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3

The German Sonderweg: multiculturalism as 'racism with a distance'

Stephan Lanz

In West Germany, the debate on multiculturalism first emerged in the left-wing political scene and in pedagogical circles. It was then taken up by politicians concerned with social and labour market affairs, before achieving the decisive media exposure and becoming a political issue in the late 1980s. The German debate adopted basic concepts from earlier discourses on multiculturalism that had developed, for example, in Canada and Australia. In these countries, multiculturalism had already become a 'state doctrine' (Nassehi, 1997) by the end of the 1970s. However, in Germany the discourse on multiculturalism was adapted within the specific German norms regarding immigration.

Hence, the German model of multiculturalism cannot be properly understood without taking into account the context and history of German immigration policies. Therefore multiculturalism in (West) Germany will be analysed here as an ambiguous political concept and tool with which to deal with immigration at different levels: in public discourse, and in national as well as regional politics, with the city state of (West) Berlin as a particularly interesting and telling example. Berlin was the first West German state to pursue its own multicultural integration policy. Further, the city has for decades been used as a key reference point, both by advocates and by opponents of multiculturalism in Germany.

As will be shown, 'multiculturalism' has proved to be an extremely flexible concept for German politicians, compatible with various political ideologies. At the same time, one can identify a specific German model of multiculturalism which to this day, a quarter of a century after its emergence, still has a substantial impact on political debate concerning the whole complex issue of immigration.

The historical continuity of German immigration policy

After the West German government had signed the first treaty with Italy on the official recruitment of migrant labour in 1955, similar agreements were reached with Spain and Greece (1960), Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965) and Yugoslavia (1968). Several million so-called 'guest workers' had emigrated to the Federal Republic of Germany by 1973.

These treaties guaranteed foreign employees the same wages as their German counterparts, and provided for a rotation system by restricting their residence permits to a maximum of one year and by linking them to a single employer. As members of the European Economic Community (EEC) only Italians were exempt from this regulation. These measures showed a remarkable continuity with the preceding three political systems (German Reich, Weimar Republic, Nazi Germany), unmasking the official narrative of a new beginning for Germany's post-war immigration policy as a fiction (Herbert 2001: 201). Rather, one might reasonably conclude that the government wanted to attain 'extensive control over the presence of foreigners' (Schönwälder, 2001: 219). Already in the early 1950s, the National Socialist 'foreigners police decree' (*Ausländerpolizeiverordnung*, APVO) from 1938 and the 'decree on foreign employees' from 1933 had been reinstated, although, according to the Ministry of the Interior of Schleswig-Holstein in 1948, their 'explicit xenophobic character' and their 'removal of all legal guarantees' for non-German residents were well known (Schönwälder, 2001: 219). With the introduction of a 'central register of foreigners' (*Ausländerzentralregister*) in 1953, the national government began recording personal data on immigrants (while similar data storage for German citizens was prohibited by law) as well as possible objections to their entry into Germany (Dietrich, 2005). Around the same time, 'aliens were too often stigmatized with an embarrassing lack of historical awareness as undesirable, or even criminal and antisocial' (Schönwälder, 2001: 220). Displaced persons, in particular, most of them former inmates of the National Socialist concentration camps, became the victims of such verbal attacks. Thus the discursive structures that would dominate political debate in West Germany for decades to come had already been put in place, before the number of 'guest workers' expanded significantly at the beginning of the 1960s, and the 'general labelling of foreigners as a menace, the notion of immigration as a permanently growing danger, as illegal, as "infiltration" or a "flood"' (Schönwälder, 2001: 224).

Accordingly, the German foreigners law (*Ausländergesetz*), which passed on a broad vote across all political parties in 1965 was influenced by an authoritarian understanding of the state, consistent with traditions of the APVO. Its aim was to enable the government to register and closely control all residents of foreign nationality and deport them immediately if required (Dohse, 1981; Ha, 2003). The protection of the individual civil rights of migrants was subordinated to 'concerns and interests of the German state', and the granting of a residence permit remained an act of mercy (Dietrich, 2005: 293). Administrative discretion provided for a flexible system that was used to supply the West German labour market with the manpower needed for the economy (Herbert, 2001: 211). By that time, even lesbian relationships among recruited workers, disturbance of the industrial peace, troubling the authorities or insufficient integration were considered to be offences against the public interest and ranked among the reasons for deportation. Furthermore, different legal interpretations of the law insisted that certain groups of migrants violated the interests of the Federal Republic because they were seen as unable to adjust to the German way of life. Although it was never declared an official policy, due to reasons of image, the national post-war German governments adopted highly selective strategies towards immigrants, based on ethnic origin and skin colour. In most instances, so-called 'Afro-Asians' (*Afroasiaten*) were excluded from obtaining a residence permit, on the grounds that their customs appeared 'too strange' to Germans. The term 'Afro-Asian' merged all subjects with an African or Asian origin, becoming a general category

for incompatible strangers (Schönwälder, 2001). Notwithstanding this discrimination, the German foreigners law was considered to be liberal, as it guaranteed long-term immigrants more favourable terms than did preceding laws.

The recruitment of migrant workers was accepted as an economic necessity and won widespread approval within German society. Not only the legal instruments but also the general assessments by political and media elites were similar to those of the Wilhelminian Empire and the Weimar Republic. The deployment of migrant labour was considered to be beneficial for the country because the workers were young and therefore very efficient, and generated no educational or follow-up costs. Moreover, they prevented the need for wage increases for low-skilled workers and made it possible for Germans to rise to better positions. In addition, immigration was regarded as anticipatory of European integration. These 'encounters between Europeans', however, was not that of equals. Rather, most Germans saw themselves – informed by colonial discourses – as educators and 'development workers', doing 'guest workers' a favour. Immigrants were regarded as children in need of support and attendance, and at the same time perceived as uncivilized but sexually potent Mediterranean types (Schönwälder, 2001: 166). The media emphasized time and again – often as an attempt to promote more tolerance and empathy – the neediness especially of female migrant workers. This was not an openly hostile but rather a paternalistic gesture that sharply distinguished between 'us' and 'them'. In public discourse the presence of migrants was for the most part linked with labour market issues and crime. The stereotype of the impulsive and violence-prone 'southerner' characterized an overall category of the 'foreign worker' which did not make a distinction between ethnic origins and cultural affiliations.

In the wake of the recession in 1966 more than 400,000 migrant workers left West Germany. By then, many Germans had started to question the economic usefulness of the guest worker system. Gradually, a public discourse emerged and intensified that claimed there was a 'problem caused by foreigners' (*Ausländerproblem*). Its central elements were 'their difference', language and communication problems and the lack of assimilation. As migrants assumed an increasing visibility in certain urban neighbourhoods, officials worried about the formation of 'ghettos' and cautioned against social and political (communist) 'alien elements' and thus the disintegration of society. A decisive aspect of the discourse on the 'immigrant problem' was the idea that the growing number of strangers in Germany would take over the national economy and culture. 'This imagined threat, which has been a very powerful influence on German nationalism since the end of the nineteenth century, was obviously still firmly rooted in German society and not disavowed through history' (Schönwälder, 2001: 200). By the 1960s, debates on 'assimilation' and 'integration' had become more common and were dominated by the notion of a temporary integration of immigrants who would later return to their home country. Assimilation, understood as the detachment from identity, roots and customs, was rejected by most politicians, especially by conservatives, who believed that it would be a hindrance to the returning home of the so-called 'guests'. A spokesperson of an employers' association (cited Schönwälder, 2001: 207) defined integration on behalf of many others around that time as the 'adaptation to our social life, our idea of order, our lifestyle and our mentality'. In this understanding, nationalistic notions of nationality and ethnicity as values on their own merged with rather instrumentalist intentions to keep the idea alive that immigrants had to go back to their countries of origin when their labour was no longer needed.

Former political conceptions of integration: Berlin

In 1971, the Social Democratic senate in Berlin set up an initial planning committee supposed to develop measures for a 'harmonious integration of foreign employees and their families' (Der Regierende Bürgermeister, 1972: 2). It formulated the so-called 'demand-oriented integration model', motivated by the goal to regulate and control immigration in accordance with German interests: namely economic growth and the maintenance of law and order. A political model to foster non-transient immigration was explicitly rejected, however, with the argument that this would facilitate 'foreign infiltration' and 'thus pose a threat to Germany's constitutional system and its democracy as well as to public security and order' (Der Regierende Bürgermeister,

1972: 2). The 'demand-oriented integration model' was supposed to allow for a 'selective process by which the state could single out those migrant workers who were deemed willing and capable of integration, while the vast majority were relegated to the rotation system' (Der Regierende Bürgermeister, 1972: 13). For the few chosen ones, this model was meant to provide for reliable future prospects in Germany and various support services to assist them with integration, while at the same time motivating 'loyal behavior towards German society' and leading, in the medium term, to a process of 'normalization'. Some migrant families were seen as capable of melting into 'German culture', whereas the rest of them were supposed to return to their home countries.

