The Integration of Expellees in Germany and Poland after World War II: A Historical Reassessment

Philipp Ther

When World War II came to an end, vast portions of Germany and Poland lay in rubble. And, as if this were not enough, both countries were immediately inundated by large waves of migrants. In the years from 1944 to 1949, displaced persons, refugees, and expellees made up more than one-fifth of the populations of Poland and Germany. For the purpose of this article, expellees (or forced migrants) are Germans or Poles who had been living in the eastern territories of both countries as defined by their borders in 1937 and who were forcibly and permanently removed from their homelands between 1944 and 1949. This term also applies to Germans and Poles who were living in other countries in eastern Europe as ethnic minorities and were also forced to leave their homes. Between 1944 and 1949, 4.3 million expellees settled in the Soviet Zone of Occupation (SZO, after 1949 it became the German Democratic Republic [GDR]); the expellees represented 24.2 percent of the entire population.[1] By 1950, up to 8 million expellees, about 17 percent of the entire population, had come to West Germany, that is, the former western zones of occupation.[2] At least 2.1 million people from the eastern territories, eastern Europe, and eastern Poland who had previously been deported to Siberia, had been moved to Poland by 1948. These expellees represented as much as 10 percent of the entire postwar Polish population.[3] Returning from

1. Gerhard Reichling, *Die Heimatvertriebenen im Spiegel der Statistik* (Berlin, 1958), 14–15; see also Bundesarchiv, Außenstelle Potsdam (BAP), MdI, DO 1–10, Zentralverwaltung für Umsiedler (ZVU), no. 19.

2. Gerhard Reichling, *Die deutschen Vertriebenen in Zahlen: 40 Jahre Eingliederung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Bonn, 1989), 30–34.

3. Coming up with exact numbers for Polish and German expellees is quite difficult, especially since the statistics were prepared differently in Poland and Germany. The data currently used in Germany also appear questionable because children of expellees who were born in postwar Germany are also counted as expellees.

Banasiak assumes that there were 2.4 million repatriates. See Stefan Banasiak, "Settlement of the Polish Western Territories in 1945–1947," *Polish Western Affairs* 6, no. 1 (1965): 121–49; according to the official "repatriation" statistics, 117,211 Poles were "repatriated" in 1944; 742,631 in 1945; 640,014 in 1946; 10,801 in 1947; and 7,325 in 1948—which amounts to a total of 1,517,982 repatriates. These statistics are contained in Jan Czerniakiewicz, *Repatriacja ludności polskiej z ZSSR 1944–1948* (Warsaw, 1987), 54; To this official statistic must be added at least 600,000 repatriates who had fled from eastern Poland during the war or who returned from Germany where they had been forced laborers. Many repatriates who had been members of the underground changed their identity in order to escape persecution.

the west were an additional 2.2 million Poles who had been expelled or displaced by the Germans during the occupation of Poland.[4] As Krystyna Kersten stated: "The Pole of 1945 (and of the next two years) was a wanderer."[5]

The expellees contributed to and perpetuated a "founding crisis" in the People's Republic of Poland, as well as in East and West Germany. The term *founding crisis* is used because these three countries were established after World War II under particularly critical circumstances.[6] Material destruction can be reversed, but it is much more difficult to settle uprooted people or to rebuild the attachment to place the Germans call "Heimat" and the Poles "ojczyzna."[7]

Eventually, all three countries managed to integrate their populations of expellees. The two socialist countries were more successful in their initial efforts, but less successful than West Germany in achieving a long-term level of integration that was acceptable to both the expellees and the society receiving them. Indeed, the integration policies of the socialist countries carried the seeds of their own disintegration and endangered the territorial integrity and the very existence of Poland and East Germany. Though integration was most successful in West Germany, it was not without problems there either. The expellees' constant demands to return to their homelands were in fact demands to revoke their integration into West Germany.

In evaluating postwar expellee integration, an optimistic post hoc approach, that is, writing a success story, should be avoided.[8] The territorial and political stability that was a prerequisite for integration was guaranteed by the presence of the Great Powers and Europe's east-west split. In the course of the integration process, new societies were created that were very different from their prewar counterparts. On the one hand, the expellees were subjected to many modernizing changes. On the other hand, they contributed to and accelerated the urbanization and industrialization that changed postwar Poland and the two Germanies.

The evidence presented in this article is taken mainly from administrative sources. In Poland and in former West Germany, personal

4. Wacław Długoborski, *Zweiter Weltkrieg und sozialer Wandel* (Göttingen, 1981), 312–15.

5. Krystyna Kersten, *The Establishment of Communist Rule in Poland, 1943–1948* (Berkeley, 1991), 164.

6. The policy adopted toward the expellees in the two Germanies, East and West, could be quoted as an example of the growing gap between them.

7. For Germany, see Wolfram Wette, "Eine Gesellschaft im Umbruch: 'Entwurzelungserfahrungen' in Deutschland 1943–1948 und sozialer Wandel," in Robert Streibel, ed., *Flucht und Vertreibung: Zwischen Aufrechnung und Verdrängung* (Vienna, 1994), 257–84. In Poland, the recent wave of publications about former eastern Poland and the eagerness to study the "Kresy" (eastern territories) proves that the country is still attempting to come to terms with the loss of its eastern territories, Vilnius (Wilna), and L'viv (Lwów) more than fifty years ago.

8. In Yugoslavia nowadays, ethnic cleansing and population exchanges are widely regarded as cruel, but necessary, elements of a lasting peace. Population exchanges and expulsions in central and eastern Europe are quite often cited as factors responsible for contemporary peace in these regions. This conclusion is at best superficial.

records such as diaries and memoirs also provide valuable information. Other important sources are sociological reports and inquiries from the 1940s and 1950s that can be reinterpreted today and documents from nongovernmental organizations and churches. In general, archival research in the former GDR produces less than one might wish because archives were systematically purged of sources that presented a picture of the expellee integration that diverged from the official line. The suppression was so strict that personal sources are not even present in any archives.

To keep the length of this article within reasonable limits, many generalizations have to be made. The integration of expellees is a complex problem dependent upon such parameters as the expellees' generational status and their cultural and regional roots. Even the specific character of the regions in which the expellees settled affected their integration.[9] Rather than describing every detail of a complex history, my article discusses the key factors and problems challenging Poland, East Germany, and West Germany as a result of these forced migrations. This comparison reveals that the histories of Europe on either side of the iron curtain are more similar than broadly perceived. Furthermore, in their treatment of "others," the differences between Poland and East Germany were much greater than the traditional western view of the monolithic eastern bloc permitted. I also hope to generate interest in these issues in order to stimulate more extensive research in the English-speaking world. The history of postwar Ukrainian expellees from Poland to Ukraine, for example, is a case worthy of comparison. Furthermore, the forced resettlement of 300,000 Ukrainians within Poland (carried out in the akcja Wisła), the postwar settlement of the former Sudeten German areas in what is now the Czech Republic, and the resettlement of ethnically cleansed areas in postwar Europe in general are related topics of vital importance, which have, until recently, received little attention.[10]

Before presenting the details of the history of Polish and German expellees, I wish to make a case for the comparability of these histories. Until 1989, this comparison would have been impossible. The term *expellee* was used neither in the GDR nor in Poland and was regarded by the socialist powers as the expression of West German revanchism, of the attempt by the west to attempt to recover Germany's lost eastern territories. Indeed, the political term *Vertriebene* (expellee) is a West German creation.[11] A legal definition of this term can be found in the

9. The most comprehensive English-language publication dealing with these topics is by Karen L. Gatz, *East Prussian and Sudetengerman Expellees in West Germany, 1945–1960: A Comparison of Their Social and Cultural Integration* (Ann Arbor, 1989).

10. An estimated 40 to 50 million people were uprooted in Europe during and after World War II. These migratory waves were the largest since the great migrations (*Völkerwanderung*) of the fourth and fifth centuries. See Walter Laqueur, *Europa auf dem Weg zur Weltmacht 1945–1992,* trans. Karl Heinz Silber (Munich, 1992), 41.

11. The roots of the word are biblical and derive from the "expulsion from paradise." Church-affiliated expellees indeed viewed their expulsion as biblical punishment for Nazi Germany's wrongdoings. The term *Vertreibung* (expulsion) describes

Bundesvertriebenengesetz of 1953. The expellees were defined as "Germans who, as citizens of the former German Reich or as ethnic Germans living in other lands, . . . had to leave their homes as a consequence of World War II."[12]

In East German propaganda (including works in the humanities and social sciences), the expellees were called "resettlers." This term was intended to downplay the often horrible fate of Germans from the east and the involvement of socialist sister countries in their sufferings.[13] Not until the 1970s was some, albeit tightly controlled, research into the matter permitted.[14] In the Polish case, the expellees were called "repatriates," a term created to cover up Soviet policies against Poles and Poland. After the Hitler-Stalin Pact, that is, the fourth partition of Poland, the eastern Poles suffered first at the hands of the Soviets after the Red Army marched into the eastern half of Poland on 17 September 1939. Then, in the autumn of 1944, the Soviets started to expel eastern Poles from their homes. Propaganda suggested that these "re-

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something permanent and irreversible. The term *expellee* (Vertriebene) was used by the American and British occupying authorities as early as 1945. In German, the word *Vertriebene* also carries the implication that the indigenous society has an obligation to integrate the expellees. Obviously, the term *Flüchtling* (refugee) does not contain this implication.

The strictly scholarly use of the term *Vertreibung* was damaged by the political misuse of the term as a mere accusation against Germany's eastern neighbors. Most Polish historians used the terms *wysiedleńci* (unsettled people) and *wysiedlenie* (unsettling). Wysiedlenie also contained a connotation of unlawfulness and was for example used to describe the expulsion of Poles by the German occupants from the Warthegau during World War II. Although distinguishing among these terms might appear to be hairsplitting, it must be recalled that the quarrel over terms made the German-Polish dialogue virtually impossible for many years. The use of the terms *expulsion* and *expellees* in this article was indirectly encouraged by the increasing popularity of the term *wypędzenie* (expulsion) in Poland.

For much good advice on translating these linguistic distinctions into English I want to thank Caroline King from Georgetown University.

12. Bundesvertriebenengesetz, sec. 1, par. 1. Since 1953, this law has been amended several times, but this definition is still valid today.

13. The term *resettler* was supposed to confirm that the regulations contained in article XIII in the Treaty of Potsdam governing the orderly and humane "transfer" of the German populace from Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland had indeed been followed. The term *resettler* (Umsiedler, przesiedleńci) implies, falsely, that the resettlers left their homelands voluntarily. Hence, Naimark's assumption that Umsiedler was a "politically neutral word" is wrong. The term *Umsiedler* should be translated into English as "resettler." Naimark's translation, "settler," is the equivalent of *Siedler* in German. See Norman M. Naimark, *The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation* (Cambridge, Mass., 1995), 144, 149.

