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Abstract and Keywords

This chapter places Eastern Europe into a broader history of decolonization. It shows how the region's own experience of the end of Empire after the World War I led its new states to consider their relationships with both European colonialism and those were struggling for their future liberation outside their continent. Following World War II, as Communist regimes took power in Eastern Europe, and overseas European Empires dissolved in Africa and Asia, newly powerful relationships developed. Analogies between the end of empire in Eastern Europe and the Global South, though sometimes tortured and riddled with their own blind spots, were nonetheless potent rhetorical idioms, enabling imagined solidarities and facilitating material connections in the era of the Cold War and non-alignment. After the demise of the so-called "evil empire" of the Soviet Union, analogies between the postcolonial and the postcommunist condition allowed for further novel equivalencies between these regions to develop.

Keywords: Decolonization, globalization, global history, Communist bloc, non-alignment, Third Worldism, anti-colonialism, revolution, post-colonialism, Eastern Europe

Introduction

This chapter places Eastern Europe into the larger history of decolonization by focusing on both the domestic end of empire after World War I and the relationship of communist Eastern European states to Africa and Asia during the dissolution of overseas European empires from 1945 to 1976. Analogies between the end of empire in Eastern Europe and the Global South, though sometimes tortured and riddled with their own blind spots, were nonetheless potent rhetorical idioms that enabled solidarities and facilitated material

connections in the era of the Cold War and non-alignment. After the demise of the so-called 'evil empire' of the Soviet Union, analogies between the postcolonial and the postcommunist condition allowed for further novel equivalencies between these regions to develop.

Eastern Europe and the Global South tend to inhabit different storylines in world history. Eastern Europe's twentieth century passes through Versailles, Auschwitz, Yalta, and, after a long interregnum, the Berlin of 1989. It is a story of nationalism realized, quashed, and redeemed. By contrast, the key dates for the Global South are the advent of postwar decolonization with Indian Partition in 1947, the Afro-Asian Bandung Conference of 1955, and the wave of national independence from 1960 to 1976. Both are stories of nationalism but, with rare exceptions like the first meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement in Belgrade in 1961, they run parallel, rather than intersect. Coeval moments like the Suez Crisis and the suppression of the Hungarian Revolution in 1956, or the simultaneous crumbling of South African apartheid and the Soviet control of Eastern Europe, are seldom narrated as entangled events.

This chapter proposes a different story. The expanded approach to the 'ends of empire' taken by this volume considers a range of contact points often obscured. The small nations that emerged from the dismantled Habsburg and Russian Empires after the end of World War I had a plausible claim as the first site of decolonization in the twentieth century.[1] Indeed, the very term "decolonization" was first used in English in the 1930s to connect the already-achieved independence of states in Eastern Europe with an argument about the inevitability of the liberation of nations in Africa and Asia in the near future.[2]When Communist regimes took power in Eastern Europe after World War II and looked for partners overseas as the European empires crumbled, they saw a world both similar and radically different from their own. Communists hardly ever used the word "decolonization." This was a western term that denied agency to the liberated, suggested that independence was the enlightened gift of the former imperial powers, and hence was associated with the attempt to keep former colonies within the sphere of influence of the West.[3] Rather, Eastern European Communists employed the language of common struggle, suggesting the emergence of a new global anti-imperialist space which stretched through Berlin, Moscow, Accra, Hanoi, and Havana and united the regions that contemporaries outside the bloc called the "Second" and the "Third Worlds". According to this outlook, Eastern Europeans had waged progressive struggles against Empires that were now being replicated outside Europe: this developing sense of shared experience undergirded new political identifications, the transfer of economic knowledge, and domestic cultures of international solidarity.

There were also telling silences in the public transcripts of "East-South" interaction. Eastern European communists often seemed unsure if the same rules of development applied outside as well as inside Europe. The laws of history seemed perennially open to revision, and the spirit of proletarian internationalism did not efface differences of race and culture as promised. Other paradoxes persisted. The German Democratic Republic (GDR), a part of the former colonizing power of the Third Reich, disavowed its own

imperial past in both Central Europe and sub-Saharan Africa. Diplomacy often trumped doctrine to make non-Marxist parties from the decolonizing world the partners of Eastern European communists.

After the Sino-Soviet Split in the early 1960s, Chinese communists made the charge that the Warsaw Pact's overzealous identification with the Third World obscured the fault-lines of race that still divided the earth.[4] After the fall of the wall, activists and scholars asserted analogies between postsocialist and postcolonial experience that often distorted as much as they revealed. Relations between Eastern Europe and the decolonizing world did not always run smooth. This chapter shows that their trajectories through the century were closer to tangled knots than parallel lines.

Internationalism in Theory

The peace treaties of 1919 initiated a process that would lead eventually to the end of empire in both Eastern Europe and what would later be termed the "Global South". The timeline of this achievement was staggered. While the nation-states of Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia (initially as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes), and Poland emerged immediately from the dismembered Central European and Russian empires, or were expanded in the case of Romania and Bulgaria, the Mandates system deferred independence for Asian and African colonies, which, it was thought, could only develop the economic and political capacities to stand alone with the long-term oversight of international bodies and imperial powers.[5] Nevertheless, given the fragile nature of new Eastern European states—evidenced in particular by the instability resulting from postwar territorial disputes in Danzig, Silesia, and Fiume—some imperial figures, such as Jan Smuts, called for Mandates to be used there, too.[6] In its full-blooded form this idea was rejected. However, the idea of close equivalence between a brittle post-colonial Eastern Europe and a colonial world that needed shepherding towards self-sufficiency remained in the everyday assumptions of international politics in the interwar period. Even without the full supervision of the Mandates system, the League of Nations was granted the right to interfere in minority affairs throughout Eastern Europe[7]; and the League's financial experts were given the capacity to intervene in the region's reconstruction and financial stabilization in a manner that for contemporaries resembled the international administration of China or the debt-ridden Ottoman Empire.[8] Racialized understandings of superiority forged in global Empire could be used to denigrate the struggles to build new states on the European continent: Lord Cecil referred to the Poles as "orientalized Irish"; for Smuts, they were "kaffir".[9] The positions of new Eastern European states and overseas colonies in the world order appeared interchangeable for some too. In the late 1930s, British officials considered offering Nazi elites control over territory in Central Africa in exchange for the restraint of their imperial ambitions over the new nations of Eastern Europe.[10]

Yet in new eastern European states, there was initially little solidarity with those outside Europe whose independence was yet to be realized: Czechoslovak intellectuals and politicians lobbied the Paris Conference to allocate them land in west Africa and Kamchatka, while leaders of the one million-strong Polish Maritime and Colonial League argued that the attainment of colonies was an integral part of their country becoming a proper European nation.[11] Nnamdi Azikiwe, who would later become a president of an independent Nigeria, was critical: 'And so Poland, which until 1914 was a colonial territory of three different countries and which has been allowed to exercise the Wilsonian right of self-determination, now needs colonies, and not in Europe but in Africa. ... The former servant of the Austrian empress Maria Theresa, the Russian empress Catherine II and the Prussian king Frederick the Great now wants to be a master in an African country'.[12]

Nevertheless, with the global rise of Fascism from the mid-1930s, a growing number came to regard the fates of Eastern Europe and those of extra-European world as interconnected. One key turning point was the Italian invasion of Abyssinia in 1935: widespread sympathy for anti-colonial resistance was expressed across Eastern Europe, in part due to the historical memory of the suppression of their own nations at the hands of imperial forces.[13] The German occupation of Czechoslovakia in summer 1938—which the prominent Trinidadian anti-colonial campaigner George Padmore called the 'new Abyssinia'—further cemented the perception of such linkages. Understanding that the fates of the 'other Europe' and the colonized world beyond were related, Afro-American radicals such as Cyril Briggs and anti-colonial intellectuals such Jawaharlal Nehru and Rabindranath Tagore questioned western powers' commitment to Eastern European independence, and demanded respect for these new nations—and their sovereignty.[14]

