anti-cosmopolitans. Pluralism has a number of expressions. For our purposes, we can distinguish between nationalist, statist and non-statist pluralism. What they have in common is that they are 'oriented to the pre-existing group, and likely to ascribe to each individual a primary identity within a single community of descent. . . [and their] concern to protect and perpetuate the cultures of groups that are already established' (Hollinger 2002: 231). Communitarians claim that particular norms and cultures are to be valued and protected, and any imposition of universal standards is a denial of integrity or group autonomy.

Pluralists such as David Miller and Michael Walzer claim that 'strong' or 'thick' cosmopolitanism requires the universalization of a particular account of the good and the overriding of particular under-standings and 'shared ways of life', and this is unjust. For Walzer, justice exists precisely in the preservation of the different moral 'spheres' of human activity. Walzer (1983: 314) claims that because 'Justice is rooted in the distinct understanding of places, honours, jobs, things of all sorts that constitute a shared way of life. To over-ride those understandings is (always) to act unjustly.' To impose a single universal standard is unjustifiable, because no such standard exists, and harmful, because it forces people to conform to standards they might not share and punishes them for not conforming to those standards.

Nonetheless, the anti-cosmopolitan argument cannot function without a belief in human equality, however this value is expressed in the context of the 'thick' national communities we grow up in. For instance, the claim for national self-determination is one form of the claim that we can only be free in the context of national community. Equality needs to be understood as equality between communi-ties that in turn serve the interest of their individual members (see Kymlicka 2001). For communitarians, equality and humanity are expressed in difference and identity. To be human is to have a culture, and to belong to a community less than the species is to identify with one's community of origin or belonging. Therefore, the way to realize this goal is to preserve and recognize these cultural differences. In this context, Walzer argues that the duty to recognize different cultures as equal but different is a universal duty.

The pluralist account offers us a particular reconciliation of these two values that relies on a degree of universalism. Walzer (1994: 8) wishes to advocate 'the politics of difference and, at the same time, to describe and defend a certain sort of universalism'. He claims to be able to identify a certain minimal universalism, with the observa-tion that 'the members of all the different societies, because they are

human can acknowledge each other's different ways, respond to each other's cries for help, learn from each other and march (sometimes) in each other's parades' (1994: 8).

Pluralism and nationalism

Nationalism is the belief that we all belong to nations and that this community has special claims upon our moral obligations. It is arguably the everyday understanding held by most people. It certainly underwrites the political structure of the world, as can be seen in the very ideas of national self-determination, national sovereignty and the United Nations. However, nationalism is not coterminous with communitarianism. There are as many communitarianisms as there are nationalisms, and communitarianism does not necessarily have to designate the nation as the relevant community. Religious, sub-national and other communities could be as - if not more than - influential as the nation. Nonetheless, nationalism is perhaps the most common political expression of communitarian premises.

Most accounts of nationalism which address the international realm envision a pluralist world of nation-states. This is what Miller juxtaposes to the liberal cosmopolitan view which he claims 'implies a world state with a single distributive scheme and single homogenous citizenry' (2002: 976). That is irreconcilable with 'a world of diversity in which the variety of national cultures finds expression in different sets of citizenship rights, and different schemes of social justice, in each community' (ibid.).

Defences of nationalism identity the nation as the community in which universal values such as equality and liberty and justice can be expressed. Many nationalist and anti-cosmopolitan writers today seem to operate within the spirit but not the letter of Hegelian thought, in that they interpret the state based on Herderian rather than Hegelian principles. The Herderian state is closer to a romantic view of the relationship between community, culture and tradition, rather than an Enlightenment view focused on reason, freedom and individuality. Modern communitarians tend to identify the state with the community in practice, if not in theory, and, even though they defend individuality, they defend the cultural, national sources of individuality rather than the state as guarantor of freedom and individualism.

Mervyn Frost, for example, is much more Hegelian than communitarians such as MacIntyre and Walzer (Frost 1996, 2002). David

Miller distinguishes between the nation and the state and emphasizes that national ties are what provide our cultural frameworks (Miller 1995). This makes him closer to Herder than Hegel. What they do share is a view that insofar as there are any moral universals, it is the duty of nation-states to uphold them internally, and then only in exceptional circumstance in other countries (genocide, for instance).