This model of integration was the first example of an immigration policy which for decades tried to profit from the recruitment of migrant labour, while shying away from dealing with the political and financial consequences of a multi-ethnic population structure. Its ultimate goal was to exploit the potential of migrant workers at optimal cost. German immigration policies were from now on characterized by two double binds: on the one hand, the majority of immigrants were required to conform to German society, while at the same time they were asked to prepare for their return home at the end of their employment contracts. On the other hand, the cultivation of the presumably alien national character of the 'guest workers' was both encouraged by the government and stigmatized as a potential danger and proof that they lacked the will to integrate. Thus, the local state simultaneously introduced German lessons for immigrant children and promoted classes where they were to learn about their countries of origin (*Heimatunterricht*), in order to prevent their 'national estrangement' and not jeopardize a return (Der Regierende Bürgermeister 1972: 41ff.).

The recruitment ban and its results

The social–liberal coalition under Chancellor Willy Brandt, which took over the federal government in 1969, at first tied its immigration policy to other social and democratizing reforms. Since an increase of migrant workers was regarded as indispensable for the economy, the new government considered an integration policy via naturalization. The intention was to fight social evils and better protect minorities, a concern that was raised particularly by Willy Brandt. Initially, the general optimism regarding social reform was successful in pushing back nationalistic sentiment. Nevertheless, the main aim of integration policy in the 1970s continued to be the adjustment of immigrants to mainstream social behavioural norms. It was dominated by the patronizing notion of migrants as temporary 'fellow citizens' in need of special attendance and care. Historically familiar and still powerful resentments, and perceptions of Germany as an ethnically homogeneous society, in combination with apprehensions concerning possible economic crisis, all added to a political climate that fostered a growing rejection of further immigration, even by trade unions and various welfare associations. Cultural plurality as a potential model was not even discussed at that time: human beings were seen as irrevocable parts of a homogeneous nation (*Volk*); 'cultural exchange and change were interpreted in purely negative terms, as uprootings' (Schönwälder, 2001: 525).

The years 1972–73 marked an important turning point in German immigration policy. In November 1973, the recruitment of 'guest workers' came to an end. A political conception had steadily gained ground which defined immigrants as an incalculable expense for the national economy and as a general social burden. In the meantime, the broad discretion German authorities had exercised when dealing with the rights of non-citizen residents had been restricted by various EC regulations and by the fact that an increasing number of long-term immigrants had settled for good in Germany. The hostage-taking and killings during the Olympic Games in Munich in 1972, carried out by a Palestinian organization, also contributed to the more negative perception of non-German residents. The image of 'foreigners as victims of abuses and social evils' that had prevailed until then was replaced by a general bias, based on the portrayal of foreign students and immigrants as potential terrorists. Immigration policy was again more commonly discussed as a matter of national security. Whereas even undocumented migrants – at least for a short period – had formerly been described as victims of economic exploitation, public discourses and media reports on immigration to Germany were now

swamped with terms like 'tidal wave', 'invasion' and 'battalions of foreign workers'. All of a sudden, it was claimed that the 'boat was full' and that the 'capacity of the country to absorb' was exhausted. The inadequate provision in many urban neigbourhoods of basic social services was no longer interpreted as a problem caused by a lack of infrastructure but as the product of too many 'foreigners'. In 1973, dramatic reports on the explosive situation in urban areas, including warnings of 'ghetto fires' and open street battles, reached a peak. The term 'negro', whch was by now associated with civil unrest in US cities, as well as the term *Fremdarbeiter*, which was used in Nazi Germany to describe forced labour, resurfaced in public discourse, portraying immigrants as dangerous alien elements and as 'walking time bombs'. In this context, some very influential media branded a spontaneous strike of thousands of migrant workers against dismissals and unreasonable working conditions in the Ford Motor Company of Cologne as 'Turkish terror'. The category 'Turk', which until then had been a somewhat neutral term, became ideologically charged and a synonym for the 'communist threat' (Kleff, 2004). This was particularly true during the Cold War and in the frontier city of Berlin, where the Turkish Socialist Association, founded in 1967, was already viewed with suspicion by officials (Özcan, 1993).

Following the official recruitment ban by the federal government, which intended the return of non-EC-citizens to their home countries to be an irreversible decision, many tried to get their families to Germany and relocate on a permanent basis. Hence the numbers of non-German residents started to grow. As the increasing number of children and family members lowered the proportion of employable adults in the migrant communities, the term 'guest worker' was gradually replaced by the term 'foreigner'. In the course of their irreversible settlement in Germany, foreigners were no longer regarded 'as useful members of society who help us to maintain or to increase our gross national product' (Social Democrat MP Schmidt in 1975, cited in Morgenstern, 2002: 251). The term 'foreigner' served, rather, to highlight their alien character, by focusing on descent and different cultural roots. The term 'ghetto' advanced to become a dominant metaphor, branding foreigners as dangerous and suspicious elements. Many politicians held immigrants responsible

for the spread of urban 'ghettos', identifying their assumed desire to physically separate themselves from Germans as the main problem. In Berlin, the Kreuzberg district developed into a nationwide symbol for ideological battles around the immigration issue, as the following statement by the Christian Democrat MP Mick during a debate in the Bundestag illustrates (15 May 1975, cited in Morgenstern, 2002: 251): 'When I wander through Berlin–Kreuzberg and feel like I'm in Ankara, something must have gone wrong. We believe something must have gone wrong not because we dislike foreign workers, but rather because we don't want to create new ghettos, because we want to integrate them.' Eventually, the federal government and local officials enacted various ordinances (*Zuzugssperren*) prohibiting new immigrants moving into certain urban areas. In Berlin, non-German residents were not allowed to settle in the inner-city districts of Kreuzberg, Wedding and Tiergarten. A corresponding instruction was placed in their passports, and they could be expelled for failure to abide by the ordinance. This local immigration ban, which many considered unconstitutional, was in effect from 1975 until 1989.

In the late 1970s, an official 'report on the situation of foreigners in Berlin' found that the majority of them had settled permanently in Berlin and, in the meanwhile, had built up a dense entrepreneurial infrastructure. In Kreuzberg alone, the report recorded more than 200 businesses run by immigrants. Other West German cities registered similar developments. Against this background, the first so-called foreigners' representative (*Ausländerbeauftragte*) of the federal government, Heinz Kühn, launched a paper in 1979 which outlined a new policy for dealing with immigration. This 'Kühn Memorandum' confirmed, on the one hand, the official position that Germany was not an immigration country. On the other hand, it demanded for the first time serious efforts by the government to assist immigrants in integrating – even if this meant abandoning the requirement to return to their home country – and the right to naturalization for those who were born in Germany. However, this position did not find favour, and the report had no political consequences (Meier-Braun, 1988). Henceforth, educational inequality and high unemployment among second-generation immigrants became the main focus of integration policies. In 1979, the senate in Berlin set up new 'guidelines and

measures for the integration of foreigners in Berlin', which confirmed the previous dual strategy of improving 'integration', while calling for better protection from uncontrolled immigration and the return of unwanted alien residents: 'The senate will do everything to prevent ... an additional influx of foreigners' (Meier-Braun, 1988: 12). For the first time, an official paper warned of a 'burdensome asylum-seeker problem'. Moreover, the document claimed that the senate was 'the first local government [in Germany] to recognize immigration ... as an irreversible fact' (Presse- und Informationsamt, 1980: 1).

