and remains firmly grounded in such conventions of the *speculum* literature as the primacy of the king within his country,[78] the need for good councillors to be respected and evil advisors to be dismissed,[79] and the requirement that royal government be conducted in accordance with virtue and religion.[80] While on some of these points, Christine's qualifications and pragmatic recommendations reveal her dissatisfaction with the standard advice contained in political "mirrors," this does not form an adequate reason for denying her a place in the genre. Rather, Christine's departures from tradition suggest an attempt to draw on her own vast experience of the exigencies confronting royal rulers.

Thus, for instance, she suggests that the princess should dissemble with her enemies, even when she has definite knowledge of their plots and machinations.[81] This advice is given as far more than a counsel of Christian charity; Christine regards it to be a practical guide to maintaining public order as well as personal reputation (so long as her deceit is not discovered). As she observes,

> The wise lady will use this prudent device of discreet dissimulation, which should not be considered vicious but rather a great virtue when employed for the common good, to maintain peace, or to avoid detriment or greater harm. Not only will she escape trouble but she will also achieve great benefit if she pretends not to notice conspiracy against her.[82]

She proposes similar mendacity in the case of charitable works and benefactions. Christine counsels that the princess and her family must uphold their standing and reputation in the community by publicly endowing gifts to the poor and religious. Even if this amounts to hypocrisy, such conduct is wholly justified.

> Justifiable hypocrisy is necessary for princes and princesses who must rule over others and thus be accorded more respect than others. Moreover, expedient hypocrisy is not unworthy for others desiring honor, as long as they practice it for worthy ends.[83]

To say that, in Christine's view, the ends justify the means may be overstated. But she clearly believes that the maintenance of a decorous reputation matters a great deal to effective governance, and that rulers ought to be seen as benefactors to their people. Time and again, she demonstrates as great a concern about the public image of the royal family (and the order it engenders) as about the existence of virtue in itself, although she obviously believes that the presence of the latter ensures the former. This represents something of an inversion of the common position of advice books, according to which religion and virtue become their own rewards, quite apart from temporal consequences.

Perhaps as strikingly, Christine advocates the competence of women to contribute (perhaps even uniquely) to the tasks associated with the maintenance of peace and secular well-being. In *Cité des Dames*, she proclaims that

> in case anyone says that women do not have a natural sense for politics and government, I will give you examples of several great women rulers who have lived in past times . . . [and] of some women of your own time who remained widows and whose skill governing—both past and present—in all their affairs following the deaths of their husbands provides obvious demonstration that a woman with a mind is fit for all tasks.[84]

Christine surely knew Aristotle's argument for the exclusion of women from a role in public life, which was a mainstay of medieval political literature. Yet she challenges this claim directly, even to the point of asserting that a princess may help to quell disturbances in her land that arise from her husband's acquiescence to evil councillors:

> If the prince, because of poor advice or for any other reason, should be tempted to harm his subjects, they will know their lady to be full of kindness, pity and charity. They will come to her, humbly petitioning her to intercede for them before the prince.[85]

Christine envisions the princess as a sort of ombudsperson, a conduit between hostile forces (whether within or without the realm) whose clashes might otherwise disturb the peace.[86]

The peace of the kingdom, and the threats that exist to it, constitute themes in evidence throughout the body of Christine's writings, such as her *Lamentation sur les Maux de la France* (1410) and *Le Livre de la Paix* (1413). In turn, it is clear that she views public tranquility as an immediate result of harmonious social organization and cooperation, on the model of the organic metaphor of the body politic that pervaded medieval political thought.[87] She declares that "everyone should come together as one body of the same polity, to live justly and in peace as they ought."[88] Superficially, perhaps, the organic analogy may appear designed to justify hierarchy, inequality, exclusion, and subordination. But for Christine as for a few of her predecessors,[89] the image of the body politic also suggested an inclusive, reciprocal, and interdependent conception of community.

> Just as the human body is not whole, but defective and deformed, when it lacks any of its members, so the body politic cannot be perfect, whole, or healthy if all the estates of which we speak are not well joined and united together. Thus, they can aid and help each other, each exercising its own office, which diverse offices ought to serve only for the conservation of the whole community, just as the members of the body aid to guide and nourish the whole body.[90]

Christine's very image of peace is when the health of the entire public unit is preserved through the mutual coordination of the tasks necessary for its existence.[91] To despise any of the members or reduce them to a state of servitude is an attack on the well-being of the whole organism.

