

Austria, Germany, and the Cold War

From the *Anschluss* to the
State Treaty 1938–1955

Rolf Steininger



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Cover photo:

15 May 1955 – after signing the Austrian State Treaty: the Foreign Ministers on the balcony of Belvedere Palace in Vienna (left to right): Antoine Pinay (France), Vyacheslav Molotov (Soviet Union), Leopold Figl (Austria), John Foster Dulles (U.S.A.), Harold Macmillan (U.K.).

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respect to Austria and can also answer the question why it took ten years before Austria got the State Treaty.

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Innsbruck, February 2007

Notes

1. Stourzh, Gerald, *Um Einheit und Freiheit. Staatsvertrag, Neutralität und das Ende der Ost-West-Besetzung Österreichs 1945–1955* (Vienna–Cologne–Graz: Böhlau, 1998). The fifth edition with a bibliographical epilogue and select bibliography for the years 1999–2005 was published in 2005.
2. There have been noteworthy exceptions: Günter Bischof stresses the context of the Cold War throughout his numerous works, as do Erwin A. Schmidl, Audrey Kurth Cronin and James Jay Carafano, while Michael Gehler emphasizes the importance of the German question. But the connection of these issues – the Cold War and the German question, not to mention the *Anschluss* – with Austria is not always made.

This perspective is in part now taken up in an impressive collection of 33 essays – which came out of a conference organized in May 2005 by the Austrian Academy of Science in Vienna. Ten of these essays (five in English: T. Angerer, G. Bischof, S. Dockrill, A. Filitov, V. Mastny) deal with the political context, the Soviet Union and the West. Cf. Suppan, Arnold, Gerald Stourzh and Wolfgang Mueller, eds., *Der österreichische Staatsvertrag 1955. Internationale Strategie, rechtliche Relevanz, nationale Identität. The Austrian State Treaty 1955. International Strategy, Legal Relevance, National Identity* (Vienna: Verlag der österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2005).

Chapter I

1918–1938: The Road to the *Anschluss*

In Article 4 of the 1955 Austrian State Treaty, the victors pronounced a “prohibition of *Anschluss*.” It reads: “1. The Allied and Associated Powers declare that political or economic union between Austria and Germany is prohibited. Austria fully recognizes its responsibilities in this matter and shall not enter into political or economic union with Germany in any form whatsoever.” Austria’s commitments to prevent such union are stipulated in 4.2: Austria should not conclude any agreement with Germany, or do any act, or take any measures likely, directly or indirectly, “to promote political or economic union with Germany, or to impair its territorial integrity or political or economic independence.” In addition Austria should undertake “to prevent within its territory any act likely, directly or indirectly, to promote such union and shall prevent the existence, resurgence and activities of any organizations having as their aim political or economic union with Germany, and pan-German propaganda in favour of union with Germany.”¹

The Allies had already declared such a prohibition on more than one occasion in the past. Their goal after World War II was the same as after World War I. The 1919 peace treaties with Germany and Austria prohibited a unification of the two states. In the Versailles Treaty, which Germany was compelled to sign on 28 June 1919, the victors had proclaimed such a restriction in Article 80. Germany was forced to acknowledge and “respect strictly the independence of Austria.” In the Treaty of St. Germain, which Austria signed in September 1919, Article 88 contained a corresponding clause. It reads: “The independence of Austria is inalienable [...]. Consequently Austria undertakes [...] to abstain from any act which might directly or indirectly or by any means whatever compromise her independence, [...] by participation in the affairs of another power.”

These provisions aimed to stop a development that had emerged in the previous year, officially beginning on 12 November 1918, a memorable date in Austria’s history. A few days earlier, the German members of the Habsburg *Reichsrat*, elected in 1911, had turned themselves into the “Provisional National Assembly for German-Austria”. German-Austria (Deutsch-Österreich) was the new state; now, on 12 November, the Assembly ratified a new constitution whose Article 1 declared the new

state "a democratic Republic". Article 2 read "German Austria is an integral part of the German Republic." After a general election in February 1919 this decision was unanimously confirmed on 12 March.

The Social Democratic chancellor Karl Renner had committed himself publicly to the *Anschluss* in a passionate speech to parliament on 12 November. He lamented the fate of the German people and, among other things, declared: "The people, which was always proud to be known as the people of poets and philosophers, is momentarily on its knees. But exactly in this hour, our German people in all regions should know that we are of one tribe and of one mind." The official minutes record: "The assembled arise. Stormy, long-lasting applause and clapping of hands in the chamber and on the balconies."²

Otto Bauer, an intellectual leader of the Social Democrats and later Foreign Minister, had demanded at a party convention on 31 October, "to look for the *Anschluss*, where we can find it, where we belong by nature and from where we were only artificially separated decades ago: with the German Reich."³

In February and March 1919, Bauer and his German colleague held secret talks in Berlin and Weimar "on behalf and by order of the German-Austrian Government", which culminated with the signing of a secret protocol on 2 March. This protocol outlined how the union of the two countries could be effected "as rapidly as possible." According to this, German-Austria should join the Reich as an autonomous component state (Gliedstaat) with certain special rights (among other things, Vienna would remain as a second capital on an equal footing with Berlin; the Reich president would reside there part of the time, etc.). Various commissions containing representatives of both countries would prepare the coordination of legal, trade, traffic, education, and social policies.⁴

According to Bauer, the "most important and most definite" results of these talks was "that in Germany we are received with open arms; welcomed in a fraternal spirit; that the historically based unique characteristics of German-Austria are fully recognized by the Reich; that it is fully recognized that we can fully meet our economic needs within the Reich, that above all, we will find there a heartfelt readiness to render fraternal help".

The majority of Austrians desired union with Germany. The reasons lay close at hand, as Geoffrey W. Harrison of the Foreign Office 24 years later in his famous memorandum "The Future of Austria" (see Chapter III) noted: To him it was clear that

the Austrians are a German people, sharing the inheritance of German thought and art. But their vocation through more than five centuries has been Danubian, and living as they do at the crossing of so many ways they are by tradition Europeans. This perhaps helps to explain why the great majority of Austrians can hardly be said to have been nationally conscious before 1918 ...

So determined did the Danubian states shake the dust of Austria from their feet that to the Austrians it seemed clear that their eastern mission had ended.

Germany was apparently a new and wholly changed country. The Austrian socialist government in Vienna saw their German comrades in power in Berlin. And so, above all, *Anschluss* would be a victory of socialism. The victors brought these unification politics to an end with the treaties mentioned above. They regarded the maintenance of Austria's independence as an interest of their own. No one wanted to approve territorial aggrandizement and a population gain of 6.5 million for a defeated Germany. When the allied and associated powers forbade union with Germany, the future of Austria seemed of little interest to them; they took no effective steps to ensure that the country should enjoy at least some economic co-operation with the other successor states.

