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Socialism in One Gender: Masculine Values in the Stalin Revolution

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Between the years of 1929 and 1941, Soviet society experienced what might be described as a gender-quake, a seismic shift in sexual divisions of labor produced by the largest national peacetime expansion of women's employment in world history. As a result of this rapid industrialization campaign, over 10 million women began wage-labor in the industrial and service sectors of the Soviet economy, raising their percentage of the non-agricultural workforce from 24 percent to 39 percent.[1] The Soviet government actively recruited women for industrial employment, created affirmative action programs to train female technicians and skilled workers, and greatly expanded childcare and cafeteria facilities to free working women from some of their domestic obligations. Examining this transformation in the deployment of women's labor power inevitably raises questions about men and masculinity: if gender systems are constructed around oppositions, then a change in one side of the gender equation should produce an equivalent response in the other side. How did male gender roles change to accommodate the dramatic expansion of women's participation in the industrial economy?

The answer, perhaps not surprisingly, is that the mobilization of women's productive labor was accompanied by an elevation of men's status in Soviet society. The mass recruitment of women into paid labor during the 1930s certainly affected the sexual division of labor in the Soviet Union, but due to the 'double burden' which resulted for women, it did not necessarily represent an improvement in women's social status and occurred in such a way as not to threaten the dominant position of men in Soviet society. Because it resulted from the widespread labor shortages generated by the First Five Year Plan, the expansion of women's employment was never accompanied by widespread male

unemployment. Consequently, women's entry into the wage economy did not lead to the major change in traditional gender roles or produce the male anxiety that Friedrich Engels describes (and exhibits) in *The Condition of the Working Class in England*.

> Very often the fact that a married woman is working does not lead to the complete disruption of the home but to a reversal of the normal division of labour within the family. The wife is the bread-winner while her husband stays at home to look after the children and to do the cleaning and cooking. . . . In Manchester alone there are many hundreds of men who are condemned to perform household duties. One may well imagine the righteous indignation of the workers at being virtually turned into eunuchs.[2]

The entry of women into the Soviet labor force did not seriously alter their traditional domestic obligations and thus Russian men's conceptions of masculinity were never challenged by the need to participate in household labor.[3] In fact, by the 1930s, the Communist Party had approached women's employment from two distinct ideological perspectives, and both of them involved privileging identities and social spheres that were gendered 'masculine'. The first approach, developed by the Party's Women's Department (Zhenotdel), intended to liberate women by releasing them from private domestic work and admitting them into paid productive labor on equal terms with men. The second approach, shaped by Stalin's doctrine of 'socialism in one country', mobilized women for wage labor without truly freeing them from their traditional household labor obligations. The ideological and socio-economic conditions that accompanied this latter strategy may not have raised the status of most individual Soviet males, but it did heighten the cultural and symbolic value of masculine roles and activities while effectively restricting women's progress toward social equality.

The first of these two approaches developed during the pre-Stalin era, when Marxist ideology inspired Bolshevik feminists to seek to emancipate women by integrating them into the largely masculine sphere of public work and industrial production. As formulated by Zhenotdel activists such as Alexandra Kollontai and Inessa Armand, this blueprint for achieving gender equality would free women by creating communalized social services – cafeterias, childcare centers, public laundries – that would liberate them from domestic labor and allow them to enter productive work on an equal basis with men. The Zhenotdel's strategy of emancipation was designed not only to give women economic inde-

pendence from men, but also to release them from the private sphere of reproductive labor. According to this feminist branch of Marxist theory, private housework, child-rearing, and other reproductive tasks were economically inefficient; socializing this work would bolster the new socialist economy by replacing the inefficiencies of individual women's household labor with economies of scale and would also raise productivity by shifting millions of new workers into Soviet industries. Just as importantly, this transformation would liberate women from a type of labor that Marxist theory condemned as 'ahistoric' and non-productive, contributing neither to human self-realization nor to the development of society as a whole. By abolishing the family and transferring women into the wage economy, Marxist feminism would liberate women by 'promoting' them to a new role as, essentially, honorary or surrogate men, while largely eliminating the 'feminine' sphere of private reproductive labor.

