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Anti-cosmopolitanism

Introduction

This chapter examines what I call anti-cosmopolitanism in inter-
national ethical thought. From the Athenian generals of the
Peloponnesian War to G. W. F. Hegel, twentieth-century realists
and communitarians such as Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Walzer
and John Rawls, anti-cosmopolitans have sought to depict the
moral realm as being fundamentally different from that argued
for by cosmopolitanism. Anti-cosmopolitan positions share an
account of morality that is sceptical towards substantive univer-
salism and global egalitarianism. It should be noted that I am
making no claim for a single anti-cosmopolitan tradition. Instead,
anti-cosmopolitanism is a stance that has been present in a number
of different traditions at different times. It is at best a group of
arguments, all of which have been employed by a number of differ-
ent perspectives. Rather than any particular ideology or common
project, what unites this diverse group is rejection of cosmopoli-
tanism and substantive moral universalism in favour of local or
contextual morality. Anti-cosmopolitans make both positive claims
about the nature of morality and negative claims about cosmo-
politanism that are used to defend significant, but not absolute,
restrictions of human loyalties and to give moral priority to less-
than-universal communities. Because anti-cosmopolitans emphasize
contextual origins of community and ethics they reject cosmopoli-
tan universalism and claim that actual particularistic community,

such as nationality, overrides any abstract or imagined bonds between members of the human species.

At the core of anti-cosmopolitanism is the claim that morality is always local, and therefore that cosmopolitanism is both impossible (impractical) and undesirable, in particular because of:

a the international insecurity in the international state of nature;
b the existence of profound cultural and normative pluralism which entails the lack of universal agreement about the 'good' or the 'right';
c any attempt to act in or realize universal values would be an unjustified imposition of one account of 'the good society' upon others; and
d a world state based on universalism would be a source of violence, domination and tyranny.

In addition, Simon Caney identifies six conceptual and three normative arguments against universalism:

> Universalism is (1) flawed because it is committed to the idea of a common human nature; (2) too abstract and decontextualized to have relevance; (3) unable to provide an adequate account of moral motivation; (4) false to the experience of moral reflection; (5) unattainable because moral argument can take place only within historical traditions; and (6) vitiated by the existence of profound moral disagreement. (2005: 39)

These claims will be discussed in the sections below.

This chapter focuses on the two most common and robust expressions of anti-cosmopolitanism: realism and pluralism. Realism argues that the circumstances of international life preclude the possibility of cosmopolitan ethics or a cosmopolitan transformation because, within this setting, states are morally obliged to pursue their national interest over the common (cosmopolitan) good. For pluralists, the constraints on our moral commitments result from the absence of shared global understandings comparable to the ethical consensus present in the domestic realm of the nation-state. Common to both these anti-cosmopolitan positions is what Chris Brown identifies as a communitarian understanding of the origins of the nature of morality and ethics (see Brown 1992). Both realism and pluralism draw upon the idea that moral norms are cultural rather than transcendental and therefore that morality is essentially communal rather than global in nature. For this reason, this chapter begins with a discussion of the communitarian ideas that are common to most anti-cosmopolitan arguments.

Communitarianism

At the heart of the disagreement between the cosmopolitans and anti-cosmopolitans is a distinct moral epistemology and ontology of each tradition (Cochran 1999). As we have seen, cosmopolitanism, especially liberal cosmopolitanism, has most often been grounded in certain claims about the nature of human agency and the capacity for disinterested rationality, or, in the case of Kant himself, humanity's capacity to recognize universal transcendental reason. In contrast, communitarians made claims in both ontological and epistemological realms: individuals are formed by their culture and can only come to have moral knowledge as a consequence of inhabiting a culture. According to communitarians, morality is derived from, and only has meaning in, the specific - what Michael Walzer (1994) calls 'thick' - cultures to which we belong. Moral life begins 'at home', so to speak, in the various historical, cultural and political communities that we inhabit. Communitarianism is 'contextualist' because it argues that moral standards can only belong to the specific groups from which they emerged. The anti-cosmopolitan position takes this communitarian argument and turns it into a rejection of cosmopolitanism. Contexts place limits on universalism and foreclose the possibility of a moral point of view as such.

According to Brown (1992), the origins of modern communitarian epistemology and ontology can be found in the work of the German philosophers Herder and Hegel. While few contemporary anti-cosmopolitans present even a passing resemblance to either Herder or Hegel, they have provided inspiration and influence for anti-cosmopolitanism in general. Herder was a critic of Kant's emphasis on a pre-social or even asocial individual. According to Brown, Herder provides the basis for thinking of the national community as an organic entity, and as the social source of good and of identity. Herder was the first to emphasize the way in which culture and individual identity are intertwined. Individuals' identities are formed in the context of a shared culture or by language, history and traditions. Herder argued that 'the individual was not prior to culture . . . but shaped by it' (1992: 59). Herder is significant for today's debates because of his focus on the contextual individual. Herder's emphasis on the cultural origins of individuality also flows through to the epistemological level. From Herder's position, the Kantian emphasis on a transcendent individual reason is fundamentally in error.

Herder's preferred form of political community was a plurality of de-centred communities, which he called 'anarcho-pluralist' (Brown

1992). In contrast, Hegel was a statist. Hegel argued that the state was the most perfect form of human community and that it is only in states that people can fulfil their own individuality while reconciling it with the individuality of others. For Hegel, the sovereign state was the only setting in which people could achieve their individuality and their freedom because it was the only community within which people had reflectively constructed their identity, or in which people were capable of ruling themselves according to reason.

Statists claim that 'Social tradition within the state is the framework which founds and enables ethical discourse' (Cochran 1996: 13). The implication of this is that only when everyone inhabits their own particular state can men *(sic)* be free. Hegel then seeks to reconcile universality and particularity in the state, which he saw as the culmination of the process of history. According to Linklater:

> For Hegel an account of the development of human powers must analyse the emergence and evolutions of societies which are based upon rational, critical thinking. The development of human freedom is exhibited in man's increasingly rational control of his self and his environment. . . The culmination of this process in modern history is the sovereign state. Within this community, within a community of rational law-makers, humans realize the triumph of thought over nature, and express those capacities . . . which are specific to human subjects. (1990a: 147)

States could do this, not because they were organic communities in the Herderian sense but because they were rational communities built upon historical, not transcendent, rationality. That is a rationality developed in and of history. For this reason, David Boucher (1998) argues that communitarianism does not adequately describe Hegelian thought, which he refers to as simply the tradition of historical reason. Nonetheless, the conclusion to be drawn from Hegel's account is that the less than universal association known as the sovereign state is and ought to be the focus of individual life and ethics. Between the two of them, Herder and Hegel seem to capture the essence of modern anti-cosmopolitanism as an argument in which cultural and communal sources of moral knowledge and individual identity are married to a belief that the state is the best representative of the community.

While contemporary anti-cosmopolitans draw on the traditions of Herder and Hegel, their more immediate influence is the debate between liberalism and communitarianism which emerged in response to John Rawls's *Theory of Justice* (see Avineri and De Shalit 1992). The essential argument here was that Rawlsian liberalism misunderstood the nature of the moral realm and moral argument, and was premised on a de-contextualized understanding of individualism.

David Miller (2002) contrasts communitarian or contextual justice with universal or cosmopolitan justice as a way of indicating the limit of universalism. For Miller, the aim of universalism 'is to discover principles of justice that can and should guide our judgment and our behaviour in all circumstances . . . the basic principles of justice are invariant… it tells us what justice *is*' (2002: 7). Miller argues that no universalist account has ever succeeded in convincing everyone (universal justification) or in establishing itself as the principal account of justice. As a result, communitarians assert that different cultures have their own ethics and it is impossible to claim, as cosmopolitans do, access to one single account of morality. Instead there remains a plurality of accounts of justice in the world. This is not just some accident or the fault of poor articulation, but is instead the result of the nature of justice itself. There is no single meaning of justice and therefore no single account of justice. Therefore, all justice is contextual. The communitarian claim is that moral knowledge is ultimately relative to the particular historical communities to which we belong. Morality is a cultural artefact and different standards of morality, different understandings of right and wrong, prevail in different cultures.

For anti-cosmopolitans, the presence of significant cultural diversity, and thus of significantly different accounts of the nature of justice, mean that in practice there is no consensus on the nature of justice. Because human beings only achieve moral knowledge in concrete historical circumstances we cannot speak in terms of a transcendental universal morality that is above history and culture, in the way that cosmopolitans do. Because there is no single global culture or community of all of humanity, with a shared history or culture, there is no cultural artefact that is coterminous with the entire species. Moral communities, Walzer argues:

> have members and memories, members with memories not only of their own but also of their common life. Humanity by contrast, has members but no memory, so it has no history and no culture, no customary practices, no familiar life-ways, no festival, no shared understanding of social goods. (1994: 8)

Moral duties, therefore, exist only in the context of a society that can share these cultural artefacts. We simply cannot have duties to those we have no shared 'social contract' with, and whose values we do not share and with whom we do not identify. In other words, there is no universal context for global justice, only local or particular ones. As Walzer explains, 'our common humanity will never make us members of a single universal tribe. The crucial commonality of the human race is particularism: we participate, all of us, in thick cultures

that are our own' (1994: 83). The lack of these shared understandings both prevents the application of cosmopolitan moral code and at the same time indicates why people will not identify with cosmopolitanism. People identify with their own communities and this provides them with the moral motivation to do good. In contrast, we cannot identify with humanity sufficiently to motivate us to act in its name or in the cause of distant strangers (see Kymlicka 2001; Calhoun 2003). Our membership of humanity is at best attenuated, imprecise and morally secondary.

