Medieval and Early Modern Film and Media

Richard Burt

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

MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN FILM AND MEDIA

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To My Double Nuclear Families

For my mother, Claire Hollingsworth Burt, a native of Santa Ana, Californina and cinephile in her own right who taught me early on in my life everything I'd ever need to know about film; for my father, Maclay Burt, whose photographs of road signs in Europe he took in 1974 and of closed and often seriously deteriorating movie theaters he took in the 1990s in California continue to stop and startle me; and for my wife, the love and light of my life, fire of my loins, Elizabeth; our daughter Nora; and our son Wiley.

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Acknowledgments

Moving midcareer to a new English Department may prove to be a difficult adjustment. My new colleagues at the University of Florida—especially John Leavey, my former department chair, and Pamela Gilbert, my present chair—have made my move in 2003 both easy and quite marvelous. Our Department's open curriculum has made it possible for me to teach new courses on a wide variety of topics, including film medievalism, early modern media and the prehistory of film, the film epic and U.S. imperialism, and psychoanalysis and film theory. *Medieval and Early Modern Film and Media* emerged from a conference I organized on the medieval film, held at the University of Florida, during February 2005. Carol Murphy, professor of French and chair of France Florida, arranged for funding the conference, and John Leavey provided additional support. Al Shoaf invited Nickolas Haydock and me to coedit a special issue of *Exemplaria* (2007) on "Movie Medievalism," with most of the essays originally delivered during the conference in which Al also participated. I would also like to thank Sandra Gorgievski and Xavier Leroux for inviting me to contribute an article to a special issue of the French journal *Babel* (2007) they coedited, entitled "Le Moyen Âge mise-en-scène: Perspectives contemporaines." Similar support came from Bettina Bildauer and Anke Bernau, who invited me to contribute a chapter to their forthcoming book collection, *The Middle Ages on Film*.

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Scott Newstock has also been a great interlocutor on the phone and an e-mail correspondent about film and literary theory Peter Krapp generously put his extraordinary knowledge of the opening title sequences at my disposal and invited me to UC Irvine HumaniTech conference "Image and Text: From Book History to the Book Is History" in February 2007 to give a paper on the Bayeux Tapestry in opening title sequences of several films. My dear friend and former Ph.D. student Hussein Ibish has taught me much about film, 9/11, and the Middle East. Conversations with Nora Alter, Roger Beebe, Terry Harpold, Dragan Kujundzic, Robert Ray, Malini Schueller, and Greg Ulmer proved strikingly illuminating. My former teacher and now colleague, Donald Ault, proved as inspiring as ever, turning me onto films I had never heard of, giving me copies of commercially unavailable films I wanted to see, and inviting me onto trains of thought I never would have taken otherwise. I have also benefited from many fine students at the University of Florida who have taken my courses on film theory and on medieval and early modern film and media, including Emanuel Alex, Warren Cockerham, Lauren Ermel, Geoff Hughes, Eric Lachs, Patrick LeMieux, Ryan Macy, Jimmy Newlin, Michael Vu, Phil Wegner, and Roger Whitson. John Van Hook, research librarian at the University of Florida, has been an amazing resource, generously and frequently notifying me of books of interest to me.I am deeply indebted and grateful to my editor Farideh Koohi-Kamali for her unflagging support of this book. And I would like to thank Corrine Blalock and the team at Newgen Imaging Systems, India for so carefully overseeing its production. I would also like to thank Matt Snyder for proofreading the first chapter. First among my colleagues to whom I feel most deeply indebted is an even more recent arrival at the University of Florida, my prolific colleague and friend Galili Shahar, who shuttles back and forth each year between the University of Florida and the University of Jerusalem. Galili's intellectual generosity is truly quite exceptional, and I have learned immensely from his many remarkably illuminating conversations about the work of Eric Auerbach, Sigmund Freud, and Walter Benjamin, from his profound work on modernism, prayer, and Dada, and from taking his enlightening faculty seminar on "Secular Judaism."

The literary criticism of Stephen Greenblatt, my longtime teacher (all the way back to my senior year at U.C. Berkeley in 1976) and supporter, has continued to inspire and amaze me, and I appreciate his taking the time to talk with me about his work in conversations over e-mail, phone, and in person in Amherst, Northampton, Cambridge, and Berlin. It has been a pleasure to correspond again with Randy Starn, the outside reader of my dissertation, about this book. I would especially like to thank Natalie Zemon Davis for responding very quickly to the many e-mails I sent her, for loaning me her personal and irreplaceable copy of the *Return of Martin Guerre* musical, and for generously sending me copies or directing me to some of her articles and interviews that had not turned up in my research. Carlo Ginzburg kindly sent me a copy of his fascinating article on history and film that would have otherwise remained unavailable to me. Thanks are also due to Kathleen H. Coleman for her e-mail correspondence about her

experience as a consultant on Ridley Scott's *Gladiator*. A National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) seminar on the Bayeux Tapestry held at Yale University in July 2005 provided me with an opportunity to do further research on the Bayeux Tapestry and film. I thank Monica Lindstrom for arranging permission to use Giuseppe Arcimboldo's "The Librarian" cover image and to insert it into the photograph my father took of the Lido theater in Newport, CA; the cover image is double: the librarian becomes an actor, the archive turns into a film, the reader becomes a spectator of a mummified film.

In addition to granting me a wondrous second life, my wife Elizabeth generously read and reread the entire manuscript very closely, always giving me extremely useful feedback along the way. She certainly wins the prize, in my book, for best wife ever. The value of her love to me is truly beyond measure. Our son Wiley has been a similar source of wonder. I'll never forget the moment when Wiley, then seven years old, exclaimed "it's magic!" while we watched the Quay Brothers' *Cabinet of Jan Švankmajer*. And we have shared many entertaining hours "playing castle." I first learned of the Bayeux Tapestry when my eye caught the cover of the August 1966 issue of *National Geographic* in my seventh grade English class, taught by Mr. Robert Downer. Mr. Downer also had us perform a reduced version of *Julius Caesar* (I played Cassius) and took us to see the play in performance in San Francisco.

I dedicate this book to my parents. My mother, Claire Hollingsworth Burt, grew up near Hollywood and her own early fascinations with film and the Middle Ages inspired her young son's lifelong interest in knights and armor and the Middle Ages on film. (She named me after King Richard the Lionheart, though, like the Sex Pistols' Johnny Rotten, I have come to prefer Laurence Olivier's Richard III as a role model.) I still fondly remember her taking me to see a road show exhibition of *El Cid* for my seventh birthday when it was released, and our excitement when the palace doors opened when the film began again after the entr'acte and the aged Rodrigo appeared with a salt-and-pepper beard. I was delighted that the film was released by the Weinstein Company for its new, prestigious Miriam Collection in January 2008 on a special two-disc DVD edition with a variety of extras while the present book was already in production. Even though the DVD transfer is apparently sourced from the 35mm (internegative) used by Criterion for their laser disc edition rather than the original Super Technirama 70mm camera negative, it's wonderful to have the film on DVD complete with overture, intermission, and exit music. As an adult, I was inspired and intrigued by my father's photographs of road signs and many later black-and-white photographs of movie theaters in California that long ago closed for business but nevertheless remain works of strange beauty, even in their decaying states, in his artful photographs. Some of the photographs in series of movie theaters entitled "Yesterday's Tomorrows" hang now in our home. My grandfather, Grinnell Burt, made numerous home movies in the late 1920s, a selection of which my father had transferred onto a DVD in 2003. I thank him for taking the photo of the

interior of the Lido Theater, built in 1938 and recently restored, located in Newport Beach, CA, for the cover image of the present book.

Gainesville, Florida, April 20, 2008

* * *

Note to Readers

All references to Sigmund Freud's works are to *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (1955), trans. James Stachey. They are noted as "*SE*" followed by the volume number when cited.

Introduction: Film before and after New Media, Anec-notology, and the Philological Uncanny

Marx says that revolutions are the locomotives of world history. But perhaps it is quite otherwise. Perhaps revolutions are an attempt by the passengers on the train to activate the emergency brake.

—Walter Benjamin, "Paralipomena" to "On the Concept of History"

The power of an unknown, genuine language that is not open to any calculus, a language that arises only in pieces and out of disintegration of the existing one; this negative, dangerous, and yet assuredly promised power is the true justification of foreign words.

—Theodor Adorno, "On the Use of Foreign Words"

It is painful and difficult for the ear to hear something new; we are bad at listening to strange music. When listening to another language, we arbitrarily try to form the sounds we hear into words that sound more familiar and more like our own.

—Frederich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil

I am a philologist, not a philosopher.

—Paul de Man, "An Interview with Paul de Man"

Be Kind, Rewind: Getting On (and Off) Track

Studies drawing analogies between the media of the premodern and early modern past (scrolls, manuscripts, books, tapestries) and the electronic and digital media of the postmodern present (computer screens, pdf, film, DVD) have by now become familiar.[1] *Medieval and Early Modern Film and Media* follows in the tracks of this scholarship: I read the historical film, focusing chiefly on *Day of Wrath* (dir. Carl Theodor Dreyer, 1943), *El Cid* (dir. Anthony Mann, 1961), *Kingdom of Heaven* (dir. Ridley Scott, 2005), and *The Return of Martin Guerre* (dir. Daniel Vigne, 1981), and a number of films I link to the "schlock of medievalism" (Burt 2007c), in relation to the history of the film by comparing transitions from manuscript to printed book to the transitions from celluloid to digital film. In so doing, my ambition is to

put into dialogue scholarship on illuminated manuscripts, textual marginalia, and the history of the book in medieval and early modern literary studies with scholarship on the cinematic paratext in literary, film, and media theory.

In my mapping of the medieval and early modern historical film onto the history of film, I consider the ways in which the historical film makes use of other media such as the book or manuscript and the ways in which medieval and early modern textual and visual culture are protocinematic. More broadly, I focus on the successive historical periods of medieval and early modern film to take note of a significant shift in film and media theory away from the classical, phenomenological question of film studies posed most recently by Lev Manovich (2001, 286–33), namely, "What is cinema?" to that posed by D.N. Rodowick (2007, 26–89), "What was cinema?" My account is thus stereophonic, one channel turned on the transition from medieval and early modern media and the other channel on the transition from celluloid to digital film. The extent to which the death of cinema and its reanimation in new digital media have changed the ontology of the cinematic object is evident both in the now commonplace releasing of successive, different cuts or transfers of a film in different DVD editions, and in the addition of new kinds of paratextual frames for reception including audiocommentaries and "making of" documentaries. As Deborah and Mark Parker (2004) write:

> DVDs are no longer simply copies of films; they have been physically changed by the process of digitalization. . . . Digitalization affords the opportunity of cleaning up scratches and blots in the visual track as well as sonic imperfections. The color is routinely enhanced as well. . . .; hence, in the most rudimentary sense, physical sense, the DVD is a reconstruction. Even more transformative, however, is the new relation between film and audience offered by the DVD. The effect of the film is now, at least potentially, intensely mediated by "supplementary materials," which include extensive commentary tracks by directors and writers, the reminiscences of actors, the technical remarks of cameramen and set designers, and the critical remarks of scholars, The DVD is essentially a reorientation of the film, often carried out by a variety of agents, and subject to a wide variety of choices made by the eventual viewers. Consciously or not, the DVD constitutes a new edition. (14)

I would add that digitalization has further and more radical consequences for cinema in complicating the notion of new and old editions; different cuts of a film are often released on different DVD editions, usually with different supplements, or extras, thereby calling into question the integrity of the film object: a film may not be confined to its initial moment of release but may extend to later digital versions, and DVD editions may recycle the same paratextual features.[2] The pace of change in new media storage systems is accelerating so quickly that once seemingly fixed terminology is already outmoded: DVD has been renamed SD (for standard DVD), for

example, in order to differentiate it from the newer, higher density HD-DVD (for high-definition). Moreover, as I write in early 2008, Sony's Blu-Ray has won the HD-DVD format war with Toshiba even as HD-DVD seems to have a short life expectancy (much like the laser disc), its replacement by downloadable, "on demand" editions already visible on the digital horizon.[3] Blu-ray may go the way of the laser disc. (Since none of the films I discuss in detail has yet been released either on HD-DVD or on "combo" DVD/HD-DVDs, I will use the older term "DVD" when discussing them.) With the acceleration and dispersal of new digital formats comes mourning and nostalgia for the loss of older bygone media (Sobchack 2000; Zielinski 2006, 1–3) and the morphing of cinephila into videophilia and laserdiscophilia. (The allure of *Be Kind, Rewind* (dir. Michel Gondry, 2008), a film comedy about two video rental and thrift store workers who remake films as low budget videos starring themselves after one of the workers accidentally destroys the store's collection, depends on the fact that film studios stopped releasing videotapes in 2006 and shifted to DVD exclusively.)[4] The latest 5.0 program update quickly becomes dated. Moreover, these quickening media transitions produce a recurrent polarized critical debate between booster camps heralding a brave new future and more jaded camps dismissing the new medium as just another back to the future blip and advising us to "move along, nothing to see here, move along."

The strange ontological alterations of cinema in the wake of celluloid cinema's death complicate, I maintain, the historicist practices now dominant in film and cultural studies insofar as these practices incorporate psychoanalysis the better to subordinate and marginalize it.[5] In a one-way street, New Historicists insist that psychoanalysis be historicized.[6] Historicism, it apparently goes without saying, need not be psychoanalyzed (by "Historicism," I mean to include Old and New Historicism, Marxism, and Cultural Studies). Psychoanalysis thus remains a foreign body in historicism. Whether or not the New Historicism is dead, as many critics now seem to think, or undergoing a premature burial, as I think, its specter is already haunting putatively supersecessionist (always disavowed as such, to be sure) work in early modern studies of cultural materiality, especially work on the temporality of the object (see Yates 2003 and Harris 2008). In any case, I take up in this book the (not dead yet, as Monty Python would say) New Historicism's interest in spectrality. In my view, historicists, new and otherwise, tend to neglect what I take to be a deep, irreconcilable tension between the space of the page (particularly its margins whether in the form of printed glosses, windows opened on a moving screen image in HD-DVD, or annotations and other marginalia left by readers) and the uncanny temporality of transitions between media (such as illuminated manuscript to printed book). In historicist accounts, these transitions typically assume the form of transparently linear narratives.

My mapping of medieval and early modern historical film onto the uncanny transition from celluloid to digital film will take a psychoanalytic turn: I attend to reanimation, repetition, and doublings involved in digital

cinema, to various kinds of loops of cinematic and media history from the past and present.[7] The apparent dividing line between the old and the new is significantly blurred by a looping back to even older media by newer media that calls into question the project of recovering the past and the very notion of the past as lost and found and of error as a problem of volition that may be corrected and closed.[8] The extent to which audiocommentaries on DVDs and HD-DVDs bear more and more resemblance to audioguides in art museum exhibitions testifies to their pastness and the convergence of museum and mausoleum in editions. Indeed, DVD editions, especially those with animated menus (which also function in part like trailers), remind us that film is itself a medium or reanimation or "change mummified," as scholars from André Bazin (1971) to Philip Rosen (2001), Paolo Usai (2001), Jean-Luc Godard and Youssef Ishaghpour (2005), Anne Friedberg (2006), and Laura Mulvey (2006) have noted.[9]

My turn to psychoanalysis is also a return: in using it to read cinema, I also use cinema dialectically to reread psychoanalysis, especially Freud's essay "The Uncanny" (*SE* 17, 217–56). The philological practice of recovering the past through preserving and correcting its texts (and, by extension, preserving films about the past) operates as a version of the *fort/da* (German for "gone/there") child's game Freud discusses in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (*SE* 28, 14–17), to which I will turn shortly, as a repetition compulsion of finding and losing and then finding and losing again that is often misrecognized as a linear process of cognition and recovery. The shift from celluloid to digital film has what Freud calls an uncanny dimension not only in its reanimation of the inanimate and blurring of the human and the mechanical but also in its insistence on recognition as a delay, a rereading in which the distinction between error and its correction may also blur, in which recovery may serve as a cover up.[10] Additionally, film becomes uncanny as it becomes a fragment rather than a whole object, as it is delivered in an oddly dispersed and deferred variety of sometimes successive and sometimes simultaneously different versions rather than in a final fully restored form. An edition announced as definitive may be later followed by another edition also announcing itself as definitive. The original theatrical release movie trailers are belatedly becoming available on websites marketing new DVD editions.[11]

This kind of cinematic fragmentation occurs alongside a countertendency to produce inclusive DVD collector's editions that are often defined as such by their extracinematic supplements. The "Limited Collector's Edition" of *El Cid*, for example, includes reproductions of the original souvenir film program and an *El Cid* comic book released as a tie into the film; the two-disc DVD is identical, however, to the *El Cid* two-disc "Deluxe Edition."[12] The moment of collection may thus also be a moment of doubling. Furthermore, the fragmentation of film on DVDs both undercuts and extends the authority of the director as auteur, making the "director's cut" only one of two or more cuts, and by noting that a DVD transfer is "approved" by the director.[13] Similarly, heightening the director's

authority, both the Eureka DVD and Criterion editions of Roberto Rossellini's 1950 film *Francesco Giullare di Dio* [Francis, God's Joker] provide as a supplement the film's "Giotto Prologue" (The Criterion DVD calls it the "English Prologue"). This prologue is based on frescoes by Giotto and other medieval painters of Hell and of the life of the Saint, all seen more or less in detail, and accompanied by a male voice-over narration about the social injustices of late medieval Italy that replaces intertitles in the Italian version. Although the Giotto prologue was included in the original U.S release of the film (retitled as *Saint Francis of the Flowers*), Eureka and Criterion present the prologue as a DVD fragment because it was not shot by Rossellini and was, therefore, omitted from the Italian and British theatrical releases.

Significantly, both DVD editions of *Francesco Giullare di Dio* illustrate three central and unintended features that constitute what I take to be the uncanniness of the print and film paratext, a term I will define more fully shortly below, and that follow from the paratext's fragmenting as well as (re)unifying tendencies: paratexts go missing; they reappear (and repeat); and they go awry. The two "new" DVD editions of *Francesco Giullare di Dio* restore the prologue as an epilogue with respect to the "old" film. Moreover, they do so differently. The Eureka version of the prologue goes directly from the English titles to the prologue and into the film; the Criterion version, however, rather strangely shows the English titles, then the Italian titles, and then the prologue and into the film. The difference between the prologues helps clarify a broader facet of cinema's digitalization, namely, the way its recurring temporality disrupts a linear temporality of successive, new and newer editions considered as full and fuller. Differences in the sameness of various DVD editions constitute the new(er) as a doubling back to the old and older. And the two DVD editions of Rossellini's film also show that instead of helping unify the film in ways that orients the viewer, paratexts may disorient him or her. Supplementing and even contradicting the DVD menu text about Rossellini's role in the "English Prologue" of the Criterion, for example, "A Note of the Film Versions" in the Criterion booklet (2005) says that footage is missing from the prologue, somehow lost between its removal before the film's 1950 premiere in Venice and its "resurfacing in what is believed to be a shortened form" (12–13) in the 1952 American release. Instead of reinforcing the claim that Rossellini didn't shoot the prologue made in the text introducing the prologue supplement on the DVD, the author of the note says that there is a dispute over whether or not Rossellini shot the prologue. Furthermore, Rossellini himself says in a "Message," also included in the Criterion booklet, that he added the prologue to "make up for what is missing and to introduce the public to the *Fioretti*" (11). (The *Fioretti di San Francesco [The Little Flowers of Saint Francis]* is the fourteenth-century account of the life of Saint Francis that Rossellini used as the central source for his film).[14]

Before leaving the station to discuss specific medieval and early modern films, I pause in this introduction to address some general and abstract

theoretical and philosophical questions about historicizing film in general and to say a word about my own estranging, but I hope not alienating, critical discourse on medieval and early modern film and media, a discourse I call the philological uncanny. I coin some neologisms in order to call attention to phenomena in films and historicist criticism that have hitherto not been explicitly recognized either in film and media theory or in literary theory.[15] Chief among my neologisms is "anec-notology," by which I mean a combination of the study of the anecdote and the annotation, and more generally, a synthesis of two fields of study, narratology and paratextuality.[16] Anec-notology is the study of interpretive problems common both to digital editions of films and historicist critical practice arising from the ways in which the paratextual and framing supplements of a film narrative or a critical narrative more often than not go unread or may get in the way of reading the film or text. I examine problems of interpretation generated by the paratexts of both the filmic object and academic discourse, focusing particularly on the exchanges of historical researchers in film and historicist critics of film and how their complementary and conflicting desires to produce reality effects while policing the difference between fiction and history often turns on film credits and credibility, the paratextualization of cinema in the wake of its digitalization (extras on a recent DVD I discuss are sometimes called "Footnotes," for example) and on the manuscript and printed page as multimedia and screen.[17]

In both cases, graphic design and type in motion on the page and screen are of central interest.[18] I attend to the play of word and image in cinematic paratexts, especially as they concern cinematic authority and credibility, on the one hand, and academic authority and credibility, on the other. My attention to the paratexts of celluloid film and DVD editions provides leverage for a critique primarily of historicist criticism of film but less explicitly, of the manuscript book as well. I focus on what I take to be aberrations and strange errors in academic historicist criticism and the scholarly apparatuses constructed for their routinization and correction, apparatuses such as prefaces, acknowledgments, footnotes, and so on that make up what Gérard Genette (1997) calls the paratext and that *more or less* constitute philological criticism within the discipline of the institution of criticism. I say *more or less* because the norms of academic publication are never made fully explicit: indeed, they cannot be made fully explicit even by would-be correctional officers of criticism because of the collaboration involved in writing and publishing a book. The paratext remains partly a kind of academic unconscious, repressed, recurrent, and barely visible symptoms that are not necessarily hidden, secret, much less scandalous.[19] Negative reviews of a book and exchanges of letters between its author and its reviewer that may follow, sometimes with an apology from the journal's editor to the author in the case of an erring reviewer, or charges of plagiarism are only the most obvious and least interesting symptoms.[20] More noteworthy are repetitions of paratextual materials such as prefaces, audiocommentaries, and interviews in which discursive repetitions

become visibly aberrant if the dispersed paratexts are collected and read together. The uncanny repetitions that constitute the data of anec-notology have a nonlinear temporality and duration outside narration and are, therefore, not reducible either to historicist grand narratives or to anecdotes in the form of counter-memories. Similarly, the repairing of texts, especially by means of paratextual notes and prefaces, is not reducible to the elimination of errata since the corrected text still has a paratextual remainder that, as we shall see, always exceeds its corrective purpose. Moreover, the text or film itself has an errant relay from production to its destined (mis)readers or (mis)viewers. In addition to failing to correct what a book or film's author or director may regard as misreadings of a book or film, the paratext poses an even more fundamental problem, I will suggest, of unreading (or mis[sed]reading, and not seeing), rereading (or double reading, and reviewing), and cognitive value: the paratext is typically either overlooked or looked through as if it were transparent; few readers look at the copyright page, assuming it is insignificant. Yet many academic readers take certain parts of the paratext to be of the highest significance and value, looking first at the footnotes, index, and acknowledgments of new books in their fields of study before reading the text of these books.[21] Similarly, most film spectators tend not to watch the end credits of a film. I engage in a reading practice at once "ClosE UP" and "FAR Out," a practice of overreading that includes, out of reading over, again and again, zooming in and out not only from below or the margins, but from the sidelines of the page and DVD edition, even from off the screen and off the books, an unpublishable and invisible time and space between releases of a film or reprintings and reeditions of an article or book. My reading practice is neither temporally continuous nor spatially pure extension, however. I attend to the ontological cuts, break ups, cover ups, and recollections in a time outside of linear succession and archivalization, an invisibility within the usually invisible but potentially visible paratext and a time that haunts academic (re)publication and digital cinema, digital cinema considered not as the afterlife of celluloid cinema but as its afterdeaths.

In attending to the philological uncanny of film and historicist film criticism, I depart from academic norms and resist them- less in order to challenge what Theodor Adorno (1992) calls the "automatization and mechanization of . . . thought" (316) than in order to call attention to the mechanisms, some might call them the writing program, of now routine academic historicist practice. No critical practice escapes its fate of becoming programmatic, and one may detect a kind of mechanical rigidity in the form of dogmatic prescriptivism even in the most powerful humanist attempts to make explicit the assumptions and norms of various kinds of political or historical criticism so as to avoid repeating what seems to become an exhausted rhetorical strategy.[22] Nonetheless, at points of quiet, strange breakdown in the historicist program, the "tic" in the "programmatic" may be heard, leading (perhaps luring) one down a path that loops back and forth to the same (un)familiar and (un)predictable place in a kind of repetition compulsion

caught between the receding destinations of correctable, perhaps predictable, collection of errata at one end, and incorrigible, unexpected "erraticism," at the other. These poles are reversible: programs such as spellcheck, for example, miss errors, while human errors can become repetitive and mechanical, like a skip in a broken record. In this introduction, I discuss, albeit in self-consciously fragmentary form, elements of the philological uncanny, structured like a collapsed bridge over a big river, or, to adopt an analogy from visual media, like a series of film stills projected as slides that pop in and out, while the slide projector periodically breaks down and then starts again. Consider the present introduction, then, as a framework stoppage as I take you, reader, down a strange train of thought.

The Paratext and the Margins of Error

The philologist as editor repairs, emends, and restores the text through an apparatus located at the margins, what Gérard Genette (1988, 1997) calls the paratext, which he defines as "all of the marginal or supplementary data around the text. It comprises what one could call various thresholds: authorial and editorial (i.e., titles, insertions, dedications, epigraphs, prefaces, and notes); media related (i.e., interviews with the author, official summaries) and private (i.e., correspondence, calculated or noncalculated disclosures), as well as those related to the material means of production and reception, such as groupings, segments, etc." (163). The paratext, which also includes the book cover, copyright page, dedication, blurbs, and errata, in Genette's (1997) view, is "only an assistant, only an accessory of the text" (410) that functions to help the reader understand the author's meaning (408). Often the pragmatic function of the paratext, I would add, also performs a narratological function (by explaining the genesis of a work, for example) that potentially may either reinforce or derail the author's authority and credibility, especially when the framing narrative takes the form of an autobiographical anecdote.

The uncanniness of the paratext becomes clear if we put Genette's (1997) pragmatic poetics of the paratext in dialogue with Jacques Derrida's (1981a) deconstruction account of the preface as supplement. Genette concedes the difficulty of his own attempts to classify elements of the paratext, breaking it down into smaller and smaller elements.[23] According to Genette, the paratext is dynamic and its boundaries are, therefore, difficult to map:

> Less a well-defined category than a flexible space, without exterior boundaries or precise and consistent interiors, the paratext consists, as this ambiguous prefix suggests, of all of those things which we are never certain belong to the text of a work but which contribute to present—or to "presentify"—the text by making it into a book. It not only marks a zone of transition between text and non-text ("hors-texte"), but also a zone of transitions, a space that is essentially pragmatic and strategic.[24]

The mapping of this spatial zone is further complicated by the paratext's uneven temporality: beyond the fact that prefaces are often also postfaces

in that they are frequently written last, the paratext is subject to dispersion and (re)collection through republication. In successive editions of a text, parts of the epitext, writing published after a given book was published, become parts of the new edition of the book's peritext, writing that is included in the printed book (prefaces, acknowledgments, footnotes, index, and so on).

To be sure, the paratext is always historical in a very fundamental manner. Mentioning the publication dates of works in the paratext, Genette concludes that "it is indisputable that that historical awareness of the period in which a work was written is rarely immaterial to one's reading of that work" (7). Moreover, book prefaces often offer genetic criticism of the book itself in the form of intellectual autobiographies (in their DVD audiocommentaries, film directors similarly often speak of how a scene was made).[25] Yet Genette's account of the paratext is deeply at odds with genetic criticism, which assigns primacy to a moment in a book's printing history:

> What is oldest does not necessarily tell the truth about what is most recent, and the recovery of origins must not end up assigning any kind of hermeneutic privilege to what is earliest. Were that to happen, obviously we would be replacing the old finalist fetishism of the "last versions," looked on as the inevitable culmination and as superior by definition, with a new and even less well founded fetishism, a kind of archaizing cult of the literary *Ur-Suppe* [primal soup]. For the most important effect of the pre-text is perhaps the way in which genetic study, surrounding the "final" enormous mass of its past versions, confronts what the text is with what it was, with what it could have been, with what it almost became, thus . . . helping to relativize the notion of completion, to blur the "closure" that too much has been made of and to remove the aura of sacredness from the very notion of Text. If Jacques Petit's formula "The text does not exist" . . . serves the altogether salutary purpose of warning us that the work and the oeuvre are always to a greater or lesser extent in progress and that the cessation of this labor, like death itself, is always to some degree accidental. (402)

The antifoundational terminal and interminal temporality of the paratext (no closure provided by an origin or an end) is thus at odds with a linear, genetic narrative.

Genette (1997) adds that the aesthetic design of the paratext can sometimes derail its pragmatic function, self-consciously drawing attention to itself instead of the text and thereby creating what he calls a perverse "Jupien effect" (after a character in Marcel Proust's *Remembrance of Things Past*): "With this 'Jupien effect' of the too-tempting title we are surely verging on one of the ambiguities, paradoxes, or twisted effects of the paratext in general, an effect we will meet again, for example, in connection with the preface: procurer or not, the paratext is a relay and, like every relay, it may sometimes—if the author is too heavy-handed—impede and ultimately block the text's reception" (94; see also 234, 293, 327, and 410).[26] Yet, as we shall see, the pragmatic function of the paratext is inseparable from

its aesthetic design, and some degree of tension between function and design always haunts and threatens to disturb the paratext's capacity to serve as a relay; moreover, as we see in the case of the two DVD editions of Rossellini's *Francesco Giullare di Dio*, quite apart from the aesthetic design, the pragmatic, relay function of the DVD paratext may be delayed, deferred, and derailed rather than simply impeded due to its fragmentation and multiplication in different DVD editions of a given film.

The DVD and print paratext's pragmatic function is further complicated by the paradoxical way in which it must efface itself and go missing to serve its purpose. As Georg Stanitzek (2005) writes, "paratexts have the effect of promoting the unity of a text, but they can only accomplish this without hindrance when they are not read in the strict sense of the word as such, that is, when no questions are asked about details, when there are no inquiries into how they function, how they make references to circumstances of production or distribution or to other aspects" (34). Paratexts tend to remain transparent and even invisible, I would add, for a number of reasons ranging from the highly significant (taboo areas of academic practice that one intuits are not supposed to be discussed in print) to the apparently insignificant (areas of academic writing and publication that are not and cannot be fully rationalized). Their pragmatic purpose of helping the reader understand the author's intended meaning is undermined not only by the author's possible excessiveness but also by the way readers misread (or underread) the text by missing the paratext.

Genette's (1997) poetics and classifications of the paratext's functions and "destiny" (407) self-deconstruct as the paratext proliferates into increasingly fragmented subcategories that Genette arrests only arbitrarily and willfully through a quite witty and moralistic rhetoric of authorial responsibility; he attempts to divide ontologically good paratexts from bad ones ("one must resist temptation"; "procurer"; "heavy-handed"; "light touch"; and so on). Aesthetic judgment pronounced by the theorist reveals poetics itself to be a superparatextual supplement to the paratext, a kind of judicial aesthetics required to regulate the irregular and (dys)functional rule(s) of the paratext.

Citing and differing from Derrida's deconstructive account of the preface in "Outwork, Prefacing" in *Dissemination* (1981a), Genette (1997, 161–62) is "wary of rashly proclaiming that all is paratext" (407); Genette in practice ends up aligning his poetics with Derrida's deconstruction of the paratext as a textual fragment that involves further textual fragmenting in the form of endnotes, additional prefaces, and so on. In "Outwork, Prefacing," Derrida (1981a) comments that the preface is for Hegel a model and a norm based on a narrative of complete knowledge:

> The end of the preface, if such an end is possible, is the moment at which the exposition (*Darstellung*) and the sequential unfolding of the concept, in its self-movement, begin to overlap according to an *a priori* synthesis: there would then be no more discrepancy between production and exposition,

> only a presentation of the concept by itself, in its own words, its own voice, in its logos. No more anteriority or belatedness of form, no more exteriority of content; tautology and heterology would be coupled together in the speculative proposition. (30–31)

For Hegel, Derrida (1981a) says, "the philosophical encyclopedia, which conveys the organic and rational unity of knowledge, is not, in contrast to what is sold today under that title, an empirical aggregate of contents" (47). Hegel's prefaces proliferate rather than end by performing a capstone function. Paratextual fragmentation is inevitable in any encyclopedia given that the paratext always takes the form of a fragmentary supplement that frames the text. Yet Derrida's own account of Hegel takes a Genettian (even Hegelian) form of a poetics of the paratext as Derrida collects and classifies and subdivides Hegel's prefaces into an increasingly unified and encyclopedic account of the preface. In terms of cinema and new media, we may say that an unresolvable and dialectical tension, to put it in somewhat crude binary terms, between Derridean antiencyclopedic deconstruction and Genettian encyclopedic poetics emerges due to ontological changes in the cinematic object that continue to follow from its digitalization: phenomenological questions about the cinematic paratext will always trump and outstrip questions of poetics because new cinematic phenomena require not only further classifications but also descriptions of alterations in the ontology of both the digitalized cinematic object and its paratexts.

How the philological uncanniness of the paratext's fragmentation and (re)collection arises from what Genette calls its "threshold" function (the original French title of Genette's book *Paratexts* is *Seuils* [thresholds]) and its irreducibility to the author's self-consciousness or (lack of) taste may be further elucidated by a comment from Heidegger on the threshold as a site of both painful separation and binding. In "Language," an essay on Georg Trakl's "A Winter Evening," Heidegger (1971a) comments on the line "pain has turned the threshold to stone" as follows:

> The threshold is the ground-beam that bears the doorway as a whole. It sustains the middle in which the two, the outside and the inside, penetrate each other. The threshold bears the between. What goes out and goes in, in the between, is joined in the between's dependability. The dependability of the between needs something that can endure, and it is in this sense hard. The threshold, as the settlement of the between, is hard because pain has petrified it. . . . But what is pain? Pain rends. It is the rift. But it does not tear apart into dispersive fragments. Pain indeed tears asunder, it separates, yet so that at the same time it draws everything to itself, gathers to itself. Its rending, as a separating that gathers, is at the same time the drawing which, like the pen-drawing of a plan or sketch, draws and joins together what is held apart in separation. Pain is the joining agent in the rending that divides and gathers. Pain is the joining of the rift. The joining is the threshold. It settles the between, the middle of the two that are separated in it. Pain joins the rift of the difference. Pain is the dif-ference itself. (201–2)[27]

As the framing threshold, a defined territory the boundaries of which are nevertheless indeterminate, the paratext is the tear in the repair that, from a given perspective, may always be shown to follow from the repair of the tear.[28]

The Frame and New Media

"Only art history still knows that the famed geniuses of the Renaissance did not just create paintings and buildings, but calculated fortresses and constructed war machines," Friedrich Kittler (1999) writes. In his account of the military-entertainment complex, Kittler maintains that innovations in communications technologies and data storage mechanism are always driven by war. Freudian psychoanalysis arose from Freud's treatment of wounded and shell-shocked soldiers of World War I (Rickels 2002; 76–78). In a moment of crisis of the present U.S. neoliberal regime of globalization, digital media, and endless war, or what Naomi Klein has called "disaster capitalism" (2007), framing itself becomes a problem. The desire for a frame arises most urgently in the wake of a disaster. Any historicizing of catastrophe will be, as Jürgen Habermas (Berradori 2003) and Jacques Derrida (Berradori 2003) separately note in joint interviews on 9/11, a retrospective framing to come, and through what Derrida calls a mediatic loop. The trauma of return initiates an endless, pathless series of repetitions in which the ability to frame the past becomes a problem, a problem especially apparent in the paratext, itself often serving as a kind of narrative frame for the text that works potentially like a revolving door for the reader.

What I take to be a paratextual problem of framing is also a narratological problem of beginning, of determining what is new about new media. For Frederic Jameson (1992), the JFK assassination was new, "an inaugural event," because of its relation to television:

> Suddenly, and for a brief moment (which lasted, however, several days), television showed what it could really do and what it really meant—a prodigious new display of synchronicity and a communicational situation that amounted to a dialectical leap over anything hitherto suspected. Later events of this kind were then recontained by sheer mechanical technique (as with the instant playbacks of the Reagan shooting or the Challenger disaster, which, borrowed from commercial sports, expertly emptied these events of their content). (355)

Yet Jameson's sequential narrative, beginning with JFK and television as an inaugural event that Americans misrecognized as a national trauma (it was really a fully utopian moment, but it was emptied out by its mediatic repetition), is open to question as a myth of presence that divides the human, fully present original from its secondary and absent mechanical recording.

The resistance of the philological uncanny and anec-notology to sequential and linear narratives of media and national trauma will become

clearer if we turn to Erich Auerbach's *Mimesis* (1953, 2003). Written in exile, as Auerbach explains in his epilogue, his book is structured as a double loop: in the middle of the last chapter of *Mimesis*, devoted to the modernist novel and, in part, to its relation to cinema, Auerbach returns to his discussion in the first chapter: "Other times and places are in question; it is an excursus of the same type as the story of the origin of Odysseus's scar, which was discussed in the first chapter of this book" (538). Similarly, Auerbach's closing comments on the rise of fascism (548, 550) loop back to his initial discussion of National Socialism in the first chapter (19–20).[29] Auerbach's discussion of the framework in the last chapter (537–41) echoes his similar discussion of the frame in the first chapter (19, 21). And Auerbach doubles back yet again at the end of the epilogue (557) when amplifying these comments on his own work and providing a more overarching explanation of the genesis of his book. Rather than reinforcing Auerbach's opposition in the first chapter between the paratactic, horizontal, and transparent narrative of the Homeric epic and hypotactic, vertical, and enigmatic narrative of the Bible, these digressive loops disturb it by dropping out the narrative mode of realism Auerbach favors, namely, the Biblical, hidden, and vertical.

What counts as new, or even the desire for the new, is not reducible to the accumulation and circulation of academic cultural capital (the production of work preceded by predictable adjectives such as "cutting edge," "groundbreaking," and so on). As Peter Krapp (2006) observes, "new" media emerge as a paradox, or as a déjà vu effect, presented both as a revolutionary break and as a continuation of the same old, same old: "The fundamental question raised by hypertext [is] how to explain the anachronism of claiming precursors and forefathers while by the same token representing a radical departure. It is a curious side-effect of positing such a paradigm shift that the logic of the break is applied to itself, and suddenly with hindsight, it is as if everyone knew it along: as hypertext is hyped, what is supposedly superseded turns into hypertext *avant la lettre*" (360).[30] As Krapp points out, philologists too use hypertext to produce editions of medieval and early modern texts.[31]

Speed: The (S)Low Down

In a C-Span "Booknotes" interview televised on October 13, 2004 about *Will in the World*, Stephen Greenblatt differentiates between the different speeds entailed by having his students watch Shakespeare videos and having them read Shakespeare's plays. Responding to a question from host Brian Lamb about how he teaches Shakespeare, Greenblatt says, "one of the pleasures of Shakespeare is there are a million different ways of getting into these plays. I have my students often look at versions of the play, videos. I have my students sometimes act out things, but mostly we sit and look carefully, try to slow down."[32]

Slow reading (equally possible to do with film on video or DVD, and the printed page) has a philological pedigree. Friedrich Nietzsche (1886/1992), in the preface to the second edition of his *The Dawn*: *Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality*, writes:

> This preface is late, but not too late← what, after all, do five or six years matter? A book like this, a problem like this, is in no hurry; we both, I just as much as my book, are friends of *lento*. It is not for nothing that I have been a philologist, perhaps I am a philologist still, that is to say, a teacher of slow reading: in the end I also write slowly. Nowadays it is not only my habit, it is also my taste—a malicious taste, perhaps?—no longer to write anything which does not reduce to despair every sort of man who is "in a hurry." For philology is that venerable art which demands of its votaries one thing above all: to go aside, to take time, to become still, to become slow—it is a goldsmith's art and connoisseurship of the *word* which has nothing but delicate, cautious work to do and achieves nothing if it does not achieve it *lento*. (5)

The uncanniness of Nietzsche's preface resides not only in the slowness he advocates or even in the belatedness of the publication of his book but also and primarily in the preface that introduces its republication. The saving preface was saved for later, as it were: the repair work of self-explanation and self-justification entails delay and a deferral of reading; the belated paratext is a chance for a redo, a makeover, that is meant to go unnoted as such by the reader whom Nietzsche asks to read him well.

Foreign Returns

Nietzsche's use of the Italian word "lento" (slow) alerts us to another feature of our presentation of the philological uncanny: the practice of using foreign words in one's own writing to create obstacles to reading, producing a kind of shock or crash, a sense of estrangement as the reader runs into them while confidently driving along a seemingly familiar highway. The foreign is not confined to words imported from another language but arises as well from within any given language. In "Literature and Life," Gilles Deleuze (1997) writes that literature opens up "a kind of foreign language within language" (5). For Deleuze, moreover, the foreign is not limited to words, but to syntax as well. It is the form itself that is foreign: "The creation of words and neologisms is worth nothing apart from the effects of syntax in which they are developed. . . . Through the creation of syntax, [literature] brings about not only a decomposition or destruction of the maternal language, but also the invention of a new language within language" (5).

The shock of using foreign words and syntax can produce on the speaker blowback effects of outrage, however, that can then be reabsorbed by the speaker retrospectively as pedagogical scenes. Adorno (1991) begins his essay "Words from Abroad," for example, by relating a story about letters of outrage he received from listeners after he gave a radio broadcast

entitled "Short Commentaries on Proust"—that was the first time, he says, since his youth he had gotten such a response. He maintains that his essay had few foreign words but explains the hostile response in terms of his syntax, which "may sound more foreign than the vocabulary." Hence, Adorno concludes, "swimming against the stream . . . to capture the intended pattern precisely, and that takes pains to fit complex conceptual relationships into the existing framework of syntax, may arouse outrage because they require effort" (185). Adorno confirms this point by telling an autobiographical anecdote:

> I have had this kind of experience since my childhood, when old Dreibus, a neighbor who lived on my street, attacked me in a rage as I was conversing harmlessly in the streetcar on my way to school: "You goddamned little devil! Shut up with your High German and learn to speak German properly." I had scarcely recovered from the fright Herr Dreibus gave me when he was brought home in a pushcart not long afterwards, completely intoxicated, and it was probably not much later that he died. He was the first to teach me what *Rancune* [from the French, meaning rancor or spite] was, a word that has no proper native equivalent in German, unless one were to confuse it with *Ressentiment* [resentment], currently enjoying an unfortunate popularity in Germany but which was likewise imported rather than invented by Nietzsche. In short, it is a case of sour grapes; outrage over foreign words is to be explained in terms of the psychic state of the one who is angry, for whom some grapes are hanging too high. (185–86)

In Adorno's (1991) anecdote, which closes with a *mimina moralistic* psychoanalysis of the Other, we may begin to see more clearly the psychoanalytic dimensions of the philological uncanny as well as the philological dimensions of psychoanalysis.

Freud experiences the uncanny even while traveling, twice relating autobiographical anecdotes of his own experiences in "The Uncanny," (1919, *SE* 17), one of which involves him jumping up from his seat to correct a stranger's mistake as the train car lurches and a door opens, in a footnote:

> I was sitting alone in my *wagon-lit* compartment when a more than usually violent jolt of the train swung back the door of the dining washing-cabinet, and an elderly gentleman in a dressing gown and a traveling cap came in. I assumed that in leaving the washing-cabinet, which lay between the two compartments, he had taken the wrong direction and come into my compartment by mistake. Jumping up with the intention of putting him right, I at once realized to my dismay that the intruder was nothing but my own reflection in the looking-glass on the open door. I can still recollect that I thoroughly disliked his appearance. Instead, therefore, of being *frightened* by our "doubles," both Mach and I simply failed to recognize them as such. Is it not possible, though, that our dislike of them was a vestigial trace of the archaic reaction which feels the "double" to be something uncanny? (*SE* 17, 248n. 1)

Adorno's (1991) autobiographical story of traveling by streetcar involves a similarly shocking estrangement ("a not so funny thing happened to me on my way to school . . . "); repetition (three versions of the same story: Adorno's experience as an adult; his experience as a child; and a lecture Adorno gave in America that although had no foreign words at all in it elicited the same angry response); and an autobiographical, retroactive recall that in Adorno's case takes the form of getting high (cultured), thereby jump-starting his essay by going off, making a splash.

Fragment(ation): The Tear in the Repair

The reparative impulse in philology comes out of the tear, a moment of crisis that produces the textual and cinematic fragment by breaking with the media of the past, leaving a screen memory, a scar, a wound that will be reopened. One thinks here, of course, of Erich Auerbach's (1953/2003) practice of reading fragments of canonical literary at random in *Mimesis*, written under the long shadow of fascism. In the preface "Rigorous Study of Art" to an art history yearbook published in 1933 (the year Hitler came to power); Walter Benjamin (1988), writing under a pseudonym, similarly celebrates a new kind of art history devoted to the strange, the margins, and the insignificant that

> stands to gain more from the insight that the more crucial the works are, the more inconspicuously and intimately their meaning content is tied to their material content. It is concerned with what gives rise to reciprocal illumination between . . . the historical process and radical change and . . . the accidental, external, and even strange aspects of the artwork. . . . It is precisely in the investigation of the marginal case that the material contents reveal their key component most decisively . . . the images are submitted to a descriptive technique that succeeds in establishing the most revealing facts in this unexpected marginal realm. (88–89)

The philological uncanny here engages a modernist critical and aesthetic practice with affinities for psychoanalysis. For psychoanalysis too involves fragments, wounds, not only in Freud's theoretical formulations about the uncanny and the repetition compulsion arising from the wound of castration (body parts such as the eyes, fingers, hands, and so on) but also in his philological practice of reading in detail. In *Moses and Michelangelo* (1914, *SE* 13), Freud observes a similarity between his own method of psychoanalysis and the method of art history practiced by the Russian art historian Ivan Lermolief, the pseudonym of the Italian physician Giovanni Morelli, who "insist[ed] that attention should be diverted from the general impression and the main features of a picture, and by laying stress on the significance of minor details . . . It seems to me that his method of inquiry is closely related to the technique of psychoanalysis. It too, is accustomed to divine secret and concealed things from despised or unnoticed features, from the rubbish-heap, as it were, of our observations"

(*SE* 13, 211–40).[33] Freud's 1910 essay "On the Antithetical Meaning of Primal Words" (*SE* 11, 153–62) is itself a work of philology, and "The Uncanny" begins with a long philological discussion of the meanings of the antithetical primary word "uncanny": "*Heimlich*," Freud writes, "is a word the meaning of which develops towards an ambivalence, until it finally coincides with its opposite, *unheimlich*" (*SE* 17, 226). The digitalization of cinema demands a reading not only of disparate cinematic and paratextual fragments but also, and more crucially, of the explosive process of fragmentation in its uncanny temporality. Like Freud's timeless unconcious, which "shows" itself only indirectly in pathological, everyday time as symptoms, the process of fragmentation stands outside time, "showing" itself only in the form of time-released fragments left behind.

How Not to Be (Un)Read: Hearsay, the Anecdote, and (Im)Mediacy

In his anecdotes about the hostile response he got for using foreign words, Adorno (1991) does not notice that in both occasions, the response involved listening rather than reading. Moreover, he doesn't take note of the difference in transmission of his voice, the first time through the then new medium of the radio, the second time on the not so new transportation system of the streetcar. The one medium serves as the relay and recall of the more immediate but still networked transmission of voice and listener/writer and speaker/reader. The uncanniness of Adorno's philological and autobiographical anecdotes (in an essay on a philological topic) tells us something not only about the relation between voice, media, memory, and foreign words and syntax but also about the anecdote and travel. The anecdote arises through a double relay or transit system: a story about being on the way, the anecdote, like rumor, gossip, and hearsay, bears the stamp of oral performance at one remove, often repeating what someone else said before. The anecdote, especially in autobiographical form, has a compulsive tendency to generate paratexts, particularly letters to the editor and even articles (Foucault 1971a and 1971b) in response to reviews of the author's books and interviews, sometimes a repetitive series of them, in which the author tries to set the record straight (sometimes in new anecdotes) about what she or he said, didn't say, should have said, and so on. A title of an interview with Jacques Derrida (1983) says it all: "Excuse Me, But I Never Said Exactly So: Yet Another Interview."

Philology, Modernism, and Film: The Threshold of the (In)Visible

In his study of the history of philology, *Error and the Academic Self*, Seth Lerer (2002a) connects philologists such as Auerbach and Leo Spitzer, among other émigrés who taught in the United States after fleeing Nazi

Germany, to the character Dr. Morbius (Walter Pidgeon), who is twice identified as a philologist in the science-fiction film *Forbidden Planet* (dir. Fred M. Wilcox, 1956) and explains, near the end of the film, the meaning of an "obsolete word," namely, Freud's "id." Auerbach (1953/2003) links his practice of reading fragments of canonical literary works with the modern novel and cinema in the concluding chapter of *Mimesis*. He does not link them in a predictable chronological order, however, as does Slavoj Žižek (2003), who writes that

> a whole series of narrative procedures in nineteenth-century novels announce not only the standard narrative cinema (the intricate use of "flash-back" in Emily Bronte or of "cross-cutting" and "close ups" in Dickens)—as if a new perception of life were already here, but was still struggling to find is proper means of articulation until it finally found it in cinema. What we have here is thus the historicity of a kind of *future antérieur* (future perfect): it is only when cinema arrived and developed its standard procedures that we could really grasp the narrative logic of Dickens' great novels or of *Madame Bovary*. (39)

Auerbach's (1953/2003) account of the modern novel and film is both more complicated and more, well, novel: the modern novel does not try to exploit and imitate "the structural possibilities of film"; rather, Auerbach maintains, film itself is more novelistic than the novel in its ability to condense space and time (546). Auerbach's turn to film arises in the context of a discussion of the modern novel that is already cinematic in attending to what he repeatedly calls "the framing occurrence" and "exterior occurrence" (537, 538, 540, 541) that "cuts loose" and releases ideas so that they "may range freely through the depths of time." Much as blindness is at the center of Freud's uncanny and the enigmatic realism favored by Auerbach, cinema emerges in philology as an excursion, at moments of near invisibility and inaudibility, in the inconspicuous, the marginal, the insignificant, the opaque, the "inapparent" (Derrida 1994), the disappearing, the noisy, the nearly mute, and in fragments and sound effects cut loose by the frame that also binds.[34]

Herrorsy

The philological uncanny taps into historicism as hauntology and into politics as monotheistic political theology. "'Fremdwörter' (foreign words) are the Jews of language," Adorno writes (1945/1974, 110).[35] The history of philology is inseparable from the history of Judaism and Christianity. The correction of errors in early modern books is driven by the desire to correct religious heresy, however, as defined by Catholicism and Protestantism.[36] The practice of modern, apparently secular philology emerges, out of various kinds of estranging travels, some voluntarily and some forced, as Lerer (2002a) and other scholars have noted, due to European anti-Semitism and fascism. Error is not reducible to heresy, however, even during times of

crisis. In his laudatory introduction to the fiftieth anniversary edition of Auerbach's *Mimesis* (1953/2003), Edward Said observes that "Auerbach's Jewishness is something one can only speculate about since, in his usually reticent way, he does not refer to it directly" (xvii). Said then proceeds artfully to draw parallels between Auerbach's book, especially the chapters related to Christianity, and his negotiations between the Jewish and European (hence Christian) components of his identity. Moreover, in its desire for a restored text, philology passes beyond a purely secular practice into a technical practice that locates a ghost or spirit (re)animating a machine.

Managing Your Expectations

The philological uncanny also involves the random and expected, which may be marvelous, as in the "unexpected marginal realm" opened up by the new art history Walter Benjamin (1988) celebrates, or unwelcome, as when Freud recognizes his own image on the train window. The unexpected often arises in a threshold moment, where a door is left ajar (89). At the end of "Moses and Michelangelo," for example, Freud differentiates his own analysis from that of his precursor Watkiss Loyd, who "closes the door to a conception like ours which, by examining certain insignificant details, has arrived at an unexpected interpretation of the meaning and aim of the figure as a whole" (*SE* 13, 148). Freud does not close the door, however, now that he has apparently arrived at the unexpected; rather, he concludes his essay by wondering if he has in fact arrived at all, or if he too hasn't erred, "strayed on to a wrong path," and "taken too seriously a view of details which were nothing to the art" (148). The unexpected here appears less as the self-congratulatory interpretation itself than as the way Freud's metaphor of a door that closes interpretation out but remains permanently unlocked. Similarly, Auerbach (1953/2003) makes metacritical comments on the resemblance between the randomness of his own critical practice and the modernist novel's randomness as a digression in the last chapter of *Mimesis*: "there is confidence that in any random fragment plucked from the course of a life at any time the totality of its fate is contained and can be portrayed. . . . I see the possibility of success and profit in letting myself be guided by a few motifs . . . these basic motifs in history of the representation of reality . . . must be demonstrable in any random modernist text" (547, 548). In "Words from Abroad," Adorno (1991) similarly links the foreign and freedom with disciplinary expectations: "If one . . . conceives philosophy as a mode of consciousness that does not let the boundaries of a specific discipline be forced upon it, one gains the freedom to use words originating in the domain of philosophy where conventional usage does not expect philosophy" (196).

Perhaps unexpected in Auerbach's (2007) philology is not only his interest in film but also his interest in modernism. Auerbach's brother-in-law was Raoul Hausmann, the founder of Dada, and Auerbach mentions him in

some of his letters to Walter Benjamin.[37] In his essay on surrealism, Benjamin (1999d) regards Auerbach as a surrealist medievalist, linking André Breton's discussion of courtly love and Louis VII in *Nadja* with a discussion of the same topic by "a recent author" who gives "surprisingly exact information on Provencal love poetry, which comes surprisingly close to the surrealist conception of love," namely "Erich Auerbach" (210). Benjamin then rhymes a quotation from Auerbach's "excellent *Dante*: *Poet of the Secular World*" (210) with a quotation from Breton's *Nadja* in the sentence before Benjamin mentions Auerbach.

Wait for It . . . Strangers on a Train . . . of . . . Thought

Along with the unexpected and déjà vu, philological repetitions and loops produce a nonlinear temporality that ironizes narrative sequences (histories that are understood to start at one point, progress to another, and then stop) in the form of anecdotes. Consider a rather Kafkaesque anecdote Heidegger (1995) tells in *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* about boredom induced by our being forced to wait for the train that "has not yet arrived" (103). Here Nietzsche's virtuous slowness becomes an oppressive drag, a slowing of time we want to drive away:

> We are sitting, for example, at the tasteless station of some lonely minor railway. It is four hours until the next train arrives. The district is unattractive. We do have a book in our rucksack, though—shall we read? No. Or think through a problem, some question? We are unable to. We read the timetables or study the tables giving the various distances from this station to other places we are not otherwise acquainted with at all. We look at the clock—only a quarter of an hour has gone by. Then we go out on the main road. We walk up and down, just to have something to do. But it is of no use. Then we count the trees along the main road, look at our watch again—exactly five minutes since we last looked at it. Fed up with walking back and forth, we sit down on a stone, draw all kinds of figures in the sand, and in doing so catch ourselves looking at our watch yet again—half an hour—and so on. (96)[38]

Heidegger's (1995) story has its uncanny elements. The "we" who wait become increasingly mechanical, repetitively, compulsively, and involuntarily looking at mechanisms that keep time.[39] Moreover, Heidegger earlier in the essay takes a psychoanalytic and philological turn as he questions the meaning of the German word for boredom, *Langweil*: "Boredom, long time: especially in Allemannic usage it is no accident that 'to have long time' means the same as 'to be homesick.' In this German usage, if someone has long-time for . . . this means he is homesick . . . is this accidental . . . ? Profound boredom—a homesickness" (80). Heidegger also considers that we have to wait not because the train is late but because we have erred: it is "simply our fault for having arrived too early, because we

were mistaken about the timetable" (103). Moreover, boredom, like the uncanny, contains its opposite meaning, calmness [*Gelassenheit*]: far from being only an oppressive drag, boredom attunes us to the essence of things that leave us at peace: "Strange! . . . This strange intertwining of our passing the time and becoming bored itself—does this point to the fact that this boredom is 'more profound'?" (113).

Strange, indeed. Is it an accident that Heidegger not only sounds like Freud here in speaking of homesickness, a mistake, mechanisms, and so on, but also seems to be more Freudian than Freud in his autobiographical anecdote about seeing his image on a train? For Freud, the uncanny is related to the stranger on a train, the shock of being moved around unexpectedly on a train that one cannot stop. Heidegger goes Freud one better. Now the uncanny arises in a moment prior to train travel, the moment of waiting to get on the train that has yet to arrive. Yet this waiting does not stop Heidegger's "we" from going on automatic or keep him from verging on turning himself into a joke. Indeed, Heidegger's story is as much about the problem of stopping as it is about starting.[40] Shock effects induced by forced waiting, by virtue of becoming visibly automatic, come close to being schlock effects.[41]

Time's Up: Stuck in Schtick Drive

To start a revolution, Walter Benjamin wanted to stop the train.[42] The revolution in the form of a sealed train that brought V.I. Lenin from Switzerland to Finland Station in 1917 in his own compartment with the windows all closed was not for Benjamin. Not for me either. I share Benjamin's many interests in the fragment and in the machine that breaks down. Unlike Heidegger (1977)—for whom technology is a destructive threat to nature, a means of shrinking geographical distances between humans that creates new distances, shrinking the world picture and making us deaf: "our hearing and seeing are perishing through radio and film under technology" (48)—Benjamin finds liberating effects in the destruction of the auratic work of art by the age of technology, especially in film, arising from the arresting attention of the shock.[43] Similarly, in a 1928 essay entitled "The Cultural History of Toys," Benjamin (1999a) develops an aesthetic that in his definition of play involves not using toys as they are supposed to be used according to the instructions; play means not following directions and instead doing something differently with something designed to be used another way and thereby rendering that thing useless (116).[44] (One of the meanings of *Zeug*, the German word for "toy," is "junk," or "useless stuff.")

Let us return to Freud a last time for now, the last word on stopping technology and play, so that we may map the opposition between foreign and native words, already under pressure from neologisms, onto an opposition between the language of children and the language of adults. In an essay on toys, Benjamin (1999a) channels an aspect of Freud's "*fort/da*" [there/gone].

anecdote illustrating repetition compulsion in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (*SE* 18), namely, that the very young child does not spin the top as it is supposed to be used or drag it along and play with it as a carriage but instead throws it away and then retrieves it in a game of disappearance and return (14–16). Freud's account brings in a philological aspect of this game, namely, the initially incomprehensible word. Freud writes that as the child threw the top over his crib, he "gave vent to a loud, long drawn out 'o-o-o-o', accompanied by an expression of satisfaction. His mother and the writer of the present account were agreed in thinking that this was not a mere interjection but represented the German word 'fort.' I eventually realized that it was a game and that the only use he made of his toys was to play 'gone' with them" (14–15). In a footnote he adds that "a further observation subsequently confirmed this interpretation fully. One day the child's mother had been away several hours and on her return was met with the words 'Baby o-o-o-o!' which was at first incomprehensible." Child's play as misuse too involves an uncannily double, paratextually supplemented scene of adult reading as delay, of hearing and translating a sound as an initially incomprehensible representation of a word located in transit between noise and language, the absent father at the "fwont" (16) or front of World War I.[45]

I have no ambition to delay the train further or to stop it. I invite you, strange(r) reader, to get on the strange train of thought of this book and turn now to medieval and early modern film. Be not afeared. Although we will have occasion to take detours away from medieval and early modern films into the sword and sandals film epic and historical films concerned with other periods, the wheels will not come off. Please know in advance, though, that the train will never have left the station.

Chapter 1

The Medieval and Early Modern Cinematographosphere: De-composing Paratexts, Media Analogues, and the Living Dead Hands of Surrealism, Psychoanalysis, and New Historicism

I would just mention in passing that you really have to be a student in my seminar—by which I mean someone especially alert—to find something in the spectacle of Fellini's La Dolce Vita. *The things I say are calculated to emphasize a certain mirage, which is, in effect, the only one aimed at in the series of cinematographic images referred to. But it isn't reached anywhere except at one single moment. That is to say at the moment when early in the morning among the pines on the edge of the beach, the jet-setters suddenly begin to move again after having remained motionless and almost disappearing from the vibration of the light; they begin to move toward some goal that pleased a great many of you, since you associated it with my famous Thing, which in this instance is some disgusting object that has been caught by a net in the sea. Thank goodness, that hadn't yet been seen at the moment I am referring to. Only the jet-setters start to walk, they remain almost always as invisible, just like statues moving among trees painted by Uccello. It is a rare and unique moment. . . . It happens right at the end.*

—Jacques Lacan, "The Splendor of Antigone"

There is no reversion to the old; rather, the newest as semblance and phantasmagoria, is itself the old.

—Theodor Adorno, "Letter to Walter Benjamin," 1935

The medium through which works of art continue to influence later ages is always different from the one in which they affect their own age. Moreover, in those later times its impact on older works constantly changes, too. Nevertheless,

the medium is always relatively fainter than what influenced contemporaries at the time it was created.

—Walter Benjamin, fragment written in 1920 and unpublished in Benjamin's lifetime

Perhaps the oldest criticism in the history of film theory is that film and photography could not be art because they were technology: an automatic inscription of images without the intervention of a human hand.

—Paolo Usai, The Death of Cinema

Performatting: Shock Jacques

In a late interview on the topic of the transition from paper to digitalization of print media conducted shortly before his death, Jacques Derrida adopts the neologism of the "graphosphere" to describe paper as a multimedia screen. Derrida's (2005) graphosphere is not confined to writing on paper:

> What belongs to the graphosphere always implies some kind of surface, and even the materiality of some kind of backing or support; but not all graphemes are necessarily imprinted on paper, or even on a skin, photographic film, or a piece of parchment. . . . There are of course a great deal many competing models [with the medium of paper] (whether more technical ones—optical, as I said, like a photographic apparatus or a microscope; graphic, like the writing-pad; or more "natural"—mnemic or biographical or genetico-biographical traces, with the support being a person's body; going right back to Freud's first writings). These "models" can sometime, though, not always, do without paper, but they all belong to . . . the "graphosphere." (48, 51)

For Derrida, the "graph" is an umbrella term for a broadly defined practice of mediatic inscription, ranging from the graphic to the photographic and to the cinematic. Derrida's widely defined graphosphere presumably would include alphabetic letters that make up what Tom Conley (1991a, 2007a, b) calls the "graphic unconscious" and "film hieroglyphs" to include as well the extramimetic "marks" of cinematic inscription that Tom Cohen (2005) calls "cryptonomies."

Why then do I bother to replace Derrida's neologism with another, the "cinematographosphere"? And why do I turn specifically to medieval and early modern film and media? By using the term cinematographosphere, I want to extend Derrida's deconstruction even further and break up the presumptive unity of the overarching term "graphosphere" and its subordination of image to text by focusing on the interfacing text and image, media, and media installations, particularly at the paratextual margins of film.[1] My specific focus on the medieval and early modern cinematographosphere and media is strategic in addressing the place of cinematic, mobile

writing in film theory and the prehistory of cinema: by turning to what is generally regarded as "old" media of the Middle Ages and Renaissance, I rethink analogies between film and its precursors, considering both discontinuities and continuities between the operative technologies in early modern, modern, and postmodern regimes of vision.[2] Analogies do not necessarily imply a teleology of the prehistory or archaeology of cinema. As Tom Gunning (2000) observes, "the field should no longer be called (as it often was in the 1970s) the protocinematic because it extends through the centuries and includes a complex culture of projected and technological images that was not simply waiting for cinema to appear and perfect it" (xx). Manovich (2001) observes along similar lines that "we no longer think of the cinema as a march toward a single possible language, or as a progression toward a perfect verisimilitude" (8). The cinematographosphere is the arena of ontological fragmentation rather than convergence, of interference and static as much as clarity and transparency: the past and present emerge not only through visual and graphic matches and analogies between new and older media but also as matches and analogies fail. The recourse to the metaphor of a bridge and to analogy in Kant's discussion of painting and the parergon, or frame, as Derrida (1987) observes, occurs at the moment in which the concept of the frame becomes difficult for Kant to articulate. This breakdown, as we saw in the introduction, generates an uncanny déjà vu sense of new media as the return of the old reviewed as the always already new. I propose in this chapter that the terms "living" media and "dead" media are better suited to describe a dynamic of the deaths of cinema in (non)successive, looping reanimated and de-animated media recordings and projections.

I also turn to medieval and early modern film and media to engage recent work by medievalists and Renaissance scholars that has focused on the premodern and early modern subject (and sometimes also on the academic self). Scholarship in the past few decades theorizing medieval and early modern media subjectivity, whether historicist or psychoanalytic, has tended to focus on what was then contemporary media and their circulation or installations: manuscripts, maps, the printed book, library collections, perspective painting, wonder cabinets, anatomy theaters, the "computer," and so on. Though sometimes at odds, the varied programs of historicizing, psychoanalyzing, or queering the subject, especially the premodern or self-fashioned early modern subject, assume narrative sequence and succession, albeit in the form of a small scale anecdote rather than the *grand narrative*.[3] Modern film and media related to the Middle Ages and Renaissance remain largely ignored, confined to passing analogy or cordoned off as an imaginary, largely because film is assumed, quite reasonably, a modern rather than premodern or early modern medium (a less rational resistance to film among medievalists and Renaissance scholars may arise from a residual print-based philological iconoclasm as well as a residual modernist denigration of film, assuming it to be a debased lowbrow medium).[4] Perhaps even more crucially at stake is the recuperation of an active and

interiorizing subject through an emphasis on a materialist notion of graphic culture that delimits the machine and error to a particular stage in the process of transmission and production.[5] The place of historicism and its capacity to produce reality effects are secure as long as the machine is exteriorized from subjective memory. Film puts this unexamined assumption about the exteriority of the mechanical recording and the interiorization of human memory into question, revealing automatic repetitions and errors inscribed in historicism and its desire to preempt and thereby forget psychoanalysis by placing it in a sequential order of succession (first the early modern, then psychoanalysis).[6]

By using the medieval and early modern cinematographosphere to juxtapose film theory and film history with premodern and early modern studies, I want dialectically to raise a series of related questions about the ways in which the paratexts of film and media make the medieval and early modern past visible and legible, on the one hand, and, on the other, help make visible and legible the uncanny, programmatic repetitions that at once enable and estrange prevailing historicist and psychoanalytic (whether Lacanian or Laplanchian) critical practices: How does the paratext put into motion both the programs of historical films and academic discourse about history and film? How and what stops these programs? How are they restarted, and by whom or what? How is their repetition driven by a cognitive problem of visibility and intelligibility, a problem also driven by a desire to see, hear, and read better? What kinds of reserves and storage mechanisms relay instructions for (ab)use? How are these biomechanisms framed and encrypted in film and academic discourse? How does film put into question historicist assumptions about reference, the real, and narrative succession? How might attention to errant writing in cinematic paratexts open up productive resistances between historicism and psychoanalysis?

To pursue these questions in this chapter, I discuss the opening and end title sequences of a number of medieval and early modern historical films, focusing on the relation between the hand and automation: the hand in the act of writing, and writing appearing as titles; a hand turning pages of a book, a book turning pages by itself; puppets moving by themselves, humans moving the puppets; the human hand and the animal hand as director. Not all of the films I discuss in the present chapter are set in the Middle Ages or the Renaissance. Some are examples of movie medievalism (Burt 2007c) and some employ the medieval or early modern era as a framing prologue. Only a few of the films are explicitly surrealist. This conjunction of varied films, a montage effect of shocking juxtaposition, however, is meant to produce uncanny surrealist historicist effects. My collection of these films is also meant to resemble a Renaissance cabinet of cinematic curiosities and, as we shall see, what Adorno (1935/1977) characterizes as "the collector who liberates things from the curse of being useful" (113).

To clarify why I adopt the phrase "living dead media," instead of the more commonly used terms old and new media, I turn to the spectral hand in

Bram Stoker's Dracula (dir. Francis Ford Coppola, 1992) and *Mad Love* (dir. Karl Freund, 1935). Both films repeat scenes from their opening title sequences and prologue to link the hand to automation, error, and the uncanny. I then turn to the Quay Brothers' surrealist stop-motion animation film documentary *Anamorphosis* (1991) to examine how its recessive, theatricalized cinematic paratext and puppets pop open a series of "decomposing" analogies between instructional book, art history source book, Renaissance anamorphic paintings, and film. (By "de-composing," I mean a serial process of transformation of a given medium in which composition follows from decomposition, reconstruction from deconstruction.) From the film rendered as a pop-up book paratext by the Quay Brothers, I return to the hand, the book, and opening title sequences, this time focusing more closely on writing, automata, indexicality, and death. I examine the cutting hand, notebooks, and photocopies of pages from library books in *Se7en* (dir. David Fincher, 1995), the conducting hand of the sound track score and hand signings of legal documents in *Day of Wrath* (dir. Carl Dreyer, 1943), and the intertitle sequences derived from pages of illuminated medieval manuscripts in *Monty Python and the Holy Grail* (dir. Terry Jones and Terry Gilliam, 1971).[7] The opening title sequences of these three films all link error and death to cinematic (re)projection.[8] No human voice or hand (human or animal) can "right" cinematic history either through the opening or closing peritexts of the film.

I end the present chapter by questioning the New Historicism's assumption that the textual traces of history, or what Stephen Greenblatt (1997b) calls "the real," must precede or be contemporaneous with the fictional text being historicized in a manner that differentiates historicism both from surrealism and from psychoanalysis. To explore a surrealist and psychoanalytic historicism, I juxtapose—the Quay Brothers' *The Cabinet of Jan Švankmajer* (1984), a surrealist film inspired by the stop-motion animated Czech films of Jan Švankmajer that both foregrounds the human hand and draws extensively on Guiseppe Arcimboldo's anamorphic portraits, with Sigmund Freud's 1914 "Moses and Michelangelo" (*SE* 13), an essay that foregrounds—the relation between cinema as a writing machine and the (re)animating hand).[9] Freud analyzes Michelangelo's statue, particularly the placement of Moses' right hand, with the aid of drawings that are comparable to a stop-motion animation comic strip/film strip. In my account, neither surrealism nor Freudian psychoanalysis is the origin or ground of the other.[10] The tension and resistance between their common interests in (in)visible human and mechanical hands, ranging from holding hands as both a relay or handing off of information and hands off of information that remains on hold will subject historicist narratives of transition and succession to a surreal simultaneity of media analogies such as book and film. "Two courses are open to us from the start," Freud writes in *The Uncanny*; and he quickly adds, "I will say at once that both courses lead to the same result" (17, 369).

In dominant accounts, new media provide cinema with new means to update and increase a sense of realism, interactivity, and control, as Lev

Manovich (2001) argues in his influential book *The Language of New Media* (208–9), compatible with a cinema of historical authenticity (Rosen 2001) that avows and disavows its realism and that contains an autocritique only to keep the subject more firmly interpolated in ideology. For Manovich, mapping transitions between media is a matter of parallels and analogies. He stresses, for example, the "parallels between digital cinema and the pro-cinematic techniques of the nineteenth century." More specifically, Manovich maintains that "pro-cinematic moving-image techniques . . . relegated to animation and special effects" reemerge as "the foundation of digital filmmaking. What was once supplemental to cinema becomes its norm; what was at the periphery comes into the center. Computer media return us to the repressed of cinema" (308). This account of the history of cinema as a hiding of its own apparatus and of new media as the return of cinema's repressed depends crucially on the uncritically held assumption that older media all neatly map onto newer ones in terms of reversible analogies and parallels (already figured spatially in terms of presumably stable oppositions between the center and the margins of cinema). Consequently, Manovich's pre-psychoanalytic history of cinema, like those commonly narrated by earlier film theorists, oscillates between more or less paranoid accounts of the spectator as the controlled or as controlling, of "surface freedom" at the interface, or of DVD menu versus "standardization on a deeper level" (197).

