CHAPTER 3

Germany

Immigration and growth

The settlement in what was West Germany of a substantial Muslim population, the second-largest in Western Europe, is dominated by Turkish immigration. During the 1950s, there were a number of private and regional initiatives to recruit workers from Turkey to meet the beginnings of a shortage of industrial labour. An agreement between the Ministry of Labour of Schleswig-Holstein and the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs led to the arrival of a dozen Turkish craftsmen in Kiel in April 1957. A programme was sponsored by the Hamburg Chamber of Craftsmen. In Bavaria, a private 'Research Institute for Turkish-German Economic Relations' was in fact a recruitment agency, while a number of 'translation bureaux' sprang up for the same purpose. The best of these programmes provided some training, but most were simply looking for cheap labour. The experience of many of these early 'guest workers' (*Gastarbeiter*) was disappointing, as they learned that their Turkish craft qualifications were not recognised, that they had to do unskilled or semiskilled work below their qualifications, and that only a few of them were given the opportunity to train further.

These early settlers were concentrated in the industrial cities of the north, particularly Hamburg, Bremen and Kiel. The rules governing immigration at the time were liberal compared to later stages, and the immigrants were able to bring their families with them and to settle in quite quickly. As a result, despite their early disappointments, they were later to express quite a high level of satisfaction with the results of their move.

The federal government soon came to the view that the process of recruitment should be regularised while also being expanded. The move towards making recruitment of Turkish – and other foreign – workers a government monopoly was completed with a bilateral recruitment agreement between Turkey and Germany in 1962. The date was not coincidental. This was only a year after the Berlin Wall was erected, blocking the inflow of East Germans. It was also the year which saw the beginning of Turkey's first five-year plan, in which the export of labour was a major element.

The effect of the agreement was that German companies seeking Turkish workers had to operate through official recruitment offices set up by the German and Turkish authorities in Turkey. People looking to find work in Germany had

to go through medical checks and job interviews in Turkey and were issued with work permits and entry papers. The assumption throughout was that the period of employment was for a limited number of years, after which the worker would return home, so the men were discouraged from bringing their wives and children with them.

As a result of the growth of the German economy, the employment of foreign workers more than trebled between 1960 and 1963, and an increasing proportion of them were Turks. The number of Turks entering Germany over the same period increased tenfold.

Having established recruitment as a government monopoly, the authorities proceeded to regularise most aspects of the Turkish workers' circumstances. The social welfare of foreign workers had previously been placed in the hands of the social work arms of the two main churches: the Protestants had been charged with looking after Greek workers, and the Catholics had been given responsibility for Italian and Spanish workers. The care of Turkish workers was given to the *Arbeiterwohlfahrt*, the social welfare arm of the Social Democratic Party and the labour movement. Workers' earnings were converted to Turkish currency at a special rate to avoid a black market. Government funds were made available to support the establishment of cultural associations, and regular broadcasting in Turkish started. The German government also encouraged the opening of Turkish consulates in the main cities where the new immigrants were settling.

The first crisis in this development came with the short economic recession of 1966–7. Somewhere in the region of 70,000 Turkish workers lost their jobs, but against expectations most did not return home. Although virtually all these people had found work again by the middle of 1967, the event had raised questions about Germany's foreign labour policy. Was foreign labour simply a reserve which could be drawn on or discarded according to need? What about the social and cultural problems which the brief period of unemployment had brought to the surface?

During the following half-dozen years or so, Germany saw its greatest influx yet of Turkish workers, over 100,000 in 1973 alone. The immigration was no longer overwhelmingly male. On the one hand, women workers were being recruited – they made up almost a quarter of the 1973 influx. On the other hand, wives were beginning to join their husbands. There was the first public awareness of particular city districts becoming Turkish 'ghettos', and the German health, social and educational services were beginning to feel the pressure. There was also an increase in irregular immigration.

As a result, in 1973 the federal government introduced a new policy of integration. Employers were required to provide housing to acceptable standards and to pay a much higher rate for the recruitment service of the government. The funds thus acquired were to be used for the education and integration of new arrivals. However, almost as soon as this new policy was in place, the

economic recession following the 'oil crisis' struck, and Germany put in place severe restrictions on the recruitment of industrial workers, leaving the gates open only for family reunion and for particular specified professions and crafts.

Throughout, the basic German policy remained to benefit the labour market within limits of political acceptability. Germany has always insisted that it is not a country of immigration, so the term 'guest worker' remains in common use. At various times, measures have been taken to encourage the return home of foreign workers, such as the Turks. These measures have either been positive, such as paying them lump sums, or they have been negative, such as restricting access to welfare benefits on an equal basis with German citizens. On the same principle, basic civil rights have often been withheld from foreigners, and suggestions that they should be allowed to participate somehow in the political process through, for example, a local vote have been strongly resisted by the authorities.

While such restrictive measures changed the nature of Turkish immigration, they did not put an end to it. The total Turkish population in Germany did not level off until the beginning of the 1980s. In 1973, the figure had been 616,000. By 1980, it had reached 1.46 million and continued upwards to 1.58 million two years later. It then started falling, to reach 1.4 million in 1985.