Additionally, if morality is context-dependent and can only be decided within a culture/community, then attempts to propound universal conceptions of justice come up against the barrier of cultural difference. Communitarians, according to Thompson (1992: 22), argue that 'if individuals are constituted wholly or in part by the social relations of their communities, or if their goals, their ethical judgements and their sense of justice are inextricably bound up with community life, then why should they accept the criteria or evaluations of cosmopolitans?' The communitarian critique implies that, given that knowledge is particular and contextual, there will be no way of knowing or judging between the many contextual definitions of the good and establishing which is the correct or best ethical framework. In other words, with a vast diversity of moral cosmologies it is neither possible nor desirable to decide which is the right one, or to judge between them.

This argument is sometimes accompanied by a supporting claim that contextual knowledge is necessarily incommensurable (see Brown 1992). That is, not only is it true that there is no consensus on basic values due to cultural pluralism, but such a consensus is impossible because cultures are not translatable. It is impossible, for instance, to think simultaneously as both a modern secularist and a traditional Islamic scholar. The two cosmologies are irreconcilable. This means that not only is no consensus existent today, but none is possible in the future. The only means by which it might become possible would be through the triumph or victory of one culture and the destruction or assimilation of all the others. And this is precisely the threat that communitarians identify in cosmopolitan universalism.

The critique of liberal cosmopolitanism

The most common critique of cosmopolitanism is that it is hostile to the 'local' or national community as a result of its determination to be

impartial. While there are a number of sources of this criticism, ultimately it can be traced back to a rejection of both the cosmopolitan understanding of 'the moral point of view' and of its methodological individualism. The most important of these criticisms is that the individuals depicted by cosmopolitanism are not humans as such but liberal individuals, the product of a specific liberal interpretation. Cosmopolitan arguments rest on three assumptions:

1 That we can identify an objective account of human agency that is uninfected by its particular origins.
2 That it has been done.
3 Further, that such an account can generate a universal account of the right.

Rather than reflecting universal human qualities, liberal accounts rest on culturally specific assumptions about certain human characteristics As a result, it is questionable whether the qualities that liberals ascribe to all humans as universal are in fact so. If they are not, then it would seem that the cosmopolitan project falls at the first hurdle.

The most obvious first objection here is to the Kantian appeal to rationality. From the communitarian position, the emphasis on rationality as the uniting feature of humanity is simply not empirically justified. Reason and rationality take many forms, depending on the culture of the individual. In other words, humanity has little or no capacity to be guided by a universal reason because, simply put, there is no such reason. Reason is the product of particular cultures and circumstances, a historical product, and not transcendent in the Kantian sense. Hegel's account of the historical development of reason is present in this claim.

More specifically, communitarianism argues that disembodied abstract reason has no ethical authority because it cannot ground itself outside a specific Western tradition of thought. Cosmopolitanism does not sufficiently recognize that its abstract, idealized, supposedly impartial, principal standpoint is, in fact, the product of a particular history, context and culture, and not an impartial one. Cosmopolitanism relies upon an assumption that liberal theories of justice are determinate and final, that they are indeed universal. However, there is good reason to think that they cannot be unproblematically universalized or that they may not be acceptable to those outside the liberal realm. Communitarians ask '[w]here do these "external" criteria get their authority?' (Thompson 1992: 22). The answer, of course, is that they are authoritative only within liberalism, not globally. Ultimately, the claim is that it is not possible to

draw any substantive conclusions about universal human qualities beyond the most general, and that the type of conclusion we might draw from such an account leads to an altogether different account of justice from that portrayed by cosmopolitans (see Miller 2007).

Rawls's 'theory of justice' was the spur for the development of 'communitarianism' in its modern form. Many communitarian arguments began as a critique of Rawls's domestic liberalism, and also as a critique of his account of the nature of justice. The principal criticism levelled at Rawls was that his account relied upon too high a level of abstraction and an account of individuals that did not recognize the extent to which individual choices were the results of socialization. Rawlsian accounts are particularly prone to criticism at this level because they rely so heavily on very specific accounts of what an individual would choose in order to build their fiction of a global social contract. Much of contemporary anti-cosmopolitanism is a response to the development of Rawlsian accounts of cosmopolitanism as global justice. The issue of global distributive justice, especially when understood in terms of Rawlsian justice and constitution of 'basic institution', will almost necessarily lead to an account of a globally just society modelled on liberal if not Rawlsian principles.

Communitarians and feminists argue that liberal cosmopolitans depict the individual as some way acultural (Benhabib 1992). The feminist criticism of Rawlsianism is that the liberal model is less universalizable than liberals care to admit. Benhabib (1992: 53) argues, 'Universalistic moral theories in the Western tradition from Hobbes to Rawls are substitutionalist, |they] . . . identify the experiences of a specific group of subjects as the paradigmatic case of the human as such. These subjects are invariably white, male, adults who are propertied or at least professional.' In Rawls's case, this individual is situated behind a 'veil of ignorance'. The individual in liberal approaches is an ideally rational actor and we can model such an actor and use it as the basis for our theories, even if we can't actually find one in the real world.

For cosmopolitans, an abstracted and idealized account of the individual is used to construct and justify rules that everyone ought to be guided by. To be universally impartial, the cosmopolitan position must abstract from the particularity of agents and replace them with a generalized, and, therefore, universal, conception of the individual by reducing them to the abstract, reasoning, dispassionate (male) subject. Rawls's approach requires abstraction of the individual away from their social context and 'reduces the (actual) plurality of moral subjects to one (abstract) subjectivity' (Walzer 1983: 5). For communitarian critics of Rawls, this conception is flawed because it

robs the individual of all the traits that make them individuals, or of the traits that make them identifiable as humans. The individual so modelled is not in fact universal and therefore capable of impartiality, but is rather a product of a particular culture and, usually, gender. As Walzer notes in his argument against Rawls:

> the question most likely to arise in the minds of members of a political community is not, 'What would rational individuals choose under universalizing conditions of such and such a sort?' But rather, 'What would individuals like us choose, who are situated as we are, who share a culture and are determined to go on sharing it?' (1983: 5)

In other words, the individual becomes so far removed from any real human that what that individual may or may not choose makes no sense, and therefore the edifice upon which such a concept is built collapses.

Likewise, according to Iris Marion Young (1990), the ideal of impartiality obscures the origins of the cosmopolitan account. No vantage point is completely impartial and all positions are situated in some sort of context. There is no 'non-perspectival' perspective. As Young (1990: 104) argues: '|i|t is impossible to adopt an unsituated moral point of view, and if a point is situated, then it cannot be universal, it cannot stand apart from and understand all points of view.' To be impartial, the cosmopolitan position must abstract from the specific identity of real people and replace them with a generalized conception of 'the agent'. The cosmopolitan commitment to impartiality with regard to different conceptions of the good life is itself an articulation of a particular conception of the good life. If this is the case, then it might follow that the basis for cosmopolitan universalism is less secure than it may seem.

A related claim is Rawls's own argument against the cosmopolitan interpretation of his work. The theory of justice is based upon an assumption about certain values, or the reflective equilibrium of values common to liberal, and particularly American, society. From this viewpoint, it is an account of justice for liberal societies. There is no such basic reflective equilibrium in the international realm (Rawls 1999).

The fundamental claim of anti-cosmopolitanism is that it is impossible or at least highly difficult to identify a single human nature that can form the basis of a 'thick' universal credo. Human beings differ vastly according to their cultural and historical origins. Their preferences, values and basic understandings of life and life's purposes are so vastly different that identifying any single quality to provide the basis for a substantive or robust moral universalism is impossible.

Substantive accounts of universalism, global justice or the substantive content of universal human rights are not possible or are extremely limited in scope (see Miller 2007, for instance). Therefore, we must reject the idea of a single universal morality as a cultural product with no global legitimacy. It is impossible to realize the cosmopolitan fantasy of a disembodying universal reason because both the epistemological and the ontological prerequisites are missing.

What is required is a different understanding of justice that takes different social contexts into account and does without the possibility of making statements about what everybody ought to do. Having identified the communitarian core of the anti-cosmopolitan tradition, the next task is to discuss how this translates into ethical practice and what it means for the cosmopolitan project. That is, what type of ethical options are we left with if we accept the communitarian premises, and do they indeed effectively undermine the goal of cosmopolitanism?

Anti-cosmopolitan ethics

If we reject the possibility of a universal moral realm, then compatriots must take priority, sometimes to the exclusion of outsiders. The communitarian argument about the source of morality is one which supports giving moral *priority* not to the species but to the 'community', the nation and the state, because nation or communal boundaries are of *primary* moral significance. That is to say: we owe more, and sometimes a lot more, to our fellow nationals than we do to outsiders. This means that we may have very few, if any, obligations to the human species as a whole.