If, however, we attend closely to tensions between and within film theory (polemically followed by "post-theory" film theory), psychoanalysis (both Freudian and Lacanian), and philology (polemically divided into old and new) to observe more closely to the loops and reframings that mark transitions between cinema and new media—themselves defined not as collections of properties but as practices that remediate (Bolter and Grusin 2000), that is, refashion and reform other media both in content and form—we will arrive, if that is the right word to use here, at a stranger history of cinema as a series of uncanny haunting returns. These returns generate an increasing (and decreasing) sense of (sur)realism marking a problem of visualization and legibility rather than merely a displacement of realism as one cinematic option among others: digitalization subjects the film image and sound track both to greater realism by improving the image quality and to greater derealization (either by the undesired degradation of image and sound quality when, for example, compressed for computer screens on YouTube, Quicktime or other players, iphones, and the like, or by the intentionally unreal look of some historical films that were released in 2007, such as *300* [dir. Zack Snyder], *Pathfinder* [dir. Marcus Nispel], the dogfight sequences in *Fly Boys* [dir. Tony Bill], the Armada sequences in *Elizabeth*: *The Golden Age* [dir. Shekhar Kapur], and the 3D Imagemotion system used in *Beowulf* [dir. Robert Zemeckis]).[11] Similarly, the film object fragments into different DVD and HD-DVD editions even as it is more fully integrated into computer media, the special features of SD-DVD and HD-DVD disturbing the boundary between film as text and film as paratext, producing strange new kinds of special history effects.[12]

Contact Sheets/Contact Zones: Living Dead Media

I propose replacing the commonly used distinction with the hybrid phrase "living dead media" to foreground the uncanniness of any transition from one medium to another and to conceive that transition as a dialectic of reanimation and de-animation in which the biomechanisms of the human subject are exteriorized, in some cases as special effects, even as the narrative uses these effects to represent the inner lives of the characters. According to Manovich (2001), the loop is constitutive of early cinema; the kinetoscope loops of 1892, he points out, return in the Quicktime loop of 1991 (313): "All nineteenth-century pro-cinematic devices, up through Edison's kinetoscope, were based on short loops. As 'the seventh art' began to mature, it banished the loop to the low-art realms of the instructional film, pornographic peepshow, and animated cartoon. In contrast, narrative cinema avoids repetitions" (315).

By turning to *Bram Stoker's Dracula*, we can begin to see how the digitalization of film has radicalized the history (narrative) of cinema in ways that compromise distinctions between old and new media such that transitions in film and media may be more aptly described, as I have noted earlier, as a dialectic of reanimation and de-animation, that is, as living dead media. Coppola's film makes its medieval narrative historical frame recursive, using exclusively old-school nineteenth-century cinematic techniques to produce its special effects, in which the human body is exteriorized as a skeleton, for example, in the film of a woman in a coffin who turns into a skeleton near the end of the cinematograph sequence. *Bram Stoker's Dracula* is precisely about cinema as living dead media that loop succession and simultaneity and that exteriorize as they interiorize the subjectivity effects of narrative cinema.

Coppola introduces a medieval historical frame to the film by adding four related scenes that are not in the novel, all related to the one modern medium that Bram Stoker did not mention in *Dracula*, namely, film. The medieval historical frame appears first as a prologue and a backstory with a voice-over narrative provided by Anthony Hopkins that runs before the opening title sequence, dates the time as 1462, and begins: Prince Vlad the impaler (Gary Oldman) becomes Dracula after his wife Princess Elisabeta (Winona Ryder)—mistakenly thinking he is dead after winning a battle against the invading Turks—commits suicide and the priest (Anthony Hopkins) refuses to bury her[13] (see figure 1.1, upper left). The historical framing of the medieval prologue returns a second time when Vlad meets the reincarnation of Princess Elisabeta as Mina Parker (also played by Winona Ryder) four centuries later in London and they go to see the cinematograph. The battle scene in the medieval prologue—in which the soldiers appear as silhouettes against a cloudy, red sunset background, and during which Prince Vlad impales in the stomach a Turkish soldier, who then slowly and painfully slides down Vlad's upright spear—reappears in

the film narrative four centuries later, after Dracula arrives in London. At this later moment in the bustling London streets, an extradiegetic voice commands, "See the amazing cinematograph!" as the shot opens with an old-fashioned iris and the film moves at the quicker speed of early silent films. Coppola used an old Pathé camera, made in the 1890s, from his own personal collection to shoot this sequence and create the historical effect. When Vlad spots Mina walking across the street, the film speeds up to the standard twenty-four frames per second only, bringing the two up-to-date at the movies. Just after the moment Vlad is about to bite Mina after she seems to recognize him at the cinematograph, we see the opening battle sequence restaged as a shadow puppet show in the background (see figure 1.1, upper right and lower left). When Mina flees from Vlad, we briefly see the humans behind the screen manipulating the projector and the puppets. We are thus retrospectively reminded that the soldiers in the intentionally fake background of the opening sequence are shadow puppets.[14]

Coppola also sets up a variety of exteriorizing doubles that counter the interiorization and pathos of Dracula and Mina's loving reunion and resurrection (from past to present). For example, the Albrecht Dürer final self-portrait (c. 15000) in which Dürer paints himself as Christ is redone as a portrait of Vlad; we first see it hanging in his castle and then again during the ship montage's journey carrying Vlad's casket. The Dürer self-portrait redone as Vlad portrait gives Vlad both a medieval and an early modern past and makes him both a demonic and a holy figure. In his self-portrait, Dürer famously models himself on Jesus, and this double marker of the satanic and the holy recurs in the London cinematograph sequence that follows Vlad's first encounter with Mina. A shot-reverse shot of Mina and Vlad matches her to a Lumière poster and a camera to her right, on the one hand, and matches him to a film of an oncoming train, in the middle of the shot, with a poster to his right that announces "Edison's *The Passion Play*." The cinematograph sequence gives the origins of film a double genealogy in realism and fantasy, showing documentary footage of a train as in Auguste and Louis Lumière's *The Arrival of a Train at the Station* (1895) and scenes of magic tricks (two beautiful women in a man's lap are replaced by his ugly wife) as in a Georges Méliès film, two screens showing the same scene as a sort of stereopticon.[15] Dracula's extended afterlife is marked as a doubling, like the dissolve from the shot of the two eyes of the wolf to the matching bites Dracula has left on Lucy's neck, which precedes the cinematograph sequence.[16]

Coppola's medieval historical framing prologue returns a third time in the scene where Mina and Vlad discuss Princess Elisabeta after they drink absinthe; the scene shows shadows of people dancing outside their room and footage from the prologue, interiorized, on one hand, as a drug-induced vision flashback, and exteriorized, on the other, as the flashbacks run in split screens via superimposition or in a mirror, again making the past a cinematic trick.[17] And the medieval prologue reappears a final time in the film's coda. Coppola's film explicitly alludes to the end of Jean

Figure 1.1 Shadowing Medieval History as Modern History in *Bram Stoker's Dracula*

Cocteau's surrealist film *La Belle et la Bête* (1946) in which Belle and the Prince fly up into the sky via a special effect of superimposition. The final shot of *Bram's Stoker's Dracula* is a long take of a darkened painting (on the ceiling of the church in Dracula's castle) showing Vlad and Elisabeta holding hands while flying through the sky like saints (see figure 1.1, lower right). The allusion's marked special effect is that the lovers are gradually illuminated by red projected light coming from an unseen source above and behind them.[18] Though Mina has just killed him at his cue as he lay dying, Vlad is immediately reanimated and reunited with Elisabeta as a painting on the ceiling of the church that brightens and morphs into a magic lantern slide as a freeze frame cinematic projection through back lighting (see figure 1.1). The sorting out both of chronology (the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries) and of the two women Vlad loves (Mina returns Vlad to Elisabeta by killing him) provides closure not by equating the death of Vlad with the end of the film's narrative, but by equating Vlad and Mina's cinematic reanimation and redemption on the ceiling with the film's understanding of cinematic projection as always already the reanimated afterlife of film. Coppola's figures for a redemptive, if secular, cinema are a vampiric exteriorization and extension: Vlad is already vampiric when we first see him in the film as a warrior, wearing a suit of armor that looks like muscle without skin, or as if muscle and skin were turned inside out. Similarly, Mina's match to the shadow puppets shows that she too was always a vampire, her death is a cinematic spectral effect as a life support system. Just after Vlad decides not to bite her at the cinematograph, a shot of a beautiful woman in an upright casket shows her turning into a skeleton, marking Mina's fate as the always already living dead. As a historicized film adaptation about film, *Bram Stoker's Dracula* self-reflexively inscribes film history as a double special history effect of succession and simultaneity, the earlier, already (p)reanimating and de-animating medium haunting and exposing the artifice and trickery of the other.

Press (Re)Play: Taking a Break from Credit in *Mad Love*

The opening title sequence of *Mad Love* (dir. Karl Freund, 1935), a remake of Robert Weine's German Expressionist and overtly Freudian silent film *The Hands of Orlac* (1924), begins with a pedestrian looking at a store window display from the street and then cuts to a series of medium shots of different Parisian apartment windows taken from inside different apartments. We then return to the shot of the pedestrian outside the store window and see in close-up his fist smashing the window, with the glass slide credits for the character names (but not the cast names), still mostly visible, superimposed on the broken glass.[19] A prologue set at Le Théâtre des Horreurs then follows, with a full-scale wax figure of a woman in medieval dress, identified by a placard placed in front of her feet as "Madame Yvonne." The wax figure (actually played by the actress Frances Drake, who also plays the

role of Yvonne Orlac) stands-in for Yvonne who is at the very moment performing inside the theater in a Grand Guingnol one-act play entitled "Torturée" [Tortured]. After a spectator, quickly identified as Doctor Gogol (Peter Lorre), buys a ticket, a hand of the ticket taker using a human bone, shot in close-up, shuts the door. Doctor Gogol, who stares adoringly at Yvonne's wax figure dressed in a Renaissance costume, tells a drunken man talking adoringly to the statue to take his "hands off" her. The scene sets up a series of doubles (between the hand smashing the glass and the hand closing the door; the wax figure of Yvonne, who is alternately shot as a tableau vivant played by the actress Frances Drake), the same kind of tricky alternation recurs in a later scene. In the theatrical performance, Yvonne is tortured on the rack and with a hot iron by what appear to be two men demanding her lover's name: the first man appears to be her husband but quickly turns out to be her torturer, dressed like someone in the eighteenth century; her husband then lowers his cloak from his face and we see that he is dressed like an Italian Renaissance duke. Yvonne says she will not betray her lover but then does so. The scene moves from fake torture to what appears to be real torture.

This triangle, errant desire and the doubling of the tortured woman as doll and actress (when we see her face in close-up, are we to conclude that she really is screaming from pain or that she is just pretending?) are replayed and acted out by the three main characters in the film. To win Yvonne away from her pianist husband Stephen Orlac (Colin Clive), Gogol replaces Orlac's hands, maimed in a train accident, with the hands of a recently executed knife thrower who killed his father. Gogol buys the wax statue of Yvonne from the theater owner. After Orlac kidnaps her, Yvonne breaks the wax figure but then pretends herself to be it. She shocks Orlac into thinking that the statue has to come to life when she drops her act. The film plays out along Freudian lines as a queer take on marriage as a train wreck, cross-wiring via doubles of Yvonne and her sardonic maid, who drops various biting comments about her own husband, as Yvonne listens to a broadcast of her husband playing a piano concerto, interpreting his coughs as "I love you" while talking to the radio (the scene occurs twice: the maid blows the radio [as if transmitting it to the distant husband] a kiss the first time when Yvonne has to leave to go onstage, and a second time when she later mistakes an old recording of Orlac playing piano for a live performance by him). Conversely, Orlac mistakes Yvonne's wax figure for her, just like Gogol, whom Orlac kills by throwing a knife in order to prevent Gogol from strangling her. In the cross-wired Freudian/Lacanian logic of the film, Gogol equals Orlac's unconscious and Yvonne's maid equals Yvonne's unconscious relayed and stored by wax doubles, recorded sound, and the radio; but, (un)repressing the murderer's hands Gogol grafted onto Orlac as well as the wax figure of Yvonne, the final shot of the film of her husband Orlac holding Yvonne leaves open the question of whether she is finally in good hands and off the rack, now that her double, the wax figure, has been sold off and then broken into pieces.[20]

Outlandish Analogies: Paratexts, Narrative Frames, and the Threshold of the (In)Visible

In opening title sequences of many medieval and early modern films, what counts as a history effect typically depends on a framing that compares and differentiates one medium (represented as an icon of an older time) with a more recent one (film in its present state).[21] Their title sequences are a productive site to explore what Barbara Stafford (2001) calls "the demon of analogy" in *Devices of Wonder: From the World in a Box to Images on a Screen*.[22] Stafford notes that no medium ever totally replaces another: "The ghosts lurking even in state of the art devices remind us of the major challenge still confronting the age of *trans*-everything. How do we coordinate the variable, physically based analog past with the programmed, chip-driven digital present?" (1). I would ask as well what kinds of uncritically held assumptions are embedded in Stafford's desire for coordination. What about the possibility that analogous media promising some kind of transformation, desired or feared, are too easily and too quickly matched and mapped by the program of academic discourse? How might these critical moves of matching by analogy involve an uncoordination and unmapping, a sidetracking or reflexive jerking offtrack in order to avoid getting ground into the grooves of a predictable historicist program?

To address these broad questions, I would like to examine how opening title sequences are sites of mediatic haunting that both permit and block entry to history effects at the threshold of cinematic visibility and audibility. To do so, I turn now to the Quay Brothers' *Anamorphosis* (1991), a surrealist documentary film that explicitly engages analogies between stop-motion animation and the medieval and early modern wonder cabinet, automata, and early modern anamorphic painting, the very analogies pursed, albeit quite differently, by Stafford and her co-contributor Frances Terpak in *Devices of Wonder* (2001, 20–29; 148–57; 235–47; 266–73).

The placement of the paratext (specifically, the title of the film) in *Anamorphosis* is of particular interest, coming as it does after a prologue in the form of a teaser and positioned in the film's darkly lit and shallow focus mise-en-scène shot.[23] The title of the film comes into focus only after the prologue shows a quick succession of black and white close-up shots of Hans Holbein's "The Ambassadors" (1533), a painting of two French Ambassadors, Jean de Dinteville and Georges de Selve, at the court of Henry VIII with a diagonal smear in the bottom center that becomes recognizable as a skull when one views the painting from the side.[24] "The Ambassadors" has drawn attention from a variety of disciplinary quarters in psychoanalysis, film theory, media theory, art history, literary criticism, and the history of optics.[25] I call the opening close-ups of "The Ambassadors" in the Quays' film a teaser prologue, because it serves as a kind of trailer for the final sequence of the film, in which the painting returns, this time in color, both in full frame and in various close-ups, from the front and from the side, showing the distorted skull that looks like a

blur when the painting is viewed straight (see figure 1.2, upper right). The teaser prologue is also marked by a series of framing close-ups as a kind of peep show watched by a biotechnological spectator character (see figure 1.3, lower right) made up of mechanical and human parts. This spectator character is unable to control a theater curtain as it goes up and down over the painting, alternately revealing and hiding it (see figure 1.3, upper left).

I will take up the Quay Brothers' interest in the human machine as animating hand when I discuss their earlier film *The Cabinet of Jan Švankmajer* (1984) laer in this chapter. Here I want to focus chiefly on the paratext in *Anamorphosis*. The centrality of Holbein's painting and its framing function (beginning and ending the film) to *Anamorphosis* may be inferred from a credit, in the end title sequence, that declares the film to be an "homage to Jurgis Baltrusaitis," who conclude his book *Anamorphic Art* (1977) on the history of Renaissance anamorphic paintings and engravings with a chapter devoted entirely to Holbein's painting and which serves as the source for all of the paintings and images the Quays document in their film. *Anamorphosis* has a voice-over narrative written by Roger Cardinal, credited as "art historian," with art historian Ernst Gombrich credited as a "consultant."

Figure 1.2 Teaser Prologue for Hans Holbein's "The Ambassadors" (1533) in the Quay Brothers' *Anamorphosis* (1991)

The significance of the paratext's placement in the Quays' *Anamorphos* lies also in the way it is doubled, becoming both endodiegetic and metadiegetic by virtue of its thearicalization. In Gérard Genette's (1997) account, the paratext is always on the outside of the text, framing and surrounding its beginning and ending. In *Anamorphosis*, however, the paratext is both outside and inside the film's diegeis: the title, which first appears after the "Ambassadors" teaser, is thus already inside the film (see figure 1.3, upper left). The place of the film's title, particularly its capacity to frame and name the film, is quietly questioned by the use of a matching dissolve shot of the title (black lettering against a white background) to a shot of the exact same title, but now positioned at the center of a theater proscenium arch that also looks like an obtrusive highly ornamental painting frame[26] (see figure 1.3, upper right and lower left). As the camera pulls back, the film title appears yet again, this time written in larger letters that are blurred because of the shot's soft focus yet still legible in the background of the set behind the proscenium arch/frame now that the theater curtain has been raised (see figure 1.3, lower left).

The doubling and tripling of the more or less visible title, located both inside and outside of *Anamorphosis*, puts into extended play an analogy between stop-motion animated film and anamorphic painting by opening up



Figure 1.3 Endodiegetic Paratext as Mise-en-Scène and Biotechnological Spectator Pulling the Strings in the Quays' *Anamorphosis* (1991)

a dialogical relation between two kinds of multimedia, the page and screen already present in art historical scholarship about anamorphic painting: just as the Quay Brothers are popping up perspectival two-dimensional prints on pages in a book into three-dimensional theater sets, so Baltrusaitis (1977) turns to film to describe the mechanics of anamorphosis: "the same diminutions correct the forms and bring them close instead of putting them at a greater distance and distorting them, as in a film running backwards. The perspective is in reverse" (40). Similarly, art historian Roger Cardinal calls Arcimboldo, the Bohemian Emperor Rudolf II's court painter of anamorphic portraits, or "têtes composés" ("composed" or "composite heads"), "the first animator" in the fifty-seven minute television documentary *The Cabinet of Jan Švankmajer* (1983), made partly by the Quay Brothers.[27]

The relation between book and animated film in *Anamorphosis* is thus by no means reducible to a relation between extracinematic source and influence that the Quays' film could be said to either adapt faithfully or move beyond transgressively; rather, the combination of the camera being stationary and the movement of the spectator character's eye to see the scene in correct geometrical perspective, the exposure of the apparatus, and the progression from human to mechanical agency, all invite the viewer to draw parallels between anamorphic art reproduced in books, theater, and stop-motion film animation. *Anamorphosis* includes three theater sets that are effectively pop-up book versions of illustrations published in the Renaissance books on anamorphoses. All are published in Baltrusaitis's book.[28] The first theater set and the cutouts of paper figures in it are taken from Emmanuel Maignan's *Perspective Horaria* (1648). The second theatrical set introduces a different kind of anamorphic device called catoptric, in which two women look through a peephole to see an anamorphic drawing inside a box. The third theatrical set, taken from Jean-François Niceron's *Thamaturgis Opticus* (1646), exposes the mechanical apparatus Maignan used to draw an anamorphic illustration along a wall: the apparatus is a so-called window frame, taken from Albrecht Dürer's engraving of a semi-nude reclining woman in his *Underweysung der Messung* (1527), with a string inserted through it moving from the artist's position to points on the wall. The Quays' film allows us to supplement Jacques Derrida's (2005) account of the page as "virtually . . . a sort of audiovisual multi-medium" that "remains a screen" (42, 45, 46) and also to invert his account. Niceron's, Maignan's, and Baltrusaitis's books on technologies of anamorphic perspective are not only multimedia machines, but also cabinets of curiosities that contain collections and the secrets of their organization, the screen itself becoming a kind of page. Watching a projected film image and reading a page of a book both involve a partial occlusion of vision: just as spectatorship involves missing the frames between shots, so reading books involves mechanical motions the reader ignores as she or he performs them, as if a print book were always also a flip book or pop-up book.

As if anticipating pay-per-view, on-demand film on cable television and computers with broadband, the Quays' *Anamorphosis* shows that media

analogies are animated by a dysfunction, a hole in the whole, that narratives of first and last are built on repressions of the motion (of turning pages of a book, for example) involved in making successive frames visible as a projected image. The peepshow metaphor, already implicit in the film's teaser prologue for Holbein's "The Ambassadors," becomes explicit when the spectator character looks through successive holes to see sections of the Schoen painting. The camera moves up the peepholes of the black wooden frame, the holes showing the spectator character's eye behind them as if he were moving up through perforated holes on a strip of celluloid film. The peepholes are evenly spaced and not identified by the narrator initially. They only gradually become clear as we see the eye of the spectator looking through each of them. Visible to us but not to the spectator character, these peepholes "direct the eye," the narrator says, "to the holy image hidden in the confusion." The film's set undercuts this assertion of a progression away from confusion and in the process activates a pun on holy as holey, however. The hole serves as a blind spot that brings the image into perspective and into vision as a pause between reanimation and deanimation, a paradoxical process of de-composition.

The Quays' *Anamorphosis* extends its allegory of dysfunction as the source vision by modeling the spectator as a biotechnological subject, his head enclosed by a wooden box with a sheet of glass across it, a kind of perspective technology such as the Lumières' cinematograph, a box that both records and projects, or, to use an earlier analogue, a *camera obscura*. The biotechnological spectator character is animated by the film as well as by an animator in the film, never totally in control of vision, which always remains so, because of the film's dominant use of shallow and racking focus, both clear and opaque. All three theatrical sets produce different effects through different kinds of stasis and movement. Imaginary geometrical lines extending from the hands of humans drawn in the illustration from Maignan's *Perspective Horaria* used as the source for the film's first set become strings attached to the corners of a square on the floor and held by a man who moves them around. Whereas only the man's arm moves in the first set, a lady moves into position in the second set to look through a peephole and thereby see the anamorphic effect inside a box, much like the spectator who looks through boxes to see Niceron's chair (1663) and through a similar box to see an anamorphic painting by Maignan. The string used by the artist on the left in the third theatrical set that exposes the apparatus used by Maignan (1648) to make an anamorphic painting proceeds to take on a life of its own and begins "drawing" a figure on the wall.

The final sequence of *Anamorphosis*, announced by voice-over as "The Ambassadors: A Mystery in Two Acts" and followed by an intertitle "The Ambassadors/Hans Holbein 1533," delivers what the teaser promised and makes clearest the film's allegory of vision as a stop-motion movement rather than a onetime movement from obscurity to clarity, back from Renaissance humanism to the macabre Middle Ages. The theatrical and two-act drama metaphors are taken directly from Baltrusaitis's book

Anamorphic Art (1977, 104–5), and the theatrical dark room in which the painting is seen and the doorway to its right also follow Baltrusaitis's account of how the painting would originally have been hung.[29] The viewer would recognize that the smear she or he saw when looking at the painting straight on was a skull when looking at it from the side as he or she paused in the doorframe on he way out. The voice-over narrative confidently concludes that "the visual trick conceals and then discloses the truth which underlies appearances." Once the viewer sees the skull, according to Baltrusaitis, "everything becomes clear. . . . The play is over" (105).

Yet the film's exposition of the anamorphic effect of the "Ambassadors" does not take the form of a two-act sequence. Even before the title card "The Ambassadors Hans Holbein 1533" appears, the skull is shot out of focus in close-up from straight on for several seconds before it comes slowly into focus as a sort of smear. After the title card, the spectator returns, this time under the curtain that rises by itself in the teaser sequence and like the one he learned to raise shortly thereafter in the beginning of the film. Now he enters the darkened room under the curtain, looking somewhat analogous to an early photographer who covered himself and his camera with a cape when taking a photo. The space also becomes a kind of photography dark room in which we and the spectator character see Holbein's "Ambassadors" develop and become fully visible approximately like a photograph does. Moreover, the "Ambassadors" sequence does not end as the spectator comes to the doorway and goes out of focus as the skull comes clearly into focus and thus recognizable as such. After a series of briefly held close-ups of different areas of the Holbein painting as the camera whip pans between them and also tilts up to the left and down, the skull comes into view, but as an unrecognizable smear (see figure 1.2, bottom left). When the spectator moves closer to the door on the right of the screen, a racking focus brings him into focus rather than the skull. A cut to the Holbein painting from the side opposite the door shows us the skull in close-up and in perspective. Thus the film never matches our position as spectators to the spectator character's. A cut to the spectator character in close-up brings the skull into focus as a reflection on the pane of glass forming the front of the box covering his head. The spectator character goes out of focus. We then see the skull in perspective a final time, again from straight on, and the curtain then comes down in close-up, the camera drops down below the floor, as if the end of the show marked a collapse, a sublime breakdown rather than visual mastery.

The Quays' *Anamorphosis* ends by initiating yet another recursive movement as it cuts to the first end title, which inverts the title shot near the beginning of the film, this time in white lettering in the center of the shot's black background. This title is newly animated as it shrinks in size and moves to the upper left corner of the screen while the rest of the credits follow. This shrinking of the title also mimes what Baltrusaitis characterizes as the "visual contraction" of the rest of the "Ambassadors" when "the hidden figure [of the skull] is revealed" (105). The Quays' film insists that

anamorphosis is a recursive play of frames in a stop-start motion that no coordination of voice, image, text, and hand can arrest.

De-animating the Letter and the De-composed Notebook: Phantom Paratexts and Parergons in *Se7en*

For a fuller grasp of the way the cinematic paratext marks a biotechnological site of encryption, reanimation, and projection, we may now turn to several films, especially their opening title sequences, that make use of the human hand in drawing on medieval allegory to link cinema, death, and error. I would like to turn first to a comic moment involving the paratext in *Se7en* (dir. David Fincher, 1995) that bears, as we will see shortly, on the film's framing opening title sequence and narrative prologue. The moment occurs just after the end of the montage sequence in which Detective Somerset (Morgan Freeman) visits a public library and takes down copies of Dante's *Divine Comedy* and Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales*, thereby fleshing out the medievalism of John Doe's serial crimes as an allegorical pattern derived from the seven deadly sins. As the music from the montage sequence continues briefly, the film cuts to Detective Mills (Brad Pitt) in his car reading a copy of the *Divine Comedy*, then cursing "Dante! Fuckin' faggot!" as he throws it at the car's dashboard. Just then a cop comes up and knocks on the car window to deliver four *CliffsNotes* on Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales* and other literary texts Mills that, we are to infer, had him purchase (see figure 1.4, upper left).

The camera focuses on the *CliffsNotes* in close-up after Mills has put them down on the front seat of his car. This scene appears to cap the preceding montage library sequence's oppositions between text and paratext, between library researcher and mentor detective near retirement, Somerset, on one hand, and his young buck replacement photo examiner and television watcher, Mills, on the other. The montage sequence crosscuts between Mills and Somerset, seemingly contrasting Somerset's ability to get a read on the serial killer and Mills' sinability to do so. One detective is highbrow, the other is lowbrow; one reads literature, the other watches a boxing match; one drinks wine, the other drinks beer.[30]

Yet the library montage sequence deconstructs the very opposites the crosscutting narrative technique appears to establish. The books that Somerset takes off the library shelf are either rebound library editions with only the author and title showing, thus limiting paratextual information about them, or illustrated, nonscholarly, and, dare I say, schlocky editions[31] (see figure 1.4, upper right). The Dante edition seen in a shot of a table next to a photocopier on which Freeman has stacked various books is Dorothy Sayers's translation completed by Barbara Reynolds after Sayers's death. Most professional Dante scholars regard her Dante translations and criticism on Dante as highly idiosyncratic and eschew both. Similarly, Rockwell

Figure 1.4 Notes as Paratexts in David Fincher's *Seven* (1995)

Kent's illustrated *Canterbury Tales*, also seen on the table, is not a scholarly edition.

The library sequence also involves the production of a paratext in the form of a note, an index, of readings Somerset puts in an envelope and leaves at Mills' office. This note occurs in the middle of the library montage, the camera scrolling down from top to bottom, placing the note between illustrations from Dante's *Inferno*, tracked left to right, and quotations from the *Inferno*, also tracked left to right (see figure 1.3, lower left). The note connects illustrations and literary text by standing between them and opposing them. Somerset's note performs a pedagogical function; it tells us about the pedagogical work he is doing as a research assistant for Mills, who is now not only the detective in charge of the case but also Somerset's student.[32] Somerset's note to Mills, along with the accompanying photocopies Mills includes in the envelope, thus stands in place of the primary sources (and *CliffsNotes*) and performs a similar pedagogical function.

Yet this note that condenses texts into paratexts is itself somewhat limited, omitting important pieces of information. Dante's name and the title *Purgatory* are given in Somerset's note to Mills, but Chaucer's name drops out, leaving just the titles *Canterbury Tales* and the *Parson's Tales*. In the shot of the bookshelf, the surrounding scholarly books, such as Donald F. Howard's *Chaucer: His Life*, *His Works*, *His World*, are either passed over or remain so out of focus that one can only guess as to their identity. As the camera tracks books on the bookshelf, we move from cover spines that give full paratextual information to one that gives minimal information. And each book comes in and out of racking focus as Freeman takes them off the shelf, blurring the shot as the book gets pulled off the shelf while leaving spines with fuller paratextual information out of the frame or out of focus. Moreover, the books on the table are shot in shallow focus, so that their titles are somewhat blurred.

To be sure, the film's foregrounding the partial visibility of the paratext does not produce total dysfunction. Mills does get the *CliffsNotes* and they enable him to piece together the *Parson's Tale* with the attorney's crime scene photos. Over time, Somerset's bibliographical note listing authors and titles facilitates detection by matching word and image. Why, then, should *Se7en* deconstruct the very oppositions on which detection work depends? Largely because the film's pessimism about detection focuses on a paratexual practice of matching word and image as an uncanny repetition and doubling that approaches the criminal but never really catches up with him. To be sure, Somerset does figure out the source text of each crime and can predict their number and kind. Yet his scholarship does not lead to his catching the serial killer John Doe (Kevin Spacey), who happily points out to Mills during the car ride near the end of the film that he would never have been caught had he not chosen to turn himself into the police. Though the print paratext serves to frame the detectives' vision, it remains a blind spot for Somerset and Mills even as it is furtively drawn to our attention by

Fincher. The paratext becomes visible as a phantom blur in *Se7en* in the process of being encrypted as an endodiegetic clue.

Detection in the film is uncanny in that the solution to Doe's crimes depends on the detectives' returning to the scenes of the crimes. Somerset figures out a connection between the first and second crimes, in which Doe has left two clues, one was the word "Greed" written in blood on the floor next to the attorney Gould, serving as a caption, and the other two were rings, also drawn in blood, around his wife's eyes. After returning to the Gluttony crime scene and matching the pieces that Doe cut from the floor and forced his victim to eat, Somerset finds the *Paradise Lost* quotation and the word "Gluttony" written in grease behind the refrigerator. He can then match the two crime photos and explain to the police captain the program of Doe's crimes. The same kind of matching occurs at the murdered attorney Elliot Gould's crime scene. After visiting the victim's widow, the detectives return to the scene and find the words "Help Me" written behind an abstract oil painting in Gould's office that Doe had turned upside down. Thus, it is telling that Somerset is on the verge of retirement, marked as a repetition, a re-tire-ment, or re-treading over the same ground.

To illuminate how the endodiegetic paratexts in *Se7en* bear on its uncanny doubleness, I would like to return to Freud's footnote in *The Uncanny* (*SE* 17) in which he tells an autobiographical anecdote that I discussed in the introduction. I now also quote the beginning and end of the footnote in order to highlight the uncanny way in which Freud's anecdote doubles the already double anecdotes of a colleague who is also a precursor:

> Since the uncanny effect of a "double" also belongs to this same group it is interesting to observe what the effect is of meeting one's own image unhidden and unexpected. Ernest Mach has related two such observations in his *Analyse der Empfindugen* (1900, 3). On the first occasion he was not a little startled when he realized that the face before him was his own. The second time he formed a very unfavorable opinion about the supposed stranger who entered the omnibus, and thought "What a shabby-looking school-master that man is who is getting in!"—I can report a similar adventure. . . . Instead, therefore, of being *frightened* by our "doubles," both Mach and I simply failed to recognize them as such. Is it not possible, though, that our dislike of them was a vestigial trace of the archaic reaction which feels the "double" to be something uncanny? (248 n.1)

I will return to Freud's anecdote at greater length in the conclusion. For now, I want to note that Freud tells it in an something uncanny manner; he sees his own double, but he sees it just the way Mach saw his double (and Mach saw it twice). The uncanny double involves a serial repetition, in short, as well as a deferral of recognition (only after the second time that Freud sees his reflection, does he realize that he is looking at himself).

The back and forth loop involved in Somerset and Mills's detection work of matching word and image gets larger and larger as the film proceeds. Somerset rather quickly puts Doe's *Merchant of Venice* quotation

together with the crime scene photo of the dead attorney Gould (Greed) after dinner at Mills' apartment, long after the corpse was first discovered.[33] When Somerset finds Doe's fingerprints behind the painting in Gould's office, however, we don't see that Doe has spelled out "Help Me" (written in blue, like the words "no key" barely visible at the end of the opening title sequence) until we get to the crime lab in the following scene. The police computer fingerprint matching process is a high-tech model of detection that nevertheless, as the technician tells the detectives, may take days, and the detectives wait outside until the next morning before they get the results.

Knowledge of the crimes is similarly deferred to the viewer. The *Paradise Lost* quotation Somerset uses to match the photos of Gluttony and Greed is initially too far away from the camera to be readable by the film viewer. In the following scene, in the police captain's office, the camera is close enough to Doe's note for us to read the quotation and then hear Somerset say the words "Gluttony" and "Greed," which were visible in the two crime photos he's holding up with his right hand. The source of these deferrals, namely, the (in)visibility of the endodiegetic paratext, is marked in a shot at the precise moment Somerset, having a glass of wine at Mills's apartment, figures out (again) what Doe is doing: just as Somerset tells Mills that Doe is "preaching," we see a close-up of Somerset's eyeglasses with the distorted reflection of the crime photo in his right lens, the photo appearing upside down and the word "greed" in it written backward, as Somerset has both of his hands on it. This backward and, upside down reading is literalized in a briefly held, low-angle extreme close-up shot of Somerset's face as he looks at the crime photo, the crime photo itself reflected in somewhat distorted form on the right part of his left eyeglass lens and all of it in his right lens. Our awareness of what Somerset does not see is set up moments earlier when Somerset says to Mills that the "trick is to find one item, one detail, and focus on it."[34] "The sins were used in medieval sermons . . . as teaching tools," Somerset continues, and Mills adds "Yeah, yeah like in the *Parson's Tale* by what's his name? Phuh . . . Dante."[35] Even as Doe's clues become visible as such—it's the rings around the eyes of the wife in this case that matter—something about the clues remains outside the clueless detective's vision.

Though the detectives appear to make progress, getting a profile on the killer and eventually finding Doe's apartment, they actually go back and forth in a loop. Consider Somerset and Mills's second trip to the library. The focus of their inquiry has now shifted to a metareading of Doe's reading, producing a new paratext based on books he has checked out from the library, a list much like the earlier one, though now of subjects such as the seven deadly sins rather than book titles and authors.[36] As Somerset explains to Mills, "If you want to know who's reading *Purgatory*, *Paradise Lost*, and *Helter Skelter*, the FBI if you ask them to will tell us, will give us a name." In this scene, the books and the images from them we saw in the library montage sequence have disappeared. But the second library scene is clearly a repetition of the first rather than a departure from it. Like the

library and credits sequence, only faster with aid of a computer print out, we now see the titles of all of the books, shot in close-up, that the detectives guess Doe has checked out. And just as Somerset folds his photocopies and notes for Mills into an envelope at the end of the library montage, so he folds up the library print out and puts it in an envelope along with a cash bribe for the FBI clerk/police informant. The combination of text and cash recalls the similar conjunction of cash and other media seen as Doe compiles and binds his notebooks in the opening title sequence.

Insofar as there is a cognitive progression in the film, it involves making increasingly clear the double dimensions, literal and figurative, of the paratextual and legal impasse faced by the detectives. Though Mills and Somerset correctly find Doe's apartment, the new list only brings them to a new impasse that literalizes the paratext as door frame: Somerset and Mills arrive at the threshold of Doe's locked apartment without a warrant and are thus left with equally untenable positions: they can either wait to learn more about Doe and then get a warrant, thereby risking his flight or destruction of incriminating evidence; or they can break down the door and find incriminating evidence, thereby gutting the crime scene of legal value since none of the evidence would be admissible in court.[37] The doorway becomes a figure in the next crime scene with a dead prostitute: as they enter the room, Mills and Somerset see that Doe has carved the word "Lust" on the door. Yet, even when the paratext is almost literally in their face, neither detectives sees it. And Doe remains at large.

The more we see the film's (re)routing of the law as a routing through the relays and delays of the paratext, the more we also see a characterological doubling of Detectives Somerset and Doe. Like Somerset's bibliographically incomplete list of recommended readings for Mills, and his name being effaced from the door window of the office that Somerset has turned over to Mills, Doe uses titles to unsettle their hermeneutic function: for example, a long shot, used twice, of the Pride crime scene shows the woman fashion model's photo that has fallen from its hook on the wall (she has killed herself after Doe cut off her nose), and the word "Pride" written with her blood on the wall above the photo. The title "Pride" serves not only as a clue in focusing on the forced fit between title, photo, and corpse but also as a perverse memorial to the victim, a kind of grotesque variation on before and after photos.[38] Similarly, the titles of Doe's crimes become more paratextual in their physical location, starting off as hidden (Gluttony), then on the floor (Greed), on the wall (Pride), and finally on the door (Lust). The titles become more detached and more visible as the corpses themselves become less visible.

This characterological doubling of lawman and criminal extends to a structural, narrative parallel as well: the library montage sequence both looks back to the opening title sequence in which Doe is assembling his notebooks and looks forward to the scene in which Somerset and Mills search Doe's apartment. Like the library montage sequence, the later scene at Doe's apartment is crosscut between shots of Mills, who ends up discovering a

photo of the prostitute and a receipt from Wild Bill's Leather Shop, providing a match that predicts but does not prevent her murder, and Somerset, who finds a Bible in a drawer and ends up in a room filled with Doe's notebooks. The two detectives meet in a dark room in which Doe has hung up recently developed photos he took earlier of Mills angrily gesturing to the camera. Mills now realizes that Doe has gotten away, but neither he nor Somerset sees that the photo is a clue to Doe's final act, framing Mills as Wrath and the punisher of Doe for committing the sin of Envy. Just as Doe cuts off his skin from his fingers in order to avoid leaving incriminating fingerprints at his crime scenes, so Somerset is never able to get his hands on Doe.

The phantom, uncanny loop of involuntary returns that takes the detectives closer and closer to Doe while Doe nevertheless remains out of their reach may be more fully illuminated if we consider now the double, phantom writing of *Se7en*'s opening title sequence, which is a homage to Stan Brakhage—who, incidentally, made a six-minute, hand-painted, multigauge abstract film "based" on the *Divine Comedy*.[39] Like the crosscuts between Mills and Somerset in the library montage sequence, the opening title sequence crosscuts between the titles, shot on a codalith (black film, except for the white lettering of the titles), and close-ups of Doe's hands and fingers as he compiles and sews together his notebooks. The opening title sequence constitutes an impasse for the viewer, inviting her or him to read and look as a detective for clues by matching aspects of the title sequence to the film that follows, reading the former as cognitive evidence (as if the film were an episode of the TV series *CSI*) but disrupting that invited hermeneutic both by making Doe's writing and the titles themselves shaky and, less obviously, by encrypting a kind of writing the viewer cannot see when the film is being projected. The shakiness of legible writing produces a double vision of writing, with one version darker than its lighter spectral double. Morgan Freeman's name appears doubled, for example, the letters of his name legibly written left to right of his name spelled forward with a backward spelling briefly superimposed on top of the correctly spelled one, and the word "Envy," Doe's sin, appears written upside down. The title of the film *Se7en* appears four times in the sequence, sometimes too quickly to be readable, sometimes as a palimpsest. Like Doe's use of titles for his crime scenes, the film title moves from being legible to being illegible, as if losing its identity and paratextual function.

Writing on the codalith remains invisible to the naked eye, encrypting an even deeper uncanny doubleness.[40] This invisible writing is apparently addressed to the DVD viewer and written by Doe even as it is presented as a kind of censorship. For example, immediately after the casting credit, Doe blacks out the eyes of a boy in a crime photo. Invisible to the spectator in this same shot are three words in white lettering seen in briefly held successive shots: "will . . . be . . . you," informing the spectator that he will be Doe's next victim. The encrypted, hidden writing in some ways has a mimetic function of interiorization that rewards the film's invitation to

read it like a detective. The title sequence takes us into Doe's paranoid schizophrenic mind: the scratched invisible (except when the DVD is put on pause) writing mirrors the cuts and black marks Doe makes quite visibly in the title sequence, for example, and the invisible commands "go to hell" and "repent" seem to be Doe preaching to us, already anticipating the conclusion that Somerset arrives at later in the film (see figure 1.4, lower right).

Yet this encrypted double writing encodes the uncanny, endodiegetic status of *Se7en*'s paratext. The hidden writing, apparently ghost-authored by a sometimes shadowed hand (see figure 1.5, upper right), ranges from the legible to the illegible, from the coherent to the incoherent. "Any fraym," for example, may be reasonably decrypted as "any frame." Other writings are totally illegible, however, sometimes consisting of strings of words that don't yield grammatical, coherent sentences, and sometimes constituting nonsensical combinations of a few letters.

Visible and invisible writings are not clearly demarcated any more than the black codalith titles and the prologue narrative that remain separate in the sequence. (Moreover, Kyle Cooper is encrypted as Doe's double in the end title sequence: Cooper is credited for having designed and "executed" the main and end titles; and the letters "u" and "t" in "executed" are turned upside down.) Doe's doubly encrypted writing is a kind of fingerprint, but it moves beyond the indexical and participates in the film's stripping away of graphic marks of identity such as fingerprints (Doe's writing leaves none), names, and titles.[41]

The only way one can read the encrypted text is by killing the film, as it were, using one's hand to pause it and watch it in freeze frame. To put it another way, one can read this writing because pausing the DVD turns it into a paratext of the film when projected so that one can "read" it. "Reading" the film as paratext is the only way we may understand its allegory of cinema and death, an allegory in which the anonymous Doe is the (non)personification of Death, and reading takes the form of stopping (killing) the film. Hence the title sequence sets up the process of reading the film as a loop, just like the loop in which Somerset and Mills travel back and forth in pursuit of Doe: the title sequence arrives at a dead end, twice encrypting the words "no key." The words first time appear in white lettering, just after the credit for "John Cassini/Reginald E. Cathey/Peter Crombie," against a white background in blue. At the end of the title sequence, the words "no key" appear again in larger blueprint, with much of the blue ink erased and the words now underlined. This second shot of "no key" is in turn followed by "end of picture title reel," thereby abruptly and invisibly announcing closure without providing it. The credits serve as a ghosting, a haunting, uncanny repetition of a scene of (crime) writing that comes before and after the title sequence.

The de-animation of the letter in *Se7en*'s opening title sequence works in the opposite way that Kendrick says the animation of the letter works in medieval manuscripts, where historiated letters reaffirm the author's presence and deny differences either between manuscript copies or between

divine source and human transmitter. According to Kendrick:

> The "principle of the author" as a way of trying to close and maintain control over a written text's sense, as well as its letter, was established long before the eighteenth century. It was called into play—even in the elementary form of personalizing imprints of fingernails or mantle fringes on cuneiform tablets—almost with the invention of writing. The apparent impersonality and impotence of the inscribed text, such as a contract of donation or other material engagement, called for personalizing, empowering supplementation. The impression of personal presence was conveyed by adding imprints of the contracting parties . . . on medieval charters, imprints on wax of the beard hair, the fingerprints, the seal ring, or other cachet—and once, even of the donor's toothy bite! (178)[42]

Images of the author in historiated letters work similarly, she maintains, and are comparable to photographs. For Fincher, however, the author and title are doubled, letters are phantoms back from the dead. Death is figured in *Se7en* by the de-animated letter that appears as we pause the DVD to read it frozen on the screen; and the letter, as we know, killeth.[43] (Compare the woodcut illustrations of the "Dance of Death" in the book the still illiterate Betrande de Rols peruses in Daniel Vigne's *The Return of Martin Guerre* [see figure 1.6, upper left]).

Recording History by Hand in *Day of Wrath*

Like Carl Theodor Dreyer's earlier and silent film *The Passion of Joan of Arc* (1928), which begins with a hand turning pages of the trial transcripts, *Day of Wrath* begins with a shot of a hand, in this case, signing Herlofs Marte's (Anna Svierkier) arrest warrant.[44] Yet, far from taking us back to a more originary moment, the writing rather than the reading of the trial record, *Day of Wrath* puts that originary moment into question by declining to have the signer appear as a character in the film, thereby calling the authorship of the film's narrative into question.

Dreyer's film helps us to grasp this point by recalling the opening scene of writing when the old woman accused of witchcraft, Herlof's Marte, confesses under torture. A shot of a piece of paper identifies Reverend Absalon Pederssøn (Thorkild Roose) as a notary, linking him and the writing on the paper to the law. Yet in this case, hands and writing are more explicitly divorced than in the opening shots of the film when we saw the notary signing Herlofs Marte's death warrant: now we see the torture document being written by an unseen hand and then left unsigned and undated.

Day of Wrath also questions the reliability of sound recording along similar lines. The indexical claims of cinema appear to be strongest in the opening title sequence, in which the camera scrolls down the illustrated score of "Dies Irae" [day of wrath] as we hear the work being performed on the sound track (see figure 1.5, upper left). The film returns to this opening sequence twice, first when "Dies Irae" is being rehearsed shortly before

Figure 1.5 Carl Dreyer's *Day of Wrath* (1943) and the Dead Hand as Recording Machine

Herlof's Merte's execution. Here the film's peritext, the title sequence, becomes endodiegtic as it is transformed into a film score.

The extradiegetic opening music of the film now becomes diegetic as we see the conductor and the choir (see figure 1.5, upper right). The score is reduced to the musical notes and the shared title of the composition, *Vredrens Tag*; by definition, the score lacks the words of the song underneath the notes and the images in the left column we saw in the film's opening title sequence. This repetition of the peritext as a score thus involves a loss of signification, however, and is a diminishment rather than an enlargement of the power of media to record and transmit data by the human hand.

In revealing what was previously offscreen, Dreyer's *Day of Wrath* does not move from opacity to transparency: at the end of this scene, the conductor's hand, with index finger pointing, is shot as a shadow over the wordless and imageless score, like the cross in the opening of the film, or even like strips of the film (see figure 1.5, lower left). At the end of the film, "Dies Irae" plays again for the final time, as, in a framing bookend moment, a return to the illustrated scroll and score. An even deeper loss of signification and diminishment of the power of film and medieval media is registered by a loss of sound: only one choirboy is heard at the end, and he hums rather than sings the words of "Dies Irae." The allegorical force of this signification is made explicit as Dreyer uses two successive dissolves, the first from the shadow of the cross on the scored scroll to the shadow of the cross alone, and the second from the shadow of the cross to the shadow of a grave marker, perhaps suggesting that the cross is not an emblem of salvation but the opposite. The shadow of the grave marker calls up the grave markers we saw in the cemetery when the choirboys performed "Dies Irae" as Herlofs Marte is burned alive at the stake.

Day of Wrath charts a diminishment of the signifying capacities of writing and sound recording and storage media, especially as identified with male authority and the hand. The hand in the film's opening shots, for example, belongs to a man; similarly, at the torture scene, the men are shown next to books when recording the confession of Herlofs Marte, and the scene ends with a shot of Pederson's signature and the date on the confession. Yet Absalon's legal role as notary drops out as he loses power and authority, and his guilt about letting Anne's mother go free and marrying Anne (Lisbeth Movin) in exchange becomes so overpowering that he feels he has to confess his sin to God (and his mother overhears him). The film's final image of writing by a man is heavily ironized: in his diary entry, Absalon follows the disturbing scene of Herlof's Merte's burning by noting that she was burned on a "beauteous day." The optimism of his comment is darkened by the shadow (possibly of a cross) cast across the page as well as by the dash he curiously places after "burned" before finishing with a new line "to the glory of God" (see figure 1.5, lower right). This last image of Absalon's writing is significantly undated, matching the dwindling authority of male writing with the corruption of the patriarchal law, writing having become here a means of subverting the law of the fathers.[45]

Unsurprisingly, given the numerous repetitions in *Day of Wrath*, the final shot of a shadow of an icon of death has a double referent, activated by the sound track theme music, both to Herlofs Marte's execution and Anne's impending death.[46] Moreover, there is a striking lack of specificity in both cases, in contrast to the signing of the arrest warrant and confession transcript: instead of the exact date of death, the film refers inexactly to two days of wrath. The shadow of the grave marker at the end of the film marks what cannot be represented in cinema, hence what cannot be made clear and fully known. In repeating the opening title sequence and continuing past it, *Day of Wrath* makes explicit not only that the source of the film's ambiguities lies in the history of film rather than in the history narrated in the film but also that both the historical past and the future (past) are by definition ambiguous when filmed. Like the early modern media represented in *Day of Wrath*, cinema returns us repeatedly to the shadows and darkness that lie unmarked and unburied outside the projected film image and that both precede and follow its projection in movie theaters.

History for Dreyer is an offhand way, as it were, of indicating the inability of film ever to be indexical, to show on screen a mummified profilmic reality recorded on film. The human hand in *Day of Wrath* is not the agent of representation, rather, it is like death, outside of representation. There is a lot of finger pointing in Dreyer's film, but *Day of Wrath* gradually brings into question the power of the index finger itself to point decisively to an unambiguous and transparent original cause or future direction, a referent outside representation.

Not Dead Yet: the Reanimating Hand in *Monty Python and the Holy Grail*

Several animated intertitle sequences in *Monty Python and the Holy Grail* (dir. Terry Jones and Terry Gilliam, 1975) draw on medieval manuscript sources. In the film, the letter "R" in the title announcing the "Tale of Sir Robin" is historiated, and its shape mimes the bird perched on the left of the letter. For example, one animated sequence involves angels raising up the words "the quest for The Holy Grail." In a remarkable animated sequence introducing the "Tale of Sir Galahad," a monk jumps off a scaffold and lands on a branch in a historiated "C" that includes a nun sitting on a chair. The monk twirls around until he stops upside down with his naked rear end turned to the nun, whose facial expression registers her shock. As if animating and anticipating Michael Camille's (1992) Bahktinian account of the canrivalesque, obscene visual marginalia found in some medieval manuscripts, the sequence also sets up the tale that follows involveing a number of sexually aroused women trying to sleep with Galahad. Writing progressively goes awry in the film: a very loud extradiegtic noise disturbs the hand writing the title for the "Tale of Sir Lancelot," for example, and the Lancelot's name stops after the letter "n" (see figure 1.6, lower left). Martine Meuwese (2004) has traced many of the images in the Galahad sequence to Gilliam's scholarly source, namely, Lillian M.C. Randall's (1966) *Images in the*



Figure 1.6 The S(c)h(l)ock of the Medieval: Writing Goes Awry and the Jerking Dance of Death in *The Return of Martin Guerre*, *Se7en*, *Monty Python and the Holy Grail*, and *Masque of the Red Death*

Margins of Medieval Manuscripts. Gilliam's medieval-looking intertitles are also used in a sequence that parodies the use of the book in opening title sequences, with a book open to a page showing "The Book of the Film" written on it and then a still from the film on the facing page as a match, and a human hand turning pages in the early sequences is replaced by a monstrously hairy, animal hand in later sequences.

Monty Python and the Holy Grail is both a senseless parody and a serious allegory of the historical medieval film paratext as well as scholarly knowledge of both medieval prologues and animated letters of medieval illuminated manuscripts. The film allegorizes the pragmatic limits of paratexutal supplements in the form of animated episode title sequences by making literal the death of the film's animator, Terry Gilliam, and an anonymous academic advisor. Late in *Monty Python and the Holy Grail*, Gilliam falls back at his desk and dies, recalling an earlier sequence in which the lettering of the tale of Sir Lancelot is disrupted and the scene cuts to the artist at his desk in a library, who then goes outside to see what is shaking the building. Similarly, an elderly man, identified as a "famous historian" by a title, is brutally cut down by a knight on horseback before he can finish his first sentence, and this scene is introduced with the clapboard identifying it as a take. The film's narrative goes offtrack just as the writing goes in some of the animated sequences offtrack. Furthermore, in inhabiting the undecidable no (wo)man's land of paratextual borderlines and thresholds of frivolous parody and serious play with regard to the play of word and image in the margins of cinema and medieval manuscripts, *Monty Python and the Holy Grail* recapitulates the debate in modern medieval literary criticism over whether images in illuminated manuscripts are merely decorative or meant to be read as serious commentaries on the text.[47] More broadly, the film calls into question both the authority and meaning of the written record of history. In the cave of the Killer Rabbit, for example, the priest and the knights discover writing carved by the dying Joseph of Aramathea giving the location of the Holy Grail. A problem and debate between Arthur, Lancelot, and the priest arises, however, when the name of the castle where the Grail is located turns out rather comically to be "arrrgh." The priest insists, as he looks right at the camera in a typically bizarre shot-reverse shot sequence, that Joseph must have died while carving it. Lancelot and Arthur counter that Joseph wouldn't have carved the word if he actually were expiring; he would only have made the sound "arrrrgh." The last word of the authority thus record not the name of a location but, possibly, a meaningless death gasp.

The abrupt end of the film deconstructs the opposition between the parody of history and its regulation and authorization as the police, at the behest of the historian's widow, shut the film down, effectively killing it off in a manner that resembles both the killing of the historian and the animator as well as the series of sackings of people in charge of the credits in the opening title sequence. Just as the film ends in a kind of death (the music continues even as the screen goes black), the opening title sequence begins with a ghost in the machine. The projectionist, heard in voice-over, is a kind of

biomechanism. As if he were exterior to the projected film and back in the projection booth, we hear the projectionist coughing as the film goes black, the joke being that we, of course, are not hearing the actual projectionist showing the film as we watch it in a theater. The projectionist, noticing his mistake ("not the right bloody film"), finally recognizes that he has been showing the wrong film, *Dentist on the Job*, and quickly corrects it, "Here we are. Better stick the caption on." A title comes on stating, "one moment while we change reels." Yet as a corrector of (human) error, the phantom projectionist too is effectively killed off, compulsively returning in the opening title sequence as the stopping and restarting of more and more errors in the titles. After the increasingly absurd Swedish and then "Swenglish" subtitles appear in the opening credits, the film sound track slows to a halt with an explanatory intertitle: "We apologize for the fault in the subtitles. Those responsible have been sacked." The film's sound track then speeds up to normal, as if the film had been stopped during the intertitle. After this "correction," the film almost immediately "stops" again with a new intertitle, as the sound goes off after slowing down: "We apologize again for the fault in the subtitles. Those responsible for sacking the people who have just been sacked, have been sacked." Entirely new music comes on the sound track but the crediting is just as parodic as before (the moose and his entourage get numerous credits). In what becomes a serial process of interruption, the film "stops" again with an explanatory note that itself is self-parodying and self-reflexive: "The directors of the firm hired to continue the credits after the other people had been sacked, wish it to be known that they have just been sacked. The credits have been completed in an entirely different style at great expense and at the last minute." The "entirely different style" of the remaining credits consists of an orange and yellow strobe flashing with black titles in the background instead of a black background with white titles, and, as the sound speeds up again, with Mexican music on the sound track. The authorship of the titles has shifted from the "we" doing the sacking to the "directors" of the sacked firm. The credits remain just as nonsensical, however, llamas now replacing the moose. By the end of the highly self-reflexive credit sequence, the projectionist has become a subject of parody we initially may have mistaken for a live voice much the way Arthur's horse, in the beginning of the film, is parodied as we are quickly shown its diegetic source, namely, coconuts that his squire is knocking together.[48]

Though a subplot involving the murdered "famous historian" finally puts an end to the film as the police arrive with the widow, the role of the police, as in the opening titles about sacking, is also subject to parody and shown to be based on error. As the widow gets out of the car, she says "They're the ones. I'm sure of it." And when they get closer to Arthur, she adds, pointing at him, "That's the one." The police then arrest King Arthur and Sir Belvedere and put them in a van before disarming the other knights. Yet the police clearly err in arresting two men when only one committed the murder. Moreover, they have the wrong men. The knight who killed the widow's historian husband is the only knight in the film who

actually rides a horse (the sound track also matches the image when we see him riding), and his costume differs from Arthur's and Belvedere's: the knight on horseback wears a different kind of helmet, and his white tunic has a blue, fire-breathing dragon on it, whereas Arthur has a gold sun on his white tunic and Belvedere a white tree on his white and blue tunic. Just as the film does not begin with a transparent paratext but integrates the opening title sequence into the film as an example of the film's self-reflexive mechanism of narrative disruption and deflation, so *Monty Python and the Holy Grail* does not close with an end title sequence.

A problem of arriving at interpretive closure follows from the erosion of the paratext's authority and related policing functions: in a radical manner even more avant-garde than Eric Rohmer's *Perceval le Gallois* (1978), the film repetitively deconstructs and reinscribes (and reanimates) a distinction between meaning and nonsense, logic and illogic, parody and its policing; even more radically, it deconstructs a generic distinction between the film as medieval historical film and a documentary about the making of such a film.[49] The shot of the police car entering the frame near the end of the film is followed by handheld *cinéma verité* shots of the police that continue to the end, making it seem as if we are witnessing a documentary about reenactors of a medieval battle. Yet this tension between historical film and documentary is present even in the historical sequences, made manifest through pointless but immediate point of view shots from inside the Green Knight's as he fights the Black Knight, the handheld shots of the mob rushing to burn the "witch" and the knights charging in the final battle, to take only a few of many such examples. What counts as the death of film, the cut from the policeman's hand blocking the camera to the end of reel footage to the black screen and carnivalesque organ exit music that plays as if from a separate source in the theater (the same as the intermission music), amounts to a full-scale dismantling of the production and reception of the historical film. We get a deferral of closure rather than the dialectical sequence from documentary (profilmic real) to its fictionalization as diegesis and finally to simulation of documentary through excessive spectacular supplementary details, often in the form of extras, that according to Rosen (2001, 160–99) define the historical fiction film and differentiates it from the documentary film (to which Rosen tellingly devotes a separate chapter). If the historical film, in Rosen's words, lets us conclude "what we see is not actually what *was*, but what it would have looked *like*" (182), *Monty Python and the Holy Grail*'s self-reflexive serialization of its narrative, subversion of its paratext's authority, and use of extras playing knights who appear out of nowhere for the final and aborted battle estrange and confuse us, provoking us to wonder again and again about just what kind of film we are watching: a film parodying films about the Middle Ages such as Bergman's *The Seventh Seal* (1957)? A documentary about making such a film parody? Or a documentary about a film about reenactors making a film about the Middle Ages played by actors who are acting as reenactors? One of the film's many recurrent and hilarious tag lines—"Not dead yet"—may serve as a tagline for the problem

of interpreting the film's staging of its continual deferral of meaning, its refusal to deliver a narrative sequence of its own life and death.[50]

Surrealist Schlock: Uncoordinating Historicism

Having examined the de-composing paratext and the errant hand as the (phantom) agent of living dead media in a variety of film genres related to the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, we are now in a position to address both the relation between the paratext and narrative in contemporary historicist practice and the possibility of an alternative surrealist and psychoanalytic historicism. In the first of two versions of his essay "The Touch of the Real," both of which I will examine in detail in the epilogue of this book, Stephen Greenblatt (1997b and 2000a) defends the New Historicism against the charge that it is an arbitrary practice. As an example of his practice, he compares *Hamlet* with a legal deposition about an encounter with a ghost in late seventeenth-century rural England, an anecdote that, he quickly concedes, "is hardly the key to unlock *Hamlet*'s mysteries. Indeed, its invocation here comes perilously close to confirming the charge of 'arbitrary connectedness'—in effect, an irresponsible hermeneutical surrealism—sometimes leveled at New Historicism" (25). Rather than justify his anecdote, however, Greenblatt rather remarkably goes on to provide ammunition (in a preemptive counterstrike of friendly fire as congenial self-immolation?) to his imagined critics:

> Recorded in a different city almost seventy years after Shakespeare's tragedy and concerning people unlikely to have had any encounter with the professional theater or knowledge of Shakespeare's existence, it is an utterly marginal document, too fragmentary and odd to be adduced as a piece of solid evidence for anything. The most gossamer touch of the real, its only virtue in the present context is its very marginality, its stretching to the limit the possibility of a meaningful link, its distance from the kind of historical document more conventionally adduced to illuminate a work of art. Such a document usually precedes the work in question or is closely contemporary with it: it often comes from the same geographical and social setting; and, most satisfyingly of all, it may offer a direct philological link. (25)

In the epilogue, I consider why this self-defense of an example that in Greenblatt's (1997b) own terms might be called surrealist is cut from the second and revised version of his essay (2000a).

For the moment, I want to ask if historicism and philology are necessarily opposed to surrealism, confined to an order of precedence and succession that is by definition opposed to all other hermeneutics of temporal juxtaposition, to be damned by the label "irresponsible." After all, both Walter Benjamin and Theodor Adorno wrote essays on surrealism, assessing it retrospectively in very positive terms. Benjamin (1999d) used a metaphor from photography when subtitling his essay on surrealism "The Last

Snapshot of the European Intelligentsia" and celebrated André Breton's ability to "perceive the revolutionary energies that appear in the 'outmoded,' in the first iron constructions, the first factory buildings, the earliest photos, the objects that have begun to be extinct . . . when the vogue has begun to ebb from them" (181). Benjamin (1969) similarly linked Dada and cinema in his essay "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," writing that "Dadaism attempted to create by pictorial—and literary—means the effects which the public today seeks in film" (237). Along similar lines, Adorno (1991) compared surrealism to montage (87–88) and characterized it as a "photographic negative" (90). And although he regarded surrealism as already obsolete, Adorno valued the "distortions" through which surrealism "salvages what is out of date," creating "an album of idiosyncrasies in which the claim to the happiness that human beings find denied them in their own technified world goes up in smoke" (90).

While Greenblatt (2000) maintains that his precursor Auerbach was "suspicious of modernism," there is evidence of Auerbach's involvement with and hidden knowledge of the discourse of modernist art. Auerbach's brother-in-law was Raoul Hausmann, one of the founders of Dada, and Auerbach (2007) mentions him in a letter to Benjamin written in 1937 (751).[51] At stake for Adorno and Benjamin was not a consideration of reverence or irreverence to the past, but a consideration of what use was to be made of the old, obsolete, and useless media and commodities by the collector critic, that is, media and commodities whose value depended precisely on their having exchange value rather than use-value. In a letter dated August 2, 1935 to Benjamin, Adorno (1977) mentions Dadaist Raoul Hausmann in this context: "the collector liberates things from the curse of being useful: this is where Hausmann belong; his class consciousness . . . inaugurates the explosion of the phantasmagoria. The commodity is, on the one hand, an alienated object in which use-value perishes and, on the other, an alien survivor that outlives its own immediacy . . . the fetish is a faithless image, comparable only to a death's head" (113–14). Moreover, surrealism and the Renaissance have been frequently linked. At least one art historian has discussed surrealistic aspects of Renaissance anamorphic art (Margolin 1977),[52] while Arcimboldo was frequently regarded as the first surrealist, at least since a 1937 exhibition of "Fantastic Art, Dada, and Surrealism" held at the Museum of Modern of Art that included Acrimboldo's "Summer" as well as a variety of films (Barr and Hugnet 1946, 81, 246, 262). Arcimboldo effects (Legrand 1955, Hulten 1987, and Kobry 2007) have been traced from the sixteenth-century to twentieth-century Surrealism.[53] The Surrealist Salvador Dalí, for example, often made use of Spanish Baroque paintings (Stratton-Pruitt and Jeffet 2007). And art historian James Elkins (1999), whose work on cryptomorphs I will take up in the next chapter, locates various strategies of reading hidden images in modern art (Cubism and Surrealism), remarking that both "Surrealism and psychoanalysis are so deeply entangled in art historical thinking that they routinely serve as subjects for debate and hermeneutic models" (226).

Transformers: From Special Effects to Special Features in Devolving Digital Film Theory and Surreal Historicism

To examine connected lines of affiliation and faultiness of resistance between surrealism and historicism, I want to develop my account of living dead media in medieval and early modern films as a déjà vu-like loop of cinema with new media and precinema by turning to stop-motion animation and thereby interrogating both the centrality of special effects in Manovich's (2001) account of the history of cinema and the centrality of the hand and machine in his account of new media as a recycling, or rebirth, of the birth of cinema. According to Manovich, special effects have been marginalized by historians of cinema. As I noted earlier, Manovich maintains that "manual construction and animation of images gave birth to the cinema and slipped into the margins . . . only to reappear . . . as the foundation of digital cinema. The history of the moving image thus makes a full circle" (302). Turning to a scene from his key example Dziga Vertov's *Man with a Movie Camera* (1929), Manovich points to "a cameraman standing on the back of an automobile. . . . [who] cranks his handle of his camera. A loop, a repetition, created by the circular movement of the handle, gives birth to a progression of events—a very basic narrative that is also quintessentially modern—a camera recording whatever is in its way" (316). Similarly, Manovich writes of procinema from cinema in terms of an opposition between animating hand and automating machine:

> The earlier techniques [magic lanterns, the Pheatisticope, the Thumatrope, the Zootrope, the Praxinoscope, the Choreutoscope, and Zoopraxiscope] . . . all relied on hand-painted or hand-drawn images. . . . Not only were images created manually, they were also manually animated. . . . More often an exhibitor used only his hands, rather than his whole body, to put the images in motion. . . . It was not until the last decade of the nineteenth century that the automatic generation of images and automatic projection were finally combined. (296)

I have no wish to dispute Manovich's history of cinema and new media here. My point is that by conceiving of the history of cinema and media in terms of greater interactivity between human and interface, Manovich remains caught in an account of the transition between media as a repetition of the old in terms of margins and centers, standardization and customization, and thus misses and perhaps, one could say, even represses the uncanniness of the historical shift. Cinematic montage is spatialized, according to Manovich, so that "nothing need be forgotten, nothing erased. Just as we accumulate endless texts, messages, notes, and data, and, just as a person, going through life accumulates more and more memories . . . spatial montage can accumulate events and images. . . . In contrast to the cinema's screen, which primarily functions as a record of perception, here the computer screen functions as a record of memory" (325).

Manovich's distinctions between procinema, cinema, and new media and his reliance on analogies between cinema and its past, on one hand, and past media and new media, on the other, begin to fall apart if we examine a kind of animation that he skips over, namely, stop-motion animation, a kind of animation often linked to surrealism. Stop-motion animation films are entirely made up of special effects. By focusing first on the doubly animating human and mechanical hands in the Quay Brothers' surrealist stop-motion film *The Cabinet of Jan Švankmajer: Alchemist of Prague* and then, in a return to the philological uncanny, on Freud's philological "pre-animated" film analysis of Moses' hand in his essay "Moses and Michelangelo," we will arrive at a more uneven and uncanny sense of transitions between media in which any attempt to oppose the recording of perception in cinema and the recording of memory on the computer breaks down.[54]

Handing Off Historicism in Surrealist Early Modern Cinema

The Cabinet of Jan Švankmajer is a fourteen-minute short, silent film, a collection of fragments, what the Quays call "fantasy inserts," divided up by intertitle cards and recombinations of what were originally transitional segments of a series of talking head interviews in a fifty-seven minute television documentary about French and Czech surrealist animation, also entitled *The Cabinet of Jan Švankmajer*, and included as an extra on the BFI DVD edition *Jan Švankmajer: The Complete Short Films* (2007).[55] Like the Quays' film *Anamorphosis* I discussed earlier in this chapter with respect to the paratext, their earlier film *The Cabinet of Jan Švankmajer* puts into question a distinction between the human being and the technology that produces a narrative of ordered succession (first come humans, then comes technology) that are the staple of historicism. Scott Shershow's (1995) account of the origins of puppet shows is exemplary in this regard:

> The word *marionette* enters our language from French as a diminutive of Marion, itself a diminutive of the female name Marie (Mary). Thus, it seems safe to assume, as several scholars have, that the "marionette," or "little Mary," must have referred originally to the sculpted figures of the Virgin used in stationary nativity scenes. . . . The histrionic sense that eventually attaches to the word *marionette* presumably derives from the fact that some of the figures in medieval crèches were automata, capable of some form of limited mechanical movement. The actual existence of such mechanized ritual figures also goes hand in hand with legends of statues that miraculously come to life: a crucified Christ that nods its head, a Mary that blesses the assembled multitude. (40)

The Quays' *Cabinet of Jan Švankmajer* collapses Shershow's narrative sequence of stationary and then mechanized puppets into a single double origin of stop-motion animation film.

Much like the manner in which *Anamorphosis* begins and ends with Holbein's "The Ambassadors" (1533), *The Cabinet of Jans Švankmajer* begins (after a brief prelude) and ends with a Librarian mechanical doll filmmaker and teacher that is modeled on Arcimboldo's portrait "The Librarian" (see figure 1.7, upper left and right) the doll appears on screen behind his operating table with a large-scale poster of Švankmajer's face and the words "Kino Positiv" written above it placed behind him.[56] Matching shots of Švankmajer's and the Librarian's faces at the end of this sequence suggest that the Librarian is a figure for Švankmajer, though Švankmajer appears as a photograph, part of the Quays' mise-en-scène, not as an originator outside the film. The first intertitle gives the film a subtitle ("A la Arcimboldo").[57] Even more explicitly than the Quays' *Anamorphosis*, *The Cabinet of Jans Švankmajer* questions the commonsense assumption that human movement lies at the origin of film animation. The Quays allude here to the human hand that places and removes a monkey film projectionist cranking by hand the projector, turned directly toward the audience, in the manner of early silent film projectionists, in the opening and closing title sequences of the stop-motion animated film adaptation of the French medieval tale of the same name written by Pierre de Saint Cloud around 1175, namely, *Le Roman de Reynard* [The Tale of Reynard] (Irene and Wladyslaw Starewicz, 1930). A human hand thrusts into the medium shot of the frame to animate and then remove a monkey film projectionist (see figure 1.7, lower left and right).[58] *The Cabinet of Jans Švankmajer* similarly begins with a human hand putting the Librarian in the center of the medium shot and then rapidly screwing him into place with a red screwdriver. The apparently lifeless Librarian is a composite collection of discrete mechanical objects; seen from a distance, however, his calipers become arms, an open book serves as hair on his head, a blue and white early modern map of Prague his face, and a box his mouth. A cut-in shot shows the hand removing a book from his chest (made up entirely of books), adjusting his left caliper arm, and then, cutting back to the original medium shot, shows the human hand drop red ink, or blood, into the Librarian's mechanical "hand" (see figure 1.7, upper left).[59] Rather than figuring a human origin of mechanical animation, the hand gives a turn of the screw to narrative sequence and interpretation, however.[60] Through a double operation of interiorization and exteriorization, the Librarian reanimates him/itself, first by dropping the blood/red ink inside its mechanical body and then refilling itself, as it were, then by squeezing the blood slightly, dropping it inside through the opening created by the book removed from its chest, then dropping it on a piece of cotton (as if on the raw material of paper), and then removing it, which causes a gear to begin turning, and finally taking the cotton out of its chest and swallowing it.[61] The hand then returns in the frame a final time to readjust the Librarian's arm. The human hand does not cause the Librarian to come to life but initiates a process of reanimation that the Librarian also begins, first by dropping the red ink/blood into his "heart" and then again by "eating" the



Figure 1.7 Surreal and Uncanny Projections: The Animator's Hand in *The Cabinet of Jan Švankmajer* (1986) and *Le Roman de Reynard* (1930)

cotton. And unlike the hand that removes the self-congratulatory monkey and then inserts the word "Fin" (French for "The End") at the end of *Le Roman de Reynard*, the human hand in *The Cabinet of Jans Švankmajer* does not return at the end of the film to establish a framing narrative closure.

The Quays' C*abinet* follows a creative logic of simultaneity as well as succession. The cabinet of the title refers both to Expressionist cinema of Robert Wiene's *The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari* (1919) and to the wonder cabinets of Rudolf II. One title card reads, "Atelier of Švankmajer: Sixteenth and Twentieth Centuries Simultaneously: An Unexpected Visitor," a shot of library books showings author's names on the spines places Kafka next to Rudolf II and Breton next to Arcimboldo (see figure 1.8, upper right); the Quays refer to the double time scheme in their introduction to the film on the BFI DVD released in 2007.[62]

This opening "hand off" from human to machine serves as a pedagogical and dialogical metaphor for film school.[63] The plot of *The Cabinet of Jans Švankmajer* involves the Librarian training and collaborating with a child-doll of indeterminate gender, who turns up in several of the Quay Brothers' films, to become a stop-action animation filmmaker (see figure 1.8, upper and lower left).[64] Both characters take turns helping the other until together they make a stop motion animated film in the film of a ball bouncing downstairs. As the Librarian cranks the camera, one fame at a time, the child-doll records the number of frames being shot.