The economic predicament of Eastern European countries from the 1920s prefigured many of those in the African and Asian world after 1945.[15] In both cases, regions that had previously raw materials and agriculture for the industrialized metropole sought to reinvent themselves as mixed economies. In Eastern Europe, new nations tried to move beyond primary production by protecting infant industries, seeking a level of economic growth to allow them to emerge from Europe's economic hinterland.[16] It is no coincidence that some of the pioneering economists of development economics, including Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, Nicholas Kaldor, Thomas Balogh, and Michał Kalecki, were from the primarily agrarian regions of East-Central Europe re-organized after the peace treaties.[17] As Rosenstein-Rodan put it in 1944: the 'international development of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe [...] provides a model presenting all the problems which are relevant to the reconstruction and development of backward areas [i.e., across the world]".[18]

While some of these economists emigrated to the United States and the United Kingdom, others remained (or, like Oskar Lange, returned) and worked with Communist governments that took power in Eastern Europe after World War II. The central question of socialist economists was the path that nations in the Global South could take toward communism. Was the success of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe replicable on the

periphery or would different tactics be necessary? Moscow, to whom all Eastern European nations turned, with the exception of Yugoslavia and later Albania, provided shifting answers. The Stalinist period was characterized by the Eurocentric and racially tinged assumption that advanced socialism was only possible in the more developed world, and that post-colonial governments were still the puppets of Western imperialism. Yet these notions were rejected gradually from the mid- to late-1950s. The acceleration of decolonization in Africa, and the intensification of the 'anti-imperialist struggles' in Latin America and Southeast Asia appeared briefly to confirm the idea that the world 'was going their way'.[19] According to this outlook, a progressive struggle that had already been waged successfully in Eastern Europe after World War II had now reached the long-awaited, but inevitable, moment when it could extend across the world.[20] This reading was the product of a universally applicable Marxist teleological approach to history, which was understood as proceeding through a series of stages divided up by revolutionary moments: political and economic transformations which Europe had undergone were now being replicated in the rest of the world. Khrushchev declared that socialist revolutions, national liberation movements, and democratic revolution were merging into 'a single revolutionary world process undermining and destroying capitalism.'[21]

Yet even as Soviet leaders created a master global narrative, they also allowed for a diversity of paths to the endpoint. After 1956, Khrushchev's policy of 'peaceful coexistence' allowed for a resurrection of Lenin's 'non-capitalist' roads to development.[22] It also, notably, led to the acceptance of non-*socialist* paths of postcolonial development.[23] During the 1970s, East European economists followed Moscow's lead in distinguishing between 'national capitalist' and 'dependent capitalist' states, offering a typology without strict prescription beyond the vision of a strong public sector.[24] Strong distinctions blurred over time. By the 1980s, communist states were even advising postcolonial nations to turn to Western capitalist countries for aid.[25]

Relationships between Eastern Europe and the Global South were often expressions of communist weakness as much as strength. Links southward were frequently motivated by fear of diplomatic isolation or the protection of national sovereignty. The GDR, which presented itself as the first truly anti-colonial German state, sought to escape the confines of the so-called Hallstein Doctrine by striving for diplomatic recognition from decolonizing states, with some limited success. Syria, for instance, used the promise of recognition to ensure higher levels of aid.[26] Poland sought postcolonial states' support in the recognition of their western borders, which West Germany did not recognize until 1970.

For those Eastern European states that asserted their independence from Moscow, these relationships would become especially vital. In the 1960s, Albania broke with Moscow altogether and found a new patron in Mao's China.[27] Tito's Yugoslavia, which broke with the Soviet Union in 1948, cultivated an alternative engagement with the decolonizing world. It garnered considerable internal and international prestige as one of the principal architects of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).[28] Yugoslavia developed some of the

strongest cultural and economic ties with Africa and Asia of any country in the socialist east of Europe.[29] In this case, it was the very *absence* of an analogous history between Yugoslavia and former colonial powers that allowed the NAM to appear as a grouping that transcended the earlier racialized order of imperial world society.[30] Romania performed a similar act when it joined the G-77 nations in 1976, declaring itself to be a Latin American country—proving the flexible borders of political formations seemingly governed by a logic of race or shared history. These key exceptions make clear that there was no single ideological template for the Eastern European relationship to the Global South. It changed over time and, in substance, from nation to nation.

Creating Connections

In the late 1950s, many Eastern European elites claimed that they had much to contribute to the development of newly independent states outside Europe. Their own experiences of decolonization and state building were within living memory, and their more recent experience of rapid industrialization, urban rebuilding, and economic growth after World War II meant that they had developed a wealth of knowledge about development and industrial production that could be readily exported. Expertise often had to suffice given the absence of funding or access to raw materials, which the western powers could more easily provide.

The proliferation of academic institutions focused on development was testament to this belief in the possibility of Eastern European leadership in a decolonizing world.[31] Karl Marx University in Leipzig established an institute for African Studies in 1960, and similar institutions were created in the USSR in 1962 and Yugoslavia and Hungary in 1963.[32] A Centre of Research on Underdeveloped Economies (CRUE) was founded in Poland in 1962. Elites of recently decolonized countries were trained, primarily in technical subjects, at newly founded institutions such as People's Friendship University in Moscow (1960) or the University of the 17th of November, named after international students' day, in Prague (1961).[33]

Professional expertise was provided, too. Architects from the communist bloc oversaw projects in postcolonial Africa from Zanzibar to Accra and in East Asia from Vietnam to North Korea.[34] The 'traveling architecture' of the Soviet bloc helped to literally cement a shared imaginary globally.[35] To provide one example of many: when a new socialist elite in Iraq wanted a massive expansion of housing for its poor after it overthrew its monarchy and seized the land of British Petroleum, it looked to a Polish firm that had built the workers' city of Nowa Huta outside Krakow. Here was a company that embraced equality of housing, was accustomed to working for a strong state, and was from a country that had experience of massive urban rebuilding following World War II. The Polish foreign trade service learned how to market their anti-colonialism to distinguish themselves from western European and North American experts. Not only had Poland

never possessed colonies of its own, they emphasized—she had also been the victim of partitions, wiped from the map of Europe between the late eighteenth century and World War I.[36]

It was not only a shared history of anti-imperialism that was thought to bind these world regions together. Many of the states formed after World War I in Eastern Europe were recolonized under Nazi Empire from 1939 to 1945. Their experience of the abrogation of national independence after a short period of self-determination demonstrated that decolonization was reversible.[37] From the late 1950s, Communist regimes sought to make these links tangible. Despite formal independence in Asia and Africa, they warned, the world was witnessing the rise of heirs to Nazi imperialism in the form of the US and the fascist successor state of West Germany.[38]

The Eastern European experience was invoked to suggest that formal independence was not enough. Progressive nations needed to support each other against a return to the principles that had undergirded Nazi Empire. A Polish party leader explained in a 1966 speech why the citizens of Warsaw could directly empathize with the situation in south-east Asia:

> Twenty-seven years ago, Nazi Germany began the creation of 'the new order'. We remember and we'll never forget what happened then … In distant and heroic Vietnam, under the bombs dropped from US planes, people are dying, people who love their country and independence. We know it well from our own history. We fully understand our Vietnamese brothers who fight for freedom and sovereignty.[39]

In the mid-1960s, Vietnamese delegations were taken to sites that had been central to the Warsaw Uprising against the Germans. The Polish press reported that wartime commemorations could "spontaneously" became demonstrations of solidarity for the Vietnamese struggle.[40]

