SOCIAL PRECONDITIONS OF NATIONAL REVIVAL IN EUROPE

A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations

---

MIROSLAV HROCH
University of Prague

Translated by
BEN FOWKES



CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Cambridge
London New York New Rochelle
Melbourne Sydney

Published by the Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge
The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge CB2 1RP
32 East 57th Street, New York, NY 10022, USA
296 Beaconsfield Parade, Middle Park, Melbourne 3206, Australia

First published 1985

Printed in Great Britain by the University Press, Cambridge

Library of Congress catalogue card number: 84-9520

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Hroch, Miroslav
Social preconditions of national revival in Europe.
1. Nationalism—Europe—History
I. Title
320.5'4'094 D299

ISBN 0 521 22891 3

UP

Contents

Tables

Maps

Preface

A whole generation of historians of the smaller European nations have devoted themselves intensively to the study of the infant years of their countries, to the stage of their formation in the nineteenth century, whether they have called that stage 'the revival', 'the national awakening' or 'the national liberation struggle'. An immense mass of information has thus been heaped up, which the individual working in the present day can only manage to master and adequately process within the framework of his own national history. It is perhaps precisely for this reason that the historians of almost all the European nations are subject to the urgent temptation to consider their own national history (and therefore their nation as well) as a unique, specific and incommensurable component of the world's development. The other side of this attitude seems to be the traditionally one-sided conception of general (or European) history as the history of certain great states, a history in which the small states and nations occupy only a marginal place, or no place at all. In reality however we cannot give a satisfactory picture of European and world history if we limit our consideration to the history of the state entities which have been decisive politically and predominant in terms of numbers and military strength.

On the other hand the scientifically interpreted history of the smaller nations, and thus also of their revival, takes its rise initially from the fact that we insert it into the general context of historical development and place the histories of each nation in mutual confrontation, in order to establish not only the specific characteristics of their levels of development but also the general causal interconnections and laws governing the sources of the process by which these nations were created.

As is implicit in the author's methodological point of departure, he intends to look at the basic and decisive relations involved in the interpretation of the formation of the modern nations in the social and economic sphere, without of course underestimating the significance of patriotic emotions and the attitudes of individuals.

The search for the general interconnections and laws governing the formation of modern nations led the author to the application of the comparative method.

This occurred more than fifteen years ago, at a time when the utilization of this method did not as yet form part of the fashionable armoury of historical science. The application of the comparative method in association with the use of quantitative techniques for the macro-analysis of social structure was a useful aid in the endeavour to look beyond national (and anti-national) emotions and the preconceptions (or evaluative *a priori* judgements) with which we are only too often confronted when studying the history of the individual nation. Of course an approach of this kind brings with it another risk: that of a concentration on partial indications and a one-sided overestimation of the value of quantification. It is therefore necessary to emphasize, precisely at this point, that orientation towards quantitative data and their comparison definitely does not signify an underestimation of the qualitative aspects of national development. The study of impersonal and unconscious (that is, not consciously articulated) connections and relations definitely does not involve excluding or underestimating the significance for the course of historical processes of the conscious attitudes of individuals holding tenaciously to their objectives.

The results here put before the reader were for the most part worked out and published in Prague in two books, each of which constitutes a finished whole in itself, in the years 1969 and 1971.[1]

The unusual territorial scope of the examples chosen and the specific nature of the sources required research abroad. This research could only be effectuated thanks to the fact that the author obtained the opportunity to study literature and sources, and consult specialists, in the majority of the countries whose national movements he was inquiring into. In the course of many years the author conducted research in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Norway, the German Federal Republic, Poland and the USSR. Everywhere the author met with interest and not infrequently also the devoted assistance of foreign colleagues and institutions, not only in the procurement of sources but also in the interpretation of their language and content. The number of people to whom the author is indebted in this sense is too large for it to be possible to mention all of them here and thank them individually.

The interest shown by the Cambridge University Press in the publication of a book in English on the social preconditions of national revival was for the author a welcome incentive towards a re-thinking of his results; of primary importance also was the need to take account of the comments of reviewers, for which the author is grateful.[2] The text has been modernized and supplemented at certain points, in part with the results of fresh historical research by the author, but especially with the results arrived at by certain foreign historians. A new chapter has been inserted on the movement of the Danish minority in Schleswig.

In what respect can a modernized English version be of interest to foreign specialists? The author feels that his results in quantification and theoretical analysis might conceivably be of special value, in that he has attempted to contribute to the solution of problems which continue to be actual and are the subject of discussion among researchers throughout the world. He is however also aware that particular parts of the book will be considered by some historians to be too theoretical and hypothetical. Those readers will probably find the factual and descriptive sections of the book more interesting and valuable.

Only rarely do books which originated and were published in the socialist countries come into the hands of the English-speaking historians. This fact may hence lend the book an interest arising from its singularity. This interest of course conceals within itself two dangers: on the one hand the danger of superficial curiosity-seeking, on the other the danger of a failure of comprehension which may grow out of the difference in terminology as much as the difference in the social conditions under which the work came into existence. Let us trust that this lack of comprehension does not exceed the measure customary in specialized publications of this type, and that the book will be received above all as an attempt to achieve progress on the road to the solution of problems which concern historians of all parts of the divided world. If the conclusions of the author call forth informed discussion, the work of writing and translating this book will not have been in vain. For an enlightened and interested difference of opinion is a more valuable stimulant to the development of research than an indifferent assent.

MIROSLAV HROCH
(*Charles University, Prague*)

PART I

Introduction

1

A clarification of the basic concept: what is a nation?

The discussion on the definition of the nation, which has already been conducted for a whole century by historians, political theorists and sociologists, is one of the most fascinating phenomena in modern political thinking.[1] Its content is so multifarious and its range so wide that a simple reproduction with commentary of the changing opinions on the question would suffice for a separate volume by itself. We shall therefore refrain from commenting on the opinions of other authors and do no more than outline their own positions. But in order to render the text of this book intelligible, we consider it necessary to put before the reader the conception of the nation which is the author's own starting-point. This conception is decisively to be differentiated from the notion that nationalism is the primary formative factor and the nation is derivative.[2]

In contrast with the subjectivist conception of the nation as the product of national consciousness, nationalism, the national will and spiritual forces, we posit the conception of the nation as a constituent of social reality of historical origin.

We consider the origin of the modern nation as the fundamental reality and nationalism as a phenomenon derived from the existence of that nation. However one must not determine the objective character of the nation with a fixed collection of features and attributes given once and for all, just as it is not possible to view the nation as an everlasting category, standing outside concrete social relations.

In every attempt to define the nation there lies concealed a contradiction between the demand for an exhaustive definition on the one hand, and on the other the relatively rapid development of the 'distinguishing features' and their union to form the nation. Especially where we are concerned with the study of the origin of the modern nation, the need is evident for a dialectical conception of the nation, which would take fully into consideration the dynamic of social development.

If however we proceed from the distinguishing marks and features, we emphasize by that fact precisely the immutability and as a result also the external nature of our characterization of an extraordinarily dynamic social group. But this is not the only negative feature of the definition of the nation

as a collection of distinguishing features. The definition implies namely the notion that each individual's position either is or is not determinable with the appropriate 'essential traits', and his membership of a nation would already have been decided according to this test. But we are hardly ready to say anything at all concretely about the growth, the developmental variations and the nuances of such distinguishing features and traits. Let us give an extreme example of the formal application of this kind of conception of a nation. For Wales at the end of the nineteenth century all the features of the 'classical' definition were valid in their full extent: it had a compact area of settlement, an old-established and distinctive cultural unity, a modernized literary language, its territory even formed an economic whole, comparable with a national market – and despite all this we cannot speak at that time of a fully developed Welsh nation.[3] At the same time it would be possible in contrast to instance a series of nations from which some of these features were absent, but which nevertheless became constituted into national units with an independent existence.[4]

The point of departure for a more fruitful, truly dialectical conception of the nation is the recognition that the position of the individual in society cannot be defined by any fixed characteristics but only by the apprehension of his relations to society, or, as the case may be, his location in those relations. The determination of people's objective social relations within a large social group is therefore by far the most fruitful point of departure for the investigation of the nation and its process of formation. We proceed, then, from the notion of the nation as a particular type of large social group. Sociologists customarily define a group as 'large' if its members are not in immediate personal contact with each other. For us of course this definition is inadequate. The members of a nation are not characterized by a single, fundamental, reciprocal relationship, and accordingly they do not all take up an identical place in society; we are not dealing here with an identity group, such as peasants, postmen, etc., we are not dealing with a group whose members would automatically lose their right to belong to the group with the loss (or the weakening) of that sole relationship. Relations between the members of a nation are relatively constant, they cannot usually be annulled at one stroke, and they always form a well-defined complex. Hence the growth of a more definite group sentiment, hence also the relatively more long-lasting nature of membership in the group. The surface manifestation of this permanence is provided by consciousness, but its essence derives from the stable connection of the individual with a series of objective social relations. The nation is differentiated from the class above all by the fact that membership in it is not determined by links arising from a single kind of relation, such as in the example just given the relation to the ownership of the means of production.

We therefore consider the nation to be a large social group characterized by a combination of several kinds of relation (economic, territorial, political,

religious, cultural, linguistic and so on) which arise on the one hand from the solution found to the fundamental antagonism between man and nature on a specific compact land-area, and on the other hand from the reflection of these relations in the consciousness of the people. We can also apply this conception of the nation to the process by which it came into existence. It makes it possible to study the formation of this type of large social group over a longer period of time, in the course of which there have occurred very significant social changes and changes in social structure. A conception like this further makes it possible to take into account the mutual interchangeability of the different relations: some of them might play a momentous role in one nation, in another a subsidiary role, their place being filled in contrast by the extraordinarily powerful role of other relations. These differences may be transient, and they may also be long-lasting.

In the course of the nation-forming process the economic relation gains in importance; for the more intensively associated section of the nation's members at least this relation becomes the fundamental one – whether directly or through mediations.

Marxist theoreticians agree on this point – albeit in different variations and formulations – that they consider the development of exchange relations and the national market to be the most important and decisive precondition for the formation of a modern nation. This should not of course be interpreted as suggesting that we consider this to be the sole cause. The development of commodity production and productive relations proceeds in principle without regard to the development of linguistic, cultural or political entities; inequalities in the intensity of that development, and especially in the territorial extent of exchange relations are however jointly determined by a series of further relations, such as precisely linguistic and political relations, and national conditions. This determination also works in the reverse direction: the development of language, culture and so on is determined by the development of economic relations. Sometimes people talk about the 'needs of the market', at other times about the interests of the ruling classes, the principles of state policy, etc. Economic relations could and do accelerate the merging together of dialects, just as they stimulate the process by which some dialects achieve independent status; in other cases of course a comparable role might be played by political factors in influencing the direction in which economic relations are established.

Owing to the growth of the division of labour in the period of the rise of capitalist relations, the members of the different classes are linked in economic structures. This connection is not a connection between individuals who are equal with each other; in this way the large social group called the nation obtains a hierarchical character. The most closely packed matrix is of course presented by the members of the class which took its place in the forefront of economic activity, and later on also at the head of society: the bourgeoisie.

The primary elements in the formation of the economic relations of importance for the movement towards national existence must already be sought in the period of simple commodity production, when commodity and monetary relations were strengthened by those enterprises which went beyond the confines of the feudal domain or seigneurial dependence, and promoted regular intercourse between the members of those classes and social groups which were chiefly involved in the production of commodities. This development was borne along above all by two kinds of activity: long-distance trade and the blossoming of regular exchange between the towns and their rural hinterland. It has not yet been made clear whether the road to the creation of nation-wide markets led through the formation of local markets and their association together, or through the intensification of long-distance trade. In any case it was only capitalist mass production which enforced the full transition from the local market and the expansion of regular exchanges over the whole national territory; at this time of course the modern nation was already in process of formation. Political centralization was a necessary result of this supersession of the fragmentation of the means of production and the network of markets – and indeed this supersession was in its interests. Provinces hitherto independent, frequently only joined together by treaties of alliance, with differing interests, laws, governments and aims were cemented together in a single whole with uniform legislation and a single customs boundary. However the frontiers of this new political unit were far from being decided simply by economic relations and requirements. Economic development determined rather the nature of the constituents which went to make up the emerging nation; its form was determined on the other hand by the territorial, linguistic and political relations. For it is very difficult to explain otherwise what the criterion is for a local and a national market, if this is not given by the magnitude of the territory; why for example did Bohemia not form in relation to the Habsburg Monarchy one of the constituents of the market of the whole state, as a formation analogous to that presented by the cases of Bavaria, Saxony and other German territories in relation to the whole of Germany? In the concrete case presented here, a satisfactory answer can only be given by a combination of the individual types of relation. Not only the combination and the significance of the individual types of relation but also their connection with the economic relations is subject to simultaneous variation. Thus for example under certain circumstances the natural environment can become an extraordinarily powerful economic bond, where it forces human beings into very close cooperation, or extraordinary efforts (the contest of the people of the Low Countries with the sea, an insular or a mountainous position, etc.).

It would be a mistake to make a full identification between those forces we designate as economic relations and capitalist relations in general. The nations maintained themselves as fixed configurations even when capitalism began to aim, after the formation of national markets, or rather in parallel with their

formation, at the world-wide market. Large-scale industry created everywhere roughly the same relations between the social classes, and in that way destroyed the unique character of the individual nations. The ruling class of the capitalist epoch could have just as much of an interest in establishing fixed political and customs boundaries for its own nation as in asserting itself in the broader context of the European or world market. This fact complicates every interpretation proceeding from the leading rôle of the bourgeoisie in the national movement. The economic interest of the bourgeoisie was not the only material interest making itself felt, as we shall see.

2

Special features of the formation of the small nations

So far we have considered the formation of the nation as a social process which formed part of the changes during the transition from the feudal society of Estates to the capitalist society of the citizens. The formation of the modern nation thus took the following course: a new class, the 'third estate', set itself up against the old feudal ruling class and sooner or later proclaimed itself the representative of the whole nation. In fact the 'third estate' regarded itself as identical with the nation, in that it comprised all the formally equal individuals, i.e. all the citizens. In the new society of citizens, organized as the nation, national consciousness, patriotism, became an ingredient in social consciousness.

If we try to apply this model to various concrete historical situations, we find that it is only valid for some of the European nations. In others the development towards bourgeois society did not run entirely parallel with the movement towards national existence. Here the old ruling class was replaced by a bourgeoisie (or itself mutated into a bourgeoisie) not ethnically identical with the population of the relevant political unit. Hence there grew up on this territory too a national movement directed not only against the *ancien régime* and the old ruling classes but also against the new ruling class which was ethnically distinct from the members of the nationality inhabiting the region under consideration.

However, we are not concerned here with anomalies, but with the legitimate type of historical development. The origin of the modern nation took place in two basic situations: (1) Where the initial model is valid. We can briefly characterize this as the situation of the 'ruling' ('great') nation (France, England, Spain, Germany, Denmark and so on); (2) in the situation of nationalities, which at the time when they were formed into modern nations (a) did not possess 'their own' ruling class, i.e. a ruling class belonging to them ethnically, but were dominated by a ruling class of more or less alien nationality; here then the social structure of the nation was for a certain period in a state of imbalance, incomplete, since it did not embrace all the elements typical for the given social situation; (b) admittedly formed an ethnic (and sometimes even a historical) unit, but never an independent political unit; (c)

lacked a continuous tradition of cultural production in a literary language of their own, or had once possessed one, which was subsequently obliterated or underwent serious degeneration. With the rise of capitalism this group of nationalities came either completely or partially under the domination of a foreign ruling class – a bourgeoisie.

We can characterize this type of national development as the 'revival' of an oppressed, or small, nation, in which connection the term 'small' is not intended in a purely quantitative sense. There are also transitional cases between the two basic types, such as the Polish or Hungarian nations, which experienced their formative period at the dawn of capitalism as large nations, but then fell into situations characteristic of oppressed nations.

We only designate as small nations those which were in subjection to a ruling nation for such a long period that the relation of subjection took on a structural character for both parties. One can distinguish two groups among the oppressed nations from the standpoint of the continuity of political ties: (a) a group of so-called 'nations without history'; nations which had at no time in their pre-capitalist past been the repositories of an independent political formation; (b) a group of nations which did indeed constitute political entities in the Middle Ages, had their own sovereign feudal class, but lost their political independence or its essential attributes before they developed into modern nations.

In both cases the relation of the small, oppressed nation to the ruling one became structural, i.e. in these situations the ruling class held sway over two or more nationalities and belonged in its majority, or entirely, to the ruling nation alone. This circumstance suggests that the small nations were distinguished at the threshold of their independent existence by an incomplete social structure, i.e. one untypical of the given level of development. They partially or entirely lacked 'their own' ruling class, and sometimes other classes and social groups were represented atypically. This also gave rise to dissimilarities in the way the different types of relationship constituting national existence were combined.

The level of 'oppression' varied considerably in the history of the individual small nationalities; it ranged from cases at the margin of national existence (Bretons, Basques, the Sorbs of Lusatia) to the condition of political and economic dependence and cultural stagnation suffered by once independent nations (Czechs, Croats). The hegemony of an alien feudal class was in addition frequently accompanied by a considerable degree of assimilation. This was sometimes merely temporary; but in other cases it was permanent. Linguistic assimilation did not always strike a decisive blow against the further development of a nationality: one need only cite the examples of Ireland and Norway.

If we are trying to find out why modern nations could be formed, and were formed, out of oppressed nationalities, we cannot reply to the question just by enumerating the various different social ties. Nor can we merely refer to the

'general laws' covering the origin of the modern nation. It is an undoubted fact that small nations did develop in this situation; however one cannot conclude therefrom that modern nations inevitably arose out of all the 'remnants' of old ethnic units (relicts of peoples) which were on the road to assimilation. Not every falling curve of ethnic viability recorded the upturn we are familiar with from Slovak or Lithuanian history. The revival of such small nations was by no means a necessary concomitant of the development of capitalism. However, if the coming of capitalist society did not of itself automatically create the conditions for the transformation of all the feudal nationalities into modern nations, what combination of relations was needed to convert the possibility of national existence into a reality?

In investigating this question one must bear in mind that the formation of the modern nation was a process in which the establishment of objective relations between people was reflected in a growth of their awareness of national identity. In the case of the large nations this process of national self-recognition moved through broader and broader layers of the population, travelling in the same direction as the transformation of feudal into capitalist society; there was only a single national option to take up, and the whole population progressively did so. It was different for the members of an oppressed nationality. The transformation of feudal into capitalist society opened the prospect of two or more alternative routes to national consciousness. A growing number of individuals were thus drawn into a combination of relations determining the development of the two types of nation. But even if we were to assume (incorrectly) that all the ethnic units and nationalities ('peoples') of the epoch of feudalism developed under capitalism into modern nations there would still remain a difference between the conditions for the formation of a large modern nation and those for a small one.

In the ruling nations the process by which the mass of the people became aware of their national identity, their commitment to the nation, ran parallel to their struggle against the ruling class of the old society, which was composed of course of their co-nationals. It was therefore an organic part of the process of social transformation and bourgeois revolution, which does not signify that it was necessarily bound to take over any of the elements of revolutionary ideology. The small nations, on the other hand, were in a situation made much more complex by the fact that although they too had risen up against feudal ideology and the old society in their national movement, they came into conflict with the new ruling nation.

3

The subjective and objective components of national consciousness (the significance of national agitation)

We know already that the mere combination of appropriate types of relationship cannot in itself create a modern nation, if there is no corresponding alteration in the sphere of consciousness, at least among some of the people, in the shape of a strengthening of national awareness. This point is as valid for ruling nations as it is for subject nations. How is the individual's awareness of belonging to a nation influenced by the objective relations through which he or she is linked with the environment? And further: under what conditions does the individual make the transition from a simple awareness of national identity to an active national consciousness – to a patriotism which considers membership in the nation an inherently valuable quality? This is one of the central problems, and we do not claim to have entirely elucidated it in the present work.

Not every oppressed nationality formed itself completely into a nation, 'awakened' to national life. From the subjective standpoint of the national movement this 'failure to awaken' was expressed in a failure of national consciousness to manifest itself among a sufficiently numerous group of members of the oppressed nationality. The growing fixedness of the combination of relationships regarded as decisive for the origin of the nation ought to have called forth a corresponding reaction in the consciousness of the people connected together by those relationships. This did not happen. Why not? Does the failure of this change to occur mean that among the oppressed nationalities commitment to a patriotic position was the most important and decisive force in the emergence of the nation? To say this would be to contradict the fundamental conception of a nation we have already adopted.

A modern historian can hardly accept the notion that such a powerful social process as the rise of the modern nation could have been set off simply by 'the will of a Subject', by the idea of nationality or its propagation through education. Nor did the 'spirit of the nation' travel round the country awakening people. But it is a far more laborious and complex task to interpret national consciousness by analysing the development of relationships between individuals than it is simply to point to the operations of 'nationalism' and national agitation. There are many pitfalls to avoid: for instance the connection

between objective relations and national consciousness should not be formulated too mechanically. National consciousness and objective relations between the members of a nation form an indivisible unity; they cannot be isolated from each other. There is no modern nation without national consciousness, i.e. an awareness of membership in the nation, coupled with a view that this membership is an inherently valuable quality.

When we are investigating national programmes and national consciousness as necessary relations progressively involving a greater and greater number of individuals in the modern nation's formative process, we are concerned, apart from the ideological content of national consciousness in the narrower sense, with two things. First, the course of the process whereby patriotism's social impact increased in intensity, and the nature of the material interests which conditioned that impact; second, the sources of the intellectual content of the national programme in the sphere of the individuals' material interests.

These two elements are mutually complementary; it can be assumed that national ideology is effective where it reflects (even though in a merely illusory fashion) the interests of the groups to which it makes its appeal, or contains at least in part the kind of programme which is close to their interests. It is therefore important to carry out not only an ideological but also a social analysis of the patriotic groups which gradually started to adopt the national programme.

In the case of the large nations the rise of national ideology was a constituent part of a current flowing in a single direction, and its acceptance or extension had the character of a quantitative growth in a single quality – a single consciousness of nationality – within various social layers, even though these strata attained national consciousness under the impact of diverse interests. In contrast to this the members of the oppressed nationalities were bombarded by at least two national ideologies. Some of these people were able to improve their social position or gain an education, and arrived at a point where they were compelled to decide between two different available national alternatives. They had to adopt the standpoint of one particular current of opinion; they had to take on the consciousness of one nationality or the other. The individual concerned had to undergo a differentiation of personal attitudes, whereby he identified himself either with the ruling nation or the oppressed one. The fate of the numerous ethnic groups which did not awaken to national life teaches us that the result of this differentiation was not always determined in advance. Moreover it is not even necessary to point to such an extreme case as the total submergence of an ethnic group. If we concentrate instead on the success stories, we see such striking differences in the intensity and rapidity of development in individual cases as to put us on our guard against the illusion that the extension of patriotic attitudes takes place automatically and in equal measure among all the members of small nations. At the same time this demonstrates the unacceptability of notions of the priority and the decisive

significance of patriotic enthusiasm, national idealism and similar spiritual forces.

National agitation, i.e. activities directed towards increasing national consciousness, formed part of every national movement, taking on many different forms. The analysis of these forms and their comparative effectiveness, the establishment of a typology, has not yet received sufficient attention, especially where the small nations are concerned. However, a more vital question for the origin of national movements and modern nations is this: why did one and the same form have varying degrees of success among different nations?

If we want to understand the objective prerequisites for the success of national agitation we must look for the relations through which the influence of changes in the social and economic sphere could be mediated; in particular the changes that affected the readiness of the members of the oppressed nationality to accept identification with the modern nation and its programme.

The nation is made up of individuals whose patriotism is not an unalterable datum, but undergoes a long formative period, proceeding initially from an elemental awareness of belonging to a greater whole. Sometimes they do not even have this kind of awareness of belonging to a political and national unit; in these cases national awareness has first to emerge from a nationally amorphous substratum. The individual's national consciousness, and patriotism, is determined on the one hand by general factors (objective relations) and on the other by the conditions of his own existence. To understand these determining conditions we have to study the 'patriots', the people who were most easily accessible to national consciousness and ready earlier than others to become national activists. We have to locate them within the matrix of the objective relations. We shall accordingly be looking for the position these active pioneers of the national idea took up in society at a time when the small nation they belonged to was not yet fully formed. This is the fundamental task of our present investigation.

4

The social characteristics (composition) of the bearers of national agitation

The influence of the objective relations on the intensity of diffusion of national consciousness can only be traced by the historian where national consciousness has found expression in the conduct, the activities, of concrete personalities. Objective motivations for attitudes can of course only be traced indirectly. We are interested in finding out which kinds of social milieu within the emerging small nation afforded a relatively stronger response to patriotic agitation. Despite a flood of literature on nationalism, nationalists and national conflicts there remains a distinct lacuna in this area of investigation. Until we fill this gap we shall remain ignorant of the individuals who formed the vanguard of the national movement, and our reflections on the integrative or disintegrative factors within it, indeed on the very motive forces behind it, will remain at the level of logical construction and conjecture. The few available biographies of the most significant personalities cannot help us much here, since these are partial data, fortuitously acquired.

Whom shall we regard as a patriot, as a pioneer of the national movement, if we do not want to limit our choice to the narrow group of national 'leaders'? We shall use the word 'patriots' to denote those individuals who consciously, of their own volition, and over a long period of time, devoted their activities to the support of the national movement, endeavouring in particular to diffuse patriotic attitudes. We measure the effectiveness of this patriotic activity not just by its material results (for example an absolute increase in financial contributions) but also by the degree of subjectively intended personal sacrifice (and sometimes also political risk) which was associated with participation in the national movement. In addition to the leaders of the movement we shall therefore be interested in their assistants, agents and supporters. But we shall not include people who only appear sporadically, hovering at the margins.

To establish the social characteristics of the patriots we clearly need to obtain the greatest possible amount of information, of a sufficiently homogeneous character to permit comparison, about their original social milieu, and their eventual place in society. In view of the fact that we are endeavouring to fix the social position of a very large number of patriots, many of whom do not even have an entry in the national biographical dictionaries, we have been

obliged to limit to a minimum the amount of information required and to summarize it in the form of answers to certain elementary questions, about:

(1) social status (occupation), and the relevant alterations in this;
(2) social origins;
(3) territorial distribution, and location of patriotic activities;
(4) place or district of origin;
(5) educational background.

We must bear in mind at the outset that we shall not be able to gather these five pieces of information for every single patriot. Moreover, the information base will be of varying solidity from one nation to the next, owing to the state of the sources and the varying degrees of sophistication attained in each nation's historiography.

Even so, we must try to establish uniform criteria for social characteristics. Here our point of departure is the complex class structure of a society in transition to capitalism. We cannot restrict our classification to a simple division of society into its basic classes: there is also the internal structure of the classes to be considered, and the existence of a series of further social groups which were richly represented in the transitional society. The ruling class itself contained two fundamentally antagonistic elements at this epoch: the old ruling nobility of the *ancien régime*, and the emergent bourgeoisie of capitalist society. The class of the oppressed also falls into two basic components: the peasantry in process of emancipation and the emerging proletariat. The peasantry were already subject to considerable internal differentiation at the time of the transition to capitalism, but we shall treat them as a single group. It is of course necessary to distinguish as an independent group the cottagers and agricultural workers. Apart from the basic classes we shall be considering two further groups, which were subsidiary classes in feudal society and underwent a transformation with the rise of the capitalist enterprise: the merchants and the handicraftsmen. These groups constituted specific components of the new society long after the liquidation of the *ancien régime*. Hence we have retained the traditional appellations: merchants and handicraftsmen. In addition we have included in this category a number of professions with relatively few members, such as innkeepers, butchers and so on. Sometimes the contemporary sources have merely preserved the description 'burgher', which signifies a possessor of urban property and is usually a synonym for trader or craftsman.

An especially complex problem is the social definition of those professions whose members had a higher education and lived by their intellectual labour, and whom we characterize in a general way with the term 'intelligentsia'. The intelligentsia only took shape as a clear-cut group with the transition to capitalism. At the same time we are well aware that this term is understood to cover differing groups of people according to divergences of linguistic usage

and ideological position. An important problem is the social characterization of the subordinate groupings within the intelligentsia. Here we shall not limit ourselves to a simple classification of the patriots according to profession, but achieve a closer definition by looking at the position they took up within society; this was determined on the one hand by the conditions under which an intellectual received the fruits of his labour, and on the other hand by the social outcome of that labour (the social class the intelligentsia 'served', in other words). From this point of view we can distinguish three strata of the intelligentsia, each occupying a different position within the class structure of the transitional society.

The first stratum comprised the élite sections of the intelligentsia, directly associated with the ruling classes. This association could consist either in the direct performance of ruling class functions, or the sale of the product of their intellectual labour to the ruling classes at such a high 'wage-price' that one cannot speak of exploitation. This top stratum also included the highest state officials and ecclesiastical dignitaries (whether they served the old régime or modern society), the managers of the big estates and the élite of the free professions (lawyers).

The second stratum comprised those professional groups which, while still outside the wage-labour relationship, did not directly share in political power or engage in economic enterprises; this includes such categories as lawyers and doctors (in so far as they were independent), artists, journalists and scientists. The Evangelical pastors also occupy a place here, albeit a peculiar one. All these groups were in the course of emancipating themselves from their previous dependence, but they did not represent capitalist enterprise. Under the old régime these people were sometimes described as the town 'notables', and they had close relations with the highest ranks of the urban population, forming, together with the latter, a component of the ruling class of the old society.

The most numerous group was the third stratum of the intelligentsia – those who stood in a relationship of wage-labour. This includes the lower and middle officials and clerics (private, state and communal) and teachers. A special place in this stratum was occupied by Catholic priests and students. Work for wages does not of course in itself provide a sufficient justification for the unconditional assignment of these strata of the intelligentsia to the status of wage-labourers. The difference in standard and style of life was still very considerable, even if the beginnings of the so-called intellectual proletariat could already be discerned in the more advanced societies, especially among the group of the unemployed or semi-employed intelligentsia.

Our research procedure will therefore be an application of the biographical method. Elementary biographical data about the maximum number of individuals will serve as our starting-point both for the definition of professional structure, and for understanding the motivation of the national movement and the integrative and disintegrative factors in it. We shall not simply pile up

biographical data about the occupation and social status of individuals, in the manner of Lewis Namier and his followers, or merely quantify a list of professional characteristics, as in Alfred Cobban's critique of the Marxist conception of the Great French Revolution.[5] We are aware of the fact that the accumulation of a mass of data on profession, place of birth and abode can never constitute a true determination of the social basis of the national movement. It forms rather a starting point, a set of orientational pointers towards the further analysis of the social context, and the conflicts which took place within the framework and under the influence of the latter.

We shall not disguise the fact that the generalizing procedures we use in investigating hidden class and group interests and social relations are derived from the Marxist conception of historical development. We give class character priority over the simple description of professional status, and for us the determination of class and group interests is an important guide to the motives behind the individual attitudes of people who belong to this or that class or group.

5

The comparative method

In studying the social basis of the national movement we have adopted the comparative method. Its utilization has spread so far and wide in post-war history-writing that one may even speak of the danger involved in following a currently fashionable trend. However the considerable frequency with which the comparative method has been applied by no means rules out disagreements over its nature and the real weight to be attached to its results. These conflicts go so deep (and the degree of mutual intelligibility grows smaller and smaller) that one may ask whether there is anything in common between the comparative method in Theodor Schieder's conception and Stein Rokkan's;[6] or between J. Topolski's conception and the views advanced by a number of Soviet historians.[7] Although we would not regard these pages as an appropriate battleground for a polemic on the nature and meaning of the comparative method, we are obliged to acquaint the reader with our own conception of the method and with the way it has been applied here. The comparative method is one of the most complex ways of doing historical work, and its uncontrolled application has led more than once to errors and misunderstandings. In the first place it is necessary to distinguish the comparative method, as a complex of various procedures and techniques, from simple comparison, which has the character rather of a logical inference. Every application of the comparative method has a number of basic requirements:

(a) the object to be compared must be defined as precisely as possible;
(b) the aim of the application of the comparative method must be laid down;
(c) the criteria of analysis for the objects of comparison should be established;
(d) the relation of the comparative procedure to the temporal axis (i.e. to historical chronology in an absolute sense) must be clarified.

We have already dealt with the *definition* of the object of comparison. It is the process of formation of a modern nation out of a small, oppressed nationality. This definition demonstrated that we were dealing with objects which were homogeneous and therefore comparable, that they were legitimate elements of a historical process determined by social laws. Our comparative approach is made more difficult by the circumstance that we are comparing

processes, not relatively unchanging structures; this fact should be borne in mind when selecting criteria of comparison.

The comparative method can pursue several kinds of *objective*. An elementary example is the simple search for similarities and differences between a number of objects of comparison, aimed at assisting the researcher to recognize them where they occur. A more complex procedure uses the similarities and differences between the objects of comparison as the starting-point for dividing them into groups with partially concurrent characteristics – in other words it uses them as an instrument of typology. In the present work a typology of the formation of nations (see the definitions given above of the formation of ruling and oppressed nations) and of the national movement (see below) is the point of departure. But it is not the aim of our comparative method. Our own particular objective is the interpretation of the causal relations, the study of the general characteristics, and the social determinants, of the national movement considered as a process. Only here can we speak of the comparative method in the strict sense, as a complex working procedure and a route to new generalized insights.

Let us indicate for the sake of completeness that the comparative method can also adopt as its basic objective the characterization of the position a particular phenomenon (or historical process) occupies within the broad stream of historical development. In this case a large number of objects are compared in relation to a single object which we regard as central and of which we have a very detailed knowledge. At the same time we ascertain which characteristics of that object are of general application, and which ones are specific to it. This is especially important as a corrective to the study of the history of an individual nation or region; we shall give some results of this method at the end of each of the chapters devoted to specific national movements; we shall make an attempt to determine the general and the specific factors of integration and disintegration in the nation-creating process.

We understand by the *criterion of comparison* the quality with reference to which we make the comparison. That is to say, we always compare qualities applicable to each of the objects of comparison: the criterion of comparison between a carriage and a motor car can be the length of the chassis, the carrying capacity, the amount of seating room, but definitely not the power of the motor or the petrol consumption. It is however not enough to make sure that we are in a position to apply the chosen criterion to all the objects of comparison: it is also necessary that this criterion should be material to the problem to be solved and adequate to the aim in view. The more complex the problem the greater the number of criteria of comparison required. Whether we apply the individual criteria alongside each other or in succession depends on the concrete possibilities for research. The greater the number of objects of comparison, the more advantageous it is to restrict the number of criteria of comparison to a minimum. The more complex the criterion chosen, the wider

its field of heuristic fruitfulness for the historical processes undergoing comparison, and the greater the possibility of reducing the number of other criteria applied. In the present case the criterion of comparison is taken from the sphere which has central significance for our research problem, the social prerequisites for the formation of a modern nation: namely, the social composition of patriotic groups. The basic data for the comparison are derived from the information summarized under the five headings mentioned earlier: occupation, social origin, location of activities, place of birth and nature of education. Only after a comparison based on this criterion will it be possible to advance to the comparative analysis of further factors, such as the role of churches, the peasantry, industrialization, students and so on.

Here, and indeed in operating comparative procedures in general, it is of immense importance to establish a precise relationship between the separate factors and the chronological axis. In principle the comparative method can be applied both (1) *diachronically* (vertically, along the chronological axis) and (2) *synchronically* (horizontally).

(1) The comparison of events along the historical vertical axis is one of the commonest procedures of historical research: we confront prior with subsequent occurrences and we establish the similarities and differences between them.

(2a) A synchronic comparison in the narrower sense of the word involves the comparison of historical processes occurring in different countries at the same time; these processes might be mutually related and interdependent, or they might occur relatively independently; here it is important to note the asynchrony sometimes manifested by historical development.

(2b) We may make a synchronic comparison according to analogous historical situations. If we can establish that the objects of comparison passed through the same stages of development, we can compare these analogous stages, even if from the standpoint of absolute chronology they occurred at different times. We can only apply this procedure if we are certain that the societies under comparison have passed through roughly equivalent periods of historical development. The notion, typical of traditional historiography, that the historical process is a collection of unique and unrepeatable occurrences and actions is naturally incompatible with the application of the comparison of analogous historical situations along the horizontal axis. Here, then, we are comparing the process of origin of large social groups – modern nations – among small nationalities. All existing nations have been through the various stages of this process. We shall concern ourselves primarily with the stage at which patriotic activity emerged into the limelight. This stage (usually called 'the national revival') occurred at different times (but usually during the nineteenth century) and was of varying duration. Since we are undertaking an interpretative rather than a descriptive comparison, it will be useful to choose the national movements we want to compare, where possible, from

nations without any mutual relations, because in those cases the national movements can be seen to have evolved independently.

If we are to choose a comparison on the basis of analogous historical situations, and also to choose the area over which the comparison is to extend, we have to specify the characteristics of the object of comparison. Whereas we referred previously in general terms to the formative process of the modern nation without going more deeply into its internal differentiation, we must now try to specify those historical situations we shall regard as analogous and therefore comparable. The development of the national movement among the small nations was far too long-drawn-out a process for us to be able to delineate this object of comparison over its whole range. We shall therefore ask which of the key phases of this movement are actually comparable. This leads us to the question of its internal periodization.

6

The periodization of the revival of small nations

The main problem, for purposes of periodization, is the discovery of appropriate criteria. We can apply several different criteria for periodizing the national movement, according to whether we want to evaluate the general social incidence of national agitation, to fix the role of the national movement in historical development, or to analyse its social prerequisites. In all these cases the starting-point for the criterion of periodization is the relation of the national movement to the general course of the transformation of society. Of vital importance here is the fundamental distinction between the two stages of the national movement:[8] (1) the period of struggle against absolutism, bourgeois social revolution and the rise of capitalism, and (2) the period after the victory of capitalism, which coincides with the rise of the working-class movement.

One might perhaps complete this with a third grand stage, namely the period of world-wide integration and the impact of the means of mass communication, dating roughly from the end of the First World War.

This fundamental criterion of periodization may with advantage be supplemented with criteria derived directly from the internal transformation which occurred during the formation of the modern nation. The nation is a large social group defined by a combination of various types of relation; it is a group, with a given historical origin, of people who only gradually attained to national consciousness under the influence of objective circumstances. Hence a further criterion for the periodization of the national movement among the small nations will be the quantitative growth of national activity, the social impact of the impulses emerging from national agitation. Clearly this criterion of the growth of national activity cannot be separated from a number of further criteria – above all the development of a national programme, the forms of national agitation, the nascent national culture, etc.

Reference to the quantitative spread of nationally conscious attitudes (i.e. the tendency to regard membership in the nation as inherently valuable) allows us perhaps to distinguish two basic stages in the development of the small nations. The beginning of every national revival is marked by a passionate concern on the part of a group of individuals, usually intellectuals, for the study of the language, the culture, the history of the oppressed nationality. These

individuals remained without any widespread social influence, and they usually did not even attempt to mount a patriotic agitation, in part because they were isolated, and in part because they did not believe it would serve any purpose. Their interest was motivated by a patriotism of the Enlightenment type, namely an active affection for the region in which they lived, associated with a thirst for knowledge of every new and insufficiently investigated phenomenon. In so far as any agitation did occur it remained at the individual level, and to all intents and purposes lacked an organizational basis. In the concluding phase of development of the national revival we meet with a situation in which national consciousness has become the concern of the broad masses (even if still by no means the whole of the nation's members) and the national movement has a firm organizational structure extending over the whole territory. By the time this stage of development was reached, the broad masses were reacting directly to patriotic impulses. The transition from one stage to the other did not of course take place at one stroke; between the manifestations of scholarly interest, on the one hand, and the mass diffusion of patriotic attitudes, on the other, there lies an epoch which was decisive for the actual formation of the small nation, an epoch characterized by active patriotic agitation: the fermentation-process of national consciousness. The success of the patriotic agitation was made possible by the establishment of objective relations of economic, political and other types; it will be necessary to investigate concrete, specific cases to establish the degree to which each of the objective relations participated in this phase as an integrating factor. The driving force in this era of national agitation was a group of patriots who were already dissatisfied with the limitation of interest to the antiquities of the land, the language and the culture, and saw their mission as the spreading of national consciousness among the people. Scholarly research also expanded in this phase, but its function was now as much national as scientific.

For greater clarity we shall designate the three above-mentioned fundamental phases of the national movement as Phase A (the period of scholarly interest), Phase B (the period of patriotic agitation) and Phase C (the rise of a mass national movement). Incidentally, Phase C started off in some national movements during – in the sense outlined above – the first stage of development of a small nation, whereas others had already been able to make the transition to the second stage. For our theme, which is the formation of small nations, the most important phase is Phase B, and we shall devote most of our attention to this when we analyse the various national movements. In the course of this phase the agitation of the patriots sooner or later influenced a growing number of members of the oppressed nationality, who began to consider their membership in the nation as more than a simple natural fact or a political consequence of subjection to a particular monarch. In other words we must bear in mind – and we shall investigate concrete examples of this – that national agitation was not bound to be successful in all cases; Phase B was not necessarily

destined to pass over into Phase C, and in a number of cases this transition did not in fact take place. The vital role of Phase B is therefore clear; in Phase B we have found a set of historical situations both analogous and mutually comparable. These will be, in the narrower sense, the object of our comparison.

7

A typology of the national movement as the point of departure in the selection of the national movements to be studied

All that remains now is to choose certain national movements suitable for comparison, in such a way that we arrive at as representative a selection as possible. It is beyond the capacity of a single individual to work through all the European national movements, providing a systematic and comprehensive comparison. This remains a task (but not an impossible one) for the future. For greater accuracy of selection, and also to allow us to locate the individual national movements within the European context, we shall try to establish a typology of European national movements, where they occurred under the conditions of oppression suffered by small nationalities. Since the starting-point of every typology is a descriptive variant of the comparative method, we must pay attention to certain of the latter's principles in this context. We must above all establish a uniform criterion of typology for every European national movement. The most useful approach to this in our view is a combination of the fundamental two-stage periodization with our division into three phases, A, B and C, from the point of view of the level of intensity of national activity.

It was certainly a question of some importance, whether the decisive period of national revival – Phase B – took place under the conditions of the first stage (during the period of the rise of capitalism), or whether the national movement reached its height only in the course of the second stage (under the conditions of stabilized capitalist 'modern' society).[8] It seems that for the majority of national movements Phase A coincided entirely with the first stage, hence with the period when the decisive feature of social conflict was the struggle against feudalism and absolutism. The transition to Phase C, to the mass movement, on the other hand, took place in some cases in the first, but in most cases in the second stage, when the decisive antagonism was already that between bourgeoisie and proletariat. The relation between the intensity of the national movement and its place in the development of the whole society on the way from feudalism to capitalism therefore differed from one small nation to the next. Is it possible to characterize this differentiation typologically? Let us try to summarize the situation with a table:

Type

		Stage I	Stage II
1	Phase:	A → B → C →	
2	Phase:	A → B → C →	
3	Phase:	A → B → C →	
4	Phase:	A → B	

In type one Phase B runs its course entirely within the framework of the first stage; in this connection it is not important whether the transition to a mass national movement already took place before the full victory of capitalist relations or coincided with it, i.e. with the transition to the second stage. In type two, Phase B admittedly begins during the first stage, but it continues into the second. The transition to a mass national movement would in this case have had to be accomplished in conditions where the dominant antagonism was between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. This circumstance not only modified the social significance and role of the national movement but also its programme. In the third type the phases move in rapid sequence from A through B to the mass movement (C) even before the transition to capitalism; the mass movement was therefore already in progress when feudal relations were still predominant. The fourth type mainly covers national movements which did not make the transition to Phase C during the second stage; here the phase of national agitation first begins in a more or less developed industrial society.

In periodizing the national movement one should not neglect the question of what I shall call the *degree of completeness* attained by the formative process of the modern nation. What is at stake here is the limit enclosing the process of national revival, the boundary marking the conclusion of the formative process (although the national movement itself continued to develop afterwards). The fundamental yardstick of the completeness of a nation's formation is the development of the class structure of the national community. Small nations were formed with an incomplete class structure. We can therefore say that small nations were fully formed when they displayed a class structure typical of capitalist society and their national movement had taken on a mass character. The achievement of political independence is not necessarily an indication that the small nation is completely formed; and conversely the struggle to achieve independence may continue even after the nation has completed its formation. The Czech, Croat and Polish national movements are cases in point. Of course it follows from the very definition of a small nation that its formative process could not be completed before the bourgeois revolution and the rise of the industrial revolution. In this connection it is useful to recall that in a number of cases an organized working-class movement emerged before the conclusion of the formative process.[9]

If we bear in mind all these considerations in trying to establish the chronology of the transition from stage I to stage II, we arrive at the conclusion that the typology we indicated above is only very approximate and must be given greater precision. That typology contained a distorting factor in that it fixed an over-simple dividing-line between the first and second stages. The transition from stage I to stage II cannot be located by reference to a single item; we are faced with a series of complex social interconnections and transformations, of which the three most important were the bourgeois revolution, the industrial revolution and the coming of the organized and class-conscious working-class movement. These three changes, to which we must sometimes add agrarian reform, did not occur simultaneously either over the whole of Europe or within each particular small nation. What, then, was the precise chronological relation between the transition to Phases B and C on the one hand and the bourgeois revolution, the industrial revolution and the beginnings of the working-class movement on the other? We shall try to characterize the individual types of national movement more precisely by looking at the order of succession of the following events:

transition from Phase A to Phase B (abbreviated to AB)
transition from phase B to Phase C (=BC)
completion of the formation of the modern nation (=FN)
bourgeois revolution (=BR)
industrial revolution in its opening phase (=IR)
coming of the organized working-class movement (=WCM)

Type 1: The industrial revolution started before the bourgeois revolution and occurred at a time when national agitation was already taking effect. The national movement attained a mass character during or shortly after the revolution. The organized working-class movement asserted itself after the modern nation had emerged. Expressing this as a model we have:

$$AB \rightarrow IR \rightarrow \begin{matrix} BR \rightarrow FN \\ \searrow \quad \nearrow \\ BC \end{matrix} \rightarrow WCM$$

We call this the 'integrated type' of development. A second variant within this type is produced by the outbreak of the bourgeois revolution before the industrial revolution; Phases B and C remain in the same place. Thus:

$$AB \rightarrow BR \rightarrow BC \rightarrow IR \rightarrow FN \rightarrow WCM$$

In both variants the fight against feudalism and absolutism went back to the same epoch as the agitational endeavours of the patriots of the small nations; both movements moved in roughly the same direction. They were not antagonistic, but mutually complementary. A further feature of this type of development was that the newly formed modern nation relatively quickly gained a complete class structure, and worked out its national programme in

the course of the revolution. The programme was accordingly democratic in character.

Type 2: National agitation emerged before the political revolution and the industrial revolution, but the transition to Phase C, the mass national movement, was delayed, so that it first took place when the class-conscious proletariat was already organized, or even after the coming of the working-class movement. The formation of the modern nation therefore took place belatedly. Expressing this as a model (the 'belated type') we have:

$$\text{AB} \rightarrow \text{BR} \rightarrow \text{IR} \rightarrow \text{WCM} \rightarrow \text{BC} \rightarrow \text{FN}$$

or

$$\text{AB} \rightarrow \text{BR} \rightarrow \text{IR} \rightarrow \text{WCM} \rightarrow \text{FN}$$
$$\text{IR} \rightarrow \text{BC} \rightarrow \text{FN}$$

Whether this phase-shift was caused by uneven economic development on the territory of the oppressed nationality (e.g. the contrast between Riga and the Latvian countryside) or by foreign oppression (e.g. Magyarization in Slovakia), patriotic agitation in these cases became intimately involved in the crystallized class contradictions of capitalist society.[10]

Type 3: The national movement had already attained a mass character under the conditions of feudal society, hence before the establishment of capitalist society. The arrival of Phase C was in this case usually accompanied by an armed struggle against the ruling nation and it formed an important step in the bourgeois social transformation. Nor can specific features of an anti-feudal peasant war be ruled out, in theory. The nation was being formed before the bourgeois revolution, and this process could well be completed even before the industrial revolution. Expressing this as a model (the 'insurrectional type') we have:

$$\text{AB} \rightarrow \text{BC} \rightarrow \text{BR} \rightarrow \text{FN} \rightarrow \text{IR} \rightarrow \text{WCM}$$

or

$$\text{AB} \rightarrow \text{BC} \rightarrow \text{BR} \rightarrow \text{IR} \rightarrow \text{FN} \rightarrow \text{WCM}$$

Here the grand processes of transformation in the cultural sphere (the rise of a modern literature, political ideologies, the theatre and so on), and also in the social sphere (the rise of the intelligentsia) were already under way when a mass national movement arose, and they took on an unambiguously national and patriotic significance and social function. There was a rapid development towards the national state.

Type 4: National agitation first began under the conditions of capitalist society and a liberal constitutional system, hence after the bourgeois revolution and the coming of the industrial revolution. The known examples allow us to make the general statement that this type entered the mass phase very late or not at all. Expressing this as a model (the 'disintegrated type') we have:

$$\text{BR} \rightarrow \text{IR} \rightarrow \text{AB} \rightarrow \text{WCM} \ldots [\rightarrow \text{BC?}]$$

The fact that here the national movement followed the bourgeois and industrial revolutions clearly had a disintegrating effect on it.

The course of each national movement naturally had its own peculiarities and individual features; even so one can always determine which of the four above-mentioned types of nation-forming process was the nearest approximation to it.[11] We can therefore regard our typology as a suitable starting-point for the selection of specific national movements as subjects of comparative analysis. We have not looked at things exclusively from the typological angle. The regional approach, for instance, was especially useful heuristically for national movements where there were no extant sources for determining the social composition of the patriotic communities in Phase B. One must also consider the framework of absolute chronology. In the period before general industrialization, and the revolution in transport and communications, the national movement in the relevant part of Europe took a different course (it was not only slower but also differently organized) from the one it took in the era of railways, rapid postal links, and the growth of school attendance. Similarly, we must distinguish the situation before and after the rise of the internationally organized working class; its presence had a profound effect on the national movement. The fact that a working-class movement was already in progress on the territory of the ruling nation inevitably influenced the character of the national movement of the oppressed nationality, even if its own industrial revolution might be delayed.

We have used all these angles of approach in selecting a number of national movements as a representative sample for comparative analysis. Three of the four basic types of formative process have been covered. The Czech national movement in Bohemia, and the Norwegian and Finnish movements, fall within the first, or 'integrated' type. In addition we have looked at the Estonian example, which lies on the boundary of type 1. The second type, which we characterize as 'belated', includes the Slovak and Lithuanian movements. Finally the 4th type, which we have called the 'disintegrated type', is represented by the Flemish national movement. We do not have enough source material, unfortunately, to study the social structure of any national movement of the 3rd type during the crucial Phase B; but we shall be able to use partial data for the Bulgarian and Macedonian national movement in the comparative section of the book, so the 3rd type will not be entirely unrepresented. We shall deal in similar fashion with partial data bearing on the Belorussian and Lettish national movements. The picture will be completed with an analysis of the social basis of a representative national minority movement: that of the Danes in Schleswig.

We shall start, therefore, by analysing seven national movements among which three of the four fundamental developmental types are represented. We shall try to locate a historical situation sufficiently common to all of them to allow comparison and analogy. In other words, this is the search for Phase B. After analysing the social composition and territorial distribution of the patriotic groups during Phase B we shall add in each case a concluding section outlining the integrating and disintegrating factors at work. This will provide

a broad outline of the fundamental features specific to each movement. For although the basic objective of our research is to identify general features and to recognize the regularities or laws of historical development, we should not be seduced by this into denying the specificity and uniqueness of a given historical development or misled into ignoring the peculiarities of the process whereby each individual nation was formed.

In the third part of the book we shall attempt to give a comparative evaluation of the results of our study of specific national movements; we shall pose the question of the role of the various classes and social groups in the national movement as well as the more general interconnections and territorial relationships (such as the contrast between town and country, or active and passive regions). In conclusion we shall try to give an account of some of the generalizations to be derived from the comparative analysis, features which will allow us to recognize the integrating and disintegrating factors in the formative process of the modern nation. The limitations of space, as well as the limited resources (and linguistic equipment) of a single researcher, prevent pressing our comparative analysis yet further, from social structures to political developments and national ideologies. We are in any case convinced that the establishment of the general social and economic conditions governing the emergence of any national movement constitutes the necessary starting-point for a fresh interpretation of its programme, its demands and its ideological superstructure.

PART II

The Social Structure of the Individual Patriotic Groups: A Nation-by-Nation Analysis

8

The integrated type in conditions of political autonomy: the Norwegians

From the early Middle Ages Norway formed an independent political entity; at the end of the fourteenth century the Norwegian state entered into a personal union with Denmark and Sweden; and in the sixteenth century Norway became a subordinate unit in the Danish-Norwegian state structure. In this structure, from the Reformation onwards, Danish predominance in the political sphere was combined with an equally pronounced cultural hegemony. Norwegian died out as a literary language, and was entirely replaced by Danish, which also became the language of educated people and the ruling class.