The central metaphor for film animation instruction is not the exposure of the cinematic apparatus, however, as if the film were a handicraft, but takes instead the double form of the spin and the bounce.[65] (A bouncing ball appears frequently in the earliest films, as Manovich points out [2001, 97].) As the Librarian spins Arcimboldo's "Vertumnus" portrait, a chair emerges out of it for the child-doll to sit and watch a performance. The child-doll is first seen as his red triangle hat bobs up above a railing and he drops it and spins by the "Vertumnus" portrait. After the Librarian operates on the child-doll, replacing its hair and brain with a glass eye and an open book, the doll exits, leaving the red hat behind, now spinning on its own, neither automatically nor by hand.[66] During the filmmaking within the film sequence, a ball bounces downstairs as if by its own will.

Obeying a similar logic, one medium or data storage device transforms into another in the "Wonder Cabinet" sequence of the Quays' film, much as Arcimboldo's anamorphic paintings transform flowers or fish into human portraits through a logic of metaphorical and metonymic substitution (Barthes 1984). Even the four Arcimboldo anamorphic portraits quoted in the film, two from Arcimboldo's series *The Four Seasons* ("Winter" and "Summer") and two from his series *The Four Elements* ("Water" and "Fire") follow this logic of recombination. Like the early scene in which the child-doll lies its head on the table and empties out its contents, the Librarian brings to life a dynamic within Arcimboldo's portraits between the poles of beautiful têtes composés and grotesque, even monstrous têtes décomposées (see Guégan 2007 and Geoffroy-Schneiter 2007). The transformations of

Figure 1.8 **Arcimboldo as Surrealist (Re)Animator in the Quay Brothers' *The Cabinet of Jan Švankmajer***

Arcimboldo's portraits performed by the Librarian involves neither interiorization nor exteriorization, but a transferential process that alternately implodes and explodes the head: creating a moving picture that both draws in the viewer and alienates, perhaps at moments even repulsing him or her, entails a recycling and reanimation that has neither a beginning nor an end and that produces, as we see in the red dye/blood dropped on and into the Librarian, (in)digestion, gagging as well as metabolization, artifice and nature, composition and de-composition.[67]

The wonder cabinet (looking like a library with index card drawers) stores objects according to a similar logic: objects are retrieved by the Librarian with the child-doll's help from a recessive series of Chinese boxes and the child-doll in turn transforms them into a telescope through which itpeers. Sometimes gravity ceases to operate in the wonder cabinet, recalling seventeenth-century *camera obscura* that were housed in boxes or popped up from books, linear and anamorphic paintings were housed in "perspective boxes," and *tabula scatala* stacked portraits like accordions (Stafford and Terpak 2001; 226, 236, 238, 260, 307). Regarded from the present moment, the wonder cabinet drawers that open and close by themselves also resemble computer file drawers in Microsoft Windows that allow different contents to occupy the same space.[68]

We see a similar transformation of anamorphic painting when the Librarian cuts up Arcimboldo's "Winter" and "Summer" portraits into a *tabula scatala*, a painting that may be stored like an accordion, folded up into evenly spaced, horizontally or vertically cut slats (for an example, see Stafford and Terpak 2001, 226). The Librarian then turns the Arcimboldo portrait at an angle until the slats stop moving and reveal two remixed and rematched complementary paintings from the elements series,[69] "Fire" and "Winter" (see figure 1.8, upper and lower left). *The Cabinet of Jan Švankmajer* gets Arcimboldo on Arcimboldo, as it were, producing anamorphic views of his "Vertumnus" and other Arcimboldo portraits that allow for successive revelations and recombinations of new images, somewhat like the anamorphic view of the skull in Holbein's "Ambassadors." in the Quays' *Anamorphosis* (1991). The *Cabinet* differs in that a shift from one perspective does not produce what the voice-over narrator of the later film calls a "final revelation" but instead produces another anamorphic, double perspective that may be in turn flipped or spun into another anamorphic view. Anamorphosis becomes both serial and successive, like film, and in turn functions, in a twice used quick series of zoom-like cut-ins to "Vertumnus," like details of a painting reproduced in a book or even the zoom in and out functions on a computer screen. If I may go off on a slight tangent for the sake of making a larger point about the paratext and the remediation of the Renaissance book and painting as their uncanny reanimation, I would like to add to my earlier point that the opening sequence with the reanimating hands in *The Cabinet* recalls the opening sequence and end title sequences of the Starewicz's *Le Roman de Reynard* (see figure 1.7, lower left and right). At the start of *Reynard*, animal puppet characters who will appear in the film narrative first appear out of the

turning pages of an illustrated book, as if they were jumping out of a pop-up book; they disappear back into the book at the end of the film. Moreover, one book reproduction of Arcimboldo's paintings (see de Mandiargues 1977) works like a film: the paintings are shown over a series of pages, and each time one turns the page, one sees the painting in greater detail, as if by turning the book pages one were cranking a film projector and zooming in from a long shot of the painting to a medium shot to a close-up to an extreme close-up. The book turns into an interactive machine allowing the reader to go back and forth by turning the pages to see longer and closer views much like the zoom in/out functions on a computer image or on the remote of a DVD player.[70]

To return to the Quays' *Cabinet of Jan Švankmajer*, we may see that by recycling and remediating Arcimboldo's portraits in a transformative cut-and-paste manner, the Quays comment on Švankmajer's use of Arcimboldo and on Švankmajer's view of the priority of one artwork over another in terms of their creativity and originality or second hand cannibalization. The first half of Švankmajer's *Dimensions of Dialogue* (1982) recycles aspects of Arcimboldo's "Librarian," "Vertumnus" (1590), and "Water" (1566). More precisely, Švankmajer recycles two early anonymous engraved portraits in profile based on Arcimboldo paintings: "Humani Victus Instrumenta, Ars Agricultura, Instruments of Human Sustenance" (1567) and "Humani Victus Instrumenta, Ars Coquinaria, Instruments of Human Sustenance" (1569). Each engraving has the titles "Cucina" and "Agricoltura" inserted next to the respective faces (reproduced in Ferino-Pagden 2007, 184).[71] The Quays' film helps us appreciate that Švankmajer returns not to the Arcimboldo original but to early Arcimboldo effects, starting at one or two removes from Arcimboldo's elements and seasons rather than satirizing the loss of a prized original to its degraded copies. "Vertmunus" also appears in Švankmajer's dedication at the beginning of his short stop-motion animation film *Historia Naturae* (*Suita*) (1967), dedicated to Emperor Rudolf II and his wonder cabinet collections of rarities and wonders.[72] The sound track of that film doubles as the sound track of the Quays' film as well.

The Cabinet of Jan Švankmajer produces various kinds of Arcimboldo/Švankmajer effects by recycling Švankmajer's recycling of already recycled Arcimboldo effects. Švankmajer has a rather jaundiced view of recycling as cannibalization and homogeneity. Each sequence of *Historia Naturae* (*Suita*), for example, ends with a close-up of a human mouth chewing a piece of meat, and in the final sequence the human mouth is replaced by a the mouth of a skull chewing meat. The (post-)Arcimboldo-derived portraits in *Dimensions of Dialogue* repeatedly charge at each other, one ingesting the other and then vomiting it out, each portrait becoming increasingly degraded in the process even as the ugly process of artistic creation by regurgitation becomes the basis for the film's refined aesthetic. In the Quays' *Cabinet*, however, collaboration is an uncanny process in which the animated and animating subjects are also objects, copy and original becoming the effects of various kinds of analogies, repetitions, and

returns. The "Kino Positif" poster with Švankmajer's face positioned behind the Librarian alludes to the very poster of Stalin seen in Švankmajer's *The Death of Stalinism in Bohemia*. In Švankmajer's film, the poster is broken through by a skull; in the Quays', the poster returns to its state prior to the hole being torn in it as the Librarian moves through it, showing Švankmajer himself smiling, after which the Librarian returns in a briefly held shot. In another pointed allusion to Švankmajer, several pins carry a sugar cube and drop it in the mouth of a two-dimensional drawing of a man whose body has been flayed. (The Renaissance anatomy theater is also recalled in the scene of the film in which the Librarian tries to match objects inside a box placed on top of this same drawing of a flayed human body from the neck down.) Ingestion is just one of many repetitions in the film, however, and takes either a sweet form, as in the sugar cube, or a grotesque form, as when the Librarian eats the piece of cotton with red dye in it. The map on the Librarian's face shows up in a later sequence involving a map of Paris and Prague, for example, and the flip side of it shows the same graphic design around "Praha" (Prague) that appears elsewhere in the wonder cabinet around the word "Elementa."

If, as Manovich (2001) maintains, special effects are the repressed center of cinematic history, then the history of stop-motion animation is the repressed center within this repressed center. As D.N. Rodowick writes, "computer-generated images are longer restricted to isolated special effects; they comprise in many sequences the whole of the mise-en-scène to the point where even major characters are in whole or in part computer generated" (2007, 6). Stop-motion animation films are special effects *tout court* and, when transfered to DVD, produce uncanny special effects. For example, the second disc of supplements to the BFI edition of the *The Quay Brothers: The Short Films, 1979–2003*, entitled "Footnotes," includes two films with "[Scope]" appearing under their titles in the DVD menu.[73] When played, these films are each preceded by a title card explaining that while the original broadcast version of these films is on disc one (and thereby defined as the film proper), "the Quays had always conceived that the film would be projected in 'scope' through an anamorphic lens. The black bars at the top and at the bottom of the picture in this version are therefore intentional." The anamorphic lens version desired by the Quays is thus realized not as the definitive version of their film, but as a letterboxed extra in the form of a footnote preceded by a paratext, namely, the prefatory intertitle.

The Freudian Jerk: Second Hand Historicism

We may pursue the possibility of a surreal historicism that derives from a biotechnological subject by turning from the Quays' *Cabinet* as a recollection and reassembly fragments to the figure of the hand in psychoanalysis. Specifically, I will discuss the place of cinema and the hand in Freud's "Moses

and Michelangelo," originally published anonymously in 1914. I will focus on a hidden connection in Freud's essay between Moses' left hand as fragment and Moses' text as fragment. Of crucial interest in my reading is Freud's uneven attention to Moses' two hands. Freud draws our attention to the placement of Moses' hands, interpreting the meaning of Moses' seated stationary pose by reconstructing an admittedly speculative narrative of Moses' movement just prior to coming to rest and using a photograph of the statute and four drawings that form a kind of comic strip or filmstrip illustrating Moses' movements. Freud's use of visual aids to make Moses explicable and narratable hardly amount to a reassuringly genetic explanation, however, in terms of either legal crime scene investigation or psychoanalysis. Freud's essay is remarkable because it is not predictably Freudian. Indeed, it has been read as a nonpsychoanalytic essay because Freud does not psychoanalyze Michelangelo the way he does Leonardo da Vinci (*SE* 13). Freud's analysis of Moses' hands stops well short of Freud's subsequent practice of reading the hand in relation to the uncanny, reanimation, and castration: "dismembered limbs, a severed head, a hand cut off at the wrist . . . all these have something peculiarly uncanny about them, especially, when . . . they prove capable of independent activity in addition. As we know this kind of uncanniness springs from its proximity to the castration complex" (*SE* 17, 244).

Freud maintains that Michelangelo departs from the hot-tempered Moses who blows his top during the golden calf scene in *Exodus*, inventing a new, more self-controlled Moses: "The Moses of legend and tradition had a hasty temper and was subject to fits of passion . . . Michelangelo has placed a different Moses on the tomb of the Pope, one superior to the historical or traditional Moses" (37). Michelangelo's new Moses is superior because he masters his anger at his people's idolatry: he is a figure of self-discipline and nonviolence.

After devoting pages of consideration to the place of Moses' right hand, particularly the "concealed" right thumb and "the index finger alone . . . in contact with the beard" (17, 222) to advance this interpretation, Freud finally comes to the left hand only to skip quickly over it: "No mention has been [made] so far of the left arm, and it seems to claim a share in our interpretation. The hand is laid in his lap in a mild gesture and holds as though in a caress the end of his flowing beard. It seems as if it is meant to counteract the violence with which the other hand had missed the beard a few moments ago" (13, 230). Yet Freud, who initially spends a lot of time criticizing the inaccuracy of many descriptions of the statue, arguably errs both in his description of the left hand and in forgetting that he did mention it once earlier in his essay. In an earlier passage, Freud draws a political contrast between the "despotic [index] finger" of the right hand, which pins down part of Moses beard, and the "free" flowing beard below, a contrast that includes a mistaken description of the left hand:

> At the place where the right index finger is pressed in, a kind of whorl of hairs is formed; strands of hair coming down from the left lie over strands

> coming from the right, both caught in by that despotic finger. It is only beyond this place that the masses of hair, deflected from their course, flow freely once more, and now they fall vertically until their ends are gathered up in Moses' left hand as it lies open on his lap. (13, 26)

Here Freud's subtly politicized description of Moses' left index finger is clearly in error, for the left hand does not lie open but is placed squarely against Moses' lower abdomen, at the end of his beard under Moses' left thumb, his left bicep flexed.

In addition to describing the left hand in arguably errant ways, Freud never returns to discuss further the meaning of the left hand. By limiting the play of concealment and revelation to the thumb and index finger of the right hand rather than extending it to include the concealed fingers of the left hand, Freud oddly resists a Freudian reading of the Moses statue as an alternation between giving the law by exposing it with one hand, which Moses clutches to his side, and covering the wound of castration/circumcision with the other. (In *Moses and Monotheism* [1939, *SE* 23], Freud does not return to Michelangelo's Moses but writes that "Moses gave the Jews not only a new religion: it is equally certain that he introduced the custom of circumcision" [*SE* 23, 29].) Freud's omission is all the more remarkable given the numerous Renaissance paintings and statues of the *Lamentation* of Jesus in which, as Leo Steinberg (1983/1996, 202–12) has observed, Jesus' left hand is placed directly over or very near his veiled, circumcised penis in order to symbolize his fully incarnated divinity.

A further symptom of Freud's resistance is his inattention to Moses' fourth and fifth fingers, both concealed because they are closed into a partial fist and so arguably cut off. Significantly, these two closed fingers, concealed like the thumb of the right hand, are not shown either in the photo of the detail of the statue (the midsection of Moses' body) or in the four comic/filmstrip sequence of drawings of the statue that accompany Freud's essay. Indeed, the detail photo (*SE* 17, 223) puts the index finger of the left hand into focus, hiding the other fingers, and makes it all the more capable of being read as a phallus. (Freud carefully attends to the index finger of the right hand in relation to the "bulge" of the beard, the finger making "a deep trough in it," and concludes that "to press one's beard with one finger is an extraordinary gesture and one not easy to understand" [17, 223].) The first drawing doesn't even complete the left hand (no fingers or thumb appear), and the fingers are cut off in the right side of the second drawing. Only the index finger is shown in the third and fourth drawings (17, 226–27).

Freud's resistance to reading the left hand and to showing it completely (making visible the concealment of the two fingers) in the photo and drawings is all the more striking in the light that Freud mischaracterizes Moses' left hand, given that Freud later addressed the hand and masturbation in his essay on gambling, regarding guilt over gambling as displaced guilt over masturbation (21, 173–94). Similarly, in his *Interpretation of Dreams* (*SE* 5, 378–81), Freud interprets a dream Otto von Bismarck had about a horseback

ride in the Alps and his use of a "riding whip" (379) to hit a rock by comparing it to a Biblical scene in which Moses holds a rod in his left hand to strike water from a rock against God's will. Freud interprets the dream as a symbolic account of masturbation and the left hand:

> The interpretation . . . that in dreams "left" stands for what is wrong, forbidden and sinful is much to the point here, for it might well be applied to masturbation carried out in childhood in the face of prohibition. . . . The Bible passage [about Moses] contains some details which apply well to a masturbation fantasy. . . . The prohibited seizing of the rod (in the dream an unmistakably phallic one), the production of fluid from its blow, the threat of death—in these we find all the principal factors of infantile masturbation united. . . . the fact that seizing the rod was a forbidden and rebellious act was no longer indicated except symbolically by the "left" hand which performed it. (380–81)

Yet it is precisely because Freud jerks offtrack, so to speak, in his analysis of the Moses statue's de-animation, resisting the stereotypical Freudian reading one might expect to find and prematurely skipping over the left arm and hand of Moses, that we can appreciate how Freud's reading of Moses as a figure of nonviolence depends on reading the "unhandedness" of the statue with respect to writing: the index fingers of both hands are fully extended, but Freud connects only the right index finger to writing. The beard "is forced to roll over loosely and form part of a kind of scroll" (17, 222), also described as a "loop" (224). Freedom for Freud is linked to a textual metaphor, by way of an errant description, opposed to the pressure of the finger of the hand that defers consideration, as it were, of the two tablets clutched by the arm that separates writing from the wound of circumcision hidden below the partially hidden, fragmented left hand.

Freud's quite truncated discussion of the hidden left hand produces an uncanny impasse in his essay, diverting into a discussion of serial doubles: the old Biblical Moses and the new Michelangelo Moses; Michelangelo and Pope Julius II; and Freud himself and his precursor Watkiss Lloyd, who had published a book on Michelangelo's Moses in 1863 that "anticipated," Freud says, "so much of my thought" (17, 235–36). This last pair, Freud himself and his precursor Watkiss Lloyd, recalls Freud's pairing, earlier in the essay, between his method of reading in detail with the method practiced by two of his precursors, the Russian art historian Lermolief and the Italian physician Giovanni Morelli. The semiautomatic seriality of Freud's pairings leads to an undoing of Freud's claim for the newness of both the psychoanalytic reading of the statue and the psychoanalytic method of reading in general "by examining certain insignificant details" and thereby arriving "at an unexpected interpretation of the meaning and aims of the figure as a whole." Both Freud's reading of the Moses statue and his method of reading turn out

to be variations on the readings of Freud's two precursors: Freud says his method of reading in detail closely resembles Lermolief's and Morelli's methods of reading; similarly, Freud says his reading of the Moses statue closely resembles Lloyd's reading of it. The Freudian practice of psychoanalytic reading thus appears to self-deconstruct, as Freud collapses his method and reading back into those of his nonpsychoanalytic precursor doubles.

Freud's Holding Hands: Psychoanalysis and the Spacing of Data Storage

This Freudian self-deconstruction in relation to the wound of circumcision is registered by the deferral not only of attention to the hidden left hand but also of the hiddenness of the text (the stone tablets have been turned face to face such that the writing is invisible). The tablets work along the lines of the two-handed writing machine known as the Mystic Writing Pad that Freud later wrote a note on:

> The Mystic Writing Pad is a slab of dark brown resin or wax with a paper edging; over the slab is laid a thin transparent sheet, the top end of which is firmly secured to the slab while its bottom end rests upon it without being secured to it. . . . the upper layer is a transparent piece of celluloid; the lower layer is made of thin translucent wax paper. When the apparatus is not in use, the lower surface of the waxed paper adheres lightly to the upper surface of the wax slab. (19, 227)

Moses' right hand doesn't hold the tablets but presses them together under his right arm in order, according to Freud, to prevent them from being broken: the tablets "began to slide down and were in danger of being broken. This brought [Moses] to himself. He remembered his mission . . . and his hand returned and saved the unsupported tablets before they had actually fallen to the ground" (17, 230). [74] Freud's likening of Moses' beard to a scroll represses the already broken, uncannily doubled and fragmented nature of the data storage–writing machine Moses holds in place. As two stone tablets, one mapped squarely onto the other, the Jewish law already is a prototype of the mystic writing pad, with each tablet serving either as the wax base or as the celluloid cover that requires two hands to read its writing: "if we imagine one hand writing upon the surface of the Pad while another periodically raises its covering sheet from it, we shall have a concrete representation of the way in which I think [of the] functioning of the perceptual apparatus of our mind" (19, 230).

The statue of Moses is itself a kind of writing machine, then, his hands holding a storage space apart and between them in the way Freud observes is required to operate the writing pad. The law in Michelangelo's Moses has been spaced out, broken into fragments: written invisibly in the stone tablets (neither tablet shows writing on it) and constituting an inscription

of the law as itself an unconsciousness, the law, which bears the form of a cut, a split, becoming a recalling and recollection of the leftover hand of circumcision. The tension between Moses' hidden left hand and his revealed right hand bears the unrepresentable condition of representation: the tablets bound together into a book by the pressure of Moses' right arm unify them at the price of making them unreadable. The paradox of the unrepresentable bound and repressed book is made (in)visible in Freud's essay by his doubly unnoticed and unnoted textual gap between his ekphrasis of the statue, on the one hand, and the concealed details of the left hand, as well as the visual gap between the illustrations and photograph of the statue and the same concealed details of the left hand, on the other.

Re-searching History on Digital Film: Postdialogical Memory (Dis)Integration from Tablet as Film to DVD as Text

The tension between Moses' hand as a fragment and the text as fragments in Freud's essay enables us to see that cinematic and textual fragmentations drive a surreal and uncanny narrative loop both of the historical film as well as of film and media history. One can learn of the genesis of the Quays' *Cabinet of Jan Švankmajer* in the reassemblage of "fantasy inserts" of the longer, original documentary only by watching the Quays' paratexutal introduction to that documentary, both of which appear as extras on the third disc of the BFI DVD *Jan Švankmajer*: *The Complete Short Films*. The Quays BFI DVD edition does not refer to the *Švankmajer BFI DVD edition*, and one needs to either watch both by chance or do an online search of the paratexts of both DVDs to find the connection between the DVDs. I call this kind of paratextual link via a search engine a postdialogical form of interdigitextuality that follows from the production of DVD editions of films. Distinctions between text and paratext, DVD film and DVD extra, become less clear and less fixed as what serves as supplements to memory and archiving also makes a series of new editions or repressings rather than provides some totally collected "ultimate DVD edition." Histories of film and media that map old and new media by visual, mechanical analogy or audial analogy (resonance) leave out the fragment, the dissonance, or the noise that fills in as a connection. Like the bite marks that resemble typing strokes in *Bram Stoker's Dracula*, a hidden, wounding division inscribed in the digitalization of cinema produces new kinds of recollection and reviewing that returns the viewer to the film object not as the never-bookending story but as a re-bookmarking story.

From the Jerk to the Joke: After-Schlock of the Medieval, or (In)Visible Hands Off Historicism

For a final example of a medieval film paratext that clarifies the way the hand figures a jerking of historicism and linear narrative into death and

error, in this case as a joke, consider the rotoscoped end title sequence, designed by Jim Baker, of Roger Corman's lowbrow and low-budget, schlocky medieval horror film *Masque of the Red Death* (1964).[75] In this case, we have a hands-off shock effect that stops the relay of information and loops back to the opening title sequence rather than a handing off of information and narrative progression. The end title sequence involves a Tarot card reading for the audience in which *The Masque of the Red Death* becomes *The Masque of the Read Death*: an overhead shot shows a hand slowly and carefully composing a series of twelve tarot cards, laying them out one by one face up in two rows on a red background. As the cards are laid down, the credits appear next to them written in a medieval-looking font that gets progressively smaller as the increasing number of cards leaves less and less room available for the credits. These cards allude to a diegetic game of tarot cards Death had been playing with a young girl he spared, along with six other villagers, at the end of the film. The cards are for the most part personifications of vices that match images and titles. The thirteenth card is placed down after Roger Corman's director credit appears and as the music reaches a crescendo (see figure 1.6). It is the death card (a skull wearing a crown faces the viewer with the French word for death, *la mort*, written below). As if shocked by the appearance of this card, the hand loses its composure and quickly jerks away from it, leaving it placed at an angle (see figure 1.6, lower right). All of the other cards are quickly scattered from the composition, leaving the death card alone visible for the final American International Pictures credit.[76] De-composition now stalls out at decomposition as death shows its hand, so to speak.

The end title sequence sets up this aftershock effect very nicely by returning to the opening title sequence: both sequences begin with the same music, the same red and black colors, and the same font; the end title sequence changes the tense from the present in the opening title sequence ("James H. Nicholson and Samuel Z. Arkoff present *The Masque of the Red Death*") to the past ("James H. Nicholson and Samuel Z. Arkoff have presented"), adding "Edgar Allen Poe's" before "The Masque of the Red Death." The copyright date now appears and the transition from black background to all-red background is sped up. (The opening title sequence mentions Poe in relation to the screenplay credit "from a story by Edgar Allen Poe.") The framing effect of the end title sequence is strengthened by the way the film's ending is marked by a citation from its source text "The Masque of the Red Death," namely, "and darkness and decay and the red death held illimitable dominion over all," with Edgar Allen Poe's name written below. The citation is followed by "the end," all in lower case, as the film fades to black. The end title sequence suggests that the end of cinematic projection is like death, and no one in the audience is spared feeling like the film deadends. The rotoscoped hand does not "direct" the film any more than Corman does, and like Death, the end of the film turns up unexpectedly, even though the spectator knows that time is running out and that the film is nearly over. As dust returns to dust and ashes to ashes, so the final shot of Corman's *Masque of the Red Death* returns us to the first shot, both showing the title "American International Pictures." Historicist

criticism inevitably, as we shall grasp more fully in the chapters that follow, goes out of touch with the past it conjures, takes an uncanny and errant detour and (re)turn because the human hand or hands that inscribe, reanimate, and archive the texts and films of the past always perform writing and reading as a spacing, a repression or hand holding that conserves and loses data, fragments and restores data in the form of further, often paratextual, fragments.

Chapter 2

The Passion of *El Cid* and the Circumfixion of Cinematic History: Stereotypology/ Phantomimesis/ Cryptomorphoses

I started with the final scene. This lifeless knight who is strapped into the saddle of his horse . . . it's an inspirational scene. The film flowed from this source.

—*Anthony Mann, "Conversation with Anthony Man,"* Framework *15/16/27 (Summer 1981), 19*[1]

In order, therefore, to find an analogy, we must take flight into the misty realm of religion.

—*Karl Marx,* Capital, *165*

It is precisely visions of the frenzy of destruction, in which all earthly things collapse into a heap of ruins, which reveal the limit set upon allegorical contemplation, rather than its ideal quality. The bleak confusion of Golgotha, which can be recognized as the schema underlying the engravings and descriptions of the [Baroque] period, is not just a symbol of the desolation of human existence. In it transitoriness is not signified or allegorically represented, so much as, in its own significance, displayed as allegory. As the allegory of resurrection.

—*Walter Benjamin,* The Origin of German Tragic Drama, *232*

The allegorical form appears purely mechanical, an abstraction whose original meaning is even more devoid of substance than its "phantom proxy" the allegorical representative; it is an immaterial shape that represents a sheer phantom devoid of shape and substance.

—*Paul de Man,* Blindness and Insight, *191–92*

Destiny Rides Again

The medieval film epic *El Cid* is widely regarded as a liberal film about the Cold War, in favor of détente, and in support of civil rights and racial

equality in the United States.[2] This reading of the film depends on binary oppositions between good and bad Arabs, and good and bad kings, with El Cid as a bourgeois male subject who puts common good above duty. *El Cid* presents a critique of totalitarianism in favor of liberal democracy. There is, to be sure, a lot of extraformal evidence for this reading of Mann as a liberal filmmaker. He is credited with rehabilitating Indians in his Westerns as early as *Devil's Doorway* (1950). Mann also cast Ricardo Montalban as the lead in his film noir *Border Incident* (1949). Furthermore, Mann used an uncredited blacklisted writer on *El Cid*, Ben Barzman, whom Mann credited on his next film, *The Fall of the Roman Empire*.[3] In the shot of the title in the film's opening title sequence, various graffiti are written, and the words "vox populi" appear in the lower right side of the screen, with a smaller "vox dei" written below them. The heroic emperor Marcus Aurelius gives a speech about citizenship and civil rights that is even more explicitly about America and the Cold War and comes even earlier. In short, Mann's liberal/Communist sympathizer papers are in order.

Like so many historicist readings of films, this reading of *El Cid* is based on analogies between the history represented in the film and the history of its production as a film. As Mark Jancovich (2000) puts it, "the film takes as its central narrative the forging of a sense of collective purpose in relation to an external other in a manner that is clearly developed as an analogy with Cold War" (88). Amy François de la Bretèque (2004) finds similar analogies between the film's Spanish past and its Cold War (see the quotation above) present: the Moors are like the Communists and the colonized; El Cid is a liberal, American hero.[4] Along parallel but somewhat different lines, Neal M. Rosendorf, a historian and biographer of Sam Broston, and Broston's son, Bill, frame the film in their Miriam Collection *El Cid* DVD audiocommentary track in relation to the Cold War but regard the film as pro-Franco, El Cid being a dictator rather than a liberal.[5]

In my view, however, the film's politics cannot properly be understood apart from its Christian theology. Apropos are Jacques Derrida's (1994) comments about Marx's *Capital* in *Spectres of Marx*: "only the reference to the religious world allows one to explain the autonomy of the ideological, and thus its proper efficacy, its incorporation in apparatuses that are endowed not only with an apparent autonomy but was sort of automaticity. . . . " (161). To be sure, *El Cid* makes use of theological analogies through a process of typological historicism that Erich Auerbach called "figura" and which he showed exerted a great influence in the Middle Ages.[6] Yet the means by which *El Cid* makes analogies involve far more than a simple metaphorical substitution of a set of political terms for a set of religious terms.[7] My point is that *El Cid* cannot properly be historicized by mapping its diegetic narrative of eleventh-century Spain onto the moment of its production in 1961 only through analogical matches and substitutions of religion for politics. The same point holds true for classically Freudian readings that allegorize films by means of substituting one metaphor for another (a severed or missing hand stands for castration).[8] And, as we will

see in the next chapter, it holds true as well for film and media theories of transition based on analogies and parallels between old and new media (Manovich 2001). As Frederic Jameson (1981) shows in *The Political Unconscious*, Marxist allegories of history are politicotheological in that they reinscribe a medieval Christian fourfold, typological hermeneutics derived from Saint Augustine's *City of God* and the *Confessions* and, I would add, from Dante's influential discussion of allegory in his letter to Can Grande della Scala (1316–1317).[9] Marxist and other historicist hermeneutics resemble religious typological hermeneutics in matching parallel, mimetic elements. The political unconscious is always already, in my view, a political theological unconscious.

El Cid's political theology is driven by its theological poetics. The film generates two kinds of repetitions. The first kind is an overt historicist sequential mimetic matching I call "stereotypology" that elucidates and establishes very visible and recognizable political theological oppositions between Christians and Moors.[10] The second kind is a less visible kind of repetition I call phantomimetic. It has a parasitic, spectral relation to stereotypology in that it too matches elements and gestures. It does so, however, by "phantomiming," anamorphically or furtively, and in a synchronic rather than sequential manner that doubles and undoes the politicotheological oppositions apparently established through stereotypology.

As we will see, both kinds of mimetic matches proliferate so extensively, often linking elements that bear little obvious relation to one another, that the practice of ideological matching threatens to collapse Derrida's distinction between autonomy and automaticity, deconstructing the film's moral and political oppositions between bad Moors and good Christians. The legitimacy of El Cid's (non)violence derives in the film from a state of exception: the Cid stands for a law outside the law of the state; he is a man unlike any other in standing beyond the sovereign's reach. Stereotypological matches establish his position as a paralegal supplement to sovereignty: he pointedly refuses to become King when given the chance, choosing to serve King Alfonso instead, but serving him by resisting him.[11] The film's phantomimesis undoes El Cid's exceptionalism, however, making him only one of a series of Christ-like martyrs and, furthermore, deconstructs the film's politicotheological opposition between El Cid the epic male hero and his abject Others—the militant brown-faced, black-robed Africans and impotent aristocratic women. By the end of the film, the Spanish sovereign himself becomes a phantom.

This deconstruction emerges visually in Mann's film as a collapse of spirit into machine for two reasons: First, the monotheistic medievalism of the film's narrative poses a problem of representation and rhetoric because what is being made visible is also what is being hidden; what is lacking is also being filled in; what is being made present is being made spectral. Rodrigo/El Cid ("the Lord") is himself a copy of a Lord who is absent and who was resurrected as a ghost, a ghost, moreover, with holes in the form of stigmata and a hole in his chest made by the spear of a Roman guard.

Thus the wounds and scars on Rodrigo's body that make him similar to Jesus also figure metonymically the absence of the wounded, spectral Lord that Rodrigo's alias mimes and recalls.[12] Second, Mann addresses *El Cid*'s political theology as a question of biotechnology: the proliferation of mimesis and its mechanization shows that the human does not precede a technological recording as an original to a copy, as if the director were, by virtue of being human, exterior and prior to a later and mechanized scene he manipulates; rather, the human is already designed technologically. The spirit is the machine.

To understand *El Cid*'s circumfixion of history and how its furtive phantomimesis parasitically resembles and erodes the obvious analogical certainties and assurances of stereotypological historicism, I call up a top-heavy theoretical apparatus announced in the subtitle of the present chapter and put it in the service of attending closely to the film's investment in its highly dense formal abstractness, which may be made concrete in the image captures from the Miriam Collection DVD included below, though they fail to do justice, of course, to the widescreen 70mm Super Technirama Panavision-projected screen image. First I consider the formal features. *El Cid*'s abstractness is derived from a variety of formal features: the repeated use of compositional elements and dramatic gestures holding them in place in the mise-en-scène; the alternate use of deep focus and soft focus, and occasional raking focus from deep to soft; and the erratic rhythms of the editing, alternating not only between long shots and close-ups, as Mann typically does, but between rapid takes lasting two seconds with quick cutaways, and long ten- to fifteen-second takes.[13]

Now let me introduce the theoretical apparatus. Mann makes repeated use of compositional elements and gestures in both exterior and interior shots that frame the action of the film that typically begin or end a sequence. In addition to serving a narratological framing function in the film, many of these elements and gestures, I will show, indeed look *like* cinematic frames. Their very obscurity and rough similarity to each other give them a parasitic relation to the film's more obvious stereotypology: they constitute a spectral phantomiming of the mimetic repetitions on which stereotypological historicism (re)turns. Mann does not break with religious, mimetic stereotypology altogether in favor of a secular hermeneutics, however, but reframes stereotypology as a cinematic process that I call "circumfixion," through the use of repeated, phantomimetic elements. Circumfixion calls into question every moment of apparent narrative closure and dramatic resolution by revealing, usually in a furtive manner, that what counts as closure involves both a newly violent attempt to break with the violence of the past and a circling back and covering up of the violence of that break.

The practice of circumfixion doubles the hermeneutic practices of stereotypology and phantomimesis: both involve repetitions and matches that entail the fragmentation of objects and human bodies. Mann's circumfixion also makes both stereotypology and phantomimesis ghosts of

each other: moments of emblematic and typological visibility, as we will see shortly, often blur through a kind of anamorphic composition of the mise-en-scène into cryptomorphs (like the skull that is revealed when one looks awry at Holbein's "Ambassadors" that we discussed in chapter 1) in moments of enigmatic, phantomimetic near invisibility. Mann "cinematizes" this allegory of circumfixion as the spectral projection of serial film frames joined and separated by their cinematic inscription on a series of celluloid reels. In addition to being generated by the absence of an original Lord whom Rodrigo copies, the cinematic seriality of mimetic matching in *El Cid* derives from the fact that El Cid "will never die": the "lifeless knight," as Mann calls him, is never buried in the film but instead rides out of the final frame of the film narrative, just before the end credits. *El Cid*'s cinematic circumfixion of history consequently takes the form of a double practice of (dis)interring, an exhumation of the past that is at the same time a (re)encryption of it.

On the (Shortest) Road Again

To grasp *El Cid*'s allegorical routing of ideology through theology as a specifically cinematic mimetic representation, we may examine first the stereotypology of its narrative, beginning with the voice-over prologue narrated during two shots of the Castle of Burgos in Spain that constructs Rodrigo as a messianic figure:

> This is Spain one thousand and eighty years after the coming of Christ. It is a war torn, unhappy land: half Christian and half Moor. This is the time and the story of Rodrigo di Bivar, known to history and to legend as El Cid, the Lord. He was a simple man who became Spain's greatest hero. He rose above religious hatreds and called upon all Spaniards whether Christian or Moor to face a common enemy who threatened to destroy their land of Spain. This enemy was gathering his savage forces across the Mediterranean Sea on the north shores of Africa. [African drumming is heard on the sound track.] He was the African emir, Ben Yussuf.

Visually and audibly, *El Cid* matches Rodrigo to Jesus in the first scene in which Rodrigo appears. The scene opens with a medium longshot of a charred, still burning church altar after an African raid on a Spanish village, and a kneeling, overweight priest praying, "send us, O Lord, one to take us to the land." At the word "someone," Rodrigo steps into the frame, shot from behind and from the waist down, his bloody sword cutting diagonally down to the right into the frame. The good Moorish emir Lord Moutamin (Douglas Wilmer) whom Rodrigo cuts free responds in tribute by calling Rodrigo "El Cid, the Lord," further matching him to Jesus and repeating the opening identification by the narrator. Rodrigo again recalls Jesus when, after being exiled by King Alfonso, he runs into a character named Lazarus, which is shot with a cross behind him in a shot-reverse sequence with Chimene coming out of nowhere, and they happily reconcile. When a

peasant girl leads Chimene and Rodrigo to a grange to stay the night, the couple resembles the Holy Family in flight to Egypt. The next morning, they awake and walk through a door to discover a cheering army awaiting them, like a miracle.

The idea that Rodrigo is a messianic figure who has come to bring peace to Spain is further emphasized through repetitions in *El Cid* itself. Rodrigo first breaks off the arrows in the black Jesus statue and then similarly breaks off the arrow in his chest during the siege of Valencia. The scene in which Rodrigo is strapped onto his horse near the end of the film repeats Rodrigo's strapping the Jesus statue on his horse near the beginning of the film. Crosses such as those on the chest of the Jesus statue now appear on a flag held by the dead Rodrigo's Christianized corpse and on his breastplate and his shield.

According to Jancovich (2000), "Islam is not simply posed against Christianity but rather liberalism is pitted against totalitarianism . . . Rodrigo is recast . . . as a liberal savior whose fight is clearly defined as a battle for religious tolerance and racial tolerance . . . the central conflict in the film is not between Christianity and Islam but between tolerance and intolerance—between acceptance of difference and desire to impose conformity and obedience on others" (90). The central question raised by *El Cid* is what it means for the hero to be a "liberal savior," as Jancovich puts it, or in the film's more foundational and anterior idiom, what it means for Rodrigo to achieve his "destiny" by "conquering" himself. Mann's film leaves the meaning of Rodrigo's arrival at his messianic destination near the film, I will argue, undecidable: In becoming El Cid, an avatar of Jesus, does Rodrigo inaugurate a break with the violence of the past by driving out the invading Africans? Or does he begin a new cycle of violence as the corpse of El Cid qua Jesus is conscripted by King Alfonso (John Fraser) into the service of more war, a new crusade with Christian soldiers forever riding onward? Is El Cid's destiny eschatological? Mann maintains he began the film with the final shot of El Cid riding off on the beach. Does the ending of the film not provide closure and fail to herald *El Cid* as a transnational film—a Pax Americana—for its original viewers? At stake in these questions is not only the meaning of the religious war in *El Cid* but also the meaning of *El Cid* as a cinematic war machine in the Cold War, as the film's story of national unification is transposed into a story of world historical significance and as the epic film genre, with Mann's help, is coming to an end.[14]

What I take to be the undecidability of Rodrigo's destiny arises from the film's adoption of a specific practice of reading Biblical history typologically, which *El Cid* translates into a cinematic practice of mimetic matches between recognizable stereotypical icons of the past and present.[15] Before proceeding further with my argument about the film's undecidable reading of destiny at the end of the film, I would like to trace briefly and in general terms the formal contours of *El Cid*'s political theology in order to make clear how it operates both through stereotypology and

phantomimesis. These formal contours of the film include character, structural rhyming of opposites, the threshold of visibility or cryptomorphosis, and narrative framing. First, consider Rodrigo's characterization as a baroque rather than classical tragic hero He is redeemed by his Christianity in death, the ending thus being "happy." Furthermore, Pierre Corneille's tragedy *Le Cid* was the central source of the screenplay. In averting the lynching, Rodrigo certainly preaches a Christian message of peace and tolerance; Rodrigo's father Arias (Michael Holdern) consents, saying that "Rodrigo knows what he must do." Yet Rodrigo doesn't know. When he tries to explain to the shocked Chimene why he did not turn over the prisoners, he says, "I'm not sure it was right. I don't know . . . it happened strangely. It was on my way to you. I can't even remember where I was." Moreover, Rodrigo is, in fact, guilty of treason. He has no legal basis for freeing the prisoners on his own authority in defiance of an order given him by his King's representative. Similarly, the dead El Cid kills Ben Yussuf, who is on foot attempting to rally his panicking, retreating troops on the beach at Valencia, by trampling him on horseback, recalling Don Martín's (Christopher Rhodes) ignoble attempt to ride over and kill Rodrigo in the Calahorra tournament. This is hardboiled liberalism derived from Mann's violent film noirs and Westerns, to say the least.[16]

Moreover, Rodrigo is a double character: he has two names and is matched to a Jesus statue that looks like Saint Sebastian as well; he does double duty in serving as the King's champion, proving both that Calahorra belongs to Castille and that he is innocent of treason. Rodrigo even has a double origin of sorts. The first shot of the film appears as a dissolve from the same image on the film's last storyboard credit for director Mann, and the prologue's two shots of the castle are similarly lit, but the first appears to be sunrise and the second sunset.

As we have begun to see, the film's practice of typological matching through mimetic repetition doubles the apparently morally opposed Christian and Moorish sides. Jancovich sees the film as contrasting the racial purity of Francoist, fascist versions of the Cid story in which "Rodrigo is an unambiguous crusader against Islam" (91). Yet the African and Moorish villains in *El Cid* are not only both monotheistic (whereas godless communists were contrasted with American Christians in the United States in the 1950s) and multiculturalists but also advocates of racial purity. The bad emir Al Kadir's (Frank Thring) harem, for example, is multiracial and includes white and black actresses playing his sex slaves. Similarly, when Yussuf assembles and chastises the emirs to enlist them in his invasion, we see parallel deep focus shots of the two main Moorish emirs sitting in the foreground in each shot (played by English actors wearing brownface makeup) with two other emirs played by African actors sitting behind them and to their left and right. The camera tracks Yussuf from behind as he moves to the right while giving his "Islam will rule the world" speech and pauses to give a symmetrically opposite shot of the Al Kadir, the bad emir. Though these two emirs turn out to be good and bad,

they are shot as doubles in this opening sequence. The same men that Yussuf chastises later in the film show up with Rodigro to offer their services to King Alfonso. Though Alfonso finally comes around to Rodrigo's views and accepts their offer, by doing so he moves much closer to the multicultural African and Moorish villains Yussuf and the Al Kadir rather than further away from them.

Moreover, it is not clear that Alfonso's combined forces for the final battle are fully integrated cinematically in liberal terms. Though a Spanish soldier and a Moorish soldier are given equal prominence when they arrange the cloak on the dead El Cid, who is framed in the center of the shot and seen from the back, most of the subsequent shots of the two armies are not consistently integrated; instead, the Moors and Christians appear separately in two successive shots. And in a deep focus long shot, a priest in a darkly shaded area holds a black cross upright in the middle of the screen, flanked by Moors on the left and Christians on the right, linked by his black dress to Yussuf, so that the cross both integrates and segregates the two sides. In a similarly dividing and uniting deep focus long shot, the dead Rodrigo rides inside the castle of Valencia just before the final charge in the middle of the shot, between Alfonso and his Christian troops on the left in the light and the loyal emir Moutamin and his Moorish troops on the right in shadow. After a cut to a medium close-up as Alfonso gives the order to charge, the camera tilts up to show the tree and shadow more fully in the frame. These shots reframe the earlier deep-focus medium shot of Rodrigo that divided the Spanish soldiers on the left and the Moorish soldiers on the right even as they worked together to strap Rodrigo onto his horse and arrange his clothing. The dead Rodrigo, we may now grasp, is a prop, a figurehead that at once divides and unites Christians and Moors. What kind of regime he will prop up as a dead head, so to speak, remains to be seen, though the blasted tree and its shadow on the wall on the left—associated with Spain and recalling the painting of the royal family tree in the court of Castille, which the subsequent medium shot of Rodrigo ends focusing on—suggest that the future is bleak, Spain is already dead (the icon of Rodrigo is maybe just a con).

This symmetrical shots of the emirs, of the Spanish courts, of the priest holding the cross, and of the dead Rodrigo leading the parade before battle make clear the markedly abstract, structural dimension of Mann's doubling of morally opposed Christian and Moorish sides. More broadly, Mann registers similarities between these opposed sides through the repetition of shots and the rhyming of compositional elements and dramatic gestures in different shots.[17] For example, the same shot of what is either a sunset or sunrise on the horizon of the Mediterranean Sea frames the transition from the prologue to the first sequence, with Ben Yussuf announcing his jihad, and from the end of that sequence to the first sequence in which Rodrigo enters the frame.[18] The rhyming of elements even more closely links religious opposites: the close-up shot of Rodrigo's hand reaching into the air in the middle of the shot as he lies offscreen on his deathbed and

calls out "Chimene!" roughly recalls the shot of Ben Yussuf extending his open hand and arm at the end of the opening sequence of the film. Similarly, Rodrigo's sword in the first shot in which he appears is recalled by a scimitar sword drawn moments before the surprise attack to kill Rodrigo and Prince Sancho (Gary Raymond), Ben Yussuf's outstretched arm at the end of the first sequence when he announces his plan to invade Spain, and the scimitar that enters the cinematic frame in close-up before the Moors begin their surprise attack on Rodrigo and Sancho. A shot of the Christian courts of King Ferdinand and his son and heir Alfonso parallels a shot of Yussuf holding court in the film's first scene. In each case, the court is shot symmetrically. Similarly, the African drumming heard in the first scene of the film as Yussuf declares his imperial jihad recurs when Chimene and Rodrigo wait in a crypt below King Ferdinand's court as Count Gormaz "repeat[s] the charge of treason" against Rodrigo.

The meaning of this doubling of opposites, whether *El Cid* unifies or deconstructs them, turns on the film's foregrounding of the threshold of visibility, a cryptomorphic dimension of the Rodrigo/Jesus parallel and the practice of typological, mimetic matching.[19] In one of a number of similar shots of opening doors and gates, the large Moorish gates of the castle open and Rodrigo's horse then trots through them and stands still with its head in the center of the frame, with Rodrigo's head in the upper right (see figure 2.1, upper left). The sunlight coming down on Rodrigo from the upper right of the frame almost totally obscures his face, and even as he charges down in medium long shot, the upper part of the shot remains smeared, blurring the image.

I call this image cryptomorphic because it hides as it reveals, unlike the skull in Holbein's "Ambassadors"; that is, this smeared film image does not reveal a hidden image behind the smear.[20] The meaning of the smear remains enigmatic, even uncanny. In an interview, Mann described this particular shot as a repetition: Mann got the idea when "no one, an 'extra'" first rode by as Mann was looking up at the gates.[21] Tom Gunning (1995) notes that phantoms in so-called spirit photographs of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century were "described with the . . . provocative term *extras*" (51).

Finally, the politics of this narrative matching are complicated by the way a key transition in the film is shot as a framing, threshold moment. The smeared shot of the dead Rodrigo as an all white statue of a Christian icon at the end recalls but totally contrasts with the black Jesus statue icon to which he was matched and strapped near the beginning of the film. The contrast between the two icons is heightened by the way this shot involves not only a threshold of visibility (the smear withholding total visibility) but also the literal threshold of the castle gates metaphorized as "the gates of history" by the voice-over narrator as the gates open on screen and the dead Rodrigo then rides through them.[22]

The movement outside the gates is thus associated with a break. Yet their opening is also marked by a smear and obscuring light over Rodrigo.

Figure 2.1 Recurring Cryptomorphs in *El Cid*

The meaning of this double association is difficult to resolve. Is the white knight Rodrigo qua El Cid icon meant to represent the inclusion of races across time or a linear sequence, a break, out of the Moorish gates, across a threshold, the blur being a kind of blemish that links them? Is it a yoking of the two Jesus icons (the statue and the rigor mortis corpse of Rodrigo) in the name of advancing an interracial Christianity? Or does the association represent a movement away from the black Jesus statue Rodrigo matched near the beginning of the film to the name of a white racist Christianity where minorities know their place, an apocalyptic second coming of the Cid? In short, is Rodrigo qua El Cid icon a figure of racial integration or a figure of racial segregation?

Border Incidents

We may grasp how circumfixion makes the meaning of Rodrigo/El Cid's destiny undecidable by returning to the first two moments in the film that match Rodrigo and Jesus: first when Rodrigo carries the burned cross over to a horse at the end of the opening scene with the Moorish prisoners in he background; and second, when Rodrigo averts their lynching and cutting and then frees them rather than turn them over for summary execution to Don Odonez, who speaks "in the name of the King." As the priest sums it up to Rodrigo: "You did take the shortest road, my son, not to your bride, but to your destiny. God sent you, my son. God sent you." At the end of the scene in which Rodrigo cuts free his Moorish prisoners and in which Moutamin gives Rodrigo his name "the Cid," Rodrigo says to him: This moment of religious and hermeneutic confirmation in which the priest effectively anoints Rodrigo involves not a straightforward path, however, but a repetition from the second scene to the first: the dialogue contains the repetition of the priest's words "God sent you," and this repetition echoes Rodrigo's earlier repetition of the words "the cross" in the previous scene as he looks up at the black Jesus statue and then as he climbs to take down the statue and carry it with the priest's help over to a horse. There are visual repetitions as well. The medium deep-focus shot at the end of the averted lynching episode, with the priest on the right and Rodrigo on the left and the black Jesus strapped to the horse in the center, recalls the earlier shots of Rodrigo strapping the black Jesus statue to a horse with the priest's help, but with a major difference (see figure 2.2, upper left and right). In the averted lynching shot, which lasts twelve seconds, Rodrigo is walking from right to left across the screen and about to leave it when the priest grabs his arm offscreen, below the frame, to stop him and then to turn him around, keeping him next to the Jesus statue on the horse. The previous strapping sequence at the burned down church alternates between close-ups of the priest using his hands to hold up the statue with shots of Rodrigo tying it down. After he finishes, the film cuts back to the priest for a two-second shot with only his right arm extended at the bottom of the shot and his head turning to watch as Rodrigo walks past him out of



Figure 2.2 Circumfixing: Hands on History, Hands Offscreen

the shot. To arrive at his destiny, Rodrigo must be rematched, the second time in a more markedly cinematic manner, literally brought back into the cinematic frame by the priest who figuratively straps Rodrigo in the frame in a manner similar to the way Rodrigo strapped the statue to a horse.

This gesture of a man holding another's arm or hand in place is repeated a number of times in the film. In the very first sequence with Rodrigo as he goes to lift up the kneeling priest, the priest extends his arm horizontally and Rodrigo, standing behind him and offering support to help him up, takes his arm, so that both of their arms stretch across the bottom of the frame, in this case briefly for approximately two seconds (see figure 2.3, upper left and right).

Similarly, before the final battle of the film, with Yussuf at Valencia, Alfonso reaches out horizontally and grabs the dead Rodrigo's arm to make sure his horse turns a corner properly as they prepare to lead the troops out of the castle gates. One of the most furtive examples of this gesture occurs when Rodrigo makes Alfonso swear at his coronation that he did not have anything to do with the murder of Sancho, Alfonso's elder brother and prior heir to the throne. In a two-second shot, Rodrigo holds Alfonso's right hand with both his arms and slams it down on the Bible in the center of the shot as Rodrigo commands "Swear!" At this exact moment, the film cuts away (see figure 2.2, lower left and right). A similarly furtive shot involves a dissolve shot of the recently wounded Alfonso in his tent, after he lost the battle of Sagrassa, clutching his as yet untended bloody right arm at the bottom of the shot. In the brief time it takes for the dissolve to end and the shot to come into focus, the camera has tilted up to show Alfonso in medium shot, leaving his right arm no longer on screen.

Rodrigo's deathbed includes other elements that make clear the narrative dimensions of the film's circumfixion. After Moutamin tells Chimene that unless the arrow is withdrawn, Rodrigo will die, the film cuts as the shot continues in a quite long take to a medium close-up and tracks back as she walks forward to the deathbed. The camera lowers as she kneels by Rodrigo's side and the broken arrow protruding from his chest appears at the bottom of the frame. Her eyes open wide in horror as she stares at it, but within a second, Rodrigo takes his right hand and reaches across his chest to grab his Moorish silk cloak and cover the arrow. He then takes her hand with his left hand and holds it directly above the cloak covering the arrow as she continues to look at the arrow while he talks to her, her eyes now relaxed. The covering up is another phantomimetic repeated gesture that occurs when Rodrigo's corpse is stereotypologically matched to Jesus. After he breaks off the arrow in his chest, leaving only a few inches of it exposed, he places his shield over the stub to hide it from his troops and the inhabitants of Valencia, telling his lieutenant Fanez (Massimo Serato) to "cover the retreat" (see figure 2.3, lower left and right). Similarly, after two soldiers strap Rodrigo's corpse to his horse, the harness holding him up is conspicuously and carefully covered up by one of the men as he moves from the left to the right of the frame.

Figure 2.3 The Messianic Break as Supplementary Cover up of the Wound

The repeated gestures of both gentle and forceful hand-holding all involve moments of decision for Rodrigo that test his character: to take down the cross and preserve it; to free the prisoners; to make Alfonso swear against his will; to die and fight as a figurehead after he is dead rather than live but remain off the battlefield. They direct history to its destination, so to speak, through stereotypological matches. Yet, at issue in the film is who has the legitimate authority to adjudicate and thereby direct the course of action, or history. The typological matches by themselves are not sufficient to establish a legitimate, continuous authority extending to and from the hero, El Cid. The priest whom Rodrigo meets near the beginning of the film disappears without explanation, as does Rodrigo's father, even before the tournament of Calahorra. Furthermore, the film's heroic figures are all killed off during the course of the film: Rodrigo kills Chimene's father, Count Gormaz; Rodrigo chooses to keep the arrow in his chest and so die; and Count Ordonez is crucified and murdered. Similarly, King Alfonso turns into a voice-over narrator in the last shot of the film.

These phantomimetic matches of elements and gestures such as grasping hands, outstretched arms, broken arrows, shields, and cloaks both foreground and hide the violence underlying the typological desire to heal and repair wounds and to break with the violence of the past. The long take of Rodrigo on his deathbed showing his cloak over the broken arrow in his chest is a kind of blinding of the wound, and Rodrigo's refusal to let it heal leads to his death and a second charge on Yussuf's forces, just as Yussuf's siege of Valencia repeats Rodrigo's earlier siege of Valencia.

The phantomimetic elements and gestures tend to appear in decisive situations that are also moments of testing and adjudication, such as the beginning of the duel between Rodrigo and Count Gormaz, after the Calahorra tournament and before it, at Alfonso's coronation, and so on. In understanding their role as markers of decision, we may begin to grasp more concretely *El Cid*'s specifically cinematic mimetic practice of circumfixion as a double practice involving, on one hand, a stereotypological drive toward nailing similar things down, so to speak, in order to expose them and make them recognizable, and, on the other, a phantomimetic drifting off track that returns to stereotypological matches to both expose and cover the violence that such matching entails; these phantomimetic drifts make that more or less literal violence either only momentarily visible or implied, left offscreen altogether below the bottom of the shot.[23] This similarity between traumatic acts of "bad" violence and equally traumatic attempts to end them through "good" violence largely accounts, I think, for the film's dialectic of visibility and invisibility, an alternation between longer views of these controlling gestures and furtive glimpses of them, usually placed at the bottom of the frame. Hence, the priest's hand that grips Rodrigo is offscreen, as if his stopping Rodrigo and holding him in the frame were a kind of crucifixion too close for comfort to even more visible and visibly violent forcing of King Alfonso's hand, literally and metaphorically, on the Bible at the coronation ceremony.

Mann's cinematic "circumfixion" is further complicated by the way phantomimetic elements and gestures alternately mark the opposite actions of liberation and oppression as violent woundings and blindings. Consider two moments of analogous liberation: just as Rodrigo breaks the arrows off the Jesus statue near the beginning of the film, so he cuts free the Moorish prisoners in the averted lynching scene. The transitional shot of the yoked oxen that are placed at the center of the frame repeats a major compositional element of the oppression, namely, the yokes on the shoulders of the prisoners on which their arms are stretched and to which their hands are tied. The yoke across the shoulders of Lord Moutamin, Rodrigo's Moorish prisoner, is positioned at the bottom of the cinematic frame as Rodrigo frees Moutamin (see figure 2.4, lower right). In cutting the Emirs free, Rodrigo makes the yoke into a metaphorical bar to his earlier destination, his marriage to Chimene. In matching Rodrigo to the strapped Jesus statue at the end of the sequence, the priest seems to be putting Rodrigo to bind Rodrigo like the Moorish prisoners he just freed. Yet the meaning of the yoke is once reversed, albeit cryptically, in a kind of rotation just after the averted lynching scene. In the last two seconds of the shot of the averted lynching about destiny, the moment in which the priest says "God sent you" (0:12:313–31), the camera wanders, moving up and to the right, to show a banner of Castile and dissolves to a pair of yoked oxen entering a castle gate of Ferdinand's palace. Perhaps shown too quickly to become fully emblematic, the yoke takes on a positive meaning. To become a Spanish nation, both the common people and the court of Castile have to be yoked like animals, much like the horse carrying the black Jesus statue. Both being yoked and being free of yokes are thus required of Rodrigo to keep him on track toward his destiny. Narrative works by way of detours, through indirect and sometimes barely visible metaphors that involve almost redundant recirclings, and not through the shortest roads.

On the Road Yet Again

As we can see from these examples, the repeated compositional elements and gestures are uncanny in being human and inhuman, animate and inanimate. In addition to those that I have already discussed, these gestures and elements include the people standing across the bottom of the screen demanding that Rodrigo's Moorish prisoners be hung; Count Ordóñez (Raf Vallone) and Count Gormaz, embracing their arms in profile in the center of the shot as the doors of the room close in front them; the scabbard Rodrigo holds up with two hands, and then the sword he draws from it on Gormaz, both forming a bar across the entire lower screen; the guardrails in the fight for Calahorra sequence bisected in alternating matching long shots of two matching two-handed broadswords planted upright by squires in the middle of the screen; the top of a tent running across the bottom of the frame before the first joust, similarly bisected by Aragon's champion and his lance; Chimene and Rodrigo shot in profile

Figure 2.4 **Phantomimetic Pano-Mann-ic Elements and Gestures: Scabbard, Horizontally Extended Arms, Tent Top, Lance, Guardrail, and Yoke**

when they first meet, their arms extended horizontally and their hands clasping in the center of the medium close-up shot; Chimene and Rodrigo shot from behind at their wedding ceremony, their horizontally extended left and right arms joined by their hands stretching across the lower part of the frame, the camera closing in on their arms and placing them in the center of shot, with a wedding cloth wrapped symmetrically around each hand by the officiating priest (see figure 2.4.); Alfonso's arm stretched across the bottom of the frame as Rodrigo holds Alfonso's hand on the Bible and forces Alfonso to swear his innocence of Sancho's murder (see figure 2.2, lower left and right); Don Ordonez holding a dagger horizontally in the bottom of the frame before cauterizing Alfonso's wounded right arm; and numerous shots of bars, pillars, tree trunks, grates, doors opening and closing, doorframes, window frames, and gates.[24]

The film's phantomimetic elements bifurcate into two categories, one more visibly mimetic (like a portrait on a crypt) and emblematic, the other nonmimetic and enigmatic. There is a recursive phantomiming of phantomimesis, we might say. The more clearly emblematic phantomimetic elements work by matching along what I take to be conventional historicist and Freudian lines, encoding a critique of patriarchy centered on Rodrigo's inscription into a tragic destiny to which he must sacrifice his life, though not his family, and, more generally, revealing both the disciplining of heroic Christian men and also showing their infirmity. We may see more fully how these emblematic elements inscribe this critique by focusing on the geometric formalism of Mann's mise-en-scène and the composition of his shots. King Ferdinand seated at court and at the tournament for Calahorra, for example, is placed in the middle of the shot. At the tournament, he watches from inside a red tent that looks like a theater curtain, establishing his power as two sided: he is ideally positioned both as spectator looking out and as screen icon to be looked at. After Ferdinand dies, his tomb effigy is shot in the middle of the cinematic frame, and in the following shot, Sancho and Alfonso are shot from behind in medium close-up, divided by a suspended statue of Jesus that mirrors Ferdinand's tomb effigy below it. The ghostly father, remembered mimetically as an effigy and statue, no longer keeps order, however. As soon as Sancho enters the crypt and kneels beside Alfonso, the two men almost immediately turn on each other in a fight to death. Similarly, before the first joust begins during the Calahorra sequence, a third and final shot of the vertically positioned two-handed broadsword in the middle of the shot shows it bending back and forth, and the music goes off key, signaling the potential loss of Ferdinand's territory.

As the Christian rulers lose power, emblems of the weakening of Spanish patriarchy and the strengthening of the African invaders and their Moorish allies are shot in the same diagonal positions: Sancho holds his sword diagonally across a shot from the upper left down to the lower right when he dies on the ground as Rodrigo holds him. Similarly diagonally shot emblems include Count Gormaz's tomb effigy in the crypt, with a sculpture of him holding his sword like a cross. Emblems of the conversely increasing

power of the Moors and Africans are also shot similarly diagonally, as if mirror images of the Christian emblems: Ben Yussuf's outstretched arm at the end of the first sequence when he announces his plan to invade Spain; the scimitar that enters the cinematic frame in close-up before the Moors begin their surprise attack on Rodrigo and Sancho.

The second category of phantomimetic repetitions do not represent someone or something but become mimetic by virtue of their similar repetitions: guardrails, broadswords, yokes, extended arms, doors, pillars, and so on. Because they do not as such resemble anything but themselves, their mimetic function is harder to recognize. They become mimetic because their placement in the mise-en-scène and their repetition links them over time and gives them a commonality. Although they may be read as an ideological critique of patriarchal power along conventional historicist Freudian lines of castration (figured by the arrow stump left in Rodrigo's chest, Uracca's veiled fist, and so on), they are not reducible to such a reading, which adopts the same naive process of metaphorical substitution of one set of terms (arrow for penis) adopted in the standard historicist reading of the film as a liberal critique of totalitarianism. In both cases, one set of terms enables the creation of a narrative that serves as the ground and explanation of the other. It is just this exterior grounding of one narrative by another through similar elements that *El Cid*'s less visible kinds of phantomimesis calls into question.

These least visible and visibly phantomimetic elements are the most significant in terms of the film's allegory of cinematic history as a circumfixion in that they threaten to allegorize and thereby expose human autonomy as pure automaticity, spirit as a machine. Mimetic matches proliferate, subdividing into kinds of mimesis along a continuum that is clearly visible, recognizable, and meaningful at one pole, and nearly invisible, unrecognizable, and meaningless at the other pole. Much of the complexity, density, and energy of the film is derived from the fact that many of the same elements are different moments in the film positioned at different points along the continuum. For example, Rodrigo greets his young twin daughters for the first time at a convent as he passes a mural showing the Virgin Mary and infant Jesus, and a dove perches on a fountain in the foreground of the shot. It's an example of a paradoxically furtive or cryptic stereotypological matching (the convent later doubles as a jail for Chimene and the daughters). Instead of being a fully present, original, or host to a parasitic spectral means of copying, stereotypological matching turns out to be phantomimetic as well not only because Rodrigo as a messianic figure mimes an absent, hidden Lord but also because the proliferation of matches becomes more mechanical: the more automatic the matches, the more visible and recognizable they become. Even quite dissimilar or spectral elements such as guardrail posts and the stump of the arrow in Rodrigo's chest may be yoked and tortured into comparison because *El Cid* is a narrative cinema war machine that does not stop at the border between neurotic meaning and psychotic meaninglessness.

The more automatic and spectral the mimetic matching becomes in *El Cid*, the more it ceases to operate as typological reading of history and becomes dysfunctional as an ideological resolution to religious violence and war or as a critique of their causes (the contradictions of patriarchy) precisely because mimesis cannot be stopped: the phantom cannot be exorcised from mimesis. Thus, even the messianic matches that establish El Cid's exceptionalism proliferate, semiautomatically, as mimesis is spectrally phantomimed. (I say "semiautomatically" because these repetitions are the biotechnological products both of set design and direction, on one hand, and cinematic inscription, editing, and projection, on the other. The extent to which some elements take on a mimetic function is intended, inadvertent, or intended to be hidden is, therefore, impossible to tell.) The yoked prisoners who appear in the long shot when Rodrigo first straps the black statue of Jesus on a horse look like the two thieves crucified along with Jesus. King Ferdinand is Christianized in his crypt. The first shot of his crypt shows a crucified statue of Ferdinand on a cross, almost identical to the black Jesus statue, and hanging suspended from the ceiling. The camera tilts downward to show Ferdinand lying in state below his effigy, flanked by two "X"s with candles on them that are somewhat enigmatic but appear to be crosses. Similarly, Rodrigo begins the process of making Alfonso into a martyr by holding up his coronation, figuratively crucifying him to the Bible. Alfonso's own Christ-like passion includes a barely visible wounded arm cauterized with a hot dagger and a bad dream of having his arm cut off in a duel, and his suffering eventually leads to Alfonso's own redemption from a fundamentalist to a tolerant Christian King who has conquered himself. Rodrigo is not *the* Lord, but one of several Christian heroes who undergo similar redemptions through woundings.

Even more strikingly, Don Ordonez's change from traitor and attempted assassin of Rodrigo to Rodrigo's loyal follower culminates in Ordonez's crucifixion. The dialogue in the scene initially asserts a difference between the Cid and other men but ends up equating the Christian and Moorish religious leaders. Yussuf says that the Cid "is a man like other men. I will kill him," but the tortured, bloody Don Ordonez defiantly responds, "He will never die. Never." Noting that the Christians think of the Cid "as we think of our prophet," Yussuf concludes, as he raises his arms to kill Ordonez, "Then this will be more than a battle. It will be our God against yours."

Far from establishing Rodrigo's exceptionalism as a messianic figure, the sequence's mise-en-scène establishes Ordonez himself as a messianic figure even more literally than the kinds of figurative strapping of Rodrigo into the frame by the priest: like the black Jesus statue near the beginning of the film shot with arrows and like Rodrigo shot with an arrow near the end of the film, Ordonez too has been shot with arrows, one through each hand; similarly, the rope around his neck and shoulders recalls the black Jesus statue strapped to a horse (see figure 1.1, upper right). The "X" shaped cross on which Ordonez is crucified also resembles two posts behind him

and to his left that are also arranged to look like an "X," and these double "X"s resemble the two "X"s flanking Ferdinand's corpse in his crypt.

These semiautomatic phantomimetic repetitions deconstruct the dramatic purposes of exposing theological-political differences between the epic heroes and villains. El Cid does not represent a state of exception and is one of a series of martyrs. El Cid himself becomes a martyr and legend through phantomimetic repetition. The long shot of the dead Cid strapped on his horse and flanked by Moutamin and Alfonso, who shouts "For God, the Cid, and Spain!" before they all charge out the gates of Valencia the second and final time, repeats the exact same shot of the still living El Cid wearing the same clothing, except for a silver breastplate, and shouting "For God, Alfonso, and Spain!" the first time they charged out of the gates of Valencia. Yet, to speak of "exposure" is imprecise not only because phantomimesis is difficult to see (one has to look for it) but also because the violence linking the opposing sides is literally obscured. Though the only scene in which we see Yussuf unveiled is the one in which he kills Don Ordonez, the sequence ends with a briefly held shot in which Yussuf's raised black cloak covers the moment of murder. Thus, religious violence on behalf of one monotheistic religion against another does not reveal their difference but rather covers it up.

The (Un)Decider

The semiautomatization, proliferation, and spectralization of visibly mimetic recognitions into barely visible or recognizable phantomimetic repetitions emerges as an ideological problem in *El Cid* not only in characterological terms (El Cid's exceptionalism) but in narratological terms as well. Religious violence ends only by covering up the violence it puts on display, usually after its occurrence (El Cid appears first after a battle was over; Ordonez appears after having been tortured). The most spectral mimetic elements and gestures in *El Cid*, such as guardrails and extended arms, are often placed horizontally at the bottom of the shot, often giving the shot a recessive structure aided by the use of deep focus, so that a compositional element such as a sword divides the shot into foreground and background. I want to emphasize the *roughness* and even *roughhewnness* of the similarities I point out in my close readings. Phantomimetic dramatic gestures and elements become visible as the film as projected motion picture potentially fragments into the film still photographs in the form of DVD image captures. This fragmentation of *El Cid* allows one to texture the image and to *force* a fit between loosely analogous elements: the substitution of one metaphorical element for another required for it to become a figure and is made possible through the figurative tearing and binding of the film's stilled images.

In allegorizing cinema as phantomimesis, *El Cid* not only deconstructs El Cid's exceptionalism and the notion of sovereignty that it legitimates but also calls both historicist and Freudian practices of allegorical matching into

question. *El Cid* foregrounds the violent fragmenting of cinematic inscription and projections of history as a problem of visualization, which both historicists and Freudians overlook in focusing on self-contained, recognizable symbols. *El Cid*'s compositional elements have a specific kind of spectrality: they are cryptomorphs. Circumfixion is not only a question of the representation of monotheistic religious violence—the relative visibility or hiddenness of matching mimetic elements—but a question of rhetoric as well: how the elements become figures. The cryptomorph in Mann's film is not merely a mimetic image: the cryptomorph becomes visible not by a change of perspective (the spectator remains in the same position vis-à-vis the screen image) but by the metaphorically anamorphic placement of the cryptomorph in the shot (thereby foregrounding or backgrounding it) and by the repetition of that shot.[25]

The full dimensions of the ideological crisis of *El Cid*—the deconstruction of its political theology by its theological poetics—become clear in its most cryptomorphic elements, namely, framing elements that bear resemblance to the cinematic frame as they are wrenched from their position in the mise-en-scène and made substitutable metonymically for the cinematic frame, and for the process of cinematic inscription, projection, and reception. As a cryptomorph, the framing element is not merely an analogue of cinema for Mann but an allegorical fragment of the violence of cinematic mimesis and its phantomimed haunting.

To bring the film's nearly invisible allegory of cinematic history as violent fragmentation more clearly into relief, I want to focus on two episodes of *El Cid* in which a framing element becomes visible as a cryptomorph of cinema: first, the Calahorra tournament in which Rodrigo both proves he is innocent of treason and wins the province of Calahorra for King Ferdinand by killing Don Martín (King Ramírez's champion) and, second, Uracca coming to the convent to force Chimene, who is embroidering a Christianized adaptation of a panel of the Bayeux Tapestry, make Rodrigo withdraw his demand that Alfonso swear in public he had no part in Sancho's murder. Both episodes relate victory and defeat by creating, moving, or standing outside a framing element of the mise-en-scène. In the Calahorra tournament episode, the cinematic frame is figured only through elements that are not themselves frames; in the Bayeux Tapestry episode, however, the cinematic frame is figured through the wooden frame of the guardrail.

There are a number of shots with framing elements in the tournament sequence, including the tent at the bottom of the screen and matching guardrails and broadsides placed in front of the rectangular tents of both kings before the joust begins. The episode ends with Rodrigo lifting the sword up with both hands and then forcefully planting it upright into the ground, just as it was at the beginning of the episode, both by using a two-handed broadsword as a cut from inside the frame (literally a guardrail, another recursive element analogous to a sprocketed strip of celluloid film) and then as a frame when he holds it up above his head. After Don Martín is

briefly shot on the ground in deep-focus medium close-up as Rodrigo drives his sword into him offscreen, Rodrigo comes back into the shot directly facing the camera and holding up his sword, its flat side showing, above his head with both arms stretched offscreen at either end, and asking King Ramírez (Gérard Tichy) the rhetorical question, "To whom does Calahorra belong?" Removing Chimene's favor from Don Martín's corpse, Rodrigo walks to the other side of the lists, stops to pierce the veil with his bloody sword, and then—stopping a few feet further away from the camera than he was in the first triumphal shot, and now shot at a low angle—holds the broadsword up above his head again with both hands (fully in view), the favor drooping down from his left hand (see figure 2.5, upper left). The sword becomes potentially recognizable as framed in this second shot because the guardrail is now visible running horizontally along the very bottom of the shot and two pointed posts on the left and right borders of the shot (see figure 2.5, upper right). This second moment of triumph shows the adjudication of Rodrigo's innocence as a letterboxing effect, a directed framing within the film frame that raises the bar horizontally.