Solidarity with the postcolonial world was important for the legitimacy of communist regimes. They employed the struggles in the decolonizing world in domestic propaganda to inspire a commitment to socialism, particularly directed at a younger generation. The turn to progressive politics provided global evidence that socialism was a growing and vibrant force—even after the experiences of Stalinism at home. The Cuban revolution, in particular, inspired a wave of support within the Eastern bloc, as it did elsewhere in the world.[41] Unlike 'Third Worldist' solidarity movements in the West, which were usually bottom-up, extra-parliamentary manifestations of a new form of postwar activist politics, their counterparts in the East of the continent were largely top-down creations aimed at directing an official vision of protest and internationalism. Public demonstrations were expected to take place only in officially supported events, such as May Day parades or World Youth festivals.[42]

Beyond such public rituals, material solidarity was most encouraged in the workplace across Eastern Europe. There, the contribution to the anti-imperial struggle occurred simply by labouring in a factory in Budapest, Belgrade, or Warsaw. This notion was made most explicit in so-called solidarity shifts, where workers would work extra hours and 'voluntarily' donate their extra wages to the Cubans, Algerians, or Vietnamese. Obligatory gestures of support could be resented.[43] Nevertheless, engagement with decolonization could, for a younger generation, imply that one was globally aware and modern. Anti-imperialism often provided a language through which they could make sense of a world of interconnectedness in ways unanticipated by their states, and could lead to authentic outbursts of political fervour—whether in support of a growing socialist world or, conversely, directed against Soviet imperialism in Eastern Europe itself.[44]

Remaking the Global Economy?

The end of European empires raised the hope for the Soviet bloc communist leadership that global systems of trade could be remade to their benefit. What would become later known as globalization was assumed in this period to have socialist content: colonial trade routes could be broken, new shipping lines and airport routes established, and new regional economic groupings could help to ensure that wealth would remain within regions that produced it.[45] The Soviets also attempted to develop trade relationships outside a capitalist world system. One of their main weapons was so-called petro-barter; that is, exchanging Soviet oil for raw materials—for sugar from Cuba, for instance. This allowed them to circumvent capitalist markets, and in fact, through offering oil at generous terms, draw countries with raw materials into a Soviet trading system.[46]

Yet the relative economic weakness of the Soviet bloc remained an unavoidable disadvantage in the competition for sympathies in the Global South. The Soviet economy was only the approximate size of France or the UK: the US was still responsible for half of world production in the 1950s.[47] From 1945 to 1989, the entire value of Soviet funds was roughly equal to that offered by the US to Israel alone.[48] Nevertheless, the importance of Eastern bloc financial support often lay in the power it provided elites in newly independent countries—who could leverage such offers to obtain greater power in their interactions with international economic institutions.[49] Yet it was clear from the outset that, if the competition for loyalty was to be fought only in material terms, the communist world would not be victorious. Anti-imperialist rhetoric often had to substitute for credits.

Soviet bloc countries also compensated for their relative weakness with a focus on supplying arms, military and intelligence training, and energy products to the Global South. As early as 1955, Czechoslovakia joined the Soviet Union in sending weapons to Nasser's Egypt.[50] By the end of the 1970s, the Soviet Union itself had dislodged the US as the largest supplier of such goods and services to the developing world.[51] Military aid was sometimes coordinated within the Warsaw Pact, as in the provision of arms to Syria after the Yom Kippur War, but was not allocated according to a master plan from Moscow.[52] Arms and training went to ideologically sympathetic countries like Mozambique and Ethiopia but, by the late Cold War, socialist countries could be as mercenary as their capitalist counterparts. Like the US, East Germany sold arms to both sides in the Iran–Iraq War.[53] The depth of reliance on east European weapons meant that, by 1989, Iraq was Poland's biggest debtor.[54]

Eastern European countries themselves were questioning the policy of supporting economic development early on in this relationship. Most Eastern bloc states were only half-heartedly committed to the initiatives of the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD), which, from the early 1960s, fought western protectionism while also seeking preferential terms of trade, foreign aid, and commodity stabilization arrangements for what contemporaries called developing countries.[55] UNCTAD's first director, Raul Prebisch, frustrated by the lack of commitment from the socialist bloc to

building a new world economy, frequently complained of 'Second World bilateralism'. East European countries were happy to lend rhetorical support for 'the democratic transformation of international economic relations' but, as one East German legal expert put it, 'decisively rejected unjustified demands for the adoption of the same obligations as those posed to former colonial powers.'[56]

Over time, 'development' in the socialist model came to resemble another variety of dependency. Some bloc countries increasingly abandoned any trade policy based on anti-imperialist solidarity, and came to view the Global South as a reservoir of raw material and mobile labour with price differentials that could be exploited to the advantage of communist Europe.[57] The Eastern European goal of instrumentalizing decolonization to their own advantage led to a gradual abandonment of ideologically charged language for a more pragmatic mode of collaboration that did not shy from crossing the Iron Curtain and co-operating with the forces of the capitalist world.[58] By the mid-1970s, détente enabled greater co-operation between enterprises of the developed socialist and capitalist states in Europe in so-called tripartite industrial projects in Africa and the Middle East.[59] At IV UNCTAD in 1976, the states of the South decided to stop differentiating ideologically between the socialist and capitalist states of the northern hemisphere; rather, it appeared, the fundamental division in the world was now between an underdeveloped 'Global South' and an industrialized 'Global North' which held onto its structural advantages in the world economy.

An Anti-Imperialist Empire?

For East European states, the encounter with the decolonizing and postcolonial world held perils, too. The blind spots of race, the radicalism of its own youth, and the challenge of Chinese communism created environments in which the language of empire could be turned around to attack those in the bloc who claimed themselves to be the greatest 'anti-imperialists'.

Issues of race, it was claimed, had been overcome in the socialist system. Racial science was a phenomenon of a now-discredited Nazi era. Civilizational racism based on the idea of the superiority of civilizations over one another was to be rejected, too. Eastern European Communists, for the most part, did not reject the idea of race outright, however. Rather, they emphasized equality between different peoples still acknowledged as physiologically distinct.[60] In alliance with newly independent Caribbean and African countries, Eastern bloc states pushed the issues of racism and rights on the agenda of international institutions as a means of discrediting their geopolitical rivals. The Soviet Union and its allies used the drafting process of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination to condemn Western states in the mid-1960s; most supported the UN Convention on Racial Discrimination (1966); and the Soviet Union (with Guinea) were the initial sponsors of the convention to deal with the suppression and punishment of apartheid, which was passed in 1973.[61] Although some postcolonial states in the UN welcomed the support from the Soviet bloc, others condemned it as cynicism and hypocrisy contrary to the rejection in the final communiqué of the Bandung Declaration of 'colonialism in all its manifestations.'[62]

For many people of colour who visited the region, the Eastern bloc was not as racially enlightened as it claimed. Although acts of racialized violence directed at foreign students who attended Moscow's People's Friendship/ Lumumba University appear to have been infrequent, the authorities repeatedly failed to deal with the racist incidents that did occur. They viewed such outbursts as aberrant manifestations of un-socialist behaviour or the legacies of older mentalities, rather than endemic social problems.[63] Real racism, in their view, always existed outside the socialist world: in the treatment of African-Americans in US cities, the violence meted out by French and British colonial forces, or in apartheid South Africa.[64]

By the 1980s, the language of 'racism is elsewhere' had become a rhetorical device that ordinary people could wield against the authorities: do something about the excessive numbers of students or labour migrants from the South, or their unfamiliar and threatening behaviour, some socialist citizens warned, lest western-style racism enter the socialist world.[65] Privileged access to consumer goods, both real and perceived, at a time of scarcity, helped fuel a sense of (sometimes racialized) resentment among local populations.[66] As popular support for the Third World declined, acts of open

discrimination and violence against students and labour migrants from the South increased markedly.[67]

Incomers experienced the limits of Eastern bloc support in others ways, too. Accustomed to the intensity of debate and sense of freedom that had accompanied political independence, many African students came to associate Soviet-style socialism with the ossification of political expression. In 1963, for instance, between 350 and 500 African students fled Bulgaria. They experienced the East European communist rejection of pan-Africanism and the strict oversight of national student organizations as politically suffocating.[68] For others, the Soviet project was too similar to the western one: both sought to subjugate Africa and Asia. As one Nigerian student studying in Moscow put it: 'Africans did not wish to replace western imperialism with eastern imperialism, no matter how well camouflaged it might be with seeming sympathy for African nationalism.'[69] For some, the Soviet Union was not so much a communist state as another imperialist white country.

