

The *aporia* of present education

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When it comes to the highest values in life, we cannot live up to them well as long as we treat them as means for something else. For instance, it would be absurd to ask a friend “of what use are you to me?” Indeed, a friendship has its appearance in the acts and effects, but wanting a friendship *because* of these acts and effects would cancel the very friendship itself, it would transform it into mere servitude. The same holds for love or life; and of course, for education as well. And yet, nobody seems to be surprised, when the main horizon regarding education is full of the rhetoric of efficiency and competitiveness that education is supposed to serve.

So the issue or, the *aporia*, I want to discuss, focuses on the split in the European tradition, i.e., between the knowledge that has its purpose in itself, or that is the highest possibility of human being on the one hand, and knowledge as the means for mastering nature on the other. How to reconcile these two traditions (the Antique and the modern one) in our present predicament? How to reconcile the technological and humane side of education? Is it even possible? The *aporia* I have in mind is not a mere technological issue, meaning that it cannot be solved once and for all as for instance repairing the old car. Rather we *are* this *aporia*, we modern people answer it by any action and passion, by any pursuit we proceed. I am not concerned here with a demonstration of some doctrine, but rather about the definition of this issue, present in our education in its ‘obvious concealment’ (cf. Heraclitus: “The Physique likes to hide.”).

To elaborate more the issue just sketched out, I will proceed by considering these points: 1. How our, i.e., modern world is constituted and what transformation represents the project of the world as regards the education. Then 2. I will turn to the problematic of the 3rd person perspective as it stems from the modern methodical frame of objectifying science and its idealization procedures. And that is because 3. as regards education, in contrast to the 3rd person perspective, the phenomenological distinction between man as an object in the world and man as a subject for the world must be taken into account and 4. used for characterization of the 1st person perspective and its pedagogical importance as well. 5. To make clearer the educational significance of the 1st person perspective, I will take an example of the insight and point out some key characteristics.

In the increasing mechanization of our world the idea prevails that human relations could be repaired as can be a broken car. I want to draw the attention to the difference between the

meaning of education and, in contrast, the *organization of education*. The questions regarding the Idea¹ of education are not posed, or more precisely, these kinds of questions are subordinated to managerial and bureaucratic issues. This situation is only another aspect of the substitution of knowledge based on the Idea (*theoria*) with knowledge based on technology (*scientia*). From the temporal perspective, i.e., how timing articulates man's mode of being, we can formulate the contrast I have in mind as a contrast between efficiency and *scholé*. *Scholé* means free time in Greek (or, literally: a vacancy, vacation) as opposed to *ascholia*, the lack of leisure, that is also involved in the demand for efficiency being an intention constitutive for our modern world. In efficiency it's about the quantum of effects per time interval (time is money). However, to turn back to our *aporia*, as long as the leading horizon of the present organization of education is efficiency, it also means a substantial devastation of the school (*scholé*).

With regards to my approach, although it could be characterized as phenomenological insofar it tries to accomplish the *anamnesis* (*die Besinnung*) of the Idea of education, I will try to avoid a specific phenomenological terminology (and a potential dogmatism imminent when we use the known words automatically) and elucidate the issue at stake without using Husserl's (or anyone else's) rigid terms.²

Our or, the modern world

I start off by reminding us of the issue called *secondary literacy*. I interpret this issue as constituted in the demand that the student should not only operate with a particular piece of information, but also be able to identify its source, i.e., the horizon in which this information makes sense. Or, to put it in hermeneutical terms, the educated one has essentially the ability to understand the context wherein the knowledge belongs. The European (with regard to what makes him European) is the one,

- who has opened this ability to adjust their life through the insight (in German: *Einsicht, Einblick*),
- to whom the ability and possibility to ask about the validity of the knowing what they know is opened: from where do I know, that what I know, I know (is it actually knowing and not a mere assumption, *doxa* in Plato's sense)? (science as the knowing meaningful as the answer to this question),

¹ The capital "I" is supposed to indicate that I mean the Idea in the Platonic sense and not in the sense of "representation", as it is understood in modern thinking based on Cartesian metaphysics.