As an example, communitarian reasoning favours national distributive schemes and not global ones (see chapter 7). It supports a practice of moral favouritism towards insiders (compatriots) over outsiders, limiting obligations to non-compatriots, and when universal and national values come into conflict, the universal should mostly come second (see Erskine 2002: 28). Any obligations the rich may have to the poor, or that any one person may have to anyone else, are limited by the boundaries of the political community of the nation-state. This observation provides the basis for the anti-cosmopolitan position that we should not seek to develop a world state or substantive human community because that would be an injustice to the diversity of human ways of being in the world. There is little or no obligation to construct a global order based on principles which

might distribute wealth from the rich to the poor because there is no basis for a global redistribution of wealth, and such redistribution schemes can occur only within societies not across them (see Miller 2007, for a good treatment of this view; also chapter 7).

Likewise, the extent to which universal human rights can be enforced by the international community is extremely limited. If we remember the three relationships of obligations introduced at the start of the book, communitarian premises lead anti-cosmopolitans to favour minimal negative duties between political communities. "What 'they' do to each other is generally beyond 'us' to judge, both because we inhabit different ethical traditions and because what everybody owes to everybody else is limited almost exclusively to rules about coexistence and non-interference.

The communitarian underpinnings of anti-cosmopolitanism find expression in two forms: (1) 'realism' (Gvosdev 2005; Erskine 2002); and (2) pluralism (Bull 1967) which itself takes several forms. Both require us to think of ethics differently from how cosmopolitanism presents it.

Realism

Realism has dominated thinking about international politics for at least half a century. Most commentaries on realism, and indeed most discussion within contemporary realism, focus on the dynamics of interstate relations, with little or no systemic thought given to ethical issues. However, at the core of the realist concern with power is a powerful ethical moral critique concerning the relationship between politics and morality, and the possibility of the transformation of political community. In the international realm, according to realists, ethics are necessarily *consequential* and *statist.* Realist ethics are a statist (and communitarian) ethics because they are directed towards maintaining and protecting the state or national community. Realist ethics are consequentialist because ethical actions are judged according to how well they serve this end and not according to how they correlate with some abstract account of 'right' or the universal community. While few contemporary or classical realists refer to or classify themselves as communitarians, their arguments nonetheless rest on some shared assumptions. Not all communitarians are realists. Most realists are communitarians in at least a sociological if not a normative sense. Realism provides strong arguments in favour of compatriot priority and against cosmopolitanism (see Linklater

1990c), including a recognition of the normative pluralism character-izing the international realm and a scepticism towards progressivist accounts of international life.

In its earlier forms, especially in the work of Hans Morgenthau (1948/1960) and E. H. Carr (1939), the two dominant figures of early twentieth-century realism, it was as much a political philosophy as a 'method' of study. As such, ethics and normative issues were central to its definition. This is most obvious in its critique of Idealism. According to Carr and Morgenthau, Idealists made the mistake of putting the common good ahead of national interest by incorporating universal values into their foreign policy goals.

Realism identifies the arena of international relations as a competi-tion for power between separate sovereign states. States in anarchy recognize no common good. Classical realists argued that this condi-tion meant that human beings, being what they are, self-interested, will seek to achieve their own advantage, sometimes to the cost of others. States not only would but should preserve themselves, by increasing their own welfare and security without considering the needs of others. Realists identify this as the main obstacle to the realization of idealist ends such as global peace.

Under these conditions, the statesman *(sic)* must be prepared to follow a Machiavellian practice and do whatever it takes to win. Incorporating universal morality into foreign policy or relations with other states is a bad idea, because it is not applicable and is dangerous in the international realm which is one of necessity. As Morgenthau claimed 'a foreign policy guided by universal moral principles . . . is under contemporary conditions . . . a policy of national suicide' (1952: 10). Realists also claim that the lack of universal values adds to the dynamics of anarchy, but, even if there were such values, anarchy would prevent states from acting in accordance with them. For instance, if all the states were liberal or Christian or Muslim, anarchy would still overwhelm any altruistic motives they might have towards each other.

For this reason, realists put themselves at odds with what they see as the dominant moralist strains of US foreign policy.[1] Realism is critical of the tendency of US foreign policy to marry ideology with interest. States, especially great powers, too often equate their values with universal values, and their interests with their values. Realists believe that such statements are usually either a cynical mask or a self-interested delusion; 'The appeal to moral principles in the international sphere has no concrete universal meaning . . . it will be nothing but the reflection of the moral preconceptions of a particular nation' (Morgenthau 1952: 10). Morality in international affairs is

at best window dressing, for appearances only, or, worse, a form of hubris accompanying an over-inflated sense of a state's power. For these reasons, many people have characterized realist ethics as Machiavellian and amoral at best. However, it is possible to identify a moral/ethical core to realism that undermines or qualifies realist advocacy of realpolitik.

Ethics of responsibility

The realist tradition is united above all by pessimism about the nature of the international realm. Many observers have consequently argued that realism is dominated by moral scepticism per se. At its heart, it is sceptical about any moral dimension of politics. However, many realists often argue that underlying this toughness is a different and more pragmatic morality, the ethics of responsibility. An ethics of responsibility is an ethics that looks to the consequences of actions, and to their effects. This has usually been interpreted as meaning two things: (1) a simple means-ends pragmatism (incorrectly character-ized as prudence), in which the statesperson's responsibility is to achieve the national interest with whatever means are available; and (2) a responsibility above all to one's own state. In other words, the first duty of a statesperson is to ensure survival and security of one's own state/people in the uncertain conditions of international anarchy. Realists proclaim such self-interested ethics as virtuous (see Kennan 1986). To do otherwise would be to ignore the leader's responsibility to the lives and interests of their own community.

The most famous example of realist ethics was given by Thucydides in his history of the Peloponnesian War. The Athenians, who have delivered an ultimatum to the small island-state of Melos, along the lines of surrender or be destroyed, claim that in international politics the 'powerful do what they can and the weak do what they must'. That is, morality does not constrain powerful states or help weak ones. Powerful states will do what they can get away with and weak states must submit to this. In the case of the Peloponnesian War, the Melians did not surrender and were invaded and massacred, and the women and children were sold into slavery. The question the realists pose here is how ethical or moral was it for the Melian leaders to resist the reality they faced by appealing to principles of justice? The morally responsible decision would have been to accept their defeat and avoid the subsequent slavery and genocide carried out against their people. Thus, self-help is a moral duty and not just a practical necessity.

Realists, therefore, advise states to focus on material and strategic outcomes rather than the more conventional understanding of the morality of their actions. For instance, a realist like Henry Kissinger might advise bombing a neutral state such as Laos if it will serve the military goals of defeating the enemy of North Vietnam. Alternatively, a realist may also encourage having friendly relations with and support for governments with poor human rights records, such as Chile under the military rule of Augusto Pinochet, or arguably Pakistan under Musharraf, in order to secure an advantage against a military foe, such as the USSR or al-Qaeda. Thus, in dealing with states that practice human rights abuses, a statesperson must decide whether the human rights of foreigners outweigh the interests of even just one of their own citizens. The logic of realist thought suggests that the interests of one domestic citizen outweighs the human rights of foreigners. This means that not only do we tolerate but we also befriend 'bad' states, so long as we continue to gain from the relationship.

Only when there is no significant cost to oneself should a state be concerned with the domestic affairs of another state. John Mearsheimer, an 'offensive' realist, argues that only when there is no strategic interest at risk would it be advisable to intervene in, say, Rwanda to stop a genocide (Mearsheimer 2001). However, there is little from within realist logic to generate a policy of intervention for moral rather than strategic reasons. Strictly speaking, aid should only be given to another state when it is a strategic asset.

The logic of realism also means that we cannot be too concerned about any suffering or harm we might inflict upon other states, whether by commission or omission, as long as our own state is benefitting. If our interests outweigh the harm we do others, and they almost always do, then we must privilege our interests (see also Kennan 1986). Indeed, this is the argument of Madeleine Albright, former US Secretary of State under the Clinton administration. When asked on the US *60 Minutes,* 'We have heard that half a million children have died (as a result of economic sanctions imposed on Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War) . . ., is the price worth it?', Albright responded, 'I think that is a very hard choice,. . . the price is worth it' *(60 Minutes* 5 December 1996). In this context, a realist might argue that the sanctions against Iraq were justified and 'worth it' as they prevented Saddam Hussein from developing and using weapons of mass destruction, kept his regime weak, and preserved international stability and the national security of Iraq's enemies. This is a good end for the US and Iraq's enemies and, according to the realist argument, the fact that it brought about huge suffering to the people of Iraq is

a regrettable but necessary consequence if it serves the greater good of the US national interest. (From a Kantian perspective, Albright is clearly acting immorally because the price she refers to concerns the lives of others as a means to an end that entails punishing the Iraqi president and achieving US national interests.)