Nationalists vary in their views about what duties are owed between nations. While they are united in rejecting 'global egalitarianism' and 'liberal cosmopolitanism', they do not wish to reject all moral universals. Will Kymlicka and David Miller both defend the nation in liberal terms such as individual rights and freedoms, but also recognize the cultural assumptions necessary to secure commitment to those values. For liberal nationalists, basic individual rights trump community identity but they can only be realized within national communities (Miller 2000: 181). Kymlicka understands nationalism as a corrective to cosmopolitanism rather than an alternative (Kymlicka 2001). David Miller's defence of nationalism is less indebted to liberalism and therefore more hostile to liberal cosmopolitanism, though he does accept that nations have universal duties to secure the welfare of their members and to uphold basic human rights everywhere (Miller 1995, 2007; see chapter 7 for further discussion).

Nationalists identify the right of self-determination as a positive universal good, with it following, therefore, that there is some duty to support national self-determination in other countries (and not just one's own). Of course, in its most pathological forms, nationalism can lead to a hierarchical conception of the relationship between nations (e.g., Nazism), but for the most part contemporary nationalists emphasize equality between nations. The identification of the nation as the vehicle for moral universalism also finds expression in the doctrine of natural duties in the next section.

Rawls's non-statist pluralism

The most philosophically rigorous account of a non-statist pluralist ethics has been developed by John Rawls (1999) as *The Law of Peoples*, though Rawls is most famous for his *Theory of Justice* (1972). As discussed previously, many cosmopolitan theorists have adapted the theory of justice to the international setting. However, Rawls himself resisted and rejected this move. The theory of justice, he argued, must rely upon an existing reflective equilibrium amongst competing fundamental doctrines, or where there is an overlapping

consensus of core values around which principles of egalitarianism can cohere. Rawls argued that a system of global justice was neither possible nor desirable because the preconditions of reflective equilibrium and overlapping consensus were absent from the international realm (Rawls 1999). Rawls further endorsed the communitarian argument that the conception of the moral person upon which his theory is based is not uncontested, and therefore moral universalism is problematic.

In the original position, the contractors are rational individuals (Rawls 1972). However, for the international realm he argues that a second contracting session ought to take place, this time with the rules being chosen by representatives of peoples who are just. In this second round of bargaining, the representatives of peoples are not given any information about where their population lives, what quantity of natural resources they have, what income or wealth they have or how they compare to other societies. The conclusion of this second round is a contract that by and large resembles the traditional rules of international society and diplomacy. These include rules of self-determination, Just War, mutual recognition, non-intervention and so forth.

In other words, on the international level, contractors come up with a set of rules of coexistence, not rules of justice, though Rawls argues they are the equivalent of the first principle - free and equal rights coextensive with the same rights for all. However, while the existence or non-existence of a shared language or culture places limits on the possibility for a universal community, these limits are not absolute. Rawls earlier identified minimal or 'natural' duties that apply to all humans as 'the duty to help another when he *(sic)* is in need or jeopardy provided that one can do so without excessive risk or loss to oneself (mutual aid); the duty not to harm or injure another . . . [and] the duty not to inflict unnecessary suffering' (1972: 114). In addition, there was a duty to 'support and to comply with just institutions that exist and apply to us . . . [and] to further just arrangements not yet established' (1972: 115). For Rawls, these natural duties exist independently of any social contract we might be party to or any moral or ethical commitments we have made as individuals, and they apply universally to us as humans (for further discussion, see Kokaz 2007).

In addition, Rawls argued that the international realm does not resemble a system for mutual advantage. Controversially, he proposed that states or societies ought to be considered to be largely self-sufficient with only minor interaction of any moral significance. Societies are to be understood in isolation, as if they have only

minimal impact upon each other and are only minimally bound together by webs of interdependence. As a result, the best that can be hoped for is not a theory of justice but a theory of international legitimacy and coexistence, a 'law of peoples', which covers rules of coexistence between liberal and other decent peoples.

The rules of international coexistence that Rawls comes up with in *The Law of Peoples* (1999) are as follows:

> People are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are to be respected by other peoples.
>
> Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings.
>
> Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention.
>
> Peoples have the right of self-defence but no right to instigate war for reasons other than self-defence.
>
> Peoples are to honour human rights.
>
> Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war.
>
> Peoples have a duty to assist other people living under unfavourable conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime (mutual aid).

Although he doesn't mention them in *The Law of Peoples,* natural duties inform the account of mutual aid here (Kokaz 2007). Mutual aid is provided only to enable a people to develop and enjoy a well-ordered society. It is not clear whether this is a duty because a well-ordered society is what everybody deserves, or because it allows a functioning *modus vivendi,* which is necessary for liberal societies to remain well-ordered. Kokaz claims that mutual aid is defended by Rawls as a condition of sociability: without it there can be no society, not even a society of peoples (Kokaz 2007). However, while the representatives of decent societies can agree on mutual aid, they are not capable of agreeing on principles of distributive justice or global egalitarianism; nor are they required to.

