

Introduction: Sexuality and Gender in Times of Transition

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In 1989 a new epoch began behind the falling “Iron Curtain.”¹ It was marked by a spontaneous and chain-reactive collapse of communism—or state socialism, if you prefer—that was not foreseen by Sovietologists and other social scientists (Ekiert, 1999). The change was profound in the sense that it affected every aspect of social life. Formerly communist states and societies were transformed from autocracy and authoritarianism of the one-party model toward democracy and pluralism. The ideological monopoly of the communist utopia gave way to a political market of different, often conflicting, concepts and orientations. The state ceased to exert almost total control over the society.

The failing socialist experiment with a hyperregulated or command economy was replaced with a market-driven system, which required major legal and macroeconomic reforms starting with the broad and controversial process of privatization. State-owned resources were opened for competition, which often had a criminal or semilegal character. Once-in-a-lifetime opportunities created a huge demand for traditionally strong, political clientelism. The new economic system required new institutions. The reforms were usually introduced by copying Western standards, frequently encountering obstacles in local mores and untrained administrators, although strange hybrids of the old and the new institutions—especially in the legal field—were not rare.

Prompted by political and economic changes, the dominant value system—anchored in collectivism—began transforming into a more individualistic one. Political participation based on the individual vote and market competition induced a new perception of society. The idea of an egalitarian or a class-defined society was replaced by the realization that society consists of loosely connected individuals pursuing their interests or, more often, trying to keep afloat. This led, as some authors observed (Świda-Ziemba, 1994), to the atrophy of traditional social bonds.

Taken together, these rapid changes enabled the countries of Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe to step on the tracks of globalization, primarily in economic but also in political (European Union enlargement) and cultural terms. During the 1990s postcommunist countries became societies open to international trade, information flow, and cultural influences. The world has, for better or worse, become smaller for the postcommunist citizen.

How has all this affected the postcommunist “habits of the heart”? Immediately after the “Great Transformation,” the prevailing mood was one of high optimism. There was relief that the old regime was finally dead and hopes of rapid Westernization—by which people usually meant Western prosperity and lifestyles. The cheers were hardly silenced when numerous problems caused by the complex task of simultaneous transformation of political, economic, and social structures surfaced. On the macro level, a normative vacuum and political instability—fueled by political struggles, weak governments, ethnic cleavages,² irregularities in the redistribution of property rights, and raising corruption (Sojó, 1998)—led to the “delegitimation of the public sphere” (Ekiert, 1999). This growing distrust in state institutions and dissatisfaction with the politicians replaced the initial enthusiasm that the process of transition had inaugurated. As some have pointed out, everyday life became permeated with frustrated political discussions in which official politics are obsessively blamed for all the misfortunes of life (Świda-Ziemba, 1994). The short-lived culture of optimism and limitless opportunities was over. A culture of pessimism and cynicism set in.³

Misfortunes were plenty. An increase in the level of uncertainty and social insecurity—mostly, but not entirely caused by the introduction of markets—set the psychological stage for the first part of the transitional period. Transitional costs came in various forms (Paci, 2002a). A sharp increase in unemployment, poverty, social inequality,⁴ and mortality rates,⁵ as well as the declining quality of public services, such as health care and social protection,⁶ and widely perceived absence of the rule of law (Rose, 1999) created a new and oppressive social reality (see Table I.1). Few in the postcommunist world were catching up with the West. Most others were, at least subjectively, worse off than before (Arts, Hermkens, and Van Wijck, 1995).⁷

In the second half of the 1990s, several postcommunist countries, most notably Slovenia, Poland, and Hungary, began showing signs of successful transformation. Still, most of the other societies were grappling with both structural and procedural problems. Some took this as proof that institutional reforms imported from the West were simply not enough. Emerging path-dependency (North, 1990) and social capital paradigms (Putnam, 1993) provoked a rapid growth of scholarly analyses of the role of culture

TABLE I.1. Socioeconomic Development: A Comparison

Factor	European Union, the United States, and Australia	Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union
Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (1997), in \$	23,700	4,200
GDI*	0.92	0.75
Gini coefficient of social inequality (1993)**	37	46
Corruption index***	7.8	3.5
Nonsurvivors over 60 (percent)	11	25
Divorces (percent of new marriages)	41	48
Suicide per 100,000 women/men	6/20	11/52