14. The main centers of research were the Humboldt University in Berlin under the guidance of Wolfgang Meinicke and the Pedagogical College in Magdeburg under the guidance of Manfred Wille. Manfred Wille, "Die Zusammenarbeit der deutschen Antifaschisten mit der SMAD in der Umsiedlerfrage, speziell in Sachsen-Anhalt (1945–1949)," *Jahrbuch der Geschichte sozialistischer Länder Europas,* vol. 23, no. 1 (Berlin, 1979); Wolfgang Meinicke, "Zur Integration der Umsiedler in der Gesellschaft 1945–1952," *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 26, no. 10 (1988): 867–78.

patriates" returned voluntarily to their mother country. In fact, the contrary was true. Poles had lived for centuries among Lithuanians, Belorussians, Ukrainians, and Jews[15] in eastern Poland, which they regarded as their *mała ojczyzna* (homeland). These "repatriates" did not return to their home country but were forcibly relocated to the former territories of a foreign country.

Communist propaganda was quite successful in the Polish case. For the most part, western literature accepted the "fact" that the eastern Poles were resettled or voluntarily came back to their home country.[16] In referring to the expulsion of the eastern Poles, Norman Davies states that they were to be "resettled."[17] B. F. Leslie writes that Poles were "repatriated from the USSR."[18] One possible explanation for the success of eastern propaganda can perhaps best be described as "bad conscience." Since Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt had agreed to the expulsion of the eastern Poles without even consulting the Polish government, the west was prone to accept a rosy version of Polish postwar history.

For a long time, the expellees' integration was viewed far too positively in the three countries themselves. In West Germany, the general consensus was that the German expellees had paid a high price for the lost war. The loss of territories in the east and the expellees' fate were quietly regarded as something like reparations charged for Germany's guilt. At the same time, the expulsions provided the opportunity to point to the guilt of countries such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union, which had expelled Germans. As Lüttinger observes, the integration of expellees in West Germany was widely regarded as a success story, a view that the facts do not support.[19]

In the two socialist countries, successful integration even became a part of state ideology. According to the official line, the expellees

15. Among the 1.5 million registered "repatriates" were more than 200,000 Jews. See Krystyna Kersten, "Szacunek strat osobowych w Polsce Wschodniej," *Dzieje Najnowsze,* no. 2 (1994): 46; according to Litvak, 157,420 Jewish "repatriates" were registered by the Central Committee of Polish Jewry in Warsaw. See Yozef Litvak, "Polish-Jewish Refugees Repatriated from the Soviet Union to Poland at the End of the Second World War and Afterwards," in Norman Davies and Antony Polonsky, eds., *Jews in Eastern Poland and the USSR, 1939–46* (London, 1991), 235; see also Hanna Shlomi, "The 'Jewish Organising Committee' in Moscow and 'The Jewish Central Committee' in Warsaw, June 1945–February 1946: Tackling Repatriation," in Davies and Polonsky, eds., *Jews in Eastern Poland,* 240–54. The Jewish "repatriates" are a special object of study that cannot be discussed within the limited space of this article.

16. Helmut Carl, *Kleine Geschichte Polens* (Frankfurt, 1960), 153; Enno Meyer, *Grundzüge der Geschichte Polens,* 3d ed. (Darmstadt, 1990), 111. A notable exception is Jörg Hoensch, who wrote about "vertriebene Ostpolen" (expelled eastern Poles). Jörg Hoensch, *Geschichte Polens* (Stuttgart, 1983).

17. Norman Davies, *God's Playground: A History of Poland* (New York, 1981), 2:509.

18. R. F. Leslie, *The History of Poland since 1863* (Cambridge, Eng., 1980), 288.

19. Paul Lüttinger, *Integration der Vertriebenen* (Frankfurt am Main, 1989); see also Erker's excellent regional study: Paul Erker, *Vom Heimatvertriebenen zum Neubürger: Sozialgeschichte der Flüchtlinge in einer agrarischen Region Mittelfrankens 1945–1955* (Wiesbaden, 1988); Wette, "Eine Gesellschaft im Umbruch," 269.

had been successfully integrated into East Germany by 1949–50.[20] Poland was less quick in deceiving itself, but by the 1960s, integration was still considered to have been "accomplished."[21]

These examples demonstrate that the term *integration* has to be used very carefully. There is no consensus in history or social science about the point at which a group may be called integrated. Therefore, in this article I am choosing to use the most basic definition, relying on the Latin roots of the word: integration is the penetration of a smaller group into a larger group that results in the whole group being reformed.[22] In this article, I will measure the expellees' integration using widely accepted parameters: for example, levels of income, employment in the private and public sector, equality of chances, representation in the political system, changes in the realm of culture and in occupational activities, intermarriages between different groups.

Now let us turn our attention to the expulsions themselves. As compensation for Poland's losses in the east, the former eastern territories of Germany were put under Polish administration with the Treaty of Potsdam. Initially, these territories were called *ziemie odzyskanie* (recovered territories). Following nationalistic ideology, the term *recovered* was used because it was assumed that Silesia, Pomerania, Warmia, and the other territories had been liberated from many centuries of foreign German rule.[23] Most of the Germans living in these territories until 1945–46 were expelled. Thus, Poland acquired sufficient space to resettle its own 2.1 million expellees. In contrast to their Polish counterparts, the 12 million German expellees were moved to an already densely populated country.

There are several striking similarities between the two expulsions. First, most expellees lost their homelands without their consent through a process of ethnic cleansing. Second, neither Poland nor Germany participated in the decisions concerning the territorial changes that preceded the expulsions.[24] In both cases, these decisions were made by the three Great Powers.[25] Third, the Poles and Germans from the

20. Nationalrat der Nationalen Front des demokratischen Deutschland, ed., *Sie fanden eine neue Heimat* (Berlin, 1951).

21. *Rozwój gospodarczy ziem zachodnich i północnych Polski* (Warsaw, 1960), 33; Zygmunt Dulczewski and Andrzej Kwilecki, *Z Życia osadników na ziemiach zachodnich* (Warsaw, 1961), 54 ff.; Władysław Markiewicz and Paweł Rybicki, *Przemiany społeczne na ziemiach zachodnich* (Poznan, 1967).

22. Integration needs to be distinguished from assimilation.

23. In this article, these territories will be called western territories. This term, *ziemie zachodnie,* has been in common use in Poland since the 1960s.

24. Andrzej Albert regards the contracts with the Ukrainian, Belorussian, and Lithuanian governments as unlawful. Indeed, these contracts were signed by the Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego, a nonlegitimate precursor of a postwar Polish government. Andrzej Albert, *Najnowsza historia Polski 1918–1980,* 4th ed. (London, 1991), 449.

25. See Antoni Czubiński's short but informative article "Przesunięcie granic państwa polskiego pod wpływem II wojny światowej (1939–1945)," in Antoni Czubiński, ed., *Problem granic i obszaru odrodzonego państwa polskiego (1918–1990)* (Poznan, 1992), 196–203; see also Davies, *God's Playground,* 2:509.

east who had fled from the war were never allowed to return to their original homelands. Hence, temporary refugees became permanent expellees. Fourth, even more important than the legal arguments is the fact that Polish and German expellees experienced a comparable history, although the similarities of their circumstances may not at first be apparent.

Poland and Germany lost their eastern territories in different ways, and the manner of these losses had broad implications for the history of the expellees. Germany lost its territories de facto when the German population living there was expelled. Stalin forced Poland to agree on its eastern border and to sign "repatriation treaties" with the Ukrainian, Belorussian, and Lithuanian Socialist Republics in 1944.[26] Although Poland was not an equal partner of the Soviet Union when signing the treaties, the Polish government could sometimes intervene on behalf of its repatriates.[27]

The German expellees were an extraterritorial populace without any protection or protector.[28] As members of the nation that had started the war, German expellees frequently became targets of revenge.[29] Many people arrived in Germany sick or malnourished, and some even died en route.[30] Poor treatment and the violation of their human rights was the fate of German expellees[31] rather than of their

26. The repatriation treaties were never printed, in part because many regulations in favor of repatriates were never met by the Polish government. In the AAN (Archiwum Akt Nowych) the repatriation treaties are kept in the rather minor collection: Generalny Pełnomocnik Rzadu RP do Spraw Repatriacji w Warszawie (GP Rz d/s Repatr.). The treaty with the Lithuanian SSR from 22 September 1944 is kept at AAN, GP Rz d/s Repatr., sygn. 1, pp. 19–21; the treaty with the Ukrainian SSR from 6 September 1944 can be seen in AAN, GP Rz d/s Repatr., sygn. 1, pp. 28–37. The simple fact that in these treaties Poland was relegated to the same level as individual Soviet Republics gives a clear indication of its weak position versus the Soviet Union. Only on 6 July 1945 was Poland able to conclude a repatriation treaty with the Soviet Union that confirmed the regulations of the former treaties. The repatriation treaty of 1945 can be seen in AAN, GP Rz d/s Repatr., sygn. 1, pp. 16–18.

27. Czubiński, *Problem granic,* 201; Piotr Eberhardt, *Polska granica wschodnia 1939–1945* (Warsaw, 1993), 154.

28. See Artur Hajnicz, "Dialog—Założenia, obawy, oczekiwania," in *Polska w Europie,* special volume (Warsaw, 1995), 4.

29. See Theodor Schieder, *Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ostmitteleuropa* (Bonn, 1953–1961); see also Naimark, *Russians in Germany,* 71–76 and 145–50.

30. According to West German statistics, 1,618,400 Germans died during the expulsion from Poland (the overall number of victims was supposedly 2,239,500 people). Statistisches Bundesamt, ed., *Die deutschen Vertreibungsverluste* (Stuttgart, 1958), 38, 45, and 46. As Rüdiger Overmans has shown, these numbers are not entirely credible. Only about 400,000 casualties have in fact been documented. Overmans estimates that the entire number of "victims of expulsion" was approximately 600,000. Rüdiger Overmans, "Personelle Verluste der deutschen Bevölkerung durch Flucht und Vertreibung," *Dzieje Najnowsze,* 1994, no. 2:51–66.

