

ing two studies focus on the development of communists in France and Greece. The author of the article on the French Communist Party (PCF), Michel Perottino, shows the deep historical roots of this party in the society, the gradual loss of its political relevance, and the evolution of its identity in recent years. Stathis Kalyvas and Nikos Marantzidis present the bifurcation of the political trajectory of the Greek communist movement in the last decades.

The second section outlines the situation in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe. The first article in this section (by Lubomír Kopeček) tries to analyse some causes of the different development of former monopolistic communist parties after 1989 in Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. This is followed by an evaluation of the transformation of the ex-communist Polish Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and the form of its party elite by Leszek Skiba. In the following article, Miroslav Mareš describes the unsuccessful attempts to change the orthodox communist identity of the Czech KSČM, which is followed by Stanislav Balík's analysis of this party's significant relation to its own past. Ladislav Cabada's article deals with the role of ex-communists in Slovenian politics and their ideological profile. The book is concluded by Juraj Marušiak who tries to find the answer to the question whether the party Smer, a new significant participant in Slovak politics, really represents a social democratic party as it has been describing itself.

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## THE LEFT IN THE BEGINNING OF THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY

ONDŘEJ ČÍSAŘ

### Introduction

In a nutshell, it is fair to say that the challenge to which the Left is trying to develop an adequate response today is the challenge of globalisation. The current Left is focused primarily on responding to the problem of *economic globalisation*, that is, to the deterritorialization of economic activities (for more on this concept see Held et al. 1999). Thus, the basic question is what the left-wing programme should be like in a globalised world that casts doubt on many traditional tools of political regulation. This is the issue that, as we shall see, to a significant extent structures the current left-wing political field.<sup>1</sup>

The aim of the article is to outline briefly the political positions that constitute the current left-wing political map. The first section of the article summarizes the causes of the deep crisis experienced by the Left in the early 1990s. It was this crisis that propped up those political groups that currently make up the Left. The second section describes the conditions that led to the revitalisation of the radical criticism of global capitalism in the second half of the 1990s. The third section discusses the four different types of left-wing reaction to the challenge of globalisation.

### Left-Wing Depression

The left-wing movements that formed in the 19<sup>th</sup> century (i.e. communist and socialist movements) brought in radical criticism of the existing capitalist order and in this way formed the third pole of the "portfolio" of modern ideologies. Socialism positioned itself to the left of centrist liberalism, with conservatism to the right. The aim of the left-wing movements was to first seize state power and then use it to transform society. From our current perspective, it is apparent that they succeeded in fulfilling the first step of their strategy – they did seize state power (Wallerstein 2004).

After 1917, a regime based on communist ideology got firmly established in the Soviet Union. After the Second World War, the influence of this regime expanded virtually to the whole Eastern Europe and enabled

the emergence of local Leninist regimes. On the other hand, at that time the Western social democratic parties and their programme of political regulation of capitalism were successfully established in Western Europe. This model is usually described as "Keynesian socialism". Nevertheless, in view of the objectives of the original left-wing programme, none of the versions came up to the expectations that it had raised originally. The Soviet version got institutionalised as an oppressive state capitalism that replaced class exploitation with exploitation by a political party. The social democratic version became bureaucratized and established itself as a mainstream political force that accepted the rules of the game imposed by capitalism. From the perspective of left-wing radicalism, both versions failed (see Wallerstein 2003, 2004).

According to some interpretations, this failure became apparent for the first time in 1968 when members of the "New Left" opposed the socialist and communist "Old Left". The New Left's opposition was thus aimed against social democratic parties in the West as well as against communist regimes in the East (Wallerstein 2003). The New Left movement tried to revive the original egalitarian and radically democratic programme that had dissolved in the bureaucratic structures of social democratic and Leninist secretariats during the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The representatives of this movement emphasised decentralised cooperation as opposed to hierarchical organizational structure, and replaced the focus on a single dominant social conflict – that between worker and capitalist – with an awareness of the plurality of cleavages in society. The 1968 mobilisation was related to the civil rights movement in the USA, the feminist movement, the gay/lesbian movement, and above all, the environmental movement. These so-called "new social movements" outspokenly identified the negative consequences of following the Old Left programme in both of its versions (see below for more on these movements, see also Laclau, Mouffe 1985).