At moments, East European youth themselves departed from the state-directed script of internationalism. They adopted the anti-imperialist language of the regime, but went beyond it, accusing the Eastern bloc support of being insufficiently radical, or regimes of betraying their internationalist revolutionary principles at home.[70] Yugoslav youth protest was particularly striking for its preparedness to go beyond the state's encouragement to peaceful solidarity in the workplace. There was a tradition of aggressive public anti-imperialist protest which stretched back to February 1961, when an official rally of 150,000 people on Belgrade's Marx-Engels Square developed into an aggressive mob which threatened violence in front of the embassies and libraries of Western countries in response to the execution of Congolese leader Patrice Lumumba. Eventually, they succeeded in breaking through the police line in front of the Belgian embassy, burning cars and wrecking the building.[71] Violence directed against American institutions in Yugoslavia erupted following the Bay of Pigs incident and later the Cuban Missile Crisis and, in December 1966, in response to the intensification of bombing in Vietnam.[72]

A pointed challenge to the official transcript of Eastern European anti-imperialism came from Mao's China. Until the Sino-Soviet split of 1960, the addition of China, the world's most populous country, to the family of socialist nations was used to inspire Eastern European citizens to view themselves as part of an ambitious new postwar global project.[73] After the split, however, identification with China was disruptive to East European governments. In the GDR, for instance, the growing numbers of young people visiting the Chinese embassy and publicly expressing allegiance to Mao's model of violent struggle led the regime to ban admission to the building and proceed aggressively against student groups.[74]

The Soviet language of anti-imperialism always threatened to boomerang. From the Chinese perspective, Europe was a continent occupied and divided between the imperial powers of the US and the USSR. In 1969, the Chinese daily wrote that the relationship between the Soviet Union and its satellite nations was 'nothing more than the

relationship between the oppressive and enslaving ruling country and its colonies and states.'[75] In Maoist rhetoric, the redefinition of empire was turned back on the Soviet Union. If the US exercise of powers beyond its borders without formal annexation could be considered 'imperialism,' then why couldn't the Soviet Union be held to the same standard? China used the same charge against Yugoslavia, seeking (with little success) to question the legitimacy of a Non-Aligned Movement that included a white European power in favour of a 'second Bandung' without Soviet bloc or Yugoslav participation.[76] Despite their best efforts, with the notable exception of Albania, the Chinese largely failed in their attempts to persuade Eastern European elites of the superiority of their standpoint over that of Moscow.[77] The benefits of selective cooperation with the Soviet bloc were simply too great to swear off in the name of an exclusionary 'Afro-Asian solidarity.'

Those seeking to throw off Soviet control from within Eastern Europe, however, adapted a new anti-imperialist language to their own struggle. The 1956 Hungarian Uprising marked a crucial moment. For the re-established Hungarian socialist regime who suppressed the revolt, their 'victory' had been waged against western imperialists, in league with domestic 'counter-revolutionaries', who sought to spread a reactionary capitalism back into Eastern Europe. This placed them in natural solidarity with Algerians fighting the French state, or the Cubans struggling against American imperialism.[78] Much of the western world drew the opposite conclusion. For western politicians, particularly those on the right, the real imperialism of the postwar period was to be found in Eastern Europe. As Britain came under fire during the Suez Crisis for maintaining its colonial ambitions, Prime Minister Anthony Eden noted defensively that such accusations would be better directed against the Soviet Union—the fastest growing imperial power since World War II in terms of territory gained, he noted.[79] Postcolonial observers were more judicious in their criticism, noting a melancholy symmetry in the two acts. Nehru called both invasions revivals of 'old colonial methods, which we had thought, in our ignorance, belonged to a more unenlightened age.'[80] African-Americans and opponents of apartheid in South Africa argued that the western world's enthusiastic support for the Hungarian Uprising relied on the whiteness of its protagonists—their own struggles for racial justice, by contrast, were not in the 1950s yet capable of eliciting such a level of commitment.[81] Around 1960, the Year of Africa, critics of Soviet rule from the region itself increasingly fashioned their anti-Communist rhetoric in anti-imperialist language: if African nations were now granted their independence, how long would Eastern Europe have to wait?[82]

By the 1970s, Eastern European states' support for the rights to sovereignty and racial justice for Afro-Asian countries at international institutions rebounded back into their own sphere: the UN-supported Human Rights Year (1968) helped spark off some of the first manifestations of Soviet dissidence; some of the rights to freedom of expression and religion they had supported in the 1960s were taken up by the drafters of the Helsinki Accords in the 1970s.[83] Designed to decrease tensions in Europe, the 1975 agreement

forced Eastern bloc countries over time to provide a greater room for political expression, and offered a vital legal framework for nurturing the dissident movements which heralded the end of state socialism in the region.

East European communist regimes may have used links to the postcolonial world of the Global South to strengthen their own legitimacy, but alternative political imaginaries, whether around anti-imperialism, rights or cultural revolution, always carried the potential of eroding the legitimacy of regimes from the inside.

Communism and Colonialism: Analogy or Entanglement?

One of the most enduring descriptions of the Soviet Union came when US president Ronald Reagan labelled it an 'evil empire' in a speech to the National Association of Evangelicals in Orlando, Florida in 1983. In the Cold War years, the political—often anti-communist—charge of labelling the Soviet Union an empire deterred many scholars from using the term analytically.[84] As the political stigma faded after the end of the Cold War, however, a number of works have begun to understand the USSR in precisely this framework.[85] Some scholars have examined the dissolution of the Soviet bloc as an 'end of empire' story, suggesting parallels to other land-based Eastern European empires, including the Habsburg and Ottoman empires, as contiguous, multinational empires with forms of universalist legitimation challenged, and eventually superseded, by nationalisms over time.[86] Others place Moscow at the centre of three quasi-imperial concentric formations: from the multinational territory of the Soviet Union to the adjacent East European 'satellites' and 'client states' in the Global South beyond.[87]

As the moniker of empire has become less charged, so too has the description of the populations of the former Soviet bloc as 'postcolonial.' In the years around the new millennium, some scholars, mostly from literary studies and cultural anthropology, boldly claimed an analogy between the postcolonial and postcommunist condition in both East European satellite states and former Soviet republics.[88] The analogy captured the self-understanding (often described as 'liminal') of East European intellectuals after the fall of the Berlin Wall.[89] At the same time, the analogy threatened to reduce postcolonialism to a mobile framework applicable to any and all Self/Other relationships, disconnected from any specific histories of racialization or formal empire.[90] Lost in this chain of re-appropriation was a sense of historical periodicity. In a master framework drafted to understand Eastern Europe as 'colonized' before the 1990s and '"postcolonial' afterward, where is the place for intellectuals from Angola and South Africa who spent time in Warsaw, East Berlin, and Sofia in the 1970s and 1980s? What about the Mozambican, Cuban, or Vietnamese guest workers treated as racialized 'Others' both before and after the end of Soviet empire in East Europe?[91] What about the well-established academic discipline of 'orientalism' in Communist countries?[92] Should this be understood as a

relationship between colonial societies? At the global scale, Eastern Europe's membership (however vexed at different times) in the camp of the 'white West' deserves to remain central in scholarly categories of analysis.[93]

Perhaps it is advisable to think more in terms of entanglement than analogy. Rather than postcolonial East European studies, we could study Cold War *histoires croisées*. Some scholars have already demonstrated how European Communist nations were points of reference, places of education, and ports of exile for people of colour coming from more conventional colonial and postcolonial contexts.[94] Both the Iron Curtain and the borders of the Black Atlantic were more porous than often assumed, offering contact zones for interconnection between the Eastern Bloc and the Global South.[95]