Christine's use of the organic metaphor extends medieval precedent in several vital ways. First, her thinking demonstrates a noticeably secular orientation. Unlike her source for the analogy, John of Salisbury's *Policraticus*,[92] she makes no reference to the "soul" of the body (that is, the priesthood), nor does she draw upon standard medieval depictions of the supremacy of the church to the temporal sphere. Of course, she expects that the king will honor God and care for the churches within his jurisdiction.[93] However, the *Corps de Policie* reverses the expectations of conventional mirrors by, for instance, asserting a corrective role for the good ruler, since no "prelate, priest, or cleric is so great that he will dare withstand or complain about the prince who reproves him for his manifest vice or sin."[94] This is consistent with Christine's conception of the king as the ordainer and regulator of all the estates within the realm, including the priesthood, and her identification of the clergy within the body politic as one of the three branches of the common people.[95] No other late medieval thinker, with the exception of Marsiglio of Padua, was so disposed to count the priestly function as essentially a civil office, contributing to an expansive and secularist idea of public welfare in which the salvation of the soul was not the only aim of political order.

Another significant departure marked by Christine was her detailed attention to the lives of merchants, artisans, and laborers. Although she again employed language reminiscent of the *Policraticus*,[96] she demonstrated far more sympathy both for the contributions made by the humbler classes and for the plight arising from their varied tasks. She insists that burghers and men of commerce are not to be disdained, at least if they are honest and knowledgeable in the conduct of their affairs.[97]

> The merchant class is very necessary, and without it neither the estate of kings and princes nor even the polities of cities and countries could exist. For by the industry of their labor, all kinds of people are provided for without having to make everything themselves, because, if they have money, merchants bring from afar all things necessary and proper for their lives.[98]

In similar terms, Christine praises craftsmen and peasants, since "if the republic excluded laborers and artisans, it could not sustain itself."[99] Indeed, she defends both groups against the ignominy that is heaped upon them. She remarks, "Although some think little of the office of the craftsman that the clerics call 'artisans,' yet it is good, noble, and necessary"; likewise, "the estate of the simple laborer or others of low rank should not be denigrated, as others would do. . . . The estate of the poor which everyone despises has many good and worthy persons in purity of life."[100] Here Christine's devotion to the principle of social inclusion is much in evidence. Judgments may be made about how well individuals perform in their diverse offices, but no office in and of itself is to be demeaned or disdained if it contributes a vital function to the well-being of the organic community.

As a consequence of her insistence upon cooperation among the various duties necessary to the health of the body, Christine asserts that the king himself must be cognizant of the conditions of the lesser estates. Of course, the condescending precept that the greater

should attend to the welfare of the lesser had long been a commonplace of medieval political thought.[101] But Christine argues that the prince should familiarize himself with the daily conditions of the populace over whom he governs:

> He ought to hear sometimes about the common people, laborers, and merchants, how they make their profit from the poor and the rich, and similarly all kinds of things, so that his understanding is not found ignorant of anything that can be virtuously known.[102]

In this way, the prince will appreciate fully the contributions that the lower orders make to the health of the realm, and will not dismiss their importance to a peaceful reign. Moreover, the ruler must be apprised about how his policies, as carried out by royal ministers, impact the living conditions of the people.[103] Citing the deleterious effects of taxation upon the impoverished, she reports,

> There are some who come to pay this money imposed on them and then they and their poor household starve afterwards, and sell their beds and other poor possessions cheaply and for nothing. And it would please God if someone informed the king and noble princes.[104]

As a consequence of the organic unity of the realm, the ruler must realize that his own actions may directly harm the material well-being of his subjects, which in the end will only redound to his own injury, since the people's despoilment means that the realm itself will become impoverished and will generate less income in the future. Christine takes it as axiomatic that wise "princes would rather be poor in a rich country, than to be rich and have plenty in a poor country."[105] This is not merely a moral principle; it reflects an economic doctrine that naturally follows from an organic conception of communal interdependence.