31. Recently, several articles and books on the expulsion of Germans have been published in Poland; these are based on new sources and draw a less favorable picture than past publications. See Witold Stankowski, "Zur Aussiedlung der Deutschen aus Pommerellen in den Jahren 1945–1950: Ein Forschungsbericht," *Deutsche Studien* 126–127 (June–September 1995): 216–25; Bernadetta Nitschke, "Wysiedlenie Niemców

Polish counterparts, although if the "repatriates" came from regions immersed in the Polish-Ukrainian war, they could be glad to emerge alive.[32]

The Treaty of Potsdam in July 1945 attempted to provide for the humane and organized "transfer" of the German populace.[33] The same is true for the repatriation treaties, which even permitted the transportation of some household items and livestock. Yet, the refugees were often on the road for days without food, drink, or sanitary facilities. Many people died en route. The Germans were generally allowed to carry one piece of luggage. Rural Poles from the east could bring two tons of belongings per family with them, and families from urban areas were allowed one ton. During the railway journey and subsequent relocation, however, many belongings were lost or damaged.[34] Many

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z Ziemie Lubuskiej w latach 1945–1950," *Zeszyty Historyczne* 104 (1993): 103–13; Edmund Nowak, *Cień Łambinowic: Próba rekonstrucji dziejów Obozu pracy w Łambinowicach 1945–1946* (Opole, 1991). See also Jan Misztal, "Wysiedlenie i repatriacja obywateli polskich z ZSSR a wysiedlenia i przesiedlenia niemców z Polski-próba bilansu," in Hubert Orłowski and Andrzej Sakson, eds., *Utracona ojczyzna: Przymusowe wysiedlenia, deportacje i przesiedlenia jako wspólne doświadczenia* (Poznan, 1996), 45–75. Misztal's article appears to be biased, because it supports the traditional viewpoint about the proper transfer of Germans. There are also recent publications concerning the expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakia that are based on newly accessible Czech (or Czechoslovakian) sources. See Tomáš Staněk, *Odsun Němců z Československa 1945–1947* (Prague, 1991).

32. To understand the eastern Poles, their expulsion, and their postwar history, it is necessary to understand Polish-Ukrainian relations during World War II. See Piotr Eberhardt, *Przemiany narodowościowe na Ukraine XX wieku* (Warsaw, 1994), 157 ff.; Ryszard Torzecki, *Polacy i Ukraińcy: Sprawa ukraińska w czasie II wojny światowej na terenie II Rzeczpospolitej* (Warsaw, 1993); Jan Łukaszów, "Walki polsko-ukraińskie 1943–1947," *Zeszyty Historyczne* 90 (1989): 159–99. For information on Polish-Belorussian and Polish-Lithuanian relations, see Piotr Eberhardt, "Przemiany Narodowościowe na Białorusi," *Przegląd Wschodin* 2, no. 3(7) (1992–93); Franciszek Sielicki, *Losy mieszkańców Wileńszczyzny w latach 1939–1946: Okupacja sowjecka i niemiecka, wywózki, partyzanka, repatriacja* (Wrocław, 1994); and Krzysztof Tarka, "Spór o Wilno, Ze stosunków polsko-litewskich w latach drugiej wojny światowej," *Zeszyty Historyczny* 114 (1995): 60–83. Also valuable is information about the Soviet occupation of eastern Poland. Especially recommended is Stanisław Ciesielski, Grzegorz Hryciuk, and Aleksander Srebrakowski, *Masowe deportacje radzieckie w okresie II wojny światowej* (Wrocław, 1994).

33. The expulsion of the Germans can be divided into three phases. In late 1944 and early 1945, Germans either fled from the approaching Red Army or were evacuated by the Nazi authorities before the Soviet troops arrived. From spring 1945 until July 1945, Germans were expelled (the so-called *wilde Vertreibungen*). After July 1945, the Potsdam Treaty provided a legal basis for the expulsions. In the Polish case, the expulsion also occurred in three phases. From 1943 until 1944, eastern Poles fled mainly from the Polish-Ukrainian war. In 1944, the Red Army, which had again occupied eastern Poland, provided an additional motive for flight. After September 1944, the "repatriation" treaties provided a legal basis for the expulsions.

34. Some impressions about the real face of repatriation can be gained in AAN, GP Rz d/s Repatr., sygn. 12, pp. 3–13; AAN, GP Rz d/s Repatr., sygn. 1, p. 5, AAN, GP Rz d/s Repatr., sygn. 2, p. 96; AAN, GP Rz d/s Repatr., sygn. 9, p. 59. See also the reports sent to the Central Committee of the Polska Partia Robotnicza in AAN, KC PPR (Komitet Centralny PPR), 295/VII/51, vol. 76, pp. 1–15. Particularly interesting are also many individual reports about the expulsion that appear in the memoirs of

Polish and German expellees were also deprived of their belongings at the very beginning of their travels. As the authorities in the SZO reported in 1945: "It is almost a rule that the resettlers were completely robbed and lost their last belongings before crossing the frontier. Many cases of abuse are known to us."[35] The Poles were usually not treated as badly as the Germans. But when the first forty trains with expellees arrived in Opole, Upper Silesia, they had just 3,172 head of cattle with them. Statistics from the Ministry of the Recovered Territories (MZO) reveal that by May 1946 only 30 percent of the horses and about 50 percent of the cows that were supposed to be transported from the eastern territories of Poland to Silesia had in fact arrived there. This reveals how massive the losses were. One should also remember that the livestock in eastern Poland had already been reduced before the expulsion began. Taking into account that eastern Poland had been very poor before 1939, these twofold losses of livestock during the war and during the repatriation inevitably caused the impoverishment of many.[36] Those families that had managed to save one cow were among the lucky ones. For these predominantly agrarian people from eastern Poland, however, one cow was not enough to allow them to survive, let alone to prosper.

As these examples show, the expulsions resulted in massive losses of property and personal belongings. The expellees almost automatically formed a new underclass that was clearly identifiable because of the habits and dialects it had brought from the east. The loss of property deeply influenced the expellees' attitude toward the societies and the governments already existing in the territories to which they came. Their tremendous poverty, in some a cases the threat of starvation, demanded the authorities' involvement. Not only were the expellees poor, they also felt that they had suffered a particularly unjust hardship. The expellees were a potentially destabilizing element in their new homelands. The British, American, and Soviet occupying forces were naturally afraid of any hint of insurrection. The western powers especially feared a communist revolution.

The powers that had signed the Treaty of Potsdam all desired to confirm the new borders and stabilize the internal situation in Germany and Poland. Therefore, their political goal was to ensure that

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Polish "settlers" (*osadnicy*). See Instytut Zachodni, Poznan, competition "Pamietnik Osadników," 1957, memoirs 26 and 54; see also Instytut Śląski, Opole, competition "Pamiętniki trzech pokoleń mieszkańców Ziem Odzyskanych," 1986, memoirs 68, 82, 88, 95, and 127. Hundreds of memoirs were collected by scientific institutes in western Poland, some were published after the completion of competitions. Those memoirs that were either not published at all or published only in part are especially valuable for the uncensored picture they present; see also two recently published memoirs: Alma Heczko, "Pożegnanie Lwowa," *Karta,* no. 13 (1994): 3–6 and Ryszard Gansiniec, "Na Straży miasta," *Karta,* no. 13 (1994): 7–27.

35. BAP, MdI, DO 1–10, ZVU, no. 11, p. 162 (my translation).

36. Janusz W. Gołębiowski, *Pierwsze lata władzy ludowej w województwie Śląsko-Dąbrowskim* (Katowice, 1965), 177; AAN, MZO, sygn. 692, p. 86.

the expellees were successfully integrated. The German and Polish authorities shared this goal of integration, although their primary motivation in providing for the expellees was to stabilize their respective countries. I will examine several key factors of integration. First, the ways in which the expellees were settled will be demonstrated. Most of them started their new lives in small villages, in an agricultural environment.[37] Second, the attempts at integration and the degree of success of integration policies will be discussed. Here, the land reforms in Poland and East Germany play a key role. The absence of land reform in West Germany contributed to the initial slowness of integration. Third, the question of property and the reimbursement of expellees, one of the main obstacles to integration in the two communist countries, will be discussed. Finally, I will examine how the central focus of integration shifted from the villages to the cities and new industrial centers in the 1950s. Urban integration took place at a much faster rate than integration in rural settings.

After the initial flurry of relocations, the next problem was to properly settle the expellees. Millions of meals, beds, and homes were needed. The capacities and resources of the various administrative organs were already stretched to the limit from coping with the destruction of the war. At first, they were unable to gain control of the situation. Many Polish and German refugees were locked in massive human logjams clogging the roads. Others simply wandered aimlessly in search of food and shelter.

In Opole, Upper Silesia, both a transit point on the way farther west as well as a final destination for some, more than 43,000 expellees were reported to have slept under the open sky.[38] In East Germany, the desperate authorities demanded that "all wandering about and moving around . . . stop immediately. Every county supervisor and every mayor must prevent people from wandering further!"[39] Diseases caused by malnutrition and poor sanitary conditions spread rapidly among the expellees. There were massive epidemics of typhus, dysentery, and

37. For West Germany see Erker, *Vom Heimatvertriebenen,* 26 ff.; Reichling, *Die Heimatvertriebenen,* 30–36. For East Germany see BAP, MdI, DO 1–10, ZVU, no. 4, p. 80; Arnd Bauerkämper, "Von der Bodenreform zur Kollektivierung: Zum Wandel der ländlichen Gesellschaft in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone Deutschlands und DDR 1945–1952," in Hartmut Kaelble, Jürgen Kocka, and Hartmut Zwahr, eds., *Sozialgeschichte der DDR* (Berlin, 1994), 119 and 125–27. For Poland see Kazimierz Żygulski, *Repatrianci na Ziemiach Zachodnich: Studium Socjologiczne* (Poznan, 1962), 58; see also Gołębiowski, *Pierwsze lata,* 180; Franciszek Serafin, *Osadnictwo wiejskie i miejskie w województwie Śląsko-Dąbrowskim w latach 1945–1948* (Katowice, 1973), 180–81.

38. Serafin, *Osadnictwo wiejskie,* 94; Józef Liszka, "Wkład kościola tworzenia się nowego społeczeństwa w diecezji opolskiej w latach 1945–1951" (unpub. diss., Lublin, 1971), 46–47; Stefan Banasiak, "Osadnictwo rolne w województwie Śląsko-Dąbrowskim w latach 1945–1947," *Studia i Materiały z Dziejów Śląska* 6 (1964): 153. For a report about the situation in Opole, see AP (Archiwum Państwowy) w Katowicach, Archiwum Komitetu Wojewódzki PZPR (były AKW), 1/VI/15. For similar reports from Pomerania and Lower Silesia, see AAN, MZO, sygn. 84, pp. 51–53 and AAN, MZO, sygn. 69, p. 114.

