The problem of national identity: ancient, medieval and modern?

Anthony D. Smith

Abstract

To grasp the similarities and differences between modern and pre-modern collective cultural identities, we need to move beyond the dominant paradigms of perennialism and modernism and their conflicting passions and, aided by clear working definitions of key terms in the field, construct ideal types of ethnicity and nationality. This procedure allows us to assess evidence from a number of examples of collective identities in both the ancient and medieval worlds, independently of the dominant assumptions. The resulting picture reveals that, while national identity is mainly a modern phenomenon, pre-modern ethnic communities and identities are widespread and processes of national formation and representation are found in all epochs. Though the 'empirical' approach has its problems, it is more sensitive to historical context and nuance, and conveys a fuller picture, than the dominant perspectives in the field today.

'*A passionate man cannot teach*'. Partisans cannot be scholars. We expect political ideologies like nationalism to instil a spirit of absolute commitment and self-sacrifice, but political dogmatism of this kind sits ill with the spirit of detachment that scholarship seeks. In an era when, for all the studied disdain of Western scholars and statesmen, nationalism has reasserted itself, when national aspirations, conflicts and tragedies fill the air, is it too much to ask that scholarship free itself from these enveloping passions? Would this imply that a nationalist – and an anti-nationalist – cannot study nationalism and understand the problem of national identity? (For Hillel's maxim in *The Mishnah*, Aboth 2.6, see Danby 1933, p. 448; cf. Hobsbawm 1990, pp. 12–13.)

Such a ruling would be rather harsh. It would certainly make us question a number of recent theories of national identity and nationalism. For despite the scholarly air of unconcerned objectivity, few subjects continue to engage the passions so vividly. But we must also recognize the protean nature of nationalism which, like the river god Achelous, can change its shape at will. The evil that nationalism has wrought certainly lives on, but the good is not necessarily interred with

Ethnic and Racial Studies Volume 17 Number 3 July 1994
© Routledge 1994 0141–9870/94/1703–375 $3/1

its bones. It may blossom later and bear fruit. Recognition of the many-sided nature of nations and nationalisms may help to calm the passions, both the scepticism and hostility of so many of the 'modernist' school of Western scholars who associate nationalism with Nazism, and the sympathy of the old school for the 'primordial' nation (Emerson 1960; Connor 1978; Breuilly 1982).

The theoretical debate

As things stand today, however, these passions continue to inform, not just the content of national identity, but also recent theoretical debates about these issues. Broadly speaking, we can distinguish two antagonistic schools of thought about nations and nationalism: the 'perennialists' and the 'modernists'. In addition, there is a more fundamental divide over the nature of ethnic ties between the 'primordialists' and the 'instrumentalists', that is, between those who regard the ethnic community as in some sense 'primordial' and those who regard it as a malleable 'instrument' (see Geertz 1963; A. D. Smith 1984).

I shall be mainly concerned with the debate between the perennialists and modernists over the antiquity of nations and nationalism. But it is necessary first to say something briefly about the other debate on the nature of ethnic ties, and more particularly about the concept of 'primordialism'.

As recent debates have revealed, there are different positions included under the wide rubric of primordialism. One is the position adopted by many (but not all) nationalists, namely, that ethnic communities and nations are 'natural', that they are part of the natural order, just like speech or physiognomy. Another is the recent attempt by sociobiologists to explain ethnic ties in terms of genetic reproductive success and inclusive fitness, the ethnic community representing an extended family in time and space (Van den Berghe 1979).

A third position, often confused with these, is that put forward initially by Edward Shils and Clifford Geertz. Here, the primordial sentiment was *attributed* to the participants. It was and is the members of ethnic communities and nations who feel their communities are primordial, existing almost 'out of time' and having an 'ineffable' binding and almost overpowering quality. It is no part of this approach to suggest that such communities *are* primordial, only that the members *feel* they are. In this sense – what one might term a 'participant's primordialism' – the concept of the primordial plays an important part in our understanding of phenomena like national identity (Shils 1957; Geertz 1963; Stack 1986; Grosby 1991; Eller and Coughlan 1992).

This last position, not to mention the other two, is at present distinctly out of fashion among scholars of ethnicity and nationality. Most of them are of the 'instrumentalist' persuasion. They regard ethnic ties as a

social and political resource, a socially constructed repertoire of cultural elements that afford a site for political mobilization, especially where the ties of social class are in decay. At the same time, some of these scholars are profoundly aware of the durable nature of ethnic boundaries and border mechanisms, which are actually intensified by transactions across the border. I am not sure, however, whether they would thereby concede to a primordial element in ethnic ties, with the exception of John Armstrong. (See Barth 1969; Glazer and Moynihan 1975; Brass 1979; but also Armstrong 1982.)

Turning to the second debate over the antiquity of the nation, the perennialist perspective is regarded as a rather unsophisticated misreading of the history of collective cultural identities. The feeling that members of a nation may have that their nation is ancient, even immemorial, may be widespread; but to go on from this to see ancient Greeks or Egyptians, for example, as nations in the same sense as their modern counterparts is to commit the sin of 'retrospective nationalism' (see Levi 1965; Brandon 1967; cf. also Tipton 1972).

According to this modernist perspective, nations and nationalism are not only logically contingent; they are sociologically necessary only in the modern world. There was no room for nations or nationalism in agrarian society, for there was no need to unify the tiny élite strata and the vast mass of peasant food-producers and tribesmen subdivided into their many local cultures. Nor was there any chance of generating a sense or ideology of the nation from an aristocratic or clerical culture that stressed its élite status. Only in the era of modernization, argue modernists like Deutsch, Kautsky, Gellner and Nairn, was there any need, or possibility, of unifying a disparate and mobile population. Hence the pivotal role played by the intelligentsia and mass public education in the genesis of nations, in providing both the ideology and the leadership of modern, industrial societies (Kautsky 1962; Gellner 1964, 1983; Deutsch 1966; Nairn 1977, chs 2, 9; cf. A. D. Smith 1988).

The modernist standpoint clearly regards nations as well as nationalism as products of the modern era subsequent to the French and Industrial revolutions, the outgrowth of specifically modern phenomena like capitalism, industrialism, the bureaucratic state, urbanization and secularism. In this way, nations and nationalism are functional for an industrial society, providing its essential cement, the necessary solidarity without which it could disintegrate. Nationalism has become the 'religion surrogate' of modernity.

Some scholars would go further. They argue that nations are recent cultural artefacts, emerging from an era of 'print-capitalism', reading publics and political mobilization. They are creations of nationalist intelligentsia or other classes who re-present and picture them to others through books, newspapers and works of art. Much of the nation's symbolism, mythology and history is deliberately produced and

invented. In short, nations are best seen as *imagined political communities*, imagined as both sovereign and spatially finite (Anderson 1983; cf. Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983).

This kind of 'social constructionism', for all its insights and influence today, does not in my view take us very far, for several reasons. We may readily concede the role of invention and imagination in the formation of particular nations, without regarding either nations or nationalisms as largely constructs of the imagination. To read the nation as a printed text to be decoded may reveal much of the recurrent imagery and language of nationalism, but it tells us little about the genesis and course of either particular nations and nationalisms or of nationalism in general. Nor does it help us to understand why only certain political and/or ethnic communities became nations, and which these are. Secondly, while nationalist intelligentsias obviously played important roles in the creation of particular nations, they required antecedent cultural ties and sentiments in a given population if they were, and are, to strike a deep popular chord and forge durable nations. Finally, the idea that thousands, even millions, of men and women have let themselves be slaughtered for a construct of their own or others' imaginations, is implausible, to say the least. It illustrates the yawning gulf between a cognitive approach to the nation and an understanding of it as a focus for moral and political mobilization (see A. D. Smith 1991b).