From a homogeneous society to multiculturalism

Until the end of the 1970s, the dominant public discourse in West Germany perceived migrants as a homogeneous category of 'guest workers' and distinguished them from ethnic Germans. In this ideological concept, belonging to a nation or people (*Volk*) was conceived of as a natural community of common descent (*Abstammungsgemeinschaft*) whose biological reproduction was of prime importance, and that was bound by shared physical, spiritual and cultural features. By separating 'our own' from 'the other', foreign nationals were defined as temporary 'guests'. According to Christine Morgenstern (2002: 264), this ideological formation can be interpreted as 'racism without races'. During the 1970s, the fundamental contradiction between this ideological consensus and the reality of migration to Germany became increasingly evident. Especially in urban areas with a growing number of immigrants, everyday life duly produced new forms of acceptance and exclusion, with some groups no longer considered strangers, while others were further stigmatized. By this time, German law and the authorities were already differentiating between citizens of the EC and nationals from other European and Third World countries. With the rapidly growing transnationalization of migrant and refugee movements – due to poverty and political oppression in many countries in the South – a new classification system was established in Europe to deal with the increasing number of asylum-seekers; this was based mainly on cultural and ethnic distinctions. Initially, conservative politicians, in the main, linked the so-called 'integration ability' of migrants to their culture and

origins. But eventually it became the aim of the conservative–liberal government under Chancellor Helmut Kohl, which came to power in 1982, to reduce significantly the number of immigrants and asylum-seekers. During the sixteen years of the Kohl administration the main responsibility for immigration policy was exercised by the Ministry of the Interior, marking a shift in focus from regulating the labour market to matters of national security. Part of this shift was a growing concern with asylum-seekers. The official position on immigration in that period was characterized by a generally defensive attitude and a lack of programmes aimed at promoting integration; at the same time, politicians exploited immigration issues in their election campaigns (Bundesministerium, 2000: 41).

By the middle of the 1980s, alarming and aggressive debates 'on the menacing flood of millions from Turkey' (Herbert, 2001: 259) had reached their climax, when – as a result of the EC Treaty – the freedom of movement for Turkish workers finally made it onto the political agenda. The presumed inability, particularly of Turks, to integrate and adjust to German society was increasingly ascribed to their specific national and cultural identity. This identity was said to be part of a 'spiritual and mental inheritance' (Morgenstern, 2002: 315), and was believed to determine the lifestyle, language and religion of every person. Understood as a prerequisite for the well-being of individuals, communities and societies, the conservation of cultural identities came to be seen as essential. Before members of the Green Party were elected to the Bundestag for the first time in 1983, there was an agreement among all political parties in the German parliament that a further influx of immigrants with differing cultural backgrounds had to be avoided to prefent serious conflict. The main concern was Turks and non-European asylum-seekers. At the same time, immigration policy emerged as a controversial and partisan subject. Arguments on both sides – on the one hand, by advocates of immigration and integration; on the other, by conservative politicians who favoured the return of immigrants and advocated separation – grew more confrontational (Herbert, 2001: 254). The Greens characterized the plans of the national-conservative federal minister of the interior, Friedrich Zimmermann, for a new immigration law (*Ausländergesetz*) as an expression of racist thinking, and introduced for the first time

the notion of a multicultural society. The conservatives still claimed the existence of an ethnic homogeneity in German society which they wanted to preserve. In very drastic terms, they cautioned against the dangers of a 'multicultural and multi-ethnic state' that would blur all differences. The privileged treatment of ethnic Germans with Soviet or Polish nationality – the so-called *Aussiedler* – whose immigration numbers skyrocketed with the political liberalization in Eastern Europe, illustrated the nationalistic character of this ideology. However, since most social democrats and liberals had given up on the centrality of categories of descent and ancestry, and in the meanwhile acknowledged the multicultural reality of German society, the immigration policy of the conservatives lost sway.

Social-democratic and liberal conceptions of a multicultural society, though, still differentiated between immigrants who were deemed capable of integration and those from cultures that were considered to be too alien; this led to demands for restrictions on the immigration of the latter category (Morgenstern, 2002). Even in the Green version of multiculturalism, the existence of different categories of people, based on origin and cultural identity, was not questioned. It defined 'culture' as the quasi-natural environment of a person which cannot be left behind. Due to very heated public debate and the aggressiveness of national-conservative rhetoric, it went unnoticed for a long time that

> the major difference between the homogeneous and the multicultural model of society was the assumption of the latter that cultural differences could and should be tolerated. After all, culturalistic concepts, beliefs and basic ideas had gained so much ground that the most antagonistic positions both referred to them. A new ideological concept gradually began to displace the by then already outdated 'racism without races' as the foundation of a general political consensus: culturalistic racism. (Morgenstern, 2002: 349).

The Christian Democratic Party (CDU) did not begin to distance itself from nationalistic ideologies based on the idea of ethnic homogeneity until Wolfgang Schäuble replaced Friedrich Zimmermann as minister of the interior in 1989. Schäuble's draft of a new immigration law (*Ausländergesetz*) was compatible with the new ideological

formation, allowing for a compromise that was acceptable to the majority in the German parliament. The law that came into effect in 1990 was in fact still based on the ideological assumption that Germany was a non-immigration country and that German identity, in the end, had to do with a specific ancestry. However, it was no longer aimed at the preservation of a national culture and an ethnic homogeneity, but codified the actual status quo of immigration and removed certain repressive regulations. At the same time, according to the official justification of the new law, the understanding of integration had been broadened and now included the 'adaptation to local legal, social and economic circumstances' (cited in Treibel, 1990: 51).

Conceptions of multiculturalism in 1980s' West Germany

All concepts of multiculturalism start out from the fundamental premise that immigrants are nationally, ethnically or religiously distinct and should have the right to a certain cultural autonomy. Thus the resulting cultural plurality has an overall positive connotation (Welz, 1996: 106). However, whereas in Canada, the United States and Britain, the concept of multiculturalism has been linked with political demands for equal treatment and measures of anti-discrimination by representatives of ethnic minorities, the German discourse has been almost completely left to the majority; it has highlighted cultural differences and thereby legitimized, often unintentionally, social disparities and inequities. Conflicts and tensions associated with immigration that are the consequence of power relations and social and economic inequalities have been treated as questions of pedagogy (Kürşat-Ahlers, 2002: 329). This German *Sonderweg* is, essentially, the result of a specific notion of German nationality, based on ethnic-cultural conceptions, and on the dominant public discourse, which denied the reality of immigration in Germany for decades.

Nonetheless, considerable differences can be identified within the German discourse on multiculturalism in the 1980s. Back then, conservative and liberal positions fiercely confronted each other in the debate. Moreover, both camps contained competing positions and concerns (cf. Fanizadeh, 1992; Rommelspacher, 2002). The label

'multicultural society' served 'well-meaning xenophiles as well as fascist xenophobes' (Nassehi, 1997: 189). The opponents of a multicultural society interpreted multiculturalism as the coexistence of several national cultures enjoying equal rights, and regarded it therefore as a threat to a German national and cultural identity based on ethnical homogeneity. Conservatives frequently used openly cultural–racist terms in their bitter attacks on multiculturalism. Some approved of multicultural concepts, but used them – as did many right-wing extremists – to oppose any form of immigration or intermixing, since cultures are constructed as essential or intrinsic unities that require a spatial separation in order to be protected.

Typical of conservative discourses in the 1980s was another more instrumental and utilitarian approach linking immigration with demographic issues (Radtke, 1991). In particular, liberal representatives of the Christian Democrats, such as Heiner Geißler, became advocates of a multicultural society, or – in the words of a Christian Democrat strategy paper – of a 'coloured cultural society' (see Leggewie, 1993), providing the 'intellectual and economic resources' that were needed for the regeneration of the country (Geißler, cited in Fanizadeh, 1992: 14). Geißler demanded dual citizenship for migrant workers to meet the demands of the German economy. He thereby rejected 'German origin' as a criterion for affiliation to the nation, which provoked the conservative mainstream. Nevertheless, his formula of 'foreigners ... as utilizers and benificaries of a system that produces a surplus of jobs and acommodations' (15) defines a form of multiculturalism that remains within existing relations of power and economic exploitation.

In contrast to conservative approaches, three liberal concepts of multiculturalism can be distinguished: a tolerant pluralistic model; a pedagogical model; and a model that is grounded in political liberalism. The first model defines cultural diversity as an enrichment of the host culture. This implies a politically naive form of multiculturalism which ignores the challenges and conflicts associated with bargaining processes around issues of and claims for cultural recognition. Moreover, it takes for granted that cultural diversity as such fosters social life and interaction (Neubert et al., 2002: 20). As early as 1989, Thomas Schmid – an early proponent of liberalism – had already

criticized this 'harmonizing' form of multiculturalism, claiming that politicians, from both the Green and the Social Democratic parties, had tried to sell multiculturalism as a 'great street party'. According to Schmid, this approach trivializes the 'other' in order to incorporate it into the majority, since its advocates – not much different from right-wing extremists – are incapable of facing up to and accepting real difference (Treibel, 1990: 50). The main arguments of pedagogical approaches to multiculturalism, initially popular in alternative circles until they entered the mainstream social/educational work of churches and welfare organizations, tend to be somewhat moralistic. This does not mean they were not applied as techniques to deal with immigrants. In particular, social welfare organizations and schoolteachers distinguished different groups of immigrants according to their culture. This differentation was meant to make the handling of these new clients easier, by creating manageable and clear-cut categories (Radtke, 1991: 83). In practice, this form of pedagogical multiculturalism presented a social technology for interaction with, and management of, ethnic minorities that corresponded closely to the traditional German paternalism towards immigrants that had emerged during the era of colonialism. The third conception of multiculturalism, based on political liberalism and rooted in Anglo-American discourses, received only minimal attention in West Germany in the 1980s; it is not further discussed here.