39. BAP, MdI, DO 1–10, ZVU, no. 1, p. 7 (my translation).

tuberculosis. These desperate living conditions predominated until the massive flow of expellees lessened in the autumn of 1946. In this first period, the entire population suffered, but the expellees as a group led an especially harsh existence.[40]

These and similar reports demonstrate the difficulty in administering large-scale population exchanges. The disastrous circumstances of 1945 and 1946 can also be attributed to the fact that regulating these population "transfers" was not the highest priority of the governments involved. Germans who lived near the new Oder and Neiße rivers were driven out en masse because Poland wanted to secure her future western border. In Poland's eastern territories, the "repatriations" were supposed to be concluded by 1 February 1945.[41] This meant that the Poles from the east were supposed to leave even before space was secured for them in the western territories. The "repatriation" of Poles from Lithuania was to be carried out during a period of only four months, from 1 December 1944 to 1 April 1945.[42] In May 1945, the Polish Council of Ministers decided that the western territories should be settled as quickly as possible, "without paying too much attention to the misgivings and mistakes that are inevitable under these circumstances."[43] As a result of this political pressure, so many Germans were driven from their homes that the British and American zones receiving them could no longer manage and called for a delay of the "transfers."

All of Germany suffered long-term structural costs as a result of the political priority that favored quick expulsion. The expellees were settled primarily in rural areas because it was easier to find shelter for them there. Other necessities, such as the availability of work, were not considered. Hence, many expellees lived in areas where there were no jobs for them. They often had to resort to working as farm laborers for low wages.[44]

40. For a critical account of the situation in the western territories in 1945, see AAN, MZO, sygn. 82, pp. 43–59.

41. AAN, GP Rz d/s Repatr., sygn. 1, pp. 28–37.

42. Stefan Banasiak, "Państwowy Urząd Repatriacyjny w latach 1944–1946," *Przegląd Zachodni* 2 (1961): 338–39. In fact, the largest number of eastern Poles arrived in two waves during the summer and early autumn of 1945 and the spring of 1946. The entire repatriation was concluded only in 1948.

43. AAN, MZO, sygn. 1658, pp. 11–24 (my translation).

44. For the SZO/GDR see the statistics in BAP, MdI, DO 1–10, ZVU, no. 13, p. 167; BAP, MdI, DO 1–10, ZVU, no. 31, pp. 231 ff. For West Germany, see Paul Erker, "Revolution des Dorfes? Ländliche Bevölkerung zwischen Flüchtlingszustrom und landwirtschaftlichem Strukturwandel," in Martin Broszat, Klaus-Dietmar Henke, and Hans Woller, eds., *Von Stalingrad zur Währungsreform: Zur Sozialgeschichte des Umbruchs in Deutschland,* 3d ed. (Munich, 1990), 380; Marion Frantzioch, *Die Vertriebenen: Hemmnisse, Antriebskräfte und Wege ihrer Integration in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Berlin, 1987), 207 ff. Similar misgivings were typical of many areas in Poland's western territories. In 1945, the Polish authorities responsible for resettling the western territories noted that the "migration of Polish farmers and their settlement in the country are more important than rebuilding the cities and urban workplaces." Maria Kiełczewska and Leopold Gluck, "Zagadnienie akjci migracyjnej na ziemiach zachodnich," *Przegląd Zachodni* 1 (June 1945), reprinted in *Przegląd Zachodni* 2 (1995): 5 (my translation).

The hasty population movements also bore some poisonous fruits for Poland's "repatriates." The Polish expellees only partially benefited from Poland's space advantage in the western territories. Most of the eastern Poles who arrived in the west during and after the summer of 1945 came "too late": resettlers (*przesiedleńci*) from central Poland had already immigrated to the western territories.[45] Even in areas that had only been settled in 1946, some people from central Poland arrived first and were able to choose the best houses, apartments, and farms. In addition, the Red Army and, later, *szabrownicy* (plunderers) from central Poland had sacked the German houses and farms.[46] This plundering was so devastating that the government in Warsaw was concerned that the settlement of the western territories might never be successful.[47]

As the flow of expellees waned in the fall of 1946, the Polish and German authorities slowly gained control over the situation. By 1946, it became evident that the new borders would remain and that the countries had no choice but to integrate their expellees. The three countries adopted very different strategies for accomplishing this goal.

In general, the expellees were much worse off than the indigenous population, but their survival was secured at a low level, by the intervention of the authorities if necessary.[48] In all three countries, the disgruntled expellees were not allowed to organize themselves as interest groups or political associations. In West Germany, the *Koalitionsverbot* served this purpose.[49] In East Germany, the Zentralverwaltung für deutsche Umsiedler declared in 1947 "that the creation of special resettler organizations would disturb the process of assimilation and must therefore be rejected."[50] In Poland, too, any attempts by the "repatriates" to organize themselves in interest groups were suppressed.[51]

45. These migrants were true resettlers, for they migrated voluntarily to the western territories. They were also victims of propaganda, however. When the regime began to lure inhabitants of central Poland to the western territories, it promised farms or apartments for everybody. These promises were never kept. Some regions, such as Opole Silesia and Mazuria, already had a large number of indigenous people whose roots were partially Slavic. Hence, integration in these territories more closely parallels German conditions than does integration in the territories that were completely ethnically cleansed.

46. "Pierwsze lata władzy ludowej we wspomnieniach Opolan," Materiały konkursowe, Wspomnienia, Instytut Śląski, Opole, pp. 911 ff. and p. 928; AP (Archiwum Państwowe) w Katowicach, AKW, PZPR, 1/VI/380.

47. AAN, MZO, sygn. 84. pp. 54–56.

48. When reference is made to "the authorities," the role of the occupying powers in Germany must be mentioned. Until 1949, general policy directives were issued by the occupying powers. They also intervened in many individual cases in favor of those in need, and often on behalf of the expellees. This is true for the American, British, and Soviet administrations. Due to the limited length of this article, the role of the occupying powers and of the Soviets in Poland cannot be dealt with broadly.

49. Frantzioch, *Die Vertriebenen,* 144.

50. BAP, MdI, DO 1–10, ZVU, no. 13, p. 88 (my translation).

51. Serafin, *Osadnictwo wiejskie,* 115.

Until 1948, the western zones of Germany followed a containment policy towards the expellees.[52] The expellees' lack of capital, business connections, and goods to exchange made it difficult for them to survive in the West German market economy. Their first modest attempts to reconstruct their economic lives encountered a severe setback during the currency reform and creation of the Deutschmark in 1948. Although it was fundamental to the economic miracle of the 1950s, the currency reform hurt the expellees, who were already economically disadvantaged, far more than it damaged the indigenous population.[53]

The expulsions also had an enormous psychological impact. In 1945–46 homesickness was prevalent among expellees, especially among the older generation. Many were apathetic, working only to secure their immediate needs. This reinforced the widespread prejudices of the native residents that expellees were lazy and constituted a financial drain on the country.[54]

From 1948 on, the authorities in West Germany adopted an active and supportive policy toward expellees. In 1949, the poorest were helped by the *Soforthilfegesetz* (law providing for immediate care). In 1952, this law was replaced by the *Lastenausgleichsgesetz* (law providing for sharing the burden). The *Lastenausgleich* was one of the crucial laws in establishing a *soziale Marktwirtschaft,* a market economy with a social conscience. This legislation acknowledged that the expellees had suffered extraordinary losses in the war and would have to be compensated. Yet the redistribution of money alone does not explain the integrative effect of the Lastenausgleich,[55] for in most cases, expellees received money only at the end of the 1950s. Instead, it was the psychological dimension of the Lastenausgleich that was crucial: the explicit acknowledgment of the expellees' extraordinary needs and their past suffering during the expulsion.

52. There were minor differences between the administration of the British and the American zones. The French zone did not generally accept expellees in the first two years after World War II.

53. Concerning the currency reform in the SZO/GDR, see the complaints of expellees in BAP, MdI, DO 1–10, ZVU, no. 1, pp. 200 ff.; Brandenburgisches Landeshauptarchiv Potsdam (BLHA), Ld. Br. Rep. 203, no. 1105, p. 48; in West Germany, the currency reform worked to the advantage of anyone who held real estate and owned goods, whereas poor people such as expellees or small savers were disadvantaged. See Christoph Kleßmann, *Die doppelte Staatsgründung: Deutsche Geschichte 1945–1955* (Bonn, 1991), 189–91; see also Bernd Sprenger, *Das Geld der Deutschen: Geldgeschichte Deutschlands von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart* (Paderborn, 1995), 246.

54. Frantzioch, *Die Vertriebenen,* 127 ff.

55. In the Lastenausgleich, indigenous West Germans had to pay a tax on their taxable property of between 2 and 3 percent. They also had to pay a tax on profits generated by the devaluation of mortgages in the currency reform. For a critique of the Lastenausgleich, see Werner Abelshauser, "Der Lastenausgleich und die Eingliederung der Vertriebenen und Flüchtlinge—Eine Skizze," in Rainer Schulze, Doris von der Brelie-Lewien, and Helga Grebing, eds., *Flüchtlinge und Vertriebene in der westdeutschen Nachkriegsgeschichte: Bilanzierung der Forschung und Perspektiven für die künftige Forschungsarbeit* (Hildesheim, 1987), 229–39.

The passing of the Lastenausgleich is at least partially attributable to expellee activism, in particular after the expellees were allowed to organize themselves politically after the Koalitionsverbot was repealed in 1949. Using democratic means to channel their demands and needs helped them to identify with the Federal Republic and contribute to the reconstruction of the country.[56] Another facet of expellee activism, however, was the introduction of frequent demands to reconsider both the expulsion itself and Poland's western border.

These demands formed a part of the West German political mainstream until the change of government in 1969 and were a constant barrier to stability in central and eastern Europe.[57] We can only imagine what might have happened had the postwar borders of Europe not been fortified by the division of the continent and guaranteed by the Great Powers. (In Poland, many "repatriates" expected that the borders might change again and old Germany return; these fears impeded the acceptance of the western territories as a new homeland.[58] In addition, the West German expellees' demand that they be allowed to return to their homelands indirectly strengthened the socialist satellites' ties to their protector.) Yet the expellees' policy contained a contradiction. On the one hand, they demanded their return to the Heimat; on the other hand, the expellees did everything they could to be integrated into West Germany. This contradiction may today seem paradoxical, but it represents a well-known strand in German political thinking. In the early years of the twentieth century Social Democrats and their main ideologist Karl Kautsky both agitated for and hoped for revolution, while doing everything they could to ensure the gradual integration of workers into the system.