The Austrian National Assembly accepted the Treaty of St. Germain under protest on 6 September 1919; and with it the change of name from "German-Austria" to "Republic of Austria". Furthermore, the Assembly decided that "in pursuance of the State Treaty of Saint Germain the previous legal provision under which German Austria was declared an integral part of the German Reich ceases to be in force."⁵

In the eyes of many of its inhabitants, this new state was not viable. And, for all those who refused to believe in this state, union with Germany – even if no longer socialist – seemed the only possible way out of the ever-increasing misery. In the process, the *Anschluss* movement largely relocated to the provinces. They took things into their own hands, especially Tyrol, Salzburg, and Carinthia, and warned the Federal Government in Vienna to keep its hand off. Vorarlberg, always regarded in Austria as more Swiss than Austrian, sought union with Switzerland. (In the 1870's it had opposed the Arlberg railway tunnel project on the grounds that what God had put asunder by a mountain no man should join together with a hole.) The Diet of Tyrol severed relations with Vienna and dispatched an embassy to Switzerland to obtain recognition from the Western Powers – a desperate move to preserve the unity of the province (see Chapter V).

On 24 April 1921, in spite of St. Germain, Tyrol held a plebiscite at which an overwhelming majority – 98,75 percent – voted for union with Germany. (Salzburg and Styria followed suit with similar results.) At one point of the border (near Scharnitz) the border posts were already removed. Tyrol wanted to be free from "red and atheist" Vienna and generally had little sympathy for the new state. Nowhere was this made as clear as in a letter that Richard Steidle, the influential leader of the Tyrolean Heimatwehr (Home Guard; the name of the newly constituted paramilitary Heimwehr in the province) – who himself was to be killed in

the Buchenwald concentration camp in 1940 – wrote to Austrian chancellor Michael Mayr on 25 May 1921. In Steidle's opinion, what characterized decisively the attitude of Tyrol's population was "above all the wish to break away from the hated policy made in Vienna ("die ganze verhasste Wiener Wirtschaft"), with which people want nothing more to do with. This attitude is becoming almost spiteful, especially in religious and Tyrolean nationalist oriented circles, and I encounter more and more people who openly express this view." Steidle ended his letter with a clear wish, one that also reveals why this state of Austria could not settle down internally over the following years. "Actually," Steidle continued, "I should not even have told you all this because from my own personal standpoint I wish for nothing so much as that this impossible state dissolves in a stench once and for all and that Tyrol will be liberated from Vienna."⁶

It was not until 1922, when the economic situation had become desperate, that the Western Powers awoke to Austria's need of support to bear the burden of independence that had been forced upon her. The League of Nations guaranteed a loan in October 1922. In return, the republic once more committed itself "in accordance with the formulation of Article 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain not to surrender its independence" for the next twenty years.⁷

The notion of union was not yet dead, however. In the following years, massive pro-*Anschluss* propaganda efforts took place in Germany and Austria. Both countries contained "working communities" (*Arbeitsgemeinschaften*) and "peoples leagues" (*Volksbünde*) that boasted several hundred thousand members and conducted *Anschluss* propaganda in the public sphere. One of the most impressive events was the 10th German Singers League Festival in Vienna, at which the League's president declared: "Our soul thirsts for this Greater Germany but our rational mind tells us that we can only do the work in preparations for this. We want to go about this work with all the power and enthusiasm that flow from the German song."⁸

Austria was pursuing practical unification policies in the areas of traffic, culture and law. In 1925, they lifted the visa requirement between the two countries and agreed upon postal regulations. In 1926, the Austrian army replaced its green uniform with field gray, the color of the German Army.

In 1931, both sides took a further step. Germany took the initiative; Austria was "instrumentalized." The "union with Austria," as it was called in a memorandum of 7 June 1930, by the Foreign Ministry in Berlin, "should be the most urgent task of German policy, since developments in Southeastern Europe could be influenced and steered, in a wholly different way than is possible now, from an Austria belonging to Germany." The first step toward this goal was to be a customs union and

the entire operation draped in a "pan-European cloak," as State Secretary von Bülow in the Foreign Ministry phrased it in January 1931. The operation failed, and turned out to be one of the worst mistakes in German foreign policy. The idea of international cooperation in Europe was thereby finally laid to rest.⁹ The answer in Germany was Adolf Hitler, in Austria Engelbert Dollfuss.

Austria was not openly anti-democratic until 1933. Elections were held and the constitution was respected. But if a true spirit of democracy had existed, there would have been no need for the private armies maintained by both major parties – Socialists and Conservatives – until one succeeded in suppressing the other. "Clerico-Fascist" and "Marxist" were not mere propaganda phrases; they marked a gulf of fierce antagonism: the Conservatives did not believe in democracy, and the Socialists still believed in the dictatorship of the proletariat. Socially the two parties became more and more separate: separate schools, colleges, welfare organizations, libraries, youth movements and so forth ensured that the "two nations" were kept in isolation and mutual distrust. Clashes between the two paramilitary organizations – the socialist *Schutzbund* and the reactionary *Heimwehr* – became more frequent.

In 1927, after *Heimwehr* men charged with the murder of members of the *Schutzbund* were acquitted, demonstrations ensued that brought the country to the brink of civil war. Workers stormed and burned down the Palace of Justice; the police opened fire. Eighty-nine people were killed, between 600 and 1,000 wounded. In 1930 the *Heimwehr* repudiated democracy and Parliament. In 1932 Dollfuss became Chancellor and in March 1933 suspended Parliament. In February 1934 the Socialist Party was suppressed after bloody street fighting, marking the first civil war in Europe, with hundreds of people killed. Democracy and freedom had perished with an alarming unemployment rate of more than 600,000.

For Hitler, the *Anschluss* was the first prerequisite for achieving "Greater Germany". Already in 1931 he had shown, by his appointment of a Gauleiter for Vienna, that he was as devoted as ever to his intention to effect the *Anschluss* (as written on the first page of *Mein Kampf*). As soon as the Nazis gained power, a stream of threatening propaganda began. Dollfuss banned the Nazi party in Austria, Hitler reacted with the 1,000 mark barrier for Germans, which actually brought tourism in Austria to a standstill. Then a legion of Austrian Nazis was formed in Germany and the organization of violence in Austria itself developed.

Many Austrians, particularly amongst the disinherited intelligentsia and the students, who feared future unemployment, responded to the Nazi appeal. But a large body of Austrian opinion swung over rapidly from a disinterested attitude to positive opposition to the *Anschluss*.

As in 1933–34, Hitler attempted to achieve the *Anschluss* by the

quickest means, evidently hoping to utilize the dynamism of the Nazi movement. He failed. After Dollfuss had banned the Nazi party, he was now waging a two-front war against National Socialism and Social Democracy. In the "corporate state" that he built up, nearly two-thirds of the population were excluded from participating in the process of government. The nation was split in two.

Hitler's attempt at a quick solution ended with the putsch by the Austrian National Socialists in Vienna on 25 July 1934. Although Dollfuss fell victim to the putschists – he was shot – the coup itself collapsed after a few hours, thanks to determined resistance by the government and the army.