Other events in the same period foreshadowed a genuine crisis of the Old Left's programme. In the West in the period between 1967 and 1973, the Bretton Woods monetary system gradually fell apart; OPEC increased oil prices for the first time in 1973 and brought about the recession of the 1970s which apparently questioned the adequacy of the post-war programme of controlled capitalism and its promises of prosperity. The ideological hegemony of "Keynesian socialism" was disrupted and during the 1970s the ideological pendulum moved to the right (see e.g. Biersteker 1995). The New Right stepped in with a comprehensive neoliberal programme. The shift was symbolically completed by the coming

to power of M. Thatcher in Great Britain and R. Reagan in the USA. The New Right brought in a programme centred on restricting state power and capital flow liberalisation. The 1970s are thus considered the symbolic beginning of economic globalisation and the neoliberal hegemony associated with it. (With the risk of simplification, it could be argued that this hegemony was not disrupted before the second half of the 1990s.)

The Leninist Left in the East was in crisis, too. The Czechoslovak spring of 1968 was suppressed by brute force. It seemed that Soviet domination could no longer be sustained by any means other than military force. That was an unmistakable sign of the end of the ideological supremacy of Marxism-Leninism. Although it took 20 more years, the Soviet empire crumbled down into pieces in 1989. The fall of the Soviet Union dealt the last blow to the Old Left. The old socialist programme was entirely discredited (Wright 1999).

The beginning of the 1990s was marked by a considerable decline of the Left. Neoliberal ideology appeared well institutionalised and, stripped of its political character, was applied as a quasi-objective manual for organizing the society. Economic globalisation was in full sway, and there emerged a debate about the end of the political management of capitalism and its replacement with market self-regulation. The post-Soviet empire embarked on the road of market reforms. In many countries, the choice of market reform was the product of the impact of neoliberalism. For a short time, it may have seemed that Fukuyama's thesis about the end of history in the world of ideas was confirmed – the (neo)liberal discourse celebrated its political victory. The ideological battle had seemingly been fought out, and there was no choice but to adopt the dominant recipe and put it into practice.

The beginning of the 1990s thus witnessed the triumph of the liberal-right vision of the world order, which stressed the necessity of privatisation and liberalisation of trade and capital flows. Those that promoted this vision refused to speak of neoliberalism as an ideology and considered their recommendations to be depoliticised and objective expertise. However, the neoliberal hegemony (just like any other hegemony) got again caught in a number of conflicts during the second half of the 1990s that led to its re-politicisation (Barša, Cisar 2004).

### Globalisation: What to Do With It?

In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, neoliberalism was embodied in the so-called Washington consensus that defined the conditionality built in

the development and structural programmes of the international financial institutions (Williamson 1993). At the level of practical politics, the Washington consensus meant trade liberalisation, financial deregulation, privatisation of public property, and anti-inflationary measures (macroeconomic stabilisation). These measures gave a boost to globalisation and at the same time freed the global economic playing field from any limitations related to distributive justice. The opponents of neoliberal globalisation argued that the policies of the Washington consensus lead to increasing poverty in the Third World, indebtedness of poor countries, and general neglect of the poorest groups of the world population.

In the second half of the 1990s, however, a number of problems and crises of global capitalism considerably upset the hegemony of the neoliberal discourse. In the words of Ulrich Beck, one could say that the neoliberal consensus reached its objective limits (Beck 1992a). It got problematised, and thus politicised (see Higgott 2000). The belief in the infallibility of the neoliberal consensus was shaken in its foundations as a result of the big financial crises of the 1990s (East Asia, Mexico, Russia) (Cisár 2001). These crises and the reactions they elicited from the US administration and from the international financial organizations provoked in the late 1990s heated discussions and personal disputes at the highest levels of politics. These dramatic developments within the global elite provided the opponents of neoliberalism and globalisation with new arguments, and information from top political positions, and compelled some members of the global establishment to join their camp, e.g., among others, former chief economist of the World Bank Joseph Stiglitz (Stiglitz 2002).