East Germany pursued a very different route. By the end of World War II, German nationalism had been completely discredited.[59] East

56. See Eugen Lemberg and Friedrich Edding, eds., *Die Vertriebenen in Westdeutschland: Ihre Eingliederung und ihr Einfluß auf Gesellschaft, Wirtschaft und Politik und Geistesleben*, 3 vols. (Kiel, 1959). Lemberg and Edding's book was the most serious and comprehensive West German publication of the 1950s to deal with the issue of the expellees. It is also a special source for another reason: most essays were written by expellees and thus reflect the major patterns of thinking among the expellees.

57. Frantzioch claims that the demands made by the expellee organizations were primarily aimed at rallying their followers and strengthening their ties. See Frantzioch, *Die Vertriebenen,* 155–58. This viewpoint clearly underestimates the revisionist character of these demands. For a critical account of this policy, see Patrick von zur Mühlen, Bernhard Müller, and Kurt Thomas Schmitz, "Vertriebenenverbände und deutsch-polnische Beziehungen nach 1945," in Carl Christoph Scheitzer and Hubert Feger, eds., *Das deutsch-polnische Konfliktverhältnis seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg: Multidisziplinäre Studien über konfliktfördernde und konfliktmindernde Faktoren in den internationalen Beziehungen* (Boppard am Rhein, 1975), 96–161.

58. AAN, MZO, sygn. 82, p. 48; CA MSW (Centralny Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnetrzych), MAP, sygn. 118, pp. 156, 191–92; AP w Katowicach, UWŚl, Sp-Pol., sygn. 42, pp. 13–14; Instytut Zachodni, memoirs 6 and 48; *Pierwsze lata,* pp. 315–18.

59. Heinrich August Winkler, "Nationalismus, Nationalstaat und nationale Frage in Deutschland seit 1945," in Heinrich August Winkler and Hartmut Kaelble, eds., *Nationalismus—Nationalitäten—Supranationalitäten* (Stuttgart, 1993), 12–33.

Germany's communists could not use nationalism to legitimize themselves or to gain popular support.[60] As several attempts to revise the Polish-German border demonstrate, this does not mean that the Socialist Unity Party of Germany was averse to pursuing their national interest.[61] In contrast to Poland, Czechoslovakia, or Yugoslavia, however, primarily national communism was not a motivating force in East Germany; instead, the dominant political appeal of East German communism was the promise of a just, equal society.

In keeping with its egalitarian leitmotiv, East Germany did more for its expellees than the western zones up to 1948. East Germany pursued a fierce redistribution policy in order to integrate the expellees. The emerging dictatorship was able to pursue this policy because of its increasingly monopolistic power and its relative lack of concern for property and individual rights. A special administration, the Zentralverwaltung für deutsche Umsiedler, was established in September 1945 to implement the government's redistribution policy. Initially there was the naive expectation that if people were made materially equal, all other problems would be solved.[62] Hence, the integration policy in East Germany may be called egalitarian-socialist.

To create an equal society, both money and goods needed to be redistributed. One of the main problems for the expellees was the lack of living space. According to a law passed by the Allied Council of Control for Occupied Germany (Gesetz des Alliierten Kontrollrates, no. 18, 18 March 1946), it was possible to seize the apartments or rooms of former Nazis for people in need. This law was applied more often in the Soviet zone than in the western zones. Many people, even non-Nazis, had to move and share apartments. In 1948–49, several investigations were undertaken to determine whether any East German was living in "superfluous" space. In Thuringia and Brandenburg housing space was widely redistributed.[63] These controls were highly unpopular with the indigenous population and very time-consuming to administer. Despite the expenditures of time and money, the expellees still had less living space than the indigenous population.[64] The situation

60. Sigrid Meuschel, *Legitimation und Parteiherrschaft: Zum Paradox von Stabilität und Revolution in der DDR 1945–1989* (Frankfurt, 1992), 18–20.

61. The Polish government noted with suspicion the attempts by the East German government to revise the border line at the Oder and Neiße rivers. Information is contained in AAN, KC PPR, sygn. 295/XX/70, pp. 48–49, 54–59, and 82–84.

62. See BAP, MdI, DO 1–10, ZVU, no. 1, p. 13. In 1946, the resettler administration in the state of Brandenburg noted that it was a "blessing to be able to tell these people [the expellees] that we need them." BLHA, Ld. Br. Rep. 203, no. 1074, p. 4.

63. In the second half of 1948 alone, the Amt für Neubürger of Thuringia vacated 8,864 apartments on behalf of expellees. BAP, MdI, DO 1–10, ZVU, no. 27, pp. 114, 131, 134, and 151; in Brandenburg, the government seized 24,932 apartments in 1948 in order to confiscate additional space for expellees. BLHA, Ld. Br. Rep. 203, no. 1104, Bl. 6.

64. BAP, MdI, DO 1–10, ZVU, no. 23, p. 4; BAP, MdI, DO 1–10, ZVU, no. 13, p. 90; BLHA, Ld. Br. Rep. 332, L IV/2/61/574, no. 1; Sächsisches Hauptstaatsarchiv Dresden (SHSA), MinAS, no. 27, p. 5. See also Petra Pape, "Flüchtlinge und Vertriebene

was worse in the states that had received large numbers of expellees, such as Mecklenburg and Brandenburg. By comparison, in 1949 the state of Saxony claimed that the expellee population had almost the same amount of housing space as the indigenous population.[65]

Land was also redistributed. In the summer of 1945, all people owning more than 100 hectares were dispossessed. Their land was given to workers living in rural areas, small farmers, and expellees. Land reform was one of the key measures establishing the regime of the Socialist Unity Party and was aimed at creating a communist electorate in the villages and at integrating the expellees, who made up 43.3 percent of the recipients of redistributed land.[66] The authorities also tried to collect furniture and clothes for the expellees and for those who had lost their belongings during the bombing of the cities.

By 1948, the policy of redistribution had reached its natural limits. The Soviet zone had suffered enormously from the vast dismantling of its industry and the constant demands for reparations.[67] To put it simply, there was almost nothing left to be redistributed. Furthermore, the indigenous population was growing increasingly resentful of redistribution.

On the whole, the political measures undertaken to improve the lives of expellees had failed. In East Germany, land reform ended in disaster, especially for the expellees.[68] Restructuring large landed property into small farms turned out to be very expensive at best and was often impossible. According to Wolfgang Meinicke, only 15 percent of

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in der Provinz Brandenburg," in Manfred Wille, Johannes Hoffmann, and Wolfgang Meinicke, eds., *Sie hatten alles verloren: Flüchtlinge und Vertriebene in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone* (Wiesbaden, 1993), 117 ff. In West Germany the situation was particularly critical in Schleswig-Holstein, Bavaria, and Niedersachsen, which had all taken in large numbers of expellees.

65. SHSA, MinAS, no. 27, p. 29; Wille, Hoffmann, and Meinicke, eds., *Sie hatten alles verloren,* 20; Regine Just, "Die Lösung der Umsiedlerfrage auf dem Gebiet der DDR, dargestellt am Beispiel des Landes Sachsen 1945–1952" (Phil. diss. A, Magdeburg, 1985), 105. Like many East German administrative sources, the Saxonian statistics are not completely credible. In many cases statistics in the SZO and the GDR were fabricated while being collected and adjusted afterwards to present the picture that the government desired. Nevertheless, these claims reflect the government's intention of redistributing living space to achieve equality.

66. See the speech from 19 September 1945 made by the Communist party's agrarian expert, Edwin Hoernle, "Bodenreform: Eine Wende in der deutschen Geschichte" (excerpt), in Peter Bucher, ed., *Nachkriegsdeutschland 1945–1949,* Quellen zum politischen Denken der Deutschen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, vol. 10 (Darmstadt, 1990), 60–70; concerning the expellees, see 65. Joachim Piskol, Christel Nehrig, and Paul Trixa, *Antifaschistisch-demokratische Umwälzung auf dem Lande 1945 bis 1949* (Berlin, 1984), 19; see also Naimark, *Russians in Germany,* 144; Wolfgang Meinicke, "Die Bodenreform und die Vertriebenen in der SBZ und den Anfangsjahren der DDR," in Wille, Hoffmann, and Meinicke, eds., *Sie hatten alles verloren,* 55–86.

67. According to Jörg Fisch, (*Reparationen nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg* [Munich, 1992]), the reparations paid by the SZO and later the GDR were by far the highest known in the twentieth century.

68. See Naimark, *Russians in Germany,* 161.

the expellees who had received land were economically successful farmers.[69] The small farms (up to ten hectares) that had been carved out of the larger plots were not sustainable because of the great deficit of livestock and technical equipment. More than two-thirds of all land recipients did not have their own farmhouses but had to live and keep their cattle in the houses of local people or in former manors.[70] Nonetheless, the authorities did not revise the failing land reform, but instead dedicated all East German construction capacities to the building of small farms. This program, begun in 1947, may have reflected the dream of creating a society of equal agrarians, but it also precipitated an economic disaster: the reconstruction of the cities was halted until 1949, thus retarding the development of East German cities and industry.[71] At the same time, the expellees' demands became louder and louder.[72]

The authorities had no solutions at hand and therefore decided to suppress the problem. In a self-deceptive mood that became typical for the GDR, the government pronounced the expellee integration concluded in 1948.[73] The expellees were increasingly accused of being responsible for the rise of Nazism in eastern Europe and for having been Hitler's "fifth column." Any expression of Silesian or Sudeten German identity and culture was forbidden and strictly prosecuted.[74]

This change in attitude occurred in the context of East Germany's rapprochement with its fraternal socialist countries. The Czechs, Poles, Hungarians, and Russians who had expelled the 4.3 million people who had then moved into East Germany were supposed to be brotherly allies. The acknowledgement of the Oder-Neiße border with Poland in 1950 was one of the few political measures taken by the GDR which

69. Wolfgang Meinicke and Alexander von Plato, *Alte Heimat—Neue Zeit: Flüchtlinge, Umgesiedelte, Vertriebene in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone und in der DDR* (Berlin, 1991), 61.

70. The Umsiedleramt of Mecklenburg complained that the land reform could not work if the land recipients had to walk four kilometers (two and a half miles) or more to their fields. BAP, MdI, DO 1–10, ZVU, no. 2, p. 218; see also Meinicke, "Die Bodenreform," 73; Naimark, *Russians in Germany,* 155.

71. Meinicke, "Die Bodenreform," 60; Bauerkämper, "Von der Bodenreform," 125–26; see also Arnd Bauerkämper, "Das Neubauernprogramm im Land Brandenburg," *Jahrbuch für Brandenburgische Landesgeschichte,* no. 45 (1994): 182–202.