There followed the Nazi "evolutionary solution," the "spiritual permeation" of Austria orchestrated from Berlin. The country was to be hollowed out from within, which is what eventually happened. In late 1937, Austrian domestic and foreign policies were in a nearly hopeless state: Hitler had gained a free hand concerning Austria from Italy's "Duce" Mussolini during the Italian dictator's visit to Berlin in September 1937. The forming of the Rome-Berlin axis – Mussolini needed Hitler's help in Ethiopia – swept the ground from under Austria's feet. There was the bitter joke that this axis was the grill on which Austria was roasted "brown". Chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg, the successor of Dollfuss, apparently underestimated the seriousness of the situation; otherwise he would not have been prepared to meet with Hitler at Berchtesgaden (Bavaria) on 12 February 1938. If he had hoped to clear existing differences and win time, then he experienced a rude awakening. (The British later feared the same thing would happen in 1955, when chancellor Julius Raab accepted the Soviet invitation to Moscow, repeatedly invoking "Berchtesgaden"; see Chapter VIII.) He was shown the German General Staff's plan for the occupation of his country. Hitler dictated an ultimatum demanding that Austria align foreign, military, economic, and press policies with those of Germany; grant Austrian Nazis freedom to operate and a general amnesty; and appoint one of them, Arthur Seyss-Inquart, a lawyer, as Interior Minister with unlimited police authority, and another Nazi, Edmund Glaise-Horstenau, as Minister without portfolio. Schuschnigg had three days to comply. In the event of rejection, Hitler threatened an invasion by the Wehrmacht.

Schuschnigg returned from the meeting a broken man. Yet the official line was that useful conversation had taken place for the improvement of Austro-German relations. Up to almost the last moment the government in Vienna hesitated either to explain the seriousness of the situation or to rally the people behind it.

When Schuschnigg finally tried, it was too late. In early March 1938, he made a desperate move to regain the initiative and thereby initiated

the final act in the unfolding drama himself. Issuing the battle cry of the Tyrolean freedom fighter Andreas Hofer, "Men, it is time!" he announced in Innsbruck on 9 March a popular referendum for the following Sunday, 13 March. His rallying cry would ring: "For a free and German, independent and social, for a Christian and united Austria!" Even at this moment, the government regarded Austria as the "second German state", and of course the better of the two.

It is a moot point to speculate what would have happened had the referendum taken place. Hitler and his pack of crooks were probably right to be worried that Schuschnigg, in spite of everything, could have patched together a majority. The 10th, 11th, and 12th of March were characterized by confusion over competencies and decision-making authority, whereby the 11th was the decisive day. The chronology of the most important events is now largely known¹⁰ and can be summarized as follows: on the morning of 10 March Hitler reacted to Schuschnigg's speech; he ordered that Operation "Otto", the invasion of Austria, be prepared for 12 March; at 6:30 p.m. the requisite mobilization order was issued; Edmund Glaise-Horstenau, coincidentally in Germany at the time, was commissioned to return to Vienna immediately and deliver an ultimatum to Schuschnigg to postpone the popular referendum. The success of this referendum looked certain when, on the morning of 11 March, the Central Committee of the Revolutionary Socialists called on the workers to vote "yes."

There followed three more ultimatums on that day alone by the Austrian Nazis in Vienna – each time after consulting with or being ordered by Berlin:

1. At 10:00 a.m., Arthur Seyss-Inquart and Glaise-Horstenau, prevailed upon Schuschnigg, under threat of their resignation – which would have meant a breach of the Berchtesgaden agreement and given Hitler official justification for military intervention – to drop the referendum. Schuschnigg accepted at 11:30 a.m.

At 1:00 p.m., Hitler signed Directive No. 1 for the invasion on 13 March. Eventual resistance was to be broken "with the greatest ruthlessness through force of arms."

2. A few minutes after 1:00 p.m. followed Seyss-Inquart's second ultimatum, which expired at 5:00 p.m.: resignation of the cabinet, which he himself would reconstitute. Almost concurrently, the National Socialists seized power in the cities and provinces. The old regime collapsed virtually without resistance. In this situation, after diplomatic inquiries in Paris, London, and Rome revealed that no help could be expected from those quarters, Schuschnigg resigned at 4:00 p.m.

3. A short time later followed a third ultimatum, addressed to President Wilhelm Miklas: appointment of Seyss-Inquart as the new chancellor by 7:30 p.m. or German troops would march in. While Miklas still refused, Schuschnigg finally capitulated once and for all; he bade his compatriots farewell in a radio broadcast at 8:00 p.m. and reported the ultimatum and threat of invasion. The Bundesheer was ordered to “fire no shots” at the invading German forces and to “withdraw to the east.” Schuschnigg’s last words were: “Gott schütze Österreich!” (“God save Austria!”)

The discussions about a possible Austrian (military) resistance are often characterized by wishful thinking. After all, there was no political will for such a step, the country as a whole had no will to resist; there was no longer a functioning government, the Austrian forces had been infiltrated by “illegal elements” (i.e. National Socialists), and the Nazis had virtually taken power throughout the country. What would have happened, however, had Schuschnigg gone into exile with the government and had the Allies been able to count on this government in their postwar planning? The famous British memorandum on the future of Austria from April 1943 referred to exactly that scenario.¹¹

On 11 March at 11:00 p.m., Seyss-Inquart was appointed the new chancellor by Miklas. Although victory of the Austrian National Socialists was thereby complete, the Directive No. 2, signed by Hitler at 8:45 p.m., for the invasion to begin at daybreak on 12 March remained in effect. Hitler’s last uncertainty had been removed in the late evening with the news from Rome that Mussolini had no objections to the operation.

The Austrians’ cheering and enthusiasm for the German invasion on the morning of 12 March exceeded all expectations on the German side and contributed to Hitler’s decision to carry through the *Anschluss* with Austria immediately and completely, without honoring the original transitional arrangements. As the last act of his two-day chancellorship, Seyss-Inquart signed into law the “Reunification of Austria with the German Reich” in Linz on 13 March, in which Article 1 – “Austria is a land of the German Reich –,” fatefully evoked the year 1918, though now everything had changed. Five years later, when the Foreign Office started to make plans about the future of Austria, it was considered legitimate in London to ask whether the *Anschluss* represented a “case of rape or seduction,” without concealing the fact that the British government itself had recognized the *Anschluss* very quickly, by converting its embassy in Vienna into a consulate.¹²

Alongside enthusiasm, approval, hope for better times and full employment – and much opportunism, there were also Austrians who did not approve of what had happened. They went largely unnoticed,



(1) 12 March 1938: German troops march into Innsbruck.

however, for Himmler's SS-henchmen acted quickly. All the public saw and remembered were scenes of jubilation and Hitler's March 15 speech at the Heldenplatz in Vienna, before some 200,000 cheering Austrians where he proclaimed the *Anschluss*. Where there was still skepticism, it was suffocated beneath an unprecedented propaganda campaign in the weeks preceding the popular referendum of 10 April.


The Catholic bishops, for example, voiced their approval, "that, through the efforts of the National Socialist movement, the danger of godless Bolshevism that destroys all was repulsed", and bestowed "the blessings on these efforts in the future." No Communist dictatorship had ever succeeded in eliciting from a Prince of the Church an endorsement as complete as Cardinal Theodor Innitzer's admonition to "the priests and the faithful." He commanded prayers of thanksgiving for the bloodless course of a great revolution and signed with "Heil Hitler!"