In that same year, there were 47,500 Moroccans, 23,300 Tunisians, and smaller numbers of other Muslim nationalities in Germany. There were also nearly 600,000 Yugoslavs, 20 per cent of whom according to some estimates may have been Muslim. In addition, several agencies estimated that there might be as many as 200,000 undocumented Turkish migrants. By the beginning of 1989, the number of Turks had again risen to over 1.5 million. The number of Moroccans had also risen, to over 50,000, while Tunisians had decreased slightly. At this time, there were also over 17,000 Pakistanis resident in Germany.

During the mid-1980s, the pattern of immigration into Germany had begun to change character again. Very few people were coming for work. Instead, there were growing numbers of refugees from various parts of the world, including Turkey, Iran and the Arab countries. Many of these had been entering via East Berlin, where the East German authorities were allowing people without valid papers to land and then sending them across to the western half of the city. An agreement between the two governments succeeded in putting a stop to this practice in August 1986, but the arrival of refugees continued, albeit in smaller numbers, and German policy towards the status of foreigners was, by the end of the decade, dominated by its attitude towards refugees. By the beginning of 1989, this change was reflected in the presence of 73,000 Iranians, over 22,000 Lebanese and more than 9,000 each of Syrians and Jordanians, many of the latter being Palestinian.

The number of Turks cannot necessarily be taken to equate with the number of Muslims in the way that can be applied to, for example, Moroccans and

Tunisians. A significant minority of Turkish immigrants are Christian, either Armenian or Syrian Orthodox. In addition, a number of Turks of what might be called Muslim cultural background would not call themselves Muslim, rather secularist or even, in the case of a few, atheist. The national census which took place in May 1987 included a question on religion. There were almost 100,000 Turks who did not declare themselves to be Muslim. The other interesting figure to come out of that census was the almost 48,000 Muslims with German citizenship. Most of these are people who have changed citizenship, but over 5,000 of them are German converts to Islam. The total number of Muslims registered in the census was 1,650,952. A later survey from 2008 confirms it being a mistake to think everyone from predominantly Muslim country self-identifies as Muslim. In fact, 26 per cent of immigrants from these countries claim to be Christian. Regarding immigrants from Afghanistan, 20.4 per cent tick the box 'No religious affiliation' and 10.2 'other religious affiliation'. The figures for those with an Iranian background are 38.4 and 12.9 per cent. Only 48.7 per cent self-identify as Muslim.

Otherwise, the 1987 census also confirmed the regional distribution of Muslims, which one could derive from previously published data on the location of foreigners. Over a third were concentrated in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia, especially in the massive industrial conurbation stretching from Cologne through Düsseldorf and Duisburg to Essen. The city state of Hamburg had over 50,000, while Baden-Württemberg had over 250,000 concentrated in cities like Stuttgart and Karlsruhe. There were nearly 250,000 in Bavaria, the largest number of them in and around Munich, while Hessen had 170,000, mainly in Frankfurt. German unification took place in 1990 but did not affect the number of Muslims much; few Muslims lived in the East. In 2009, less than 2 per cent of German Muslims lived in the territory of the former GDR.

In 2000, the Federal Statistical Office gave a figure of just short of 2 million Turks, of which just over one-third had been born in Germany. By then the impact of the wars in former Yugoslavia had also become visible, with 156,300 Bosnians and 51,800 Macedonians recorded, many of whom were Muslims, especially in the former case. At this time, new laws introducing dual citizenship and the possibility of acquiring citizenship by birth in Germany were already having their impact. The official statistics for Turks showed the number falling to 1,912,200 by 2002, a decline of almost 90,000 in just two years. An independent research institution, basing itself on Muslim sources, gave a total of 3.2 million Muslims in 2001. Of these, some 2.2 million were estimated to be Sunnis, 340,000 Alevis, 170,000 Shi'ites, and 310,000 German passport-holders, of which some 11,000 were of German descent.

From 2007 onwards, a few larger statistical studies focusing on Muslims in Germany have been published. The Federal Ministry of Interior Affairs produced a report, *Muslims in Germany*, the first larger quantitative study, followed

by *Religion monitor 2008* and the *Muslim Life in Germany* report in 2009. The latter report put the number of Muslims in Germany at a total of 3.8–4.3 million, Turkish immigrants being the most prominent group (2.5 million). Sunni Muslims were still the largest group (74.1 per cent) followed by Alevi (12.7) and Shi'ites (7.1). Ahmadis were few (1.7) but accounted for 28 per cent of those from South and South-East Asia. Seventy per cent of the Muslims were born abroad. The report states that 45 per cent of the interviewed were German nationals. Muslims make up, approximately, one-quarter of those with an immigrant background in Germany.