The obvious question provoked by the inclusion of natural duties is: how can even this minimal moral universalism be defended from communitarian premises? There are two possible sources that can be used to answer this question. The first is the tradition of natural law, and the second is the work of Immanuel Kant. The idea of natural duties could perhaps be derived from the idea of natural law, which David Boucher (1998) identifies as one of the main traditions of international political thought. According to Boucher, normative thought in international relations is best characterized as divided between empirical realism, universal moral order (natural law) and historical reason. Boucher's categories provide a useful addition to the cosmopolitan/anti-cosmopolitan framework because they allow

us to highlight another aspect of anti-cosmopolitan thought that is not inherited directly from the presuppositions of Herder and Hegel.

According to Boucher, natural law thinking is an expression of the idea of a universal moral order. Natural law thinking attempts to identify certain universal moral principles or laws, which all humans have access to via the use of reason (see also Nardin 2002b). Martin Wight describes natural law as a 'belief in a cosmic, moral constitution, appropriate to all conscious things, a system of eternal and immutable principles radiating from a source that transcends earthly power' (Wight 1991: 14). The idea of natural law aims to identify basic moral categories that are not culturally dependent. Natural law theorists argue that cultural differences do not prevent the recognition of a universal moral order. These basic moral categories are necessarily thin, yet binding and substantive. Freedom of commerce, travel, right of private property, mutual assistance and, above all, to do no harm are fairly consistently included in the list of natural laws. In some variants, natural law thinking includes certain cosmopolitan elements and emphasizes individual duties and rights, while in others natural law develops into a statist code of coexistence. Samuel Pufendorf is generally cited as the epitome of the statist tradition (Devetak 2007), while Kant's cosmopolitanism clearly sits at the cosmopolitan end.

Walzer has offered a defence of his 'minimal moral universalism' in terms of thick and thin cosmopolitanism. This defence includes a claim that mutual aid or something like it can be identified 'in different times and places . . . even though (it is) expressed in different idioms and reflects different histories and different versions of the world' (Walzer 1994: 17). However, on other occasions, Walzer has explicitly invoked Rawls's conception of natural duties as providing 'one positive moral duty' which extends beyond frontiers (see Walzer 1981, 2003b). Miller, on the other hand, defends his more complex notion of a basic global minimum 'humanitarianism', and of basic human rights, on what he calls an 'empirical' grounding in human suffering and need (Miller 2007). It is possible that Walzer, Miller, Jackson and others might claim natural law as the source of their endorsement of mutual aid.

Rawls himself defended mutual aid as one of his natural duties and he did so on broadly Kantian grounds rather than natural law. For Rawls, the natural duty of mutual aid is consistent with the categorical imperative (CI) and indeed Rawls recognizes that in a way Kant is trying to provide a rational foundation for the earlier natural law principle. For Kant, it was defended based on human reason and not on the capacity to suffer:

> as a person's true needs are those which must be met if he is to function (or continue to function) as a rational, end-setting agent. Respecting the humanity of others involves acknowledging the duty of mutual aid: one must be prepared to support the conditions of the rationality of others (their capacity to set and act for ends) when they are unable to do so without help. The duty to develop (not neglect) one's talents and the duty of mutual aid are thus duties of respect for persons. (Herman 1984: 597)

Herman argues that Rawls attempts a different grounding from Kant and derives his mutual aid principle from the method of the original position. Contractors behind the veil of ignorance would agree on this rule, including applying it to non-contractors, again from rational calculations of interests. Therefore, Rawls argues that the principle of mutual aid holds universally across borders and to all humans.

If we take Kantian premises rather than natural law as the source of Rawls's natural duties, it is clear that the idea of natural duties extends directly from Kantian arguments rather than communitarian premises. Thus, when Rawls and subsequently communitarians such as Walzer invoke natural duties, they are implicitly at least invoking Kantian moral universalism. The implications of this will be returned to in the remaining chapters of this book.

In conclusion, Rawls's inclusion of cosmopolitan elements such as human rights and natural duties contributes to the case for inclusion of cosmopolitan principles as foundations of international order, even if these principles are not fully fledged or institutionalized. This has led some critics to dismiss his *Law of Peoples* as just another version of liberal imperialism or indeed cosmopolitanism (see Jackson 2005; Mouffe 2006). However, the criticism of Rawls levelled by liberal cosmopolitans is that he is not liberal enough, and that it is possible to extend his account to the international in a way he is unwilling to do (see chapters 2 and *7).*

Rawls's account in *The Law of Peoples* is consistent with his own earlier account in *Theory of justice.* While Beitz may be correct that the international sphere is interconnected enough to count as a system of social cooperation, what the international sphere does not have in Rawls's terms is an overlapping consensus. Therefore, what Rawls attempts is an account of liberal justice that liberals can live with, without having to fully liberalize the international realm and thereby violate a liberal principle of toleration and pluralism. In this way, a decent liberal state should not try to, and has no duty to, globalize its conception of distributive justice. Thus, even though cosmopolitan elements are present, Rawls's position is anti-cosmopolitan overall because, as Wenar (2006: 3) argues, for Rawls, individuals cannot

be the focus of a global theory under conditions of pluralism and anarchy. Rawls's view of justice will be returned to in chapter 7.