We can demonstrate another example of such an entangled history in the close succession of the dissolution of the Soviet Bloc and of South African apartheid. Opposition groups in South Africa had long cultivated ties to the socialist East. The Soviet Bloc was hosting South African dissidents as early as 1951, when, for example, Ahmad Kathrada travelled to the World Youth Festival in Berlin at the expense of the World Federation of Democratic Youth.[96] Some eastern bloc states brought the UN-sponsored International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the anniversary of the Sharpeville massacre (21 March) into their own domestic commemorative calendars in the 1960s.[97] Between 1963 and 1991, the Soviets provided substantial humanitarian and military support to the ANC, and military training to over 2000 activists, and political and specialist education to many more, including future South African president Thabo Mbeki.[98] In the 1970s and 1980s, the ANC was the most important overseas partner for training by the East German Stasi.[99] Nevertheless, the Soviet financial contribution to the ANC remained limited; Scandinavian countries alone provided more in the 1970s.[100]

The official support for the anti-apartheid struggle made it difficult for Eastern European dissidents to make it a cause of their own. Although some in Poland's Solidarity movement had recognized similarities in the parallel struggle of trade union movements against illegitimate power, the support of Warsaw's Communists for the ANC, and of some Polish exile organizations for the apartheid state, made such identifications difficult to develop.[101] Nor could the ANC, which had not opposed 'Soviet imperialism' in Hungary in 1956 or Czechoslovakia in 1968, find common cause with the Eastern European anti-regime opposition. This was left to more moderate groups such as Federation of South African Trade Unions' which looked to Solidarity in Poland, or to writers interested in Eastern European traditions of literary resistance against state power.[102]

The weakening of the Soviet Union allowed parallel processes of decolonization to occur from 1989. One was in eastern Europe, where democracy began to function with open elections in Poland in June of that year, reforms toward multi-party democracy Hungary in October, and, eventually, the street demonstrations in Leipzig and Berlin that culminated in the fall of the Berlin Wall in November. The second was in southern Africa. Rapprochement between the West and the Soviets led to a treaty which withdrew Cuban troops from Angola, and the South African army from what would become the

independent state of Namibia.[103] The collapse of the Soviet Union slowly undermined the apartheid regime's 'red terror' propaganda, weakened the hand of the radicals in the anti-apartheid opposition, and softened fears that black suffrage would usher in a Moscow-directed Communist dictatorship. [104] Hence, it helped erode the Manichean opposition that had sustained both apartheid and anti-apartheid in the late Cold War, opening up the possibility for compromise and an end to the last struggle of decolonization in Africa. The execution of Romanian leader Nicolae Ceaușescu, who had been developing relationships with leaders across southern Africa, was received as an important warning against the excessive concentration of political power.[105]

It was only after the collapse of state socialism that oppositional movements recognized deeper affinities with each other.[106] By the early 1990s, the ANC, who had abandoned the armed struggle in favour of negotiation, looked to the peaceful settlement in Eastern Europe for inspiration through what contemporaries termed the 'Leipzig option'.[107] In 1992, a South African communist periodical wrote that 'comrades have been invoking the 1989 examples from Eastern Europe of massive and ongoing city centre demonstrations (in Leipzig, Prague, and elsewhere) which acted as the engine for the rapid demise of regimes.'[108] The political turn in countries which had once provided refuge for ANC and SACP exiles now gave a boost to forces across southern Africa who argued for marketization and political pluralism, continuing processes that had already begun in countries such as Mozambique and Zambia before 1989. This discovery helped many radical movements—from SWAPO to the South African Communist Party (SACP)—to appreciate that the world was turning towards multi-party politics and market economy.[109] As one scholar has noted, one might find an evocative date for both the end of apartheid and the Cold War—not with the release of Nelson Mandela in 1990, but rather with the assassination of the head of the SACP Chris Hani in 1993 by a far-right anti-Communist who had immigrated to South Africa from Poland in 1981.[110] The definitive end of empire also meant the death of the communist alternative.

Conclusion

It is easy to imagine Eastern Europe playing a starring role in a global account of modern decolonization. It was the first site of decolonization in the twentieth century. Its experience of Nazi and Soviet occupation in World War II and its aftermath demonstrated that the end of empire and national sovereignty was reversible—a story echoed in the experiences of Latin America and Western Europe, and in that sense illustrative of a global dynamic more common than a simple shift from outright colony to postcolonial nation. The end of Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe could be understood as the finale to the century's grand process of imperial disintegration.

In the 1960s, a range of critical voices in Eastern Europe did note the parallels between the struggle to end Soviet Empire and decolonization across the world. Yet the consciousness of these connections had all but disappeared by the 1980s. Anti-imperialism had become too closely associated with regime rhetoric. Moreover, postcolonial movements' attempts to shake off Eurocentrism had little purchase for oppositional movements in the Eastern bloc who sought to escape their region's own subservient geopolitical status through a 'return to Europe'. Dissident intellectuals from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, in an act of cultural decolonization, coined the term 'Central Europe' to describe a zone distinct from the imperial Soviet centre—an act that forced Soviet intellectuals to admit to the fact that they represented an imperial power, a concept that was absent from their discourse.[111] Critical movements under Soviet influence understood themselves, for the most part, as part of *national* or *regional* struggles for sovereignty. Mainstream voices in Polish Solidarity, for instance, presented the trade union movement as part of a national tradition of resistance against centuries-old invaders, whether Prussian, Austrian, German, Russian, or Soviet.

Moreover, the transformation in both Eastern Europe and Southern Africa were much more commonly narrated in the categories of economic transition and democratization—rather than anti-imperialism and the end of empire. The idea of a third wave of democratization—made famous by political scientist Samuel Huntington—has swamped a language of decolonization.[112]. One scholar has argued that the 'Manichean perspective' of the Cold War beclouded the diverse visions for the future that had circulated in the decolonizing world.[113] The lauded 'end of history' may have been even more constricting as the shared horizon of free market capitalism became the sole form of political imagination in an era after empire.

Notes:

(1) For recent attempts to "draw the periodization of both decolonization and the Cold War backward" before the Second World War, see Leslie James and Elisabeth Leake,

"Introduction", in Leslie James and Elisabeth Leake, eds., *Decolonization and the Cold War: Negotiating Independence* (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), 8; Joshua A. Sanborn, *Imperial apocalypse: The Great War and the destruction of the Russian empire* (Oxford: OUP, 2014), 3–7.

([2]) Stuart Ward, "The European Provenance of Decolonization," *Past and Present* 230 (2016): 237–240.

([3]) James Mark and Péter Apor, "Socialism Goes Global: Decolonization and the making of a new culture of internationalism in socialist Hungary 1956–1989," *Journal of Modern History* 87 (2015): 853.

([4]) Jeffrey James Byrne, "Beyond Continents, Colours, and the Cold War: Yugoslavia, Algeria, and the Struggle for Non-Alignment," *The International History Review* 37, no. 6 (2015): 923–927; Jeremy Friedman, *Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015), 56, 217–218.

([5]) See Susan Pedersen's contribution to this volume.

([6]) Jan Christian Smuts, *The League of Nations: A Practical Suggestion* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1918), esp. 10–13. For Smuts, Eastern Europe consisted of 'embryo states and derelict territories' and leaders who were 'untrained … deficient in power'.

([7]) Adam Tooze, *The Deluge: The Great War, America and the Remaking of the Global Order, 1916-1931* (New York: Allen Lane, 2015), 555–556.

([8]) Jamie Martin, "The Colonial Origins of the Greek Bailout," *Exeter Imperial and Global History Blog* (July 2015), accessed at: http://imperialglobalexeter.com/2015/07/27/the-colonial-origins-of-the-greek-bailout/.