Law and organisations

Germany's constitution, called the Basic Law, guarantees freedom of religious worship, organisation and teaching. The state is regarded not as being laicist in the French or Dutch form, rather it is *religionsneutral*. In other words, it does not take a position on religious affairs. The distinction is important, because the state and religious institutions are not rigidly separated as in France. The Jewish community, the Catholic dioceses and the regional Protestant churches all have the status of a publicly recognised corporation (*Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts*). In practice, this means that the state collects a church tax from the members of the churches on their behalf and hands the tax over to the churches after deducting an agreed administration charge. The regional states and the churches cooperate very closely in areas of education, and 80 per cent of the publicly funded nursery schools are run by the churches, as are a number of hospitals and other welfare institutions. The state has also, as we have seen, delegated to the churches' welfare agencies the oversight of the social care of southern European immigrants. The specific questions relating to education will be dealt with below.

Religious communities which have not been granted such recognition can operate freely under the laws of association. There are two such categories which have been used by Muslim organisations, namely that of registered association (*eingetragener Verein* or e.V.) and that of a foundation (*Stiftung*). The status of registered association has been by far the most common form to be sought, and a 2001 estimate suggests that there were then about 2000 such associations. To satisfy the requirements for this, the association must have a democratic structure with a recognisable membership list. The structure of a foundation is controlled by a group of trustees with strict rules as to the administration of and responsibility for properties.

In these two forms of association, Muslim groups have been able to put into practice most of the activities they have wanted to set up. First and foremost, of course, this has meant the opening of places of worship. The earliest mosques to be established in Germany after the Second World War were in Frankfurt and

Hamburg by the Ahmadi movement during the 1950s. Mosques arising out of the immigration only started to appear in the late 1960s, usually in converted flats, rooms, outhouses and garages. Occasionally, with time, resources were found to purchase larger properties such as warehouses, small factories, shop premises and, in one case, a former four-storey public bath-house. By the mid-1980s, a few new mosques had been constructed, of which probably the most notable is the Islamic Cultural Centre built in Iranian style on the shore of the Alster Lake in Hamburg, where it has become something of a tourist attraction. In Berlin, the old mosque in Wilmersdorf was restored to use, and in Aachen and Munich mosques and Islamic centres have been built with particular encouragement from groups of German converts to Islam. By 2000, there were over sixty mosques, many of them purpose-built, and over 2,000 other spaces in regular use for worship. Fourteen years later, approximately 2,700 facilities for Friday prayers existed and, in addition, several hundred Alevi *Cem evi*, gathering houses. Two hundred mosques had been renovated or purpose-built to resemble traditional mosques and scholars estimate another 150 to be under construction.

When the Turks started arriving in large numbers, there was already a small network of Muslim associations bringing together people of various nationalities, including Germans. There were a number of Sufi groups which tended to be international in their recruitment among young intellectuals. The ideas of the Indian Sufi Inayat Khan are said to have been influential in attracting young Germans during the 1950s and 1960s. In Berlin, the scene was long dominated by the charismatic figure of Salah Eid, who brought together a variety of Sufi groups and others in an attempt to present a unified Islam to the city authorities. Since his death, the grouping has mainly dispersed. The early Sufi tendencies were, in any case, being overtaken by the growth of Turkish Muslim organisations. Here, the Naqshbandis were prominent for a time, but as an organisation they also had to give way, and their influence in more recent years has tended to be more through the Naqshbandi links of officials within the main Turkish associations.

In the years until the late 1970s, the most active Turkish Muslim groups were those linked to movements which were either banned or disapproved of by the Turkish government. The most prominent of these was the *Avrupa Islam Kültür Merkezleri Birligi*, the association of Islamic Cultural Centres in Europe, known in German as *Verband islamischer Kulturzentren e.V.* With its headquarters in Cologne, this represented the European branch of the *Süleymançi* movement which, as an organisation, was banned in Turkey at the time. From Cologne, it controlled at its high point in 1981, 185 mosque associations and a further twenty-four 'fraternal groupings'. Although the member mosques were all constituted with e.V. status, the central control of the 'Chief Imam' in Cologne was considerable. During the 1970s, the Chief Imam represented an assertive form of Turkish Islam which laid great stress on the Qur'an school model which the

founder of the movement in Turkey had emphasised. At times, the Chief Imam wrote in Turkish in the newspaper *Anadolu* aggressively against the churches and the German order, and this led to a campaign by the German trade unions supported by the Turkish federation of workers in Germany, FIDEF, to have the Islamic Cultural Centres banned. The Imam finally received instructions from the *Süleymançi* leadership in Turkey to tone down his statements. Soon afterwards, he was recalled, and the leadership during the 1980s took a much more constructive approach to working with German institutions. But it soon resumed its more public activities in opposition to official Islam in Turkey, stressing more openly its Sufi character, and therefore has remained suspect also by the German authorities. It has also started training imams at the headquarters in Cologne. After a change in leadership in Turkey in 2000, *Süleymançi* in Germany was ordered to interact less with German society and engage in opening boarding schools to protect the Muslim youth from bad influences. The order has not been popular among adherents, and it has not lessened suspicions against the group.