Former Chancellor Karl Renner professed on 2 April:

Although not achieved with methods of which I would approve, the *Anschluss* has now been effected, is a historic fact; and I consider that true amends for the humiliations of 1918 and 1919, for St. Germain and Versailles ... As a Social Democrat and therefore as a proponent of nations' right to self-determination, as the first Chancellor of the Republic of Austria I will vote yes.¹³

Who among the Catholics and socialists would still vote "no" in the face of such "recommendations?" Accordingly, the outcome of the referendum was clear. To the question: "Are you in agreement with the reunification of Austria and the German Reich that occurred on 13 March 1938 and do you support the candidates of our Führer Adolf Hitler?", 4,453,772 Austrians (99.73 percent) voted "yes," only 11,929 voted "no," 5,776 ballots were void. (In Germany, 44,362,667 or 99.02 percent voted "yes," 440,429 voted "no." The referendum on the *Anschluss* also counted as a Reichstag election.) We should not assume that there were falsified ballots on a large scale; indeed, under the prevailing conditions they were not necessary.

Many Austrians, however, soon woke up to a sober reality. Hitler had never particularly cared for the Austrian Nazis and so National Socialists from Germany took over the leading positions in Austria. Significantly, the first airplane that touched down in Vienna at 4:30 a.m. on 12 March 1938, contained, among others, Heinrich Himmler, the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police, and SS-Gruppenführer (Lieutenant-General) Reinhard Heydrich, Chief of the Security Service (Sicherheitsdienst or SD). During March and April alone approximately 21,000 Austrians found themselves in "protective custody"; many were transferred to Dachau concentration camp. In the following weeks



(2) 15 March 1938: Some 200,000 Austrians gather on Vienna's Heldenplatz (Square of Heroes) to hear Adolf Hitler proclaim the *Anschluss*.

systematic terror and acts of vengeance took place, as well as terrible anti-Semitic violence and countless Jewish suicides – developments made possible because anti-Semitism had deep roots in Austria. From March to May 1938, 203 Jews committed suicide in Vienna alone.¹⁴ On 8 May, following Hitler's directive, construction of the Mauthausen concentration camp began.

Notes

- 1 Text of the Austrian State Treaty in U.S. Department of State, Bulletin 32, 6 June 1955: 916–932, and <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1961/14.html>
- 2 Michaelis, Herbert, and Ernst Schraepfer, eds., *Ursachen und Folgen* (Berlin: Dokumentenverlag Dr. Herbert Wendler, no date), vol. III, 285–287.
- 3 See Rolf Steininger, “12 November 1918–13 March 1938: The Road to the Anschluss”, in Steininger, Rolf, Günter Bischof and Michael Gehler, eds., *Austria in the Twentieth Century* (New Brunswick, USA., and London, U.K.: Transaction Publishers, 2002), 85–114.
- 4 See Rolf Steininger, “Die Anschlussbestrebungen Deutschösterreichs und das Deutsche Reich 1918/19”, in Arbeitskreis für regionale Geschichte, ed., *“Eidgenossen, helft Euren Brüdern in der Not!” Vorarlbergs Beziehungen zu seinen Nachbarstaaten 1918–1922*, (Feldkirch: Wenin, 1990), 65–83.
- 5 *Ursachen und Folgen*, vol. III, p. 290.
- 6 Cited in Hermann J. W. Kuprian, “Tirol und die Anschlussfrage 1918–1921,” in Albrich, Thomas, Klaus Eisterer and Rolf Steininger, eds., *Tirol und der Anschluss* (Innsbruck: Haymon Verlag, 1988), 65.
- 7 *Bundesgesetzblatt für die Republik Österreich*, 3 December 1922, 842.
- 8 See Steininger, “12 November 1918”, 97.
- 9 See Rolf Steininger, “... der Angelegenheit ein paneuropäisches Mäntelchen umhängen ...”: Das deutsch-österreichische Zollunions-Projekt von 1931,” in Gehler, Michael, Rainer F. Schmidt, Harm-Hinrich Brandt and Rolf Steininger, eds., *Ungleiche Partner? Österreich und Deutschland in ihrer gegenseitigen Wahrnehmung. Historische Analysen und Vergleiche aus dem 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Beiheft 15 der Historischen Mitteilungen der Ranke-Gesellschaft), (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1996), 441–478.
- 10 See Schausberger, Norbert, *Der Griff nach Österreich: Der Anschluss* (Vienna and Munich: Jugend und Volk, 1978), and Schmidl, Erwin A., *März 38: Der deutsche Einmarsch in Österreich* (Vienna: Bundesverlag, 1987).
- 11 “The Future of Austria.” Memorandum by Geoffrey W. Harrison, 4 April 1943. The National Archives, London, Public Record Office [PRO], Foreign Office [FO] 371/34464/C 3729/321/18.
- 12 *Ibid.*
- 13 *Neues Wiener Tagblatt*, 2 April 1938.
- 14 Johnson, Lonnie, *Introducing Austria* (Riverside: Ariadne Press, 1987), 121–22.

Chapter II

1938 and Beyond: Austria as “Victim”

On 1 November 1943, the Allies proclaimed in their so-called “Moscow Declaration” that Austria had been “the first victim of Hitlerite aggression” in 1938 (cf. Chapter III). That statement became something like the “founding document” of the Second Republic in April 1945. Moreover, it has been repeatedly noted that no Austrian government could have been in a position to decline this offering from the Allies; in that context, one can speak of the Moscow Declaration’s “legitimizing function” for the Second Republic.¹

To be sure: Austria as a state was a victim in 1938. The overwhelming majority of Austrians, however, felt themselves anything but victims. Austrians became victims only in the following years: approximately 20,000 died of aerial bombing, 242,000 were killed while serving in the Wehrmacht, 500 soldiers and approximately 30,000 civilians were executed, hundreds of thousands became invalids. The Nazi reign in



(3) After the *Anschluss*: as in many places in Austria, Jews are now “undesired” in St. Anton in Tyrol. What begins in this way ends with the expulsion of 130,000 and

Austria in many ways resembled that in Germany; in some respects it was even more brutal. The Austrian historian Gerald Stourzh rightly points out that the victim myth applied to the personal experiences of numerous politicians of the first hour and the first years of the Second Republic. They could easily identify themselves with the myth.² Leopold Figl, who became Chancellor in December 1945, had been arrested by the Nazis in 1938 and brought to Dachau. Released in 1943, he was arrested once more in 1944 and interned in Mauthausen, which was liberated in April 1945. His government of 17 ministers included 12 who had been persecuted during the Nazi period.

Stourzh brings to light a previously unknown anecdote. Once, in a cabinet meeting, Figl announced his participation at a memorial service for a Soviet general who had been murdered by the Nazis, adding: "The Russian general was located two cells next to me when I was in Mauthausen." Stourzh writes:

The reference to the state of Austria as a victim of Hitlerite aggression cannot be questioned. Something else, however, must be criticized: first, aside from any legal responsibility, the lack of moral awareness that shame for the inaction of compatriots can be felt even by those who are not individually culpable; second, the practice – rooted in an old Austrian tradition – of acting in a legalistically, even narrow-heartedly formalistic way, where voluntary magnanimity, born of far-sighted political will, would have been the better, because morally more persuasive, political course.³

Austrians, however, were not only victims but also perpetrators. "We are all victims," something often heard after 1945, is as far off the mark as the notion of a "zero hour." Regardless of any sympathy for the new state's difficult situation, the victim myth perpetrated, and eventually internalized, by the responsible political leaders was not then and even today is not justifiable.