In fact, the modernist view is as much a myth as perennialism, where myth is understood as a dramatization and exaggeration of elements of truth in the tale it tells of a heroic past which serves the present. The modernists' 'myth of the modern nation' exaggerates the gulf between tradition and modernity, the impossibility of nations in traditional agrarian societies and their necessity in modern, industrial ones. It thereby assumes what we need to explore and demonstrate empirically, that is, the modernity of national identity and nationalism (see Tudor 1972; A. D. Smith 1988).

The problem of definition

If we are to move beyond the sweeping certitudes of these rival positions, we shall need to proceed more cautiously, using the mass of historical evidence at every step. We also need to try and unravel the tangle of terms like nation, nation-state, national identity and nationalism, which bedevils progress in this field. Only then can we begin to move forward and deal with the question of the nature of collective cultural identities in the pre-modern and modern epochs, and how far and in what ways they differ or resemble one another.

Let me start with the term 'nationalism'. It is used in different ways, according to context. We can distinguish four main usages:

1. the whole process of growth of nations and national states;
2. sentiments of attachment to and pride in the nation;
3. an ideology and language (discourse) extolling the nation;
4. a movement with national aspirations and goals.

We can put aside the first usage; it is a broad, umbrella concept for a whole series of processes that we shall want to delineate separately.

The second usage is more germane. 'National sentiment', though often confused with nationalism, should be distinguished from both the ideology/language and the movement of 'nationalism'. One can have nationalist movements and ideologies in a given unit of population, without any real diffusion of national sentiment in that population. Nationalist ideologies and movements frequently start out as ideologies and movements of small minorities of intellectuals, as has occurred in several states in Africa and Asia this century. The reverse can also be found, though rarely; the English (arguably) had a widely diffused national sentiment at certain stages in their history, but little in the way of a nationalist ideology or movement.[1]

It is therefore useful to distinguish between nationalism, the ideology and movement, and national sentiment, the feelings of collective belonging to a nation. The ideology and movement, on the other hand, usually go together. One could, of course, have the ideology without the movement, in the sense that one might identify a few writers who held nationalist beliefs but who were too few to form a movement with political demands; but the reverse is inconceivable, by definition. In practice, there is a relatively swift transition from the early nationalist intellectuals to the birth of a nationalist movement, so I shall treat the third and fourth usages together as a single phenomenon, the 'ideological movement' of nationalism, while recognizing the possibility that they might be separable (see Hroch 1985).

What is the ideology and what are the goals of this ideological movement? The ideology can be briefly summarized:

1. the world is divided into nations, each with its own character and destiny;
2. the nation is the sole source of political power, and loyalty to it overrides all other loyalties;
3. everyone must belong to a nation, if everyone is to be truly free;
4. to realize themselves, nations must be autonomous;
5. nations must be free and secure if there is to be peace and justice in the world (A. D. Smith 1973, section 2; 1983, ch. 7; Breuilly 1982, Introduction).

These propositions form the 'core doctrine' of nationalism everywhere, at all times. They are the central tenets preached by the founders of nationalism: Rousseau, Burke, Herder, Jefferson, Fichte, Mazzini,

Korais and others. It follows that the modernists are right when they underline the modernity of nationalism, the ideological movement, dating as it does from the late-eighteenth century in Western Europe. Any other nationalist ideas and motifs are specific to particular nationalist movements and national communities; but they are secondary to the central tenets of the core doctrine. Nationalism also differs from what is sometimes meant by 'patriotism', which strictly speaking is a sense of attachment to a country or state. Nationalism is an ideological movement on behalf of a nation, a cultural-historical community which may or may not at that moment have its own homeland or state. (Whereas patriotism is commonly thought to be positive, nationalism may be positive or negative, depending on the viewpoint of the participant or analyst. In fact, it is often both at the same time, in the sense that it has both constructive and destructive effects).

What, then, are the goals of nationalist movements? There are three main recurrent goals: national identity, national unity and national autonomy. For nationalists, the nation must possess a particular character or identity and what Max Weber called 'irreplaceable culture values'. It must also be united, both as a compact territorial unit and as a fraternity of citizens, as preached by the *patriots* of the French revolution. Finally, the nation must be free. It must be master of its destiny, a subject of history, and not liable to external interference. It must obey only its own 'inner laws' (see Hobsbawm 1990, ch.1; A. D. Smith 1991a, ch. 4). Hence, we can define nationalism as an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining identity, unity and autonomy on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential 'nation'.

What then of the 'nation'? Can we describe it simply as an imagined political community, limited but sovereign? That would lead us to include Iceland and the former Soviet Union, as well as the Roman and Chinese empires behind their *limes* or walls, as well as ancient and medieval city-states like Tyre, Corinth and Pisa. Since any community above the level of the face-to-face is imagined, this kind of definition is more suggestive than helpful.[2]

The defect of such subjectivist and voluntarist definitions, even Renan's, is that any self-selecting group, provided its aspirations are spatially limited, can claim to be a nation. That would rule in all kinds of grouping – churches, sects, professions, and voluntary associations – which have nothing to do with our understanding of what is meant by the term, nation. On the other hand, objectivist, cultural definitions of the nation come up against the vast numbers of cultural categories that could claim the status of nation, the particularity of each national experience and the many permutations of the objective elements of culture (language, religion, customs), something especially true of lan-

guage which the German romantics regarded as the touchstone of the nation (Akzin 1964; Haugen 1966; Gellner 1983; Edwards 1985, ch. 2).

The only way to break out of the resulting impasse, I believe, is to formulate an ostensive definition derived from the images and ideas of the nation held by most or all nationalists. The question is: do all or most nationalists possess common images and ideas of the nation? Can these be merged into some ideal type? Does not such a procedure come perilously close to the modernist tenet which holds, in Gellner's words, that

> Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist – but it does need some pre-existing differentiating marks to work on, even if, as indicated, they are purely negative . . .

with all the social constructionist implications that have been criticized (Gellner 1964, p. 168)?

I think not. A procedure for *defining* the nation needs to be sharply separated from one for generating *explanations* of nations, nationalism and national identity. Appealing to the common images and ideas of the nation held by nationalists for the purpose of defining the nation is not to be confused with a procedure for explaining the rise of nations and nationalisms. In other words, our definitional procedure should not prejudge the relationship between nations and nationalism.

In fact, we can, I think, extract some common ideas and motifs of the nation common to most, if not all, nationalists, and thereby establish an ideal type of the nation for purposes of comparison. Such an ideal type, derived from the three goals of national identity, unity and autonomy, would include:

1. the growth of myths and memories of common ancestry and history of the cultural unit of population;
2. the formation of a shared public culture based on an indigenous resource (language, religion, etc.);
3. the delimitation of a compact historic territory, or homeland;
4. the unification of local economic units into a single socio-economic unit based on the single culture and homeland;
5. the growth of common codes and institutions of a single legal order, with common rights and duties for all members.

These motifs, commonly found in the writings and speeches of nationalists everywhere, help us to define the nation as a named cultural unit of population with a separate homeland, shared ancestry myths and memories, a public culture, common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members (see Connor 1978; Gellner 1983, ch. 5; A. D. Smith 1991a, chs 1, 4).