According to Eric Naiman, a similar impulse to erase the feminine appeared in Russian cultural traditions that otherwise had little in common with revolutionary feminism. In his quest to escape the world of the flesh and female sexuality, the pre-revolutionary spiritual philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev longed for a future androgynous society in which maternity 'would be "conquered"' and the problematic category of woman would be eliminated.[4] This type of antipathy towards the feminine could also be found within the Bolshevik Party, whose male members tended to identify women as backwards and counter-revolutionary. Women were associated with the private or domestic sphere, which the revolutionaries intended to destroy, and Bolsheviks often viewed family life as detracting from a Party member's devotion to the cause.[5]

Although Bolshevik feminists clearly did not share these misogynistic attitudes, the logic of the Zhenotdel strategy seems to have been aimed towards outcomes similar to those sought by Berdyaev: conquering maternity (or at least the obstacles it created for women's social equality) and creating a society that minimized gender distinctions. Although Soviet women would still be obligated to conceive and bear children for the socialist society, the Zhenotdel hoped to facilitate women's equality and freedom by providing collective childcare that, in its maximal variant, would completely replace individual parents as caregivers.[6] With this strategy of liquidating the family and private reproductive labor in favor of production and public life, the Zhenotdel approach to women's liberation tended to preserve and elevate 'masculine' roles while largely eliminating the private social spheres

previously occupied by women. Viewed schematically, this emancipatory strategy seems to involve shifting women out of one set of gender roles, the traditionally feminine ones, and into another set long regarded as masculine that the Bolsheviks had left virtually intact and unchallenged. As the socialist revolution abolished the 'specific' limitations and spheres associated with the female gender, the new Soviet person would, by default, be oriented toward a 'universal' gender identity that most Soviet citizens understood as essentially masculine.[7]

Despite its endorsement of masculinist values, however, the Zhenotdel strategy had little appeal for most male (and even most female) Party members. From a male perspective, this strategy, in addition to the expenses and turmoil it would involve, threatened to weaken further the status of individual men by eliminating the social context for patriarchy, which modernization had already begun to undermine.[8] Without families, male heads of households would lose their remaining authority and prerogatives, a prospect that may partially explain the lack of enthusiasm among male Party members for the Zhenotdel and its activities. In the end, this controversial strategy for liberating women was defeated by an overpowering combination of factors, including economic underdevelopment, unfavorable political priorities, the economic structure of peasant households, and widespread opposition both from within the Party and from the population as a whole.[9]

As the Zhenotdel began its decline in the late 1920s, gender policies were increasingly influenced by a new ideological paradigm – Stalin's doctrine of 'socialism in one country' – that privileged the masculine in a second and entirely different way. The Zhenotdel approach to liberating women involved integrating them into a super-productive socialist economy that would be created following a global (or at least, continental) revolution. In this scenario, Russia would have access to the rest of Europe's technology and resources, which would allow it to modernize its economy and to invest in the infrastructure of nurseries, daycare centers, and other institutions that would make women's emancipation possible. Stalin began developing the idea of 'socialism in one country' during the mid-1920s, as it became clear that global revolution was not coming to the rescue of the Soviet economy. Rather than retreating from the goal of socialism, Stalin and his followers decided that the USSR would have to create the economic prerequisites for it in isolation, while surrounded by hostile capitalist powers. From this perspective, the campaign for industrialization and modernization became, among other things, a desperate struggle to arm the Soviet Union for the defense of socialism. New heavy industries would not only provide

the foundation for a highly productive socialist economy, but were also essential to produce the military might necessary to protect the socialist homeland from its foreign enemies. 'Socialism in one country' would also involve internal class warfare, as the party confronted what it saw as the urban and rural enemies of socialism within Russia.

The rhetoric of Stalin and his supporters emphasized the contrasts between the 'socialist offensive' that the new policies entailed and the passive treatment of class enemies that they saw as characterizing the NEP. Historians have often noted the military terminology associated with Stalin's 'revolution from above', and have argued that it expressed a yearning among young communists, and in Stalin himself, for a 'new October' and the mythologized heroism of the civil war that followed.[10] By using imagery from and nostalgia for the Civil War to energize the Party for the 'revolution from above', the Stalin regime was drawing upon memories or fantasies of a homosocial experience that largely excluded women and the feminine.[11] The new doctrine appealed to male Party members by emphasizing activism, willfulness, and mastery over the physical and political environment. In contrast, the NEP was often gendered and criticized as feminine, characterized by demoralizing (and emasculating?) ideological compromises that the virile pursuit of 'socialism in one country' promised to sweep away.[12] Stalin himself personalized this analysis by questioning the manhood of his opponents in the inner-party power struggles of the 1920s. Robert Tucker has pointed out that at the 15th Party Conference in October 1926, Stalin described the Zinoviev-Kamenev-Trotsky opposition as