However, realists often confound expectations when it comes to their view of war as a tool of policy. While realists argue that a state must always be ready to use war, so long as other states also remain prepared to do so, they will often counsel caution in relation to specific wars. Realists advise against ideologically driven wars of conquest. Realists such as Morgenthau spoke out against the Vietnam War, because they saw it as unnecessary and imprudent, as this did not and could not strengthen the position of the US in the international realm. So, while countering and containing Soviet influence was a concern for realists during the Cold War, they argued that the threat was not ideological but geopolitical. One version of realist thinking made its way into US foreign policy under the influence of Henry Kissinger, US Secretary of State in the Nixon administration. Kissinger's policy of détente with China and the Soviet Union was premised on an understanding that China could be used to counter the USSR ('my enemy's enemy is my friend') and the recognition that the USSR could be viewed as a state with its own security interests, rather than an ideological foe bent on the destruction of the US. Likewise, in the months preceding the US invasion of Iraq in April 2003, the most consistent critics of US policy were realists such as John Mearsheimer who counselled that the strategy of containment via sanctions and the inspection regime had worked, and that Iraq presented no real threat to US vital national interests (Mearsheimer and Walt 2003). Most realists are sceptical about the Bush administration's aims of spreading democracy in the Middle East and the administration's claim that 'American values are universal values' (Lieven and Hulsman 2006). In this sense, the war was unnecessary from a realist point of view. The Iraq War was imprudent because the likely negative consequences outweighed the positives, and the war was not necessary for US survival. The point here is not that the realists are pacifist, but that they evaluate policy primarily in terms of the national interest and with an ethics of prudence.

For realists, the primary moral virtue for good statecraft is that of prudence, which involves the development of wisdom and knowledge about what is possible and what is not and, more importantly, about what are the best means for achieving one's ends. Morgenthau (1960: 10) states 'there can be no political morality without prudence, that is, without consideration of the political consequences of seemingly

moral action'. Prudence involves the weighing of the consequences of alternative political action. While the ultimate purpose, to pursue national interest, may be clear, what this means in particular contexts is a matter of judgement. In substantive terms, prudence may require a statesperson to make horrible decisions or decisions which go against common-sense morality, but the decision can be justified if made for the right reasons and with the right consequences of responsibility. The most obvious example here would be the universal moral law forbidding murder. Most people see murder as wrong and yet for a statesperson murder, in the form of warfare, is an acceptable and sometimes necessary tool for achieving a state's goal of security. In this sense, realists accept what is immoral in domestic life is acceptable and sometimes laudable in political life. While the critics say this can slip into opportunism, justifying almost any actions on ethical grounds, realists maintain that statesmen have a duty to their own people first and that ignoring these realities would be a dereliction of that duty.[2]

However, contrary to common belief, prudence does not mean a purely unprincipled or purely instrumental account of judgement and action in the sense that 'what will help me meet my aims most efficiently' is prudent. Rather, according to Murray (1996) and also Lieven and Hulsman (2006), prudence for Morgenthau, at least, refers to a process whereby the moral, or universal law, is mediated through the concrete practical here and now. A prudent realist might therefore ask whether there were also not other means of 'containing' Iraq and whether the suffering of the Iraqi people was not the best means of achieving the US ends. The weapons inspections regime may have been enough to prevent or at least seriously hamper Iraqi capacities. In this case, a realist may have seen the suffering of the Iraqi people as unnecessary. Realists may also have added that there may have been negative consequences for the US as a result of resentment against this policy. That is, Morgenthau would not necessarily condone the suffering of others if he understood that suffering to be out of balance or too great a violation of the moral law. For instance, Morgenthau argued that genocide was not a tool available to states within a realist morality. Thus, any pursuit of national interest can only be responsible if it also takes humanity into account. This understanding is clear in realism's continued opposition to 'thick' moral universalism or idealism. Such idealism is irresponsible not only because it damages the national interest, but because it is harmful to others who have legitimate interests of their own. Likewise, hubris and empire are not only dangerous to the nation-state but to the stability of the system as a whole.

Nonetheless, underlying realist ethics, especially for Morgenthau, is a profound sense of not only the political realm but also the human condition as essentially tragic. Tragedy is not used in the weak or commonplace sense that the TV news refers to the loss of a life as tragic, but rather in the classical sense, as depicted in the Greek plays or the classics, and in the work of Shakespeare (Lebow 2003). A tragedy here refers to a situation in which, no matter what choice you make, a bad consequence will occur. There is a sense here that politics, despite the best efforts of people, remains beyond human control. Realism identifies the international realm as tragic because it sees human beings as imperfect and imperfectible. We cannot entirely conquer our own nature and we can never have complete knowledge of the social world and the outcomes of our actions. Sometimes there is no option of a 'moral' or good choice. Only a choice between the lesser of two evils (if you are lucky) remains. For instance, the decision to drop an atomic bomb on Japan was, from one perspective at least, a tragic one - either risk losing lots of American lives taking the Japanese mainland, or kill more than 100,000 civilians in order to bring the war to a quick end. This is tragic in the sense that both alternatives were horrible but there was no escaping the decision to choose one of the alternatives. The notion of the security dilemma indicates this sense of tragedy very well. No matter which choice is made, security is not assured - you either have an arms race or a war. This means that we are constantly placed in situations where we have to assess which is the least bad action to take. Realist ethics, then, are an attempt to think about how to act well morally under these circumstances. They are an ethics of the least bad rather than a morality which seeks to articulate an absolute conception of the good.

Conclusions

Realism can be said to be communitarian and anti-cosmopolitan because it takes the nation-state as a given and argues for the ethical primacy of the national or state community. This is both a pragmatic and principled position. This position is pragmatic because realists aim to take the world as it is. It is principled because realist ethics are the best ethics available in terms of the reality of the world. Realists are also communitarians because the effect of adopting realist principles is to give primacy to the particular rather than universal, and because realists routinely express sympathy for the plurality of communities. While it is sometimes necessary to override other states'

interests, realists argue that it is generally a good thing that no state is able to do so all the time and impose its own account of universality. While never fully theorized in realist thought, this concern for diversity is almost always present. As Murray (1996: 101) notes, for Morgenthau, 'ultimately toleration and the acknowledgment of the right of the other to pursue an alternative conception of the good are asserted as fundamental moral necessities'.

Realists are vulnerable to the observation that not every choice faced by states is between survival and destruction. The realist objection that the state of nature determines the state's ethical choices only applies in instances in which state survival is at risk, or where following a particular ethical policy would place the state at real risk of dissolution, or leave a population open to real harm.

However, for many states, and in particular the wealthiest states, such conditions exist only intermittently and are often restricted to certain issues. Given that most of the time states do not face life-threatening consequences to themselves if they choose to act ethically, the realist argument against international ethics only holds under certain extreme circumstances (see Beitz 1979 and Moellendorf 2002). Though it is true that most states face choices that will have consequences that affect their interests, these consequences do not normally affect a state's ability to exist or survive. Many decisions, rather, are between advantage or disadvantage. It does not stand to reason that seeking advantage allows the statesperson to opt out of conventional morality in the same way that survival might. The context is similar for individuals and their ethical choices. Ethics is about considering individual costs and benefits, and determining at what point one's own interests should take priority over the interests of others and vice versa.

The central ethical question that emerges from realist analyses of the nature of international politics is whether it is ethically irresponsible for the realist statesperson to direct foreign policy towards transforming the logic of the international system, so that the logic of realpolitik is less or no longer pervasive. The arguments above suggest that realism directs foreign policy towards managing the status quo rather than transforming the international environment. However, it is worth noting that both Morgenthau and Carr suggested that human survival will require overcoming the logic of anarchy, and the replacement or supplementation of the idea of state sovereignty (see Morgenthau 1949; Carr 1939).

While realism is consistent with nationalism, realists themselves are often opposed to nationalism, both as an ethical stance and because of its pernicious effects, many preferring to use the term patriotism

I i. v. n -iful Hulsman 2006). Morgenthau (1949) and Carr (1939) **m particular both** made statements to suggest they did not view the **national state** as the ultimate form of political community. Indeed, **these** theorists saw nationalism as a negative development which **would** contribute to international disorder, precisely because it exacerbated 'centrifugal' tendencies already present in anarchy. National survival may rest on the possibility of pursuing piecemeal and gradual reform of the international order in a cosmopolitan direction. Morgenthau's comments in his chapters on international morality and the concluding pages of *Politics Among Nations* (1948/1960) suggest that ultimately human well-being can only be served by the creation of a cosmopolitan world-society or world-state. A realist ethics of responsibility could be understood as aiming for the latter because pursuit of the national interest should always occur within the framework of the good of humanity. Such an argument has recently been made by Lieven and Hulsman (2006). However, it is not clear that these types of claim are either inherent in realism or simply reflect the limitations of realism as a complete political philosophy (on the latter, see Carr 1939).

In conclusion, while realism is often associated with realpolitik and the narrow pursuit of national interest, it is also concerned with the creation of a stable international order. Such an order is a prerequisite for the security and stability of the communities which make it up. As Gvosdev argues, 'realism's emphasis on making the world's nations . . . stakeholders in a stable and predictable international order intersects with the communitarian interest in constructing a viable global architecture' (2005: 1593; see also Wesley 2005). However, the ethics associated with this are perhaps more fully developed in the pluralist idea of an international society, which is addressed in the next section.