Pluralism and statism: the international society of states

Rawls's list of liberal duties to other states owes a lot to writers such as Terry Nardin (1983), who work in the international society tradition of statist pluralism, or the English school (see Linklater and Suganami 2006). Nationalism and the law of peoples refer to two expressions of communitarian ethics which focus on the cultural or sociological level. Statist pluralism pursues the political expression of these ideas.

As we have seen, non-statist pluralism does not necessarily equate political/cultural community with the state which is seen as an administrative apparatus which governs but does not necessarily reflect or embody the values and traditions of a political community. In this view, the state is analytically distinguished from the nation (Miller 1995) or peoples (Rawls 1999), or simply political community (Walzer 1983). There is a variety of reasons for making this sort of distinction. The most obvious one is that not every state reflects a single nation or people. However, while this may be analytically the case, when it comes to the political realm most observers argue that it makes little sense to talk of political communities in the contemporary world without reference to the state because the state has become the single model of legitimate *political* association. In its statist form, anti-cosmopolitan pluralism is expressed in the Grotian idea that states form an international society and not just an international system (see Bull 1966, 1977). Statist pluralists argue that any obligations to humanity are best mediated through states and through the society of states.

While many anti-cosmopolitans such as Walzer and Miller fit Boucher's category of historical reason (Hegelianism), these same authors are 'Grotian' or pluralist in their understanding of the morality of international life. In his discussion of Just War, for example, Walzer (1977) appears to endorse a statist understanding of international law.

For our purposes, it is the statist pluralist argument and the distinction between pluralist and solidarist accounts of international society that is of most relevance. Terry Nardin (1983) claims that the society of states is a 'practical' association of those 'who are associated with one another, if at all, only in respecting certain restrictions on how

each may pursue his own purposes' (Nardin 1983: 9). This type of association covers those areas concerned with the rule of law and standards of conduct entailing 'a set of considerations to be taken into account in deciding and acting' or rules of engagement (Nardin 1983: 6).

In contrast, purposive association is concerned with pursuing common and shared goals such as a trade union might do. Nardin (1983) himself draws on the work of Michael Oakeshott for this distinction. In Nardin's pluralist ethics, 'the nature of international society is such that all-inclusive association can only be practical' (1983: 215). In such an association the objective is merely to keep the various purposive associations apart. Indeed, it was precisely because the universal moral consensus of Christendom was fracturing and the legitimacy of the Catholic Church was in doubt that the Treaty of Westphalia was instituted and the society of sovereign states brought into being. In Bull's terms, the Treaty of Westphalia was a compact of coexistence designed to overcome the breakdown in consensus regarding the legitimacy of the Church's temporal role.

In international society, pluralism is contrasted with solidarism, which is another name for what Nardin called a purposive international society. Solidarism is different from pluralism because it goes beyond an ethics of pure tolerance and raises the standards by which tolerance is accepted (see Bull 1966). Solidarism contains elements of cosmopolitan ethics because it makes sovereignty conditional upon treatment of individuals (Nardin 1983; Brown 1992). Pluralists are sceptical about the use of human rights in diplomacy as it gives some states the opportunity to deny others their sovereignty (Jackson 2000), while humanitarian intervention in emergencies which offend the 'conscience of humankind' can occasionally be defended (Walzer 1977, 2004).

The absence of centralized law enforcement in international society means that any collaborative action requires a high degree of consensus amongst the sovereign autonomous members of international society. It was only when such consensus existed that effective action was possible in relation to issues such as the sanctioning of the apartheid regime in South Africa (Bull 1983).

However, for the most part, such a consensus is lacking between states. This position essentially holds that the absence of a genuine moral consensus in international society means that the morality or legitimacy of any claim to universal morality is suspect. A lack of consensus on substantive normative or ethical questions makes it difficult for the members of international society to act in a concerted fashion.