This moment allegorizes history through a specifically cinematic framing: the hero is framed within the shot in a manner that loosely resembles a film frame. I will say more about the verb "loosely" when I turn to the Bayeux Tapestry sequence. For the moment, I want to show in some detail how the film's allegory of heroic Christian violence is inscribed in a split between Rodrigo's actions and the mise-en-scène. As Rodrigo approaches the tents representing the side of Castille in a deep-focus long shot, the guardrail runs across the top of the frame and the Aragon tents, which are themselves framed by curtains, are behind him (see figure 2.5, lower right). The tents are spaced in such a way that they look like celluloid film frames, with the guardrail as the celluloid strip around the individual film frames that join the frames together in serial order. The horizontal position of Rodrigo's sword as a triumphal gesture contrasts markedly with Don Martín's vertical use of his broadsword just before he dies. The horizontal guardrail frames four of the last five shots before Rodrigo wins. Don Martín pushes Rodrigo, who at this point is holding only his saddle to defend himself, back into the guardrail. Rodrigo moves at the last second and Don Martín brings his sword down crashing through the guardrail (in a shot that lasts only one second) and breaks the frame (see figure 2.5, lower left). Rodrigo, who by now has gotten his own broadsword, then strikes him in the back in another brief take and then, after Don Martín collapses and falls back face up on the ground, plunges his sword into Don Martín's chest as the camera cuts away and the screen briefly goes black.

The shots of Rodrigo's horizontal and suspended sword and the guardrail provide closure to the episode, but only partially. Rodrigo's heroic position of triumph works well enough the first time in establishing Ferdinand's claim to Calahorra, but the second time, it is a position of abject failure. To be sure, Rodrigo lays claim to God's hand in his Victory—"God saw fit to

Figure 2.5 The Calahorra Tournament Sequence: Letterboxing Avant la Lettrebox

give me strength"—as he addresses Ferdinand, who in turn confirms this view with the words, "Who can doubt that God was with you?" before making Rodrigo his champion. In a rather tasteless witticism, Rodrigo offers Chimene her bloody favor saying that her "colors are no longer black." The blood shed through his violence, first literal and then metaphorical, has, he thinks, put an end to their feud by restoring his honor with God's aid. Chimene avers, however, that until her father is avenged, her "colors shall always be black," and, refusing to stop mourning her father, in the very next scene at the side of her father's tomb effigy, still dressed in black, she plots to have Rodrigo murdered. Rodrigo may have pierced her bloody favor with his sword, but he has not broken her hymen. Indeed, their wedding feast, with two figures of jousting knights on the table, repeats the impasse at the end of the Calahorra sequence: now the two of them joust verbally as Chimene manages, as it were, to unhorse Rodrigo and prevent him from riding her.

The framing element is specifically cinematic, I suggest, in being comparable to the space that separates each frame horizontally, as if it were being picked up by a film reel. At the end of the episode, Rodrigo creates a frame but does not manage to box Chimene into it. His position outside the frame that he creates by raising his sword and in which he appears as hero does not allow him to direct the action by cutting or placing an element—the favor—into the frame. Rodrigo's exteriority marks the rather abject failure of his position and his status as supplementary support, or prop, to the King in the form of champion.

Indeed, the force of Rodrigo's sword in the final shot of the episode is reduced cinematically, being positioned behind the guardrail that runs across the shot, unlike the matching shots of the two broadswords in the ground at the beginning of the episodes, which were positioned unobstructed in close-up in the center of the shot, with the guardrails in the background. The entire tournament episode repeats the episode of the duel between Count Gormaz and Rodrigo that led to the count's death and that the tournament qua trial by combat is meant to resolve. That duel began with Rodrigo holding his scabbard and smaller sword horizontally across the shot; at one point, Rodrigo falls back on a table and turns over quickly before Count Gormaz crashes his sword down into the table on which Rodrigo had fallen, but just after Rodrigo gets out of the way. In both cases, the loser dies offscreen.[26] Even as it establishes a distinction between innocent and guilty parties and awards terrority to the King of Castille, the tournament episode recursively frames the decision as a replay of similar moments of violent resolution in the past, not a break with them. Rodrigo's sword figures as a cinematic frame as a bar that reframes what is represented, not as a cut that breaks out of the frame. The frame figures a mark, a marker that cuts mimesis into a sequence of images and thereby moves the narrative forward. Yet the frame also figures as a bar to representation, a blind spot that stalls narrative progress toward an eschatological end.

Stumped Speech: The Bayeux Tapestry as Bar that Breaks Faith with History

We may grasp more fully how *El Cid*'s allegory of cinematic phantomimesis challenges a classically Freudian substitution of matching symbolic elements, with El Cid as a castrated epic hero who mirrors the castrated women and villains of the film, by turning to *El Cid*'s most telling cinematic cryptomorph, namely, the upper bar of a wooden frame onto which a Bayeux Tapestry panel is being embroidered by Chimene that appears horizontally across the entire lower part of the shot. As we saw in chapter 2, scholars have frequently compared the Bayeux Tapestry to film. Mann explores this analogue, however, not only in terms of what is embroidered in the Tapestry panel but also in terms of how it is framed and stored during its production.[27] (A note on the back cover of the Criterion laserdisc edition of *El Cid* says "Mann presents a tapestry of legend and myth with all of Spain as its backdrop.")

The Bayeux Tapestry episode falls into two parts, the first part focusing on the Tapestry panel Chimene is embroidering as Uracca enters her room in the convent, and the second part focusing on the wooden frame to which the Bayeux Tapestry is strapped and onto which the embroidered panel is strapped (see figure 2.6). In the first part of the sequence, Chimene's Tapestry panel is seen from both sides in a series of shot-reverse shots. The film cites panels 154 to 155 of the Bayeux Tapestry, a scene from the Battle of Hastings with the inscription "Hic ceciderunt simul Angli et Franci in prelio" ("Here English and French fell together in the press [of battle]").[28]

Though the panels cited from the genuine Bayeux Tapestry are clearly recognizable in the film, Chimene has misquoted "derunt simul" as "derun simul" (the border paratext errs, almost invisibly, as Norman and Saxon history become a Spanish legend in the panel). More obviously, she has Christianized the story of El Cid by making the Norman knights into Christians and the Saxons into Moors. She has given a Moorish dress to the battle-axe wielding knight on foot immediately to the left of the Norman knight on horseback, and she has added crosses both to the mounted knight's shield and to the right flank of his horse (the horse's color has been changed from green to yellow) (see figure 2.6, upper left). He faces a Moorish knight with a scimitar who has also been added and placed above and behind the upended, vertically positioned horse, which has been drawn in but not yet embroidered. In Christianizing the Bayeux Tapestry, Chimene differentiates the warring sides by their dress (whereas Normans and Saxons dress alike in the Tapestry) and gives the panel a stereotypological dimension: the Christianized Norman knight prefigures Rodrigo. By matching the Tapestry panel to the film narrative, the mise-en-scène seems to endorse religious violence rather than peace.

Yet the genuine Bayeux Tapestry unsettles that stereotypological, figural meaning, since the Normans were the invaders, the Saxons the defenders.

Figure 2.6 Bayeux Tapestry as Allegory of Phantomimetic Cinema

Moreover, Chimene is not necessarily Christianizing the Bayeux Tapestry but rechristening it, repeating and amplifying the Christian icon of the papal banner raised by the Normans that appears twice in the Bayeux Tapestry and indirectly throwing into relief the Tapestry's undecided status as a secular or religious artifact.[29]

The episode makes the mimetic significance of the Tapestry panel by making it a serial image capable of being scrolled: Chimene's is copying an only partly visible model, a partially scrolled up drawing of the Tapestry. Though there is clearly a mimetic relation between what we can see of the rolled up source drawing and Chimene's embroidered copy of it, there is also a subtle yet significant mismatch between them in the manner in which both are stored: the Tapestry panel we see is on a longer piece of fabric that has been rolled up and tied down at the left and right sides of the panel, the drawing to Chimene's lower left is unbound, leaning against a column, and folded at the ends like a scroll, as if it had been earlier rolled up.

As mimetic representations, neither Cimene's embroidered copy nor the drawing she is using as her model are ever entirely visible. We never see Chimene's panel completely because Chimene first obscures its right side when seated and then its left side when standing, and the lighting similarly obscures the edges of the Tapestry panel by casting them in shadows (see figure 2.6, upper right). Furthermore, when shot with Chimene standing behind it, the Tapestry's reverse side does not match its front side: the drawn, upended horse that Chimene has yet to embroider is invisible.

The significance of the Tapestry as a prefiguration of cinematic history becomes clear only when the panel frame becomes recognizable as a cryptomorph when, in the second part of the sequence, the upper part of the wooden panel frame becomes the prominent focus of the shot. As the power struggle between the two women intensifies and reaches its crescendo and decrescendo, the bar runs along the bottom of the film frame in four shots totaling thirty-four seconds (1:28:32–40; 43–47; 51–59; 2:09:03–17). The upper horizontal piece of the Tapestry frame becomes a bar that Uracca literally cannot break nor get past. Initially agitated as she addresses Chimene, Uracca wraps her right hand in a veil that she removed from her head after she entered the convent room (in mourning for her dead brother Sancho, who was murdered in the previous scene). The sequence reaches a crescendo when Uracca, having become agitated in the face of Chimene's courteous defiance, strikes her veiled hand down on the right post holding the Tapestry panel frame (so it may be tilted up and down) and then again on the frame itself (see figure 2.6, lower right). The quick cuts away from her hand at that moment figure her hand as a mutilated stump, and, by extension, her emphatic gesture as an unsuccessful stump speech for Alfonso.[30]

Through repeated long takes, the upper bar of the panel frame becomes recognizable as a cryptomorph of the film line horizontally separating celluloid images as the feed reel of film projector loops through the projector and is rolled up by the take reel. Both Chimene's panel and its frame allegorize

the moment of cinematic inscription (made possible by the spacing between frames) as a cutting or piercing (the needle Chimene is pushing through the Tapestry), the partially rolled up Tapestry akin to the loose equivalent of a film reel on an editing table. That frame also inscribes and embeds the same allegory: perforated holes of celluloid are like the holes in the Tapestry panel through which the rope runs around the frame, the violence represented in Chimene's Tapestry panel has been suspended. The sword of the Christian knight in Chimene's unfinished panel has not yet fallen on the Moorish foot soldier. Moreover, an upended horse's erection in the genuine Tapestry has been drawn but not yet embroidered in Chimene's rechristened version of it.[31]

In reconstructing Norman history for eleventh-century Spanish purposes, Chimene also becomes a rough analogue of director Mann and his screenwriters. Instead of simply drawing an analogy between old and new kinds of mimetic histories and their means of production, however, Mann's film shows that analogical or mimetic reconstructions of history entail a violent process of conscription that fragments, even mutilates, as it also binds what it puts in motion. Chimene is, on one hand, working like a philologist, repairing and restoring the Bayeux Tapestry in ways somewhat similar to the practices of restoring the Tapestry and Renaissance paintings during the mid-nineteenth century, filling in areas not completed in the original or painting over its damaged areas.[32] On the other hand, however, Chimene is doing violence to the past in the act of reconstructing it, breaking faith with it in order to conscript it for the purposes of political resistance to monarchical sovereignty. In standing still to defy Uracca and become a living statue, Chimene reveals another dimension of cryptomorphoses: to represent by standing in for someone for something else; to become a figure, in other words, can be a gesture of (non)violent resistance[33] (see figure 2.6, lower left).

Judgment Daze: *El Cid, Transporter 2*

That *El Cid*'s cryptomorphs present an allegory of cinematic circumfixion as an ideological crisis not recognizable as such in conventional historicist and Freudian secular allegories becomes even clearer if we attend to the way the film's inscription of Rodrigo is shown in the title of the film as a transnational figure El Cid who rides "out of the gates of history into legend." The meaning of El Cid as a legendary figure, in short, is to be read in the film's title, or legend. As Johanne Lamoureux (1993) points out, a legend is both prescriptive and marginal:

> When in the twelfth century, the word ["legend"] imposes itself, it has only a religious, hagiographic meaning and signifies, a la letter, "what must be read" . . . the legend is . . . characterized by the ornamentation that produces it as such and that gains its appeal as *doxa*, as a normative representation. It participates in what Derrida has called the "logic of the supplement," for it no

> longer designates an entire narrative, or even a collection of such hagiographic texts, but rather the single inscription in the margins of visual representation, at the edge of the visual field . . . the legend no longer prescribes as much as it acts to inflect the sense of the image, at times countering its meaning opacity. (22–23)

In the opening title sequence, the title "El Cid" appears in large red type, superimposed on a drawing of the Colahorra joust between Rodrigo and Don Martín. The film's title is positioned here both at the end of the visual field, in the peritextual margin of the opening credits, and yet also in the center of the frame. As a captioning effect on the framed image itself rather than outside it as in an art museum, the title reactivates a prescriptive reading, that which "must be read," though it no longer designates the film narrative, but the (dis)assemblage of the film.

That the title qua legend of *El Cid* must be read as an allegory of circumfixion and will become even more clear once we see that the film's recursive narrative structure and phantomimetic matching extend into its extradiegetic and peritextual frames in the opening and closing sequences of the narrative and the opening and end title sequences: a voice-over narrator begins the film and uncannily returns at the end when the dead Cid rides out of the gates of Valencia; in both cases the narrator mentions that El Cid was a figure of "history" and "legend." This extradiegetic narration within the film is further framed by the shared style of the opening and closing credits, some of which match shots in the film. Tom Conley's comments that a given film's promotional paratextual materials and the opening credit sequences work as forward movements through the film in ways that invite a retrospective recasting of the film. Conley (1991/2007b) writes that "the intelligence of the spectator is almost entirely built into the mechanism that the relation of writing and credits establishes with the narrative of images" (xxvi). But he adds that credits can produce unconscious effects as well:

> The rapport of credits to a film is further complicated by the profusion of advertisements and marketing that already interpret the rapport of image and writing before a viewing takes place. Most often, the configurations in trailers, newspapers, and magazines that herald a film will duplicate what is obvious in the difference within writing and the image track in the film. Here, however, the work of subliminality, or what might be called a poster-unconscious, or a configuration of forms and shapes that baits the viewer, elicits the same will to interpret or to "come and see"—or to inaugurate a scene of visibility, to *commence*—what is effected in the credits. Spectators move to and from pregiven writing and pictures and those in the film. Scenes represented in newspapers are discovered in the ways they match or differ from the imaginary constructs they elicit. Hence, before and after the viewing, if the overall strategy of promotion works, a matrix of ambivalence will determine what a film means. Yet in the play of the relation of credits and writing to the image, the allegorical structure (an aspect usually based on what is thought to be a consumer's desire) can be loosened or flattened. (xii)

In contrast to Conley, I would argue that the mechanism that establishes the relation of writing and credits with the narrative of images produces ambivalence. In *El Cid*, what Conley characterizes as an allegory effected by a loosening or flattening is effected by a stretching and tightening: both the opening and end credits similarly frame the film's narrative and effectively enfold and rip it, much like a DVD copying a program, into the film's recursive and phantomimetic narrative machine. The phantomimetized cinematic paratext deconstructs the framing function, becoming a supplementary parergon much like El Cid's breastplate worn when he rides out of Valencia as a corpse. In *El Cid*, the cinematic peritext is in itself an internal add-on or "extra," lacking what Derrida (1987) calls the "transcendent exteriority" of the parergon that thereby disturbs its function of establishing closure by becoming significant.[34]

The Last Temptation of the Cid

Though *El Cid* ends with Rodrigo, now resurrected as El Cid, leaving the cinematic frame as he rides out on the beach alone, he returns in the last final credit appearing in a black and white storyboard drawn in the same style as those we saw at the beginning of the film: after we see the final title, "The End," written in bright red letters over a drawing of a cloudy sky and a few shields scattered on the ground below, we see the final credit: "A Samuel Bronston Production" and some other text in the same red lettering written over with the dead El Cid on horseback and some of his men drawn as they ride out of Valencia in the final attack on Ben Yussuf. The storyboard for this final shot of *El Cid* matches a shot of the film and doubles up the film's recursive repetitions, returning to a shot of the Cid from behind just before the Cid tramples Yussuf and which recalls the shot of the Cid from behind as he is being strapped into his harness by two soldiers. Similarly, the storyboard drawing the final "The End" title repeats the same storyboard used for the "Intermission" title. The end title and credit pull taut the film's narrative structure by doubling the matching of the storyboards in the "Overture" title and in the opening title sequence forward with the later shots of the film resembling many of the storyboard drawings as well as backward from the storyboards in the end title sequence to earlier shots of the film (see figure 2.1, lower left and right). The final end credit (followed by the "Exit Music" title as the film's exit music plays over a black screen) also suspends the film's narrative closure by marking a postapocalyptic shot outside the film after the seemingly final "The End" title. The messianic figure of El Cid returns (un)dead on arrival outside the narrative frame, after the end, in a movement of return that is a leaving rather than an arrival, a third coming as going.

Although the beginning and end title sequences match through the shared use of storyboards and thereby provide an overarching frame, their framing function to mark the passage from history to legend is undone by the frame's spectralization: the storyboards in both title sequences are

subjected to phantomimetic matching. Some of the storyboards in the opening title sequence match shots later seen in the film, others do not; similarly, the first of the final credit matches a shot in the film, but the intermission and end titles do not. The framing voice-over narrative is also subjected to phantomimesis. There are two voice-overs at the end of the film. In addition to the narrator already mentioned, who speaks before the battle, Alfonso, becoming a Christian hero as he becomes a spectral voice, speaks the final line of the film after the battle—"open your arms to receive one who died the purest knight of all"—over the final shot of the film as the camera tilts up to show his horse begin to ride off, activated as if by Alfonso's offscreen voice. Furthermore, the solo organ music heard as the Cid emerges through the gates before the battle now repeats and then is integrated with the rest of the orchestra and a chorus playing the theme music (with which the film began) in the final two shots of the film, first of Chimene and their twin daughters on the ramparts, and then of the Cid riding on the beach. The peritextual and extradiegetic frames fail to serve even as marginal supplements in that their mimetic spectralization dissolves their parergonal into the film's recursive mechanism of circumfixion.[35]

In *El Cid*, Mann thus inverts the logic of figuration, which moves from shadows to incarnation by moving from body to corpse, and fragments as well as unifies the film's narrative. The wounded body is itself a fragment of signification, like the film or book title, a body whose wounds are covered up by another fragment that is both a work of art and armor, a belatedly supplementary breastplate with a cross that matches the crosses on his banner and shield and thereby uncannily marks the Holy Trinity as a triple cross. If El Cid lives again at the end of the film and yet again (and again) in the final end credit, it is only because he is always already (un)dead, s/trapped from the start on the back of the horse-powered flatbed engine of history.[36]

Chapter 3

Cutting and (Re)Running from the (Medieval) Middle East: The Return of the Film Epic and the Uncanny Mise-hors-scènes of *Kingdom of Heaven*'s Double DVDs

There is no escaping the parallels with our time, when leaders who try to make peace are admired, but their efforts are subverted by more radical factions. We set out to tell a terrific story from a supremely dramatic age—not to make a documentary or propagandize. But since our subject is the clash of these two civilizations, and we are now living in the post-9/11 world, Kingdom of Heaven *will invariably be looked at from that perspective.*

—*Ridley Scott,* Kingdom of Heaven: The Ridley Scott Film and the Story Behind the Story; Introduction by Ridley Scott *(2005, 8)*

Hi, I'm Ridley Scott. I'm the director of Kingdom of Heaven. *I think we could say this is the director's cut in a phrase of being* [sic] *my favorite version. This isn't just adding a couple of shots at the beginning, a couple of shots at the end, and doing a long, elongated version of a lot of entries and exits of scenes. This is organic characterization put back into the movie . . . There are some people who might argue as being* [sic] *too long or take too long to get there but I think you should see it what is* [sic] *and you judge for yourself.*

—*Ridley Scott (introduction to the four disc, extended DVD edition,* Kingdom of Heaven*, May 23, 2006)*

We do not seek an empire. Our nation is committed to freedom for ourselves and for others.

—*President George W. Bush, speaking to veterans at the White House, November 11, 2002*[1]

Kingdom of Heaven *After* Kingdom of Heaven: (No) Exit Strategy from Kerak/Iraq

Cultural criticism of the film epic has largely sought to explain it in relation to the history of U.S. imperialism. For example, in her book *Epic*

Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the Middle East, 1945–2000, U.S. Imperialism, Melani McAlister maintains that the Biblical film epic and the sword and sandals film epic were central to the development of U.S. foreign policy from 1946 to 1960 and that film epics such as *The Ten Commandments* (dir. Cecil B. DeMille, 1956), *Quo Vadis* (dir. Mervyn LeRoy, 1951), and *Ben-Hur* (dir. William Wyler, 1964) need to be read not just as antitotalitarian but also as anticolonial.[2] The policy of the United State's global "benevolent supremacy" depended, according to McAlister, on the United States not being regarded either by the rest of the world or by its own citizens as a traditional colonial power but instead as a leader open to all races and cultures. Foreign policy has a cultural component, and the film epic was a highly significant part of that culture, framing the "religious narratives in terms of contemporary politics" (McAlister 2001, 44).

Ridley Scott's *Kingdom of Heaven* (2005) certainly invites this kind of historicist reading. The intertitle in the final shot of the film speaks of an "uneasy truce," which implicitly extended to the film and its more critical reviewers. Despite his statements to the contrary, President George W. Bush has been widely viewed as advancing U.S. imperialism in a more naked form, and reviewers and Scott himself connected the dots between Bush's reference to a "crusade" against terrorism just after 9/11 and Scott's film.[3] The final intertitle of the film also alludes to the present-day conflict: "The King, Richard the Lionheart, went on to the Holy Land and crusaded for three years. His struggle to regain Jerusalem ended in an uneasy truce with Saladin. Nearly a thousand years later, peace in the Kingdom of Heaven remains elusive." Indeed, some critics of *The Kingdom of Heaven* drew parallels with the draft screenplay and the war in Iraq before the film was released.[4] Cambridge professor Jonathan Riley-Smith dismissed the story as "Osama bin Laden's version of history," claiming it will "fuel the Islamic fundamentalists" (Thompson 2005; Waxman 2005). Muslim critics of the film's draft screenplay saw it the opposite way: "I believe this movie teaches people to hate Muslims," UCLA Islamic law professor Khaled Abou El Fadl told the *New York Times* in August 2005 after reading a script the newspaper had provided, which he regarded as being riddled with Islamophobic stereotypes (see Thompson 2005).

Many reviewers noted the parallel with 9/11 and the war in Iraq before the film was released, and Scott himself writes in the introduction to the book used as a tie-in to the movie that his film will inevitably be read in light of 9/11.[5] Similarly, Scott and his editor Dody Dorn refer to "what's happening in politics today" and "fanaticism" in their audiocommentary on a deleted scene (of the extended four-disc DVD edition) entitled "Hattin Aftermath" in which Saladin (Ghasson Massoud) refuses to follow his general's advice and orders the execution of all his Christian prisoners.[6] Moreover, *Kingdom of Heaven* is one of several film epics, which included Wolfgang Peterson's *Troy* (2004), read in relation to the war in Iraq; Oliver Stone's *Alexander* (2004) pointedly drew parallels between George W. Bush and Alexander the Great.[7] Furthermore, *Kingdom of Heaven* appeared in

theaters as older epics were also being rereleased on DVD, including *Demetrius and the Gladiators* (dir. Delmer Daves, 1954), *Helen of Troy* (dir. Robert Wise, 1956), *The Bible* (dir. John Huston, 1966), *Hannibal* (dir. Edgar G. Ulmer and Carlo Ludovico Bragaglia, 1959), and *Alexander the Great* (dir. Robert Rossen, 1956).[8] Scott's *Gladiator* and Wyler's *Ben-Hur* both were rereleased in new DVD editions in August 2005, and Wolfgang Peterson's *Troy* (2004) was similarly rereleased in a "Director's Cut Ultimate Collector's Edition" that includes thirty minutes of additional footage in September 2007.[9] In January 2008, *El Cid* (dir. Anthony Man, 1961) was released in two editions, one a "deluxe" edition and the other a collector's, both with two discs. In these various multiple digital editions of film epics made over a long duration, we may see that what Manovich (2001) defines as the "new media object," namely "something that can exist in numerous versions and numerous incarnations" (134), is now the cinematic object itself, existing in successively released and differently cut DVD and HD-DVD editions of a given film with various combinations of new and old supplements.[10]

In this chapter, I focus on *Kingdom of Heaven*'s two DVD editions to make two related points: first, I advance a reading of the film in relation to the war in Iraq in order to show that the digitalization of film requires a rethinking of the matching film and its moment of production in (genetic) historicist cultural film criticism, and, by extension, in histories of media theory that adopt the same kind of parallels and analogy in mapping transitions between old and new media (Manovich 2001). New kinds of interaction between film and spectator have opened up on DVD and HD-DVD through the construction of new paratextual interfaces between word, spoken and written, and image that further disturb the integrity of the mise-en-scène as cinema and computer programming become more and more integrated.[11] Far from being merely promotional material or film trivia for fans, *Kingdom of Heaven*'s DVD paratexts are, in my view, central to a (re)reading of both cuts of the film.[12] Second, I show how the additional scenes in the extended DVD edition and the paratexts in both DVD editions of *Kingdom of Heaven* constitute "mise-hors-scènes": the paratextual supplements are meant to serve as interpretive guides to the film by standing apart from the film; thereby attempting to frame the way we read it, or read about it. It is perhaps no accident that attention to how a film was created in "making of" the kinds of genetic criticism (added as bonus features on DVDs) increases as the cinematic object becomes increasingly indefinite; similarly, the border between historical fiction film and documentary becomes more and more uncertain and uncanny as digital reviewings, which may often put the film on pause, turn a given film into a historical document.[13]

One caveat before turning to Scott's film: what seems new and different is the result in part of a misrecognition of uncanny continuities between celluloid and digital cinema. The digital, new media afterlives of what Paolo Usai (2001), Anne Friedberg (2006), and D.N. Rodwick (2007) consider to be the death of celluloid cinema are

something like a return to the early practices of filmmaking when two cameras were used to shoot domestic and export versions of the same film and edited by different editors, then recut by distributors when exported due to reasons of censorship or projection time. The Eureka two-Disc DVD edition of F.W. Murnau's *Faust* (1926) released in 2007, for example, makes available the restored and recently rediscovered domestic print with optional and newly translated English subtitles and two modern sound tracks as well as the export version with one modern sound track. The second disc includes a documentary contrasting the versions and providing text claiming to show the superiority of the domestic cut both in terms of its composition and editing.[14] The Eureka *Faust* DVD edition includes a frame to read the history of film's passage through a standardized double origin at the moment of production (two very similar versions of the what are sold as the same film produced and released at the same time in native and foreign markets) to a standardized double origin at the moments of production and postproduction (one version made during production but with the intention of being its recut at least twice later in two different stages of postproduction and then released successively in quite different theatrical and digital versions).

K/Irakqing Up the Crusades: The Returns of the Film Epic after 9/11

The timing on which a historicist reading of a film such as *Kingdom of Heaven* tends to depend is somewhat off in that the film epic returned in ways that were unexpected and multiple.[15] According to Vivien Sobchack (1990), the Hollywood historical epic spanned roughly the first six decades of the twentieth century, ending with Anthony Mann's *Fall of the Roman Empire* in the wake of the rise of television, the Civil Rights movement, feminism, the end of the Hollywood studio system, and the cultural homogeneity of the Cold War as the United States entered Vietnam: "The era of the Hollywood historical epic . . . can be characterized as informed by those cultural values identified with rational humanism, with bourgeois patriarchy, with colonialism and imperialism, and with entrepreneurial and corporate capitalism. It was in the 1960s that, for a variety of reasons, these ideological values were placed in major crisis" (1990, 41).

Scott's return to the Hollywood sword and sandals film epic with *Gladiator* in 2000—a decade after Sobchack's article appeared in print—was both unpredictable and inexplicable in terms of her analysis of the film genre.[16] Drawing parallels between cinematic and historical moments of production in the case of the resurgent film epic also proves difficult because *Alexander* and *Kingdom of Heaven* were in development long before the war in Iraq began. While these timing problems do not negate the value of historicizing films such as *Kingdom of Heaven*, they do call into question some of the central and unexamined assumptions underlying the historicist practice of using parallels and equivalences between a film

narrative and a narrative of its moment of production we saw in readings of *El Cid*. (Significantly, in their audiocommentary for the Miriam Collection DVD edition of *El Cid*, William Bronston and Neal Rosendorf mention two kinds of historical analogies between the film and the Cold War, when the film was made, and between the film and post 9/11 Islam.)[17] The word "moment" is crucial to historicist film criticism. Extracinematic history, however full of contradictions, is spatialized as a single amount of time, a span of years, a period with a label such as the "Cold War." Hence, only the theatrical release of a film is typically historicized; later broadcasts of a film on television and later releases of the film on video, laserdisc, and DVD are ignored by historicist cultural critics, the assumption being that these later horizons of reception do not determine anew the film's meaning; and a corollary assumption holds that the meaning of a film is complete, that the film, once released theatrically, has an integrity that does not change over time or in its rereleases on video, laserdisc, DVD, and HD-DVD.[18] To be sure, the impact of the film and the extent of its promotion during theatrical release are deeper than the later reception of the film when released on DVD or HD-DVD, the default audience being individual home viewers. Nevertheless, DVD editions are significantly promoted and they are also widely reviewed on various websites and to some extent in major newspapers.[19] At the end of his audiocommentary on *Kingdom of Heaven*, Scott mentions the sales of the first DVD and says that the possibility of his making a sequel will depend not only on the film's box office but also on how well both DVD editions sell.

Consider the digital afterlife of *Kingdom of Heaven* further. Scott's film is typical in being released twice on DVD in two different cuts.[20] The two cuts were both released theatrically the same day, the extended edition being limited to a two-week engagement at the Fairfax Laemelle Theater, an art house movie theater in Los Angeles.[21] The 144-minute theatrical cut was released in October 2005 on a two-disc DVD edition, the first disc being the film and the second disc composed of paratextual documentaries going from the film's preproduction, to production, and then to release. A second 191-minute extended version of the film was released a year later as a four-disc edition, the first two discs being the film and the third and fourth containing more documentaries with academic scholars, production notes, galleries, storyboards, and so on.[22] (This second DVD edition was given a brief theatrical exhibition at the Laemelle Theater in December 2005.) Both DVD editions include pop-up "footnotes" written on horizontally elongated red Templar's crosses in the "Pilgrim's Guide" on the two-disc DVD and in the "Engineer's Guide" on the four-disc DVD, and the extended DVD edition contains three audiocommentary tracks. Some of the footnotes in the Engineer's Guide refer the viewer to features on other discs of the extended edition. The guides on both DVD editions of *The Kingdom of Heaven* invite the viewer to *read* them as hyper(para)texts rather than *view* them as films designed to be watched without interruption from beginning to end.

Since *Kingdom of Heaven* is hardly alone either in having more than one DVD edition or in containing a variety of paratextual supplements, commonly known as "extras," I think the implications of these aspects of both *Kingdom of Heaven* DVD editions may best be examined by first placing them in relation to broader problems for historicist cultural criticism posed by the digitalization not only of the film epic but of film *tout court*. The digitalization of films such as *Kingdom of Heaven* calls into question the underlying and respectively narratological and phenomenological assumptions about the linearity and successiveness of historical and cinematic narrative, on the one hand, and about the integrity of the film as a complete object, on the other. As Laura Mulvey observes, video and digital technologies have had a significant impact both on the cohesiveness of film narrative and on film spectatorship:

> Once the consumption of movies is detached from the absolute isolation of absorbed viewing (in the dark, at 24 frames a second, in narrative order and without exterior intrusions), the cohesion of narrative comes under pressure from external discourses, that is, production context, anecdote, history. But digital spectatorship also affects the internal pattern of narrative: sequences can be easily skipped or repeated, overturning hierarchies of privilege, and setting up unexpected links that displace the chain of meaning invested in cause and effect. (27–28)

A close examination of the two *Kingdom of Heaven* DVD editions will show that the impact of digitalization on film narrative and spectatorship is more radical than Mulvey allows, and hence equally troubling to historicist cultural film criticism and to film theory. Mulvey refers to the "original cohesion" of celluloid film, but it is precisely this original cohesion that is in question with the digitalization of cinema—for the DVD now often delivers multiple versions of a film, usually only one in theatrical release, and all of them are typically part of the film's production. The digitalization of film changes its ontology and temporality and hence its narrative cohesion as a unity of duration and extension. The epic film genre, Vivien Sobchack writes, "constitutes its historical field aliterally and materially onomatopoetically—extended and expanded. An excess of temporality finds its form in, or 'equals,' *extended duration*: films far longer than the Hollywood norm. Correlatively, an excess of space finds its form in, or 'equals,' *expanded space*: Cinemascope, Cinerama, Superscope, 70mm" (37).

With the uneven and erratic temporality of the digital film epic, however, this unity of extension in time and space falls apart. The delayed delivery of film on DVD disrupts this fantasy of priapic cinema by fragmenting and proliferating versions of the film. Instead of one film, we get different films, each one an ostensibly final cut, accompanied by different paratextual commentaries and other extras. Unlike celluloid film, then, digital films such as *Kingdom of Heaven* are no longer a single object, but are instead subject to multiple recuts, which produce arguably more or less cohesive narratives. Similarly, digitalization redefines not only the phenomenology of film but also, in consequence,

what counts as the mise-en-scène. Like historicist cultural critics, film theorists such as Tom Conley (1991/2007b) and Tom Cohen (2005) maintain that a counternarrative is inscribed in cinema through hieroglyphs, maps, and other kinds of "writing," adopting a conventional understanding of the mise-en-scene as set design.[23]

Yet in digital film the cinematic scene is no longer only what is placed in the shot but also how the shot is placed in the film; that is, the digital film scene, deleted, extended, or restored, with or without audiocommentary, involves film editing and projection as well as shot composition and space, thus further undermining the notion that the final version is completely integrated.[24] It's not an accident that Ridley Scott addresses 9/11 in the preface to the *Kingdom of Heaven* tie-in book or that *Kingdom of Heaven* (2005) indirectly addresses its critics in its paratext when declaring an uneasy truce in the final intertitle. Both DVD editions of the film and the differing paratexts of each edition enable Scott to engage retrospectively not only the controversy over its putative partisanship with regard to the Muslims, but two related controversies as well. The second controversy concerned a perceived lack of authenticity and romanticism in the film, especially the use of Sir Walter Scott's *The Talisman* and similar nineteenth-century fictional accounts of the Crusades as sources.[25] The third concerned a lawsuit by popular historian James Reston claiming writer William Monahan had plagiarized from his book *Warriors of God: Richard the Lionheart and Saladin in the Third Crusade* (2001), which includes a chapter entitled "Kingdom of Heaven."[26]

Both DVD editions of *Kingdom of Heaven* and their respective paratexts respond to the prerelease controversies, I will maintain, but do not resolve them for reasons having to do with the temporality of the paratext rather than with Scott's personality or the particular politics of his film.[27] Scott attempts to exert control over the film's identity by giving it greater length and more scenes and over its reception by including a variety of new paratexts, or, more precisely, epitexts (paratexts added after the film was first released). Both DVD editions of Scott's film include documentaries featuring historians who vouch for the film's authenticity, for example. The theatrical DVD edition includes an A&E television channel documentary *Movie Real: Kingdom of Heaven* and the extended DVD edition includes a "new featurette on the film's historical accuracy" entitled "Creative Accuracy: The Scholars Speak"; the list of historians includes scholars, for male-female and Western-Middle Eastern balance, identified successively in superimposed titles on each of their respective talking head shots as "Dr. Nancy Caciola, Ph.D., University of California, San Diego," "Dr. Hamar Dabashi, Ph.D. Professor of Iranian Studies, Columbia University," and "Dr. Donald Spoto, Writer/Theologian."

Yet the oblique manner in which these extras and the audiocommentaries address the controversies subvert Scott's attempts at control insofar as they take the form of censorship as much as they illuminate, making both the film in its different versions and Scott as their director into

moving targets. The scholars in the *Creative Accuracy* documentary, for example, did not serve as consultants on the film and do not directly engage the critics who savaged the film before it was released theatrically.

Instead of giving Scott a controlling narrative of the film or its genesis, and production, and postproduction, the mise-hors-scènes of both DVD editions of *Kingdom of Heaven*—whether in the form of added scenes or paratextual extras such as the controversial draft screenplay and similarly controversial storyboards of Saladin beheading Guy de Lusignan (Marton Csokas) after parading Guy on an ass—do the opposite, producing a paratextual proliferation in which even more narratives arise to defend, explain, and excuse why it is the way it is in either edition. The continued response to the pretheatrical release controversies on both DVD editions is all the more odd given that the response to the shorter theatrical release put an end to the prerelease controversies, with the American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee and the Council on American Islamic Relations issuing statements in support of the film (ADC 2005 and BBC 2004a). Foreign box office in the Middle East was likewise positive, with Lebanese audiences cheering when Saladin enters Jerusalem near the end of the film and pauses to pick up from the floor a crucifix knocked down during the fighting to place it upright on an altar (see Fisk 2005).

Kingdom of Heaven's mise-hors-scènes are symptomatic of the film's contradictory imperialist and anti-imperialist trajectories, namely, its desire implicitly to justify both the occupation of Iraq and an exit from it.[28] What appears to be a forward movement involving an exit (leave the world a better place than you found it, to paraphrase Balian's motto etched above his forge) in the form of an exteriorizing paratextual frame that takes the spectator out of the film's scene turns out to be a haunted return and revisitation, a "déjà (pre)vu" with the result that one cannot tell if Scott's film is coming or going. Indeed, the paratextual mise-hors-scènes make more evident a narratological problem already present in both versions of the film. As we will see when turning to *Kingdom of Heaven*'s use of two staples of the film epic genre, namely, the balcony scene and the scale model of Jerusalem under siege, the survey of territory or women in order to possess them, in Orientalist fashion, is disturbed and disrupted. The scale model of Jerusalem, the toy boat that local children and Balian (Orlando Bloom) float in the newly irrigated fields of his home, Ibelin, and young Baldwin's (uncredited) toy knight, all literalize Scott's inability to frame and place properly scaled elements in the scene of *Kingdom of Heaven*. It is as if Scott couldn't stand outside the frame at a distance that would have allowed him to decide what to keep in the scene and what to take out, consequently requiring him to justify in new paratexts on the extended DVD edition his recutting of the film, a practice that Scott has followed in more recent DVD editions of his films *Blade Runner* (1982) and *American Gangster* (2007) released in December 2007 and February 2008 respectively.[29]

I read this problem of framing with respect to scale and Scott's problem in framing the mise-en-scène as symptomatic not only of Scott's attempts

to resolve the prerelease controversies over his film but also his own ambivalence about the bearing of 9/11, itself an uncanny event, on how *Kingdom of Heaven* was edited in the two different versions.[30] Unlike American neoconservative imperialists such as George W. Bush who disavow their own imperialism, Scott apparently has no problem with a superpower such as the United States or the United Kingdom being an empire.[31] Yet Scott has no wish to justify the occupation of the Middle East by the "coalition of the willing." *Kingdom of Heaven* floats a fantasy of the Middle East's decolonization, an exit strategy for Iraq that allows for an uneasy truce, if not peace, signaled by the repeated use of crane shots behind soldiers or civilians marching away from the camera.

Scott can't simply let the Middle East go, however, and so builds in a narrative pattern of exiting and return. Hence, the film's recursive narrative structure, its beginning and ending as arrivals that are returns and departures that are also returns: the film begins with Godfrey's return to Europe from the Crusades and almost immediately leaving it, with Balian riding to catch up with him; just after arriving back at his forge in France, Balian and Sybille leave it together at the end of the film presumably to catch up with Richard Coeur de Lion (Ian Glen), and in a shot very similar to the one that began the film, Balian pauses at his wife's grave before riding off at the end of the film.[32] Hence the siege of Jerusalem also ends with a slow motion tilt shot of the defenders from behind, the camera rising over the breached wall, followed by a lingering forty-second overhead shot that stands, in my view, as a cinematic emblem of failed exit in the form of vertical transcendence: Arabs and Christians continue to fight in slow motion and morph, as the camera zooms back, into corpses stacked on top of the rubble and each other, neither side able to get out of Jerusalem or get into it but both instead stuck at the threshold qua gap.

In *Death at 24x a Second*, Laura Mulvey (2005) remarks that DVD "'add-ons' with background information, interviews and commentaries" shift "movies of the past . . . from pure entertainment into a quasi-museum-like status" (27). The two *Kingdom of Heaven* DVDs resemble less a museum than the mausoleum, the two spaces being more than phonetically connected, as Theodor Adorno (1967, 173–86) and others have shown (see Crimp 1993, 44–64). The *Kingdom of Heaven* DVDs uncannily encrypt, in the sense of encode and inter, the controversies to which they respond: extras have been buried in various places and yet remain there to be raided, exhumed, exscripted, so to speak, by the viewer. Scott stands in relation to these DVD extras as Balian stands in relation to the children's toys and scale models in the film: the various DVD extras have a relatively small scale in relation to the two editions of the film, a belatedness about them that won't ever catch up to the impact of the film in theatrical release but which nevertheless attempt metalepsis via what are effectively deracinated or homeless entertainment systems that supplant the theatrical release by retroactively reframing the film's meaning and genesis.[33]

No Exodus

The kinds of narratological problems Scott faces in elaborating a coherent fantasy of decolonization, I should pause to note, are not specific to *Kingdom of Heaven* but extend to films related to Iraq that followed in its wake. The cartoonish action film *The Kingdom* (dir. Peter Berg, 2007), about FBI agents collaborating with Saudis to solve a suicide bombing in a compound of U.S. citizens, makes a geographical detour from Iraq and an unconvincing fantasy of a redo of the 2003 invasion that makes Americans the victims rather than victimizers of terrorism and that unconsciously covers up Osama bin Laden's Saudi national origins. Even more incoherent and interesting for our purposes is the liberal minded drama *Rendition* (dir. Gavin Wood, 2007). The narrative loops back at the ending of the film to a suicide bombing we saw near the beginning of the film, as if on a Moebius strip roller coaster. In order to straighten out the impossible temporality of its "even paranoids may sometimes be right" thriller genre and suspense narrative, however, *Rendition* sacrifices its own liberal, ACLU, Amnesty International-derived critique of the U.S. use of torture to gain information from detainees, allowing that torture works if one is guilty (and an Arab) but fails if one is innocent (and an Arab-American immigrant with a green card married to a pregnant white woman U.S. citizen). *Rendition*'s politics come out backward: though the film presents itself as pro-immigration and pro-interracial marriage, its politics turn out in the end, albeit subtly, to be anti-immigration. (Indeed, it's never made completely clear that the tortured apparently innocent man who escapes from prison, with a help of an American case officer, is indeed innocent.) Unfolding a strangely American fantasy about the exceptional wrongly accused man being allowed to escape from prison and then to immigrate to the United States, the film has no exodus strategy for all the other Arabs stuck back there somewhere in the civil war—torn Middle East (the geography of the Middle East is never identified—at times it seems that the action takes place in Egypt, at others a mix of Gaza and Israel, and at others Iraq).

"Mission" Accomplished

In order to understand how the film's mise-hors-scène disturbs the film's attempts to achieve formal unity, we must first grasp the relation between the film's fantasy of (de)colonization and its form, particularly, its recursive narrative structure and the scale it adopts to characterize Balian's heroism in childlike terms. Though the film is set in 1184 during the Second Crusade, its idealizing account of knighthood makes the film more closely resemble the later Children's Crusades. Religion is at the front and center in *Kingdom of Heaven*, but the real purpose of the film's division of the Christians into bad, intolerant, and hypocritical fundamentalists, on one hand, and good, spiritual, ecumenical, and morally upright multiculturalists, on the other, is to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate imperial

occupation of the Holy Land by the Christians. Thus, the Templars are murderous marauders who provoke war for personal gain. They are purely exploitative occupiers. In contrast, Sybilla (Eva Green) and Marshall Tiberias (Jeremy Irons) are good occupiers who want to allow the same freedoms to Islam and Christianity alike and who want to maintain trade and peace with Saladin. Balian occupies what Scott calls a "middle position" (in his audiocommentary on the deleted scene "Golgotha"), standing with the good imperialist occupiers against the bad ones but unwilling to "do a little evil for the sake of a greater good," as Sybilla says. After arriving in the Holy Land to further his father's mission, namely, recover Jerusalem in order to build a better world, a "kingdom of conscience," a "kingdom of heaven" where Muslims and Christians will live together in peace, he is greeted by the execution of Templar knights for their criminal attacks on Arab caravans. Balian is a pacific imperialist, someone who is interested, finally, neither in war nor in occupation but who wants to help the locals help themselves, rather like a Peace Corps volunteer. After redeeming his wife (Nathalie Cox) from Hell by burying her silver necklace with a cross at Golgotha, he ends his pilgrimage and goes, at King Baldwin IV's (Edward Norton) order, to Ibelin to defend the trade route and become an engineer.

As a good occupier who improves his farmlands at Ibelin, Balian "will build a new Jerusalem," as Sybilla puts it, a phrase that echoes Godfrey's phrase "a new world." Scott earlier made a film about Columbus called *1492: Conquest of Paradise* (1992), but Balian differs from Scott's idealizing imperialist Columbus (Gérard Depardieu), who goes berserk soon after arriving in the New World and discovers to his deep dismay that he has helped turn Paradise into Hell. Balian wants moral improvement as well in his New Jerusalem: he does not keep slaves, as he tells the Arab friend who says Balian can keep the horse and even him, and his terms of surrender to Saladin are that the people of Jerusalem live and go free. Reversing the domination of the male gaze and eroticizing of the female body that are typical of Orientalist harem bathing scene, *Kingdom of Heaven* shows a chaste Balian who is the object of the gaze: after bathing at his house in Jerusalem, he demands and obtains a towel from the manservant and covers himself at the waist with it, reluctantly allowing the several smiling, attractive young women ardently towel his torso dry as they laugh in enjoyment.[34] Sybilla's husband, Guy de Lusignan, by contrast, initiates sex with a very attractive young Arab woman who is apparently one of Sybilla's ladies-in-waiting. In other words, Balian is the only truly good imperialist occupier. He will not sell his soul to become powerful by murdering Guy and marrying the queen, whose son will become Baldwin V when her brother, the leper King Baldwin IV, dies. As a working-class hero, Balian will accept Sybilla as his wife only if she abdicates her position as Queen and becomes a blacksmith's wife.

Yet Balian's difference from Sybilla and Tiberias is one of degree rather than kind. He is no Balian of Arabia trying to mobilize the Arabs to expel the occupiers. Balian is always and only a defender. He never lays siege (unlike Richard the Lionheart (Henry Wilcoxson), who leads a successful

attack on Acre in Cecil B. DeMille's *The Crusades*, 1935), and he will not engage in political struggles and will not become King. In the extended DVD edition, the village priest finds Balian at the grave of his dead wife and taunts him, "You never fight back. You always turn the other cheek." Balian does not fight back until, in a later scene, he sees that the priest has stolen the cross from his wife's corpse. The fight in the desert oasis between Balian and Nasir's servant over the black horse offers a more significant example. The scene is inspired by Sir Walter Scott's *The Talisman* and its film adaptation *King Richard and the Crusaders* (dir. David Butler, 1954); the pugnacious hero Sir Kenneth presents an immediate and intolerant challenge to Saladin based on their religious difference. Unlike Sir Walter Scott's hero, Balian tells Nasir (Alexander Siddig) that he does not want to fight, further departing from Scott's novel in this scene of *Kingdom of Heaven*: unlike Sir Kenneth, who pugnaciously charges Saladin the charge on horseback because of their religious difference, Balian fights reluctantly over property (his horse) with a sword and on foot against an Arab who is mounted on horseback and armed with a spear and a sword. Similarly, Balian waits for Saladin to begin his siege on Jerusalem before returning fire. He doesn't fight at the battle of Hattin, as he does in the film's draft screenplay; and when three Templars with their swords or maces drawn, on horse and on foot, come to kill him at Guy's order, Balian doesn't use his sword, which hangs on his horse out of reach, but instead uses a piece of pottery to kill one of his adversaries and uses the dagger of another to kill him. By the end of the film, Balian has become known chiefly for his reactive tactics. As Richard I tells him, "we come by this road to find Balian who was defender of Jerusalem." In defending rather than attacking, Balian is simply following the orders of his father Godfrey (Liam Niesson) and the Hospitaller (David Thewlis). On his deathbed, Godfrey tells Balian to "safeguard the helpless," and the Hospitaller echoes Godfrey when he advises Balian in Jerusalem that "holiness is in right action and the courage on behalf of those who cannot defend themselves." Baldwin IV voices similar sentiments to Balian just before Baldwin dies: "go now to your father's house at Ibelin, and from there protect the pilgrim road. Protect the helpless. And then perhaps one day when I am helpless you will come and protect me." Balian himself passes on this message of defense when he knights commoners before the siege on Jerusalem, telling them "safeguard the helpless" and that "it has fallen to us, to defend Jerusalem, and we have made our preparations as well as they can be made."[35]

In its reluctance to provide a final resting place to which Balian might retire and reside, *Kingdom of Heaven* suggests not only that Balian is a good occupier, but, contradictorily and more fundamentally, also that he is not really a colonizer at all. Balian is not only a defender, but, more significantly, also a loser, symbolically castrated in psychoanalytic terms and lacking property in economic terms. In the extended edition, he gives Ibelin to his Almaric (Velibor Topic)—the knight who served Godfrey as well as Balian, before the siege—should Balian not survive.[36] Similarly,

Balian defends Jerusalem only to surrender it and then immediately exit from the Holy Land for his village in France. He loses consciousness several times while in the Holy Land, first after the shipwreck, then at the end of the battle for Kerak, again after killing the three Templars sent to assassinate him, and finally after the battle for Jerusalem. In his ability to reside and be at rest in the Holy Land, he mirrors Tiberias, who tells Balian he started out believing in God and then saw that the Crusades were all about the accumulation of power and wealth. Tiberias becomes disenchanted and leaves for Cyprus. None of the other good Christians are colonizers either: Godfrey dies on the way back, the Hospitaller is beheaded after the battle of Hattin, and Sybilla abdicates and leaves the Holy Land with Balian.

Kingdom of Heaven's fantasy of decolonization thus takes the form of disavowing that the Holy Land was ever really colonized by the Crusaders at all—hence the strange logic of Balian inexplicably losing the black horse after the shipwreck, only to find it at the oasis, and then, after winning the fight against Nasir and his servant, giving the horse away to Nasir when he and Balian arrive at Jerusalem. Although Nasir gives back the horse to Balian near the end of the film, he does so only after Saladin retakes possession of Jerusalem. The exchange of the horse is symbolic not only of friendship despite religious differences but of who owns the Holy Land. The giver in both cases gives away the horse when his religious side owns the Holy Land.[37] And though the city is seen changing hands at the end of the film, Jerusalem by this point is no longer a geographical space but an idea as well. Tiberias, before he leaves for Cyprus, says Jerusalem is finished—meaning that the idea of the Crusaders making "a better world" is over. Similarly, Balian tells Sybilla, after he has negotiated the surrender of Jerusalem with Saladin, that the city that lives in their hearts and heads can never be surrendered.

Kingdom of Heaven's even more fundamental strategy for erasing European colonial possession is the lack of narrative closure: the end of the film does not make it clear where Balian will end up and what he will do when he leaves France a second time (apparently, his murder of the village priest has been forgotten). The openness of the ending, at once a return to France and an almost immediate departure from it, is further underlined by the film's recursive narrative structure. The film begins and ends with the same shot of the cemetery where the beheaded corpse of Balian's wife is buried. When Balian pauses at his wife's grave, the music returns to the opening theme of the film. Some of the dialogue exchanged between Richard I and Balian echoes that between Godfrey and Balian when Godfrey returns to the village near the beginning of the film, with Balian giving Richard I the same directions, word for word, that Godfrey had earlier given Balian: "You go to where the men speak Italian and then continue until they speak something else." The extended DVD edition also adds an early scene in which Balian has a flashback of his dead wife planting a tree behind the forge—a flashback that is meant to be recalled at the end of the

film when he touches the buds on the tree. Similarly, the delay between Richard I's departure and Balian and Sybilla riding off in the same direction repeats Balian's delayed departure after Godfrey leaves the village.

The implication of the film's final three shots of Balian and Sybilla riding away from the village cemetery is that Balian and Sybilla will catch up with Richard Coeur de Lion and join the Third Crusade, which will end, as the final intertitle then tells us, in a truce. Assuming it is reasonable to draw this conclusion, *Kingdom of Heaven* leaves us with a series of unanswered questions even as its final intertitle about the truce Richard negotiated and elusive peace of the present day shifts from the present of the film into a past tense that frames what will have happened to the characters after the film's end and shifts again to the aftermath of these events as of 2005: If Balian is returning with Sybilla, does that mean the two of them plan to rule as King and Queen? Or are they simply going to support Richard Coeur de Lion? If they are going back, their return to France seems rather pointless. Why did Sybilla refuse to be Queen and cut her hair if she never meant to abdicate permanently? After all, she leaves Jerusalem and goes back home. Balian and Sybille's departure from France at the end of the film also significantly differs from Balian's earlier departure in having Sybilla accompany him and ride off ahead while he pauses at his wife's grave. Has she had enough of his mourning and blacksmithing and decided to seduce Richard I, now the leader of the crusade and a monarch, instead?

We can begin to get a fuller sense of how *Kingdom of Heaven*'s narrative recursions and lack of closure are symptomatic of its fantasy of (non)occupation by attending to Balian's characterization as loser or castrated hero in relation to the film's mise-en-scène, more specifically, in the film's balcony scenes and use of scale models. The possession and holding of territory from a commanding, heroic, and male perspective emerge as a problem of scale that threatens to collapse distinctions both between genders and between adulthood and childhood.

Balian's return to France at the end of *Kingdom of Heaven* signals his transition to adulthood and his capacity for renewal. An eyeline match between Sybilla and Balian as she looks out at him as he touches the buds on a tree his dead wife planted in the yard below the forge, each of them smiling in mutual recognition, seems to affirm the transition both have made. They seem to have mourned their losses, he of his dead wife and child, she of her dead brother and dead son. Yet this eyeline match quietly suggests that the transition is incomplete. As she looks out at him from above the balcony of the forge, she takes a position that the film marks throughout as the dominant one, reinstating Sybilla's position on horseback looking down at Balian on foot in the first encounter, and again when she arrives at Ibelin and demands his hospitality. The suggestion that Sybilla's position above Balian marks the persistence of something left unmourned that is evinced more loudly by the difference between Balian and Sybilla's responses to the grave of the dead wife at the end of the film: Balian pauses, but Sybilla rides on ahead.

To appreciate more fully how Sybilla's gaze registers an aberration in mourning that disturbs the narrative closure of *Kingdom of Heaven*, we need to consider how the film's fantasy of colonial dispossession requires an undoing of Balian's positions as commanding spectator and director in control of his mise-en-scène. The landscapes is haunted by the dead in *Kingdom of Heaven*, and the film marks this haunting by including a balcony scene at Ibelin that recalls similar scenes in earlier film epics. In *Ben-Hur* (dir. William Wyler, 1959), Arrius (Jack Hawkins) and Ben-Hur (Charlton Heston) talk about the latter returning home while standing on a balcony overlooking Rome. *Spartacus* (dir. Stanley Kubrick, 1960) contains a balcony scene with Crassus (Laurence Oliver) telling his slave Antoninus (Tony Curtis) about Rome, which he personifies as a demanding and dominating irresistible mistress. *Alexander* (dir. Oliver Stone, 2004) contains a balcony scene with Alexander (Colin Farrell) sounding like a neoconservative talking about multiculturalism and freedom with Hephaistion (Jared Leto) and the two communicating their mutual affection. In *Troy* (dir. Wolfgang Peterson, 2004), Priam (Peter O'Toole) and his son Hector (Eric Bana) discuss whether to force Paris (Orlando Bloom) to send Helen (Diane Kruger) home. The balcony scenes are clearly sites of homosocial bonding, even homoerotic in the cases of *Spartacus* and *Alexander*, and arguably in *Ben-Hur* as well. To gaze is to command, whether by dominating or liberating.

Kingdom of Heaven has a similar scene in which Balian takes possession of Ibelin, unused lands he has inherited from his father. The scene begins inside the bedroom with a servant opening the door to the balcony in a symmetrical composition. The camera then tracks Balian as he walks from inside the room outside onto the balcony, where he looks out with Almaric behind him, followed by a long shot of the arid landscape below.

The cinematic mastery in the balcony scene at Ibelin is recalled later when Balian, again with Almaric standing behind him, surveys the land outside Jerusalem to determine at what distances Saladin's siege towers may be fired upon accurately (see 1:09:00–1:09:35). After a close-up of Balian's right eye looking down the instrument blade, a solitary Arab appears on horseback in a prosthetic long shot taken with a telephoto lens. Balian concludes correctly "they're here," and the film confirms his inference in a helicopter shot coming up over the horseman and continuing forward over the mountains to show the enormous size of Saladin's troops in the distance, again as if the shot were a prosthetic extension of Balian's sightline.

The characterological and cinematic potency of these sequences depends, however, on Balian not colonizing the land for his own purposes but developing and defending it for the residents. (Hence, the film's introduction of the anachronism of Balian teaching the Arabs how to irrigate, something they had known how to do for thousands of years.)

The quiet tension arising from Sybilla gazing down at Balian from the French village forge at the end of the film is more loudly present earlier in the film when Sybilla appears to recolonize Balian's gaze instead of being,

in typical Orientalist fashion, the erotic object of his gaze. Sybilla initially appears to be just such an object. Though of French descent, Sybilla was born and raised in the Holy Land and has never been to France. She has clearly "gone native," as her Arabic dress, eye makeup, and henna dyed tattos on her hands testify. Yet she seems to recolonize Balian's land by at times occupying the commanding position of spectatorship, turning him into an object of her gaze. For example, after she has bathed shortly upon arriving at Ibelin, Sybilla goes to a grated window through which she watches Balian helping his serfs irrigate his lands. We then see her face from the other side of the window, much of it hidden behind the grate.

As if sensing her watching him, Balian pauses and looks up at the window. The sequence begins as a conventional shot-reverse shot sequence with her looking at Balian, then Balian looking at her. Yet instead of cutting to Sybilla looking at Balian, the sequence ends with a shot from his position looking at Sybilla's room. From this great distance, he can't possibly see her face or even if someone is actually looking at him. In what seems to be a commanding spectatorial position, she sees him without being seen.

By presenting her gaze in this way, the film risks both making Sybilla into a morally bad character and Balian into a politically weak character. Sybilla's obscured face and her ability to see without being seen darken her character and place her interests at odds with Balian's. Balian's position as Orientalist spectator in command of his land is weakened in a later scene showing Sybilla washing his face on the balcony: the exclusively medium close-up shots of the two characters never show the irrigated land. (Significantly, a deleted scene entitled "Penitent Man II" shows Balian alone on his balcony at night surveying his land as the camera rotates 360 degrees.)

The extended DVD edition of *Kingdom of Heaven* more pointedly marks the erosion of Balian's power and the darkness of Sybilla's increasing dominance by including a montage sequence that begins in the afternoon with shots of Balian in the irrigated fields of Ibelin followed by shots of the field; these shots are followed by a dissolve of the partly wet lands into a matching shot of the irrigated lands later in the day as two men ride their camels in the right of the shot. A high-angle long shot of the field even later in the evening (1:17:32) follows, but instead of matching back to Balian's gaze, the film cuts to Sybilla having her hands painted with henna by her maid, followed by a close-up of Sybilla and then a long shot pan of the irrigated lands that matches her sightline as she looks out at them from over the balcony. The montage sequence, unified by Arabic instrumental music, ends as a sapphosocial sequence with Sybilla looking out at Balian, who is now completely unaware that she is observing him.

The point of darkening Sybille's gaze by constructing it as an apparently recolonizing of Balian's is to make her more powerful than Balian, but it weakens them both. Her gaze is impotent, linked, in psychoanalytic terms, to castration and death. The film's fantasy of decolonization plays out as an undermining of any colonizing gaze in order to ground it in an even more radical fantasy, namely, that the Holy Land was never really colonized by

the good Christians in the first place. The extended edition includes a scene that links Sybille's gaze to a wall painting in Balian's home with the dance-of-death figures and two cartoon-like panels with two banderoles (a medieval analogue of the comic-book word "balloons") stating "quod summus" and "hoc ecitis." (In an earlier scene, Balian translated them for the audience, "Such as we are, you will be"). As day breaks at Ibelin the morning after Sybilla and Balian have had sex, the camera pans left from the balcony on the newly irrigated lands, then cuts inside the room where they had sex, and a tilt shot of the wall shows the dance-of-death panels as the camera moves upward. Two medium close-ups of Sybilla lying horizontally in bed alternate with a shot of the dance of death: now awake and with Balian still asleep, she silently reads the panel with the banderole stating "you will be [dead]."

The harsh sounds at the end of the illicit Crusader attack on the Arab caravan continue into the long shot of the irrigated fields at the beginning of this added scene and are replaced by a flute when the camera enters the room. But the sound of the attack returns as we see the close-up of the skeleton and the words "hoc ecitis." The panoramic shot of the irrigated lands and the overlapping and recurring sounds of the attack on the Arab caravan mark Ibelin not as an idyllic pastoral space distinct from the violence of the caravan route, wherein Guy and Reynald de Chattilon (Brendan Gleeson) make their attack, but as a space of death: only in a horizontal gaze approaching and approximating their future deaths can the lovers perhaps stand apart from the violence of Guy and Reynald.

To distinguish Sybilla from a colonizer and represent her as someone not interested in colonization but in peace and moral improvement by constructing her gaze as castrated, *Kingdom of Heaven* goes so far as to occasionally sacrifice continuity of sightlines and literally flattens out her gaze. Before and during the battle of Kerak and its aftermath she gets a commanding, panoramic view until the very last shot. As the battle begins, a long shot of the battle from the castle, its towers symmetrically in the left and right sides of the frame, is followed by a close-up shot of her face looking down at the battle. This same sequence of a long shot of the battle and a close-up (a tighter shot) of Sybilla follows two more times during the battle, after Balian seems to be killed and when Baldwin arrives and negotiates a truce with Saladin, and is used a final time when Baldwin enters the fortress to punish Reynald and twice more after Reynald has been punished.

The battle of Kerak sequence ends, however, with a medium long shot of Sybilla that retroactively subverts her commanding sightline from above. After Reynald is thrashed by Baldwin, a medium close-up of Balian looking up is followed by the same close-up of Sybilla, then followed by a high-angle shot of Guy observing Balian and looking up at Sybilla. Yet the next medium long shot shows Sybilla turning away from Guy to enter the fortress, keeping her level with Balian and Guy. The sequence cuts her gaze down to size, so to speak, and flattens it out. A similar breach of continuity

in editing occurs with respect to Sybille's gaze after the battle when a medium close-up shot of Sybilla looking down from the ramparts at the siege is followed by a long shot of Balian returning from negotiations with Saladin. Yet at the end of this shot-reverse shot sequence, Balian looks up not at Sybilla but instead in successive medium low-angle shots at two groups of defenders on the ramparts who are looking back at him.

Kingdom of Heaven's exit strategy fantasy involves vertical camera work, like the crane shots of the troops, and metaphors: "rise a knight." Sybilla's gaze becomes progressively more impotent after Kerak as she becomes a decolonizing loser like Balian. She watches silently when Guy is paraded at Saladin's command on a donkey outside Jerusalem (disc two 1:02:57) and before the siege when Balian knights the commoners (disc two 1:55:04). The shared impotence of Balian and Sybilla's gazes is registered in two odd recognition scenes between them, one in which Balian logically should have recognized Sybilla and the other in which he shouldn't have done. In the first scene, during the siege, Balian walks past Sybilla without noticing her when she tends to the injured gravedigger (Martin Hancock) even though she faces him as he passes by her. One may infer that he misses her because he doesn't know she has cut her hair. Yet the gravedigger does recognize her, just as he also earlier recognized Balian when Balian knights him before the siege. In an even odder scene after the siege, Balian does recognize her after almost riding past her when she is leaving Jerusalem along with the other refugees. It's unclear in this scene how he could have spotted her since he passes her from behind.

Kingdom of Heaven pays a rather stiff price in cinematic and narrative consistency, then, for giving up a claim to possession by undoing the colonial gaze—for the decolonization of Sybilla's gaze ends up making her character less rather than more consistent, morally either worse or better than Balian (she is willing to engage in Machiavellian hardball politics but she also abdicates). Though Scott says in his introduction to the extended DVD edition that the Sybilla plot was the central addition, he does not mention that his director's cut nevertheless deleted two scenes in which Sybilla is held responsible by Guy and holds herself responsible to Balian for Saladin's siege because she euthanized her son soon after he developed leprosy. The third disc contains some of Scott's note cards on the screenplay, one of which describes Sybilla as a "vampire"; she is described as a murderous, scheming harpy fighting with Tiberias for control of Jerusalem and who goes mad because she has poisoned her son in order to save him from her brother's fate. Leaving these scenes out may make Sybilla more sympathetic than their inclusion would have done.

Yet even in the extended DVD edition, something of the draft screenplay's arguably misogynistic version of Sybilla remains. Her fur-lined hood in the last two close-ups of her at Balian's forge both cover over and recall the shot of looking at Balian outside from behind the grated window and, even more tellingly, when her mirror reflection becomes monstrous as it morphs into her dead brother's deformed face when she cuts her hair

short. Insofar as Sybilla seems to colonize land or Balian through her gaze at all, she is marked in the film as monstrous. The efforts to redeem her by decolonizing her gaze, having her do social work (becoming a proto-Florence Nightingale during the siege), and abdicating after she cuts her hair equally mark her as monstrous, however. Indeed, the scene in which she cuts her hair suggests that her mirror reflection as a purified martyr recalling Maria Falconetti's appearance in Carl Dreyer's *Passion of Joan of Arc* (1928) is indistinguishable from her reflection as a deformed, zombie-like monster. Similarly, the montage scene of Balian playing with the toy boat at Ibelin that ends with Sybilla watching him from the balcony may evoke a maternal feeling on her part, but it is precisely her status as a loving mother that the euthanasia scene leaves in doubt, not only because of the act of infanticide itself, but also because the scene begins with close-up shots of Sybille gazing at her son playing with his toy knight the way she gazed at Balian playing with the toy boat at Ibelin.

More broadly, by undoing colonization through the castration of Balian's and Sybilla's gazes, *Kingdom of Heaven* significantly subverts gender and religious differences. A crane longshot of Saladin's troops taken from behind them as they leave for the battle of Hattin parallels a similar shot of Guy's troops leaving Jerusalem for that battle. Both Christian and the Muslim leaders are cross-dressers: King Baldwin wears a headdress that resembles a woman's and Saladin wears a long skirt when he enters Jerusalem. Similarly, Balian often cross-dresses in Muslim attire: see, for two examples, four briefly held low-angle close-ups of Balian wearing black clothing and a black headdress looking much like the mullah's (Khaled Nabawy) and a shot-reverse shot sequence of a similarly dressed Balian looking down at Guy looking up as he enters Jerusalem on horse with his men following behind. So neither Christians nor Muslims are credited with an entirely legitimate possession of the Holy Land.[38]

The Downfall: Scaling the Film Frame

By turning now to scenes in *Kingdom of Heaven* involving scale model toys, we may see that the collapsing of adulthood into childhood in these same scenes further extends the film's fantasy of decolonization.[39] Just as Balian does not frame the scene through a commanding, colonizing gaze, so too his play with models and toys reveals him even more directly as a castrated, childlike hero who cannot frame and place elements in the mise-en-scène. In his book *Cartographic Cinema*, Tom Conley notes the frequency with which maps appear in films, and the historical films and film epics almost invariably include them.[40] It is all the more striking that the only map in *Kingdom of Heaven* is a scroll young Baldwin writes during a geography lesson given him by Sybilla, who explains to him that he may never see France because he has "to be King here" (disc two, 0:16:00).

The connection made between the map, residence, and a child-size perspective is made even clearer in the film through the use of scale models,

notably the scale model of Jerusalem in Tiberias's quarters that Balian examines. The film's difficulty in achieving narrative unity follow from a literal lack of an adult capability of framing and directing what goes into the film's mise-en-scène and where.[41] The shot of Balian picking up the siege tower matches a shot in the production documentary extra in which Scott looks over a scale model of Jerusalem set with siege towers, perhaps inadvertently implying equivalence between Scott as director and Balian as hero in control of events via the mise-en-scène qua scale model. Scott returns to the cutaway scale model of the Colosseum in *Gladiator* where Commodus places models of two gladiators in the center. *Gladiator* looks back to scenes of Nero (Peter Ustinov) surveying and then showing a scale model of his new Rome in *Quo Vadis* as well as to a scale model of Troy in a promotional documentary for *Helen of Troy* (dir. Robert Wise, 1956), in which the announcer hovers over a scale model of Troy. Stone's *Alexander* includes a similar scene with Alexander moving models of soldiers in various battle formations as he explains his strategy to his officers before the battle of Gaugamela.

Unlike *Gladiator*, however, *Kingdom of Heaven* can't direct the mise-en-scène by matching the scale model and film image and thereby code a political stance. In *Gladiator*, the shot of Commodus (Joaquin Phoenix) putting a gladiator such as Maximus into the scene is immediately followed by an overhead blimp shot of Rome that ends over the Colosseum with CGI gladiators fighting in it. There is a direct match between Commodus's scale model Colosseum and the full-scale CGI Colosseum, associated with shots from Leni Riefensthal's *Triumph of the Will* (1935) and also from a Nazi film of Albert Speer's scale model of the new Berlin.[42] *The Downfall* (dir. Oliver Hirschbiegel, 2004) begins with Hitler (Bruno Ganz) and Speer (Heino Ferch) discussing his scale model of Berlin (a replica of the new Nazi Berlin scale model used in Rienfenstahl's film). The match between model and city in the successive shots of *Gladiator* implies that Commodus is a fascist auteur and a demonic parody of Ridley Scott, an antifascist but otherwise apolitical film auteur.[43] A promotional book for *Gladiator* makes the link explicit by including a page with a shot of Scott standing next to the scale model as well as a still of the blimp shot of the Colosseum. The very similar *Kingdom of Heaven* book has two successive pages matching a shot of Scott with the production model of Jerusalem; a storyboard drawing of Saldin's siege; a technical drawing of a Jerusalem street; and a scale model of the city under siege.

Unlike the film *Gladiator*, however, *Kingdom of Heaven* has a wide gap of time between the shots of Balian inspecting the scale-model siege tower and his destruction of the real siege towers during the actual siege of Jerusalem.[44] Though a pedagogical connection is implied between Balian's examination of the toy siege tower and his overturning of the real siege towers, the connection is so tenuous as to be nearly invisible.[45] Indeed, it is obstructed by a series of dissolves after the chess sequence in which Balian and Baldwin discuss the city's fortifications, laid out on a piece of paper

held by Baldwin that we never see directly: the defense of Jerusalem seems more closely matched to the chess pieces than it does to the scale model siege tower.

The extended edition inadvertently makes clear that the film's problem of coding its politics of temporary residence and (non)occupation is a consequence of Balian's loss of control over the mise-en-scène, a loss of control that goes hand in hand with a reduction in the stature of Balian's heroism. Instead of looking like a general in command, Balian resembles the children in the film who play with toys. For example, Balian finds young Baldwin's toy knight on the floor and straightens out the lance as Baldwin opens a door and the two exchange glances; the toy knight reappears when Guy finds him playing with several knights on the floor and finally when Sybilla euthanizes her young son by pouring poison in his ear. The last sequence with the toy knight ends just as the first one did in a lingering medium close-up shot of the toy knight on the floor. The film's editing further connects the toy knight to Balian by following the shot of it on the ground, after the child dies, with a nearly 360 degree medium shot whip pan encircling Balian, who is sitting with his back resting on a palm tree, and coming to a stop behind one of the three Templars arriving to assassinate him. The sequence of these two shots draws a connection between Balian and both the boy, abandoned by his mother Sybilla, and her young son's toy knight.