A slightly smaller but also very active group is the *Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüş* (IGMG), first known as *Avrupa Milli Görüş Teskilati*, which in the early 1980s claimed to have the support of about half of the Muslim population of Berlin. In many ways, it was more militant in its attitude to German society and Turkish politics, and during the 1970s the movement was perceived as being very close to the Turkish National Salvation Party (MSP) of Necmettin Erbakan. During the 1980s, a section of the movement broke away to form a separate section sympathetic to the trend of the revolutionary leadership in Iran. Commonly identified with its leader Cemalettin Kaplan, it began to dissipate after his disappearance in the mid-1990s and was finally banned by the authorities in the aftermath of the events of 11 September 2001 (see Chapter 10). In the meantime, the main movement has grown to become one of the most important among Turks across Europe, not just in Germany. The growth in its support reflected the growth of the Refah Partisi in Turkey, also led by Erbakan, for a time prime minister (in 1996) until the military forced him out and had the party banned in 1997. IGMG experienced severe setbacks due to this, especially when economic investments in Turkey connected to Refah Partisi failed. Many in Germany lost their savings and blamed the IGMG leadership who had encouraged the investments.

In Germany, the IGMG did not develop local political ambitions and restricted itself to providing cultural, educational and religious services to the community, but this has not stopped the internal security services from retaining an interest in its activities. A new, younger leadership emerged after the loss of legitimacy of the older. Under the leadership of Mehmet Sabri Erbakan, nephew of the famous Turkish politician, especially with support from younger, educated members, the organisation moved its attention away from purely

Turkish concerns to an activist involvement in German society, encouraging members to apply for German citizenship and claim space. In so doing, they are also showing a tendency to relate more closely with like-minded groups across ethnic and national borders. This is also reflected in the proliferation of youth and women's sections in the local branches of the IGMG.

Mehmet Sabri Erbakan resigned in 2002 and a new leadership emerged stressing cooperation with German institutions instead of confrontation. By acknowledging that German secularism had actually created space for Islam, a new understanding of the Muslim presence in Germany grew. As a result, IGMG has since tried to develop a progressive minority *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence).

During the 1980s, the Nurçuluk movement claimed about twenty-eight local associations, which they called *medreses*. Early supporters of this movement could be found in Germany long before the Turkish immigration – in fact, the movement's founder had spent some time in Berlin after being released from a Russian prisoner-of-war camp after the First World War. However, not until the 1970s did Nurçu activity take an organised form. Apart from education of the Muslim community, often organised in *dershanes* (reading houses) of which there were fifty-seven in 2003, they have been particularly active in publishing. Politically, they have kept a low profile and seem not to have engaged actively in the Turkish political conflicts of the late 1970s, although they did use their German base to extend their educational and religious activities in Turkey. During the 1980s, trained followers of the movement appeared to have some success among Turks who had returned to Turkey.

A completely different picture emerges from observation of the Turkish Alevi community (which must not be confused with the Alawis, or Nusayris, of Syria). According to statistics from 2008, they make up as much as a fifth of the Turkish migrant population. The community's organisation rests overwhelmingly on family and clan structures. They distinguish themselves by taking a more relaxed view of religious ethical requirements than do strictly orthodox Sunnis. The women are allowed more freedom of movement and have greater disposition over how they arrange their lives. As the religious life of the Alevi tradition hardly requires mosques (their worship is based on a form of the Bektashi *dhikr*) or Qur'an schools, they are hardly visible in the organised Muslim life of Germany. A study of the community in Berlin published in 1988 could only identify one Alevi organisation. An additional factor in this 'invisibility' is the distrust expressed towards them both by Sunni movements, who regard them as heretical, and by the Turkish authorities, who regard them as perhaps not quite loyal Turks. The latter feeling is strengthened because many Alevis are Kurds.

For a long time, this meant that the Alevis themselves preferred to keep a low profile. However, in 1986, Alevis established a national organisation called *Alevitische Gemeinde Deutschland* in Cologne. It coordinates 125 local associations.

During the 1990s, the growing self-assertion of the Alevis in public in Turkey was reflected also in a much more visible representation of Alevism in Germany. By expressing and explaining Alevi uniqueness to the authorities, Alevi parents and organisations have gained the right to have Alevi religion taught in several schools with the start in 2006 in Baden-Württemberg. In fact, the Alevi organisation is the only one who, this far, has been fully recognised by the state in accordance with article 7, section 3 of the German Constitution regulating religious communities.

As the 1970s progressed, tensions within the Turkish communities increased in line with tensions in Turkey itself. Besides the Muslim organisations, Turkish trade union activity was also great. Turkish teachers employed to teach mother tongue and culture to Turkish children in German schools joined the trade unions in campaigning for the secularist traditions of the Kemalist lay republic. There were small but active groups on the Marxist left, in addition to radical Kurdish groups. As the movement in Turkey itself for a more conscious reislamisation of the country moved ahead and met with the secularist response, so the Turkish émigré communities in Germany became a base for all the various parties to the growing conflict, and it was not unusual for the conflict to spread into Germany.