Pluralists resist attempts to develop a more solidarist world in which principles of human rights are enforced and humanitarian

intervention is institutionalized. Instead, for pluralists, what is required is a toleration of a plurality of cultures. If we have any international obligations to those beyond our borders, it is an obligation to refrain from imposing a particular conception of the good life, a particular culture, or a particular ethical morality upon others. In this view, sovereignty is an ethical principle and not just a *modus vivendi,* which allows states and the different cultures they harbour to exist alongside each other. Likewise, pluralism does not advocate universal distributive justice, either as a practical possibility or as a moral good in itself because it requires the imposition of a specific, usually liberal, account of justice upon other cultures. According to pluralists, the primary ethical responsibility of the statesperson is to maintain order and peace between states, not develop a global account of justice.

Pluralists are cautious about undoing the compact of coexistence by holding up states to scrutiny for their human rights records because there is no international consensus strong enough to justify this, and the effect of acting as if there were would be to undermine the capacity of international society to maintain order. In Bull's words, 'the rules of coexistence serve to maintain order in an international society in which a consensus does not exist in normal circumstances about much else besides these rules' (1977: 157). A solidarist international society goes beyond coexistence by adopting shared goals, such as justice, defence of human rights and practices of armed intervention in defence of these shared purposes. The ability of international society to move in a solidarist direction will depend on the degree to which they reflect a consensus amongst its members (Bull 1977; Wheeler and Dunne 1996). Bull argued that:

> the interests of order are not served ... if in the situation in which no such consensus actually exists and the international society is divided into contending groups, one of these groups claims to represent the consensus and act as if it does . . . the result is that the traditional rules which assume a lack of consensus are undermined. (1977: 157)

Therefore, sovereignty and pluralism are the most appropriate ethical responses to cultural diversity and normative disagreement. Pluralism recognizes that states have different ethics but can agree upon a framework whereby they tolerate each other, do not impose their own views upon others and agree on certain limited harm principles. R. J. Vincent (1986) has described this as the 'egg box' conception of international society where 'The general function of international society is to separate and cushion, not to act.' In international society, states acknowledge that domestic conceptions of the good are not necessarily shared and, more importantly, can only

be secured by a pact of coexistence between these competing conceptions to guarantee freedom from undue outside influence. Thus, international society is the means by which different particular cultures maintain their separateness. This allows them to feel reasonably secure and to go about their business in relative peace.

The pluralist view is that the obligations of states are those of states rather than individuals. In the pluralist view, this is a moral community in which the members make laws and develop norms to govern their actions. There is a global social contract, or covenant, between states (see Bull 1979; Frost 1996; and Jackson 2000). Obviously, the most important of these agreements is that of sovereignty. The appropriate moral realm, and ethical vocabulary, is that of state, sovereignty and international law. Sovereignty imposes moral obligations upon members of international society to respect each other's independence, to avoid war against each other and to uphold and defend the rules of international society (see chapter 6). These obligations, however, apply only to states, as they are the contractors.

Very few pluralist writers today defend a pure ethics of coexistence and most concede that human rights should form part of the norms of international society. For instance, Mervyn Frost (1996) views human rights as essential to an ethical society of states, Robert Jackson (2000) includes them in his account of a pluralist international society, and John Rawls cited human rights as a basis for the liberal 'law of peoples'. Michael Walzer endorses the 'morality of states' in some cases (Just War, see chapter 6) and initially characterizes international society as a regime of toleration (1997), but has in later work (1994: 11) argued that 'We can (and should) defend some minimal understanding of human rights and seek its universal enforcement' (though this statement contradicts his earlier argument above). Likewise, Miller provides a strong case for a global basic standard based on fulfilment of basic rights (2007; chapter 7).

Nonetheless, what ultimately unites anti-cosmopolitans is scepticism about moral progress, a normative defence of the status quo, and the division of humanity into separate political and moral communities. Anti-cosmopolitans reject efforts to transform the *political* structure of the world to bring it more into line with any universalist account. Moral universalism is both misguided and pernicious; therefore it follows that there is no duty to institutionalize cosmopolitan principles within the current international order or to transform the contemporary world order in the way envisioned by cosmopolitans. At best, with regard to international ethics, the traditions discussed in this chapter only incorporate a duty to act on principles of natural duty, minimal or basic rights, and to maintain order.