The lessons about inclusion that Christine derives from the body metaphor she also transfers to her discussion of women's estates. The princess, as I have indicated, is to further the process of intercommunication between the parts of the body by serving as an mediating force between the king and the people.[106] Nor does Christine deem it "unsuitable for a princess to lavish attention on her lowlier subjects."[107] Rather, the princess is to meet on occasion with burghers, merchants, and artisans in order to facilitate "love and good will" among subjects, and thereby strengthen public order and unity. Indeed, Christine regards this function as crucial to the king's peaceful rule:

> The subjects create the lord, not vice versa. If people want to be troublesome, they will much more easily find someone to take them on as subject than a lord will find subjects to accept him as ruler. . . . Even if at a given time he had the military power to destroy them, he would also destroy himself. . . . Their respect for him will arise from his concern for them, rather than from force. Otherwise his power will be in question. A common proverb reinforces this point: "No one is lord in his country who is hated by his people."[108]

The princess thus plays a delicate role in maintaining the structure of reciprocity entailed by the organic order of the community. If she declines to perform this function, the health of the body itself is imperiled.

Christine also demonstrates sensitivity to the unique circumstances of humbler women's stations. She recognizes that to be a woman of the commercial or laboring classes imposes special burdens that may render it difficult to achieve the virtues espoused for royal or noble women. Not surprisingly, she evinces real compassion for the special predicament of poor women, and is gentle in her admonitions toward them.[109] By no means is Christine's advice for the conduct of the female commoner any less practical than for the princess. For example, she warns the wives of merchants to "avoid ostentation" in dress not simply out of concern for moral rectitude, but also because a conspicuous display of wealth "can cause new taxes for their husbands."[110] Christine is thus closely attuned to the complexities associated with the intersection of gender and social class, and proffers appropriate and useful counsel to women of various stations with the goal of sustaining a harmonious and cooperative body politic.

In the "mirrors" of Christine de Pizan, then, one encounters a theoretical framework designed to cope with a more diverse social order than that which the authors of conventional *specula* envision. Her attention to the needs and interests of women as well as the disenfranchised and the poor within her vision of a properly regulated community stands as a criticism of the narrow focus of traditional "mirror" literature. Of course, Christine does not dispense with instruction about the office of the prince, often couched in quite customary terms. But she alters the context for this conventional advice by setting it within a more intricate social order requiring of the ruler a greater measure of flexibility and a wider range of political skills than mainstream *specula* envisage. Christine does not wish the prince to surrender the moral and religious precepts that earlier "mirrors" promoted. She does seem to think, however, that these qualities are not sufficient to govern effectively in a diverse and complex society, especially one in which material well-being and economic profit competed with eternal salvation as goals worthy of recognition and pursuit. Hence, the effect of Christine's *specula* is to challenge the simplicity (and perhaps naivete) of the worldview assumed by her predecessors. Kings will only be able to maintain themselves on the throne, and their realm in peace, to the extent that they prepare themselves to deal with the full range of subjects over whom they rule.

BEYOND THE CRITICAL FRINGE?

The conversion of the medieval *speculum* into a form of overt political and social criticism, undertaken by the three authors I have examined, hints at growing dissatisfaction in the late Middle Ages with the traditional characteristics of the genre. Even where conventional "mirrors" implicitly criticized a reigning monarch by pointing to his failure to achieve the ideal, they reflected at best *ad hominem* censure; they were not written to challenge the status quo or to advocate wholesale reform, and therefore remained comfortably within the genre's main contours. By contrast, because of their intentions to serve as vehicles of social and political commentary, the *Speculum Justiciariorum*, *Speculum Regis Edwardi III*, and Christine's "mirrors" all undermine or collide with central features of the *speculum* tradition. Taken as a group, and speaking generally, these works point up the inadequacies of moral and religious instruction as sufficient assurance that the prince will govern lawfully and for the common good; they diminish the role of the king in promoting the personal salvation of his subjects by defending the tenets of Christian faith; they stress the secular foundations and goals of the community, along with royal responsibility for ensuring the material welfare of the people; they criticize by name and deed the powerful men of their times, rather than shielding themselves with allusions to classical and

scriptural history; and they endorse pragmatic strategies for the ruler's control of his administration as well as his retention of temporal authority within his realm. In each instance, we may note a considerable departure from the advice typically offered by standard "Mirrors for Princes."