As if to reinforce the point, the film links Balian to the children at Ibelin, the extended edition adding scenes in which he plays alone with the toy boat one of the children had floated down the irrigation pump when water was first drawn from the ground. Similarly, a shot of Balian writing at night when Sybilla comes to have sex with him, with the inkstand in the right foreground, is echoed in a later series of shots of young Baldwin signing peace letters to Saladin on a large table with his mother's assistance, and the inkstand on the table. Like the geometric formalism of the long shots of the battle of Kerak from Reynald's fortress that were followed by the close-ups of Sybilla, this sequence begins with a geometrically formal shot of young Baldwin signing the letters followed by shots that show he is too small and too young for the job. In both cases, the return to the female gaze marks an abandoning of the commanding male gaze. The letter signing sequence, for example, includes a shot from under the table of the seated boy swinging his legs because they are too short to reach the floor and ends with Sybilla losing control of events. Although the hawkeyed warmongering Patriarch (Jon Finch) observes that young Baldwin does not feel the hot wax that accidentally drops on his hand as he seals a letter, the Patriarch does not let on that he has discovered the boy's leprosy, the Patriarch does not act on this knowledge and gains no advantage from it.[46]

Like the balcony scenes that show Balian to be a loser, an (unaware, at times) object of the gaze rather than its commanding director, the scale model and toy show Balian himself to be castrated, a child and a son lost in play rather than a father. Balian's heroism is scaled to that of a child's fantasy

of knighthood. His idea of adulthood—namely to "make the world a better place" and do what his father told him to do: "be a good knight"—amounts to a child's fantasy of goodness. Balian chooses not to exert control over events in order to make the world better, nor is it clear that he does make the world better. In an extended scene of the extended DVD edition of *Kingdom of Heaven*, Balian plays chess with Baldwin, the chess set composed of medieval figures that resemble toys, but only Baldwin moves the pieces, telling Balian you never know where you'll end up when you begin the game. Baldwin is unable to "move" Balian to kill Guy, marry Sybilla, and become King, but Balian too is unable to move others, except to defend a city he then surrenders. Scott's desire to defend a good, heroic kind of occupation that takes the paradoxical form of exiting and returning runs into a problem of geographical and cinematic placement: an uncanniness or homelessness about the Holy Land undermines Balian's ability to be heroic by taking his supposedly rightful place in the film's landscape and mise-en-scène. Instead of evincing the kind of cinematic extension and duration Sobchack maintains is typical of the film epic, *Kingdom of Heaven* reveals the extent to which its own fantasy of a truce, a middle ground that Balian occupies but that fanatics do not, turns out quite literally to be a cinematically flattened no-man's-land, a transitory space of narrative recursion and cinematic castration rather than an elevating movement that implies a colonizing command of territory and bodies. Indeed, vertical camera movements always occur in the film as territory is lost, as in the crane shots of Christian soldiers going to battle Saladin after Guy fails to heed Balian's warning, the end of the shipwreck sequence when Balian loses his horse, when Balian explains to his men on the Jerusalem ramparts the terms of the truce, and in the final shot of the film when the camera rises slightly and tracks left as Balian and Sybilla ride off in the distance.[47]

Blackwater Down: Defending the Film Stronghold

Having already discussed several extended and deleted scenes, I wish to turn more directly to the editing of the director's cut to explore the problem of what I have called the film's mise-hors-scène, a problem, that is, of determining by the director and film editor what is in the scene and what needs to be taken out in order to unify the film's narrative. The central means of formal unification in *Kingdom of Heaven* are narrative recursion and a wide variety of related kinds of repetition. Repetitions include identical shots such as the opening and ending of the cemetery; the exchange of the black horse between Balian and Nasir; the Arabic music that plays as Reynald's men behead their Arabic prisoners, after the battle of Hattin, and at the end of the siege of Jerusalem when we get an overhead shot of all the dead bodies amassed at the breach in the wall; a flashback shot of Balian's dead wife and a nearly identical shot of Godfrey's subsequent flashback of him playfully seducing Balian's mother; the chicken seen in medium close-up in the first shot of Balian's flashback of his dead wife and another chicken

in a very similar medium close-up shot in Balian's home in Ibelin seen before he enters it and smiles at it, as if in recognition; Balian's quotation, before the siege of Jerusalem, of Godfrey's earlier dying speech to Balian about knighthood; and one-liners such as "rise a knight," "God wills it," and "I am the blacksmith."

By deepening the meaning of these repetitions, the added scenes in the extended DVD edition may help further develop the characters, but they don't really change the reading of the film or succeed in unifying its narrative; instead, they tend to make moral distinctions between characters that were already clear in the first DVD edition of the theatrical release of *Kingdom of Heaven*. The added scenes are thus redundant, extraneous, and out of place. Consider just a few examples. Near the beginning of the film, a bishop invokes Jesus and gives money to the bad half-brother priest to give to Balian and free him. The scene gives us contrasting good and bad religious figures we see clearly enough in the theatrical release. Potentially more controversial additions and extensions are the more violent ones. Yet these too make little difference. Consider Saladin's execution of Reynald after the battle of Hattin. The extended edition adds two very short extra shots, the first of Reynald still standing gagging as blood gushes just after Saladin slits his throat, and the second of Reynald falling to his knees as more blood gushing from his neck (disc two, 0:40:11). In footage added in the extended DVD edition, Saladin walks over from the tent to where three of his men hold Reynald and draws his sword above his head in slow motion as he prepares to behead Reynald. Though Saladin becomes more vindictive and brutal in this extended version, our view of Saladin's character is left unchanged. His anger at Reynald links his additional violence to Balian's violence at the village priest. Both murders are committed in revenge for crimes against a female member of their families, a sister in Saladin's case and a wife in Balian's. Moreover, in the extended version of the beheading scene, we get the same kind of alternating and contrasting reaction shots to Saladin's personal execution of Reynold as we do earlier before Saladin orders his men to march to Hattin: Nasir looks unhappy after Reynald is beheaded, while the fundamentalist mullah smiles gleefully. This splitting of Arabs into good moderates and bad fanatics is also present in the *Talisman*-inspired scene at the oasis, with Ridley Scott replacing the single Arab in Sir Walter Scott's novel (and in David Butler's 1954 film adaptation *King Richard and the Crusaders*) with two Arabs, one impulsively violent, the other a trickster and gentleman.

In addition to being redundant, many of the added scenes included in the extended edition of *Kingdom of Heaven* derail attempts to unify it by creating new questions in the process rather than by answering questions raised by the shorter DVD theatrical release edition. By having Saladin behead Reynald using the sword the mullah offers him, the extended edition makes nonsense of the theatrical release edition in which he refuses that sword and uses his own dagger instead to slit Reynald's throat. Moreover, no mention is made of the draft screenplay (included as an extra on disc three of the extended edition) in which Saladin puts his finger in

Reynald's blood after slitting his throat and then touching his own bloody finger to his own forehead, leaving the gurgling Reynald to be taken out of the tent and butchered by Saladin's men. The attack led by Guy and Reynald on the Arab caravan is similarly made more violent and less consistent in the extended edition, with a brief shot of the Muslim grandee (Nasser Memarizia) cut in half from shoulder to stomach by Reynald, who looks all the more evil in consequence. By adding a conversation between the Muslim grandee and Tiberias after Reynald evades prosecution by Tiberias for Reynald's unauthorized caravan attack, the film makes clear that this same Muslim grandee shouts in recognition "You!" off camera at Reynald. In the shorter theatrical release DVD edition, the meaning of this recognition is left unclear because the Muslim grandee is seen only in the background in Tiberias's quarters, remaining silent; he is thus next to impossible to identify as Reynald's victim in the caravan attack. Yet the added dialogue with the Muslim grandee undercuts the critique of Guy's brutal raid and murder by making the Muslim grandee himself a bigot who is easily corrupted by a sack of coins Tiberias throws at him contemptuously. Furthermore, the much lengthier sex scene before the caravan attack makes that attack seem like a consequence of Sybille's adultery rather than the kind of action that appears to have caused her to commit adultery, namely, his immoral, rogue violence.

Cutting and Rutting: Outland Empire, or Lost My Highway

The writing in the opening title and end title of the film, or peritexts, frame it like bookends and put brakes on the film's narrative recursiveness, thereby attempting to resolve the problem of the mise-hors-scène by enclosing the film narrative. Yet the audiocommentaries and other epitexts of the extended DVD edition effectively undo the resolution offered by the peritextual framing to the film's lack of closure by removing the writing, or brakes, and allowing for continued kinds of reframing that further derail the film. The two audiocommentary tracks by Dody Dorn and by Scott, Monahan, and Orlando Bloom openly do this by discussing three different versions of the film's ending, beginning at the scene of the refugees and Balian leaving Jerusalem and finishing as the end title sequence is over. Monahan originally wanted the film to end with Balian riding past Sybilla, who is walking barefoot and leaving blood in her footprints, without recognizing her. Scott, however, wanted to end with their return to France, saying "I always like going back full circle." Dorn adds that there was also discussion of ending the film as Sybilla and Balian hold hands after they leave Jerusalem. One possibility was to have Balian ride after Richard Coeur de Lion at the end of the film without Sybilla.

Monahan, Bloom, and Scott also discuss a possible sequel to *Kingdom of Heaven* about the Third Crusade. Significantly, they talk only about the sequel's ending, which would have had, according to Monahan, Richard giving Balian lands in England called Locksley. Balian would then have

become Robin Hood. For Scott, the sequel would not mean a progression forward in time but a return: "I'd make a sequel in a flash. I'd love to revisit this situation." Dorn similarly undoes what she calls the "bookend" quality of the ending by completing her commentary wondering about the "life of the film after its release," whether it will become a classic over time or be forgotten. She then returns to the marketing of the film in theatrical release, which she faults for placing the film in the wrong genre. Sounding rather like a film critic, she says the film was advertised as an adventure film when it was actually a historical epic that should have been marketed as a major "prestige picture" such as *Lawrence of Arabia* (dir. David Lean, 1963) or *Gandhi* (dir. Richard Attenborough, 1982). As a result of the bad marketing, she maintains, people were disappointed by it even "before it got out of the starting gate," led to expect it to be something it wasn't. Her commentary serves as a final attempt, then, to reframe the film not for the DVD viewer but to tell the DVD viewer how the earlier version should have been seen.

Before discussing further how the DVD epitexts subvert the braking function of the film's peritextual frame, I want first to return to the implications of digital film for historicist cultural criticism broached at the beginning of this essay. In *Death at 24x a Second*, Laura Mulvey notes that the introduction of new technologies such as DVD involve "a delayed cinema" (11). She avers that "there is nothing fundamentally new here" in the ways in which "video and digital media have opened up new ways of seeing old movies" (8). Yet she unjustifiably limits the meaning of cinematic delay to two definitions, both of which were already present on video: slowing down a film while watching it and the time it takes for a dormant detail in a film to be noticed. Mulvey downplays the extent to which digital media have opened up new ways of seeing movies such as *Kingdom of Heaven* on DVD. Attention to the extended edition's epitexts will show how they complicate to the point of breakdown the kind of film historicism that Mulvey continues to practice. *Kingdom of Heaven*'s epitexts retroactively frame the film in two moments, the earlier moment of audiocommentary and the present moment of auditory spectatorship. Hence, the framing audiocommentaries always involve time delays, returns, and repetitions, even as they can be heard only if the DVD is played at its normal speed.[48]

The extended DVD edition of *Kingdom of Heaven* provides the viewer with a self-historicizing frame in the form of genetic criticism (audiocommentaries and documentaries explaining how the film was developed, how it was made, how it was promoted). Yet because the *Kingdom of Heaven* DVDs involve not only delay but repetitions and returns of the repressed, an uncanny (un)censoring, what follows is a kind of phallic disorder of the auteur, involving a priapic, Pinnochio-like extension and elongation of Scott's authority over the film, on one hand, and a symbolic castration/fragmentation of that authority, on the other. The framing extras are both too much and not enough, remainders that are too little and too late. The DVD's belated self-historicization takes the form of an

endlessly recursive loop, and so challenges the uncritically held assumptions about narrative and time held by of historicist film and media critics and theorists, even when, as in Mulvey's case, it incorporates psychoanalysis.

The extended edition of *Kingdom of Heaven* suggests that the reanimation of the past that involves the repression of returns as well as returns of the repressed. Paratextual excuses don't exonerate, as Paul de Man (1979) points out, but require more excuses. Thus, paratextual attempts to explain and justify *Kingdom of Heaven* more often than not produce questions rather than answers. Consider the commentary by Ridley Scott and his film editor Dody Dorn on some of the paradoxically entitled "Deleted and Extended Scenes." In "Walking the Ramparts," Balian prepares for the siege and as he walks along the ramparts meets a woman who offers him an orange. Dorn mentions that the woman on the ramparts recalls Balian's dead wife, and both she and Scott then pause without further comment until Almaric enters the scene. Her gesture of offering the orange to Balian is repeated in another deleted and extended scene, "The New World," in which Godfrey, on his deathbed, reaches out to give Balian an orange. The deleted and extended scene unifies the film through this kind of repeated element and gesture and would have connected as well to two shots of Balian holding an orange in the montage sequence after he has bathed in his home in Jerusalem, making clearer the film's theme of death and renewal. These deleted and extended scenes thus seem no more extraneous than other additions. Yet neither Scott nor Dorn offer any comment on the connection or explain why the dead wife comes back or why they cut that part of the scene.

Their silence seems more symptomatic, a kind of phantom commentary, than merely contingent, and tracks the generally haunted landscapes of the film. Numerous shots of the dead show the inconsistent ways in which the remains of the dead are either disposed of or left to rot: Balian has his wife buried but cremates the baby's clothes; he and Saladin cremate corpses during the siege of Jerusalem but those who lie dead after the siege ends are never seen being buried; in a phantom of the opera moment, Sybilla takes off what has become the death mask of her brother and then puts it back on as he lies in his open coffin; drowned seafarers lie unburied on the beach after the shipwreck; Arab and Christian corpses remain strewn on battle fields; and in the deleted "Flashback" scene, Balian, Almaric, and Sybilla discover several semiburied Christians, the wind blowing sand off their partially exposed corpses, when arriving at the aftermath of the Templars' attack on the caravan.

Scott's, Monahan's, and Dorn's audiocommentaries on scenes that relate to 9/11 and the war in Iraq register a different kind of haunting. No explanation is offered for the deletion of "Hattin Aftermath," a scene in which Saladin and Nasir walk around the corpses of Christian knights until Saladin gives the order to behead all of the prisoners.[49] In his audiocommentary on this scene, Scott begins by praising Saladin as a "great all-round character of very high integrity . . . and a very, very tough ruler" who had to "act politically" and do "things maybe he really didn't want to do." In a typically

oblique manner, Scott excuses Saladin's execution of the prisoners without ever saying that Saladin ordered their execution. Dorn then jumps in and explains that "in the dialogue, Saladin says 'kill all the knights of the religious order,' and Nasir protests, not wanting to hurt Saladin's reputation . . . it's sort of an inverse of kind of the idea of what is going on in politics today [*sic*]." Scott quickly leaps to a talking point:

> fanatics are fanatics. It doesn't matter what your call is. A fanatic is a fanatic. And a fanatic's very hard to deal with. You can't negotiate. I don't care whether you're Christian, Muslim or Buddhist, Hindu. It's impossible to deal with. There's no reasoning. And I think Saladin was right in the middle of it all and . . . cleverly very modern in his view about "How do I sustain the status quo? 'Cause' we're not going anywhere by going at each other."[50]

Scott's commentary indirectly justifies Saladin's argument, but Scott does not explain why he cut the scene, as he and Dorn do explain in the extended scene entitled "Rape." The extended edition of the "Rape" scene after Reynald has provoked the war Guy wishes for shows a number of Crusader prisoners kneeling, their arms bound behind them, about to be beheaded after the first prisoner is beheaded. The extended scene also briefly shows in the background of the shot two of Reynald's men holding a woman down while a third brutally rapes her, as written in the draft screenplay. Scott says he cut the rape footage because "it just seemed just too much" and because he was trying to get a rein on the violence and atrocities of the period. Dorn adds that the rape footage also makes the viewer hate Reynald instead of regarding him as a mischievous bad boy.[51]

Scott and Dorn could have made a similar case for cutting "Hattin Aftermath," since that scene exposes the illogic at the core of Scott's militant democratic view of religious and multicultural tolerance: to defend against fanatics, Saladin has to act like a fanatic and order the killing of all his fanatical prisoners. No freedom for the enemies of freedom.[52] In any case, by cutting the "Hattin Aftermath" scene, the film leaves the viewer with an unexplained gap between Saladin's beheading of Reynald and then Tiberias telling Balian at the battlefield in the next scene that he is leaving for Cyprus. No mention is made by Scott or Dorn of why they did not shoot the sequence in the draft screenplay that has the beheading of the Crusader prisoners, including the Hospitaller, who "smiles at his executioner" before losing his head. The sequence ends with a medium close-up shot of severed knights' heads lined up next to each other on the ground, with the Hospitaller's in the center, implying that these dead knights got what was coming to them, regardless of whether they were fanatics or not.

Instead of a framing perspective that allows one to understand better how the film's narrative is unified in the extended DVD edition, then, these epitexts morph into a palimpsest of sedimented frames that make the narrative seem less rather than more unified. Explanations involve loud silences that register repressions or oblique references to the present. The DVD palimpsest has no set layers because they have no set path to view the

extras. To be sure, the third and fourth discs are both called "Path to Redemption," and both discs have numbered tables of contents. Indeed, putting them in dialogue involves what I would call "ex-traying," taking a disc out of the DVD tray and putting another into it, the consequent effect being something like an X-ray of a layer of the film. Rather symptomatically, Ridley Scott's introduction to the extended edition is not integrated into the DVD. It is a menu option, but after playing it once, one cannot return to the menu or hit the back button to return to the introduction. To see it again, one must take the disc out and reinsert it. Epitextual commentaries and documentaries on the two DVD editions are spatially as well as temporally uncanny. The epitexts cannot be located in one place or on one disc. In each of the two DVD editions of *Kingdom of Heaven*, epitexts appear both on separate discs and on the discs with the film itself as visual and audiocommentary tracks. Located both inside and outside the film, the epitexts break down the opposition between an interior film narrative and its surrounding paratexts, or what Mulvey calls "external discourses."[53]

No End in Sight: Between Two *Kingdom of Heaven*s

The various epitexts appear to be based on a kind of time travel fantasy akin to that of the medieval science-fiction film *Timeline* (dir. Richard Donner, 2003) that exhibits a fantasy of encryption: like the archaeology professor, his son, and the young woman archaeologist who becomes his girlfriend, Ridley Scott and his film crew can travel back in time to the making of the film, if only through the trope of metalepsis, and reframe the film by standing outside it and before it, excavating it, so to speak, as an archival and archaeological ruin, literally a tomb with writing that becomes readable in the present as a result of the travel to the past. Encryption takes the form of exscription. The events of 9/11 and the war in Iraq are only one historical horizon among others that haunt the film. The DVD editions return not only to this contemporary horizon and the prerelease controversy over the film's putatively pro-Muslim sympathies but also to the earlier horizon of 1960s road show theatrical exhibitions of the film epic as well as to the exhibition history of *Kingdom of Heaven* and the history of the making of the extended DVD edition. The Engineer's Guide on the extended DVD edition begins with an account of the road show exhibition and ends with commentary on the Laemelle theatrical exhibition.[54]

Moreover, this extended DVD edition mimes the road show theatrical releases of earlier epics such as *Ben-Hur*, *King of Kings* (dir. Nicholas Ray, 1961), *Spartacus*, *The Ten Commandments*, *El Cid*, among others, by including, as did these roadshow releases, an overture, entr'acte, intermission, and exit music. Just as Scott returned in *Gladiator* to Anthony Mann's *Fall of the Roman Empire* and remade it, so Scott returned in *Kingdom of Heaven* to Mann's *El Cid* (1961), remaking not only that film but his own *Gladiator*

(1995) as well (see Winkler 2004). Full of citations to many of Scott's earlier films, *Kingdom of Heaven* arguably returns to *The Duellists* (1976), his earliest film, set in the Napoleonic empire and focused on the unsuccessful efforts of one officer to de-escalate and disengage from a decades-long series of challenges to his honor. In this commentary in the end title sequence, Scott mentions that Richard was imprisoned on his way back to England and that Scott shot scenes from *The Duellists* at Dürnstein, the castle where Richard Coeur de Lion was imprisoned on his return to England. Yet the recursiveness of *Kingdom of Heaven*'s epitexts shows that the film's narrative and archaeology are actually closer to David Lynch's three most recent films, *Lost Highway* (1997), *Mullholland Drive* (2001), and *Inland Empire* (2006), in which a Mobeius strip narrative recursively loops back to the beginning and then starts over.[55]

Deadenders: Historicism in the Wake of Cinema's Digital Remains

Historicist cultural film criticism entails the same kind of Oedipal quest for origins played out in Richard Donner's *Timeline* (2003), regarding history as a narrative, whether grand or petit.[56] The historicist film critic frames a film and its contemporary history as parallel yet sequential discourses, the latter being the genesis of the former. The Marxist/Lacanian symptomatic reading offers an account of a given film as incomplete and full of absences—a nonunified narrative from the perspective of a historical narrative (or a fully narratable theory of sexuality and cinema) that is assumed to be complete. In this respect, historicist and film and media criticism converge. In Mulvey's view, nothing is new about delayed cinema: digital and video media allow the viewer to repeat and replay scenes, to turn motion images into still photographs.[57] Though she refers to the "technological uncanny" and uses psychoanalytic language (fetishism), her account of digital film and delay is really antipsychoanalytic in that it assumes that a film can be (re)viewed without loss, that a DVD edition is an essentially cryogenic storage unit the contents of which can be unfrozen and reanimated by the spectator at will. In historicizing film by framing it in relation to a matter of parallel moments in time, historicists, such as Mulvey (2005), assume that cinema has a resting place, a grave. The historicist locates a given film in a sequence of narratable, symbolizable events.

Like so many films on DVD that are subject a series of homeless phantom commentaries and deleted scenes, the DVD editions of *Kingdom of Heaven* are radically uncanny, however, because they have more than just one restless place since the film object is never definitively over. These always already more or less "extended" DVD editions represent a broader challenge to the practice and theory of historicist film criticism in that their erratic and uneven temporality and ontological fragmentation impede a coherently narratable transition between a film's death after theatrical release finished and its subsequent afterlife on DVD. The metaphor of DVD as a burial site is an aftereffect, a

retroactive fantasy that attempts to make them fully narratable tales from the crypt. As Slavoj Žižek (1989) comments,

> The process of historicization implies an empty place, a non-historical kernel around which the symbolic network is articulated. In other words, human *history* differs from animal *evolution* precisely by its reference to this *non-historical* place, a place which cannot be symbolized, although it is retroactively produced by the symbolization itself. (135)

Historicist framing of parallels between film and historical events thus implies a fantasy of exteriority, the possibility one could occupy what Žižek calls the "*non-historical* place" that cannot be symbolized. But as *Timeline* (dir., Richard Donner, 2003) shows, excavation involves, on one hand, a violence that threatens to repress the object of excavation either by destroying it or by leaving its contents unexhumed, undiscovered, and unread, and, on the other, the symbolization of the past as its exteriorization. Hence, the meaning of the tomb's contents is written on its outside.[58]

By understanding how *Kingdom of Heaven* and its paratexts are relayed between two uncannily double DVDs, we may grasp a more general point, namely, that historicism and film and media theory of a cultural studies cast cannot escape the trauma that the historicist film critic wants to make fully symbolic and narratable. The film's uncanny epitexts and delayed delivery—potentially accelerating the speed of reviewing and collapsing old and new, mechanical and human—oscillate without a telos between cinematic (re)inscriptions and their framing exscriptions. Murmurings of ghost versions on the audiocommentaries of the *Kingdom of Heaven* DVD ruins are remainders, extras that disrupt the possibility either of laying the film to rest by grounding it in a frame or of exhuming it for a kind of ex-post-facto *CSI* analysis.

Chapter 4

Le détour de Martin Guerre: "Anec-notes" of Historical Film Advisors, Archival Aberrations, and the Uncanny Subject of the Academic Paratext

If I distrust my memory . . . I am able to supplement and guarantee its working by making a note in writing.

—Sigmund Freud, "Note on the Mystic Writing Pad"

Let us note: Nachtrag *[supplement, addendum] has a precise meaning in the realm of letters: appendix, codicil, postscript. The text we call present may be deciphered only at the bottom of the page, in a footnote or postscript.*

—Jacques Derrida "Freud and the Scene of Writing," in Writing and Difference*, 212*

To compensate a little for the treachery and weakness of my memory, so extreme that it has happened to me more than once to pick up again, as recent and unknown to me, books which I have read carefully a few years before and scribbled over with my notes, I have adopted the habit for some time now of adding at the end of each book (I mean of those that intend to use only once) the time I finished reading it and the judgment I have derived of it as a whole, so that this may represent to me at least the sense and general idea I had conceived of the author in reading it. I want to transcribe some of these annotations here. And I am so good at forgetting that I forget even my own writings and compositions no less than the rest. People are all the time quoting me to myself without my knowing it. . . . it is no great wonder that if my book follows the fate of other books, and if my memory lets go of what I write as of what I read and of what I give as of what I receive.

—Michel de Montaigne, Essays*, 305; 494*

The Return of *The Return of Martin Guerre*

In the opening title sequence of *The Return of Martin Guerre* (dir. Daniel Vigne, 1981), Natalie Zemon Davis is given a prominent credit as historical consultant (see figure 4.1, upper left).

Figure 4.1 **Doubly Desiring Women Writing in Film: Natalie Zemon Davis, Bertrande de Rols, and the Historical Advisor as Extra**

Davis's placement testifies to the higher prestige of historians at the moment of the film's production. Priska Morrissey notes that the placement of the film credits shifted during the 1970s and 1980s, "More and more, their names were placed at the end of the opening title sequence" (Morrissey 2004, 55–56).[1] Davis's credit is preceded by two credits that establish the film's authorship. The first credit, following the title of the film and credits for the main actors Gérard Depardieu and Nathalie Baye, reads, "a film written by Jean-Claude Carrière and Daniel Vigne." And the final credit, following Davis's, reads, "a film by Daniel Vigne."[2]

One might think that this prominence in the title sequence lends the historian greater authority and prestige. One would be wrong to do so, however. For when the academic historian comes into the film frame, as Davis does with her screen credit, things start to get strange, even ugly. Thomas Cripps (2002) begins his review of Natalie Davis's book *Slaves on Screen* (2000b) by telling an anecdote about how, in Davis's presence, he retold an anecdote previously told by film scholar Robert Ray about the "camel principle," a means of determining what needs to be in a frame and what can (or should) be left out. Ray's (1991) anecdote runs as follows:

> When she worked as an advisor to the film crew making her own *The Return of Martin Guerre*, historian Natalie Davis tried to ensure authenticity by cramming the mise-en-scène with medieval details. The director explained, however, that they were unnecessary, since Hollywood worked on "the camel principle": "if you want to suggest Egypt, you simply put a camel in the corner of a frame, and the audience does the rest." (243)[3]

After Cripps retells Ray's anecdote, he claims that Davis (2000b) corrected Ray's version by reversing the relation between narrator and addressees:

> A few months ago, I participated in a panel discussion at Canisus College in Buffalo, New York on the topic of Natalie Zemon Davis's *Slaves on Screen*. Hoping to draw us into a discussion of the historian's role in the making of historical motion pictures, I told a wry story I had gotten from an essay by the theorist Robert B. Ray. The director of Davis's *The Return of Martin Guerre* (and indeed, it was her movie, perhaps more than any previous movie was indebted to an historian). . . . [Cripps retells Ray's anecdote cited above.] Davis quickly turned the story on its end, pointing out that it was she who saw the value of simplicity as against cramming in a symbolic jam of pyramids, minarets, and Arab cows on the Nile. (103)

For Cripps, at stake in this reversal of who says what needs to be in the camera frame is the legitimacy of historians vis-à-vis film directors, with which Cripps then savages filmmakers:

> I begin with this tale of one small victory as evidence of the casual, even low esteem in which historians have been held by filmmakers. At best historians

> seem no more than pesky pedants: at worst their urges run up the costs, besides who really cares? . . . even when moviemakers adhere to authenticity of detail, their decisions are often in the service of historically warped, perverse, even prevaricating movies. (2002, 103)

Acute paratextual aberrations appear in this anecdotal relay from film to history: a return to Davis's earlier book written sixteen years earlier; a hyperbolic overvaluation of Davis as the true filmmaker, not Daniel Vigne, the director of *The Return of Martin Guerre*; and an even more hyperbolic, possibly paranoid, view of what is asserted to be the filmmaker's low regard for the historians they hire as consultants. An anecdote told in passing about what should be in the frame becomes—as it is repeated, revised, and rewritten—an inaugural anecdote about the true source of the cinematic principle, leaving us in the realm of fiction, outside the archive (no sources of Cripps's anecdote are footnoted: Cripps does not offer any evidence in support of his claim that Davis said she formulated the camel principle, nor does Cripps footnote the source of Ray's anecdote).[4]

Davis's role as film consultant in *The Return of Martin Guerre* and her anecdotal writings about it as well as the writings of film critics such as Ray and historians such as Cripps excite and express such unusual academic ferocity in large part, I suggest, because her role and writing about it reveal a common paratextual and narratological problem the historian faces when serving as a film consultant with regard to getting credit: the historian is at once inside the film as a credit in the peritextual margins and outside the film narrative, limited to being at most part of a framing prologue we follow as the titles roll.[5] At stake in Cripps's anecdote and its retellings as well as in Davis's own writings on the Guerre case and the Vigne film are larger questions about the relation between academic historian's authority and credibility and the cinematic and print paratext's role in establishing that authority and credibility. By putting the historian in the cinematic frame as a written credit and hence exterior to the film narrative, the opening title sequence of *The Return of Martin Guerre* both produces a cognitive and narratological reality effect based partly on the historian's authority (the credit accompanies a prologue that explains the genesis of the story prior to its unfolding) and unsettles the authority of that effect by indirectly calling attention to the historian's fantasies of exteriority, their need and desire to remain outside the frame in order to determine what is in it, which consequently is also an uncanny spectrality.

In adopting the title of the Vigne film as the title of her book, *The Return of Martin Guerre*, Davis makes her book a ghostly double of the film.[6] As *conseiller historique*, Davis parallels Conseiller Judge de Coras (Roger Planchon), the author of the book *Arrest Memorable du Parlement de Toulouse* (1560), whom Davis used as her main source, and activates a comparison in the film, which is drawn elsewhere by Davis and social historian Carlo Ginzburg (1983b and 1991) between the judge and the historian. As Ginzburg (1988) comments in the postface to the Italian edition of Davis's

The Return of Martin Guerre, "the historian has the impression of conducting research through an intermediary—the inquisitor or the judge. Trial records, accessible directly or (as in Davis's case) indirectly, can be compared to the firsthand account of an anthropologist, assembled from his field work, and bequeathed to future historians" (115).[7] Similarly, Davis has also compared the historian to the anthropologist.[8]

The historian's identification with the judge and the anthropologist as analogous figures has to do with a fantasy of exteriority, of being outside the frame, and of being prior as well. When the academic historian enters the frame, however, she or he turns out to be less in a position of framing exteriority and foundational, genetic extranarrative narration, but, quite literally, as we shall see in the case of Vigne's *The Return of Martin Guerre*, in the position of an extra, a cast member more or less crammed into the mise-en-scène and, because by definition uncredited, outside of cinematic codes of writing and authority. The historian, no matter how famous, gets an extra credit, as it were, placing him or her paradoxically in the film and yet outside it and, thereby, both crediting and discrediting her or him. Consider Michel Foucault's disappearance in Rene Allio's film *Moi, Pierre Rivière, ayant égorgé ma mère, ma soeur et mon frère* (1976) based on a dossier put together by Foucault and published three years earlier with the same title.[9] Guy Gauthier's book *Les Chemins de René Allio* (1993, 113) includes a photo of a baldheaded Foucault dressed as a judge on the set, with the caption below stating "Un regard sur l'histoire: Michel Foucalt dans *Moi, Pierre Rivière* . . . " Yet the caption is mistaken. Foucault does not appear in the film.[10] Still, we may ask: Was Foucault playing a joke here? Or was he serious? Was he serving as an advisor to Allio? Or was he satirizing the quasi-legal authority of the historical advisor? We cannot know, of course. Foucault's quasi-spirit-photograph is nicely emblematic, however, of the way the historian judges history on the set: as a ghost who looks at history and haunts it behind the mise-en-scène.

The exteriority of the historian, whether credited as consultant in the opening title sequence or uncredited as extra, exposes a problem that is at once narratological, institutional, archival, and cognitive, namely, determining what counts as historical sources, documents, evidence, authenticity, and truth. In Davis's case, this problem emerges as the relatively frequent repetition of a genetic narrative—how she came to write her book—in numerous publications, some well known and easily available, some largely unknown and hard to find. In addition to retelling the story of Martin Guerre in her book, Davis has also retold the story of how she came to consult on the film and how she came to write her book in three different prefaces, two for the two editions of her book (1982 and 1983b) and a third for the Italian translation (1984), and also in four articles, five interviews published from 1984 to 2003, the preface to her book *Slaves on Screen* (2000), and two autobiographical articles about her personal life and academic career published in 1997 and 2002.[11] Space does not permit a fully chronological narrative of these numerous retellings. Speaking generally, however,

Davis retells a version of the following anecdote, with significantly varied omissions and additions: she read Judge Coras's book and wanted to see it made into a film; she was then put in touch with Vigne and Carrière, and became a consultant to the film; having become dissatisfied with the film's version of the story during its production, as she was doing archival research, she began to write her book while the film was in production. Davis puts herself into the frame of the print paratext through autobiographical anecdotes, I maintain, in order to keep the boundaries of written history intact (cinema is not admitted to the archive or admitted as evidence) while policing and regulating what counts as history in historical films, trying and failing, in my view, to use the paratext to keep a cognitive hierarchy of print history over film history firmly in place.

(Foot)Note to Self: Returning to Martin's Return on the Set

In what follows, I adopt a deconstructive and psychoanalytic vocabulary of the uncanny, erratic, and aberrant in discussing Davis's writings about film to theorize and elucidate a more general problem in the paratexts of both the historical film and the historicist book by bringing the study of paratextuality into dialogue with the study of narratology, a field of inquiry I call anec-notology and that I will define further momentarily.[12] To be clear, let me say that I find nothing scandalous about what I take to be aberrations in Davis's writings about the Guerre case and Vigne film. This kind of aberration is not all that unusual and is by no means reducible to the unconscious of a particular author, in this case, either Natalie Davis or Thomas Cripps. The unconscious does not provide, in any case, the sort of unequivocal, evidentiary truth that a legalistic prosecution of scholarly error requires.[13] As Jacques Derrida observes, the law has failed to assimilate and integrate both psychoanalysis and what he calls "the technical" (Stiegler and Derrida 2002, 82–99). In a discussion of the subject on who testifies in court and the evidentiary status of his or her testimony, Derrida comments: "The unconscious . . . the differentiation or scission of the agencies, the fact that the ego is only one agency or can be a disassociated agency, all of this . . . remains massively ignored by juridical discourse" (Stiegler and Jacques Derrida 2002, 98).

As I indicated in the introduction, anec-notology is the study of narratological and interpretive problems in historical films and historicist writing generated by paratextual supplements intended to serve pragmatic functions as interpretive frames. In this chapter, I focus on aberrant repetitions in academic historicist writing at odds with linear, successive narratives and counter-narratives, aberrations that arise out of the collective practice of book publication (copyright pages mark republications) and the breadth of tacit, unconscious institutional norms in academic publishing allowing one either to make revisions and republications of one's work explicit in a preface or acknowledgments or to leave such repetitions unnoted altogether.

The anec-note is disclosed by gaps between variations in the retellings of a series of paratextual traces that can never be archived because they stand outside the frame of what counts as published and publishable academic discourse. The anec-note is paradoxical: it arises from an unpublishable record (that itself may or may not be complete) of (re)tellings without a footnotable reference. Both journalistic and academic interviews, for example, about a scholar's work are always conducted as if they were the first interview, without reference in the notes to prior interviews. Though different versions of the anecdote's retelling can be tracked down, collated, and compared by searching various databases and by contacting the author, one can never be sure one has found all of the versions (a database or bibliography may be incomplete; an author's memory may fail). Moreover, this kind of tracking of different versions by the reader is not invited by authors or publishers since earlier versions are usually assumed to be less definitive than later versions and hence no longer need to be read.

In some cases, making explicit differences between the present version and an earlier version or versions, or the lack thereof, by narrating and noting them in one's paratexts seems worth doing; in other cases, it doesn't seem worth it. The differences between earlier and later versions of an article or book chapter are almost never recorded by the author (even a "new preface" added to a new edition of a book will not speak of differences between the new and earlier prefaces since an author will reasonably feel that such differences are of minimal interest, if any, to the reader); earlier versions of a publication, therefore, are typically noted for legal reasons only on the copyright page. Differences between titles of republished articles, between versions of the texts of republished articles, or between editions of book paratexts may become significant for readers, but usually only as accumulated elements of cultural capital that republication may signify and symbolize, and which, along with a relatively high number of citations to a given scholar's work, help to establish that scholar's prestige, canonize his or her works, and institutionalize his or her critical practice.[14] In some cases, however, paratextual markings of differences between versions of the same story given in books, articles, and interviews or between republications of different versions of the same article are themselves repeated in ways that are so unusual that I characterize them as aberrant, uncanny, and erratic.The crucial question to ask, as Jane Gallop (2002) has suggested, is under what conditions and pressures academics feel compelled to offer autobiographical anecdotes. More specifically, we may ask: what drives the desire to explain oneself (to oneself as much as to others) in a supplementary, excrescent narrative fragment typically located in a paratext? Why does the autobiographical anecdote, in other words, take the form of an anec-note? To what extent is the autobiographical anecdote an antidote? Does its paratextual, anec-notal delivery mean that the remedy it promises will necessarily fail to arrive, its repetitions just rearmarments, actings out of yet more elaborate and errant (self-)defense mechanisms? (It is worth noting that Gallop's book on anecdotal theory is itself a collection of previously published articles. See Burt and Wallen [1999].)

It's precisely because Davis's work is so distinguished and influential that its aberrations are also so distinctively marked. To be sure, Davis is hardly alone in being a historian who worked on a film and ended up feeling dissatisfied in discussing her experience.[15] She is unique, however, in discussing it repeatedly and in offering such varied accounts of her experience, and in producing writings about film or her experience as an advisor that have sparked unusually explosive responses.[16] Her writings are, therefore, I think, worthy of unusually close attention to show that anec-notal repetitions produce a mechanical "erraticism" or errancy that cannot be reduced to the sort of errors a philologist or historicist would want to amend, repair, and regulate through the scholarly apparatus of the academic paratext. The tics in Davis's repetitions clarify the extent to which academic fantasies about historical films will be disappointing, precisely because the imagination of the historian is always mediatized, already formed by the codes of cinematic realism and authenticity that become progressively obsolete over time. As Priska Morrissey (2004) observes: "Let us not distinguish crudely between scientific history and mythic history, deformed by fiction, literature, or film. For the historical imagination of historians can just as easily proceed from reading works of fiction, comic books, or films where they have put aside historical research, and can reappear as the occasion of collaboration" (65, my translation). More crucially, neither academic nor cinematic paratexts can ever establish consistently disciplinary, legal norms to adjudicate the value of this or that work or this or that historical advisor to a given film.[17] Will Durant receives a single credit as the consultant in Anthony Mann's big budget *Fall of the Roman Empire* (1961), for example, but the far less famous Cyril Hughes Hartman gets a similarly prominent credit as "Historical Advisor" in the low-budget *Columbus* (dir. David MacDonald, 1949), starring Frederic March as Columbus.[18]

As we have noted, framing prologues differ. A brief review of some additional examples with an eye to the more uncanny ones will make the point clearer. *The Mission* (dir. Roland Joffé, 1986), *The Brotherhood of the Wolf* (dir. Christophe Gans, 2001), *Land of the Pharaohs* (dir. Howard Hawks, 1955), and *Alexander* begin and end with a retrospective narration, being either written or dictated by an eyewitness to the events of the film. Similarly, *Becket* (dir. Peter Glenville, 1964), *Anne of the Thousand Days* (dir. Charles Jarrott, 1969), *Saving Private Ryan* (dir. Stephen Spielberg, 1998), and *The Affair of the Necklace* (dir. Charles Shyer, 2001), all begin with retrospective narrations, in the last case in voice-over, by characters who also appear later in the film. More ingeniously, *Le roman de Reynard* (dir. Irene and Wladyslaw Starewicz, 1930), as we saw in chapter 1, begins and ends with a film camera being projected at the audience by a monkey with the initial help of a human hand that also pulls the bowing monkey off the screen to end the film.[19] Similarly, *La Nuit de Varennes* (dir. Ettore Scola, 1982) begins and ends with a band of traveling actors in postrevolutionary Paris who tell the recent history of the French Revolution with the aid of a "new machine" that an actor also serving as a barker says shows "moving pictures."[20] Both *Madame du Barry* (dir.

Christian Jacque, 1954) and *The Emperor's New Clothes* (dir. Alan Taylor, 2001) include framing sequences that end with match out dissolves from slides (a magic lantern is seen in the latter) to the film.[21] *Le Tour de Nesle* (dir. Abel Gance, 1955) and *The Agony and Ecstasy* (dir. Carol Reed, 1966) begin with contemporary documentary footage of where the events took place, accompanied by voice-over narration.

In many cases, spectral effects sometimes become apparent in the narrative framing. In *300* (dir. Zach Snyder, 2007), the source of what is initially an extradiegetic voice-over narration is identified a few minutes into the film as the diegetic voice of a Spartan soldier. Somewhat uncannily, *Jefferson in Paris* (dir. James Ivory, 1995) begins with two prologues, the first involving a writing machine that simultaneously produces a copy.[22] Jacques Tourneur's pirate film *Anne of the Indies* (1951) is particularly interesting because it begins with a close-up of a hand in the act of writing the names of pirate ships in a ledger and ends with the same close up shot of the hand now crossing out, in the same ledger, the name of the ship belonging to Anne, who initially appears in the film, as if a ghost, out of cannon smoke and cinematically dissolves back into smoke when she dies in battle at the end of the film. The framing prologue and epilogue title sequences of Carl Dreyer's *Day of Wrath* (1943), as we saw in chapter 1, similarly questions the indexicality of history by linking the recurring scroll of the illustrated sound track "Dies Irae" at the beginning of the film to a rehearsal of the same music in which the conductor's hand is seen pointing, but only as a shadow over the notes of the composition, now missing the words and illustrations seen accompanying the notes in the opening and end title sequence, and thus paralleling the film's opening close-up shot of a (ghostly) hand signing a document by a character who never appears in the film.

One of the most openly uncanny instances of a prologue and epilogue frame is *Tous les Matins du Monde* (dir. Alain Corneau, 1991), in which Gérard Depardieu plays the aged seventeenth-century French court composer Marin Marais in the beginning and end of the film while his son Guillame Depardieu plays the young Marais during the rest of the film.[23] Even more ghostly narrative frames have been made possible through DVD editions. In a manner recalling the fragmented prologues of the two editions of Rossellini's *Francesco Giullare di Dio* that I discussed in the introduction, the DVD edition of *The Mutiny of the Bounty* (dir. Lewis Milestone, 1962), for example, includes an alternate retrospective framing prologue and epilogue in which the last surviving mutineer becomes a narrator. This footage was shot for the original theatrical release but cut before the road show exhibition and only later restored for the initial 1967 television premiere of the film; it was not seen again until it was restored as two of the DVD's special features.[24] These cinematic peritexts have been restored as epitextual extras to the DVD edition of *Mutiny of the Bounty*, but thereby remain detached from the film itself as fragments. Moreover, the alternative prologue and epilogue in the *Mutiny of the Bounty* DVD are both preceded by new print peritexts produced for explaining their genesis and original function. Perhaps most ghostly of all, Ariane Mnouchkine casts a melancholy

retrospective glance back at her 1978 film *Molière* in the 2005 DVD audio-commentary; she begins by talking movingly about what she has forgotten of the film as she watches it again as if for the first time after she made it.

For the purposes of the present chapter's concern with credit and credibility in the historical film, the most interesting example of the opening and end title sequences serving respectively as framing prologue and epilogue is seen in *The Magic Box* (dir. John Boulting, 1951), the film's credits appear in white letters and are superimposed over the gray lettering for several film inventors, each getting a separate shot, in the form of tombstone engravings: "Thomas Alva Edison 1847–1931 The Inventor of Motion Pictures"; "Etienne-Jules Marey 1830–1908 Foundateur du Cinéma"; "Louis Le Prince 1842–1890 L'inventeur de la Cinématographe"; "Louis Lumière 1864–1948 Avec son frère le Créateur du Cinéma Moderne." The final credit for the director is followed by a fade out to black as the music continues, but in a subdued fashion. The first shot, now in Technicolor, shows an old man walking down a street and large white letters superimposed "William Friese-Greene 1855–1921," who happens to be the man in the shot and the central character in the film, an Englishman who claims he invented cinema but never got credit and recognition for his work. The numbers appear one above another rather than on the same line as in the film inventor's gravestone, without the hyphen between them. The film ends by returning to this opening scene where Friese-Greene dies as he delivers a canister of his film and addresses incoherently a convention of filmmakers. A final close-up of a canister of his film dissolves into a gravestone credit, like those seen at the beginning of the film, in which Friese-Greene gets a tombstone credit and hyphens are inserted in his name and the dates: "William Friese-Greene 1855–1921; A Pioneer of the Cinema," over which the cast list rolls until "The End" appears and the film ends. Historical films make use of devices such as framing prologues, but these devices never constitute a prescriptive norm because of a built-in tension between the peritext's aesthetic design elements and its cognitive function. As Genette observes of books, the more literary and self-conscious the paratext, the more it disturbs the pragmatic function of helping the reader understand the text. The medium of historical cinematic paratext (and cinematic paratexts in general) is more complex than the straightforward opposition Genette draws between the aesthetic dysfunction and the pragmatic function of the paratext. In playing with word (in print and in voice-over narration) and image, cinematic paratexts become most cognitively effective when they innovate and break from past aesthetic design practices, even occasionally breaking the frame, especially when they interrogate the indexicality of film, calling into question the very possibility of cinematic inscription of pro-filmic reality and linear narrative.[25]

Manovich (2001) notes that the kinds of uncanny effects generated by new media have extended now to the digital cinematic object and its reception:

> The historical birth of modern fictional cinema out of the loop returns as the condition cinemas rebirth as an interactive form. . . . The viewer becomes an

> editor, but not in the traditional sense. Rather than constructing a singular narrative sequence and discarding material not used, here the viewer brings to the forefront, one by one, numerous layers of looped actions that seem to be taking place all at once, a multitude of separate but coexisting temporalities. The view is not cutting but reshuffling. (319–20)

Along similar lines, D.N. Rodowick observes acutely that "the celluloid strip with its reassuring physical passage of visible images, the noisy and cumbersome cranking of the mechanical film projector or the Steenbeck editing table, the imposing bulk of the film canister are all but disappearing one by into virtual space, along with the images they so beautifully recorded and presented" (2007, 8). Yet the move to virtual space has its own materiality, of course, and attention to the fragmenting and unifying paratextual frames of DVD edition of both celluloid and digital films may recall us to the uncanny mix of virtual and material that always was cinema (and its remains).

Hi-Fidelity Historicism: Fiction in the Anec-note

Davis's autobiographical anecdotes explaining how she became involved in the making of *The Return of Martin Guerre* generate uncanny academic subjectivity effects in two ways. First, academic subjectivity is defined by a paratext: to be an academic subject, one has to have a paratext and be capable of becoming part of someone else's in the form of a citation. Yet because the autobiographical anecdote has no paratext (it does not include citations) but is itself part of a paratext (either a peritext such as a preface or epilogue, or an epitext such as an interview), the autobiographical anecdote inevitably involves a blurring of fiction and forgery rather than an erection of a wall between them, thereby making the academic subject into a spectral authority.[26] The autobiographical anecdote's truth-value is guaranteed only by the institutional authority and reputation of its teller. No amount of scholarly prestige or credentials will secure the teller from doubts about the veracity of his or her tale. Similarly, the paratext is meant to explain the teller's work rather than offer an interpretation of the teller. The teller comes into the frame in order to frame, not to be framed. Yet the paratextual anecdote, by virtue of being autobiographical and putting the author's designs and exclusions so clearly on display, allows, if not invites, an exact framing of the author in the form of resistant reading.[27] The paratext secretes a spectral narrative about the author and invites speculation on the meaning of the author's narrative in excess of what the author has narrated.

In order to understand why Davis's print paratexts fail to master the frame of either the print or cinematic version of the story of Martin Guerre, we must examine the fantasies about media that inform them, turning first to her comments on the cinematic paratext, especially her

suggested revision of the opening of *The Return of Martin Guerre*, and then to her desire to prescribe film practice as well as to regulate collaborations between filmmakers and historians, including legal matters such as contracted salaries and the credit given to academics hired as historical film consultants. To her credit, Davis has never limited her interest in film to determinations of a film's historical accuracy, nor does she eschew anachronism or endorse cinematic realism.

Davis wants film history to be as closely analogous as possible to print history and faults film for lacking print equivalents. According to Davis, film lags behind print in its ability to narrate history because film does not have the paratextual features of print: "film has a great advantage over print in being able to recapture a sense of wonder. But there are problems as well. How are we to introduce the richness of the past, the ambiguity, the paradoxes? . . . How are to get some equivalent of footnotes into film?"[28] Along similar lines, she writes: "one could generate better ideas about opening or end credits: why not acknowledge a historical source if one can acknowledge villages, chateaux, foundations, and suppliers of hats and foods? Why not find the visual equivalent of a preface and say what the film intends?" (1987, 480–81). In addition to serving an explanatory narrative frame, the print paratext, especially the footnotes, functions for Davis as a kind of "truth in advertising" supplement for historians, which is unavailable to filmmakers: "in their scholarly writings [historians] use 'perhaps'es, 'may have been's, and footnotes to express their doubts and reasons" (1987, 460).[29] As Davis places a high ethical value on these supplements in *Slaves on Screen*:

> Historians should tell readers where they found their evidence and, when it is ambiguous or uncertain or contradictory, they should admit it. Historians have developed various techniques for doing so since the sixteenth century: discussions in the text, commentary on the margins, notes at the bottom of the page or in the back of the book, bibliographies, appendices. (2000a, 10)

In Davis's account, film credits can potentially serve this cognitive function as well by marking themselves as fictional creations:

> The old options—opening with "this is a true story" and/or ending with "any resemblance to persons living or dead"—are no longer acceptable. Interestingly . . . filmmakers place a legend along with the final credits where they state they have followed an actual story, but have changed certain names in such and such a way. Filmmakers can surely invent fresh images and sequences to let their viewers in on the secrets of what they have done with the past. Where does a historical account come from? Some . . . filmmakers announce an immediate source in the credits. (2000a, 131–32)

For Davis, the paratext's cognitive function depends on its effective metatextual location outside the narrative given in the historical text as its guarantee and promissory note of truth and authenticity.[30] It is a fantasy of

a genetic narrative, the genealogy of which doesn't have to be narrated. The paratext furthermore has a philological, reparative textual function in allowing other historians to correct errors the historian may have made, or in the case of Martin Guerre, by allowing Davis to correct errors made by the filmmaker and screenwriter (see Pringle and Prior 1986, 240). In both cases, Davis rather naively assumes, from a neo-"Genettic" perspective, so to speak, that a genetic narratological sequence, a foundational cognitive origin, is built into the paratext as a kind of framing prologue.[31]

Discrediting History on Film

The problems with Davis's hierarchical understanding of print and film as rival media of history become particularly apparent when she suggests an alternative beginning for the Vigne film. Davis writes that

> *The Return of Martin Guerre* opens with a notary arriving on horseback, moves to the marriage of a young Martin and Bertrande, and then an anonymous [male voice-over] . . . "You will not regret listening to this account, for it is not a tale of adventure of imaginary fable, but a pure, true story." Now this remark is in fact from a printer's blurb from a sixteenth century edition of the judge's book about the case. . . . Why not give the remark to a printer, who is shown talking with Judge Coras about his manuscript? (1987, 481)[32]

Responding to her question, Davis supplies her own alternative script:

> *Coras*: I judged this case four months ago, and it is so strange, I still wonder about it. Will readers ever believe my book?
> *Printer*: With your name on it, they're sure to. And I'll say in my preface "This is not a fantastic made tale, but "*une pure et vrai histoire*."
> [Cut to the village of Artigat]. (1987, 481)

Davis interestingly drops out the opening title sequence and the notary in her revised beginning, making Coras, with the printer's aide, the sole author. She wants the film's beginning more clearly linked to the book of the film from which the quotation is taken and to its printer; more precisely, she wants the opening linked to the book's paratext, its preface. The conjuncture of author and printer in Davis's revision harmonizes the text and paratext: the book's authority depends not only on Cora's account of the trial, but also on the paratextual supplements, both of the prefaces written by the printer, and the author's name.[33] As Gérard Genette (1997) comments, the use of the author's authentic name in a book "fulfills a contractual function . . . much greater in all kinds of referential writing, where the credibility of the testimony, or its transmission, rests largely on the identity of the witness or the person reporting it. Thus we see very few pseudonyms or anonyms among authors of documentary or historical works, and this is all the more true when the witness himself plays a part in his narrative" (41).

Yet Davis's suggested revision of the film's prologue does not solve the problems she seems to think it does. For if it were adopted, her new frame would itself need to be historicized, since, as Genette (1997; 263, 267) notes, it was only in the sixteenth century that the preface became detached from the book and the preface writer first had the function of recommending the text. Moreover, Davis's alternative script condenses the printing history of Coras's book, which first appeared in 1651. The *Avertissement de l'imprimeur aux lecteurs* [printer's blurb] is written by the printer Galliot du Pré and dated Paris September 12, 1571; the blurb first appears in the 1572 Paris octavo edition. Thus, Davis's own preface is a fictionalization of the book's origins and involves a conversation that could never have taken place. As Davis notes, printers and publishers often added their own prefaces, dedications, and so on, when they reprinted a book first published by someone else.[34] So Davis's own fictionalized preface would require a framing disclaimer to establish that it too is based on a true story.

The cognitive limitations of Davis's alternative script for the prologue are made further apparent by the absence of attention to problems of transmission introduced by the printer. As Jeanette Ringold comments, "the text was difficult [to translate] because of inconsistencies of punctuation and capitalization. Coras's printer, and I suppose most printers of that time, had no standardized procedures." To secure its cognitive function of telling the viewer the historical sources of the film, Davis's revised cinematic prologue would require a footnote on the history of printing as well as on the editions of Cora's book. Given Davis's interest in footnotes, one would think that such a note on printing history would include attention to the hundred "beautiful and sweet annotations" Coras included in his book and noted in the book's title. Similarly, Davis's revised prologue mentions Cora as the single author. Yet her book acknowledged two sources, Coras's book and "sources are every scrap of paper left me by the past" in the archives of Foix, Toulouse, and Auch (ix). Moreover, she does not include a credit in the title sequence to the film's ostensible source, something like "Based on *Arrest Memorables* by Jean de Coras."[35] The problem with Davis's suggested revision is less the infinite regressions opened up by what for her is a metatextual frame than what Genette remarks is the absence of the border sharply separating "paratext from metatext and, more concretely, preface from critical essay" (270). Even if there were a fuller cinematic frame, in other words, there would always be a need for a further paratextual supplement, both a footnote to the anecdotal framing narrative and a disclaimer alerting the viewer to its fictive status.

Micro(scopic)history: In the Margins of Natalie Davis's Margins

To grasp how the cognitive and narratological problems implicit in Davis's comments on cinematic paratexts in historical films such as *The Return of Martin Guerre* extend to her book *The Return of Martin Guerre*, we may turn

now to the paratextual materials in her book and in later interviews as well as examine articles where she gives accounts of the film and her book.[36] A preliminary sense of the uncanniness of these problems may be gained by outlining a series of Davis's aberrations with respect to the norms of film and historical writing about film. Davis stands apart historians who have served as consultants on film. Many academic historians have written about their experiences as film consultants. Yet Davis is the only academic historian, to my knowledge, who has written more than once about a film on which she consulted. For over two decades since Davis's *The Return of Martin Guerre* was published, first in France in 1982 and then in the United States in 1983b, Davis has repeatedly talked about her experience as a consultant in numerous print venues, including in the preface to her book *Slaves on Screen* (2000b).[37] With the exception of Davis, historians give the director credit as the author of the film when defining their contribution. If a film credits them as consultants, then they identify themselves as consultants in their writings about the film.

The paratexts of Davis's book on Martin Guerre and subsequent comments in interviews and later books may be called uncanny not only because of the way they resemble a repetition compulsion but also because they involve a double narration. In the preface and introduction of her book, Davis tells two anecdotes, one in the preface, about how consulting on the film led to the writing of the book, and the second in the introduction, about how historians write such books. Davis's two stories of film consulting and history writing cannot be separated paratextually without a repetition that also links them. The preface to the English edition adds new introductory and concluding paragraphs about the retelling of the story that effectively frame her earlier preface to the French edition, which began with what becomes her second paragraph in the English edition, an account of her reading Coras's book and her desire to see it become a film. She ends the English again noting that she is retelling the story, saying "it is a pleasure to recount the history of Martin Guerre once again" (1983b, ix).

Yet she sup(er)presses the telling of how she came to retell the history in a new preface. Inside this retelling, or (p)retelling, frame of the English edition preface that foregrounds the way the tale has been retold, she makes an inaugural gesture that marks off her account from that of the others, using the word "first" a second time: "When I *first* read . . . I would give this arresting tale its *first* full-scale treatment, using every scrap of paper left me by the past" (1983b, ix, my emphasis). Though Davis "recount[s] the history . . . once again" (1983b, ix), her recounting is nevertheless said to stand apart from those prior to it as the "first."

Davis's double narration of her book's genesis challenges her assumptions about the cognitive and narratological functions of the paratext, however. One of the remarkable things about Davis's book *The Return of Martin Guerre* is that she began writing the book after she had begun consulting on the film rather than before it (unlike Robert Rosenstone's *Romantic Revolutionaries*, the basis for Warren Beatty's *Reds* [1974] or

Margaret Rosenthal's *The Honest Courtesan* (1992), the basis for Marshal Herskovitz's biopic about the Renaissance Italian courtesan poet Veronica Franco, *Dangerous Beauty* [1996]).[38] Nor is Davis's book the equivalent of a novelization of a film. Indeed, explaining where her role in the making of the film ended and her research for her book began proves difficult for Davis in the prefaces of her book and later interviews. Far from being a means of securing a foundational narrative beginning, her paratexts evince an unresolvable narratological problem for Davis in establishing what came first, print or film, in explaining how she came to write her book. Whether her book is a paratext of the film, rather than an alternative and correction of the film that stands apart from it and retroactively before it, is thus an open question.[39]

In her numerous retellings, over a period of more than twenty years, of how she came to tell the stories of consulting on the film and writing the book, her first choice of media for telling the story of Martin Guerre—either film or book—and her first choice of line of work—either professor or filmmaker—have both shifted rather than stabilized. Davis has moved the origin of her book back from reading Coras to her earlier interest in film so that film precedes print rather than the reverse. In her preface to *Slaves on Screen*, Davis (2000b) precedes her account of how she read Coras's book and wanted it to become a film, retold yet again, with a new story of how she first desired to make films before she became a historian:

> When I started my graduate studies a half-century go, I planned to put my history training to work in documentary film. But then I was caught by voices from the archives and books of the distant past, especially the voices of resistance. I put aside my movie plans and turned instead to the typewriter, the printing press, and the university podium. (ix)[40]

And in an interview in 2002a, she pushes the narrative even further back, wondering if she didn't want to make the film out of a desire related to her father, to whose memory *Slaves on Screen* is dedicated and whom she says in the book's acknowledgments, "was happiest about my research when I served as historical consultant for the film *Le retour de Martin Guerre*" (2000b, 164).

The relation between film and print versions of the Martin Guerre story, the question of which medium explains the generation of the other, becomes more rather than less entangled in later interviews and articles in which Davis discusses her role in the film and her book and frequently gives conflicting accounts of how her collaboration with Vigne and Carrière began, as well as the sequence of events entailed in that collaboration. What may seem like minor discrepancies in Davis's recountings entail serious investments in the writing of history as superior to its filming and in how the historian should be credited, in both senses of the word: the issue of acknowledgment in the title sequence is inseparable from the issue of the

veracity of the historian. A microscopic history of Davis's microhistory of the Martin Guerre story is required to make these investments clear. Though in the French preface to her book she says that she went to the archive after she couldn't answer questions about sixteenth-century France posed to her on the set, in interviews she says she was already giving the actors, writer, director, and costume designers the results of her research. And in other accounts, she was moving back and forth between the film set and the archives. In some interviews, she says that Vigne and Carrière had already written the screenplay and decided on the narrative structure before she came on board, in others, she says they began working on the screenplay at the same time.[41] In one interview, she says she came on board after the screenplay was written: "The timing wasn't perfect. They had already finished the script and were beginning the shoot, and I hadn't completed research on that period. The whole time the film was going on I was adding to my knowledge" (Aufderheide, 136–37). In another interview, she implies a much more continuous collaboration: "I gave them ideas on everything from start to finish" (Benson 1983, 63).[42] In some interviews, she says she was on the set for two weeks, and in some others, for three weeks.[43] In some interviews, she says she came in contact with Vigne and Carrière after meeting Le Roy Ladurie at a conference where he told her of Vigne and Carrière's plan to make a film and that she later flew to Paris after first talking with them on the telephone; in other interviews, she says she went to Paris looking for a director to film the story.[44] In these various retellings of how she wrote the book, issues of credit—who did what, how much, and when—are clearly central.

Moving into even greater microscopic detail, consider the variations in Davis's recountings of how she first read Jean de Coras's account of the trial, the book that she wanted to be filmed. In a 1984 interview, she gives this account of how she came to the subject of Martin Guerre:

> It was in the course of teaching a graduate seminar at Berkeley on family, kin and social structure. I was in the rare book collection of the library looking for primary sources for my students. I came across this book by Jean de Coras, the *Arrest Memorable*, his account of the case. I used it in the class and quite frankly in one of my publications. But my real thought was when I read it was that it should be a film. (Pringle and Prior 1986, 231)

In another account, Davis is even more precise about the citation of the source and the response to it that she gave in the preface of her book:

> I had come across it in a perfectly ordinary historian's way in the process of giving a seminar on family and kinship. I even wrote an essay called "Ghosts, Kin, and Progeny" which appeared the next year (*Daedalus*, Spring, 1977), in which I cited the Coras book the way you do as a historian. But what I really thought when I read it, as I said later in the preface to my book (*The Return of Martin Guerre* . . .) was, this should be a movie. (Benson 1983, 52)

In a 1991 lecture given at Royal Holloway College, published by the College in an offprint as "Remaking Impostors," Davis tells a story with a significantly new detail added in a footnote:

> In 1976, also out in California, I came across the story of Martin Guerre in the *Memorable Decree* of Jean de Coras. I was giving a graduate course at Berkeley on Family, Kin, and Social Structure in Sixteenth Century France, and one of my students, doing a paper on adoption, had found the book in the Rare Book Library of the Law School.[17] I read it and said to myself, "this has got to be a film." (16)

In footnote seventeen, Davis names the student: "The student was Anne Waltner. She went on to write an important book about adoption in China: *Getting an Heir: Adoption and the Construction of Kinship in Late Imperial China* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1991)." Presumably, Davis did not read the footnote aloud when she delivered her lecture.

One might think that the former graduate student gets a belated acknowledgment in a footnote to a rather out-of-the-way offprint of a lecture because the student has since met with academic success. Yet in a still later version of the story, more accessible because it is available online, Davis drops the footnote to her former graduate student:

> Near the end of my Berkeley years, one of my graduate students showed me a sixteenth-century book from the Law Library by Judge Jean de Coras. Under the title *Memorable Decree*, it told the story of a celebrated case of peasant imposture in a Pyrenean village: a man who seemed to be accepted as husband by another man's wife for three years or more. My first reaction was: "This has got to be a film!" Why such an impulse? Was this just a sudden effort to recapture the theatrical romance of my father's life and my own youthful hope to make a documentary film? (1997a, 25)

Davis's recountings of her first reaction don't clearly put first things first when it comes to research, history film consulting, and history writing. Unable clearly to determine a narrative sequence in which firsts can be established, beginnings separated from ends, print media from film media, and authorial attribution and title to intellectual property properly assigned and credited, Davis cannot clearly determine their transmission either.

The Return of Natalie Zemon Davis: Historian on Top, or Propped Up?

Nicolas Royle notes that "the uncanny is a crisis of the proper: it entails a critical disturbance of what is proper . . ., a disturbance of personal or private property" (2003, 2). The kinds of crediting problems we have seen emerge in Davis's paratextual recountings of the origins of her book become even more apparent in the uncanny ways Davis talks about both

the trial and the film in terms of intellectual, legal, and narrative property. As we saw at the outset of this chapter, the opening title sequence to *The Return of Martin Guerre* limits the film's authorship to the director and screenwriters. Davis is credited as the historical consultant. In addition to departing repeatedly in her work from the usual practice of historians writing about film consulting, Davis stands alone among historian film consultants in referring in print to the film on which she consulted as "our film" (1983, viii) and even as "my film" (2003, 3). A question of intellectual property in relation to film arises elsewhere in Davis's writings, particularly their titles. The title and subtitle of her 2003 article "Movie or Monograph?: The Historian/Filmmaker" are somewhat at odds. The title contrasts two clearly different objects, film and book. Yet the forward slash in the subtitle conflates the historian and filmmaker while also separating them. In her 2003 Cosmos Club lecture, entitled "The Historian Makes a Film: *The Return of Martin Guerre*," published by the Club as an offprint for its members, Davis calls the film "my film," significantly putting "my film" in quotation marks, as if thereby both asserting her ownership of the film and denying that ownership. Later in the same lecture, she refers to "our film."

Along similar lines, Davis gives frequently conflicting accounts of the screenplay's authorship. She says "we wrote the script," though, of course, she is not credited in the film as a coscreenwriter. In her numerous accounts of how she came to collaborate on the screenplay, she sometimes says "we wrote" it, at others that she made suggestions after the first draft had been written. She also refers repeatedly along similar lines to Coras's book as "my story": "All I knew was that they had my story" (Benson 1983, 55). In a similar recounting, she adds:

> Then in the late Spring of 1980, I sat next to a woman at a dinner party, Sharon Genasci, who was a very fine documentary filmmaker in Princeton. Of course, out tumbled Martin Guerre and she said, "Natalie, this is wonderful. I want you to write up a version, a synopsis, right away and get it copyrighted." (Benson 1983, 54)

Davis doesn't say whether she followed her friend's advice. Yet it is unclear in what sense, legal or conceptual, the story of Martin Guerre itself, retold numerous times before her, could be said to belong to her since it is part of the public domain. Indeed, the legal principle that historical documents cannot be copyrighted by modern historians was reaffirmed in the 2006 case involving alleged plagiarism of historians by Dan Brown in his novel *The Da Vinci Code* (2003). (Brown won the case.)

Uncanny Specters of Martin, or First Contact: "I See Dead Peasants"

What emerges in Davis's aberrant retellings of her work on the film and her book's genesis in that work is a narratological loop rather than a

progression: a desire to make a film leads to a desire to become a historian that leads to a desire to make a film that leads to a desire to write a book instead that leads to a desire to write on the making of the film and her book that leads to a desire to retell this story, and so on.[45] The story of Davis's desire to film/write the story of Martin Guerre must be told, apparently, yet it can't be told, just (p)retold. What drives this narrative loop? What drives the thematization of narrative repetition by tellers of the tale who note typically that the story has been retold many times before?[46] How is this narratological problem related to the way the origins of Davis's book, by her own account, lie not only in film but also in a fully mediatized writing process, including phones, photocopying, mail, and air travel?[47]

To address these questions by turning to Davis's many writings about the Guerre case and Vigne film, from which I will have occasion to quote frequently and rather liberally below in order to make clear a kind of repetition compulsion driving them, is to see that Davis's assumptions about history and media are informed by an uncanny fantasy about the dead. Davis uncritically assumes that there is a media hierarchy and narrative in the professional academic practice of history: historians deal first with texts, then with images (see Davis and Walkowitz, 1992). She has a similar sense of the hierarchy of disciplines even as she crosses disciplinary boundaries between social history and anthropology. Like images, anthropological fieldwork comes second to historical documents. Anthropology provides the historian with a visual, theatrical, and cinematic supplement that allows her or him to visualize what she or he reads in archival documents and other sources. As Davis says in an interview:

> Many of the things our documents don't reveal to us can be observed by an anthropologist working in the field. This made me want to visualize the people . . . that I studied about. . . . Then I began to think that maybe you could tell about what you "saw" not just through stringing words together, but through a film. (Benson 1983, 50)

Davis's move from print sources to images, anthropology, and film entails nothing less than an uncanny fantasy about the cinematic reanimation of the dead.[48] "My subjects were all long since dead," Davis says in an autobiographical article about her career, "and I was not going to resort to a medium to consult them" (1997a, 26). Yet Davis did consult the medium of film as if she were channeling the dead through the living filmmaker and actors.

Davis frequently adopts similar metaphors for the way film brings the past to life for the audience. Consider the preface to *The Return of Martin Guerre*, which Davis begins as follows: "When I read the *Arrest Memorable* by Jean de Coras for the first time in 1976, I thought it was . . . a perfect occasion to *revive* the sixteenth century for millions of spectators."[49] (Benson 1983, 52, my emphasis). What matters to Davis is not accuracy, but the spirit of the film.[50] Is it just a coincidence that Davis first cited Judge

Coras's book in an essay she wrote entitled "Ghosts, Kin and Progeny?" (Benson 1983, 51).

Davis's description of filmmaking as a feedback loop is even more uncanny: "I thought that even though the people I was writing about were long since dead, I would try to treat them with the same respect that I would accord to subjects who were still alive. Then I discovered that in filmmaking you could get a kind of feedback, especially when you filmed on location." Davis gives a similar account of the way amateur actors were cast by René Allio for his film *Moi, Pierre Rivière*, and here popular memory is clearly an issue[51]:

> Allio went to the village in Normandy not far from the village where Pierre Rivière had murdered his mother and sisters back in the nineteenth century, and he lived there for six months. All of the actors in the movie except those playing lawyers and physicians were villagers. He took his time about choosing them, and they worked on the story with him. He had an historical text: the dialogue in the film came from the confession of the . . . murderer. But all the interpretation was done by Allio and the actors. In other words, the film grew out of an interplay between those villagers 145 years or so later and the director and historical text. . . . The anthropologist can bounce her account off live subjects. Here the subjects were dead, but you had someone else in their stead, and that someone else wasn't another scholarly historian who would read your work and evaluate it. It was the people who were the heirs of the Normandy past, who were still in the village: they had present day concerns, but they were also close to the old issues of property and family. Allio told us how the people had come to see the rushes every Friday night. He looked around in the huge Berkeley auditorium, and he said there were more people to see the rushes and talk about the film than there were in our theatre. (Benson 1983, 51)

Perhaps Davis's account of filmmaking as a laboratory is most strikingly resonant of the uncanny. Rehearsals involve making contact with dead people: "I said early in this interview that I was surprised at how much contact there was between the sixteenth century past and the present there turned out to be with Martin Guerre. It was in talking with the actors that I sensed that, then again in watching them try out the lines from the past under Daniels's sensitive direction." But it is only filming that for Davis completes this process of reanimating the inanimate. As she says: "When the shooting started, I was fascinated to be . . . watching . . . as the actors brought these figures from the sixteenth century to life on the screen" (Adelson 1991, 408).

The core of this fantasy of reanimation comes into focus when Davis describes postproduction film editing as a laboratory. As she wrote in the "Prefazione all, Edizione Italiana" to the Italian translation of *The Return of Martin Guerre* (1984):

> It had never occurred to me how many connotations could be contained in the phrase of Jean de Coras "But the nature of women are [*sic*] often deceived

> by the malice of men" until I saw the rushes of Roger Planchon as he tried out different intonations in the judge's amusing remark. In this imaginary past, cut into sequences of a few seconds, brilliantly illuminated by the projectors, said, resaid, and taken from another angle, it seemed to me that I had at my disposal a true and proper historiographic laboratory, a laboratory in which the experiment generated not irrefutable proofs but historical possibilities. (1984, x; my translation)[52]

Carlo Ginzburg (1988) acutely seizes on this metaphor in his "postface" to the Italian translation and introduces an apt analogy of his own, namely. the cutting-room floor: we better understand why Natalie Zemon Davis needed to define the cutting room on *Martin Guerre* as a true "historiographic." Davis uses a similar metaphor in another version of this story: "Watching Depardieu playing the imposter Anrnaud de Tilh playing Martin Guerre gave me new questions to ask about the definition of self in sixteenth century France. It was then that I first began to think of historical film as a 'thought experiment.' Along with the records of Martin Guerre's village of Artigat, I had the village where we filmed—a surrogate Artigat where we could try out the past." What Davis refers to as the vivacity of the actors, the spirit of the past in film, the laboratory as revival, the cutting-room floor, and the thought experiment, all call up in a *Frankenstein*-like fantasy of reanimation of the dead. As the spark-giving inspiration to her own desire to write a book, film cannot be fully metabolized, either incorporated or left behind. The film, Davis says, is not proof, not evidence: "I could not cite either of these actors (Maurice Barrier, who plays Pierre Guerre and Bertrande de Rols) as proof in the notes to the book I wrote, but their comments strengthened my conviction that I was moving in the right direction" (1997b, 27).