Problems with anti-cosmopolitanism

With the combination of the condition of international anarchy, practical problems of normative pluralism, and the defence of diversity, anti-cosmopolitans present a significant case for defending particularist values and arguing against cosmopolitanism. Drawing on communitarian critiques of liberalism, the anti-cosmopolitan traditions of realism and pluralism make some very important observations on the limits of universalism in the international realm. Communitarian objections indicate that many universalist accounts, especially liberalism, rely upon certain assumptions and forms of reasoning that are problematic. The liberal account of agency, which depicts a uniform and idealized account of human beings, is problematic and too substantive to be the basis of a genuine universal ethic. Likewise, some forms of universalism do appear to be 'hostile' or inconsistent with substantive moral/cultural pluralism. The universalization of a Rawlsian account of justice, as understood by Beitz or Moellendorf, does indeed appear to require overriding alternative interpretations of fairness. Insofar as the anti-cosmopolitan critique is directed towards liberal cosmopolitanism, then the charge of indifference to the plural conceptions of the good has some purchase.

Nevertheless, whether or not these observations undermine cosmopolitanism as a whole, as many particularists claim, is debatable. The most important thing about the communitarian critique of cosmopolitanism is the desire to resist homogenization and to acknowledge the diversity of moral cosmologies. The question for cosmopolitans in response is to ask whether these values are necessarily or only contingently in conflict with universalism, and whether they override universal duties to the individual or not?

Cosmopolitans point out several flaws in pluralism and anti-cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitans, especially liberal cosmopolitans, have faith in reason as the provider of objective, or at least grounded accounts of ethics and morality. For cosmopolitans, this gives their account an authority, and ultimately justifies its universalism. In order to be coherent, communitarianism or pluralism must also be situated within a form of universalism.

Communitarians also make certain foundational claims regarding truth, the most important of which involves the provision of meaning by culture, which is also the source of ethics and identity. As a consequence of this observation, communitarians argue that different cultures ought to be preserved and defended. However, pluralists can't make this case without violating or substantially surrendering

certain aspects of their case about the nature of moral knowledge, and adopting certain universalist premises such as equality, or the universal importance of defending different cultures. That is, despite the relativistic implication of the communitarian position that norms are culturally dependent, writers such as Miller, Walzer and Frost all tend to make certain foundational claims about their position's objectivity or truthfulness. Cochran argues that communitarians proceed 'as if their weak foundations yield non-contingent ethical claims' (1999: 16) or, while they claim weak foundations, they reason as if these foundations are strong. Anti-cosmopolitans operate as if their argument - that it is always wrong to override particular understandings - is non-contingent, and can be grounded and defended universally. If this is the case, then the anti-cosmopolitan argument is also culturally particular and cannot claim a universal status; it cannot claim to be true in any trans-historical or moral sense. Why, then, should cosmopolitans accept its arguments as having universal significance?

The question to ask at this stage is: what claim to truth can any ethics make? Is it possible to provide firm foundations for ethical judgements, and for judgement between judgements? The justifications provided for anti-cosmopolitan concessions to universalism are either very thin or, more seriously, fundamentally contradict other premises of their arguments. This prompts another question: if some universalism is okay, why not more? The answers to this can only be pragmatic once universalism is conceded, that is, they can rest only upon contingent and not absolute claims. If universalism is a violation of community priority, then how can communitarians accept any universalism? On what basis do communitarians accept minimal human rights or natural duties? Is it because such rights are already agreed upon? If so, then communitarians are conceding to the fact that universal agreement is possible. If that is the case, communitarians must be able to explain why we ought not move towards more agreement. If it is possible or acceptable to hold that no one ought to be denied their right to live, to housing or to basic standards of human decency, then why is it also not possible to argue that no one ought to be denied the right to speak freely or marry the person of their own choosing? (Miller 2007 is the exception in that he does provide a clear position on exactly these questions, though one in which rather a lot of ground is conceded to cosmopolitanism.) The communitarian's best defence is that there is, at present, no consensus on these issues. This only begs the question: why not develop or pursue such a consensus?[3]

Another criticism is that pluralists reify communities. Be it nations or states, communitarians or pluralists assume that communities are relatively coherent and that diversity does not exist (or is at least

managed) within communities. Pluralists tend to see communities as organic beings that are in some sense natural and singular. This is ironic because one of the critiques of cosmopolitans shared by communitarians and pluralists is that cosmopolitans idealize humans and do not pay attention to particular human beings. Nevertheless, pluralists tend to ignore particularities or to dismiss the existence of disagreement within communities and the historical ways in which the so-called consensus or shared norms of political communities rely upon historical domination or assimilation. Pluralists are unable to provide reasons why intra-community disagreement is in any way substantively different from inter-community disagreement. Likewise, if domination and assimilation are bad between communities, then why ought they be acceptable 'within' communities? Pluralists can only defend their point of view if they think there is something special about the national state. However, for many other pluralists who are less Hegelian, no such argument is forthcoming. Walzer and Rawls pretend that states do not matter or even exist; they talk of people and communities. And yet it is the national state that exists today as the most powerful form of communal affiliation in history.