Arguably, similar expressions of dissatisfaction with the conventional admonitions of the *speculum* continued beyond the Middle Ages, most notably in Machiavelli's *Il Principe*. To observe some relation between *Il Principe* and the "Mirror for Princes" tradition is hardly a novelty. Scholars from Alan Gilbert onward have addressed how Machiavelli appropriated the genre of the medieval and Renaissance *speculum principum* in order to achieve his own purposes.[111] Most recently, Judith Ferster has argued that many of the important inconsistencies in *Il Principe* are precisely a feature of Machiavelli's contiguity with the advice books of the Middle Ages.[112] She observes that

> mirrors for princes are full of contradictory advice that cannot be reconciled and contradictory stories with incompatible morals. . . . If this is also true of the *Prince*—and I think it is—then it is not uniquely so, and this is not a way to distinguish the *Prince* from its medieval analogues. The tradition is already deconstructed.[113]

In other words, to the extent that Machiavelli adopts discursive strategies commonly found in earlier *specula*, which permit him to voice camouflaged criticism of princely conduct, his pronouncements about his own novelty ought not to be taken at face value.[114]

In some measure, this interpretation suffers from an excessively narrow bent. I wish to suggest in brief, on the basis of the texts studied above, that Machiavelli's relationship with the advice book tradition is far more complex and elastic than Ferster and other scholars allow, in part because they invoke a rigid conception of the nature and function of criticism in medieval *specula*. As we have seen, contributions to the genre were quite compatible with overt and stinging attacks, not just on the behavior of individual rulers, but on salient assumptions of the "mirror" literature itself. *Il Principe* in some ways seems to fit better within this self-consciously critical (and more subversive) strand of the *speculum* tradition than into the thread of discourse examined by Ferster. We have no idea which "mirrors" Machiavelli may have read, and hence with which approach (or approaches) he would have enjoyed familiarity; I do not claim that he had knowledge of any of the works treated above (just as I am not imputing any discernable connection between the authors of those writings). Yet, Machiavelli's ideas and attitudes seem to me more directly resonant of the overt criticism contained in works near the margins of the "mirror" genre than of the subterranean critics of the conventional *speculum*. At the same time, to the extent that Machiavelli may have been entirely unaware of medieval precedent for his arguments, we can still take seriously his self-representation as an innovator (however historically inaccurate this turns out to be).

It is not appropriate at the present juncture to examine in detail these claims about Machiavelli's relationship to the critical fringe of the *speculum principum* tradition. Suffice it to say that important dimensions of *Il Principe* stem from his frustration with not simply the traditional ideal of the prince, but with the moral and religious assumptions underlying that ideal. Such assumptions were not called into question even by medieval *specula* engaged in the sort of camouflaged criticism examined by Ferster. It was only at the boundaries of the *speculum* genre—in works such as the *Speculum Justiciariorum*, *Speculum Regis Edwardi III*, and the "mirrors" of Christine—that similarly subversive challenges

were lodged prior to Machiavelli. It thus seems mistaken to dissolve his observations so thoroughly into the mainstream of the *speculum* literature (however conceived) that the striking differences of his approach, marked by decided hostility to major premises of that literature, are obscured. For this reason, Machiavelli might better be viewed as the culmination of a line of later medieval innovators seeking to extend the *speculum principum* beyond conventional boundaries through a sort of immanent critique of the failings of such writing. Locating *Il Principe* within such a tradition permits us to balance its customary features with its novel aspects, to grasp how it is both a contribution to, and a subversion of, the *speculum* genre.[115]