72. As in West Germany, attempts were made to form expellee organizations. At the same time, the Zentralverwaltung für deutsche Umsiedler attempted to extend its power and to establish a "resettler committee," which would have been something like a separate expellee parliament with far-reaching legislative and executive powers. See also Manfred Wille, "Die Zentralverwaltung für deutsche Umsiedler—Möglichkeiten und Grenzen ihres Wirkens (1945–1948)," in Wille, Hoffman, and Meinicke, eds., *Sie hatten alles verloren,* 27–55.

73. BAP, MdI, DO 1–10, ZVU, no. 1, pp. 89–90.

74. See Philipp Ther, "Vertriebenenpolitik in der SBZ/DDR 1945–1953 am Beispiel des Kreises Calau-Senftenberg," *Jahrbuch für brandenburgische Landesgeschichte,* no. 46 (1995): 159–68; see also David Pike, *The Politics of Culture in Soviet-Occupied Germany, 1945–1949* (Stanford, 1992), 443 ff. and 645 ff.

met with widespread and open resistance.[75] Despite the surveillance of expellees by the police and the secret service and the suppression of any dissent, the GDR continued to be anxious about these recent arrivals. In most regions bordering Poland and Bohemia, the expellee population grew throughout the 1950s. As the authorities muttered, these people continued to move closer to their homelands in order to be able to return quickly.[76] Had the Soviets not supported the existence of this new border, history might have followed a different course.

The "ungrateful" expellees served increasingly as scapegoats in the GDR. If there was resistance against political measures or regulations at the workplace, the information service and the police often assumed expellee involvement. Virtually no former expellees were able to reach high levels in the party or state leadership. Even in industry, careers of expellees usually ended at middle levels.[77] This discrimination reflected the native population's widespread prejudices against and resentment of expellees. Because the East German system became increasingly restrictive and the state grew increasingly dominant in the late 1940s, expellees there had fewer opportunities than the expellees in West Germany to rise above their difficulties.[78] East Germany, which was quite able to resolve the immediate postwar crisis, was not able to solve the long-term and delicate problem of integration by methods other than coercion and suppression.

As has been mentioned, Poland was in a different situation than that faced by the two Germanies because it had acquired territory in which to settle its expellees. Nevertheless, the integration of expellees was not hastened by this apparent advantage. The reason for this failure lies, on the one hand, in the general difficulties involved in resettling the western territories and, on the other hand, in the failure of Poland's expellee policy. One might ask whether such a policy existed at all, since many key sources concerning the western territories did not even mention the "repatriates." Securing these territories and

75. BAP, MdI, DO 1-11, HVDVP, no. 886, p. 13; BAP, MdI, DO 1-10, ZVU, no. 13, p. 88; SHSA, MdI, nos. 336 and 337; SHSA, KT/KR Hoyerswerda, no. 14 (no pagination); BLHA, Ld. Br. Rep. 202 G, no. 54, p. 74; BLHA, Ld. Br. Rep. 202 G, no. 136, p. 33; see also Ingeborg Suckut, *Blockpolitik in der SBZ/DDR 1945–1949: Die Sitzungsprotokolle des zentralen Einheitsfront-Ausschusses* (Cologne, 1986), 82, 256–57, 277, 302, 451, and 486–88. Partly in response to the demands of the expellees, the Socialist Unity Party demanded a revision of the Oder-Neiße line in 1946. See BLHA, Ld. Br. Rep. 250, LRA Calau/Senftenberg, no. 254, p. 73. The antipathy of the first president of the GDR, Wilhelm Pieck, toward the border was widely known. Pieck came from the town of Guben, which had been divided by the new border. After 1947, politicians accepted the party's official support for the new border.

76. BLHA, Ld. Br. Rep. 202G, no. 71, p. 7; see also SHSA, Bezirk Dresden, no. 6072, no pagination; SHSA, no. 6971, pp. 85–89.

77. See Meinicke and von Plato, *Alte Heimat—Neue Zeit,* 68–77, 136–60.

78. Steffi Kaltenborn, "Der Versuch zur Wiederbelebung des Gablonzer Kunsthandwerkes im Land Thüringen—Utopie oder reale Möglichkeit?" in Christoph Buchheim, ed., *Wirtschaftliche Folgelasten des Krieges in der SBZ/DDR* (Baden-Baden, 1995), 383–402.

building a monolithic, socialist nation-state were regarded as more urgent tasks than solving the problems of the expellees.[79]

The Polish government assumed that if everybody living in postwar Poland and its western territories was a Pole, all problems would be solvable. Whereas the East German communists relied upon egalitarianism as a binding force for building a new society, the Polish communists wanted to create a new society based on the principle of Polishness.[80] Hence, nationalism was the primary integration tool the Polish state offered its expellees. The Polish expellees were supposed to be pioneers of Polishness in the western territories and to secure these territories for Poland.[81] Hence, the Polish method of integration may be called socialist-nationalist. Initially, however, the eastern Poles were regarded as only second-class pioneers.[82] In 1945–46, resettlers from central Poland were given preference for the high-profile jobs in the economy and the political system.[83] The regime assumed its expellees were potential grumblers and reactionaries.[84] Given the expellees' experiences with Sovietization and expulsion from 1939 onward, that assumption was probably accurate.[85]

Beneath this nationalistic leitmotiv, the Polish government's expellee policy was similar to that of East Germany. The expellees were

79. AAN, MZO, sygn. 82, pp. 221 and 224; most Polish authors blame Stalinism, i.e., a radicalized socialism, for Poland's problems in its western territories. As an example, see Tomasz Szarota, *Osadnictwo Miejskie na Dolnym Śląsku w latach 1945–1948* (Wrocław, 1969), 309. The problems created by nationalism and the myth of a monolithic Polish nation were mostly overlooked before 1989.

80. Jakub Tyszkiewicz, "Propaganda Ziem Odzyskanych w prasie Polskiej Partii Robotniczej w latach 1945–1948," *Przegląd Zachodni* 4 (1995): 117–32.

81. AAN, MZO, sygn. 83a, p. 197.

82. In an explanatory appendix to a Council of Ministers' decision about the resettlement of the western territories in May 1945, repatriates are called "a valuable element as Poles, . . . who are not qualified to play the role of pioneers, conquerors, and organizers as demanded by the tasks challenging Poland." AAN, MZO, sygn. 1658, pp. 11–24 (my translation).

83. Several statistics prove the underrepresentation of expellees in the 1940s. For the police (MO, milicja obywatelska) and the office for security (UB, urząd bezpieczeństwa), see Wojciech Błasiak, "Śląska Zbiorowość regionalna i jej kultura w latach 1945–1956," in Miroslawa Błaszczak-Wacławik, Wojciech Błasiak, and Tomasz Nawrocki, *Górny Śląsk: Szczególny przypadek kulturowy* (Warsaw, 1990), 88 ff. For the Upper Silesian administration in 1946, see the statistics in *Śląsko-Dąbrowski Przegląd Administracyjny,* no. 1 (1947): 30. Many reports and memoirs from the entire western territories also prove that the expellees were not equally represented in the MO, UB, and the general administration. After the 1940s, no statistics are available, but because of frequent purges of the administration and a positive reevaluation of the "repatriates" role as "pioneers," the underrepresentation of expellees was probably slowly reversed.

84. AAN, MZO, sygn. 690, p. 81; AP w Katowicach, UWŚl, Sp-Pol., sygn. 37, p. 19; Zdzisław Żaba, "Wrocław nasz," *Karta,* no. 14 (1994): 71.

85. See also Kaźmierska's article, which tries to summarize the contents of narratives given by eastern Poles. Kaza Kaźmierska, "Konstruowanie narracji o doświadczeniu wojennej biografii: Na przykładzie analizy narracji kresowych," *Kultura i Społeczeństwo,* Biografia i Tożsamość narodowa, vol. 39, no. 4 (1995): 43–60; see also Szarota, *Osadnictwo Miejskie,* 284.

supposed to be part of a new socialist society. To achieve this goal, apartments, farms, and small artisanal workshops were redistributed to expellees. Until 1948, the key actor in this policy was the state repatriation office (Państwowy Urząd Repatriacyjny).[86] The task of redistributing was easier than in Germany because Poland could parcel out what had previously been German territory without dispossessing members of its own society.

Nevertheless, the Polish government faced structural problems similar to those in East Germany. Large landed ownership had been prevalent under German rule, and these large farms made it difficult to create a system of small and medium farms. The most serious problem was the lack of farm buildings. In 1946–47, there was a paradox: many areas could not be settled and cultivated, yet in parts of the western territories, there were peasants without any farms.[87] Because many expellees arrived after the best farms and land had already been redistributed, they were particularly affected by these structural problems. In his monograph on the northern and central parts of Lower Silesia, Franciszek Kusiak has shown that in comparison to resettlers, expellees received farms with less acreage and poorer soil.[88] The same disadvantage prevailed in the distribution of apartments and small artisanal workshops.

Expellees also had difficulties adapting to new conditions in the western territories. A general problem for expellees in Germany and Poland was that they often arrived in an area with unfamiliar climate and soil. The bigger the climatic difference, the more difficult the integration.[89] In the Polish case the differences between the eastern territories and the newly acquired western territories were significant. In parts of the eastern territories, farmers had been cultivating the best soil in Europe, although they were using primitive tools. In the western territories, the soil was often sandy, but there was a high degree of mechanization. In addition, the climate was much less continental than in the eastern territories. Many Poles from the east had major problems with their first two harvests, and some stopped working altogether.[90]

86. For more information on this repatriation office, see Stefan Banasiak, *Działalność osadnicza Państwowego Urzędu Repatriacyjnego na Ziemiach Odzyskanych w latach 1945–1947* (Poznan, 1963).

87. Krystyna Kersten, "U podstaw kształtowania się nowej struktury agrarnej Ziem Zachodnich (1945–1947)," in *Polska Ludowa: Materiały i studia,* vol. 1 (Warsaw, 1962), 37–85; see also AAN, MZO, sygn. 755, pp. 66, 69, and 73. According to Banasiak, the entire region (*województwo*) of Upper Silesia, eight districts (*powiaty*) in the Wrocław region, five districts in the Olsztyn region, and two districts in the Poznan region were overflowing with peasants. Banasiak, "Settlement," 145.

88. Franciszek Kusiak, *Osadnictwo wiejskie w środkowych i północnych powiatach Dolnego Śląska w latach 1945–1949* (Wrocław, 1982), 234 ff. To verify this, Kusiak tabulated the land-conferment documents for all settlers in several counties.

89. Żygulski, *Repatrianci,* 20.