The pluralist idealization of the national state is compounded by a general inability and unwillingness to address the existence of inter-dependence between communities. There is both a normative and empirical point to be made here. The first empirical point is that communities today are intertwined with other communities in increasingly complex ways. This means it is harder for communities to be conceptualized as 'autarkic'. Yet this is precisely what theorists like Rawls insist upon (again, Miller is the exception to this; see his 2007).

Many anti-cosmopolitans treat communities as if they were self-sufficient. There are two problems with this. Communities are not coherent singular identities, and treating them as if they were self-sufficient results in a refusal to deal with the impacts that communities have upon each other. This is one of the most profound failings of pluralist accounts. Even if we accept that communities are largely singular in identity, we cannot accept that they are autarkic or that they have no impacts upon outsiders. Even the act of defining a border of a nation-state, for example, often affects those not included within the border (see chapter 4).

Thus, given that most states engage in international trade and commerce, travel and so on, communitarians must ask what obligations if any the members of these communities have to outsiders. However, as we have examined in this chapter, many pluralists limit these moral or ethical obligations to the minimum. Rawls's *Law of Peoples,* for instance, provides little or no guidance for thinking about the ethics

of global warming, or even of economic growth, in situations where domestic activity has profound impacts on those outside the borders.

If pluralists are to be taken at face value, they must hold either that economics is outside the realm of the moral, or that states should seek to reduce the amount of interaction they have with each other. Communitarian ethics also imply a right of closure to outside influences. Communities have the right to maintain their identities by restricting access to these communities (see Walzer, and the next chapter on refugees). The implication is that almost any interaction with outsiders will constitute a harm done to the community. This includes actions we domestically might consider to be beneficial to our own community, resulting from the interaction with outsiders, such as trade or exposure to another's culture through literature, television or film. (This line of thought conforms to realist understandings of interdependence as a cause of conflict and not a way of overcoming it.)

From this reification of communities, it follows that pluralists emphasize states' rights, but not their responsibilities (again, Miller has done the most to redress this imbalance). It is for this reason that Buchannan (2000) referred to Rawls's *Law of Peoples* as 'rules for a vanishing Westphalian world'. Pluralists have been outstripped by reality in that the world they defend no longer exists. This causes particular problems because they claim pluralism's grounding in 'reality' contrasts with the idealism of cosmopolitanism, yet the pluralists conception of reality is contentious. In this vein, cosmopolitans and solidarists argue that a strict ethics of coexistence is simply out of date and can actually be harmful, as the scope for intercommunity harm has increased exponentially with globalization and the interconnectedness of communities (see Hurrell 2007). Most cosmopolitans argue that an 'egg box' ethics is not enough under conditions of globalization.

Perhaps most importantly, while pluralists serve individual interests through defending their membership in communities, they tend also to give power to the community over individuals. Does the human right to belong to a group mean that group rights may override individual human rights, opening the way to condoning behaviour and practices that harm individuals? Thus, for pluralists, if a community has the belief that women are second-class citizens with restricted rights and duties, then it is the overall right of their community to self-determination rather than the individual rights of women that trumps here. In this example, the community overrides the individual. In other words, there are some circumstances where it is communities per se that are the relevant or even basic subject of morality rather than individuals.

Although this assumption is not always entirely clear in

anti-cosmopolitan writing, it is a clear implication. For example, Walzer (1983) condones the moral priority of the community over the individual with regard to the cases of refugees, of non-combatant immunity and supreme emergency (see chapters 4 and 7). Pluralists find themselves caught in a contradiction when they argue that individuals are best served by the norms of their community even when that community might not recognize those individuals as bearers of equal moral worth. The position of women in many cultures provides a clear example here (for an illuminating discussion, see Nussbuam 1995). Pluralists implicitly give little hope to women everywhere who seek to challenge those practices of their own culture which harm or exclude women from equal moral consideration. If a group of women has no resources with which to argue for this, then communitarianism implies that women in those communities ought to accept their lot. Communitarians are also incapable of demonstrating how those women are best served by that community (Nussbaum 2007; Nussbaum and Glover 1995). This is, of course, the position that ultimately defines cosmopolitans differently from anti-cosmopolitans.

Cosmopolitans are not willing to make the claim that the community should in some cases come before the individual. According to cosmopolitanism, it is the individual who is the moral agent and the moral subject and who therefore ought to be the focus of moral concern. To make the claim that group rights can override individual rights, it must follow that the individual would be better off having been overridden, for the value of community can only lie in its utility for individual members. Without this premise, we could end up accepting all sorts of suffering and harm on the grounds that they are community endorsed or expressions of a right of communal self-determination. One of the advantages of cosmopolitan thought, along with the idea of impartiality, is that it protects individuals from abuse by their own culture.