NOTES

1. An overview of the genre is provided by Einar Már Jónsson, *Le miroir: Naissance d'un genre littéraire* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1995).
2. For a comprehensive account of the genre, see Herbert Grabes, *The Mutable Glass: Mirror-Imagery in Titles and Texts of the Middle Ages and English Renaissance*, trans. G. Collier (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). This is a substantially revised version of the author's *Speculum, Mirror und Looking-Glass: Kontinuität und Originalität der Spiegelmetapher in den Buchtiteln des Mittelalters und der englischen Literatur des 13. bis 17. Jahrhunderts* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1973).
3. For a survey of these sources, see Harry Randall Dosher, "The Concept of the Ideal Prince in French Political Thought, 800–1760" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1969), 1–42.
4. In the classic study of the subject, Wilhelm Berges argues against a direct connection between Carolingian and later medieval *specula*, taking the view that the genre was reinvented after ca. 1150 (*Die Fürstenspiegel des hohen und späten Mittelalters* [Stuttgart: Hiersemann, 1938], 3–8). This view has been convincingly challenged, however, by Dora M. Bell, *L'Idéal éthique de la Royauté en France au Moyen Age* (Geneva: Droz, 1962), 8–13; Sverre Bagge, *The Political Thought of the King's Mirror* (Odense: Odense University Press, 1987), 19 and *passim*; and Dosher, *The Concept of the Ideal Prince*, 43–138.
5. See Quentin Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 1, 118–123; James M. Blythe, *Ideal Government and the Mixed Constitution in the Middle Ages* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 60–61, 118.
6. In addition to the work of Berges (*Fürstenspiegel*) see: Lester K. Born, "The Perfect Prince: A Study in Thirteenth- and Fourteenth-Century Ideals," *Speculum* 3 (1928): 470–504; J. Röder, *Das Fürstenbild in den mittelalterlichen auf französischen Boden* (Emsdetten: Lechte, 1933); Wilhelm Kleineke, *Englische Fürstenspiegel vom Policraticus Johannes von Salisbury bis zum Basilikon Doron König Jakobs I* (Halle: Niemeyer, 1937); Allan H. Gilbert, *Machiavelli's Prince and Its Forerunners: The Prince as a Typical Book de Regimine Principum* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1938).
7. Bernard Guenée, *States and Rulers in Later Medieval Europe*, trans. J. Vale (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), 70.
8. For example, Guenée, *States and Rulers in Later Medieval Europe*, 69–74, 86–88; Jacques Krynnen, *Idéal du prince et pouvoir royal en France à fin du Moyen Age* (Paris: Picard, 1981); Diane Bornstein, "Reflections of Political Theory and Political Fact in Fifteenth-Century Mirrors for the Prince," in *Medieval Studies for Lillian Herlands Hornstein*, ed. J. B. Bessinger and R. R. Rayno (New York: New York University Press, 1976), 77–85.
9. As has been emphasized by Kate Langdon Forhan, Christine de Pizan, *The Book of the Body Politic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), xvii–xx.
10. Jean-Philippe Genet, "General Introduction," to idem, *Four English Political Tracts of the Later Middle Ages* (London: Royal Historical Society, 1977), ix–xviii.
11. Judith Ferster, *Fictions of Advice: The Literature and Politics of Counsel in Late Medieval England* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996), 3.
12. Mark Hulliung, *Citizen Machiavelli* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 24.
13. Ferster, *Fictions of Advice*, 160–73.
14. Berges, *Fürstenspiegel*, 343.