There are several points about this definition. It is inevitably a modernist definition, in the sense that its very concepts such as public culture, common economy and common legal rights derive their meaning from developments in and of the modern epoch. Our understanding of these terms is infused with 'modern' connotations. It may be that there were parallels for each of these concepts in pre-modern epochs, and we shall explore this. It must be admitted, however, that the *definition* of the nation is framed in modern, and one must add, modernist terms, while nevertheless recalling our earlier refusal thereby to sanction automatically a modernist *explanation*.

Secondly, it treats subjective elements like myths and memories as objective realities. In one sense, everything in the definition is subjective, conceived by nationalists and others. In another sense, each element has an empirical referent, a piece of territory, a chronicle or epic poem, a lawcode, a material and institutional embodiment, summing up recurrent activities, such as national markets, courts and rituals.

Thirdly, there is no mention in the definition of the state. While I accept Weber's dictum that 'A nation is a common bond of sentiment whose adequate expression would be a state of its own, and which therefore normally tends to give birth to such a state', the qualification 'normally' suggests that the nation is first and foremost a social and cultural community independent of the state, and that like Poland after the Partitions it can exist without 'a state of its own'. State and nation are often linked in practice, but they should be kept conceptually distinct, even in that misnomer, the 'nation-state' (Connor 1972; Tivey 1980, Introduction).

Finally, the definition makes no mention of ethnic identity. Nevertheless, the nation is closely related to ethnic phenomena. It is, in my view, a subcategory of, and development out of, the far more common phenomenon of the ethnic community, which is itself a development out of the global phenomenon of the ethnic category. We start from a world divided into ethnic categories, that is, cultural units of population with some sense of kinship or ancestry, some common dialects and deities, but little collective self-awareness, few shared memories, and no common name or territory or solidarity. Only travellers, missionaries and scholars may note their close affinity, and perhaps by their activities help to weld them together, as did the missionary pastors of Bremen who reduced the Ewe dialects to a common Anlo script, or the native missionaries among the Yoruba tribes whose cultural work helped to unify them in the mid-nineteenth century (Welch 1966; Peel 1989).

From these categories certain processes of ethno-genesis give rise to fully-formed ethnic communities, or what the French term *ethnies*, which we may define as named human populations with shared ancestry myths, historical memories and common cultural traits, associated with

a homeland and having a sense of solidarity, at least among the élites. In this definition, the sense of shared birth and ancestry, common to the Greek *ethnos* and the Latin *natio*, is pivotal. It gives rise to all the real and metaphorical kinship connotations of nationality, to be found in the Israelite ethnic genealogies of the Patriarchs but equally powerfully, though more metaphorically, in the *fraternité* of the revolutionary *patriots* of 1789 (Noth 1960; Kohn 1967; Hertz 1944; cf. for the term *natio*, Zernatto 1944; Kemilainen 1964; and for *ethnos*, Tonkin, McDonald and Chapman 1989, Introduction).

Ethnies, then, are named groups with shared ancestry myths and memories or 'ethno-history', with a strong association, though not necessarily possession of, a historic territory or homeland. The élites often have a vivid sense of solidarity, a sense of distinctive 'peoplehood'; these are the aristocratic 'lateral' *ethnies*. Where this ethnic sentiment is widely diffused to other strata of the community, we may speak of demotic 'vertical' *ethnies* (see Connor 1978; A. D. Smith 1986, chs 2–4).

Collective cultural identities in antiquity

This long excursus into definitions was necessary, if we are to advance any substantive arguments about the nature of collective cultural identities in the pre-modern and modern epochs. It also encourages us to move beyond the sweeping generalizations of the competing perspectives of perennialism and modernism, whose dogmas blind us to the nuances and complexities of historical realities in various periods in different parts of the world. In what follows, I can only concentrate on a few examples from the many that could be studied, testing the working definitions sketched above against the collective cultural identities presented in the historical record, first in the ancient world and then in the medieval era, and comparing them implicitly with the national identities of the modern era.

In the ancient world, I would argue, human beings were for the most part divided into fairly fluid ethnic categories and some more durable ethnic communities, or *ethnies*. A few of the latter – Persians, Egyptians, Israelites – possessed states of their own, that is, states run by and for members of the dominant *ethnie*, even when members of other ethnic categories resided on their territory, as the Israelites lived before the Exodus in the north-east Egyptian province of Goshen. The question that might be asked is whether such 'ethnic states' can be termed nations, according to our criteria, as scholars of an earlier generation were wont to do (Walek-Czernecki 1929; Koht 1947).

Ancient Egypt, for example, a community named after the god (Ha-Ka-Ptah, in Greek, Ai-guptos), regarded itself as separate, chosen and central, the community of inhabitants of 'the land', with everyone else

as outsiders to that provident territory. The community had its native Pharoahs who mediated for Amon-Re, the representative of the Egyptian pantheon, its Memphite Theology of creation and ancestry myths, its shared memories of Menes' union of Upper and Lower Egypt and its king-lists and chronicles. Moreover, the Egyptians, of all ancient communities, had the most clear-cut attachment to their land, a function perhaps of their radical separation from other communities by the eastern and western deserts, and of the unity provided by the life-giving Nile. On the other hand, the boundaries of ancient Egypt were neither as clear-cut nor as well-policed as those of its modern counterpart; nor was its economic life as unified, given the divisive power of the regions and nomarchies, and the chronic differences between Upper and Lower Egypt, represented in the Pharoah's two crowns. These factors militated against a single division of labour throughout the country, and supported the localism of Egyptian economic life (Frankfort *et al.* 1947; Frankfort 1954, ch. 4; Atiyah 1968, ch. 1; Trigger *et al.* 1983).

It is not only in the economic sector, but also in the sphere of culture and education, that the designation of ancient Egypt as a 'nation' can be questioned. For one thing, the sons of nobles and priests had a much more privileged education than that afforded to commoners' sons. For another, different classes had diverse funerary practices, as well as different rights and duties; there were also rival priesthoods and competing temple centres. On the other hand, the Pharaoh sought to enact ordinances for the whole population, and to represent the community as a whole in its relations with the divine pantheon, and in the many common temple rituals, thereby helping to forge over time a sense of collective Egyptian history and destiny (see Beyer 1959; David 1982).

Following our criteria and working definitions, then, ancient Egypt resembles more an 'ethnic state' than a nation. In contrast, many Old Testament scholars have regarded ancient Israel as a nation from the time of David and Solomon, if not earlier. The evidence adduced includes a collective name (or names), vivid creation and ancestry myths, and shared memories of the Exodus, conquest and wars with the Philistines, recorded in the books of Judges and Samuel. There is also the well-known description of the sacred territory of Israel, stretching from 'Dan to Beersheba', in Numbers 34 and Joshua 22[3] (Noth 1960; Grosby 1991).

Ancient Israel was also distinctive and relatively unified in terms of public culture. Admittedly, this was a religious culture, centred on Temple worship, the cult of the Sabbath, the three pilgrim festivals and the New Year and Day of Atonement; but then several modern nations have a predominantly religious culture, including Ireland, Morocco and Iran. It is, of course, difficult to say from the surviving evidence how many ordinary Israelites of the First Temple period participated in

this public religious culture. Certainly, popular participation was much greater in post-Exilic times, especially after the Ezraic reforms, and in the area round Jerusalem. Much later, after the Hasmonean reforms, a public culture of the synagogue established itself in town and countryside and gained a following in the Roman period. By the Mishnaic period, after the destruction of the Temple, the idea of a religious culture embracing 'all Israel' was well established under the sages, a culture dominated by law (Torah and Halakka, or Oral Law). This, in turn, suggests that in a period when the distinctions between Priests, Levites and People had all but lost their meaning, a uniform code of law with common rights and duties embraced all Jewish males[4] (see Neusner 1961; *Cambridge History of Judaism* 1984, vol. I, pp. 143–47).