It was the merchants who profited from the rapid development of Norwegian towns and trade from the first half of the eighteenth century onwards. Their self-confidence grew perceptibly, and their enterprises sometimes included, in addition to trade, mining and ironfounding and the buying up of landed property. These strata grew discontented with the existing relationship towards Denmark: they wanted a Norwegian national bank and equal rights for Norwegian merchants.

The weakening of Norway's dependence on the central government, shaken by the events of the Napoleonic Wars, created favourable conditions for the endeavours of the Norwegian patriots. As early as 1811 the new generation of patriots had begun to collect funds for setting up a university, and to draw up a programme of political autonomy. Some of the patriots started to set up secret associations of intellectuals. The Treaty of Kiel at the end of January 1814 opened the road to action for them. A 'National Assembly' of representatives of all the estates of the realm was summoned to meet at Eidsvoll. It was a milestone in Norwegian history. A constitution for the new state was worked out, and promulgated on 17 May 1814. In July the Swedish king Carl Johan began military operations against Norway. The Norwegian representatives accepted the establishment of a personal union between Sweden and Norway. However, Norway did not enjoy an equal position within this personal union. The national movement started under changed conditions.[1]

A unique feature of the Norwegian national movement was that the enlightened patriotism of a 'historical' nation, becoming active in the eighteenth

century, passed directly to successful political action. The beginning of Phase B can be dated to 1814, the year of the Eidsvoll Assembly. After the establishment of the union between Sweden and Norway the spread of patriotic attitudes was initially expressed simply by an increase in political awareness, and only from the 1830s onwards did Norwegian national agitation in the narrower sense of linguistic and cultural activities begin to develop. From the angle of the quantitative growth of the national movement, all the political activity of 1814 and subsequent years was carried on by a small handful of patriots. We can speak of mass participation in political life from the 1860s, whereas the growth of linguistic and cultural self-confidence took somewhat longer.

Even though the pamphlet literature of the Norwegian independence movement around 1814 already indicated the peasants as the foundation of national existence, their share in the movement itself was insignificant.[2] There are no precise and reliable data available about the *social position* of the pioneers of the patriotic movement prior to the summoning of the *Storting* to Eidsvoll. We are therefore forced to rely on fragmentary references to the lives of the patriots. The 'patriotic' manifestoes issued by the officials at the time of the British blockade of Norway (1794–1814) cannot be seen as a proof that this social group as a whole was aware of its national identity; but we do know that some high-ranking members of the bureaucracy took part in the preparations for separation from Denmark. We also know that they had the cooperation of a number of entrepreneurs, landowners and intellectuals. There is no more precise information available about the composition of the secret Society for the Welfare of Norway (*Selskabet for Norges Vel*), which is known to have been organized on the model of the contemporary German *Tugendbund*, and to some extent of the Italian *carbonari*.[3]

This lack of information from other sources gives added value to the evidence on the social composition of the national movement provided by the membership of the Eidsvoll *Storting*. Nevertheless, we should not mechanically accept the composition of the *Storting* as a true representation of the national movement, for it was roughly determined in any case by its division into Estates. Apart from this, we have to distinguish the social composition of the whole Eidsvoll *Storting* from that of the group of genuine Norwegian patriots within the assembly. The basic classification according to Estates gives us a *Storting* of 59 'officials', 37 members of the peasant estate, and 18 merchants and entrepreneurs.[4] The peasant estate remained completely passive throughout the proceedings; but only 13 were ordinary peasants, the remainder being minor officials (14), rural schoolteachers (4) and village officials (6).[5] The group described as 'officials' was also highly heterogeneous: 18 army officers belonged to it, as well as 12 district judges (i.e. one fifth of all the district judges in Norway). Finally, the category 'officials' included 14 pastors and 10 administrative officials who sat in the *Storting*. Another figure we have, for 12

Table 1. *The social composition of the Eidsvoll 'Storting'*

	Active patriots	Passive patriots	Nationally indifferent	Total
Landowners, high officials	9	7	0	16
Entrepreneurs, merchants	8	5	5	18
Officials (urban and other)	1	3	12	16
Gymnasium teachers, doctors	3	0	0	3
Teachers	0	1	3	4
Clergy	3	6	3	12
Officers	3	6	8	17
Peasants and under-officers	1	6	14	21
Total	28	34	45	107

big landowners and large-scale merchants, is misleading, as there were also numerous entrepreneurs among the officials.[6]

The minutes of the proceedings at Eidsvoll are so copious that it is possible to get an idea of the degree of national consciousness displayed by almost every representative. We shall distinguish between three basic attitudes here: an aggressive, actively patriotic approach; a fairly patriotic attitude but a passive role in the debates; and national indifference. Opponents of patriotic tendencies were present only in small numbers and for our purposes can be left out of account. In view of the above-mentioned peculiarities in the composition of the Eidsvoll *Storting*, we have included in the group of entrepreneurs those officials who took part in industrial or commercial undertakings, while we have assigned the higher officials to the group of landowners. Hence the basis of social demarcation differs somewhat in the Norwegian case from the procedure we shall normally adopt when analysing national movements.[7] Table 1 clearly shows that members of the ruling class – and in particular the higher bureaucracy – took a very active part in the national struggles of the Eidsvoll *Storting*. The representatives of the popular strata, on the other hand, were mostly indifferent; for the ordinary people, questions of nationality were as yet alien and remote. A relatively convincing reason why many of the merchants also kept in the background would be their concern for the interests of trade. Commercial prosperity depended on a good relationship with Britain; we therefore find that most of the advocates of a union with Sweden were merchants, because this was the solution Britain was endeavouring to bring about.[8]

Throughout the subsequent decades the officials retained their numerical preponderance in the Norwegian *Storting* (cf. Table 2). The evolution of the *Storting*'s social composition kept in step with the overall development of the relationship of political forces in Norway;[9] the preponderance of the officials was temporarily outweighed for the first time in the 1830s by the numerical

Table 2. *Changes in the Social Composition of the 'Storting'* (%)

	1814	1818	1821	1824	1827	1830	1833	1836	1842	1848
Officials	46	54	42	46	51	48	34	38	41	43
Merchants, entrepreneurs	12	12	23	20	18	17	15	12	9	11
Lawyers	3	6	—	3	3	3	3	3	4	5
Peasants	36	23	32	31	25	25	47	45	43	37
Others	4	5	3	—	3	5	1	2	3	4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

superiority of the peasant representatives, and then in the latter half of the nineteenth century the peasants completely won the upper hand. In addition to their basic social demands, the peasant representatives also sought to put into effect a moderate democratization of public life. Conflicts became acute soon after 1814, at a time of financial crisis and economic difficulties, for which the peasants blamed the merchants and officials who had advocated and achieved separation from Denmark. The attempt to block the 'unpatriotic' agitation of the peasants by restricting their representation in the *Storting* was not successful.[10]

The rural element was from the beginning more strongly represented than one might expect from the proportion of peasants among the deputies: from 1815 to 1827 45% of the rural representatives were peasants, and 47% officials; from 1830 to 1842 59% were peasants, and 31% officials; from 1845 to 1857 63% were peasants, and 29% officials.

The remainder of the rural representatives belonged to the free professions.[11] Among the urban representatives, on the other hand, the officials were able to maintain their position in the *Storting* until the mid-nineteenth century:[12] from 1815 to 1827 the towns were represented in a proportion of 48% by officials, and 45% by merchants; from 1830 to 1842 the proportions were 60% officials to 34% merchants: from 1845 to 1857 the proportions were 50% officials to 32% merchants.

The rest of the deputies were lawyers, and, to an increasing degree after the 1840s, craftsmen. In reality the fusion between the entrepreneurial and the bureaucratic strata was so pronounced that many members of the bureaucracy entered the *Storting* as representatives of the commercial Estate. This becomes clear if we look at the composition of the electoral colleges of the four largest towns in Norway – Oslo, Kristiansand, Bergen and Trondheim.[13]

If we observe the composition of the electoral colleges, where changes in the level of political activity of the different social strata were most directly expressed, we find that the political activity of the craftsmen was already on

Table 3. *The composition of the four electoral colleges*

	1815	1820	1823	1829	1832	1835	1841	1844	1850
1. Officials and free professions	28	25	24	30	24	26	28	22	15
2. Merchants	29	34	33	27	30	26	25	30	29
3. Craftsmen	2	3	4	9	12	13	15	14	23

the increase by the beginning of the 1830s, i.e. their political emergence runs parallel with that of the peasantry.

Since these changes in the social basis of Norwegian political life occurred in the 1830s they coincided with the entry onto the political scene of a generation of patriots who emphasized the cultural, linguistic and ethnic individuality of Norway, adducing as evidence the character of the Norwegian peasantry. For the present we can determine only the relative share of the different social groups in this patriotic activity by using a representative sample, namely the list of around 550 subscribers to the *Samlinger til det norske Folks Sprog og Historie*, published by the Society for the Language and History of the Norwegian People (*Samfundet for det norske Folks Sprog og Historie*).[14] The subscribers formed at the same time the base of the society's membership, so that the social composition of this group is highly significant for the whole movement.

Table 4. *The social composition of the group of subscribers to the Samlinger til det norske Folks Sprog og Historie (in %)*

	Location of activity				
	Oslo	Other towns in Ost- and Westfold	In the rest of Norway	Country places	Total
Officials	6.3	6.5	3.2	5.6	21.6
Merchants and entrepreneurs	1.7	7.8	3.9	2.4	15.8
Officers	5.6	2.6	2.4	3.5	14.1
Free professions	1.3	0.9	0.4	0.4	3.0
Teachers	2.6	1.5	0.6	—	4.7
Clergy	0.2	0.9	0.8	16.9	18.8
Students	10.4	1.5	0.4	0.4	12.7
Peasants	—	0.2	0.2	7.0	7.4
Office employees and others	—	0.9	0.2	0.8	1.9
Total	28.1	22.8	12.1	37.0	100.0

This table confirms certain of the hypothetical assumptions we formulated earlier. The peasants only infrequently supported the endeavours of the patriots, but pastors living in country districts displayed a higher level of participation than the urban clergy, thereby indicating the future importance of the country people to the national movement. The low proportion of subscribers who were urban entrepreneurs, especially in Oslo, is a remarkable phenomenon, and reflects the hostility of the commercial bourgeoisie to linguistic radicalism. The only people who showed a certain interest were the merchants of Østlandet. The category 'free professions' includes only doctors, pharmacists and artists; lawyers have been placed in the category 'officials'. From the point of view of territorial structure the importance of the area around the fjord of Oslo is fairly clear: more than three quarters of the urban patriots had their field of activity there.

There is no other direct evidence from this period that the peasants actively participated in the patriotic movement; on the other hand we do know that as early as 1829 Henrik Wergeland was organizing the publication of popular educational books for the rural public. His periodicals *Nationalbladet* and, subsequently, *Statsborgeren*, took this kind of reading public into account in their programme.[15] Moreover, Wergeland was in favour of the reforms the peasants were pressing for, which aimed at democratizing Norway's institutions. Wergeland's radical national programme was objectively the expression of the peasantry's claim to hegemony in the national movement. But how far was it directly a peasant programme? The question remains open.

In speaking of the role of the commercial bourgeoisie, or the entry of the peasantry into political life, we do not mean to imply that here, any more than in any other country, patriots from all districts participated to an equal degree. Owing to Norway's peculiar geographical conditions we cannot hope to establish the true level of participation of particular compact districts in the life of the nation; there were no such districts. But it would be correct to say that the more influential politicians came for the most part from the large towns, and, inversely, that the small towns of the north of Norway played almost no part in political and national life. This was also true to some extent of the west. Among the rural areas, Østlandet appears to have been the most active part of Norway: this was also the area where the peasants entered political and national life earliest. For example, the representatives of Østlandet were the most active of all the peasant deputies to the Eidsvoll *Storting*.[16]

In view of the way the Norwegian national movement developed, the question of the *social origin* of the patriots has a twofold significance. The question at issue here is not only the social origin of the supporters of Wergeland's radical group, but also the social origin of the Norwegian intelligentsia as a whole after the year 1814. For the alternative to Wergeland's patriotism, among politically-minded and educated Norwegians, was not national indifference, or a different national consciousness (Danish or Swedish),

but a Norwegian patriotism of another kind. If, in a constitutional state, we can see university education as the prerequisite and the instrument for politically conscious thought, the social origin of the Norwegian intelligentsia as a whole will be of interest to us. This aspect also has a special methodological significance for our comparative study. The Norwegian nation is the only one of our oppressed nations whose national movement ran its course under conditions covered by the Western European conception of the development of a 'state-nation': here political and ethnic unity were largely identical, and the oppressed nation displayed roughly the same organic social structure as the ruling nation. This is why the group which pioneered the revival of the Norwegian nation differed so considerably in its social composition from those of other oppressed nations. The bourgeoisie and the topmost strata of the intelligentsia, who were attached to the bourgeoisie, had the foremost place in the movement, whereas in the other cases those groups were to be found predominantly within the ruling nation. An investigation of the social origin of this intelligentsia is therefore of enhanced interest for our study.

Before we undertake this analysis, let us briefly reconstruct the social origin of the members of the Eidsvoll *Storting*. Data were available for three quarters of the deputies, and can be summarized as follows:

Social Origin	Number of Deputies
family of officials	17
family of merchants or entrepreneurs	15
family of craftsmen	3
family of pastors	3
family of officers	9
family of rural schoolteachers	2
family of peasants	23

Significantly enough, most of the merchant deputies came from merchant families, pastors from pastors' families, almost all officers from officers' families, and almost all peasants from peasants' families. Only the officials were different: approximately half of them came from a non-official milieu.[17] The social origin of the representatives at Eidsvoll accordingly confirms our picture of the division of eighteenth-century Norwegian society into fixed and stable Estates.

Let us look now at the social origin of those members of the intelligentsia who passed through the Norwegian national university at Oslo in the first half of the nineteenth century.[18] Under the Norwegian system all students graduated initially in the arts. The social origin of the graduates from the Faculty of Arts accordingly forms our most appropriate starting-point.[19]

A high proportion of Norwegian students thus originated from ruling class families. This finding fits in well with the initial social composition of the group

Table 5. *The social origin of students in Oslo University's Faculty of Arts (in %)*

Parents' profession	Period covered					
	1813–25	1826–30	1831–5	1836–40	1841–5	1846–50
High officials	17.7	15.0	12.5	21.3	13.3	8.5
Merchants, craftsmen	19.5	26.5	28.5	24.9	24.0	23.9
Officials (medium rank and municipal)	8.8	12.4	13.5	9.8	15.9	14.8
Free professions	3.0	2.2	3.4	4.7	6.8	8.9
Clergy	24.5	16.5	13.9	14.2	16.8	17.8
Teachers	2.6	4.4	3.4	1.7	3.2	3.5
Officers	11.3	13.9	12.9	12.7	10.7	14.7
Peasants, fishermen	6.7	4.2	5.9	4.1	4.9	4.0
Workers and others	5.9	4.9	6.0	6.6	4.4	4.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

of pioneers of Norwegian political and national life. The first half of the nineteenth century saw a decline in the proportion of students from the families of high officials, while the proportion of students from the families of merchants and craftsmen remained high throughout. The numerical strength of the group of students from officers' families should be viewed as a reflection of the 'typical' social structure of the whole nation, and the existence of a national army was clearly a prerequisite for this phenomenon. Despite the numerical strength of the peasantry in the country as a whole, the proportion of students of peasant origin was insignificant, and over the period studied it tended to decline rather than increase. Only in the second half of the nineteenth century did increasing numbers of students appear from the country districts. The emergence of the popular masses in the first half of the century is shown not by a peasant influx into the student body but by an increase in the proportion of students from the families of middle and lower-ranking officials and craftsmen.

The officials were the most active component of the intelligentsia from a political and national point of view. Most of them had had a legal education.[20] The graduates of the Faculty of Law showed a remarkable divergence from the average in their social origin.[21] Among the law students, the proportion of sons of officials was much higher than it was in the Faculty of Arts (it varied between 30% and 33%). The proportion of sons of merchants and entrepreneurs was also much higher (between 13% and 22%). Students of popular origin and sons of pastors, on the other hand, were more weakly represented (between 7% and 16%). However, the theology students present a different picture, particularly in the earlier generations. Nearly 50% of them came from the

families of pastors, and the proportion of sons of officials was correspondingly lower (between 14% and 20%). The originally very low percentage of sons of town-dwellers showed an increase over the period (from 13% to 23%), which affected the category of sons of craftsmen in particular. The proportion of sons of peasants showed a similar increase (from 3% to 7%).[22]

Even though there is not enough material available in the Norwegian case to answer all of our questions, certain results do emerge clearly from this analysis.

1. The high bureaucracy took the lead in Phase A, the period of local patriotism. They were joined by a section of the entrepreneurs (not just the commercial bourgeoisie); these groups also had a decisive influence at the beginning of Phase B. The peasantry, on the other hand, showed very little concern at the outset for national affairs.

2. The linguistic and cultural movement of the 1830s looked mainly to the peasantry for support. Its actual organizers, of course, were students and young intellectuals, although the precise composition of the movement cannot be established at present.

3. Of the other components of the intelligentsia, it was the clergy who were the most strongly represented among the patriots, although they do not stand in the forefront in terms of political impact. The teachers and the professional classes only took a very small part in the movement.

4. National life was undoubtedly at its liveliest in the urban milieu. The rural region which showed the most pronounced national feeling was Østlandet.

5. The overwhelming majority of the Norwegian intelligentsia originated in the towns, and its most politically active section came predominantly from the upper strata of urban society – high officials, merchants and entrepreneurs. The families of craftsmen and members of the free professions played a much smaller part. The proportion of the intelligentsia of peasant origin was insignificant in the first half of the nineteenth century. The only group to increase its proportional weight among the intelligentsia in the period studied was the sons of the clergy.

We have now to establish which elements of the objective relations decisive for the formation of a modern nation played the role of agents of integration in the Norwegian national movement, and which elements on the contrary had the effect of retarding it. Among the integrating factors the first place is occupied by political relations. Norway maintained its political individuality, and the events of 1814 were the victorious conclusion of the movement we describe as 'Landespatriotismus', which had its counterpart in most of the countries we studied, though it usually died out with the fall of the feudal system. The victory of this patriotism in Norway was not simply associated with a favourable constellation in international politics, but resulted first and

foremost from the distinctive social composition of the group which upheld it. Its members were not from the landed aristocracy, but from the bureaucracy, which gradually merged with the commercial bourgeoisie. With this we arrive at the second weighty circumstance which played a positive role in the successful outcome of the Norwegian national movement. In the course of the transformation of the feudal ruling class into a capitalist one, a part of the bourgeoisie separated itself off, and although it continued to belong to the ruling nation ethnically and linguistically, politically it placed itself in opposition and took the lead in the movement of the oppressed nation. In this sense Norway's national development occupies an intermediate position between the revival of a small nation and the formation of a modern 'great' nation.

The proclamation of Norwegian independence, and later on the advantageous terms under which Norway was brought into the union with Sweden, were the work of a small group of politically active patriots, and one can hardly say that these events resulted from the efforts of the whole ruling class. The success of the patriots, who could not rely either on mass political support or military strength, was made possible by the exceptional international situation: at this time none of the Great Powers was interested in the complete subjugation of this remote and far-flung land. But the considerable distances and the territorial fragmentation characteristic of Norway worked the other way too, retarding the national movement, especially in Phase B, when the determined action of a handful of patriots was no longer adequate, and it was necessary instead to mobilize broad strata of the population. Norwegian national consciousness penetrated very slowly into the countryside, and this was certainly a result, less of peasant mistrust towards the urban milieu (though this certainly existed) than it was of the barriers to communication created by distance, high mountains and a deeply indented littoral. These disadvantages had a disintegratory effect, hindering the spread of linguistic patriotism during the emergence of the Wergelandian generation and the struggle over *landsmål*. We have already mentioned a number of other circumstances tending towards disintegration: the deep antagonism between town and country, based on divergent traditions and divergent economic interests, and the lack of a sufficiently powerful threat to the nation from outside, capable of galvanizing the members of the nation into forming a closer union.

Changes in the labour market might also have been an important factor in motivating national activism among the intelligentsia. Whereas up to the middle of the 1830s Norway was very short of clergy and officials with a university education, a period of insufficient employment opportunities began in the 1840s. This was because the new Norwegian university was now capable of producing more graduates than could find jobs. The lack of suitable jobs was not, it seems, severe enough to cause extreme radicalization among young academics, but it was enough of a threat to drive the majority into conformism

and deter them from breaking lightly with the existing norms of national life.[23] These harsh realities probably had a bearing on the way the national movement developed in the mid nineteenth century. Whereas the emergence of the radical patriots coincided with the first period, their patriotic agitation was carried on in a time of growing conformism among the young intelligentsia, and this was certainly also from the national point of view a factor of disintegration.

We can therefore say in conclusion that the conditions for the formation of the Norwegian nation were unquestionably very favourable, but many factors worked against the creation of a radical national programme and hindered its implantation in the masses. Objective relations acted initially as integrating factors, helping to ensure a rapid transition from Phase A to Phase B, but important disintegrating factors emerged during Phase B, especially in relation to communication-links and vertical social mobility. As a result of this the transition to Phase C was delayed. The national community turned out to be held together predominantly by political and economic ties; however, these were so powerful that it continued to be possible to dispense with linguistic unity as a component of national existence.

9

Integration heightened by revolution: the Czech national movement in Bohemia

The formation of the modern Czech nation took place in an area divided historically into two states: the Bohemian kingdom and the Moravian margraviate. These two units had been joined together under a single ruler throughout their history. The Bohemian state, which was independent in the Middle Ages, retained a certain autonomy after 1526, when it was associated with the Austrian lands and Hungary in a personal union under the rule of the Habsburgs. Only after the defeat of the rising of the Bohemian Estates between 1618 and 1620 were real restrictions placed on the independence of Bohemia and Moravia. Moreover, a large part of the Czech ruling class had vanished; henceforth people of Czech nationality lived under the domination of a foreign ruling class.

During the second half of the eighteenth century a new interest in Czech culture and the Czech language arose, based on the patriotic scholarship of the Enlightenment. These activities faced obstacles after the accession of Francis II (1792), whose regime removed even the partial liberalization of the Josephine era and restored a system of rigid oppression. This circumstance certainly retarded the growing patriotic activity of Phase A, and prevented any immediate transition from scholarship to conscious agitational work. A new phase of the national movement did not commence until the coming of the next generation, in the second decade of the nineteenth century.[1]

Despite the atmosphere of political repression the Czech national movement achieved some remarkable results, which we may regard as the first manifestation of Phase B. In the 1840s national agitation penetrated successfully into broader layers of the population, not only in Prague and the Czech towns in general, but also, with a certain delay, in the countryside and Moravia.

The transition to Phase C of the national movement is clearly linked in Bohemia with the revolution of 1848–9. The revolutionary events speeded up the process of establishing relations between the centres of patriotism in Prague and the countryside. The peasants acted: petitions in considerable numbers, demanding above all the liquidation of feudalism, were sent to the newly established National Council in Prague. Even though the political revolution was defeated, and national life was in state of suspended animation in the period

of reaction which followed in the 1850s, the coming of the mass national movement was an irreversible development, and at the beginning of the constitutional era in the early 1860s it re-emerged in full maturity.

What sources can we draw on to study the social composition of the patriotic groups of the 1820s, 1830s and 1840s? The most valuable sources of information are the patriotic periodicals and the records of participation in patriotically motivated actions during this period.[2]

However, only a few of the patriotic periodicals had a significant influence on the Czech national revival. The *Journal of the Bohemian Museum* (*Časopis Českého musea*, from 1827) was one of these. Its aim was to gather together a public of patriotic Czechs; in this it differed from the very outset from similar journals produced among other nationalities. In the case of this journal it is possible to establish the list of subscribers, whereas with other journals only the names of the contributors survive. The most important source for the names of Czech patriots is the list of people who worked for and gave support to the Czech Association, the *Matice česká*. The unambiguously patriotic tendency of the *Matice* distinguishes it from an analogous organization, which was set up to diffuse religious literature in the Czech language, the so-called Bequest of St John (*Dědictví svatojánské*), in which the Catholic aspect took precedence over the patriotic element. The *Matice* acquired the monetary means necessary to finance Czech patriotic books solely from the voluntary contributions of its supporters; its records, and the private correspondence of Czech patriots, inform us with certainty that this institution was generally considered the most important centre for the publication of books in Czech. To make a contribution to the *Matice* required a definitely patriotic attitude; presence in the list of contributors is therefore a conclusive proof of this. The names of contributors to the *Matice* were regularly published in a supplement to the *Journal of the Bohemian Museum*, along with the nature of the donor's employment and his place of residence. This gives us a peculiarly valuable mass of source-material, which was originally intended for agitational purposes. It is of no relevance in this context that the contributions were motivated in part by personal vanity, or by a wish to keep up appearances. We proceed from the assumption that national consciousness in itself was no guarantee of the personal integrity or elevated character of the individual.

The fact that the lists of contributors to the *Matice* were published in the *Journal of the Bohemian Museum* was not an accident. The *Matice česká* was closely linked with the Bohemian Museum from the outset. The lists of contributors to the *Matice* directly followed on after the lists of subscribers to the *Journal of the Bohemian Museum* from its initial publication in 1827 onwards. From this date, therefore, we have adequate material for the study of the Czech patriots. However, both institutions underwent considerable changes in the period between 1827 and 1847. Their programme of activities increasingly changed

its emphasis from the earlier scientific and scholarly tendencies towards patriotic work for the popular reader. This was reflected from the opening of the 1840s in a new conception of editorial policy on the part of the *Matice*.

But there is a problem. Is not our sample of lists over the whole period investigated liable to be distorted by the fact that contributions to the *Matice* were disproportionately high? The lowest known contribution was one of five florins, and we know that the poorer patriots must have had to scrape and save a long time to be able to send a contribution of this amount to the *Matice*. Poverty could therefore certainly distort the composition of the lists of patriots. We have accordingly checked our analysis by comparing the *Matice* with another patriotic undertaking where a lack of assets was not such an obstacle. This is the campaign for a Czech Technical School, in connection with which collections were made from just before 1848 until the early 1850s.

In Moravia the national revival occurred very late in the *Vormärz* era, and proceeded by and large independently of developments in Bohemia. The *Matice česká* lists are accordingly not as reliable for the Moravian patriots as they are for Bohemia, and there are no other similar sources for Moravia at this time. For these reasons we have eliminated the Czech national revival in Moravia before 1848 from our investigation and concentrated our attention on Bohemia.

So much by way of introduction, to allow us to proceed to our actual findings on the social composition of the patriotic groups in Bohemia. The clearest picture of the variations in the participation of each social group at this time is provided by Table 6, which gives a general view of the social composition of the list of contributors to the *Matice* (and up to 1833 of the readership of the *Journal of the Bohemian Museum*). Despite a number of accidental variations, the table reveals many striking changes in the level of participation of the individual groups. The data on the period of the Museum Journal (1827 to 1833) fit in with our conception of the predominance of men of learning among the subscribers; hence the great part played by the nobility and the relative weakness of the student element. We are surprised on the other hand by the interest shown by middle-class circles. The beginnings of the *Matice* were marked by the emergence of the students to prominence and by a considerable regression in aristocratic interest, as well as by a tendency, hard to explain for the moment – a withdrawal of the burghers from the movement. This change in the orientation of the *Matice* is shown above all by an increase in the interest displayed by officials and members of the free professions, while the proportion of students fell (temporarily) and the role of the clergy went into a lasting decline.

In order to provide a more reliable basis and to allow the analysis to be pressed further we have collected data on a broader circle of patriots, treating other lists of contributors to the *Matice* according to the principles set out earlier. Our analysis of the social composition of a complex of almost 2,800

Table 6. *Subscribers to the 'Journal of Bohemian Museum' and contributors to the 'Matice' in the years 1827 to 1848, by social group, in %*

	Nobility	Free professions	Officials	Teachers	Students	Artisans, burghers	Peasants	Workers	Clergy	Numerical total for year
1827	8.5	7.5	11.5	5.5	10.0	6.0	—	—	48.0	375
1828	9.0	8.0	13.0	8.5	6.0	11.0	—	—	45.0	173
1829	10.0	7.0	14.0	8.0	7.5	8.5	—	—	45.5	140
1830	8.5	8.5	14.0	8.5	5.0	9.5	—	—	44.5	175
1831	13.5	9.0	12.0	9.0	5.5	5.5	—	—	44.5	134
1832	9.5	7.0	17.0	8.0	9.5	8.5	—	—	40.0	279
1833	2.0	6.5	12.0	7.0	23.0	5.5	—	—	44.0	223
1834	1.0	6.0	11.5	9.5	25.5	5.5	—	—	41.5	222
1835	1.0	8.0	12.0	6.0	23.0	6.0	—	—	44.0	227
1836	4.0	5.0	14.5	7.0	23.5	4.0	—	—	42.0	183
1837	7.5	8.5	13.0	5.0	10.5	6.5	1.5	0.5	41.0	219
1838	3.0	11.0	12.5	3.0	18.5	5.0	—	—	47.0	125
1839	2.5	8.5	13.0	7.0	22.0	6.5	1.0	—	39.0	74
1840	4.0	10.0	8.0	4.0	20.0	6.0	—	—	48.0	49
1841	2.5	12.0	22.0	4.0	14.0	4.0	1.5	—	40.0	76
1842	4.0	16.5	20.0	8.5	13.0	10.0	—	—	28.0	231
1843	2.5	15.5	16.5	7.0	17.0	12.0	0.6	0.5	28.0	381
1844	1.5	15.0	18.0	4.0	22.0	11.0	—	0.5	28.0	517
1845	0.5	11.0	18.0	6.0	22.0	8.5	—	0.5	33.5	917
1846	1.5	6.0	20.0	6.0	24.0	12.5	1.5	2.0	30.4	1,157
1847	1.5	3.5	20.0	7.0	23.5	11.5	1.0	2.0	29.0	1,443
1848	0.1	1.0	16.5	7.5	30.0	11.0	1.5	2.5	29.0	1,135

patriots, presented in Table 7, confirms and gives added precision to the fundamental tendency of development already shown in Table 6, namely towards a high level of participation by students, clergy and officials (in particular officials on private estates, or 'seigneurial officials'). Not all the groups shared to an equal extent in the rapid rise in the number of contributors.

Now we can ask how the relevant social groups were represented in the various types of settlement, from village to city (see Table 8). Most members of the free professions and most students lived in Prague. More than half of the patriotic clergy, on the other hand, lived in rural areas and thus formed the majority of the local patriots. Seigneurial officials formed the second largest group of rural patriots. The latter figure, expressed as a percentage, was as follows for each type of settlement: Prague 32%, larger towns 10.5%, medium-sized towns 21%, small towns 8% and villages 28%.

Let us now compare the data we have gained on the social composition of our group of patriots with data on the composition of the readership of a popular journal from the *Vormärz* era, of the list of supporters of the institution for religious literature we mentioned earlier, and of the list of contributors to the Czech Technical School before 1848. The list of supporters of the Bequest of St John Nepomuk is so detailed that it could be given a similar treatment to that given in the case of the *Matice*. But we shall limit ourselves here to giving

Table 7. *The social composition of Czech patriots*

	Prague		Towns over 5,000		Towns of 2–5,000		Towns of 1–2,000		Villages and townships		Total	
	1827–41	1842–8	1827–41	1842–8	1827–41	1842–8	1827–41	1842–8	1827–41	1842–8	1827–41	1842–8
Nobles, landowners, high off.	54	28	6	4	3	—	—	—	6	12	69	44
1. Merchants	5	19	3	17	10	12	—	7	—	4	18	59
2. Entrepreneurs	1	8	1	3	4	3	—	2	—	—	6	16
3. Artisans	14	34	9	13	15	42	2	16	7	31	47	136
Burghers	20	61	13	33	29	57	2	25	7	35	71	211
4. Doctors	19	26	1	7	7	17	—	3	—	3	27	56
5. Lawyers	17	8	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	18	9
6. Artists, etc.	33	21	5	2	—	1	—	—	—	—	38	24
Free professions	69	55	7	10	7	18	—	3	—	3	83	89
7. Patrim. off.	4	4	2	4	15	38	14	20	40	79	75	145
8. Other off.	21	59	5	23	19	26	1	19	3	24	49	151
Officials (7+8)	25	63	7	27	34	64	15	39	43	103	124	296
Clergy	20	21	13	29	72	85	44	70	164	248	313	453
9. Gymnasium teachers	6	16	6	9	8	12	1	—	—	—	21	37
10. Other teachers	13	25	3	11	9	11	1	8	8	25	34	80
Teachers (9+10)	19	41	9	20	17	23	2	8	8	25	55	117
Officers and soldiers	4	8	—	4	1	5	—	1	—	—	5	18
Students	113	257	14	77	28	107	1	9	4	40	160	490
Millers	1	7	—	2	—	2	—	2	2	15	3	28
Peasants	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	2	28	2	29
Workers, employees	1	5	—	2	2	2	—	4	2	10	5	23
Housewives, etc.	3	10	3	6	2	14	—	1	2	15	10	46
Total	329	556	72	214	195	377	64	163	240	534	900	1,844

Note: Off. = officials. Patrim. off. = Patrimonial, otherwise called seigneurial, officials.

an outline classification according to the percentage share of each social group, and the tendency of this proportion to evolve in one direction or another through time.[3] Here are the percentages, for three sample periods, rounded off to whole numbers:

	1834–40	1841–5	1847–8
Artisans and burghers	9	15	12
Officials, free professions, teachers	16	8	6
Clergy	65	60	21
Peasants	3	11	54
Others	7	6	7
Total	100	100	100

Table 8. *Social composition of the group of patriots, by size of place of activity*

	Prague	Towns +5,000	Towns +2,000	Towns +1,000	Villages	Total	%
Landowners, high officials	82	10	3	—	18	113	4.2
Merchants, artisans, burghers, millers	89	48	88	29	59	313	11.5
Free professions	124	17	25	3	3	172	6.3
Officials	88	34	98	54	146	420	15.4
Clergy	41	42	157	114	412	766	28.0
Teachers	60	29	40	10	33	172	6.3
Students	360	91	135	10	44	640	23.4
Officers	12	4	6	1	—	23	0.8
Peasants	—	—	—	1	30	31	1.1
Workers, servants	6	2	4	4	12	28	1.0
Others, or undetermined	13	9	16	1	17	56	2.0
Total	875	286	572	227	774	2,734	100.0
Total in %	32.0	10.5	20.0	8.3	28.3	100.0	

Table 9. *Social composition of the readership of the periodical 'Večerní vyražení' (in %), according to size of place of residence*

	Prague	Towns	Villages	Place not established	Total
Merchants, artisans burghers	13.0	10.0	0.5	6.0	29.5
Officials, teachers, free professions	9.0	9.0	8.0	6.0	32.0
Clergy	2.0	6.0	10.0	0.5	18.5
Students	3.0	0.5	—	4.0	7.5
Peasants, millers	0.5	—	2.0	—	2.5
Not established	1.5	0.5	6.0	—	8.0
Total	29.0	26.0	26.5	16.5	98.0

The proportion of artisan and burgher supporters was in general the same as with the *Matice* group, but the proportion of the secular intelligentsia fell progressively, and was by and large insignificant. The predominance of the clergy is no surprise, unlike the pronounced decline in its share, which was a result of the mass entry of peasants into the association. This is itself unquestionably an expression of the penetration, if not of national consciousness, at least of education, into the broad mass of the peasantry, and corresponds to our periodization of the movement, according to which the beginning of Phase C should coincide with this very phenomenon.

Table 9 gives a clear picture of the social composition of the readership of

the popular journal *Večerní vyražení* (*Evening Entertainment*) for the year 1831. It is almost astounding how closely the social composition of the readership of this journal parallels our group of patriots in the period when the *Matice* was beginning its activity: there is a similarly low level of participation by students and peasants, and in general similar proportions coming from the various types of settlement.

From the period of the close of Phase B of the national movement we still have available the lists of contributors to the Czech Technical School. The complicated problems arising from the analysis of these lists would require a separate study. For our purposes, however, it will be sufficient to make a crude classification of the social composition of the earliest list, which refers to the year 1847.[4] Burghers and artisans provided 32% of the contributors, the secular intelligentsia 24%, students only 3.5%, the clergy 8% and peasants 14%. In the course of the succeeding years the number of workers increased, but otherwise the proportions remained the same. Here therefore we meet with a social structure which already seems to be characteristic for Phase C of the national movement in Bohemia.

After undertaking these comparisons we feel it is impossible to deny the part played by urban patriots in the Czech national revival. These comparisons enable us to establish a 'topography of patriotism', i.e. to analyse the territorial distribution of patriots over the province of Bohemia. Did all the towns take part in national activity? In which regions do we find the largest number of patriots? To answer these questions we added together the data on contributors to the *Matice* or the Bohemian Museum, and projected the results onto the map of Bohemia. Here we concentrate our gaze on small groups of patriots, including those to be found in the country districts. We regard a town or a rural commune as the locus of a patriotic group if we can establish the simultaneous presence in it of at least three contributors to the *Matice* or Museum, or two contributors of different occupations and a third present either immediately afterwards or immediately before. The aim is to find out which milieu favoured the growth of national consciousness or, respectively, whether we can establish any regular pattern at all. The description 'a community of patriots' as applied to a group of contributors consisting of three persons is by no means an exaggeration. We have assumed, and this is confirmed by a number of studies of local history, that other interested parties collected around the patriots themselves, and that journals and books were lent by one person to another, and also read aloud to larger groups of listeners.[5] On the other hand we should not underestimate the significance of the distribution of the patriotic groups in places where they consisted mainly of persons who were unable independently to choose their own locus of activity. There is no proof that these people spent their formative years in that particular place. This statement applies above all to the clergy, but it also applies to some teachers in *gymnasia*



Map 1 The Territorial Structure of the National Movement in Bohemia

and, to a lesser degree, to officials. The above map, which is drawn up on the basis of the analysis we have undertaken, speaks very plainly in its own right. It will therefore be sufficient simply to give certain facts in broad outline.

The size of the patriotic groups was directly proportional to the population of the patriots' locus of activity. The patriotic communities were evenly distributed over the territory of Bohemia. We can, however, distinguish three areas in particular, by reference to the density of the patriotic population in the towns (and in country districts, where fairly large groups of patriots were present):

(a) an area where a group of patriots was active in all towns with more than 1,000 inhabitants (middle Elbe valley, Jizera valley, Eastern Bohemia),

(b) an area where we can only find patriotic groups in the larger towns and in certain administrative centres (whether of state or seigneurial institutions – above all in Southwest and Western Bohemia),
(c) an area with isolated groups of patriots separated from each other by considerable distances (Southeast and Southern Bohemia).

It will only be possible to interpret these facts when we have made our comparative study.

The patriotic communities are not only to be distinguished from each other by their size, but also by their social composition. We shall therefore try briefly to characterize the types of patriotic community with regard to their social composition and their situation. We shall avoid making an exhaustive enumeration of the names of these localities, and simply give the conclusion of an investigation which we made on a fairly large scale:

1. The groups in the nationally more active areas of Bohemia consisted more often than elsewhere of members of all the basic social groups (i.e. officials, burghers and clergy).
2. We find the middle classes most strongly represented in the patriotic groups of Eastern Bohemia and in the eastern part of Central Bohemia (the Elbe valley), but they were almost never represented in the patriotic groups of the areas of Bohemia which were less active nationally.
3. Officials were at their strongest in the groups of patriots on the nationally active territory which extended from Western Bohemia to the area where the river Jizera enters Northern Bohemia.
4. The small groups of patriots in the nationally passive areas consisted most often of men of religion, with occasional participation by officials.

The question of the *social origin* of the patriots or, more precisely, of the patriotic intelligentsia, is a problem that has by no means been neglected in the Czech specialist literature on the subject. Most authors see the Czech patriots as sons of peasants, who in the course of their education entered German or Germanized towns and arrived at an awareness of their nationality while there.[6] E. Chalupný, however, pointed to the fact that many patriots came from the towns.[7] More precise analyses are entirely lacking. But we do have a very valuable source for the social origins of the patriotic intelligentsia in the shape of the student registers of Prague University, and of the theological seminaries outside Prague.[8] These uniform catalogues make it possible to establish the nature of the employment of the parents, and the place of birth, for almost all students from 1815 onwards. Except for some registers, which only give the district of birth rather than the place of birth, we have here a mass of reliable and carefully drawn up source material.[9]

We might expect a more serious distortion to arise from the fact that we cannot identify all the members of the intelligentsia. Out of the total number

Table 10. *Social origin and size of birthplace of the patriotic intelligentsia*

Parental occupation	Prague		Towns over 4,000		Towns over 1,500		Smaller towns		Villages		Not known	Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	%	No.	%
Merchants	17	1.8	8	0.8	16	1.7	6	0.6	9	1.0	0.7	63	6.7
Artisans, burghers	37	3.9	76	8.1	118	12.5	57	6.1	36	3.8	2.7	350	37.2
Free professions	12	3.9	4	0.4	10	1.1	—	—	1	0.1	—	27	2.8
Officials	32	3.4	17	1.8	25	2.7	9	1.0	17	1.8	0.3	103	11.0
Teachers	5	0.5	1	0.1	5	0.5	8	0.9	13	1.3	1.0	41	4.4
Millers	3	0.3	8	0.9	6	0.6	5	0.5	18	1.9	1.3	53	5.6
Peasants	—	—	1	0.1	2	0.2	9	1.0	119	12.6	3.3	161	17.1
Workers, employees	9	1.0	4	0.4	2	0.2	7	0.8	7	0.8	0.6	35	3.7
Miscellaneous	19	2.0	19	2.0	30	3.2	15	1.5	24	2.5	—	107	11.4
Total	134	14.3	138	14.7	214	22.8	116	12.3	244	25.9	10.0	940	100

of members of the intelligentsia and students we were able to get complete data for 800, and for another 140 patriots at any rate incomplete data. The level of success we were able to achieve varied according to which group we were dealing with within the intelligentsia. The social origin of almost all the university students could be established, and the same was true of most of the doctors and lawyers and the majority of the clergy. As against this it was not possible to identify most of the officials; this can of course be explained by the fact that by no means all officials had a university education, at the University of Prague or elsewhere.

As in the case of the social composition of the patriotic element in general, we shall be concerned here above all with social origins (i.e. the nature of the parental occupation) and with place of birth. Table 10 has been drawn up on the basis of these indices.[10] The patriotic intelligentsia originated for the most part from the families of artisans and merchants. Less than a fifth of them came from peasant families. Similarly, most of the patriots were born in towns, and only a quarter came from the countryside. The relatively low percentage of sons of doctors and lawyers is not surprising; and the very low percentage of patriots from teachers' families confirms the insignificant part played by this stratum in the national revival. The share of seigneurial officials in the countryside is however surprisingly low. Is this a reflection of the distortion arising from our failure to identify the social origins of more than a handful of the patriotic officials? Only an insignificant number of Czech patriots came from families we could include among the 'notables'; most of them came from families of small-scale producers in town and country. We may explain the low proportion of patriots from the ranks of the poor in town and country by pointing to the very low percentage of people from this stratum who had

received secondary education. The relationships which emerge from these data compel us to reflect critically on the customary notion that the thatched cottage was the cradle of Czech patriotism. This will in turn make us sceptical *a priori* of traditional conceptions like this which attempt to explain the social origins of patriots among other nations than the Czech.

To what degree do the results we have arrived at possess validity as a guide to the social origins of specific generations of the patriotic intelligentsia? Here we have to bear in mind the distortions caused by the lacunae in the registration data, and where possible leave out of consideration the oldest generation of patriots. We therefore place our first chronological boundary in the year 1810, and our second in the year 1820; the oldest generation then consists of patriots who were students at the beginning of Phase B, the middle generation those who grew up after the year of revolution (1830), and the youngest generation is then represented by those who were studying when Phase B was already reaching its end. Table 11 presents the social composition of the members of these three generation-groups. It reveals some interesting and highly significant tendencies of development.

Table 11. *Social origin of the patriotic intelligentsia, by year of birth*

Parental occupation	Born before 1810			Born from 1811–20			Born from 1821–30			Total
	No.	% A	% B	No.	% A	% B	No.	% A	% B	%
Merchants	20	6.2	2.5	21	8.1	2.6	14	6.2	1.7	6.8
Artisans	141	44.3	17.6	92	35.5	11.5	75	33.3	9.3	38.4
Free professions	4	1.3	0.5	14	5.4	1.7	8	3.6	1.0	3.2
Officials	22	6.8	2.7	38	14.7	4.7	34	15.1	4.2	11.6
Teachers	12	3.8	1.5	12	4.6	1.5	6	2.7	0.7	3.7
Millers	13	4.0	1.6	15	5.8	1.9	12	5.3	1.5	5.0
Peasants	36	11.3	4.5	34	13.1	4.2	49	21.8	6.1	14.8
Workers, employees	6	1.8	0.7	12	4.7	1.5	11	4.9	1.4	3.6
Miscellaneous	66	20.6	8.2	21	8.1	2.6	16	7.1	2.1	12.9
Total	319	100.0	39.8	259	100.0	32.2	225	100.0	28.0	100.0

A = Proportionate share of the social group in the given age-group.
B = Proportionate share of the social group in the total number of patriots.

During the closing years of the eighteenth century artisanal production rose considerably, the towns expanded, and the proportion of the population not engaged in agriculture increased. While this process was going on, there was in contrast to it an increase in the number of patriots from peasant families. Starting with the older generation, in which only just over a tenth of the patriots came from peasant families,[11] their share had almost doubled by the time the youngest generation was reached. Even more pronounced was the

increase in the proportion of patriots from the families of officials and members of the free professions; the most striking increase took place between the oldest (pre-1810) and the middle (1811–20) generation. The overall tendency of this development emerges clearly if we merge the members of the different generations into larger social groups, and look at the share of these groups in the total number of patriots:

Employment of parents	Date of Birth Up to 1810	1820	1830
Merchants, artisans, millers	21.7	16.0	12.7
Peasants	4.5	4.2	6.1
Officials, free professions	3.1	6.4	5.2
Total	39.8	32.2	28.0

How did the proportions in the stage-by-stage renewal of the ranks of patriots in town and country correspond to this picture? Table 12 confirms the growing influx of patriots from the countryside and the reduction in the proportion of patriots of urban origin, with the exception of those from Prague, whose share in contrast increased. This tendency is exactly the contrary of the one we noted when analysing the social composition of the patriotic community. Whereas the number of patriots actually in Prague grew much more slowly than the number in other towns, the increase in the number of patriots born in Prague was greater. At the same time the number of patriots born in the other towns declined.

We must naturally undertake further tests, and try to make the results of our study of the social origins of the patriots still more precise. How far were

Table 12. *Place of origin of the patriotic intelligentsia, by year of birth*

Place of birth	Born before 1810		Born 1811–20		Born 1821–30		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Prague	44	13.8	47	18.1	41	18.2	132	16.4
Towns with over 4,000 pop.	57	17.8	46	17.8	31	13.8	134	16.6
Towns with 1,500–4,000 pop.	93	29.1	59	22.8	51	22.7	203	25.3
Small towns	51	15.9	35	13.5	24	10.7	110	13.7
Villages	75	23.4	72	27.8	78	34.6	225	28.0
Towns together	194	61.2	152	58.6	123	54.8	469	58.4
Small towns and villages	126	38.8	107	41.4	102	45.2	335	41.6
Total	320	100.0	259	100.0	225	100.0	804	100.0

the social origins of the patriots and the proportions in which these were divided merely a reflection of the social origins of the student body as a whole? We could only give a complete answer to this question after a systematic treatment of the social origins of all students; this would require a separate investigation. Let us therefore make do with a comparison, taken at random, between a number of academic years at various faculties.[12] These comparisons show us that the proportion of students of peasant origin was in general higher (particularly in the Theological Faculty) than the proportion of the intelligentsia of peasant origin among the patriots; it varied between 15% and 20% in the Faculty of Philosophy, and between 20% and 30% in the Faculty of Theology. The proportion of students from the families of artisans and shopkeepers underwent considerable variations, fluctuating between 40% and 60%, but there is no evidence that it ever sank to such a level that we might be able to view the falling influx from these strata into the patriotic intelligentsia as the reflection of a general tendency of development. Students from the ranks of the intelligentsia are only to be found in very small proportions in the Faculty of Theology (around 10%). In contrast, their share of the Faculties of Medicine and Law was understandably large (around 40%), higher in fact than the proportion of patriotic doctors and lawyers who originated from the ranks of the intelligentsia. In crude outline, therefore, the proportions according to which the patriots varied in their social origins corresponded to the general picture of the social origins of the university intelligentsia in the Bohemia of the *Vormärz* era. Where we find divergences from the basic proportions, they are precisely in the opposite direction from the one we would expect on the basis of the more summary evaluations: a smaller proportion of the peasant strata was to be found among the nationally inclined patriots than the proportion formed by this group of the social origins of all students, and, in the case of the intelligentsia, their share of patriots (with the exception of lawyers and doctors) was higher than the average for students as a whole. Our comparison therefore underlines the significant role played by the artisanal and urban milieu in the origins of the Czech patriotic intelligentsia.

A further useful comparison is between the social origins of patriots and the social origins of a group of students linked together by a criterion closely associated with, though not identical to, patriotism. A group of this kind is formed by the students of the Czech language at the Prague Faculty of Philosophy. We certainly cannot regard all those who successfully completed their Czech examinations as patriots; although we can in most cases regard the choice of Czech as an examination subject as a criterion of Czech nationality. In addition to this the milieu in which these students moved was full of patriotic impulses, hence provided the best possible atmosphere for the development of national consciousness. We are therefore interested not only in the proportional division of social origins for the whole group, but also in its development from the 1820s to the 1840s (cf. Table 13).

Table 13. *Social origins of students of Czech at Prague University, 1826–47*

Parental occupation	1826–31		1832–7		1842–7	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Landowners	4	0.8	8	1.6	2	0.2
Merchants	27	5.3	25	4.9	40	4.4
Artisans	202	38.7	191	36.8	249	27.4
Free professions	13	2.5	10	1.9	52	5.7
Officials	58	11.1	71	13.6	129	14.2
Teachers	11	2.1	30	5.8	26	2.9
Millers	20	3.8	22	4.2	22	2.5
Peasants	69	13.2	67	12.8	144	15.9
Workers and employees	14	2.7	23	4.3	32	3.5
Miscellaneous	103	19.8	72	14.1	212	23.3
Total	521	100.0	519	100.0	908	100.0

The proportion of students from rural backgrounds thus did not increase, although at the outset it was considerably higher than the proportion of educated people of rural origin among the patriots. As in the case of the patriotic intelligentsia, the growth in the proportion of people born in Prague in the 1840s corresponds to the growth in the number of students from the families of officials, though it follows some way behind it.

On the basis of these two comparisons we may therefore conclude that the intelligentsia of rural and peasant origin in the older (i.e. the pre-1820) generations had a greater 'immunity' to patriotic agitation and the patriotic milieu. Only when national consciousness had spread more widely and the social prestige of the patriots had risen did national activity among the intelligentsia of peasant origin reach a level which corresponded approximately to the overall proportion of this group in the educated classes.

We do not of course want to exaggerate the significance of social origins. They should only lead us to identify the milieu from which there emerged the group of intellectuals who possessed the greatest number of pre-conditions for taking part in the national movement, or the greatest receptivity to the idea of national interests. A not less important role was played by education at school before university. Owing to the lack of adequate material we are unfortunately unable to put together any tables combining data on social origins with the location of secondary-school education. But we can already say in advance that a striking number of patriots (including those born outside Prague) went through Prague schools and, furthermore, that out of the remainder we meet most frequently with ex-pupils of the schools in Slaný, Rychnov and needless to say Hradec Kralové, where the liveliest activity took place around the theological seminary. In Litoměřice, on the other hand, we

find very few patriots at the seminary; while the seminary in České Budějovice only became active in the 1840s. The notion we have already criticized, namely that Czech students who came from the countryside into a German urban milieu attained national consciousness as a result, is valid for České Budějovice and for that town alone. Most of the patriotic theology students there came precisely from peasant families.

We can also make a contribution to the question of the environment, in school and outside it, which moulded the patriots in their youth, by examining the distribution of their birthplaces on a map of the province of Bohemia. The distribution is by no means an even one over the whole province. The places of origin of most of the patriots coincided to a considerable extent with the places where the biggest patriotic groups and the densest patriotic networks were found to exist. This is true in particular for the plain of the Elbe and Northern Bohemia, whereas in Western Bohemia the birthplaces of the largest number of patriots extended more towards the south and south-east. The distribution of birthplaces only coincides with the network of secondary schools in so far as all towns with secondary schools were at the same time places where large groups of patriots were born.

Let us in conclusion try to summarize the results of our analysis of the social composition of the Czech patriotic community in Bohemia, by advancing certain basic theses.

1. It was the clergy who formed the largest patriotic group at the threshold of Phase B; at the end of Phase B their share declined until they were roughly equal to the students and the officials (half of whom were seigneurial officials).

2. Small-scale artisanal producers and merchants began to participate in contributions to the *Matice česká* only after the intelligentsia had already started. Control analyses of participation in other patriotic actions, or activities closely related to the national movement, showed in all cases that the level of participation of artisans in patriotic actions eventually equalled that of the secular intelligentsia. The same control analyses showed that the decline in the participation of the clergy towards the end of Phase B was more pronounced than that indicated in our initial statistical table.