Source: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 1999

**Gender relations development index* = female/male life expectancy at birth + adult literacy rate + education + income

***Source:* World Bank, 2002

****Source:* Transparency International, 2000; the index ranges from 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (highly clean)

and traditional patterns of social interaction in social and economic development (Nichols, 1996; Krygier, 2001; Rose, 1999). The communist legacy, amplified by the fact that the Communist Party rose to power in societies with a largely absent democratic and civic tradition, is usually described as the dominance of state over society, the state of affairs responsible for the deficit of civic associations (Krygier, 2001). In the transitional context, an underdeveloped civil society manifests itself in the widespread preference for state paternalism, as well as in opportunistic behavior.⁸ High levels of distrust in institutions legitimate the use of the old “antimodern tactics” (Rose, 1999)⁹ based on corruption, law-bending, political connections, and informal networks. In short, the postcommunist “mentality”—although not always depicted as a fixed and uniform entity (Kennedy, 1994)—is usually considered to be an impediment to development (Świda-Ziemba, 1994).¹⁰

CHANGING THE GENDER ORDER

Unlike sexuality, gender(ed) relations in postcommunism immediately caught the attention of a number of scholars (Einhorn, 1993; Funk and Mueller, 1993; Jaehnert, Gohrisch, and Hahn, 2001; Moghadam, 1993; Occhipinti, 1996). The process of transition, according to the analysts, had numerous negative effects on the lives of women. In addition, it provoked a deterioration of gender relations, both in public and private arenas.

The demise of the system of planned economy brought an end to the full employment ideology. Such a development, as is usually claimed, hit women the hardest.¹¹ Being the first to be let go and discriminated against in (re)hiring, women soon found themselves overrepresented among the unemployed (Molyneux, 1995).¹² This and the shrinking of social services and benefits such as maternal leaves and mothers' allowances led to the feminization of poverty. It has been argued that the situation is likely to remain uncanged for some time due to decreasing representation of women in politics during the early 1990s.¹³

Within the private sphere, at home, the situation seemed equally problematic, if not worse. The breakdown of the old social order, rising economic insecurity, poverty, and frustration often exploded in domestic violence and sexual abuse (Johnson, 2001). This was especially common in the countries affected by armed conflicts, as in the case of the former Yugoslavia where soldiers and militia frequently had a hard time adjusting to ordinary, and most often pauperized, life. Unfortunately, whether the rates of domestic violence increased in the 1990s cannot be determined since the same period is also marked by the increasing activity of women's groups and international organizations, which helped to raise public awareness of the problem and, consequently, made the victims more likely to report the abuse. Perceived as an attack on traditional family values, in some countries public campaigns against domestic violence met fierce resistance from the religious right.¹⁴

What is often lacking in the analyses of the gender relations in postcommunism is the fact that social reality changed drastically for men, too. The new uncertainty and increasing hardships pushed men into a "masculine anomie" (P. Watson, quoted in Molyneux, 1995, p. 646), as reflected in rising mortality rates. Among the younger, urban, and educated generations of men in the more successful transitional countries, this collective male identity crisis seems to be already resolved—or at least sedated—by adopting a Westernlike professional image. Among older generations this "new individualism" is often synonymous with embezzlement, materialism, and cynicism.

A firm consensus exists among analysts that the old communist gender order—its main characteristics being the declarative equality of genders (epitomized in educational rights and full employment) and systematic resistance to all the “feminist-inspired” innovations from the West—is long gone. Its legacy is probably still alive among the older generations, but a host of changes brought about by the historical opening of the societies in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe began shaping a new gender order. To varying degrees, almost all postcommunist countries show evidence of the increasing public awareness of women’s rights and growing sensitivity toward gender discrimination and abuse. Still, there is a marked difference in the perception of gender roles between the East and the West. According to World Values Survey 1995-1997 data, the average score on the index of gender equality—ranging from 0 (absolute gender inequality) to 4 (absolute gender equality)—is 2.6 for the East and 3.1 for the West.¹⁵