15. Although one must say that Jean-Philippe Genet's attempt to confine the *speculum principum* genre to French writings of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries is surely too restrictive ("General Introduction," xii–xvi).
16. Einar Már Jónsson, "La situation du *Speculum Regale* dans la littéraire Occidentale," *Études Germaniques* 42 (1987): 394.
17. This definition is certainly restrictive. Jónsson proceeds to exclude from the body of the genre such works as John of Salisbury's *Policraticus*, a treatise that both Berges, *Fürstenspiegel*, 40–52 and Kleineke (Englische Fürstenspiegel, 23–47) count as the first and one of the foremost "Mirrors for Princes." See Jónsson, "Situation du *Speculum Regale*," 394–395.
18. Jónsson, "Situation du *Speculum Regale*," 395–397.
19. Grabes, *The Mutable Glass*, 56.
20. Grabes, 58–60.
21. However, Grabes's synoptic listing of medieval and early modern writings containing "mirror" terminology in their titles does include the treatise (*The Mutable Mirror*, 244), but he counts it as a mirror for lawyers, not rulers (54).
22. See Maurice Keen, *England in the Later Middle Ages* (London: Methuen, 1973), 82; Michael Prestwich, *War, Politics and Finance under Edward I* (London: Faber and Faber, 1972), 247; idem *The Three Edwards: War and State in England, 1272–1377* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1980), 125; and Nicholas Pronay and John Taylor, *Parliamentary Texts of the Later Middle Ages* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 13.
23. For the most complete discussion of the authorship issue, see H. G. Reuschlin, "Who Wrote *The Mirror of Justices*?" *Law Quarterly Review* 58 (1942): 265–79.
24. See Cary J. Nederman, *State and Political Theory in France and England, 1250–1350* (Ph.D. dissertation, York University, Canada, 1983), 279–84.
25. J. G. A. Pocock, *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law* (New York: Norton, 1967), 41–43, 67–68, 91–92.
26. John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, ed. P. Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 246.
27. *Speculum Justiciariorum*, ed. W.J. Whittaker (London: Quaritch for the Selden Society, 1895), 1. I ordinarily follow Whittaker's translation, although I have occasionally modified it.
28. *Speculum Justiciariorum*, 1–2.
29. *Speculum Justiciariorum*, 2.
30. *Speculum Justiciariorum*, 3.
31. *Speculum Justiciariorum*, 121.
32. *Speculum Justiciariorum*, 121–22.
33. *Speculum Justiciariorum*, 166; see also 143–44, 166–71.
34. *Speculum Justiciariorum*, 155.
35. *Speculum Justiciariorum*, 6.
36. *Speculum Justiciariorum*, 7.
37. *Speculum Justiciariorum*, 43.
38. *Speculum Justiciariorum*, 131–32.
39. *Speculum Justiciariorum*, 175.
40. *Speculum Justiciariorum*, 8.
41. *Speculum Justiciariorum*, 156.
42. Ferster, *Fictions of Advice*, 67–68, 126–27.
43. *Speculum Justiciariorum*, 8.
44. *Speculum Justiciariorum*, 175–200.
45. Although, for purposes of simplicity, I will treat the two texts as a single unit, one should note that the second recension (B) is not a lightly edited version of the first (A). Rather, B forms an entirely new treatise that restates essentially the same grievances as its predecessor, but does so in a tone that conveys a far more direct threat to the temporal as well as spiritual welfare of the king and his court. The text of both works was edited by Joseph Moïssant, *De Speculo Regis Edwardi III* (Paris: Picard, 1891); translations are my own. References are to the recension and section number.