The year 1980 was a crucial one. Among the Muslim movements, the success of the Islamic revolution in Iran was an encouragement to further campaigning. In September, the Turkish armed forces took power. As part of the consolidation of the influence of the new regime, control over the émigré communities was essential. A variety of methods was used, among which the organisation of Islam was an important one. It helped that it suited both the German and the Turkish governments to cooperate in this field. The central arm of the Turkish religious policy was the *Diyanet*.

It has been suggested that the religious policy of the military government and its successor in reality represents a continuation of the policy of moving towards a compromise between strict laicism and Islam which started during the 1940s. What has happened in Germany since 1980 has hence been merely an extension of that policy from Turkey to Germany. In 1972, the *Diyanet* had established a branch for overseas affairs. By 1981, it had only eighty religious officials placed throughout Europe at a time when the total number of Turkish mosques may have been as high as 1,000. During the late 1970s, a few mosques had come into existence in Germany linked to the *Diyanet*.

Soon after the military coup of September 1980, *Diyanet* officials in Ankara were moving towards a policy requiring that only imams and religious teachers approved by the *Diyanet* should be allowed to service the Turkish community abroad. Of all the European countries concerned, Germany was the easiest with which to reach such an arrangement. The *Diyanet* established a German branch in 1982, headquartered in Cologne (*Diyanet Isleri Türk-Islam Birligi* or DITIB),

which proceeded to expand its influence among the Turkish mosques in the country.

There is little doubt that the move was welcome among the ordinary Turkish community. A survey in the early 1980s had shown that nearly two-thirds of the Turks in Berlin were uninterested in links with organisations such as the *Süleymançi* or the *Milli Görüş*. Another survey at the same time had shown that the same proportion of Turks attended prayers in the mosques with some degree of regularity and that they regarded the religious education of their children as important. The possibility of being related to mosques and finding Qur'an schools which were not so closely identified with movements involved in anti-government activity was clearly attractive.

By the end of the decade, a number of mosques linked to DITIB had been established. Some of them were new, but in others the membership had elected leaders who were sympathetic to DITIB. It was not unusual as a next step for the new leadership to have the status of the mosque association changed from e.V. to that of a foundation, the trustees of which would overlap with the trustees of the DITIB head office in Cologne. In this manner, DITIB not only expanded its influence but also made it irreversible. By 1984, it was estimated that 200 to 250 mosques in Germany had become linked to the *Diyanet*, and by the end of the decade, between half and two-thirds of the Turkish mosques had thus fallen into line with DITIB. Ten years later, registered membership of DITIB associations far outnumbered the combined membership of all other Muslim associations. In 2014, DITIB organised nearly 900 mosques and was still the largest organisation by far. Given the formal link with the Turkish state and popular suspicion of both the IGMG and the *Süleymançi*s, German public opinion tends to regard DITIB as the natural partner for the German authorities.

At various times, the leaderships of these various organisations have been involved in serious mutual conflict. This has occasionally expressed itself in public, and it has often been difficult to arrange meetings even at national level, where rival leaderships were prepared to share the same platform. At the local level it has often been different. It was not unusual for local mosque committees to include members from a variety of organisations, even when the particular mosque association was publicly identified as being linked to one of the rival movements. It was even possible to find committee members from both the *Diyanet* and the movements banned in Turkey sharing work on a committee.

Since the 1980s, this phenomenon of crossing boundaries has, if anything, increased. At the Turkish end, the theological training, which is a prerequisite for employment by the *Diyanet*, tends to attract young men – and women – who are Islamically conscious and often consider themselves supporters of one or other of the Islamic movements, especially the *Süleymançi* and the *Milli Görüş*. Such imams, once stationed in Germany or other European countries with

Turkish communities, find it not too difficult to establish personal relations with fellow sympathisers, relations which can be difficult to control by the officials in Cologne or Ankara. Ultimately, the only form of control is the requirement that these officials return home after four to six years according to the agreement between Ankara and Berlin. At the same time, the official German policy of only allowing entry to imams approved by the Turkish government has been an incentive to activists in the Muslim movements to get their people through the official Turkish training system and into Germany through the official channels – essentially a form of infiltration.

Besides the Turkish movements, there are a number of active groupings in other circles. Perhaps the most influential has been the association of German-speaking Muslims, which also includes German converts and their children. Their activities are ubiquitous but centre in particular around the Islamic Centres in Aachen and Munich. These centres were founded by groups of students and converts who sympathised with the ideas of the Egyptian and Syrian Muslim Brotherhoods. Each group has regular conferences and assemblies, while its individual members take an active part in local Muslim affairs, regardless of the particular political, ideological or ethnic pattern.

Native German Muslims deserve a particular mention in this context. More than in any other European country, German Muslims played a crucial role in the establishment of Islam. For many years, Turks who sought to live according to Islam found that they had to turn to German Muslims for help. The laicist history of the Turkish republic meant that the educated Turks who came to Germany were unwilling to identify themselves with Islam. They were therefore not available as a leadership resource which could mediate with German society. This role was taken by countless German Muslims, and it is a role which continues even as the Turkish Muslim groups are beginning to build up their own competent leaderships.