What are the facts? In the German Wehrmacht, Austrians were overrepresented vis-à-vis Germans in some areas, for example in the Balkans, where so many atrocities were committed. Austrians were also disproportionately represented in the National Socialist terror apparatus and made decisive contributions to the mass murder of the Jews. 40 percent of personnel and 75 percent of the commandants in the extermination camps at Belzec, Sobibor and Treblinka came from Austria, such as Irmfried Eberl, who studied medicine at Innsbruck and became the first commandant of Treblinka. His neighbour, Franz Stangl, was previously commandant of Sobibor.⁴ The brutal Amon Göth from Schindler's List hailed from Vienna. All three commandants of the Theresienstadt ghetto were Austrians, there were Arthur Seyss-Inquart, Reich commissioner of the Netherlands and responsible for the deportation of the Dutch Jews; then Otto Wächter, first commissioner in

the Galician district and later in Italy, Odilo Globocnik, the Higher SS and Police leader in the Lublin district, who supervised the death camps in Poland; and Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Chief of the Reich Security Main Office (Reichssicherheitshauptamt) from 1943 and the second man behind Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler – to mention only a few names. Austrians organized the deportation and extermination of Jews from all across Europe: 80 percent of Adolf Eichmann's men were from Austria.

As members of the death squads (Einsatzgruppen), a conspicuously large number of Austrians participated in mass shootings of Jews and non-Jewish civilians in the rear areas behind the Eastern Front. Just under 14 percent of all SS men were Austrians, though Austrians constituted only 8 percent of the German Reich's population. According to Simon Wiesenthal's estimates, Austrians were directly responsible for the murder of three million Jews! These included 65,000 out of 200,000 Jews from their own country, as well as 11,000 "Gypsies" and 10,000 "euthanasia" victims.⁵

Before this happened, Austria was the scene of wild pogroms, whose victims were helpless Jews. What took place in 1938 in Vienna and also Innsbruck during the so-called Reichskristallnacht "was a regression into barbarism (and) belongs to the darkest hours of Austrian history," as the Austrian historian Ernst Hanisch described it.⁶ His colleague Gerhard Botz has put it this way: "The attacks consisted mostly of symbolic acts and historic rituals aimed at the destruction of a sense of identity – humiliations, abuse and arrests – but there were also physical attacks, beatings, murders and also robberies on a mass scale. It was as if medieval pogroms had reappeared in modern dress."⁷

In no city of the Reich were pogroms so "spontaneous", so general and so brutal as in Vienna or Innsbruck. Not so much as a single word of protest was heard from the Austrian bishops. Even after the war, the episcopate's famous pastoral letter of 21 September 1945 contained not one word of regret, not one word about the terrible crimes committed by and against their own countrymen – nor does the word "Jew" appear. Only the Nazi policies against the church were loudly lamented.⁸

The predatory attacks against Jews after the Anschluss were at first "wild" and then carried out legally. "Aryanization", a euphemism for stealing, was thoroughly exhaustive. To list only a few statistics just for Vienna: 65,000 apartments and more than 30,000 businesses and stores were "aryanized" or "liquidated." 80 pharmacies, approximately half the total for the entire city, and 74 cinemas (more than half of Vienna's entertainment establishments) were "aryanized", as well as such icons as the State Opera, Jugendstil mansions, Ringstraßenpalais, Ottakringer beer or the famous Riesenrad (ferris wheel): while the Jewish owners were murdered, the amusement continued. Vienna became considerably more "aryan."

Then there was art stolen from the Jews, the most famous example being five paintings by Gustav Klimt, one of Austria's most celebrated painters. The paintings were seized by the Nazis. Until 2006 they were on public display in a Vienna museum. After a long legal battle between the Republic of Austria and the rightful heir a court ordered Austria in 2006 to return the paintings. They were later sold at auction. The most well-known of them, the "Goldene Adele" was bought by the former U.S. ambassador to Austria, Ronald Lauder, on 18 June 2006, for \$ 135 million, the highest price ever paid for a painting at that time.

Without further ado, the Nazis falsified the history of music. The registry of St. Stephen's parish was sent to Berlin, where the page containing reference to the Jewish ancestors of the "King of Waltz" was removed. In this way, Johann Strauss, father and son, were "aryanized."⁹

Then there was the enforced exodus of Jews in 1938/39: Everything was taken from them before they were allowed to emigrate. By November 1939 about 126,000 – two-thirds of the Austrian Jewry – had already left their fatherland – never to return. The historian Robert Wistrich called this a "tribute" to the brutality of Viennese anti-Semitism "which was far more radical than anything hitherto seen in the 'Old Reich', Nazi Germany before the Anschluss."¹⁰

The history of the two largest Austrian banks is particularly dark in this respect. In 1944 the Länderbank had stored in its vaults almost 400 tons of gold, taken from the teeth of concentration camp prisoners, mainly Jews – alive or dead. The gold had been extracted and melted down into bars.

The Creditanstalt sold about five tons of it to Turkey between 1942 and 1944. The Creditanstalt branch in Cracow conducted business with 12 concentration camps, among them Auschwitz, Buchenwald, Dachau, and Mauthausen.¹¹ At the end of 1944 there were about one million slave workers in Austria, among them 580,000 foreigners.¹²

It is remarkable how far the decision makers in postwar Austria were prepared to go to distance themselves from everything German in order to build up the new state. Even though some knew better, surely the first victim could not also be a perpetrator. After all, Austria was the first victim of Hitler's aggression – the Allies had said so themselves!! And so it would be from now on! Guilt over the crimes committed during the Nazi period was pushed off on "the Germans." That was the view, for example, in a memorandum of the Vienna State Chancellery for Foreign Affairs in summer 1945, which claimed that the persecution of Jews

took place throughout the occupation of Austria by German troops. The persecutions were ordered by Reich German authorities and executed with their help. Austria, which possessed no government of its own following the occupation by foreign troops, neither decreed this measure nor could prevent it. According to international law, Austrian Jews' reparations claims should

The "collective guilt" of the Germans, often cited at the time, was juxtaposed against the "collective innocence" of the Austrians. A report from November 1951 by the British embassy in Vienna¹⁴ also addresses this issue. This report claims that it was tactless "to ask an Austrian, particularly a Viennese, whether he welcomed the *Anschluss*; it is an insult to question his repudiation of Nazism. Seyss-Inquart was apparently the only Austrian Nazi. Nazis, like most Germans, lacked 'culture.' And that was unpardonable." The report goes on to enumerate all those things that contradict that notion: the "chameleon-like" transformation of Vienna into a "Nazi town," the attitude of Cardinal Innitzer, the Jewish pogroms, aryanization, and others: "Swastikas appeared everywhere; the police had the right arm-bands ready in their pockets, German troops were feted."¹⁵