46. Kleineke, (*Englische Fürstenspiegel*, 66–72) includes the *Speculum Regis Edwardi III* as a contribution to the genre, although Berges (*Fürstenspiegel* 343) places it outside the *speculum* tradition.
47. *Speculum Regis Edwardi III*, A 1.
48. *Speculum Regis Edwardi III*, A 16.
49. *Speculum Regis Edwardi III*, A 36; B 51.
50. *Speculum Regis Edwardi III*, A 43; B 23, 37.
51. The dating was first suggested by James Tait, "On the Date and Authorship of the *Speculum Regis Edwardi*," *English Historical Review* 16 (1901): 110–15. William's authorship was established by Leonard Boyle, "William of Pagula and the *Speculum Regis Edwardi III*," *Medieval Studies* 32 (1970): 326–36. The circumstances of the work's composition have been examined in a forthcoming paper by Cary J. Nederman and Cynthia J. Neville, "The Origins of the *Speculum Regis Edwardi III* of William of Pagula, *Studi Medievalia* (1998).
52. For the known details of William's life, see Leonard Boyle, "The *Oculus Sacerdotis* and Some Other Works of William of Pagula," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, (5th Series), 5 (1955): 81–110.
53. *Speculum Regis Edwardi III*, A 15, 17; B, 7.
54. *Speculum Regis Edwardi III*, A 6, 7.
55. *Speculum Regis Edwardi III*, B 31.
56. *Speculum Regis Edwardi III*, B 30.
57. *Speculum Regis Edwardi III*, B 1–3.
58. *Speculum Regis Edwardi III*, B 38.
59. *Speculum Regis Edwardi III*, B 15.
60. *Speculum Regis Edwardi III*, B 28, 18.
61. *Speculum Regis Edwardi III*, A 9, 15, 37.
62. *Speculum Regis Edwardi III*, B 16.
63. *Speculum Regis Edwardi III*, B 1.
64. *Speculum Regis Edwardi III*, A 34; see also A 45; B 7.
65. *Speculum Regis Edwardi III*, B 37.
66. *Speculum Regis Edwardi III*, B 34–35.
67. *Speculum Regis Edwardi III*, A 10, 18.
68. *Speculum Regis Edwardi III*, B 7, 50.
69. *Speculum Regis Edwardi III*, A 11.
70. *Speculum Regis Edwardi III*, B 38.
71. On this background, see Nederman and Neville, "The Origins of the *Speculum Regis Edwardi III*."
72. Christine's name does not merit a mention in the work of Born, "The Perfect Prince"; and Berges, *Fürstenspiegel*; Dosher, ("Concept of the Idea Prince") rejects her as a "first-rate political thinker" on the grounds that she "not only repeated well-worn arguments found in French political literature of the Middle Ages but manifested a pedantic and pedagogical penchant for moralizing about the duties of kingship and the virtues of the ideal prince" (114; see 120–28). Much has been done to restore Christine to her rightful place by the contributors to *Politics, Gender, and Genre: The Political Thought of Christine de Pizan*, ed. Margaret Brabant (Boulder: Westview, 1992).
73. See Christine, *Book of the Body Politic*, 6, 22, 54; Christine de Pizan, *A Medieval Woman's Mirror of Honor: The Treasury of the City of Ladies*, trans. C. C. Willard (New York: Bard Hall/Persea, 1989), 70. The latter is a translation of *Le Livre des Trois Vertus*.
74. On Christine's political circumstances generally, see Charity Cannon Willard, "Christine de Pizan: From Poet to Political Commentator," in Brabant, *Gender, Politics and Genre*, 17–32.
75. See Kate Langdon Forhan, "Reflecting Heroes: Christine de Pizan and the Mirror Tradition," in *The City of Scholars: New Approaches to Christine de Pizan*, ed. Margarete Zimmerman and Dina De Rentiis (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1994); Bell, *L'Ideal éthique de la Royauté*, 105–31; and Diane Bornstein, *Mirrors of Courtesy* (New York: Archon Books, 1975).
76. Charity Cannon Willard has thoroughly documented Christine's background and career in *Christine de Pizan: Her Life and Her Works* (New York: Persea, 1984).
77. Christine, *A Medieval Woman's Mirror of Honor*, 197–202.
78. Christine, *Book of the Body Politic*, 48–49.