² Yet, the foundational phenomenological distinction between sense-giving, constitutive and constituted level as well as between living experience and idealized constructions is operative all over this text.

- and to whom, in all their life, the ability to ask about the good itself is still opened: what is good as such and what is good for me? (freedom as freedom to my “self”).

To the knowledge as such belongs the horizon wherein this knowledge makes sense. How is it with the horizon of our modern world? What project lies in its base? What constitutes the guiding intention into which all our conduct is integrated? How do we understand our world and, correlatively, ourselves in this world? The meaning of the modern project from which our world is being born is elaborated by René Descartes: to “make us masters and possessors of the Nature”. This consideration will be important for the explication of the horizon within which the modern pedagogy operates. Insofar as education is the bringing one up to their own humanity, once we decided about the humanity of man, we decided about the meaning and direction of education as well.

There is the distinction between *education as an objective process* and *education in its Idea* that is important to understand. As all the other ideas, this is my elaboration of Husserl’s phenomenology, specifically, his critique of modern objectivism. Husserl discovered that there is an oblivion in modern science in the sense that it proceeds by construing idealized methodical approaches to nature and then mistakes these methods (or rather their objective correlate: the idealized nature) for the things themselves (*die Sachen selbst*). As I translate it, science deals only with “processes”, that means with spatiotemporal motions in the horizon of idealized nature. It deals with its own idealizations, objectified, integrated into the frame of an objective Cartesian coordinates, not with things themselves. The whole point of phenomenology is to uncover again the things themselves under the strata of idealizations. And the idealization does not concern only nature, but men as a part of nature as well. Modern sciences are situated IN THE WORLD, they do not concern with the constitution of the world, with the subjective sources of the sense of the world (“the world” not in the sense of sum of all entities that are in the space and time, but as the horizon of sense in which every event, every experience is lived through and understandable before any scientific explanation). The abbreviated way to explain it is to say that the world is not an object, but every science is defined by its realm of objects that are of its concern and thus the world is not visible for it, rather, it provides the fundament, the ground on which scientific constructions are build on, but that is foreseen by scientists. That is why I consider Husserl’s insight that science deals only with man as an object in the world and not as a subject FOR THE WORLD so important and I turn to it later. But the education is a motion that takes place not only in the world (as a machinery of processes – *Weltmaschinerie*), but rather and primarily as a

transformation of our 'relation' TO THE WORLD as such. In its objectivism, modern science tends to forget this sense.

What is the point of scientific idealization? The point is to master the nature, to be able to predict scientifically the effects from causes. And by knowing the nature to be able to command it by our own will. In this pursuit, one cannot deny that science succeeds enormously – almost everything in our modern world is a result of scientific success (but we also see more and more clearly that this progress has its limits). But one of the consequences of it is that the sense of knowledge is overturned, “revolutionized”. I mean, the ancient THEORIA was the ability to see what is the highest, i.e., the measures (Gr. METRON, KRITERION) thanks to which we can measure the realm of MIXIS, our sensible world. And the sense of education (PAIDEIA) was: bringing one up to these measures. In THEORIA, the pupil is able to see the visibility itself (IDEA), not only to stare on what is visible (in a sense, Husserl is Platonic: his WESENSSCHAU-‘intuition of essences’ is THEORIA – but he inverts the meaning, because according to him Plato interprets THEORIA and IDEAS objectively, but his phenomenology seeks to find the subjective sources of these). And unlike the visible, the visibility itself is not accidental (it is not a matter of fact to put it with David Hume), one can approach it only in the consciousness of ‘cannot be otherwise’ (apodictic evidence: I know the source, the wherefrom (APO-) the respective knowledge shows itself (DEIXIS) as true). For instance it makes a huge difference when the student has some particular knowledge on the one hand and when he understands the horizon (or hermeneutically: the context) on which the knowledge makes sense on the other. It transforms him because he knows not only THAT something holds true, but he has the insight into WHY it is so. There is a bond in his knowledge – but this bond does not tie him up to some DOXA, to some belief, it discloses him for the pure possibilities (the horizons of sense) from whose the respective knowledge makes sense. To give an example from Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*: the uneducated one does not understand why he is supposed to behave well. He behaves well only from the fear that he might be punished when doing otherwise. The educated one stands in the question regarding the good life. In this sense, he is able to appreciate the good for itself (not in the sense that he knows what this good would be once and for all).