> 'a combination of castrated forces', explaining that to be castrated means to be 'deprived of power'. Now he was saying that the political eunuchs had a view of the Revolution which deprived it of its own internal, independent power and condemned it to a passive role in international relations. This was a frank appeal to the pride of political virility in the rising Soviet ruling class, its will to believe in the potency and world mission of the Russian revolution.[13]

You can almost smell the testosterone in the air as the Party girds itself for the socialist offensive. According to Victoria Bonnell, the resulting efforts to subordinate the agricultural sector to the demands of industrialization were also represented in strongly gendered terms, as poster art 'feminized the image of the peasantry as a social category'.[14] These images used 'gender differences to convey the hierarchical relationship between the worker (male) and peasant (female) and by implication,

between urban and rural spheres of Soviet society'.[15] Perhaps the Stalin revolution was answering the male anxieties that the NEP produced within the Party by harkening back to masculinized episodes in Party history and symbolically subordinating the feminine to the masculine.

'Socialism in one country', however, did more than promote aggressive 'masculine' policies; it also created an economic context that systematically undermined efforts to emancipate women. By assigning so much urgency to rapid industrialization, Stalin's doctrine required all of the Party's resources to be focused on developing the heavy industries that would make further industrial and military growth possible. These investments came at the expense of the light industries, which not only employed many women, but also produced the consumer goods that might have lightened their domestic labor. The new priorities also restricted the construction of cafeterias, laundries, daycare centers, and other institutions necessary for Bolshevik-style women's emancipation.

Ultimately, 'socialism in one country' allowed the Party to sublimate the 'woman question' in order to pursue policies that had a more visceral appeal for the Party's membership. The Marxist blueprint for a workers' revolution had always assigned male activists to the 'heroic' and 'masculine' task of forcibly overthrowing a corrupt and repressive order. The emancipation of women following this violent revolution, however, was an entirely different process; it was outlined only vaguely in the Marxist canon and involved dismantling the remnants of a patriarchal order from which male workers themselves generally benefited. As interpreted by the Bolsheviks, this revolution involved building cafeterias and providing daycare for children, tasks which Party members tended to view as 'feminine' and less compelling than crushing the bourgeoisie.[16] Instead, the Stalin leadership chose to activate the Party's male rank-and-file to achieve 'socialism in one country' through a new round of class warfare, an offensive war against internal class enemies and a defensive war against the encircling capitalist powers. The result was a 'quasi-wartime mobilization' that placed a premium on masculine skills and activities.[17]

In this new rhetorical and political context, the full emancipation of women – previously theorized as an economic prerequisite for socialism – could now be viewed as a luxury to be pursued only after the immediate dangers had been overcome. This trend became increasingly clear in 1930, after the abolition of the Zhenotdel, as the First Five Year Plan created shortages of male labor that spurred the regime to begin recruiting more women into the paid-labor force. The Soviet govern-

ment actually began developing a Five Year Plan for Women's Labor, but the effort to mobilize women was not accompanied by a commitment to freeing them from domestic labor. Although social services did expand somewhat during the 1930s, they did so within limits, and only to the extent necessary to recruit a certain number of women workers. As the Commissariat of Labor was drafting the Plan for Women's Labor in May 1930, it expressed both the new Stalinist priorities and the restrictions that would limit the liberation of women from their private reproductive responsibilities:

> The further socialization of everyday life will proceed according to the growth of the industrialization of the social economy and on the basis of the rise of the material circumstances of the nation. In the present, it is necessary to throw maximum resources into industrialization, into the development of tractors, combines, sowing-machines, etc., which permit the social adaptation of the countryside. It is impossible (*nel'zia*) to throw more than a fixed minimum of resources into the completion of the socialization of everyday life. But that minimum should be significant enough to guarantee the fulfillment of the female five year plan. . . .[18]

This 'fixed minimum' approach confirmed a traditional gender hierarchy within the industrial labor force. Despite the regime's reliance on women as workers, their incomplete emancipation would consign them to being a type of provisional, auxiliary labor force, rather than fully liberated and thus equal to men.