There was less unity in the economic sphere. In terms of produce and modes of existence, Galilee and the coastal area round Caesarea were separate from the Judean centre round Jerusalem. Moreover, production in the villages was predominantly local. Hence, the compact territorial and economic unity often found in modern nations was lacking, though a clear sense of the Lord's land and its indigenous resources inspired much Zealot thinking of the period. Clearly, ancient Israel in the later Second Temple era was well on the way to becoming a nation, and it seems that significant sections of the population saw themselves as members of a distinctive nation, in a sense of the term not unlike the one that is prevalent today. Of course, it is easy to fall into the trap of a retrospective nationalism, such as arguably informs Brandon's well-known thesis about Zealot guerilla nationalism; yet, as other scholars have shown, ancient Israel in this period possessed those attributes of distinctive Hellenistic political communities – a capital, temple, territory, leadership and army as well as a unifying ideology – that testify to a national consciousness and existence (Brandon 1967, ch. 2; Alon 1980, vol. I, chs 7–8; cf. Zeitlin 1988, pp. 130–48; Mendels 1992).

The discussion of ancient Israel clearly reveals the fluid historical processes whereby an ethnic category (Israelite slaves in Egypt) become a clear-cut *ethnie* through the Mosaic reforms, and then part of the community comes to approximate, after many vicissitudes, to a nation. This is not to suggest some kind of necessary evolutionary development, but rather a typological series from the broader, encompassing category to the narrower. Undoubtedly, the narrowest category, the nation, is found predominantly in the modern epoch, something that requires separate explanation; but that does not preclude its presence in earlier epochs, and ancient Israel in this period, according to our criteria, may well be designated a nation.

The other well-known case of ethnic consciousness in antiquity, the ancient Hellenes, presents a more complex picture. They are often portrayed as a *Kulturnation*, but we are in fact dealing with at least three levels of collective identification: with the territorial city-state and

its shared myths, memories and public culture, its clearly demarcated borders and in some cases legal uniformity; with the linguistic subculture – Dorian, Ionian, Aeolian, Boeotian – and its separate genealogies, tribal organizations, calendars, dialects and architectural styles; and with the Hellenic community and its common worship of the Olympian pantheon, its Greek language and script, its Homeric epics, its games, festivals and colonies, and later, its pan-Hellenic rhetoric. All these circles of allegiance overlapped one another; the public cultures of the city-states were mostly variants of a wider Hellenic culture; the genealogies, styles and dialects of the linguistic subgroups were again variants of the Hellenic culture and also used by political factions of rival city-states; while the Hellenic community was being continually defined and pressed into the service both of individual city-states and of linguistic groups of city-states, such as Pericles' bid for pan-Hellenic supremacy for Athens or the Spartan (Dorian) League (Fondation Hardt 1962; Alty 1982).

Only the widest Hellenic circle could constitute a national identification. Given the lack of any economic unity, however, the differences in laws and public culture throughout Hellas and the ragged nature of Greek boundaries stretching from the Black Sea to Sicily and Magna Graecia, ancient Hellas is closer to a loose ethnic community than to a nation. No wonder that the *philosophes* and Rousseau looked back to the city-republics of Sparta, Athens and Rome, rather than to Greece! (Rosenblum 1967; Cohler 1970).

The other well-known example of a cohesive *ethnie* from the ancient world is the Persian. That the Persian rulers of the far-flung Achaemenid empire were conscious of the separate identity of Medes and Persians, in contrast to other ethnic communities, is evident not only from Persian records, like Darius's Behistun inscription, but also from the sculptural representations of ethnic groups bearing gifts for the New Year ceremony, in the reliefs of the Apadana staircase at Persepolis. How far this Persian *ethnie* then, or later, in the Sassanid empire, could be said to constitute a nation with a common public culture, clear-cut territory, legal membership and economic unity, rather than simply an ethnic state, is unclear, not least because of problems in interpreting often textually defective or ambiguous documents. The same is true of other *ethnies* in the ancient world – Sumerians, Elamites, Babylonians, Assyrians, Hittites, Hurrians, Arameans, Philistines and Phoenicians; in some cases, we may speak of ethnic kingdoms (Elamites, Hittites, Assyrians), in others (Arameans, Arabs) of a series of culturally cognate but separate political units, and in yet others (Sumerians, Philistines and Phoenicians) of a network of culturally homogenous city-states which are often in civil conflict (see Moscati 1962; Frye 1966; Wiseman 1973).

Ethnies and nations in medieval Europe

For these reasons we should not allow ourselves to be seduced by either the modernist or the perennialist paradigms of nationality. How far we may speak of a widespread conception and presence of national identities in the ancient world, and what these signify, is a question that requires detailed empirical investigation of particular cases and their processes of nation-formation. My argument is simply that use of the criteria of ethnicity and nationality proposed here does not prejudge the presence or absence of nations and national identities for any particular period or continent.

The same kind of reasoning applies *mutatis mutandis* to later epochs and other areas. In principle, the same kind of open-ended investigation could help us to analyse processes of ethnic and national formation for areas like the Far East – Japan, Korea, China and Tibet in the late first millennium AD – or Latin America – notably Mexico and Peru – from the first to the mid-second millennium AD, or for part of the Middle East and Horn of Africa (Arab Caliphates, Persia, Seljuq Turks, Mamluk Egypt, Monophysite Ethiopa) in the same period (see Katz 1972, chs 9–10, 13; Ullendorff 1973, ch. 4; Armstrong 1982, ch. 3).

It is for medieval Europe, however, that this kind of comparative investigation is most relevant and necessary. For it has been a long and powerful tradition here, informed by a romantic genealogical nationalism, that traces the roots, the 'true' origins, of several modern European nations to an early medieval seed-bed. Museum and gallery exhibitions to this day insinuate in their guides and catalogues similar presuppositions, overtly or subtly impregnated with a philological and archaeological nationalism that tells us much about the continuing hold of this kind of ethno-history, even in a rational, 'post-modern' era (see Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983, chs 3, 7; Horne 1984; Johnson 1992).

We need to separate out these issues of filiation from those of comparative analysis. The question, for example, whether Kievan 'Rus was in any sense the 'true ancestor' of modern Russia or whether the medieval Muscovite state bore much resemblance to later Tsarist or Soviet Russia, should not be confused with attempts to evaluate the nature of collective cultural ties in these polities *in their own right*, and not as the prelude to, or seed-bed of, something else. The same arguments apply in the parallel Greek case, where it is customary to trace national filiation to the classical or Byzantine heritage and communities (see Portal 1969; cf. Campbell and Sherrard 1968, ch. 1 and Carras 1983).

The Russian case is peculiarly complex. Kievan 'Rus, at least, was undoubtedly highly heterogeneous ethnically, with Varangians, Slavs, Chazars and others intermingling along the Dnieper route to Constantinople. There was greater ethnic homogeneity among the later north-

east Slav settlements, especially after the Orthodox Church had consolidated their culture in the fourteenth century, in opposition to both the Mongols and the Latin West. Certainly, by the sixteenth century, a distinctive ethno-political identity had evolved among ruling and clerical circles, buttressed by the political myth of the Third Rome and Byzantine succession. By 1500, indeed, Muscovite Russia approximated to an ethnic state, but thereafter, the incorporation of vast tracts of land with culturally alien *ethnies* (Tartars, Ukrainian Cossacks, Mari and others) undermined any cultural or economic unity that may have existed, while the reimposition of serfdom under the new class of boyar landowners ruled out any possibility of common legal rights and duties for all members of the community (see Cherniavsky 1975; Pipes 1977, especially ch. 9).