In contrast to THEORIA, the modern SCIENTIA is a means, an instrument (INSTRUMENTUM) for the commanding will. One of the consequences is, that, unlike the ancient PAIDEIA (*non vitae sed scholae discimus*), the education is conceived as an instrument (as they say it now: to produce competitive human resources for the labor market).

From this does not follow that the original sense of education is lost. But it is covered (analogically to what happened to science) with the sense of higher order, the idealized processes, to say it in a shortcut.

In the modern project, the reversion, not to say perversion, of the meaning of knowledge and science is taking place. The science (*scientia*) is the means for mastering the nature and does not have a purpose of its own. This mastering proceeds by objectifying – we can say with Jan Patočka, that freedom for modern man consists in this objectifying. This change has its consequences also in the area of human conduct: the substantial relation between the means and the good is disconnected: in the idealizing concept (*concupere*), the conduct is decomposed into efficient causes and causal processes. Such a fragmentation of the living motion into particular causal processes makes us able to increase the efficiency of this motion. This efficiency is achieved by technological, artificial re-constructing the respective living motion so that it is integrated into the idealized machine enabling us efficiently producing the required effects.

To make things clearer, we can compare the approach of modern science with the one of the old philosophy. Plato and Aristotle investigated the *essence* of the activity. And with regards to this essence one character is important, i.e. the action aims at some good. Unlike the modern approach, the old one investigates the living whole in its constitutive characters. But this later approach is limited: the antiquity is familiar only with a finite *a priori* of human perspective.³ Compared to this limited *a priori*, the modern science is operating with the idea of actual infinity (it has its origin in Christian theology).⁴ This new type of a priori enables the modern science to make a revolution in its approach to nature. Modern mathematization turns the order upside down in the sense: the starting point is not the living nature itself, but the mathematical continuum as a specific type of abstraction that is retroactively applied to living nature. This makes possible to convert nature into exactly measurable quantities and to treat it as a special case of a mathematical continuum.

The point of this mathematization (Galileo Galilei elaborated the ingenious project of conceiving (*concupere*) whole universe as a special example of geometrical space) is to master the living motion as a controllable process, as a motion in objective time and space. But as the consequence of this method the essential necessity of Idea is lost from the sight. The goal is not to understand phenomena, but to master the reality. Let me get some simple examples to

³ Cf. „Aber die Euklidische Geometrie und die alte Mathematik überhaupt kennt nur endliche Aufgaben, ein endlich geschlossenes Apriori.“ *Hua* VI, p. 19.

⁴ Christian God, who is transcendent to our actual world is an example par excellence.

make things more graspable. If we decompose the cup into clear and distinct ideas (as in Locke's method), i.e. the sensations and perceptions, the idea of "cupness" is lost. When we decompose the ladybug into its organic parts, it seldom happens to come to life again. When we decompose human being into its particular processes of physical, biochemical, psychical, social, economic etc. kind, we get the person as an *object*, but the humanity of this person is lost. And that happens because humanity is not an object at all. We don't get humanity if we compose all the processual levels going on the object "homo sapiens sapiens" together. The result of this operation is not human being, but Frankenstein's monster, that will not be a part of any living context, except as a monster.⁵ And finally, if we break the education down into particular processes and subprocesses, the educational *eros* is lost from it.