In view of the tensions among groups over the years, tensions which were only exacerbated by the rival demands for religious education to be given in Turkish or German, to be discussed later, it should come as no surprise that efforts towards overall Muslim federation have shown few results. At various times different attempts at union have failed, both nationally and locally. The most recent attempt was the foundation in 1987 of the Islamic Council of West Germany and Berlin, which brought together several of the independent Turkish groups, the Alevis, the Muslim World Congress and the Muslim Refugees Spiritual Administration. However, this fell apart over disagreements concerning what attitude to take towards the North Rhine-Westphalia Islamic religious education syllabus.

Perhaps the greatest success has been the Islamic Federation of Berlin. Founded in 1980, much of the initiative lay with the *Milli Görüş* in association with a number of German Muslims, but the Federation also includes a number

of women's groups and individual mosques and associations independent of the *Milli Görüş*, as well as students' associations.

The lack of unity is one reason for the failure of any Muslim organisation to achieve recognition as a public law corporation. The first application for such recognition came from the Islamic Cultural Centre of the *Süleymançi* in Cologne in 1979. This was made to the regional state of North Rhine-Westphalia. One response to this application was an informal agreement among the federal states that they would coordinate their responses to such applications. This one was turned down, as was one a few years later from the Islamic Federation of Berlin. A reason for such negative responses has clearly been the lack of unity among Muslim groups. The German law on recognition requires that recognition is granted to an institution or organisation which is broadly representative, both in its following and its internal structure, of the faith-community which it claims to represent. The organisation must also have a character of permanence and accept the provisions of the Basic Law. The last two requirements have also created problems. Permanence is a difficult quality to prove, given the relatively short life of the organisations in question. The fact that Germany, for a long time, also officially denied the fact of immigration and permanent settlement allowed the authorities to question the permanence of Muslim organisations. One suspects that the suggestions made by some constitutional lawyers that recognition may be unwise, given also that Islam might be in conflict with the Basic Law, may themselves be unwise: reference is made to the inequality of the sexes and to a potential loyalty to authorities other than the Basic Law, both points which could legitimately be raised in relation to, for example, the Roman Catholic dioceses, which do have recognition.

Being excluded, until the end of the 1990s, from German citizenship, Turks have had to find other ways of influencing the German political process. They have been only marginally successful. During the 1980s, an at times quite heated debate took place over whether foreigners should be allowed to vote in local elections. This possibility seems to have been finally stopped by a decision of the constitutional court in 1990 that such a voting right would be unconstitutional. It has been mainly through their own organisations that Turks have been able to achieve some influence, and this almost exclusively from the Kemalist side. Turkish labour unions have been active in Germany and have developed a close collaboration with their German counterparts. This link was exploited successfully in the years around the military coup in September 1980 in Turkey, when the Turkish unions were successful in mobilising their German partners against Muslim organisations and their activities centred around the *Süleymançi* mosques and Qur'an schools.

Following a reform of the nationality law (2000), German federal politics changed towards a more inclusive understanding of the Muslim presence. Since then, some very prominent politicians have symbolically expressed that

Islam belongs in Germany, or is domestic to it, for example German President Christian Wulff (in 2010) and Chancellor Angela Merkel (in 2015). Educational politics especially have changed to be more inclusive (see below).

The Gülen movement is active in Germany, organising intercultural dialogue associations (there were fifteen in 2012), engaging in social work and education (more than 100 educational facilities were associated with Gülen in 2012). The movement has a remarkable ability to arouse enthusiasm in people, but also to provoke and attract harsh criticism.

Both the Protestant and Roman Catholic churches established structures to educate their congregations and to establish relations with Muslim organisations. The Federation of Protestant Churches (EKD) appointed an official specifically for this purpose at the end of the 1970s, and by the end of the following decade all the regional churches had a counterpart. The order of the White Fathers set up a documentation and information centre, CIBEDO, in 1979, which a decade later was officially taken over by the Bishops' Conference. Throughout the same period, a Muslim–Christian Working Group (ICA) met regularly, involving representatives from the churches and the main Muslim groups. The Protestant churches involved Muslims in programmes in the biannual popular church gathering, the *Kirchentag*, throughout the 1980s, and by the end of the decade the Catholic equivalent was following suit. The Catholic church started the practice of issuing official greetings to Muslims at the time of Ramadan and 'Id al-Adha, following the pattern set by the Vatican. By the end of the 1980s, the EKD was also doing this, although not without opposition from among its members. In 2014, interreligious relations have become a part of the everyday work of Muslim organisations. Several organisations promoting meetings, dialogues and information exist, for example *Koordinierungsrat des christlisch-islamischen Dialogs e.V.* in Buseck.