Yet film is precisely what Davis never left behind when she left the film set to return to print and archival sources. In an article defending her book, Davis says she "wanted to develop an expository style for the first part of the book that could provide the equivalent of a cinematic movement, with flash-forwards rather than flashbacks" (1988, 575). When asked whether she has more plans to film, in an interview in 1984 about *The Return of Martin Guerre*, Davis says she "would like to make a low budget film." In another interview, she says that she "might settle for making a film about upper-class people if a woman were central." Interviewer Daniel Snowman says that when he "first met Natalie Davis some years ago, she talked animatedly about her desire to work again in film. A movie option on *Women in the Margins* was taken up, but nothing materialized" (2000).

It may come as no surprise that uncanny doublings recur throughout Davis's book on the Martin Guerre trial. Most obviously, her book shares the film's title; Davis's book appeared in two versions, English and French, and the French version was preceded by a novelization of the screenplay by Daniel Vigne and Jean-Claude Carrière. Similarly, in her book *The Return of Martin Guerre* and in several of the numerous interviews she has given about the book and film, Davis describes Bertrande as playing a "double

game" and uses the same phrase to describe her own work on the film and her book, making Davis something of a double of Bertrande. Davis also substantially rewrote the French preface. "The story of Martin Guerre has been recounted many times . . . Two books were immediately written about the case . . . over the centuries it was retold in books. . . . It has inspired . . . two novels" (1983b, vii). In the preface to the French edition of her book, she discusses two scenarios:

> The creative tension between cinematic work and the work of an historian gave birth in me a desire to write the story of Martin Guerre. I left the set at Balague for the Archives at Foix, Toulouse and Auch. . . . Two scenarios were playing in my head. They came from the same inspiration. My Bertrande, my Pierre Guerre, my false Martin and the others had the same psychology and seemed to me to be the same as the characters created by Jean-Claude Carrière and Daniel Vigne with my advice. But here my subjects are separated from us by four centuries, with their lives, their historical frames and their own destinies. From the liberty and discovery of film, I went back to my exigent but beloved struggle with texts, scraps of paper that I inherited from the past and to which I must be faithful. (Davis, Vigne, and Carrière 1982, 119–20; my translation)

Similarly, in an interview, she comments that her book too was designed as: "a kind of *double game*. . . . When I ask whether Pansette has done it again, I raise the whole problem of the book. I really had a *double intent* in the way I set up" (Pringle and Prior 1986; 234, 239, my emphasis).

Double Crossover: *Tous les Martins du Monde*

The highly uncanny doubleness of Davis's metaphors for her research and book turns us to the question of fidelity discourse (Burt 2007c) about film and history in some unexpected ways. One film critic (Vincendeau 2000) has criticized Davis for adopting a fidelity model of film criticism in her book *Slaves on Screen* (2000b). To be sure, Davis speaks about turning from film to print in terms of a need to remain faithful or loyal to her sources. But Davis's notion of fidelity to her sources allows for invention as well, she says in the paratext of her book and in later interviews, and she connects surprisingly with her account of how she wrote a line spoken by Bertrande de Rols in the film and notes in interviews that she very much likes the scene in which Arnaud teaches Bertrande how to write her name even though there is no historical basis for it (see figure 4.1, upper right). Since Davis's identification with Bertrande is so explicit, it is worth pausing to note that Bertrande is in many respects made the film's central character. The film's narrative turns on several scenes in which she is interrogated by Judge Coras: her first-person narrative transits into several flashbacks, and Coras returns and interviews her a final time near the end of the film to

understand why she changed her mind and stopped supporting the imposter. Bertrande gives the film a double narrative frame, or a frame within the frame: the first frame is the prologue during which the notary arrives as Martina and Bertrande are being married and the voice-over narrator tells us the events are based on a true story; the second frame consists of Coras and the priest interviewing Bertrande.

The film also links Bertrande to the duplicity of writing and thereby to Artaud, who is in some respects a figure of the unreliability of written contracts, signatures, and the notary himself.[53] When she hears from Martin that he has learned to read and write, she flips through two pages of a book, each of which shows the dance of death (see figure 1.6, upper left).[54] Several shots foreground the clerk writing down her testimony, but she is able to convince the court that the X on the arrest warrant is not her X, though it is hers, because she has learned to sign her name (see figure 4.1, bottom left).[55]

Davis describes Bertrande using the same metaphor we saw earlier that she used for researching her book and the design for it, namely, the double game: "she played her double role perfectly" (1983b, viii), "especially the double game of the wife and the judge's inner contradictions were softened" (1983b, 69); "She's under pressure and does what I call *her double game*" (Pringle and Prior 1986, 241); "in fact she plays a very interesting *double game* all during the trial, and I talk about it at length in my book" (Benson 1983, 56). Davis also refers to Bertrande repeatedly in interviews as "my Bertrande," just as she refers to the story of Martin Guerre as "my story."

Davis goes further in likening herself to Bertrande by introducing some striking, if somewhat implicit, analogies between her own marriage to Chandler Davis and Bertrande's to Martin, marriage and print history, on one hand, and adultery and filmmaking, on the other.[56] In the preface to the English edition, Davis uses the word "invention" (1983b, 5) to describe the story she tells in her book. She similarly describes the marriage between Bertrande and Arnaud as an "invented marriage" (1983b, 44), and she refers to the two lovers as "our invented couple" (1983b, 49), even titling her chapter about them "The Invented Marriage." Davis similarly identifies herself and Bertrande through the use of the word "invention" in her preface, linking it up to the film: "The film thus posed the problem of invention to the historian as surely as it was posed to the wife of Martin Guerre" (1983b, viii). Even though Davis presents herself as a loyal wife, Bertrande was, in her account, a full-knowing and fully complicit adulteress, who, according to Davis, took the impostor to court hoping to lose her case. This is Bertrande's "double game."

Rather notably, Davis describes Chandler Davis, to whom she dedicates her book, as her own "authentic husband" in the book's acknowledgments and links him in the same sentence to the "impostor-spouse" Arnaud.[57] Davis even managed to heighten the similarity between herself and Bertrande in the film by convincing Vigne and Carrière to add the phrase "comme un vrai

epoux" [like a true husband] to the screenplay when Coras interviews Bertrande alone about Arnaud near the film's end: "I had them add the lines about Martin neglecting her and deserting her, and Arnaud treating her with respect and they lived together and she trusted him 'like a true husband.' That phrase 'like a true husband,' 'comme un vrai epoux,' was very important to me" (Benson 1983, 58). This scene is a pure invention of Vigne and Carrière (Coras did not return to the village to conduct a personal interview of Bertrande). Davis's contribution to the screenplay is fiction—derived neither a quotation from Coras's book nor from another historical source.

Yet Davis also refers to the real Martin Guerre as Bertrande's "true husband" (1983b, 61). Similarly, Davis compares her profession as a historian to her true husband in an interview: "At the beginning of the book I tried to cast myself as someone who is leaving one fictive thing to go back to my *métier*, like going back to a real *mari* [husband]" (Pringle and Prior 1986, 239).[58] Identifying her double game with the adulteress Bertrande's double game (while contrasting Bertrande's "impostor-spouse" who is nevertheless "like a true husband") and making her métier analogous to her true husband, Davis implies, inadvertently to be sure, that Vigne's film is an impostor (faux histoire, as it were) and that her working on the film is adultery or, perhaps, an invented marriage. Davis effectively identifies (with) herself as a romantic heroine who cheats on her academic profession (by working as a consultant on the film) with an impostor who is like a true husband, more exciting than her real husband who has neglected her (or needs to be supplemented); yet in the end, Davis implies, she hasn't really betrayed her profession because she is going back to her husband/*métier*, "sources," and writing a book rather than making a film of her own. Good husbandry and good history, indeed.

Extra (Dis)Credit: Natalie Zemon Davis, Woman Framed on the Margins

Davis's (over)identificatory rapport with Bertrande is particularly striking because her claim for a kind of knowingness in relation to that character, and even possession of her, falls so completely outside of the historian's evidentiary norms.[59] Fiction in the archive crucially takes anecdotal form in Davis's history from below since the anecdote is important precisely because archival documents give her access to a past made up of "voices" rather than written records. Davis similarly identifies her own writings with her "authorial voice" (1988).[60] As I observed in the preface to the present book, the anecdote is like rumor, or gossip, in that it is oral and often repeats and replays, with possible distortions, what someone else said before. As such, the anecdote is both less and more truthful than historical/legal evidence and scientific knowledge (the ambiguously true and false story is always the one that can't be printed). The anecdote is hearsay rather than admissible evidence and yet retains an extralegal, extradocumentary claim to being the truth.

By attending more closely to how Davis is in *The Return of Martin Guerre*, we may see better how the film unsettles the belief that the credits are supposed to credit, as it were, namely, that the historian's writing refers to an extratextual reality. Davis enters the frame of Vigne's *The Return of Martin Guerre* in an uncannily double way, not only in the film's opening title sequence as a credited advisor but also in the trial scene as an uncredited extra. Film extras are quite significant to Davis. In her account of Rene Allio's film *Moi, Pierre Rivière*, for example, which she had screened in Berkeley, when making a film on Martin Guerre was still a fantasy for her, she notes that the peasants who appeared in the film as extras were quite involved in the film as part of popular memory.[61]

In several interviews, Davis has told versions of an anecdote about her appearance as an extra in the film. She was "bearing false witness" by appearing in the film, she says, because the trial scene is unhistorical: the spectators would not have been allowed in the courtroom during the trial, only when the verdict was being read aloud. As Davis tells it:

> *ND*: So what was supposed to be witnesses waiting and not listening, became witnesses reacting to the trial. I'm there. You wouldn't notice me, but I'm one of the people at the back. I shouldn't be there.
>
> *Voice* [from the audience]: In the academic robe? (laughter)
>
> *ND*: I'm a sixteenth century upper class lady.[62] (Davis 1983a, 33)

As an extra, Davis has an explicitly uncanny sense that she both does and does not belong in the film: "I'm there . . . I shouldn't be there." And Davis's presence in the film is even more uncanny: although she was only an extra, Davis had a body double. The day after she appeared on camera, she left the film set to go to an academic conference. Another extra filled in for her as the upper-class lady wearing the same dress. She gets a longer take than Davis and a fuller shot of her walking across the courtroom.[63]

Davis's anecdotal spectralization of herself as a film extra extends to a similar spectralization of the dead or socially marginal people whose voices, she says, make up history. Consider how she concludes an interview with an anecdote about a peasant who appeared as an extra in *The Return of Martin Guerre*. Again the anecdotal form is crucial:

> With the peasants from Balague . . . in which we filmed . . . things worked out differently from Rene Allio's peasants [who were engaged by his film *Moi, Pierre Rivière*, in which they appeared as extras and the rushes of which they saw]. They [the peasants from Balague] weren't especially interested in talking about the story of Martin Guerre . . . and none of them was invited to see the rushes. But the making of the film had a profound effect on village life nonetheless. I was on a TV show in Geneva, Switzerland, last December together with Daniel, Jean-Claude, Depardieu and two people from Balague, the cure and a peasant. The peasant had served as an extra, and his property had been used for the costume tent, the office, and the canteen. The master of ceremonies asked him how he felt when all the people had left. He looked

> up and said with his Gascon accent, "If I hadn't had my twenty five cows, I would have left with them," and he had tears in his eyes.[64]

Far from being there, in the village, however, the peasant extra is exterior to it. In Davis's anecdote, the impact "on the village" can only be registered at a distance from it, in a medium exterior to the location.

Though Davis finds in the peasant extra's comments an anecdotal story worth narrating, she also spectralizes him, one might say, dehistoricizes him by leaving him as a nameless, uncredited extra. It is telling that Davis doesn't give his name: just as he is not credited in the cinematic paratext, so too he is not credited in Davis's account of his appearance on the TV show.[65] (By way of contrast, see the scene in Jean-Luc Godard's *Pierrot le Fou* [1963] in which three extras address the camera directly, giving their names, ages, birthdates and places of birth and then talking briefly about lives before reappearing as fictional characters in the following scene; the last of three actors says: "Éte, André, born on May 25, 1903, in Marbouie, Eure-et-Loire. Age 62: Present occupation: film extra." To extend this digression a moment longer, compare also the extras used for the March on Orleans sequence in Georges Méliès's *Joan of Arc* [1897] who, for several minutes, continually reappear wearing different costumes each time after exiting behind the scenery to give the illusion of a large army and its followers. The hidden looping of extras produces a seemingly linear film narrative.) And we can see the flip side of Davis's fantasy of exteriority as historian qua anthropologist and judge. As local insiders who speak rather than write, the people, as carriers of popular memory, lack authenticating paratexts. In the acknowledgments to *The Return of Martin Guerre*, Davis thanks the archivists of Artigat by name, but, later in the book, she does not name the villagers of Artigat who respond to the story or retell it: "when I recently talked about Bertrande and Arnaud with people in Artigat who were still familiar with the old story, they smiled, shrugged their shoulders, and said, 'That's all very well—but that pretty rascal. He lied'" (1983b, 59). "The people" become a fictionalized subject (an anonymous "they") with a single, uniform response and words. The people can preserve popular memory, it would appear, only if they lack names, that is, only if they are not part of the archive and hence cannot be cited in footnotes.

Similarly, in the epilogue to her book *The Return of Martin Guerre*, Davis (1983b) even more explicitly aligns the people with the local and oral, in this case, also gendering the deepest insiders as female and contrasting them with the male, literate outsiders: "That word reached [the villagers of Artigat] about Coras's book seems certain—surely the notaries and merchants going back and forth to Rieux would hear of it—but it also seems very unlikely that the Artigatois would want the *Arrest Memorables* read aloud at their evening gatherings or accept this outsider's version as their own. The local story would be told . . . it lasted, beyond the other anecdotes" (125). Davis, who does not say who continued to tell the local tale, ends by telling a final anecdote of her own about a French Catalonian immigrant in Artigat,

who is told the story by an Artigat grandmother. Implicitly linking oral transmission and women back to the local and to her own account, Davis says: "'Perhaps not now,' answered the grandmother, 'but in the sixteenth century . . . ' and she related the story of Martin Guerre." Significantly, however, Davis does not narrate the grandmother's version of the full story, quoting only the very beginning, or preface, of the story.[66] Because Davis omits the grandmother's version, how it might differ from Coras's or, for that matter, from Davis's is thus impossible to determine. Presumably, we are to infer that the grandmother's and Davis's versions are identical. The grandmother's story need not be retold, we are to infer, because it would duplicate the one Davis has told. But more than identity is in operation here. Rather than give us access to the insider's account attributed to the grandmother, which Davis identifies with popular memory, Davis's anecdote shows that the insider's account, lacking the referential paratext of a footnote, not only puts the truth-value of that account into question and potentially discredits it but also shows that it is, strictly speaking, totally extraneous.

To be an authentic historian, Davis has to supplement her belated, outsider's account with that of an unnamed and ahistorical—dare one say, fictional—but local storyteller, whose story goes untold. Thus Davis's anecdote is representative of the historian's anecdote in that it concerns not only what has already been said, but also the unsaid (or the unpublished) of what has already been said. Less important than the gender of the teller in Davis's anecdote about the grandmother is that the teller's gender marks the anecdote—here taking the form of women's gossip—as oral and immediate. Davis's view that "fiction in the archive" consists of voices of the past immediately traceable through their recordings by notaries is really a fiction of the archive.[67] The anecdote is crucial to Davis because it involves, she thinks, oral transmission, immediacy, and closeness, and also about distance and spectrality, or what she calls the "spirit" of the past. This mix of human presence and inhuman spirit, of closeness and distance, in the anecdote makes her task to be "faithful" to the past, a faithfulness that takes on a religious, spiritual character as history becomes a tradition rather than a collection of stories.[68] The historian becomes a religious figure whose faith overlooks evidence that can be seen and who instead hears voices while becoming possessed by them.[69]

Returning Historians: Everything Dis(re)counted

We can better appreciate the uncanniness of Davis's historicism if we examine more closely her fantasies about improving (by redoing) the film, fantasies that again take anecdotal form. Speaking of the charivari scene in the film, for example, Davis says:

> The shouting and the noise makers were fine, but the costumes were much too fancy. The bearskin that Martin was wearing looked as though it had

> come right out of a sports shop and his opponents costumes were theatrical. Peasants would improvise with an old skin and things they had around the house. I wasn't on location the day they filmed that, but if I had been, I hope I could have had the chutzpah to stand up to Daniel and to Anne-Marie Marchand, our very talented costume mistress, about this. (Benson 1983, 63)

The fantasy is that the film would be better if she had been there on location from the very start: "If I were to do this again, I would want to work on the problem from the beginning"; "I wish that we would have been together from the very beginning and worked out everything together" (Benson 1983, 61).

Yet Davis's fantasy of beginning the story at the very beginning is belied by her account of writing the book as a *return*: "I had to return to my original métier, even from location in the Pyrenees I was running off to archives in Foix, Toulouse, and Auch" (1983a, ix). Moreover, when daydreaming about being there at the beginning, Davis does not take into account the doubleness of the film's origins. Her becoming the film's consultant was made possible because of Vigne's own research: Le Roy Ladurie consulted with Vigne after Vigne had been reading around in the Annales school; similarly, Vigne and Carrière were already doing research for *The Return of Martin Guerre*, reading Davis's book *Society and Culture in Early Modern France*, as Davis learned when she first called Vigne on the phone. Her fantasy of being at the beginning does not address how her beginning would ever match Vigne and Carrière's beginning. Though on the phone, Davis does not put the connection through: inattentive to the resistance on the line, delays in overseas reception, and time lags between sending and reception, Davis forgets that directors and screenwriters do their own research.[70]

Davis also feels that if she were able to redo the experience, she would do it better the second time because she now knows better how to be a historical consultant: "I should have spent the whole time [on location], and I should have acted differently there, because I didn't know how to act right. I didn't get Daniel to involve me properly, and I didn't know how to tell him. I see I could do it better next time" (Davis and Walkowitz 1992, 31–32; see also Davis 2003a, 48 and Lyons and Azzolini 2005, 91.3–91.4 for similar comments). Yet Davis's retrospective fantasies that she could have made the film better are severely qualified by her repeated admissions that she had no final say over anything, that she was powerless with regard to the script, the film's narrative structure, and the editing (Benson 1983, 31; Pringle and Prior 1986, 233). More tellingly, Davis attempts to regulate and prescribe what historical films should do in order not to err, but she doesn't deliver concrete prescriptions showing how filmmakers should film history correctly. In "Rights and Responsibilities of Historians in Regard to Historical Films and Video" (Davis with Walkowitz, 1992), for example, Davis leaves out the key information when

discussing the exact kind of film credit she thinks the historical consultant should receive:

> The historian has a right to receive accurate and appropriate credit for work done. The familiar term "historical consultant" may not apply in cases where the historian has a more fundamental role in the production process, and in such cases a more appropriate term should be used. The historian should be in agreement about the title that will appear in the credits identifying his or her role. (15)

If "historical consultant" doesn't do as a title credit, what title should go in its place? And why would it be better? Davis doesn't bother to say.[71]

The problems Davis feels were left unresolved in Vigne's film could not have been resolved by her or any other historian, for that matter: the problems she faced were inescapable. No number of historical consultants would have made a difference. Historical consultants, whether dissatisfied or satisfied with historical films, can't and don't deliver concrete criteria when describing or recommending what historical films do or should do. For example, Kathleen H. Coleman (2004), like Robert Rosenstone, returns to the cul-de-sac of Marc Ferro's question, when asked in his book *Cinema and History* (1977) whether a filmic writing of history exists: "Is the responsibility of relaying history compatible with an act of imaginative reconstruction? Sophisticated collaboration between film director and historical consultant could provide a positive answer" (50). Coleman does not deign to explain here what a "sophisticated collaboration" would be or how it would differ from previous naive collaborations.

Historians sometimes fantasize about reaching lots of people through film, much more than they can reach in print.[72] Serving as a film consultant certainly gives a historian a high degree of cache. Journalists seem to think that the highest compliment they can pay a reviewer is to say that a book of history should be made into a film.[73] Some historians, notably Simon Schama, have crossed over from the classroom lecture hall to television documentaries.[74]

Yet the story of academics who have served as film consultants is, by their own account, frequently not a happy one. Kathleen Coleman had her name removed from the credits of Ridley Scott's *Gladiator* (2000) and wrote an article about her disappointing experience (Coleman 2004).[75] Film credits often amount to academic loser moments (Morrissey 2004; 55, 71). Despite her wish to withdraw from Scott's *Gladiator*, Coleman shows up as a talking head authority in a documentary about the making of the film entitled "*The Tale of the Scribes*" on disc two of the extended Special DVD edition. Though filmmakers want academics as consultants, they also appear to underpay them and ignore their advice (Coleman 2004). Many academic consultants feel this way. Remuneration is often poor (Morrissey 2004, 61–63; 87; 261; 287–88). Consider the cases of the three famous French historians, all of whom worked on Jean-Jacques Annaud's adaptation

of Umberto Eco's novel of the same title, *The Name of the Rose* (1986): Michel Pastoureau says he was well paid for his work, but he seems to be the exception that proves the rule. Jacques Le Goff says he was paid a ridiculously low sum.[76] Jean-Claude Schmitt says that he doesn't know if his advice was followed; he also says he gave Eco (1996) an article that he wrote and that Eco used it but did not footnote it (Schmitt laughs in both cases) (Morrissey 2004; 306, 308, 315, 145). Jacques Le Goff was invited to the shoot but was then told it was over when he arrived (Morrissey 2004, 290). The historian Llipo also says he was ignored by the filmmaker and felt that he was reduced to a nitpicker (Morrissey 2004, 174). Strikingly, the historian hired as the advisor to Eric Rohmer's *le Marquise d'O* (1976) is credited as an "accessorizer" (Morrissey 2004, 88). DVD editions of historical films may add insult to injury. The historian and military historian who served as consultants for the remake *The Alamo* (dir. John Lee Hancock, 2004) are not noted on a cover of the dir. John Lee Hancock, DVD, nor are they included in the main DVD menu. One has to click on the "Bonus features" option of the main menu to find them.[77] Even the margins historians such as Davis like to inhabit have shifted as film has been subjected to what Manovich (2001) saw as a new media object ("something that can exist in numerous versions and numerous incarnations" [134]) in the form of successive and differently cut DVD and HD-DVD editions of a given film. The fortunes of the historian working as film consultants keep waning and waxing: the historian may come into focus and then go out of focus as new digital editions of a given film are released. For example, Robin Lane Fox, the advisor on Oliver Stone's *Alexander* shared an audiocommentary track on the first two DVD editions with Stone (they were recorded independently, with Fox filling in the gaps between Stone's comments); Stone did the sole track for his second DVD edition *Alexander: Director's Cut*; the DVD of *Alexander Revisited* has no audiocommentary, both the HD-DVD and Blu-ray editions of *Alexander Revisited* have two new and separate audiocommentaries by Stone and Fox.

In some cases, the person credited as a historical consultant for a film is not an academic historian but an amateur simulating a historian. Credited as "historical consultant" in the BBC/HBO television series *Rome* (2005), Jonathan Stamp prepared an interactive onscreen guide "All Roads Lead to Rome" for the DVD edition, but he has never had an academic affiliation, nor has Justin Pollard, who was credited on the Working Title Films website for *Elizabeth: The Golden Age* (dir. Shekhar Kapur, 2007) as the film's "historical researcher," and he similarly gets credited as a "Historian" when appearing in an extra on the DVD edition of the film.[78] Perhaps more bizarrely, Jon Spence, an emeritus English professor and the author of the biography *Becoming Jane Austen*, on which the biopic *Becoming Jane* (dir. Julian Jarrold, 2007) is based, is credited as the film's "historical consultant."[79]

The fact that Davis has not moved past the ideas about film she first advanced in her writings of the 1980s, repeating instead the same points, phrases, and even sentences in writings over the past two and a half decades, should thus not be taken, in the form of a summary judgment, as

autoindicting evidence of her own particular intellectual laziness, peculiar psychological fixations, the poverty of her ideas about historical filmmaking, her exceedingly narrow definition of the historical film, or the limits of her knowledge of films and film history. Indeed, the usually heated polemical exchanges Davis has had with another historian and with a film critic have largely deflected attention away from the extent to which all historians and film critics face the same deeply intractable narratological and narrative problems arising from the paratext Davis brings so clearly into focus through her numerous paratextual writings.[80] No matter how intellectually gifted other historians may be, they, like Davis, have not been able to advance beyond the questions raised by Pierre Sorlin (1990) and Marc Ferro back in the 1970s. Perhaps the strongest among them, Robert Rosenstone (2006)—a historian who says he served quite happily as a film consultant on Warren Beatty's *Reds* (1981) and has championed cinematic history since the 1990s—registers in his most recent book on film and history, *History on Film/Film on History*, many of the uncanny loops and compulsive repetitions I have noted in Davis's writings.[81] An uncanny loopiness, as it were, goes with the territory. By ignoring the paratext and its problems, historians interested in the historical film have resisted the uncanny temporalities and errancy of the paratext, the uncanny defined as "everything . . . that ought to have remained hidden and secret, yet comes to light" (*SE* 17, 245). If historians were to understand the print and cinematic paratexts better and recognize their (dys)functions more fully as a tension between cognitive and design elements, they would still not be better able to reconcile print history and film history; rather, they would understand that historians so consistently fail to reconcile print history and film history because their compulsion to understand history through both print and film media is itself an uncanny return and repetition.

Epilegomenon: Anec-Post-It-Note to Self: Freud, Greenblatt, and the New Historicist Uncanny

If I had invented my writings, I would have done so as a perpetual revolution. For it is necessary in each situation to create an appropriate mode of exposition, to invent the law of the singular event, to take into account the presumed or desired addressee, and, at the same time, to make as if this writing will determine the reader, who will learn to read ("to live") something he or she was not accustomed to receiving from anywhere else.

—*Jacques Derrida,* Learning to Live Finally: The Last Interview

To write a book is in a certain way to abolish the preceding one. Finally one perceives what one has done is—both comfort and deception—rather close to what one has already written.[1]

—*Michel Foucault,* Foucault Live

Hopelessly, like death's heads, foreign words await their resurrection in a better order of things.

—*Theodor Adorno, "Words from Abroad"*

And this brings us back to psychoanalysis, which is where we started out from.

—*Sigmund Freud, "Dreams and Occultism,"* New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis

The only discernible difference between a method and bricolage is the joker. The principle of bricolage is to make something by means of something else, a mast with matchstick, a chicken wing with tissue meant for the thigh, and so forth. Just as the most general model of method is the game, the good model for what is deceptively called bricolage is the joker.

—*Michel Serres,* The Parasite

Telepathy is the interruption of the psychoanalysis of psychoanalysis.

—*Jacques Derrida, "Telepathy"*

People don't want to read nowadays, substituting thematic reaction for reading . . . and if people don't want to read, they are caught up in the fetishistic project.

—*Joel Fineman, fragments in endnote five of the posthumously published "Shakespeare's Ear"*

Cinematic Writing Machines

We may learn something more about academic historicist fantasy and the historian's uncanny by turning away from Davis's dissatisfaction with *The Return of Martin Guerre* to engage larger questions about visualization, psychoanalysis, and historicism Stephen Greenblatt (1986b) raises in his essay "Psychoanalysis and Renaissance Culture."[2] We may thereby begin to appreciate more fully what Christian Keathley (2005) has termed "the filmic quality of the new historicist anecdote" (138). The Guerre case is of interest to Greenblatt largely because it connects new property laws to the fashioning of identity Greenblatt locates in the sixteenth century.[3] The uncle of Martin Guerre turned against the imposter Arnaud de Tilh only when his property and profits were at stake. The story of Martin Guerre is for Greenblatt a "Renaissance story," not "a universal myth" (216). Attributing a "unitary vision" (217) of the subject to Freud, Greenblatt maintains that this vision "is achieved, as Natalie Davis's book makes clear, only by repressing history, or, more accurately, by repressing *histories*—multiple, complex refractory stories. Such stories become, in effect, decorative incidents, filigrees enchased on the surrogate of a solid and single truth, or (in subtler versions) interesting variants on the central and irreducible narrative, the timeless master myth" (217). Historicism can explain psychoanalysis as a belated consequence of changes in property law, according to Greenblatt (1986b), but psychoanalysis cannot explain historicism: "psychoanalytic interpretation seems to follow upon rather than to explain Renaissance texts. . . . psychoanalytic interpretation is causally belated. . . . Psychoanalysis is . . . less the privileged explanatory key than the distant and distorted consequence of his cultural nexus [of relations, materials objects, and judgments]. . . . Psychoanalysis is the historical outcome of certain characteristic Renaissance strategies" (216, 224). According to Greenblatt, psychoanalysis is "crippled" (216), much like the real Martin Guerre when he shows up at court with a wooden leg, whereas historicism presumably walks on two legs, fully erect. Practicing a diplomatic disciplinary foreign policy, Greenblatt will allow psychoanalytic interpretation to proceed as long as "it historicizes its own procedures (221)," or, one might say, as long as it is not psychoanalytic. (For an implicit rejoinder to Greenblatt, see Torok [1986], who maintains that "writing a history of psychoanalysis" [84] must be psychoanalytic: "the history of psychoanalysis cannot successfully borrow its methods of inquiry from any other discipline" [84].)[4]

The paratexts of Greenblatt's (1986b) essay make evident a significant degree of resistance to the psychoanalysis he claims to have historicized: psychoanalysis remains, I suggest, a foreign body within Greenblatt's historicism. Like Natalie Davis, Greenblatt wants to tell a sequential narrative: first came the possessive individualism of Thomas Hobbes, then came Freud's self-possessed ego, a belated and false universalization of what is in fact the historically specific emergence of the Renaissance literary and legal subject. Yet this narrative sequence in Greenblatt's essay is not matched by a similar paratextual sequence in its endnotes. Just the opposite is the case.

In the first endnote to the essay, Greenblatt scrupulously cites both the English and French editions of Davis's *Return of Martin Guerre*, linking the latter to the film while serving as an annotation note on the textual history of Davis's book: "Davis's text was originally published in French, together with a 'recit romanesque' written by the film's screenwriter and director, Jean-Claude Carriere and Daniel Vigne (*Le Retour de Matin Guerrre* [Paris: Robert Laffont, 1982])." Quite remarkably, however, Greenblatt (1986b) does not quote a single work by Freud or Lacan, whom he mentions once in passing in the essay, with tentative approval (141), nor does he give the title of even a single one of their works either in the essay or in the endnotes.

Why this scrupulousness when citing Davis and yet this striking offhandedness when not citing Freud and Lacan? The question invites a symptomatic reading of Greenblatt's essay (1986b) that would diagnose psychoanalytically his New Historicization of psychoanalysis as a (legalistic) defense against psychoanalysis. In failing to quote or cite from Freud, Greenblatt has not only to masquerade as Freud, much as Freud often masqueraded as his patients when recounting their dreams in the first perons, and adopt Freud's own terms when offering a putatively Freudian account of the Guerre case but, in a citational slip, but also expose his need to dream up what he calls the "dream" of psychoanalysis in order to differentiate it from historicism (which can analyze dreams better than Freud can).[5] In short, Greenblatt's aberrant (lack of) citations make it possible to reverse the terms of his essay and read the New Historicist critic who resists psychoanalysis as a Freudian case study.[6] Greenblatt cannot narrate a sequence of events and call it historical, that is, without repressing psychoanalysis, turning it into a fiction (and misreading it as ego psychology, a dream of mastery and self-ownership rather than the opposite it may appear to be) that cannot be checked against Freud's texts. If one were looking for evidence of Greenblatt's repression of psychoanalysis, one might note that in the new preface to *Learning to Curse* (1991/2007) Greenblatt discusses all of the essays in it except for "Psychoanalysis and Renaissance Culture."[7] Furthermore, one might note that Greenblatt targets the specifically humanist psychoanalysis of Freud, leaving aside the antihumanist psychoanalysis of Lacan, whose "signs of historicizing" he identifies as Hegelian.[8]

Yet it would be much too simple to do a classically Freudian reading of Greenblatt's misrecognition of psychoanalysis as ego psychology. For Greenblatt (1988) himself adopts a psychoanalytic vocabulary, frequently using the word "uncanny," for example, and his historicism often consists of a desire to reanimate the past, to "speak with the dead" (1), rather like Freud's discussion of the inanimate becoming animate in "The Uncanny" (*SE* 17).[9] As Freud writes, "apparent death and the re-animation of the dead have been represented as most uncanny themes" (*SE* 17, 246). Similarly, Greenblatt's interest in literature as estrangement parallels Freud's account of the uncanny as a self-estrangement and disorientation. If Greenblatt resists psychoanalysis, he also accommodates it or, to use his terms, attempts to displace and absorb it. Moreover, Greenblatt does not favorably

oppose "History" to psychoanalysis but subtly shifts in a single sentence from saying that Freud represses history to saying Freud represses "histories," which Greenblatt then makes synonymous with "stories." Indeed, Greenblatt emphasizes that Guerre's case is a story: "It is important to characterize the case of Martin Guerre as a *story*" (187, emphasis in the original). The history Freud represses not only becomes plural "histories" but, more radically, history becomes, in effect, fiction. And the historical specificity of a given story amounts to genre fiction: The Martin Guerre story is "a peculiarly *Renaissance* story" (139). (Somewhat peculiarly, Freud uses the adjective "peculiarly" to modify the noun "uncanny" in his 1919 essay "The Uncanny"; see Freud *SE* 17, 244.) Even more strikingly, Greenblatt's unwillingness to cite Freud (and thereby read his writings closely), instead of totalizing them into a seemingly never revised, unified, master narrative, bears on the uncanny and fictional aspects of the paratextual anec-note that I traced in chapter 4 on Natalie Davis's role as the historical advisor to Daniel Vigne's *The Return of Martin Guerre* and that, in the form of the autobiographical anecdote, is the easily recognizable signature of Greenblatt's New Historicism.[10]

The Uncanny of the Uncanny, Psychoanalytic and New Historicist

To grasp more fully the uncanniness of Greenblatt's New Historicism, I would like to compare an autobiographical anecdote related by Freud in his essay "Delusions and Dreams in Jensen's *Gradiva*" (1906/1907, *SE* 9) with a similar autobiographical anecdote related by Greenblatt in a new preface to the Routledge Classics reissue of *Learning to Curse*, in which "Psychoanalysis and Renaissance Culture?" appeared a second time after having first been published in the book collection *Literary Theory/Renaissance Texts Literary Theory and Renaissance Texts* (Greenblatt 1986b) five years earlier.[11] By attending to similarities in the differences between these two anecdotes, we may more fully understand the uncanny dimensions of Greenblatt's historicism. Both anecdotes involve twin sisters, one of whom is dead. Here is Freud's anecdote, quoted in full:

> A man who has grown rational and skeptical, even, may be ashamed to discover how easily he may for a moment return to a belief in spirits under the combined impact of strong emotions and perplexity. I know of a doctor who had once lost one of his women patients suffering from Graves' disease, and who could not get rid of a faint suspicion that he might perhaps have contributed to the unhappy outcome by a thoughtless prescription. One day, several years later, a girl entered his consulting room, who, in spite of all his efforts, he could not help recognizing as the dead one. He could frame only a single thought: "So, after all, it's true that the dead can come back to life." His dread did not give way to shame till the girl introduced herself as the sister of the one who had died of the same disease as she herself was suffering from. The victims of Graves' disease, as has often been observed, have a marked facial resemblance

> to one another; and in this case this typical likeness was reinforced by a family one. The doctor to whom this occurred was, however, none other than myself; so I have a personal reason for not disputing the clinical possibility of Norbert Hanold's temporary delusion that Gradiva had come back to life. (*SE* 9, 71–72)

And here is Greenblatt's anecdote, also quoted in full:

> A strange thing happened to me at the Smithsonian conference that had some bearing on my understanding of the instability of resonance and wonder. When I got up to speak, I looked out at the audience in the hall and saw with astonishment someone who looked uncannily like my first serious girlfriend, from university days more than twenty-five years earlier. There was no mistaking it: it was the girl I had once loved, now older of course, but unmistakably she. The circumstance would not itself have been so surprising—though a quarter of century had passed since I last saw or spoke to her—had it not been for something else. Some two months earlier my mother had clipped from the newspaper and sent me my ex-girlfriend's obituary. She had died tragically young of breast cancer. For a moment, in the peculiar heightened intensity in which one begins a talk before a large audience of strangers, I thought I might be going mad. I was almost overcome with wonder. The experience was as close as I will ever get in real life to what Leontes feels when he first sees the state of Hermione. At the time I was far too unnerved to think of a literary analog. But I understood even then, in the split-second of my disoriented response, that the wonder welling up in me conjoined desire and impossibility. Then, as I opened my mouth to speak, my mind raced frantically for some reassurance, some escape route, some exit, from an excess of wonder. I found it quickly enough: it must not have been more than a few seconds before it flashed upon me that my girlfriend had an identical twin sister whom I had briefly encountered, since she went to a different university. And indeed when the talk was over, this twin came up to introduce herself to me. She had brought some pages of her sister's diary from the time we were dating, and wanted me to see how sweetly and poignantly she wrote about our relationship. The voice, the handwriting, the turns of phrase, the snatches of conversation recorded from so long before—all conjured up what was irrevocably past and slowly turned wonder into resonance. (1991/2007, xiv–xv)

The similarities between the two anecdotes are striking: Greenblatt's anecdote is not only about twin sisters, one dead, the other alive, but also phrased using one of Freud's terms: the woman Greenblatt sees in the audience "looked uncannily like" his girlfriend. And like Freud, who tells his anecdote in the middle of an analysis of a work of fiction, Jensen's *Gradiva*, Greenblatt compares his experience giving his paper with the experience of a literary character in a play by Shakespeare about the reanimation of a woman seemingly dead, precisely the territory of the Freudian uncanny. Moreover, both Freud and Greenblatt occupy a position exterior to literature: Freud's anecdote comes out of his clinical practice; Greenblatt's comes out of an academic conference. One more similarity is worth noting: both anecdotes involve museums. The occasion of Greenblatt's

anecdote is the Smithsonian; more remotely, Freud remarks in "Postscript to the Second Edition (1912)" of his essay on Jensen's *Gradiva* that the relief of the young girl Jensen named Gradiva is not Roman, as Jensen thought, but Greek and may be found in "the Museo Chiaramonti in the Vatican (No. 644)" where it "has been restored and interpreted by Hauser (1903)" (*SE* 9, 95).

The similarities between Freud's and Greenblatt's anecdotes are by no means reducible, of course, to a question of unacknowledged citation or appropriation by Greenblatt, nor even to a Freudian "repression" by Greenblatt of what some readers might suppose to be Greenblatt's unconscious source text. It is the sameness in the difference between Freud's and Greenblatt's anecdotes that put them both on an uncanny dialogical wavelength. (Freud says in "The Uncanny" that his "paper is presented to the reader without any claim to priority" [*SE* 17, 220] and remarks in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* that "priority and originality are not among the aims that psychoanalytic work sets itself" [18, 7]).[12] Freud repeats himself, after all, telling Ernest Jones he saw "another double" of himself, "not Horsch" (Derrida 1981/2007, 232), while travelling on a train and discussing two dreams about two sets of twins, one boys, the other girls, in what Derrida (1981/2007, 241; 249–45; 260) calls Freud's "fake lectures" (fake because they were never delivered as lectures but published only as epistolary articles) on telepathy and psychoanalysis. (Freud's view that "only psychoanalysis can teach something about telepathic phenomena and not vice versa" [Derrida 1981/2007, 252] mirrors Greenblatt's (1986b) insistence that psychoanalysis be historicized but not vice versa; similarly, much as psychoanalysis remains a foreign body in historicism and Marxism, swallowed and vomited back up, or gagged on and coughed up, so telepathy remains, in Derrida's words, a "foreign body" [Derrida 1981/2007, 256–57)] in psychoanalysis; or, as Freud puts it, "the theme of telepathy is alien to psychoanalysis" (cited by Derrida 1981/2007, 258). Freud's *Gradiva* autobiographical anecdote is thus not an "original" that Freud might be said to own and Greenblatt unconsciously to imitate. In Freudian terms, there can never be intellectual property or an original, because the uncanny is not proper and always appears as a repetition: there is no home, no archive to house a given text securely as property.

Phony Shakespeare

Freud's anecdote in "Delusions and Dreams in Jensen's *Gradiva*," like his anecdote in "The Uncanny," is psychoanalytic because it shows that knowledge arrives belatedly as the self-correction of an initial misrecognition. Furthermore, knowledge arrives as a digression, even a paratextual supplement, and, via literary transmission, as a true story. Freud turns himself into a narrator and character in his anecdote about the twin sisters before letting us know that he is the doctor. Freud openly plays a trick on the reader. One last similarity: both Freud's and Greenblatt's anecdotes

involve travel and transportation, the story about the author being on the way to somewhere or coming back from somewhere. Grasping the uncanny relation between the Freudian and Greenblattian uncanny requires that we read closely Freud's and Greenblatt's engagement with media in terms of the calculated yet risky long-distance, hung up phoniness (meaning both "telephonic" and "fake") that often (dis)connects many of their autobiographical anecdotes to their paratexts. In Freud's case, it means reading Freud's use of letters, postcards, telegrams, and other long-distance correspondence in his essays on telepathy, his comparisons of telepathy to being informed "as if . . . by telephone . . . [as] a kind of psychical counterpart to the wireless telegraphy" (*SE* 22, 36), his comparison of thought transference "finding conscious expression in a slightly disguised form" to the way "the invisible end of the spectrum reveals itself to the senses on a light-sensitive plate as a colored extension" (*SE* 18, 185), his reference to his "phonographic memory" (*SE* 22, 5), and his double allusion to *Hamlet*, linking the same line ("there are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy") to the occult in one case (*SE* 18, 178) and to psychoanalysis in the other (*SE* 22, 31), all in relation to his paratextual and textual autobiographical anecdotes staged in the *Gradiva* essay and elsewhere and as being about both Freud and someone else.

Here we may note a number of significant ways in which Freud's psychoanalytic uncanny differs from Greenblatt's historical uncanny. The Freudian autobiographical anecdote emerges as a kind of genre, one in a series, as Freud tells in the autobiographical anecdote in the footnote to "The Uncanny" (*SE* 17, 248) that I cited earlier in chapter 1 in my discussion of David Fincher's *Se7en*. If we return briefly to that anecdote, we may appreciate more fully the difference between the Freudian uncanny and the New Historicist uncanny. In the footnote to "The Uncanny," Freud rewrites a "(p)recursive" anecdote told by another (Mach) and then relayed and repeated by Freud, who cites his course. Furthermore, the anecdote moves from repetition to recognition, the second time Freud sees himself being a correction of error that doubles a failed attempt to correct error ("Jumping up to set it right, I"), failed because premature—"jumping up"—and premature because the jumping up is not rational but arises from a kind of allergic, phobic reaction to the other's intrusion; the error involves mistaken attribution of error to another or Other. In taking anecdotal form, the experience is repeated as recollection and as a persistent memory at that ("I can still recollect"). Moreover, the experience is linked to the paratext not only as a footnote but literally as a threshold: Freud sees his reflection on the open door window and he sees it because a threshold has been transgressed ("the washing-cabinet, which lay between the two compartments"). Freud's anecdote comes with a commentary in the last two sentences, when Mach and Freud become a couple.

With this long distance (dis)connection between autobiographical anecdote and paratext in mind, we may now return to the ways in which

Greenblatt's autobiographical anecdote about the twin sisters differs from Freud's in "Delusions and Dreams in Jensen's *Gradiva*." Whereas in Freud's anecdote self-criticism arises from a sense of guilt (he feels he is partly responsible for a death), knowledge follows error (the dead can return to life), and recognition arrives delayed and with a sense of disquiet, in Greenblatt's anecdote error lasts only a moment, a "split-second," and a feeling a disquiet soon passes by the time he finishes reading the diaries. He knew from the start ("But I understood even then . . . ") and any sense of guilt about the dead girlfriend, if there is any, remains unstated. Although he tells an anecdote about himself as a digression in the midst of a psychoanalysis of literary characters, he concedes well into the essay that he is discussing as if they were real people, and thereby blurring the real and the literary; Greenblatt turns to a literary text only as an afterthought, thereby distinguishing the real experience from literature. And whereas Freud's anecdote involves only oral communications, Greenblatt's involves media/postal relays and delays: a newspaper clipping sent by his mother and diaries delivered by the surviving twin sister. A melancholic sense of loss rather than guilt sets the tone of Greenblatt's anecdote, the details of which remain opaque, their meaning open-ended in ways that invite speculation. (How did the relationship end? Why did it end? Who ended it? What did the twin sister want from Greenblatt? Did she give him the diaries or only loan them momentarily? If they were a gift, did Greenblatt keep them or discard them as if they were cremated ash?).

Greenblatt's New Historicist uncanny emerges most clearly, however, not in the enigmatic effects produced by this autobiographical anecdote but in Greenblatt's more general willingness to put into question the truth-value of some of his most memorable and fascinating autobiographical anecdotes. The anecdote about the twin sisters, like the anecdote in the epilogue to *Renaissance Self-Fashioning* (1980/2005, 25)—about the father traveling to a Boston hospital to visit his sick grown son who has lost his will to live and who asks his fellow airplane passenger Greenblatt to say soundlessly the words "I want to die. I want to die"—has an aspect of incredibility and implausibility about it, as if Greenblatt were inviting or perhaps even daring the reader to wonder if Greenblatt made it up. Consider some further differences between Freud and Greenblatt. While Freud plays a trick on the reader and exposes it as such, Greenblatt makes one wonder if he is a trickster. Freud's anecdotes do seem factual, not because they are inherently more plausible (they aren't) but because Freud distances his anecdote from fiction, even exorcizing fiction from the "Jensen's *Gradiva*" anecdote by deferring knowledge that he is the doctor or by using a scholarly citation before relating his story about seeing his reflection while traveling by train in "The Uncanny" footnote. Unlike Freud, Greenblatt spectralizes and fictionalize his historicist anecdotes.

Greenblatt's most uncannily powerful anecdotes are the ones that most seem to be detached from history, the ones with a literary, parabolic relation to the text in excess of any retrospective account of the work's

genesis or meaning that frame them and that they help frame. This sense of detachment arises in part because Greenblatt dissolves Freud's opposition between story and commentary, making the anecdote itself a commentary. Yet Greenblatt's more memorable anecdotes also seem to float free of the history in which they are apparently anchored in his framing paratexts. For example, Greenblatt (1991/2007) relates the anecdote in *Learning to Curse* at the very end of the preface, after seeming to finish two pages earlier with "a final description of the setting of one of the essays . . . a 1988 conference at the Smithsonian in Washington, D.C." (xiii). Greenblatt caps that paragraph with a quotation about wonder from the last scene of *The Winter's Tale*. In returning to the conference, Greenblatt recounts his anecdote as a potentially extraneous afterthought. His personal history stands in a relatively external textual place even as it pushes toward a deeper sense of inwardness than his more historical account of giving the paper allowed.[13]

Greenblattiana: Cinema and the Touch of the Reel

What the New Historicism counts as history or values as a means of accessing history conceived as the voices and bodies of the dead, namely, the anecdote, is thus tied up as much with a fictionalizing of the academic self in the anecdotal form. And this fictionalizing is at the same time a spectralization or externalization of the self, authenticated and authenticating by virtue of misrecognizing itself as interior and self-present. This uncanny crossing between traces of the real inside memory and outside in writing also makes clear the mediatic dimensions of the Greenblattian uncanny. In a review of Greenblatt and Catherine Gallagher's *Practicing New Historicism*, David Simpson (2001) makes use of a cinematic metaphor:

> The new historicism, in its early essays, emphasized the cinematic bringing to life of the past—avowedly "representational" but giving the effect of the real . . . . Like a slice of movie footage, the new historicist past was wholly there and yet not there, and not implicated in any pattern beyond that of its own telling, except by loose association with something in the teller's own place and time that was itself resistant to full knowledge. History, in this way, became synchronic: events were conjured up in densely contextual detail, but they were cut loose from what came before or after. Some said that this was as much of history as we could have in an age that had forgotten how to think historically; others found only another incarnation of the "slice-of-life" criticism, now in a mode more fully cinematic than ever.

Simpson's cinematic metaphor applies even more precisely, I think, to the New Historicism's interest in narrative framing and specters than it does to the use of anecdotes culled from raiding the archives to generate counter-histories. Insofar as it is uncanny, the New Historicism is engaged in not only reading the past but, like Natalie Davis, also in attempting

(and failing) to visualize it. For Freud, the uncanny is largely about the failure to see. The anec-notal repetitions I have traced thus far in Greenblatt's uncanny historicism present a problem of visualization and discernment.

The uncanniness of Greenblatt's historicism is registered acutely in Greenblatt's analysis of a problem of academic authorization arising from the academic's autofocus, through a framing of his intellectual autobiographical narrative. In his essay "The Touch of the Real," an essay that first appeared in the journal *Representations* and then again in revised form in *Practicing New Historicism*, Greenblatt observes that what the historicist takes to be reality effects, or traces of the past, are produced through a narrative frame. As he puts it when discussing anthropologist Clifford Geertz's seminal essay "Thick Description": "thickness is not in the object; it is in the narrative surrounding, the add-ons, the nested frames . . . Thickness no longer seems extrinsic to the object, [it is] a function solely of the way it is framed . . . The frame is crucial, since in this case it helps us to conjure up a 'real' as opposed to an 'imaginary' world."[14] The real to which ethnographic and historicist writing refers is an effect of a narrative frame.

Greenblatt's (2000a) historicism becomes uncanny when he turns to a discussion of academic self-narration. Greenblatt raises the question of whether Geertz and his Maghreb native informant Cohen might have fabricated their stories and then proceeds to make a telling distinction between the two storytellers:

> If it turned out that Geertz's Cohen had taken it upon himself to be the Flaubert of the Maghreb and had made up his entire story, we might have still concluded that we possessed something of ethnographic allure: a glimpse of the fantasies of an old man who had been steeped in the symbolic systems of colonial Morocco. If, however, it turned out that Geertz had made up Cohen, we at least would have concluded that as an ethnographer Geertz was not to be trusted, and his work would immediately lose much of its value. For it was precisely not as a fiction or as a little philosopher's tale that Geertz invites us to read his anecdote; it is as a "raw" sample of his field notes. The frame is crucial. . . . If it is only a matter of rhetoric—then only a reality-effect is conjured and nothing more. (29–30)[15]

Greenblatt distinguishes the value of the real from the reality-effect of the fake easily enough: if the academic doing the framing is telling the truth, then his or her story and writing have value.[16]

Why, then, does Greenblatt ask hypothetically about Geertz's possible lack of truthfulness in the first place? There is after all no reason to think that Geertz is making up his notes, and Greenblatt does not imply that he did. For an answer, we may consider that Greenblatt's odd hypothetical question arises in relation to Greenblatt's quite subtle deconstruction of a distinction between the real and reality effects. Both are acts of conjuring: "The frame is crucial, since in this case it helps us to *conjure* up a 'real'; if it is only a matter of rhetoric—then only a reality-effect is *conjured* and nothing

more (29, my emphasis)." The highly valued real exists only in quotations marking it as a conjured up "real," hardly distinguishable from the conjured "reality effect" Greenblatt devalues. By questioning the truthfulness of Geertz's account without doubting it, Greenblatt suggests that the real is always an illusion and may always be exposed as a conjuring trick, or what would be called in cinematic terms a magic trick.

What I find especially remarkable about Greenblatt's uncanny as opposed to Freud's is Greenblatt's willingness to risk entirely deflating the value of his own work, to call into question, albeit very subtly, the value of the kind of historicist criticism he writes so incredibly well by making his historicist writing seem like fiction and by inextricably intertwining and yet freely disassociating fraud and Freud. Unlike Freud, who moves from repetition to recognition, and hence from error to knowledge, Greenblatt moves, as Joel Fineman put it in a wonderful essay on the anecdote, from fiction to fiction.[17]

The Greenblattian historical uncanny emerges from Greenblatt's apparent resistance to recognize openly that what he puts at risk is what largely accounts for the power of his historicism as writing. I say "apparent" because, unlike Freud, for whom the transition from repetition to recognition is also a transition from error to knowledge, Greenblatt repeats himself rather than attains closure by advertently letting on that which he knows his anecdotes are made-up of or, inadvertently, that which he doesn't know. His resistance to Freud's resistance makes Greenblatt more or less like Freud; but Greenblatt's willingness to inhabit the gap between Freud and fraud, to risk seeming to engage in Fraudianism rather than Freudianism, makes his uncanny historicism all the more uncanny. For Greenblatt does not repeat himself across his different texts in the same way: he not only tells new autobiographical anecdotes, for example, but also comments on the anecdote as well as his own critical practice (see 2007b). Whereas in Freud's case, the autobiographical anecdote has a discrete size and works as a fragment (the footnote to "The Uncanny," a digression in "Jensen's *Gradiva*," and an introductory story in "Moses and Michelangelo"), in Greenblatt's case the anecdote and the text are not clearly differentiated by a frame. In the new preface to the 2005 reedition of *Renaissance Self-Fashioning*, for example, Greenblatt returns to an anecdote about teaching a course on Marxism at U.C Berkeley he (re)tells in the Introduction in his essay "Towards a Poetics of Culture," reprinted from one of two "slightly different" versions in *Learning to Curse* (1991/2007, viii–ix; 197–98).

In similarly providing a retrospective account of New Historicism, "The Touch of the Real" could be read not only as a restatement of this essay but also as one long autobiographical "anec-note." The anec-notal character of the essay becomes clear if one attends to both versions, or, more precisely, to the fact that the revisions of the second version are left unnoted. Though the first parts of both versions of the essay are identical while the second parts are entirely different, the copyright page refers to the article in the book version as if it were the same.[18] No prefatory remarks about this earlier version are made, so that the

copyright permission implies by default (without the author intending or not intending) that the article republished in the book is unrevised.[19] Though nothing like a straightforward repression happens here, a ghosting effect can nevertheless be detected when the two versions of Greenblatt's essay are put into dialogue. Both versions offer a retrospective account of the New Historicism, but roughly the second half of Greenblatt's earlier version of the article, which drops out in the book version, relates and historicizes an exemplary anecdote of Greenblatt's practice, which just so happens to involve ghosts. In the book version, this discussion is replaced by a discussion of Erich Auerbach, which falls—uncannily—into two parts. The uncanny haunts this account of Auerbach. Greenblatt refers to "specters, the specters of mimetic genius" and to a "a quasi magical effect" (37). Most strikingly, Auerbach is a "conjurer" (37; see also 28) who, it is twice said, performs "a conjuring trick" (38). The addition of the new second half of the essay introduces a new repetition. Greenblatt had already written of "Geertz's conjuring of the real" in the first part (30). Though the more explicitly autobiographical and ghostly anecdote offered in the *Representations* version drops out, then, the register of the uncanny becomes more explicit only in the revised version's various mentions of the "spirit of representation", specters, spectral effects, the supernatural, conjuring of spirits, the magus, and "charmed space" (48).[20] In moving from Geertz to Auerbach, that is, we move from an academic conjurer who might not have told the truth to an academic who comes close "to acknowledging that [he] is [performing] a conjuring trick" (38).

Greenblatt's New Historicist uncanny goes further than the historian's uncanny of Natalie Davis in spectralizing the evidence of history and calling into question the historian's ability to not only retell history correctly but to also gain access to the voices of the past through the archive. In contrast to a legal notion of evidence that is supposedly transparent and indexical and on which he relies in his essay "Psychoanalysis and Renaissance Culture," Greenblatt's generally regards historical evidence, or what he sometimes call recorded "traces" of now disembodied voices, as opaque. Access to these voices is a matter of "conjuring," of prestidigitation rather than digitation. The final sentence of Greenblatt's anecdote in the new preface to *Learning to Curse* about the twin sisters (which is also the final sentence of the new preface to the 2007 edition) gives agency to inanimate pieces of evidence: "The voice, the handwriting, the turns of phrase, the snatches of conversation recorded from so long before—all conjured up what was irrevocably past and slowly turned wonder into resonance."

"Literature professors are salaried, middle-class shamans," Greenblatt writes on the first page of *Shakespearean Negotiations* (1988). Yet his daring willingness to hauntologize history threatens to turn the authorized and authorizing New Historicist uncanny, or New Histori-shaman-ism, into its unauthorized, discredited double, the New Historici-sham-ism, by blurring the line between showmanship and shamanship.

A Funny Thing Happened to Me on the Way to . . . : The Schlock of the New Historicist of Uncanny

As we have seen, the historian and the New Historicist both depend on a certain version of the uncanny that involves estrangement and reanimation and that nevertheless allows for a linear temporality and subjective interiorization. What troubles the (new) historicist uncanny, however, is the mechanical nature of the returns and repetitions that mark its practices. Precisely because of their automaticity, these repetitions cannot be fully internalized and thus redeemed as the grounds of the humanist historian's pathos. We are now in a position to understand why Greenblatt focuses specifically on Freud's humanist psychoanalysis. Greenblatt can hold the mechanical repetitions of his practice at bay only by means of a melancholic, deeply personal, and even private, pathos or failing, which is a potentially corrosive demystification of his own New Historicist practices as a conjuring trick: conjurer or trickster amounts to the same humanist difference. Lacan, the psychoanalyst who was called a charlatan and a shaman and whose seminar lectures were taped, transcribed, and published with notes, is perhaps too close for comfort. By repeating his anecdotes in a "characteris-tic" manner, Greenblatt produces "Greenblattian" subjectivity effects that exceed his desire to interiorize his academic self. His anecdotes are almost always delivered, that is, in paratexts, usually prefaces, introductions, and epilogues, and at the beginning or end of a given text or paratext. Though quite varied and wonderfully written, the anecdotes are mechanical insofar as they are predictable. A similar kind of mechanism may be detected in the way Greenblatt sometimes ends essays with a repetition of the already uncanny word "return." After seeming to end "Psychoanalysis and Renaissance Culture" ("I want to end," 1986, 191), for example, Greenblatt repeats his concluding point about the belatedness of psychoanalysis, already made earlier in the essay (184) in the last sentence of a paratext that takes the form of an appendix: "I return to the notion that psychoanalysis is the outcome of certain characteristic Renaissance strategies" (195). The same word "return" recurs in the first and last sentences of the first version (1997b) of "The Touch of the Real." The spaces between text and appendix or between article and republished book chapter serve as cuts, or breaks, that enable and apparently require returns, repetitions, and possibly redundancy as well.

This mechanism is, moreover, not merely a metaphor. Greenblatt's anecdotes are also a form of travel literature, a genre on which he has often written: On an airplane, talking to his dead father; on his way back from an airport after picking up his codignitaries for a dinner party who then mistake him for the chauffeur; on his way to a conference at the Smithsonian; in Bali where he encountered a villagers' screening of Charles Bronson in *Death Wish*; on his arrival at U.C. Berkeley as an assistant professor; about a woman student in a graduate seminar who read *Utopia* and then went to

Jonestown and committed suicide there.[21] As in Freud's autobiographical anecdotes about seeing his reflection on the train car window and returning unintentionally three times to the red-light district of Venice in "The Uncanny" (SE 17 248 n.1; 237), the New Historicist uncanny autobiographical anecdote is always linked to transportation networks. The autobiographical anecdote, whether Freudian or Greenblattian, stands in relation both to the anecdotal and the grand narrative like a train wreck stands in relation to an otherwise internally regulated mechanism. The uncanny involves not only "the impression of automatic, mechanical processes at work behind the ordinary appearance of mental activity" but also deferral and expectancy, especially the unexpected, and ghosts and mourning, or what Derrida (1994) calls "awaiting (at) the arrival" (60–61). Unlike uncanny detours and wanderings, which for Freud (17, 213) always bring one back involuntarily and unintentionally to the (never quite the) same place (because one arrives there unexpectedly), the catastrophic transportation accident brings things to a stop, arrests them, slows down reading as readers crane their necks driving by the wreckage or, in some cases, crawling from it. Furthermore, the accident externalizes the viewer reader in relation to the event: one looks at it from the outside; the anecdote thereby derails the destination of the locomotive death drive into the leisurely drive by death. Yet the uncanny is also about who can travel and who cannot, who has his papers *in Ordnung*, and who doesn't, who is able to emigrate and who isn't.

The relation between Freud's uncanny and Greenblatt's uncanny is itself uncanny. Freud sees the uncanny coming out of a repressed childhood, even infantile trauma, which later returns and takes the form of repetition compulsion (*SE* 17, 220–21). In an anecdote about his childhood, Greenblatt links his interest for travel to media in ways that are very (anti-)Freudian. In a profile on Greenblatt, Lucasta Miller (2005) relates the story: "His own childhood was marked by a similarly visceral love of reading. Born in 1943 in Boston, the son of a lawyer and a housewife, he escaped from his typically humdrum 1950s suburban childhood into 'mind travel.' It was not a bookish household. 'I remember my parents saying "Stevie, don't strain your eyes reading, come and watch TV".' But the young Greenblatt remained addicted to feeding his imagination with *The Arabian Nights* or popular travelogues."[22] Freud's analysis in "The Uncanny" of being robbed of one's eyes (*SE* 17, 205) and the split father image in Hoffmann's story is about optics, a telescope, automata, and blinding, as in *The Sandman* (*SE* 17, 207–8, note 1); Greenblatt's parents fear that he will hurt his eyes by reading. In this primal screen memory, the structure of the personal anecdote begins to resemble the structure of the anecdote as analyzed by Freud, with Greenblatt inverting the post-Freudian, Lacanian schema of childhood development: he is already in the symbolic (books), while his parents are still back in the imaginary (television). In a kind of threshold, perhaps pre-psychoanalytic space of will between the child wanting to read and the parental, solicitous call to watch television, Greenblatt is both more inside the home and outside it (a *Wunderkind* already going places) than his parents, who remain engaged in the presumably deferred, mindless travel of

television. The touch of the real is not confined to pathos but extends to irony, to the (sometimes bitter) joke, or what I call the ghost of schlock in the aftershocks of historicism.[23]

Academic Auto(out-of)focus: Cinema and the Touch of the (Un)Real

Although Greenblatt wants psychoanalytic interpretation to (new) historicize its own procedures, an even more direct New Historicist engagement with Freud's writings—through, say, a reading of Freud's "The Uncanny"—might get more fully at the uncanny relation between Freud and Greenblatt by attending to Freud's own repetitions in writing his essay as Freud's resistance to psychoanalysis.[24] Freud never defines the uncanny in a self-consistent manner in "The Uncanny," spending most of his time talking about what it is not. Furthermore, the New Historicist might attend to Freud's own desire to exorcise spirits from his writings as well as to the various paratexts he added, or what editor James Strachey added, in various editions of his works, as well as Freud and Marx's common interest in ghost busting and in exposing conjuring tricks.[25] Yet any such engagement would necessarily be a belated recognition, relayed via another anec-postal-note to self: "Remember to reread that spectre Freud, again. And don't forget to read Lacan either, or Marx on the conjuring trick." In an essay on Freud's "The Uncanny"—published the year before Greenblatt's "Psychoanalysis and Renaissance Culture"—Niel Hertz (1985) poses the issue of Freud's repetitions in protocinematic terms, as a question of visibility: Where do we find the repetitions that structure uncanny? Hertz closes his essay by expressing dissatisfaction with a compound analogy he draws "between that which is repeated, coloring matter, and figurative language." These analogies depend, Hertz says,

> upon the notion of a real preexistent force (call it sheer repetition), the death instinct, or whatever that is merely rendered more *discernible* by that-which-is-repeated, or by the lurid colors of the erotic, or by some helpful figure of speech . . . rendering that force "visible." But we know that the relation between figurative language and what it figures cannot be adequately grasped in metaphors of vision; and we might well doubt that forces of repetition can be isolated—even ideally—from that-which-is-repeated. (120–21)

What makes uncanny repetitions (especially in academic criticism) visible, as Hertz suggest s, is a matter of paratexts and typography; thus, Hertz italicizes the word "discernible" and puts quotation marks around the word "visible."

Here we arrive, I think, at the most directly cinematic metaphor in Greenblatt's "Touch of the Real," the "cut," a metaphor that significantly is used only in the second version.[26] Near the end of the essay as he finishes his discussion of Auerbach, Greenblatt asks "If one abandoned canonicity, what was there beyond a completely arbitrary cut?" and links this arbitrariness to

his own practice: "Arbitrariness, the randomness Auerbach noted in modernist novels, was indeed built into the new anecdotal practice" (46). I consider the "cut" to be a barely visible cinematic metaphor as well as a metaphorical wound in that it derives from cinema: a film is released as a cut, a book is not.[27] For this extended discussion of Auerbach, mentioned once in the first part of both versions (1977b and 2000a), skips over, or cuts out on, Auerbach's discussion of the novel and film in "The Brown Stocking," the chapter of *Mimesis* Greenblatt finds to be weakest, the one in which Auerbach comes closest to acknowledging that [his practice] is a conjuring trick.[28] The modern novel, Auerbach says, does not exploit film; on the contrary, film now does what the pre-film, premodernist novel did: film has greater freedom to condense "time and space than the novel itself" (546). When juxtaposed with Auerbach's comments on film, Greenblatt's metaphor of the "arbitrary cut" may be seen to (dis)engage with media technologies.

In the second, or "recut" version of the essay (2000a), Greenblatt cuts the self-defense he mounted at the end of the first version of "The Touch of the Real" against the charge that his own practice is arbitrary. The cut self-defense returns us to Greenblatt's (1997b) rejection of "an irresponsible hermeneutical surrealism" (25) that I discussed in the first chapter.[29] By giving up randomness, accident, and chance in favor of some historical necessity in the first version beyond visibility and mimesis (eschewed in audial terms as a connection between an extraliterary text and a literary one it "sounded like"), Greenblatt (1997b) automatically, as it were, returns to the close proximity of voluntary and involuntary (mechanical) gestures: "It is no accident that the ghost made his appearance precisely at the moment the two men were talking over the story of his appearance. For though the appearance of a ghost may be as sudden and involuntary as a twitch, we are never in fact very far from winks, fake winks, burlesque fake-winks, and so forth" (27). Never very far from wakes and fake wakes either. The ghost, or more precisely, "ghosting" is the "strongest example" of the uncanny and "repetition automatism," according to Freud.[30] Much like Freud's repetition compulsion, the return of the ghost is followed by a repetition that becomes a pathless loop divorced from the initial traumatic return and yet never very far from it.

In the second version, Greenblatt (2000a) accepts the arbitrariness of his practice, but now as a wound, and ends his essay considering how the New Historicism no longer seemed able to illuminate canonical literary works when the practice came to seem like a gimmicky mimetic matching of one text that "sounded *like*" (47, my emphasis), a phrase Greenblatt repeats twice in the same sentence. Greenblatt goes on to consider how Auerbach's practice came to seem exhausted and "lose some of its force" (47), but cuts short discussion before considering whether the New Historicism's practice of "revivification of a canonical work" (47–48) by way of a marginal anecdote has reached the same fate, a failed promise of "a new access to the real," a formal procedure "curiously detached from anything real" (47). In

both versions, we arrive at the same outcome: there is no off-twitch, as it were, to the technology of the New Historicism.

No[te:] End of Story

In the play of re-cutting resistances and repetitions that paratextually haunt the anec-notal histories and case histories of historicism and psychoanalysis, we may understand better how what I have called the "ab-*errant*," "programma-*tic*" aspects of both critical practices produce (un)yielding returns on our investments in them and in the haunted territory which "re-grounds" and recoups them. On the one hand, the historicist uncanny ends up being about writing from behind rather than writing from below, caving into a kind of a deadening dogmatic prescriptivism about a codifiable critical practice defined in retrospect (the practice now has a title, or grave marker, and reading is now a matter both of what "should" be read and how it "should" be read) in the name of revivifying canonical and extracanonical texts. Yet, on the other hand, precisely both because it is a writing machine connected to transportation networks that regulate mobility and (im)migration and because its (mechanical) repetitions and returns are so distinctive, the historicist uncanny continues to produce highly valuable, unusually estranging effects, even if they are unintentionally disquieting and have a kind of rare and unexpected value many academics might not want to collect and keep. A conjuring tic is perhaps more compelling than a conjuring trick.[31]

Notes

Introduction: Film before and after New Media, Anec-notology, and the Philological Uncanny

1. Scholars of medieval and Renaissance literature, history, and art history have drawn similar analogies between medieval and early modern media for close to a century (Poucet 1952a, Poucet 1952b, Renoir 1958 and 1960). The earliest instance of the analogy I have found is the art historian Dagobert Frey's (1929) comparison of Gothic painting to film. Kendrick (1999) compares what she calls "animated" letters in medieval manuscripts to contemporary electronic media: "It is not difficult to think of analogies between imaging technologies being integrated into modern electronic writing and those used by early medieval scribes—for example, variable scaling or 'zoom' effects and greatly enlarged letters of the chi-rho page of the Book of Kells" (3). In his book on the history of the bookshelf, Petroski (1999) similarly maintains that present-day print and television journalism "still operates on the medieval model of book production" (38–39). Rhodes and Sawday (2000) have edited a book entitled *The Renaissance Computer* in which they and the other contributors compare the modern computer with early modern book machines of encyclopedic memory. More broadly, Hayles (2003) calls for a rethinking of the translation of books from print to electronic media with attention paid not only to "the relation of linguistic and bibliographic codes" but also to "the relation of meaning to digital codes" (265). Similar links have been drawn between predigital and digital media. Medieval and early modern scholars have compared old, preprint medieval manuscripts and visual culture and early modern printed books to new "postprint" digital media, reconceptualizing the transition from script to print in digital terms, as an interface, attending as well to images of books and reading in medieval and early modern paintings (see Robinson 1997, Camille 1998b, Driver 2000, Stallybrass 2002, Christie 2003, Crick 2003, and Foys 2007). As Foys (2007) comments, "digital media and medieval discourse share a number of common traits that print does not, and early commentators [Marshall McCluhan and Walter Ong] of electronic media linked the transformation of expression in post-print technologies to pre-print forms . . . An increasing number of critics have refined such functional analogies, further developing how pre- and post-print worlds connect through analogies of their respective operation" (36). Along similar lines, Conley (1992/2007a) has described the graphic unconscious of French Renaissance literary texts in cinematic terms: "motion"; "fading"; "montage"; and "screen-memories" (2, 4, 7, 13, and 14). In a chapter on Athanasius Kircher's magic lantern (1671) and other light and shadow devices Kircher invented, Zielinski (2006) says that Loyola's *Spiritual Exercises* "translated into media terms . . . read like the shooting script of a film" (123). Biagialio (2006) draws an analogy between film and Galileo's illustrations of the moon, writing that for Galileo "what counted . . . was . . . the 'movie' of their

motion. . . . Galileo . . . presented his claims in visual terms—as movies about satellites and shadows" (103, 110–11). In a footnote, Biagialio presses the analogy quite far, writing that his "reference to Galileo's observation as a kind of movie is not meant metaphorically. While Galileo's visual narrative is articulated on the printed page rather than on film, its logic is distinctly cinematic" (n. 94, 103). Biagialio also uses film in many of the titles that divide his chapters into shorter sections, including "Cinematic Presentations" (143) and "Public Movies and Private Dark Rooms" (196; see also 103, 135, 177, and 214). An extensive interest in film informed Erwin Panofsky (1997) and Aby Warburg's iconological art histories of ancient, Medieval, and Renaissance period (see Levin 1996 and Michaud 2004). In a discussion of Florentine court spectacles, Levin (1996) notes that Panofsky (1941/1971) gave lectures using slides of his book *The Codex Huygens and Leonardo da Vinci's Art Theory* comparing the codex to a film Art Theory and that Panofsky's essay "Style and Medium in the Moving Pictures" is cited in German art history in connection with "discussions of the protocinematic structure of antique and medieval image sequences" (n. 17, 28). I would add that Panofsky (1941/1971) draws between film and *Codex Huygens* in the final paragraph: "In order to arrive at those astonishing drawings which seem to foreshadow the modern cinema, or rather what is now called 'multiflash photographs,' our author had only to work out Leonardo's sketches and ideas in a methodical way" (128). For more on Panofsky, film, and medievalism, see Burt (2007c).