If we decompose the action into particular processes, insofar as the aim at some good belongs necessarily to it, everything will be preserved except this good alone. But what is the point of education when we (we, the modern men) break it down into processes and lose its essence? This 'what for' is hard to find, as humanity is not an object within objective time and space. Nietzsche expresses this situation of a modern man with precision: „»Ich weiß nicht aus noch ein; ich bin alles, was nicht aus noch ein weiß« – seufzt der moderne Mensch...“ (*Antichrist*, § 1)

These considerations may seem to be only of a speculative value. But we can see how our actual education is impregnated with what I described as the modern project, how, for instance, university education is more and more substituted with managerial and corporate training. The understanding of contexts and consequences is replaced with the technological skills and *know-how*. And the education alone is more and more incorporated into the *infotainment*. Not to mention that the education becomes an area of bank business.⁶ The students apprehend themselves as human resources, i.e. as producers and consumers, demanding their own efficient exploitation and the education be fun.

The ontological meaning of the world in modernity is "objectivity". Then, freedom is conceived as the mastering by the means of objectification. All the modern world is constructed as a system of this kind of freedom. But this freedom is not the whole truth. What stands beyond the borders, beyond the representation of this freedom, is the necessity relating to the controlling the one in control, in other words, the incorporation of living man into the system of control.

⁵ Cf. SHELLEY, Mary Wollstonecraft. *Frankenstein, or, The Modern Prometheus*. Ware (GB): Wordsworth Editions, 1993.

⁶ Cf. for instance: STANDING, Guy. *The Corruption of Capitalism: Why Rentiers Thrive and Work Does Not Pay*. London: Biteback Publishing, 2016, p. 187-193.

Theoretical attitude and the 3rd person perspective

We can distinguish two types of theoretical distance. First would be a distance that a scientist has from the object of their research, let's say a "laboratory distance" as in a scientist and their mouse as a subject of laboratory research. This type of distance allows the researcher to investigate its object as a system of objective processes from the 3rd person perspective. The second type of distance is a distance of eidos, *Wesen* (in a Husserl's sense): we do not experience the particular, but we look at the Idea of the respective thing as a whole (*kata ton holon*). We do not take a stand *in* the world and correlatively some particular perspective, but we are observing this particular perspective *as such*.⁷ For instance, a judge, in order to make his decision right, needs to take into account not only the perspective of one side, he needs to take into account the case as a whole. This second type of distance is the phenomenological one. And this kind of distancing is important as far as the aim of education is not to integrate the student into some particular perspective (as if we hold the one and only truth) of some doctrine, but to care for their (and ours as well) ability to free themselves up from any perspective and prejudice. To put it differently, the ability to identify the different horizons is constitutive for the condition to identify the thing itself. And such an ability again constitutes the possibility to communicate with others, i.e. to meet with them on the same page, on the same matter. In this sense Edmund Husserl speaks about what is educational in the phenomenological reduction (*das Erzieherische der phänomenologischen Reduktion*): it "uns nun überhaupt für die Erfassung von Einstellungsänderungen empfänglich macht, die der natürlichen oder, wie wir jetzt deutlicher sagen, der naturalen Einstellung ebenbürtig sind, die also wie diese nur relative und beschränkte Seins- und Sinneskorrelate konstituieren."⁸

Consider the apprehension of one and the same thing in different horizons. You can approach a cup standing before you from different perspectives, chemical, biological, economical, poetic, psychological etc. These perspectives are *incommensurable* (to use Paul Feyerabend's term), and yet they have a matter that is common to all of them, some "what" are they about.⁹ Every one of these perspectives will be different and contingent as well (it could be otherwise or not being at all). But if we turn it into a problem, i.e., if we look at the respective perspective alone as a mental experience (*Erlebnis*) with its own essence, we get the unity of 'so-and-so-meaning'. And what is important, this new unity is not contingent, but necessary.

⁷ This does not mean logical abstraction (the respective perspective is still here).

⁸ Srov. HUSSERL, Edmund. *Ideen II*, p. 179.

⁹ *Materie* in Husserl's sense.