Another significant event was the gradual mobilization of the so-called antiglobalisation and alterglobalisation movements (see the difference below) that was intensified after the impressive mobilisation against the World Trade Organization in Seattle in 1999. It is this mobilisation that symbolises the beginning of organized resistance against the capitalist global order as such rather than against individual problems associated with globalisation (Kaldor 2000). The last major problem for neoliberal hegemony was the increasing awareness of the growing inequality between the most developed and the least developed parts of the world (Pogge 2002). The coordinated campaign by many non-governmental organizations placed the issue of world poverty on the agenda of the global political elite.

While globalisation was a source of frustration for the Left, it also compelled it to reformulate its programme. The *response to globalisation*

thus constitutes one of the dividing lines within the current left-wing movement. On the one side of this divide are those who prefer reversal of the processes of globalisation and restoration of "national capitalisms". These so-called neo-sovereignists call for the restoration of the political control of nation states over global economic forces. This camp seeks to close individuals and economic forces back within the community of a nation state – it thus constitutes a particularistic (communitarian) position. On the other side of the divide are those who attempt to complement economic globalisation with political regulation and democratisation. This would set up mechanisms of political control at the supranational level, and economic globalisation would thus be kept in check by democratic control. This camp takes a globalist position that does not strive to reverse the "wheel of history"; on the contrary, it argues that economic integration must be followed by political integration (for the difference between the globalist and the particularistic positions see Kaldor 2000; Anheier et al. 2001; Kaldor et al. 2003).

Thus far, we have differentiated between a globalist position and a particularist one. When we combine this distinction with the distinction between *revolutionary* and *post-revolutionary* radicalism, we obtain four positions (see the table). The revolutionary Left seeks to replace the current capitalist order with an alternative order – a free (communist) society. It thus considers the destruction of modern capitalism as a necessary precondition for the implementation of the left-wing programme. The post-revolutionary Left, on the other hand, strives for radical criticism from within the system itself. It is an immanent criticism that does not believe in a "big leap" into a radically new reality. The post-revolutionary Left bears in mind the experience of the unsuccessful implementation of the communist utopia in the 20<sup>th</sup> century and abandons the questionable metaphysical belief in human history heading towards freedom. According to this position, the rejection of the Marxist ideas hidden behind slogans about the realisation of real human freedom and equality must go hand in hand with a critical attitude to particular instances of injustice and with a willingness to engage in a dialogue with different perspectives. The post-revolutionary Left is unwilling to give up the modern ideal of individual autonomy, but it is also unwilling to promote it by means typical for the 19<sup>th</sup> century. In this sense this position is supposed to be a "realistic utopia" (Rawls 1999), "rational utopianism" (Bourdieu 1998), or "utopian realism" (Giddens 1994). What Rawls, Bourdieu and Giddens have in mind is programme that is realistic and yet does not abandon the egalitarian and democratic ideals of the Left.



Table: Typology of the Positions of the Current Left

	particularism – communitarianism	globalism – individualism
revolutionary radicalism	social populism, antiglobalisation movement	revolution of the "multitude", "spirit of Porto Alegre"
post- revolutionary radicalism	traditional social democracy	alterglobalisation movement, global (or European) social democracy

### Revolutionary Radicalism

Radical politics emerged in the 19<sup>th</sup> century as a *revolutionary* doctrine. The radicalism of Marxism was based on the belief that the oppressive capitalist society would dissolve just as the feudal society before it and would thus allow the emergence of a really free communist society. The communist utopia, according to Marxism, laid *beyond* the capitalist system and the system of representative democracy. A communist society could emerge only if the conditions maintaining the system of capitalist dominance had been destroyed. According to Marx, this was supposed to be achieved by a proletarian revolution that would destroy the capitalist order (based on private ownership) and pave the way for communism (Marx, Engels 1978).