The leading status of male workers as the primary labor force was also reinforced by the health studies and protective legislation concerning industrial labor during the 1930s. The Commissariat of Labor (Narkomtrud) advised that studies be carried out to determine which industrial jobs were safe for the 'female organism'. The research and regulations that resulted showed an obsessive concern with women's reproductive organs and processes, as Narkomtrud studied the impact of heavy lifting and tractor driving upon women's uteri.[19] As a result, this legislation defined all women first as potential mothers, and consequently as a 'specific' type of labor power, restricted to jobs that did not threaten reproductive capacities. The 1936 abortion ban compounded this tendency by placing all women in jeopardy of becoming mothers, whether they chose to or not. Narkomtrud never examined the reproductive health of men, despite their many hazardous occupations in the early Soviet economy, thus leaving them defined as 'universal' workers, whose labor could be applied in any sector of the economy.

The distribution of skills within industry was another factor guaranteeing men a privileged status within the workforce. Despite the regime's formal commitment to equal pay and training for women, a variety of factors prevented women from obtaining skilled status. Diane Koenker has recently analyzed the hostility of male printing workers towards women workers during the NEP and described how these men defined skill as a masculine trait.[20] These attitudes made it difficult for women to enter into apprenticeships or establish the type of interpersonal relationships through which skilled status was transferred. This misogyny did not disappear with the NEP, of course, and Koenker even suggests that it might have intensified in the masculine reassertion of the Stalin revolution.[21] Certainly, many examples of shopfloor hostility toward women workers can be found during the 1930s, and they often took the form of questioning women's suitability for skilled work, or for industrial work in general. In 1931, a Belorussian factory committee member stated that, 'The only work for women is to wash windows and clear out boxcars.'[22] When the director of a ship-repair station in Archangelsk was asked about the recruitment of women, he replied, 'We don't need women. I intend to raise the issue of canceling these absurd directives. Women have not proven themselves and work worse than men.'[23] The supervisor of a furnace shop in the Urals flatly refused to accept female workers, announcing, 'You will not fulfill the Five Year Plan with women.'[24]

Despite these shopfloor attitudes towards women as skilled workers, the chronic labor shortages of the early 1930s motivated the regime to train women as specialists (especially because these jobs were considered less physically demanding and thus were better suited for the vulnerable 'female organism'). The quotas for training women in skilled professions, however, were consistently underfulfilled during the early 1930s, due to weak recruitment and high drop-out rates among female students. Throughout the 1930s, women workers were typically hired 'at the gate' and channeled into unskilled, low-paying and physically strenuous jobs, leaving men with a virtual monopoly on many skilled jobs.[25] All of these trends involving the integration (or segregation) of women within the industrial labor force ensured that the role of worker would be gendered as 'masculine,' just as it was in the poster art of the time.

Men's leading roles as the workers, producers, and engineers of Soviet society was also highlighted by the *obshchestvennitsa* movement, which attempted to involve the wives of managers and industrial specialists in volunteer work at their husbands' factories. While these women worked at improving the 'feminine' spheres of factory life – the cafeterias, dor-

mitories, medical centers, and childcare facilities – they were instructed not to allow this work to interfere with their duties as wives to provide comfortable homes and good meals for their husbands.[26] By 1939, these expectations seemed to apply to all wives, even working-class women, as this quote from the journal *Obshchestvennitsa* suggests:

> Women should try to create at home for their husbands all of the conditions for fruitful work and cultured relaxation. Breakfasts and dinners that are prepared on time, cultured relaxation, a well-organized place at home for home-work and study – all of these are very effective measures in the struggle with tardiness, in the struggle to raise the culture of labor.[27]

The *obshchestvennitsa* phenomenon served a normative purpose by presenting elite wives as a role model for all Soviet women and publicly emphasizing the subservience of women to men. The movement reinforced male primacy by mobilizing and positioning women according to their husbands' occupations, rather than allowing them independent identities.[28] At the same time, the movement also portrayed wives as potentially interfering with their husbands' important responsibilities, an image that echoed earlier Bolshevik perceptions of women as 'dark' and counter-revolutionary. The threat of idle, unhappy wives distracting their specialist-husbands from their work was a recurrent theme in descriptions of the benefits of the *obshchestvennitsa* movement:

> We have many newly-arrived employees. Often it turns out this way: the husband is working well in the factory, but he comes home – the wife is sitting on a suitcase and – in tears: 'Let's go to the capital! It's boring to me here! I'm vegetating here.' How easily do you think work goes for such an engineer?[29]

This image of a 'backward' wife undermining her husband's work echoes Lenin's own description of women as 'little worms, which . . . rot and corrode' men's 'joy and determination'.[30]

As the *obshchestvennitsa* movement indicates, the role of husband retained its privileges in the Stalin era, even as men were able to escape many of the responsibilities shouldered by prerevolutionary patriarchs. During the 1930s, the burdens of parenting were increasingly divided between women and the state, especially as employment migration, arrest, or male abandonment left many families headed by women.[31] Although collective childcare did not liberate Soviet women from family

responsibilities, it did expand dramatically during the 1930s, allowing the state and Stalin to assume symbolically the role of father.[32] Meanwhile, the Stalin regime increasingly identified women as mothers even as it intensified women's reproductive responsibilities and labor. The abortion ban and the labor legislation have already been mentioned. By the mid-1930s such hortatory events as the celebration of Women's Day tended to emphasize women's roles as mothers and homemakers, rather than as workers and citizens.[33]

As the emphasis on women's roles as wives and mothers grew stronger, the responsibilities of men in family life were decreasing. In the pre-Soviet era, the peasant patriarch could be described as a 'responsible autocrat', a family leader who wielded great power, but was also responsible for organizing the work and consumption of the family.[34] In the Soviet era, these responsibilities gradually diminished with the rise of industrialization and urbanization, but cultural values that subordinated wives to husbands persisted and were even reinforced by the *obshchestvennitsa* movement. Analysts who attempt to explain the 'hyper-masculinity' of Soviet men point to the decline of male responsibilities in the family, which produced a matrifocal society in which the Soviet man strove 'desperately to hold on to the traditional prerogatives that most forcefully set him off as a man – namely the right to behave in a free and self-serving way in sexual life, drinking, and other matters'.[35] With bans on abortions and the sale of contraceptives, the Stalin regime clearly sought to intensify the reproductive labor and family obligations of Soviet women. For men, the Stalin revolution accelerated the erosion of patriarchal obligations and, in many cases, removed men from the family altogether. This, of course, was not always a positive trend for individual men, but traditional male freedoms and privileges did remain largely intact, even as male responsibilities declined.

More than anything else, the new configuration of male hegemony in the Stalin era derived from the perceived military threat from capitalist enemies, which in turn made the male role of soldier a primary element in the new masculine identity. Even while the Stalin regime was coming to see all women as potential mothers, it was treating all men as potential soldiers. By 1928, military conscription was universal for all male 'toilers' between ages 19 and 40, and Soviet men entered five years of active service at age 21.[36] Although tens of thousands of women had served in the Red Army during the Civil War, they had often encountered hostility and resistance to their combat roles and their participation produced little change in traditional views of women in

the military.[37] Without entirely ruling out female participation during future wars, the Soviet government excluded women from the armed forces following the Civil War, citing the same health and reproductive concerns that governed female labor in industry: 'And if women are not enlisted into military service, that can be attributed to the sufficient quantity of male contingents in our nation, which makes it possible to free women from these heavy responsibilities, just as she is freed from a whole range of harmful industries.'[38] Meanwhile, military service qualified male recruits for educational opportunities, improved eligibility for Party membership, and training and connections for careers both within the armed forces and in the civilian economy.

Although the role of soldier offered disadvantages as well as advantages to the individual man, it contributed overall to the promotion of the 'masculine' within Soviet society. The ultimate goal of 'socialism in one country,' after all, was to make the Soviet Union strong enough militarily and industrially to defend itself against capitalist aggression. Mark von Hagen has described the development of a 'militarized socialism' during the 1920s, which was characterized by 'a bellicist world view and the predominance of national security values and military interests in the economic and cultural life of the country'.[39] A society centered so strongly around military security is likely to be oriented toward the 'masculine', and to value the interests and contributions of male citizens over those of female citizens. As Karen Petrone has pointed out in her study of Stalinist celebrations, the leading status of the Red Army, the pre-eminent masculine institution in Soviet society, was represented symbolically during these years by its leading position in holiday parades.[40]