CHANGING SOCIAL REGULATION OF SEXUALITY

As mentioned, the studies of postcommunist sexualities are conspicuously missing. It seems to be less an act of omission than the consequence of the marginal status of sex research in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe.¹⁶ A good example is the seminal work on HIV/AIDS related sexual behavior in Europe (Hubert, Bajos, and Sandfort, 1998), which is completely silent on the situation in transitional countries. Although it could be argued that the research project presented in the book started back in 1991 when the HIV/AIDS situation in Eastern Europe was much less dramatic than it is today, the reason behind the omission is the fact that postcommunist countries lack large-scale sex surveys on which the research project and the book were based (Hubert, 1998). So, where do we begin in assessing the impact of the postcommunist transition on gender and sexuality issues? According to the standard sociological approach, the process of social regulation of sexuality is anchored in social institutions—religion, family, and secular institutions, such as school, law, and medicine (see Figure I.1)¹⁷—that produce and/or reproduce ideologies and norms, which define social expectations (DeLamater, 1987; Reiss, 1986). In spite of the fact that every modern, complex society is a dynamic system in which a number of intimate ideologies coexist and frequently compete (creating sexual subcultures), it is nevertheless argued that a dominant set of ideas regulates gender roles, sexuality, and inscribed power relations at any given time. Never a perfectly harmonious and consistent system, it provides everyday guidelines that resonate—and are sometimes contested—in the media and public discourse.




FIGURE I.1. Social Regulation of Sexuality

All three major pillars of social regulation of sexuality underwent a profound change after 1989. Freed from strict party control, the Church became an omnipresent social and political force influencing the decision-making process in more than just matters of public morals. Already displaying the signs of growing instability before the beginning of the transition, the family in postcommunism seems to be less popular and more fragile than ever.

The imperatives of a new and fundamentally different political and economic life changed the existing state institutions, especially the legal system, often beyond recognition. Though only formally sometimes (Nichols, 1996), they were reshaped into Westernlike institutions—often under considerable pressure from international organizations.

Religion

Prior to 1989, religion was under close Communist Party scrutiny in most Eastern European societies. The social influence of the Church was strictly limited and its impact often actively discouraged.¹⁸ In the 1990s at least two elements—apart from the collapse of communist rule—came together to create favorable conditions for an explosion of religiosity. One was uncertainty, and the other was psychological costs induced by the process of economic transformation and the related social disorientation and decline in the standard of living. The second element was a revival of ethnonational identities. Since a historic “national religion” is one of the core ingredients of ethnonational identity, it comes as no surprise that in the countries in which nationalist conflicts took place during the 1990s, reli-

gion became an important ethnonational marker and one of the vehicles of social mobilization (Tishkov, 1996; Schoepflin, 1996).

Postcommunist Europe experienced a rapid increase in church attendance (Tomka, 1999, 2001; Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Świda-Ziemia, 1994). Although in the EU the percentage of people who identify themselves as religious decreased somewhat during the 1990s, the situation in the Eastern European countries points to the opposite trend (see Table I.2). As argued by several authors in this collection, rising religiosity and the growing social impact and influence of the Church as the *ultimate moral authority* strengthened conservative viewpoints and policy initiatives, especially in discussions on abortion, sex education, homosexuality, gender roles, and family violence.

Family

Economic and social hardship, rising unemployment (due to the closing of large production units), erosion of family savings, and breakdown of community ties, as reflected in high homicide statistics (see Table I.3)¹⁹, had a direct impact on marital and family dynamics.²⁰

Personal distress and social fragmentation had several negative consequences. Although systematic empirical evidence is lacking, it is reasonable to assume an increase in the frequency of interpersonal tensions and conflicts. In spite of the fact that the trend of marital dissolution and the rise of alternative forms of marriage originated in the West, current divorce statistics place transitional European countries above their EU counterparts (see Table I.4). This is not to say that marital instability simply exploded after 1989, nor that the process of transition was the sole (or even most important) initiator of marital dissolution. The process was already developing in the 1980s, especially in countries such as Hungary, Russia, and Czechoslovakia, and the process of postcommunist transition provided an extra spin. It accelerated the decline of the traditional family not only by bringing more marriages to an end, but also by lowering the likelihood of marrying. The reaction from the religious and nationalist circles was swift (Occhipinti, 1996), but ultimately impotent. The pro-family and pro-reproductive rhetoric proved too outdated and out of sync with the new and *globalized* cultural expectations of the urbanites.²¹ Alternative forms of committed intimacy, with their nontraditional sexual rules, continued to gain popularity among the new generations in “the East.”