Education

In the context of Germany, education has to be considered in at least four different spheres, namely nursery schools, the teaching of mother tongue and culture, religious education in both state and Qur'an schools, and religious education at universities. In addition, it must constantly be remembered that education is the responsibility of the regional states, not the federal government. Certainly, the ministers of education of the various states have their standing conference in which they meet regularly to coordinate matters. But that has not prevented significant differences of policy from developing, quite apart from the differences in religious education imposed sometimes by the differences in the constitutions of the states.

Ever-growing numbers of nursery schools in all the major cities of Germany, including Berlin, have been finding that they have a majority of Muslim,

especially Turkish children. Eighty per cent of nursery schools are run by the Protestant and Catholic churches on behalf of and funded by the state authorities. This Turkish and Muslim presence has placed demands on the staff and the system which correspond to some degree with the general school situation. Thus teachers have been undergoing training, and educational policies have in some places been adapted. However, one of the main problems with the church-sponsored nurseries has been that, while they are funded by the governments, the staff are actually recruited and employed by the responsible church agency.

These agencies usually have the aim of providing a Christian upbringing for the children who attend. On the one hand, this has meant that nurseries have had to deal with a distinct change of emphasis in their practice, a change which some have coped with better than others. On the other hand, the church lawyers have tended to take the view that the nurseries cannot, therefore, employ staff from other religions on a full-time permanent basis. This is a view which has succeeded in blocking any significant appointment of, for example, Turkish nursery teachers. Although the leaderships of both the Protestant and Catholic churches have officially taken the view that their nurseries must respect Turkish and other Muslim children in their home culture, it was not until the 1990s that they were able to find legal ways around the problem.

A few Muslim nurseries have been established but as part of one or other Muslim association. They therefore are regarded as private initiatives and excluded from public funding. In addition, there were seven public Muslim kindergartens receiving public subsidy in 2009.

In the schools, the emphasis has been on establishing support structures for Turkish children. This has tended to be arranged by the states in conjunction with the Turkish authorities, but different patterns of such cooperation have developed. All the states provide complementary mother-tongue teaching, which is provided by Turkish teachers usually trained and qualified in Turkey. In the states of Bavaria, Hessen, Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia and Rhineland-Palatinate, this complementary teaching is run by the ministries of education. They employ the Turkish teachers, often recruiting them from Turkey, usually on a time-limited contract. The other states, that is, Baden-Württemberg, Berlin, Bremen, Hamburg, Saarland and Schleswig-Holstein, have an arrangement with the Turkish authorities whereby the Turks are responsible for mother-tongue teaching, employ the teachers, and fix the curriculum.

Up until the first decade of the twenty-first century, Islamic religious education was, if it was to be found in schools at all, part of this complementary teaching. Only in Bavaria was there in the early 1980s a regular period of two hours per week specifically devoted to Islamic religious instruction. This was taught by Turkish teachers with Turkish qualifications in religious instruction and according to the syllabus and with the textbooks designed for Turkish schools.

All the regional states have some form of arrangement whereby Christian religious instruction is offered within normal school hours, usually by normal teachers, although in some places by priests or ministers with some educational training. While the educational standard of the teachers and the syllabus has to be approved by the regional state's education authority, as do the textbooks used, the content of the syllabus and the religious standing of the teacher have to be approved by the recognised church authority.

The question of introducing Islamic religious instruction as a separate subject for Muslim children has exercised German educationists and Muslim leaderships since the mid-1970s. The issue reached something approaching a crisis at the end of the decade. The education authorities had resisted Muslim demands for facilities similar to those of the churches. At the same time, the independent, mosque-related Qur'an schools had experienced an enormous growth. As the political crisis in Turkey spilled over into demonstrations and odd incidents of violence in Germany, the call was raised from many German and secularist Turkish quarters for the banning of such schools, especially those connected with the *Süleymançi*. Motions were placed before regional parliaments as late as 1983 demanding their closure on the grounds that they were in conflict with the German Basic Law.

In response, the introduction of some Islamic religious instruction within the complementary hours for Turkish children was speeded up by some states which had not already adopted the pattern. However, this was clearly not a satisfactory solution for those Turkish Muslim groups which were independent of the Turkish government, and it was certainly of no use to Muslims who were not Turkish. Even the minimal intentions of the model were often not met, as many of the Turkish teachers tended towards secularism in the Kemalist tradition and were thus not trusted by many Muslim parents. The city state of Bremen was not even able to move forward this short step, because its constitution contains a paragraph stating that only a non-denominational Christian biblical study may be offered in the state school.

Two regional states attempted, however, to adopt a more constructive approach to providing a form of Islamic religious instruction which might break the near-monopoly of the Qur'an schools. In Hamburg, separately from any Islamic instruction which might be given within the mother-tongue teaching supervised by the Turkish consulate-general, the education authority for some years in the mid-1980s offered, on an experimental basis, two hours per week of Islamic religious education for Turkish children. The syllabus had been developed under the auspices of the education authority itself, and the textbooks for it were developed in the light of experience. The course was taught by Turkish teachers employed by the Hamburg education authority and given a special training course. The course was voluntary, and in 1987 there were 2,000 pupils enrolled.