During the first Five Year Plan, this concern with military strength contributed to the Party's efforts to recruit women into industry. The authors of the 'Five Year Plan for Women's Labor' noted its 'special military significance', explaining that in the event of war, it would allow officials 'to know how and where maximally to introduce female labor power. In addition, the female five year plan is directly a defensive measure, since the threat of war is inevitably growing.'[41] As the USSR began mobilizing for war in Poland and Finland in September 1939, the party instructed union, Komsomol and industrial organizations to support the so-called 'masculine professions' movement, which aimed to recruit women into fields that had previously been considered too skilled or physically demanding for women.[42] In anticipation of a military crisis that would drain off skilled male workers, industrial officials began encouraging women to work as locomotive engineers, engine

machinists, open-hearth furnace workers, and to enter other occupations from which they had previously been excluded. Where the party had initially promoted women's employment in terms of its emancipatory effects, it now justified recruiting women as a means of freeing men for the more important tasks of defending the socialist homeland. In this same spirit, *obshchestvennitsy* used a military metaphor to describe their movement as 'work that strengthens the rear of production, which assures the uninterrupted and precise work of production itself'.[43] This metaphor privileges production as the military front where men make the essential contributions, while the wives fulfill an auxiliary role, assisting their husbands by working behind the lines. Likewise, the military crises that inspired the 'masculine professions' movement served as much to emphasize the significance and value of male roles as it did to raise the social status of the women involved.

The alterations of male and female roles during the prewar Stalin era produced a peacetime example of what Margaret and Patrice Higgonet have termed the 'double helix', an image they use to describe the reorganization of gender roles during massive wars such as the First and Second World Wars.[44] In these cases, women's status in society may improve as they are mobilized to replace conscripted men in industry and to assume auxiliary roles in the military. At the same time, however, total war raises men's status, for they become the physical defenders of their societies. The double helix refers to the fact that the temporary wartime improvement of women's status is only possible because of a corresponding and equivalent improvement in men's status; the gap between the two genders and the hierarchy within which women and men are ordered remain the same. The Stalin revolution produced a similar 'wartime' dynamic during the 1930s, as gendered priorities and policies worked to privilege masculine roles and values. Lest women's expanded role in the wage labor force threaten the equilibrium of gender relations in the new Soviet society, state policies and cultural initiatives restored the balance by bolstering the male side of the equation.

It has been argued here that the Zhenotdel strategy for emancipating women espoused, albeit implicitly, long-standing masculinist values. The doctrine of 'socialism in one country' made those values its fundamental credo. The Stalin revolution asserted male primacy at the expense of women's social equality, producing a cultural, social, and economic system that recast masculine hegemony for a new socialist context. As a program for creating a modernized, centralized, and 'cultured' society, 'socialism in one country' involved dismantling many

of the socio-economic structures that empowered men as patriarchs and it offered at least some women opportunities that would have been unimaginable prior to 1917. In important symbolic and material terms, however, the Stalin revolution provided Lenin's famous query – *kto-kogo*? – with a gendered answer: *muzhskoi – zhenskogo*.

Notes

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1. Gail Warshofsky Lapidus, *Women in Soviet Society*: *Equality*, *Development*, *and Social Change* (Berkeley, 1978), 166.
2. Friedrich Engels, *The Condition of the Working Class in England*, trans. and ed. W. O. Henderson and W. H. Chalover (Stanford, 1958), 162.
3. See Daniel Rancour-Laferriere, *The Slave Soul of Russia*: *Moral Masochism and the Cult of Suffering* (New York, 1995) for an interesting discussion of the strongly gendered cultural attitudes towards housework among Russians: 'In Russia domestic labor such as cleaning and cooking is semiotically loaded. It *signifies* femininity and low status. It is therefore a *threat* to masculinity and to male authority within the family' (169, italics in the original).
4. Eric Naiman, 'Historectomies: On the Metaphysics of Reproduction in a Utopian Age', *Sexuality and the Body in Russian Culture*, ed. Jane T. Costlow, Stephanie Sandler, and Judith Vowles (Stanford, 1993), 263.
5. Anne E. Gorsuch, '"A Woman is Not a Man": the Culture of Gender and Generation in Soviet Russia, 1921–1928', *Slavic Review* 55, no. 3 (Fall 1996), 636–60, emphasizes these attitudes among male Komsomol members. Lenin himself revealed similar suspicions toward women: 'The backwardness of women, their lack of understanding for the revolutionary ideals of the man, decrease his joy and determination in fighting. They are like little worms, which unseen, slowly but surely rot and corrode.' See Klara Zetkin, 'Reminiscences of Lenin', *The Family in the USSR*, ed. Rudolph Schlesinger (London, 1949), 78.
6. In a 1921 speech at Sverdlov University, Alexandra Kollontai emphasized women's productive role and described maternity as a social responsibility: 'The labor republic sees woman first and foremost as a member of the labor force, as a unit of living labor: the function of maternity is seen as highly important, but as a supplementary task that is not a private family matter but a *social* matter [italics in the original].' Alexandra Kollontai, 'The Labour of Women in the Revolution of the Economy', *Selected Writings of Alexandra Kollontai*, trans. Alix Holt (Westport, Conn., 1977), 143.
7. Wendy Z. Goldman, *Women, the State and Revolution: Soviet Family Policy and Social Life, 1917–1936* (Cambridge, 1993) also notes this tendency in Soviet family policies: 'If women were to be liberated economically and psychologically, they needed to become more like men, or more specifically, more like male workers' (11).