There is an instructive comparison here with the formation of national identity in France. In both, the guiding *mythomoteur* was dynastic; the land, people and dynasty were closely related. Both communities, too, had a vivid myth of ethnic election, memorably resonated by St. Joan in France, but circulating well beforehand among the clergy. In this myth, the French, like their Russian counterparts, were seen as a 'chosen people' with a God-given mission to unbelievers, schismatics and aliens. In both the Church, centred in France on the archbishopric of Rheims, played a leading part in defining the nature of ethno-political identity; and in both cases, the medieval state and community have often been seen as the true ancestors of the modern nation (Armstrong 1982, pp. 152–59; Reynolds 1983; and for the modern French myth, Citron 1988).

But the French case diverged from the Russian as a result of vastly different geopolitical circumstances: a growing dynastic public culture in France expanded during the later medieval era to cover a limited and *compact* territory, hemmed in by other European powers. Even the later annexations (Brittany, Lorraine, Avignon, Venaissin, Nice) did not alter the fact and sense of a compact territory with 'natural' frontiers based on the original hexagon, a shape that goes back to the Carolingian era, to the *regnum* of Charles the Bald (with the exception of Lorraine, of course). By the later stages of the Anglo-French wars there was a clear identification of the French state, community and sacred realm, within definite boundaries that excluded, for example, England. On the other hand, economic unity had to wait for centuries, until the late-nineteenth century, according to Eugene Weber, and the same was true for common legal rights for all Frenchmen, let alone French women. But, then, the same has been true of most Western states. To deny the title of 'nation' to communities that lacked economic unity or full legal rights for all members would be unduly restrictive and posit a rather static view of the nation as a target to be attained once and for all, rather than a set of processes and a growth of con-

sciousness, as I am suggesting. If we reject the idea that nations can only be 'mass nations', then our task is to trace the growth of the French nation from the time of the Anglo-French wars, if not earlier, and relate it to a pre-existing *ethnie* originating with the Frankish *regnum*[5] (Weber 1979; Connor 1990).

Similar cautions apply in tracing the growth of an English (not British) community in the Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-Norman periods. From Bede and others it would appear that educated Englishmen of the eighth century saw themselves as a named community of common descent with myths of common ancestry and shared historical memories of migration across the seas from northern Europe, followed by battles with the native Briton inhabitants. By this period, too, there was a growing public culture based on the organization of the Church and subsequently on the court of the kingdom of Wessex in its struggles with the Danes. Given the rivalries between the Anglo-Saxon kingdoms, territorial borders were only stabilized in the tenth century, with a body of common laws and a measure of common trade emerging in the eleventh century, despite the predominance of local economies. Can we speak here of the nucleus of an English nation? (Reynolds 1984, ch. 8; Howe 1989; cf. L. Smith 1984).

In the subsequent Anglo-Norman period, we can also discern a growing unity in a number of spheres: language and culture, laws and institutions, stronger trading links despite the predominance of feudal tenures, and new myths of common descent, formulated by Geoffrey of Monmouth in his compilation of the pedigrees of the British kings. It was not, however, until the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries that we find an increased sense of common English identity and destiny, and some would place this development after the long-drawn-out wars with Scotland and France. Here, too, the political effects were felt later. Only with the Tudors does centralization of the state gain real momentum and help to determine the shape and course of an English (later British) national identity. The overall picture of the course of English medieval histories represents therefore a series of movements into and out of sociopolitical structures approximating to the pure types of *ethnie*, ethnic state and nation, rather than any simple linear progression from ethnic category to ethnic community to nation. Indeed, it is only from the late-fifteenth century that we can begin to speak confidently of a growing sense, among the élites at least, of an English national identity (Geoffrey of Monmouth 1966, Introduction; MacDougall 1982; Corrigan and Sayer 1985; Mason 1985).

One more example may help to clarify these distinctions. The Swiss Confederacy is often cited as a counter-example to the importance of language for nationality, the need for cultural homogeneity and the central role of the state. From the modernist perspective, Switzerland represents an anomaly. This holds also for the perennialist perspective,

which treats Switzerland as an immemorial nation, at least from the Oath of the Rütli in 1291. It is extremely doubtful whether the Alemannic tribes around the newly opened St. Gotthard Pass possessed much sense of a common ethnicity, divided as they were by grandiose mountain ranges and speaking cognate dialects in their valleys. By this time, they had evolved a cantonal jurisdiction, their rights subject to confirmation by the region's overlord, in this case Rudolf of Habsburg. Only when such confirmation failed to materialize and the first oaths of the *Eidgenossenschaft* were sworn between representatives of the forest cantons, did a process of ethnic formation commence, binding together a string of local communities who had constituted no more than a very loose ethnic (Alemannic) category. In the course of prolonged struggles with the Habsburgs and Burgundians, the various Swiss cantons and city-republics produced a fund of sagas, songs, rituals and laws embodying and chronicling their memories, myths, symbols and traditions, including the legend of William Tell (originally recounted in the *White Book of Sarnen* of the 1470s and unconnected with Stauffacher's revolt and the founding Oath of the Rütli) whose exploits recalled an earlier, less mercenary, heroic ethos at variance with the one later espoused by the victorious Confederacy under the leadership of the burghers of Berne, Lucerne and Zurich (Thurer 1970, pp. 23–6; Steinberg 1976, ch. 2; Kreis 1991, ch. 4).

There followed a long period of consolidation of the Old Confederacy and of divisions produced by Zwingli's Reformation. The sixteenth century also marked the moment of transition from a purely Alemannic to a wider community incorporating Protestant as well as French-speaking cantons like Fribourg and Geneva. Here was the seed-bed of a possible Swiss political community, though, given the repressive and exclusive nature of the patrician urban oligarchies that held power, its realization was postponed for two centuries. Not till the late-eighteenth century, after the Enlightenment had produced a movement of national renewal among the intelligentsia of Berne, Zurich and Geneva, did it prove possible to dissolve the Old Confederacy and inaugurate a modern national community, first in the form of the Helvetic Republic under French auspices, and then in 1848 with a modern federal constitution (Kohn 1957; Warburton 1976; and especially Im Hof 1991).

Thus, from about the late-fifteenth century, it seems reasonable to speak of a Swiss *ethnie* with common name, ancestry myths, historical memories, replicated social and cultural institutions and a growing sense of historic territory. This was reflected in a clear sense of common Swiss identity and destiny. Economic unity and common rights and duties were certainly lacking, as was a shared public culture for all Swiss men (let alone women) at this period; while the changing shape of the Confederacy's territories, and the differing statuses of new and some older cantons, meant that before 1798 any Swiss 'nation'

resembled a patchwork of partly contiguous local territories rather than the compact fraternal unity espoused by nationalists in the nineteenth century and really only achieved after 1848. So, despite some early processes of nation-formation, it is difficult to describe the Swiss Confederacy as a nation, rather than as an ethnic community, before 1798.[6]

Conclusion

Inevitably, in any discussion of the problems of defining the concept of national identity and dating the emergence of nations, there is an arbitrary element. In this case, it involves my starting-point, the appearance in the later eighteenth century in Western Europe and America of the ideological movement called nationalism. This seems to be the one fixed point in a field otherwise marked by flux and paradox, and it has important social and political consequences. This was recognized by a number of scholars, as the title of John Armstrong's book, *Nations before Nationalism*, indicates. The emergence of nationalism marks a critical divide in the history of ethnicity and nationality. For only after 1800 has it been possible for every self-aware *ethnie* and political community to claim the title of nation and strive to become as like the nationalists' pure type of the nation as possible. Before the eighteenth century, no such doctrine or movement was available to confirm nations in their status, or guide would-be nations to their goal; and so it was not possible before that time to create 'nations by design' (Armstrong 1982; cf. Tilly 1975 and Seton-Watson 1977, chs 2–3).