TABLE I.2. The Percentage of Religious Respondents in Selected Western and Eastern European Countries

	1990	1999	1990-1999 difference
Italy	84.5	85.8	1.3
Austria	81.3	80.9	– 0.4
Denmark	72.5	76.5	4.0
Belgium	69.3	65.1	– 4.2
Germany (West)	64.6	62.1	– 2.5
Netherlands	60.8	61.4	0.6
Spain	66.8	59.0	– 7.8
France	50.7	46.3	– 4.4
Great Britain	57.4	41.5	– 15.9
Sweden	31.3	38.8	7.5
Western Europe (average %)	63.9	61.7	– 2.2
Poland	95.3	93.9	– 1.4
Romania	74.5	84.8	10.3
Lithuania	55.1	84.2	29.1
Slovenia	73.1	70.2	– 2.9
Latvia	54.4	76.9	22.5
Russia	56.0	66.9	10.9
Hungary	56.8	57.5	0.7
Bulgaria	36.1	52.0	15.9
Estonia	21.2	41.3	20.1
Czech Republic	37.7	29.4	– 8.3
Eastern Europe (average %)	56.0	65.7	9.7

Source: Adapted from Tomka (2001); data source: *European Values Survey*

TABLE I.3. Homicide Statistics of Selected Western and Eastern European Countries

	Homicides in 1995 (per 100,000 inhabitants)	Homicides in 2000 (per 100,000 inhabitants)
Average Western rate*	2.7	2.8
Average Eastern rate**	9.2	9.2

Source: *International Crime Statistics* (Interpol, 2002)

*Norway, France, Greece, Portugal, Finland, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, and Switzerland

**Croatia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Russia, Romania, Estonia, Moldova, Latvia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, and Ukraine

TABLE I.4. Divorce Statistics of Selected Western and Eastern European Countries

	Divorces, 1996 (as percent of marriages)
Average Western rate*	38.4
Average Eastern rate**	39.4

Source: UNDP (1999: 225-227)

*Norway, Belgium, Sweden, Netherlands, Great Britain, France, Switzerland, Finland, Denmark, Austria, Italy, Spain, Greece, and Portugal

**Slovenia, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, Croatia, Belarus, Lithuania, Latvia, Bulgaria, Romania, Russia, Ukraine, Macedonia, Albania, and Moldova

Societal Institutions

Since the very beginning of the transitional era, institution building was a top priority. Although not always recognized or embraced by local elites, in the eyes of international advisers and global financial institutions the task of reshaping legal, economic, political, and social institutions was clearly the most important one. It turned out to be a painstaking and often frustrating

job, which showed no linear progress. In some countries institutional reform was relatively fast and successful. The new institutions proved efficient both in establishing and enforcing the new set of rules, providing an impetus for the development of civil society. In others, especially those with no precommunist democratic tradition, institution building was stalled, undermined, and boycotted by authoritarian regimes.

In simplistic terms, institutional reform in postcommunist societies had two main characteristics: (1) it was modeled after Western standards,²² and (2) it allowed, and sometimes even encouraged, public participation in the process. Both elements were highly important. The first inoculated the new institutional design with the individual rights perspective, which was largely absent from the old, collectivist-bent legislation. Opening the door for civic initiatives and the participation of various interest groups also had important and long-term benefits. It resulted in greater transparency of the whole process and in generating public criticism.

The outcome is clearly visible in the context of what used to be regarded as the regulation-free “private sphere.” Marital rape, family violence, sexual harassment, and trafficking in women are being increasingly prosecuted, even if not systematically sanctioned. In addition, intense and focused external political pressure—especially from the EU²³—led to important legal innovations regarding gender and sexuality (Jelušić and Antić, 2001; Center for Reproductive Law and Policy, 2000). Paradigmatic cases here are the decriminalization of same-sex contacts in Russia in 1993 (Nardi, 1998) and in Albania in 1995 (Van der Veur, 2001).