3. Most of the patriots were active in the towns, and the part played by the Prague patriots was greater at the beginning of Phase B than at its end.

4. The distribution of patriotic life over the territory of Bohemia was very uneven; it was at its strongest in the central Elbe plain and the adjoining districts of Eastern and Northern Bohemia. We can establish that there was, as against this, a much weaker patriotic life in general on the southern side of a line running from the Sázava river to the Brdy mountains.

5. Patriotic groups in which artisans and merchants participated strongly were concentrated in particular in the nationally active region of the Elbe plain.

They participated in general to a greater degree in Western and Northern Bohemia, where the secular intelligentsia was the predominant element. Most of the patriotic groups in the south and south-east, on the other hand, were dominated by the clergy (with the exception of towns which possessed secondary schools).

6. Most of the patriots originated in an urban environment, and from the point of view of social origin the biggest group was constituted by the sons of artisans and merchants. The proportion of patriots from peasant families, and from the families of intellectuals, was higher in the latest generation of patriots.

7. The birthplaces of members of the patriotic intelligentsia were concentrated by and large in the same regions as those with the densest network of patriotic communities, plus the towns with secondary schools.

8. This chapter, devoted as it is to the analysis of the social composition of the Czech movement of national revival, has at the same time a methodological purpose. It is intended to test the appropriateness of the method and the possibilities of comparing the surviving material, and also to provide a measure of its reliability. Thanks to the rich material we have at our disposal for Bohemia, we have been able to test three results which are of basic significance for the further course of our study:

(a) the criterion of participation in the distribution and support of the patriotic press, and contributions to it, provides a guarantee of a sufficiently representative selection of patriots;
(b) the results of the analysis of the social composition and origin of patriotic groups are not a fortuitous conglomeration of numbers, but provide a consistent picture of the structure, without internal contradictions, and capable of rational interpretation. This is shown by the occurrence of the same proportions in an entirely random selection of numerically weaker patriotic groups;
(c) a cartographic projection of the patriotic communities and the birthplaces of patriots similarly provides firm data, which enrich and sharpen considerably our knowledge of the social structure of the national movement.

The above-mentioned results justify us in proceeding with our social analysis – even though the relevant material is much less abundant for other national movements.

We have established that only a more thorough interpretation and presentation of the complex constituted by the social structure of the patriotic community will permit a comparison with the results of an analogous analysis of the patriotic communities of other nations. Hence the methodological starting-point we formulated in the first chapter of the book has found confirmation.

The pre-eminent position of the Czech national movement, or at least its Phase B, in the absolute chronology of the comparable nation-creating processes in Europe bears witness to the fact that powerful integrating factors stood around its cradle, and that these factors were more powerful and more developed than with the majority of the oppressed nationalities of contemporary Europe. In political relations the relevant factor was above all a tradition of political unity and independent existence which had admittedly long been an empty formality without practical significance, but despite this acted as an instrument in awakening national consciousness. This fact directly manifested itself in the ranks of the ruling classes as 'Landespatriotismus' and indirectly penetrated into their subjects as well. The formal existence of a political unit, which roughly coincided moreover with an ecclesiastical unit – the archdiocese of Prague – was the source of an elemental awareness of belonging to a well-defined entity – the Kingdom of Bohemia. There was of course one aspect of political relations which had a partially disintegrating effect; the fact that the Czech nation grew up on the territory of two, or even three, historic entities (Bohemia and Moravia, and in addition Austrian Silesia) which did not have any horizontal political links.

The territorial structure too, especially in the case of Bohemia, was propitious to the rapid expansion of the relations relevant to the formation of a nation. The province had long-standing natural boundaries and formed a unified whole with an organic internal structure and a stable centre in the shape of Prague, which had on the whole good communications with all the Czech-speaking parts of the province (with the exception perhaps of Southern Bohemia) even before the coming of the railway age. The Czech population in Bohemia inhabited a compact territory without large enclaves, mixed-language areas or islands of population inhabited by other nations.

The Czech national movement arose at a time of already developed production under the system of manufacture, and during Phase B it was already passing through the industrial revolution. The severe disproportion between the interests of the development of productive forces and the feudal control of economic life would therefore in theory have had significance for integration. But of course this contradiction did not in practice have a nationally integrating significance, because the entrepreneurs in manufacture and industry were at first without exception members of the ruling German (Austrian) nationality. Furthermore, until Phase B there continued to be a parallel between on the one hand the class antagonism between the lords and their subject peasants and on the other hand the linguistic distinction between those two classes. More important was the integrating effect exerted by the expansion in manufacturing and factory production, which was felt indirectly: as a factor in the strengthening of economic links within the province. However a not less influential factor of integration in this regard was the traditionally

dense network of urban settlement, with its regular exchange relations between town and country. Admittedly these exchange relations did not have a direct influence on the national antagonism, but they did affect the possibilities of communication and the rise to self-consciousness of the Czech bourgeois strata.

Cultural relations were also already a significant factor in integration at the time of the transition from Phase A to Phase B. Maria Theresa's educational reform laid the basis of a regular school system over the whole territory of Bohemia. Even though the educational level of these schools was still very low especially in the country districts, on the whole they created the preconditions for the liquidation of illiteracy and the extension of the reading public. A specific agent of integration was the existence of the university in Prague, in the very centre of the territory of the oppressed nation, at which entry to studies at degree level had already ceased to be subject to extra-economic restrictions. The Czech national movement could gain a point of support in the cultural sphere from a well-developed ancient literature. Also significant for the formation of a Czech literary language was the fact that the dialects of Bohemia were separated only by very slight differences. A weighty effect of the religious relations was the fact that the Catholic Church, which in the period covered by Phase A controlled the vast majority of the means of communication, initially took up a neutral attitude towards the national language movement. This showed itself in practice especially by its refusal to prohibit the lesser clergy from participating in patriotic actions.

On the threshold of Phase B, then, the situation for the Czech national movement was highly favourable in comparison with that in other small nations. Why despite this did the process of attaining national consciousness proceed so slowly in this phase? The reason was above all the impact of the repressive policy of the Austrian state, which forbade all organized forms of social activity and persecuted any expression of political ideas. This was another reason why the patriots were compelled to limit themselves to a language programme, which could not of course find a sufficiently broad base in the sphere of the material interests of the mass of the population. Of the common material interests around which Czech society could have been concentrated under the leadership of the patriots, they only adopted an anti-feudal position in the peasant question, which was of fairly slight actual significance for the urban milieu. As a result of the advanced development of capitalist relations, Czech patriotic society was already too differentiated for it to be possible to unite it around a single common interest without the preliminary creation of national consciousness. This work of raising the level of understanding among the nation could not of course be carried on with the same rapidity in the conditions of the first half of the nineteenth century as was later made possible by the revolution in transport and the development of communications in the second half of the century.

10

Integration without revolution: the Finns

Between the twelfth and fourteenth centuries the territory of present-day Finland became a part of the Kingdom of Sweden, and it remained a part of the Kingdom of Sweden until the eighteenth century. It did not however have any kind of special position within that framework: the term 'Finland' was merely a geographical expression. From the time of Sweden's expansion and colonization a population of two nationalities lived on this territory. Of this population the Finns constituted an absolute majority. The coastal districts of the south and south-west were inhabited by Swedes – not only as members of the ruling class, but also as an urban population and long-settled peasants.

The first attempts at creating a written Finnish literature in the era of the Reformation are linked with the name of Bishop Mikael Agricola, and by the first half of the eighteenth century there were signs of an interest in the culture and language of the Finnish-speaking population. Definite manifestations of Finnish consciousness began to appear among the nobility living in Finland around the middle and at the end of the century, in the sense of territorial patriotism – 'Landespatriotismus'.

It was a momentous landmark in Finland's history when in 1809 that country was attached to the Russian Empire. With this change Finland's political situation underwent an essential transformation. From being an integral component of the Swedish state Finland became an autonomous administrative unit within the framework of the Russian monarchy. Finnish national consciousness began to be clearly transformed after 1809. The new, slowly emerging Finnish consciousness classified linguistic and cultural individuality as fundamental characteristics and preconditions of national existence.

The new wave of the national movement in the linguistic and cultural sense was incarnated in the personality of Johan Wilhelm Snellman, who worked out a radical patriotic programme the hesitant beginnings of which he developed in the 1820s and in the 1840s transformed into a systematic collection of categorical demands. The endeavour to influence the national consciousness of the popular strata and to popularize the radical patriotic programme

coincides with the fourth or fifth decade of the last century; this entitles us to situate the coming of Phase B at the latest in that period.

The accession as Tsar of Alexander II (1855) created a favourable situation for the Finnish radical patriots, the Fennomen. They achieved a series of successes in 1860s. By the end of the 1870s the Finnish national movement already had a mass character: the successful completion of Phase B can be placed at the latest in the 1880s.[1]

What do we know of the attitude of the different strata of Finnish society towards the national movement in those decades? The social basis of the Finnish national movement was much more diversified and complex than the kind of thing we shall find when we come to the Baltic States, for instance. Of course, if we were to take as our basic criterion the official standpoint of the individual Estates, we should get a very simple picture: not only the nobility but also the clergy, considered as Estates, still proclaimed their support for territorial patriotism and the maintenance of the official Swedish language, while the leading figures of the burgher Estate manifested an undisguised sympathy for Scandinavianism.[2] Did the peasantry therefore form the main basis for Phase B of the national movement in Finland? It would be a mistake to draw this conclusion on the basis of the official attitude of the various Estates. Right up to the 1860s we fail to find any particularly conspicuous evidence of national consciousness among the rural population. Any conflicts we hear of at this time arose from social differences.[3] Nor was there any chronic and nationally motivated rivalry between the Swedish-speaking and the Finnish-speaking rural population at the points of contact between them.[4] The ruling class was in any case aware of the nationally amorphous character of the rural population. Hence the purposeful and tenacious endeavours of both the Tsarist authorities and the Swedish bureaucracy to prevent the social ascent of the youth of the countryside, so that the Fennomen should not be able to find a social basis there.[5]

It is therefore not surprising that the existing literature customarily upholds the view that the Finnish national awakening, in its early period, rested on a fairly small section of the intelligentsia.[6] The first patriotic appeals were directed above all to the intellectuals.[7] During the forties and fifties of the nineteenth century these appeals are alleged to have been favourably received by younger members of the intelligentsia and students. Contemporaries sometimes interpreted the Fennomanian movement as resulting from a conflict of generations.[8] That is to say, the patriotic students who left the universities went on to become patriotic officials, clergymen etc. Did the social basis of the Finnish national awakening really become broader in this way?[9] If that is so, which strata actually supported their national activity? Reflections on the social origin of the Finnish patriots are restricted in all these cases to general remarks on their emergence from the popular strata. We find only one isolated

Table 14. *The newly-recruited members of the Finnish Literary Society between 1831 and 1875: their social status, in* %

	1831	32–3	34–5	36–7	38–9	40–1	42–3	44–5	46–7	48–9	50–1	52–6	57–66	67–75
High officials, nobility	10	6	19	17	17	11	6	10.5	7	4	14	6	10	5
Merchants, artisans	—	3	4	8	4	4	3	8	7	5	15	19	14	10
Free professions	45	19	5	6	17	11	3	1.5	1.5	4.5	4	7	12	4
Officials	4	9	19	16	12	13	6	20	12	8	20	23	17	10
Teachers	4	7	5	4	8	6	13	8.5	8	5.5	6	10	15	19
Clergy	31	34	35	24	17	24	17	12	19	6.5	10	18	12.5	8
Students	2	20	11	17	17	29	43	35	30	45	8	13	4	39
Officers	4	2	1	6	8	2	6	—	1.5	2	23	4	2	2
Peasants	—	—	1	1	—	—	—	4	2	5	—	—	8	0
Wage-labourers	—	—	—	1	—	—	3	—	1.5	3	—	—	0.5	2
Women	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.5	10	13	—	—	5	1
Total in %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total number of new members	51	102	75	83	23	54	31	140	135	111	57	79	298	99

attempt at a concrete determination of the issue: the younger patriots, it is said, were mainly the sons of rural clergy, but came in part from urban families.[10]

Let us now endeavour to extract some precise data from the evidence concerning the *social composition* of the patriotic groups and the social origins of their members. We shall start by analysing the Finnish Literary Society, which was from the time of its foundation the central organization looking after the publication of literature on the Finnish ethnic group, and popular works in Finnish. It also provided support for research into the Finnish language and other subjects. It thus occupied a similar position to the Estonian Literary Society and, more remotely, to the *Matice česká* in its early stages. The year 1856 has been chosen as the terminal date for the selection of the complex of members we intend to investigate, since this precedes the conflict between the radicals and the moderates in the movement. Nevertheless we shall also trace the further development of the social composition as far as the 1870s. Originally the Society was also acceptable to the old-style 'Landespatriotismus', hence at the opening of Phase B it united a broad front of Finnish patriots.[11]

We can immediately establish the development of the social composition of this group, which numbered more than 950 in 1856, by looking at the changes in the social composition of the new groups of members who entered in each year (Table 14).[12] Then we divide the period investigated into four stages and work out the overall social composition for each of them (Table 15). The initially high proportion of clergy fell sharply, while the proportion of officials and teachers rose. Particularly striking is the rising interest displayed by the merchants. The literary character of the Society clearly had a restrictive effect

Table 15. *Social status of members of the Finnish Literary Society 1831–56 (in* %)

	Percentage during the periods: 1831–6	1837–43	1844–9	1850–6	Total no. in 1856
Landowners	1.	1.0	1.0	1.0	13
High officials, high clergy	12.0	11.5	9.0	9.5	88
Total landowners + high officials	13.0	12.5	10.0	10.5	101
Merchants, entrepreneurs	3.0	3.0	3.0	4.5	43
Artisans	0.5	1.0	2.5	3.0	30
Total, upper and lower bourgeoisie	3.5	4.0	5.5	7.5	73
Doctors	9.0	8.5	6.0	7.5	70
Professors	8.0	6.0	3.5	4.0	39
Total, free professions	17.0	15.0	10.0	12.0	117
Officials	11.5	12.5	14.5	19.5	181
Clergy	31.5	29.0	22.5	24.5	230
Gymnasium teachers	4.5	4.0	4.5	6.5	58
Elementary teachers	1.0	2.5	4.5	4.5	42
Total, teachers	5.5	6.5	9.5	11.0	100
Students	14.0	16.0	19.0	5.5	51
Officers	2.5	3.5	2.5	4.0	36
Peasants:	1.0	0.5	2.0	1.5	16
Wage-labourers	0.5	0.5	1.0	1.0	7
Women	—	—	3.5	3.0	30
Numerical total	275	420	808	941	941
% total	100	100	100	100	

on its social basis; even in the period of the emergence of the mass movement it was not attractive to the broader popular strata. This is shown particularly in the data on the social status of the new members of the 1860s and 1870s.

The social composition of the Finnish Literary Society in Viipuri diverged considerably from this picture. This society had in the 1840s approximately 500 members, of whom a fifth were peasants. Officials, in particular judicial officials, stood at the head of the Society. The greater emphasis laid on the Finnish language in the activities of the Society, as early as the 1840s, also corresponded to this difference in social composition. Here too, of course, the

peasants were by no means the decisive factor. On the contrary, when police surveillance became stricter after 1848, the directorate of the Society decided not to invite peasants to assemblies of the members in future, so as not to provide the Tsarist police with an easy excuse for persecution on the ground that they were 'stirring up the people'.[13]

Did the composition of the Finnish Literary Society differ in any essential respect from the social spectrum of all those inhabitants of Finland who were interested in cultural matters, without regard to their original language? To answer this question we should like to turn to the material for comparison provided up to the year 1851 by the membership lists of the Finnish Art Association, an organization which united the friends of art whatever their nationality, and whose programme was purely cultural, and in language and content in fact Swedish. The results of this analysis will therefore afford an example of the social composition of an a-national, cultural organization with a Swedish but not a Svecomanian tendency.[14] Table 16 displays a social composition diametrically opposite to that of the two patriotic societies mentioned earlier: the upper social strata, or 'notables', have absolute predominance here, the leading role is played by the ruling class and sections of the intelligentsia linked with it.

Table 16. *The members of the Finnish Art Association up to 1851*

Nobility, high officials	24.1 %
Merchants, entrepreneurs, artisans	25.5 % (of whom 18.5 % merchants)
Officials	19.2 % (of whom 8.3 % judges)
Free professions	10.8 % (of whom 5 % doctors, 4.1 % professors)
Clergy	2.9 %
Teachers	2.1 %
Officers (non-noble)	5.0 %
Students	2.9 %
Women	5.0 %
Miscellaneous	2.5 %
Total	100.0 %

In order to deepen our understanding of the social composition of the patriotic community we have in addition selected a group of 200 leading personalities in intellectual life and politics, who were active during Phase B and at the beginning of Phase C.[15] The social composition of this group of patriots is distorted by the criterion of selection, as can be seen from Table 17. For this reason there is an inappropriately high percentage given for cultural workers, such as artists, professors, and teachers in higher schools (gymnasia). If we disregard the effect of this distortion, we may note that in its proportional basis the list agrees with the data on the composition of the Finnish Literature

Society; leaving aside the free professions, the difference consists in the somewhat lower proportion of officials among the leading personalities of the Finnish national movement.

Table 17. *The social composition of the group of pioneers of the Finnish national movement in the mid nineteenth century* (*in* %)

	Members of the Finnish Literary Society in 1856	Leading patriots and active journalists
Landowners, high officials, bishops	10.5	3.0
Merchants, entrepreneurs, artisans, burghers	7.5	5.5
Officials	19.5	5.5
Professors, artists	4.0	33.5
Other free professions	8.0	6.5
Clergy	24.5	15.5
Teachers in *gymnasia*	6.5	21.0
Other teachers	4.5	3.5
Officers	4.0	1.5
Students	5.5	—
Peasants	1.5	4.0
Wage-labourers	1.5	1.0
Women	3.0	—
Total	100.5	100.5

We were able to find out the *social origin* of all the patriots in the Finnish Literature Society who studied at the Academy in Turku, or, after 1828, at the University of Helsinki.[16] The group of over 400 persons arrived at in this way is in our view sufficiently representative to allow the social origins of the patriotic intelligentsia to be determined, but not the social origins of patriots in general (cf. Table 18). The greater part of the group investigated came from the families of men of religion and officials (altogether more than a half); there followed after that a wider group from the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie. The share of the peasantry and the lower urban strata in the formation of the patriotic intelligentsia was insignificant. There is an impressive difference in the proportions in which the various generations of patriots came from the social groups indicated. In the oldest generation patriots from the ranks of the clergy predominated. Sons of officers formed a strong group, and so, strangely, did the sons of peasants. In the younger generations the proportion of patriots from official and bourgeois families increases, but also patriots from the ruling class. The frequent identity of social origin and social status among the patriotic intelligentsia was a clear sign of the survival among a number of strata of an enclosed social organization on Estate lines.[17]

Table 18. *Social origin of the nationally-inclined Finnish intelligentsia, by current social status (in %)*

Parents' occupation	Social status of patriots: Free profs.	Officials	Clergy	Teachers	Others	Total No.	Total %
Landowners, high officials	12	17	1	—	12	34	8
Merchants, entrepreneurs	10	5	4	5	17	32	8
Artisans, petty bourgeois	6	7	8	11	6	32	8
Free professions	7	3	2	9	6	21	5
Officials	32	33	18	21	11	123	23.5
Clergy	20	20	37	34	33	118	28.5
Teachers	1	—	—	1	—	2	0.5
Officers	7	13	9	9	6	37	9
Peasants	—	1	12	6	5	21	5
Employees, workers	5	1	9	4	4	18	4.5
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total number	61	101	90	80	78	411	—

Table 19. *Social origin of the nationally-inclined Finnish intelligentsia, by year of birth*

Occupation of parents	Patriots' year of birth: Before 1805	1806–20	1821–36	Year of birth of all students in Helsinki: 1828–32	1839–44	1848–50
Landowners, high officials	6	5	11	7	7	9.5
Merchants, artisans, entrepreneurs	6	18	15	20	16	17.5
Free professions	—	4	7	2	4	4.5
Officials	9	26	24	20	25	29.5
Clergy	40	26	29	22	25	20
Teachers	—	—	1	—	2	2
Officers	17	11	6	17	9	8
Peasants	11	5	4	8	6	4
Employees, workers	11	5	3	4	4	5
Total (numerical)	35	179	198	434	468	201

The comparison with the origins of all the students at the University of Helsinki is intended to test how far the social origins of the patriotic intelligentsia correspond to the social origins of students in general. The differences here are quite apparent. The proportion of sons of clergy was considerably higher among the patriotic intelligentsia than among the students

as a whole.[18] Inversely, the proportion of patriots from bourgeois families, and indeed, in the younger generation, from peasant families, was appreciably lower than the average proportion for all students.[19]

The group of leading patriots we mentioned earlier also offers a further possibility for comparison (see Table 20). Their social origins differed from those of the patriotic intellectuals in the Finnish Literary Society, in particular through the greater participation of individuals from a peasant background as well as from the families of artisans; an important negative difference was the lower proportion of leading patriots from the families of officials. This reflects the circumstance that a numerically strong group of 'leading personalities' had attained their position without a university education, and that some of these were patriots who first became active towards the end of Phase B.

Table 20. *Social origins of the leading Finnish patriots (in %)*

Occupation of parents	Social status of the patriots: Free profs.	Merchants, artisans	Officials	Clergy	Total
Landowners, nobles, high officials	10.0	—	11.0	6.0	8.5
Merchants, entrepreneurs	12.0	18.0	—	6.5	8.0
Artisans	10.0	18.0	11.0	13.5	12.0
Officials	3.0	9.0	35.0	11.5	12.0
Free professions	9.5	9.0	—	—	6.0
Clergy	29.0	—	11.0	44.0	25.0
Teachers	6.0	—	—	—	3.5
Officers	8.0	—	23.0	6.5	7.0
Peasants	9.5	18.0	11.0	6.5	13.0
Workers, employees	3.0	27.0	—	6.5	5.5
Total (%)	100.1	99.0	100.0	100.0	100.5

The *territorial distribution* of the Finnish national awakening can be established by looking at the membership figures of the Finnish Literary Society. Evidently the greater part of them lived in the coastal towns. Further, and unambiguous, data are to be derived from the records of the readership of the patriotic periodicals. These records have survived in Finland, in the sense of notes on the numbers of periodicals transmitted to specific post offices which had then to send them on to the individual subscribers.[20] Hence relatively precise and reliable data are available on the number of subscribers to patriotic newspapers and periodicals in each area, and this makes it possible to estimate the level of patriotic interest shown by the different districts of the country. This

material is subject to the disadvantage that we cannot use it to penetrate as far as the individual localities; we must make do with the local post office district as our fundamental unit. It will therefore be more useful to give an account of the part played by districts, rather than towns or villages, in the diffusion of patriotic periodicals. We have subdivided the country into districts by combining the criteria of postal districts and road links with those of state administration, language and geographical regions. On this basis Table 21 presents the data on the number of subscribers to the periodicals *Saima* and *Maamiehen Ystävä* in 1845 (i.e. at the threshold of Phase B) and *Suometar* in 1849, 1853 and 1855.[21]

Table 21. *Territorial distribution of subscribers to Finnish patriotic periodicals*

	Number of subscribers to the periodical:			
	Saima	*Maamiehen Ystävä*	*Suometar*	
Post Office (District)	1845	1845	1849+ 1853	1855
Turku, Rauma, Pori, Naantali	105	185	135	483
Hämeenlinna, Tampere	53	128	103	523
Vaasa, Kaskinen, Kristiina, Pietarsaari, Kokkola	54	92	34	278
Oulu, Raahe, Tornis	36	75	51	370
Helsinki, Karjaa, Ekenäs, Porvoo, Loviisa	151	63	204	237
Viipuri, Hamina, Lapperanta, Käkisalmi	78	196	134	598
Mikkeli, Heinola, Joroinen	33	43	70	264
Kuopio, Jyväskylä	91	177	78	442
Joensuu, Tohmajärvi, Savonlinna, Sortavala	31	74	48	277

The largest number of subscribers to patriotic periodicals lived in the larger towns in the 1840s – Helsinki (108 subscribers to *Saima*, 41 to *Maamiehen Ystävä*), Turku (73 and 108 respectively), and Viipuri (43 and 110 respectively). The high figures for Viipuri can however be assumed to include subscribers from the surrounding district. In the case of the town of Kuopio and its environs, we cannot regard the high number of recorded subscribers as decisive evidence, as Kuopio was the town where two of the periodicals were actually published. The subsequent evolution of the patriotic reading public is remarkable: the number of subscribers rose fastest in the districts of Hämeenlinna, Kuopio-Jyväskylä and Northern Karelia. Southern Karelia on the other hand was partially saturated by a patriotic local newspaper, *Sanaan Saattaja*. The direction of this evolution in the reading public corresponds to some extent with

the traditionally accepted version of the Finnish national awakening: until the 1840s it is said to have been confined mainly to Turku and Helsinki (and indeed to have stayed largely within the university milieu), and patriotism is said to have been alien to the population in the interior of the country, whether they were peasants, artisans, or petty officials.[22] If we combine the districts displaying the fastest growth in patriotic subscribers in general with the districts where there was an increase in the number of subscribers to *Suometar* in particular, we can draw a triangle on the map of Finland, enclosing a territory centred on Hämeenlinna and containing at each of the three corners the towns of Turku, Helsinki and Tampere. In addition there is a separate concentration around the town of Kuopio.

Our group of patriotic intellectuals drawn from the ranks of the Finnish Literary Society can be used to establish with relative exactitude the proportional part played by various localities in bringing patriots into the world: 46% came from the towns, 54% from the country. The members of the latter group were mainly sons of peasants, but also a large number of them came from pastors' families. Table 22 gives a clear picture of the representation of the various districts.[23] If we project these data onto a map, two regions emerge with a remarkably dense concentration of birthplaces: almost 50% of the total number of patriots were born in Turku-Pori, Hämeenlinna, a large area within the district of Nylands and the western edge of the district of Mikkeli, i.e. they were born in the region with the largest reading public for patriotic periodicals.

Table 22. *Origin of Finnish patriots according to place of birth*

	Place of birth		Total	
District	Village	Town	Numerical	%
Hämeenlinna	25	10	35	9.5
Turku-Pori	20	49	69	19.0
Nylands	12	30	42	11.0
Mikkeli	20	8	28	7.5
Kuopio	20	12	32	9.0
Viipuri	7	23	30	8.0
Vaasa	21	16	37	10.0
Oulu	13	18	31	8.5
Uncertain locality	65	—	65	17.5
Total	203	166	369	100.0

From the point of view of the relation between the size of a town and the number of patriots born there, we can distinguish between three groups: (a) towns with a high proportion of native-born patriots – Kuopio (91 inhabitants to 1 born patriot), Pori (211), Hämeenlinna (238), Oulu (246), Viipuri (249),

Helsinki (253), Tampere (264), Porvoo (278); (b) towns with a lower proportion – Vaasa (372), Turku (433); and (c) towns with an insignificant group of patriotic sons – such as Raahe, Raumo, Kokkola, Loviisa and others. What was clearly decisive in the first instance was the representation of the Finnish ethnic group in each town and in the relevant social strata; in group 'a' the rank order of the towns would look somewhat different if we only took into consideration the number of Finnish-speaking inhabitants in each town in establishing the proportion. In broad outline, however, the picture we sketched earlier of the patriotically active regions of Phase B is confirmed by this evidence.

When we compare the territorial structure of patriotic activity in Phase B with the data for the period of the rise of the mass movement, some interesting results emerge from this operation, as demonstrated by the Finnish historian Pirkko Rommi.[24] When in the 1870s the Fennomen launched an appeal for contributions towards the construction of a Finnish high school (gymnasium) they found a broad response over almost the whole country. The number of donors reached tens of thousands; the most active districts where organized collections were made lay in part in Häme and the west of Savo (similarly to Phase B) but there was also a shift towards the north-west (Southern Ostrobothnia) and the east (Northern Karelia). There was a relative decline in the significance of the south-west of the country. At the same time one must bear in mind the differences in the character and the content of patriotic activities: they had become politicized, and were now more comprehensible to the broad strata of the population. The social composition also changed at the threshold of Phase C: the peasants became the largest group, and among the educated people the schoolteachers.

We can now summarize the results of our analysis of the Finnish patriots during Phase B.

1. The foreground of the Finnish national movement during Phase B was occupied by the numerically strong officials, students and clergy; but from the point of view of activities one must of course add to this list the free professions and the teachers in high schools. In general the higher ranks of society, the 'notabilities', were strongly represented in the Finnish national movement.

2. In view of Finland's predominantly rural character, one may say that the urban strata were relatively strongly represented among the patriots.

3. We have described as nationally active territory the compact region which embraces most of the district of Turku-Pori, the western and southern part of the district of Hämeenlinna, and a part of the district of Nylands; to this region must be added a smaller area around the town of Kuopio in the interior (the Savo region). With the transition to Phase C the Häme and Savo regions retained their importance, while Southern Ostrobothnia and Northern Karelia participated more intensively in the movement.



Map 2 The Territorial Structure of the Finnish National Movement

4. Almost half the patriots were born in towns, although less than a tenth of the total population of Finland lived in towns (and a still smaller proportion of the total Finnish-speaking population). Roughly two-thirds of the patriots came from families of the intelligentsia, and the proportion of patriots of

bourgeois origin (in the narrower sense of the word) was 20%. We can estimate the patriots from peasant families at just under 10%. Most of the patriots of country origin therefore came not from peasant families but from the families of pastors first and foremost, and, secondly, the families of officials.

Of the objective relations which acted as agents of integration during the formation of the modern Finnish nation, let us first instance the political relations. In 1809, thanks to the influence of external circumstances, Finland attained a position of political individuality; the country became an autonomous unit within a powerful state formation, with which it was not connected apart from the political tie in any way, whether in its cultural tradition, its language, or the character of its political institutions. Owing to this, the fact of its political autonomy had the effect of stimulating a feeling of mutual interdependence among the inhabitants of Finland (even though until the 1860s its autonomy was hardly very great), in particular among the ruling class and the educated strata. This feeling became more intense the more frequently it was necessary to fight to defend the existing elements of political autonomy or indeed to acquire further political rights for the country. As a result of this, the first strivings towards a Finnish 'Landespatriotismus', which emerged in the second half of the eighteenth century, very soon took on a new shape which had little in common with 'Landespatriotismus' of the old type: this new form of patriotism had as its framework the unit with a separate political existence; it was a patriotism strengthened by the political relations.

The integrating effect of the political relations was heightened by the geographical configuration of Finland. It was surrounded on almost all sides by natural boundaries, and its inhabitants had direct contact only very sporadically with members of the two ruling nations – the Swedish and later the Russian nation. This circumstance was of particular importance for the Swedish-speaking minority, who could conceive only with difficulty (even in theory) of a unification with their 'maternal' nation. Their feeling of belonging to Finland was clearly underlined by the inherent circumstances of the country. Finland's geographical situation also had its elements unfavourable to the formation of a unified national whole. These were not only the considerable extent of the national territory, which was very sparsely populated, but also its internal structure: its dense network of lakes and deep forests always formed a grave obstacle to communication between distant regions.

These specifically geographical conditions also had a significant influence on the formation of the economic relations; above all in the sense that the commercial connections of the border districts with the outside were frequently more powerful than connections within the ethnic territory. On the other hand the growing economic association with the foreign market strengthened the urban population's awareness of belonging to the nation, which derived from their real interest in their economic hinterland. The factors creating a large

'national' market in Finland were therefore closely linked with foreign trade and concentrated on the relatively small area of territory which was affected by the economic results and circumstances of this trade. Especially after the attachment of the country to Russia and the extension of its autonomy in questions of finance and tariffs, and within those parts of Finland which had already started to move beyond the natural economy and to overcome the isolation of the local market, the economic relations began to grow into an important integrating agent for Finland's further national development, an integrating agent which may in part have bridged over the language differences. Another development which had an integrating effect was the growth in exchanges between agriculturally self-sufficient districts and those that were not.

Language and culture very definitely did not belong at first among the vital elements hastening the formation of a national whole, in the Finnish case. The Finnish language remained marginal, and was unable to become a force for integration, because in any case there hardly existed an old Finnish 'national' culture or a cultural tradition in that language. On the other hand it must be said that in Finland, deep into the nineteenth century, language was considered to be a merely administrative affair and that the ruling nation had no ambition to assimilate the Finnish-speaking population. Nevertheless, during Phase B the language programme became at the same time a social programme; and because it was directed against the language of the nobility and the high bureaucracy it came near to being a democratic programme.

Social and class conflicts had a somewhat weaker effect on the process of Finnish national integration than was the case in Central and Eastern Europe. This was above all a result of the fact that Finnish society at the end of feudalism was a society of free individuals, who knew nothing of serfdom, and had in theory the possibility of rising in the social scale and also in part possessed political rights (within the confines, it will be understood, of contemporary social barriers and prejudices bound up with the Estates system). Moreover the common resistance against Russian domination acted as a factor bringing the two ethnic groups closer to each other; although at the same time this struggle played to a certain degree the role of a nationally integrating factor for the Finnish movement itself. The social conflicts which occurred at the threshold of capitalist development were able to gain articulation relatively early in the terms appropriate to a political struggle. Hence the relatively large place reserved to political objectives in the programme of the Finnish patriots of Phase B. A deliberate and militant linguistic nationalism only stepped to the forefront in the course of Phase C.

11

At the point of transition to the belated type: the Estonians

The strategic significance of the southern shores of the Gulf of Finland had already provided the impulse for the formation of a province of Estland in the Middle Ages – a political unit which changed its masters rather frequently. The name of the province was subsequently transferred to the province's original inhabitants. The territory the Estonians inhabited was however not coextensive with the province of Estland proper, which fell to Russia under Peter I, but covered in addition the northern part of Livonia. The composition of the ruling class in this region was entirely predetermined by the expansion of the Teutonic Knights and the subsequent German urban colonization. Language thenceforth remained a barrier separating the ruling class from the subject people.

Up until the first half of the nineteenth century we do not meet with any manifestations of national consciousness among the Estonian population, but the beginning of the nineteenth century saw an awakening of interest in the language and popular culture of the Estonians among some of the German or Germanized men of letters. Not until the 1850s di the idea that people would have to be educated in the spirit of national self-consciousness come to fruition. This idea was taken up by a group of students of Estonian origin at Tartu University; more significant, however, were attempts to turn directly to the Estonian people by means of a periodical press.[1]

From the Tartu group of Estonian intellectuals there emerged at the beginning of the 1860s the initiative for the first activities with a consciously patriotic objective. These were very closely linked with the culture of the people – for example an edition of the epic poem, the *Kalevipoeg* (1857), and meetings of Estonian choirs. At the beginning of the 1870s two patriotic organizations arose, whose activities were a manifestation of the new national movement – the Estonian Literary Society and the Committee for the Estonian Secondary School, later aptly renamed the Alexander School.

The radical wing of the patriots was headed by K. R. Jakobson, who in 1878 founded the journal *Sakala*, the first patriotic Estonian periodical with an uncompromising anti-German programme of national individuality and social improvement. *Sakala* built up a network of correspondents and contributors

and met with a rapid success. It gained a dominant position in the Committee for the Alexander School and used the collections as an instrument of political and national agitation. At the beginning of the 1880s a petitioning movement against the German landlords developed under the influence of *Sakala*.

In the middle eighties the Tsarist authorities started a campaign of open Russification in the Baltic provinces. This Russification came exactly at a time of more rapid development of the national movement, when the patriotic idea was spreading successfully among the people; at a time, therefore, when Phase B was already concluded and the mass national movement of Phase C was coming upon the scene.

In which social groups do we find the leading figures and promoters of the national movement? In Phase A the picture was not excessively complex: it was certain German pastors, teachers, and the category of people known as 'Küster' – literally 'sacristans' – who first showed an interest in the Estonian people.[2] The earliest tendencies towards national self-awareness developed in the 1860s and were favourably received (it was alleged) among the rural population.[3] The radical patriots of Phase B also oriented their programme towards the rural population. *Sakala* was directed in the first place at the peasants, and in the second place at the rural poor (or, at times, at the small peasants). The third category it appealed to was the urban working class. Jakobson, perhaps influenced by the Narodniks, considered the petty bourgeoisie to be worthless, and of no significance for the national movement.[4] What we have said in this paragraph is of course no answer, either to the question of what strata actually welcomed the patriotic agitation of Jakobson and his followers, or to the question of the social composition of the patriotic community.

Historians have so far provided two basic answers to these questions. The first is that the most active component of the national movement was the lower stratum of the rural intelligentsia, above all the village schoolteachers and the 'Küster'.[5] The Estonian schools gradually became emancipated in the sixties and seventies from the influence of the German pastors.[6] Already in 1870, in the period of Phase B, we come upon criticisms of the assimilatory consequences of higher education, voiced at a meeting of teachers.[7] However, it is doubtful whether such a minute group as this could have had this kind of far-reaching impact on the whole society. The second answer given so far is to the effect that the main strength of the national awakening lay in the bourgeoisie. This view is formulated unambiguously in the writings of Soviet historians of the 1950s. This 'bourgeoisie', which stood at the head of the national movement, is understood here to include, among others, small shopkeepers, owners of craft workshops, and peasants.[8] This is presumably intended to apply to Phase C of the Estonian national movement.[9] The process of the formation of the Estonian bourgeoisie is a development which ran its course subsequent to Phase

B of the national movement, and the concrete examples cited of members of the above-mentioned 'bourgeois' social groups nowhere rise above the level of the older small-scale craft enterprise. Neither of the answers so far given can satisfy us. Contemporary Soviet historians, as has appeared recently, are themselves not satisfied with these answers, and they are starting to undertake a concrete quantitative analysis of the Estonian patriotic community. The results arrived at by Ea Jansen in particular are of very great significance in our context.

A relatively abundant collection of source material has survived for the *social composition* of the Estonian patriotic community during Phase B. The lists of contributors to the Alexander School are known to us, as also the lists of members of the committees which organized the collections for the school. We can also establish the circle of people involved in the periodical *Sakala*, and those who took out subscriptions. Likewise we can in part establish the social status of the members of patriotic clubs.

Participation in organizing collections for the Alexander School is undoubtedly a criterion of patriotism. We know that it was risky to work in those committees, and that it required both a certain readiness to make personal sacrifices and ability to agitate for explicitly patriotic objectives among the popular strata in town and country.[10]

The best known of the Estonian patriotic organizations from the point of view of its composition is the Estonian Literary Society, in which the dominant position was held by the moderate wing of patriots associated with Phase B. Nearly half the founding members were teachers and 'Küster' (18 out of 43). The next largest group was that of students.[11] The subsequent composition of the membership can already be expressed quantitatively.[12]

Table 23 plainly shows the growth of the popular, above all the rural, element among the members of the Society, and inversely the stagnation in

Table 23. *Social composition of the Estonian Literary Society*

Occupation	1878 Number	%	1882 Number	%	% of total of known status
Shopkeepers	17	6.1	65	5.8	9.0
Artisans	8	2.8	67	6.0	9.2
Officials	17	6.1	66	5.9	9.1
Pastors	8	2.8	?	?	?
Students	22	7.8	27	2.4	3.8
Teachers	140	50.0	270	24.3	38.1
Peasants or smallholders	26	9.3	219	19.6	30.8
Unknown	42	15.1	404	36.0	—
Total	280	100.0	1,118	100.0	100.0

Table 24. *The social composition of contributors to 'Sakala'*

Occupation	Location of activity: Town	Country	Total No.	Total %
Landowners	—	7	7	1.2
Shopkeepers	21	15	36	6.2
Artisans	15	22	37	6.6
Free professions	7	—	7	1.2
Officials	14	31	45	7.9
Pastors or priests	2	6	8	1.3
Teachers	23	152	175	30.7
Students or pupils	32	13	45	7.9
Peasants	—	170	170	29.3
Workers, farmworkers or servants	19	25	44	7.7
Total known	133	441	574	100.0
Occupation not established	93	258	351	—

the numbers of officials and students. The rise in the number of teachers indicates that we should be cautious in evaluating the decline in their relative role in the membership of the Society. The teachers, as is apparent, continued to hold the first place as the numerically strongest group even at an advanced stage of Phase B.

There was probably something of a distinction between the social composition of the Estonian Literary Society and that of the first choirs. Among the organizers of the choir festival of 1869 in Tartu the burgher (or urban) element predominated: among the 16 directors of the festival there were only two teachers as against eight artisans and shopkeepers.[13] And it was above all burghers, small shopkeepers, artisans, and town council employees who stood at the head of the urban singing-clubs in Tartu and Tallinn.[14]

Another conclusive criterion of patriotic activity was without doubt involvement with Jakobson's *Sakala*. The list of the correspondents and contributors of *Sakala* is therefore a unique source both for the analysis of the social composition of the Estonian patriotic groups who sympathized with the radical wing of the movement, and for the understanding of their demands. Thanks to an analysis undertaken by the Estonian historian Ea Jansen we can treat the social composition of the group around *Sakala* as representative of the Estonian patriotic community as a whole at the end of Phase B, and in particular of the nationally and socially more radical majority tendency.[15] Table 24 shows that the social composition of the group who contributed to *Sakala* was largely the same as the social composition of the Estonian Literary Society in 1882. The lower proportion of small-scale urban producers can perhaps be laid at the door of Jakobson's programmatic orientation towards

the rural population, while the greater part played in *Sakala* by the poorer strata is to be explained by the difference in objectives between a literary society and a patriotic periodical. The weaker representation of patriotic teachers among the *Sakala* contributors in comparison with the Estonian Literary Society appears to confirm the contemporary lamentations about the insufficient national radicalism of the teaching professions. Notwithstanding this, it is precisely in the Estonian national movement, more than any other of the movements under investigation, that the rural schoolteachers played the biggest part. Nor should we underestimate the role of the small-scale urban producers: in percentage terms this was not much less than in the highly-developed Czech milieu, and it was far more significant than in Lithuania for example.

For the period of the coming of Phase C in the eighties and nineties of the last century there is some comparative material available on the social composition of the group of collaborators of the folklorist Jakob Hurt. Of the 42% of Jakob Hurt's collaborators whose occupational status could be established, almost half were teachers and a third peasants. The lower proportion of members of the urban strata in this group is a consequence of the nature of its patriotic activity, which was the collection of folklore.[16]

We can establish far less about the *social origins* of the Estonian patriots than we can about their social status. This is a result on the one hand of the insignificant part played by the university-educated intelligentsia and on the other hand, in particular, of the relatively simple social structure of the Estonian population as a whole.

The editorial correspondence of *Sakala*, as well as the lists of subscribers to the journal, provide us with a relatively exact and reliable picture of the *level of participation of the different districts and towns in patriotic activity* in and around 1880. In order to establish the *territorial composition* of the national movement we can in addition make use of the data on the collections for the Alexander School, on the readership of certain other periodicals, and on the spread of singing clubs (the data on the last two indicators mentioned are incomplete). Let us first attempt to give a broad and general outline of the characteristics of the different Estonian districts.

The distribution of *Sakala*'s readers over the Estonian districts of Livonia and in the government of Estland itself was very uneven. By far the biggest response to the periodical was made in the district of Viljandi. In contrast, the districts of Harjumaa, Järvamaa, Läänemaa and Saaremaa contained very small numbers of subscribers. The districts of Virumaa, Tartumaa and Pärnumaa lay between these two extremes. In general, then, the Estonian inhabitants of the government of Estland (except the district of Virumaa) showed much less interest in *Sakala* than did the Estonian inhabitants of the government of Livonia.[17] The network of active contributors to *Sakala* corresponds by and large to the network of subscribers.[18] If we look at the collections of the 1870s

for the Alexander School we find that the liveliest activity – the largest number of committees – within the government of Estland was centred in the district of Virumaa, but this time an almost equal level of interest was present in Järvamaa. These two districts also sent the largest number of choirs to the singing festival of 1877.[19] The intensity of the collections in the southern districts of Estonian settlement was of course much greater than in the north. In particular, at the beginning of the 1870s the predominance of the districts of Viljandi and Tartu was plainly evident, as for example in the case of the collection of 1872, when the district of Viljandi brought in five times as much as the whole government of Estland, while the district of Tartu brought in three times as much.[20]

The territorial distribution of the members of the Estonian Literary Society diverged from that of *Sakala*'s contributors to the extent that they were more strongly represented in the districts of Tartu and Võru. They were also more numerous than the average figure in the eastern parts of the districts of Viljandi and Pärnu.[21]

We have endeavoured to integrate all the available indices of patriotic activity among the Estonians, and to give a general characterization of each parish (or *Kihel* – a territorial unit whose number of inhabitants was usually between 5,000 and 10,000), designating the different parishes according to these indices as either above average in national activity, average, or below average.[22] We have projected these individual characteristics onto a map of the area, and this has allowed us to establish that the majority of the districts we have designated as above average in patriotic activity formed a compact territory, the nucleus of which was the district of Viljandi, plus the adjoining parishes in the direction of Pärnu to the west, Rakvere to the north, and Võru and Tartu to the east.[23] The parishes with a lower than average degree of national activity formed an equally compact and clearly defined area, namely the rather larger districts of north-western Estland, extending as far as the central region around the small town of Paide, and in addition almost the whole of the south-eastern and north-eastern border region. The inhabitants of the islands off the western coast participated still less in the national movement. The two largest Estonian towns, Tartu and Tallinn, lay on the boundary of the nationally passive region. In both of them the German element had a predominant position, but there was also a large group of Estonian patriots. The other towns in the nationally passive region had no particular significance for the national movement.

The territorial distribution of *Sakala*'s correspondents did not alter greatly in the course of its period of publication. The activity of the district of Viljandi underwent a certain degree of relative decline, but remained far in advance of the rest of the territory. Worth mentioning is the increase in the number of correspondents of *Sakala* in the Rakvere-Tallinn strip and in part also in the district of Pärnu. There was a corresponding increase in the number of

subscribers to *Sakala* in some of these areas, and only in this case does the area around Tallinn begin gradually to stand out more clearly.[24]

There was also a shift in the territorial distribution of members of the Estonian Literary Society, which took place between 1873 and 1882. Towards the end of the 1870s the membership of the Society spread out from the original core region between Viljandi, Võru and Tartu in a northerly and westerly direction. At the beginning of the 1880s this tendency ceased to operate in the north, and only continued hesitantly in the district of Pärnu. In the core region, on the other hand, the number of members increased strongly.[25]

If we apply the indices for the intensity of the national movement to the whole Estonian territory, rather than to each individual parish, we arrive at a still more striking result. In 1881, only 31 % of the total Estonian-speaking population lived on the compact portion of the area we have described as above average, or average, in patriotic activity, but 58 % of the contributors to *Sakala* were active there, and 65 % of all copies sold to subscribers went to that area.

We have arrived therefore at a relatively simple picture of the social composition of the patriotic community in Estland.

1. Village schoolteachers formed the largest group of Estonian patriots. Of the other groups within the intelligentsia only the lowest categories of official are worth mentioning. The other groups, such as the university-educated intellectuals and the students, played an insignificant part. The German pastors understandably did not take part in the movement at all. The share of the peasantry in the national movement was relatively large, particularly among the supporters of the radical wing, which was beginning to separate off, and with the coming of Phase C of course it became even larger.
2. If we take account of the predominantly rural character of the area, and the impact of the radical patriots (in particular the *Sakala* circle) on the people of the countryside, the part played in the movement by small-scale urban producers and small traders was relatively large.
3. The overwhelming majority of the patriots lived of course in the country; but the most important national leaders were to be found in the towns, in particular in Tallinn, Tartu and Pärnu.
4. Patriotic agitation was most enthusiastically taken up in the southern part of the Estonian territory, particularly in the district of Viljandi and the neighbouring parishes, and in Võru and Tartu.
5. A lack of documents makes it impossible to undertake any analysis of the social origin of the patriots. It is clear, however, that most of them came from rural, and above all peasant, families.

If we take an overall look at the circumstances which conditioned and influenced the course of the Estonian national movement we note above all that many of these circumstances were highly unpropitious for the course and



Map 3 The Territorial Structure of the Estonian National Movement

possible success of Phase B. So far we have traced the course of national movements of the integrated type, and we have found that certain relations appeared to be weighty formative agents in them. But in the Estonian case almost all these relations were modified in such a way as to work rather as elements retarding than hastening the spread of patriotic attitudes.

The territory inhabited by the Estonians had never formed a distinct political entity at any time in history. It was always divided into the provinces of Estland and Livonia, which had had divergent political destinies. At the time when the Estonian national movement began to unfold its activity, all the Estonians admittedly resided within the boundaries of a single state – Tsarist Russia – but their territory remained split into two separate governments along the dividing-line given by history. The national movement was therefore unable to link up with a tradition of political history, and its programme therefore lacked a historical component. Another result of this territorial division was that the Estonian territory did not have a definite centre from which the national movement might radiate out into the provinces. Tallinn was surrounded by nationally passive territory, and it had a disadvantageous position for communications with the interior of the country: Pärnu had a predominantly German character; and thus the centre of the movement was dispersed between Tartu, Võru and Viljandi.

Nor did the linguistic and cultural situation furnish sufficiently powerful bonds to promote the formation of a nation. A written language had not yet been constituted; it was first formed, not too skilfully, in the course of Phase A. No literature existed in the national language, merely popular sayings and devotional reading-matter. Nor could the religious links act as an integrating factor, for the church was a part of the apparatus of the ruling German nation, and entirely beneath the sway of the ruling class of that nation: it was not possible for members of the Estonian ethnic group to make the social ascent into the ranks of the clergy. The inadequacy of their own literary tradition could be compensated for to a certain extent by the possibility of eking it out with the cultural traditions of the neighbouring, and related, Finnish nation. In this situation tendencies towards Russification had to a certain degree a positive effect, in the sense that they paralysed the influence of the German element, which until then had been clearly predominant.

The prevailing type of scattered settlement and the weak relationship between the peasants and the market over the greater part of Estonian territory also had an unfavourable impact on the chances for the development of the national movement. Whence a lack of opportunities for social communication; and it is significant that Phase B of the national movement set in – and made rapid advances – in the period of the construction of railways in the Baltic lands. The movement was also affected unfavourably by extra-economic barriers, which not only hindered the Estonian population from leaving the rural areas but also prevented them from gaining a higher education or craft qualifications

in the towns (the last-named barrier continued to operate even after the abolition of personal attachment to the soil). In view of these circumstances the sole route to education and a broader social outlook remained the rural school.

Given the impact of such a powerful collection of disintegrating factors, where then should we look for the circumstances which acted as integrating and nation-creating factors? It would not be enough here merely to give an exposition of the fears and hopes of the patriots. The fundamental and probably most decisive factor which from a certain date onwards stimulated the spread of national consciousness among broad strata of the oppressed Estonian nationality was the class antagonism between the feudal German landowners and their Estonian subjects. In addition to this there was the conflict of interests between town and country. We have seen that in the Estonian case, as in others, the antagonism between the fundamental classes of the old society remained a 'pure' class antagonism, and that until the 1850s the national aspect did not enter the foreground, at least not consciously.

Only when the education, general outlook and also the standard of living of the peasants had attained a certain level, following the agrarian reforms of the first half of the nineteenth century, did the agitation of the patriots find in them a grateful and receptive audience. This agitation was the more effective for including a clear-cut programme for the solution of the agrarian problem. With the progressive penetration of members of the Estonian ethnic group into the towns, where they were already able, thanks to the bourgeois reforms, to enter a number of urban trades and also gain higher education, the sphere of the integrating factors expanded to include the antagonism between the small-scale Estonian commodity-producers and the middle and upper German strata there. The rapid passage of the Estonians through Phase B was also conditioned by the relatively dense network of schools and (with considerable regional variations) the rapid growth in literacy. Another, secondary contribution was made by the use for patriotic agitation and communication of the tradition of popular creativity expressed in the choirs, which had sprung up in almost every parish. These also formed a channel of communication making it possible to bridge over the gaps which derived from the dispersed nature of agrarian settlement in the region.

12

A national movement of the belated type: the Lithuanian example

The history of Lithuania is a characteristic case of divergence between the history of a political unit and the history of the ethnic group which gave it its name. Originally Lithuanian nationality was professed by the nobility of the territory of the medieval Grand Duchy of Lithuania; as soon as the union with Poland became a fixed political reality, Lithuania was subjected to a decisive Polish cultural influence. From the sixteenth century onwards a rapid shift of national consciousness on the part of the nobility took place – from Lithuanian to Polish. The Polish language asserted its position as the ruling language, and Polish culture became the culture of the ruling class. The Polonization of the towns and the clergy during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was an accompanying feature of this process.

The full incorporation of most of the Lithuanian lands (with the exception of the Suvalki region) into Russian state after 1815 produced an even more powerful orientation on the part of the Lithuanian nobility and intellectuals towards Polish culture. Lithuanian culture, in the proper sense of the word, remained within the limits of a peasant culture up to the middle of the nineteenth century. Between 1820 and the 1860s a large number of folksongs and certain other examples of popular artistic creation were published; these publications were an outgrowth of the predilections and scientific interest of Polish and German scholars. This interest did not of course exclude a love for the people as a creative cultural force, typical of Phase A. Both the Polish and the Lithuanian inhabitants of Lithuanian territory participated in the Polish revolution of 1863. The reprisals carried out by the Tsarist government after the defeat of the revolution fell upon both the Polish and Lithuanian peoples.