From this fixed point, we can go on to construct the ideal or pure type of the nationalists' ideal of the nation everywhere. Yet, it is important also to realize that the pure type itself is not a fixed standard, since its features are actually social and political *processes*. The formation of nations includes collective myth-making and ethno-historical selection, ethnic territorialization, cultural assimilation and mass public education, economic unification and legal standardization. It also includes processes of collective representation, of the growth of collective consciousness among ever wider strata of the designated population. These processes are not inevitable; they can often be reversed. That is why nationalisms arise to 'awaken the people' and stir them from their slumber. This means that nationalism, the ideological movement, is part of reversible nation-forming processes, which it influences and shapes and hastens but does not produce or construct.

A key question arises here: can these processes of nation-formation exist independently of nationalism? Were there nations before nationalism? Clearly, unless we arbitrarily restrict the notion of the nation to mass nations, the origins of such nations as the French, English and Dutch can be traced back well before the nationalist era. What about nations in yet earlier epochs? Can we discover there, too, the nation

of the nationalists' vision? It is important to treat this question on its own merits, independently of the rival perennialist and modernist perspectives, and irrespective of what occurred in the same geographical area in subsequent periods of history. Whether the English or French constituted nations in the seventh or fourteenth century is not to be confused with the issue of their relationship to the modern English or French nations. It must be determined by independent criteria drawn from the processes selected for inclusion in the ideal type of the nation. Adoption of such a procedure reveals the complexity of the empirical issues and rules out the possibility of uncovering law-like regularities or sweeping generalizations in this field.

There are several objections to the ideal-type procedure. The first is that the argument is circular. It sets out from a nationalist vision of what constitutes the concept of the nation, one which is infused with the modern European context of its initial formulation, and it then examines how far pre-modern collective formations approximate to the ideal type of the nation drawn from the nationalist vision, that is, how far collective formations far removed in epochs and continents from eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe conform to this nationalist ideal. Is this not to adopt a retrospectively nationalist criterion? Should we not recognize that the very meaning of the concept of the nation is contextual, that is, it is specific to the time and place of its appearance?

To accept such a relativist criticism would, of course, rule out the possibility of comparison and general explanation, and lead to a *reductio ad absurdum*: every nation and nationalism would be incommensurable, even conceptually, because, by definition, its historical appearance is specific. That would underwrite the irreducible particularism which nationalism extols. However, the terms and concepts of the discourse of nationalism are also general and comparative; though each nation and nationalism has its specific features, it is also related to a wider conceptual framework of 'nationalism in general' of which it forms an instance.[7]

There is the additional problem with this procedure of how 'we moderns' are to grasp the inner meaning of the terminology of collective identity of each distinct era in its own terms and without any modern presuppositions. How can we know whether the terms and concepts of ethnicity and nationality of pre-modern epochs correspond in any way to our own modern ones? (Does 'modern' here bear the original meaning of 'recent', 'just now' (*modo*), or a more sociological one of a new stage of history marked by machine-power technology, industrialism, the bureaucratic state and the like?)

In one sense, the problem is insuperable. Either one accepts that modern society is radically different from pre-modern society, so that every term of analysis is also different in the two kinds of society, and pre-modern ethnicity and nationality simply cannot be compared with

modern ethnicity and nationality; or one does not, and then these terms and concepts can be related to each other across the modernization divide, because the similarities are more important than the differences. Clearly, this is something that cannot be settled by a purely 'empirical' method that must treat the terms of definitions as valid for all eras to allow useful comparisons, irrespective of their historical context.

In another sense, I am not sure that the dilemma is insuperable. It is possible to recognize the radically different nature of (sociologically) modern societies, while treating collective cultural identities through the ages and across continents on a single continuum and as part of a single discourse that spans the epochs and zones. This does not mean ignoring differences in historical context – or for that matter, of geographical context. (Do ethnicity and nationality, common legal rights and public culture bear quite different meanings in China, Ethiopia and Mexico, even in the modern epoch, let alone in antiquity or the medieval era? Does the 'context' only change with modernization?) Nor does it ignore the changes that terms and concepts may undergo with modernity (as with *natio* to nation). At the same time, this procedure allows us to frame general concepts and language that can accommodate comparisons across epochs and continents, as part of the social scientific enterprise, while being sensitive to changes in many of the key terms of that language.

A third objection to the ideal-type procedure adopted here is that the data found in pre-modern epochs will not permit definitive answers to the questions under consideration here. We rarely possess the records of the vast majority of pre-modern cultural units of population, of the peasants, tribesmen and artisans, or of most women. We have to rely on the testimonies and relics of a tiny fraction of the population, usually the clergy, but also a few nobles, bureaucrats and merchants. Other relics include buildings and artefacts – sculptures and paintings, craft objects, inscriptions and the like – which often have recognizable regional or ethnic styles, though inferences from such artefacts are by their nature limited.

To this we may reply that it would be foolish to imagine that we can arrive at full answers to such questions even in the modern world. The best we can hope for is an approximation to the realities of a given epoch or area. Besides, the historical record, even in pre-modern epochs, often contains sufficient accounts of political, religious, military and economic activities to allow us to make reasonable inferences about ethnic or national motivations, as has been demonstrated in a study of the Ionian and Dorian sentiments of many of the participants in the Peloponnesian war, based on a close reading of the accounts of Herodotus and Thucydides (Alty 1982).

A last objection is the classical sociological one: so what? Where can such an exercise in nuanced analysis lead? For historians, perhaps, this

is not an important objection, but for social scientists trained to search for large-scale regularities there is a question of theoretical yield. Unfortunately, the nationalists have a point. The field of nations and nationalisms is one of particularities, variations and nuances. It is a field of cultural plurals. No wonder that Max Weber, with his historical training, hesitated to give us the book on the formation of national states that he promised us. Hence, too, his recommendation, which I have followed here, to use the ideal-type method, in order to allow some means of comparison and contrast.

But there are other uses of this method. By creating a framework for examining the nature of collective cultural identities, the ideal type is useful for the identification of key processes in the formation of *ethnies* and nations, something that is critical if we are ever to formulate a more general model or theory. Secondly, in by-passing the all-or-nothing formulations of perennialists and modernists, the ideal-type method can help us to search for the varieties of collective identities, and the similarities and differences between ethnic and national identities. Thirdly, this method can provide a touchstone for discovering whether there may be substantial relationships between ethnic and national communities in the same area in successive historical periods and this, in turn, may help us to determine which nations emerged and why.

Finally, the ideal-type approach emphasizes the need for caution in predicting the demise of ethnic and national identities. Nations may not be immemorial, nor is nationalism perennial. At the same time, the long history of ethnic identification suggests the rootedness and functionality of ethnic and national ties and identities in so many periods and areas of the world. We are all too aware of how politically controversial is the problem of the nature and antiquity of ethnic or national identity of French and English, Germans and Poles, Arabs and Jews, Tamils and Sinhalese, and how easily these questions generate rivalries, hatreds and wars even today. In seeking more balanced and many-sided answers to such complex and controversial questions, social scientists and historians may help us to gain a deeper understanding of a rich and fascinating sphere of human existence, and also make a modest contribution to a saner and more tolerant approach to human diversity.