SEXUALITIES IN POSTCOMMUNISM

So, how different is the East in terms of sexuality from the West? Could it be that the differences listed (Kon, 1999; Francoeur, 1997-2001, see especially chapters by Kon, Zverina, and Sierzpowska-Ketner)—from more sexual aggression in adolescent sexual encounters and more intolerance toward sexual minorities to nonexistence of sexual offender treatment programs and lack of sexual health services—are mostly imaginary? Should we write them off as a mere mirage, the shimmering of the *exotic* in the “colonial” gaze?

If anything—having in mind the unique social conditions in postcommunist societies, as well as their specific sociocultural inheritance—the absence of differences would be a real explanatory challenge. This must sound almost unbearably trivial to readers viewing human sexuality as a social outcome refracted through the lenses of individual dispositions and interpersonal negotiations. Real and important differences between

the East and the West are observable in at least five dimensions: (1) the HIV/AIDS-related epidemiological situation, (2) sex education, (3) the status of sexual minorities, (4) sexual permissiveness, and (5) sex commerce.

HIV/AIDS

HIV infections are increasing at an alarming rate in parts of Eastern Europe. As stated by UNICEF officials, “HIV/AIDS is currently spreading at a faster rate in parts of Central and Eastern Europe than anywhere else in the world” (UNICEF, 2002; UNAIDS, 2002a). Russia, Ukraine, and Estonia seem to be hit the worst. Prior to 1995, as is well documented, transitional countries were almost HIV-free. Then the situation changed dramatically. Between 1995 and 2000 estimated HIV cases increased by a factor of more than twenty (World Health Organization [WHO], 1998),²⁴ as elsewhere, almost 80 percent of new infections were recorded among young people.

The rapid increase was caused by a change in transmission patterns. Before 1995 most HIV cases in Eastern Europe were linked to homosexual contacts. Then, the epidemic exploded among injecting drug users, some of whom were also sex workers. Palpable social erosion, rapid increase in drug use and the volume of sex work, lack of relevant information, and habitual avoidance of condoms provided conditions for the steady increase of HIV infections (UNAIDS, 2002a; WHO, 1998).

Sex Education

An important part of the increasing HIV/AIDS problem in transitional countries is the traditional reluctance to use condoms and contraceptives in general (Center for Reproductive Law and Policy, 2000). In comparison to EU countries, almost twice as many women in transitional countries do not use any contraception (see Table I.5).

The finding has a specific historical background. The fact that modern contraceptive methods were not easily available under the communist rule resulted in adoption of alternative practices, as reflected in high abortion rates (Center for Reproductive Law and Policy, 2000). Unfortunately, after contraception became widely obtainable—if expensive—little or nothing was done to change the old habits. Systematic, i.e., school-based, sex education does not exist in postcommunist societies (see Table I.6). Rare attempts at introducing comprehensive programs are met with fierce opposition, as was well illustrated in Russia (Nardi, 1998). Taking into consideration that economically more successful transitional countries are more likely than less successful countries to have introduced some elements of sex education

TABLE 1.5. Percentage of Married Women Not Using Any Contraceptive Device/Method in Selected Western and Eastern European Countries

Country	Year	%
Belgium	1991	20
Denmark	1988	22
Finland	1994	21
France	1994	25
Germany	1992	25
Netherlands	1993	26
Switzerland	1994	18
Great Britain	1989	28
W. European average		23
Czech Republic	1993	31
Hungary	1993	16
Romania	1993	43
Slovakia	1991	26
Slovenia	1989	8
Estonia	1990	65
Latvia	1995	32
Lithuania	1994	34
Belarus	1995	50
Moldova	1990	78
Russia	1994	33
Ukraine	1990	77
E. European average		41

Source: U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), 1999

TABLE I.6. School-Based Sex Education (SE) in Europe

The West	Status of SE	The East	Status of SE
Austria	-/+	Bulgaria	-
Belgium	+	Czech Republic	-/+
Denmark	+	Poland	-/+
Finland	++	Hungary	-/+
France	-/+	Russia	-
Greece	-	Yugoslavia	-
Ireland	-	Macedonia	-
Italy	-	Bosnia and Herzegovina	-
Iceland	++	Croatia	-
Netherlands	++	Romania	-
Spain	-/+	Slovenia	-/+
Germany	-/+	Slovakia	-/+
Portugal	-	Ukraine	-
Sweden	++	Albania	-
U.K.	-/+; +	Moldova	-

Sources: Caron, 1998; Francoeur, 1997-2001

- SE is nonexistent or mentioned sporadically.