We get to a necessity that guides the respective perspective. To get an example: the fact that I see a cup before me is contingent, but the experience (*Erlebnis*) of ‘I see a cup’ is not contingent, it has its own *eidōs* involving all the characters belonging to it. The same holds for abstract matters like justice or the Idea of education. We use these words mostly without making clear what do we understand by them. But it does make sense, instead of free discussions, to make clear the idea, the necessity belonging to these matters. The *visibility* or, more formally “*encounterability*” alone is not visible, but it provides a condition to understand something as something.

Every specific science (*Spezialwissenschaft*) approaches the human being through the lens of its specific methodical frame and ways of gaining its own object. Instead of living person it researches an object, its own *methodically constructed idea* of human being. Phenomenological effort is different. We can say it goes an opposite direction: the point is to turn off the objectifying, idealizing construction and ask the thing itself about her *self-identity* (*Selbigkeit*), about her sense of being. This matter is important after the experience of the 20th century. Unless we are able to distinguish between technological constructs and things themselves, all our efforts to construct heaven on Earth will result in some sort of concentration camp, no matter how fancy and “smart”. The care for the ability to meet on the same matter, to distinguish the matter itself (*Sachen selbst*) from the idealized constructions belongs to the Idea of education.

The educated one is supposed to be able to identify the methodical approach, during which the thing is transformed into the specific object of the respective science. That means not to confuse this object with the matter itself and to know about the idealization involved in the approach of modern science. Also the teacher should understand that by teaching his subject, he lets his pupils look into the specific world with its own *a priori*: the world of atoms and forces in physics, the world of molecules, reactions in chemistry, the world of social processes in social and political sciences etc. But it is not a set of molecules I am eating when I have lunch. Also, it is not a social process in the 3rd person when I am involving in a dialogue with others.

In this sense, what belongs to an educated human is the possibility and ability to see the issues through the eyes of someone else, not to be enclosed in one way of seeing which I confuse with the reality, and also not to be enclosed in one particular ego, which is so to say petrified in his own ways of encountering and so in his petrified possibilities how to encounter anything. Such a human being lives in self-enclosing to his own self, insofar this enclosing means not knowing about my not knowing, i.e. about myself (as not knowing). Johann

Gottlieb Fichte gets this point when he explicates the essential character of the uneducated on (*der Nichtdenker*): “Seine unheilbare Krankheit ist die, das *zufällige* für *notwendig* zu halten.”

Here we can learn something from Socrates who in *Phaedo* speaks about his disappointment with Anaxagoras: “It may be said, indeed, that without bones and muscles and the other parts of the body I cannot execute my purposes. But to say that I do as I do because of them, and that this is the way in which mind acts, and not from the choice of the best, is a very careless and idle mode of speaking. I wonder that they cannot distinguish the cause from the condition, which the many, feeling about in the dark, are always mistaking and misnaming.”¹⁰

The care for the ability to distinguish between the essential and non-essential, between the important and the unimportant is important in our predicament of information overload. This applies also to school. Nietzsche said it well in his *Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen*: “Das Wissen, das im Übermaße ohne Hunger, ja wider das Bedürfnis aufgenommen wird, wirkt jetzt nicht mehr als umgestaltendes, nach außen treibendes Motiv und bleibt in einer gewissen chaotischen Innenwelt verborgen, die jener moderne Mensch mit seltsamem Stolz als die ihm eigentümliche »Innerlichkeit« bezeichnet.”¹¹ The good teacher is not the one who is able to saturate the cognitive needs of his students. To put it other way round, the good teacher is the one who can create the erotic tension, the sense of the lack of knowledge, to let the pupil experience the privation of knowledge, the urgent need to know something as important for his own life. When Plato speaks about the *erotic* structure of asking, when Aristotle speaks about *orexis*, they do not have some particular psychological faculty in mind, but they think the ontological structure of being man. And insofar as education is the bringing one up to his own humanity, the education is not one job among many, but the one pursuit of becoming man.