Pluralism: ethics of coexistence

Because communitarians value community and diversity, they recognize that the many ways in which individuals are formed in different cultures is a good thing in itself. Therefore, they argue that the best ethics is one which preserves diversity over homogeneity. This view lends itself to the idea of pluralism. Pluralists contrast the universalism of cosmopolitan visions with the idea of a heterogeneous world, in which each community pursues their own conceptions of the good life. Such a world is the world envisioned and defended by pluralist

anti-cosmopolitans. Pluralism has a number of expressions. For our purposes, we can distinguish between nationalist, statist and non-statist pluralism. What they have in common is that they are 'oriented to the pre-existing group, and likely to ascribe to each individual a primary identity within a single community of descent. . . [and their] concern to protect and perpetuate the cultures of groups that are already established' (Hollinger 2002: 231). Communitarians claim that particular norms and cultures are to be valued and protected, and any imposition of universal standards is a denial of integrity or group autonomy.

Pluralists such as David Miller and Michael Walzer claim that 'strong' or 'thick' cosmopolitanism requires the universalization of a particular account of the good and the overriding of particular under-standings and 'shared ways of life', and this is unjust. For Walzer, justice exists precisely in the preservation of the different moral 'spheres' of human activity. Walzer (1983: 314) claims that because 'Justice is rooted in the distinct understanding of places, honours, jobs, things of all sorts that constitute a shared way of life. To over-ride those understandings is (always) to act unjustly.' To impose a single universal standard is unjustifiable, because no such standard exists, and harmful, because it forces people to conform to standards they might not share and punishes them for not conforming to those standards.

Nonetheless, the anti-cosmopolitan argument cannot function without a belief in human equality, however this value is expressed in the context of the 'thick' national communities we grow up in. For instance, the claim for national self-determination is one form of the claim that we can only be free in the context of national community. Equality needs to be understood as equality between communi-ties that in turn serve the interest of their individual members (see Kymlicka 2001). For communitarians, equality and humanity are expressed in difference and identity. To be human is to have a culture, and to belong to a community less than the species is to identify with one's community of origin or belonging. Therefore, the way to realize this goal is to preserve and recognize these cultural differences. In this context, Walzer argues that the duty to recognize different cultures as equal but different is a universal duty.

The pluralist account offers us a particular reconciliation of these two values that relies on a degree of universalism. Walzer (1994: 8) wishes to advocate 'the politics of difference and, at the same time, to describe and defend a certain sort of universalism'. He claims to be able to identify a certain minimal universalism, with the observa-tion that 'the members of all the different societies, because they are

human can acknowledge each other's different ways, respond to each other's cries for help, learn from each other and march (sometimes) in each other's parades' (1994: 8).

Pluralism and nationalism

Nationalism is the belief that we all belong to nations and that this community has special claims upon our moral obligations. It is arguably the everyday understanding held by most people. It certainly underwrites the political structure of the world, as can be seen in the very ideas of national self-determination, national sovereignty and the United Nations. However, nationalism is not coterminous with communitarianism. There are as many communitarianisms as there are nationalisms, and communitarianism does not necessarily have to designate the nation as the relevant community. Religious, sub-national and other communities could be as - if not more than - influential as the nation. Nonetheless, nationalism is perhaps the most common political expression of communitarian premises.

Most accounts of nationalism which address the international realm envision a pluralist world of nation-states. This is what Miller juxtaposes to the liberal cosmopolitan view which he claims 'implies a world state with a single distributive scheme and single homogenous citizenry' (2002: 976). That is irreconcilable with 'a world of diversity in which the variety of national cultures finds expression in different sets of citizenship rights, and different schemes of social justice, in each community' (ibid.).

Defences of nationalism identity the nation as the community in which universal values such as equality and liberty and justice can be expressed. Many nationalist and anti-cosmopolitan writers today seem to operate within the spirit but not the letter of Hegelian thought, in that they interpret the state based on Herderian rather than Hegelian principles. The Herderian state is closer to a romantic view of the relationship between community, culture and tradition, rather than an Enlightenment view focused on reason, freedom and individuality. Modern communitarians tend to identify the state with the community in practice, if not in theory, and, even though they defend individuality, they defend the cultural, national sources of individuality rather than the state as guarantor of freedom and individualism.

Mervyn Frost, for example, is much more Hegelian than communitarians such as MacIntyre and Walzer (Frost 1996, 2002). David

Miller distinguishes between the nation and the state and emphasizes that national ties are what provide our cultural frameworks (Miller 1995). This makes him closer to Herder than Hegel. What they do share is a view that insofar as there are any moral universals, it is the duty of nation-states to uphold them internally, and then only in exceptional circumstance in other countries (genocide, for instance).

Nationalists vary in their views about what duties are owed between nations. While they are united in rejecting 'global egalitarianism' and 'liberal cosmopolitanism', they do not wish to reject all moral universals. Will Kymlicka and David Miller both defend the nation in liberal terms such as individual rights and freedoms, but also recognize the cultural assumptions necessary to secure commitment to those values. For liberal nationalists, basic individual rights trump community identity but they can only be realized within national communities (Miller 2000: 181). Kymlicka understands nationalism as a corrective to cosmopolitanism rather than an alternative (Kymlicka 2001). David Miller's defence of nationalism is less indebted to liberalism and therefore more hostile to liberal cosmopolitanism, though he does accept that nations have universal duties to secure the welfare of their members and to uphold basic human rights everywhere (Miller 1995, 2007; see chapter 7 for further discussion).

Nationalists identify the right of self-determination as a positive universal good, with it following, therefore, that there is some duty to support national self-determination in other countries (and not just one's own). Of course, in its most pathological forms, nationalism can lead to a hierarchical conception of the relationship between nations (e.g., Nazism), but for the most part contemporary nationalists emphasize equality between nations. The identification of the nation as the vehicle for moral universalism also finds expression in the doctrine of natural duties in the next section.

Rawls's non-statist pluralism

The most philosophically rigorous account of a non-statist pluralist ethics has been developed by John Rawls (1999) as *The Law of Peoples,* though Rawls is most famous for his *Theory of Justice* (1972). As discussed previously, many cosmopolitan theorists have adapted the theory of justice to the international setting. However, Rawls himself resisted and rejected this move. The theory of justice, he argued, must rely upon an existing reflective equilibrium amongst competing fundamental doctrines, or where there is an overlapping

consensus of core values around which principles of egalitarianism can cohere. Rawls argued that a system of global justice was neither possible nor desirable because the preconditions of reflective equilibrium and overlapping consensus were absent from the international realm (Rawls 1999). Rawls further endorsed the communitarian argument that the conception of the moral person upon which his theory is based is not uncontested, and therefore moral universalism is problematic.

In the original position, the contractors are rational individuals (Rawls 1972). However, for the international realm he argues that a second contracting session ought to take place, this time with the rules being chosen by representatives of peoples who are just. In this second round of bargaining, the representatives of peoples are not given any information about where their population lives, what quantity of natural resources they have, what income or wealth they have or how they compare to other societies. The conclusion of this second round is a contract that by and large resembles the traditional rules of international society and diplomacy. These include rules of self-determination, Just War, mutual recognition, non-intervention and so forth.

In other words, on the international level, contractors come up with a set of rules of coexistence, not rules of justice, though Rawls argues they are the equivalent of the first principle - free and equal rights coextensive with the same rights for all. However, while the existence or non-existence of a shared language or culture places limits on the possibility for a universal community, these limits are not absolute. Rawls earlier identified minimal or 'natural' duties that apply to all humans as 'the duty to help another when he *(sic)* is in need or jeopardy provided that one can do so without excessive risk or loss to oneself (mutual aid); the duty not to harm or injure another . . . [and] the duty not to inflict unnecessary suffering' (1972: 114). In addition, there was a duty to 'support and to comply with just institutions that exist and apply to us . . . [and] to further just arrangements not yet established' (1972: 115). For Rawls, these natural duties exist independently of any social contract we might be party to or any moral or ethical commitments we have made as individuals, and they apply universally to us as humans (for further discussion, see Kokaz 2007).

In addition, Rawls argued that the international realm does not resemble a system for mutual advantage. Controversially, he proposed that states or societies ought to be considered to be largely self-sufficient with only minor interaction of any moral significance. Societies are to be understood in isolation, as if they have only

minimal impact upon each other and are only minimally bound together by webs of interdependence. As a result, the best that can be hoped for is not a theory of justice but a theory of international legitimacy and coexistence, a 'law of peoples', which covers rules of coexistence between liberal and other decent peoples.

The rules of international coexistence that Rawls comes up with in *The Law of Peoples* (1999) are as follows:

> People are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are to be respected by other peoples.
>
> Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings.
>
> Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention.
>
> Peoples have the right of self-defence but no right to instigate war for reasons other than self-defence.
>
> Peoples are to honour human rights.
>
> Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war.
>
> Peoples have a duty to assist other people living under unfavourable conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime (mutual aid).

Although he doesn't mention them in *The Law of Peoples,* natural duties inform the account of mutual aid here (Kokaz 2007). Mutual aid is provided only to enable a people to develop and enjoy a well-ordered society. It is not clear whether this is a duty because a well-ordered society is what everybody deserves, or because it allows a functioning *modus vivendi,* which is necessary for liberal societies to remain well-ordered. Kokaz claims that mutual aid is defended by Rawls as a condition of sociability: without it there can be no society, not even a society of peoples (Kokaz 2007). However, while the representatives of decent societies can agree on mutual aid, they are not capable of agreeing on principles of distributive justice or global egalitarianism; nor are they required to.