However, it is important to stress that in those years any concept of multiculturalism in Germany was grounded in an extremely problematic, unhistorical and essentialist concept of culture, based on the assumption that the identity of any ethnic group is defined by a stable system of cultural homogeneity and a clearly separable set of practices and values. It implies that there is a natural and unchangeable link between culture and ethnicity, and that ethnic groups are self-contained communities of common descent. Therefore all members of these communities share one 'culture', which determines customs and individuals' patterns of interpretation and guides their actions (Bommes and Scherr, 1991). By connecting diversity to ethnic or national origin, this type of multiculturalism defines ethnicity as an anthropological factor (Radtke, 1991: 91). Thus, it remains 'on the track of nationalism, even if it changes direction' (Radtke, 1996:

13). The argument that culture is an individual's second nature is one that barely differs from biological racist theories. Hence, Slavoj Žižek has referred to this form of multiculturalism as 'a disavowed, inverted, self-referential form of racism, a "racism with a distance" – it "respects" the other's identity, conceiving the other as a self-enclosed "authentic" community, towards which he, the multiculturalist, maintains a distance rendered possible by his privileged universal position' (Žižek, 1997: 44). Thus Žižek emphasizes the issue of power relations concealed within German concepts of multiculturalism. In German debates, which are characterized by paternalistic positions, advocates of multiculturalism usually form the majority. This raises the questions of who defines 'culture' and who uses this term. Very often, the interests of conservative elites, both of the majority and of the minorities, overlap: while the former try to outdistance ethnic minorities or even exclude them, the latter try to consolidate their power within immigrant communities, which are defined as quasi-natural groups (Rommelspacher, 2002). At the same time, multiculturalists tend to take the most conservative values of minorities as representative of their authentic character. This is because these values appear to be farthest away from their own (Erel, 2004).

In arguing against this position, cultures cannot be understood as stable and essential unities but rather as brief products of dynamic and never-ending processes of construction. 'Therefore, the drawing of lines between different groups that are called ethnic is based not on traditions, but on positions continuously renegotiated between self-definitions and definitions by other actors, between inclusion and exclusion' (Welz, 1996: 114). Cultures are discursive fields (Schiffauer, 1997) or representations (Sökefeld, 2004) grounded in specific interests and represented by different claims to power. They change constantly and are open, without strict borders. Therefore culture does not determine the actions of individuals but instead originates from individual and collective action. Furthermore, ethnic groups do not exist per se but are socially constructed within a process of ethnification, which is driven at least initially by the majority: 'In this process, immigrants become objects of classification and analysis by administrative, legal, scientific and everyday discourses, which separate them from the national population and emphasize

their cultural difference' (Ronneberger, 1997: 225). At the same time, migrants often ethnicize themselves within the context of their situation in the country of immigration. Here, ethnic distinctions are secondary processes that can become functional in certain social situations (Bukow, 1993). Thus it is no coincidence that in the West German context interpretations of migration as a problem of ethnic-cultural differences emerged at around the same time that rising unemployment could no longer be coped with 'by means of the social-technical manipulation of migration streams' (Bommes and Scherr, 1991: 299). On the other hand, migrants of the second and third generations took over the cultural attributions and labels from the majority and adopted the cultural perspective of their opponents. They demanded more tolerance for their 'cultural group' or defined their self-organization in ethno-cultural ways. Thus ethnicity can also have an instrumental dimension that can be used by elites, which define themselves as ethnic, politically on behalf of their interests. Moreover, at the individual level it can provide for orientation and relief (Dittrich and Radtke, 1990). The ethnic-cultural identity of migrants is thus 'less a problem before migration but a result of migration' (Nassehi, 1997: 192). A concept of culture, however, which addresses individuals in an essentialist manner and does not allow for multiple affiliations, can easily evolve into an 'object of imperatives of exclusion' (196). To sum up, discourses on multiculturalism dating from the 1980s must be credited with having brought up positions that are more sensitive and accept differences, while at the same time they must be held responsible for the negative consequences that go along with culturalist understandings and definitions of the character and essence of migrants (Mecheril, 2003).

'Real existing' multiculturalism in 1980s' West Berlin

The conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) came to power in West Berlin in 1981, a year before the Kohl administration assumed office. In its election campaign in Berlin the CDU had focused on immigration issues, especially on the populist slogan that the 'capacity of the country to absorb' was exhausted. The position of the new CDU senate on the local regulation of immigration coincided with

changes in urban and social policies: there was a shared rejection of modernistic conceptions of a comprehensive state planning system in favour of small-scale entities and identities, along with the growing involvement of the business community and civil society. Immigration policy, which until then had been understood as a problem of governmental planning, was now organized around a system of 'representatives and commissions' (Schwarz, 1992, 2001). In 1981, Berlin, the first West German state to introduce the position of 'foreigners' representative' (*Ausländerbeauftragte*), whose main task was to develop and coordinate local immigration policies. From the beginning, this office was well equipped with the necessary staff and skills. Conservative immigration policies in the 1980s basically followed the well-known dual strategy, promoting the return home of unwanted migrants and the integration and adaption to German ways of life of those remaining. Richard von Weizsäcker, who was elected mayor of Berlin in 1981, defined integration in his inaugral address as 'the will and decision to become a German in the long run'. Whereas the parliamentary representatives of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in Berlin demanded that foreign 'fellow citizens' have 'equal opportunities and treatment in all legal, social and political matters' (SPD Berlin, 1981: 9), the CDU-majority senate cared more about aspects of well-being and culture. The type of multiculturalism implemented by the foreigners' representative in West Berlin added to the traditionally repressive elements of conservative immigration policy new aspects of a socio-cultural identity policy: 'People with different national backgrounds should live together free of tensions ..., feel comfortable with each other and at home', and become accustomed to the 'idea of naturalization' (Senator für Gesundheit, 1982: 6). Social rights were not even mentioned. 'Foreigners' were called upon to accept and adopt democratic principles along with the 'basic points of view and customs' of locals. Integration efforts on the part of the majority were reduced to the willingness 'to accept the other in his otherness' (6). For the first time, though, it was officially acknowledged that 'the coexistence of various customs and cultures ... can be also experienced as an enrichment through more diversity. Therefore, the Berlin senate prefers integration programmes which leave enough space for the cultural autonomy of foreigners' (6). In a declaration issued after taking office, Eberhard Diepgen, who in 1985 followed Weizsäcker as governing mayor, stressed: 'A metropolis like Berlin profits from its diversity, heterogeneity and from its immigrants' (Presse- und Informationsamt, 1985: 30). On the one hand, Diepgen praised the decline in the number of migrants of Turkish descent in the city as a positive outcome of conservative policies. On the other hand, immigrants were no longer to be judged solely according to their economic performance, but were praised for their contribution to a culturally diverse and lively metropolis. This discourse is representative of broader transformations in the perception of large cities: from the social-democratic 'Fordist' conception that focused on a standardized culture and social equality, to the postmodern model of a 'metropolis'. As urban lifestyles and social environments became increasingly pluralized and diverse, social and cultural contrasts which were formerly regarded as undesirable and a reason for state intervention were increasingly portrayed as quasi-natural components of a metropolitan culture.