A new type of national idea began to gain a hearing in Lithuanian life in 1870s. The first sign of this was a conscious and consistent distancing of Lithuanian intellectuals from Polish cultural life. The initiators of national agitation were chiefly members of the student youth of the 1870s. As a result of energetic deliberations it proved possible in 1883 to publish the journal *Aušra* (*Dawn*). The coming of *Aušra* signalled the split with the old 'Landespatriotismus' of Phase A and also the beginnings of the struggle for an organization of Lithuanian patriots. The secular intelligentsia, taking the

programme of *Aušra* as their point of departure, developed it in the direction of a greater radicalization both nationally and socially. The political differentiation which ran parallel with the emergence of a mass national movement was brought to a height in the revolutionary year of 1905: it became possible for patriots of all tendencies to make an open political appearance on Lithuanian territory (Phase C).[1]

There are certain attempts in the existing studies of the history of the Lithuanian nation to give an account of the social composition of the patriotic groups. It is not surprising that the intelligentsia is in general considered to be the most active factor in the Lithuanian national movement in Phase B. In Phase A it is assumed that the decisive part was played by the clergy, and to a somewhat smaller degree by the lesser nobility, especially those from Žmud' (Samaiten, Samogitia).[2] The greater part of the patriotic intelligentsia is also alleged to have come from the lesser nobility.[3] On the basis of what we already know about the campaign against *Aušra* by the clergy, we can assume that most of them kept their distance from the new national movement at least in the first years of Phase B.[4] We do not find the nobility among the supporters of *Aušra*; on the contrary, the editors of *Aušra* criticized the nobility for its refusal to participate.[5] The 'Landespatriotismus' of the nobility had long been rooted in a Polish national consciousness. This view is however not generally accepted as far as it concerns the lesser nobility from the region of Žmud'. Indeed, some authors assert that the latter group contributed to the national movement a set of new and liberal demands, and a conception of the nation as a group of citizens possessing equal rights; and further that the patriotic intelligentsia of Phase B owed its origin to these nobles.[6] The position outlined here is not too convincing, and needs to be examined critically. There can, however, be no doubt that the Lithuanian patriots endeavoured to win over the lesser nobility of Žmud', and that at this stage they themselves were not certain of their national affiliation.[7]

These contradictory views of the share of the nobility in the Lithuanian national awakening are reflected in differences in the evaluation of the part played by the popular strata, an expression which of course refers exclusively to the rural population, in view of what we already know about the social structure of the Lithuanian national group. The generally accepted view is that the rural population was the guardian of the language and cultural tradition of the Lithuanians, and the main force which frustrated attempts at Polonization and Russification. Various estimates are given of the level of active participation of the peasantry in the actual national movement of Phase B. Reference is most frequently made to the backwardness of the peasantry, its isolation from cultural and political development, and, in connection with this, its insufficiently developed national consciousness. The developments of the 1880s, on this view, were the work of the intelligentsia more than any other

group.[8] At the other extreme we find the view that the peasants were the fundamental force in the national awakening, that they actively supported patriotic endeavours, and that almost all the patriots of Phase B were of peasant origin.[9] More significant, however, is the generally recognized fact that we do not find the slightest trace of a nationally-minded bourgeoisie in the course of Phase B in Lithuania. Only at the end of the 1880s and the beginning of the 1890s did the patriots around the socialist and patriotic journal *Varpas* call on the Lithuanians to penetrate into the urban environment. They recommended the peasants to engage in trade, to have their children apprenticed to urban crafts, and various other measures.[10] The endeavours of the *Varpas* group could only produce results when the objective conditions for their success were present, hence only in a later phase of the national movement.

We can accordingly sum up the picture of the social composition of the patriotic groups in Phase B presented by previous studies of the subject as follows: the main force behind the national movement was the intelligentsia, a stratum which originated perhaps from the peasantry and perhaps from the nobility; the significance of the peasantry is not uniformly evaluated; nor is the part played by the lesser nobility of the Samogitia region. We do not know much about the share of the various components of the intelligentsia in the movement; we have definite information only about the students. No section of the bourgeoisie took part in the national movement. These data are extremely incomplete, and in part disputable. However, they can form a valuable point of departure for further investigations.

No attempt is made anywhere in the existing literature on this subject to express in quantitative terms the social composition of the patriotic groups. Let us therefore try to test the summary evaluations just referred to by using concrete biographical data about the individual participants in Phase B. The sources at our disposal are exceedingly sparse. In the view of the fact that patriotic activities went on illegally under conditions of severe oppression, neither lists of subscribers to patriotic periodicals nor lists of participants in other aspects of the national movement have survived. We have therefore been compelled to abandon the attempt at a precise and differentiated analysis, such as we were able to undertake for most of the other movements. Instead we must confine ourselves to combining certain indirect data on the individual members of the community of patriots. The kernel of this community may be regarded as the editorial staff of *Aušra*. The published list of the staff admittedly contains pseudonyms and people only identified by initials, but most of it can be deciphered and the true names discovered.[11] This list of the editorial staff of *Aušra* was supplemented by lists of organizers of patriotic student associations,[12] and by the names of people who helped with the secret distribution of books, and writers and journalists who were patriots but did not work directly with *Aušra*.[13] In this way we were able to secure data on the social status of almost 260 active participants in the national movement in Phase B (patriots born

in 1870 at the latest). It was possible to extract further biographical data for most of this group: we were able to find out changes in occupation in the course of the 1880s and 1890s, information which was of particular interest where it concerned people who entered the patriotic movement while still students. Hence it proved possible to draw up a table outlining the social composition of the patriotic community in the years between 1880 and 1885, and as a supplement to this the social composition of the same group in approximately 1890.

Table 25. *The social composition of Lithuanian patriotic groups during the Aušra period and around 1890*

	Period of *Aušra*			Around the year 1890		
	Numerical total	%	%	Numerical total	%	%
1. Nobles, landowners	11	4.0		12	4.5	
2. Traders, entrepreneurs	5		2.0	11		4.0
3. Craftsmen	16		6.0	16		6.0
4. Traders and craftsmen (2+3)	21	8.0		27	10.5	
5. Doctors, chemists	14		5.5	45		18.5
6. Lawyers	3		1.0	17		6.5
7. Free professions (5+6)	18	7.0		64	25.0	
8. Officials	12	4.5		20	7.5	
9. Clergy	32	12.5		59	23.5	
10. Village teachers	11		4.0	12		4.5
11. Gymnasium teachers	11		4.0	13		5.5
12. Teachers (10+11)	22	8.5		25	10.0	
13. Medical students	48		19.0			
14. Law students	20		8.0			
15. Theology students	40		15.5			
16. Students (13, 14, +15)	108	42.5		12	4.5	
17. Peasants	23	9.0		22	8.5	
18. Employees and others	10	4.0		15	6.0	
Total	257	100.0		256	100.0	

The data summarized in Table 25 make possible an extremely interesting comparison with the views mentioned earlier. Thus the idea of the relatively small part played by the clergy, particularly in the period of *Aušra*, finds

confirmation in the table. The clergy played a small part in Phase B, not only in comparison with their numerical weight as a whole, but also in comparison with their role in Phase A, where we are able to concur with Römer in his estimate that the clergy's numerical contribution was roughly 50%.[14] The low proportion of nobles in the lists also corresponds with previous estimates. But the weak representation of the teaching profession is a surprise. Apparently Römer's criticism of the behaviour of teachers in the period of Russification is justified. Lithuania, like Bohemia, had its patriotic teachers as a national type, but not as a significant factor in the social composition of the national movement.[15] The low proportion of officials corresponds to the backwardness of the administration, but not to the results of the census of 1897, according to which the officials belonged to those groups of the intelligentsia in which the numbers of the oppressed nationality had to a very large degree retained their linguistic affiliations. A surprising fact is the high proportion of members of the free professions among the patriots, in particular the doctors. This is a striking characteristic of the Lithuanian national movement. In view of what we know about the absence of a Lithuanian bourgeoisie, the part played by craftsmen and traders is also somewhat surprising. Of course, in most cases the craftsmen would be at work on a small scale in the countryside. The growth in the number of traders by comparison with the earlier period indicates that by 1890 some pioneers of the national movement had already begun to put into effect the programme of mass penetration into the towns, and accomplish the transition to independent commercial activity. The stagnation in peasant interest which emerges from our figures is only apparent; in the course of Phase B the peasants' participation in the national movement underwent a rapid increase. If we want to avoid being involved in baseless speculations, we must not give any characterization of the evolution of the proportionate share of specific social groups in the national movement during Phase B, owing to the unsatisfactory state of our knowledge of these matters.

In view of the predominance of the intelligentsia in the national movement in Phase B, the question of their *social origin* is of great significance. We have already mentioned certain characteristic features in outline; now we return to the question in more detail. There is no reason to doubt that in the course of the first half of the nineteenth century the educated classes in Lithuania were recruited from the children of the nobility, the Polonized urban strata, the burghers, and the educated classes themselves.[16] Let us note in passing that in 1824 the children of peasants were excluded from the secondary schools altogether.[17] Only when this restriction was removed with the emancipation of the serfs in 1861 did the sons of the richer peasant households go away to study.[18] At first the decision to gain an education was motivated by the intention to enter a clerical career. But many peasant children gave up this idea while still at school, deciding instead to return to the land or to transfer to other subjects: medicine, law, or science. Thus there gradually arose a

Lithuanian secular intelligentsia. We can only guess at the reasons behind this process of transformation. What is certain is that it was the sons of peasants who founded the first secret patriotic societies, in the 1870s. And all six of the chief editors of *Aušra* came from peasant families.[19] If we test these assertions against the biographical material we have gathered for our group of 257 patriots in Phase B, we find they meet with complete confirmation, even though we cannot draw up an exact table of the social origins of the patriots. The fact that the overwhelming majority of them came from the countryside (only 8 patriots – 3.5% – were born in a town) is sufficient evidence for their peasant environment, especially as it is known that handicrafts were only spread very thinly over the rural areas of Lithuania. The only question remaining open is the degree of participation in the movement by sons of members of the rural intelligentsia – petty officials and schoolteachers. However, there is no reason to assume it was very great. Among the isolated references in the sources to the social origin of patriots we find almost thirty to peasant origin, six to families of lesser nobility, two each to families of organists and officials, one to a doctor's and one to a teacher's family.

We can investigate the *territorial distribution* of the national movement in Lithuania from two angles: location of patriotic activity, and concentration of patriots' birthplaces.

The location of the Lithuanian patriots' activity was determined to a considerable extent by the places where it was possible for the intelligentsia to get any employment at all in a backward agricultural country. The clergy had almost unlimited opportunities for employment in the Lithuanian countryside, but the secular intelligentsia was subject to considerable limitations. During the whole of the nineteenth century, as far as the mid-1880s, a large proportion of university graduates (and probably also school-leavers) could find no chance of employment in Lithuania. They were therefore unable to return to their home districts after studying, and remained in Russian, Polish or Prussian towns. Only after the 1880s did the chances of employment improve in the towns of Lithuania.[20] Given the social composition of the patriotic community, this situation excluded any possibility of setting up large centres of patriotic life in the Lithuanian region itself. Concentrations of Lithuanian patriots were to be found in Moscow, St Petersburg, Warsaw, Tilsit and Memel. We may regard the two last-named towns as Lithuanian, but they too were situated either on the border, or, in the case of Memel, entirely outside the actual territory of Lithuania. Patriotic activity, which under these conditions literally 'came from outside', did not meet with an identical reception over the whole of Lithuania. All trustworthy accounts, and all contemporary witnesses, are agreed that Lithuanian patriotism was liveliest in the northern part of the government of Suvalki. In the villages of that region there was a very dense network of secret circles for the reading of Lithuanian books. The Lithuanian language emerged most frequently in the village schools of the region, and the

secret Lithuanian pamphlets came from there as well.[21] Samogitia stood in second place as regards the intensity of the local patriotic movement (if we leave out of account the strip of land in Prussia inhabited by Lithuanians, which also had a high concentration of patriots). In contrast to these areas, extensive regions in the east, the centre and the north east of the country displayed very little national activity until the end of the nineteenth century.[22]

Let us now supplement this picture of uneven patriotic activity on Lithuanian territory with data on the places of origin, or birth, of the pioneers of the national movement during Phase B. With almost all our group of patriots we are able to establish both the place of birth and the place of secondary education. The distribution of the schools the patriots went to provides us with an instructive picture. Among the patriots whose educational background we were able to establish, the following secondary schools were represented:

Place of education	No. of patriots
Marijampole	68 (52% of total)
Suvalki	5
Kaunas	3
Lettish territory	12
Rest of Russia	8
Panevežys	3
Šiauliai	25
Krajiai	1
Vejverai teachers' training college	5

If we project these data onto the map, we see that the small southern corner of Lithuania which formed the northern part of the government of Suvalki attracted almost two-thirds of the Lithuanian patriotic intelligentsia. The proportion of ex-pupils of the Marijampole high school (gymnasium) is perhaps slightly overstated, owing to the inclusion in the overall group of patriots of the members of the patriotic circle at the school itself. But as this only consisted of two people, the distortion is of little significance. To make the situation clearer, let us give here the proportions of students of Lithuanian nationality in various secondary schools: 40% in Marijampole, 33% in Jelgava (a Lettish town), 22% in Liepāja, and 50% in Vejverai.[23]

We can only establish the territorial distribution of the national awakening according to the location of patriotic activities by making overall estimates on the basis of the data provided by patriotic publications. In the case of the patriots' places of origin the situation is different: here we possess data extensive enough to make possible a cartographic and quantitative presentation. With respect to the social composition and origin of the patriotic groups, we assume that the environment in which they spent their childhood and youth had an immense significance for their attainment of national consciousness, much



Places in the neighbourhood of which between two and five patriots were born

Places in the neighbourhood of which more than five patriots were born

Seats of the district authorities

Present-day boundary of the Lithuanian SSR (roughly identical with the language boundary)

Boundaries of the Russian governments (*gubernii*) in the nineteenth century

Boundaries of the districts in the nineteenth century

The numerals marked on the map denote the numbers of patriots born in each district

Map 4 The Birthplaces of Leading Lithuanian Patriots

greater than was the case in Bohemia for example. If we assign the birthplaces of the patriots known to us to the appropriate administrative district (Russian *uyezd*) we arrive at the following very instructive result: Telšiai 15 patriots, 6%; Šiauliai 33 patriots, 13%; Panevežys 27 patriots, 11%; Zarasai 10 patriots, 4%; Raseiniai 12 patriots, 5%; Kaunas (Kovno) 12 patriots, 5%; Ukmerge 11 patriots, 4.5%; Vilnius (Vilna), none; Švenčionys 1 patriot, 0.5%; Trakai 2 patriots, 1%; Šakiai 30 patriots, 12%; Marijampole 42 patriots, 17%; Vilkaviškis 24 patriots, 10%; Kalvarija 15 patriots, 6%; Suvalki 3 patriots,

1.5%; and the list is completed by 8 patriots, or 3.5%, originating from Prussian Lithuania. The northern part of the government of Suvalki (the districts of Šakiai, Marijampole, Vilkaviškis and Kalvarija) formed only a very small portion of the territory of Lithuania, and only 15% of all Lithuanians lived there, yet nearly half the total number of known patriots were born in this region. The region with the second largest number of patriots – comprising the districts of Šiauliai and Panevežys in the north of the country – was twice as large as Suvalki, and had roughly the same Lithuanian population, but it only produced 24% of the patriots. On the remainder of Lithuanian territory, inhabited by two-thirds of the Lithuanian people, only 25% of the total number of patriots were born. Let us repeat once more than most patriots came from the countryside. In this connection it is interesting that with the exception of Marijampole and Šiauliai the areas around the towns were not very strongly represented in the list of birthplaces; a striking example of this is the weak representation of the environs of Kaunas itself. But we shall reserve a general evaluation of these data to the concluding section of the book, where we undertake the comparative analysis. Let us restrict our remarks here to the following summary.

1. The secular intelligentsia stood at the head of the national movement. At the beginning of Phase B this category was represented above all by the students; they were gradually joined by a strong group from the free professions, and, in third place, by the clergy. There was little continuity between Phase B of the national movement and the preceding Phase A. The peasants played a greater and greater part in the movement.

2. The part played by craftsmen and traders was insignificant, although it increased somewhat at the end of Phase B.

3. A large proportion of the leading patriots had their sphere of activity outside the actual territory of Lithuania. This was in part for political reasons (persecution of national movements in Tsarist Russia), and in part for material reasons (the impossibility of making a living in Lithuania). Lithuania lacked a strong urban centre of patriotic life. In so far as the patriots did live in Lithuania, they were for the most part active in the countryside.

4. Patriotic activity in Lithuanian territory met with an uneven reception. It was at its strongest in the northern part of the government of Suvalki, and at its weakest in the eastern and north-eastern parts of Lithuania.

5. The towns were for the most part untouched by patriotic agitation; the programme of patriotic penetration into the towns registered a few successes, but only when national consciousness had already spread among the peasant masses.

6. Almost all the patriots came from the country districts, and most of them were from peasant families.

7. The people who formed the nucleus of the patriotic movement originated in the northern part of the government of Suvalki; almost two-thirds of the

patriots had passed high schools in that region. Another, smaller section came from Samogitia, and only isolated cases occur of patriots originating from other Lithuanian areas. However this does not imply that no patriotic activity at all took place in those areas.

A number of highly contradictory conditions presided over the development of the Lithuanian national movement. This fact already emerges from the two basic characteristics of that movement: it belongs to the 'belated' type of movement among the small European nations, yet its Phase B advanced to the stage of the mass movement with great rapidity. Among the conditions in the social and cultural sphere we meet with some factors with a very powerful disintegrating effect, but in contrast there were other factors which in specific circumstances exerted a powerful pull in the direction of integration.

The political situation and the administrative set-up undoubtedly had a negative influence on the development of national consciousness. Political repression after 1864 considerably hindered any social or cultural activities. Above all, it compelled the Lithuanian patriots to shift the centre of their activities away from their own national territory; for a long time the Lithuanians lacked a fixed national centre with stable institutions and authority. There was also an added circumstance contributing to the fragmentation of the national movement: the fact that the ethnically Lithuanian territory did not constitute a single political or administrative entity, but was shared out among several wider units, in only one of which (the government of Kovno) did the Lithuanians form the majority of the population. Understandably this fragmented condition was not a suitable foundation for 'Landespatriotismus', which could only live off historical reminiscences and therefore necessarily died out during Phase B.

The Lithuanian population had been exposed since the Middle Ages to a twofold assimilatory pressure – to Germanization in Prussia and Polonization in Lithuania proper. However, in the critical period of the emergence of conscious and aggressive national activity on the part of the ruling nations, the tendency towards Polonization was paralysed by a tendency towards Russification. There still remained the assimilationism of the Germans, which was pursued with heightened energy during the second half of the nineteenth century. Russification, on the other hand, had a contradictory significance for the Lithuanian national movement. From one angle it forced the patriots into illegality and limited their opportunities for making an impact. But from another angle it provided an impulse towards a more rapid growth in linguistic, and indirectly also national, awareness on the part of the Lithuanians, and their differentiation from the Polish ruling class. Religious and ecclesiastical relations also had contradictory effects on the Lithuanian national movement. If the bonds of religious affinity had a negative role in the process of differentiation from the Polish ruling nation (the opposition of the Church to any separation

from the national union with Poland) they subsequently became a support for patriotic activity against the advance of Tsarist oppression, and an instrument in the creation of national consciousness among the Lithuanian-speaking population. The gradual change in the attitude of the clergy towards the national movement in the course of Phase B corresponds to this general change in the role of the Catholic Church. In East Prussia, in contrast, the Lithuanian minority was of the same religious persuasion as the ruling nation, and the ties of religion were a factor contributing to the assimilation of the Lithuanian inhabitants; moreover, it was a serious factor of disintegration that the Lithuanians in Prussia, where a considerable part of the patriotic and especially the journalistic activity of the Lithuanians was concentrated, were of a different religion from the one that prevailed in Lithuania proper. One should add a further factor to all these circumstances, namely that the extraordinarily powerful role of religion in Lithuania derived in the second place from its position as a kind of temporary 'substitute' for cultural relations, which could not themselves fully develop owing to the persecution of the authorities. In view of the temporal belatedness already referred to, such a role for religion was of course an anachronism in the period of the emergence and expansion of the organized working-class movement not only in Western and Central Europe but also in Russia and Poland.

The social structure of the Lithuanian-speaking population was extremely simple, as we have noted; in the initial stages of Phase B the large social group known as the nation was hardly to be distinguished from the class of peasants at the threshold of capitalist development. This fact accelerated the growth of national consciousness among the peasants to the extent that the language difference ran parallel with the class antagonism, which it did in the period of the emergence of patriotic agitation. On the other hand there was one circumstance arising from this which acted to hold back the process of completing the nation's formation: there was no support to be had from the towns, which in the majority of other small nations were the centres from which patriotic agitation radiated out into the countryside. We also know that the towns of East Prussia, settled predominantly by members of the German ruling nation, exerted a powerful assimilatory pull on the Lithuanian villages. In Lithuania proper this was not so. If we inquire into the reason for this, we can perhaps find the answer in the specific role of the Jewish population of the towns of Lithuania. The Jews formed a closed group, which was unable to assimilate other nationalities and itself only underwent assimilation in certain individual cases. These were intellectuals, and they always became assimilated, if at all, into the ruling nation. Therefore, in so far as the towns of Lithuania were settled by large Jewish populations, they could only assimilate the countryside with difficulty. But the Jewish element had yet another significance for the Lithuanian ethnic group. The rapidly multiplying Jewish population was increasingly forced towards the margin of society. The poverty-stricken

majority of the Jewish population emerged from the ghetto in order to perform the task of an unskilled workforce in the expanding capitalist society, as servants, casual labourers and so on. These were functions which were carried out elsewhere in towns at the threshold of capitalist development by people coming from the country in search of employment. Thus the presence of large Jewish groups in the towns in fact retarded the influx of the rural Lithuanian population; the towns thus retained their character of foreign bodies in Lithuanian territory, and this slowed down the process of forming a Lithuanian nation.

Economic relations had only a relatively weak effect in the period of Phase B. The political disunity of the territory occupied by the Lithuanians acted as a disintegrating factor in particular in preventing a unified orientation of long-distance commerce. It was difficult to discover economic interests held in common by the inhabitants of agrarian regions of such divergent orientations. Even local trade did not have the unifying effect we are familiar with in most other countries; in the eastern half of Lithuania in particular the peasant went incomparably less frequently to the local market than his Central European homologue, for his trading connections were taken care of to a considerable degree by a middleman, who was usually Jewish, and who sought out the peasant directly in his village environment. But the low horizontal mobility of the peasants had another cause as well: the extra-economic compulsion which limited their personal freedom wherever serfdom continued to exist. This was true up to the 1860s, and to a limited extent also in subsequent decades. There is nothing specific to the Lithuanian situation in the fact that Phase B of the national movement gained its first successes roughly one generation after the emancipation of the peasantry.

13

Belatedness under the influence of external oppression: the Slovak national movement

From the early Middle Ages the lands occupied by people of Slovak nationality formed an integral part of the kingdom of Hungary. After the Turkish invasion, and in particular after their occupation of the greater part of Hungary in the early part of the sixteenth century, the present-day area of Slovakia formed a vital part of the Hungarian state remaining in the possession of the Habsburgs. The Magyar nobility of occupied Hungary retreated to the north, onto Slovak territory, a factor which contributed to the rapid assimilation of the local ruling class. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the process of assimilation continued. A specific feature of Slovak cultural development was that it was closely intertwined with the Czech lands. The common language of the Lutheran reformation in Slovakia was Czech; Slovak students came to Prague; and Czech books were brought into Slovakia.

In the mid eighteenth century an Enlightenment interest in the people's language and culture began to manifest itself. An interest in cultural education was the motive behind the foundation of the Slovak Learned Society, which operated from 1792 onwards in a number of Slovak towns, and an extensive economic and historical literature was written at this time in a new variant of the literary language. A number of individuals from the Catholic and Evangelical camps dreamt, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, of a common agitation among the Slovak people. However, this remained at the level of academic speculation until the 1820s.

The activity of the patriots first bore fruit in the 1830s. The winning over of the popular masses to the national idea was generally recognized by these patriots as the goal of national agitation, but the actual results of their endeavours were for the moment only slight. After 1840, Ludovít Štúr, together with other patriots, worked out a project for a reform of the written Slovak language. The acceptance of this reform was itself more an element among the outstanding advances of the Slovak national movement than a causal factor. Even so, there is no doubt that the mid 1840s saw the beginning of a successful national agitation over large parts of the territory of Slovakia. For all that, even in the course of the revolution of 1848 the national movement did not attain a mass character. After the period of stagnation in the national

movement under the absolutism of Bach (1852–9), the patriots entered a new struggle from 1861. They gained a series of outstanding successes in the cultural and educational sector. But the rapid development in the direction of a mass national movement was broken off after the *Ausgleich* setting up the Dual Austro–Hungarian monarchy in 1867 was accepted. The subsequent wave of militant Magyarization broke over Slovakia at the beginning of the 1870s; in 1875 the Hungarian Prime Minister declared that a Slovak nation did not exist in Hungary. The transition from Phase B to Phase C was temporarily thwarted by this external intervention, and displaced from the nineteenth to the twentieth century.[1]

The prolonged character of Phase B of the Slovak national movement adversely affects our chances of studying the social spectrum covered by its pioneers and supporters. If we wanted to grasp the Slovak Phase B in its broadest sense, we should have to include in our analysis of its social composition patriots born over a span of more than a century. Here we have considered it useful to concentrate on patriots who functioned above all in the period between the second and the sixth decades of the nineteenth century. Those who emerged in the early part of the period still looked back to Phase A, out of which their activities had grown; those whose work falls at the end of the period were functioning under the specific conditions of Magyarization and at the same time in a situation when Phase C was making its entry. Some very valuable biographical data for the period we regard as vital have been collected by the Slovak historian J. Hučko. His criteria of selection and classification of social groups differ somewhat from the ones we have employed in the present work. Moreover, his sample of generations is chronologically wider, and encroaches onto our Phase A. Nevertheless we think it useful to reproduce his results first of all. Hučko distinguishes two groups of patriotic intellectuals: those active in artistic and literary creation, and those who took part in patriotic activity in other ways. In this connection he takes into consideration the specifically Hungarian situation that a significant part of the educated strata originated from the families of the lesser nobility; of course, the majority of these nobles pursued middle-class occupations, so that they were closer to the other, non-noble, members of their professions than they were to the ruling class in the correct sense of the term. In his analysis of social composition Hučko does not include patriots who belonged to social groups outside the intelligentsia. Of the two tables in which he summarizes his results, he considers the more representative to be the table of the social composition of that part of the patriotic intelligentsia which took part in the national movement in other ways than purely literary activity.[2] But one can of course combine the two tables into a single whole, and we have done this (Table 26).

According to Hučko the criterion of patriotic literary activity is the language: if the individual in question wrote in Czech or Slovak, as the case

Table 26. *The social composition of the Slovak patriotic intelligentsia 1780–1848*

		Form of activity			
		Literary type		Other types	
Occupation	Birth	number	%	Number	%
Free professions	Noble	34	3.8	23	2.0
	Non-noble	74	8.2	30	2.6
Teachers	Noble	41	4.5	16	1.4
	Non-noble	138	15.4	197	18.5
Catholic clergy	Noble	57	6.3	55	4.9
	Non-noble	185	20.7	235	21.0
Prot. clergy	Noble	56	6.2	51	4.5
	Non-noble	216	24.2	270	24.1
Officials	Noble	35	3.9	63	5.6
	Non-noble	39	4.3	97	8.6
Others	Noble	3	0.3	13	1.1
	Non-noble	14	1.5	67	6.0
Total	Noble	226	25.0	221	19.7
	Non-noble	666	75.0	896	80.3
Overall total		892	100.0	1,117	100.0

might be, without regard to the content of his literary production, he was a patriot. As a result of this broad criterion his selection of patriots includes authors of devotional literature or economic treatises without any specifically patriotic tendency – people we would therefore not include among the patriots on our criteria. The most well-marked group in Hučko's category of patriots engaged in 'other types' of activity is formed by the members of the Slovak Learned Society, active in the 1790s; in other words, people who took part in patriotic activities typical of Phase A. In order to eliminate these two important differences and to make our collection of Slovak patriots comparable with other patriotic groups, we have undertaken a selection of patriots engaged in literary activity, limiting it to those whose works were written in a patriotic spirit.[3] We have also used similar criteria to eliminate divergences from the collection of patriots active in other ways, and joined the two groups together. In view of the fact that the division into nobles and commoners considerably lessens the clarity of the tables, we shall not pursue this any further, contenting ourselves with the information on the relationship between the two categories provided in Table 28: there was a high proportion of nobles among the members of the free professions and the officials, and an even higher proportion among the patriots engaged in literary activity. First of all we shall look at the structure of the whole patriotic sample in respect of a division into generations (Table 27). Then we shall undertake a comparative analysis of the groups active in a literary fashion (Table 28, p. 102 below).

Table 27. *The social structure of the patriotic Slovak intelligentsia by generation*

	Patriots born in the period:										
	1740–80			1780–1810			1810–30			Total	
Occupation	No.	%A	%B	No.	%A	%B	No.	%A	%B	No.	%
Free profs.	7	3	0.8	29	12	3.5	69	20	8.3	105	12.6
Teachers	42	17	5.0	42	17	5.0	68	20	8.2	152	18.3
Prot. clergy	80	33	9.6	93	39	11.3	119	34	14.7	292	35.2
Cath. clergy	107	44	12.9	65	27	7.8	70	20	8.4	242	29.1
Officials	7	3	0.8	12	5	1.4	21	6	2.5	40	4.8
Total	243	100	29.2	241	100	29.0	347	100	41.8	831	100

A: Percentage share in the patriotic group of the given generation.
B: Percentage share in total number of patriots over all three generations.

Table 27 clearly demonstrates the growing share of the secular intelligentsia among the patriots, above all in the categories of the free professions and the officials (hence in the least numerous groups). The share of the Catholic clergy declined sharply, whereas the share of the Protestant clergy remained roughly constant. The high proportion of Catholic priests in the earliest of the generations is to be accounted for by the above-mentioned group of members of the Slovak Learned Society;[4] this fact however only slightly modifies the general tendency of the representation of this category to decline. For the latest generation of patriots one cannot regard the data on their social status as absolutely accurate, because a large part of this generation still belonged to the category of students in the 1840s, which we are not employing for the present. If we exclude from the group of patriots active in a literary fashion those who entered the national movement as students, we get somewhat different levels of representation for the other professions: the share of the free professions is now considerably smaller (perhaps only 10%), the officials and teachers remain roughly the same, while there is a slight increase in the proportion of Protestant and Catholic clergy. From the point of view of the trends of development this means that we must make some corrections to the conclusions derived from Table 27. The considerable growth in the number of members of the free professions involved in the movement is valid rather for the concluding decade of Phase B only, whilst the growth in the share of officials and teachers in the latest generation is confirmed. The diminution in the part played by the Catholic clergy was not as marked as appears from the original data.

We have made our selection of the patriots who were engaged in literary activities in a definitely patriotic spirit from the data provided by Hučko in order to test the degree to which his different criteria of selection lead to

Table 28. *The social structure of the actively patriotic element in the Slovak literary community*

Occupation	Born before 1800		Born after 1800		Total	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Free professions	15	14.0	14	5.5	29	8
Teachers	15	14.0	45	18.0	60	17
Prot. clergy	36	34.0	71	28.5	107	30
Cath. clergy	33	31.5	37	15.0	70	20
Officials	7	6.5	16	6.5	22	6
Students	—	—	66	26.5	66	19
Total	106	100	250	100	356	100

different results. In the group of those born after 1800 we have separated out as an independent group those who entered the national movement as students (see Table 28).

The difference between the social structure of the actively patriotic element selected according to our criteria and the social structure of Hučko's collection of patriots active in literature is surprisingly small. The share of teachers and officials is roughly the same in each case, while the share of the Catholic clergy is somewhat lower in our collection of nationally-active patriots (24% against 27%); this is also true of the free professions (10% against 12%). A more remarkable difference is to be noted in the case of the Protestant clergy: their level of participation among the clearly active patriots of the literary community was around 7% higher than in the case of the Slovak literary community in general (37% as against 30%).

We shall analyse the question of the *social origin* of the patriots, keeping a clear view of all the above-mentioned correctives. The collection of patriots studied thus includes both authors active in literature in a national sense and patriots active for the national cause in other ways, but excludes members of the Slovak Learned Society and patriots born before 1760. At the same time we have combined the data on social origin with the data on the current social status of the patriots. We have also tried to catch the distinction in social origin between patriots of the older and the younger generation. A particular problem is the category of social origin denoted as 'noble'. In certain isolated cases this refers to estate-owners (not too well-off), but often it refers to farmers who differed from other people precisely by their noble origin and to a much lesser degree by their amount of property. In the majority of cases, however, more precise data are not available.

A very large section of the Slovak patriots, more than a third, came from the families of craftsmen, small traders and burghers.[5] A little less than a third

came from peasant and gentry families, although as we have seen some of the patriots of noble origin came from a non-agricultural background, so that the participation of sons of peasants and gentry in the narrow sense was actually lower. The tendency of these proportions to evolve from one generation to the next was entirely contrary, if one compares each group. Among patriots of the older generation peasant and gentry origin was the predominant characteristic (over 40%), but in the younger generation this proportion fell markedly. In contrast to this, the proportion of patriots from a craft or in general a burgher milieu rose precisely among the younger generation of patriots. The difference between the generations would be still greater if we were to take account of the social origin of members of the Slovak Learned Society, the majority of whom came from peasant (and gentry) families. Among the students of the younger generation the urban background was especially strong (over 40%). The third largest group from which the patriots originated was the Protestant clergy, whose share was roughly equal in the older and younger generations – nearly a fifth. A specific feature of this group is the fact that the majority of patriots from the families of Protestant pastors became Protestant pastors themselves.

Table 29. *The social origin of the patriotic Slovak intelligentsia* (%)

Parent's occupation		Present occupational group						Total (a+b)		
		1	2	3	4	5	6	No.	%	%
Trader, craftsman, burgher	(a)	11.0	7.0	8.5	17.5	8.0	—	57	27.9	35.7
	(b)	20.0	35.5	19.5	23.5	18.5	42.0	206	38.7	
Free prof.	(a)	7.5	—	—	—	—	—	4	2.0	1.6
	(b)	2.0	0.5	1.5	—	1.5	1.0	8	1.5	
Teachers	(a)	—	7.0	2.5	—	1.5	—	16	7.8	11.3
	(b)	—	14.5	8.0	1.0	1.5	17.0	67	12.6	
Prot. clergy	(a)	5.5	1.5	15.5	—	1.5	—	38	18.6	18.8
	(b)	7.5	8.5	24.0	—	10.0	17.0	100	18.8	
Officials	(a)	—	—	—	1.0	1.5	—	2	1.0	1.6
	(b)	—	—	0.5	1.0	3.0	3.5	10	1.9	
Peasants	(a)	7.5	5.0	7.5	15.5	3.0	—	45	22.1	15.4
	(b)	4.0	12.0	5.5	16.5	3.0	11.0	68	12.8	
Gentry	(a)	11.0	3.0	3.5	16.5	11.5	—	42	20.6	15.6
	(b)	24.0	6.0	4.0	7.5	34.5	8.5	73	13.7	
Total		100	100	100	100	100	100	736	200	100

1 = free professions, 2 = teachers, 3 = Protestant clergy, 4 = Catholic clergy, 5 = officials, 6 = students. (a) = patriots born between 1760 and 1800. (b) = patriots born between 1800 and 1830.

A highly differentiated picture emerges if we look at the social origin of the people who compose each occupational group within the patriotic intelligentsia. Whereas all occupations are represented roughly equally among patriots from the families of craftsmen and burghers, the Catholic clergy predominated among patriots from peasant families, and they also formed the largest group among patriots from a gentry background in the older generation. Gentry of the younger generation were more frequently officials and members of the free professions. The Protestant clergy were recruited above all from their own ranks. The same can be said of the older generation of patriots from the families of teachers: they were themselves predominantly teachers.

We can analyse the *territorial composition* of the Slovak national movement chiefly with reference to the location of patriotic activities and the birthplaces of the patriots. If we represent the data for these two parameters cartographically we get a picture of a very uneven distribution. We were able to establish the location of activities of over 800 patriots, and the birthplaces of 520. This is how they were distributed over Slovakia, in percentages:

Geographical area	% active	% born
Western Slovakia		
1. in the region between the town of Skalica and Trenčín	17	20
2. in the district around the towns of Modra, Nitra and Trnava	13	10
3. in Bratislava	7	1.5
Northern Slovakia		
1. between Bytča and Žilina in the Váh valley	6	7.5
2. in the districts of Liptov and lower Orava	11	18
Central Slovakia		
1. in the districts of Banská Bystrica, Martin, Banská Štiavnica and Zvolen	22	22
2. in the districts of the Upper Hron river	9	8
In Zips	4	4
In Eastern Slovakia	5	4
In the other, smaller districts of Slovakia	6	5

A combination of these data with further indicators of patriotic activity such as participation in petitioning movements, membership in the *Matica Slovenská* and a high intensity of cultural life[6] confirms that three patriotically active districts crystallized out in Slovakia in Phase B of the national movement: (1) in western Slovakia, from Skalica and Trenčín in the north to Trnava and Nitra in the south, (2) in central Slovakia from Banská Bystrica and Martin in the north down to the area south of Banská Štiavnica, and (3) Liptov with the lower Orava region.

More than two-thirds of the patriots were active, and almost three-quarters



Map 5 The Territorial Structure of the Slovak National Movement

of the patriots were born, therefore, in the patriotic regions of Slovakia, which themselves covered less than a third of the national territory. Also worth attention is the correlation between concentration of birthplaces and location of patriotic activity; the only striking variations we come upon are the cases of Bratislava, which as a capital city showed a higher percentage of active patriots than patriots who were born there, and the area around Trnava, where a considerable number of Catholic priests of the older patriotic generation were active.

The high degree of participation by patriots from families of craftsmen indicates the significant role of the urban milieu in patriotic life; 22.5 % of the patriots were born in towns with over 3,000 inhabitants, 33 % in small towns, with between 1,000 and 3,000 inhabitants, and 44.5 % in country areas[7]. Over 50 % of the patriots, therefore, in a predominantly agrarian country, emerged from the urban environment. If we look at the location of patriotic activity, the share of the towns is still greater, amounting to roughly two-thirds, and within this group in turn the larger towns played by far the greater part. It must of course be said that in Slovakia the small town had a predominantly agrarian character, and frequently resembled a big village. In the youngest generation the proportion of patriots who came from an urban milieu grew to roughly two-thirds from the overall figure of 55.5 %. The towns were therefore not so strongly Magyarized as has sometimes been assumed.

We can summarize the results of our analysis of social and territorial structure as follows.

1. During the first part of Phase B of the Slovak national revival the Catholic and Protestant clergy were clearly predominant among the patriots, and among the patriotic intelligentsia.

2. In the course of Phase B the share of the Catholic clergy declined, and the share of the secular intelligentsia grew, while the share of the Protestant clergy remained on the whole stable. There was a sharp increase in particular in the patriotic activism of the students.

3. More than a third of the patriots came from the families of traders and craftsmen, and there was a constant increase in the share of this category. The proportion of patriots from peasant and gentry families declined on the other hand. In so far as the patriots came from the families of the educated classes, this meant for the most part the families of Protestant clergy.

4. More than half of the patriots in Phase B came from towns, and only about a third from the countryside. At the same time the vast majority of the Slovak population lived in the countryside.

5. The territorial structure of the national movement presents a number of patriotically active areas: two in South-West Slovakia, and two more in Central Slovakia. The greater part of Eastern Slovakia was conspicuously passive from the patriotic point of view; this was also true of parts of the north.

14

The disintegrated type: the Flemish movement

At the time of the Great French Revolution the former Habsburg domain of the Southern Netherlands – Belgium – was annexed to France and fully integrated into that country. Then the Vienna Congress formed a single Kingdom of the Low Countries, and thus subjected Belgium to the government of the northern Netherlands. The situation changed fundamentally with the revolution of 1830. Free Belgium adopted a liberal constitution, and in the new state the Francophone element gained cultural predominance over the Flemish. This reversal of fortune did not at first call forth any particularly noticeable reaction from the Flemish-speaking inhabitants. Only a minute group of patriots reflected on the future fate of the Flemish element in the country.

Patriotic agitation gained its first successes only in 1840, when a petitioning movement was organized calling for the Netherlandish language to be granted equality of rights with the French. This period also saw a new activity of the patriotic Student association Met Tijd en Vlijd. However limited the first results of all these activities may have been, we can clearly date the coming of Phase B of the Flemish movement from the early years of the 1840s. The first timid attempts to formulate a political programme at the end of the 1840s were not greeted with favour even among the patriots themselves. An organization ambitiously entitled The Flemish Central Committee (Het Vlaemsch Midden-Comiteit) sought after 1850 to unify the activity of the scattered patriotic groups on the basis of a politicized language-programme. But even though this Central Committee developed a considerable degree of activity, it did not achieve success.

At the beginning of the 1860s the most important political organization – Het Vlaemsch Verbond – renewed the attempt to achieve a political unification of the local groups. But neither improved organization, nor the social demands in the political programme, brought about a mobilization of the broad masses for participation in the national movement. The Vlaemsch Verbond did not attain its goal. The Flemish national movement continued to exist, but it did not succeed in attaining a dominant position in the Flemish part of Belgium. The fundamental political structure of Belgian public life was determined not by national antagonism, but by the antagonism between the liberals and the

clericals. This political antagonism was also latent within the Flemish movement itself, and was bound to split it sooner or later, despite all endeavours to keep it united on the basis of language and culture.[1]

For our comparative analysis of the patriotic community of the Flemish movement we shall select as Phase B the period from the 1840s onwards. In view of the fact that the transition to a mass national movement did not, for a number of reasons, take place, we shall limit our analysis of the patriotic community to a single chronological segment of Phase B, which displays relatively speaking the greatest similarities to the national movements of the other national units undergoing comparison. This segment comprises roughly the first three or four decades of the movement – hence the period of the 1860s and 1870s.

The specialist literature on the Flemish movement has so far contented itself with a merely general characterization of the *social composition* of the nationally-minded groups; the movement has customarily been described as the work of a group of intellectuals without any connection with broader strata of the Flemish-speaking population.[2] More recently, M. De Vroede has endeavoured to give a more penetrating and strongly differentiated analysis. On the basis of a study of the pamphlet literature of the time he reached the conclusion that the Flemish movement only gained moderate support from the bourgeoisie, in which class he included the whole of the upper social strata; even in the Flemish region of the country they were for the most part Francophone, though not anti-Flemish.[3] While the free professions (lawyers, doctors, university professors) were only exceptionally represented in the group of nationally-minded Flemings, the most important participants in the movement in the 1850s and 1860s, according to De Vroede, were teachers, journalists, artists, booksellers, craftsmen, and in part also clergy and office employees.[4] Unfortunately he does not back up this opinion with any concrete quantitative data.

We shall remedy this omission, but not by undertaking an analysis of the social composition of any group around a central organization or periodical of Flemish national tendency. In the case of the Flemish national movement there was no such thing; one of its basic characteristics was particularism, as well as a tendency to divide into fragments of different political colours. We have already mentioned the petition, or 'petitionement', of 1840, which stands at the threshold of Phase B; but this was a single act, not followed by others, and it provided no impetus towards the establishment of a durable organization. Apart from this, data have survived only on the local impact of the 'petitionement', and even these are imperfect. In order to assemble a 'typical' list of pioneers of the Flemish national movement we have to look at certain smaller groups, and even here we are restricted to the cases in which biographical data are available. Even so, two important associations of nationally-minded Flemings, of very different character, will provide an

Table 30. *Social composition of the association Met Tijd en Flijt*

Occupational group	1855–6		1857–8		1864–5		1867–8	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Landowners, high officials	3	1.5	1	0.5	5	2.0	5	1.5
Traders, craftsmen, entrepreneurs	5	3.0	6	3.5	4	2.0	8	2.5
Free professions	33	18.0	36	19.5	40	17.0	58	18.5
Officials	15	8.0	17	9.0	23	10.0	20	6.5
Teachers	32	17.5	31	16.5	31	13.0	33	10.0
Clergy	49	27.0	48	26.0	55	23.5	60	19.0
Students	16	8.5	19	10.0	40	17.0	95	29.5
Deputies, Town Councillors	3	1.5	3	1.5	12	5.0	18	5.5
Men of letters	9	5.0	9	5.0	19	8.0	21	6.5
Occupation unknown	18	10.0	15	8.5	6	2.5	2	0.5
Total	183	100.0	186	100.0	235	100.0	320	100.0

adequate starting-point: the Willems-Fonds, based in Ghent, and Met Tijd en Flijt in Louvain (Leuven). Unlike most of the other Flemish organizations, these two retained their influence for decades. Their membership figures were constantly on the increase throughout the period under consideration, even though this rise in numbers did not occur smoothly and evenly.

The association known as Met Tijd en Flijt was founded as early as 1836 by a small group of students with literary interests, but it only became a significant part of the Flemish movement after 1843. Its organizational nucleus continued to be students from the University of Louvain, and in some cases lecturers; a broader circle of nationally-minded Flemings attached itself to this nucleus, composed in part of former students of the university.[5] The fact that this association's activities were centred on Louvain is an indication of its basically clerical tendency. This circumstance must be borne in mind in evaluating the development of the social composition of Met Tijd en Flijt, information for which is extracted from the annual reports of the association, covering the years 1855–6, 1857–8, 1864–5 and 1867–8.[6] The results are presented in Table 30. Nationally-inclined people with a university education understandably predominated among the members of the association. The proportion of students went up over the period by leaps and bounds; this shows that the Flemish movement first took root at the university itself, in the 1860s.

The Willems-Fonds, an association founded in Ghent in 1851, declared its allegiance in its very name to one of the precursors and pioneers of the Flemish

Table 31. *Social composition of the Willems-Fonds association*

	1852	1857	1862	1865–6	1868
Landowners, high officials	9.0	7.5	9.5	4.5	4.5
1. Traders	2.0	4.0	3.5	2.5	5.5
2. Craftsmen	—	3.5	7.0	5.5	5.0
3. Entrepreneurs	2.0	3.0	2.5	9.0	7.5
4. Booksellers	6.0	6.0	5.0	3.5	3.5
Bourgeoisie and petty bourgeois (total, 1–4)	10.0	16.5	19.0	20.5	21.5
5. Doctors	5.0	4.5	6.5	4.5	4.5
6. Legal profession	5.0	9.0	12.5	12.5	12.0
7. University profs.	—	2.5	1.5	0.5	0.5
8. Artists etc.	5.0	2.5	2.0	3.5	3.5
Free professions (total, 5–8)	15.0	18.5	22.5	21.0	20.5
Officials	15.0	17.0	19.5	16.5	16.5
9. Teachers in gymnasia	23.0	13.5	9.0	6.0	5.0
10. Other teachers	2.0	2.0	4.5	10.5	14.5
Teachers (total, 9–10)	25.0	15.5	13.5	16.5	19.5
Clergy	—	2.5	0.5	0.5	—
Students	4.0	4.0	1.5	2.5	3.0
Peasants	—	0.5	—	—	—
Officers	—	0.5	—	—	—
Employees	—	1.0	—	1.0	0.5
Deputies	6.0	7.0	4.0	2.5	1.0
Town councillors	5.0	4.5	4.0	7.0	5.0
'Men of letters'	6.0	2.0	1.5	2.5	2.0
	2.0	2.5	3.0	1.5	1.5
Others	2.0	0.5	1.5	3.5	4.5
Total (%)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total (number)	59	171	187	628	710

movement, J. F. Willems. The objective of this association was to advance the growth of national consciousness among the Flemings, to contribute to their education, and to provide support for the publication of scientific and popular Flemish literature. The condition for membership was either an agreement to send a regular annual subscription of at least four francs, or a single contribution consisting of a much larger sum.[7] The political attitude of the founders of the association was clearly liberal. For all these reasons we may expect a broader-based membership than in the case of Met Tijd en Flijt, with the exclusion of course of any clerical element. The clericals themselves later founded a rival organization, the Davids-Fonds, which attained a predominant position in the 1880s. We also know the membership of the Willems-Fonds from the annual reports of that organization for the years 1852, 1857, 1862, 1865–6 and 1868 (cf. Table 31).[8] The insignificant part played by the clergy was a necessary consequence of the liberal tendency of the association. The low level

of student participation, on the other hand, is difficult to explain. We know from a contemporary source that the Willems-Fonds achieved success during the first two years of its existence as a result in particular of 'the enthusiasm of young writers in the academies and colleges'.[9] The report relating to autumn 1853 refers expressly to students.[10] We therefore have to assume, at least for the 1850s, that students cooperated with the association, but did not pay direct monetary contributions, and were not therefore included as members. A striking feature of the Willems-Fonds was the high level of participation by the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie and the relatively greater role played by the officials in comparison with the figures for the association Met Tijd en Flijt. An increase in the participation of teachers from primary schools in the course of the 1860s was another very pronounced phenomenon.

We can compare the results of both analyses with the social composition of two further nationally-inclined organizations, which were of a very different type: the Willems-Monument (figures are available for its contributors in 1846)[11] and the learned journal *Vaderlandsch Museum* (figures are available for its subscribers in 1858).[12] A further opportunity for comparison is provided by a representative group of two hundred leading personalities of the Flemish movement, whom we have selected on criteria analogous to those adopted for Lithuania and Finland (see Table 32). It should in addition be pointed out that members of the bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeoisie formed the largest group among the identifiable members of the association called the Nederduitsch Bond in Antwerp (admittedly only a fifth of the members could be identified). The Nederduitsch Bond intervened successfully in the political struggle at a local level in the 1860s.[13]

We may sum up by saying that the most important social groups in the

Table 32. *Social composition of the smaller patriotic Flemish groups (in %)*

Occupation	Collection for the Willems-Monument, 1846	Subscribers to the *Vaderlandsch Museum*, 1855	Leaders of the Flemish movement
Landowners, high officials	18.0	13.0	5.5
Traders, craftsmen, entrepreneurs	10.0	16.0	7.5
Free professions	18.5	17.0	26.0
Officials	17.5	16.5	24.5
Clergy	4.5	8.0	12.5
Teachers	12.5	10.0	23.0
Students	0.5	5.5	—
Others, and unknown	18.5	14.0	1.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Flemish movement were the officials, the free professions, the secondary-school teachers, and to an increasing degree the primary-school teachers. There were considerable variations in the part played by the bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie, the students and the clergy. The teachers in primary schools and the bourgeoisie showed the strongest tendency to increase in numbers. Of course, if we were to include in the 'bourgeois' category all the groups we regard as components of the Belgian ruling class,[14] the share of those groups in the Willems-Fonds would be around 55% for the 1850s, and 46% in 1868. In the association Met Tijd en Flijt the same class (excluding the students) would remain stable at around 50%, while it would constitute 58% of the contributors to the Willems-Monument and 46% of subscribers to the *Vaderlandsch Museum*. Further data also confirm that the broader strata of Flemish-speaking people had little interest in national agitation (with the exception of the population of Antwerp).[15]

The data on the *social origin* of nationally-inclined Flemings are very incomplete. The student registers at the University of Ghent do not indicate the occupation of the parents, and these data are even in part missing from the biographical handbooks. No reliable generalizations can be made on the basis of the sixty cases in which we were actually able to establish the social origins of the leading organizers of the Flemish movement. We shall simply state that almost half of their fathers (25) came from the ranks of traders, manufacturers and handicraftsmen, a further ten came from the free professions, and only a tenth of the total (6) came of peasant stock. In our view the insignificant role of the peasant milieu suggested by these figures is sufficiently confirmed by the fact that out of the 180 leading members of the movement whose birthplaces we were able to establish, only 25 were born in the countryside, and of these several were sons of village schoolteachers rather than of peasants.

In order to investigate the *territorial structure* of the Flemish movement we have used the following indices: (a) the distribution of contributors to the Willems-Fonds and members of Met Tijd en Flijt, (b) the level of response in the towns to the 'petitionement' of 1840,[16] (c) sale-figures for the periodical *Belgiesch-Chronykje* in 1844,[17] (d) the places where the Vlaemsch Midden-Comiteit was promoted and given support early in 1853,[18] (e) the places where the nationally-inclined local associations declared their support for Het Vlaemsch Verbond[19] and finally, (f), the birthplaces of leading figures in the movement. By combining all these indices we have endeavoured to reduce to a minimum the danger that our results might be distorted by the already-mentioned particularism of the Flemish movement and the concomitant limitation to single localities of the field of action of each particular association.