The obvious question provoked by the inclusion of natural duties is: how can even this minimal moral universalism be defended from communitarian premises? There are two possible sources that can be used to answer this question. The first is the tradition of natural law, and the second is the work of Immanuel Kant. The idea of natural duties could perhaps be derived from the idea of natural law, which David Boucher (1998) identifies as one of the main traditions of international political thought. According to Boucher, normative thought in international relations is best characterized as divided between empirical realism, universal moral order (natural law) and historical reason. Boucher's categories provide a useful addition to the cosmopolitan/anti-cosmopolitan framework because they allow

us to highlight another aspect of anti-cosmopolitan thought that is not inherited directly from the presuppositions of Herder and Hegel.

According to Boucher, natural law thinking is an expression of the idea of a universal moral order. Natural law thinking attempts to identify certain universal moral principles or laws, which all humans have access to via the use of reason (see also Nardin 2002b). Martin Wight describes natural law as a 'belief in a cosmic, moral constitution, appropriate to all conscious things, a system of eternal and immutable principles radiating from a source that transcends earthly power' (Wight 1991: 14). The idea of natural law aims to identify basic moral categories that are not culturally dependent. Natural law theorists argue that cultural differences do not prevent the recognition of a universal moral order. These basic moral categories are necessarily thin, yet binding and substantive. Freedom of commerce, travel, right of private property, mutual assistance and, above all, to do no harm are fairly consistently included in the list of natural laws. In some variants, natural law thinking includes certain cosmopolitan elements and emphasizes individual duties and rights, while in others natural law develops into a statist code of coexistence. Samuel Pufendorf is generally cited as the epitome of the statist tradition (Devetak 2007), while Kant's cosmopolitanism clearly sits at the cosmopolitan end.

Walzer has offered a defence of his 'minimal moral universalism' in terms of thick and thin cosmopolitanism. This defence includes a claim that mutual aid or something like it can be identified 'in different times and places . . . even though (it is) expressed in different idioms and reflects different histories and different versions of the world' (Walzer 1994: 17). However, on other occasions, Walzer has explicitly invoked Rawls's conception of natural duties as providing 'one positive moral duty' which extends beyond frontiers (see Walzer 1981, 2003b). Miller, on the other hand, defends his more complex notion of a basic global minimum 'humanitarianism', and of basic human rights, on what he calls an 'empirical' grounding in human suffering and need (Miller 2007). It is possible that Walzer, Miller, Jackson and others might claim natural law as the source of their endorsement of mutual aid.

Rawls himself defended mutual aid as one of his natural duties and he did so on broadly Kantian grounds rather than natural law. For Rawls, the natural duty of mutual aid is consistent with the categorical imperative (CI) and indeed Rawls recognizes that in a way Kant is trying to provide a rational foundation for the earlier natural law principle. For Kant, it was defended based on human reason and not on the capacity to suffer:

as a person's true needs are those which must be met if he is to function (or continue to function) as a rational, end-setting agent. Respecting the humanity of others involves acknowledging the duty of mutual aid: one must be prepared to support the conditions of the rationality of others (their capacity to set and act for ends) when they are unable to do so without help. The duty to develop (not neglect) one's talents and the duty of mutual aid are thus duties of respect for persons. (Herman 1984: 597)

Herman argues that Rawls attempts a different grounding from Kant and derives his mutual aid principle from the method of the original position. Contractors behind the veil of ignorance would agree on this rule, including applying it to non-contractors, again from rational calculations of interests. Therefore, Rawls argues that the principle of mutual aid holds universally across borders and to all humans.

If we take Kantian premises rather than natural law as the source of Rawls's natural duties, it is clear that the idea of natural duties extends directly from Kantian arguments rather than communitarian premises. Thus, when Rawls and subsequently communitarians such as Walzer invoke natural duties, they are implicitly at least invoking Kantian moral universalism. The implications of this will be returned to in the remaining chapters of this book.

In conclusion, Rawls's inclusion of cosmopolitan elements such as human rights and natural duties contributes to the case for inclusion of cosmopolitan principles as foundations of international order, even if these principles are not fully fledged or institutionalized. This has led some critics to dismiss his *Law of Peoples* as just another version of liberal imperialism or indeed cosmopolitanism (see Jackson 2005; Mouffe 2006). However, the criticism of Rawls levelled by liberal cosmopolitans is that he is not liberal enough, and that it is possible to extend his account to the international in a way he is unwilling to do (see chapters 2 and *7)*.

Rawls's account in *The Law of Peoples* is consistent with his own earlier account in *Theory of justice.* While Beitz may be correct that the international sphere is interconnected enough to count as a system of social cooperation, what the international sphere does not have in Rawls's terms is an overlapping consensus. Therefore, what Rawls attempts is an account of liberal justice that liberals can live with, without having to fully liberalize the international realm and thereby violate a liberal principle of toleration and pluralism. In this way, a decent liberal state should not try to, and has no duty to, globalize its conception of distributive justice. Thus, even though cosmopolitan elements are present, Rawls's position is anti-cosmopolitan overall because, as Wenar (2006: 3) argues, for Rawls, individuals cannot

be the focus of a global theory under conditions of pluralism and anarchy. Rawls's view of justice will be returned to in chapter 7.

Pluralism and statism: the international society of states

Rawls's list of liberal duties to other states owes a lot to writers such as Terry Nardin (1983), who work in the international society tradition of statist pluralism, or the English school (see Linklater and Suganami 2006). Nationalism and the law of peoples refer to two expressions of communitarian ethics which focus on the cultural or sociological level. Statist pluralism pursues the political expression of these ideas.

As we have seen, non-statist pluralism does not necessarily equate political/cultural community with the state which is seen as an administrative apparatus which governs but does not necessarily reflect or embody the values and traditions of a political community. In this view, the state is analytically distinguished from the nation (Miller 1995) or peoples (Rawls 1999), or simply political community (Walzer 1983). There is a variety of reasons for making this sort of distinction. The most obvious one is that not every state reflects a single nation or people. However, while this may be analytically the case, when it comes to the political realm most observers argue that it makes little sense to talk of political communities in the contemporary world without reference to the state because the state has become the single model of legitimate *political* association. In its statist form, anti-cosmopolitan pluralism is expressed in the Grotian idea that states form an international society and not just an international system (see Bull 1966, 1977). Statist pluralists argue that any obligations to humanity are best mediated through states and through the society of states.

While many anti-cosmopolitans such as Walzer and Miller fit Boucher's category of historical reason (Hegelianism), these same authors are 'Grotian' or pluralist in their understanding of the morality of international life. In his discussion of Just War, for example, Walzer (1977) appears to endorse a statist understanding of international law.

For our purposes, it is the statist pluralist argument and the distinction between pluralist and solidarist accounts of international society that is of most relevance. Terry Nardin (1983) claims that the society of states is a 'practical' association of those 'who are associated with one another, if at all, only in respecting certain restrictions on how

each may pursue his own purposes' (Nardin 1983: 9). This type of association covers those areas concerned with the rule of law and standards of conduct entailing 'a set of considerations to be taken into account in deciding and acting' or rules of engagement (Nardin 1983: 6).

In contrast, purposive association is concerned with pursuing common and shared goals such as a trade union might do. Nardin (1983) himself draws on the work of Michael Oakeshott for this distinction. In Nardin's pluralist ethics, 'the nature of international society is such that all-inclusive association can only be practical' (1983: 215). In such an association the objective is merely to keep the various purposive associations apart. Indeed, it was precisely because the universal moral consensus of Christendom was fracturing and the legitimacy of the Catholic Church was in doubt that the Treaty of Westphalia was instituted and the society of sovereign states brought into being. In Bull's terms, the Treaty of Westphalia was a compact of coexistence designed to overcome the breakdown in consensus regarding the legitimacy of the Church's temporal role.

In international society, pluralism is contrasted with solidarism, which is another name for what Nardin called a purposive international society. Solidarism is different from pluralism because it goes beyond an ethics of pure tolerance and raises the standards by which tolerance is accepted (see Bull 1966). Solidarism contains elements of cosmopolitan ethics because it makes sovereignty conditional upon treatment of individuals (Nardin 1983; Brown 1992). Pluralists are sceptical about the use of human rights in diplomacy as it gives some states the opportunity to deny others their sovereignty (Jackson 2000), while humanitarian intervention in emergencies which offend the 'conscience of humankind' can occasionally be defended (Walzer 1977, 2004).

The absence of centralized law enforcement in international society means that any collaborative action requires a high degree of consensus amongst the sovereign autonomous members of international society. It was only when such consensus existed that effective action was possible in relation to issues such as the sanctioning of the apartheid regime in South Africa (Bull 1983).

However, for the most part, such a consensus is lacking between states. This position essentially holds that the absence of a genuine moral consensus in international society means that the morality or legitimacy of any claim to universal morality is suspect. A lack of consensus on substantive normative or ethical questions makes it difficult for the members of international society to act in a concerted fashion.