The senate introduced a new programme which especially supported self-help groups, including immigrants' organizations. Social and cultural work gradually converged programmatically and conceptually:

> This policy was launched as being communicative, close to people's way of life, generous and tolerant: ... It assists Turkish community and counselling centres and folkloric groups, providing the latter with rehearsal rooms and engagements. A special advertising campaign promotes sympathy and greater acceptance of foreign workers. It creates the positions of so-called women's and foreigners' representatives.... It introduces one million programmes for self-help projects.... It experiments with new conceptions of urban renewal, which are less aggressive and more open to grassroots interests. This kind of identity politics is concerned with creating a socio-cultural climate in which citizens are supposed to feel and act as self-dependent, unique and competent subjects. (Homuth, 1987: 101f)

The foreigners' representative played a crucial role within this 'ideological penetration of the informal sector' (Homuth, 1985: 84). Until then, governmental aid to migrants had been limited to various social services provided by established German welfare associations. Policies

or studies which were concerned, for instance, with 'inclinations and barriers towards the integration' of Turks in Berlin (EMNID, 1983) had either ignored their self-organizations completely or had defined them as a phenomenon conducive to ghettoes. Now Barbara John, the foreigners' representative of West Berlin, began actively to involve associations of migrants in her policy. By 1987, almost fifty groups with a migrant background were supported financially by the local government. The temporary 'accentuation of a specific ethnic identity' in the course of 'the conflict-riddled self-discovery process within German society' was no longer automatically regarded as an obstacle to integration. However, not all forms of self-organization were accepted: 'A critical limit ... is reached when the emphasis on cultural peculiarities is accompanied by the deliberate retreat to an ideological ghetto and insulation, creating hostility towards the outside world and an aggressive inward pressure to conform and show solidarity to one's own community' (cited in Schwarz, 1992: 134).

This 'policy of notabilities' followed conservative traditions (Schwarz, 2001), while it perceived immigrants for the first time as independent subjects, and no longer as destitute victims. Increasingly, it addressed such social problems as being due to insufficiently educated adolescents or to rapidly growing unemployment among the immigrant population, which accompanied the process of de-industrialization. In 1982, the unemployment rate among immigrants was already 40 per cent higher than the rate among native Germans (Senator für Gesundheit, 1982). Local government instrumentalized the social commitment of nonprofit organizations for their own benefit by promoting more and more self-help programmes. Therefore the number of such groups grew considerably. 'The bare existence' (Schwarz, 1992: 146) of ethnic organizations often rendered them worthy of financial support by the government. One reason for the encouragement of their activities was to compensate for the exclusion of immigrants from the political system. Thus the organizational structure within minority communities changed. Organizations which had started out as solely political initiatives now founded neighbourhood centres or projects for young people in order to fulfil funding guidelines and receive money from the local state. Another new element of conservative social policy at the beginning of the 1980s

was to introduce workfare measures for welfare recipients and test them first in the refugee community. Asylum-seekers were forced to perform community service, 'to send a signal', according to one official. Later on, participation in workfare programmes became compulsory for all recipients of welfare payments (Grottian et al., 1985: 49).

After the Kohl era: political reforms of the red–green government

Unification in 1989 generated an instrumental 'self-ethnification' of German national identity, combined with widely discriminatory policies and attitudes towards immigrants (Bommes and Scherr, 1991: 331). Thus, at the beginning of the 1990s the concept of multiculturalism disappeared from the main political agenda. According to Claus Leggewie, an early advocate of the concept 'for the time being, multiculturalism was in the political index' (1993: 1). It was still alive, though, in programmes of the representatives of foreigners and social workers dealing with immigrants. The end of the 1990s marked another important turning point, at both national and local levels.

In 1998, the SPD and the Green Party formed a governing coalition at the national level, with Gerhard Schröder becoming chancellor. In the election campaign both parties had advocated an extensive liberalization of immigration policies. They duly introduced a major reform of German citizenship law at the beginning of 2000, although it turned out to be a compromise between the governing parties and the conservatives. Shortly before that, the CDU had gained power in the state of Hesse thanks to a campaign against the plans of the red–green federal government to grant immigrants dual citizenship. Nevertheless, the citizenship law constituted a break with the ethno-national principle, according to which one could not become a German but had to be one by origin and birth (Bade and Oltmer, 2004: 129). It added to the prevailing *jus sanguinis* central elements of the *jus soli*. Thus the Wilhelminian law of 1913 was replaced (see Grenz, 2000). For the first time in German history, it was officially declared that 'Germany became an immigration country a long time ago' (cited in Meier-Braun, 2002: 98). Although other promised

reforms of the foreigners' law, such as the right of residents from non-EU countries to vote in local elections, failed, the federal government had initiated a debate on the principles of German immigration policy (see Angemendt and Kruse, 2004).

By 1999, the Social Democratic minister of the interior, Otto Schily, howeer, still claimed that the 'capacity of the country to welcome and absorb immigrants' had already been exceeded. Shortly after that, a new political agreement recognized that for demographic and economic reasons Germany had to recruit highly qualified foreigners. Even within the national conservative wing of the CDU a major U-turn was evident: whereas formerly it had rejected all immigration, it now supported immigration that was beneficial to the German economy. Responsible for this change of heart was a bold initiative by Chancellor Schröder: the 'Green Card'. In February 2000, during the technology trade fair CeBIT, Schröder announced that the German government would bring much needed foreign computer specialists into the country by issuing a so-called 'Green Card'. The subsequent 'Green Card decree' arranged for the immigration of 20,000 highly qualified information technology specialists, linking their residence permit to an employment contract, restricted to five years – basically, a modernized version of the recruitment of 'guest workers'.

Whereas this recruitment policy would have been possible without a 'Green Card', it introduced a new idea into German discourse which tied immigration issues to economic competitiveness. 'At that time, the label "Green Card" had the potential to link the hype around the glorious "New Economy" to the unpopular topic of immigration'; now it was about 'immigration in "our" interest' (Ette, 2003: 48). The federal government used the new climate to set up an independent commission under the direction of the liberal conservative politician Rita Süssmuth, which was assigned to produce a new immigration law. The CDU reacted with the creation of its own commission. Representatives of the business community, in particular, had pushed the conservatives to give up their opposition to a modern immigration law.

The so-called 'Süssmuth Report' urged for a 'paradigm shift' in immigration and integration policies. It advocated a system of comprehensive support and services to assist with integration, recommended

simplifying the foreigners' law, and proposed the introduction of a points system to select suitably qualified migrant workers (Unabhängige Kommission, 2001). The report of the CDU commission, for its part, proposed a similar model for the regulation of necessary migration. Thus a general agreement between the government and the opposition began to effect what was described as a 'paradigm shift in immigration policy' (Hailbronner, 2001: 7). The consensus view accepted the reality of immigration and allowed for controlled immigration in the economic interest of Germany. At the same time, the intention was to restrict other forms of immigration, and require immigrants in Germany to redouble their efforts at integration. By summer 2001, the draft of a new immigration law, coordinated by the minister of the interior and conservative politicians, had postponed the option of a points system for migrant workers to a far-off future. Instead, it tightened the laws on asylum-seekers by expanding the reasons for deportation, and thereby returned, according to statements issued by numerous welfare organizations, 'to an integration model of rotation hostile to "guest workers"' (cited in Meier-Braun, 2002: 110). The events of 9/11 also had a major impact on public opinion. Once again, traditional discourses on national security prevailed, and Muslim immigrants were suspected of representing a potential risk. By autumn 2001, the all-party consensus on immigration policy had fallen apart. Whereas members of the governing coalition disputed the restrictive character of the bill, the conservatives criticized the fact that it did not provide for sufficient control of unwanted immigration. They pursued a course of confrontation, which caused the law to be rejected by parliament in spring 2002.

After a new round of negotiations between the red–green government and the conservatives, a more restrictive version of the original bill was passed and came into force at the beginning of 2005. The main focus of this 'immigration law' (*Zuwanderungsgesetz*) lay in effective regulation and a limitation placed on immigration. According to the law, the government finally recognized Germany as a country of immigration, but the initially proposed immigration options were simply dropped. The law, in principle, allows only for the legal entry and settlement of highly qualified experts and entrepreneurs. It relaxes the residency rules and contains some improvements based on

humanitarian concerns. Migrants are now obliged to attend newly set up integration courses and to learn the German language. So-called 'hate preachers, for instance, "agitators" in mosques' (Meier-Braun, 2005: 247) can be expelled much more easily than before. Applications for naturalization have to pass initial scrutiny by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (one of Germany's intelligence services). All the new restrictions in the law are premissed on the supposed clash of cultures between the West and Islam.

Good cultures, bad cultures: Berlin as a multicultural metropolis

At the end of the 1990s, another factor proved decisive for the dual shift in national and local immigration policy: a specific political interpretation of social–spatial processes within German cities. Particularly in Berlin, contradictory trends can be observed: on the one hand, a revival and modernization of the concepts of multiculturalism that had emerged in the 1980s; on the other hand, a political and ideological relapse into ideological concepts of a 'national German culture' (*Leitkultur*) to which immigrants must assimilate.