According to Marx, the proletarian class is formed in the course of development of capitalist production. Proletarians unite in reaction to the concentration of capital and gradually become aware of their class interest, namely to overthrow capitalism as an exploitative system. Marx thus thought that society would become progressively polarized into capitalists and proletarians, and that the situation would gradually and irreversibly escalate into a proletarian revolution (Femia 1999). The development of capitalism made the revolution against capitalism inevitable.

Currently, a similar position is taken by authors (and social forces) that believe the current globalisation of capitalism would pave the way for a global revolution (a *revolutionary globalist position*). This revolution, however, is no longer primarily aimed at transforming the social structure (as in Marx); it is supposed to take place directly in the everyday anti-systemic actions of individuals. The purpose of these actions is no longer to achieve in the future a separately defined objective – a communist society – but to attain freedom and solidarity "here and now" in direct action. Among the proponents of this position are Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (Hardt, Negri 2000, 2004).

At the heart of Hardt and Negri's arguments is the thesis that we are living in an omnipresent global empire in which you cannot distinguish centre from periphery and "metropolis" from its "dependencies". There is therefore no point of speaking about "imperialism" as a purposeful policy of the imperial centre towards the borders of the empire aimed at expanding the empire. What we have is a depersonalised system that has destroyed the oppressive structures of the modern nation state, only to subject the individuals directly to a global machinery of production and social control. The liberation of the subordinate subjects would then take the form of spontaneous eruptions of direct action that could occur everywhere in the system and in all social areas. If the system is everywhere – and mainly "inside" the participants themselves – then the possibility of a revolution is not primarily a feature of the periphery, but is latently present directly in the centre of the empire (Hardt, Negri 2000).

As the new capitalism's key sources of production are no longer material resources but rather intellectual capacities developed directly at the level of individual consciousness, even small "revolutions" in lifestyle and way of thinking may constitute anti-systemic breakthroughs. Since empire is immanent in our lives, the basic means of subversion is the development of alternative ways of life that allow the individuals to directly overcome the internalised norms of the system and to free their creative energy. Each new outburst of creativity is a revolt. The individuals free themselves when they break down the paralysing structures of the system and achieve self-actualisation.

Since the roots of revolution are in the spontaneous creativity of a large number of individuals that succeeds in turning the subjects into autonomous and unique beings, Hardt and Negri are trying to find for this "movement" such organizational forms that would be capable of preserving its spontaneous creativity. The bearer of the current communist revolution is not the working class lead by the avant-garde – a hierarchically organised social democratic or communist party, but the untamed and spontaneous *multitude*. The real-world example of such a *multitude* is, according to Hardt and Negri, that part of the movement for global social justice that stands against economic globalisation in its current form but, rather than calling for a return to the world of nation states, demands that globalisation be subjected to democratic control. Yet, this does not involve the formulation of an instrumental technocratic programme of building democratic institutions, but the direct realization of democracy in the framework of alternative forums and social movements (Hardt 2002; Hardt and Negri 2004: chap. 2) **Univerzita Karlova v Praze**  
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For Hardt and Negri (as well as for a range of other current revolutionary intellectuals, see e.g. Wallerstein 2003), the symbol of these forums and movements is the *World Social Forum*, which took place for the first time in 2001 in the Brazilian town of Porto Alegre, and which managed to absorb the vast plurality of current anti-systemic forces from both the developed countries and the global "South". For Hardt and Negri, the "spirit of Porto Alegre" is an illustration of a decentralised organisational platform and at the same time constitutes the beginning of a new – democratic – global order that would be established not by a bloody revolution but by acts of individual revolt. In this sense, at present we are not speaking of a social revolution (as in Marx), but primarily of an *ethical* revolution – a change in the patterns of individual behaviour that should transform the whole system. The acts of individual revolt symbolised by Porto Alegre thus represent an alternative to the "spirit of Davos" and its focus on preserving the inequalities and injustices characteristic of the current world order (Hardt, Negri 2004).