The first fundamental result of the investigation is this: we find most of the nationally-inclined people in the towns. As in Bohemia, and in part also in



Map 6 The Territorial Structure of the Flemish Movement up to 1870

Finland, this result permits us to determine the territorial structure of the movement by investigating the way nationally-inclined people were distributed over the towns. By combining our six indices we obtained four groups of towns, which clearly stood out by their level of national activity, and a very small number of intermediate cases. Here are the four groups:

(1) big centres of the national movement (Antwerp, Brussels, Ghent, Louvain (Leuven), Bruges (Brugge));
(2) Towns where large groups of nationally-inclined people were present, and national associations were active in support of endeavours to unify the whole movement: these were also usually the places of birth of numerous leading participants in the Flemish movement;
(3) towns with small nationally-inclined groups, or isolated national associations;
(4) towns in which no significant national life can be demonstrated (except for the accidental presence of some personalities or a rather inactive association).

If we project these results onto a map of the country, we get a very clear picture of the different degrees to which each province participated in the Flemish movement. Even if we cannot precisely demarcate the boundaries of the 'active' region, its nucleus emerges clearly in the shape of the province of East Flanders, with extensions in the direction of Brussels and Antwerp. East Flanders did not occupy this position simply because Ghent was the

headquarters of the Willems-Fonds. Over a third of the leaders of the Flemish movement were born in that province. We can however be more precise in establishing the region which related passively to the Flemish movement; it consisted of the province of Limburg and the eastern parts of the provinces of Antwerp and Brabant. In connection with what we already know about the social composition of the Flemish movement, it is significant that despite their extension with the onset of industrialization the suburbs of the large towns were for the most part related only passively to the Flemish movement.

Let us now finally summarize the basic results of our analysis.

1. The proportion of members of the bourgeoisie in the narrow sense of the word among the participants in the Flemish movement was by no means very high, but even so members of the property-owning intelligentsia, who stood very close to the ruling class, constituted almost half of the patriots.

2. Officials and members of the free professions, and secondary school teachers, were the groups belonging to the higher social strata which participated most strongly in the Flemish movement. The rural population, and the craftsmen, participated only to a very slight degree in the movement.

3. The social origin of the participants in the Flemish movement clearly corresponded to its social composition at the time in question. Participants in the movement originated from the towns for the most part, and probably from the middle strata of urban society. The part played by the peasant milieu, on the other hand, was insignificant.

4. National activity was most lively in the province of East Flanders (and also in the cities of Antwerp and Brussels and the university town of Louvain).

5. The general tendency of development throughout the first three decades of Phase B does not by any means indicate an increase in the participation of the middle or popular strata in the Flemish movement. A solitary exception to this rule is the increasing strength of the interest among teachers.

It might appear on the face of it that the Flemish patriotic movement ran its course under extraordinarily favourable conditions. A political system without censorship or police repression provided considerable freedom of expression and the possibility of a broad agitation. The high degree of urbanization in Belgium and the high level of general economic development facilitated an abundance of journalistic activity. No other national movement, at a comparable phase of its development, had at its disposal so great a number of periodicals as the Flemish movement. In no other case do we meet with such a large number of patriotic associations and organizations. People with secondary education and the property-owning classes were more powerfully represented among the Flemish patriots than in the majority of the other national movements. Despite all these factors, which ought according to all our assumptions have played an integrating role, the Flemish movement did not, as we have seen, achieve a mass impact. Clearly, then, these forces were

counteracted by a further circumstance with a powerfully disintegrating effect. Where should we look for this?

The Flemish movement emerged at a time when Belgium was already considerably developed economically; it was a country with a capitalist economic system. The basic social antagonism was not that between peasants and landowners but the antagonism between the bourgeoisie and the workers (or, in some cases, the small-scale craft producers). At the same time the language division cut across both the class fronts. The coming of the industrial revolution brought forth conflicts between the different Flemish regions of the country. Moreover the Flemish movement proceeded under conditions of political freedom, which allowed for the possibility of solving conflicts of interest in the political arena. These conflicts therefore did not have to be transformed into cultural and linguistic demands and articulated in that form. Hence political conflicts and relations occupied the first place in the social consciousness of the majority of Belgians (and therefore also the majority of Flemings), while linguistic conflicts and relations were regarded as secondary. A definite analogy to this phenomenon is to be found in Norway, although there the priority of politics played a linguistically rather than a nationally disintegrating role. To put this another way: the content of social communication was allowed to be political, and therefore only a small area remained over for cultural content. The third important disintegrating factor was the absence of any clear demarcation of objectives for the Flemish movement. The tendency towards the creation of an independent Flemish nation was paralysed by the 'openness' (i.e. the lack of a clear definition) of this ethnic group; it was simultaneously open in two directions. On one side, in its relation to the emergent Belgian nation. The secular association between the provinces of the Southern Netherlands after the Dutch Revolution of the sixteenth century cemented this region into a single economic and cultural unit. The common experience of bourgeois revolution side by side with France laid a strong foundation for the formation of a bilingual Belgian political nation. This development preceded the growth of a tendency towards the division of Belgium into two parts on the basis of two different national languages. On the other side, the Flemings were not clearly demarcated towards the north – towards the Northern Netherlands. A common language and a common cultural inheritance brought the militant Flemings so close to the Northern Netherlands that a tradition survived among them of a return to the Greater Netherlandish nation. Admittedly the possibility of leaning on Netherlandish solidarity for support slowed down the assimilation of the Flemings, but on the other hand it distracted them from creating a closed national group, which would have been bound together by firmly established internal cultural and linguistic relations. Religion, which separated the Catholic Flemings from the officially Calvinist majority of the population of the Northern Netherlands, could have been a substitute for cultural relations, but only one of the branches

of the Flemish movement adopted Catholic positions in its programme. A final disintegrating factor, by no means to be disregarded, was the strong regionalism of the historic provincial units, which owed its extraordinary strength to the internal unevenness of economic development; this called forth conflicts of interest within the Flemish camp itself.

In summary, then, we should note that analysis of the Flemish movement confirms its typological character as a movement which did not achieve success because it first emerged after the completion of the bourgeois revolution and the inception of the industrial revolution.

15

An example of a minority national movement: the Danes in Schleswig

Up till now we have deliberately avoided the problem of national minorities and their national activation. This type of national movement does not, it is true, belong to the same category as those we have made the subject of our comparative study; but it does possess similar characteristics to them in a large number of cases. Hence we shall limit ourselves to investigating the type of minority which stands closest to the national movements of oppressed nations. The Danish national struggle in Schleswig in 1840s and 1850s, which we have selected as our example, will help us to adumbrate the characteristics of the social structure of a national movement and to verify some of our preliminary generalizations on this topic.[1]

Constitutionally, Schleswig and Holstein constituted an independent political entity, and from the fifteenth century onwards they formed a part of the Danish state, attached to it by a personal union. From the time of the victory of the Reformation in Schleswig the German language was predominant, and during the first decades of the nineteenth century the German language penetrated along the eastern coast into the fertile district to the south of Flensburg, and also into the Frisian areas to the west.

When in 1831 Christian Paulsen brought out a pamphlet demanding equality of linguistic rights for the Danish minority, it did not cause much of a stir. Open conflict first began in 1836, when the deputy Nis Lorenzen put down a motion calling for the recognition of Danish as the language of the administration. The group of Schleswig patriots rapidly assembled their forces. In 1838 nearly 1,000 patriots affixed their signatures to a petition demanding equal rights for the Danish language in Schleswig. In the following year, a beginning was made with the creating of popular rural libraries of Danish literature. In 1843 a group of Northern Schleswig farmers founded the Schleswig Society (Den Slesvigske Forening), which set itself the goal of developing Danish education. One result of this was the emergence of an initiative towards the foundation of a people's high school for Northern Schleswig; the school was set up in the small town of Rødding.

While the Danish agitation was enjoying its first successes, a current of local patriotism (Landespatriotismus) was taking shape, commonly described as

Schleswig-Holsteinism. The repository of this 'Landespatriotismus' was in part the nobility, and in part the merchant classes of a number of towns, above all Flensburg, the most important commercial centre of Schleswig, whose merchants had as many interests in the Kingdom of Denmark as they had in Hamburg. A similar explanation of Landespatriotismus is also valid for the middle strata of the town of Åbenrå, who rejected both the German nationalism of the liberal bourgeoisie and Danish patriotism as well.

How, then, under the circumstances we have indicated, did the social basis of the Danish patriotic movement in Schleswig develop? As has already emerged from our brief outline of the course of events, the answer to this question has two components: patriotic activities were supported on the one hand by the population of the kingdom of Denmark proper, especially Copenhagen, and on the other hand by the inhabitants of Schleswig. It will be understood that we are interested only in the second component of the group of supporters. It is clear even from the older accounts that the Danish national movement in Northern Schleswig was supported above all by the farmers, while the attitude of the urban population and the intelligentsia was ambivalent, or even hostile.[2] In a number of cases we have the possibility of verifying this traditional conception and confronting it with quantitative data both on the structure of the patriotic community and on the composition of the groups which participated in anti-Danish activities in a spirit of local Schleswig patriotism.

If we examine the list of initiators of the address of thanks to the sovereign from the population of Schleswig for the language rescript of 1840 we find sixteen farmers, five teachers and eight traders.[3] Out of the whole number of nearly three thousand signatures we find craftsmen only in 9% of the cases, and members of the intelligentsia in 2.5%; all the rest fall into various categories of peasant and countryfolk of uncertain social status.[4] The predominance of the peasant element is also confirmed by the distribution of readers' societies and Danish people's libraries founded from 1839 onwards, which we shall discuss later in this chapter.

We have precise data on the development of the social composition of the patriotic society of Danish patriots in Schleswig entitled *Den slesviske Foreningen.* It is possible to compile a table of the social status of newly accepted members from the minutes of the society.[5]

Table 33 unambiguously demonstrates the clear predominance of the peasant element in the association. Even if we were to view the influx of peasants in 1844 as a temporary upsurge of interest, they would still remain the most numerous group among the patriots. It is worth noting that the diminution of interest in belonging to the association which is evident from 1845 onwards was more marked among the peasants than the intelligentsia. A role was perhaps played in this development by the shift in the main peasant

Table 33. *The Social status of new members of the society Den slesviske Foreningen*

	1843	1844	1845	1846–7	Total	%
Landowners	1	3	—	—	4	1.0
Traders	11	19	7	2	39	8.0
Craftsmen	4	24	12	2	42	9.0
Free profs.	—	3	—	2	5	1.0
Officials	3	9	2	6	20	4.5
Clergy	2	3	—	2	7	1.5
Teachers	2	7	4	4	17	3.5
Students	—	17	2	1	20	4.0
Farmers	84	180	17	15	296	62.5
Poor peasants	1	13	6	5	25	5.0
Total	107	278	50	30	475	100.0

preoccupation towards the social sphere after the rise of the movement for the liquidation of the remnants of feudal dependence, from that same year of 1845.[6]

These data on the basic structure of the patriotic community and tendencies of development of the part played in it by the different social groups are confirmed by what we know of the social composition of the group of financial contributors to the school at Rødding.[7]

Table 34. *The social composition of the group of contributors to the school at Rødding*

	1850–1	%	1860	%	Total	%
Traders and businessmen	78	13.0	33	9.0	111	11.5
Craftsmen	31	5.0	11	3.0	42	4.5
Free professions	21	3.5	23	6.0	44	4.5
Officials	116	19.5	83	22.0	199	20.5
Clergy	78	13.0	56	15.0	134	14.0
Teachers	39	6.6	21	5.5	60	6.0
Peasants	232	39.0	148	39.5	380	39.0
Total	595	100.0	375	100.0	970	100.0

Although in this case the peasants did not form a majority, even so their share in the patriotic action was very considerable. Another noteworthy feature is the relative increase in the share of the intelligentsia and the decline in the interest manifested by craftsmen and traders.

The social composition of the Danish patriotic community stands out more clearly still if we approach the matter negatively, i.e. if we pose the question of which social groups took the initiative in opposing the Danish linguistic

programme, or in advocating local Schleswig patriotism. The Schleswig-Holstein Patriotic Society occupies a central position in this connection, and the newspaper *Lyna* provides information about its membership in the years between 1845 and 1847. The social composition of the society can be summarized for the period mentioned in the following table.

Table 35. *The social composition of the Schleswig-Holstein Patriotic Society*

Occupation	Number	%
Merchants, shipowners, manufacturers	54	17.5
Craftsmen and small traders	75	24.0
Free professions	34	11.0
Officials	25	8.0
Intellectuals (other than above)	11	3.5
Students	9	3.0
Farmers	93	30.0
Others	10	3.0

Although the most numerous group here is once again the farmers, their percentage share is considerably lower than in the case of *Den slesviske Foreningen*. In contrast, the share of the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie was clearly higher in this case, especially the small-scale urban producers. In so far as it is permissible to amalgamate the two groups, their total share was half as great again as that of the farmers. It is also worth noting the relatively low participation of the intellectuals typically present in the rural environment: the schoolteachers and clergy. In general, then, German-language local patriotism in Schleswig was above all an affair of the bourgeois and urban milieu. Incomplete data from Åbenraa also tend to confirm this characterization. There around 120 citizens signed a proclamation protesting against the king's language rescript. The signatories divided as follows: 41 shipowners (34%), 58 craftsmen (49%) and 11 intellectuals (10%).[8] There is also the characteristic fact that speeches at protest meetings against the Danish festival on Skamlingsbank were made by merchants, officials etc., but not a single peasant representative spoke.[9]

It remains to complete our information on the social basis of Danish patriotism in Schleswig by looking at the social origins of the patriots. It clearly follows from the predominance among them of the peasant element that this milieu will also be the determining milieu for the origin of patriots from the patriotic intelligentsia. We can confirm this clearly well-founded hypothesis by analysing the data on the origin of the students who attended the People's High School in Rødding.[10]

The clear predominance of the peasant element in Danish patriotic activities in Schleswig in the 1840s is therefore confirmed by an analysis of the social

Table 36. *The social origin of students at Rødding High School*

Occupation of parents	Years of attendance				
	1844–5	1846–7	1850–3	Total	%
Traders and craftsmen	2	—	7	9	6
Millers	3	1	3	7	5
Officials	1	—	1	2	1
Clergy	—	—	6	6	4
Teachers	1	3	2	6	4
Peasants	40	35	46	131	80
Total	47	39	66	152	100

origin of the people who committed themselves to the first People's High School in Rødding. The share of the peasant milieu stands out still more emphatically if we take into account the fact that at the university of Kiel only 16% of the students on the average came from peasant families.[11]

The *territorial distribution* of national activities has a special significance where we are dealing with an almost mono-occupational group of patriots – in the case of Schleswig of course it is the peasants. The first petition in favour of Danish, in 1836, already displays a noteworthy absence of even distribution. Whereas the greater part of the parishes in the county of Haderslev adopted the petition, and in the county of Åbenraa sixteen parishes and some dozens of individuals gave their support, the island of Als and the counties of Tønder and Sundeved remained almost entirely apart from the movement.[12] Once again, it was the peasants from the counties of Haderslev and Åbenraa who participated most intensively in the 1840 address of thanks to the king, in particular the peasants of Øster Logum in the north and Felsted in the south, in Sundeved the villages on the coast and on the island of Als the villages in the southerly parts. In 1845 the most active patriotic region was still the major part of the county of Haderslev (with the exceptions of Hoptrup and Vilstrup in the south and Christiansfeld and Magrup in the north), while in the southern and Western regions indifference was the rule.[13]

We come upon active opposition to Danish linguistic demands within the Danish territory in the already mentioned towns of Haderslev, Åbenraa, Tønder and Sonderborg, although in no case did the whole population of the town take up this attitude. Apart from this, there were certain rural communities which rejected Danish national activity, adopting instead a local Schleswig patriotism and considering resistance to Germanization as both unnecessary and doomed to failure. They were for the most part districts with rich and consciously commercial farmers, who also had an economic interest in



Map 7 The Territorial Structure of the Danish National Movement in Schleswig

maintaining the links with German territory. The greater part of North-West Schleswig remained passive, both towards Danish and local Schleswig patriotism.[14]

If we take into consideration the places where the members of *Den slesviske Foreningen* were active, the places which sent pupils to the school at Rødding, and the distribution of Danish people's libraries, we can provide a cartographic projection of Danish patriotic activity.[15]

The map clearly demonstrates the different levels of patriotic activity in the territory inhabited by the Danish-speaking population of Schleswig. Two fairly small districts display a markedly higher level of participation in patriotic activities than the rest of the region: the first one lies between Haderslev and Rødding, and their environs, the second runs along the coast northwards from Vonsbaek to Kolding, a town which itself already lies on the other side of the border with Denmark proper. Both these districts were situated in the county of Haderslev. The county of Åbenraa, on the other hand, was nationally passive. This is also confirmed by what we know of the centres of local patriotism to the south (Vilstrup) and to the north of Haderslev (Christiansfeld), not to speak of Åbenraa and Flensburg.[16]

The situation of the Danish minority in Schleswig was analogous to the initial situation of the other oppressed nationalities we have investigated in a whole series of respects. It did not have its own ruling class residing on the territory inhabited by it; this territory was not an independent historical entity but a part of a larger political unit with a foreign ruling class. However, there were also important differences. The Danish minority did not have first of all to work out its own literary language or to endeavour to create its own culture. It could make use of the Danish language and culture which had developed in the kingdom of Denmark; and at the same time Denmark represented for the Danish minority a tradition of autonomous political development and political independence. Admittedly, the Danish minority had an incomplete class structure, but it could seek support from the ruling class in the mother country; hence the incompleteness of the class structure did not influence the formation of a national programme or the process of raising national consciousness which the same phenomenon possessed for the small nations previously investigated. The existing links with the national cultural traditions of the mature Danish nation, as well as the possibility of relying on the Copenhagen bourgeoisie and in part also on the absolutist bureaucracy – all these things were important factors of integration in the course of the rise of the Danish minority to national self-awareness. The rapid course of this process – naturally it only took place in the ethnically Danish part of Schleswig – is connected with the possibility of linking up with a mature and fully-formed nation: the national programme could be brought in from outside, just as it was possible to utilize the high degree of communication within the Danish motherland. A further element which

accompanied this cultural radiation from a more advanced national milieu was the rapid internal differentiation of the Danish national movement in Schleswig, which acted rather as a factor of disintegration. Another factor of disintegration was local Schleswig patriotism, which was in the course of being outgrown but influenced the temporary national ambivalence of part of the rural population and especially the town-dwellers. One should of course seek the reason for the relative success of local patriotism in differences of economic interest, such as competitive rivalry with the Danish bourgeoisie from the kingdom or commercial dependence on regular relations with the German lands, especially Holstein and Hamburg. Two processes were in conflict here: the formation of a Danish, and of a German national market. It is significant that neither the open war with the German patriots nor the Prussian intervention of 1848–9 brought any reversal of attitudes for the districts and places where a powerful current of Landespatriotismus had maintained itself. On the contrary, after the separation of Schleswig from Denmark and its incorporation into Germany the German policy of assimilation gained outstanding successes in those districts.

Without claiming any universal validity for our remarks on the social basis of the movement of the Danish minority in Schleswig, as applied to other minority movements, we may certainly point out that the social basis, the structure and the degree of completeness of this minority were essentially different from the comparable features of Phase B of the national awakening among the small nations. Different also was the internal articulation of integrating and disintegrating factors in this movement. This negative result permits us to assert, with a certain degree of schematization, that our initial decision has found confirmation, namely not to regard national minority movements of this type as movements of national revival among small European nations, and hence not to include them here as objects of comparison.

PART III

Comparative Analysis

Comparative analysis

In the introductory section of this work we indicated the principles according to which we apply the comparative method. We have designated the social structure of the patriotic groups in Phase B of each national movement as the criterion of comparison. It will therefore be useful now to proceed to a mutual confrontation of the results we arrived at in the preceding chapters. We shall try to establish not only the proportionate weight and the role played by the various classes and groups in Phase B of the national movement, but also to analyse the more general relations, in so far as they can be illuminated by interpreting the variations in the social and territorial structure of the different national movements. However this definitely does not mean that we are subject to any illusions about the absolute homogeneity of the collections of individual cases which emerge from our analysis of the patriotic communities; similarly we are well aware that the significance of concrete social (and therefore also patriotic) activity cannot be reduced to a mere set of numerical data. The wealth of forms of manifestation of the national movement among the different European nations makes it impossible to define membership in the set of patriotic communities with reference to entirely identical criteria.

Although we were able to proceed when defining membership of a patriotic group from a single basic criterion of participation in national agitation or support for it, when establishing the concrete manifestations of a nationally conscious attitude we were compelled to rely on different sources of evidence for different nations. The objectives of the individual patriotic organizations, or their actions, could be differentiated in detail, even though their fundamental point of departure was the same. These partial differences were reflected in the character of the sources and also, indirectly, in the data on the social structure of the patriotic groups which took part in each movement. We should therefore also pose the question of the degree to which differences in the type of source-material, and in the character of the information available about the members of patriotic groups, were capable of influencing the apparent share of different classes or social groups. This operation will be possible specially where the character of the sources palpably induced a disproportionately strong representation for certain groups within the patriotic community. On

the other hand, however, we do not think it permissible to extrapolate the data on the share of those groups we assume were under-represented owing to the specific character of the sources. In cases like this all we can do is draw attention to the possibility of distortion, without increasing the indicated share of the relevant group.

A simple comparison of the social structures of the patriotic communities will therefore certainly be interesting, but it will not tell us much in depth about the context of the formation of small nations in the modern epoch. Hence we shall give a more concrete direction to our comparative analysis: we shall look at the share of the individual classes and social or professional groups in the national movement. This procedure is of course itself inadequate – if only because it threatens to isolate the question of social structure from the many detailed problems around the share of each particular group. The comparative analysis will therefore have a second chapter: this will be an analysis of the more general components of the social structure and their connection with the changes in the whole of society characteristic of the epoch of the transition to capitalism. Then there will be a third chapter, devoted to questions of the territorial structure of the national movement and its economic, social and cultural interpretation.

16

The share of the individual classes and social groups

First of all we shall try to give a summary outline of the basic proportions governing the social structure of the patriotic groups of all the national movements we studied in the earlier part of this book. The arrangement of the tables summarizing the data derives from our typology of national movements, and we have therefore completed the picture with some partial data on the social structure of the Bulgarian patriotic community.[1] The numerical data have for obvious reasons been rounded off, and they have in the present case the form of general indicators, with the aim of orienting the reader on the overall proportions and developmental tendencies involved.

The most outstanding and obvious result we can derive from Table 37 is a negative conclusion: no class or social group had a stable place in the structure of the patriotic communities, sufficient to signify that such a group had a fixed and necessary share in the national movement. Of course this negative result does not rule out a series of positive conclusions. Although we cannot assign a firm position in the structure of the national movement to any particular social group (and we cannot establish a definite rank order for the importance of the groups), it is clear that the strongest component in every national group (with the exception of the Danish minority in Schleswig) was the group we refer to under the summary description of 'intelligentsia'. We include in this category not only all patriots with a high-school education, but all those who lived from their intellectual labour. However, in the course of Phase B the share of the other groups in general rose – people from the ranks of the urban and rural producers and traders. The social structure of the patriotic communities of national movements belonging to the same type (e.g. to the integrated type, or to the belated type) displays greater similarities, especially in the share of the upper strata, the officials and the peasants.

We cannot of course interpret the overall social structure of the patriotic groups without having regard to the general structure of the individual oppressed nationalities. It will readily be understood that the share of the ruling classes and the upper layers of the bureaucracy was more marked at the beginning of Phase B in places where at least part of these strata could be taken from the ranks of the oppressed nationality in question. *The most lively*

Table 37. *Overall proportions governing the social structure of patriotic groups*

	Integrated type				Belated type		'Insurrectional' type	Disintegrated type	Minority
Group	Norwegians	Czechs	Finns	Estonians	Lithuanians	Slovaks	Bulgarians	Flemings	Danes
1. Old ruling class, landowners	c.20	7–1 decl.	12–5 decl.	c.1	c.4	c.5	0	20–5 decl.	c.1
2. Traders, entrepreneurs	20–30 fluct.	3–5 rising	3–5 rising	c.5	2–3 rising	?	c.15	c.5	13–5 decl.
3. Craftsmen	5–15 rising	5–10 rising	1–3 rising	3–7 rising	c.5	?	c.15	c.5	5–10 fluct.
4. Free profs.	c.10	10–4 decl.	15–10 decl.	c.1	7–15 rising	10–5 decl.	c.3	c.20	1–4 rising
5. Officials, lower and middle-ranking	c.10	14–18 rising	12–20 rising	c.5	5–8 rising	10–6 decl.	c.5	10–20 fluct.	5–20 rising
6. Lower clergy	c.10	35–20 decl.	30–20 decl.	0	15–20 rising	60–30 decl.	c.10	5–25 fluct.	2–10 rising
7. Teachers, lower and middle school	c.5	c.6 fluct.	5–10 rising	50–30 decl.	c.10	15–26 rising	c.10	20–10 decl.	c.5
8. Students	c.20 fluct.	15–25 rising	c.15	c.5 fluct.	40–20 fluct.	10–20 rising	?	5–20 fluct.	c.5
9. Peasants	c.10	1–5 rising	2–5 rising	10–30 rising	10–30 rising	?	c.33	c.1	40–65 fluct.
10. Wage-labourers	0	0–3 rising	c.1	c.7	c.5	?	c.2	c.1	?

participants in the various national movements came from those groups into which social ascent out of the ranks of the oppressed nationalities was possible and customary. To express this another way: the nearer a small nation stood to completing its formation (i.e. to achieving the full class structure of a nation of the epoch of capitalism) the more strongly do we find the middle and higher strata represented among the patriots of Phase B.

We also trace definite regularities in the tendencies of development of the share of the various classes in the national movements. In places where the share of traders and craftsmen at the beginning of Phase B was relatively higher than the share of the peasantry (Bohemia, Norway, Finland) the participation of peasants in patriotic actions increased in the course of Phase B. This regularity of development does not however hold for the disintegrated type represented by the Flemish movement. On the other hand, in places where the peasants participated more strongly at the beginning of Phase B, we can demonstrate that in the course of further development the social basis of the patriotic community extended to draw in craftsmen and traders, or in some cases the intelligentsia. These relations will naturally emerge more clearly (and it will be possible to confirm them) once we come to investigate the participation of the various social groups and classes in the national movement in the context of the general development of the social structure and when we look at the place of these groups in a society in transformation.

THE RULING CLASS OF THE OLD SOCIETY

Linguistic assimilation of the provincial ruling class with the ruling nation was a common phenomenon in the epoch of feudalism. It is enough to mention the examples of the Francisation of the Flemish nobility, the Magyarization of the Slovak nobility in Hungary, the Germanization of the Czech nobility, and the Polonization of the Lithuanian nobility. The lasting political subjection of a country usually determined sooner or later the linguistic and cultural orientation of the aristocracy, and gradually that of the whole feudal class.

With the coming of the age of absolutism, and in the process of the general crisis of feudalism, the ruling class of the old society was forced into a contradictory position. On the one hand the aristocracy rejected capitalism both politically and ideologically; on the other hand it was transformed by it in economic practice, which was itself in part determined by the economic policies of absolutism.[2] This contradiction is also reflected to a certain degree by the ambiguous and contradictory positions of members of the old ruling class in relation to the language question in the period of the dissolution of feudal relations. On the one hand a section of the aristocracy and the old élites endeavoured to maintain the compartmentalized society of Estates by conserving linguistic differences wherever they served simultaneously as symbols of membership in a given Estate. We have seen this in the case of the

German barons in the eastern Baltic, and the Swedish aristocracy in Finland; we can add also the attitude of the Polish nobility in the eastern regions of Poland. On the other hand, under the system of absolutism the ruling class unquestionably bent its efforts towards the linguistic assimilation of the whole population in the name of the unity of the state and in the interests of a rationalization of administration: the classic examples here are France, Prussia, the Habsburg Monarchy under Joseph II, and Russia in the first half of the nineteenth century. A situation could thus arise in which the pressure towards assimilation and centralization exerted by absolutism upon an oppressed nationality came into conflict with the interest of the old ruling class in retaining linguistic differences; such a conflict could then become a reason both for the conservation of the linguistic and cultural peculiarities manifesting themselves on the territory of an oppressed nationality and for their exploitation as an instrument of feudal particularism. In both cases, of course, the patriotic attitude of the aristocracy (Landespatriotismus) was founded on their struggle against the fundamental tendencies of development operating in the given epoch, and could in no way become a permanent foundation or starting-point for the national movement.

The particularist section of the old ruling class was able to take part in the ethnographic and cultural activity of the patriots of Phase A; especially in the case of the so-called 'historic nations' a minority of patriotic landowners played a Maecenas role. Examples of this are known to us from Bohemia, Finland and Lithuania. In contrast to this, however, there was a series of other nationalities where the class interest of the old ruling class in the retention of Estates barriers took precedence over their political interest in utilizing the language and culture of their own subjects as an argument against absolutist centralism. This standpoint was adopted, as we know, among the so-called 'unhistoric nations', such as the Estonians, Slovenes and Lusatian Sorbs. In the case of the disintegrated type of national movement the question took on a highly specific coloration. For the Flemish movement, on the one hand, one cannot even pose it, since the Great French Revolution and two generations of capitalist development lay between its Phase B and the 'ancien régime'. The Breton nobility, on the other hand, were admittedly the main repositories of patriotism during Phase A, even under post-revolutionary conditions, but they remained isolated, since the movement did not take hold in the towns and could not therefore overcome the class limitations and the local particularism of peasant interests.[3]

In the course of Phase B the part played by the old ruling class declined – whether they were landowners or high officials – and this process occurred even among the 'historic nations'. The majority of the Maecenas-figures ceased to play this role. This tendency of development is commonly taken as an accompanying manifestation of the great transformation of society during the period of the bourgeois social revolution, but it was modified in certain concrete

and specific features. In Bohemia we only find by way of exception an occasional representative of the aristocracy among the supporters of the national movement during Phase B. In contrast, in the Scandinavian lands the part of the old ruling class which occupied high offices and made the transition to the new society while retaining those offices maintained a relatively important position in Phase B of the movement as well; this was because the process of capitalist transformation there was almost untouched by revolution of a political kind. Indeed, in the case of Norway the old members of the high bureaucracy of the old regime actually stood at the head of the patriotic movement, in alliance with the rising bourgeoisie; this situation continued well into Phase B. This was also the case in Finland, though to a lesser degree. And for various reasons part of the old ruling class maintained its leading position in national movements which were located typologically at the boundary between the 'small nation' and the 'ruling nation'; the relevant cases are the Magyar and the Polish movements.[4]

The question of the participation of the old ruling class is sometimes erroneously narrowed down by the application of the criterion of noble descent. The Norwegian ruling class (to be more precise, the Danish ruling class in Norway) was in its majority non-noble, and conversely the lesser nobility of limited means were characterized among a whole series of nations first and foremost by their middle-class occupations, as lesser officials, army officers or priests, and their place in society was primarily determined by their profession. Noble origin brought with it more a style of life than anything else – within the framework of the available material possibilities. This is how it was in the case of some of the Lithuanian patriots, but especially in the Slovak national movement, where the share of the intelligentsia of noble descent went as high as 25%, although it would be wrong to deduce from this that the feudal class played a dominant role there.

THE INDUSTRIAL BOURGEOISIE

The idea that the modern bourgeoisie is linked to the formation of the modern nation is deeply rooted in Marxist historiography – possibly as far back as the early years of Karl Kautsky's theoretical activity.[5] And it is a fact that in the bourgeois revolution of the ruling nations the industrial bourgeoisie has not only emerged as the leading agent of political and social transformation, but also proclaimed itself to be the representative of the nation and identified itself with it. The bourgeoisie's interest in controlling its own national market could certainly have been there in the background as a motive force of the rise of national consciousness, of nationalism.[6] We might expect, by way of analogy, that the bourgeoisie of an oppressed nationality might step forth in the process of the struggle against feudalism, in so far as it actually formed a component of the class structure of that particular nationality. If we define the bourgeoisie

as a class in possession of its own means of production and living from the surplus-value produced by the labour-power of wage-labourers, we shall look in vain for any prominent role taken by that group among the patriots of an oppressed nationality during Phase B of the national movement (not to speak of Phase A). Only in the case of Norway was the group of entrepreneurs represented among the patriots, and they were of course predominantly members of the commercial bourgeoisie. In all other cases the category we have designated with the term 'men of commerce' consisted predominantly of small traders of purely local importance.

It is of course possible to make the objection that the bourgeoisie, like the nobility, could play a significant role in the national movement not in numerical terms, but by using their financial strength. They could provide material support for national endeavours, and eventually, after a bourgeois revolution, they could form a power base. The quest for the bourgeoisie among the patriots of the oppressed nationalities (including entrepreneurs in manufacture and industry, the commercial and financial bourgeoisie, and landowners running their farms as capitalist enterprises) did not have a merely statistical purpose in the present work; what we were endeavouring to do was to track down possible patrons, the Maecenas figures of the national movement. But here too the search for the bourgeoisie did not meet with great success; at best – once again with the exception of Norway – there were just a few isolated, and exceptional, examples. In Bohemia and Finland at the end of Phase B certain patrons of the national movement did emerge from the ranks of the bourgeoisie, but we cannot ascribe a leading role to them, or a decisive influence on the finances, the theory, or the practice of the national movement.

This situation changed in the course of Phase C; from then onwards we can speak of participation in the movement by a rising bourgeoisie of the small nation, just then taking shape. This is valid for all the national movements we have studied, with the exception of the disintegrated type. But even for this period we cannot assert with certainty that the bourgeoisie always and everywhere stood at the head of the struggle for a unified national market; whether this was so or not probably depended on the stage the economic development of the small nation had reached when the bourgeoisie entered the forefront of the patriotic movement. This question requires further investigation. Here it is enough to establish that in the majority of the movements we have studied the bourgeoisie did not take any essential part during Phase B. Social ascent into the ranks of the bourgeoisie was still usually accompanied by a transition into the bosom of the ruling nation.[7]

Does this signify that the national movement, in turning against the ruling nation – and therefore also against its ruling class – thereby took on an anti-capitalist character? How can one explain the anti-feudal direction which was predominant in the programme of the national movement? Or is it wrong to assert that national demands must inevitably be directed against the old

regime? Was it perhaps a typological characteristic of small nations that were formed without a bourgeoisie? This kind of scepticism is certainly out of place, if we are aware that the successful completion of a small nation's formation was dependent precisely on the transition of its national movement to the mass phase, Phase C, and on the emergence of its own national bourgeoisie. However, we also know that even among some ruling nations, such as for example the German nation, the bourgeoisie was incapable in the first decades after the fall of feudalism of building up its own political personnel and placing itself at the head of all social activity.[8] So the process of political emancipation in the case of the small nations was even more long drawn out. It is however significant that the objective of creating a bourgeoisie proper to one's own nation, an entrepreneurial stratum in commerce and industry, was already formulated in the course of Phase B in the case of the Czech, Finnish and Latvian national movements, and later on also among the Slovaks and Estonians.

Can we say that in the period before the class structure of the small nation was complete the bourgeoisie was represented by other social groups – e.g. particular sections of the intelligentsia?[9] We are certainly justified in posing the question of representation here, but one has to keep in mind the fact that there are two different levels to consider. In the sense of a generally anti-feudal struggle for a modern civil society of the nation, one can speak indisputably of representativity and of the representation of the bourgeoisie by the intelligentsia (or other groups). If, however, we are thinking of the representation of the concrete class interest of a concrete class, the question becomes more complex, and it will be necessary to analyse each particular case without any preliminary generalization. Namely, if the bourgeoisie was as yet absent from the class structure of a small nation in process of formation, its interests could scarcely have found representation.

Certain over-simplified views of the role of the bourgeoisie in the national movement proceed from a search for this group in 'the emerging bourgeoisie', inserting into this category a series of craft occupations, plus millers, carters, innkeepers and farmers. There is no doubt that the social milieu of these groups could be a basis for a bourgeoisie, just as it is clear that in the majority of the small nations this milieu was one of the sources of national patriotic activity – whether as early as Phase B or only at the opening of Phase C. However, to proceed in this way would be to fragment the concept of the bourgeoisie in a simple descriptive umbrella covering all the independent producers and middlemen engaged in exchange, or even all members of the 'middling strata'. If we want to avoid this we must insert all the above-mentioned occupational groups into a separate category of small-scale producers and petty traders, who stood at the point of transition from the medieval class of the 'burghers' to the petty bourgeoisie. We shall have to treat this group separately in connection with the national movement.

THE SMALL-SCALE CRAFT PRODUCERS AND THE PETTY BOURGEOISIE

In the period of the coming of capitalism, the petty bourgeoisie emerged into the forefront of political and cultural life, alongside the bourgeoisie, as an independent class with a specific relation to the ownership of the means of production and with separate and autonomous social interests.[10] The master craftsmen and small traders were not of course a new group – we already know of their existence in the guild system of the old regime. In the course of the process of transformation which the society underwent at the threshold of the capitalist epoch the wealthiest elements in these classes gave birth to the bourgeoisie, part of them became proletarianized, and the remainder survived as the petty bourgeoisie right into the twentieth century. Despite certain fundamental common characteristics, this group was always very heterogeneous. Hence it will be important for the study of their participation in the national movement to distinguish in particular the craftsmen from the small traders.

The scholarly character of Phase A of the national movement theoretically excluded the small craft producers from participating, by its very nature. On the other hand, during Phase B we find the petty bourgeoisie represented in all the cases we have investigated, even though their share fluctuated considerably. It was at its highest in the Czech and Norwegian movements, in both cases with a clear tendency to increase. It was somewhat lower in the Estonian and Finnish national movements, but here too with a tendency to rapid growth. Finally it was relatively lowest in the Lithuanian and Flemish movements. In all this we have to take into consideration the character of the sources, which tended somewhat to depress the share of the petty bourgeoisie in the Czech and Finnish movements; in both these cases the participation of that class was higher than the percentage figures indicate. There were two exceptions to these examples, the Flemish movement, where the share of the petty bourgeoisie declined over time, and the Danish movement in Schleswig, where it was always very slight. Participation by the petty bourgeoisie still cannot automatically be identified at this time with participation by urban elements. Urban crafts predominated over rural among the patriots of Bohemia and Norway unquestionably, and perhaps also in Finland, while in the Estonian and Slovak cases urban and rural crafts were equally balanced, and in Lithuania the rural crafts held the predominant position.

What was the significance of the petty bourgeoisie's participation in the national movement? In none of the cases we have studied could it be described as a leading force in the movement; it was nearest to this position at the end of Phase B in Bohemia, where it had a marked share in the organization of patriotic life and the formation of the national programme. For the most part, however, the attitude of this class displayed a residual a-political character inherited from the burghers living in their century-old oppression and in

bondage to the guild system.[11] Nevertheless, one cannot regard their share in the national movement as insignificant. It is enough to point to the fact that it was precisely among the nationalities which did not manage to form themselves fully into modern nations, or only attained this phase of development very gradually (the Lusatian Sorbs, the Bretons, the Belorussians[12] and others), that the petty bourgeoisie was only sparsely represented among the patriotic community. This is also confirmed by the Flemish case we mentioned earlier. It appears as if participation by the petty bourgeoisie was one of the preconditions for the success of Phase B of the national movement. However, let us not anticipate our overall conclusions. We shall instead content ourselves with noting provisionally that the small urban (and rural) craft producers and traders were on the average more receptive to national agitation than many other classes and social groups. The generally growing interest of the petty bourgeoisie in the national movement created as it were a social bridgehead for the entry of national consciousness into the subsequent bourgeoisie, which emerged from this petty bourgeoisie and began to grow active in the national movement during Phase C. Even though the petty bourgeoisie is often described as the main social repository of nationalism in the subsequent period, especially in Phase C,[13] it was not possible for it to become the ruling class of a modern nation. The significance of the petty bourgeoisie, then, consisted in this: that it was one of the main prospective vehicles of the creation of national consciousness among the small nations in process of formation, even though in Phase B it still had a relatively slight influence in some cases. It was also significant in another way, in providing a potential source for the ruling class of small nations. In both senses, the petty bourgeois milieu contained the hidden potential for the future of the oppressed nationalities.

THE OFFICIALS

The group of officials includes members of a variegated spectrum of professions, who differed from each other in degree of education, standard of life and social prestige, but who had this in common, that they fulfilled certain administrative, fiscal, judicial or other functions and stood in a wage-relation. One element of this group of professions has for obvious reasons not been included among the officials but among the ruling class: these are the officials who belonged to the topmost layer of the bureaucracy and occupied positions of decisive power. The high state and provincial officials emerged in Phase A among some nations, and they played a role similar to that of the so-called 'notables'. At the same time, however, it must be made clear that state service was more powerfully linked with the ruling nation than other forms of administration, and this did not provide particularly favourable conditions for an individual's commitment to the welfare of the oppressed nation. Nevertheless, with the progressive modernization of the state apparatus and the bureaucratization of

the administration the need for state officials grew – above all for those of the lower and middle categories – and the proportion of members of the oppressed nationalities in the state apparatus grew larger. This was accompanied by a diminution in the intensity of the assimilation linked with the transition into that apparatus. There was also a growth in the demand for officials in the urban and judicial branches of the administration. And where the feudal domains (seigneuries) formed the basic administrative unit, there was also an increase in the number of officials in the private service of the aristocracy. Some of these officials also occupied functions in production; an official of a new type was formed above all in the sphere of industrial production and the branches of enterprise associated with it (e.g. engineers in railway construction, surveyors and so on). But the sources which have been preserved do not make it possible to trace the internal composition of the group of patriotic officials with reference to the full extent of their internal professional differentiation.

The representation of the various categories of official among the patriots varied considerably from nation to nation. In Bohemia the proportion of officials was relatively high and plainly increased during Phase B. The most strongly represented groups here were seigneurial officials and the lower categories of official in general. The share of officials in patriotic activity was also large in Norway, where they actually stood at the head of the movement, and in Finland, where the middle and lower levels of the state and urban administration and the judiciary were represented. The share of officials among the pioneers of the Flemish movement was similarly large, though here the predominant category was that of the middle-ranking officials. In contrast to this, the share of the officials among the other national movements studied was considerably lower, nor did their share grow to any marked degree. The reasons for the declining share of the middle category of officials are approximately the same as those for the withdrawal of the so-called 'notables'. In both cases the parallel drawn by E. J. Hobsbawm between the economic role of a section of the educated classes of the old society and the role of merchant capital after the coming of the industrial revolution can be of assistance in our interpretation.[14] Clearly, the strong participation of the more wealthy categories of official was a more long-lasting feature where linguistic assimilation or bilinguality did not rule out activities directed to advancing the patriotic goals of the oppressed nationalities (Norway, Finland, the Flemish movement). It was of course members of the lower and lowest layers who had the decisive share in the growth of officials' participation during Phase B, in which context one should note that membership in a lower category (clerk, copyist, auxiliary official) was not yet automatically identical with a lower level of prior education and inferior qualifications. Although the level of education required to hold certain offices differed from country to country, it is clear that for the members of the popular strata of some of the oppressed nationalities

the career of a small official was one of the main chances of social ascent (in addition to the other possibilities, which were to enter the Catholic priesthood or become a schoolteacher).

We can therefore conclude that as the process of modernizing the administration required a growing number of officials, the share of this group also grew among the patriots of Phase B in most of the national movements we have studied. We find officials represented in all the patriotic groups, though in varying degrees, but there was a tremendous divergence in their significance and in the influence they had in each case on the course of the national movement. These things clearly depended on several factors: on what kind of administrative structure there was in the period of the great transformation of the society, what kind of general atmosphere there was in the state offices, and also what types of professions were mainly represented among the patriots. In contradistinction to most of the other categories of the intelligentsia, we can therefore only with difficulty express any generalized judgement on the role of the official class in the national movement of the small nations.

THE CATHOLIC AND PROTESTANT CLERGY

The position of the clergy in society had its specific features, some of which were also of importance for the role it played, or, as the case might be, could have played, in the national movement.

1. The majority of the clergy lived in constant and direct contact with the popular strata, hence with members of the oppressed nationality; at the same time their position in society had definite features characteristic of the ruling class (the extent to which this was true varied according to the religious affiliation and the rank of the clergyman in question).
2. The clergy were bound to their church as an institution, both organizationally and ideologically (more strongly in the case of Catholics, less so in the Protestant and Orthodox cases). The Church also had the right to supervise and restrict the social activity of the clergy and determine their attitude.
3. The preliminary requirement for exercising their clerical function, which was therefore also an indispensable component of their qualification for the clergy, was a knowledge of the language of the population among whom they lived and worked. Hence they had to know the language of the relevant small nation.

Social ascent into the clerical Estate out of the ranks of the small nationality was not associated with an unambiguous compulsion towards assimilation, and therefore even in the period before the coming of the national movement it did not inevitably lead to complete identification with the ruling nation. In this regard the clergy, together with the teachers in elementary schools, occupied a peculiar position among the various groups of the intelligentsia. The

example of Lithuania, of course, shows that even the maintenance of one's own national language did not rule out identification with the national sentiment of the ruling nation.

The group to which we have given the overall description of 'clergy' includes of course three constituents from the confessional point of view. We have devoted detailed attention to two of these: the Catholic clergy (in Bohemia, Lithuania, Belgium and part of Slovakia), and the Evangelical (Lutheran) clergy (Norway, Finland, Estonia, Schleswig, and part of Slovakia). There is finally the Orthodox clergy, who only appear marginally, in the example of Bulgaria. Our selection of national movements for comparison involved leaving entirely to one side the clergy of the Greek-Catholic (Uniate) and Helvetian (Calvinist) confessions. What was the nature of the differences between the three confessions we have been concerned with? Out of the three groups, the material situation of the simple Orthodox clergy was worst, and the Lutherans were in the best position. Organizational and ideological dependence on the Church was considerably stricter with the Catholic clergy than the others. On the other hand the Catholic clergy were less dependent on the local Church community than was characteristically the case for other clergy, especially the Evangelical Church in Norway and Finland (not however in the Baltic region). Until the rise of capitalism the Protestant clergy were predominantly recruited from their own ranks, which was out of the question for the Catholic clergy, who were recruited in large part from the popular strata; the possibility of gaining an education paid for by the Church opened the road to a clerical career for young people of talent from poor families.

If we turn our attention to the class character of the clergy, we must first of all separate off the ecclesiastical hierarchy, who indisputably belonged in the period of the *ancien régime* to the ruling feudal class, and also shared its fate in the course of the modernization. In feudal society the lower clergy too were linked with the nobility, sharing their privileges to a greater or lesser degree, and living off feudal rents, even if they did not enjoy a personal right to the land. Their dependence on the organizational structure of the Church and their imbrication with the nobility provides us with illumination as to why the Catholic clergy took an active part in Phase A of the national movement wherever the 'Landespatriotismus' of the old ruling class was a prominent feature (Bohemia, where moreover the Church was organized on a territorial basis, Lithuania, but also Brittany).[15] This does not mean that the motivation of the clergy's participation in Phase A was inevitably limited to Landespatriotismus: we find them among the patriots of Phase A in Slovakia, where the objective conditions for Landespatriotismus did not exist.[16] As against this the clergy only participated slightly in the Flemish national movement; this phenomenon was connected with the Belgian statist conception and organization adopted by the church there.

The difference in the places taken up by the Catholic and Evangelical Clergy

in the national movement can be demonstrated with the example of Slovakia, where clergy of both confessions were represented among the patriots in roughly equal proportions. Whilst the Catholic clergy were educated in the spirit of ideal Hungarian statehood, the Evangelical Church had a 'national' character – not only because its Czech language was close to the people, but also because the whole Church was organized as a Slovak Church: the Slovak superintendents had to supervise Magyar and German congregations as well as Slovak ones. To explain this situation one should add that the Magyar non-Catholics were predominantly of the Geneva confession, which was naturally organized separately from the Lutheran Church. The nationally conscious Evangelical clergy, who by social origin belonged rather to the 'notables' of the old society, recruited to a large extent from their own ranks and also in the period of the coming of the national movement provided a supply of nationally conscious intellectuals for the secular professions, as well. The high cultural level they traditionally maintained is shown by the fact that almost every one of the patriotic clergy was at the same time a poet, a scholar, or at least an educational writer.[17] A small number of Evangelical clergy originated from other groups, from the families of teachers, gentry, burghers, and, but only after the Patent of Toleration, peasants. In contrast to this, the Catholic clergy traditionally recruited above all from the ranks of the peasant population. They were more intimately connected with the rural community, but their cultural level was on the average lower. This may be a result of the rule of celibacy, which excluded the possibility of continuity and the further development of the cultural level at which certain of the Catholic clergy did their work. The same thing can naturally be said of the continuity of patriotic attitudes and patriotic activity.

With the coming of capitalism the Church (in particular the Catholic Church) lost the chief bastion of its political and economic power, and the clergy found themselves to some extent in a 'power vacuum'. Their position was also threatened in a number of cases by the administrative and political reforms with which the feudal social structure was swept away or seriously undermined. This process was also accompanied by a decline in their social prestige; in Catholic lands especially this prestige had until then counterbalanced the otherwise inadequate economic situation of the lower categories of this group. It was this diminution of prestige which first began to bring home to the average simple priest his inferior material situation, and to make him view it as a certain form of 'pauperization'. Many of these priests were then open to various forms of radicalization. There emerges here a certain analogy to the socio-psychological impact of the pauperization of sections of the petty bourgeoisie in the epoch of industrialization.

The Orthodox Church had an essentially different relation to the ruling class of the old society in the lands under Turkish domination, such as Bulgaria or Serbia. Here the situation of the simple clergy was closer to that of the subject

population, not only because of their place in the social and political structure, but also because of their material position, their manner of life, and to a certain degree also their level of education. Moreover, under conditions of political oppression it was the monasteries which were the main centres maintaining a cultural tradition.[18] In some cases the organization of the Church formed a natural basis for the continuous existence of the relics of state consciousness (Serbia). Elsewhere the struggle of the Church for organizational and cultural autonomy foreshadowed the coming of the national movement and formed a specific element in Phase A of that movement. The struggle of the Bulgarian clergy for emancipation from the Greek Church in the first half of the nineteenth century is a part of this process; moreover, in the same period other ecclesiastical actions also had an indirectly patriotic character, such as collections for the construction of new churches.[19] However, after the achievement of independence the Church turned into a supporter of the new ruling class, and thus it lost to a considerable degree its significance for the national movement. For the regions where a commitment to the Orthodox faith coincided with the ethnic boundary the national differentiation between the ruling nation and the small nationality did not therefore have the same significance as the differentiation which arose from the implementation of civil equality on the road to bourgeois society: of course this latter form of differentiation brought results rather in the political than the national sphere. A special situation arose where, as in Bosnia or the Ukraine, the religious and ethnic boundaries crossed or encroached on each other. However, to deal with this situation would be to go beyond the boundary of our research.

In order to interpret the role of the clergy in Phase B of the national movement we need a more exhaustive characterization of the complex changes which occurred in the place of this group in the total social context. In Bohemia the quantitative share of the clergy among the patriots of Phase B was high, although its general tendency was clearly downwards: the earliest patriotic actions had nearly 50 % clerical participation, while in the 1840s the proportion of clergy had fallen to a quarter. In the Lithuanian Phase B it was around a quarter, with a tendency to move upwards with the coming of Phase C. In the Slovak national movement, where the clergy at first formed nearly half the patriots, the share of the Catholic clergy was similar to that in Lithuania, but the general tendency was for it to decline. The equally large share of the Evangelical clergy in the Slovak Phase B declined similarly, not indeed as a result of a relative decline of interest within this group, but as a result of the small size of the group as a whole. In the Finnish national movement one can similarly perceive a tendency for the share of the clergy to decline: initially this group formed not quite a quarter of the supporters of patriotic actions. In Norway the pastors only ever took a slight part in national activities, and their degree of participation did not increase over time. The clergy played no perceptible part at all in Phase B in the case of the Estonian (and also the

Latvian) national movements. In the liberal section of the Flemish national movement we meet with only isolated individuals from the clergy; but in its Catholic section almost a third of the original patriots were priests, though their share gradually diminished subsequently. We can sum up, then, by saying that the share of the clergy in the national movement had a prevailing tendency to decline. Its share in Phase A and at the beginning of Phase B was clearly higher where the members of the oppressed nationality had a better chance of being admitted to the clerical estate.