Throughout the 1990s, the reunited city of Berlin – which again became the German capital – was run by a CDU–SPD coalition, under the governing mayor Eberhard Diepgen (CDU). The coalition pursued a radical growth policy, the main goal of which was to make Berlin a 'global city' within only a few years. This policy was based on an absurdly optimistic and unfounded boom scenario. Because the senate ignored the real economic and social situation of the city, Berlin soon faced an economic and fiscal crisis of gigantic proportions. The city lost two-thirds of all its manufacturing jobs within a couple of years. By the end of the 1990s, unemployment had reached almost 20 per cent. The unemployment rate of the second and following generations of most immigrant groups, who had come to Berlin mainly as low-skilled industrial workers, levelled off around 40 per cent. The racist structures of the German educational system contributed to the fact that in most instances children of the first generation of immigrants did not experience any upward mobility, but were relegated to the low level of education of their parents (see Gomolla and Radtke, 2002; Terkessidis, 2004). Many immigrants experienced a downward trend, which included lasting exclusion from the labour market as well as persistent impoverishment and social marginalization.

The economic decline of Berlin was in contrast to the increasing international attention paid to the dynamics of its urban cultures. In the period immediately following the fall of the Wall, a temporary legal vacuum and the availability of large amounts of derelict land in the centre of East Berlin provided ideal conditions for the spread of various subcultures. In the space of a decade, they had developed into one of the few instances of economic potential in the city. In addition to the media and music industry, tourism was regarded as another hope for economic growth. By the end of the 1990s, crisis-ridden Berlin and its establishment began to lay claim to urban (sub)cultures as one of the few marketing opportunities for the city. Multicultural facets of the urban landscape of cultures were an important part of this strategy. Efforts to style Berlin as a cosmopolitan metropolis and the growing 'festivalization' of urban policy began to incorporate specific elements of immigrant cultures. Public discourse henceforth increasingly distinguished 'good' (utilizable) from 'bad' (potentially disturbing) cultures.

In particular, the 'Carnival of Cultures' evolved into a symbol for the economic and social potential of the multicultural metropolis: for the first time, in May 1996, this street parade took place in Berlin–Kreuzberg. Since then it has developed into an annual mega-festival and international tourist attraction. Today, several thousand participants and up to a million visitors take part in the parade and the numerous accompanying parties and club events; even larger numbers watch the festival live via the Internet and television. An amazingly broad coalition of participants welcomes and uses the carnival as a metaphor for a peaceful and very lively display of multiculturalism. The carnival began as a 'workshop of cultures' set up by the foreigners' representative Barbara John (CDU) as a sign of 'the growing cultural variety of Berlin' (John, 2005: 9). According to the organizers, who for the most part once belonged to the alternative scene, the objectives of the carnival are to fight 'xenophobia' or 'fears of foreign infiltration', to demonstrate diversity and to provide migrants with the opportunity to express their cultural identity (Frei, 2003). From its beginnings,

it expressed a moral, and indeed explicitly anti-racist, commitment as well as supporting the idea of 'multicultural coexistence' in urban society (Klausner, 2005; Glindemann, 2005).

However, the carnival is above all embedded in an overall policy of culturalization and ethnic representation, and is thus part of an 'ambivalent space where self-perceptions and external perceptions are constructed and negotiated' (Färber, 2005: 12). The multicultural idea embodied in the carnival is still grounded in the German tradition of a clear distinction between different and coexisting cultures, notwithstanding the tolerance of hybrids and the fact that nobody is excluded. Ethnologist Michi Knecht (2005: 27) discovers in the 'Carnival of Cultures' the 'ubiquity of a pedagogical concept of multiculturalism' whose symbolic structure easily delegitimizes opposing views: 'Those who do not want to join in tend to be accused of being too religious, backwoods, uneducated, intolerant or inferior in some other way.'

The latent selectivity distinguishing between desired and suspect cultures becomes obvious when one considers the composition of the actors and participants and the public perception of the carnival. Body conscious, colourful and exotic dance groups, specifically inasmuch as they feature 'samba, Rio de Janeiro and half-naked women' (Frei, 2003: 165), are clearly overrepresented. At the same time, the rather limited participation of 'Turks' or 'Arabs' – that is, Muslims – receives critical attention. These are perceived not as musicians but rather as representatives of their religion or their nation, being too traditionalistic and lacking in the happy-go-lucky required of a carnival (see Früh and Schmidt, 2005). Since only the exotic seems to appeal to the public, the carnival serves and reproduces cultural clichés, even when it pretends to strengthen intercultural possibility. This is true also for the immigrants whose 'identity management' (Welz, 1996) follows the precept 'folklorize yourself or die!' (Diederichsen, 1995: 130) that is communicated to them in a more or less subtle way by the majority. For most, the main reason for their participation is the economic benefit of the carnival. It also provides an opportunity to become visible, make contacts, exchange information and socialize. Thus, the category culture allows for an advancement of personal status. 'Therefore, the very logic of the participants to define their living space culturally can be understood as a way to

position themselves within the social order of the majority' (Frei, 2003: 168f). However, at the same time the insistence on cultural instead of political strategies of adjustment leads to stereotypical and traditional behaviour instead of modern forms of adaptation. So how is the huge success of the carnival to be explained? First, it belongs to the category of urban events which on a global scale represent the city as an attractive cosmopolitan consumer zone. Accordingly, it is a counterpart to the dominant representation of the multi-ethnic metropolis as a zone of disintegration and social problems. This not only serves the interests of the growth coalition in symbolic economies – culture, media, tourism – which encompasses all relevant political, media and economic forces of the city; it also suits players in the multicultural milieu, who believe that such festivals foster a climate more tolerant of immigrants and less vulnerable to racist positions. If one takes a closer look at the carnival, it becomes apparent that its policy of culturalization leads to classifications of cultural diversity; this serves to privilege certain practices, while others remain invisible. Its success results from its ability to serve two dominant codes of ethnic representation in Berlin today: the code of 'consumption of ethnic cultures' and the 'code of an integrating space, transforming ethnic culture into socio-culture' in order to cover up social problems (Färber, 2005: 12f). The first code follows an exoticism focused on immigrants; the latter leads to an instrumentalization of culture for social purposes and the political objective of integration. Culture, on the one hand, is politically charged with 'nearly utopian expectations of salvation' (Greve, 2003: 404) and, on the other hand, is symbolically downgraded to second-rate status by virtue of its use as a means of integration in socio-cultural work.

The West and the rest: Muslims as the 'Other'

Parallel to the success story of the 'Carnival of Cultures', which began to offer a positive and living example of multiculturalism, one could witness among Muslims a discursive and political relapse into the negativity of earlier decades, as a result of the increasing social problems experienced by numerous immigrant milieux, on the one hand, and the discursive consequences of 9/11, on the other

hand. Increasingly, state-sponsored studies had revealed that spatial and social structures, especially in big cities, had become increasingly fragmented and polarized. This is to say that groups that had originally migrated as 'foreign workers' and lived in the immigrant quarters of the inner cities were noticeably more impoverished. Muslim immigrant groups seemed to be particularly affected by these processes of social exclusion. As a result, discourses on the integration of these 'other'/excluded groups of immigrants blended with discourses on new forms of urban poverty. 'Integration' was now increasingly perceived as a failure, or at least threatened by failure. In line with the historically dominant integration discourse in Germany, which had always focused on immigrants as a potential danger to national security or the social peace, exclusion was picked out as a central topic, primarily from a point of view which interpreted them above all as a threat to society.

Because discourses of 'failed integration' mainly blaimed the 'culture' and behaviour of the affected groups for this failure, such groups were constructed as dangerous classes. Muslim youngsters in particular were accused of deliberately separating themselves from the majority. After the 9/11 attacks, a West–Islam conflict scenario began increasingly to dominate debates on immigration and integration. However, it was the murder of Theo van Gogh – whose films and publications had attacked the idea of a multicultural society and accused Islam and Muslim immigrants of not being compatible with Western societies – by a young Islamist on 2 November 2004 that caused a 'discursive bursting of a dam':

> Obviously, an already tense mood found a valve in this murder; the attack was just the last straw of it. In a wild acceleration, all debates that had emerged since 9/11 culminated here: terrorism and fundamentalism, the constitution of the European Union and the admission of Turkey, multicultural society or the German Leitkultur. (von Lucke, 2005: 10)

'Holland is everywhere' ran the headlines not only in the most popular and highest circulation tabloid *Bild* (15 November 2004), and the radical right-wing paper *Junge Freiheit* (19 November 2004) but also the acclaimed weekly magazine *Die Zeit* (16 December 2004). However, none of them referred to concrete incidents in Germany.