Notes

1. This is true only of some periods. There were strong cultural and political nationalist movements in puritan England, and again at the end of both the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; see Kohn (1940); Colls and Dodd (1986); Newman (1987); and more generally, Samuel (1989). One could also argue that where national sentiment is widely diffused and territorial claims have been satisfied, as in Norway, Switzerland and Holland, there is little need for an explicit nationalist movement.
2. Why cannot city-states become nations? Presumably because their public cultures

and myths were variants of wider ethno-linguistic and religious cultures, and their descent myths harked back to a common ancestor of cognate city-states, as in Sumer, Phoenicia and ancient Greece. Does this apply to a city-state like Venice, which was formed after the breakdown of a common Roman-Italian culture? What of republican Rome itself, with its *populus Romanus* in contradistinction to the barbarian *nationes*? Do not Rome's dual foundation myth (Romulus, Aeneas), its later exclusiveness to foreigners, its very public culture and uniform legal codes, make the later Roman republic appear like a dominant 'nation' at the head of a growing empire, in the same way as the English (through Britain) came to rule a large empire? (For Roman myths and attitudes, see Ogilvie 1976; Balsdon 1979.)

3. See also Deuteronomy 11, 12. The settlement of the Israelite tribes on the sacred land is discussed by Grosby (1991, especially p. 240) where the conjoining of a distinctive 'people' with a specific sacred 'land' is a 'characteristic referent in the shared beliefs constitutive of nationality, ancient and modern: a people has its land and a land has its people'.

4. It can also be argued that the early Mosaic code enjoins such equality of rights and duties on all Israelite males at a very early period; see Zeitlin (1984, ch. 3).

5. This is the recent position of Connor (1990). The rise of nations, he argues, can only be dated from the emancipation of the masses and the spread of national sentiment and rights to the majority of the population, including women. The indicator here is the enfranchisement of the majority of the population, which would place the emergence of nations in the West in the early-twentieth century. This raises a number of questions. Is this not a rather arbitrary criterion of the presence of the nation? Where is the 'cut-off' point in such a quantitative account? Does this not suggest that the nation is a target that must be attained, or perhaps a moving target that always eludes our grasp? (See Nettl and Robertson 1968, Part I.)

6. With the proviso that there is nothing inevitable about this process, we may agree with Im Hof (1991, Introduction) that elements of a later Swiss national identity can be traced back as far as the later fifteenth century.

7. Gellner (1983) distinguishes explanations of the rise of particular nationalisms and explanations of nationalism in general. We seek both kinds of explanation, of course, but there remains a tension, not least between historians and social scientists, over the importance accorded and the methodology adopted, to one or the other.

References

AKZIN, BENJAMIN 1964 *State and Nation*, London: Hutchinson

ALON, GEDALIAH 1980 *The Jews in their Land in the Talmudic Age*, vol. I, Jerusalem: Magnes Press, Hebrew University

ALTY, J. H. M. 1982 'Dorians and Ionians', *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, vol. 102, no. 1, pp. 1–14

ANDERSON, BENEDICT 1983 *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, London: Verso

ARMSTRONG, JOHN 1982 *Nations before Nationalism*, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press

ATIYAH, A. S. 1968 *A History of Eastern Christianity*, London: Methuen

BALSDON, J. V. P. 1979 *Romans and Aliens*, London: Duckworth

BARTH, FREDRIK (ed.) 1969 *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*, Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Co

BEYER, W. C. 1959 'The civil service in the ancient world', *Public Administration Review*, vol. 19, pp. 243–49

BRANDON, S. G. F. 1967 *Jesus and the Zealots*, Manchester: Manchester University Press

BRASS, PAUL 1979 'Elite groups, symbol manipulation and ethnic identity among the Muslims of South Asia', in David Taylor and Malcolm Yapp (eds): *Political Identity in South Asia*, London and Dublin: School of Oriental and African Studies, Curzon Press Ltd., pp. 35–77

BREUILLY, JOHN 1982 *Nationalism and the State*, Manchester: Manchester University Press

CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF JUDAISM 1984 *Vol. I, Introduction: The Persian Period*, W. D. Davies and L. Finkelstein (eds), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

CAMPBELL, JOHN and SHERRARD, PHILIP 1968 *Modern Greece*, London: Ernest Benn

CARRAS, C. 1983 *3,000 Years of Greek Identity – Myth or Reality?*, Athens: Domus Books

CHERNIAVSKY, MICHAEL 1975 'Russia', in Orest Ranum (ed.), *National Consciousness, History and Political Culture in Early-Modern Europe*, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 118–43

CITRON, SUZANNE 1988 *Le Mythe National*, Paris: Presses Ouvriers

COHLER, ANNE 1970 *Rousseau and Nationalism*, New York: Basic Books

COLLS, ROBERT and DODD, PHILIP (eds) 1986 *Englishness, Politics and Culture*, London, Sydney, Dover, New Hampshire: Croom Helm

CONNOR, WALKER 1972 'Nation-building or nation-destroying?' *World Politics*, vol. 24, pp. 319–55

—— 1978 'A nation is a nation, is a state, is an ethnic group, is a . . .', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 1, no. 4, pp. 378–400

—— 1990 'When is a Nation?', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 92–103

CORRIGAN, PHILIP and SAYER, DEREK 1985 *The Great Arch: English State Formation as Cultural Revolution*, Oxford: Blackwell

DANBY, HERBERT (ed.) 1933/67 *The Mishnah*, Oxford: Oxford University Press

DAVID, A. ROSALIE 1982 *The Ancient Egyptians: Beliefs and Practices*, London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul

DEUTSCH, KARL 1966 *Nationalism and Social Communication*, 2nd ed., New York: MIT Press

EDWARDS, JOHN 1985 *Language, Society and Identity*, Oxford: Blackwell

ELLER, JACK DAVID and COUGHLAN, REED M. 1993 'The poverty of primordialism: the demystification of ethnic attachments', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 183–202

EMERSON, RUPERT 1960 *From Empire to Nation*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press

FONDATION HARDT 1962 *Grecs et Barbares*, Entretiens sur l'Antiquité classique VIII, Geneva

FRANKFORT, HENRI 1954 *The Birth of Civilisation in the Near East*, New York: Anchor Books

FRANKFORT, HENRI *et al.* 1947 *Before Philosophy*, Harmondsworth: Penguin

FRYE, RICHARD 1966 *The Heritage of Persia*, New York: Mentor

GEERTZ, CLIFFORD 1963 'The integrative revolution', in C. Geertz (ed.): *Old Societies and New States*, New York: Free Press

GELLNER, ERNEST 1964 *Thought and Change*, Weidenfeld and Nicolson

—— 1983 *Nations and Nationalism*, Oxford: Blackwell

GEOFFREY OF MONMOUTH 1966 *The History of the Kings of Britain*, (trans. L. Thorpe), Harmondsworth: Penguin

GLAZER, NATHAN and MOYNIHAN, DANIEL (eds) 1975 *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press

GROSBY, STEVEN 1991 'Religion and nationality in antiquity', *European Journal of Sociology*, vol. XXXII, pp. 229–65