Man is not only an *object in the world* but also *the subject for the world*

As I have said before, modern science approaches human being by objectifying him by its idealizing methods. This approach involves a reduction of human being to an object in the world. Here Husserl’s phenomenological discovery must be appreciated, that *man is not only an object in the world, but a subject for the world as well*. This structure of being is important in education. As long as pedagogy treats man only as an object in the world, it loses its essential necessity, it cannot ask about the meaning of his existence. As a consequence,

¹⁰ Plato. *Phaedo*, 99a-b.

¹¹ Nietzsche. *Werke in drei Bänden*. München 1954, Band 1, p. 231.

science and education have nothing to say regarding the meaning of the human being and being human and his life as well. Science and education are not concerned with this type of question at all. We can remember Husserl's critique of modern science in *Krisis*: „In unserer Lebensnot – so hören wir – hat diese Wissenschaft uns nichts zu sagen. Gerade die Fragen schliesst sie prinzipiell aus, die für den in unseren unseligen Zeiten den schicksalsvollsten Umwälzungen preisgegebenen Menschen die brennenden sind: die Fragen nach Sinn oder Sinnlosigkeit dieses Ganze menschlichen Daseins. ... Was hat über Vernunft und Unvernunft, was hat über uns Menschen als Subjekte dieser Freiheit die Wissenschaft zu sagen?“¹²

Primarily, the living and lived situation of education is not taking place as a natural or social process in the 3rd person. Of course, this processual perspective is possible and legit. But then it is important to know that in this perspective we do not look at education itself in its Idea, we look away from its sense and look at the *process and organization* going on in time and space. To use a Stoic Chrysippus' picture, just as a real wagon does not come out of my mouth when I speak about the wagon, so teaching does not consist in the real process going on in time and space, but in bringing one to the matter itself. Of course, it is possible to conceive education as a process and looking for the amendments of it to get more efficient results. But in the actual teaching (or more generally when I try to clarify something), my concern is not with initiating or regulating some processes going on in the 3rd person (biological, psychological etc. processes), rather in the set of sentences, I am trying to focus the other person on the matter alone, on the “*what*” I am speaking about. The idea of education as bringing one to things themselves, to understanding the matter I am teaching him at the moment. This goal is what guides everything, the management and control of feedback processes is something derivative.

The teacher needs to understand *the conditions, the pure possibilities* from and in which some knowledge makes sense and acquires its necessity. Understanding these pure possibilities is the most important in education: they do not regard the seen particular, but the ‘wherefrom’ something is *visible*, the *visibility* itself (in Plato's language: *eidōs*). The pupil is supposed to understand the conditions under which the particular knowledge holds true. And these pure possibilities cannot be transferred. Sophisticated technologies are of no use here, they even divert from the matter. The understanding is not a positive knowledge that can be tested by some feedback process. Everyone needs to do the insight into the essence by himself. And since understanding in the sense of the insight is not any positive information or data or skills,

¹² Husserl, *Krisis*, p. 4.

it cannot be arranged technologically. The insight itself cannot be transferred, we cannot “google it” – this can be done only with mathematical result of the insight.

The 1st person perspective

The prevalence of the 3rd person perspective has its consequences also in the way how curriculum is transferred. In his unfinished work, *Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie*, Husserl speaks about “die Schullherrschaft der objektiv-wissenschaftlichen Denkweisen”.¹³ Why is he talking about the objectivity? Isn't it right if we strive for objectivity instead of being lost in our subjective opinions?

But what are the criteria for objectivity? Isn't it right if any objective truth must be justified by our own thinking, in the evidence as a source of any validity? And indeed, this thinking is subjective, not in the sense of particular psychological processes, but in the sense of subjective acts that we must perform in order to understand something. No ready-made objectivity can help us here. So I interpret Husserl's remark about the “objective modes of thinking” as an important reminder that the objectivist frame blocks the very possibility of education, the possibility to strive for the source of evidence, substituting it for the objective result in the shape of a set of information. Here I find the concern of phenomenology about the source of our knowledge very important for our *anamnesis* of the Idea of education. And with this concern the replacement of the 3rd person perspective by the 1st person perspective is taking place.