Features pages of influential newspapers discussed the 'battle around Europe' (Gilles Kepel in *Welt am Sonntag*, 21 November 2004) and the 'bankruptcy of multiculturalism' (*Frankfurter Algemeine Zeitung*, 23 November 2004). Fierce criticism countered such opinions by declaring instead the 'simple-minded reasoning of a monoculture' as a failure (*Frankfurter Algemeine Zeitung*, 15 November 2004), defending the 'experiment of multiculturalism' against the 'panic mood of a religious world war' that had grasped the West since 9/11 (*Südeutsche Zeitung*, 12 November 2004). Nonetheless, the headline of the conservative German news magazine *Focus* condensed the prevailing discourse in its headline 'Uncanny guests. The counter-world of Muslims in Germany' (22 November 2004). In doing so, it abandoned the distinction between Islam and Islamism, and 'racialized' Muslims as an ethnocultural group incompatible with Western societies. Moreover, it excluded Muslims from society and relegated them to their original status of 'foreign workers', irrespective of nationality. Hence, their life was declared a 'counterworld'. 'The stigmatizing suggestion is clear: in the Muslim "counterworld" lurks the stranger, the unknown, in short the bad' (von Lucke, 2005: 10). At that time, the notion of a parallel society evolved into a fashionable concept counter to 'multicultural society' (Butterwegge, 2005: 200). This set off a nationwide debate, which found its concrete object of discussion in the Berlin district of Neukölln. The mayor of Neukölln, Heinz Buschkowsky (SPD), contributed heavily to the discussion by emphasizing the structural similarities in the failure of migrants to integrate in Rotterdam and Neukölln. He accused Arab and Turkish 'main minorities' of being unwilling to integrate. He claimed the existence of a parallel society with its 'own binding behavioural norms' and, hence, declared multiculturalism to have failed (first in *Die Tagesspiegel*, 13 November 2004). This debate on Neukölln and interviews with Buschowsky in several newspapers received nationwide media attention.

It is worthwhile examining the statements of this Social Democratic mayor more closely. Neukölln is a borough of Berlin associated with social problems and heterogeneous immigration. The middle classes have been moving out in much larger numbers than from any other district of Berlin or from any other city in Germany. Buschowsky's

statements not only demonstrate the persistent continuity of a particular German understanding of multiculturalism, but also refer paradigmatically to important discursive shifts. Like 'integration', the term 'multiculture' functions within German immigration discourse as a concept open enough to include all kinds of contents and political positions. It is almost impossible to assign advocates and opponents of multiculturalism to traditional political camps. Hence, the fiercely debated thesis of the failure of multiculturalism raises the question, what is multiculturalism all about? What are the concepts of a 'multiculture' that form the foundation of this debate? How do they relate to traditional currents and to contemporary conceptions of integration policies? To which images of an immigration society do they relate?

The public statements of Mayor Buschkowsky sum up the type of multicultural discourse based on the objective of assimilation that is dominant in the contemporary debate. In one interview, he compares two versions of multicultural society: 'In my view, a multicultural society consists of many cultures peacefully living together in one country. Other people say that in a multicultural society many people introduce their own conceptions of life and culture into a community and in that way create a new multicultural identity' (*Kommune*, January 2005: 16). He goes on to say that because the latter model would deny that people feel secure only in their own familiar culture, a multicultural society in that form could not exist. According to Buschkowsky, this idea led to the formation of 'areas of social and ethnic segregation ... in our cities'. However, a 'multiethnic society, which peacefully lives in a common democratic legal order with shared values is possible. This is what I aim for' (*JF*, November 2005). These two opposing versions of a multicultural society basically correspond to the two ideological models of assimilation in American immigration debates: the 'melting pot' and cultural pluralism. These debates have a long tradition in the United States; however, both concepts are outdated and have never really related to the historical reality of racial and ethnic discrimination and segregation in the country. The concept of a 'melting pot' suggests that the cultures and origins of immigrants should meld into a new national identity. The concept of cultural pluralism maintains that 'ethnic groups should be integrated into American society under the protection of their culture and in a way that allows them to live together peacefully and be treated equally' (Han, 2005: 324). Since Mayor Buschkowksy understands culture as the second nature of individuals with a determining role, the melting pot for him must exist as an ideological notion that is not realizable. Furthermore, since his concept of culture is linked automatically to ethnicity, there remains only one option in dealing with the reality of immigration: either the apartheid model of an unconnected coexistence of ethnic groups, or cultural pluralism – diversity within unity, in which coexistence conforms to a given order of shared values. Such a constellation is described by the term 'salad bowl', a metaphor in which the ingredients of the salad are still individually identifiable but are supposed to harmonize with each other. This reveals that Buschkowsky agrees precisely with the basic points of those proponents of a multicultural society against which he so vehemently fights. According to Daniel Cohn-Bendit and Thomas Schmid, the German conception of multiculture is based on the thesis that 'the melting pot is a failed model' (1993: 316). They do not agree with the position that advocates 'diversity instead of homogeneity.... Democracy requires a common understanding of binding values on which common agreement is needed' (319).

At the heart of this discourse is a concept of immigration and integration that separates the ethnocultural self from the other self by defining both with the help of distinct sets of cultural attributes. The self that defines social normality and thus binding values either embraces only those groups that identify with a German ethnoculture, or integrates in a broader sense all subjects which identify themselves as members of a Western community with shared values. Immigrants are thus split into two large groups: those that accept Western values, and thus are not targeted by the integration discourse; and those defined as 'others' that have to be 'normalized'. According to Stuart Hall (1994), the latter category corresponds to the 'rest' beyond the 'West', and is today characterized primarily by its affiliation to Islam. This discourse does not just reveal historical continuities –'the West and the rest' discourse or an essentialist concept of culture – but also marks an evident move away from German tradition. For the first time, national-conservative positions also basically accept the reality of immigration and now direct their 'patriotic appeal' (Balibar, 1993)

also to immigrants. Hence, they follow the new principle of citizenship that was introduced by the red–green federal government: one does not necessarily have to be a German by descent; even an immigrant can become a German. Nevertheless, this finds its limits where cultures are assumed to clash. An integral part of this differential thought and speech is the discourse of cultural assimilation, which imagines society as a salad bowl in which various 'cultures' have to conform without conflict to an order of shared values dictated by the majority.

Because this discourse addresses immigrants as members of essentially different ethnocultures, it stands in the tradition of German multiculturalism and must therefore, to cite Slavoj Žižek, be considered as 'racism with a distance'. However, we can again identify a significant shift from this period. The early concepts of multiculturalism of the 1980s positioned themselves against a prevailing integration discourse that demanded that foreigners adapt culturally to the majority. This majority was perceived as homogeneous. By demanding recognition of the cultural peculiarities of immigrants, early multiculturalism was talking mainly to the majority. The present, implicit multiculturalism, however, takes the opposite perspective by demanding that immigrants integrate the central values of the majority into their own 'cultures' and identify with them. This current form of German multiculturalism thus contains the imperative of cultural dominance, similar to the traditional integration discourse against which it was originally directed. Thus, in time, it has moved from the left to the right wing of the political spectrum. Since 9/11, more and more leading politicians, and also journalists, formerly of the left, have joined the ranks of those articulating this discourse. This is especially true of politicians from the Green party. The antagonistic construction of the West as secular and democratic and of Islam as backward and undemocratic seems to be successfully separating the majority from Muslim immigrants.

'The hype about hybridity': diversity-recognizing multiculturalism

Far from the culture-clash debates, however, diverse concepts of multiculturalism have emerged within the last decade, which at least in Germany can be considered as new to the political stage. It appears

that two discourses confront each other in the current debate. They differ in distinct ways. The first concept, assimilative multiculturalism, is consistent with traditional German notions of multiculturalism and constructs differences between cultures as essentialist; the second concept assumes a dynamic diversity in society. In doing so, it moves beyond the traditional German model. Whereas the former concept interprets cultural differences as a potential threat to social cohesion and aims at a specific variation of cultural assimilation, the latter is based on the thesis of social normality built on a dynamic cultural diversity that needs to be accepted by everyone.