([9]) Tooze, *The Deluge*, 555. For a more sympathetic account of Smuts' role in reconstruction in Eastern Europe and the Middle East after the First and Second World Wars, see Saul Dubow, "Smuts, the United Nations and the Rhetoric of Race and Rights," *Journal of Contemporary History* 43, no. 1 (2008): 52–53.

([10]) Susan Pedersen, *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire* (Oxford: OUP, 2015), 343–345.

([11]) Jan Havlasa, *České kolonie zámořské* (Prague, 1919); Rudolf Cicvárek, *Asijské problémy a naše vystěhovalectví* (Prague, 1927); Piotr Rypson, 'Polish Public Opinion on the Italo—Abyssinian War' (forthcoming).

([12]) "National Mythology, Suitcase Trade, and Blank Spaces. Janek Simon Talks to Michał Woliński," *Piktogram* 13 (2009), 50.

([13]) Piotr Rypson, "Polish Public Opinion. 'Alo! Alo! … Ovde Abisinija!'", *Radio Beograd*, 8 October 1935.

(¹⁴) On African American radical Cyril Briggs, see Minkah Makalani, *In the Cause of Freedom: Radical Black Internationalism from Harlem to London, 1917–1939* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011), 38. George Padmore, "Czechoslovakia: A New Abyssinia" in *The People (Trinidad)*, 15 October 1938. Thanks to Leslie James for this point. European struggles. Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Unity of India: Collected Writings 1937–40* (London: Lindsay Drummond, 1948), 273–274.

(¹⁵) Moritz Bonn, "The Age of Counter-Colonisation," *International Affairs* 13, no. 6 (1934): 846.

(¹⁶) Joseph LeRoy Love, *Crafting the Third World: Theorizing Underdevelopment in Rumania and Brazil* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996); Manuela Boatca, *From Neoevolutionism to World-Systems Analysis: The Romanian Theory of "Forms without Substance" in Light of Modern Debates on Social Change* (Opladen: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2003).

(¹⁷) J. F. J. Toye and Richard Toye, *The UN and Global Political Economy: Trade, Finance, and Development* (Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press, 2004), 54–56.

(¹⁸) P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan, "The International Development of Economically Backward Areas," *International Affairs*, 20/, no. 2 (April 1944): 164.

(¹⁹) Christopher Andrew, *The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World—Newly Revealed Secrets from the Mitrokhin Archive* (New York: Basic Books, 2005).

(²⁰) Vojtech Mastny, "The Soviet Union's Partnership with India," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 12, no. 3 (2010): 53.

(²¹) Quoted in Alfred B. Evans, *Soviet Marxism-Leninism: The Decline of an Ideology* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993), 73.

(²²) David C. Engerman, "Learning from the East: Soviet Experts and India in the Era of Competitive Coexistence," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 33, no. 2 (2013): 232.

(²³) Mark Philip Bradley, "Decolonization, the Global South, and the Cold War, 1919–1962," in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, eds., *The Cambridge History of the Cold War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 475.

(²⁴) Gareth M. Winrow, *The Foreign Policy of the GDR in Africa* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 210; Oscar Sanchez-Sibony, *Red Globalization: The Political Economy of the Soviet Cold War from Stalin to Khrushchev* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 128.

(²⁵) Winrow, *Foreign Policy of the GDR*, 208.

(^{26}) Massimiliano Trentin, "Modernization as State Building: The Two Germanies in Syria, 1963–1972," *Diplomatic History* 33, no. 3 (2009): 502; William Glenn Gray, *Germany's Cold War: The Global Campaign to Isolate East Germany, 1949–1969* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2003).

(^{27}) Elidor Mëhilli, "Defying De-Stalinization: Albania's 1956," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 13, no. 4 (2011): 4–56.

(^{28}) See Robert Niebuhr, "Nonalignment as Yugoslavia's Answer to Bloc Politics," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 13, no. 1 (2011): 146–179; Robert B. Rakove, *Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

(^{29}) Tvrtko Jakovina, *Treća strana hladnog rata* [The Third Side of the Cold War] (Zagreb: Fraktura, 2011); Hrvoje Klasić, *Jugoslavija i svijet 1968* (Zagreb: Naklada Ljevak, 2012).

(^{30}) Itty Abraham, "Prolegomena to Non-Alignment: Race and the International System," in Nataša Mišković, Harald Fischer-Tiné, and Nada Boškovska Leimgruber, eds., *The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War: Delhi, Bandung, Belgrade* (New York: Routledge, 2014), 77.

(^{31}) Jeremy Friedman, "Soviet Policy in the Developing World and the Chinese Challenge in the 1960s," *Cold War History* 10, no. 2 (2010): 253–254.

(^{32}) Young-Sun Hong, *Cold War Germany, the Third World, and the Global Humanitarian Regime* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 235. The Hungarian "Center for Afro-Asian Research" was part of the national Academy of Sciences. The Zagreb-based "Africa Research Institute" became "The Institute for Developing Countries" in 1971.

(^{33}) Daniela Hannova, "Arab Students inside the Soviet Bloc: A Case Study on Czechoslovakia During the 1950s and 60s," *European Scientific Journal* 2 (2014): 373. Across the socialist East of Europe, students from newly decolonized countries came to receive technical training at local universities, institutes, and factories.

(^{34}) Hong, *Cold War Germany*, chapters 2 and 9. Łukasz Stanek, "Accra, Warsaw, and Socialist Globalization," in B. Albrecht, ed., *Africa. Big Change, Big Chance* (Bologna: Editrice Compositori, 2014), 162–164; Vladimir Kulić, "Building the Non-Aligned Babel: Babylon Hotel in Baghdad and Mobile Design in the Global Cold War," *ABE Journal* 6 (2014).

(^{35}) Christina Schwenkel, "Traveling Architecture: East German Urban Designs Abroad," *International Journal for History, Culture and Modernity* 2, no. 2 (2014): 155–174.

(^{36}) Łukasz Stanek, "Miastoprojekt goes abroad: the transfer of architectural labour from socialist Poland to Iraq (1958–1989)," *The Journal of Architecture* 17, no. 3 (2012), 384. This position conveniently set aside the colonial aspects of the Polish presence in Belarus and Ukraine, and the interwar fantasies of overseas colonies of some business leaders.

(³⁷) See Andreas Eckert covering "Nazi empire" in this volume.

(³⁸) See, e.g., Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, *The Neo-Colonialism of the West German Federal Republic* (n.p., 1965).

(³⁹) Nigdywięcejwrześnia 1939 r. [Never again September 1939], *Trybuna Ludu* (2 September 1966).

(⁴⁰) James Mark, Péter Apor, Radina Vučetić, and Piotr Osęka, "'We are with You, Vietnam': Transnational Solidarities in Socialist Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia," *Journal of Contemporary History* 50, no. 3 (2015): 445–446.

(⁴¹) Anne Gorsuch, "'Cuba, My Love': The Romance of Revolutionary Cuba in the Soviet Sixties," *American Historical Review* 120 (2015): 462–496; Tobias Rupprecht, *Soviet Internationalism after Stalin. Encounters between the USSR and Latin America during the Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), chapter 2; Mark and Apor, "Socialism Goes Global," 857–859; Jennifer Ruth Hosek, *Sun, Sex and Socialism: Cuba in the German Imaginary* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012), chapter 2.

(⁴²) See Nick Rutter, "Look Left, Drive Right: Internationalisms at the 1968 World Youth Festival," in Anne E. Gorsuch and Diane Koenker, eds., *The Socialist Sixties: Crossing Borders in the Second World* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013). Interpersonal relations frequently escaped these bounds. Hong, *Cold War Germany*, 52.

(⁴³) See Gerd Horten, "Sailing in the Shadow of the Vietnam War: The GDR Government and the 'Vietnam Bonus' of the Early 1970s," *German Studies Review* 36, no. 3 (2013): 557–578; Toni Weis, "The Politics Machine: On the Concept of 'Solidarity' in East German Support for Swapo," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 37, no. 2 (2011): 351–367.