8. See S. A. Smith's paper in this volume for a discussion of the weakening of traditional patriarchal authority and the reconstruction of masculinity that resulted from rural–urban migration.
9. For the decline of the Zhenotdel and its emancipatory strategy, see Goldman, *Women, the State and Revolution* and her 'Industrial Politics, Peasant Rebellion, and the Death of the Proletarian Women's Movement', *Slavic Review*, 55, no. 1 (Spring 1996), 46–77.
10. The links between the Stalin revolution and the military context of the Civil War are discussed in Sheila Fitzpatrick, 'The Legacy of the Civil War', *Party, State, and Society in the Russian Civil War*, ed. Diane P. Koenker, William G. Rosenberg, and Ronald Grigor Suny (Bloomington, 1989), 395–7; and in Mark von Hagen, *Soldiers in the Proletarian Dictatorship*: *the Red Army and the Soviet Socialist State, 1917–1930* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1990), 331–43.
11. See Barbara Evans Clements, *Bolshevik Women* (Cambridge, 1997), 171–200, for 'the masculinist cast of Bolshevik political culture' during the Civil War.
12. For an intriguing discussion of the anxiety and threatening female imagery associated with the NEP, see Eric Naiman, 'Revolutionary Anorexia (NEP as Female Complaint)', *Slavic and East European Journal*, 37, no. 3 (1993), 305–25.
13. Robert C. Tucker, *Stalin as Revolutionary, 1879–1929: A Study in History and Personality* (New York, 1973), 388–9. The 'masculine' values associated with 'socialism in one country' are also readily apparent in the policies that it inspired. The industrialization 'campaign' demanded by the new doctrine was treated by the Party as a quasi-military mobilization and military metaphors abounded. See Stephen Kotkin, *Magnetic Mountain*: *Stalinism as a Civilization* (Berkeley, 1995), 33.
14. Victoria E. Bonnell, 'The Peasant Woman in Stalinist Political Art of the 1930s', *American Historical Review*, 98, no. 1 (February 1993), 79.
15. Ibid., pp. 79–80.
16. See Carol Eubanks Hayden, 'The Zhenotdel and the Bolshevik Party', *Russian History* 3, no. 2 (1976): 161, for examples of the disdainful attitudes towards the work and objectives of the Zhenotdel which male (and some female) party members exhibited in the 1920s. This mindset can also be seen in the widespread neglect of childcare and other social services by industrial officials during the 1930s. Even in cases in which abundant funds and construction materials were provided for these purposes, managers refused to utilize them, focusing instead on the battle for production in their enterprises. See Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF), f. 3316, op. 51, d. 7, 50–1; d. 3, p. 15; d. 2, 9.
17. Fitzpatrick, 'War and Society in Soviet Context: Soviet Labor Before, During and After World War II', *International Labor and Working-Class History*, no. 35 (Spring 1989), 37–52. Both Fitzpatrick and von Hagen (*Soldiers in the Proletarian Dictatorship*, 337) describe Soviet society during the 1930s as being mobilized for war in a way similar to what other Western nations experienced during the Second World War.
18. GARF, f. 5515, op. 13, d. 5, 21b.
19. Ibid., d. 13, 1–4; Ibid., f. 5451, op. 15, d. 357, 108.
20. Diane P. Koenker, 'Men against Women on the Shop Floor in Early Soviet Russia: Gender and Class in the Socialist Workplace', *American Historical*