Conversely, some film and new media scholars have considered medieval and early modern visual media as part of the prehistory of film, or film before film. Kittler (2002) begins his history of new media with the "old" media of the printed book and Renaissance perspective painting. As Manovich (2001) writes:

> The shift from analogue to digital filmmaking to the shift from fresco and tempura painting in the early Renaissance . . . medieval tempera painting can be compared to the practice of special effects during the analog period cinema. A painter working with tempera could modify and rework the image, but the process was painstaking and slow. . . . change[s] in painting technology led the Renaissance painters to create new kinds of compositions, new pictorial space, and new narratives. Similarly, by allowing a filmmaker to treat a film image as an oil painting, digital technology redefines what can be done with a camera. (305)

See also Manovich on Alberti and Dürer (104–06) and the Northern and Italian Renaissance (327). Robinson (1995) begins his history of the transition from the peep show to the movie palace with a prehistory of cinema beginning with the magic lantern (3–17). Laurent Mannoni (2000) begins his book on the archaeology of cinema with chapters on the *camera obscura* and the magic lantern dating back to the thirteenth century. In an essay on the cinematic imaginary after film, Bieliky (2003) tells a story about Rudolf II being entertained by a Rabbi who used a magic lantern to transform his house into a palace and concludes that we may speak of a "medieval virtual reality" (197). See also Rossell (1998); Bolter and Grusin (2000); Thorburn and Jenkins (2003); Munster (2006, 11–12; 73–85) on early modern collecting, the *Wunderkammer*, and information aesthetics; and especially Friedberg (2006, 26–48; 77–81) on connections between Alberti's and Dürer's perspective machines, the *camera obscura*, and the magic lantern, and on the centrality of Renaissance perspective to apparatus film theory. The subtitle of Usai's (2001) book on the death of cinema, "*History, Cultural Memory, and the Digital Dark Age,*" medievalizes the future of digital cinema as a return to a bleaker past.

2. Filming on digital cameras has also blurred a distinction operative in celluloid cinema between cinematography and postproduction editing. Editors of digital film can now "punch in" a camera shot to produce a zoom effect that could only have been achieved with a camera in celluloid film. On analogy with respect to painting and digital media, see Davis (2006).
3. A similar convergence of now separate film editing computer programs into a single program also seems visible.
4. *Be Kind, Rewind* has a series of uncanny features arising from a variety of nested frames, including cameos by actors who appeared in videos for rent and a black and white film within-the-film that is initially part of the opening title sequence and completed and shown at the end of the film narrative.
5. I develop this point in chapter 4 and the conclusion. I have in mind collections such as Mazzio and Trevor (2000) and Freccero (2006). Pye (2000) is an important exception.
6. See, for example, Mazzio and Trevor (2000), 12.
7. Tellingly, psychoanalysis flags as an unmarked narratological problem in the histories of film and media constructed by Manovich (2001) and Rodowick (2007, 5, 19) at the moment history turns into story or allegory: Oedipus or a given set of films turned into characters that are examples of Freudian disavowal respectively drive Manovich's and Rodowick's narratives of film and media history. After discussing the parallel histories of the cinema and the computer, Manovich (2001, 19–25) mentions Oedipus (25) and drops history in favor of "the story" and "our story" (25), to which he gives a "happy ending" (25). Rodowick (2007, 5–19) flanks a discussion of the death of cinema in which films such as *The Matrix* and *Toy Story*, among others, serve effectively, without being recognized as such by Rodowick, as characters or personifications in a historicist allegory, with a mention of Freud's disavowal (5) and closing with Freud's notion of interminable interpretation (19).
8. In a typically witty and crushing response to one of his critics, Paul de Man (1982) takes the opportunity to amplify his own account of mistake and error in Nietzsche, noting that he himself could have made clear a distinction between a mistake as voluntary and local, on the one hand, and error is involuntary and systemic, on the other; de Man notes, however, that it is impossible to keep the mistake and the error separate. See especially the section of Godard and Ishaghpour (2005) entitled "How Video Made the History of Cinema Possible" (31–39); and see also Jean-Luc Godard's account of the death of cinema in his eight-part film *Histoire[s] du cinema* (1988–98), released on DVD by Gaumont (2007) on four discs with incomplete English subtitles.
9. On film trailers, see Kernan (2004). Trailers themselves are important film paratexts that have similarly been digitally dispersed, available on websites that promote both the theatrical release and the DVD editions of a given film as well as appearing as extras on DVD editions of a given film. See, for example, the trailer to *In Bruges* (dir. Martin McDonagh, 2008). It makes use of 3-D, holographic fragments from Hieronymous Bosch's Hell panel of his triptych "The Garden of Earthly Delights" (1503–1504). (The film itself includes a sequence at Bruges's Groeninge museum showing the central and right panels Hieronymous Bosch's "The Last Judgment" triptych ["The Last Judgment" and "Hell," respectively] as well as a series of close-ups of "The Flaying of Sisamnes," the right panel of Gerard David's "Judgment of Cambyses" (1498). *In Bruges* ends with a shootout at filming of a "Bosch nightmare" sequence of the film's film-being made-within-the film homage to Nicolas Roeg's death in

Venice thriller *Don't Look Now* [1973], with extras dressed up as characters from Bosch's the *Last Judgment*'s central and right panels.)

10. My insistence here on a theory of misreading arises from my own resistance to the untheorized pragmatics of reading focused on book use (the default always being active) and data searching and processing now commonplace in early modern textual studies. A quiet polemic runs through the present book against the current tendency in the history of the book and textual studies not to theorize reading. For an important exception, see Yates (2003). While recent scholarship on the medieval and early modern book, especially the margins, is often insightful and illuminating, the more or less unconscious refusal theorize reading arises from what I take to be a be a phobic relation to open academic conflict, a tendency to put deconstruction, for example, up against an oral notion of writing, typically women's "voices," and then a refusal to deconstruct or even see a tension or even an opposition between the two notions of writing, reading, and archivalization.
11. For example, Amazon.com has the movie trailer of *El Cid* on its Web pages for the *El Cid 2-Disc Limited Collector's Edition* and the *El Cid 2-Disc Deluxe Edition*.
12. Further fragmentation are dispersal are registered in the partial overlap between the supplements on the Criterion laserdisc edition of *El Cid* and those on the Miriam Collection DVD edition of *El Cid*.
13. Criterion has led the way in employing "director approved transfer" as a paratextual marker of the DVD's high image quality on the cover of some of its DVD editions. There may also be more than one "director's cut" DVD edition as well, as we will see in chapter 3.
14. By "what is missing," Rossellini means what he leaves out of the story of Saint Francis's life in his film. Both the Eureka and Criterion DVD editions use the Italian cut as their transfer source. And the Eureka booklet and DVD paratext contradict each other the same way the Criterion booklet and DVD paratext do.
15. On the return to philology, see de Man (1986), Ziolkowski (1990), Culler (2002), Lerer (2002a, 2002b, and 2005), Gumbrecht (2003), and the special issue of *Speculum* 65:1 (January 1990) devoted to the "new philology."
16. For a valuable survey of annotations across traditionally defined periods of English literature, see Barney (1991). On annotations and error, see Timpanaro (1976) and Greetham (1995, 1996, 1999); and on the paratext and errata, see Lerer (2002a). On notebooks and computers, see Derrida (2005, 46); and on notes and scientific writing, see Rheinberger (2003). On opening title sequences of films, see King (2005), Allison (2001) and Harris (2000). On DVD audiocommentaries by directors, see Parker and Parker (2004) and Voigts-Virchow (2007); and on special edition DVDs, see Parker (2007) and Parker and Parker (2008).
17. See Derrida (2005): "the page remains a screen. . . . Even when we write on the computer, it is still *with a view* to final printing on paper, whether or not this takes place" (46; emphasis in the original).
18. On graphic design in film, see Bellantoni and Woolman (1999) and Woolman (2005). On film writing, see Ropars 1981; Ropars (1982); and Conley (1991/2007b).
19. Unlike academic scandal, the academic aberrations I analyse pose no threat to academic prestige; rather, they go hand and hand with academic prestige. In this sense, I depart both from the work on footnotes by Grafton (1997), for whom the scandal of footnotes constitutes the real story of scholarship and from the "textual forensics" of D.H. Greetham, in which psychoanalytic slips and other errors are also forms of evidence in a paralegal sense. See also Timpanaro (1976) and Cosgrove (1991).

20. For a witty account of unreading that nevertheless skips over the paratext, see Bayard (2007). On the way academics determine the value of a scholar's work based on the frequency of that work's citations, see Stevens and Williams (2006).
21. Derrida (2005, 95) says that difference is not a "program." But see Derrida's comments on the program in connection with a discussion of the postcard in which he puts forward the hypothesis

    > of a letter that after the event seems to have been launched toward some unknown addressee at the moment of its writing, an addresses unknown to himself or herself . . . ; this is then quite another thing than the transfer of a message. Its content and its end no longer precede it. So, then, you identify yourself and commit your life to the program of the letter, rather of a postcard, of a letter that is open, divisible, at once transparent and encrypted. The program says nothing, it neither announces nor states anything, not the slightest content, it doesn't even present itself as a program. One cannot say that it makes "like" a program, in the sense of appearance, but, without seeming to, it makes, it programs. (1981/2007, 228–29)

    From this nonsignifying program, according to Derrida, the letter arrives by chance rather than by accident, as a gift rather than as a wound: "I receive as a present the chance to which the card delivers itself. It falls to me. I choose that it should chose me by chance" (1981/2007, 220).
22. For the transcript, see http://www.booknotes.org/Transcript/?ProgramID=1806.
23. See Lacan's (1977b) discussion of Freud's account of repetition compulsion in "Tuché and Automaton" (61–63).
24. Although Genette (1997) distinguishes the "functionality" that is "the most essential of the paratext's properties" (407) from the perverse Joupien effect that impedes it, he frequently uses the terms "effect" and "function" interchangeably.
25. See Genette (1988, 63 and 1997, 407). See also Stanitzek (2005) and Kreimeier et al. (2004). For his discussion of genetic criticism, see Genette 1997, 396–403.
26. The integrity of the index is also subject to fragmentation in the form of footnotes and marginal annotations. See Read (2007) on software enabling readers to make marginal notes into digital documents.
27. See Heidegger's (1977) quite different discussion of the word "Ge-stell" (Enframing) "in a sense that has been thoroughly unfamiliar up to now" (19). Enframing for Heidegger is "nothing mechanical, nothing on the order of a machine" and "destining" (23).
28. Agnès Merlet's controversial biopic *Artemisia* (1997) about the Italian renaissance painter Artemisia Gentileschi illustrates the shift from flat perspective to three-dimensional perspective painting vision as a painful anamorphic shift; see the shots of Artemisia [Valentina Cervi] examining the chapel painting in the brilliant opening title sequence and the redistribution of Alberti's *velo* not only as a device for painting but as the two windows on nature that appear in Albrecht Dürer's woodcut of a male artist using the device to draw a nearly naked woman, used in several scenes by Tassi to instruct Artemisia in perspective and in the two windows shown twice in the film, first in Tassi's prison cell and second in the film's final sequence, when the device becomes a kind of camera that matches Artemisia's painterly vision to Merlet's cinematic vision. Learning to see through a new technology of perspective is painful (note also the bandages on her tortured fingers at the end of the film as figures of the opening of

vision as a wound and her eyes opening wide during the rape, when she reimagines it and hears the ocean as she masturbates, and her full body search examination by two nuns at the trial). For a similarly painful notion of the threshold and vision, see *Girl with a Pearl Earring* (dir. Peter Webber, 2003). The door to Vermeer's studio functions as a taboo threshold that only Vermeer (Colin Firth) and the maid Greet (Scarlet Johansen) may cross. The opening of her mouth, remaining kissed by Vermeer when she poses, recalls the open windows in the studio through which they earlier watched and discussed the colors of clouds and anticipates the closed studio door on which she doesn't knock before leaving the household for good.

29. See also Auerbach's 1953/2003 metacritical comments in his last chapter on the resemblance between his own critical practice and the modernist novel's randomness: "there is confidence that in any random fragment plucked from the course of a life at any time the totality of its fate is contained and can be portrayed. . . . I see the possibility of success and profit in letting myself be guided by a few motifs . . . these basic motifs in history of the representation of reality . . . must be demonstrable in any random modernist text" (547, 548).
30. The "newness" of new media has also been usefully interrogated in relation to repetition by Chun (2005), 3, and Friedberg (2006).
31. Krapp cites Tim William Machan (1994). On déjà vu, see Krapp (2005).
32. For the transcript, see http://www.booknotes.org/Transcript/?ProgramID=1806
33. See Lacan (1977, 61–63). What I term the "tic" in the "programmatic" and automatic in my account is like Lacan's concept of the *tuché*, the Real that interrupts the automatic insistence of the letter. In my view, however, the *tuché* is itself a mechanism, albeit a broken one that tics off (and on).
34. Citing a then recent essay on Dürer's "Melancholia I and II," Benjamin (1940/2003) notes that "if the most meaningful works prove to be precisely those whose life [is] most deeply embedded in their material contents . . . then over the course of their historical duration these material contents present themselves to the researcher all the more clearly the more they have disappeared from the world" (89). The afterlife of the work of art begins during its lifetime.
35. Jephcott mistranslates the German word "Fremdwörter" as "German words of foreign derivation."
36. Lerer (2000a) writes that

> the errata sheet stands not as a static marker of uncaught mistakes but as a placeholder in the ongoing narrative of bookmaking, and book reading, themselves. Like many of the paratexts of early print—the prefaces, notes, correspondences, and occasional handwritten comments in the margins of the book—errata sheets illustrate how an early printed book was used by the first ones to see it . . . errata sheets and their accompanying paratexts became the places where the urge to confess could still find a voice and where the seeking of forgiveness found its listener not among the booths of the church but in the stalls of the bookseller. (18)

In Lerer's account, errata sheets are crucially important paratext because they are humanizing and secularizing: "embedded in errata is the story of correction

itself: correction more than typographical or even theological but human and political" (33). According to Lerer, print

> makes possible not the fixity of the text but the participation of the reading public in the act of correction. Though errata sheets enable readers to correct their personal copies, they also make readers active players in the game of textual confession. They serve to establish authorial authority through the acknowledgement of error. In the process, they refashion the relationship of author to reader along new templates of power. The writer stands as pleading witness to a knowing judge, as humble subject to a king or patron, as appellant student to a learned master. . . . The humanist becomes the master of his own mistake. (19–20, 41)

Yet Lerer's rather sadomasochistic rhetoric of mastery and error suggests that the theological haunts the secular fantasy of total correction. See also Camille (1992) on the unplanned production of marginal illustrations in medieval illuminated manuscripts: "One of the earliest . . . marginal masterpieces cannot be described as having a 'programme'. There are important illuminated manuscripts that have fully coherent narrative or typological sequences in their margins. . . . In saying that image making is conscious, I am not saying that it was pre-planned, as were most miniatures . . . It was one area where artists could do 'their own thing,' which was, of course, always already somebody else's meanings" (43). The fact that the marginal images were not preplanned does not make them programmatic however. Indeed, one could argue that the subversive potential Camile attributes to them arises not from their becoming Freudian jokes, as he maintains, but by virtue of their uncanny placelessness as "somebody else's" property. As Camille comments, images of grotesque "bodies remain tethered to texts which they can 'play upon' but never replace" (1992, 47). For a fascinating study of error and failure in relation to the early modern object, see Yates 2003.

37. I thank my colleague Galili Shahar for drawing my attention to these Auerbach letters.
38. For a valuable discussion of this passage, see Agamben (2004, 63–70).
39. Heidegger (1985) denies that this behavior is "some purely mechanical action" (97) and adds that "passing the time is not like some device, installed to drive away boredom" (112). Yet the question of the mechanics of boredom recurs, dare one say it—mechanically—in Heidegger's discussion of boredom. See, for example, "Yet when we are left in peace by something, do we then *automatically* become bored by it?" (103, my emphasis). See also his discussion of machines and equipment (214–15).
40. See also Paul de Man's use of the metaphor of the machine for writing in "Excuses (Confessions)" (1979) and the same metaphor for the trope of irony in "The Concept of Irony" (1996): In Friedrich Schlegel's *Lucinde*, "there is a machine there, a text machine, an implacable determination and a total arbitrariness" (1979, 181). De Man writes that irony cannot be stopped: "the spirit of irony, if there is such a thing, cannot in itself answer such questions: pursued to the end, an ironic temper can dissolve everything, in an infinite chain of solvents. It is not irony but the desire to understand irony that brings such a chain to a stop" (1996, 166).
41. See Heidegger (1996) for his discussion of the uncanny. Heidegger predictably does not mention Freud's "The Uncanny" (*SE* 17), though one may

reasonably infer that he had read it. The shock effect Adorno (1991) values in the use of foreign words (192) is also uncanny: as foreign words are repeated, they come closer to being mechanical, a tic, a parodic kind of schlock.

42. See also the sixteenth and seventeenth of Walter Benjamin's "Theses on the Philosophy of History" (1969): "A historical materialist cannot do without notion of a present which is not a transition, but in which time stands still and has come to a stop. . . . Where thinking suddenly stops in a configuration pregnant with tensions, it gives that configuration a shock" (262).
43. Heidegger (1971b) slams film in particular, writing in "The Thing":

> All distances in time and space are shrinking. Man now reaches overnight, by plane, places which formerly took weeks and months of travel. He now receives instant information, by radio, of events which he formerly learned about only years later, if at all. The germination of growth of plants, which remained hidden throughout the seasons, is now exhibited publicly in a minute, on film. Distant sites of the most ancient cultures are shown on film as if they stood this very moment amidst today's street traffic. Moreover, the film attests to what it shows by presenting also the camera and its operators at work. The peak of this abolition of every possibility of remoteness is reached by the television, which will soon pervade and dominate the whole machinery of communication. (165)

44. On toys and dolls, see Walter Benjamin (1986, 1991a, 1991b, 1999a, 1999b, and 1999c). Benjamin sometimes differentiates wooden from mechanical toys. The German word "Werkzeug" means "tool." In a Heideggarian moment, Benjamin (1986) celebrates preindustrial Russian wooden toys that "still live on . . . in their homeland" and others that have survived "the long journey" to "a safe asylum in the Moscow museum" (124).
45. Freud notes that he stayed at the home of the child (*SE* 18, 14).

1 The Medieval and Early Modern Cienmatographosphere: De-composing Paratexts, Media Analogues, and the Living Dead Hands of Surrealism, Psychoanalysis, and New Historicism

1. Once such breakup occurs when Derrida (2005) returns to his essay on Freud's "Note on a Mystic Writing Pad" and mentions belatedly in the interview that "Freud's description of the celluloid cover sheet is 'a sort of film' or *pellicule*" (49). Drawing an analogy between recording media and memory proves to be a problem for Freud in his essay on the mystic writing pad.
2. For a history of cinema's prehistory that emphasizes discontinuities between film and early modern technologies of vision, see Crary (1990 and 1999). See also MacDonald (1996). See the four-disc DVD extended editions of Peter Jackson's *Lord the Rings* (2001, 2002, 2003) trilogy for examples of recycled paratextual special features.
3. See Greenblatt (1980/2005), Patterson (1990), Aers (1992), Bretzius (1997), and Pye (2000). Bynum (1995), Biddick (1998), and Dinshaw (1999) have all made gestures toward film.
4. I mark my turn to cinema as strategic because the study of film in itself does not necessarily alter the critical practices of either psychoanalysis or historicism with respect to the Middle Ages or Renaissance literary and visual culture.

Compare the excellent studies of Murray (1993) and Pye (2000) for example. Similarly, Conley (1991/2007a and 1991/2007b) reads Renaissance writing and maps the same way he reads films. Conley's reading of film hieroglyphs (1991/2007b) is deeply indebted to art historian Meyer Shapiro's (1973) account of medieval scripts in pictures republished with additional material as Shapiro (1996). See Paxson (2007), however, for a stellar account of medieval film within film as ekphrasis. On the cultural imaginary of medievalism, see de la Bretèque (1985) and (2005); Kawa-Topor (2001); Haydock (2003); Harty (2002 and 2006); Williams (1990 and 1999); Gorgievski (2001, 2002, and 2007); and Aronstein (2005). The problem with a sociological concept of the medieval imaginary is that it keeps in place an opposition between a "real," primary, and prior medieval or early modern core of literary and visual culture (or archive of historical documents) and a later, fantasmatic, and secondary set of citations of that core in so-called popular culture. My view is that the postmodern mediatization of the premodern and early modern literary and visual culture serves as its support and unconscious, thereby calling into question the integrity of any conceptual opposition or temporal sequence between kernel and shell, primary and secondary, and past and present. The archive, as Derrida (1995) shows, is always already technologized.

5. For recent examples of such work in the field of textual studies and the history of the book, see Chartier (2007) and Sherman (2008a). On early modern graphology, see Goldberg (1997), especially on the hand, and Fleming (2001). Chartier comments that "textual production involved a variety of stages, techniques, and operations" (31).
6. See Chartier (2007, 146, n. 21), for example. Chartier cites Freud's "Note on a Mystic Writing Pad" in an endnote and does not mention Freud by name in the body of his text or in the index. I take up historicist resistances to psychoanalysis as a narratological problem in chapter 4 and the Epilgomenon of the present book.
7. For more on the cinematic peritext of medieval films and the way all film credits are medieval in their function as word/image composites derived from (manuscript) illumination, see Burt (2007c). And for an analysis of citations and adaptations of the Bayeux Tapestry in the cinematic peritexts of several medieval films, see Burt (2008b). See also the parody of the Bayeux Tapestry in the opening title sequence of *The Simpsons* Season 19, Episode 10 "*E Pluribus Wiggum*" (airdate January 6, 2008). And an ax wielding knight from the Battle of Hastings sequence in the Bayeux Tapestry appears on the title page of a Beowulf book, the pages of which turn automatically forward after it opens and then go back in reverse until the book closes, during the trailer for the Beowulf Video Game (2007), based on Robert Zemeckis's *Beowulf*. King Edward in the first panel of the Bayeux Tapestry appears in a later illustrated page of the book. For the trailer, go to http://www.youtube.com/watch? v=hOhCb42dAdM.
8. See also the time machine as a figure of cinema in *Timeline* (dir. Richard Donner, 2003). Early on in the film, Chris Johnston (Paul Walker), the son of an archaeologist who goes missing while leading an excavation of a French medieval castle named "Castlegard," talks about a tomb effigy of a knight and his wife. André Marek (Gerard Butler), a Scottish assistant at the dig, assumes that Chris has no interest in the "romantic crap of the past." Yet Chris says the effigy of the couple holding hands intrigues him. The film ends with uncannily matching shots of the couple holding hands on the tomb effigy and Chris holding hands with his new girlfriend Kate Ericson (Frances

O'Connor), a grad student in archaeology who was also working at the excavation. *Timeline's* time travel narrative sets up an uncanny mise-en-abyme whereby damage both precedes and follows restoration, and vice versa, rather than a simple progression from an original pristine cleanliness to its later dirtying by time and then to its subsequent restoration. The hands of the couple on the effigy figure a romantic attachment between them that makes up for the loss of one of the knight's ears, which we learn later was cut off during combat. Marek, having traveled back in time, turns out to be the model for the knight on the tomb effigy, who by the end of the film is buried there alongside Claire (Anna Friel), his fourteenth-century lady love.

A damaged altarpiece found at the site hides a secret passage to Castlegard, the medieval equivalent of a wormhole through which the modern characters travel to the past. The altarpiece is later broken in the medieval past by Chris and Kate, who had earlier (in the present) expressed disgust that someone had broken it. Similarly, the knight's missing ear on the tomb effigy at first appears to be the consequence of modern day vandalism, the memorials of the past having been disfigured over time. *Timeline* allegorizes cinematic representations of the Middle Ages as a paradox: any restoration of the visible past is made possible by a (p)refigurative and literal iconoclastic damage that obscures that past. For related medieval and medieval themed films making use of the crypt, see the ruins of the Roman crypt in *Tristan + Isolde* (dir. Kevin Reynolds, 2006) and recurrent shots of the large statue of the ruling family's ancestral medieval knight in the Church near the graveyard crypt used by smugglers in Fritz Lang's *Moonfleet* (1955).

9. For an excellent account of deep tensions between Freudian psychoanalysis and cinema, see Heath (1999).
10. Freud had no interest in surrealism. On the common interests in automata shared by André Breton and Freud, however, see Gibson (1987). On psychoanalysis and surrealism, particularly the repetition compulsion and the uncanny, see also Foster (1993).
11. For an interview with special effects designer of *Beowulf*, see Kehr (2007). As Gallagher (2007) notes, the image capture motion system Zemeckis used to make the film tends to be judged on its ability to let animators cross what Japanese roboticist Masahiro Mori called in 1970 the "uncanny valley" theory, "the no man's land where artificial humans look both realistic and unrealistic at the same time, giving them a creepy vibe."
12. For example, the Robert Zemeckis's *Beowulf* was released in two different DVD editions in February 2008, one being the theatrical release, the other subtitled "Director's Cut." Only the latter version was released at the same time on HD-DVD. Zack Syder's *300* has been remade as an adult feature (on DVD only) by Michael Ninn as *The Four* (2008) in ways that undo the unreal animation look of Synder's film while also alluding to shots from Oliver Stone's *Alexander* (2004). For the trailer of *The Four*, see http://ninnworx.com/four/media/four-reg.mov
13. The film's medievalism recurs in several close-up shots of the medieval German book *Vampyr* that Van Helsing (Anthony Hopkins) is seen reading and that shows two authentic woodcut illustrations of Vlad Tepesch. For a related use of a medievalizing prologue that sets up a cyclical narrative in which the hero is reanimated, see Merian C. Cooper's *She* (1935), released by Kino on

DVD in 2007. And for a comparable and more extended use of a Renaissance portrait, in this case of the Hungarian Countess Elizabeth Báthory, Vlad the Impaler's sixteenth-century female vampiric counterpart, see *Eternal* (dir. Wilhelm Liebenber and Federico Sanchez, 2004). For a somewhat similar medieval framing prologue, in this case composed of medieval flags, shields, and suits of armor and a stained glass bay window in a nineteenth century Victorian mansion, see *The Undying Monster* (dir. John Brahm, 1942). The film's medievalism continues in later sequences involving a crypt in the mansion that contains three tomb effigies of the heroine's (Heather Angel) medieval ancestors dressed as knights, the oldest of whom, we are told "was a crusader in King Richard I's lifetime."

14. For a possible source of the shadow puppets in the cinematograph scene, see the late 1880s drawing by Gaston Tissandier entitled "Les ombres françaises de Caran d'Ache—Disposition intiérieure de la scène" in Crary (1999, 274), more fully shown and identified by Stafford and Terpak (2001, 295). In Coppola's film, however, the men seen behind the screen are adjusting the light source, not moving the shadow puppets. An unidentified source of the woman in the coffin who turns into a skeleton appears to be Georges Méliès's *The Vanishing Lady* (1896).
15. For more on the familiarity of early cinema that misses its déjà vu strangeness, see McKernan (2006). On nineteenth-century amusements and cinema, see Schwartz (1999).
16. For Coppola's use of old school cinematic techniques to produce the film's special effects, see the documentaries *In Camera: The Naïve Visual Effects of Dracula* and *Method and Madness: Visualizing Dracula* and the second disc special features of the 2007 two-disc DVD collector's edition of *Bram Stoker's Dracula* (1993). This latter documentary points to an illustration of a tarantula by Gustave Doré for Dante's *Inferno* as the source for Dracula's two monstrously joined wives. *Se7en* also uses Doré in the library montage sequence. In *Van Helsing* (dir. Stephen Sommers, 2004), Van Helsing (Hugh Jackson) is equipped by a character like Q in a James Bond film, informed of his assignment through a three-lens magic lantern qua slide projector that shows him his medievalized vampire targets and allies.
17. See Coppola and Hart (1992), *Making Old Time Movie Magic* (52); on the cinematograph scene and the shadow puppets, see *Sorcery on Screen* (82–83) Both very informative short films expose the film's many magic tricks.
18. The documentary *Method and Madness: Visualizing Dracula* (see note nine above) points to Jean Cocteau's *La Belle et la Bête* as a major source for the film, the most obvious link being Vlad reappearing at some points in monstrous form and others as a handsome prince and the ending in which the monstrous vampire Vlad returns to his handsome youthful state before he dies much like the beast becomes the handsome prince. An arm holding a lit candle in Dracula's castle is also taken from Cocteau's film.
19. *Mad Love* (dir. Karl Freund, 1935) is a remake of the more classically Freudian and Expressionist film *Orlacs Hände* aka *Die Unheimlichen Hände des Doktor Orlac* aka *The Hands of Orlac* (dir. Robert Weine, 1924). Freund emigrated from Germany to Hollywood in 1929. Before emigrating, he worked in Berlin as a cinematographer for many of the most famous German Expressionist films, including Weine's *The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari* (1919). Production Notes on the Kino DVD edition of Weine's *The Hands of Orlac*

link the film's plot and German Expressionist set design to the *Nibelungenlied*.

20. Similarly, in Michael Curtiz's 1933 film *Mystery of the Wax Museum* the historical wax figures of Marie-Antoinette and Joan of Arc are "played" by actresses who appear as living characters in the film.
21. In my view, cinema has often defined itself as a recording medium by keeping at its paratextual margins the kinds of writing and media it sometimes polemically regarded as old, if protocinematic. For example, see the matching of magic lantern and slides of Napoleon and cinema in the opening title sequence of *The Emperor's New Clothes*. (See Burt 2006). See also a remarkable scene in *Bedlam* (dir. Mark Robson, 1946), "based" on a print of Bedlam by William Hogarth in *The Rake's Progress*, in which an inmate imagines projecting a flip book of his illustrations on the wall as a projected image like a film, for which, a visitor says, one could even charge admission.
22. On the problem with a recourse to analogy, see the discussion of the parergon in Derrida (1987).
23. See Švankmajer's 1967 short film *Historia Naturae (Suita)*: it uses the oft-reproduced title page engraved illustration of Basilius Besler's wonder cabinet in his book *Continuatio rarorium et aspectu dignorum varii generris* (Nuremberg 1622); see Kenseth (1991, 236) for a reproduction; see also http://www.kunstkammer.at/beslraum.htm. The Latin text ("an arrangement of rare and observable noteworthy things of various kinds, that I come upon, procure, collect and make public, as if alive in open air") is located in the center of the title page illustration to which the paratexter actor and barker Besler points as he announces and advertises the reanimation of the amassed *Wunderkabinet* through the title of the book to a spectator on his left who doubles as the prospective reader of the book. On the *Kunstkammer* and theater, see Bredekamp (2005). In *Historia Naturae (Suita)*, Švankmajer reproduces a somewhat cropped version of the title page illustration and cuts and pastes new texts in place of the original Latin serving as titles to introduce each sequence of his film (the first text, for example, reads "1. Aquatillia foxtrot"). See also Švankmajer's early modern/ Surrealist animated title sequence using Leonardo da Vinci's "Vitruvian Man" drawing as the basis for anamorphic letters (made up of human bodies) that spell out, in domino effect, the film's title *Leonardo's Diary* (1972, 10 minutes). Both films are available on the BFI *Jan Švankmajer: The Complete Short Films* DVD. On early modern book images of wonder cabinets, see Felfe (2005); and for a broader view of early modern illustrated title pages, paratexts, and architectural frames, see Sherman (2007).
24. On the controversial restoration of Holbein's "Ambassadors," see Wyld (1998). See also the National Gallery's documentary film *Restoring the Ambassadors* (dir. Alexander Sturgis and Susan Foister, 1997). The area of the skull in Holbein's "Ambassadors" was restored in nineteenth century, but the original could not be recovered. A computer generated model of the skull was used to restore the painting because the restored version of the skull did not have the correct perspective. Whether or not the newly restored or previously restored skull conforms to the original is thus open to question.
25. Lacan (1977a, 85–90, 92 and 1986, 135, 140); Lacan (1986/1997, 135, 140) (and on anamorphosis in Sophocles' *Antigone*, 243–87); Žižek (1992, 90–91, 96), Gombrich (1960, 1974), Lemann (1975, 13–14), Berger (1972, 89–91, 94–95),

Kemp (1990, 208–10, 304), Murray (1993, 34, 60, n. 9 and 1997, 50–51, 207, 233–36), Silverman (1995, 175–78, 181, 246, n. 16), Hansen (2004, 200), and Greenblatt (1980/2005 17–27, 57–58) all discuss Holbein's painting (Greenblatt [1980/2005, 260, n. 8] cites Baltrusaitis's book).

26. The film's yoking of its title as title page to a hand pulling a curtain echoes the appearances of hands and the importance of title pages in early modern printed books. As Sherman (2008a) notes, "the margins of Renaissance texts are littered with severed hands, frozen in gestures that cannot fail to catch the eye. . . . they have an uncanny power to conjure up the bodies of dead writers and readers. . . . As the printed book hit its stride and title pages began to come into their own, there was no section more in need of highlighting than the title itself" (29, 41). For another cinematic example of shots of a hand that writes a fragmenting text and fragmented author, see the first scene of Peter Greenaway's *Prospero's Books* (1991). See also the film animator's hand entering the shot in Dante's *Inferno* (dir. Sean Meredith, 2008), a live action film using animated cutout drawings as puppets with human voice-overs delivering their lines. The hand may be seen in the film trailer at http://www.dantefilm.com/traileryoutube.html. And for close-up shots of a hand turning pages of a book (the novel on which the film is based) used as wipes to cut to shots from the film, see the trailer for *Captain from Castille* (dir. Henry King, 1947), included as an extra on the DVD edition.
27. Five talking head experts in art history and film who are interviewed in the Švankmajer TV documentary entitled *The Cabinet of Jan Švankmajer* on the BFI DVD *Jan Švankmajer—The Complete Short Films* appear in front of Arcimboldo's seasons series and stills from what the Quays in an interview "extra" on the BFI DVD call the "fantasy sequences" from the documentary that were recut and passed together to make up the Quays' shorter film of the identical title *The Cabinet of Jan Švankmajer*. The first fantasy sequence includes a voice-over commentary that is apparently delivered by Švankmajer or someone quoting him and also mentioning Arcimboldo. And the Quay Brothers highlight Rudolf II and the sixteenth and twentieth centuries in their introduction for the BFI *Jan Švankmajer* DVD. See also special feature entitled *The Animator of Prague, A BBC Documentary* on the *Collected Shorts of Jan Švankmajer* (Kino Video, 2 disc, 2005). At thirteen and a half minutes into the DVD, Švankmajer says he "lives in very special kind of Prague by which I am influenced. It is the Prague of Rudolf II. I believe Rudolf's personality left a very strong mark on Prague"; the Vertmunus portrait appears, followed soon thereafter by Švankmajer's voice-over commentary on the opening of *Historia Naturae (Suita)* (1967). On the reanimating aspects of Rudolf II's collection (that Arcimboldo curated), see Fučíková (2000): "Rudolf's collection was not merely a static display to please the eye of the onlooker; it was a living organism and a fascinating resource" (52).
28. For a literal match out between a shot of page of a pop up Renaissance architecture book and a film set based on that page, see Peter Greenaway's film adaptation *Prospero's Books* (1991). On the early modern print paratext and architecture, see Sherman (2007). See also Sherman (2008b).
29. This account of how Holbein's "Ambassadors" was hung has been questioned by Hart and Robson (1993), who use a computer simulation to argue that the painting would have been hung on a staircase allowing the skull to be seen on

the way up or down the stairs. The skull itself had to be restored by the National Gallery, and the restorer assumed that a real skull was used originally even though the traces of the earlier restoration proved not to be fully perspectival. See Wyld (1998) and Foister et al. (1998). See also the National Gallery's documentary film *Restoring the Ambassadors* (dir. Alexander Sturgis and Susan Foister, 1997).

30. The highbrow/lowbrow shows up later in two more scenes as well: When Somerset cites lines from *The Merchant of Venice* and gives the title, Somerset says "Didn't see it," assuming Somerset is talking about a film. When looking over the titles of books checked out by library patrons, Somerset pointedly mispronounces the Marquis de Sade's last name.
31. The edition of the *Canterbury Tales* with the yellow cover, because it says Modern Library, may be the W.W. Skeat edition which the Modern Library brought out in the late 1920s based on the old Skeat edition for Oxford (1897). My thanks to my colleague R. Allan Shoaf for help with these identifications and for information on their scholarly standing.
32. For Genette (1997), the paratext has "a pedagogical objective, namely, the instruction of the public, so as to guard against eventual misunderstanding and to orient the reader. . . . " (63).
33. To be sure, the *Paradise Lost* and *Merchant* quotations are not actually medieval. I would argue that the seven sins model only becomes fully clear due to the literary references when Somerset "gets medieval" at the library.
34. This instruction is also literalized for the spectator when Somerset moons us as he jumps up to take the painting down in Gould's office while Mills is miming receiving anal intercourse from behind.
35. Mills adds that Dante's *Purgatorio* begins with Pride, not Gluttony. So the analogy between Doe the medieval preacher and Doe the serial killer is already breaking down.
36. In the scene preceding the second visit, Mills reads to Somerset in the car from the list, giving either titles or authors (*Of Human Bondage*, the Marquis de Sade, and so on), thereby registering a further fracturing of the paratext.
37. As I note in the introduction, the French title of Genette's *Paratexts* is *Seuils*, meaning "thresholds."
38. On the other hand, the photo of the model's head anticipates the matching head shot of Tracey briefly seen just before Mills shoots Doe.
39. Fincher acknowledges Stan Brakhage on the laserdisc version commentary of *Se7en*. Brakhage also made a six-minute, hand-painted, multigauge abstract film "based" on the *Divine Comedy*, which he read in every translation he could find, entitled *The Dante Quartet* (1987) which is broken into three parts, *Hell Itself; Hell Spit Flexion*; *Purgation*; and see also his *Existence is Song*. For a different analysis of the title sequence, see Böhnk (2003).
40. Doublings and repetitions in the title sequence are frequently echoed in the film. There are two televisions in the Gluttony crime scene, one stacked on top of the other, on different channels; there are two television sets, both on the same channel, in the lawyer's office; there are two audiotapes for interrogation of the Lust victim and porn shop owner; and there are two Wild Bill's "Leathers" written on the two windows of the shop front.
41. Victor's fingerprints left at the scene of a crime that John Doe committed turn out to be a ruse. Doe's prints cannot be traced, moreover, as none are on record because he has shaved them off his finger tips. Somerset's name is

effaced from the office door in one scene, and Somerset drops of an envelope addressed to Mills' on Mill's desk, identified as such by a plaque entitled "Det. Mills."

42. See also Renoir (1960).
43. "This is a footnote movie. I love footnote movies," David Fincher says about *Se7en* very near the end of his audiocommentary on the DVD. Let me footnote briefly Fincher's docudrama *Zodiac* (2007), in many ways a remake of *Se7en*. "He offered a few people, he wrote a few letters, and faded into footnote," former Chronicle reporter Paul Avery (Robert Downey, Jr.) says about the Zodiac killer more than four years after the killings have stopped without his ever being found. Yet it is the *San Francisco Chronicle* newspaper cartoonist Robert Graysmith (Jake Glynnhaal) that cartoonist Avery is dismissing as who knows what to do with footnotes. In an earlier scene set at a bar over drinks, Graysmith pulls out a copy of a book entitled *The Code Breaker*, the author's name invisible, and places it on the table as he explains to Avery how to decode the ciphers the Zodiac killer has sent to the *Chronicle*: "In this book, the author presents a very simple substitution in the preface." Avery replies "But there are none letter symbols, cuz there's all these medieval ones," pointing to symbols on A letter from Zodiac shot in close-up. Graysmith agrees, replying "I thought they looked medieval too. But then I found a code written in the Middle Ages," and holds up a second book entitled *Codes and Ciphers*, this time the author's name, John Laffin, visible. "Guess what it's called. The Zodiac alphabet." The film's narrative is structured by a chiasmus relayed by a preface of one book and its supplement by a second: the contemporary code looks medieval, but the medieval code turns out to be contemporary. For a related detective film (not yet released theatrically as this book was in production) about a serial killer who uses "anamorphosis, a Renaissance painting technique which uses the principles of forced perspective to construct an alternate image within the frontal composition," see *Anamorph* (dir. H.S. Miller, 2007). The killer puts mimetic serialization into question (he is not a copycat) by a staging crime scenes using body parts of a murder victim rearranged as clues, in one case, and using the corpse of his victim posed as a model posed by a huge machine with mechanical arms that automatically paints a gigantic scale triptych portrait of the (de)faced victim, in another. (Features of the face of another murder victim are gradually filled in a flip book the detective flips through.) *Anamorph* also contains scenes showing the surface of an anamorphic painting from an anamorphic camera angle, showing a split skull in one case, and the detective (Willem Dafoe) is also shown using a convex mirror he has placed over an anamorphic painting to decode its clues. The serial killer's handwriting looks very much like John Doe's in Fincher's *Se7en*. The film trailer may be seen at http://www.ifcfilms.com/ viewFilm.htm?filmId=736.
44. For commentary by historians on *Day of Wrath*, see Davis 1987 and Ginzburg 1983b. I thank Professor Ginzburg for sending me a copy of his essay.
45. We see Martin writing later in the film, but his writing is not significant.
46. The "Dies Irae" music also links the two women, first when Martin and Anne encounter the horse drawing wood to the execution, and the music morphs into "Dies Irae," again when the two encounter the choir boys rehearsing the music, and again when Anne and Martin watch the burning and hear the choir boys perform "Dies Irae." The alternating use of the

theme music as extradiegetic and diegetic linking these two women further complicates the history the film is narrating, divorcing the time of the film itself from the time being narrated.

47. Compare Salter and Pearsall (1980) to Kendrick (1999), especially 217–25.
48. *Shrek the Third* (dir. Chris Miller and Raman Hui, 2007), a parodic retelling of previously parodic retellings of the Arthurian legend, begins with an allusion to *Monty Python and the Holy Grail* (coconut halves knocked together are revealed to be the source of what seemed to be the sound of horse hooves). The character's voices belong to Python's Eric Idle and John Cleese. The film begins and ends with musicals (dinner theater first, then a Disney/Las Vegas/Broadway show at the end). *Shrek the Third* alludes less to the film *Monty Python and the Holy Grail* than to its reanimated Broadway musical avatar, *Spamelot*. Clips from the Broadway production are available on YouTube.com.
49. Although it is not celebrated for its humor, Rohmer's *Perceval le Gaullois* bears resemblance to *Monty Python and the Holy Grail* in a number of respects, notably an erring central character who is foolish, stupid, even virtually uneducable (he mistakes a knight's tent for a church, for example, and then forces himself on a Lady whom he later does not recognize after her Lord has punished her); the sound of Perceval's horse's hoofs offscreen during the end title sequence; the anachronistic staging of the story of Jesus' arrest, flagellation, and crucifixion using medieval knights as Roman guards (compare the similar kinds of anchronistic costuming in Pier Palo Pasolini's 1964 film *The Gospel According to St. Matthew*); the uncertainty over whether the lengthy next-to-last sequence is a medieval Passion play reenactment of the story of Jesus, with Perceval sporting a new beard only because he is now playing Jesus, or the actual story, given the use of stage blood as if it were real blood and the lack of a narrative frame marking the performance as a play within the film; arbitrarily having many of the same actors play different roles wearing different clothes, notably Fabrice Luchini cast both as Perceval and as Jesus, and other actors play only single roles; and repetitions such as recurrent, semicircular right to left pan shots of the highly artificial set with metallic trees and green astroturf (as when Perceval and Gauvain [Sir Gawain] ride by the same trees), the four dining scenes, the chorus singing lines just spoken by a character, and Jesus carrying the cross in a circle, falling to his knees in the same place, in the center of the shot. Moreover, fidelity of Rohmer's *Perceval* to its source by drawing on medieval illuminated manuscripts for its mise-en-scène and costumes in ways that recall the similarly odd fidelity of animated sequences of *Monty Python and the Holy Grail* and the flat perspective paintings of castles and sets derived from the Limoges brothers' illuminated book the *Très riches heures du duc de Berry* (1412–16) in Laurence Olivier's *Henry V* (1944), Rohmer's *Perceval* adopts various estranging effects that disrupt the narrative, including having characters deliver extradiegetic voice-over; address each other or speak by themselves in the past tense as third person reciters and narrators of actions the character is presently performing and having the musician singers turn into characters during, for example, Perceval's near rape of a damsel as three women sing about it as they look into the tent and the later parallel scene with Blancefleur kissing Perceval in his bed all night as the same women sing the narrative, or, to take another, during the first King

Arthur sequence when the woman singer turned admirer of Lancelot is slapped by Sir Kay for smiling at him. Given that Perceval relies mostly on medium and medium long shots with relatively long takes, the sparing use of formal cinematic devices such as the single use of a dissolve at the beginning of the Fisher King sequence, the single superimposition of the three blood spots left by the wounded goose on the ice over Blanchefleur's face as her eyes and mouth, and the single special effect marking the entrance and exit of the strange-haired woman on horseback who tells Perceval he is cursed for not speaking up when he saw the Grail and always bleeding spear; the single shot of blood when Perceval throws a spear into the Red Knight's right eye; the single shot (and, unusually, in close-up) during the Passion play with stage blood when a spike is driven into Jesus' feet; and the single two shot animated sequence with a log shot of animated geese flying in the background over a frozen lake and then, in a entirely animated medium shot, one goose attacked by another are all similarly notable, if not disruptive. The music and various sound effects of birds and the ocean alternately functions in a conventionally diegetic manner and unconventionally in the film's diegesis as when musicians sing the story as if the characters in the scene did not hear them. (The self-contained, digressive Guavain subplot is marked as exceptional within the film in that by the music always being extradiegetic.) Rohmer's avant-garde New Wave film bears some similarities to the Hollywood film musical and to *Spamelot* as well. For an excellent analysis of Rohmer's film, see Williams (1983).

50. The two-disc "Ultimate Definitive Final Special DVD Edition" of *Monty Python and the Holy Grail* extends these interpretive problems by offering a variety of more or less ridiculous subtitle options and other paratextual features. The animated DVD menu also makes use of a number of medieval illustrations. Compare Jean-Jacques Annaud's much more simplistic account of manuscript marginalia and vision in *The Name of the Rose* (1986), especially the scene with Adso of Melk (Christian Slater) peeping into the hut outside the abbey walls as the woman he slept with and her family cavort, laughter erupting as an old man is awakened by bird shit falling on his left eye. The peasants who are blind to their own social and economic marginality contrast sharply with the pellucid vision of the two Franciscan monks, Adso and William of Baskerville (Sean Connery). The film draws an equally sharp contrast between the acute moral vision of the Franciscan monks and the obtuse moral blindness of the leaders of the Inquisition and their supporters, especially the literally blind Jorge de Burgos (Feodor Chaliapin Jr.). Everything, no matter how marginal, can be made into a significant clue by William of Baskerville. The scriptorium scene is key in making the visual manuscript illustrations (the Pope as a fox, the Abbey as a monkey) of the dead translator into a covert but easily readable critique of the Church William reads with the aid of his eyeglasses.
51. I thank Galili Shahar for drawing my attention to this letter. On Benjamin and Dada, particularly the Dadaist Francis Picabia, see Baker (2007), 84–85, and, specifically on Benjamin and Dada films, Baker (2007), 291–92.
52. See also Poltun 1987, 275–301. For Arcimboldo scholarship that contests this connection, see Kaufman (1976, 1978, 1993, and 2007). The two views clash in essays in the Musée du Luxembourg exhibition catalogue *Arcimboldo: 1526–1593* (Ferino-Pagden 2007, 17, 100).

53. See also Legrand (1955).
54. For related images of flight, suspension, and early modern art, see the sequences in *Ivan's Childhood* (1962) with three woodcuts by Albrecht Dürer; the close-ups of Brueghel's "Hunters in the Snow" in space station's library in Tarkovsky's *Solaris* (1972); the turned pages of a book of some of Leonardo da Vinci's paintings and drawings that ends a montage sequence and precedes a déjà vu experience and the Leonardo painting in the living room sequence that follows soon after a space balloon sequence in Tarkovsky's *The Mirror* (1975); and the air balloon scene at the beginning of Tarkovsky's *Andrei Rublev* (1969). Andrei Tarkovsky has sometimes been labeled a surrealist filmmaker (see Martin 2001 and Král 1990/2001) though Tarkovsky himself repudiated the term, Yet it would appear that although André Breton thought that symbol and allegory were dead, over, done with, Tarkovsky returned to them via medieval and early imagery. See also the first sequence following the opening title sequence in Derek Jarman's *The Last of England* (1988) that crosscuts between color photo footage of an angry young gay man shooting up, then stomping on and finally having mock sexual intercourse with Caravaggio's "Profane Love" (Amor vincit omnia), with Jarman getting high writing on a paper with images as he provides a narrative voice-over.
55. The *Return of Martin Guerre*, for example, is a ghost story written by a screenwriter, Jean-Claude Carrière, who wrote screenplays for several Luis Buñuel films. Carrière also cowrote with Milos Forman *Goya's Ghosts* (2007), in which the same actress, Natalie Portman, plays an unmarried mother and her prostitute daughter. For related kinds of historical films, see Jean Cocteau's *La Belle et la Bête* (the mise-en-scène is derived from Vermeer's paintings); *The Hypothesis of a Stolen Painting* (dir. Raul Ruiz, 1977), which includes a scene alluding to Ingmar Bergman's *Seventh Seal* (1957) and is based on a novel by the surrealist Pierre Klossowski; and Jean Dreville's 1938 historical fantastic film *Le joueur d'échecs* (The Chess Player), about a Polish rebellion against Catherine the Great and based on Baron Wolfgang von Kempelen's life-size mechanical "Chess Turk," animated by a human hidden inside, that he presented to the court of empress Maria Theresia in 1769. The film not only allegorizes the heroine Sonja (Micheline Francey), called a Polish Joan of Arc by Catherine II (Francoise Rosay), an emblem enlisted by Poland against its Russian oppressor that matches the mobilizing of the French nation against its potentially Nazi German oppressor, but, more significantly, exposes the mechanisms of such cinematic allegories by triangulating Sonja, herself the object of a romantic rivalry between a Russian and a Polish officer, with the Baron de Kempelen (Conrad Veidt). Clearly a figure for Dreville as film director, as in the opening scene with Kempelen forging automata in his studio (one fragmented mannequin looks like it just arrived from the studio of Dadaist Hans Bellmer), Kempelen becomes explicitly parallel to the filmmaker the second time Kempelen exposes the mechanisms of his chess player, this time placing a light into the cinema reels below that are already turning by themselves and making the whirring sound of a film projector. (The film is available on a Studio Canal DVD region 2 with intermittent English subtitles). Benjamin (1969), incidentally, discusses this automaton as a figure for historical materialism at the beginning of his "Theses on the Philosophy of History" (253). See especially *Premonition* (dir. Mennan Yapo, 2007): a key scene in the psychiatrist's office involves a medium

long shot and noticeably long take of Diego Velázquez's *Las Meninas* (1656) as an encrypted reference to an absent, invisible narrative frame that would explain the events of the film as the protagonist's psychotic hallucinations: her husband didn't die in a car accident; she murdered him. An alternate ending on the DVD edition makes this invisible narrative frame even more clear.

56. As Maiorino (1991) comments on Arcimboldo's The "Librarian", "the anonymous tomes set up the book as an object whose many bookmarks signal usage but fail to identify authors and titles" (48). The original title of the painting, if there was one, is unknown; the title "The Librarian" was supplied by Olof Granberg in the twentieth century Tellingly, the identification of "The Librarian" with Wolgang Lazius turns on images of titled books appearing in three pictorial examples: "the title page of a book by Lazius, his personalized bookplate, and his woodcut portrait" (Elhard 2005, 118). See also the books without titles in Albrecht Dürer's engraving of the bibliomaniac in Sebastian Brandt's *Narrenshiff*. For a discussion of Arcimboldo and Brandt, see Elhard (2005, 118 and n. 4, 123). On Emperor Rudolf II and Arcimboldo, see Kaufmann (1988), Fučíková (1997), and Fučíková (2000).
57. A DVD entitled *Visite de l'exposition Arcimboldo (1526–1593)* produced by SVO ART for the Musée du Luxembourg 2007 exhibition "*Arcimboldo: 1526–1593*" (in French only) has an interesting and uncanny relation to the Quays' film: it includes two different DVDs, one for adults and a "Bonus DVD junior" for children. Both films are directed by Christian Guyonnet. The bonus animated DVD for children highlights facets of Arcimboldo's anamorphic portraits in order to illustrate their meanings. (For example, the character Arcimboldo tells the child in the film that the "F" next to Arcimboldo's name woven into the collar of "Spring" means "I made it.")
58. For a similar use of the hand by Jan Švankmajer, see the crayon drawing the hand that in turns begins drawing hair that morphs into a Leonardo da Vinci self-portrait in *Leonardo's Diary* (1972); later in the film, the hand points offscreen a number of times, appearing to exert destructive force on cut in live film objects such as a man crashing his motorcycle and an airplane bomber dropping its bombs.
59. *Le Roman de Reynard* is available on DVD, region 2 only. The opening and title sequences of this stop-motion animated film also remediate the theater and the book. At the start of the film, characters in the film appear out of illustrated books, as if out of pop-up books, and then disappear back into them at the end.
60. For a brilliant analysis of the trope of turning the screw of interpretation, see Felman (1977).
61. The surrealist cut, famously instantiated by the razor through the cow's eye following the cloud across the moon in Luis Buñuel and Salvador Dalí's *Un Chien Andalou* (1929), becomes the title card insert a break in the Quays' *Cabinet of Jan Švankmajer*. Similarly, a credit is given to the posthumous composer of *The Cabinet of Jan Švankmajer*, the sound track of which was used earlier in Švankmajer's *Historia Naturae (Suita)* (1967). Transformation is part of this film's phantom afterlife, a quotation of the earlier film without a paratextual credit to it. See also the stop motion animated sequence in which the mounted movie camera seems to come to life near the end of Vertov's *Man with a Movie Camera* (1929).
62. The Quays' *Cabinet of Jan Švankmajer* might alternatively be said to skip over the Enlightenment notion of the museum collection as a transmission

of "a scientific narrative of knowledge" (Crane 2000, 73), or alternatively, to disclose a deconstructive logic already at work in the German Enlightenment cut-and-paste pedagogical logic with respect to the book. See Heeson (2002), for a useful analysis of Johann Siegmund Stoy's fascinating *Picture Academy for the Young (1780–84)*, a series of books to be cut up into single pages by the teacher and student and stored in a box "like a modern-day card catalogue" (7), and eventually rebound as a book with additional blank pages left for notetaking.

63. For a similarly uncanny though less self-conscious conjunction of machine and human in surrealist Czech cinema of the 1980s, see the first seven minutes of Jirí Barta's stop motion animation film *The Pied Piper of Hamlin* (1985) in which the interior mechanism of the town's clock is shown to have anthropomorphic elements (one piece looks like a torso with moving arms), cross cut with two rats in profile beating a bell, two men (carved puppets) in a forge beating metal on an anvil, a series of shots of stone carvers and carpenters working on a cathedral working at the same rhythm and making parallel sounds with their tools, culminating in a shot of a man minting coins with a hammer in a basement space. The film begins at dawn as the clock mechanism serves as awake up call to the carved puppet people that inhabit the German Expressionist looking medieval village of Hamlin. The minting of money produces breakdowns in the otherwise automatically cooperative behavior of the citizens, pairs of whom as buyer and seller squabble intensely over the monetary value of various goods on sale. The cross cuttings of rats and puppets beating their tools in time are punctuated by close-ups of medallions representing their labor that then zoom out to reveal their places on building pediments; an overhead shot of the village (here a village circle) dissolves onto a close-up of drain hole which the camera tracks down to match to a close-up of a metal coin being minted that also takes the form of a royal medallion showing the King's face in profile. Architectural ornaments and money are thus connected visually and psychoanalytically thorough an anal track, although money is not hoarded and accumulated so much as produced as excrement vomited up above by the squabbling buyers and sellers. The circulation and printing of money are recorded by the minter in a ledger and this account book is reviewed with consternation by the King. The 55 minute long film is available on the DVD *Jirí Barta: Labyrinth of Darkness*.
64. For a fine analysis of Renaissance dolls that attention indirectly to their uncanny status, see Croizat (2007), esp. 107–8 (on automata and female dolls). See also Freud's discussion of the mechanical doll Olympia in his discussion of Hoffmann's "The Sandman" in "The Uncanny" (*SE* 17). For a related surrealist film involving medieval illustrations in the title sequence, dolls, and puppets, see Alejandro Jodorowsky's *Fando y Lis* (1968); and for a surrealist film involving a woman and her mannequin double, see Luis Buñuel's *The Criminal Life of Archibald de la Cruz* (1952). See also the highly self-reflexive and clever *Warning Shadows: A Nocturnal Hallucination* (dir. Arthur Robison, 1923) and *The Doll* (dir. Ernst Lubitsch, 1919) for German Expressionist films that use puppets and puppetry to theatricalize Freud's concepts of the desire, projection, and the uncanny. Robison's *Warning Shadows* involves a traveling player who gains entry at a dinner party to perform an Asian shadow puppet play and related shadow entertainments by using his hands to make shadows

of human faces; close-ups of a shadow of a hand with the thumb, index, and second finger extended upward also mark transitions between characters in the film's theatricalized prologue screen (echoed later by the shadow proscenium arch screen used during the shadow puppet performance) and opening title sequence as well as transitions between narrative segments of the film and close-ups of a guest lusting after the host's flirtatious wife also parallel shots of the shadow play itself (also about a romantic triangle) and shots of the apparently darkly motivated traveling player, who more and more explicitly in the film figures as a filmmaker and film projectionist, behind the screen manipulating the puppets to make the highly agitated host paranoid and conclude mistakenly that his apparently unfaithful wife is, in fact, an adulteress (his jealously ends up making her into an adulteress whom he then punishes by having three of the four all-male guests murder her in a diegetic shadow sequence). In an unusually extended epilogue long enough to be a final act, however, the film involving the wife's adultery and murder turns out to be a film-in-the-film (we have been tricked, much like the husband). This film-in-the-film has been made, we learn, by the traveling player qua filmmaker and projectionist, who stands revealed not as a malicious demonic threat to the host but as the collective therapist and pedagogue of the dinner party members. He has channeled the potentially destructive fantasies and desires of the hosts and guests he earlier hypnotized through a cinematic lighting illusion, and as the player returns to the Asian shadow play to show how the story ends, the shadow play has clearly become a silhouette stop motion animated film in the manner of a Lotte Reiniger's *Pied Piper of Hamelin* (1918). The dinner party members are shown watching it as film spectators, who uneasily absorb its lesson, until the host alone claps. The married couple reconcile and together look out from a window, previously the source of ambiguous shadows of the wife engaged in adultery, on the departed dinner guests and the traveling player in the square below in the full light of day and hence free of shadows. The film's final shot, however, uses special effect shadows looking like theater curtains to close the screen from the left and the right sides and thereby end the film. Lubitsch's *The Doll*, about a man happily tricked into marriage by a woman masquerading as a full-size doll, opens with a quite funny theatrical framing sequence in which a puppet master takes pieces out of a toy box to construct a scale model of a house on a hill in which he places two dolls. A matchout transition reveals what still seems to be the miniature doll house and trees actually to be full-scale models composing the film set as the dolls-turned-human actors walk out of the front door of the house. For a related conjunction of the Renaissance and surrealism, see the mock photograph taken near the end of Luis Buñuel's *Viridiana* (1961) in which the beggar's banquet is staged as a recreation of Leonardo da Vinci's "The Last Supper." And for a film linking the Renaissance, dolls, surrealism, and the uncanny, see *The Cell* (dir. Tarsem Singh, 2000), especially its revelation of the source of a torture disembowelling device used by the villain on the hero as a reproduction of a Jusepe de Ribera-like painting of a saint being tortured hanging in the serial killer's bedroom.

65. See also two sequences in Švankmajer's *Leonardo's Diary* (1972), the first focusing on one of da Vinci's eyeballs, showing it turn repeatedly 180 degrees, based on da Vinci's "Leonardo's Eye" (1485), the earliest known example of perspective anamorphosis, and the second showing a paper with

one of da Vinci's drawing on it crumpled up into a ball a number of times until it finally bursts into flame and turns to ash. See Ackerman 1978, 147–48. For medieval and early modern films that make use of the spin as a voluntary divine gesture of providential direction or involuntary reflex resulting from demonic possession, see the scene with Saint Francis directing the priests to turn themselves around until they become dizzy and fall down near the end of Rossellini's *Francesco Guillare di Dio* (1950) and the spinning nuns sequences in *Mother Joan of the Angels* (dir. Jerzy Kawalerowicz 1961).

66. A similar kind of transformation occurs in the sequence with a map of Europe highlighting Paris and Prague. When the map is flipped over, the word "Praha" (meaning "Prague") is also an overhead image of a Ryswick Vauban-like fortress city; as it is turned horizontally, this word as fortress is becomes recognizable as the head and torso of a man whose flayed arms flank his body, one extended downwards toward the cathedral and the other lying by his side. Both arms look quite mechanical, like the Librarian's.
67. For a similarly dynamic dialectic between interiorization and exteriorization, see the animated sequences involving Leonardo da Vinci in Švankmajer's *Leonardo's Diary* (1972), particularly the 180 degree rotating eyeball of Leonardo shot in close-up noted above; the back of Leonardo's tongue and the inside of his throat as he sticks it out; and the pumping heart and breathing lungs in Leonardo's chest. These sequences also include a close-up of the apprentice drawing of a "Profile of an Ancient Captain" (175–60) cut back and forth with "Head of a Young Girl" (1508); the study of "Heads for the Battle of Anghiari" and "Study of Combatants on Horseback and Foot for the Battle of Anghiari" (1503–1505); "Viscera of the Human Abdomen" (1506–1508); and the "Study of Muscles of the Mouth" (1508), which morphs into a red chalk drawing on paper of the lone self-portrait of himself when an old man (1515). These sequences involve a dialectic of creation and destruction as well: A woman's head is surrounded by geometrical tools and designs and a skull, and it then morphs into a building that is blown up by the cannon ball; similarly, a piece of paper crumples up after a cannon shoots a cannon ball (both are taken from Leonardo's drawing of a mortar with mechanisms for adjusting its range in his *Codex Atlanticus* f. 9v–a). The crumpled ball of paper finally burns up and turns to ash.
68. On the Renaissance computer, see Rhodes and Sawday (2000).
69. The Quays' *Cabinet* here also plays out the logic of Arcimboldo's two vertically reversible anamorphic portraits, "The Man in the Plate" (1570) and "The Man and the Vegetables" (1590) which look upright as fruit in a basket or roast pig in a plate even when the "face" is hung upside down. The inside front and inside back pages of the *Paris Match* "Guide Officiel Arcimboldo Le Jardin Extraordinaire" (2007) show the importance of the paratext in Arcimboldo's paintings by reproducing this reversible effect on the cover and inside covers. The cover shows Arcimboldo's "Man in a Fruit Basket" upside down and prints the *Paris Match* logo on the upper left, as usual, but also upside down on the lower right as well as the title "Arcimboldo" upside down across the bottom with a smaller printed subtitle also written upside down "Il a mis le xvi^{e} siècle sens dessus dessous" ("He put the sixteenth century upside down"). Similarly, Arcimboldo's "Man in the Plate" and "Man in Vegetables" and their identifying texts appear upside down in the inside front and inside back covers, respectively. The reader

must animate the magazine guide in order to "read" the paintings with the aid of their guiding paratextual titles.

70. The "punch in" zoom function of postproduction digital film editing software programs allows the film editor to perform a similarly interactive function. For a similar book with zoom in features, see Musset's (2005) reproductions of the Bayeux Tapestry and a computer version, see Martin K. Foys' (2003) CD-ROM edition of the Bayeux Tapestry.
71. See also I.G.A. Brambilla's nearly contemporary engraving of four Arcimoldesque portrait profiles and "caricaturales des dieux olympienes," (reproduced in Ferino-Pagden 2007, 222).
72. See Švankmajer's animation of Leonardo da Vinci's alphabet in the opening title sequence of *Leonardo's Diary* (1972, ten minutes).
73. The BFI DVD *The Quay Brothers: The Short Films, 1979–2003* was released in the United States under the title *Phantom Museums: The Short Films of the Quay Brothers* (2007).
74. I thank Galili Shahar for this reference and for his comment on it to me that the left hand, in Freud's interpretation, is the hand of sexual crime. It is also worth noting Freud's discussion of his inability to visit Rome and his various dreams about it (*SE* 4, 195–97; 325–26).
75. On the need for two hands to use the mystic writing pad and the unconscious, see Derrida (2005). On the schlock of medievalism, see Burt 2007c. Medieval schlock effects may double back into serious shock. At the shock end of the spectrum, consider the place of three Dürer engravings in Andrei Tarkovsky's *Ivan's Childhood* (1962). The film begins and ends with two miraculous dream sequences: the first uses a blimp shot of Ivan flying (from his p.o.v.) and the second uses a blimp shot of Ivan (Nicolai Burlyayer) running on water. The film's opening and closing fantasy of flight (and of Ivan's reunion with his dead mother) frames a key sequence in the film in which Ivan is shown by a friendly, young Lieutenant some "spoils of war" which now belong to the Russian officer, namely, three Dürer engravings: the four horseman of the apocalypse (c. 1498), an unidentified portrait of "a doctor or writer," (Ulrich Varnbuhler, c. 1522), and a knight on horseback (Knight, Death, and the Devil (c. 1513). Ivan asks the young officer if the horsemen are Germans and compares the people being trampled to the Russians (they indeed match two executed Russians the Nazis have left unburied). The central moment comes in a close-up of a tear in a protective cover sheet between the engravings that shows the face of one person about to be trampled and the arm up of another. These images are rhymed by a hole on the wall where they are reading and graffiti left by Russian prisoners an hour before they were to be executed by the Nazis demanding that the reader avenge them. The tear in the cover sheet is later echoed near the end of the film, which abruptly shifts to the fall of Berlin and documentary footage of the Reich Chancellery and Reichstag in ruins as well as the corpses of Joseph Goebbels and his family. Lieutenant Galtsev, who with Khilov had earlier taken Ivan back to spy on the Germans, jumps down a hole in the floor of a ruined Nazi prison in Berlin to recover the file of Ivan, whose photograph flashes on the screen, hanging from a wire, revealing that he was taken prisoner and guillotined (a close up shot of his decapitated head quickly tracks it rolling on the floor until it stops right side up). Early modern engravings figure the shock of war as the tear in the protecting sheet,

the file that falls through the cracks, motion just before and after death in Ivan's head hanging as a photo, or, beheaded and rolling, showing the traces of archival recording and making audible a ghostly voice-over (of the Nazi guards) in the ruins.

76. On the jerk as a reflex, see Crary (1999, 314).

2 The Passion of *El Cid* and the Circumfixion of Cinematic History: Stereotypology/ Phantomimesis/Cryptomorphoses

1. Mann also said, in a more paradoxical manner that mixes life and death, "The reason I wanted to make *El Cid* was the theme 'a man rode out to victory dead on a horse'; I loved the concept of that ending. Everybody would love to do this in life." See Koszarski (1977, 335). Jeanine Basinger begins her liner note to the Criterion laserdisc edition of *El Cid* with a paragraph-long description of this final scene.
2. For discussions of *El Cid*'s historical (in)accuracy by Williams (1990); see Airlie (2001, 175–77); Jancovich (2000, 85–88); de la Bretèque (2004, 244–54); and Winkler (2004, 249). See also Nadel (1993) on the Biblical film epic and the Cold War.
3. On Mann's Westerns, see Rancière (2006); on Ben Barzman, see Barzman (2003). Barzman remains uncredited in the Miriam Collection El Cid DVD, but his widow Norma discusses at length his central role rewriting the script in the documentary on disc two entitled "Hollywood Conquers Spain: The Making of an Epic." For the practice of restoring screen credits of blacklisted writers, see Ceplarir (2007).
4. According to de la Bretèque, the film may be interpreted in the context of the 1960s, referring to Détente and the Cold War (2004, 250).
5. In his rather simpleminded historicist reading of the film, Rosendorf maintains that "El Cid equals Francisco Franco" (during the first scene in which Rodrigo appears). In the same audiocommentary track, the son of the film producer Samuel Bronston, William, contests this view, however, noting that screenwriter Ben Barzman was on the left.
6. See especially the last section of Auerbach's "Figural Art in the Middle Ages" (1984, 60–76).
7. Indeed, no map appears in *El Cid*. By contrast, Marcus Aurelius has a small map on leather in his private quarters and Commodus stands on a map of Italy and the Mediterranean region on the mosaic floor of his palace. For more on maps and films, see my discussion of *Kingdom of Heaven* in chapter 3.
8. See, for example, Freud's comments in "The Uncanny": "Dismembered limbs, a severed head, a hand cut off at the wrist as a fairy tale of Haruff's feet which dance by themselves . . . all these have something peculiarly uncanny about them, especially when, as in the last instance, they prove capable of independent activity in addition. As we already know, this kind of uncanniness springs from its proximity to the castration complex" (*SE* 17, 234). The uncanny moment in this quotation is the phrase "As we already know": knowledge arrives through repetition. The uncanny is the compulsion to repeat (what we already know). In *El Cid*, "castration effects" happen through the cinematic cut to the human limbs.

9. The second, figural level of this typological hermeneutics is historical, matching an event in the Old Testament to its fulfillment in the New.
10. Auerbach notes that "Often vague similarities in the structure of events or in their attendant circumstances suffice to make the *figura* recognizable: to find it, one had to be determined to interpret it in a certain way" (29).
11. For similar paralegal heroes in two of Mann's earlier films, see the bounty hunter in *The Tin Star* (1957) and the trapper in *The Last Frontier* (1955).
12. On the hiddenness of the Judeo-Christian God, see Auerbach (1953/2003, 15).
13. Anthony Mann used Robert Lawrence, the film editor of *El Cid*, on Mann's next film, *The Fall of the Roman Empire* (1964). The later film does not use the erratic, arrhythmic editing of *El Cid* and no doubt suffers accordingly. On Mann's incorporation of film noir and Westerns in *El Cid*, see Winkler (2004). Winkler mistakenly separates the genres in *El Cid*, however, into exterior landscapes (Westerns) and interiors (crypts and psychological states). As we shall see, compositional elements and gestures cross over from interiors and exteriors linking the two genres in terms of their borders. I largely leave out of consideration, due to limitations of space, the sound track of *El Cid*. It works along similar lines, however, repeating them to identify a character in a given role, and often blurring the boundary between diegetic and extradiegetic sound. For example, when drums roll and two doors open to show the aged Rodrigo as he walks directly toward the camera into what we see in the next shot as Alfonso's court, his face in close-up is flanked by close-ups of the tips of two trumpets. Yet the sound we hear of trumpets is in excess of the two seen on screen, and drums appear nowhere in the shot outside of the court or inside it. The sound matching too seems not be cued by a human agent, a conductor, but is cued by a machine.
14. On cinema as a war machine, see Cohen (2005). Mann's *The Fall of the Roman Empire* is widely regarded as the final Hollywood film epic. See Wyke (1997, 188). And as Jacques Rancière (2006, 85) points out, Mann's Westerns come at the end of that film genre as well.
15. On political theology, see Derrida (1994) and Žižek (2001 and 2005).
16. See especially Mann's *Raw Deal* (1948) and *The Man from Laramie* (1955), in which Jimmy Stewart's gun hand is shot at point-blank range offscreen by the villain. A close-up of a dead hand appears near the beginning of *The Tin Star* (1957). Mann had earlier fused film noir and historical films in *The Black Book* aka *Reign of Terror* (1949).
17. Mann no doubt borrows this rhyming technique from Fritz Lang, who pioneered it in *M* (1931).
18. The second shot reappears with a difference. The first time a weird freeze-framing of Yussuf as he stretches out his hand at the end of the shot (and sequence) dissolves into a shot of a sunset or sunrise on the horizon of the Mediterranean like the one that began the sequence. Moreover, the second shot appears twice.
19. Consider that Mann made Westerns entitled *Devil's Doorway* (1950) and *The Last Frontier* (1955) and a film noir entitled *Border Incident* (1949); similarly, discussion of frontiers comes up repeatedly in *The Fall of the Roman Empire* (1964).
20. James Elkins (1999) defines a cryptomorph as an image that is hidden at its making, *remains invisible for some period*, and then is revealed so that it becomes an image that once was hidden (and then can no longer be hidden again) (184).