After 1945 Austria, out of self-interest, either vehemently denied the existence of Austrian anti-Semitism or else downplayed its importance. Thus the mayor of Vienna, Theodor Körner, ridiculed in February 1947 "the fairy-tale of anti-Semitism" in his city, calling it "totally alien" to the Viennese. Sharply criticizing unfriendly reports in the foreign (especially American) press, he claimed that "naturally, not a word of these horror stories is true. [...] Let it be known once and for all that, except for the riots organized by the Nazis during their reign over Austria, there were never any pogroms in Vienna; the Viennese is a cosmopolitan and therefore sui generis no anti-Semite."¹⁶

Like his fellow party member Karl Renner, Körner was a socialist. Renner had said at a cabinet meeting in May 1945:

It would be incomprehensible if one compensated every little Jewish businessman or private tutor for his loss while (at the same time) an entire class and a movement to which 47 percent of the population belonged can have the fruits of their labor and organizational activity simply taken away, unpunished and with no recompense, while the law provides no redress against it.¹⁷

Under these circumstances, restitution was all but unthinkable. Where property was returned, harassment occurred. Pharmacies serve as an example: if an applicant for restitution sought to take over his old pharmacy, he was required to go through a year-long internship. The umbrella "Pharmacy Chamber" had in the meantime annulled the returnees' professional qualifications. Those who had been disowned now had to have their professional competence confirmed by the public administrator of the business placed on reserve. The "aryanizers," on the other hand, faced no such difficulties: as soldiers at the front, they had not lost their professional qualifications. The highest representatives of politics and the civil service attempted to outdo one another with

the matter of Jewish property placed on reserve. They subordinated their sense of justice to the interests of the perpetrators. As Chancellor Leopold Figl said in a January 1947 cabinet meeting on the subject of anti-Semitism: "The Jews just want to become rich folks very quickly."¹⁸ ("Die Juden möchten halt rasch reiche Leute werden.")

The murder and robbery of Jews following the *Anschluss* were officially ignored, even though the political actors were well aware of the questionable morality of such a stance. Interior Minister Oskar Helmer (SPÖ) said in a cabinet meeting in November 1948: "What was taken away from the Jews cannot be ascribed wholesale to the 'Greater German Reich.' A majority does fall upon the shoulders of our own dear fellow citizens. That is an assessment borne out by the facts." But, according to Helmer, the Nazis had also had everything taken from them in 1945. He wanted to "resolve" the restitution issue by prolonging the matter indefinitely ("Ich wäre dafür, dass man die Sache in die Länge zieht."), and simply telling the Jews "we'll see." ("Man sollte ihnen ganz einfach sagen, wir werden schon schauen.")¹⁹ And, in fact, that is exactly what happened.

Austria did adopt several so-called "restitution laws" and "compensation" did occur. However, these measures were hesitant, dispersed across a large number of confusing directives, often enacted too late, always shaped by a denial that Austrians shared any responsibility for Nazi crimes, and therefore devoid of any open generosity. Each new measure had first to be wrung out of Austria. And these restitution, welfare, and compensation laws, it was always emphasized, applied to all victims of National Socialism; distinctions on the basis of faith, race, or nationality were not permitted. In restitution matters Austria considered the legal successor to the German Reich – the Federal Republic of Germany – to be solely responsible, Germany, after all counted as the perpetrator of injustice. And it was the Federal Republic which in 1952 committed itself to paying 3.4 billion Deutschmark to Israel. In the same year, Austria granted Israel a loan of 100 million Schilling, albeit with a price tag attached: the bankrupt state of Israel had to recognize officially Austria's "victim thesis" and thereby renounce publicly any claims to reparations from Austria. Israel's foreign minister Moshe Sharett did this in August 1952 in Paris: "Israel will not demand reparations from Austria. Israel accepts the supposition that Germany is responsible for acts committed against Austrian Jews since they took place only after the *Anschluss*."²⁰ Nevertheless the Austrian victim thesis was not really accepted. There were problems when it came to normalizing Austrian-Israeli relations. Israel's representative in Vienna, Arie Eshel, made it clear that Israel desired a declaration to the effect that Austria "unconditionally condemned the atrocities and acts of inhumanity carried out against the Austrian Jews by the Austrian Nazis."

With the envoy Clemens Wildner, Eshel was even clearer. Wildner must not forget "that a significant portion of the Austrian population had sinned against the Jews."²¹ Wildner informed Karl Hartl, Austria's diplomatic representative in Tel Aviv, and stressed indignantly: "Austria has nothing to do with these things, and it is not the occasion for us to especially emphasize this in a declaration of friendship."²²

When in the summer of 1953 the Committee for Jewish Claims on Austria demanded restitution, the government declared that it was prepared to hold talks, yet at the same time making once again its own position clear. It stipulated to its foreign representatives the following wording ("Regelung der Sprache"):

In Austria, all measures of persecution were only perpetrated after the occupation by the German Reich. Under international law, Austria was incapable of acting at that time. It therefore cannot be held responsible for the actions and decrees of the National Socialist rulers which occurred against its will and which it was not in a position to prevent. Reparations from Austria are also not being demanded by any side. Israel has expressly endorsed this viewpoint. As already mentioned, the talks with the Committee for Jewish Claims on Austria therefore do not concern the provision of reparations to Israel or to world Jewish organizations, but rather are aimed at various measures for the improvement of the individual lot of the victims of National Socialism who are of the Jewish faith.²³

It is hard to believe that Karl Hartl – socialist, anti-Nazi, resistance fighter, married to a Jewish woman – was among the most vehement advocates of the Austrian victim thesis. When Chancellor Julius Raab, Foreign Minister Karl Gruber, and Finance Minister Reinhard Kamitz expressed their willingness for talks with representatives of world Jewish organizations, Hartl was outraged: "What made a Raab, a Gruber, a Kamitz take their stance? If we imitate the Germans – but good heavens! – we simply are not the Germans and do not have to imitate them. We are not obligated to this righting of wrongs the way the Germans are, since we are not the successor of that regime."²⁴ And he warned, "There could be people who could use prejudices against us."²⁵ For Hartl, the representatives of the world Jewish organizations who were carrying on talks in Vienna were "agents of the Israeli Treasury ... nothing more;"²⁶ in any case, it was clear that Israel "urgently needs cash." Hartl went on to add that the negotiators and collectors of the Jewish Agency were employed full-time with raising money for Israel and were not so fussy in their methods;²⁷ the negotiations that were beginning in Vienna had aroused considerable excitement among the circles of former Austrians in Israel. If Austria were to pay and money were to go to Israel, even if in a roundabout way, Hartl felt that this money should go to the actual victims and not to the State of Israel.