-/+ Some elements of SE are incorporated into other classes.

+ Obligatory SE programs are in place in schools.

++ Comprehensive SE is a part of the national curriculum.

in their school system, it could be that further economic and social development in the region will weaken the resistance to systematic sex education.

Sexual Minorities

For a number of transitional countries decriminalization of homosexuality was a recent event. Most often, the legislative change was prompted by international pressure and was conceived of by local political elites as an "admission ticket" to international organizations and donor conferences. Being neither the outcome of grassroots action nor the result of broad consensus over human rights, the exclusion of homosexuality from the penal

code did not end everyday discrimination and harassment (Van der Veur, 2001). Although the situation varies considerably from one country to another, ranging from widespread acceptance in the Czech Republic (Widmer, Treas, and Newcomb, 1998) to extreme homophobia in Albania (Van der Veur, 2001),²⁵ sexual minorities' status in postcommunist societies is significantly less destigmatized than in the West. One has only to review prevailing attitudes toward same-sex contacts (see Table I.7).

Two arguments support the claim that the future seems brighter than the past when discussing the rights of sexual minorities. The first, external political pressure, which will certainly intensify with the EU accession process, was already mentioned. The second argument points to the existence of a new generation of sexual minority activists, whose political and social visibility should to a large extent be attributed to the development of civil society in Eastern Europe after 1989. Familiar with the international accomplishments and more accustomed to collective action than the older generations, their agenda is increasingly proactive and media conscious.

Sexual Permissiveness

In comparison with the EU countries, the countries of Central, South-eastern, and Eastern Europe score lower on indicators of sexual permissiveness (Figure I.2 and Table I.7). The majority of respondents in postcommunist countries find sexual contacts between two consenting adults of the same sex unacceptable. Attitudes toward teenage sexual activity,

TABLE I.7. Attitudes Toward Teenage and Same-Sex Sexual Contacts

	The West***	The East****
Index of teenage sex tolerance (ITST)*	48.2	50.3
Index of same-sex tolerance (ISST)**	21.5	50.5

Source: Adapted from Widmer, Treas, and Newcomb (1998)

*ITST = A (percentage of answers "teenage sex is ALWAYS wrong") – B (percentage of answers "teenage sex is NEVER wrong"); the original scale has four points (always, almost always, only sometimes, never)

**ISST = C (% "homosexual sex is ALWAYS wrong") – D (% "homosexual sex is NEVER wrong")

***Australia, Austria, Canada, Germany (West), Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, United States

****Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia, Slovenia




FIGURE I.2. Attitudes Toward Sexual Freedom and Tolerance in Comparative Perspective (Source: Štulhofer, 2002, based on data from World Values Survey, 1995-1997)

another indicator of sexual permissiveness, do not differ to the extent observed in the case of acceptance of same-sex sexual contacts. Here, the East seems almost as permissive as the West. To test this further, we used data from the *World Values Survey* (WVS). The analysis confirmed the lower acceptance of homosexuality, but pointed to an interesting bifurcation in regards to the question of sexual freedom. Figure I.2 shows two distinct patterns: Respondents in the first group—Slovenes, Croats, Estonians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians—were as accepting of the idea of unlimited sexual freedom as the respondents from the selected Western countries. Respondents from the second group of transitional countries were significantly more inclined to social restrictions.

Sex Trade

Following 1989, the laws prohibiting adult entertainment were removed from the criminal code of most postcommunist countries.²⁶ Although it is true that the laws on prostitution remained largely unchanged,²⁷ associated policing became significantly more lenient. Although both sex work and explicit entertainment existed under communist rule, a rapid increase occurred on the supply side after 1989 (Occhipinti, 1996; Gal and Kligman, 2000). Rapid commercialization of sex, including its gloomy international ramifi-