Pluralists resist attempts to develop a more solidarist world in which principles of human rights are enforced and humanitarian

intervention is institutionalized. Instead, for pluralists, what is required is a toleration of a plurality of cultures. If we have any international obligations to those beyond our borders, it is an obligation to refrain from imposing a particular conception of the good life, a particular culture, or a particular ethical morality upon others. In this view, sovereignty is an ethical principle and not just a *modus vivendi,* which allows states and the different cultures they harbour to exist alongside each other. Likewise, pluralism does not advocate universal distributive justice, either as a practical possibility or as a moral good in itself because it requires the imposition of a specific, usually liberal, account of justice upon other cultures. According to pluralists, the primary ethical responsibility of the statesperson is to maintain order and peace between states, not develop a global account of justice.

Pluralists are cautious about undoing the compact of coexistence by holding up states to scrutiny for their human rights records because there is no international consensus strong enough to justify this, and the effect of acting as if there were would be to undermine the capacity of international society to maintain order. In Bull's words, 'the rules of coexistence serve to maintain order in an international society in which a consensus does not exist in normal circumstances about much else besides these rules' (1977: 157). A solidarist international society goes beyond coexistence by adopting shared goals, such as justice, defence of human rights and practices of armed intervention in defence of these shared purposes. The ability of international society to move in a solidarist direction will depend on the degree to which they reflect a consensus amongst its members (Bull 1977; Wheeler and Dunne 1996). Bull argued that:

> the interests of order are not served ... if in the situation in which no such consensus actually exists and the international society is divided into contending groups, one of these groups claims to represent the consensus and act as if it does . . . the result is that the traditional rules which assume a lack of consensus are undermined. (1977: 157)

Therefore, sovereignty and pluralism are the most appropriate ethical responses to cultural diversity and normative disagreement. Pluralism recognizes that states have different ethics but can agree upon a framework whereby they tolerate each other, do not impose their own views upon others and agree on certain limited harm principles. R. J. Vincent (1986) has described this as the 'egg box' conception of international society where 'The general function of international society is to separate and cushion, not to act.' In international society, states acknowledge that domestic conceptions of the good are not necessarily shared and, more importantly, can only

be secured by a pact of coexistence between these competing conceptions to guarantee freedom from undue outside influence. Thus, international society is the means by which different particular cultures maintain their separateness. This allows them to feel reasonably secure and to go about their business in relative peace.

The pluralist view is that the obligations of states are those of states rather than individuals. In the pluralist view, this is a moral community in which the members make laws and develop norms to govern their actions. There is a global social contract, or covenant, between states (see Bull 1979; Frost 1996; and Jackson 2000). Obviously, the most important of these agreements is that of sovereignty. The appropriate moral realm, and ethical vocabulary, is that of state, sovereignty and international law. Sovereignty imposes moral obligations upon members of international society to respect each other's independence, to avoid war against each other and to uphold and defend the rules of international society (see chapter 6). These obligations, however, apply only to states, as they are the contractors.

Very few pluralist writers today defend a pure ethics of coexistence and most concede that human rights should form part of the norms of international society. For instance, Mervyn Frost (1996) views human rights as essential to an ethical society of states, Robert Jackson (2000) includes them in his account of a pluralist international society, and John Rawls cited human rights as a basis for the liberal 'law of peoples'. Michael Walzer endorses the 'morality of states' in some cases (Just War, see chapter 6) and initially characterizes international society as a regime of toleration (1997), but has in later work (1994: 11) argued that 'We can (and should) defend some minimal understanding of human rights and seek its universal enforcement' (though this statement contradicts his earlier argument above). Likewise, Miller provides a strong case for a global basic standard based on fulfilment of basic rights (2007; chapter 7).

Nonetheless, what ultimately unites anti-cosmopolitans is scepticism about moral progress, a normative defence of the status quo, and the division of humanity into separate political and moral communities. Anti-cosmopolitans reject efforts to transform the *political* structure of the world to bring it more into line with any universalist account. Moral universalism is both misguided and pernicious; therefore it follows that there is no duty to institutionalize cosmopolitan principles within the current international order or to transform the contemporary world order in the way envisioned by cosmopolitans. At best, with regard to international ethics, the traditions discussed in this chapter only incorporate a duty to act on principles of natural duty, minimal or basic rights, and to maintain order.

Problems with anti-cosmopolitanism

With the combination of the condition of international anarchy, practical problems of normative pluralism, and the defence of diversity, anti-cosmopolitans present a significant case for defending particularist values and arguing against cosmopolitanism. Drawing on communitarian critiques of liberalism, the anti-cosmopolitan traditions of realism and pluralism make some very important observations on the limits of universalism in the international realm. Communitarian objections indicate that many universalist accounts, especially liberalism, rely upon certain assumptions and forms of reasoning that are problematic. The liberal account of agency, which depicts a uniform and idealized account of human beings, is problematic and too substantive to be the basis of a genuine universal ethic. Likewise, some forms of universalism do appear to be 'hostile' or inconsistent with substantive moral/cultural pluralism. The universalization of a Rawlsian account of justice, as understood by Beitz or Moellendorf, does indeed appear to require overriding alternative interpretations of fairness. Insofar as the anti-cosmopolitan critique is directed towards liberal cosmopolitanism, then the charge of indifference to the plural conceptions of the good has some purchase.

Nevertheless, whether or not these observations undermine cosmopolitanism as a whole, as many particularists claim, is debatable. The most important thing about the communitarian critique of cosmopolitanism is the desire to resist homogenization and to acknowledge the diversity of moral cosmologies. The question for cosmopolitans in response is to ask whether these values are necessarily or only contingently in conflict with universalism, and whether they override universal duties to the individual or not?

Cosmopolitans point out several flaws in pluralism and anti-cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitans, especially liberal cosmopolitans, have faith in reason as the provider of objective, or at least grounded accounts of ethics and morality. For cosmopolitans, this gives their account an authority, and ultimately justifies its universalism. In order to be coherent, communitarianism or pluralism must also be situated within a form of universalism.

Communitarians also make certain foundational claims regarding truth, the most important of which involves the provision of meaning by culture, which is also the source of ethics and identity. As a consequence of this observation, communitarians argue that different cultures ought to be preserved and defended. However, pluralists can't make this case without violating or substantially surrendering

certain aspects of their case about the nature of moral knowledge, and adopting certain universalist premises such as equality, or the universal importance of defending different cultures. That is, despite the relativistic implication of the communitarian position that norms are culturally dependent, writers such as Miller, Walzer and Frost all tend to make certain foundational claims about their position's objectivity or truthfulness. Cochran argues that communitarians proceed 'as if their weak foundations yield non-contingent ethical claims' (1999: 16) or, while they claim weak foundations, they reason as if these foundations are strong. Anti-cosmopolitans operate as if their argument - that it is always wrong to override particular understandings - is non-contingent, and can be grounded and defended universally. If this is the case, then the anti-cosmopolitan argument is also culturally particular and cannot claim a universal status; it cannot claim to be true in any trans-historical or moral sense. Why, then, should cosmopolitans accept its arguments as having universal significance?

The question to ask at this stage is: what claim to truth can any ethics make? Is it possible to provide firm foundations for ethical judgements, and for judgement between judgements? The justifications provided for anti-cosmopolitan concessions to universalism are either very thin or, more seriously, fundamentally contradict other premises of their arguments. This prompts another question: if some universalism is okay, why not more? The answers to this can only be pragmatic once universalism is conceded, that is, they can rest only upon contingent and not absolute claims. If universalism is a violation of community priority, then how can communitarians accept any universalism? On what basis do communitarians accept minimal human rights or natural duties? Is it because such rights are already agreed upon? If so, then communitarians are conceding to the fact that universal agreement is possible. If that is the case, communitarians must be able to explain why we ought not move towards more agreement. If it is possible or acceptable to hold that no one ought to be denied their right to live, to housing or to basic standards of human decency, then why is it also not possible to argue that no one ought to be denied the right to speak freely or marry the person of their own choosing? (Miller 2007 is the exception in that he does provide a clear position on exactly these questions, though one in which rather a lot of ground is conceded to cosmopolitanism.) The communitarian's best defence is that there is, at present, no consensus on these issues. This only begs the question: why not develop or pursue such a consensus?[3]

Another criticism is that pluralists reify communities. Be it nations or states, communitarians or pluralists assume that communities are relatively coherent and that diversity does not exist (or is at least

managed) within communities. Pluralists tend to see communities as organic beings that are in some sense natural and singular. This is ironic because one of the critiques of cosmopolitans shared by communitarians and pluralists is that cosmopolitans idealize humans and do not pay attention to particular human beings. Nevertheless, pluralists tend to ignore particularities or to dismiss the existence of disagreement within communities and the historical ways in which the so-called consensus or shared norms of political communities rely upon historical domination or assimilation. Pluralists are unable to provide reasons why intra-community disagreement is in any way substantively different from inter-community disagreement. Likewise, if domination and assimilation are bad between communities, then why ought they be acceptable 'within' communities? Pluralists can only defend their point of view if they think there is something special about the national state. However, for many other pluralists who are less Hegelian, no such argument is forthcoming. Walzer and Rawls pretend that states do not matter or even exist; they talk of people and communities. And yet it is the national state that exists today as the most powerful form of communal affiliation in history.