(⁴⁴) See Christina Schwenkel, "Affective Solidarities and East German Reconstruction of Postwar Vietnam," in Quinn Slobodian, ed., *Comrades of Color: East Germany in the Cold War World* (New York: Berghahn, 2015), 267–292.

(⁴⁵) Johanna Bockman, "Socialist Globalization and Capitalist Neocolonialism: The Economic Ideas behind the NIEO," *Humanity* 6, no. 1 (2015): 109–128.

(⁴⁶) By the early 1970s, the Soviet Union was the world's largest oil producer. Douglas Rogers, "Petrobarter, Oil, Inequality, and the Political Imagination in and after the Cold War," *Current Anthropology* 55, no. 2 (2014): 136.

(⁴⁷) Sanchez-Sibony, *Red Globalization*, 134.

(⁴⁸) Sanchez-Sibony, 138.

(⁴⁹) Jude Howell, "The End of an Era: The Rise and Fall of GDR Aid," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 32, no. 2 (1994): 328.

(50) Klaus Storkmann, *Geheime Solidarität: Militärbeziehungen und Militärhilfen der DDR in die "Dritte Welt"* (Berlin: Christoph Links, 2012), 162.

(51) Mark Kramer, "The Decline in Soviet Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1986–1991," in Artemy Kalinovsky and Sergey Radchenko, eds., *The End of the Cold War and The Third World: New Perspectives on Regional Conflict* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), 56–57.

(52) Storkmann, *Geheime Solidarität*, 170.

(53) Storkmann, 579.

(54) Storkmann, 592.

(55) Robert E. Hudec, *Developing Countries in the GATT/WTO Legal System* (London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007), 59.

(56) Dietrich Schulz, "Aktuelle Fragen des Völkerrechts," *Neue Zeit*, 14 March 1984.

(57) Engerman, "Learning from the East," 234. Lorenzini, "Comecon," 187–188. Alena K. Alamgir and Christina Schwenkel, 'Between Internationalism and International Relations: Labour Mobility in the Socialist World', in James Mark, Artemy Kalinovsky and Steffi Marung, ed., Alternative Globalizations: Eastern Europe and the Postcolonial World (forthcoming). Excepting Romania and Yugoslavia, Eastern European socialist states did not commit themselves to supporting the "New International Economic Order" in the 1970s.

(58) Sanchez-Sibony, *Red Globalization*, 127. Jude Howell, "The End of an Era," 308.

(59) Sara Lorenzini, "Comecon and the South in the years of détente: a study on East–South economic relations," *European Review of History* 21, no. 2 (2014): 191–193.

(60) Quinn Slobodian, "Socialist Chromatism: Race, Racism and the Racial Rainbow in East Germany," in *Comrades of Color*, 23–39.

(61) Roland Burke, *Decolonization and the Evolution of International Human Rights* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 71; Steven L. B. Jensen, *The Making of International Human Rights. The 1960s, Decolonization, and the Reconstruction of Global Values* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), especially chapters 4 and 5.

(62) Itty Abraham, "From Bandung to NAM: Non-Alignment and Indian Foreign Policy, 1947-1965," *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 45 (2008): 206.

(63) On African students, see Julie Hessler, "Death of an African Student in Moscow: Race, Politics, and the Cold War," *Cahiers du monde russe* 47, no. 1–2 (2006): 33–63. On Latin American students, see Rupprecht, *Soviet Internationalism*, 284–287.

(^{64}) Ian Law, *Red Racisms: Racism in Communist and Post-Communist Contexts* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 39.

(^{65}) Alena G. Alamgir, "Race is elsewhere: state-socialist ideology and the racialization of Vietnamese workers in Czechoslovakia," *Race & Class* 54, no. 4 (2013), 73–74.

(^{66}) Zatlin, "Scarcity and Resentment," 697.

(^{67}) Maxim Matusevich, "Probing the Limits of Internationalism: African Students Confront Soviet Ritual," *Anthropology of East Europe Review* 27, no. 2 (2009): 28–30; Maxim Matusevich, "Testing the Limits of Soviet Internationalism. African Students in the Soviet Union," in Philip E. Muehlenbeck, ed., *Race, Ethnicity and the Cold War* (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2012), 155–159; Weis, "The Politics Machine," 366. On skinhead attacks on Cubans in Hungary, see James Mark and Bálint Tolmár, "Encountering Cuba in Socialist Hungary," (forthcoming).

(^{68}) Quinn Slobodian, "Bandung in Divided Germany: Managing Non-Aligned Politics in East and West, 1955–63," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 41, no. 4 (2013): 654.

(^{69}) Abigail Judge Kret, "'We Unite with Knowledge': The Peoples' Friendship University and Soviet Education for the Third World," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 33, no. 2 (2013): 248.

(^{70}) Mark et al., "'We are with You, Vietnam'": 453–461.

(^{71}) P. J. Marković, "Najava bure: studentski nemiri u svetu i Jugoslaviji od Drugog svetskog rata do početka šezdesetih godina," *Tokovi istorije* 3–4 (2000): 59.

(^{72}) Mark et al., "'We are with You, Vietnam'": 455–456.

(^{73}) David G. Tompkins, "The East is Red? Images of China in East Germany and Poland through the Sino-Soviet Split," *Zeitschrift für Ostmitteleuropa-Forschung* 62, no. 3 (2013): 393–424.

(^{74}) Quinn Slobodian, "The Maoist Enemy: China's Challenge in 1960s East Germany," *Journal of Contemporary History* 51, no.3 (2015): 635–659.

(^{75}) Institut für internationale Beziehungen. Abt. Sozialistische Staaten. Die Entwicklung der Beziehungen zwischen der VR China und der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik von 1949 bis 1971. N.d. DY 30-IV A 2/20/1013.

(^{76}) Jovan Cavoski, "Between Great Powers and Third World Neutralists: Yugoslavia and the Belgrade Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement, 1961," in *The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War*, 197. See also Mark T. Berger, "After the Third World? History, Destiny and the Fate of Third Worldism," *Third World Quarterly* 25, no. 1 (2004): 14.

(⁷⁷) See Lorenz M. Lüthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), chapter 5; Elidor Mëhilli, "Mao and the Albanians," and Domnique Kirchner Reill, "Partisan Legacies and Anti-Imperialist Ambitions: The Little Red Book in Italy and Yugoslavia," in Alexander C. Cook, ed., *Mao's Little Red Book: A Global History* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

(⁷⁸) See this interpretation in the so-called White Books, which were used to propagate the idea that the revolt of October 1956 was the expression of international counter-revolution in schools and in public life: *Nagy Imre és Bűntársai Ellenforradalmi Összeesküvése* [The Counter-Revolutionary Conspiracy of Imre Nagy and His Fellow Criminals] (Budapest: A Magyar Népköztársaság Minisztertanácsa Tájékoztatási Hivatala, 1958), chapter 8.

(⁷⁹) Martin Thomas and Richard Toye, *Arguing about Empire: Imperial Rhetoric in France and Britain 1882–1956* (Oxford, forthcoming), chapter 6.

(⁸⁰) Quoted in Nataša Mišković, "Between Idealism and Pragmatism: Tito, Nehru and the Hungarian Crisis, 1956," in *The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War*, 125.

(⁸¹) Rachel A. Wonder, "From Cotton Curtain to Iron Curtain. Black Americans' reaction to the Hungarian Crisis of 1956 and 1957," (University of Montana MA thesis, 1997), 102; "Hungary and South Africa," *Africa South* 1, no. 3 (1957): 3–5.

(⁸²) Mate Nikola Tokić, "The End of 'Historical-Ideological Bedazzlement' Cold War Politics and Émigré Croatian Separatist Violence, 1950–1980," *Social Science History* 36, no. 3 (2012): 421–445.

(⁸³) Jensen, *International Human Rights*, 217–218, 219, 280.

(⁸⁴) Alexander J. Motyl, *Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 3.