The high quantitative share of the clergy in the majority of national movements investigated is not however an indisputable demonstration that they had fundamental significance for those movements. Let us note that the majority of the Lithuanian clergy kept their distance from *Aušra*, that a large section of the Finnish pastors ignored the efforts of *Saima*, and that we only meet with isolated individual priests among the leaders of the Czech movement of the 1840s. This will lead us to evaluate the real influence of the clergy in the national movement somewhat more soberly than we should if we were to proceed mechanically from the quantitative data. Perhaps the most important role played by the clergy was as mediators of the contact between the peasant communities and the surrounding national milieu. They remained, deep into the capitalist era, especially in the less developed regions, the main connecting link through which information arrived (and was filtered) about events in larger world of the nation, and, conversely the medium through which information passed to the outside world about what was happening in the peasant communities. It is naturally a matter of great importance to establish what kind of people fulfilled this function of communication: it could either be clergy who came from the ranks of the oppressed nationality, or clergy who belonged in part or entirely to the ruling nation. It would of course be an over-hasty generalization to assert that the process of national awakening of the peasant masses depended precisely on this circumstance. The fact that in terms of absolute chronology this process ran its course later in Lithuania and the eastern Baltic was not inevitably a direct reflection of the national affiliation of the clergy there; both phenomena could of course have had a deeper cause common to each of them. Let us recall that in a whole series of cases, to which we have not devoted any attention here, clergy coming from the ranks of the oppressed nationality did not have any decisive success in their endeavours to initiate national activities in the peasant milieu (e.g. Brittany, Bukovina and Slovenia).[20]

How can we explain the generally diminishing share of the clergy among the patriots of Phase B (and also in comparison with Phase A)? The majority of the clergy withdrew into the background as soon as the national movement began to strive for concrete practical and political goals, and thus entered into a struggle which might lead to conflict with the organs of the state, and eventually with the official state ideology. Struggles of this kind were supported

only by individuals from the ranks of the clergy, but not by the average patriotically-minded cleric. The clergy stood aloof not only from conflicts with the ruling class of the old society, but also with the new state power of the ruling nation, in so far as it did not pursue an anti-clerical policy. Then during Phase C the coming of a specifically clerical current within the national movement was a part of the process of internal differentiation. However, the positions the Church itself took up in the name of its own specific interests did not possess this character. Thus for example the resistance of the Catholic Church in Lithuania against Russification was primarily a resistance to the state-supported penetration of the Orthodox faith into the country, and only in a second sense did it have a national content.[21] Up to a certain point in time one could also say the same of the case of the anti-English standpoint of the Irish Catholic Church;[22] this also applies to the case of the resistance of the Scottish clergy to English domination in the 1830s.[23] Similarly, the national-cum-confessional standpoint of the highest dignitaries of the Rumanian, Serbian Orthodox, and Uniate Churches was primarily motivated by ecclesiastical interests: here of course the standpoint of the lesser clergy became differentiated from that of the hierarchy in the course of Phase B.[24]

Summarizing, then, we can distinguish three levels of influence exercised by the clergy on the national movement. This applies to all three confessional groups.

1. The clergy were the vehicles of social communication, both between the centre and the provinces and within the individual localities and regions; this role in communication began to disappear with the growth of literacy among the members of the small nations, which usually occurred only in Phase C of the national movement.

2. The clergy represented the interests of definite social classes and groups: the Evangelical pastors stood relatively closer to the petty bourgeoisie (higher prestige, private property in the means of production) than did the lesser Catholic clergy, who had more in common with the small-scale producers and could not accumulate property over generations; moreover, the Catholic clergy was dependent on the ruling class of the old society in the early phases of the national movement.

3. It was possible for the clergy partially to fulfil the role of spokesmen of the national movement, and also eventually to take part in the formulation of a national programme; they played a more prominent part in this context in the Catholic countries, a less prominent part in Protestant lands. In general, of course, they became less important with the growing politicization of the national movement.

For all these reasons, the movement of the clergy towards national consciousness, and their national activity, was intensively pursued to the extent that the content of the national movement was centred on cultural and linguistic goals, and in so far as it maintained its ideological uniformity by not formulating social or political demands. When, in the course of Phase B, the national movement went beyond the limits of the earlier cultural programme, it did this without the participation of the clergy (or at least, increasingly in their absence). The continued operation of this process of differentiation during Phase C led either to a return of the clergy's national inertia or to the creation of a specifically clerical variant of bourgeois nationalism.

THE TEACHERS IN PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS

In our analyses of the social composition of the individual patriotic communities we have referred to 'teachers'. In using this expression we had in mind two fundamental strata, which differed considerably in their material situation, level of education and social prestige: teachers in primary schools and teachers in secondary schools (described in many countries as 'professors in gymnasia'). The second group was actually closer in its situation to the 'notables' of the old society, but we have preferred to classify them according to the character of their action within society. The total number of secondary school teachers in a given society was in any case very small, and they were therefore also not represented in any great numbers among the patriots. Their influence and significance was however much greater than the simple percentage figures would suggest: symptomatic of this is the high proportion of members of this group among the active literary leaders of the national movement in the Czech, Finnish and to a lesser degree also the Slovak and Lithuanian cases. Nor did the decline in the percentage share of this numerically small profession during Phase B mean any change in this situation; the decline itself was a reflection of the influx of members of other categories of the intelligentsia.

Let us now look at the much larger group of the teachers in primary schools. Of all the groups which lived from mental labour this one on the average possessed the lowest educational qualifications and lived in the worst material conditions, which sometimes did not even reach the living standard of the middle peasants. Their social prestige was of course higher than that of the peasants, or at least one would generally assume this in theory. Furthermore, teachers were almost everywhere existentially and ideologically dependent on the local authorities, whether organs of local self-government or offices of state. This dependence was understandably a severer burden under the conditions of the *ancien régime* and the seigneurial system. It was also considerably greater in the countryside than in the towns. We accordingly have to assume that in our analyses the role of the teachers will be subject to distortion in a downward direction wherever patriotic activity depended on the level of the individual's material wealth, and also wherever there was a threat of political conflict between national commitment and the attitude of the state authorities or the

autonomous local administration. With this reservation, then, we may proceed to interpret the results arising from our quantitative data on the share of the teachers among the patriots of the small nations.

Of all the groups of the intelligentsia, the representation of the teachers in the national movement displayed the greatest degree of variation. In the Estonian case they constituted the unquestionably dominant group among the patriots – both in percentage terms and in their actual significance. The apparent decline in the share of the teachers at a later period is merely a function of the influx of patriots from the popular classes, not an indication of any decline in activity or influence. The proportion of teachers among the Belorussian and Macedonian patriots was also high (in these cases they formed the main group within the intelligentsia)[25] and in Slovakia, even though there their percentage share was by no means as great as in the Estonian case. The initially high proportion of teachers in the Flemish movement declined in the course of Phase B, not only relatively but also absolutely, in the case of the secondary school teachers. At the opposite pole stands the low level of participation by teachers in the Czech, Finnish and Norwegian national movements. Although in these cases (and especially in Bohemia and Finland) the share of the teachers is understated owing to the character of the source-material, we cannot consider the reduction as sufficiently severe to allow us to account for a proportion of teachers which goes below 5 %. In both cases, of course, it was the teachers in secondary schools who were represented on the whole more strongly among the patriots. Lithuania occupied an intermediate position; here a higher level of participation by the teaching profession was clearly inhibited by the specific situation of the elementary schools in the period of persecution.

How are we to explain these diametrical contrasts in the representation of the teaching profession? Differences in the material position of teachers cannot provide an entirely satisfactory explanation; for neither in Estonia, nor in Slovakia, nor in Belorussia or in the Ottoman Empire were the teachers much better off than in the Czech lands or Finland. We might in fact make the reverse assumption, that the teachers were more active precisely where they were worse off. Cultural oppression also explains very little: it was certainly just as severe in Tsarist Russia as in the Habsburg Monarchy of Metternich's day, and very much worse there than in Scandinavia. Nor will a reference to the current language of instruction bring us much further forward; all this can explain, at most, is the low proportion of teachers in the Lithuanian movement. It seems that measurement with absolute yardsticks, and comparisons between the teaching professions of different nations, are of little assistance to us in our quest.

We shall be able to explain more if we take account of the relative situation of the teachers *vis-à-vis* other groups within the same nation. The teachers in elementary schools in Bohemia, Norway, Finland and Belgium too occupied the lowest social level of all the groups of the intelligentsia which had emerged

from the ranks of the oppressed nationality – and they therefore also occupied almost the lowest social level among the patriots themselves. Patriotic officials, clergymen, doctors, etc., all stood higher than the teachers on the social scale. In the Baltic region, on the other hand, the teachers were almost the highest social group which had not accepted the language of the ruling nation. At the same time they were one of the highest social groups to which it was possible to rise without difficulty from out of the ranks of the oppressed nationality. If we count the *Küster* as part of this stratum, we can say that becoming a teacher (or a lesser official) was the most usual form of social ascent for the sons of the Estonian peasantry. This description is also valid for the Belorussian situation, and, to a lesser degree, for Slovakia and Lithuania as well – for in these two areas one cannot speak of extra-economic barriers of an Estate type, such as inhibited access to higher education in Estonia and Belorussia. We may also add here that there is a parallel between the level of activity of the village schoolteachers and that of the peasantry in the national movement; it seems as if a high level of activity may have had common or similar causes.

It is necessary finally to take into consideration the fact that not only the standard of the schools but also their density in a given area and their degree of influence on the popular masses were subject to considerable variations in the countries investigated. In this connection the intensity of their influence was not necessarily in direct proportion to the level of economic development of the country (cf. the relatively high percentage of illiterates in Belgium). The leaders of all the national movements sooner or later started to grasp the importance of the teachers as intermediaries in communication and instruments of patriotic agitation in the countryside. Every one of the movements investigated here (with the exception of the Estonian one, where this was unnecessary) began at a certain moment during Phase B to pose the question of how the village schoolteachers could be activated, how the educational level of the primary schools could be raised, and how patriotic content could be injected into them. This question was posed with particular intensity in Bohemia and Finland, but also in Latvia.[26]

THE STUDENTS

In view of the fact that being a student is not a lifelong profession, but rather a preparation for one, we shall take into account the ambiguous nature of the students' position when evaluating their participation in the patriotic groups of Phase B. They formed on the one hand a specific social group, and on the other hand they were differentiated internally according to the profession for which they were preparing as well as by the prospects of success offered to them in practical life by their subject of study, their family connections and their social status. There were considerable differences with regard to the location of universities: only in the Norwegian case was there a local university founded

during the emergence of the national movement, and all the other universities in question, where patriotic students gained their education, were universities of the ruling nations. Sometimes, indeed, they were located outside the territory of the small nation, as was the case for the Slovaks, the Lithuanians, and also the Latvians.

The criteria by which membership of a patriotic group is defined have in the student case a considerable influence on the disproportions in the calculation of their share in the national movement. Especially where we have defined the social composition of the national movement retrospectively, on the basis of patriotic biographies (in Lithuania and Slovakia) the determination of the number of students at a particular date is only very approximate. Nevertheless, some of the proportional relations are entirely clear and indisputable; above all the fact that the participation of students in national activity grew considerably in the course of Phase B. In Bohemia their percentage share increased over two decades by a factor of nearly five (from 6% to 30%), in Finland it increased twofold. In Slovakia we are first able to determine the share of the students accurately from the time of the emergence of the radical group of patriots around Štúr, when they formed at least a quarter of the total number. The Flemish movement too attracted students to an increasing degree; they formed almost a quarter of the members of patriotic groups, even excluding the patriotic milieu of Leuven, which was strictly a student affair. In Lithuania we cannot follow accurately the development of the percentage share of the students in the movement; however there is no doubt that already at the beginning of Phase B it was higher than in the other movements investigated. In Norway, at the beginning of Phase B, there is admittedly no evidence of any student participation, and they did in fact participate only pretty well imperceptibly; but during the 1830s and 1840s they came forward very strongly, although it is difficult to give this statement statistical content. The only national movement in which the students played little part was therefore the Estonian movement. Moreover, their share grew only moderately during Phase B. We should add that the proportion of students was low in the Danish movement in Schleswig as well.

The variations in the representation of the students in each national movement were therefore not as great as we might have assumed theoretically. Only in the case of Estonia was there any confirmation of the assumption that without a university located in the territory of the small nation the proportion of students in the movement would be low. It is significant for instance that after the closure of Vilna University the only institutions of higher education in Lithuania were theological seminars, and despite this students of medicine and natural science formed the largest group of patriotic Lithuanian students. If at the beginning of Phase B the share of the students among the patriots was in the majority of cases very low, it grew considerably during that phase.

This growth manifested itself not only in a simple increase in the quantitative share of the students, but in the growing significance of the university milieu for the organization of patriotic activities and their propagation. The student environment was an extraordinarily receptive field for national agitation. The students very quickly adopted the national idea and established connections with the patriotic community, not only as individuals, but to an increasing degree as organized groups. In this context the level of formality which entered into this association together of patriotic students is not of any importance. The rapid activation of the students was certainly determined by their youth (of which more later) but the kind of position they occupied in society also played its part: they were relatively more independent of material interests (this does not signify that they were not subject to ideological control), they had greater freedom to dispose of their own time and they lived under conditions of intensive reciprocal contact. Of course, this intensity of reciprocal contact was at the same time a factor which tended to limit the significance of the students for the national movement: they formed a group which was to a considerable extent socially and territorially self-enclosed, and their impact outside the university centre was very weak. The students could provide a driving force for the national movement, but they could never be a fundamental element in it; the universities could influence the national consciousness of future doctors, officials, priests etc., but they could not gain hegemony over the movement as a whole. To give a correct account of the importance of the universities one must also have regard to the fact that the majority of them (the exception is Oslo) were at the same time the places where members of the ruling nation gained their national consciousness – think of the German students in Prague, the Swedes in Helsinki, the Poles at the Russian universities, and so forth.

THE PEASANTRY

The peasants were indubitably the ethnic substratum of the oppressed nationalities, and to answer the question of the degree to which, and the form in which, they took part in patriotic activity we must first of all give our attention to more general social relations: above all we must look at the way fundamental changes leading away from feudal dependence were turning the unfree peasant into the independent small-scale agricultural producer of the capitalist epoch. The emancipation of the peasantry and the removal of feudal relations in the countryside resulted in a transformation of the determining social contradictions. The fundamental conflict between the peasants and their feudal superiors was replaced by a series of fresh contradictions (or, in some cases, by an intensification of already existing contradictions): the contradiction between town and country, and the internal contradictions arising from

differentiation within the peasantry. These changes have to be taken into consideration, especially in respect of their chronological relationship to the period we have described as Phase B of the national movement.

Only at the close of Phase B do we find a large number of peasants in the Czech national movement; even then the proportion of peasants was by no means high. One element in the coming of Phase C of the Czech national movement was the clear increase in the patriotic activity of the peasantry. In Lithuania the peasants already formed a small part of the patriotic community at the threshold of Phase B, and their share underwent considerable growth in the course of the 1880s, which in the Lithuanian context was prior to the transition to Phase C. The situation was similar among the Estonian peasantry; their share of the patriotic movement rose over the twenty-year duration of Phase B to one third. In Finland, on the other hand, the peasants only participated to a very slight extent in Phase B, and, in contrast to the situation in Bohemia, we cannot find evidence for any clear growth in their activity in the course of the national agitation of Phase B. However, if we look at the opening of Phase C they had a very definite share in the actions of that time, especially as regards the language programme. The Norwegian peasants too engaged in little serious patriotic activity at the beginning of Phase B; in any case their entry into political conflicts, fought out within the Storting and elsewhere from the 1830s onwards, was not at first accompanied by any kind of clear-cut programme. We come upon peasants only very rarely in the Flemish movement – and even then they appear very belatedly. In Schleswig the national programme rapidly received a response among the peasants, but only in certain regions. The share of the peasantry in the national activities of the Cassubian, Lusatio-Sorbian and Breton patriots is a special question on its own.[27] The Irish peasantry participated very considerably, but of course only within definite phases and types of the national movement.

To what extent did the patriots of the nations studied originate from the rural and peasant milieu? Even though we must limit ourselves here to the question of the social origin of the patriotic intelligentsia only, the results are significant enough, and it is possible to express them in a highly concrete and quantitative fashion. In Bohemia roughly 15% of the patriotic intelligentsia came from peasants' families, and the general tendency during phase B was for this proportion to rise moderately. In the case of the Slovak patriots, over 20% came from the countryside, although the general tendency here was downwards. In the Finnish and Norwegian national movements only around 5% of the patriots came from the peasant environment, and during phase B there was no tendency for this share to increase. In view of the fact that a further section of the patriotic community, i.e. the group of people who had not received a university education, consisted as a rule of craftsmen and small traders, who most probably originated in their majority from the towns, the share of the peasant milieu in the social origin of the patriots was still somewhat

lower than these figures would indicate. Even though we cannot establish precise figures for the Estonian and Lithuanian national movements, it is clear that in both these cases the majority of the patriotic intelligentsia came from peasant families; the importance of the peasant milieu comes out even more strongly here because of the share of the peasantry among the patriots themselves.

The results we have given here will be modified somewhat if we pose the question as to which section of the patriotic intelligentsia was linked by its social origin to the rural environment (hence not just to the peasants properly so-called). Roughly a third of the Czech patriots were born in the countryside – but the same was also true of the Norwegian patriots. In Slovakia more than half the patriots came from the countryside, in Finland as many as two-thirds to three-quarters. Of those of the Lithuanian patriots we have succeeded in identifying, practically none came from the towns: the proportion of patriots of rural origin approached 100%. In the case of the Estonian patriots, one may estimate the proportion born in the countryside at between 80% and 90%. In complete contrast, almost all the identifiable Flemish patriots were born in the towns.

The above-mentioned data take on a clearer meaning if we compare them with the overall social structure of the population on the territory of the small nationalities. In Bohemia at the beginning of the nineteenth century around 80% of the population lived in the countryside, while in Slovakia the proportion in the whole of the first half of the nineteenth century was almost 90%. It should be added that the urban population of those parts of the Habsburg Monarchy did not consist exclusively of members of the small nation; there were also members of German nationality present in each case. In Norway, during the period of Phase B, roughly an eighth of the population lived in the towns, while the proportion of farmers in the population was itself only slightly higher, around 15%. The figures for urban population in Finland in the mid-nineteenth century were similar; here, however, only a third of the inhabitants of the towns lived from handicrafts and trade, and a large part especially of the urban upper strata on the coast belonged to the ruling Swedish nationality. At the beginning of the second half of the nineteenth century only 10% of the population in Estonian territory lived in towns, and a third to a half of these were of German nationality, belonging in their majority to the urban upper strata. In the Lithuanian towns, where similarly around 10% of the population lived, the Lithuanians themselves merely formed a minority element.

It is therefore possible to say, on the basis of our quantitative data, that the peasantry, and the rural environment, played a weighty role in the course of Phase B only in the Estonian and Lithuanian cases, and the case of the Danish minority in Schleswig. In addition there was the case of the Irish, the Belorussians and the Lusatian Sorbs, where the peasantry were also of

importance. In all the other cases investigated, the share of the peasantry in the national movement was far from corresponding to their overall share in the social structure of the small nationalities, and was also, in absolute terms, very low indeed. Although we fully recognize the significance of the rural population for the maintenance of the language, the ethnic individuality and the cultural continuity of small nationalities, we cannot in general characterize the peasantry as an important integrating factor for the patriotic endeavours of Phase B of the national movement (with the exception of the two above-mentioned cases). Only in Phase C did the peasantry start to assert itself more actively in the national movement, and when it did come forward, eventually, it was predominantly in defence of its own specific social interests.

It is possible to sketch the relation of the peasantry to the national movement in general outline with the thesis that the national awakening only had an impact on a broad scale upon the peasantry after the abolition of serfdom and feudal dependence, or in the course of the bourgeois political revolution. With the exception of certain national movements of the belated type (Lithuania, Belorussia), the peasantry of the oppressed nationalities linked up with the struggle for national objectives later than the majority of the other classes and groups ('strata') belonging to the social structure of those nationalities. Only when the development of communications and social mobility had reached a certain level was the peasantry capable of formulating its material interests in demands for national self-determination, the maintenance of national culture and so on. At the same time, the level of activity of the peasantry was not decided by the relative degree of oppression they suffered in the period before the destruction of relations of feudal dependence: the Norwegian and Finnish peasantry never experienced serfdom, yet their share in Phase B was just as low as it was in the case of the Czech and Slovak peasantry. On the other hand, both the national movements which displayed a high level of peasant participation grew up in a situation dominated by a very harsh variant of serfdom. Why did the peasantry not automatically take to its bosom the idea of national emancipation, in view of the fact that the ruling feudal class was at the same time the representative of the ruling nation, and therefore not only of social but also national oppression? Why did the antagonism between the two fundamental classes of the old society play so small a role in the formation of peasant national consciousness, in most of the national movements we have considered?

In answering these questions it is not enough simply to refer to economic interests and social conflicts. The fundamental external characteristic of the national movement was the programme of abolishing not only the social but also the cultural and psychological relations typical of the old feudal society. Such a programme was from the outset foreign to the peasantry, for they lived under patriarchal conditions which continued to prevail, even though they rejected their feudal subjection. From the beginning the national programme

failed to include any clear and concrete demands for peasant emancipation, in the case of all the movements studied, apart from the Estonian one. The peasants were therefore only able to appraise properly the advantages of national emancipation after they had entered into regular relations with the market and the broader collective of the national community as a whole. This is also valid for those oppressed nationalities which consisted mainly of peasants in feudal subjection to a linguistically and nationally alien ruling class.

It does not seem that the type of political system or the form of feudal exploitation which prevailed in a given case had any vital significance for the level of national activity displayed by the peasantry. The peasants remained from the first outside Phase B of the national movement wherever particularism and decentralization were the predominant forces: in the regions with a high level of exploitation just as much as regions with relatively less exploitation. The preliminary conditions for the peasants' entry into national activity were therefore not only their emancipation and insertion into the broader market relations, but also a definite level of education, enough to allow them to grasp the connection between national ideology and their own material interests. A special place among these educational requirements was occupied by the necessity for a secularization of the peasants' conception of society, their liberation from the domination of a religious ideology.

The material situation and level of education of the peasants of the countries studied differed considerably from one case to the next, although there are no clear criteria for establishing the precise degree of these educational variations, apart from the very crudest indications of literacy. Moreover, it would be unwise to rely on global estimates or on traditional judgements. We might for example by a process of logical deduction arrive at the conclusion that the Lithuanian peasant in Phase B was at a lower level of education than the Czech peasant in a comparable historical epoch. However, it is enough to cast a passing glance over the biographical data on the patriotic Lithuanian peasants to be assured that roughly a third of them passed through a partial (or even a full) secondary school (gymnasium) education and then returned home to their native plot of land. In analysing the educational and cultural level of the peasantry in the period of Phase B of the national movement it will be necessary to take into consideration their deep internal social differentiation, which was certainly a source of considerable cultural differentiation.

It is significant that in the majority of the movements studied the peasantry did not bring into being a specifically peasant intelligentsia – despite their numerical preponderance and their social weight – nor did they appropriate for their own use any of the traditional strata of the intelligentsia, with the exception perhaps of the rural schoolteachers. On the contrary, many of the ideologists of other classes and social groups originated from a peasant background.[28] This would also explain the subsequent adoption of typical ethnographic attributes of the nation from feudal times by urban and

intellectual circles of patriots. Of course, at other times this was a simple manifestation of political commitment. In the majority of the cases investigated the patriots identified themselves more enthusiastically with the peasantry and its life-style than the peasantry did with those very patriots and their national programme.

It was the entry of the peasantry into the national movement (in Phase C) which first brought the decision as to its definitive success – the formation of the modern nation as a complete entity. The nation was never formed as a purely peasant community, however it would be true to say on the other hand that the more the fate of the national movement was decided by the participation of the peasantry, the later did its Phase C begin.[29]

17

The fundamental components of the social structure

The results of the analysis in the preceding chapter have been essentially negative. The conclusion reached was this: the success of the activities of Phase B, which were directed at raising national consciousness, did not depend on the exclusive participation of any of the social groups we have been studying from the point of view of their share in the process of national awakening. There was also no 'typical' combination of social groups.

Even a negative result of this kind can be fruitful, so long as we do not view it as a proof that any investigation of the objective social prerequisites for the origin of the modern nation is superfluous. In any case, the fundamentally negative result on the wider issue was not the only outcome of the analysis. We also observed a number of striking regularities and parallels between the course of the national movement and its social composition, or the social origin of its leaders. We have seen that a weaker or stronger participation of certain social groups corresponded to a slower or faster rate of development from Phase A to Phase C of the national movement. Furthermore, we have seen that the participation or lack of participation by a particular social group in the national revival of a given nation can be explained for the most part by looking at its situation and its interests at the given level of social development. We should not underestimate the value of these results, attained through our analysis of the prerequisites for the participation of the various groups in the national movement. But that was only the first step to interpreting the national revival in itself.

A further step forward will be to compare certain fundamental social relations and processes, which occurred *pari passu* with the transformation of society at the point where one epoch passed over into another; these phenomena should be set alongside the origin of the modern nation. The most advantageous form of such a comparison would be an analysis of the participation of large social groups as structural elements in the process of national revival, which would then allow us to compare their role in that process with their participation in the life of society as a whole. Taking as our starting-point the general features through which we can fruitfully compare the social structure of the national movement with the structure of the whole society, we shall concentrate on the simplest available yardsticks: the social origin of the

patriots, the type of human milieu in which the patriots acted (i.e. town, city, countryside), their degree of personal wealth, their division according to age-groups, the relative importance of different generations, the level of intensity of their activity in the national movement, and, finally their degree of social mobility.

THE SOCIAL ORIGIN OF THE PATRIOTS

We were unable to extract comparable data on the social origin of the patriots for the nations investigated, and it would therefore be wrong to undertake analyses of the data in such depth as was possible when we were comparing the social composition of the patriotic communities. However, even these figures are conclusive enough, at least as far as the basic connections are concerned. Let us compare the incomplete data we possess about the social origin of the patriotic intelligentsia in four different nations (see Table 38 below). In Lithuania the overwhelming majority of the patriots (over 90%) came from peasant families. If we wanted to extend the data on the social origin of the intelligentsia to cover the whole patriotic community (i.e. to include people without higher education) we should have to make the following changes in our figures: for Bohemia the proportion of traders and craftsmen would have to be raised by at least 10%, and that of peasants by between 3% and 4%, for Finland the proportion of traders and craftsmen by between 5% and 8% and that of peasants by 3% to 4%, and for Norway the proportion of traders and craftsmen by between 5% and 10%. The justification for making these changes is our assumption, repeatedly tested in the course of this study, that the greater part of the traders and craftsmen in this phase of social development were in turn the sons of traders and craftsmen, and that almost all the peasants originated from a rural environment. The result of the above adjustments is that the fundamental proportions characteristic of these three nations become even more apparent. Although we had at our disposal a relatively narrower group of individuals for investigating the social origin of

Table 38. *Proportional social origin of patriots*

Parents' occupation	Bohemia % Tendency	Finland % Tendency	Norway % Tendency	Slovakia % Tendency
High officials, landowners	3 ?	8 rising	15 falling	? falling
Traders, craftsmen	50 stable	15 rising	25 stable	40 rising
Protestant clergy	— —	30 falling	15 falling	20 stable
Officials, teachers	20 stable	30 rising	20 rising	15 rising
Peasants	15 rising	5 falling	5 stable	20 falling
Workers, employees, the poor	5 rising	3 falling	3 stable	3 ?

the patriotic community than we had for analysing its social composition, the results are so striking that we may regard them as reliable as a general statement of the overall proportions. The group of national movements investigated can be divided from the point of view of the social origin of the patriots into three types:

(a) national movements with patriots of predominantly peasant origin (Lithuania, Esthonia; Belorussia can also be included here);
(b) national movements whose leaders originated in a proportion of two thirds from the intelligentsia and the middle classes (Norway, Finland);
(c) national movements whose leaders originated exclusively or predominantly from the urban middle classes (Bohemia, Flemish movement) or, as the case might be, a class of craftsmen and small traders from both town and country (Slovakia).

To a certain extent the social composition of the patriotic community was conditioned by its social origin. If it originated largely from the popular strata, this excluded any participation in the national movement by the higher bureaucracy and the upper strata in general. It has been demonstrated statistically for the intelligentsia of Northern Europe that, with exceptions, an educated person from the rural masses could rise, at most, as high as the free professions.[30] This holds to an even greater extent for the situation in Lithuania, and makes it easier to explain the high level of participation by the free professions among the patriots there. Of course, it was above all the clergy which held the key to social ascent for the popular strata. In the Catholic areas the priest was, among the peasants, 'the model for all those who held social ambitions to overcome their own conditions of life' (Antonio Gramsci). Hence the peasant's burning desire to put at least one of his children through a course of study, particularly the study of theology. However, the rule of celibacy meant that this possibility of social ascent remained sterile. In any case, it is significant that the clergy's share in the Flemish movement was slight, and there was a correspondingly low proportion of the nationally active intelligentsia there who came from a peasant background. In Protestant areas there was an analogous road open to the attainment of higher social status after the softening of the rigid division of society into Estates, at the beginning of the capitalist epoch: the clergy often became an intermediate stage in social movement upwards to the higher strata.[31] In view of the limited possibilities of social ascent available in the Baltic lands, the function of an intermediate link in this process was taken over by the teachers and lesser officials.

How far did the social origin of the patriotic intelligentsia correspond with the social origin of all educated people on the territory inhabited by members of an oppressed nationality? We have seen that in the cases of Norway, Finland (in part) and Belgium (probably) there was a high correlation between the two. Among these nations, therefore, social origin in itself did not determine patriotic activity. With the other nations investigated, however, the social

origin of the patriots was diametrically opposed to the social origin of the intelligentsia as a whole; here, then, we may say that social origin gave an impulse towards patriotic activity – though only after access to education had ceased to mean assimilation into the ranks of the ruling nation. This difference between the two groups of oppressed nationalities is paralleled by differences in the chronology of the national awakening. *Where the patriots originated predominantly from the countryside, or from peasant families, the national awakening (or, to be precise, Phase B) occurred perceptibly later.*

TOWN AND COUNTRY

When, in the first chapter of this book, we gave our grounds for adopting a classification of patriots according to social groups, we pointed out that this form of classification is not the only correct and possible one. It was inadequate because, among other things, it did not provide for any distinction between activity in the towns and on the land for any of the social groups to which the patriots were assigned. Let us therefore summarize here the results we arrived at in our analysis of the part played by the various social groups in the national awakening, bearing in mind the relationship between town and country.

It is true that, in the case of most of the nations investigated, organizational and ideological leadership was concentrated in the towns. The situation is however different if we look at the patriotic circles in the broader sense. In Bohemia, Belgium and Norway the majority of the patriots lived in the towns; in Finland and Slovakia town and country were equally represented; in Estonia and Latvia the towns were admittedly predominant as ideological and organizational centres of the national movement, but most of the patriots lived in the country; and finally in Lithuania and Belorussia the towns were almost unrepresented in the national movement. Cities like Prague and Riga naturally attracted a large proportion of patriotic life, in view of their specific weight in the life of the community.

We can also ask our question about the role of the urban environment in the national awakening in relation to the social origin of the patriots. The differences between the nations we have studied are here analogous to those arising in the case of the locus of activity. In Bohemia and Norway two thirds of the patriots came from the towns, in Slovakia half, in Finland only a quarter, and in Estonia probably between 10% and 20%. In Lithuania on the other hand (and similarly in Belorussia) almost none of the patriots were of urban origin. It should however be noted that the Flemish movement was made up almost entirely of townsmen, the proportion being 90%. Where people from the towns participated decisively in the national awakening there were no important changes in the origin of the patriots in the course of Phase B; the share of the rural population only rose slowly.

The data we have just given in outline require of course to be compared with the overall social composition of the population on the territory of each

of the oppressed nationalities. In Bohemia, where we established that the proportion of urban patriots was 75% and the proportion of patriots of urban origin was 70%, four fifths of the population lived in the countryside at the turn of the eighteenth century. In Slovakia 90% lived on the land in the first half of the nineteenth century. Moreover, the urban population did not consist exclusively of members of the Czech or Slovak ethnic group. In Norway at the same time only an eighth of the population lived in the towns. In view of the specific role of the language question in the Norwegian national movement, the fact that the upper and presumably also the middle urban strata were under Danish influence did not play a significant role. In Finland, around the middle of the nineteenth century, the rural population formed 85% of the whole; of the urban remainder only a third made their living from handicrafts or trade. In all the towns of Finland the topmost strata were Swedish not Finnish. If we leave aside some small towns in the interior, we can say that the Finnish-speaking section of the urban population had an inferior social position and considerably less education than the Swedish-speaking section. In Estonia the urban population formed 10% of the whole at the beginning of the second half of the nineteenth century; of this 10% the Germans constituted a third to a half in every town (usually they formed the upper urban stratum). Estonian was spoken in the towns by the poorer craftsmen, the most inferior members of the intelligentsia, and the employees, servants and workers, all of whom had received less education on the average than the Germans. In Lithuania and Belorussia the urban and rural populations were roughly equal; but almost no Lithuanian or Belorussian lived in a town.

In the following table we endeavour to give a general picture, of a synchronic type, of the basic phases of the national awakening, and the relationship of those phases to the proportion between urban and rural activity in Phase B:

Table 39. *The participation of the urban and rural population in the national movement*

Country	1800	1820	1840	1860	1880	1900
Norway		B Predominance of towns C				
Bohemia		B Predominance of towns C				
Slovakia		B town and country evenly balanced				
Finland			town and country evenly B balanced C			
Belgium (Flemish movement)				B predominance of towns		
Estonia				rural predominance; B partly towns C		
Lithuania				predominance of rural population B	C	

Let us draw certain tentative conclusions on the basis of the connections we have established:

1. *A successful national movement was based predominantly on the urban strata in places where Phase B occurred early* (Bohemia and Norway); but the unsuccessful Flemish movement was also based on the urban strata.

2. *The urban milieu played a considerable role in the national awakening in all the cases investigated, with the exception of the nations in which Phase B occurred latest* (the Lithuanians and the Belorussians): *indeed, the urban milieu often played a greater role than would have corresponded to the urban proportion of the total population*, even leaving out of consideration the nationality of that population. This difference would be still more striking if we only took into account the part of the urban population which actually consisted of members of the oppressed nationality.

3. The national movement failed to strike root in those towns where the oppressed nationality was represented only by some isolated individuals. On the other hand, we do find patriots in those towns where only a part of the urban lower classes belonged to the oppressed nationality.

THE RICH AND THE POOR. THE CRITERION OF WEALTH

Although we did take into consideration the material situation of the patriots when analysing the proportions in which the different social groups participated in the national movement, we have not as yet posed the question of the degree to which the level of material wealth affected the development of national consciousness. 'Rich' and 'poor' are relative terms, and we shall apply them with this reservation. The whole matter is assumed to be quite simple in the schematic presentations customarily advanced in the patriotic literature of the small nations themselves: the national awakening had a popular character, they say, it was a struggle of the oppressed against their oppressors – and therefore also a struggle of the poor against the rich. How far do our data correspond to this schema?

We have already seen that neither the landed nobility nor the bourgeoisie (except in the Norwegian case) played a decisive role in Phase B of the national movements. But, conversely, the part played by the strata we can describe as poor was by no means great; indeed their role was so small that no significant change can be made in the data even by pointing to possible distortions arising from the application of criteria of patriotism related to monetary contributions. A person who lived in want, or who passed his life on the very edge of the basic minimum required for continued existence, had no interest in the national idea, given the low level of popular education, and could never have arrived at such an interest, in the absence of any means of communication capable of 'convincing' him that an 'enemy' belonging to another nation was responsible for his misery, or that only the national community offered a way out of his difficult situation. In Phase B of the national awakening such means of

communication were simply not available; they were not employed until the twentieth century.

To say that a certain standard of living was a preliminary requirement for an interest in the national movement is not to assert that this standard necessarily had to be up to the level of the bourgeoisie. It was those strata which lay beneath the very rich and above the poor which participated above all in the national movement. In other words – using the relative expressions we have adopted – the poorer of the rich, and the richer of the poor. However, we do not possess enough data to allow us to establish systematically in each case the point on the scale of material wealth occupied by the patriotically active members of a given social group; i.e. we cannot say whether for instance the patriotic judges, doctors and officials belonged to the richer or the poorer sections of their profession or category.

Certain partial data on the material position of the Czech, Finnish, Estonian and Norwegian patriots indicate a partial shift in the course of Phase B from the national activity of the 'richer' strata to a greater and greater level of participation by the 'poorer' strata; we are thinking here in particular of the perceptible displacement from the 'notables' to the poorer categories of the lower intelligentsia, who participated ever more strongly in the national movement. In one case we are able to differentiate more precisely within a social group in the course of Phase B: among the patriotic teachers, the wealthier ones, in other words the secondary school teachers, played a predominant role in many of the movements considered. This generalization is valid for Finland, Bohemia, Lithuania and Norway; not however for Estonia or Macedonia, or, most probably, for Latvia. In all these reflections we have been looking at the matter from the angle of the purely quantitative representation of the different strata; but the practical importance of the wealthier strata in giving financial support to national activities is of course unquestionable.

This analysis of the role of the material standard of living in motivating patriotism therefore leads us, initially at least, to a number of negative conclusions, as follows.

1. *The richest strata did not participate in Phase B of the national awakening*. Norway is the only exception to this rule, an exception we can perhaps explain by referring to the nature of its national programme, or to the 'organic' social structure characteristic of this particular oppressed nationality. *We do not find the poor, either urban or rural, among the patriots of any of the nations we have studied*; moreover, the number of patriots originating from the poorer strata nowhere rose beyond a certain minimum level determined by the accidental factor of the social ascent of a certain number of individuals.

2. *The more wealthy the social stratum, the larger the section of it which was assimilated to, or already belonged to the ruling nation*; the poorer the social stratum, the larger the section of it which belonged to the oppressed nationality. But we know

already that the national activity of the individual strata, their role in Phase B of the national movement, was not directly related to their numerical strength.

3. *The later the opening of Phase B of the national movement, the greater the role played in it by the 'richer of the poor'*; this is strikingly apparent in Estonia and Macedonia, though only true to a limited extent for Lithuania (the peasants). The point we are making here is not definitively established; it is more in the nature of a working hypothesis.

These three points do not in fact conclude our study of the criterion of material wealth. There is a further analysis to be made: the foundation for this will be provided by our study of the territorial structure of the national movement, in the third chapter of this section of the book. Once we know the territorial structure, we can compare the material wealth of the 'patriotic' regions with that of the nationally indifferent, or the assimilated regions.

We have dealt up until now with the social composition of the patriotic groups under the aspect of their quantitative proportions; we have deliberately left out of account the degree of the individual's influence and his significance for the movement; these things were naturally subject to considerable variation from case to case. In a separate study we hope to move away from the quantitative proportions to the social characteristics of the leading personalities, the organizers and the theorists of the national movement. Only when this is done will it be possible to give the necessary perspective to the knowledge so far acquired. In the present study we shall make do with a simple reference to those other important components of the social structure of the national movement, and give as a substitute for a broader treatment a generalized hypothesis, covering the relationships we have found to exist in our separate investigations into each of the relevant small nations, as follows: *Leading pioneers of the national movement were in particular to be found (1) in the milieu of the highest of those social groups actually represented in the social spectrum of the small nation in question, and (2) in the milieu which provided the best conditions for reciprocal and energetic influence to be exerted upon a reasonably extensive group of members of the small nation in question.*

The territorial distribution of the national movement formed a further important component of the social structure, and this will be dealt with in the next chapter.

18

The territorial structure

The initial results of our study of territorial structure can be formulated in the following two theses:

(1) intense national activity was distributed very unevenly over the territory of all the small nations investigated;
(2) this unevenness of distribution (which was by no means a random mosaic) can be expressed by distinguishing between a small, compact land surface of intensively patriotic character, and an equally compact area where patriotic interest was average to slight, and only grew slowly in the course of the phase of national agitation.

The only exception to these rules is Norway, where the towns – the main seats of the national movement – lay too far from each other to form a compact area. The areas of intensive patriotic life and the areas from which the largest section of the patriots originated are fairly strongly correlated in all the cases investigated. The result of our study of the territorial composition of the patriotic movement is therefore first and foremost the recognition that the areas of liveliest patriotic activity did not grow up entirely at random over the territory of a small nation, but rather in the kind of ordered pattern which justifies us in posing a further question, to wit: can we find reasons for this territorial distribution which would be common to all the cases investigated? The question is not posed for its own sake; it arises out of the fundamental problematic of the formation of a modern nation. Here too, our aim is to establish what objective conditions were favourable to the success of a patriotic movement, and assisted the extension of national consciousness.

TERRITORIAL CHARACTERISTICS

What was the geographical situation of the nationally active region in relation to the total area settled by the members of an oppressed nation? In Finland it was the central region, close to the national boundary, in Bohemia it comprised both a part of the central region and an outlying region, in Estonia and Lithuania, as also to some degree in Slovakia, it was quite clearly located

ex-centrically, on the border itself. The location of nationally active regions was by no means influenced by the proximity or otherwise of the political and economic centres of a country. These centres were usually, one must admit, the headquarters of a large and important group of patriots (with the exception of Lithuania), but such groups were also to be found in large urban centres outside the territory of the oppressed nation. We have already seen how in the case of Lithuania a section of the leading patriots was living for a certain time in cities located on the territory of the ruling nations (Moscow, Königsberg, Klajpeda); the incipient Lettish movement had a similar 'representative centre' outside its own territory (St Petersburg), as did the movement of Lusatian Sorbs (Prague, Leipzig) and also the Slovak and Bulgarian movements.

None of the nationally active regions formed a self-enclosed, natural, entity, though they were on the whole geographically homogeneous, not divided internally by natural barriers. Where we do find such barriers, we also find a break in the compactness of the nationally active territory.

Moreover, if we look at the predominant type of settlement, we do not find that the nationally active regions possessed any uniform characteristics. In Lithuania (just as in Belorussia) the rural districts were clearly predominant, but in Bohemia the national centre of gravity lay rather in the towns of a given district. This was even more emphatically the case in Belgium and Norway. In Finland, Estonia and Bulgaria both types of settlement were equally represented. The bigger towns were centres of the national movement, but patriotic life was sometimes more passive in their immediate hinterland. The environs of Tartu and Tallinn, as also for the most part the immediate surroundings of Prague and Brussels, form highly characteristic examples of this phenomenon. The nationally passive district around the town of Kaunas belongs here too, although one must make the reservation that this was in any case an administrative and economic centre rather than a national one. Was it only the possibility of moving into a larger urban centre in the immediate neighbourhood which prevented the establishment of independent centres outside?

LINGUISTIC CHARACTERISTICS

What was the character of the nationally active territory of a small nation from the point of view of linguistic structure? Can we regard the linguistic homogeneity of a territory as a factor accelerating the development of national consciousness, or was this process on the contrary accelerated precisely by linguistic variety, by the direct interpenetration of different nationalities across a linguistic boundary?

In Bohemia we have to do with a territory which was almost purely Czech in the countryside. In the patriotically active towns we only occasionally come

across a numerically significant German minority (Plzeň, Jindřichův Hradec). We find a similar situation in the Flemish national movement. In Estonia the rural part of the nationally active region was purely Estonian, while the towns had a German population of between a third (Viljandi) and a half (Rakvere).[1] An analogous distinction between the urban and rural situations is to be found in Slovakia. In Finland on the other hand the patriotic countryside stretched from the purely Finnish interior southwards towards a predominantly Swedish area and westwards towards a linguistically mixed part of the country. The character of the towns in this territory also varied from a semi-Swedish type (Helsinki, Turku) to those that were almost purely Finnish (Kuopio, Hämeenlinna). The greatest variety in linguistic composition in Lithuania was presented by the region which was the nucleus of the Lithuanian national movement: there the proportion of the population speaking Lithuanian varied from 60% (Seinai, Vilkaviškis) to 77% (Mariampole) and 73% (Kalvarije). The remainder of the population was Jewish, Polish, and in the case of Vilkaviškis German as well.[2] *The level of activity of the national movement did not depend, therefore, on the linguistic homogeneity of the territory on which it developed.* Nor can one maintain the hypothesis that there was a contrast between the linguistically pure and therefore patriotic countryside and the 'denationalized' towns, lacking in patriots.

But there is one further point of departure for investigating the hypothesis that linguistic variations had significance for the development of national consciousness. The very proximity of a language boundary might have had a similar influence to a linguistic mixture within a given area. Was national agitation in fact more lively in the neighbourhood of this boundary? Did it achieve greater successes there? Let us compare the course of the language boundary with the margin of the nationally active region for each of the nations we have studied. In Bohemia the two lines coincided only on the northern boundary and partially also in the east. Over most of Bohemia, however, the lines did not even run parallel. In contrast to this, the most active Lithuanian region was half, or even two-thirds, surrounded by linguistically alien elements; to the west it marched with German territory (here the language boundary was almost identical with the political boundary), to the south with Polish territory, and to the east in part with Belorussian. Estonian patriotic territory lay only in the south of the country, and for a relatively short distance here its border was contiguous with the language boundary; but this was a language boundary with a neighbouring oppressed nation – the Letts – and there was no sign here either of conflict or any degree of assimilation. In Finland, as we already know, the two boundaries intersected, and the patriotically active region extended into the Swedish-speaking, or, as the case might be, the mixed-language, region. All the livelier centres of the Flemish movement (with the exception of Brussels) lay at a distance from the language boundary with the Walloons. In the case of Slovakia, strength of patriotic activity was only

correlated with the proximity of the language boundary in the south-western part of the country.

During Phase B, therefore (in Phase C the situation probably changed), we cannot consider either linguistic homogeneity or the closeness of the language boundary as factors assisting us to clarify the question of the situation and distribution of the nationally active regions. We cannot therefore consider these ethnic and geographical variables as factors either in the acceleration or the retardation of the development of national consciousness.

THE IMPACT OF SCHOOL EDUCATION

To what extent did the growth of national activity in each region depend on the educational level of the population and the influence of schools? An independent study should really be devoted to the problem of the relation of education in schools to the development of national consciousness. Here we shall do more than attempt to compare the density of the school network with the territorial distribution of the patriotic centres and communities. An exact comparison is of course hardly possible in the present state of our knowledge. The necessary prior studies of the development of the school system of the nations we have investigated here are lacking; if they did exist, they would then have to be worked through on the basis of our criteria, and taking into consideration the distribution of educational institutions of various types over the national territory. We are therefore forced, instead, to establish the density of the school network in each of countries investigated according to somewhat diverse indices; we shall nevertheless always endeavour to present the results in a form in which they can be utilized for the basic comparison.

In Bohemia the gymnasia were roughly speaking evenly distributed over the whole surface of the country; but their density was relatively greater in the German-speaking districts.[3] Every town with a gymnasium, set in surroundings at least in part Czech, had a numerous patriotic community; there were of course important differences in the degree to which the influence of the gymnasium radiated out to the neighbouring towns and the country districts.

Even though considerable subsequent changes in the density of the population could well have altered the picture arrived at on the basis of the absolute numbers we have, for 1821, we think it worthy of attention that districts with very much more than the average number of elementary schools were situated for the most part on the territory we have characterized as 'nationally active'. In the given situation, the most reliable indicator is the rise in the number of schools in each district; it then becomes unnecessary to compare this figure with the number of inhabitants. From the beginning of the 1790s up to 1821 the number of schools in 14 districts increased by more than a third (according to evidence from 1850); of the districts where the increase took place only three lay outside the 'nationally active' region.[4] In Bohemia, therefore, the territorial

distribution of the patriotic communities corresponded in a considerable measure to the dynamics of the growth of the elementary school system. In Slovakia the correlation was rather with the distribution of the secondary schools.

Of all the towns with gymnasia in Lithuania, only Mariampole had a patriotic community; this unquestionably exerted influence on the surrounding areas. Unfortunately we do not possess any data on the elementary schools in Lithuania as far back at the beginning of Phase B; we can however at least substitute data from a period a couple of decades after this. At the turn of the century, the nationally active Lithuanian region of the *gubernia* of Suvalki had 239 elementary schools, attended by 15,200 pupils in all; three districts of the gubernia of Kaunas, which contained roughly as many people as the whole of the gubernia of Suvalki, only had 105 schools, with 4,750 pupils.[5] In the second half of the nineteenth century the proportion of illiterates in the gubernia of Suvalki was around 25%,[6] whereas in the gubernia of Kaunas it varied between 30% and 70% from district to district even in the 1890s. Improved attendance at school might also have been connected with the language of instruction; in the gubernia of Suvalki up to 1880 it was permitted to conduct at least religious instruction in the Lithuanian language.[7] In Lithuania too, therefore, we find that the densest school network and the highest level of school-attendance coincided with the nationally active region.

We are very well informed about the network of schools in Estonia. Here, of course, it is only elementary schools which come into consideration. The fact that a high proportion of the Estonian patriots were teachers already in itself indicates the connection between the patriotic movement and the network of elementary schools. Secondary schools were represented only in Tartu and Tallinn, if we leave out of account teachers' training colleges.[8] In the gubernia of Livland the districts which had the densest school network were Tartumaa and the north of Võrumaa,[9] while in Estonia proper the highest number of schools, in comparison with the number of rural communes, were to be found in eastern Järvamaa and Virumaa. The schools were at their sparsest during the period of the Estonian Phase B in Pärnumaa, Harjumaa and Läänemaa.[10] The district with the highest patriotic activity, Viljandi, occupied an intermediate position between these two groups. The areas with the lowest relative numbers of village schools were admittedly also the most passive from the national point of view, although the converse does not hold, that the most actively patriotic areas had the densest school network. They did not even have the highest percentage school attendance by rural children up to the age of 15; the record here was held by the district of Võrumaa with 71% in the year 1862, followed by northern Valgamaa with 57%. The patriotic district of Viljandimaa, on the other hand, had only 34% school attendance. However Viljandimaa did have (after northern Valgamaa) the highest percentage of children undergoing education at home;[11] this naturally raised the percentage

of those undergoing education of any type in this patriotically lively district. A comparison between the distribution of schools and the location of the most successful centres for collections on behalf of the Alexander School in the gubernia of Estland allows us to establish that both indicators sometimes had the same density, but that most of the time the level of patriotic activity was far lower than the density of the school network might indicate (e.g. Läänemaa in the centre, and the district around Paide) – and also the converse was true.[12]

In countries where national activity was centred mainly in the towns (Norway, Belgium), we can regard this fact as providing a positive answer to the question of the relation between the level of patriotic activity and the density of the school network, in so far, that is, as tendencies emerged in the urban schools which were favourable to the language of the small nation under consideration. However, in the case of the Flemish movement one cannot uphold the view that the districts with the highest level of patriotic activity were also, as a whole, the districts with the highest level of education. Even as late as 1880 it was precisely Eastern Flanders which had the highest percentage of illiteracy in the whole of Flemish territory (48.2%), whereas the nationally passive province of Limburg had only 42.3% illiteracy. The province of Antwerp had the lowest rate of illiteracy (40.6%).[13]

The existing literature does not provide enough material for a comparison between the nationally active region and the school network in Finland. We shall have to content ourselves with noting that the secondary schools were originally almost exclusively concentrated on the coast, and only began to penetrate into the Finnish interior in the nineteenth century. Moreover, they were only to be found in the area we know to have been 'nationally active'; at the same time gymnasia were established, Finnish-language in the interior, mixed-language on the coast.[14] The network of village schools was dense only on the coast – hence predominantly in Swedish-speaking or mixed-language areas. In the interior there was a shortage of schools and teachers, partly compensated for by the system whereby teachers travelled from place to place.[15]

Attendance at school, as the prerequisite of literacy, without which national consciousness is hardly conceivable, must have influenced the territorial structure of patriotic activity. However the density of the village-school network was not the only factor on which the level of patriotic activity depended.

ECONOMIC RELATIONS

What were the distinguishing features of the economic situation on the nationally active territory of the nations we have studied? Are there any striking differences to be noted in this respect from the situation on the rest of the territory occupied by members of the nation in question? We should

like first to compare the territorial composition of the national movement with the economic situation from the point of view of three indicators: factory and workshop production, agricultural production and exchange relations. We shall concentrate particularly on phenomena which can be expressed quantitatively or cartographically. The period covered will not be limited by the chronological boundaries we have assigned to the phase of national agitation in each nation, but will be pushed further back to allow us to trace the essential features of previous development.

In Bohemia the areas of manufacture were far from being identical with the region where national activity developed. The northern boundary of the latter region ran roughly parallel to the southern boundary of intensive domestic textile production, and only in Eastern Bohemia did the two regions overlap, over an area stretching from the southern edge of the Orlický Mountains as far as Polička.[16] In the lowlands of Central Bohemia manufactures only emerged in an isolated way and they were usually unable to maintain themselves for long (with the exception of industries supplying foodstuffs). Apart from Prague, it was above all the linguistically German parts of Bohemia which saw the initial development of the industrial revolution.[17] Of course, taken as a whole, Bohemia occupied a significant place in the economic life of the Habsburg Monarchy from the second half of the eighteenth century onwards; it was one of its most advanced provinces.

Out of the three nationally active regions of Slovakia, two were linked with the expansion of manufacturing production. Central Slovakia had an old tradition of mining and metalworking. Liptov and the surrounding district were characterized by an extensive domestic production of textiles.[18]

Flanders had been a classical region of manufacture from early modern times. The production of textiles was a source of livelihood for tens of thousands of people, in town and country. The rise of industry threw Flanders into a prolonged social crisis, which was deeper and more oppressive in the west, where there occurred mass pauperization of the local craft producers. For the centre of gravity of the industrial revolution lay in the south, in the Walloon part of Belgium. In general, during the nineteenth century, small-scale production and scattered manufactures maintained themselves more strongly in the Flemish part of Belgium. Even in the first half of the nineteenth century the Flemish provinces had on the average 45% of independent producers and 51% wage-labourers, whereas in the Walloon provinces the proportion was 40% of the first to 55% of the second.[19] The nationally active region of the Flemish movement therefore coincided with that very part of the territory afflicted by the crisis of the old textile manufacture where the economic situation relatively rapidly stabilized (namely eastern Flanders). There is also the fact, which is in consonance with the above observation, that the national movement was more active in the stagnant or slowly growing towns, but by no means in the decaying towns of western Flanders, whereas among the towns

with a rapidly growing population it only met with a broad response in the case of Antwerp.