The pluralist idealization of the national state is compounded by a general inability and unwillingness to address the existence of inter-dependence between communities. There is both a normative and empirical point to be made here. The first empirical point is that communities today are intertwined with other communities in increasingly complex ways. This means it is harder for communities to be conceptualized as 'autarkic'. Yet this is precisely what theorists like Rawls insist upon (again, Miller is the exception to this; see his 2007).

Many anti-cosmopolitans treat communities as if they were self-sufficient. There are two problems with this. Communities are not coherent singular identities, and treating them as if they were self-sufficient results in a refusal to deal with the impacts that communities have upon each other. This is one of the most profound failings of pluralist accounts. Even if we accept that communities are largely singular in identity, we cannot accept that they are autarkic or that they have no impacts upon outsiders. Even the act of defining a border of a nation-state, for example, often affects those not included within the border (see chapter 4).

Thus, given that most states engage in international trade and commerce, travel and so on, communitarians must ask what obligations if any the members of these communities have to outsiders. However, as we have examined in this chapter, many pluralists limit these moral or ethical obligations to the minimum. Rawls's *Law of Peoples,* for instance, provides little or no guidance for thinking about the ethics

of global warming, or even of economic growth, in situations where domestic activity has profound impacts on those outside the borders.

If pluralists are to be taken at face value, they must hold either that economics is outside the realm of the moral, or that states should seek to reduce the amount of interaction they have with each other. Communitarian ethics also imply a right of closure to outside influences. Communities have the right to maintain their identities by restricting access to these communities (see Walzer, and the next chapter on refugees). The implication is that almost any interaction with outsiders will constitute a harm done to the community. This includes actions we domestically might consider to be beneficial to our own community, resulting from the interaction with outsiders, such as trade or exposure to another's culture through literature, television or film. (This line of thought conforms to realist understandings of interdependence as a cause of conflict and not a way of overcoming it.)

From this reification of communities, it follows that pluralists emphasize states' rights, but not their responsibilities (again, Miller has done the most to redress this imbalance). It is for this reason that Buchannan (2000) referred to Rawls's *Law of Peoples* as 'rules for a vanishing Westphalian world'. Pluralists have been outstripped by reality in that the world they defend no longer exists. This causes particular problems because they claim pluralism's grounding in 'reality' contrasts with the idealism of cosmopolitanism, yet the pluralists conception of reality is contentious. In this vein, cosmopolitans and solidarists argue that a strict ethics of coexistence is simply out of date and can actually be harmful, as the scope for intercommunity harm has increased exponentially with globalization and the interconnectedness of communities (see Hurrell 2007). Most cosmopolitans argue that an 'egg box' ethics is not enough under conditions of globalization.

Perhaps most importantly, while pluralists serve individual interests through defending their membership in communities, they tend also to give power to the community over individuals. Does the human right to belong to a group mean that group rights may override individual human rights, opening the way to condoning behaviour and practices that harm individuals? Thus, for pluralists, if a community has the belief that women are second-class citizens with restricted rights and duties, then it is the overall right of their community to self-determination rather than the individual rights of women that trumps here. In this example, the community overrides the individual. In other words, there are some circumstances where it is communities per se that are the relevant or even basic subject of morality rather than individuals.

Although this assumption is not always entirely clear in

anti-cosmopolitan writing, it is a clear implication. For example, Walzer (1983) condones the moral priority of the community over the individual with regard to the cases of refugees, of non-combatant immunity and supreme emergency (see chapters 4 and 7). Pluralists find themselves caught in a contradiction when they argue that individuals are best served by the norms of their community even when that community might not recognize those individuals as bearers of equal moral worth. The position of women in many cultures provides a clear example here (for an illuminating discussion, see Nussbuam 1995). Pluralists implicitly give little hope to women everywhere who seek to challenge those practices of their own culture which harm or exclude women from equal moral consideration. If a group of women has no resources with which to argue for this, then communitarianism implies that women in those communities ought to accept their lot. Communitarians are also incapable of demonstrating how those women are best served by that community (Nussbaum 2007; Nussbaum and Glover 1995). This is, of course, the position that ultimately defines cosmopolitans differently from anti-cosmopolitans.

Cosmopolitans are not willing to make the claim that the community should in some cases come before the individual. According to cosmopolitanism, it is the individual who is the moral agent and the moral subject and who therefore ought to be the focus of moral concern. To make the claim that group rights can override individual rights, it must follow that the individual would be better off having been overridden, for the value of community can only lie in its utility for individual members. Without this premise, we could end up accepting all sorts of suffering and harm on the grounds that they are community endorsed or expressions of a right of communal self-determination. One of the advantages of cosmopolitan thought, along with the idea of impartiality, is that it protects individuals from abuse by their own culture.

Conclusion

One of the most important criticisms of nationalism is that, in the words of Voltaire, it makes its adherents 'the enemy of humankind'. For cosmopolitans, communitarianism presents this type of threat. If we are to accept their moral epistemology and ontology are we not condemned to make ourselves the enemy of humankind? The challenge for cosmopolitanism is to defend a form of moral universalism that can incorporate this recognition, and the challenge for

anti-cosmopolitanism is to accommodate the legitimate needs of universalism so that we don't become enemies to each other.

Any defence of cosmopolitan ethics must address the issues arising from the attempt to enact a universal moral realm in a situation where universalism is either contested or simply lacking. The existence of ethical pluralism means that we cannot assume that everybody else will act according to the same ethical framework, either in relationship to each other or to us. In other words, we cannot assume a universal ethical and moral framework.

Additionally, if it is not possible to identify any morally meaningful qualities (such as the capacity for 'rationality') that are common to all humans, then the cosmopolitan community guided by universal rules that all agree to cannot come into being. It is worth noting, however, that anti-cosmopolitanism is not a necessary conclusion to be drawn from communitarian premises; a number of accounts of moral universalism and cosmopolitan have been derived from this starting point (see, for instance, Kung 1990; Etzioni 2004; Shapcott 2001). These accounts all argue that the contextual origins of moral thought does not prevent the emergence, development and even agreement upon some moral universals, as long as these are developed dialogically.

The point to be taken from the communitarian argument is not that universalism is impossible, but that acting ethically is difficult. While normative pluralism certainly makes the making and enforcing of laws more difficult, and also makes it harder to be confident of the morality of one's decisions, it does not render these impossible. Similarly, as individuals, many of us assume that we share some values and not others with different people. This usually means that we tolerate this diversity or that we seek to understand another's position before we act or pass judgement upon them. The most obvious example in contemporary Western societies is the difference between secular liberal values and orthodox Islamic practices, especially in relation to women. The presence of differences is not considered to relieve us of our ethical obligations, or of the idea that we should treat people ethically; it only makes these obligations and ideas more complex, and subject to reflection and modification.

In other words, within the context discussed above, what it means to treat someone ethically is problematized but not undermined, even in situations where not everyone agrees that all people (such as women, in the example above) should be treated as equals. For example, we can imagine a situation where a slave might believe that they are unequal, but we recognize them as equal and treat them as such. We would feel bad to treat them as unequal, regardless of

what they believe. At the same time, we would need to be sensitive to the conditions of the slave's life; they might suffer punishment if we encouraged them to act as though they were not a slave. But this would not relieve us of the duty to view the slave as worthy of moral respect (up to and including the possibility of ending their status as a slave). The point is that, for those of us who are concerned about acting ethically, the existence of other people with different ethical frameworks does not mean that we should automatically throw up our hands and think we are no longer required to treat them well, i.e., as ends in themselves. It only means that to treat someone well is made more difficult. The same conceptual framework or idea applies to states. If we believe in human rights and incorporate them into our foreign policy goals, then the fact that others may not share the same understandings of human rights and the same foreign policy goals does not relieve us of the obligation to pursue human rights as our own ethical goals even though it requires a more sensitive handling of the issues (see, for instance, M. A. Brown 2002).

In sum, the conclusion to be drawn from this account of anti-cosmopolitanism is that it advances a legitimate concern for ethical/moral diversity and the recognition of different standards in different places. However, this criticism is best understood as a corrective to cosmopolitanism rather than a repudiation of its central ideas. Anti-cosmopolitan pluralism, we have seen, rests on universal foundations of its own and appeals to the moral universalism of natural duties.

In addition, any ethics in the contemporary era of globalization needs to draw upon more resources than are provided for by 'communitarianism' and anti-cosmopolitanism. This is implicitly acknowledged by the anti-cosmopolitan invocation of natural duties. Once this argument is advanced we are entering into a cosmopolitan domain of discourse.

Recognition of natural duties raises many questions about the extent and nature of duties to aid and not to harm, as well as the institutional structure of international ethics. Questions concerning those duties are best evaluated from a cosmopolitan framework because the anti-cosmopolitan framework has insufficient theoretical resources to address them. These considerations will be explored in more depth in the following chapters. This chapter and the previous one sketched the epistemological, ontological and moral arguments of cosmopolitanism and anti-cosmopolitanism. The remainder of the book discusses how these different perspectives are expressed in relation to some specific ethical issues.