Hardt and Negri agree with Marx's conception of a communist revolution as an event that comes only after capitalism has fulfilled and exhausted all of its potential. For this reason they oppose the efforts of neo-sovereignist opponents of globalisation (the *antiglobalisation movement*, see the top left quadrant of the table) to restore state control of capitalism. This would equal a return to the previous form of oppression, while it is necessary to complete capitalism and break free from its limitations. By destroying all barriers to the flow of capital, the globally united world creates conditions for the liberation of all inhabitants of the globe. Hardt and Negri's attitude towards neoliberal globalisation is as ambivalent as Marx's attitude towards industrial capitalism. The coming of capitalism and the coming of globalisation destroyed the old forms of unjust oppression and replaced them with new ones. The eradication of new injustices cannot be accomplished by returning to past injustices, but by making a step forward – in Marx, by creating a communist society; in Hardt and Negri, by achieving the global *multitude* emerging in demonstrations against neoliberal globalisation and in the *World Social Forum* meetings.

An *alternative (communitarian) view* that does not rely on the forces of global capitalism and its opponents, but instead prefers the tested and proven instruments of the nation state, is advocated by the above-mentioned neo-sovereignists. Their goal is not only the destruction of the structures of global capitalism, but also the destruction of international political organizations that in their opinion act only as capitalism's "ex-

ecutive committee". This camp welcomes any failure of international negotiations (such as the WTO in Cancún in 2003) as a promise of restoring national control over global capitalism. The problems of globalisation are therefore to be solved not by globally coordinated individual resistance, but rather by introducing strict regulations of capital flows in order to restore a balance of power favourable to the state. This is the only way to realize this camp's preferred alternative – de-globalised social economic development that could do without global capital and even without international trade and economic cooperation among the different parts of the world. This is the position taken by that part of the movement for global social justice that could be labelled as *antiglobalisation movement*. Various such groups are organized in the network *Our World Is Not For Sale*, formed by organizations such as *Public Citizen*, *Focus on the Global South* and *Food First* (Said, Desai 2003).

A similar view is held by certain left-wing political forces whose reaction to the dissolution of Marxism-Leninism was to lean towards "social populism". Instead of continuing to present themselves as the avant-garde of the proletariat, at present they see themselves as the *people's voice* against oppression from powerful economic and political elites that are conceived as a transnationally interconnected class. They reject the globalism of capitalism in favour of the particularism of a specific "people" in danger. Typical representatives of this camp are radical left-wing protest parties, such as the post-communist parties in the eastern part of Germany and in the Czech Republic in the 1990s (March, Mudde 2005).

### Post-Revolutionary Radicalism

In Marx's philosophical-historical scheme, the identity, interest, and success of a particular class (and the individuals that belonged to it) depended on the position of this class in the relations of production. Modern society according to Marx was marked by the opposition between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The proletariat was predestined for historical success, regardless of its actual behaviour. If the working class failed to recognize its historical mission, this was only due to "false consciousness", the ideology that served the bourgeoisie and enabled it to control the proletariat. The task of the scientific theory of socialism (or communism) was to destroy the barrier that did not allow the objective situation of the proletariat to be adequately reflected in its subjective consciousness. Once this barrier had been destroyed, the social structure

would begin to directly shape the collective identity of workers, which would ensure that workers recognize their interest in revolution. Capitalism would thus really find in them its own gravediggers, just as Marx presumed.