It would be a mistake to suppose that education can be reduced to technological issues, the issues of transferring or construing knowledge etc. It was Augustine, who, in his dialogue *De magistro* elaborates Plato's question concerning the possibility of teaching and learning. He demonstrates that in truth, it is not a teacher who is teaching. We can add that if a teacher believes that he performs teaching, the result is that he overloads the student with information, *as if this were the point of teaching*, and not the student's ability to come to the source of some knowledge, his freedom to ask about the condition of the respective knowledge. The fact that a teacher or any other authority tells me something does not follow that it is true. The teacher has only signs at his disposal, but in them no knowledge, no evidence is involved. I myself must be able to seek for the evidence and the source of any claim to truth: “those who are called ‘students’ [*discipuli*] consider within themselves whether truths have been stated. They do so by looking upon the inner Truth, according to their abilities.”¹⁴ Of course, we do

¹³ *Hua VI*, s. 132.

¹⁴ AUGUSTINE. *De magistro*, p. 145.

not need to accept Saint Augustine's theological perspective, but noting that the understanding cannot be transferred by the teacher is important.

As we know from Frege's and Husserl's critique of psychologism, the knowledge is not derived from any real psychological processes taking place in objective time and space. It is obvious, that the real *existence* of some knowledge depends on psychophysical constitution and thus on some specific objective time-space configuration. But it is absurd to claim this dependence for the truth itself that is judged. From the fact that in some individual consciousness a cognitive process is going on does not follow that its content is true. Not even if the respective thought was performed for a million times. For instance the truth (or untruth) of the sentence '2+2=5' is not derived from the fact, that there is some actual mind that performs this statement. It would be absurd to claim that something is true or false in the sense that it depends on any psychological performance as a matter of fact and that it expires together with this performance.

The knowledge in the sense of the consciousness 'it cannot be otherwise' (Husserl speaks about the apodictic evidence) is not visible for the psychological approach. But it is precisely this type of knowledge that provides the foundation for education. Because it frees the educated one for himself, for the necessity, for the yoke of the evidence, that is not anything real (being in the causal relations in time and space) but that is more necessary than any reality.

These considerations are useful also in the realm of ethics. The good is not an objective entity, it enables us to apprehend something as good or as bad. According to Aristotle, the uneducated is the one who behaves well only out of fear of punishment. We can put it otherwise: the educated is the one who is motivated by the thing itself and the good itself, not because of the fear of punishment.

The insight

Let's look at the insight phenomena. When we are solving some problem, we do not construct particular steps of a solution as in the cookbook. Constructing presupposes the already given totality that is reconstructed. In order to (re)construct, the solution must be already presupposed. Solving problems as a living experience has rather character of searching, groping in the dark, or in the space only partially clear. We rather proceed by trial and verify if the given way leads to the solution or to absurdity. Such an attempt can lead to the state where we exhaust all the possibilities we can find.

This exhausting of possibilities teaches us, that we always already are in some specific attitude regarding the issue. In our approach to the problem also some enclosure is involved, that means some anticipation of the possible solution. Do we have any option left in this situation, where we do not see any viable way of solving? We either give up searching, or we change our own anticipating attitude. We can find that the real issue was our attitude alone, making us blind for some options *as options*. Here the Socratic structure ‘knowing about knowing nothing’ is present: we do not understand that we do not understand. In order to be able to free myself from my own presuppositions, the *epoché*, i.e., holding my assent is of a great importance. Such a moving myself, freeing from my own self-engagement and self-enclosure is the hardest undertaking, precisely because it involves myself. This could be done only in the 1st person. Of course, the other, for instance a teacher, could be helpful, but the decisive moment is always up to myself.