Lithuania was a marginal and backward region, as compared with both Poland and Prussia, as also with the territory inhabited by the Letts. In earlier times in Lithuania there was a complete absence of rural manufactures. Large workshops arose in the towns, which also housed the first small industrial undertakings in textiles and iron (Vilnius, Kaunas). In the district of Suvalki craft production remained on a small scale: at the end of the nineteenth century there was one workshop for every four workers. Expansion took place above all in the food-producing branches as also those industries directed to satisfying the needs of the countryside (soap-making, leather-working, distilling, brush-making, candle-making).[20]

As in Lithuania, so also in Estonia there were originally no significant manufactures outside the large towns (Tallinn, Tartu). However, after the middle of the nineteenth century, the industrial revolution penetrated into the country areas as well; but the industrial enterprises which arose in this way lay in fact for the most part outside the territory we have characterized as nationally the most active (Narva). In Viljandi, on the other hand, there was rapid expansion on a different basis: small craft workshops.[21]

Craft production and manufacture in Finland was extremely scanty; most of it took the form of sawmills and woodworking enterprises in general. Most of them were situated in the interior, and with the exception of the south-western part of Finland they represented the only enterprises of a manufacturing character there up to the beginning of the nineteenth century. In south-west Finland and on the western coast, apart from the woodworking enterprises there had since the previous century existed a relatively large group of ironworks; in some districts we also find a small scattering of textile manufactories. Apart from the linguistically mixed province of Nylands, the most active centres for the production of timber, iron and textiles were the southern and central parts of the district of Hämeenlinna and the eastern Hinterland of the town of Turku. In the interior, production was not concentrated in the towns. Among the new industrial centres we may mention, apart from Helsinki itself, Tampere in the district of Hämeenlinna, which could be called the birthplace of Finnish industry.[22] In Finland, then, the nucleus of the nationally active region was formed by the part of the country which (leaving aside the Swedish-speaking districts) had the most highly developed manufacture. Inasmuch as Finland did not possess large industrial complexes (with the exceptions of Helsinki and Tampere) but was characterized rather by small workshops, we may sum up by saying that the patriotically active parts of the national territory certainly saw an expansion of small-scale craft production, but only in certain cases was there a growth of manufacture and only very rarely do we find factory production.

How can we characterize the patriotic areas we have studied in regard to

their agricultural production? In Bohemia almost the whole of the nationally active region lay in an area where grain was abundant, and whose western margin also produced hops. In the south in particular the boundaries of the two regions – the grain-producing region and the nationally active region – coincided strikingly, while in the west the grain-producing region extended beyond the language boundary, and in the east the nationally active region extended into the area of linen production in the mountain foothills, as we stated earlier. The peasant farms of the Elbe valley already possessed grain surpluses in the sixteenth century, which they sold in part to the towns and in part to the 'mountain'; a small part of their produce was also exported from the country.[23] The volume of production for the market in the nationally active territory was distinctly higher than it was in passive territory, as recent research has indicated.

The fact that eastern Flanders was a very fertile area of land cannot be considered of relevance in judging the character of the nationally active region. The situation here was different from that in Bohemia, for the Flemish movement was emphatically an urban one; besides, eastern Flanders was far from being the only fertile area of Belgium.

In Lithuania a similar situation developed to that in Bohemia. The northern part of the gubernia of Suvalki was the most fertile area of the whole territory inhabited by the Lithuanians. The only comparable area was the western part of the district of Kaunas.[24] The gubernia of Suvalki also had a higher proportion of cultivable land than any of the adjoining gubernii.[25]

Among the patriotically active districts of Slovakia only the south-west lay in the area of high grain production, which was also an area where wine production had developed strongly. Neither Liptov nor central Slovakia belonged to the most productive agricultural region, in absolute terms, but their position between the poverty-stricken mountains and the pasture-lands made them centres of production for a far-flung area. For central Slovakia one must also add that it supplied the mining towns. A number of essentially more productive areas to the south and east were of course nationally passive.

The district of Viljandi and the nationally active areas adjacent to it lay in the most fertile agricultural region of Estonia. But the much more nationally passive district of Tartumaa also came into this category. Here they grew not only rye but wheat, fodder plants, flax and to a lesser degree hemp.[26] At the same time, Viljandimaa formed part of the area of the most intensive economic growth.[27]

The Finnish countryside, a not particularly fertile area, was never a large-scale exporter of grain. Only at the end of the eighteenth century did agricultural production develop sufficiently. At the same time the southern part of the district of Hämeenlinna began to cultivate and export flax and hemp in greater quantities.[28] However, the liveliest areas from the national point of view lay entirely within the agriculturally self-sufficient part of the country.

The remoter environs of the town of Kuopio had already ceased to be economically self-sufficient, as had the boundary strip which comprised the greater part of the district of Mikkeli.[29] A comparison of the character of agricultural production among the nations we have studied therefore provides us with another general rule: *the patriotically active territory lay in all the cases investigated either in part or entirely on the most productive and the most market-oriented parts of the territory occupied by an oppressed nationality*. Usually this area produced grain for the market, but it sometimes grew plants for industrial uses as well. Here we come to a further criterion for determining the character of the patriotic districts – the place they occupied in the exchange of commodities.

EXCHANGE RELATIONS

We do not require an extensive demonstration in the case of the Czech national movement to prove that the nationally active region was also the most actively involved in trade of all the Czech-speaking regions of the province of Bohemia. It had the most thickly spread network of market towns, and apart from the traditional trading relationship with the 'mountains', which we have spoken of before, there were the deliveries made by the country districts to Prague and other large towns. Clearly, the transformation of the general economic structure of Bohemia was an important new factor, determined in particular by the development of the northern part of the country, which brought an intensification of exchange relations in the neighbouring agricultural districts without regard to the language spoken by the local inhabitants. From the point of view of transport and communications, too, the nucleus of the patriotically active region was the very part of Bohemia which had the closest links with the capital city. It had the densest road network as well, and relatively speaking the most rapid means of communication with Prague, both in the post and in transport.[30]

The high percentage of town-dwellers in Flanders is a fact that in itself bears witness to the liveliness of exchange relations between the towns and their rural hinterland. Where the towns grew most rapidly, the intensity of trading relations also grew. Apart from Brussels and Antwerp it was the towns of eastern Flanders which registered the greatest relative growth: that is to say, precisely in the region of the liveliest national activity. The western part of Flanders forms a contrast to this situation: it was hit most of all by economic decline and hence also by the weakening of exchange relations, and from the point of view of the national movement it did not belong to the most active region.[31]

We know already that the peasants of the northern part of the gubernia of Suvalki produced grain for the market, and that this was in part exported. The peasants here were richer than in the rest of Lithuanian territory.[32] Traditionally this area was linked up with the European market indirectly, through the trade route of the river Niemen. We do not however have sufficient information on the trade situation in the other parts of Lithuania to allow us to compare relative intensities in trade connections.

The rise of the town of Viljandi from the mid nineteenth century onwards is plainly evident from the tempo of its numerical growth.[33] Viljandi developed into a wealthy trading centre, on which a whole series of small local markets in the neighbourhood were dependent. Apart from its function in mediating exchange relations between the town and the rural hinterland the urban market also handled the purchase of grain and industrial plants for export. This region – together with the not too distant environs of the town of Riga – entered into close contact with the markets of Europe, especially as an exporter of flax.[34] The internal trade of the southern portion of Estonian territory was on the whole considerably livelier than it was in the northern areas. Only towards the end of the century was the north able gradually to draw level.[35]

Apart from the coastal areas, Finland only displayed large-scale trading activities in the cases of Turku-Pori and Hämeenlinna. In the course of the nineteenth century this activity extended into the interior, in a north-easterly direction. New towns and market centres arose in the north east, the first being Lahti and Heinola, followed by Mikkeli and then Joensuu and Lisalmi.

The fundamental comparison of the economic characteristics of the various national territories which we have made from the point of view of the distinction between areas of greater and lesser patriotic activity has brought forth some positive results. Whereas the search for a common denominator on the basis of comparisons according to extra-economic indicators, such as administration, language, or type of settlement, brought no clear results – with the exception of school attendance – the patriotically active districts did display certain concurrent features from the economic point of view:

(1) they were not districts where expanding industries were centred, and in a number of cases they were not even centres of manufacture; they were areas of developed small-scale craft production, aimed at satisfying the domestic requirements of the urban population and the agricultural hinterland;
(2) they were situated in the most fertile part of the national territory (where grain was produced above all, but also frequently combined with industrial plants), although they did not necessarily cover the whole of the fertile area;
(3) their agricultural produce was as a rule destined for the local market, through which a connection was then made with more distant markets; the local markets in question were not, therefore, self-enclosed markets of the mediaeval type;
(4) even though they were not the main vehicles of the process of industrial-

ization, they were affected in their economic life and their social structure by the cultural transformations characteristic of the emerging capitalist society.

The characteristics indicated above are not in contradiction to what we know of the territorial structure of the Norwegian national movement; it was almost entirely concentrated in the towns, which in view of the special geographical conditions in that country did not form a compact territorial area. In so far as the peasants did emerge politically, they did so above all in Østland, which was agriculturally the most advanced part of Norway.[36] It has been possible to verify the results of our analysis most recently in the case of one of the Balkan nations. In the Bulgarian national liberation movement between 1869 and 1873 we find the densest network of revolutionary committees in the towns but also in the very part of the Bulgarian countryside which was economically the most advanced: in the districts of Sofia, Plovdiv, Pasardžik, and to a lesser degree also the districts of Loveč and Stara Zagora.[37] On the other hand, the nationally active region for the Macedonian national movement was located at the turn of the century in the mountainous *sanjak* of Monastir, away from the fertile plains and the most important lines of communication. This was, however, a region where the Turkish population was relatively strongly represented, with the result that the conflict of interests with Ottoman rule could penetrate more rapidly into social consciousness.[38]

We may, hypothetically, add yet further characteristic features of the regions we describe as patriotically active. It is likely that in all the cases studied they were the regions with the most densely implanted network, permitting the quickest movement from one place to another.[39] They were also likely to have been settled and cultivated since the distant past, and to possess the highest population density in the nation's territory. Independent small-scale producers in the countryside (farmers) and in the towns (craftsmen) are likely to have been more strongly represented in the social structure of their population than elsewhere.

During the phase of national agitation, therefore, the national movement was taken up most enthusiastically on the part of the territory of a small nation which displayed the highest relative level of social communication. In this connection, the main instruments of the communication process were the market relationships which developed first and foremost out of small-scale commodity production (it is a matter of indifference whether these relationships were urban or rural), and only secondarily the development of the educational system. At the same time, these were probably the regions with the greatest degree of horizontal social mobility.

PART IV

Conclusion

Conclusion

As we said in the introductory chapter, an analysis of the social and territorial structure of the national awakening among small nations should not be a mere summary of the various discrete statistical data for our own edification, but a step forward which for all its one-sidedness has the purpose of extending our knowledge of the social forces and relations which determined the process of formation of the modern nations. We shall therefore endeavour in our conclusion to continue along the road pointed out to us by the data on social structure, and to meditate on the more general connections and regularities displayed by the formation of the modern nation. Although the criterion we used for our comparative approach was the relatively narrow problem of the social structure of the patriotic groups, we pointed out in the last chapter that this problem touches the very kernel of the matter.

Some of the partial results we arrived at with our quantitative analysis may appear to the informed reader as a mere confirmation, or, as the case may be, clarification, of what he or she already knew or perhaps conjectured, about the social structure of the various national movements. However, we consider that this kind of quantitative confirmation of assumed characteristics is itself a positive advance. And, in the second place, it was possible on the quantitative basis to rebut convincingly a large number of other generalizations, traditionally accepted as valid, but in fact incorrect. Between the two extremes, the confirmation or the refutation of what was assumed, there is of course a whole spectrum of results and corrections allowing a greater approximation to the truth. Far too many myths and dogmas have arisen precisely around the study of the national movement because historians have placed their trust uncritically in constructs which were apparently logical and self-evident. In our own field, let us give as examples of this the thesis customarily accepted by many national historians that the teachers played an important role in all national movements, or the thesis that the patriots in small nations always came predominantly from the countryside, or the thesis that the bourgeoisie stood at the head of the national movement right from its inception. These and other theses could not retain their universal validity when confronted with the quantitative data.

But the more significant results of our study begin where an answer emerges

to the question of the roots and conditions of the national movement. In this connection we consider our most important advance to be this: with the quantitative method we have succeeded in confirming the initial hypothesis, that *the origin of the modern nation and the birth of the national movement cannot be explained primarily through patriotic agitation.* Identical forms of agitation, identical patriotic manifestations, led to very different results among the different nationalities, and nowhere were they sufficient by themselves to bring the national movement successfully into its mass phase. Patriotic agitation may possibly allow us to explain changes in the attitude of intellectuals during Phase A; but as soon as we arrive at the problem of interpreting Phase B of the national movement, the phase which was properly decisive for the further development of a small nation, we are obliged to take into consideration the clear connection between national agitation and the objective relations constituted by the processes of agrarian revolution, industrialization, urbanization and the general social transformation at the threshold of capitalist society. In any case, a deeper investigation would probably show that even Phase A cannot be explained merely by referring to the 'ideas which created the nation'.[1]

Although we have been only marginally concerned with Phase A, it should not be viewed as unimportant, nor should its significance for the formation of the modern nation be overlooked. Phase A proceeded with an intensity which varied considerably from nation to nation. Some national movements only experienced a very short Phase A (the Estonian and the Latvian movements), for others it lasted longer but was very extensive (the Lithuanians, the Bulgarians). In this phase intellectuals from the ranks of the ruling nation frequently attached themselves to the movement (the German pastors in the Baltic region, Russian scholars in Belorussia, Swedish-speaking intellectuals in Finland, and other similar cases). Those small nationalities which had retained a certain tradition of political individuality, albeit mediated rather through historical consciousness than historical actuality, experienced a very well-marked Phase A, in which 'Landespatriotismus' (regional patriotism) manifested itself as well as scholarly interest. In places where this Landespatriotismus was founded on a genuine political autonomy which was in the course of disappearing, or on the remnants of a previous autonomy, a part of the old ruling class of the given territorial unit attached itself to Phase A of the national movement. Their participation was more emphatic the more strongly the political programme was represented already in Phase A. For a better understanding of this point, let us recall that the acceptance into the national movement of a political programme of a feudal, Estate-like character could be, though it by no means had to be, identical with the start of national agitation. Here it is sufficient to point to the difference between the participation of the ruling class in Phase A of the national movement among the Czechs or Lithuanians, on the one hand, and among the Norwegians, Poles, Magyars and Croats on the other.[2] Where the territory of the political unit to which regional patriotism (Landespatriotismus) was attached was not co-extensive with the territory inhabited by the members of the relevant small nationality (Croatia, Finland, Bohemia, Schleswig), in those cases an internal differentiation took place during Phase A within the social groups which were the repositories of the national movement.

The ruling strata of the old society became converted into a bourgeoisie (in particular a landowning bourgeoisie) in the process of transformation which affected the whole society; these people then only come into consideration in Phase B of the national movement where there was a continuity of social support from Phase A to Phase B. Even then the share of this class declined to a minimum. Where no continuity of social support existed we do not find any survivors of the old ruling class in Phase B. It is by no means our personal discovery that the most numerous group in Phase B of the national movement was the intelligentsia. We also know that in view of the strong internal differentiation of this stratum an overall characterization of the social significance of this predominance of the intelligentsia would be out of the question. If we therefore take into account the internal subdivisions of the intelligentsia according to occupational groupings, we may note that none of these groups had either an identical or a constant place in all the nations studied. Here we shall not reproduce in minute detail all the differences between the shares of the various professional groups in the national movement; we shall restrict ourselves to the assertion that participation in the national movement was not conditioned *a priori* by membership in particular classes or social groups, in fact, on the contrary, no class or professional group was an irreplaceable component of Phase B. We must however give a greater precision to this conclusion in the case of two classes: the bourgeoisie and the peasantry. The participation of these two classes in the national movement was a fundamental prerequisite for the coming of the modern nation, since without them no nation could attain a fully rounded class structure (i.e. a class structure typical of capitalist society), and this class structure is indispensable for the completion of the nation-creating process.

We have in fact come across members of the bourgeoisie in the course of Phase B among the patriots of the majority of the nations only in isolated individuals (Norway being the exception here). At the same time, we did establish that small-scale urban producers and traders were present in the majority of the patriotic groups of this phase. Admittedly, it is difficult to determine the degree to which in each concrete case one is dealing with old-fashioned craftsmen of the guild type, and to what extent one is already faced with a modern petty bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, it is plain that the milieu of urban production and commerce, which was of the highest importance from the angle of the expansion of capitalist relations, was open to national agitation and more or less supported it already in Phase B. Then, in the course of Phase

C, there grew out of this environment the bourgeoisie specific to the small nation. The function of a bourgeoisie could therefore be performed at first, to some degree, by the small-scale urban producers. This was not however the sole possibility. Just as certain of the bonds and relations which determined the formation of the nation could be substituted for each other, so also were the roles of certain classes and social groups mutually substitutable, even if only temporarily. We have already noted that the function of a bourgeoisie in Phase B of the national movement could also be assumed, apart from the small-scale producers, by certain groups from the ranks of the intelligentsia of an oppressed nationality, and sometimes indeed by an emergent rural bourgeoisie (Lithuania).

The case of the peasantry was somewhat different. The peasants, as the natural repositories of the nation's linguistic and cultural tradition, were an indispensable condition for the success of any national movement. This does not mean, of course, that this objective role of the peasantry, for which no substitution at all could be made, necessarily implied that its subjective role was equally vital. Quite the contrary: we saw in fact that the peasantry on the whole participated relatively weakly in national agitation, or was relatively unwilling to accept national consciousness, in the course of Phase B. It only participated more strongly where this phase began relatively late (Lithuania, Estonia).[3] Patriots from the peasant environment were prominent in Phase B especially where the entry of the national movement into this phase was subsequent to the emancipation of the peasantry or the agrarian reforms (these did not necessarily have to be identical with the complete liquidation of feudal relations). Hence, although the role of the peasantry as the objective substratum of national existence was irreplaceable, its subjective participation in national [illegible] not an unavoidable condition of the successful progress of Phase [illegible] of a decisive section of it) into the [illegible] criteria for the transition [illegible] then, the participation of [illegible] of the bourgeoisie.

[illegible] tions of definite classes or [illegible] es not signify that we intend [illegible] ion of its instruments. We [illegible] out the more general social [illegible] among all the different [illegible] ses, conditions which were [illegible] nationally activist attitudes [illegible] the national movement in

[illegible] aracteristics of this kind. We [illegible] on the average more rapidly [illegible] iving in the countryside. The

same can be said of the younger in comparison with the older generation. The 'young people' in question could either be students or young members of the intelligentsia, who were seeking to make their mark in society for the first time. We summarized our results by saying that *interest in national agitation was at its greatest among the highest category of professional groups, which was as yet accessible to the members of the oppressed nationality*; the concrete possibilities of social ascent of course varied considerably with the given time and place.

In this study we have undertaken the analysis of the social composition of the nationally active groups on the basis of an assumed fixed and determinate membership of particular professions, and, more broadly, of definite strata and classes. The decisive moment for determining the individual's membership of one of these groups was the moment at which he entered the ranks of the patriots. In real life, of course, the position of the individual in society is not necessarily stable and unchanging. It alters both with changes in his own individual fate, and more particularly with transformations of the whole society and with changes in the place occupied by his occupational group arising from those processes of transformation. In the period of the transition from feudal to capitalist society these social changes were particularly dynamic and intricate. However, there are ways of solving this problem. We noted when analysing the territorial structure of the national movement that the social situation of individuals and groups can be defined and measured, from the point of view of their potential commitment to the movement, by using two general characteristics: the degree of social communication and the degree of mobility.

Social mobility is the clearer of the two indicators.[4] As one can see from the high level of participation by the intelligentsia in the national movement, and other evidence, the more intra-generationally mobile groups were predominant in all the national movements investigated. The question of regional *inter-generational mobility* is only slightly more complicated. Here too the majority of the patriots of Phase B were members of groups mobile in this sense. This can be seen from the predominantly non-academic social origin of the intelligentsia. Moreover, the majority of the professions belonging to this stratum had by their very nature the preliminary requirement that sons would exercise their professional functions in another place than their fathers. However, intra-generational horizontal mobility was low, both in the movement of the Danish minority in Schleswig and in the Estonian movement. In evaluating *vertical social mobility*, we are compelled to rely above all on patriotic groups whose social origins are known to us in detail. For these groups we can establish a noteworthy connection between vertical intra-generational and inter-generational mobility. If we subdivide the professions according to the criterion of the kind of chances of social ascent which offered themselves to their members, we can also approximately determine the proportion of patriots belonging to the more mobile and the proportion belonging to the more stable

groups of a given nation. If we direct our attention to social origin we can on the whole establish quite clearly what proportion of patriots took up a higher position on the social ladder than their parents had done; here it is generally valid that the more popular the origin of the patriotic intelligentsia the higher their vertical inter-generational mobility. We can summarize the relation between the two categories of vertical mobility in tabular form (see Table 40). The numbers in this table are of course largely symbolic, and the table has rather the character of a model.

Table 40. *The vertical social mobility of the patriotic groups*

National movement	Vertical mobility: relation between mobile (M) and stable (S) groups	
	Intra-generational	Inter-generational
	M:S	M:S
Norway	6:4 (or 5:5)	4:6
Finland	6:4	3:7
Bohemia	3:7 (or 4:6)	6:4
Slovakia	3:7	6:4
Estonia	3:7	5:5
Lithuania	4:6	7:3

Worth attention here is the 'relationship of mutual compensation' between the two types of vertical mobility. Those patriotic groups whose members belonged for the greater part to professions where the chances of social ascent were good had a relatively low level of inter-generational mobility (in addition to the Norwegian and Finnish examples the Flemish movement also belongs in this category). In contrast to this, those patriotic communities dominated by groups without any great chance of future social ascent (such as the clergy, the rural schoolteachers and the peasants) displayed a considerable improvement in social status in comparison with the preceding generation. This difference also corresponds to a difference in the social structure of the nationality as a whole, and it is not correlated with the relevant nationality's membership of one of the basic types of national movement which come into question here (the integrated or the belated type). One can however see the outline of a definite connection in the programmatic sphere. The language programme did not play as important a role in national groups with high intra-generational and low inter-generational mobility (Norway, Finland, Flemish movement) as it did in the other national movements. The patriots had the least chance of social ascent in cases where Estates-type barriers survived strongly and where the national movement was dominated by the rural population or groups of the lower intelligentsia associated with the

countryside. It is of course significant that none of the patriotic groups were dominated by patriots with a low vertical mobility of both the intra- and inter-generational types. We may conclude, therefore, that high social mobility formed a favourable condition for the acceptance of the patriotic programme in Phase B of the national movement.

Social communication, as a process of transmitting information and data about reality, and implanting attitudes and instinctive reactions, plays an important role in modern society in every case where conscious commitment is required – hence also in the national movement. From this angle we may characterize the endeavour to bring the nation to consciousness of itself as an attempt to penetrate into the communication system with the goal of influencing certain attitudes towards the national collectivity. In analysing the level of communication during Phase B we are forced back onto approximate data, although the results of our earlier quantitative analyses may well serve as a valuable guideline.[5] If we were to divide up the social and professional groups to which the patriots belonged, or from which they originated, according to the strength of their communications network, we should arrive without doubt at the conclusion that the patriotic agitation of Phase B met with a response above all from that section of the oppressed nationality which possessed stronger communications links. But, on the contrary, the patriots of some of the nations we have studied came predominantly from an environment where a low level of communication was the rule (peasants, craftsmen). Here, however, one has to take into consideration the differences in the class structures of the various small nations in the period when they were starting out on their national existence. We therefore have to turn our attention to relations within the national territory. An analysis of the territorial structure of the national movement demonstrates that national agitation attained success most rapidly in regions where the communication system was on a relatively higher level.

We can therefore sum up with the generalization that the national movement attained success more rapidly among that section of the oppressed nationality which was socially more mobile and possessed of stronger communications links. The spread of the national movement during Phase B went hand in hand with the advance of social communication and mobility. We are of course aware that social communication and mobility did not stand here in the position of a *primum movens*, a primary factor, but were rather the vehicles of the relation between social consciousness and the decisive transformations in the economic and social sphere.

This conclusion still has the character of a working hypothesis, nothing more. It is necessary to verify it by confronting it with two extreme situations – on the one hand a situation of extremely backward social communication, and on the other a situation of a high level of communication and mobility. For the first test we have to hand a veritable laboratory example in the district of Polesia (situated today in the western part of the Belorussian SSR, though

after the First World War it formed part of eastern Poland). When the local inhabitants were asked at the census of 1919 and again in 1931, about their nationality, the majority of them replied to this question by saying that they were 'from hereabouts' (*'tutejszy'*).[6] Polesia was a district of minimal social mobility, with a very sparse transport network (it was a region of marshes) and the peasants had very weak contact with the markets. Most of this contact with the markets was in fact mediated through middlemen (predominantly Jewish), who made the trip to market themselves. Only a third of the peasants could read and write at the beginning of the twentieth century. Only the inhabitants of the small towns in this region were able to identify their nationality, in most cases.[7] A similarly low level of communication and mobility kept in existence the mediaeval condition of national inertia in which the popular masses were gripped in the regions of the Lithuanian–Belorussian border,[8] part of Lower Lusatia,[9] and also, with modifications, West Prussia and Mazuria.[10] The negative test therefore confirms our thesis on the significance of social communication and mobility.

But what about the opposite case? Were an intensive growth of communications and a high level of social mobility causes of the emancipation of oppressed nationalities? The industrial revolution, with all its accompanying consequences, took root very early in Great Britain, including South Wales (and with a certain time-lag in North Wales). The transformation of society took place very quickly here; moreover, public life developed more rapidly than in any of the countries we have investigated. What effect did this have on the process whereby the nation was formed? When groups of patriots endeavoured to set in motion a national agitation in the years before the mid-nineteenth century, they only achieved partial success, and they never managed to reach the stage of a mass national movement. Precisely the area where industrialization developed to its fullest extent was the area where the national idea was entirely lost to sight, whereas the most backward parts of Wales were the places where the national movement at least attained certain partial successes.[11] In this example, then, a high level of social mobility and well developed communications acted as factors of national disintegration. And Wales was not the only case. The growth of social mobility in Schleswig, Brittany, Prussia and Lusatia had similar consequences. The disproportion between a high level of communication and mobility on the one hand and a weak response to national agitation on the other was particularly striking in the case of the Flemish movement, even though here it did not come to any widespread linguistic assimilation.[12] It is not accidental that all the examples we have presented here belong to the fourth type of national movement, which we characterized in the introductory section of this study as the disintegrated type, or, in the case of Schleswig, to a minority national movement. In all these cases national agitation arose in the situation of a mature liberal society.

It is therefore clear that the model advanced by K. W. Deutsch does not pass

the test.[13] There was a further weighty factor, over and above social communication and mobility, which was decisive in the formation of the modern nation, or, as the case might be, the course taken by the national movement. This further factor was the conflict of material interests, which, just as much as the others, was derived from the sphere of the transformation of society during the transition to capitalism, and mediated by the reflection of material interests in people's consciousness. We are concerned above all with the nationally relevant component of these social antagonisms, these conflicts of material interest. That is, we are concerned with *those conflicts which coincided in the period of Phase B to a considerable degree with linguistic (and sometimes also religious) differences*. These conflicts of interest between classes and groups whose members were divided at the same time by the fact that they belonged to different linguistic or national groups had indisputable significance for the intensification of the national movement. The polarity of material contradictions therefore ran parallel to differences of nationality, and as a result of this conflicts of interest were articulated not (or not only) at the social and political level appropriate to them but at the level of national categories and demands. We are therefore interested not only in the simple and abstract level of communication reached, but also in the content which was mediated through this system of communication as the more or less transformed reflection of conflicts of material interest. It is in this direction that we need to complete our final model of the process of the growth of national consciousness among small nations, and of the factors which determined its success or failure. Of course, this takes us beyond the framework of a limited comparative analysis of the social structure of patriotic communities. This social structure can only have symptomatic significance (playing the part of a control group) for the investigation of the ways of recognizing the various nationally relevant antagonisms.

Before we attempt to determine some of the fundamental antagonisms of this type, it is necessary to emphasize that neither in Phase B of the national movement nor, by the way, in Phase C, can one speak of 'national interests' and 'national antagonisms' in the usual sense. The nation is not a homogeneous class or social group, with fundamental interests which it possesses as a single unit. What is described in the contemporary writings of the patriots, and also emerges indirectly in the works of historians, as 'the national interest' is the transformed and sublimated image of the material interests of definite concrete classes and groups, whose members took an active part in the national movement (or had to be won over to participation in it). One can only speak of 'the national interest' in the proper sense of the word metaphorically, as an abstraction representing the interest of the nation's existence, the development of definite relations typical for the national group considered as a unit. But then one is not speaking of conflicts of interest but rather of the general trend of national development. *Hence, where the national movement in Phase B was*

not capable of introducing into national agitation, and articulating in national terms, the interests of the specific classes and groups which constituted the small nation, it was not capable of attaining success. An agitation carried on under the exclusive banner of language, national literature or other super-structural attributes such as history, folklore and so on, could not by itself bring the popular strata under the patriotic banner: the road from Phase B to Phase C was closed off, or, in some cases, interrupted.

What can we ascertain about the role of conflicts of interest in the national movement if we proceed from our information about the social structure of the patriotic communities? First and foremost, we must devote our attention to the basic antagonisms which are characteristic for the period of the transformation of the old feudal society and the bourgeois revolutions: namely the antagonism between the rising bourgeoisie and the old feudal class and the antagonism between the feudal class and the peasantry.

To the extent that we take the contradiction between the ruling class of the old society and the industrial bourgeoisie in the narrow sense of the word, it is evident that there is a clear and simple answer: we do not find such a contradiction in Phase B of the national movement. The incomplete class structure of the small nation in process of formation was distinguished precisely by the absence of a bourgeoisie, and therefore it appears that the fundamental class conflict between the old and the new society was only fought out within the ranks of the ruling nation. However, such a view would be an oversimplifying and schematized one, reminiscent of Kautsky's opinion that nationalities without a bourgeoisie are condemned to assimilation.[14] For the bourgeoisie should not be viewed as a homogeneous and solid entity, but as a collection of separate components, each component possessing its own separate interest in addition to the general bourgeois interest. Some of these components are already to be found in embryonic form in the social structure of the patriotic community (e.g. the traders, or the rich and enterprising peasant-farmers). Of greater weight than this, however, is the fact that an interest in a bourgeois reconstruction of society could be represented by other social groups, above all from the ranks of the intelligentsia, but sometimes also from among the independent small-scale producers. At the same time, the relevant point here is not only that certain sections of the intelligentsia were close to the ruling class in their situation, their interests and sometimes also their origin, but that – as we have stated previously – they were able, thanks to their authority and their place in the system of social communication, to fulfil temporarily the function of that ruling class under the conditions of a small nation engaged in the process of forming itself.

To what degree did the antagonism between the peasants and the feudal nobility play an integrating role in the national movement? This classical antagonism of the old society was in the case of the oppressed nationalities customarily accompanied by a linguistic separation (in Ireland and south-east

Europe a religious separation as well) between the ruling class and the people of the countryside: the nobility thus represented at the same time the ruling nation, the peasants the oppressed nationality. The fight of the serfs against the old regime whether it expressed itself in open insurrections or (which was more frequent) individual legal disputes and manifestations of disobedience, was unquestionably one of the *objective* conditions for the formation of the small nation. We have seen, however, that the course of concrete historical events was somewhat otherwise: the *subjective* commitment of the peasants to the national movement first occurred after a greater or lesser delay. They had first to be won over to the movement, in order that in Phase C they might become the subjects, the active bearers, of the national movement. The goals of the anti-feudal peasant movements in the period of Phase A, and often far into Phase B, were expressed predominantly in social demands and categories: they had no national element. Let us recall in this context that in eastern and central Europe Phase B began roughly one generation after the emancipation of the peasants from serfdom. This still does not signify that the peasants were represented in Phase B of each national movement in that area. The national programme made its way quickest into the attitudes of the peasants wherever there were yet other distinguishing marks than social position and ethnic character separating them off from the nobility: frequently the extra line of division was a religious one, and here religion took on an extra-religious function – just as in other groups the language programme took on an extra-linguistic function. In these cases, where the peasantry or a part of it had already made the identification with the national programme in Phase B, this phase took place relatively late (Ireland is an exception here for a number of reasons). Almost everywhere, even where the peasants only attached themselves as isolated individuals to the national movement in Phase B, an agrarian programme of the emancipation of the peasantry, in one variant or another, formed a component of the national programme. Only in the case of the fourth type of movement, the 'disintegrated' type, was this not so. It should not be overlooked in this connection that some of the peasants' traits linked them with the old system, and hindered their subjective identification with the goals of the national movement, especially where the latter had an urban character. It was in particular patriarchal relations and the patriarchal mode of thought which gave to the peasants a system of values in which there was only a place for national demands in so far as they had the character, in appearance or in reality, of a defence of patriarchal relations. The patriarchal colouring of peasant patriotism naturally conserved within itself strong features of a feudal patriotism to which ideas of civil equality and social progress were alien, and in which there continued to exist relics of racial xenophobia. These phenomena emerged particularly at the moment when the rural strata were confronted with the emancipatory movement of the landless labourers and poor peasants and with the rise of the organized working-class movement.

Let us however turn to the nationally relevant conflicts of interest, which definitely cannot be reduced to the two fundamental social antagonisms mentioned earlier. This reduction cannot be made because the internal structure of the nation is essentially different from that of the class: there belong to the large social group we call the nation a whole series of classes, strata and human groups, which all have their different group interests. It is therefore necessary to look for further objective conflicts – conflicts rooted in the situation and the interests of various social groups, and running a course parallel with the difference between the nationalities. Conflicts of this kind, precisely in the period of the general transformation of society, were complex and multi-faceted. We can assume that a specific combination of partial conflicts of interest stood in the background of every national movement; we gave a characterization of some of them when we were dealing with the development of the individual nationalities. Here we shall try to define three of the many conflicts we assume to have been nationally relevant. We can substantiate the existence of all three in Phase B of some (though not all) of the national movements studied.

The process of industrialization did not just bring into existence the modern bourgeoisie and the proletariat. It also brought with it a conflict of interests between the old guild handicraftsmen (and the small traders) on the one hand, and the large-scale industrial producers (and big merchants) on the other. In so far as the small craft producers and the small traders belonged to the oppressed nationalities, the coming of large-scale production and trade manifested itself to them as a characteristic feature of the rise of the ruling nation. This objective contradiction, which in the case of the large nations ran its course according to social laws as a subsidiary antagonism of the epoch of industrialization, could become transformed in the situation of the oppressed nationality into a conflict carried on under the sign of nationalism. The degree of intensity of this conflict, and the degree to which it was intertwined with the rise of national consciousness, were of course dependent on a further series of circumstances: on the social and national structure of the urban population, on the level of industrialization reached in the period of Phase B (or, respectively, the incipient Phase C), on the territorial distribution of the industrial revolution in relation to the ethnic, political and administrative structure of the state, and so on. We are concerned, then, with the contradiction which could play an important integrating role in the type of national movement in which the coming of the industrial revolution (at least on the territory of the ruling nation) coincided with the period during which Phase B of the national movement took place (Bohemia). Where Phase B and the beginning of Phase C proceeded under conditions which were still those of the epoch of manufacture, this conflict was represented more weakly, and tended to be limited to the sphere of trade. Admittedly, with the entry into the industrial bourgeoisie of some of the small craft producers from the ranks of

the small nation, during Phase C, the objective contradiction between the large-scale and small-scale producers also became an internal conflict within the emerging small nation, but this was not reflected in the national programme. In the national programme, and in the social consciousness of the petty bourgeoisie, this conflict lived on as an instrument of national activation, or of nationalism, right into the twentieth century, in my view because it could be exploited by the weaker bourgeoisie of the small nation as an ideological weapon against the more powerful bourgeoisie of the ruling nation.

We can gather our second example of a nationally relevant conflict of interests from the intelligentsia's efforts to gain its existence and from its vertical mobility. In almost all countries, the pulling down of extra-economic barriers, i.e. the division into Estates, was a part of the process of social transformation which brought the old society to an end. These barriers had prevented members of the non-noble strata from gaining access to secondary and higher education, which they could otherwise have achieved, provided of course that they had sufficient material resources to send their children for education. Once the barriers had gone, the proportion of students in secondary and higher education from the middle and lower strata of society increased, sometimes rapidly, sometimes more gradually. Where the lower social strata were composed of members of an oppressed nationality, the consequence was that the proportion of members of that nationality among the educated strata, among the intelligentsia, grew markedly. Moreover, as a result of the modernization of the administration, and the growth of productive capacity and service requirements (especially the school system), the need for people with a secondary or a higher education grew, especially the need for professional groups in the inferior categories, where the pay was worse and the prestige was lower (such as teachers, office ancillaries, clerks). The élite, on the other hand, which traditionally belonged to the ruling nation, still continued to be recruited by and large from its own ranks – just as it had been under the old feudal regime – and it maintained its monopoly hold on the higher and better paid professions. The individual cases of social ascent from the ranks of the oppressed nationality which did occur were customarily accompanied by assimilation. In consequence the members of the new intelligentsia of the oppressed nationality – in so far as they did not assimilate – were faced with an obstacle which impeded and disproportionately reduced (in comparison with their numerical strength) their chance of rising into a higher social position.[15] As soon as membership of a small nation began to be interpreted in the social consciousness of these strata not as an individual but as a group handicap, it began to function as a source of transformation of the social antagonism into a national one. The aspirations of the intelligentsia of the oppressed nationality took on a national articulation precisely in Phase B, when the formation of social élites belonging to the oppressed nation itself did not

yet come into consideration. We can quote concrete cases from Bohemia, Slovakia, Norway, and, with certain modifying factors (such as study abroad), Lithuania.

Finally we must mention one grave conflict of interests which directly embodies the connection between the transformation of society in the direction of capitalism on the one hand, and the formation of the nation on the other. This is the conflict between the principle of civil equality and the society divided into Estates.[16] The growing all-round hostility of the popular strata to feudal privileges and the barriers between the Estates took on a national character in the case of the members of the oppressed nationalities, since the repositories of privilege and the custodians of Estates barriers were the members of the ruling nation. The fight for the equality of all citizens thus gained a national expression in the demand for the equality of all citizens irrespective of nationality: hence the equality of all nationalities and nations with each other and at the same time the equality of all members of a given nation. There is in this case an integral union between the demand for national equality and the conception of the nation as a collection of equal citizens all possessed of full political rights. Here we see the qualitative distinction of principle between the national movement, which was a part of the process of the formation of the modern nation, and the 'national' activities of the movement of the Estates (whether exclusively aristocratic or involving the burghers as well) for territorial political rights in the epoch of feudalism, which Hans Kohn, and, following him, a number of other scholars, erroneously regard as manifestations of 'nationalism'.

Our reflections on the nationally relevant conflicts have already led us onto ground which lies outside the field of the analysis of the social structure of the patriotic communities. They have, however, demonstrated the kinds of possibilities an interpretation of these results offers for preparing a general dynamic model of the factors determining the course of national movements, and therefore, in addition, grasping the specific regularities covering the formative process of the modern nation. Any further research, if it is to proceed in this direction, will therefore have to trace the growth in the intensity of social communication and mobility, in relation not only to the oppressed nationalities, but also to the ruling nations. At the same time, this can only be a secondary element, a secondary factor, in comparison with the role of the nationally relevant conflicts of interest. It will still be necessary to subject to comparative analysis the roads which led from these conflicts of interest to the provision of a specific content for social communication, and indirectly also a specific content for national agitation and the national programme. The same thing can be said of the relation between the overall social transformation at the threshold of capitalist development and the role played in the formative process of the modern nation by communication and social mobility. The growth of

communication and social mobility was not a primary factor in social development, as some Western scholars imagine, but a reflection of the implantation of new forms of production and a new, capitalist type of relation between the people engaged in that production.

In conclusion it is necessary to emphasize once again that the author is aware of the fact that the angle of vision from which he has approached the comparative historical investigation of the formation of the modern nation is only a partial one, and not the most important at that: namely, the social composition of the groups who pioneered the movement for a modern nation. Nor has the author been concerned with the national movement in its full extent, but only with a single segment of it: the period of national agitation before the coming of the mass national movement. It would certainly be useful if the same kind of attention devoted here to Phase B were also devoted to Phase C of the national movement. The author did not select as his subject of comparative investigation every single national movement, or even every type of national movement, but concentrated on two types (which were in any case the predominant ones), devoting only certain partial soundings to two further types. It emerged that even this one-sided approach was able to produce fresh insights of a broad character, and formed a contribution to the study of the general laws of social development. Nevertheless, our general conclusions should be taken rather as a foundation for the further study of this group of problems, or, one might say, as a collection of working hypotheses which require further clarification and verification. The production of a genuinely scientific synthesis covering the process by which the modern European nations were formed is still in its initial stages.

Notes

NOTES TO THE PREFACE

1 The analytic and quantificatory part of the research was published in the book entitled *Die Vorkämpfer der nationalen Bewegung bei den kleinen Völkern Europas. Eine vergleichende Analyse zur gesellschaftlichen Schichtung der patriotischen Gruppen* (Acta Universitatis Carolinae Philosophica et Historica, Monographia XXIV, Prague, 1969); a factual account of the history of the individual nations was published in the book *Obrození malých evropských národů. I. Národy severní a východní Evropy* [The Revival of the small European nations. I. The nations of Northern and Eastern Europe] (Prague, 1971).

2 Among the more extensive reviews I should like to pick out in particular those of M. Šmerda (in *Časopis Matice Moravské*, 1970); V. Psotová (in *Československý Časopis Historický*, 1972; S. Kieniewicz (in *Przegląd historyczny*, 1970); A. Tyla (in *Lietuvos istorijos metrastys*, 1971); A. Kemiläinen (in *Historiallinen Aikakauskirja*, 1970); M. Gross (in *Časopis za suvremenu povijest*, 1970); W. Zorn (in *Vierteljahrsschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, 1969); and H. Sundhausen (in the *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism*, 1974). Apart from these there were a number of shorter notices in other journals.

NOTES TO PART I

1 Neither a more detailed introduction to the terminology used, nor a more precise set of definitions, can entirely obviate the misunderstandings which may arise from the different meanings speakers of different languages attach to fundamental concepts. This is true even for the concept of the 'nation', which has a different content in English from the one current in Czech, but cannot be replaced by any equivalent word. This also applies to 'patriot', 'oppressed nation', 'small nation', 'national movement', 'national revival' and so on. The inevitable failure to work out a uniform and generally accepted terminology is one of the paradoxes of international discussion about nations and nationalism. In defining fundamental concepts in this part of the work, we are not setting up a claim to have arrived at universally valid definitions. What we are trying to do is avoid unnecessary misunderstandings. The limited size of this work and its orientation towards the solution of partial problems is also reflected in the character of the notes and bibliographical references. We have not tried to provide in every case a detailed

enumeration of all the relevant works on a given question, but only to refer the reader to the most important ones or to those of such interest that they can be commended to the attention of other investigators (this applies in particular to the historiography of the small national movements treated in the present book). We have also abstained from giving a detailed account of the plethora of opinions put forward about the nation and its characteristics. It will perhaps be enough to refer to two basic select bibliographies: Koppel S. Pinson, *A Bibliographical Introduction to Nationalism* (New York, 1935); and Karl W. Deutsch, *An Interdisciplinary Bibliography on Nationalism, 1935–1953* (Cambridge, Mass., 1956). For more recent works, cf. especially the bibliographical supplements to the *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism.*

2 The works of Hans Kohn and his followers may be taken as representative of the kind of view that stresses the primacy of nationalism. The same fundamental perspective is adopted, though more subtly and with a greater openness to other factors, by the German historian Eugen Lemberg, cf. his *Nationalismus* (2 vols., Hamburg, 1964).

3 Cf. for example J. F. Rees, *The Problem of Wales* (Cardiff, 1965), p. 16.

4 The majority of Marxist historians for decades upheld Stalin's definition of the nation, as given in *Marxism and the Question of Nationalities*. From the 1960s onwards, however, there have been increasing differences of opinion about this, as manifested especially in the discussion carried on by Soviet historians, ethnographers and philosophers in the pages of the journals *Voprosy istorii* and *Voprosy filosofii*, between 1966 and 1968. Cf. more recently Yu. V. Bromley, *Etnos i etnografiya* (Moscow, 1973). An outline of the development of Marxist views is given for the English-speaking public by C. C. Herod, in *The Nation in the History of Marxian Thought. The Concept of Nations with History and Nations without History* (The Hague, 1976).

5 L. B. Namier, *The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III* (London, 1929); G. P. Judd, *Members of Parliament 1734–1832* (London, 1955); A. Cobban, *The Myth of the French Revolution* (London, 1955).

6 Theodor Schieder sees the use of the comparative method as a route to unique understanding (*Geschichte als Wissenschaft. Eine Einführung*, Munich and Vienna, 1965, pp. 187ff. and 201–2). A similar view of its task was already expressed by E. Bernheim in his *Lehrbuch der historischen Methode und der Geschichtsphilosophie* (Leipzig, 1909), pp. 606 and 707ff. The methodological principles of Stein Rokkan and his colleagues, on the other hand, inspired by modern political and social science, are so complicated and theoretical that their utilization for solving the concrete problems of the past calls forth definite misgivings among plain historians. Cf. the collection *Comparative Research across Cultures and Nations*, ed. S. Rokkan (Paris, The Hague, 1968), Publications of the International Social Science Council, No. 8; S. Rokkan, K. Saelen and J. Warmbierner, 'A review of recent of comparative research and selected bibliography of analytical studies', *Current Sociology*, vol. 19, no. 3 (Paris, The Hague, 1973). Nearer to our own conception in the West European literature is M. Duverger, *Méthodes des sciences sociales* (Paris, 1964), 3rd edn., as are certain Scandinavian historians; cf. 'Analyse-syntese-komparasjon' in *Studier i historisk metode*, VI (Bergen, Oslo, Tromsø, 1972). L. L. Snyder's approach to the problem of comparison assumes the primacy of nationalism, in *Varieties of Nationalism: A Comparative Study* (Hinsdale, Ill., 1976).

7 J. Topolski, *Metodologia historii* (Warsaw, 1973), pp. 420ff., A. N. Chistozvonov, 'O stadial'no-regional'nom izuchenii burzhuaznych revolutsiy XVI–XVIII vekov', *Novaya i noveyshaya istoriya* (1973), no. 2, pp. 89ff.; V. V. Ivanov, *Sootnosheniye istorii i sovremennosti kak metodologicheskaya problema. Ocherki po marksistsko-leninskoy metodologii istoricheskogo issledovaniya* (Moscow, 1973), especially the second section of chapter 4.

8 V. I. Lenin, 'The Right of Nations to Self-Determination', *Collected Works*, 4th edn., vol. 20, Moscow, 1964, p. 401.

9 Our choice of typological criteria and concepts differs from that suggested by K. Symmons-Symonolewicz in 'National Movements: An Attempt at a Comparative Typology', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, VII, pp. 221ff.

10 Recently published work by Mirjana Gross and Gerhard Brunn demonstrates convincingly that the Croatian and Catalan national movements are of this type. See M. Gross, 'On the integration of the Croatian nation: a case study in nation building', *East European Quarterly*, XV, June 1981, pp. 209ff., and G. Brunn, 'Die Organisationen der katalanischen Bewegung 1859–1923', published in *Nationale Bewegung und soziale Organisation*, I, Munich and Vienna, 1978, pp. 281ff. It emerges from the recent study by Jutta de Jong (*Ansätze und Grundlagen einer makedonischen Nationalbewegung zu Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts und ihre Trägergruppe 1890–1903*, dissertation, Bochum, 1982) that the Macedonian movement around 1900 belonged rather to the 'belated' than to the 'insurrectional' type. Her interesting results could not unfortunately be included in our investigation at this late stage.

11 Although the Irish national movement has not been investigated in this book, the author feels it would be useful to comment here on its typological characteristics. We have in fact in this case a movement which cannot be assigned entirely to any of the four types. It is brought close to the 'insurrectional' type by its rapid assumption of a mass character, its politicization and its radical methods of struggle. It was not, however, in conflict with an old feudal regime but with a ruling nation, which was already well on the way towards capitalism and where the industrial revolution was in the course of taking place. Nevertheless there is no question of assigning this movement to the 'disintegrated' type. Hence the difficulties experienced in periodizing the Irish national movement into the three phases, which have recently been indicated by Gale Stokes in the *Journal of Modern History*, vol. 52, Dec. 1980, p. 683.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 8

1 H. Koht, *Eidsvold 1814, Christiania 1914; Det norske Storting* I (Oslo, 1908); H. Koht, *Nasjonalkjensla i Norge, in Norsk vilje* (Oslo, 1933), pp. 1ff.; A. Elviken, *Die Entwicklung des norwegischen Nationalismus*, Historische Studien 198 (Berlin, 1930); H. Koht, *Norsk Bondereising. Fyrebning til Bondepolitiken* (Oslo, 1926).

2 M. Jensen, *Norges historie* II. *Fra 1660 til våre dager* (Oslo, 1949), pp. 240–1.

3 Y. Nielsen, *Graf Wedel-Jarlsberg* I (Christiania, 1888), p. 399.

4 M. Jensen, *Norges historie* II, p. 184.

5 H. Koht and C. W. Schnitler, *Eidsvolds-maendene, in Eidsvold 1814* (Christiania, 1914), p. 348.

6 W. Munthe, 'Fedrene på Eidsvold', in *Norsk slekthistorisk tidskrift*, vol. 10, part 3, pp. 298–9.

7 This table was drawn up on the basis of the biographical data given by Koht and Schnitler (see note 5 above). The lower-ranking officials were in large part village officials.

8 M. Jensen, *Norges historie* II, p. 185; Biographical data on all the deputies come from T. Lindstøl, *Stortinget og Statsrådet i Norge 1814–1914*, II (Christiania, 1914).

9 The crude division into social groups given by J. Kårtvedt in *Det Norske Storting i 150 år* (Christiania, 1908), p. 148, does not differentiate between the 'officials' and the entrepreneurial groups of the urban bourgeoisie, on the one hand, and the petty bourgeoisie, on the other. For the year 1836 we can test these data against the political character-sketches given in *Statsborgeren*, vol. 16 (1834–5), as a preparation for the elections (*Bedömelse over Kongeriket Norges... Storting-Personale*). The following table gives the results:

	'democratic'	'conservative'	'wavering'	Total
High officials	2	3	19	24
Merchants and burghers	2	1	8	11
Craftsmen	1	1	—	2
Free professions	2	1	—	3
Teachers	—	2	1	3
Clergy	2	3	2	7
Peasants	25	12	3	40
Others	5	5	—	10

10 Jensen, *Norges historie*, II, pp. 218–19 and 238ff.

11 Kårtvedt, *Det Norske Storting*, I, p. 129.

12 Kårtvedt, *Det Norske Storting*, I, p. 127.

13 Kårtvedt, *Det Norske Storting*, I, p. 117.

14 On the activities of this society, see Nissen, *Det nye Norge grunnlegges*, pp. 323–4. The catalogue of the members of the Studenterforbundt, preserved in its archive (Universitetsbibliteket Oslo), unfortunately does not give occupational data, and I was unable to identify the profession followed by each individual.

15 For the activity and significance of Henrik Wergeland see above in this chapter, p. 34.

16 Koht and Schnitler, *Eidsvolds-maendene*, p. 366.

17 For the social origin of the deputies, the source is Koht and Schnitler, *Eidsvolds-maendene*, pp. 243ff.

18 In Norway, unlike many of the other countries we shall be investigating, considerable attention has been paid to the social origin of the intelligentsia. We are therefore working with factual material that has already been examined. This table is taken from Palmström, 'Om en befolkningsgruppens utvikling giennem de siste 100 år', *Statsökonomisk tidskrift* 49, pp. 333–4, table IXa, b. His classification of the social groups differs from ours but we are obliged to use it in this case.

20 V. Aubert, 'Norske jurister: en yrkesgrupe gjennem 150 år', *Tidskrift for rettsvitenskap*, 77 (1964), pp. 308–9.

21 *The Professions in Norwegian Social Structure 1720–1951* (Oslo, 1962), II, Table 1039.

22 Mansåker, *Det norske presteskapet i det 19. århundret* (Oslo, 1954), pp. 143–4 and 201; and *The Professions in Norwegian Social Structure*, II, Table 1033.