The indefensibility of this conception was first highlighted in the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century by the revisionist Eduard Bernstein (Wright 1999). Bernstein opposed the revolutionary strategy of Marxism and positively evaluated standard democratic competition. He concluded that in the future social democrats should be striving to gradually reform the capitalist system from within rather than wait until the conditions for a social revolution were ripe. Electoral success and control over the state began to be viewed as the basic preconditions for social transformation and for the gradual "civilisation" of capitalism. In the course of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, social democratic policies in the form of social legislation had a real effect on the institutional structures of all developed countries. According to this position, the welfare state succeeded in taming market forces and making them work for the benefit of the whole (read: national) society. The present problems are thus caused by political deregulation (economic globalisation) that frees market forces from political control. The solution would accordingly be to reintroduce the instruments of political regulation of capitalism and allow the state again to use the major tools of economic control such as protectionist measures, control of capital flows, etc. This view constitutes a *particularistic post-revolutionary position*, represented for example by some Western trade unions (see Amsden 2000; Kaldor 2000).

Currently, this position is not common in Europe. Social democratic programmes for the regulation of capitalism today rely more on the power of the European Union which, the proponents of this position believe, can be instrumental in protecting the European tradition of social solidarity and the welfare state against the individualising forces of neoliberal globalisation. In this way, European states could regain at the supranational level part of the regulative capacities that they have lost at the national level as a result of increasing globalisation (Bourdieu 1998; Habermas 1998).

By now, European social democracy belongs to the second *post-revolutionary camp* – to those political forces that no longer wish to rely on the state and advocate instead the introduction of mechanisms of democratic control of globalisation at a *supranational – European or global – level*. In general, these forces are members of the so-called alter-globalisation movement whose aim is not to halt globalisation (as in the

case of the antiglobalisation movement), but to subject it to democratic regulation. The first major step in this direction would be to overturn the global hegemony of neoliberalism that shields economic forces from political control. If we are to discuss the hegemony of ideas and conceptions and the resistance against it, we need to start with the work of A. Gramsci – the first Marxist who acknowledged the importance of the cultural and ideological components of social power.

Gramsci abandoned the conception of ideology as merely a "false consciousness" obscuring the "real" – i.e. the material – sources of oppression, and began to see it as a relatively independent source of oppression and, at the same time, as a potential instrument of the struggle against oppression. He thus rejected the subordination of the sphere of ideas to the material conditions of social existence, and duly concentrated on the cultural aspect of political fights. Gramsci realized that social domination is not exercised only by way of controlling the means of coercion (as liberals would argue), nor only by way of controlling the means of production (as orthodox Marxists would have it), but necessarily also by way of controlling the means of cultural formation of subjects' identities. The power of coercion and wealth are propped up by the subjects' voluntary consent to their own subordination, a consent that results from the way in which they understand themselves and the world. Material reality does not affect the social world directly and in itself, but always through the meanings we confer on it when trying to make sense of the world. These meanings are formed, preserved and internalised in families, schools, churches, and the media. Gramsci was aware that culture and ideology are as important for maintaining the political rule as they are for resisting it (see Gramsci 2005).

Gramsci's emphasis on the cultural aspects of the political struggle was later used in the analysis of the new social movements of the 1970s – environmental, peace, and feminist movements, movements of sexual, ethnical, and other cultural minorities, or the movement of nonconformist youth and its "counterculture" (Laclau, Moufe 1985). Politically, these radical movements (and the theoreticians that studied them) *accepted the liberal ideology of rights* and began applying it to spheres where it had not been relevant before – schools, mental institutions, and industrial companies. The political practice and theory of the new social movements politicised social spheres that had earlier not been considered primarily political. At the same time, the theoreticians of the new social movements demonstrated that Marx's analysis of capitalism reflected the reality of 19<sup>th</sup> century industrial society and was unsuited for understand-

ing the post-industrial society that has been developing since the last quarter of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (Melucci 1996).