79. Christine, *A Medieval Woman's Mirror of Honor*, 83, 87–88; idem, *Book of the Body Politic*, 35–36, 39–40.
80. Christine, *The Book of the Body Politic*, 14–15, 25–31.
81. Christine, *A Medieval Woman's Mirror of Honor*, 105–7.
82. Christine, 106–7.
83. Chiristine, 109.
84. Christine de Pizan, *The Book of the City of Ladies*, trans. E. J. Richards (New York: Persea, 1982), 32.
85. Christine, *A Medieval Woman's Mirror of Honor*, 85.
86. Christine, 84–87.
87. Interestingly, however, the standard survey of medieval organic thought makes no mention of her contribution; Tilman Struve, *Die Entwicklung der organologischen Staatsauffassung im Mittelalter* (Stuttgart: Hiersemann, 1978).
88. Christine, *Book of the Body Politic*, 59.
89. See Cary J. Nederman, "Freedom, Community and Function: Communitarian Lessons of Medieval Political Theory," *American Political Science Review* 86 (December 1992): 978–79, 981–82.
90. Christine, *Book of the Body Politic*, 90.
91. Christine, 91.
92. On her deployment of this source, see Kate Langdon Forhan, "Polycracy, Obligation, and Revolt: The Body Politic in John of Salisbury and Christine de Pizan," in Brabant, *Politics, Gender, and Genre*, 33–52.
93. Christine, *Book of the Body Politic*, 12.
94. Christine, 14.
95. Christine, 19, 95–99.
96. Forhan, "Polycracy, Obligation, and Revolt," 43–44.
97. Christine, *Book of the Body Politic*, 104.
98. Christine, 103; this judgment is seconded by Christine, *A Medieval Woman's Book of Honor*, 196.
99. Christine, *Book of the Body Politic*, 105.
100. Christine, *Book of the Body Politic*, 105, 108, 109.
101. Going back at least as far as Gregory the Great; see Giles Constable, *Three Studies in Medieval Religious and Social Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1995), 271.
102. Christine, *Book of the Body Politic*, 10.
103. Christine, 40.
104. Christine, 20.
105. Christine, 22.
106. Christine, *A Medieval Woman's Mirror of Honor*, 85.
107. Christine, 110.
108. Christine, 110–11.
109. Christine, 219–23.
110. Christine, 6.
111. Gilbert, *The Prince and Its Forerunners*; Felix Gilbert, "The Humanist Concept of the Prince and the *Prince* of Machiavelli," *Journal of Modern History* 11 (1939): 449–465; Skinner, *Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, 1, 128–38; and Maureen Ramsay, "Machiavelli's Political Philosophy in the *Prince*," in Niccolò Machiavelli's *The Prince: New Interdisciplinary Essays*, ed. Martin Coyle (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), 183–87.
112. On these inconsistencies, see Michael McCanles, *The Discourse of Il Principe* (Malibu: Undena, 1984); Mary G. Deitz, "Trapping the Prince: Machiavelli and the Politics of Deception," *American Political Science Review* 80 (1986): 777–800.
113. Ferster, *Fictions of Advice*, 163.
114. Ferster, 164–65, 172–73.
115. An earlier version of this essay was presented to a conference on "Crossing Boundaries: Issues of Cultural and Individual Identity in the Middle Ages and Renaissance," sponsored by the Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, Tempe, February 1997. My thanks are due to participants in that conference, especially Jonathan Rose, as well as to Benedetto Fontana and the anonymous readers for *The European Legacy*, for their helpful suggestions. Allison Hinson read and commented usefully on several different versions of this essay.

The Ecological Self: Humanity and Nature in Nietzsche and Goethe

~ DANIEL R. WHITE AND GERT HELLERICH ~

> When one speaks of *humanity*, the idea is fundamental that this is something which separates and distinguishes man from nature. In reality, however, there is no such separation: "natural" qualities and those called truly "human" are inseparably grown together. Man, in his highest and noblest capacities, is wholly nature and embodies its uncanny dual character. Those of his abilities which are terrifying and considered inhuman may even be the fertile soil out of which alone all humanity can grow into impulse, deed and work.[1]

This passage, from the early work of Nietzsche, is a good indication of what we now think of as an "ecological" sensibility. The processes of industrial modernization, especially urbanization, have removed human beings far from their traditional contacts with the natural environment. The "modern" city, as Mumford reveals in *The City in History*,[2] was designed not for people so much as for the automobile. Of course, the "human being" is considered as little more than an appendage to the machine in the designs for industrial mass production, as Mumford also points out in *The Myth of the Machine*.[3] The result is that people have become abstracted from the "lifeworlds" of traditional cultures: literally drawn away from what they themselves typically thought of as their "kinship" with the plant and animal life as well as the geological environment of Gaia, and encapsulated in the simplified mechanisms of what Bateson thinks of as *homo economicus*: "Of all imaginary organisms—dragons, protomollusca, missing links, gods, demons, sea monsters, and so on—*economic man is the dullest*. He is dull because his mental processes are all quantitative and his preferences transitive."[4]

Bateson, here approaching the style of Nietzsche, makes a point worthy of the philosopher, particularly in his observation that "economic man" is the construction of an impoverished imagination: the mere appendage of increasingly universal subservience to the quantitative machinery of modernity; including mass production, bureaucratization, and econometric evaluation. The "domination of nature" as Leiss called it, has been basic to the idea of modernization since the Renaissance. The "environment" has been defined as a cache of "resources" or as a dump or as "real estate"—what Heidegger called *Gestell* or "standing reserve" for exploitation. Romantically, it has been seen as a realm of solace for quasireligious meditation, as in Wordsworth, but in spite of Romantic protestations the bottom line is the estrangement of human beings from nature and the pervasive establish-

Honors College, Florida Atlantic University, Palm Beach Gardens, FL 33410, U.S.A.
and University of Bremen, Bremen, Germany.

The European Legacy, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 39–61, 1998