In particular, Berlin's 'integration programme' (*Integrationskonzept*), which was passed in the local parliament under the slogan 'Promote plurality – strengthen cohesion' in August 2005, embodies the diversity model of multiculturalism in Berlin politics. This is the first official document that expresses explicitly the intention to implement an integration policy on different political levels. It is the foundation of the integration policy of the Berlin government which since 2001 has been constituted by a Social Democratic–Socialist coalition under the governing mayor Klaus Wowereit (SPD). The integration programme no longer reduces plurality and diversity to the dimensions of 'ethnic groups' and 'culture'. Rather, 'pluralization is [regarded as] an irreversible process of modern societies': plurality is interpreted as 'social wealth', and accordingly 'does not restrict itself to ethnic plurality, but takes the whole complexity of modern urban societies as a starting point' (Abgeordnetenhaus, Dr. 15/4208, 2005: 6). The red–red senate pursues the approach of diversity which aims for a 'neutral' public sphere and adopts measures to counter cultural forms of discrimination. One example is the 'package of measures to create the ideological–religious neutrality of the state, better integration and protection against the discrimination of migrants' (Presseinformation der Fraktionen SPD und PDS, 31 March 2004). The senate established these policies in 2004 in the wake of a nationwide political debate which centred on the demand to prohibit the wearing of the headscarf in public institutions such as schools and courts. In the meantime, an anti-discrimination office was created with a 'representative for migration and integration' as its head, which has replaced the former position of foreigners' representative.

This office is conceived 'as a contact point for everybody who feels discriminated against on ethnic, religious and ideological grounds'. 'Its main objective is to strengthen and encourage a culture of acceptance towards persons of other religions and other ethnicities', the senate announced in February 2005 (Der Beauftragte, 2005). Furthermore, new policies include a 'neutrality law', according to which civil servants are no longer allowed to wear any 'visible religious or ideological symbols' (Gesetz- und Verordnungsblatt für Berlin, 2005). However, the conservatives, for their part, demanded prohibition of only the headscarf while allowing Christian religious symbols in public institutions. The CDU thus demonstrated that its official policy remains rooted in the idea of cultural assimilation (see Abgeordnetenhaus, Dr. 15/2122, 2005).

The liberal strand within the conservative camp, however, has taken up a position in favour of diversity, thereby demonstrating that the dividing line on multiculturalism does not run straightforwardly between conservative and progressive parties. At the same time, it turns out that only representatives of the majority advocate an assimilative multiculturalism. Therefore, a central reason for the emergence of pro-diversity positions in public discourses in Germany has to do with the fact that representatives of immigrant minorities have started to become much more visible and have achieved a stronger voice in national politics.

The difference between the pro-diversity and the assimilative position is that the former does not construct ethnocultural groups and set up an antagonism between 'us' and 'them'. Hence, this constellation dismisses the historically hegemonic German immigration discourse that had defined national affiliation ethnoculturally as a community of common descent and culture, and conceived of culture as the determining second nature of an individual. In contrast, this new notion of a pro-diversity multiculturalism defines culture rather as a dynamic set of everyday practices and discourses that neither strictly determine the actions and identities of individuals nor can be applied as an overall explanatory category for social and individual problems and conflicts. It neither marks non-Western immigrants as fundamentally Others, nor establishes exclusionary borders against them. The centrality of the West–Islam conflict scenario in contemporary

immigration discourse is obvious, as the main focus on Muslim immigrants illustrates. The emphasis on religion in this debate makes clear how much these positions differ from the assimilative ones. Assimilative positions define problematic phenomena such as the oppression of women within patriarchal family relations as typical of Islam. By doing so, they put Muslims – whether they are immigrants or not – generally under suspicion and stigmatize them. In contrast, pro-diversity positions can address such problems within the concrete context of each case and do not interpret and ascribe a value to religious groups as imaginary cultural communities. Rather, a dynamic diversity of national, ethnic, religious and (sub)cultural affiliations is perceived as an essential, given feature of contemporary societies. Such diversity is seen not as a fundamental problem but instead as desirable and worthy of being fostered. This view is not concerned with potential collisions or disharmonies between cultures, because society is not understood as a given community with a common destiny and all-embracing norms and values. Instead, society is seen as functionally, socially and culturally diverse, held together primarily by the quality of its institutions. Thus, this discourse disengages from the logic of cultural apartheid that used to characterize German concepts of multiculturalism, and promotes dynamic processes of cultural hybridization that often also follow economic interests.

The integration programme of the senate in Berlin, for instance, establishes a connection between 'cultural plurality' and the economic competitiveness of the city, disclosing in the process the progressive and emancipative, but also the utilitarian, character of its policies and intentions. According to the integration programme, 'the positive handling of plurality promotes intercultural competence, a certain vitality and the capacity to act on behalf of the city, and leads to advantages in the international competition of cities thanks to its attractiveness for its people and business community' (Abgeordnetenhaus, Dr. 15/4208, 2005: 71). From this point of view, Berlin ranks among the globalizing cities, 'where new influences merge with traditions to produce new forms of cultural expression' (71). The postulate 'plurality is a strength' is presented as a major 'principle of modern business philosophies' that could also hold true for Berlin. 'Migrants contribute to this strength': their traditions and cultures mix with

'cultural and traditional aspects of the receiving society ... [and] foster the emerge of new hybrid cultures which have become symptoms of modern urban societies' (5).

This text reveals a phenomenon which the political scientist Kien Nghi Ha (2005) calls the 'hype about hybridity': today, processes of cultural penetration are reinterpreted in a positive way. This is not necessarily an obviously emancipatory project and a liberation from the binary modern logic of either/or. Rather, the concept of hybridity seems to be quite compatible with the cultural dominant logic of postmodern capitalism (see Harvey, 1989; Lanz, 1996). In so far as the global economy becomes increasingly 'cultural' and flexible, the difference of the Other is perceived less and less as a dangerous breeding ground of marginality, but rather as a resource likely to foster productivity and as a 'lifestyle and consumption model in the market of possibilities' (Ha, 2005: 59). According to Ha, the classical German concept of multiculturalism, which wanted to preserve absolute differences, is beginning to be replaced by a model of society that puts hybridity and transculturality at its centre. In this model, ethnic and cultural mixtures are seen as producing desirable results. Such a logic, for example, can be found in the *BerlinStudie*, which was commissioned by the mayor in search of a vision for the future of Berlin. This report assigns to immigrants the role of a dynamic avant-garde whose job it is to remove the 'mental barriers' of an ossifying society by introducing and spreading more entrepreneurial behaviour. Thus immigrants are seen as an important resource that should develop within one or two generations into a 'new elite' (Der Regierende Bürgermeister, 2000: 68). However, this instrumental 'hype about hybridity' makes it necessary to detach the threatening parts of the construction of the Other from the desired ones and to domesticate the unpredictable moments of cultural transformation. Here, another shift can be observed. Traditional concepts of multiculturalism accepted the 'difference' of other cultures so long as it offered some form of exoticism that appealed to the majority society and was manageable. This is a mechanism that can still be found in festivals such as the 'Carnival of Cultures', where exoticism is celebrated as an enrichment of society. However, today the incentive of multiculturalism is primarily the economic potential of cultural

diversity, which is perceived as a competitive advantage in a globalized economy.

Between frontier fortification and hybridity

This overview on the contemporary formation of discourses on multiculturalism in Germany has illustrated the existence of two main positions: a cultural 'frontier fortification and hybridity' (Terkessidis, 2000: 202). On the one hand, the political focus narrows down to the assumed cultural fundamentalism of Muslim immigrants who are constructed as radical 'others' and are increasingly excluded from an imagined community of the 'self'. On the other hand, a positive reference to cultural plurality and hybridity has evolved. Minorities not only appear as an additional participant in the consumer market, but, particularly in Berlin, are also valued as a relevant social resource for the future. In some instances, minorities are even represented as an economic and social avant-garde that facilitates the shift towards a neoliberal society. At the same time, the pedagogical socio-multiculturalism which had characterized a great deal of the integration policy of the municipal authorities since the 1980s seems to have become obsolete.

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4

Multiculturalism in Italy: the missing model

Stefano Allievi

From country of emigration to country of immigration

Italy has only recently become an immigration country. While Central and Northern European countries are already well-established labour-importing economies (most from at least the time of post-war reconstruction and the subsequent period of economic boom, some for longer), Italy was still, along with other Mediterranean countries such as Spain, Greece and Portugal, a sending country with a significant percentage of emigrants.[1] Only in the 1970s did the situation begin to reverse.

In one century, from the country's unification in 1861 until 1970, almost 27 million Italians were obliged to expatriate (Ascoli 1979), mainly in search of a job (a relatively smal number were political refugees during the Fascist period): an impressive number, considering that the entire population of Italy was, at the beginning of Italian history as a unified country, only 21 million (excluding the region of Veneto, not yet part of the country). Not all these migrations were definitive: net emigration – the difference those who emigrated and those who repatriated – was probably between 8 and 9 million (Birindelli, 1989). Today, around 5 million Italians (those holding an Italian passport) still live abroad; in addition to which perhaps 50 to 60 million people of Italian descent (migrants and their descendants)