Currently, the key production base no longer consists of material means of production, but rather of intellectual knowledge and skills. For this reason, the focus of the emancipation struggle has shifted from a proletarian revolution to the defence of individual and group autonomy in various spheres of social life. Class conflicts over positions in the division of labour and over the distribution of the social product have gradually been replaced with conflicts over quality of life, equality for women and other formerly subordinated cultural groups, environmental protection, self-actualisation, and democratic participation. The focus has shifted from the clash over the redistribution of material goods to the defence of "post-material" values (Melucci 1988; Habermas 1981). Accordingly, the social basis of radical politics is no longer formed by the working class, but by the new middle classes. The place of left-wing political parties (communist or social democratic) is taken by new social movements whose political struggles take place in the spheres of the civil society and everyday culture rather than in the political system (Cohen, Arato 1992).

The new social movements problematise the certainties of everyday life that prevent certain groups from obtaining recognition of their identities and, accordingly, from securing their equal position in the society. They politicise the subordination of women at home and at work, of patients in hospitals and mental institution, of children and students at schools. The new social movements are double-edged. On the one hand, they always pursue a specific aim, e.g. equality for women. On the other hand, in the course of their struggle they problematise the general structure of the functioning of the society; in the example above – the patriarchy (Melucci 1994). Another example can be an environmental movement fighting against the launching of a nuclear power plant. While pursuing this objective, such a movement would question and politicise the general attitude of modern society to the use of natural resources. By making a specific political demand, the environmentalists would problematise the seeming certainty of man's exploitative attitude to nature (Beck 1992b).

The recent emergence of the movement for global social justice can be understood in a similar way. This movement triggers a public discussion about the limits of economic globalisation. Economic globalisation, on the one hand, deepens economic and political cooperation between various parts of the world. Yet, on the other hand, it systematically creates

groups and areas that cannot gain equal access to the world market due to the policies of the developed countries. Similarly to the emergence of the new social movements in the 1960s and 1970s, this movement, too, is an indicator of a new conflict. It is a conflict over the rules and institutions of the international economy. As with other social movements, the protest against the World Trade Organization is not just a struggle against this particular organization, but questions the general structure of the global economy. It politicises the seemingly natural organisation of international economic relations, as it has developed since about the end of the 1970s.

Nevertheless, the problematisation of the neoliberal hegemony is not intended to clear the way for the emergence of a new utopia, but for the radical introduction of liberal-democratic values in all social spheres and also outside the developed world (cf. Ancelovici 2002; Graeber 2002). In the strict liberal conception, only the narrowly defined sphere of competition for the possession and use of state power is considered really political. The new social movements (and the theories about them) reject the liberal inclination to reduce power to state power only, as well as the Marxist inclination to reduce power to control over the means of material reproduction of the society. They promote human rights and democratic control over power in all spheres of society rather than only in the narrowly defined political system. The alterglobalisation movement can be understood as another instance of the tendency of the new social movements to politicise originally non-political areas – in this case the issue is the promotion of democratic control in the area of international politics, mainly the inclusion of the marginalized parts of the world's population. By pursuing specific political aims, these movements problematise and thus politicise the general structure of the world order and the structure of international institutions (cf. Beck 2002, 2003). Their aim is to start a global debate about the possibility for introducing democratic control over the power of developed countries and global capital, so as to ensure a fairer distribution of the benefits of globalisation among the different parts of the world.

## Conclusion

The aim of this article was to introduce the four types of left-wing response to the challenge of globalisation and outline the basic structure of the political map of the current Left. Economic globalisation and its intensification in the 1980s and 1990s – the primary source of left-wing



frustration – compelled the Left to formulate various recipes for overcoming their harmful effects. This analysis classified the left-wing responses to globalisation on the basis of two criteria – attitude to the possibility of a radical revolutionary social change, and attitude to globalisation itself. The article distinguished between a revolutionary and a post-revolutionary Left based on the first criterion, and between a globalist and a particularistic attitude based on the second criterion. When combined, the two dimensions form four different positions that were analysed in detail. The question that is deliberately left open is which of the above-presented positions is the Left's most convincing answer to globalisation. Or are we still waiting for it?

### Notes

1. This text draws and further elaborates on certain parts of Barša, Čisár 2004.

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