90. Czesław Osękowski, *Społeczeństwo Polski zachodniej i północnej w latach 1945–1956* (Zielona Góra, 1994), 75–77; Żygulski, *Repatrianci,* 70 ff.; Stefan Nowakowski, *Adaptacja ludności na Śląsku Opolskim* (Poznan, 1957), 39 ff.

The problems of agricultural adaptation demonstrated that the Polish expellees had not been moved to ancient Polish lands, as the nationalistic propaganda tried to make people believe, but to the former territories of a foreign country. The problems of economic and cultural adaption aggravated the expellees' feeling of "otherness."

The Polish expellees were also troublesome because of the unresolved problem of reimbursement. The repatriation treaties with the Lithuanian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republics required that the "repatriates" be completely reimbursed for the property they lost in the eastern territories. The amount of land farmers were to receive was supposed to be regulated through a land-reform law. These promises were repeated in 1945 in brochures handed out to expellees.[91] One of the key factors permitting integration was that the expellees would receive land or other goods and could start to establish a new economic and social basis for their existence.[92]

In the western territories, farms, apartments, and personal possessions left behind by the departing Germans were allocated to expellees. In only a few cases, however, did the expellees receive valid titles of ownership to the land. The registration of these titles was delayed until 1948.[93] After that, nationalization of all real estate and collectivization of land became political priorities.[94] Thus, the Polish expellees were cheated of their reimbursements. As Krystyna Kersten states, a "feeling of disadvantage" was prevalent among Poles from the east.[95] The collectivization hindered the expellees from stabilizing their private lives and accepting the western territories as new homelands.[96]

The question of property and reimbursement was also one of the vital factors impeding the expellees' integration into East Germany. The East German expellees began demanding a Lastenausgleich in 1946.[97] The regime denied this request because it feared protests by the indigenous population and because it did not want to acknowledge that the expellees bore any burden as a result of the lost war.[98] This denial was one of the main reasons why expellees expressed feelings

91. Państwowy Urząd Repatriacyjny, Wydawnictwo Ministerstwa Informacji i Propagandy, *Wracamy na Polskie Ziemię* (Warsaw, 1945).

92. AAN, MZO, sygn. 497, p. 140; see also Instytut Zachodni, memoir 61; Elżbieta Kościk, *Osadnictwo wiejskie w południowych powiatach dolnego Śląska w latach 1945–1949* (Wrocław, 1982), 225; Stanisław Łach, *Przekształcenia ustrojowo-gospodarcze w rolnictwie ziem zachodnich i północnych w latach 1945–1949* (Słupsk, 1993), 60.

93. AAN, MZO, sygn. 46, pp. 15–23; for information about the delays, see AAN, MZO, sygn. 70, Bl. 85, and sygn. 67, p. 116.

94. Adolf Dobieszewski, *Kolektywizacja wsi polskiej 1948–1956* (Warsaw, 1993).

95. Kersten, "U podstaw," 72–73. The authorities also noted that the expellees' resistance to collectivization was especially fierce. See CA MSW, MAP, sygn. 118, p. 167; AP w Katowicach, UWŚl, Sp-Pol., sygn. 43, pp. 1 ff.

96. Kusiak, *Osadnictwo wiejskie,* 292; Zygulski, *Repatrianci,* 120; Banasiak, "Osadnictwo rolne," 167.

97. BAP, MdI, DO 1–10, ZVU, no. 27, p. 224; SHSA, MdI, no. 337; SHSA, KT/KR Bautzen, no. 887 (no pagination).

98. BAP, MdI, DO 1–10, ZVU, no. 31, p. 202.

of unjust treatment and why they could not accept East Germany as their new Heimat.

The lack of reimbursement also impeded integration in a wider sense, because it prevented the expellees from acquiring property. As a general rule, the more property expellees could acquire and develop in their new homelands, the more integrated they would feel. One of the main reasons integration was successful in West Germany was the "economic miracle."[99] In the 1950s, expellees as a group profited from the general upswing. Permission to develop new property was a prime motivator of successful integration and was accompanied by reduced demands on the part of the expellees to return to their homelands.

In Poland and East Germany expellees also profited from an economic upswing. Having never really settled in, they were readily capable of moving and establishing careers in the new industrial centers. Internal migration placated the harsh differences between expellees and other groups within society.

As a society, the GDR paid a high price for its failed expellee policy. About 800,000 expellees left the country between 1949 and 1961, contributing to the drain in human capital that almost led to the collapse of the GDR.[100] Only isolation of the eastern block permitted stability to be salvaged. The erection of the wall put an end to the migration and indirectly also stabilized expellee integration in East Germany.

The socialist-nationalist integration policies in Poland soon produced side-effects as well. The indigenous population in Upper Silesia and eastern Prussia, who had Slavic roots and often spoke a strong Polish dialect, had long been "trapped" between the German and the Polish nations.[101] These autochthones (in Polish *autochtoni* or *ludność rodzima*) were completely alienated from Poland and Polish society.[102] Even those Silesians who had fought for Poland in the Silesian upris-

99. Abelshauser, "Der Lastenausgleich," 234; West German literature has argued that the presence of expellees as a potential labor force was essential for the economic miracle. See Frantzioch, *Die Vertriebenen,* 214. Expellee integration progressed quickly only after state and private revenues had risen sharply in the mid-1950s.

100. The expellees contributed disproportionally to the emigration from the GDR. About a third of the people emigrating from East to West Germany were expellees, whereas they made up 24.2 percent of the population of the GDR in 1949. For a general description of this emigration from the GDR (of both expellees and the indigenous population), see Helge Heidemeyer, *Flucht und Zuwanderung aus der SBZ/DDR: Flüchtlingspolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland bis zum Bau der Mauer* (Düsseldorf, 1993).

101. According to the census of 1950, the number of autochtones in the western territories was 935,830. Quoted from Osękowski, *Społeczeństwo Polski,* 63.

102. For a critical and—unfortunately for Poland—almost visionary view of the situation in Upper Silesia in the first two years after the war, see Stanisław Ossowski, "Zagadnienia więzi regionalnej i więzi narodowej na Śląsku Opolskim," *Przegląd Socjologicznej* 9 (1947): 73–124. The Upper Silesians (*Ślązacy*) had a mixed national consciousness. In response to different influences and constraints, they changed their affiliation several times. Reacting to the "otherness" of Poles and the oppressive nationalistic policy, the Silesians (and Mazurians) frequently turned their sympathy and identity toward Germany.

ings in the 1920s were discriminated against after 1945. Many Silesians regretted the end of German rule, for the Polish government mistreated anyone who did not behave in a narrowly defined Polish way. Nationality and nationalism were adopted to aid in the establishment of communist rule. Anyone could be purged from his position using the accusation that he did not properly serve the nation and *polskości.*[103] A large segment of the indigenous population responded to this policy by rediscovering its sympathies for Germany or even emigrating there.[104] Hence, the existence of a large "German" minority in Poland is also a result of integration policies under communism.

For some expellees nationalism also offered a possible point of identification. Moreover, the new system offered careers to people who were or became committed to socialism. In all three countries, those who were upwardly mobile supported the acceptance of the new homelands.[105] With their high degree of internal mobility, the socialist economies were open to expellees if they disguised their heritage and did not question the official versions of resettlement or repatriation. The opportunities for careers were offered primarily in the new industrial centers in Poland and East Germany. In all three countries, integration proceeded more quickly in urban than in rural settings. Interviews demonstrate that many expellees were absorbed into the "melting pots"

103. A notable exception to this nationalist zeitgeist was the role of the Catholic Church. Liszka rightly assumes that the church played a decisive role in the integration of the entire society. Liszka, "Wkład kościola," 101, 159, 274 ff.; see also Ks. Alojzy Sitek, *Organizacja i kierunki działalności Kurii Administracji Apostolskiej Śląska Opolskiego w latach 1945–1956* (Opole, 1986). For Osękowski the church was, aside from the school, the main factor contributing to integration. Osękowski, *Społeczeństwo Polski,* 195 ff. and 210 ff.; see also Bp. Wincenty Urban, *Duszpasterski wkład księży repatriantów w Archidiecezji w latach 1945–1970* (Wrocław, 1970).

The churches also aided integration in Germany. As in Poland, the churches in Germany helped many needy expellees. Moreover, the expellees could express their cultural heritage within the church. This contributed to the psychological well-being of many. In all three countries, the churches also set an example for the expellees' integration into existing hierarchies and administrative structures. If a priest from the eastern territories could not get his own parish, he was assigned to an existing parish where he could work as a chaplain or in a related position. See H. Rudolph's two-volume publication: Hartmut Rudolph, *Evangelische Kirche und Vertriebene 1945–1972* (Göttingen, 1984–85); for the Catholic Church, there is a compilation of sources in Franz Lorenz, ed., *Schicksal Vertreibung. Aufbruch aus dem Glauben: Dokumente und Selbstzeugnisse vom religiösen, geistigen und kulturellen Ringen* (Cologne, 1980).

104. Michał Lis, *Ludność Rodzima na Śląsku Opolskim po II wojnie swiatowej 1945–1993* (Opole, 1993); Joachim Georg Görlich, "Autochtoni," in *Kultura* (Paris, 1965), 1:133–38; Maria Szmeja, "Ludność autochtoniczna Śląska Opolskiego," *Przegląd Zachodni* 2 (1989): 57–69; Kazimierz Żygulski, "Przyczyny wyjazdu ludności rodzimej z woj. opolskiego na Zachód," Referat, Instytut Śląski, Opole, 1958.

105. For West Germany, see Frantzioch, *Die Vertriebenen,* 207. For East Germany, see Meinicke and von Plato, *Alte Heimat—Neue Zeit,* 70 and 136–60; Lutz Niethammer, *Die volkseigene Erfahrung: Eine Archäologie des Lebens in der Industrieprovinz der DDR* (Berlin, 1991), 113, 400 ff., and 488; see also BAP, MdI, DO 1–10, ZVU, no. 13, p. 87. For Poland, see Stefan Nowakowski, *Narodziny miasta* (Warsaw, 1967).

that had been created by industrialization.[106] In order to join these new industrial societies and to profit from the higher incomes paid, the expellees often had to move.

The expellees were far more mobile than the indigenous population in all three countries. By forming a "reserve industrial army," as Marx would have described it, this group was of vital importance for social and economic modernization.[107] Because of poor material conditions in the early 1950s, the expellees were also generally more open to modernization than the more prosperous indigenous population.[108] They were also more open to modernizing influences in the realm of culture. The decline of traditional rural and small town German and Polish life was influenced and accelerated by the expellees. Nevertheless, the indigenous society and the expellees could in many cases find a common denominator in new patterns of culture, life subsistency, and behavior.