HAUGEN, EINAR 1966 'Dialect, language, nation', *American Anthropologist*, vol. 68, no. 4, pp. 922–35
HERTZ, FREDERICK 1944 *Nationality in History and Politics*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul
HOBSBAWM, ERIC 1990 *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
HOBSBAWM, ERIC and RANGER, TERENCE (eds) 1983 *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
HORNE, DONALD 1984 *The Great Museum*, London and Sydney: Pluto Press
HOWE, NICHOLAS 1989 *Migration and Mythmaking in Anglo-Saxon England*, New Haven and London: Yale University Press
HROCH, MIROSLAV 1985 *The Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
IM HOF, ULRICH 1991 *Mythos Schweiz: Identität – Nation – Geschichte, 1291–1991*, Zürich: Neue Zürcher Verlag
JOHNSON, LESLEY 1992 'Imagining communities', paper given to Conference on *Imagining Communities: Medieval and Modern*, Centre for Medieval Studies, University of Leeds, 23 May 1992
KATZ, FRIEDRICH 1972 *The Ancient American Civilisations*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson
KAUTSKY, JOHN H. (ed.) 1962 *Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries*, New York: John Wiley
KEMILAINEN, AIRA 1964 *Nationalism, Problems Concerning the Word, Concept and Classification*, Yvaskyla: Kustantajat Publishers
KOHN, HANS 1940 'The origins of English nationalism', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, vol. I, pp. 69–94
—— 1957 *Nationalism and Liberty: The Swiss Example*, New York: Macmillan
—— 1967 *Prelude to Nation-States: The French and German Experience, 1789–1815*, New York: Van Nostrand
KOHT, HALVDAN 1947 'The dawn of nationalism in Europe', *American Historical Review*, vol. 52, pp. 265–80
KREIS, GEORG 1991 *Der Mythos von 1291: Zur Entstehung des schweizerischen Nationalfeiertags*, Basel: Friedrich Reinhardt Verlag
LEVI, MARIO ATTILIO 1965 *Political Power in the Ancient World*, (trans. J. Costello), London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson
MACDOUGALL, HUGH A. 1982 *Racial Myth in English History: Trojans, Teutons and Anglo-Saxons*, Montreal: Harvest House, and Hanover, NH: University Press of New England
MASON, R. A. 1985 'Scotching the Brut: the early history of Britain', *History Today*, vol. 35, (January), pp. 26–31
MENDELS, DORON 1992 *The Rise and Fall of Jewish Nationalism*, New York: Doubleday
MOSCATI, SABATINO 1962 *The Face of the Ancient Orient*, New York: Anchor Books
NAIRN, TOM 1977 *The Break-up of Britain*, London: New Left Books
NETTL, PETER and ROBERTSON, ROLAND 1968 *International Systems and the Modernisation of Societies*, London: Faber
NEUSNER, JACOB 1961 *Max Weber Revisited: Religion and Society in Ancient Judaism*, Oxford: Oxford Centre for Postgraduate Hebrew Studies
NEWMAN, GERALD 1987 *The Rise of English Nationalism: A Cultural History, 1740–1830*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson
NOTH, MARTIN 1960 *The History of Israel*, London: Adam and Charles Black
OGILVIE, R. M. 1976 *Early Rome and the Etruscans*, London: Fontana Paperbacks
PEEL, JOHN 1989 'The cultural work of Yoruba ethnogenesis', in Elizabeth Tonkin, Maryon McDonald and Malcolm Chapman (eds), pp. 198–215

PIPES, RICHARD 1977 *Russia under the Old Regime*, London: Peregrine Books
PORTAL, ROGER 1969 *The Slavs: A Cultural Historical Survey of the Slavonic Peoples*, (trans. Patrick Evans), London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson
REYNOLDS, SUSAN 1983 'Medieval *Origines Gentium* and the community of the realm', *History*, vol. 68, pp. 375–90
—— 1984 *Kingdoms and Communities in Western Europe, 900–1300*, Oxford: Clarendon
ROSENBLUM, ROBERT 1967 *Transformations in late Eighteenth Century Art*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
SAMUEL, RAPHAEL (ed.) 1989 *Patriotism, The Making and Unmaking of British National Identity*, London and New York: Routledge
SETON-WATSON, HUGH 1977 *Nations and States*, London: Methuen
SHILS, EDWARD 1957 'Primordial, personal, sacred and civil ties', *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 7, pp. 113–45
SMITH, ANTHONY D. 1973 '*Nationalism*, a trend report and annotated bibliography', *Current Sociology*, vol. 21, no. 3, The Hague: Mouton
—— (ed.) 1976 *Nationalist Movements*, London: Macmillan
—— 1983 *Theories of Nationalism*, 2nd ed., London: Duckworth, and New York: Holmes and Meier
—— 1984 'Ethnic myths and ethnic revivals', *European Journal of Sociology*, vol. 25, pp. 283–305
—— 1986 *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, Oxford: Blackwell
—— 1988 'The myth of the "Modern Nation" and the myths of nations', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 1–26
—— 1991a *National Identity*, Harmondsworth: Penguin
—— 1991b 'The nation: invented, imagined, reconstructed?', *Millennium, Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 20, no. 3, pp. 353–68
SMITH, L. M. (ed.) 1984 *The Making of Britain: The Dark Ages*, London: Macmillan
STACK, J. F. (ed.) 1986 *The Primordial Challenge: Ethnicity in the Contemporary World*, New York: Greenwood Press
STEINBERG, JONATHAN 1976 *Why Switzerland?*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
THURER, GEORG 1970 *Free and Swiss*, London: Oswald Wolff
TILLY, CHARLES (ed.) 1975 *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
TIPTON, LEON (ed.) 1972 *Nationalism in the Middle Ages*, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston
TIVEY, LEONARD (ed.) 1980 *The Nation-State*, Oxford: Martin Robertson
TONKIN, ELISABETH, MCDONALD, MARYON and CHAPMAN, MALCOLM (eds) 1989 *History and Ethnicity*, ASA Monographs 27, London and New York: Routledge
TRIGGER, B. G., KEMP, B. J., O'CONNOR, D. and LLOYD, A. B. 1983 *Ancient Egypt, A Social History*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
ULLENDORFF, EDWARD 1973 *The Ethiopians, An Introduction to Country and People*, 3rd ed., London: Oxford University Press
VAN DEN BERGHE, PIERRE 1979 *The Ethnic Phenomenon*, New York: Elsevier
WALEK-CZERNECKI, M. T. 1929 'Le role de la nationalité dans l'histoire de l'antiquité, *Bulletin of the International Committee of Historical Sciences*, vol. II, no. 2, pp. 305–20
WARBURTON, T. RENNIE 1976 'Nationalism and language in Switzerland and Canada', in A. D. Smith (ed.), *Nationalist Movements*, pp. 88–109
WEBER, EUGENE 1979 *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernisation of Rural France, 1870–1914*, London: Chatto and Windus
WELCH, CLAUDE 1966 *Dreams of Unity: Pan-Africanism and Political Unification in West Africa*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press
WISEMAN, D. J. (ed.) 1973 *Peoples of the Old Testament*, Oxford: Clarendon Press

ZEITLIN, IRVING 1984 *Ancient Judaism*, Cambridge: Polity Press
—— 1988 *Jesus and the Judaism of His Time*, Cambridge: Polity Press
ZERNATTO, G. 1944 'Nation: the history of a word', *Review of Politics*, vol. 6, pp. 351–66

ANTHONY D. SMITH is Professor of Sociology at the London School of Economics and Political Science.
ADDRESS: Department of Sociology, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK.

Copyright of Ethnic & Racial Studies is the property of Routledge, Ltd. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.

Copyright of Ethnic & Racial Studies is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.