In the moment of finding a solution the whole issue is given as a whole, a single intention – however complicated in its inner structure – goes through it. We see why the things cannot be otherwise, we do not have only the matter of fact truth (*that* it is so), but also *why* it is so (*Wesenschau*). But at the same time this result together with the living evidence slips away in retention. The pure ego, living in the evidence holds the mode of clarity, the ‘self-identity’ (*Selbigkeit*): “that’s it! I have found it! *eureka!*” But this mental experience (*Erlebnis*) flows away into the past. I no longer have the total coincidence with myself (i.e., my thinking “with” the issue as thought), but modified consciousness of this coincidence. Correlatively, the result of solution is fixed as a real, given possibility that can be retrospectively construed in successive steps. The original living asking and searching is modified. The solution in the form of successive consequent steps became a normal part of knowledge, functioning as a ready-made instrument for solving relevant type of problems.

In the phenomena of solving problems and freedom to myself, we find a coincidence with ourselves – this is what some philosophers call the “pure delight”. In the moment of apodictic evidence we move ourselves by a detour via our own prejudices and suppositions, thus free ourselves to our Selves. We are in touch our own source so to say. That is why Archimedes in the moment of his discovery is so delighted as he shakes off every burden. This is not only a psychological experience. The experience of the freedom of this kind is an introducing the “divine” into the whole of our life that Aristotle is talking about: “But one ought not – as some recommend – to think only about human things because one is a human being, nor only about mortal things because one is mortal, but rather to make oneself immortal, insofar as that

is possible, and to do all that bears on living in accord with what is the most excellent of the things in oneself.”¹⁵

To let a person have this experience of freedom is the meaning of the place we call in our tradition the “school” (*scholé*): spare time, rest. Of course, there is a legit objection possible that what we claim is time consuming. But the freedom to my Self belongs to the Idea of education. This freedom is what eroticizes the education, not some entertaining or interactivity which in fact leads away from the matter at hand. The education is either in coincidence with its own Idea or it is not at all. Here, Kierkegaard’s idea is important, that interest is *inter-esse*, being in the erotic tension, in the difference as well as coincidence with the matter.¹⁶ The motion of education or rather education in motion must start off from the living person and from the questions that are of interest for her.

Comenius instead of conclusion

One can object that the idea of education implicit here is too exclusive, useful maybe for philosophers and not for an “ordinary” standardized education, not to speak of children’s pedagogy. I do not think so. We can find a very meticulous example of education for little children in Comenius’ *Informatorium Maternum*. In this work, the plan of child education up to 6 years is presented. If I see it correctly, the key idea is to lead the child through the visible to the invisible, to the invisible order that rules in the visible. It is not designed to provide students with some *Weltanschauung*, but to lead him to understanding that every particular belongs to the horizon of all horizons, i.e. the world. Also Comenius’ *Orbis sensualium pictus*, is a great contribution to the above mentioned issue of secondary literacy. Every particular thing is presented within the living whole, living universe. Unlike most current schoolbooks, the pictures in *Orbis pictus* do not function as a construction plan or a model, but they are supposed to picture everything substantial for the respective issue or activity *together with the context which they fit into according to their purpose*.

Instead of a conclusion, I would like to stress out that Europe is not founded on the magical formulas about competitiveness and efficiency – otherwise, and I am sorry for a little political incorrectness, even a Martian could be a good European. The self-preservation of Europe is

¹⁵ Aristotle. *Nicomachean Ethics*, X, 8 (1177b).

¹⁶ Cf. “For one who exists, what interests him most is existing, and his being interested in existing is his actuality. What actuality is cannot be put in the language of abstraction. Actuality is an inter-esse splitting the hypothetical unity of abstraction’s thought and being. Abstraction deals with possibility and actuality, but its grasp of actuality gives a false account, since the medium is not actuality but possibility. Only by suspending actuality can abstraction grasp it, but to suspend it is precisely to transform it into possibility.” Kierkegaard, Sören. *Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Crumbs* (2009), Cambridge University Press, p. 263.

linked to the discovery of the possibility that has the name – among many others – education. And this possibility consists in bringing one up to the apodictic evidence, to the consciousness of ‘cannot be otherwise’ that is more necessary than any reality.

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