Even in the industrial centers, however, noticeable distinctions between expellees and the indigenous society remained well into the 1950s.[109] When conflicts between workers or within divisions of a company arose, solidarity could be observed to follow the lines of descent rather than of class. Only by the end of the 1950s did distinctions in

106. See the interviews conducted by von Plato contained in Meinicke and von Plato, *Alte Heimat—Neue Zeit,* 70 ff.; for Poland, a good example is the industrial town of Kędzierzyn-Koźle; see Dorota Simonides, "Problem unifikacji narodowej na Śląsku na przykładzie Kędzierzyna," *Znak,* vol. 55 (1959): 3–22; Nowakowski's *Narodziny miasta* also deals with Kędzierzyn; for East Germany, see also Peter Hübner, "Arbeiter und sozialer Wandel im Niederlausitzer Braunkohlenrevier von den dreißiger Jahren bis Mitte der sechziger Jahre," in Peter Hübner, ed., *Niederlausitzer Industriearbeiter 1935 bis 1970: Studien zur Sozialgeschichte* (Berlin, 1995), 41–51.

107. Erker showed that the expellees were an especially mobile group within West German society. By the mid-1950s, only about one-third remained in the villages where they had originally been settled. Erker, *Vom Heimatvertriebenen,* 26 ff. There are no exact statistics for the GDR, but in comparison to their percentage of the entire population, expellees disproportionally participated in the exodus from the land. For Poland, see Żygulski, *Repatrianci,* 15; Krystian Heffner, *Śląsk Opolski: Proces przekształceń ludnościowych i przestrzennych systemu osadnictwa wiejskiego* (Opole, 1991) 43–44; see also Bożenna Chmielewska, *Społeczne przeobrażenia środowisk wiejskich na ziemiach zachodnich: Na przykładzie pieciu wsi w województwie Zielonogórskim* (Poznan, 1965).

108. For West Germany, see Alfred Karasek-Langer, "Volkstum im Umbruch," in Lemberg and Edding, eds., *Die Vertriebenen in Westdeutschland,* 1:606–94; Friedrich Prinz, *Integration und Neubeginn: Dokumentation über die Leistungen des Freistaats Bayern und des Bundes zur Eingliederung der Wirtschaftsbetriebe der Vertriebenen und Flüchtlinge und deren Beitrag zur wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung des Landes* (Munich, 1984); Doris Brelie-Lewien, "Zur Rolle der Flüchtlinge und Vertriebenen in der westdeutschen Nachkriegsgeschichte," in Schulze, Brelie-Lewien, and Grebing, eds., *Flüchtlinge und Vertriebene,* 24–46. For East Germany, see Lutz Niethammer, *Die volkseigene Erfahrung,* 113, 400 ff., and 488. For Poland, see Markiewicz and Rybicki, *Przemiany społeczne;* see also Dorota Simonides, ed., *Etnologia i folklorystyka wobec problemu tworzenia się nowego społeczeństwa na ziemiach zachodnich i północnych. Materialy z sesji 10–11.10.1986.* (Opole, 1987).

109. AP w Opolu, PUR, pow. Kluczbork, no. 6, pp. 46, 224–26; AAN, MZO, sygn. 67, p. 88; see also Żygulski, *Repatrianci,* 101; Ossowski, "Zagadnienia więzi regionalnej," 115–23; Nowakowski, *Adaptacja ludności,* 194; Simonides, "Problem unifikacji," 18 ff.

income and position become more important than distinctions based on ethnic or cultural heritage.

The integration was particularly slow in the areas of Poland inhabited by autochthones. A symptom of this constrained situation was the low rate of intermarriage between Poles from the east and other groups.[110] In a sense, the Polish regime fell victim to its own misconception of the character of society. The Polish communists were not as committed to social equality as a solution as were their comrades in East Germany: instead they saw the nation as a binding force, as a solution in itself. Major communist intellectuals such as Alfred Lampe and all high party officials, among them the general secretary of the Polska Partia Robotnicza, Władysław Gomułka, were so enthusiastic about founding a monolithic and mono-ethnic Polish state,[111] that before 1947 the regime hardly took into account the existence of distinctive groups within society. Any group that sought to address specific interests or did not agree with government policy was immediately suspected of being either a menace or a traitor. The self-delusional view that ethnic and cultural homogenity existed and the suppression of any group interests created a political culture that looks almost psychopathic today. Instead of discussing and working on real problems, administrative bodies in the western territories were busy fighting an imagined internal enemy.[112] No group interests, whether of the autochthones or of the "repatriates," could be integrated in such a political culture.

The powers signing the Treaty of Potsdam and the advocates of monolithic nation-states had hoped that by expelling national minorities they could stabilize precarious internal politics. The ethnic cleansings in central and eastern Europe did not bring these hoped-for results. Instead these dislocations inflicted terrible human costs and long-term destabilizing effects on those countries and societies that received the expellees. As West Germany's frequent requests, until the

110. Anna Olszewska-Ładykowa and Kazimierz Żygulski, "Małżeństwa mieszane na Śląsku Opolskim," *Przegląd Socjologiczny* 1, no. 13 (1959): 89–106; Zygmunt Chrzanowski, *Problemy Adaptacji i integracji społecznej w Lewinie Brzeskim* (Opole, 1966), 70–72; Bogusław Chruszcz, "Osadnictwo i przeobrażenie spoleczne w Wałbrzychu ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem zagadnienia małżeństw mieszanych w latach 1945–1955," *Studia Śląskie,* new series t. 16 (1969): 194–219.

111. Lampe's thinking is dealt with in Eberhardt, *Polska granica wschodnia,* 143; see also Krystyna Kersten, "Polska—państwo narodowe: Dylematy i rzeczywistość," in *Narody: Jak powstawały i jak wybijały się na niepodległość?* (Warsaw, 1989), 442 and 473. Gomułka and other leading communists considered Polish Jews to be a hindrance to the establishment of a monolithic nation-state. See Litvak, "Polish-Jewish Refugees Repatriated," 228–29; see also Edmund Dmitrów, "Die Zwangsaussiedlung der Deutschen in der polnischen öffentlichen Meinung der Jahre 1945–1948," *Deutsche Studien,* no. 126–127 (June–September 1995): 230.

112. This phenomenon can be well observed in the medium and lower levels of administration. The records of the provincial committee for settling in Upper Silesia may serve as an example of this. AAN, MAP, sygn. 2467, pp. 9–66; see also CA MSW, MAP, sygn. 122, p. 18.

early 1970s, to revise Poland's western border indicate, not only the intranational, but even the international pacification of central and eastern Europe could not be achieved during the first twenty-five years after the war. In neither East Germany nor Poland were the linkages within society strong enough to withstand the immediate strains caused by their founding crises. Gradually, in the 1950s and 1960s, most conflicts between the groups began to be solved, not primarily as a result of successful government policy, but as part of a process of modernization that was occurring on both sides of the iron curtain: urbanization and industrialization.

In the Federal Republic of Germany, conflicts were regulated within the structures of a democratic system. The successful integration of the expellees was symbolized by the downfall of their political party, the Block der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten, in 1957. The downfall of this party indicated the redundancy of a separate political platform for these interests.[113] In the long term, West Germany was able to take advantage of the expellees' economic and cultural potential to strengthen the state and the society.

In the communist countries, by contrast, the expellees' potential was not at all or only partially put to good use. The majority of the expellees never became loyal to the government or participated in actively building up the state. In the communist regimes, integration was retarded because group interests could not be addressed. However, integration in Poland and East Germany profited from the fact that the constant shortages of goods affected all groups within society; thus the leveling process typical of socialist systems was not without some positive effects for the integration of expellees.[114] In Poland, however, the rift between the autochthones and the rest of the society remained. In the western territories, though, expellees and resettlers were both newcomers, and after the mid-1950s these two groups increasingly intermingled and even intermarried.[115]

113. Frantzioch, *Die Vertriebenen,* 153.

114. Peter Hübner, "Soziale und mentale Trends in der Industriearbeiterschaft," in Kaelble, Kocka, and Zwahr, eds., *Sozialgeschichte der DDR,* 180 ff.; Gerhard Lippold, "Arbeiter in Hoyerswerda 1955–1965: Ergebnisse der Zeitbudgetuntersuchung 1965," in Hübner, ed., *Niederlausitzer Industriearbeiter 1935 bis 1970,* 134 ff.; Monika Rank, "Sozialistischer Feierabend? Aspekte des Freizeitverhaltens von Industriearbeitern des Senftenberger Braunkohlenreviers in den 1950er Jahren," in Hübner, ed., *Niederlausitzer Industriearbeiter,* 266. For Poland, see Chruszcz, "Osadnictwo i przeobrażenie," 193; Chrzanowski, *Problemy Adaptacji,* 51; Nowakowski, *Narodziny miasta,* 12. This is especially true for the GDR, where the leveling was more pronounced than in Poland. See Sigrid Meuschel, *Legitimation und Parteiherrschaft: Zum Paradox von Stabilität und Revolution in der DDR 1945–1989* (Frankfurt, 1992), 9–14 and 43 ff.

115. Olszewska-Ladynkowa and Żygulski, "Małżeństwa mieszane," 97 ff.; Chrzanowski, *Problemy Adaptacji,* 70–72; Chruszcz, "Osadnictwo i przeobrażenie," 194 ff.; Nowakowski, *Narodziny miasta,* 119. There exists only one small paper concerning intermarriages in East Germany. See Karin Wiechhusen, "Die Integration der Vertriebenen in der Stadt Schwerin, dargestellt anhand der Eheschließungen," in *Die Integration der Vertriebenen in Deutschland—Möglichkeiten und Grenzen,* Symposium vom 25.–

In conclusion, integration was aided by the fact that expellees and natives spoke a similar language and shared some aspects of history and culture. In addition, most expellees themselves wanted to become integrated. Moreover, the countries in which the expellees arrived gradually perceived the expellee integration as a central task. This strong will and the presence of outside powers guaranteeing the status quo allowed further progress throughout the 1970s and 1980s. When Europe was reshuffled in 1989–90, time had healed most wounds. The expulsions and the expellees were no longer a hindrance to the further peaceful development of Europe.

29.4.1991 in Magdeburg (Magdeburg, 1991), 138–51. Several articles and papers concerning intermarriage in West Germany are contained in Lemberg and Edding, eds., *Die Vertriebenen in Westdeutschland.* Throughout the 1950s, the number of intermarriages was much higher in both Germanies than it was in Poland. At the end of the 1950s, the rate of intermarriage was around 50 percent in both Germanies.