Apart from that, in Hartl's opinion there was also another weighty reason why the benefits from Austria should not go toward the State of Israel, namely, the Arabs. They might indeed come to understand that Austria would make restitution and perhaps even compensation to Israel, provided it could be proven that all of this would go not to the benefit of the enemy state, but rather to private persons or private organizations that could prove a claim in respect of Austria: "Never ever will anyone make the Arabs recognize why the State of Israel is the legal successor to the Jews who perished in Austria." Hartl told Vice-Chancellor Adolf Schärf:²⁸

Certainly, I am for justice, but charity should attend to the unemployed in Austria before it goes to the Israeli mortars that are pounding the Arab villages to pieces. And that is what the balance represents – at least 45 percent of the balance, because with the total outlays of the State of Israel, military spending in the most varied of forms takes up 45 percent – for these mortars or these airplanes, since all global compensation that we concede to the Jewish negotiators goes to Israel. And we owe Israel nothing – not one Groschen!²⁹

Hartl was really outraged at the end of 1953 when a regulation from the Israeli Ministry of Trade became known banning the sale of Austrian soap while, at the same time, German soap continued to be sold. For Hartl, as he expressed clearly in a letter to Foreign Minister Figl, this was veiled, though still clear, reverse pogrom rabble-rousing ... the blood of Christians in the host has been replaced by the fat of Jews in the soap.³⁰ In a letter to Schärf, Hartl turned away from the official Israel appalled. This official Israel "hated Austria and would always hate it" for the foreseeable future:

There was and is the possibility of neutralizing this aggressive impulse. Because of its daily difficulties, Israel will always make one last claim, and after its fulfillment it will want to be considered as satisfied. But will the sick soul of Israel, which sees in the 'nations' the former or potential murder of the Jews, be at all able to find the peace that it should, indeed must give to others in the interest of its own continued existence?

And he answered with resignation: "Probably scarcely in this generation, because Israel is compelled to market its hatred in order to protect the poor country from financial and political collapse." He went on to explain by using the example of Austria. In 1949/50, the hatred against Austria had been neutralized and set aside since the newborn state of Israel needed the broadest political recognition. Israel then provisionally became stable and more or less – "in the end, markedly less" – discreetly let Austria understand that relations were indeed established but that scores had not been settled. Then Austria gave the 100 million Schilling

claims on Austria, a promise formally kept until then, because, after the granting of the credit, calm had reigned for the time being.

Attention was then directed to Germany. Pressing economic woes had compelled Israel "to haggle with the Germany of the murderers, to 'realize' moral condemnation and bitter hatred. Everyone knows and feels that it is blood money from which Israel lives today."³¹ And from that results the paradox "that in their complete isolation, the Israelis actually see their best friend to be – the Germans."³² However, with a view toward Austria, Israel had given its word that the state would make no claims on Austria, and yet

nothing is more legitimate than the fact that the representatives of international Jewry are presenting the bill to Austria against which the 'mess of potage' accepted by Israel cannot suffice. But the fact that Israel is following these representatives' negotiations with Austria with the greatest interest, that through its consul it is cautiously and in the most friendly manner informing the Austrian government how damaging it would be for Austria if it were to have a falling out with these powerful international Jews – nothing is more legitimate, since nothing can be foreign to the state of Israel anywhere, anytime, and for anything where Jews are concerned. But Israel has not broken its word and thus for a long period of time, the blackmail may wear the mantle of a good deed.

Israel had still not gone back on its word, "that word that is to cost us 100 million Schilling." But the interruption of negotiations in Vienna had already once again "unleashed the murmurings of hatred in the press."³³ At any rate, Hartl had a reason for why Israel worried about not reaching a settlement with Austria in "questions of reparations." It was not about not being able to collect five, twelve, fifty million dollars; it was the "fear that the successful resistance by Austria to pay 'reparations' to Jewish organizations or, in a roundabout way, to Israel could give Germany 'bad ideas'."³⁴ For that reason, the "Austrian reparations" had become a test case of Germany's obligations. "Between the Oder-Neiße line and the German tractor that is supposed to plow in the Negev, there appear to be more intimate correlations than I may reasonably assume," Hartl said in January 1954.

There was at least one person who saw things differently: Ernst Luegmayer, Hartl's successor in Tel Aviv from 1958 to 1962. In a critical analysis in April 1961, he showed "what obstacles stand in the way of a favorable development of mutual relations", namely:

The greatest and most difficult problem to solve is represented by overcoming the memories of the persecution of the Jews in Austria during Nazi rule and the most broad-reaching elimination possible of its consequences, that is, compensation which is recognized to be sufficient.

The events of the past naturally cannot be undone. All attempts to pass off or deny responsibility for them have only met with very limited success.

Arguments under international law have caught on either not at all or only very little. The Jews who experienced the *Anschluss* in Austria know all too well how enthusiastically the Germans were received by a considerable portion of the Austrian population when they marched in and, what is even more regrettable, that numerous Austrians were substantially involved with the persecution of the Jews.

Efforts to then declare only the Germans as guilty or the Austrians as not responsible therefore cannot be successful and even often give rise to opposite reactions, since reference is made to the fact that the Federal Republic of Germany at least recognizes its guilt and makes honest efforts to provide for reparations, while Austria attempts to dodge away with every possible flimsy pretext.³⁵

Those Jews who had fled the country after the *Anschluss* and asked for restitution were met with renewed anti-Semitism. They were even made responsible for the failure of the State Treaty negotiations at the Foreign Ministers' Conference in Berlin in February 1954. In this respect the negotiations between the Austrian Government and representatives of the Committee for Jewish Claims on Austria were highly sensitive. The U.S. State Department, for example, made it clear again and again that a satisfactory agreement would influence the Treaty negotiations.³⁶

The final sentence of the Moscow Declaration of October/November 1943 goes as follows. "Austria is reminded, however, that she has a responsibility which she cannot evade for participation in the war on the side of Hitlerite Germany, and that in the final settlement account will inevitably be taken of her own contribution to her liberation." This sentence was put into the Declaration in this form at the specific request of the Russians – with long-lasting consequences for Austria.

Austria never accepted this part of her responsibility. When on 28 April 1945 the Austrian "Declaration of Independence" appeared in the daily *Neues Österreich*, jointly published by the three political parties that had formed the Provisional Government, it was stated therein that this contribution could only be a modest one.³⁷ It was even less than that as the following years showed. Austria got away with it – at least for the next 40 years – and the Allies accepted it at the time although they knew better.

The Western Allies saw reason as well as interest in doing everything in their power to help the Austrians make a lasting success of their second attempt at building a nation. Privately they had their own opinions about the Austrians – and these were not always flattering (for the French High Commissioner, General Béthouart, see below, p. 91). In the above-mentioned British report of November 1951 the embassy had considered the chances of survival of the modern Austrian state from the point of view of the characteristics and historical traditions of the Austrian people themselves and had asked if there was such a thing as an "Austrian" character. The answer:

There are many variations of this theme. Austrians, for example, never participated in Hitler's war. Some say they fought only under duress – surprisingly well in the circumstances; others that they only did their patriotic duty in defending the Fatherland. They committed no war crimes. And since they ceased to exist as an independent state after the *Anschluss* they could not be treated as an ex-enemy.

If need be the opposite theses may be argued with equal plausibility. The People's Party, in order to defend the validity of the 1934 Concordat, contends that the continuity of Austria's existence as a State was never really broken. She was merely deprived temporarily of her freedom of action. The Germans in either case were responsible for everything. Small wonder that the conviction of being 'Austrian' came in 1945 with the force of revelation. No longer was there any need to kick against the pricks of Allied policy. Everyone discovered that they had always hated and despised the Germans. Only a few exiles like Friedrich Adler, writing in Brussels, had the courage to ask whether this *volte-face* reflected principle or expediency. And indeed it will be some time before the final answer is known.³⁸

Only in the aftermath of the so-called Waldheim affair in the 1980's did Austrian socialist Chancellor Franz Vranitzky acknowledge first in a speech in Parliament in 1991 and in 1993 in the Knesset in Jerusalem that Austrians after the *Anschluss* had been not only victims but also perpetrators.