Conclusion

One of the most important criticisms of nationalism is that, in the words of Voltaire, it makes its adherents 'the enemy of humankind'. For cosmopolitans, communitarianism presents this type of threat. If we are to accept their moral epistemology and ontology are we not condemned to make ourselves the enemy of humankind? The challenge for cosmopolitanism is to defend a form of moral universalism that can incorporate this recognition, and the challenge for

anti-cosmopolitanism is to accommodate the legitimate needs of universalism so that we don't become enemies to each other.

Any defence of cosmopolitan ethics must address the issues arising from the attempt to enact a universal moral realm in a situation where universalism is either contested or simply lacking. The existence of ethical pluralism means that we cannot assume that everybody else will act according to the same ethical framework, either in relationship to each other or to us. In other words, we cannot assume a universal ethical and moral framework.

Additionally, if it is not possible to identify any morally meaningful qualities (such as the capacity for 'rationality') that are common to all humans, then the cosmopolitan community guided by universal rules that all agree to cannot come into being. It is worth noting, however, that anti-cosmopolitanism is not a necessary conclusion to be drawn from communitarian premises; a number of accounts of moral universalism and cosmopolitan have been derived from this starting point (see, for instance, Kung 1990; Etzioni 2004; Shapcott 2001). These accounts all argue that the contextual origins of moral thought does not prevent the emergence, development and even agreement upon some moral universals, as long as these are developed dialogically.

The point to be taken from the communitarian argument is not that universalism is impossible, but that acting ethically is difficult. While normative pluralism certainly makes the making and enforcing of laws more difficult, and also makes it harder to be confident of the morality of one's decisions, it does not render these impossible. Similarly, as individuals, many of us assume that we share some values and not others with different people. This usually means that we tolerate this diversity or that we seek to understand another's position before we act or pass judgement upon them. The most obvious example in contemporary Western societies is the difference between secular liberal values and orthodox Islamic practices, especially in relation to women. The presence of differences is not considered to relieve us of our ethical obligations, or of the idea that we should treat people ethically; it only makes these obligations and ideas more complex, and subject to reflection and modification.

In other words, within the context discussed above, what it means to treat someone ethically is problematized but not undermined, even in situations where not everyone agrees that all people (such as women, in the example above) should be treated as equals. For example, we can imagine a situation where a slave might believe that they are unequal, but we recognize them as equal and treat them as such. We would feel bad to treat them as unequal, regardless of

what they believe. At the same time, we would need to be sensitive to the conditions of the slave's life; they might suffer punishment if we encouraged them to act as though they were not a slave. But this would not relieve us of the duty to view the slave as worthy of moral respect (up to and including the possibility of ending their status as a slave). The point is that, for those of us who are concerned about acting ethically, the existence of other people with different ethical frameworks does not mean that we should automatically throw up our hands and think we are no longer required to treat them well, i.e., as ends in themselves. It only means that to treat someone well is made more difficult. The same conceptual framework or idea applies to states. If we believe in human rights and incorporate them into our foreign policy goals, then the fact that others may not share the same understandings of human rights and the same foreign policy goals does not relieve us of the obligation to pursue human rights as our own ethical goals even though it requires a more sensitive handling of the issues (see, for instance, M. A. Brown 2002).

In sum, the conclusion to be drawn from this account of anti-cosmopolitanism is that it advances a legitimate concern for ethical/ moral diversity and the recognition of different standards in different places. However, this criticism is best understood as a corrective to cosmopolitanism rather than a repudiation of its central ideas. Anti-cosmopolitan pluralism, we have seen, rests on universal foundations of its own and appeals to the moral universalism of natural duties.

In addition, any ethics in the contemporary era of globaliza-tion needs to draw upon more resources than are provided for by 'communitarianism' and anti-cosmopolitanism. This is implicitly acknowledged by the anti-cosmopolitan invocation of natural duties. Once this argument is advanced we are entering into a cosmopolitan domain of discourse.

Recognition of natural duties raises many questions about the extent and nature of duties to aid and not to harm, as well as the institutional structure of international ethics. Questions concern-ing those duties are best evaluated from a cosmopolitan framework because the anti-cosmopolitan framework has insufficient theoretical resources to address them. These considerations will be explored in more depth in the following chapters. This chapter and the previous one sketched the epistemological, ontological and moral arguments of cosmopolitanism and anti-cosmopolitanism. The remainder of the book discusses how these different perspectives are expressed in relation to some specific ethical issues.