23 Developments in the labour-market are analysed by U. Torgersen, *The Market of Professional Manpower in Norway* (Oslo, 1967); for his evaluation of the political consequences of the situation in the labour-market cf. in particular chapter 9 of the above work and also his study 'Akademisk forsigtighet og frodighet – og arbeitsmarkedet', *Samtiden*, May, 1967, pp. 198ff.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 9

1 See on this period J. Kočí, *České národní obrození* (Prague, 1978); O. Urban, *Kapitalismus a česká společnost. K otázkám formování ceske społečnosti v 19. století* (Prague, 1978); M. Trapl, *České národní obrození na Moravě v době předbřeznové a v revolučních letech 1848–1849* (Brno, 1977); J. Purš, *Průmyslová revoluce v českých zemích* (Prague, 1960); A. Robek, *Lidové zdroje národního obrození* (Prague, 1974); and *Městské lidové zdroje národního obrození* (Prague, 1977).

2 The kernel of this chapter was published in the collection *The Czech Renascence of the Nineteenth Century. Essays in Honour of Otakar Odozilik*, eds. Peter Brock and H. G. Skilling (Toronto, 1970); on the *Matice* more recently S. B. Kimball. 'The Matice Česká 1831–1861: The First Thirty Years of a Literary Foundation', in the same collection; see also the older work by K. Tieftrunk, *Dějiny Matice České* (Prague, 1881).

3 The lists are printed in K. Borový, *Dějiny Dědictví svatojanského* (Prague, 1885).

4 The lists are printed in *Časopis Českého Musea*, 1847.

5 Patriotic activity in Nové Město nad Metují is described by Z. Nejedlý in *Bedřich Smetana*, vol. 3 (Prague, 1929), pp. 447ff.; and in Polička by J. Růžička, *O Drašarovi a poličských buditelích. Roman a skutečnost* (Polička, 1966), ch. 1.

6 E. Denis, *La Bohême depuis la Montagne Blanche*, (Paris, 1901–3); K. Krofta, *Dějiny selského stavu* (Prague, 1949), p. 349; A. Klima, *Rok 1948 v Čechách* (Prague, 1949), p. 16.

7 Chalupný, *Havlíček* (Prague, 1929), p. 133.

8 Our main sources have been the registers of students in the various faculties of the university and the episcopal seminaries, which began in the second decade of the nineteenth century to keep systematic and careful records of the social origins of their students.

9 We tested the data on individual students by comparing registers drawn from different academic years. These tests showed that the data are in fact very reliable; the only variations we found were between the term 'burgher' and a description of a particular trade, and the terms 'peasant' and 'countryman'.

10 The sons of non-noble landowners have been placed along with the sons of officers, etc. in the category 'Miscellaneous'. The size of the towns and villages is that which prevailed in 1844.

11 The relatively high proportion of individuals in this category about whose social origin we have no information works to the disadvantage of those people who studied before 1815, hence before the introduction of the relevant category, 'employment of father'.

12 Students of theology and philosophy for the years 1819, 1823, 1831 and 1834–5 were selected; and law students for the year 1827.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 10

1 Summaries of the history of Finland in world languages: E. Jutikkala, *A History of Finland* (London, 1962); M. G. Schybergson, *Geschichte Finnlands* (Gotha, 1896); and *Politische Geschichte Finnlands 1809–1919* (Gotha, Stuttgart, 1925); J. H. Wuorinen, *Nationalism in Modern Finland* (New York, 1931); P. Scheibert, 'Finnland zur Zeit Kaiser Nikolaus I', *Jahrbücher für die Geschichte Osteuropas* 5, 1940, pp. 142ff.; on the history of the national movement P. Renvall, 'Zur Organisations- und Sozialgeschichte der finnisch-nationalen Bewegung im 19. Jahrhundert', in *Sozialstruktur und Organisation europäischer Nationalbewegungen* (Munich, Vienna, 1971), pp. 156ff.; A. Kemiläinen, *Nationalism. Problems Concerning the Word, the Concept and Classification* (Jyväskylä, 1964); K. R. W. Wikman, 'Den svenska nationaliteterrörelsen', in: *Det svenska Finland* II, 2 (Helsinki, 1923), pp. 327ff.

2 L. Krusius-Ahrenberg, *Der Durchbruch des Nationalismus und Liberalismus im politischen Leben Finnlands 1856–1863* (Helsinki, 1934), p. 19; R. Johansen, 'Skandinavismen i Finland', *Historiska och litteraturhistoriska studier* 6, 1930, pp. 321ff.

3 P. Scheibert, 'Finnland...', pp. 168–9.

4 Wuorinen, *Nationalism*, p. 47.

5 H. Waris, *Suomalaisen yhteiskunnan rakenne* (Helsinki, 1948), p. 17.

6 Krusius-Ahrenberg, *Durchbruch*, p. 16.

7 Cf. A. J. Arvidsson, *Finlands nuvarande statsförfattning* (Stockholm, 1841). 'The patriots did not count on the nobility' (Scheibert, 'Finnland...', p. 156).

8 As the background of this statement is an attempt to compromise the Fennomen, its reliability should not be taken on trust (Krusius-Ahrenberg, *Durchbruch*, pp. 84 and 116).

9 Scheibert, 'Finnland...', p. 187.

10 Scheibert, 'Finnland...', pp. 164–5.

11 On the character of the Finnish Literature Society, cf. Schybergson, *Geschichte Finnlands*, pp. 591–2; and Wuorinen, *Nationalism*, pp. 76–7.

12 Cf. *Förteckning öfver Finska-Litteratur-Sällskapets i Helsingfors Ledamöter ifran dess stiftelse intill den 16. Mars 1856* (Helsinki, 1856). For the later period, cf. the continuation of these membership lists: *Luettelo Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seuran, Jäsenistä* (Helsinki, 1876).

13 Y. Teperi, 'Vanhan Suomen Suomalaisuusliike I', *Historiallisia tutkimuksia* 69 (Helsinki, 1965), pp. 274–5 and 277.

14 *Finska Konstföreningens Matrikel vid årsdagen den 10. Mars 1851.*

15 The basis for the selection of this group was the *Finsk biografisk håndbok*, ed. T. Carpelan (Helsinki, 1903). The decisive criterion adopted was the nature and the linguistic character of their journalistic and organizational activity. This is by and large the same criterion as the one used by J. Hučko for the Slovak group of patriots active in the literary field. See below, p. 99.

16 The biographical data were established on the basis of the student registers issued for Turku (Åbo) and Helsinki (Helsingfors): *Åbo Akademis Studentmatrikel* II, ed.

V. Lagus (Helsinki, 1895); *Helsingfors Universitets studentmatrikel 1820–1852*, ed. T. Carpelan (Helsinki, 1928–30). Present-day Finnish historians are now directing their attention to the political and cultural activities of the students: M. Klinge, *Studenter och idéer. Studentkåren vid Helsingfors universitet 1828–1960*, 3 vols. (Helsinki, 1969–75).

17 On this, Waris, *Suomalaisen*, pp. 15–16.

18 For the earlier period, cf. J. Koskinen, *Klubbekriget* (Helsinki, 1864), pp. 20–1 and 50ff. A regionally limited study is that by S.-E. Åström, 'Ståndseamhälle och universitet. Universitetsbesöken som socialt fenomen i Österbotten 1722–1808', *Bidrag till kännedom af Finlands natur och folk*, H. 95, No. 1 (Helsinki, 1950).

19 This difference would be even more striking if we were to accept H. Waris' assertion (*Suomalaisen*, pp. 11–12) that 8% of the students originated from the peasant milieu.

20 This table has been compiled from the data in P. Tommila, *Suomen lehdistön levikki annen vuotta 1860* (Porvoo–Helsinki, 1963).

21 Only periodicals with a circulation covering the whole of Finland have been selected, and we have chosen the years to be investigated in such a way as to provide a clear picture of the quantitative development of the circle of readers.

22 Wuorinen, *Nationalism*, p. 56. The coastal towns were for the most part centres of the Svecomanian movement, as Krusius-Ahrenberg points out (*Durchbruch*, p. 31).

23 Note that in Table 22 we have added to the village total the 65 patriots whose precise birthplaces could not be established.

24 P. Rommi, 'Fennomanian "liikekannallepano" 1870-luvulla', *Turun Historiallinen Arkisto*, 28, 1973, pp. 253ff. (in particular the map on p. 263).

NOTES TO CHAPTER 11

1 On Estonian history in the nineteenth century, cf. *Istoryia Estonskoi SSR* II (Tallinn, 1966); J. Kruus, *Grundriss der Geschichte des estnischen Volkes* (Tartu, 1932); the German position is put forward in R. Wittram, *Baltische Geschichte* (Munich, 1953); H. Rosenthal, *Kulturbestrebungen des estnischen Volkes während eines Menschenalters (1869–1890)* (Tallinn, 1912); O. Loorits, 'The Renascence of the Estonian Nation', *Slavonic and East European Review* 33, no. 80, 1954, pp. 30ff.

2 A. Pullerits, *Estland, Volk, Kultur, Wirtschaft* (Tallinn, 1931), p. 73.

3 Kruus, *Grundriss*, p. 127; Loorits, 'Renascence', p. 30 associates the possibility of activating the peasantry with their independence from the landowners; P. Hunfalvy cited the peasants as the chief readers of Estonian periodicals in the 1860s: *Reise in den Ostseeprovinzen Russlands* (Leipzig, 1874).

4 Kruus, *Grundriss*, p. 138.

5 Kruus, *Grundriss*, p. 119; Loorits, 'Renascence', pp. 30–1; Rosenthal, *Kulturbestrebungen*, p. 26.

6 H. Speer, *Das Bauernschulwesen in Gouvernement Estland vom Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts bis zur Russifizierung* (Tartu, 1936), pp. 455–6.

7 Rosenthal, *Kulturbestrebungen*, p. 115.

8 *Istoriya Estonskoi SSR* I (Tallinn, 1954), p. 270.

9 Kruus, *Grundriss*, pp. 117–18.

10 A. von Tobien, *Die livländische Ritterschaft in ihrem Verhältnis zum Zarismus und russischen Nationalismus*, II (Berlin, 1920), p. 210; Speer, *Bauernschulwesen*, p. 455, and the basic work on the subject, H. Kruus, *Eesti Aleksandrskooli* (Tartu, 1939), in particular pp. 215ff.

11 Rosenthal, *Kulturbestrebungen*, pp. 129–30.

12 *Eesti kirjameeste Seltsi Aastaraamat 1878* (Tartu, 1878), pp. 27ff.; *Eesti Kirjameeste Seltsi Aastaraamat 1822* (Tartu, 1883), pp. 23ff.

13 Rosenthal, *Kulturbestrebungen*, p. 54.

14 Kruus, *Grundriss*, pp. 136–7.

15 Ea Jansen, '"Sakala" kaastööliste sotsiaalsest ja kutselisest jagunemisest', *Eesti NSV TA Toimetised*, 14, 1965, no. 4, pp. 435ff. Ea Jansen was able to identify the social status of two thirds of the contributors and subscribers to Sakala. We have adapted her categorization of social groupings to our own procedures, and made a fresh calculation on that basis (cf. Table 24). We have included the Küster among the teachers. They formed the most inferior category of village schoolteacher, and functioned simultaneously as vergers, or in other cases as organist-choirmasters.

16 Ea Jansen, 'Eesti talurahva rahvusliku teadvuse kujunemisest XIX sajandil', in: *Eesti talurahve sotsiaalseid vaateid XIX sejandil* (Tallinn, 1977), pp. 109–10.

17 M. Kahu, C. R. Jakobsoni, '"Sakala" levikust', *Keel ja Kirjandus*, 1964, 4, pp. 213–14.

18 Ea Jansen, 'Rahva poliitilisest ja kultuurilisest aktivsusest Eestis aastail 1878–1882', *Eesti NSV TA Toimetised* 12, 1963, pp. 372ff.

19 Speer, *Bauernschulwesen*, p. 446.

20 Rosenthal, *Kulturbestrebungen*, p. 167.

21 Jansen, 'Eesti talurahva', maps 4, 5, 6 and 10.

22 Within this aim we have merged four separate indicators of patriotic activity: numbers of contributors to *Sakala*, numbers of subscribers to *Sakala*, results of collections for the Alexander School, and territorial spread of the activities of the Estonian Literary Society.

23 Compare the maps in Jansen, 'Eesti Talurahva', p. 102, and 'Rahva poliitilisest', pp. 368–9.

24 Kahu, C. R. Jakobsoni, '"Sakala" levikust', pp. 213–14.

25 Jansen, 'Esti talurahva', pp. 88ff.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 12

1 On Lithuanian History in the nineteenth century cf. M. Römer, *Litwa. Studium o odrodzeniu naroda litewskiego* (L'vov, 1908); J. Ehret, *Litauen in Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft* (Bern, 1919); W. Gaigalat, *La Lithuanie* (Geneva, n.d.); W. Wielhorski, *Litwa wspólczesna* (Warsaw, 1938); C. R. Jurgela, *History of the Lithuanian Nation* (New York, 1948); M. Hellmann, *Grundzüge der Geschichte Litauens* (Darmstadt, 1966); J. Ochmański, *Historia Litwy* (Wrocław, Warsaw, Kraków, 1967). On the national movement, E. Linksch, *Litauen und die Litauer* (Stuttgart, 1917); M. Hellmann, 'Die litauische Nationalbewegung im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert', *Zeitschrift für Ostforschung* 1953, pp. 81ff.; V. Kaupas, *Die Presse Litauens, unter Berücksichtigung des nationalen Gedankens und der öffentlichen Meinung* I (Klaipeda, 1934); K. J. Čeginskas, 'Die

Polonisierung des litauischen Adels im 19. Jahrhundert', *Commentationes Balticae* IV–V, 1958, pp. 19ff.; and 'Die Russifizierung und ihre Folgen in Litauen unter zaristischer Herrschaft', *Commentationes Balticae* VI–VII, 1959, pp. 122ff.

2 Römer, *Litwa*, pp. 51–2 and 57; Jurgela, *History*, pp. 371–2 and 402–3; Čeginskas, 'Polonisierung', pp. 19ff.

3 Hellmann, 'Nationalbewegung', p. 73.

4 Römer, *Litwa*, pp. 118–19; L. Wasilewski, *Litwa i Białoruś* (Kraków, n.d.), p. 182; Hellmann, 'Nationalbewegung', pp. 85ff.

5 Römer, *Litwa*, p. 105; Ochmański, *Historia*, p. 183.

6 Čeginskas, 'Polonisierung', pp. 16–17 and 21; Jurgela, *History*, pp. 370 and 475.

7 D. Alseika, *Lietuviu tautine ideja istorijas šviesvoj* (Vilnius, 1924), pp. 1133–4.

8 Römer, *Litwa*, pp. 30 and 93–4; Wasilewski, *Litwa i Białoruś*, pp. 98ff.; Wielhorski, *Litwa*, pp. 47–8.

9 A. Rimka, *Latuvia tautos atsimimo* (Kaunas, 1931), pp. 15ff.; Čeginskas, 'Russifizierung', pp. 15–16 and 49–50.

10 Römer, *Litwa*, pp. 178–9; Hellmann, 'Nationalbewegung', p. 89.

11 This task has been successfully performed in most cases by V. Biržiška, 'Slapyvardžiai', *Knygos* (1924), 4/6, col. 307ff.

12 These lists are printed in K. Grinius, *Atsiniminai ir mintys* I (Tubingen, 1947), pp. 46ff. and 57ff.

13 The Lithuanian encyclopaedia (*Lietuviju enciklopedija*), of which we were able to use thirty-four volumes, contains a large number of valuable contributions.

14 Römer, *Litwa*, p. 43.

15 The list of members of the Lithuanian Academic Society around the year 1890 forms a contrast to this: we find a high proportion of its members were secondary schoolteachers working in Lithuania (cf. the lists published in the proceedings of the society). This society should in fact be seen as a continuation of the academic interest in patriotism characteristic of Phase A.

16 Jurgela, *History*, p. 404. But Jurgela's assumption that the patriotic intelligentsia came predominantly from the ranks of the nobility cannot be maintained.

17 Ehret, *Litauen*, p. 134.

18 This process has been traced by Rimka in his above-mentioned book (n. 9). Cf. also Jurgela, *History*, p. 475; Linksch, *Litauen*, p. 14.

19 Ehret, *Litauen*, p. 146; Gaigalat, *La Lithuanie*, pp. 96–7.

20 Linksch, *Litauen*, pp. 20–1; Römer, *Litwa*, pp. 45 and 225.

21 Gaigalat, *La Lithuanie*, p. 100; Wasilewski, *Litwa i Białoruś*, pp. 174–5 and 178; Čeginskas, 'Polonisierung', p. 19; Wielhorski, *Litwa*, pp. 47–8.

22 There was also a stronger tendency to linguistic assimilation in these regions; cf. K. Pakštas, 'Earliest Statistics of Nationalities and Religions in the Territories of Old Lithuania 1861', *Commentationes Balticae* IV–V, pp. 24ff. W. Tyla commented critically in a review on the low estimate of patriotic activity in the eastern parts of Lithuania given in my book, *Die Vorkämpfer der nationalen Bewegung*. He pointed out that here too, as also in the north, one can find evidence of a growth in national activity (*Lietuvos istorijos Metrastis* [1971], pp. 143ff.).

23 Römer, *Litwa*, pp. 236–7.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 13

1 On Slovak history cf. J. Butvín, J. Havránek, *Dějiny Československa* II, 1 (Prague, 1968); *Přehled dějin Československa* I, 2 (Prague, 1982); *Slováci i ich národný vývin* (Bratislava, 1966); *K počiatkom slovenského národného obrodenia* (Bratislava, 1964); V. Matula, 'K niektorým otázkam slovenského národného hnutia štyridsiatých rokov', *Historický časopis* 2, 1954, pp. 375ff.; R. W. Seton-Watson, *Slovakia Then and Now* (London, 1931).

2 J. Hučko, *Sociálne zloženie i povod slovenskej obrodenskej inteligencie* (Bratislava, 1974), pp. 43–4.

3 The biographical data for this and subsequent calculations have been drawn from the appendices to the above-mentioned book by J. Hučko.

4 Out of the 446 members of the Slovak Learned Society, 355 were Catholic priests.

5 In 1787 only 2.6% of the male population of present-day Slovak territory were assigned to the category of craftsmen and burghers (Hučko, *Sociálne zloženie*, p. 20).

6 *Atlas československých dějin* (Prague, 1965), maps 19j and 20h.

7 These calculations only cover patriots from the years between 1780 and 1820, i.e. rather in the period of the transition from Phase A to Phase B (Hučko, *Sociálne zloženie*, p. 41).

NOTES TO CHAPTER 14

1 On the Flemish movement cf. L. Picard, *Geschiedenis der Vlaamse en Grotnederlandse Gedachte* (Antwerp, 1963); H. J. Elias, *Geschiedenis van de Vlaamse Gedachte*, I, II (Antwerp, 1963–5); M. Lamberty, *Philosophie der Vlaamsche Beweging en de overige stromingen in België* (Bruges, 1944); M. De Vroede, *De Vlaamse beweging in 1855–56* (Brussels, 1960); P. Fredericq, *Uit de Geschiedenis van Willems-fonds en Davids-fonds* (Ghent, 1909).

2 Picard, *Geschiedenis* I, p. 219; Lamberty, *Philosophie*, p. 94.

3 De Vroede, *Vlaamse Beweging*, pp. 95 and 97–8.

4 De Vroede, *Vlaamse Beweging*, pp. 98–9.

5 L. Dosfel, *Die flämische Studentenbewegung* (Gladbach, 1916).

6 *Verslagen van de toestand en de werksamheten van het Tael- en Letteren-Genootschap Met Tijt en Vlijt 1855–56, 1857–58; Verslag over de werkzaamheden van het Taal- en Letterlievend Studenten-Genootschap Met Tijd en Vlijt 1864–65, 1867–68.*

7 Cf. the statutes printed in the journal *De Eendragt*, V, 9 March 1851.

8 *Willems'-Fonds. Verslag over de Werkzaemheden van het bestuer gedurende het jaar 1852* (Ghent, 1853), *1856* (Ghent, 1857), *1861* (Ghent, 1861), *1865* (Ghent, 1866); *Jaarboek van het Willems'-Fonds voor 1869* (Ghent, 1868).

9 I.e. in the gymnasia and at the university; cf. *De Eendragt*, VII, 15 March 1853.

10 *De Eendragt*, VIII, 30 October 1853.

11 Printed in *De Eendragt*, I, 2 August and 30 August 1846.

12 Cf. the supplement to the volume *Vaderlandsche Museum voor Nederduitsche Letterkunde, Oudheid en Geschiedenis*, I, 1855.

13 'Naamlijst der Leden van der Nederduitsche Bond Antwerpen', *Archief voor het Vlaamse Cultuurleven*, Sign. B 714 D.

14 Alongside the traders and entrepreneurs we include in this category landowners, lawyers, high officials, judges, university professors, deputies and town councillors.
15 L. von Ploennies, *Reise-Erinnerungen aus Belgien* (Berlin, 1845), p. 76); L. Wils, *Het ontstaan van de meetingspartij te Antwerpen en haar invloed op de Belgische politiek* (Antwerp, 1963), pp. 84–5 and 130–1.
16 Published in the *Kunst- en Letter-Blad* (1840), p. 23.
17 *Belgiesch Chronykje*, III (1844), pp. 3–4.
18 Cf. *Vlaemsch Midden-Comiteit*, 15 March 1853 (p. 3), 20 April (Supplement 2) and 25 December 1853 (p. 11) (*Archief voor het Vlaamse Cultuurleven*, Sign. M 625/D.).
19 *Het Vlaemsch Verbond* (1861), No. 6.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 15

1 On the Danish national movement see W. Carr, *Schleswig-Holstein 1815–48. A Study in National Conflict* (Manchester, 1963); K. Fabricius, *Sønderjyllands Historie* IV, 1805–1894 (Copenhagen n.d.); R. Skovmand, V. Dybdahl, E. Rasmussen, *Geschichte Dänemarks 1830–1939* (Neumunster, 1973); O. Hornby, *Striden om Filialen. Banksagen i hertøgdømmerne Slesvig og Holsten ce. 1840–46* (Flensborg, 1975).
2 Fabricius, *Sønderjyllands Historia*, IV, pp. 281 and 285–6.
3 Cf. the leaflet calling for signatures to the address, which is deposited in the Flor Papers (Ny. Kongl. Saml. 1766, Fol. III, 7).
4 The petition with its signatures is deposited in RA København, Kongehusets arkiv, Christian VIII, 263.
5 According to the minutes of *Den slesviske Forening*, published in the *Sønderjyske Aarbøger* (1890), pp. 124ff.
6 Skovmand, Dybdahl and Rasmussen, *Geschichte Dänemarks*, pp. 76–7.
7 *Fortegnelse over Medlemnerne i den sønderjyske Afdeling of Foreningen for Rødding Folkehøiskole i Aarer 12. Juni 1851 til 12. Juni 1852* (Haderslev, 1853); 'Beretning om Rødding Folkehøiskole i Aarer 12. Juni til 12. Juni 1860', deposited in RA København, Statsrevisor Sofus Högsbro Arkiv, Tillaeg II. E.
8 G. Japsen, *Den nationale udvikling i Åbenrå 1800–1850* (Copenhagen, 1961), pp. 197–9.
9 Fabricius, *Sønderjyllands Historia*, IV, pp. 285–6.
10 'Fortegnelse over Eleverne ved Rødding Høiskole fra 1844 til 1848 og fra 19. Nov. 1850', deposited in the Flor Papers, fol. III, Ny Kong. Samling 1766.
11 J. Biernatzki, 'Aus welchen Schichten der Bevölkerung gehen unsere Studierenden hervor?', *Schleswig-holsteinische Jahrbücher*, II (1885), p. 149.
12 According to the petitions deposited in the Staatsarchiv, Kiel (Fabricius, *Sønderjyllands Historia*, IV, pp. 212–13).
13 Fabricius, *Sønderjyllands Historia*, IV, pp. 260 and 321ff.
14 Fabricius, *Sønderjyllands Historia*, IV, pp. 259 and 280.
15 The network of libraries is described in *Beretning om Foreningen til dansk Laesnings Fremme i Slesvig*, reports for the years 1842–6. Cf. also the anonymous report to the king on the spread of readers' associations (probably dating from 1844), RA København, Kongehusets A, Christian VIII, 273.
16 H. V. Gregersen, 'Hjemmetyskheten i Vilstrup Sogn for hundrede år siden', *Sønderjysk Manedsskrift*, 1953, pp. 57ff.; J. H. Holdt, Løjtinger for hundrede år siden', *Sønderjysk Manedsskrift* (1950), pp. 69ff.; and H. P. Jørgensen, *Uge Sogn. Et Graensesogn igennem 150 Aar* (1951), pp. 133ff.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 16

1 S. I. Sidel'nikov, 'O chislennom sostave bolgarskich revolyutsionnych organizatsii v 1869–73 gg.' in: *Istoriko-sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya* (Moscow, 1970), p. 270.
2 C. Brinkmann, 'Die Aristokratie im kapitalistischen Zeitalter', in: *Grundriss der Sozialökonomik*, Abt. IX, T.1 (Tübingen, 1926), pp. 23ff.
3 The study of the unfulfilled Breton national movement ('Breton regionalism') is still in its beginnings. Cf. Y. Guin, *Histoire de la Bretagne de 1789 à nos jours* (Paris, 1977).
4 This may provide an explanation for the fact noted by Eric Hobsbawm: namely, that the middle and lesser nobility were the leading forces in the national movement in Poland and Hungary. Cf. Hobsbawm, *Age of Revolution* (London, 1962), pp. 164–5.
5 K. Kautsky, 'Die moderne Nationalität', *Die Neue Zeit* (1887), p. 405. The whole development has been analysed by a Czech historian, J. Kolejka, in *Národnostní programy pro střední a jihovýchodní Evropu. Z dějin socialistické teorie národnostní otázky 1848–1917. Od Marxe k Leninovi* (Brno, 1971).
6 J. V. Stalin, *Marxism and the National question*, emphasises precisely this source of the bourgeoisie's material interest in the promotion of national consciousness.
7 This rule does not of course apply to the transition made by the richer peasants to capitalist forms of enterprise (which will be discussed later in this chapter).
8 A. Gramsci, *Gli intelletuali e l'organizzazione della cultura* (Turin, 1955).
9 This is the interpretation given for example by the Soviet historian V. I. Freidzon, 'Hnutí slovanských narodů v habsburské řisi do dualismu', *Československý časopis historický*, 24 (1976), p. 694.
10 This characterization is met with in e.g. *The Communist Manifesto*.
11 The first indications of burgher interest in politics are traced by R. Engelsing, in a methodologically path-breaking fashion, in 'Die periodische Presse und ihr Publikum', *Zeitschrift für Geschichte des Buchwesens*, IV, 6, pp. 1481ff.
12 On the social structure in Belorussia, cf. N. P. Vakar, *Belorussia, the Making of a Nation*, Russian Research Center Studies vol. 22 (Cambridge, Mass., 1956), p. 90.
13 O. Bauer, *Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie* (Vienna, 1907), p. 268.
14 Hobsbawm, *Age of Revolution*, p. 166.
15 On the role of the clergy, cf. M. Zur, *Der bretonische Regionalismus in Frankreich* (Berlin, 1938), p. 53, and M. Lagrée, *Mentalités, religion et histoire en Haute-Bretagne au XIXième siècle. Le diocèse de Rennes, 1815–1848* (Paris, 1977).
16 J. Hučko, 'K charakteristike vlasteneckej inteligencie v prvej fáze slovenského národného obrodenia se zretel'om na jej sociálne zlozenie a pôvod', in *K počiatkom národného obrodenia* (Bratislava, 1964), pp. 35–6.
17 Hučko, 'K charakteristike...', pp. 74ff.
18 A summary of the writings of Bulgarian historians on the role of the church in the national movement is given by Z. Markova, 'Problemi na tsrkovno-natsionalnite borbi v izsledvaniyata na b'lgarskite istoritsi', in *Problemi na b'lgarskata istoriografiya* (Sofia, 1973), pp. 332ff. An overview of the role of the Orthodox church in Serbia

is given in the collection *Srpska pravoslavna crkva, 1219–1969. Spomenica o 750-to godišnjici autokefalnosti* (Belgrade, 1969). On the situation in the Danubian basin and Transylvania, see E. Turczynski, *Konfession und Nation. Zur Frühgeschichte der serbischen und rumänischen Nationsbildung* (Düsseldorf, 1976), especially pp. 43ff.

19 On the fight of the Bulgarian church for independence, cf. especially the collection entitled *100 g. ot uchredvaneto na B'lgarskata ekzarkhiya* (Sofia, 1971); also T. S'bev, *Uchredvane i diotsez na B'lgarskata ekzarkhiya do 1878g.* (Sofia, 1973). More recently V. Traykov has treated these matters in a broader context, in *Ideologicheski techeniya i programi v natsionalno-osvoboditelnitse dvizheniya na Balkanite do 1878 godina* (Sofia, 1978), pp. 269ff.

20 E. Prokopowitsch, 'Die rumänische Nationalbewegung in der Bukowina und der Dakoromanisum', *Studien zur Geschichte der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie*, III (Cologne, Graz, 1965), p. 11.

21 Römer, *Litwa* (L'vov, 1908), p. 66.

22 E. Larkin brings some fresh objections to this often repeated view of the role of the Roman Catholic Church, in *The Roman Catholic Church and the Creation of the Modern Irish State 1878–1886* (Philadelphia, Pa., 1975).

23 R. Coupland, *Welsh and Scottish Nationalism* (London, 1954), p. 267.

24 Turczynski, *Konfession und Nation*, pp. 271ff.

25 L. Wasiliewski, *Westrussland*, pp. 28–9; Wasilewski, *Litwa i Białoruś* (Krákow, n.d.), p. 287.

26 On the participation of Latvian teachers in the movement, cf. *Istoriya Latviyskoy SSR* II, pp. 101 and 105. Among contemporary witnesses one may note J. Eckhardt, *Bürgerthum und Büreaukratie. Vier Kapitel aus der neuesten livländischen Geschichte* (Leipzig, 1870), p. 254; his essay 'Zur Nationalitätenfrage', *Baltische Monatsschrift* (1864), p. 568; and see also Lenz, *Umvolkungsvorgänge*, p. 46.

27 S. Ramult, *Statystyka ludności Kaszubskiej* (Kraków, 1899), p. 33; B. Stelmachowska, *Stosunek Kaszub do Polski* (Toruń, 1932), pp. 14ff.; W. Chojnacki, 'Polska akcja narodowo-uświadamiająca na Mazurach przed I. wojną swiatową', *Zapiski historyczne*, 21 (1955–6), pp. 242ff.

28 Gramsci, *Gli intelletuali*.

29 I have dealt with the role of the peasantry in the national movement in more detail in 'Die Landbevölkerung und des "Erwachen" kleiner Nationen', in *Studia Historica in Honorem Hans Kruus* (Tallinn, 1971), pp. 367ff. Noteworthy observations of a more general nature are made by Ea Jansen in her study 'Eesti talurahva rahvusliku', in *Eesti talurahve sotsiaalseid vaateid XIX sejandil* (Tallin, 1977), pp. 117ff.

30 T. Geiger, *Det dansk intelligens fra reformsjonen til nutiden* (Copenhagen, 1949), p. 130.

31 V. Aubert and U. Torgersen, *Akademiker i norsk samfunnsstruktur* (Oslo, n.d.), p. 14.

32 On this, cf. *Istoriya Latviyskoy SSR* II, pp. 102ff.; H. Becker, 'Die nationale Frage in der Dorpater Studentenschaft um 1850', *Baltische Monatshefte* (1934), pp. 567ff.; and J. von Hehn, *Die Lettisch-literarische Gesellschaft und das Lettentum* (Königsberg, 1938), pp. 44–5 and 59–60.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 18

1 Jansen, 'Rahva poliitilisest', *Eesti NSV TA Toimitised*, 12, p. 374.

2 Wasilewski, *Litwa i Białoruś* (Krákow, n.d.), pp. 96–7.

3 See P. J. Šafařík's account of the *Časopis Českeho Musea* (1848).

4 Calculated on the basis of the article 'Čechy', in *Ottův Slovník naučný*, vol. 6 (Prague, 1893).

5 N. Gukovskiy, *Kovenskaya guberniya* (Kaunas, 1890–6), parts 1–6; M. Aschmies, *Land und Leute in Litauen* (Breslau, 1918), p. 73.

6 Gaigalat, *La Lithuanie*, p. 58.

7 J. Ehret, *Litauen in Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft* (Bern, 1919).

8 Here, of course, the gymnasia were still emphatically a German affair at the start of Phase B of the national movement; c.f. P. Jordan, *Beiträge zur Statistik des Gouvernements Estland* II (Reval, 1871), pp. 5–6.

9 *Materialien zur Kenntniss des evangelisch-lutherischen Landvolksschulwesens in Livland* (Riga, 1884), pp. 2ff.

10 H. Speer, *Das Bauernschulwesen in Gouvernement Estland vom Ende de 18. Jahrhunderts bis zur Russifizierung* (Tartu, 1936), p. 265.

11 F. Jung, *Material zu einer allgemeinen Statistik Livlands und Oesels* (Riga, 1863), pp. 78 and 84ff.

12 The area of greater national activity in Estonia, to the south-east of Tallinn, was almost without rural schools (see Speer, *Bauernschulwesen*, pp. 163–4 and 446ff.).

13 Lamberty, *Vlaamsche Beweging*, pp. 133 and 198.

14 E. Jutikkala, *Suomen historian kartasto* (Helsinki, 1949), map no. 72.

15 Schybergson, *Geschichte Finnlands* (Gotha, 1896), p. 467.

16 *Atlas Československých dějin* (Prague, 1965), map. no. 17; cf. also Karníková, *Vyvoj obyvatelstva v českých zemích 1754–1914* (Prague, 1965), pp. 36–7 and 80.

17 L. Kárníková, *Vývoj obyvatelstva*, pp. 92–3; *Atlas československých dějin*, map no. 17a.

18 *Atlas ćeskoslovenských dějin*, map no. 12d.

19 Lamberty, *Vlaamsche Beweging*, pp. 128–9.

20 Gaigalet, *Litauen*, p. 116.

21 *Istoriya Estonskoy SSR* II, pp. 99 and 101; Jansen, 'Rahva poliitilisest', p. 375.

22 Jutikkala, *Kartasto*, map nos. 53 and 54.

23 J. Petráň, *Zemědělská výroba v Čechách ve druhé polovině 16. a počátkem 17. století* (Prague, 1964), pp. 187ff.

24 Linksch, *Litauen und die Litauer* (Stuttgart, 1917), p. 29.

25 In the *guberniya* of Suvalki, 49% was arable land and 23% forest, whereas in the neighbouring *guberniya* of Kaunas only 38% of the land was arable and 24% forest, and in the *guberniya* of Vilnius 40% was arable and 28% forest; cf. Gaigalat, *Litauen*, p. 111.

26 Meyer-Willuda, *Wirtschaftsgeographie von Estland* (Berlin, 1938), pp. 25–6.

27 Meyer-Willuda, *Wirtschaftsgeographie von Estland*, p. 188.

28 Schybergson, *Geschichte Finnlands*, p. 438.

29 Jutikkala, *Kartasto*, map no. 48.

30 *Atlas československých dějin*, map nos. 19c, 19d and 19f.

31 H. Pirenne, *Histoire de Belgique*, vol. 7 (Paris, 1932), pp. 126ff.; R. Van Eenoo,

Economische crisis en Vlaamse beweging: reacties in de Brugse pers, Studia Historica Gandensia, 119 (Ghent, 1969).

32 Hellmann, *Grundzüge der Geschichte Litauens* (Darmstadt, 1966), p. 115.

33 Viljandi had the highest index of growth of all the Estonian towns in the second half of the nineteenth century; for the data see *Istoriya Estonskoy SSR* II, p. 132, and E. Kant, *Bevölkerung und Lebenstamm Estlands* (Tartu, 1935), p. 191. Also, most recently of all, there is R. Pullat, *Gorodskoye naseleniye Estonii s kontsa XVIII veka do 1940 goda* (Tallinn, 1976), p. 22.

34 Kant, *Bevölkerung*, pp. 225–6; *Istoriya Latviyakoy SSR* I, p. 554.

35 *Istoriya Estonskoy SSR* II, pp. 122–3.

36 H. Koht and C. W. Schnitler, *Eidsvolds-maendene. Eidsvold 1814* (Christiania, 1914), p. 366.

37 Sidel'nikov, 'O chislennom sostave', in *Istoriko-sotsiologicheskie issledovaniya* (Moscow, 1970), p. 262. These developments are summarized in K. Kosev, *Za kapitalisticheskoto razvitie na b'lgarskite zemi prez 60-te i 70-te godiny na XIX vek* (Sofia, 1968). From the point of view of agricultural production this was not a fertile grain-producing region, but a region of successful specialized production, especially the production of rose oil, wine and textile plants. It was also a region of sheep-pasture.

38 J. de Jong, *Ansätze und Grundlagen einer makedonischen Nationalbewegung* (diss., Bochum, 1982), pp. 249ff.

39 For Finland, cf. Jutikkala, *Kartasto*, map nos. 65 and 66; for Bohemia cf. *Atlas československých dějin*, maps 19c and 19d; for Lithuania cf. *Das Strassennetz in Westrussland* I (Berlin, 1917); also A. Schönemann, 'Die litauischen Binnenstrassen', *Osteuropa-Markt*, 16 (1936), pp. 602ff.; for Estonia finally, cf. *Das Strassennetz in Liv- und Estland* (Berlin, 1918); and Kant, *Bevölkerung*, appendix 13.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 18

1 Cf. for example the conception of E. Lemberg, put forward in *Nationalismus* I (Hamburg, 1964), especially chapter II, sections E and F. For him, the objective relations operating to create the nation take second place, after the impact of nationalism. This conception also has its supporters among some historians who regard themselves as Marxists, e.g. J. Chlebowczyk, *Procesy narodotwórcze we wschodniej Europie srodkowej w dobie kapitalizmu* (Warsaw and Kraków, 1975), especially ch. 2.

2 This point was previously made by P. Sugar, in 'The roots of Eastern European nationalism', *I^er Congrès international des études balkaniques* (Sofia, 1966), *Résumés et communications. Histoire XXe siècle*, p. 167.

3 It is claimed by E. Niederhauser that this relationship exists in the Balkan national movements. Cf. E. Niederhauser, 'Les intellectuels de la société Balkanique au XIXe siècle', *I^er Congrès international des études balkaniques* (Sofia, 1966), *Histoire XV^e–XIX^e siècles*, p. 225. It appears, however, that this was not the case: the Serbian movement, in which the countryside participated decisively, arose earlier than the Bulgarian movement, where the towns participated more strongly than they did in Serbia.

4 The terminology here is taken from J. S. Roucek and R. L. Warren, *Sociology: an Introduction* (Totowa, N.J., 1965), pp. 53–4.

5 We have used as our criterion of the level of communication the standard worked out by K. W. Deutsch, in *Nationalism and Social Communication* (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), p. 100; 'mobilized population'.

6 Sometimes they also used the expression 'miejscowi' ('locals'). Cf. J. Tomaszewski, *Z dziejow Polesia 1921–1939* (Warsaw, 1963), pp. 24 and 32; and G. Garecki, 'Mezhy Zachodnjaj Belarusi u Pol'shchy', in *Matarjaly da gevagrafii i statystyki Belarusi* I (Minsk, 1928), p. 91.

7 N. Gukovskiy, *Kovenskaja gubernija* (Kaunas, 1890–6), Vilkomirskij ujezed, pp. 32ff., Kovenskij ujezd, pp. 63ff. Tomaszewski, *Polesia*, pp. 70ff.; M. Bürgener, 'Pripet-Polessie', *Petermanns Mitteilungen*, Ergänzungsheft 237 (Gotha, 1939), pp. 107–8 and 119ff. M. B. Dovnar-Zapolskij, *Narodnoje khozjajstvo Belorussii 1861–1914* (Minsk, 1926), pp. 224 and 229.

8 K. Srokowski, *Sprawa narodowosciowa na Kresach Wschodnich* (Kraków, 1924), p. 7; L. Wasilewski, *Westrussland*, pp. 18, 37–8 and 98–9; L. Wasilewski, *Litwa i Bialoruś* (Kráków, n.d.), p. 290.

9 R. Lehmann, *Geschichte der Niederlausitz* (Berlin, 1963), p. 684.

10 W. Chojnacki, 'Polska akcja narodowo-uświadamiająca na Mazurach przed I. wojna światowa', *Zapiski historyczne*, 21 (1955–6), pp. 242ff.; and similarly, for the Cashubians, S. Remult, *Statystyka Ludności Kaszubskiej* (Kraków, 1899), p. 33, and B. Stelmachowska, *Stosunek Kaszub do Polski* (Toruń, 1932), pp. 14–15. J. Chlebowczyk regrettably fails to take into consideration these groups of nationalities in his noteworthy theory of assimilation (Chlebowczyk, *Procesy narodotwórcze*, pp. 41ff.).

11 R. Coupland, *Welsh and Scottish Nationalism* (London, 1954), pp. 168–9. On the significance of the industrial revolution, cf. A. R. Dodd, *The Industrial Revolution in North Wales* (Cardiff, 1933); and N. Edwards, *The Industrial Revolution in South Wales* (London, 1924). The matter is treated in a general way in Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication*, p. 111.

12 F. Burkhardt, *Die Entwicklung des Wendentums im Spiegel der Statistik* (Berlin and Leipzig, 1932), pp. 13 and 74–5; Lehmann, *Niederlausitz*, p. 694. For the territory of Prussian Lithuania, see W. Hubatsch, 'Masuren und Preussisch-Litauen in der Nationalitätenpolitik Preussens 1870–1920', *Zeitschrift für Ostforschung* 14 (1965), pp. 641ff. For the Breton region, see Zur, *Der bretonische Regionalismus* (Berlin, 1938), pp. 38 and 42, for Belgium see Lamberty, *Philosophie der Vlaamsche Beweging en de overige stromingen in België* (Bruges, 1944), pp. 128, 133 and 198.

13 This is not altered in any way by the fact that Deutsch is aware of the dependence of the level of communication on economic factors (*Nationalism and Social Communication*, p. 65). The antagonisms we mention are also known to him – even if only at the margin of his model – but once again he looks upon them as a product of the process of social communication (cf. for example his comments on the awakening of antagonisms of a national kind in the countryside, in *Nationalism in Social Communication*, p. 129).

14 K. Kautsky, 'Die moderne Nationalität', *Die Neue Zeit* (1887), pp. 404 and 444.

15 Eric Hobsbawm has already drawn attention to this in a general way (*Age of Revolution*, pp. 166–7); cf. also Kautsky, 'Die moderne Nationalität', p. 447, although there the problem is narrowed down to the struggle over offices in the administration.

16 We regard this conflict as more serious than the so-called external or linguistic

oppression, customarily referred to by a whole series of authors without any deeper consideration. In fact the latter conflict could only play a nationally integrating role in conjunction with other conditions. Cf. for example B. C. Shafer, *Nationalism: Its Nature and Interpreters* (Washington D.C., 1976), pp. 176–7; Lemberg, *Nationalismus* (2 vols., Hamburg, 1964), I, p. 100; and Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication*, p. 25.

Select Bibliography

PART 1

Bauer, O., *Die Nationalitätenfrage und Sozialdemokratie*, Vienna, 1907

Brass, P. R., 'Ethnic Groups and Nationalities: the Formation, Persistence, and Transformation of Ethnic Identities', in *Ethnic Diversity and Conflict in Eastern Europe*, ed. P. F. Sugar, Santa Barbara/Oxford, 1980

Bromley, Ju. B., *Etnos i etnografiya*, Moscow, 1973

Chlebowczyk, J., *On Small and Young Nations in Europe*. Wrocław/Warsaw/Kraków/Gdańsk, 1980

Dann, O., 'Der moderne Nationalismus als Problem der historische Entwicklungsforschung', in *Nationalismus und sozialer Wandel*, Hamburg, 1978

Deutsch, K. W., *Nationalism and Social Communication*, Cambridge, Mass., 1953

Dujker, H. O. J. and Frijda, N. H., *National Character and National Stereotypes*, Amsterdam, 1960

Engels, F., 'Democratic Panslavism', in K. Marx, *The Revolution of 1848*, London, 1973
Germany: Revolution and Counter-Revolution, London, 1969

Gramsci, A., *Gli intelettuali e l'organizzazione della cultura*, Turin, 1955

Herod, Ch. C., *The Nation in the History of Marxian Thought*, The Hague, 1976

Hobsbawm, E. J., *The Age of Revolution, 1789–1848*, New York, 1962

Kamenka, E. (ed.), *Nationalism. The Nature and Evolution of an Idea*, 2nd edition, London, 1976

Kautsky, K., 'Die moderne Nationalität', *Die Neue Zeit*, 1887
'Nationalität und Internationalität', *Ergänzungshefte zur Neuen Zeit* 1, 1907–8

Kemiläinen, A., *Nationalism. Problems Concerning the Word, the Concept and Classification*, Jyväskylä, 1964

Kohn, H., *The Idea of Nationalism. A Study in its Origins and Background*, New York, 1946

Lemberg, E., *Der Nationalismus* 1–2, Hamburg, 1964

Lenin, V. I., 'The Right of Nations to Self-Determination', in *Collected Works* 4th edition, 20, Moscow, 1964

Marx, K. and Engels, F., 'Manifesto of the Communist Party', in *The Revolution of 1848*, London, 1973

Rokkan, St. (ed.), *Comparative Research across Cultures and Nations*, Paris/The Hague, 1968

Rokkan, St., Seelen, K. and Warmbrunn, J., *Nation-building. A Review of Recent Research and Selected Bibliography of Analytical Studies*, The Hague/Paris, 1973

Stalin, J. V., 'Marxism and the Question of Nationalities', in *On the National and Colonial Question*, London, 1936

Sugar, P. F., 'External and Domestic Roots of Eastern European Nationalism', *Nationalism in Eastern Europe*, Seattle, 1969

'Ethnicity in Eastern Europe', in P. F. Sugar (ed.) *Ethnic Diversity and Conflict in Eastern Europe*, Santa Barbara/Oxford, 1980

Tilly, C. (ed.), *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, Princeton, N.J., 1975

PARTS 2 AND 3

Aubert, V., 'The Professions in Norwegian Social Structure', in *Transactions of the Fifth World Congress of Sociology*, Washington, 1962

Bagge, P., 'Zur Organisations- und Sozialgeschichte dänischer nationaler Bewegungen im 19. Jahrhundert', in T. Schieder (ed.) *Sozialstruktur und Organisation europäischer Nationalbewegungen*, Munich/Vienna, 1971

Bracker, J., 'Die dänische Sprachpolitik 1830–1864 und die Bevölkerung Mittelschleswigs', *Zeitschrift der Gesellschaft für Schleswig-holsteinische Geschchichte* 97–8, 1972–3

Brunn, G., 'Die Organisationen der katalanischen Bewegung 1859–1923', *Nationale Bewegung und soziale Organisation* I, Munich/Vienna, 1978

Bürgener, M., 'Pripet-Polessie', *Petermanns Mitteilungen, Ergänzungsheft 237*, Gotha, 1939

Carr, W., *Schleswig-Holstein 1815–48. A Study in National Conflict*, Manchester, 1963

Ceginskas, K. J., 'Die Polonisierung des litauischen Adels im 19. Jahrhundert', *Commentationes Balticae* IV–V, 1958

Clough, S. B., *A History of the Flemish Movement in Belgium*, New York, 1930

Coupland, R., *Welsh and Scottish Nationalism*, London, 1954

Denis, E., *La Bohème depuis la Montagne Blanche* 1–3, Paris, 1901–3

Dosfel, L., *Die flämische Studentenbewegung*, Gladbach, 1916

Elviken, A., *Die Entwicklung des norwegischen Nationalismus*, Berlin, 1930

Gaigalat, W., *La Lithuanie, le territoire occupé, la population et l'orientation de ses idées*, Geneva, n.d.

Gross, M., 'On the integration of the Croatian nation: a case study in nation building', *East European Quarterly* XV, 1981

Guin, Y., *Histoire de la Bretagne de 1789 à nos jours*, Paris, 1977

Hehn, J. v., *Die Lettisch-litterarische Gesellschaft und das Lettentum*, Königsberg, 1938

Hellmann, M., *Grundzüge der Geschichte Litauens und des litauischen Volkes*, Darmstadt, 1966

Holotik, L., 'Der österreichisch-ungarische Ausgleich und die Slowaken', *Der österreichisch-ungarische Ausgliech 1867*, Bratislava, 1971

Hroch, M., *Die Vorkämpfer der nationalen Bewegung bei den kleinen Völkern Europas*, Prague, 1968

'Die Landbevölkerung und das "Erwachen" kleiner Nationen', *Studia Historica in Honorem Hans Kruus*, Tallinn, 1971

Istoriya Estonskoi SSR I, II, Tallin, 1954, 1966

Istoriya Latvijskoi SSR, Riga, 1952

Johnsen, O. A., *Norwegische Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, Jena, 1939

Jong, J. de, 'Ansätze und Grundlagen einer makedonischen Nationalbewegung zu Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts und ihre Trägergruppe 1890–1903', diss. Bochum, 1982

Jutikkala, E., *A History of Finland*, New York, 1962

Kaupas, V., *Die Presse Litauens unter Berücksichtigung des nationalen Gedankens und der öffentlichen Meinung* I, Klajpeda, 1934

Kimball, S. B., 'The Matice Ceska, 1831–1861', *The Czech Renascence of the 19th Century*, Toronto, 1970

Krastyn, J. P., 'O charaktere mladolatysskogo dvizeniya', *Istoriya SSSR*, 1961

Krusius-Ahrenberg, L., *Der Durchbruch des Nationalismus und Liberalismus im politischen Leben Finnlands 1856–1863*, Helsinki, 1934

Kruus, H., *Grundriss der Geschichte des estnischen Volkes*, Tartu, 1932

Kuranda, J., *Belgien und seine Revolution*, n.p. 1846

Loorits, O., 'The Renascence of the Estonian Nation', *Slavonic and East European Review* XXXIII, 1954

Meyer-Willuda, E., *Wirtschaftsgeographie von Estland*, Berlin, 1938

Nebesky, W., *Geschichte des Museums des Königreichs Böhmen*, Prague, 1868

Niederhauser, B., 'Les intelectuels de la société Balkanique au XIXe siècle', *Ier Congres international des études Balkaniques, Histoire*, Sofia, 1966

Ochmanski, J., *Historia Litwy*, Wrocław/Warsaw/Krakow, 1967

Osvoboditelnoye dvizseniye narodov Avstriyskoy imperiya. Vozniknoveniye i razvitiye, konets XVIII.v.–1849 g., Moscow, 1980

Pabst, K., 'Zur Vorgeschichte der Universität Oslo und zum Erwachen des norwegischen Nationalbewusstsein', *Politische Ideologie und nationalstattliche Ordnung*, Munich, 1968

Pakstas, K., 'Earliest Statistic of Nationalities and Religions in the Territories of Old Lithuania, 1861', *Commentationes Balticae* IV–V, 1958

Philipp, F., *Die Wirksamkeit der herrnhuter Brüdergemeinde unter den Esten und Letten zur Zeit der Bauernbefreiung*, Cologne/Vienna, 1974

Picard, L., *Geschiedenis der Vlaamse en Grootnederlandse Gedachte*, Antwerp, 1963

Pirenne, H., *Histoire de Belgique*, vol. VII, Paris, 1932

Pullat, R., *Gorodskoye naseleniye Estoniyi s kontsa XVIII. v. do 1940*, Tallin, 1976

Renvall, P., 'Zur Organisations- und Sozialgeschichte der finnischnationalen Bewegung im 19. Jahrhundert', *Sozialstruktur und Organisation europäischer Nationalbewegungen*, Munich/Vienna, 1971

Rosenthal, H., *Kulturbestrebungen des estnischen Volkes während eines Menschenalters (1869–1900)*, Reval, 1912

Seton-Watson, R. W., *Racial Problems in Hungary*, London, 1908

Scheibert, P., 'Finnland zur Zeit Kaiser Nikolaus I', *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* V, 1940

Schybergson, M. G., *Politische Geschichte Finnlands 1809–1919*, Gotha/Stuttgart, 1925

Sidel'nikov, S. I., 'O tsiselnom sostave bolgarskich revolyucionnych organizatsiy v 1869–73 gg.', *Istoriko-sotsiologischeskiye issledovaniya*, Moscow, 1970

Skovmand, R., Dybdahl, V. and Rasmussen, E., *Geschichte Dänemarks 1830–1938*, Neumünster, 1973

Thimme, H., *Kirche und nationale Frage in Livland während d. ersten Hälfte d. 19. Jahrhunderts. Der Pastor und Generalsuperintendent Ferd. Walter und seine Zeit*, Königsberg, 1938

Turczynski, E., *Konfession und Nation. Zur Frühgeschichte der serbischen und rumänischen Nationsbildung*, Düsseldorf, 1976

Tyla, A., *Revoyutsiya 1905 g. v litovskoy derevne*, Vilnius, 1964

Wasilewski, L., *Die nationalen und kulturellen Verhältnisse im sogenanntem Westrussland*, Vienna, 1915
Wuorinen, J. H., *Nationalism in Modern Finland*, New York, 1931
Zolberg, A. R., 'The Making of Flemings and Waloons: Belgium 1830–1914', *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* v, 1974
Zur, M., *Der bretonische Regionalismus in Frankreich*, Breslau, 1938

Index