Two years later a national fund was set up to compensate all NS-victims, not just Jews. And in 2000 the Government set up a "Reconciliation Fund" (436 million Euros) to compensate former slave workers. Some 132,000 men and women accepted these "voluntary payments."³⁹

Notes

1. See Robert Knight, "Besiegt oder befreit? Eine völkerrechtliche Frage historisch betrachtet", in Bischof, Günter and Josef Leidenfrost, eds., *Die bevormundete Nation: Österreich und die Alliierten 1945–1949* (Innsbrucker Forschungen zur Zeitgeschichte 4), (Innsbruck: Haymon Verlag, 1988), 75–91.
2. Stourzh, *Einheit*, 26.
3. *Ibid.*, 27.
4. Thomas Albrich, "Holocaust und Schuldabwehr: Vom Judenmord zum kollektiven Opferstatus", in Steininger, Rolf and Michael Gehler, eds., *Österreich im 20. Jahrhundert*, vol. 2, (Vienna: Böhlau, 1997), 41.
5. See also Albrich, "Holocaust," 39–45, and Morawek, Elisabeth and Wolfgang Neugebauer, eds., *Österreicher und der Zweite Weltkrieg* (Vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1989).
6. Ernst Hanisch, "Der Ort des Nationalsozialismus in der österreichischen Geschichte", in Tólos, Emmerich, Ernst Hanisch, Wolfgang Neugebauer and Reinhard Sieder, eds., *NS-Herrschaft in Österreich* (Vienna: öbv & hpt VerlagsgmbH, 2000), 20.
7. Quoted in Robert S. Wistrich, "Austria and the Legacy of the Holocaust", American Jewish Committee, ed.: <http://www.ajc.org>.
8. Reproduced in *Ursachen und Folgen*, Vol. XXIII, 107–112.
9. See Walzer, Toni and Stephan Templ, *Arisierung auf Österreichisch* (Berlin: Aufbau Verlag, 2001), *passim*.

10. See note 7.
11. See Feldmann, Gerald D., Oliver Rathkolb and Theodor Venus, *Österreichische Banken und Sparkassen im Nationalsozialismus* (Vienna–Munich: Beck, 2006; Stiefel, Dieter, *Ökonomie des Holocaust* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2001).
12. See Freund, Florian, Bertrand Perz and Mark Spoerer, *Zwangsarbeiter und Zwangsarbeiterinnen auf dem Gebiet der Republik Österreich 1939–1945* (Vienna–Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2004).
13. Cited in Knight, Robert, ed., *“Ich bin dafür, die Sache in die Länge zu ziehen.” Die Wortprotokolle der österreichischen Bundesregierung von 1945 bis 1952 über die Entschädigung der Juden* (Vienna–Cologne–Weimar: Böhlau, 2000), 105–106.
14. See note 34.
15. See note 33.
16. Cited in Reiter, Margit, *Unter Antisemitismus-Verdacht: Die Österreichische Linke und Israel nach der Shoah* (Innsbruck–Vienna–Bozen: Studienverlag, 2001), 41.
17. Cited in Knight, *“Ich bin dafür”*, 62.
18. *Ibid.*, 121.
19. *Ibid.*, 146.
20. *Jerusalem Post*, 8 August 1952.
21. 24 May 1952, in Steininger, Rolf, ed., *Berichte aus Israel*, 12 volumes (Munich: Olzog, 2004), vol. 3, Doc. 24.
22. *Ibid.*, 17 June 1952, Doc. 30. :
23. *Ibid.*, 7 December 1953, Doc. 182.
24. *Ibid.*, 14 June 1953, Doc. 130.
25. *Ibid.*, 29 November 1953, Doc. 175.
26. *Ibid.*, 1 July 1953, Doc. 137.
27. *Ibid.*, 16 December 1953, Doc. 187; also 26 July, 1952, Doc. 41.
28. *Ibid.*, 14 June 1953, Doc. 130.
29. *Ibid.*, 25 November 1953, Doc. 175.
30. *Ibid.*, 8 December 1953, Doc. 183.
31. *Ibid.*, 7 December 1953, Doc. 182.
32. *Ibid.*, 21 October 1953, Doc. 165.
33. *Ibid.*, 7 December 1953, Doc. 182.
34. *Ibid.*, 10 January 1954, vol. 4, Doc. 6.
35. *Ibid.*, 19 April 1961, vol. 6, Doc. 20.
36. See Thomas Albrich, “Jewish Interests and the Austrian State Treaty”, in Bischof, Günter and Anton Pelinka, eds., *Austria in the New Europe* (Contemporary Austrian Studies 1), (New Brunswick, U.S.A., and London, U.K.: Transaction Publishers, 1992), 137–164.
37. See Chapter III.
38. 16 November 1951 Harold Caccia (Vienna) to Anthony Eden (London); 19?page Memorandum. To the length Caccia noted: “It is long, but a thousand years of history and seven millions of people and their traditions cannot usefully be analyzed in a paragraph or two.” FO 371/93597/CA 101131. See Bischof/Leidenfrost, *Nation*, 17.
39. For details see the official website: <http://www.reconciliationfund.at/>

Chapter III

1943: Postwar Planning for Austria

As Austria’s history was inextricably intertwined with that of Germany in the years 1938–1945, so it would be again after the war, but under completely different auspices. Austrians wanted nothing more to do with Germany – out of expediency and/or the fact that the *Anschluss* had disillusioned them forever with Germany. And it was priority No. 1 for the Allies that Austria be separated from Germany in order to weaken the latter. A renewed *Anschluss* must never happen again. The all-important issue, therefore, was not what to do with Austria, but what to do with Germany. How could Germany be weakened permanently to protect the world from renewed aggression?

On the Soviet side Austria’s future was first mentioned on 21 November 1941. That day Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov sent a top secret telegram to Ambassador Ivan Maisky in London explaining a speech Stalin had made on 6 November. Stalin had said that as long as the “Hitlerites” had “collected and united” German territories like the Rhineland and Austria they could be considered as a “kind of nationalists”. The leadership of the British communists had asked Maisky for clarification who in turn had asked Molotov.

According to this telegram Stalin thought that, although the *Anschluss* of Austria, a territory “where mainly Germans live”, could be seen as part of German nationalism this by no means meant he was for this *Anschluss*. On the contrary, with his speech he had had in mind to “sow confusion among the Hitlerites and conflict between the Hitler regime and the nationalists among the German people.” In regard to Austria and the Rhineland, etc., it was his idea that Austria should be separated from Germany as an independent state, and Germany itself, including Prussia, cut up into several more or less independent states.¹

Stalin took up these ideas during British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden’s visit to Moscow on 16 December – to Eden’s surprise. He talked of cutting off the Ruhr and the Rhineland – “especially the industrial area” – from Prussia and establishing an independent state or setting up a protectorate (“the only guarantee for permanently weakening Germany”) – and possibly creating a separate state of Bavaria. Poland would receive East Prussia “so that the corridor can be removed” (the border with the Soviet Union was to run along the Curzon line; Stalin wanted to keep