The major reaction to the crisis was sponsored by North Rhine-Westphalia, the state with the largest Muslim population in the Federal Republic and the one in which both the *Süleymançi* and the *Diyanet* had their European headquarters. The state authorities, and not just the Ministry of Education, had clearly been worried about the increasing political activism associated with the mosques and Qur'an schools. It had also been the first to have to deal with a request for recognition of a Muslim organisation as a public law corporation.

In a major report on the policy of the state towards foreigners, which was published in June 1980, the government of North Rhine-Westphalia decided to counter the 'inadequate' and 'negative' forms of Qur'an instruction in a mainly 'positive and constructive' manner. This was to be achieved, in the context of a stronger reference to the cultural and religious characteristics of the Muslim community, by offering a suitable Islamic religious instruction within the school curriculum and thus 'move Qur'an instruction into the school'. In other words, the independent Qur'an schools were to be driven out of business by competition.

The task of producing this official Islamic instruction was not simple. The law of the state required that religious instruction be implemented in consultation with the appropriate religious institutional leadership. This did not exist, so far as Islam was concerned, or rather competing claims to this status existed, and the state had refused to entertain the request for recognition by one of the major groupings. The state was advised that by calling the subject *religiöse Unterweisung* rather than the legal terminology *Religionsunterricht*, it should be safe. A curriculum task force was established consisting of German experts in education, including religious education, as well as Islamic scholars and representatives of the Turkish religious authorities represented in Germany, mainly DITIB.

In 1984, the first units of the new syllabus were being implemented on a trial basis, and by 1987 the first four years of a primary-school syllabus were ready, including the associated teaching materials and the teachers trained to deliver the syllabus in schools. These teachers were employed by the state of North Rhine-Westphalia.

The syllabus commission had sought to obtain the support of a variety of Muslim organisations, Turkish and otherwise, but it soon found that this was impossible. Most of the independent Turkish Muslim organisations withdrew their support, mainly because *Diyanet* representatives had been closely involved. Groups representing Germans and other non-Turkish nationalities remained sceptical because the syllabus was explicitly to be taught in Turkish. A number of the German Muslim representatives attacked the syllabus on educational and methodological grounds. These arguments contributed to the demise of the Islamic Council for Germany only a few years after it had been founded. The syllabus itself had a mixed reception, with many Turkish parents welcoming it,

partly because the teaching was perceived as being independent of the intra-Turkish rivalries.

With the reunification of Germany, the new eastern states were reluctant to adopt the western model of cooperation between state and church in the design and delivery of religious education. In 1996, the state of Brandenburg passed a law introducing the subject 'Life Stances, Ethics and Religious Knowledge' to much heated public debate, and in Baden-Württemberg and Lower Saxony experiments were conducted with an (intra-Christian) ecumenical approach to the religious education syllabus. In the meantime the North Rhine-Westphalia experience had reached the point that the University of Münster had appointed a professor for training teachers of Islamic religious education. The events of 11 September 2001 brought the debate about Islamic religious education into the open across the country, and in several states political moves were made to make the subject available, taught in German, within the mainstream curriculum in cooperation with Muslim community organisations. During the last fifteen years, a tremendous change has taken place. In 2015, most states have acknowledged Islamic collaboration partners, established, tested and approved curriculum and textbooks in *Islamischer Religionsunterricht*, and have at least some years of experience of teaching. Baden-Württemberg is widely acknowledged as a model and a pioneer in this, already starting Islamic religious instruction in German in 2006. In the state, in 2015, thirty-one schools arrange Islamic religious education for some 2,000 pupils. In Bayern, 261 schools give 11,500 pupils Islamic religious education, engaging sixty-five registered teachers specialised in the field. Some courses are obligatory, others voluntary, depending on the state. Courses are not offered at all schools in a state. In Bayern, approximately one in eight pupils with a Muslim background takes the subject.

The introduction of Islamic religious education in schools has created a demand for trained teachers. In 2010, the German Council of Science and Humanities recommended the establishment of centres for Islamic theology at German universities, especially in regions where a large number of Muslims lived. Soon after, the federal minister responsible for universities announced federal funding for up to fifteen chairs in Islamic theology spread over a limited number of universities. As of 2015, four such centres have been established in Erlangen-Nürnberg, Frankfurt/Gießen, Münster/Osnabrück and Tübingen. The aim is to provide education relevant to teachers, but also to community workers and theologians.

It has been possible in a couple of instances to establish Muslim schools, namely a publicly funded primary school in Berlin, opened in 1989, and a combined primary-secondary school in Munich. In both cases some public funding is involved, although the methods differ according to the practices of the distinct federal states. At least six colleges for women are in operation in various parts of the country, mostly at the initiative of the *Milli Görüş*, and in 1995 a King Fahd

Academy opened in Bonn. The *Verband islamischer Kulturzentren* runs an imam training school in Cologne, and a few independent associations run others.

When the Gülen movement started to operate in Germany it quickly established private schools, which is its policy. In 2013 there were more than twenty of them, including six upper secondary schools.