(⁸⁵) See, e.g., Francine Hirsch, *Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet Union* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005). Terry Martin, "An Affirmative Action Empire: The Soviet Union as the Highest Form of Imperialism," in Ronald Grigor Suny and Terry Martin, eds., *A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). V. M. Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007).

(⁸⁶) Robert W. Strayer, "Decolonization, Democratization, and Communist Reform: The Soviet Collapse in Comparative Perspective," *Journal of World History* 12, no. 2 (2001): 376–77.

(⁸⁷) Sharad Chari and Katherine Verdery, "Thinking between the Posts: Postcolonialism, Postsocialism, and Ethnography after the Cold War," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 51, no. 1 (2009): 16.

(⁸⁸) See, e.g., Sibelan E. S. Forrester, Magdalena J. Zaborowska, and Elena Gapova, "Introduction: Mapping Postsocialist Cultural Studies," in Sibelan E. S. Forrester, Magdalena J. Zaborowska, and Elena Gapova, eds., *Over the Wall/after the Fall: Post-Communist Cultures through an East-West Gaze* (Bloomington; Indiana University Press, 2004), 10; Violeta Kelertas, ed., *Baltic Postcolonialism* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2006); Steven Tötösy De Zepetnek, "Configurations of Postcoloniality and National Identity: Inbetween Peripherality and Narratives of Change," *The Comparatist* 23 (1999): 89. On the region as "doubly postcolonial"—the object of both Soviet imperialism and Western "peripheralizing capitalism"—see Dorota Kołodziejczyk and Cristina Şandru, "Introduction: On colonialism, communism and east-central Europe—some reflections," *Journal of Postcolonial Writing* 48, no. 2 (2012): 115.

(⁸⁹) Clare Cavanagh, "Postcolonial Poland," *Common Knowledge* 10, no. 2 (2004): 84–92; David Chioni Moore, "Is the Post in Postcolonial the Post in PostSoviet? Toward a Global Postcolonial Critique," *PMLA* 116, no. 1 (2001): 118–124.

(⁹⁰) See, e.g., Michał Buchowski, "The Specter of Orientalism in Europe: From Exotic Other to Stigmatized Brother," *Anthropological Quarterly* 79, no. 3 (2006): 466.

(⁹¹) On the racialization of Vietnamese labour migrants in Czechoslovakia, see Alamgir, "Race is elsewhere". In 1983, over 7,000 Cubans were participating in training programs in the GDR, and an additional 4,000 in Czechoslovakia. The USSR also accepted workers from Cuba. See Perez-Lopez and Diaz-Briquets, *Labor Migration*, 283. On the sexualization and racialization of female labour migrants in Hungary, see Mark and Tolmár, *Encountering Cuba* (forthcoming).

(⁹²) See Michael Kemper and Artemy M. Kalinovsky, eds. *Reassessing Orientalism: Interlocking Orientologies During the Cold War* (London: Routledge, 2015).

(⁹³) For influential challenges to this notion, see Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Larry Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994).

(⁹⁴) See, e.g., Matusevich, "Probing the Limits of Internationalism," 19–39; Monica Popescu, "On the Margins of the Black Atlantic: Angola, the Eastern Bloc, and the Cold War," *Research in African Literatures* 45, no. 3 (2014): 91–109; Simon Stevens, "Bloke Modisane in East Germany," in *Comrades of Color*, 121–130.

(⁹⁵) Cedric Tolliver, "Alternative Solidarities," *Journal of Postcolonial Writing* 50, no. 4 (2014): 380; Michael David-Fox, "The Iron Curtain as Semipermeable Membrane: Origins and Demise of the Stalinist Superiority Complex," in Patryk Babiracki and Kenyon Zimmer, eds., *Cold War Crossings: International Travel and Exchange across the Soviet Bloc, 1940s-1960s* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2014): 18.

(^{96}) Nick Rutter, "The Western Wall: The Iron Curtain Recast in Midsummer 1951," in *Cold War Crossings*, 91.

(^{97}) Report of the UN Secretary-General, "Implementation of the UN Declaration on the elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination," 30 August 1967, 34.

(^{98}) Irina Filatova and Apollon Davidson, *The Hidden Thread: Russia and South Africa in the Soviet Era* (New York: Jonathan Ball, 2013), 308, 323. For a rather uncritical analysis from an insider, see Vladimir Shubin and Marina Traikova, "There is no threat from the eastern Bloc," in *The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Vol. 3. International Solidarity* (Los Angeles: Unisa Press, 2008), 1059–1060.

(^{99}) Storkmann, *Geheime Solidarität*, 568.

(^{100}) Filatova and Davidson, *Hidden Thread*, 343–344; Tor Sellström, *Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa, Volume II: Solidarity and Assistance 1970–1994* (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2002), 36.

(^{101}) Christiaens and Goddeeris, "Entangled Solidarities?"

(^{102}) Monica Popescu, *South African Literature Beyond the Cold War* (New York: Palgrave, 2010), 12.

(^{103}) Fabian Klose, "Decolonization and Revolution," *European History Online*. http://ieg-ego.eu/en/threads/europe-and-the-world/european-overseas-rule/fabian-klose-decolonization-and-revolution#InsertNoteID_89_marker90.

(^{104}) Chris Saunders, "The Ending of the Cold War and Southern Africa," in *The End of the Cold War and the Third World*, 270; Rob Nixon, "The Collapse of the Communist-Anticommunist Condominium: The Repercussions for South Africa," *Social Text* 31, no. 32 (1992): 235–251. Even the reaction to Nelson Mandela's release from prison in February 1991 was muted in the Soviet Union.

(^{105}) Douglas G. Anglin, "Southern African Responses to Eastern European Developments," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 28, no. 3 (1990): 434.

(^{106}) See also Solidarity's embrace of anti-apartheid only after the fall of Communism. On 13 December 1989, on the first anniversary in democratic Poland of the proclamation of martial law, a reggae concert against Apartheid was held in the Gdańsk shipyard: Christiaens and Goddeeris, "Entangled Solidarity."

(¹⁰⁷) Chris Saunders, "1989 and Southern Africa," in Ulf Engel, Frank Hadler and Matthias Middell, eds., *1989 in Global Perspective* (Leipzig: Leipzig University Press, 2015), 358–359. Adrian Guelke and Tom Junes, "'Copycat Tactics' in Processes of Regime Change: The Demise of Communism in Poland and Apartheid in South Africa," *Critique and Humanism Journal* 40 (2012): 172. Links were also invoked by Jamaican-born black British poet Linton Kwesi Johnson. He had sought to connect the struggles of the British working class under Thatcherism and Polish Solidarity in 1982's "Wat about di working claas," had performed in Gdańsk at Solidarity's 1990 anti-apartheid concert, and suggested an entanglement between the fall of state socialism in the Eastern bloc and the fight to end apartheid on the 1991 track, "Mi Revalueshanary Fren".

(¹⁰⁸) Jeremy Cronin, "The Boat, the Tap and the Leipzig Way," *African Communist* 130 (1992). www.nelsonmandela.org [Accessed April 19, 2015].

(¹⁰⁹) Guelke and Junes, "Copycat Tactics", 186–187.

(¹¹⁰) On his death as the turning point, see Christopher J. Lee, "Decoloniality of a Special Type: Solidarity and Its Potential Meanings in South African Literature, During and after the Cold War," *Journal of Postcolonial Writing* 50, no. 4 (2014): 466. Kenneth S. Zagacki, "Rhetoric, Dialogue, and Performance in Nelson Mandela's 'Televised Address on the Assassination of Chris Hani'," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 6, no. 4 (2003): 709–735.

(¹¹¹) See Jessie Labov, "A Russian Encounter with the Myth of Central Europe," The Contours of Legitimacy in Central Europe: New Approaches in Graduate Studies. European Studies Centre, St. Antony's College, Oxford: Lisbon conference, 1988.

(¹¹²) Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

(¹¹³) Bradley, "Decolonization", 465.

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