Review 100, no. 5 (December 1995): 1438–64. In this volume, Smith describes a similar, prerevolutionary trend as male rural migrants, lacking the control of land or family members, redefined masculinity in terms of industrial skill, which led in turn to shop-floor misogyny.
21. Ibid., 1462–3.
22. GARF, f. 5451, op. 15, d. 362, 84.
23. Ibid.
24. *Istoriia industrializatsii Urala, 1926–1932 gg*. (Sverdlovsk, 1967), 408.
25. For details on efforts to hire and train women workers during the 1930s, see Thomas G. Schrand, 'Industrialization and the Stalinist Gender System: Women Workers in the Soviet Economy, 1928–1941' (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1994).
26. Veronique Garros, Natalia Korenevskaia, and Thomas Lahusen, (eds)., *Intimacy and Terror: Soviet Diaries of the 1930's* (New York, 1995), 185. Recent evaluations of the *obshchestvennitsa* movement's goals and evolution include Mary Buckley, 'The Untold Story of *Obshchestvennitsa* in the 1930s', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 48, no. 4 (1996), 569–86; Sheila Fitzpatrick, *Everyday Stalinism* (New York, 1999), 156–63; Rebecca Balmas Neary, 'Mothering Socialist Society: the Wife-Activists' Movement and the Soviet Culture of Everyday Life, 1934–41', *The Russian Review*, 58 (July 1999), 396–412; and Schrand, 'Soviet "Civic-Minded Women" in the 1930's: Class, Gender and Industrialization in a Socialist Society', *Journal of Women's History*, 11, no. 3 (Autumn 1999), 126–50.
27. *Obshchestvennitsa*, January 1939, 25.
28. This trend of subordinating women's identities to those of their husbands reached its cruellest point during the Great Purges, when women were sent to labor camps because they were 'wives of traitors to the motherland'.
29. Rossiskii Tsentr Khraneniia I Izucheniia Dokumentov Noveishei Istorii (TsKhIDNI), f. 17, op. 120, d. 255, 8.
30. Zetkin, *Reminiscences of Lenin*, 78.
31. Fitzpatrick, *Everyday Stalinism*, 139–63, notes the prevalence of female-headed households and the various socio-economic difficulties created by men who abandoned or neglected their families during the 1930s.
32. See Naiman, 'Historectomies', 275–6.
33. Instructions for the 1935 Women's Day ordered local factory committees to inspect the institutions 'called upon to serve women and children: nurseries, daycare centers . . . maternity homes, hospitals, and also laundries, sewing and repair shops, cafeterias, etc.' (GARF, f. 5451, op. 19, d. 458, 1).
34. H. Kent Geiger, *The Family in Soviet Russia* (Cambridge, 1968), 243–4.
35. Ibid., 244. For the link between matrifocal societies and hyper-masculinity, see Rancour-Laferriere, *The Slave Soul of Russia*, 144.
36. D. Fedotoff White, *The Growth of the Red Army* (Princeton, 1944), 286.
37. See Clements, *Bolshevik Women*, 171–93.
38. *Spravochnik Osoaviakhim po podgotovke trudiashchikhsia zhenshchin k oborone* (Moscow, 1930), 10.
39. von Hagen, *Soldiers in the Proletarian Dictatorship*, 331.
40. Karen Petrone, '"Life Has Become More Joyous, Comrades": Politics and Culture in Soviet Celebrations, 1934–1939' (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1994), 35.

41. GARF, f. 5515, op. 13, d. 5, 6b–7.
42. See G. P. Anufrienko, 'K voprosu o vovlechenii zhenshchin v promyshlennosti v predvoennye gody', *Sbornik nauchnykh trudov Magnitogorskogo gornometallurgicheskogo instituta im. G. I. Nosova*, no. 79 (Magnitogorsk, 1970), 41–5.
43. *Vestnik Inzhenerov i Tekhnikov*, no. 1 (January 1936), 13.
44. Margaret R. Higgonet and Patrice L.-R. Higgonet, 'The Double Helix', *Behind the Lines: Gender and the Two World Wars*, ed. Margaret Randolph Higgonet, Jane Jenson, Sonya Michel, and Margaret Collins Weitz (New Haven, 1987), 31–50.