21. In an interview, Mann chooses this shot as an example to show the advantage of shooting on location. His account is interestingly symptomatic in that what he calls "seeing" seems as much visionary as ocular:

    > I'll never forget how I woke up one morning and there was a misty fog over the whole of Valencia. It was around eleven o'clock in the morning, this white mist was all over the town, you could just see the outline of the walled city, and I yelled at Heston, "Look, I'll never capture this again. Put on the armor and ride with a white horse across the sands and across the ocean right across this scene." And in ten minutes we got it. I'd never have got it except that I saw it, it was there. *You see it*: for instance the moment when El Cid came out strapped onto this horse with his shining armor and his white horse—I was lying on the sand looking up at he big arch and the mosque, I was looking up, and a rider passed, it wasn't even Heston, it was no one, just an extra. Well, he passed in his armor and as he came out of the shadow into the light, his armor shone. I yelled to Bob Krasker, "Look at it, that's what we want, that's God, that's the sun, we have to get the sun on us." It was about twelve thirty and at this moment at twelve thirty we were shining Mr. Heston's armor and we let him ride out, and by God that was how he shone and there was no spotlight or anything; it just happened to be the moment when the sun hit it and it was so white and electrifying. (Fenwick and Green-Armytage 1965, 187–88)

22. The opening of the Moorish city gates recalls many similar moments in the film, including Chimene going into her father Count Gormaz's (Andrew Cruikshank) room; Rodrigo going into that room to find Chimene in mourning after he has killed Count Gormaz; the opening of the Church doors to admit the people into Rodrigo and Chimene's wedding; and most clearly, the opening of the doors at the beginning of the second part of the film to reveal Rodrigo in medium close-up. (In its original road show exhibition, the film had an intermission, with music, that marked the passage of time and Rodrigo's having aged in this shot.)
23. The off-screen bottom of the film frame is the site of particular vulnerability for Mann. Jimmy Stewart's hand is shot at point-blank range at the bottom of the screen in Mann's *Man from Laramie* (1955) and a barbarian chief burns James Mason's left hand three times at the bottom of the frame off-screen in Mann's *The Fall of the Roman Empire* (1964).
24. Shots with the doorframe, usually with doors opening, include Don Ordonez and Count Gormaz standing in profile as they grasp one another's arms and are flanked by the doormen outside the door, the camera outside their room; Chimene's first appearance in the film as she comes out of a door just after the doors to her father's room close in the previous shot (she mishears the sound of the doors closing as the sound of Rodrigo entering, calling out his name and not getting an answer). The most notable such shot is of the church doors opening, accompanied by the sound of the wind, as the people enter to watch the wedding ceremony of Rodrigo and Chimene
25. For Elkin (1999), discovering a cryptomorph is largely a matter of a change of perspective, as when the blur in the lower part of Holbein's "Ambassadors" becomes a skull when the painting is looked at from the side. The hidden image is immediately recognizable as such. On hidden images, see also Leeman (1975).
26. To be sure, Count Gormaz dies off screen in a suspenseful moment; initially, we think he is the victor. The camera cuts away from Don Martín, who is shown wounded and lying on the ground, the moment before Rodrigo plunges his sword into him.

27. On the Bayeux Tapestry and cinema, see Burt (2007b). The Tapestry is not only a prototype of cinema that precedes cinema's invention centuries later but is itself part of the history of cinema, a film before film, a palimpsest of film technologies and aspect ratios that includes silent film (the words near the upper borders functioning like intertitles), narrative film, and, in panels such as the shield wall, and widescreen film. The analogy between the Tapestry and cinema may be easier to see if we recall that the links between sewing and film, especially film projection and film editing, are extensive and multiple. Lumiére solved the problem of projection—creating continuous movement of film—by adapting the "presser foot" mechanism of a sewing machine. The cinematograph could create the negatives of an image on film, print a positive image, and project the results at a speed of twelve frames per second. http://www.madehow.com/ Volume-7/Movie-Projector.html. The Singer sewing machine company also made Graflex 16-mm film projectors in the 1960s and 70s. "Lacing" is used as a term for splicing segments of film, matching up the sprocket holes on a film-editing machine by an editor as well as on a film reel by a projectionist. Walter Murch (2001) notes that women were hired for film editing because splicing film was thought to be a skill akin to sewing.

    To be sure, the Bayeux Tapestry is less clearly an analogue of film than are sewing and filmmaking in films unrelated to medievalism. For example, in a montage sequence in his *Man With the Movie Camera* (1929), Dziga Vertov intersperses a woman sewing a piece of cloth and spools of factory weaving with his wife, Elizaveta Svilova, working at the cutting table (she edited the film). See the Kino DVD at 36:01–36 audiocommentary by Yuri Tsivian: "To think about it, sewing is a kind of editing and some early cameras were constructed from parts borrowed from sewing machines. And this one [speaking of a sewing machine seen from the side] looks a bit like a camera too. Svilova is weaving strips of images taken in different cities, same looking reels and for a minute the camera itself becomes a kind of loom imitating a shuttle scurrying to and fro." I would add that there is a shot of Svilova writing in a notebook the letter and number ("~~N~~23") of a film strip and another of her attaching the piece of paper to a roll or spool of film, so that weaving is also a form of writing unrecognizable as such because it is not part of the projected film image. The first sequence of the film (numbered "1") follows a close-up of the film being threaded through the projector with a slow zoom shot of an apartment window with lace curtain in it. Similarly, at the beginning of Theo Angelopoulos's *Ulysses Gaze* (1995), which includes the first film made in the Balkans by the Manakis Brothers, shows women weaving.
28. Brilliant (1991) offers some connections between *El Cid* and the Bayeux Tapestry (110–11).
29. The two papal banners were used in the opening title sequence of *Robin Hood, Prince of Thieves*. See Burt, forthcoming (2008a).
30. "Stump speech" is a term in the United States for a candidate's standard address to an audience in a political campaign.
31. See Sarah Larratt Keefer's (2005) discussion of the Bayeux Tapestry's "priapic horses" (100–5).
32. On the Bayeux Tapestry's restoration, see Foys (2003). On nineteenth-century practices of restoration of art and medieval architecture and their bearing on film, see Rosen (2001).
33. Chimene becomes a cryptomorph of the screen star as a different analogue of cinema is potentially activated in this scene by another cryptomorph, namely, the circle stained glass window through which flowed light into the room behind. The window resembles a film reel, the light resembling that of

a film projector. Chimene becomes a screen icon of resistance, in short, through another kind of violence in which compositional elements become cryptomorphs as they are torn from their place in the mise-en-scène in order to be made rhetorical figures (as in my ekphrasis of them here) of cinema.

34. Derrida (1987) writes, "the frame does not signify anything . . . the *sans*-text and the *sans*-theme relate to the end in the mode of nonrelation" (98). Insofar as the end credits of *El Cid* signify, then, they do not serve as a frame that provides closure.
35. *El Cid* thus combines two functions of the title—to archive and to fabricate—noted by Derrida (1981b) in his essay "Title (to be specified)." Derrida comments on two meanings of the word "titleer":

    > The noun titleer would signify at least two things. In the Old French, a *titleer* (*titrier*) was a monk responsible for the archive of the titles of a monastery. He was an archivist, the archivist par excellence, for if every archivist must prevail over the order of titles—how can there be an archive without a title—what is to be said of a guardian of titles? But in a more recent and pejorative, devaluating meaning . . . a titleer refers to a falsifier, a maker of bogus titles, a fabricator of counterfeit titles, as we would almost say of counterfeiters in thinking of what is called entitling or *titrage* of money in a rather narrow sense. (9)

    On the visual history of book titles, see Welchman (1997).
36. This reanimation or afterlife of film continues to put film history and philology in dialogue. Both film historians and philologists share an investment in the restoration of the text or the film image (the entire image, the elimination of scratches, the addition of previously missing footage, and so on) and its (re)release in other formats with increasingly better image quality (analog video; DVD; high definition DVD).

    Yet reeditions of books and transfers from celluloid film to analog video, laserdisc, DVD, and high definition DVD editions show that the difference between damage and restoration, between fragmentation and wholeness are not as clear-cut as they may at first sight appear to be. Consider the Criterion laserdisc edition of *El Cid*, advertised on the cover as having been "Fully Restored." In fact, this laserdisc does not fully restore the film. The source for the analog transfer was a duplicate negative 35-mm print converted from the 70-mm Technicolor Super Technirama camera negative when the film was rereleased theatrically in 1993. As is the case with many high-end DVD editions of older films, the Miriam Collection 2008 two-disc DVD edition of *El Cid* includes an informative supplement on the restoration process entitled "Preserving Our Legacy: Gerry Byrne on Film Preservation and Restoration"; DVD supplements that compare film sequences before and after restoration may themselves involve a kind of damage.

3 Cutting and (Re)Running from the (Medieval) Middle East: The Return of the Film Epic and the Uncanny Mise-hors-scènes of *Kingdom of Heaven*'s Double DVDs

1. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/11/20021111-2.html
2. McAlister (2001, 46). See also Wilson (2002, 62–71), Kaplan (2005), Joshel (2001), and Sobchack (1990, 24–49).

3. On Bush's use of the word "crusade," see Ford (2001). For a review connecting Bush's line to Scott's film, see Thompson (2005); and for a review that quotes Scott making the connection, see Goodale (2005). As late as August 2007, an evangelical group called Operation Straight Up planned an entertainment tour in Iraq, cancelled by the military, called the "Military Crusade" and wanted to send "freedom packages" that included Bibles, proselytizing materials, and a *Left Behind* video game. See the *LA Times*, Anon (2007).
4. Sterritt (2005), Lowe (2005), Smith (2004), Anon (2005a), Sarris (2005).
5. Though critics of *The Kingdom of Heaven* drew parallels between the plot and characterizations of the draft screenplay circulated before the film's release as well of as the theatrical release cut of the film with Iraq, Ridley Scott claimed that the project was under way two years before the film was made and that such parallels were by the way. The final intertitle does not explicitly refer to September 11, 2001, as does the opening intertitle of the history Channel documentary *Holy Warriors: Richard the Lionheart and Saladin* (2005).
6. On ABC's *Empire* (2005) and HBO's *Rome* (2005), see Rachman (2004).
7. Stone's *Alexander* was even more directly read as a polemical brief for Bush's neoconservative brand of multicultural imperialism. Stone notes the parallel between Alexander (Colin Farrell) and Bush in his audiocommentary on the theatrical release DVD. Zach Snyder's *300* (2007), an adaptation of Frank Miller's graphic novel *The 300* based in turn on the film *The 300 Spartans* (dir. Rudolph Maté, 1962), was widely read in relation to Iran both by Western viewers and by the Iranian government as well.
8. In other cases, new releases of old films on DVD can precede a given new film in theatrical release. *Anne of the Thousand Days* (dir. Charles Jarrott, 1969) and *Mary, Queen of Scots* (dir. Charles Jarrott, 1972) were released as a double DVD, for example, shortly before the theatrical release of Shekhar Kapur's *Elizabeth: The Golden Age* (2007); the double DVD included a "sneak peek" of the Kapur film.
9. A region 2 (Italian) two-disc DVD edition of Terence Malick's *The New World* (2005), with the national theatrical cut on one disc and the original, extended local theatrical cut on the second disc, appeared in 2007.
10. Manovich's (2001) formula for digital film—"digital film = live action material + painting + image processing + compositing + 2D computer animation + 3D animation" (301)—now describes all film. For an earlier version of chapter 3, with a large number of screen captures, see Burt 2007a.
11. Now defunct, Tobisha's HD-DVDs made possible a new range of immersive, interactive options in the menu (additional text in the menu chapters), bookmarking scenes, saving favorite scenes and collecting them. By opening up a Microsoft window as the disc plays, one could watch a scene from a documentary about the sequence from the film while watching the film at the same time. HD-DVD marked a further stage in DVD's textualization of film by making the DVD more like an Adobe pdf. No doubt, viewers will eventually be able to annotate scenes from high definition DVDs in the same way they can annotate texts in pdf files. For more information on HD-DVD, go to http://www.thelookandsoundofperfect.com/index.php.
12. See also Burt (2007b). The definitive DVD edition of *Passion of the Christ* includes what are called "Biblical footnotes" on the back cover of the DVD.

13. A similar development combining genetic historicism and scientific technology (in an arguably scientistic manner) may be seen in art history and museum exhibitions. An exhibition entitled "Rubens and Brueghel: A Working Friendship" at the J. Paul Getty Museum held from July 5 to September 24, 2006 devoted one room to a series of X-rays of their painting "The Return from War: Mars Disrobing Venus," differentiating what Rubens contributed from what Brueghel did.
14. Further support for this hierarchy of versions of Murnau's *Faust* is provided indirectly by means of paratextual fragmentation between the two DVD discs and the accompanying booklet: A closing essay in a booklet accompanying the DVD discusses five versions of the film but classifies both the domestic and export as the originals (25–26).
15. What may initially seem like a critical mass of film epics produced in the wake of the 2003 invasion of Iraq begins to look more complicated, a critical mess, so to speak, once the digitalization of film is taken into account. Consider again the DVD releases from 2003 to 2005 of film epics made decades earlier. DVD editions of these films too register the impact of digitalization, brought out with new extras in multiple-disc editions. Stone's *Alexander* has been issued in three different DVD editions, two of them director's cuts; and the HD-DVD edition of the third DVD version, *Alexander Revisited* adds two new commentary tracks by Stone and his historical advisor, Robin Lane Fox, and a new "making of" documentary. *Gladiator* was produced, for example, when the United States was at peace rather than at war, and Rob Wilson (2002) has read it as a critique of the Pax Americana and U.S. dominated forms of neoliberal globalization and soft hegemony. The politics of these film epics and even more recent film epics were different when the films were made, of course, than when they were rereleased, often more than once, on DVD and again on high definition DVD. Did *Gladiator* mean the same thing or something else when released a second time on DVD in 2005, after the first DVD edition of *Kingdom of Heaven* and a year before the second DVD edition? Whatever the answer to this question, we may say more generally that digital delays recast the history of the film epic not as a one time event but as a series of time-related effects that alter the horizon of reception both by altering the film itself and by offering new paratexual frames through which to view it.
16. It is perhaps not purely an accident that when McAlister, who relies on Sobchack's (1990) essay, revised her book for publication in 2001, she did not mention *Gladiator*.
17. The *El Cid* DVD audiocommentary invokes two historical horizons of interpretation for the film, the moment of its production and the moment of its release on DVD in the wake of 9/11. When Ben Yussuf first appears in *El Cid*, William Bronston likens him to Osama Bin Laden and laments and nearly apologizes for the extent to which the film's portrayal of the Arabs as dark skinned seems to involve racist stereotypes. He notes that this aspect of the film won't pay well in today's world. After stating that the film draws a "metaphor" between "the Moors and the Communist threat," Rosendorf says that in "the post 9/11 world" some viewers see him more "literally" as an Islamic fanatic. The DVD has another uncanny paratextual effect: "The Miriam Collection" logo appears twice, first when the viewer puts the DVD into the player and before the animated menu surfaces, then again after the viewer presses the "play movie" menu option to watch the film.

18. Sumiko Higashi (1994, 201–3) discusses briefly the televisual broadcast of Cecil B. DeMille's *The Ten Commandments*.
19. The *New York Times* reviews a small selection of DVD releases each Friday. See www.dvdverdict.com, http://dvd.ign.com, http://www. dvdtalk.com, among others websites devoted to DVDs and HD-DVDs. The Miriam Collection *El Cid* DVD may be something of an exception in terms of impact as it was widely reviewed in major U.S. newspapers (Dave Kehr for "Critic's Choice" in the *New York Times*, Susan King for the *LA Times*, Michael O'Sullivan for the *Washington Post*) and magazines (Richard Corliss for *Time*) upon its January 29, 2008 release.
20. The first DVD edition of *Kingdom of Heaven* was released on October 3, 2005.
21. Extended DVD editions of all other films of which I am aware never received theatrical release. No straightforward parallel may rightly be drawn between any of the post-9/11 historical films and Iraq, to be sure. There is always some excess, some distortion, even when one-to-one correspondences between the film's characters and events, on one hand, and contemporary politicians and national and international conflicts, on the other, seem to be clear. For example, *300* is so far to the political right that it slides over into satire, and one journalist asked the director if the Spartan leader Leonidas or the Persian leader Xerxes was supposed to represent George W. Bush. See Slavoj Žižek (2007), "The True Hollywood Left," http://www. lacan.com/ zizhollywood.htm. Consider also a scene from Shekhar Kapur's sequel to *Elizabeth* (1998), *Elizabeth: The Golden Age* (2007), in which the Catholic fundamentalist Philip II orders the launching of the Armada (a scene of deforestation to build the ships is shown already in the works long before war is declared) on the pretext of a "just war" after his agents successfully trick Elizabeth into executing Mary, Queen of Scots, strongly implying a parallel between Philip II and George W. Bush when he invaded Iraq in 2003. This is a rather strange parallel to draw since Elizabeth might seem closer to the warmongering Prime Minister Tony Blair, a leading participant in Bush's war, than Philip II to Bush. Indeed, the film epics made in the wake of 9/11 seem to be rather less sure-footed than the medieval historical films of Sergei Eisenstein, whose deliberately designed parallels between the Teutonic Knights and Nazi Storm Troopers in *Alexander Nevsky* (1938) and between Ivan and Stalin in *Ivan the Terrible* (1944) were explicit and unmistakable, though Stalin turned on Eisenstein before he could complete the third part of the latter film.
22. See the two-disc "definitive edition" DVD of Mel Gibson's *The Passion of the Christ*, released in February 2007, with various documentaries on the making of the film, audiocommentaries, deleted scenes, and both the 2005 cut and original 2004 theatrical release cut. Similarly, the four-disc *Gladiator* extended DVD includes both theatrical and extended DVD versions of the film.
23. On the importance of mise-en-scène to film theories of cinematic writing, see Cohen (2006, 194), and Conley (2007, xxx): "with writing conceived as a compositional element in the visuals of film, the narrative that it helps to convey is both aided and subverted."
24. The sequence of releases does not necessarily amount to a narrative of progress; that is, the latest edition doesn't necessarily deliver a better image quality or a more unified narrative.
25. See BBC (2004b) and Smith (2004).

26. See Burt (2007c); Anon (2005a); Anon (2005b); and Waxman (2005).
27. The ways in which the authority of the director, especially in relation to the film frame and frame up in the film, can mislead by seeming to deliver the authoritative account and explanation of the film may approach self-parody. For a particularly interesting DVD audiocommentary that bears on narrative framing and authority and reliability of the director as omniscient narrator, see Peter Greenaway's audiocommentary on the 2007 BFI DVD edition of *The Draughtsman's Contract* (1982). Greenaway presents himself as an authority on the film's meaning, talking calmly as if he were disclosing all the film's secrets. Yet he pointedly does not comment on many clues such as the paintings hanging in the country house (characters do so in the film). His seemingly authoritative commentary thus appears to be a pose that extends the ruses to the many puzzling frame-ups in the film itself rather than the solution to the film's puzzles.
28. *Kingdom of Heaven* in this respect is a complicated revision of Ridley Scott's earlier and financially much more successful action film about U.S. troops trapped in a defensive gunfight as they attempt to exit from Mogadishu, Somali, in 1993, namely, *Black Hawk Down* (2001), which also featured Orlando Bloom, albeit in a small role, and which also has an interesting relation to 9/11. Its release date was rushed ahead by ten weeks in order to cash in on the patriotic fervor after 9/11. The film was accused of giving a racist, pro-Bush view of the Somalis. See Gray (2002).
29. In December 2007, Scott's *Blade Runner* (1982) was released in three different DVD editions (two, four, and five discs), one with two versions of the film on two discs, another with three versions on four discs, and yet another with four versions on five discs, each version of the film on all three DVD editions was preceded by an introduction with Ridley Scott; *American Gangster* was released in two editions (two and three discs), and both included the theatrical release and extended version. Blu-ray may have an impact on this double tendency toward disintegration and integration of various film cuts and DVD paratexts as only the five-disc version of *Blade Runner* was released on Blu-ray and Toshiba's HD-DVD.
30. The uncanniness of 9/11 became clear—both because the recognition of the attack as an attack, rather than as an accident—only after the second tower of the World Trade Center was hit and because the televised replays of the attack recalled action films that anticipated the "real" attack, see Warner (2002), http://dc-mrg.english. ucsb.edu/committee/warner/ 911.html and Žižek (2003, 9–19). Simpson (2006) observes that "any attempt at an understanding of 9/11, its place in history, and its projections for a future will constitute some kind of framing, whether it be through the act of remembering, of reliving, or of critique" (87). For a brilliant analysis of the figure of the tape and narrative loop as a repetition compulsion, see Derrida's footnotes 8 and 9 to his interview in Berradori (2001, 188–89).
31. On U.S. imperialism and its disavowal, see Kaplan (2005).
32. The second, extended DVD edition of *Kingdom of Heaven* adds a number of scenes that are extraneous to a reading of the film in its theatrical release version and remark the pattern of exit and return already evident in the theatrical release. Rather than unify the film, as Scott maintains they do, these extras more deeply etch the film's symptomatic inability to stay in Iraq or get out of it.

33. On the convergence of electronic media and on repeat viewings of the film on DVD in the home, see Klinger (2006). Lacking in this kind of cultural studies, sociological analysis of reception is any sense that the home is itself uncanny, involves a haunted remembrance or repression of the theatrical viewing experience.
34. On Orientalism and the colonial gaze, see Said (1978) and McAlister (2001, 8–37, 269–71).
35. In order to keep Balian's character as a nonaggressor and reactive defender consistent, Scott cut a deleted scene entitled "Obstruction and Salvation" in which Balian and his men confront the Patriarch and his assembled Templar knights, led by the fundamentalist Templar master (Ulrich Thomsen) who is given to exclaiming "Gods will it" and "Blasphemy!" When the Patriarch refuses to release the Queen to Balian, Balian threatens to kill him and does kill the Templar master.
36. Outside Jerusalem at night just before the siege begins, Balian says: "Almaric, if you survive Ibelin is yours. You are master of Ibelin. I confirm it. Rise a knight, and Baron of Ibelin." Almaric smiles and jokes, recalling and nearly repeating exactly a comment about it he made when first seeing it with Balian: "But it is a poor and dusty place." This joke effectively diminished the value of the lands.
37. Similarly, *Kingdom of Heaven* begins with a fantasy of the Crusades as a pilgrimage that makes possible the redemption of Balian's dead wife for having committed suicide, Godfrey for his sins, and Balian himself for having murdered the village priest (also his brother in the extended version). Yet this fantasy falls apart even before it comes fully into play. The village priest orders the beheading of Balian's wife and steals the cross from her neck with which she was to be buried. A priest preaching to passersby on the pilgrimage route confirms this negative view of religion by saying "To kill an infidel, the Pope has said, is not murder; it is the path to Heaven." And Balian concludes he is outside God's grace after he completes his pilgrimage and buries his wife's cross at Golgotha.
38. In one of the film's many moments of contradictory dialogue, Balian tells the defenders of Jerusalem that all have claim to the city and that none have claim.
39. Near the beginning of the production of documentary on the third disc of the *Gladiator* extended DVD edition, set designer Arthur Max, who also worked on *Kingdom of Heaven*, observes that "scale is the essence of the film epic."
40. Film maps have an uncanny, dislocating dimension that may subvert the film's ideology:

    > The map offers a spatial picture of shape and duration other than those of the image in which it is found. Quite often the map locates the history of the film within itself. It has affinities with a *mise-en-abyme*, but while it may duplicate or mirror the surrounding film, the map can reveal why and how it was made and how its ideology is operating. . . . The fluid and shifting spaces of the film and its cognition become *terrae incognitae* that the viewer explores in different directions and from various angles. (2007, 20–21)

41. Conley also points out the scale model of Rome in *Gladiator* (2007, 200). For a range of examples of maps in historical films, see the animated, multitiered and almost three-dimensional map of the North America in the

opening and end title sequences of Terence Malick's *The New World* (2005); the recurrent use of mosaic maps of Greece and Persia as prologue frames in Stone's *Alexander*; the animated map of France with blood showing the English territory at the beginning of Luc Besson's *The Messenger* (1999); a tapestry map of the Nile River and Middle East on the wall of Cleopatra's palace in HBO *Rome* second season finale; a map of England and Norway in *The Vikings* (dir. Richard Fleisher, 1957) title sequence; a map of Greece in the opening title sequence of Peterson's *Troy*; and the use of maps as transitions between scenes in *The Adventures of Marco Polo* (dir. Archie Mayo, 1936); *Indiana Jones and the Last Crusade* (dir. Stephen Spielberg, 1989); and *Prince of Foxes* (dir. Henry King, 1949).

42. Clips from the original Nazi film of a scale model of Speer's plans for a future, neoclassical Berlin appear in the documentary *The Architecture of Doom* (dir. Peter Cohen, 1989), and in some superimposed shots of Hans-Jürgen Syberberg's *Hitler: A Film from Germany* (1978).
43. By "apolitical," I mean the way in which Scott's Maximus differs significantly from Kubrick's Spartacus. Maximus is willing to participate in a revolt against Emperor Commodus only because he wants to carry out the Emperor Marcus Aurelius's wishes. In his introduction to the "Final Cut" (not to be confused with the 1992 "director's cut") on the four-disc DVD edition of *Blade Runner* (1982) released in December 2007, Scott furthers his claims as an auteur by saying that he approves of the DVD transfer and participated in making sure the colors in the DVD image appear correctly.
44. See also the long, penultimate, and panoramic shot of a David Kaspar Friedrich-like painting of the fanatical Bonapartist Feraud (Harvey Keitel) in Scott's first film, *The Duellists* (1977). Having lost the final duel, Feraud, very much resembling Napoleon in exile, looks out at the French rural landscape. Scott sides against the impotent, would-be dictator and director (Feraud has now lost control of the right to challenge D'Hubert [Keith Carradine] to any future duel). By "apolitical," I mean the way in which Scott's Maximus differs significantly from Kubrick's rebellious, democratic Spartacus. Maximus is willing to participate in a revolt against Commodus only because he wants to carry out Emperor Marcus Aurelius's last wishes.
45. For a telling contrast, see Paul Verhoeven's *Flesh and Blood* (1985), in which the "good" character Steven (Tom Burlinson) helps his father lay siege to a medieval town by providing weapons he has invented based on science he learned at school.
46. In the extended DVD edition of *Kingdom of Heaven*, Sybille sits next to her dead son's crypt during the siege holding his toy knight. The extended scene "husband and wife" in which Guy confronts Sybilla over the murder of her son and confesses his order to have Balian murdered ends with a ground level shot with the toy knight prominently in the middle frame as Sybilla holds onto it. Similarly, the extended scene "Obstruction and Salvation" ends with Balian finding Sybille at her dead brother's crypt; she says to him, "save the people from what I have done."
47. It is worth comparing the uncanny recursiveness of *Kingdom of Heaven* to an earlier film epic to which editor Dody Dorn likens *Kingdom of Heaven* near the end of her audiocommentary, namely, David Lean's *Lawrence of Arabia* (1963). Lean makes use of a double narrative framing. The opening shot of the Overture is repeated after the film's opening sequence in England with

T.E. Lawrence's (Peter O'Toole) death and funeral, taking us back in time to Arabia to begin the story (again). Furthermore, the film ends with Lawrence riding his motorcycle in Arabia, repeating the beginning of the film which shows Lawrence's fatal crash in England while on his motorcycle. In both cases, the recursiveness does not produce a full circle, however, but a spacing between the links and unifies the beginning and ending that paradoxically gives us, via the source interviewed by the reporter at Lawrence's funeral, the straight story.

48. For an interesting account of intentionally bogus and bonus DVD audiocommentaries as "paratracks," see Voigts-Virchow (2007). On the transition from Criterion laserdisc audiocommentaries to DVD audiocommentaries, see Parker (2007); Parker and Parker (2004); and Parker and Parker (2008).
49. Screenwriter William Monahan's audiocommentary of the film raises similar sorts of questions. In the scene of the Battle of Hattin, for example, he says he regrets that "we don't have Saladin's order to execute the knights of the religious orders here," but he does not say why. He notes that they also did not have Balian threaten to execute his prisoners when negotiating the truce that ends the siege of Jerusalem, but again does not say whether that omission was good or bad in his view. During the Jerusalem scale model scene, Monahan talks about only using primary sources for his script and his not attending to the historians who vetted the film: "All you need are the sources." These comments indirectly respond to James Reston's unsuccessful lawsuit for copyright infringement. Monahan implies he never read Reston's book even though he doesn't name it or Reston.
50. Scott also praises Saladin in his audiocommentary on the film in the scenes after the siege ends for not sacking the city or executing any of its inhabitants.
51. It is not clear why Scott shot this scene in the first place. The *Kingdom of Heaven* tie-in pictorial moviebook includes two pages of his annotations of the screenplay from this scene showing that he crossed it out (see Landau 2005, 54).
52. On the problem of tolerance and "militant democracy," see the interview with Jürgen Habermas in Berradori (2002, 40–41).
53. Thus, historicist interpretation of a film may no longer rightly be limited by a single horizon of the theatrical release reception, but must extend to the film's release(s) on DVD, sometimes two. Since the late 1990s, DVD cuts have been integrated with film production, usually as part of a marketing strategy and also as a way of compromising with a director, whose cut is released on DVD rather than theatrically. See, for example, Antoine Fuqua's *King Arthur* (2004).
54. More details on the film's exhibition history are provided on the documentary on "Paradise Found: Creating the Director's Cut" on disc four. We learn that the longer theatrical release at the Lamaelle Theater was a rough cut of three hours, not the DVD extended version which was cut after the 191-minute theatrical release was finished. The documentary is largely composed of shots dissolving one into the next interspersed with shots of various people who made the DVD director's cut and offering comments. Oddly, it contains shots taken from the deleted and extended scenes, in effect documenting a fantasy version of the film as a totality of everything that was shot but was never made.

55. Two relatively contemporary films that are even closer to Lynch's films than *Kingdom of Heaven* are Clint Eastwood's *Flags of Our Fathers* (2007), with its wrenching shifts back and forth between multiple framings of the battle of Iwo Jima and its aftermath, and Darren Aronofsky's *The Fountain* (2006), a New Age science-fiction film with a recursive time travel narrative and a plot set in sixteenth-century Spain and the Mayan Yucatan and a contemporary plot that involves a scene about a museum exhibition of Mayan codices.
56. For more on Donner's *Timeline*, see note eight to chapter 1.
57. One of the disappointments of Mulvey's promising book is its essentially reactive conservatism, intellectually speaking: she does not engaged new media dialectically to rethink her own critical practice, instead ignoring what is really new about new media in order to continue talking about film as she always has.
58. See, by contrast, *Indiana Jones and the Last Crusade* (dir. Stephen Spielberg, 1989) and *The Da Vinci Code* (dir. Ron Howard, 2006). In the former, Indiana (Harrison Ford) and Dr. Elsa Schneider (Alison Doody) break through the X, or Roman numeral 10, on the bottom of the library floor and find a knight's tomb in the catacombs below. They take the lid off and discover a mummy of a knight with writings on his shield that matches writings on a tablet Jones saw earlier in a private collector's possession. The inside of the tomb thus remarks writing as an interiorized exteriorization in the form of the shield. *The Da Vinci Code* ends with a kind of epilogue by conflating the Louvre with a mausoleum. The hero Dr. Robert Langdon (Tom Hanks) kneels in the Louvre as if at the grave of Mary Magdalene, a grave that houses only a figurative, nonexistent Holy Grail. The unmarked burial site without a crypt in this case is nevertheless found by a literal bloodline that Langdon connects, from blood in a sink when he cuts himself shaving, to the Museum. A similar kind of encryption and blocked mourning may be found in *Braveheart* (dir. Mel Gibson, 1995), with the cloth William Wallace's (Mel Gibson) wife (Catherine McCormack) makes for him reappearing on the broadsword that lands in the ground in the last shot of the film.

4 Le détour de Martin Guerre: "Anec-notes" of Historical Film Advisors, Archival Aberrations, and the Uncanny Subject of the Academic Paratext

1. On Hollywood crediting of historical advisor, typically credited with the label "technical advisor," see Eldridge (2006, 127–51).
2. On the restoration of blacklisted writers to Hollywood films for which they wrote the screenplays, see Ceplair (2007). Credit here is based on legal account of authorship linked to intellectual property. Usually, royalties and contracts are at stake in the credits. In the cases involving blacklisting, however, the desire to restore credit was purely a moral issue related to memory. It's unclear to me whether the credits have ever actually been restored to the film prints (and DVDs), however, after credit was newly assigned by the Guild.
3. Some uncanny aspects of the academic retelling of the Martin Guerre story are present in Ray's (1991) anecdote: the ambiguity of reference to the book and film (same title) and the contestation of who owns what (it is not clear

what Ray means by "her own" when he writes that Davis was "making her own *The Return of Martin Guerre*": the film was not directed by her and her book came out after the film rather than before it); moreover, Ray tells the anecdote twice, the second time (64).

4. For the flip side of Cripp's (2002) irrational elevation of Davis with respect to the film, see Finlay's (1988) equally irrational devaluation of her book with respect to Vigne's film.
5. See Greenblatt (1997b and 2000). Marc Ferro (1988) snidely discredits, so to speak, historian consultants after mocking filmmakers who try to be historians: For the most part, filmmakers pay attention to this scholarly precision [seeing that the reconstruction is precise, the decor and the location are faithful, and the dialogue is authentic]. In order to guarantee it they happily turn to counterfeit historians who get lost deep down in the list of credits. Obviously there are more demanding filmmakers who go to the archives themselves and play at being historians. (159).
6. Davis never comments, to my knowledge, on why she adopted the same title. On titles, see Genette (1997) and Jacques Derrida (1981).
7. Ginzburg (1991) discusses Davis's *Return of Martin Guerre*. Ginzburg (1988) says he was first inspired to research witch trials after seeing Carl Dreyer's *Day of Wrath* (208).
8. Davis has several times compared working on the film to being an ethnologist and being supported by her interest in anthropology. See Davis (2000b, x and 1997a, 26); Benson (1983, 50; 52). Davis does not examine links between early cinema and the emergence of anthropology as a discipline, explored by Griffiths (2002) and Guynn (2006, 1–2).
9. On Foucault's participation in Allio's film, see Macey (1993, 341). Macey does not mention the photo of Foucault on the set, however.
10. Similarly, Foucault does not appear in any of the photos in a special issue of *Avant-Scène* (No. 183, March 1977) that published the screenplay of Allio's *Moi, Pierre Rivière*. Either Foucault was never meant to be in the film or, if he was, failed to make the final cut. A professor of History from Normandy, France, Jean-Vernard Caux, also was an extra in the film (Morrissey 2004, 190). Allio's film was released on video in 1996.
11. Davis (1982, 11–15, 18–19, 28–39, and 41; 1988, 1990, 1996, 1997a, 2000b, and 2003), Coppin and Harding (1983), Davis, Vigne, and Carrière (1982), Benson (1983), Aufderheide (1984), Benson (1984), Pringle and Prior (1986), McCleery (1986), Adelson (1991), Hasse-Dubosc and Elianne Viennot (1991, 306–9), Davis with Walkowitz (1992, 15–17), Snowman (2002), Crouzet (2004), Pallares-Burk (2002), and Lyons and Azzolini (2005). See also Bretzius (1997), Ginzburg (1988), Staiger (1989), Jardine (1994), Vincendeau (2000), and Humbert (2001).
12. On the cinema itself as an uncanny mechanism that animates inanimate still frames of the film reel, see Gunning (1995) and Mulvey (2006).
13. These kinds of anec-notal aberrations that can be found more or less present in all academic writing on history films. The tabloid journalistic game of "gotcha," where one scores points by holding up external evidence against the author to expose his or her errors, or worse, unprofessionalism (plagiarism), is worthless except as crude evidence of the typically hidden uncanniness and errancy of academic discourse. Similarly, ungenerous and unwarranted attacks on Stephen Greenblatt have focused on a note card; footnotes in the hardcover and paperback editions of his book *Learning to Curse*; and his acknowledgments

in several of his books. See Barton (1991); for a particularly egregious and self-embarrassing example of a misplaced "gotcha" attack on Greenblatt, see Lee (1995); an editorial correction of Lee (in response to a letter from Greenblatt pointing out that Lee was in fact totally wrong) was published as an editor's note in *Essays in Criticism* in 1998. For a justly critical discussion of Lee's attack on Greenblatt, see Stevens (2002). On Greenblatt's acknowledgment pages in his books (and acknowledgments in books written by other highly influential critics) as networking, see Bauerlein (2001). For a collection of essays honoring Greenblatt, see Kelly (2002).

14. For the earliest noting of this role, see. Johnson (1952). On the emergence of theory, see Kelly (1980, 873). For a broader examination, see English (2005).
15. Similarly, Coleman (2004), worries less about the consultant being credited than about the lack of historical writing in the film's framing paratexts: "Is it proper to let the cinema-going public think that the past looked like our cinematic conception of it? In a film that involves a fictitious plot employing real characters, is it legitimate to dispense with an epigraph or postscript stating the bald historical facts?" (50).
16. Davis has found herself in two unusually bitter polemical exchanges, the first of which focused on footnotes and her work on Vigne's *The Return of Martin Guerre*. For the first exchange, see Finlay (1988) and Davis (1988); for the second, see Vincendeau (2000) and Davis (2000a).
17. On the French historian and consultant for Victor Fleming's *Joan of Arc* (1948), Paul Doncoeur, see Burt (2007c).
18. See also a lengthy credit for the technical advisor in *The Iron Mask* (dir. Douglas Fairbanks, 1929).
19. In F.W. Murnau's *Tartuffe* (1926), the modern prologue serves as a framing film in a period film adaptation of Molière's 1664 play. A son of an old man who parallels Molière's character Tartuffe, suspicious that his father is being conned out of his fortune by a scheming maid, returns home a second time disguised as a film projectionist in a traveling cinema show. Before running the film *Tartuffe* for his father and maid, the son holds up a scroll with the cast of credits in English, gradually rolls it up until ending with the tagline "a play for all times in all realms." He then puts the scroll down, blows out the candles, and announces the play will begin, which he then projects as a film on a screen, the projected image dissolving into the film. The frame returns at the end and the son unmasks himself, exposes the maid's attempted swindle, and reconciles with his father. See also a remarkable scene in *Bedlam* (dir. Mark Robson, 1946), "based" on a print of Bedlam by William Hogarth in *The Rake's Progress*, in which an inmate imagines projecting a flip book of his illustrations on the wall as a projected image like a film, for which one could charge admission.
20. The opening title sequences of *La Nuit de Varennes* plays over a sepia-tinted long shot of Notre-Dame in Paris circa 1793 under a bridge that approximates a still photograph. At the end of the film, Restif de la Breton (Jean-Louis Barrault), a pornographic reporter of Parisian nights who appears in the film, reappears in the epilogue, quoting from his diaries as he ascends the stairs and breaking the frame of the film by showing us contemporary Paris during the day with heavy car and pedestrian traffic. The camera pulls back and pans left as the credits roll until freezing the frame at the same shot of Notre Dame that began the film, only from above the bridge and in color, with the

traffic in a standstill. The prologue of the film, involving a band of Italian actors showing a sort of peep show miniature of Marie-Antoinette and her execution also returns at the end of the film, connected through the same shot of an archway that serves as a kind of portal from the more recent past to the older past. In the film itself, history is shot literally from below: the feet of the King and Queen are seen by a Countess from the bottom of a doorframe and an iris surrounds a mannequin wearing the king's clothes, to which the Countess bows. See also the prologue following the opening title sequence introducing the main characters in Abel Gance's *Lucrèce Borgia* (1935): a shot of Machiavelli writing *The Prince* is followed by a shot of successive pages of the book being turned by hand; the same shot of other pages returns twice as a bridge between episodes later in the film, and Machiavelli returns at the end.

21. *Madame du Barry* (dir. Christian Jacque, 1954) offers a self-consciously artificial use of media homologies as a narrative framing device. The opening title sequence begins with a production credit in white letters superimposed over an untitled red book, and the credits appear on its automatically turned pages after the book opens automatically. The last page morphs into a circular shape, a slide on a sheet with the coproduction credit written in it as the camera pulls back. This shot dissolves into a matching slide on a sheet at what is then revealed, as the camera pulls even further back, to be a Revolutionary fair in Paris circa 1789. A barker gives his spiel outside a kind of wax museum (with a banner running across a proscenium arch entitled "A la République de Figures du Cire" [Wax Figures from the Republic], based on the historical "Cabinet des figures de cire," lost in 1847) to the festive crowd walking past, the camera focusing on a mother educating her little boy about liberty and equality, as he holds a toy guillotine, and a middle-aged couple celebrating liberty. A whip pan takes us to the wax figures and the barker points to a succession of circular slides that change automatically. He briefly turns to discuss a head on a pike and wax figure of Madame du Barry, the "whore of France," before resuming his commentary on the slides. The last slide, of a coach in Paris, then dissolves into a matching shot as the barker stops his commentary. The move to history involves a doubly double transition of media, from book to slide, from slide to film, and wax museum to film.
22. The epilogue of *Jefferson in Paris* returns us briefly to the second prologue with the newspaper reporter. Lasse Hallström's light-hearted *Casanova* (2005) playfully undoes the cognitive authority that usually accompanies narrative frames in historical films and biopics by beginning with a prologue narrated by an aged man writing his memoirs who apparently is Casanova only to reveal him in the film's epilogue to be the real Casanova's (Heath Ledger) double, Giovanni Bruni (Charlie Cox), now an old man and the real author of "Casanova's" memoirs. *Girl with a Pearl Earrig* similarly begins ands ends with matching book end overhead shots of Griet (Scarlett Johansson) pausing at the center of Delft's central, public square.
23. The framing, retrospective prologue and up to the moment epilogue of *Tous les Matins du Monde* involve sleep, death, shadows, and the "dying fall" of the music. Marais's (Gérard Depardieu) difference with his mentor viola player and composer Sainte Colombe (Jean-Pierre Marielle) is that Colombe does not publish his compositions, which he writes down using papers that he

collects and binds in a red book. Marais later takes the book and publishes them as his own. When playing his various musical compositions, to which the film script assigns melancholic titles, the ghost of Colombe's dead wife appears to him several times and even talks to him on occasion. And for another uncanny echo of Martin Guerre related to narrative framing and casting, see Jean-Paul Rappeneau's *Cyrano de Bergerac* (1990). The film stars Gérard Depardieu as Cyrano and includes a magic lantern show in the prologue and a later sequence with Cyrano pretending to have returned from the moon, as if in anticipation of Georges Méliès' *Trip to the Moon* (1902). Jean-Claude Carrière co-wrote the screenplay. For a similar use of framing prologue and epilogue, see *Le roi danse* (dir. Gérard Corbiau, 2000), a biopic about a homoerotic relationship between Italian court composer Jean-Baptiste Lully (Boris Terral) and Louis XIV (Benoit Magimel). For a very much weaker version of this narrative framing device with Depardieu playing a dying priest in the prologue and epilogue, see the execrable *Battle of the Brave* (dir. Jean Baudin, 2006).

24. See also the "Postscript" title and sequence that follows the end title sequence of *Little Dieter Needs to Fly* (dir. Werner Herzog, 1997) on the DVD edition (2001) containing footage of Dieter Dengler's funeral and subtitles providing information about his death.
25. See, for example, the very self-consciously theatrical epilogue of *D'Artagnan's Daughter* (dir. Bertrand Tavernier, 1994) in which the actors, still in character and costumed, take bows while directly addressing the camera, thereby breaking as the fourth wall convention, as the end title sequence rolls. See also the biopic *Becoming Jane* (dir. Julian Jarrold 2007) and Burt (2008b). Andrei Tarkovsky's *Andrei Rublev* (1969) ends with a sequence of shots of the twelfth-century Russian painter's icons that, as the audiocommentator on the Criterion DVD edition of the film points out, might serve as the opening title sequence of a more conventional biopic. He does not mention them, but the opening title sequences of *Lust for Life* (dir. Vincent Minelli, 1956), *Nightwatching* (dir. Peter Greenaway, 2007) and *Moulin Rouge* (dir. John Huston, 1952) serve to make his point precisely.
26. Davis (1987b) insists that fiction is neither falsification nor forgery. Yet the first-person voice, which Davis identifies with the past, and autobiography are all haunted by fiction because they lack a paratext: in Davis's writings, the autobiographical is paratextual.
27. This is even more clearly the case in Davis (1983a). She includes a chapter on Coras entitled "The Storyteller," reading the unconscious of Cora's book on the trial as well as his letters to his wife. She frames, then, the tale's framer. Yet her preface, which offers an explanation of how she wrote her book, does not offer a similar interpretation of herself as the teller and the attendant unconscious symptoms. She comes into the frame in order to stand outside the story as the master teller.
28. Guynn (2006) draws a similar and, with video and DVD, untenable distinction between the "critical apparatus of historical analysis referenced in the text or footnotes and bibliography" (77) and the absence of such a critical apparatus in film. Davis makes her harshest assessment about history in film failing to match history in prose (Pallares-Burke 2002, 96–97); see also Davis (2000b, 5) and Aufderheide (1983, 138) for Davis's kinder, more condescending remarks about film with respect to print history.
29. Davis frequently mentions the importance of footnotes: Davis (1987, 460, 478 and 1988, 575). Finlay (1988) attacks Davis for not using footnotes prop-

erly to distinguish fact from fiction: "such arguments, it may be said, make footnotes to sources quite beside the point. If historical records can be bypassed so thoroughly in the service of an inventive blend of intuition and assertion, it is difficult to see what distinguishes the writing of history from that of fiction" (569). See also Moote (1985, 943). On the way footnotes always serve a rhetorical function, see Cosgrove (1991) and Hunt (1982). On footnotes as the site of scholarly polemics, see Grafton (1999).

30. The historian performs a disciplinary and disciplinarian gatekeeping function to tell the truth, possibly negative, that the archive does not provide a unified, single truth, but a truth subject to division by conflicting accounts given by historians. Nevertheless, the historian's *caveat emptor*, like the film's notice that it is fiction, stands as a displaced kind of unified, singular truth.
31. See also Coleman (2004) on cinematic epigraphs. Davis's fantasies about the paratext are tied to her fantasies about film as a laboratory preview of the film: both fantasies obey the loopy logic that Lev Manovich (2001) ascribes to new media: "The viewer becomes an editor, but not in the traditional sense. Rather than constructing a singular narrative sequence and discarding material not used, here the viewer brings to the forefront, one by one, numerous layers of looped actions that seem to be taking place all at once, a multitude of separate but coexisting temporalities. The view is not cutting but reshuffling" (320).
32. See also Davis on Coras and the film prologue in Benson (1984, 132–33).
33. See Genette (1997, 39–42), for a discussion of his term for the use of the author's real name, "onymity," in distinction for pseudonymity and anonymity.
34. Davis, personal e-mail correspondence with Richard Burt, May 20, 2006.
35. The male voice-over says at the end of the film that Coras, "impressed by the impostor, made a record of" the trial.
36. Davis's paratexts include footnotes, prefaces, introductions, their order, book covers, and interviews, and the paratext is not a secondary and more polemical story than a narratological and cognitive problem in (re)telling history through film and print. See Genette's (1997) chapter 12, "Notes," 319–43.
37. All other historians who have worked as film consultants, to my knowledge, have limited their discussions to a single interview, essay, or book. See Hartmann (1950), Van den Ecker (1950), Coleman (2004), and Fox (2004).
38. I know of no other example.
39. The epitext often takes the form of published articles that are not easy to learn of or find. The epitext is something of a collector's fantasy. Both the peritext and epitext are fragmented, and the latter is materially dispersed beyond the pages of a bound book. One could make a similar point about previously published online epitexts of film included in its DVD and HD-DVD editions as extras.
40. See Davis (1983b, vi, and 2000b, x), for nearly identical sentences on wanting to turn the story into a film.
41. For three versions, see Aufderheide (1984, 136–37); Pringle and Prior (1986, 233); Benson (1983, 46). Similar differences are provided by Davis of her account of when she decided to write the book. See Davis (2003a, 46), Benson (1983, 56–57, and Pringle and Prior 1986, 232).
42. See Benson 1984 for his own account of Vigne's *Return of Martin Guerre*.
43. Vigne says that Davis came to the set once or twice (Morrissey 2004, 261). Carrière notes twice that it was her first experience as a consultant and says she discovered a universe she hadn't known before (Morrissey 2004, 270).

44. Davis frequently has recourse to the elliptical and uncanny locution "I found myself." See, for two examples, Davis (2003b, 46) and Davis (1997, 26). See also Adelson (1991); and see Freud's similar locution in "The 'Uncanny'" (*SE* 17) for his involuntary returns to the red light district in Venice—"I found myself" (237) and "I suddenly found myself" (237) and for the story he read in the *Strand* magazine which "fell into my hands" (244).
45. The spring driving this circular process of epitextual emendation is wound even tighter by the way the published interview is not a transcription of what is said live but a revised transcription usually derived from a tape recording that allows the interviewee to revise his comments. See Genette (1997, 357).
46. Most scholars who discuss the case of Martin Guerre begin by recounting the story and then saying that it has been "recounted many times," as Davis (1983a) says in her preface to the English edition of her book, noting that the story has been retold in books and as "a play, two novels, and an operatta" (vii). Like Davis, Stephen Greenblatt (1986b) notes that part of the record "formed the basis of a fine historical novel by Janet Lewis, *The Wife of Martin Guerre*, has recently been amplified and analyzed with great power by the historian in a short book called *The Return of Martin Guerre* and dramatized in a French film of the same title" (210). [For a much fuller example of this move to tell the story and tell that it has been retold, see Grossvogel (2002, 134)]. See also Staiger (1989, 400)]. I would add that this story about doubles, one real and one impostor, complete with two returns of "Martin Guerre" and Martin Guerre as well as two trials, has also been doubly narrated from the start: as Davis notes, "two books were immediately written about the case" (vii). Jean de Coras and Guillame Le Sueur both published accounts of the trial in 1561, and both books were printed in two editions. [For the bibliographical details, see Davis (1983a, 127–28).] A similar doubling extends to the retellings of the story. Alexander Dumas included the story in a novel he entitled *The Two Dianas*. To the two books and two novels Davis mentions, we can add two musicals, two films (the remake *Sommersby* [dir. John, Amiel, 1993], being the second film), the two editions of Davis's book (first in French, then in English), *The Return of Martin Guerre*, and video and DVD editions of the film (the latter includes twelve additional minutes and is in widescreen, whereas the former is full screen, and occasionally has different subtitles. Vigne's film, released theatrically in the United States in 1983 and on DVD in 1998, has never been released on video or DVD in France.) Davis's *Return of Martin Guerre* appeared in two editions, and the first edition is itself doubled, the first part being a novelization of the screenplay and the second Davis's account. Carrière and Vigne note this doubleness in their preface to their novelization of the film in the book *Le Retour de Martin Guerre*, jointly published with Davis's book, stating that "it is in an attempt to show the parallel paths of these two methods that we have made this book, composed of two texts (Davis, Vigne, and Carrière, 1982, 8)." One review of Davis book is entitled "Double Trouble" (See Le Roy Ladurie 1983). Davis entitled her response to Finlay's (1988) polemical attack on her *Martin Guerre* book, "On the Lame," which is also the title of a chapter in her *Martin Guerre* book as well as the title of an essay by Michel de Montaigne that mentions the Martin Guerre case.
47. Consider the sequence: Davis's decision to go to France to talk about the film arises from a dinner party discussion with a filmmaker; she learns of the Vigne film from a colleague who served as a consultant on Vigne's

earlier TV program; after she cries, she phones the film director. She begins consulting by taking photocopies of materials and mailing them to the director and actors (Pringle and Prior 1986, 232).

48. See Freud, "The Uncanny" (*SE* 17); on reanimation, see his discussion of E.T.A. Hoffman's short story "The Sandman" and the figure of the doll automata, Olympia. See also Royle (2003) and Krapp (2004) on the uncanny.
49. Davis comments on the same page about René Allio talking about people in his film watching the rushes: "It meant that history was living for those people . . . I wanted to bring the sixteenth century to life before the eyes of millions of spectators . . . my dream was to make a film" (Benson 1983, 52).
50. On the spirit of the film, see Davis with Walkowitz (1992, 31, 33) and (Benson 1983, 62). See also Walkowitz (1985).
51. On film in relation to popular memory, see Foucault (1989).
52. For other examples, see Robin Lane's self-introduction to the audiocommentary of Oliver Stone's *Alexander*. See also similar comments by historian Jean Claude-Schmitt in Morrissey (2004, 310). On Davis's view of the limits of accuracy as a criterion for evaluating historical films, see Aufderheide (1984, 139).
53. During a recess of the trial, Coras asks Arnaud the name of the notary and Arnaud gives it to Coras. Coras, who, like the notary, is linked to written documents and recording and hence is clearly analogous to a historian is defined by social microhistorians Carlo Ginzburg and Natalie Davis, both of whom have drawn analogies between the historian and the anthropologist, detective, and judge. As do the heroes in *Se7en* (dir. David Fincher), *The Reckoning* (dir. Paul McGuigan), and *The Advocate/The Hour of the Pig* (dir. Leslie Megahey, 1993), Coras resembles a detective on a criminal case. He is even more like a modern anthropologist visiting illiterate narratives. Though he is a far less central character, the notary, in my view, is an even stronger figure of the historian as writer and keeper of records. Just as the notary takes his saddle and papers with him into the Guerre home, a voice-over prologue tell us that what we are about to see is "a true story." See also the image of a chicken, when Guerre signs his name to the wedding contract in the scene that follows.
54. The second page is only visible if one puts the video or DVD on pause. The second image is entirely made up of skeletons, whereas the first shows a skeleton dancing with living aristocrats. The book is a kind of palimpsest, or even unconscious writing.
55. The specificity of the film's links between Bertrande's learning to write (her name) and forgery may be seen in the scenes of her desiring/writing that are contrasted with similar scenes of John Rolfe (Christian Bale) teaching Pocahontas (Q'orianka Kilcher) to read and write in the extended DVD version of Terence Malick's *The New World* (2005) (DVD edition 2007); the Dominican monk Etienne de Bourbon (Tcheky Karyo) teaching a local woman healer named Elda (Christine Boisson) to write in *The Sorceress* (dir. Suzanne Schiffman, 1987), a film shot uncannily in the same village where *The Return of Martin Guerre* was filmed and released both in English audio and in French audio with English subtitles videotapes; a priest (Mandy Patinkin) teaching Squanto (Adam Beach) how to read in *Squanto, a Warrior's Tale* (dir. Xavier Koller, 1994); and a priest teaching Joan of Arc (Sandrine Bonnaire) to write her name in Jacques Rivette's *Jeanne La Pucelle: les*

Batailles (1994). See also the scene of Lavinia (Laura Fraser) writing the names of her rapists in Julie Taymor's *Titus* (1999).

56. Davis writes: "Some directors, like [Carl Theodor] Dreyer, care about being faithful to historical evidence" (1987, 14).
57. See her "Indeed, my whole book, from its opening dedication to my husband, 'my authentic husband,' to its closing evocation of Pansette" ("On the lame" 1988). In Davis (2006), Davis's husband also reappears uncannily in both the dedication ("once again—as always") and the final paragraph of the acknowledgments, placed at the end of the book (416). Davis(1985) has also written an essay on dedications. See also Freud's essay on the family romance. Davis plays an upper-class lady as an extra in the trial scene; fantasies of secretly being from a royal family are a symptom, Freud comments, of the family romance.
58. In the Adelson (1991) interview, Davis notes she "wrote a short book [*The Return of Martin Guerre*] that I dedicated to my husband."
59. Davis comments: "I decided to help them make their Bertrande into as plausible a sixteenth-century character as possible. In the first version she not only did not bring that case but was also a very narrowly defined woman, a nineteenth or twentieth century romantic, passive woman, hardly doing anything" (Pringle and Prior 1986, 233); in a different interview, Davis makes a similar point: "Natalie Baye . . . has such a good sense of the woman's sense of the practical that she realized the Bertrande of the film script had more of the nineteenth-century romantic in it than was realistic. And she put some of the sixteenth-century woman back into the role" (Aufderheide 1986, 139).
60. See also Davis (1988) for an aggressive response to Finlay's (1988) attack on her book *The Return of Martin Guerre*, where she writes of his "deafness" to her voice.
61. Allio's *Moi, Pierre Rivière* is based on Michel Foucault's dossier of the same title. Foucault's cache made it possible for Rene Allio to finance his film *Moi, Pierre Rivière* (see Morrissey 54, 184–85).
62. Davis also writes: "A scene from the court room sequence, where you see the correct placement of the prisoner on his stool, but the unhistorical presence of the spectators at the back. I am one of those spectators, 'bearing false witness!'" (2003b, 12). Similarly, she writes: "Under the circumstance, my only possible protest was to announce, as I took my place at the back of the spectators in my sixteenth-century dress, 'I am bearing false witness'" (2003a; 48).
63. In an e-mail correspondence (May 27, 2006) with the author, Davis writes:

    > These shots . . . were taken the day I had to leave for a conference on other 16th century matters. The day before I was filmed at the back of the courtroom scene wearing the same light purple dress and dark head dress as the lady in the third of these three pictures (the one whose arm is being taken). If you look at the back at the left (your spectator's left) of the scenes while the trial is still going on, you'll catch a glimpse of me.

    In response to my question "So is that you, to the left of Nathalie Baye, in the shot immediately below?" Davis writes, "Yep, that's me! Cheers, Natalie" (e-mail from Natalie Davis to Richard Burt, May 27, 2006).
64. Benson (1983, 65).
65. Similarly, Davis (1983a) does not name the peasants in her book or in the epilogue.

66. For a similar matrilineal chain of succession back to the true story via a granddaughter contrasting to mere rumors, see the framing flashback prologue and epilogue in *Ever After* (dir. Andy Tennant, 1998), a film that historicizes the Charles Perrault story of Cinderella and that is now relayed in person to the Brothers Grimm. *Ever After* links matrilineal authority to a recessive interior space in which the home is a mausoleum; the past is what is mourned, collected, put in a box (the slipper) and framed (a da Vinci portrait of Danielle du Barberac [Drew Barrymore]), the true Cinderella.
67. The notary becomes a much more central figure in Davis's following book, *Fiction in the Archive* (1987), a book that was stimulated by her *The Return of Martin Guerre*. Davis explains in the preface to *Fiction in the Archives*:

> A royal notary and his clerks prepared a draft with the supplicant agent and then recorded the letter on its final parchment. Royal notaries (or secretaries as they were also called) made up the elite of the world of scribes, possessors of a royal office, which could pass from father to son, or uncle to nephew and bring with it an ennoblement. Rather than just recording the contacts and wishes of private persons, they reported in all "truth and loyalty" what the king had resolved and commanded. . . . The secretary also went over the rules with the supplicant—reminded him he must set down faithfully what happened. (1987, 15; 22)

Davis's account both of the faithful notary and of the faithful supplicant sounds remarkably like her account of herself as a historian "faithful to her sources and the voices" of the past in her preface and introduction to the French edition of *The Return of Martin Guerre*. "From the liberty and discovery of film," Davis writes, "I went back to my exigent but beloved struggle with texts, scraps of paper that I inherited from the past and to which I must be faithful" (Davis, Vigne, and Carrière, 1982, 120; my translation). Davis's faithful notary/secretary who records an equally faithful account provided by the supplicant crucially stands as framing writer outside the narrative he recorded, outside the fiction Davis wants to find in the archive, on the side of the truth rather than the literary. Though literate enough to recognize a good story, "By and large the notaries were not active literary figures. . . . The letters of remission have a variety about them that seems impossible to attribute merely to the talents of a limited number of notarial hands" (1987, 15; 23). Davis wants to reserve the ability for herself to "invent the past" and to read "fiction in the archive." Yet in the archive as Davis conceives it, fiction, literariness, narrative, and authorship are the exclusive province of the supplicant; the notary's additions and transformations of the supplicant's narrative are supplements that stand outside fiction, framing it, and do not produce any static, noise, or interference that might get in the way of the voice of the supplicant but instead are the guarantee of that voice's authenticity:

> collaborative product though it is, the letter . . . can still be analyzed in terms of . . . the person saving his neck by a story. . . . Letters of remission . . . emerged from an exchange among several people about events, points of law, and chancellery style. All of the authors have some connection with narrative tradition, literary and oral, but the remission setting, with a faithful secretary and consulting attorney, privileges the account of the person asking for pardon . . . the petitioner's voice [is] the predominant one. (1987, 25)

Moreover, the notary, for Davis stands outside of the narrative: "The notary gives the document its frame and writes the supplicant and the King into the narrative" (1987, 25; see also 16, 17, 22, 23). (Similarly, in the epilogue of her 1983 book *The Return of Martin Guerre*, the notary may bring news of Coras's book, but he doesn't himself bring a story of the trial. The true story is implicitly outside the province of print, the recording machine.)

In Davis (1987) account, the notary is a double of the faithful historian because he serves to guarantee the difference between truth and fiction, speech and writing in the archive. Faithful means accuracy in reproducing the record and voices of the past in the case of the notary, but allowing for fidelity to the spirit and hence room for invention in the case of the supplicant/primary author and the historian. Fiction is not in the archives so much as it is outside and prior to the process of archivalization. For Davis, speech by the supplicant precedes writing and recording by the notary, clerk, and attorney. Yet for Davis, their recording, to be considered authentic, has to be idealized, rendered perfect, faithful, much like a digital remastering of LPs and 45 vinyl records, if I may introduce a modern media analog, that eliminates hisses and scratches, or, to use another analogy, like digital film restorations that eliminate flaws in the celluloid print. While Davis views filmmaking as a collective collaboration and regards the screenwriter, director, and historical consultant as co-owners and coauthors of the film, she isolates the voice of the supplicant and her or his story in the submission for pardon from its collective production and recording by the notary and the supplicant's attorney. To paraphrase Virginia Woolf, Davis wants a doom of one's own for the supplicant qua author. Davis fantasy that the archive is a space of voices telling their own stories depends on her introducing a copying machine in the archive in the form of a notary that functions faithfully without any tech support.

68. Religion is perhaps more important than gender to Davis as a marker of historical presence and absence. For an example of the paratexual fiction that also involves faith, see Davis's fictional prologue qua dialogue with the three seventeenth-century women she writes about in *Women in the Margins* (1995, 1–4). Davis marks her Jewish identity on the first page by dating it according to the Roman and Hebrew calendars: "October 1994, Hevsham 5755" (1995, 1).
69. The way to possessing a specter entails being possessed by it, see Derrida (1994, 132). In the fictional prologue to *Women in the Margins* Davis turns herself into an eavesdropping ghost who haunts the past and describes the "persons" in the prologue as "four women past sixty . . . The fourth [Davis herself, though she does not identify herself] listens for a time in the shadows" (1995, 1). Davis begins addressing the other three women, however, on p. 2 and uncannily ends her prologue by pleading with the three women she has written her book about, asking them to "read it *again*" (4, my emphasis). Davis engages here in a kind of l/eaves dropping. The prologue also concerns a specific paratext, the "special title" Davis says Glikl gave her sons but not her daughters (3).
70. For a discussion of research in Hollywood history films of the 1950s, see Eldridge (2006) and Rosen (2001, 47–66).
71. "Advisor" is a commonly used synonym. More recent possibilities include the "animateur" credit listed on *New World* (dir. Terence Malick, 2005) website. For an explanation of this term, see http://www.thenewworldmovie.com/

and go to "features" and scroll down to "On the set with Michel Singer, Part 4: A 'Buck' of All Trades."

72. See Finlay (1988), Rosenstone (1989), Davis (1989).
73. As a reviewer writes:

> Regardless of how [*Kingdom of*] *Heaven* ultimately fares at the box office, it's hard to imagine there being another major Crusades-era film anytime soon. This would be a great loss, because there is a great story to be told, one that is recounted with wonderful vigor by historian Jonathan Phillips in his new book, *The Fourth Crusade and the Sack of Constantinople*. It is a tale teeming with unlikely heroes, canny operators and nasty brutes, plus bloody battles and incessant political intrigue, not to mention fascinating military ingenuity. In other words, it would make a great movie.

Goldstein 2005 asks "how's this for a Crusades concept? As a student of history, Ridley Scott knows as well as anyone that the Crusades have been given the gauzy, soft-focus treatment by Hollywood."

74. See also *BBC History* magazine article on the BBC TV show "Crusader Fort."
75. See also Coleman's Classics Listserv post "Movie consultancy" in response to David Lupher's post on the same listserv entitled "K. Coleman on *Gladiator*," Monday, May 22, 2000, 17:10:16–0400 (EDT) From: Kathleen Coleman, kcoleman@fas.harvard.edu.
76. Only Pastereau says he was well paid for his work. See Morrissey (2004, 62, 288).
77. Similarly, the French two-disc DVD edition of *Ridicule* (dir. Patrice Leconte, 1996) includes as extras an interview with unnamed "specialist in the eighteenth century court of Louis XIV" that is matched nicely to a documentary on the making of the film and its successful international reception. By contrast, the name of the costume designer, Christian Gasc, is given in a description of an interview about the costume designs. The contents are listed as follows: "L'histoire de Ridicule: Making-of sur la génèse du film, sa production et son succès international (52 min) Le film et l'histoire: Entretien avec un spécialiste du XVIII^{ème} siècle et de la Cour de Louis XVI (15 min) Les costumes: Interview de Christian Gasc sur la conception et confection des costumes du film (10 min) Les photos 'Studio': photos commentées par Patrice Leconte (5 min); Commentaire audio de Patrice Leconte et de Rémi Waterhouse."
78. For Pollard's diary entries on *Elizabeth: The Golden Age*, see http://www.workingtitlefilms.com/featureProductionDiary.php?featureID=114.
79. Some historical films go to great lengths to establish a claim for authenticity, even if it turns out to be rather bizarre. The DVD edition of *The New World* (dir. Terence Malick, 2005) includes a ten-part documentary on the making of the film that includes interviews with the archaeologist of Jamestown Settlement as well as interviews with various Native American tribal leaders and cast members. Sometimes the results are even more strange. *Pathfinder* (dir. Marcus Nispel, 2007), a fantasy film about the Viking invasion of North America designed to look like a graphic novel in the style of Frank Frazetta, costumes the native Americans in "authentic" garb while costuming the Vikings as if they had walked out of *Conan the Destroyer* (dir. Richard Fleischer, 1984). Yet the Norse spoken by the Vikings is subtitled in English while nearly all the Native Americans speak contemporary American English with mid-Atlantic accents.

80. See Moote (1985) and Ginzburg (1988).
81. Rosenstone (2006) includes highly critical remarks on Davis. Yet, like Davis's work, Rosenstone's is uncannily recursive and repetitive. The conclusion to his most recent book repeats almost verbatim points and personal anecdotes told in the introduction. In the introduction to *History on Film, Film on History* (2006), Rosenstone tells two autobiographical anecdotes about films which adapted books he wrote and for which he served as a consultant, in one case writing the narration as well (6–7). One of the films was Warren Beatty's *Reds* (1981), as yet not released on DVD. Rosenstone retells the anecdotes in somewhat fuller form in the conclusion as well (156–57). Rosenstone also repeats almost verbatim a number of points throughout the book. Consider, for example, his point about film being metaphorical, not literal (8, 31, 160, 162). Similar examples could easily be multiplied. See, for one, Burgoyne (2008). Unlike Natalie Zemon Davis, Rosenstone has no desire to prescribe what filmmakers should and should not do when representing the past. Films need to be judged according to different criteria from historical accuracy, Rosenstone maintains. For Rosenstone, the cinematic match out, an editing transition that visually matches one image with another like it, best describes his desire to reconcile film history and written history. If the film matches debates among historians or accounts by historians, then it is a serious historical film. But Rosenstone too has a great deal of ambivalence about film. He so narrows his definition of the historical film, despite the seemingly all-encompassing title of his book, attending only to what he calls the serious historical film, that he ends up confirming the negative view of historical films held by most historians (at least as he imagines his audience). Rosenstone too, that is, dismisses films like *Gladiator* and *Braveheart*, and significantly does not attend to research departments in Hollywood studios or the history of the film consultant (Hollywood films are dismissed as romantic costume dramas and adventure films despite the fact that the title of Rosenstone's book on John Reed is *Romantic Revolutionary* and the tagline of *Reds* was "Not since *Gone With The Wind* has there been a great romantic epic like it!"). By the end of the book, he has conceded a great deal of ground, saying that while film is not history with a capital "H," it contributes to our historical understanding (162). Just pages earlier he writes that "film will always be less complex than written history" (159) and that "certainly the historical world created by film is potentially much more complex than the written text" (160). Rosenstone repeatedly says that film adds "something" to our historical understanding, but never says what that something is. Instead, he repeats the same point about film being metaphorical, not literal (see 2006, 8, 31, 160, 162). One wonders if there are unconscious attachments for which film serves as some sort of neurotic compensation for felt losses in terms of student interest in racial movements and revolutions as well as for now dated debates between historians; hence, Rosenstone's need to retread the same ground over and over again rather than move forward into our present film and digital media history age. Like Davis, who has retold the same story about consulting on *The Return of Martin Guerre* for over twenty years, and like the directors of serious historical films he admires who are "obsessed by the past" (116, 159), Rosenstone has obsessively repeated positions he first staked out in the 1980s but continues to fight a fight long after it has been won: historians have

long treated film as a legitimate subject of analysis. See, for the example, the section of each issue of *American Historical Review*, the leading journal of the profession, devoted to film reviews. Rosenstone's interest in film seems to have less to do with film as film than with using it to outflank historians with whom he disagrees, making him a progressive and his opponents into old farts and fuddy duddies. So film is thus a means of settling old scores in his discipline.

Epilegomenon: Anec-Post-It-Note to Self: Freud, Greenblatt, and the New Historicist Uncanny

1. For a similar and more expansive ironic take on reviewing as rewriting the book under review, with an eye on Juan Luis Borge's short story "Pierre Menard, Author of Don Quixote," see the exchange between Foucault (1971) and Steiner (1971).
2. In an interview with Denis Crouzet (2004), Natalie Davis mentions the concept of overdetermination, saying that it is a "psychoanalytic term, I believe" and that she does not use psychoanalysis except that it has been absorbed into everyday thought (96–97). Similarly, in an interview with Pallares-Burke (2002, 62) Davis says she uses psychoanalytic commonplaces but does not do psychoanalytic readings. Yet Davis discusses Bertrande's dreams in her book *The Return of Martin Guerre* (1983a) and does what may reasonably be called a Freudian symptomatic reading of what she calls omissions and exaggerations in both Coras's letters to his wife and his account of the trial.
3. Davis (1983b, 103) cites Greenblatt's (1980/2005) *Renaissance Self-Fashioning* and thanks him in her acknowledgments (1983b, x).
4. For a broader challenge deconstruction presents to the monopoly on historicism uncritically assumed by historicists, see Derrida's (2002) comments on the way justice puts into question what can be recognized as history: "Justice, as the experience of absolute alterity, is unrepresentable, but it is the chance of the event and the condition of history. No doubt an unrecognizable history, of course, for those who believe they know what they are talking about when they use this word, whether it's a matter of social, ideological, political, juridical or some other history" (257). Along lines similar to Torok (1986), Jean-Luc Godard (Godard and Ishaghppour 2005) maintains that "only cinema can narrate its own history" (41) through quotation and montage.
5. In relating his account of Freudian psychoanalysis, Greenblatt (1986) ignores the ways in which Freud frequently mixes literature and history in essays and autobiographical anecdotes. Moreover, Greenblatt treats Freud's case histories as if they were histories, not as fictional narratives that overlap with history in a manner similar to the way Natalie Davis's history overlaps with fiction in the archives and storytelling.
6. For a Lacanian critique of Greenblatt's essay, see Bellamy (1992).
7. Greenblatt's essay (1986) is oddly asymmetrical with respect to the two Martins: Greenblatt provides a psychoanalysis of the real Martin Guerre (as if Guerre were a Freudian case study) but not of Arnaud, Guerre's double (nor of Bertrande, for that matter). Like Davis (1983), Greenblatt does not recognize the Renaissance story as a ghost story. On theater and possession, see Greenblatt (1986a).

8. Greenblatt (1996) begins his essay "Remnants of the Sacred in Early Modern England" (338) with a favorable account of Slavoj Žižek's account of the Lacanian Real. For a brilliant Lacanian critique of historicist and materialist accounts of subjectivity, see Pye (2000).
9. For a few examples of Greenblatt's use of the word "uncanny," see Greenblatt (2004a, 14 and 1992, 23, 72). The word "uncanny" often modifies "power" when Greenblatt uses it. For an fascinating and very autobiographical account of reading and death, see Greenblatt (1997b). On Greenblatt's use of the word "uncanny," see, for example: "The uncanny power of these spectral dreams depends in large part on their reality claim." (2001b, 164). See also the first sentence of the anecdote I cite from the new preface to *Learning to Curse* (1991/2006) and this closing sentence of a twice published article by Greenblatt (1997b and 1998): "Literature is functionally powerful precisely because it carries the traces of those who are now only ghosts, because it has the *uncanny ability* of seeming to be written, as St. Paul puts it, 'for us,' because it has always stalked the boundary between life and death" (my emphasis). Greenblatt (1998) notes at the end of the article that the essay was previously published under a different title, "What is the History of Literature?" (Greenblatt 1997c).
10. See the epilogue to Greenblatt (1980/2005).
11. In an essay about his practices, Greenblatt (2007b) exposes the mechanisms of his own work and explains why he has dropped some strategies as they became rhetorically exhausted. This self-exposure may be seen as yet another performance, however, like a magician who ends not with this trick but by incorporating into his trick an explanation of how it is done.
12. Freud, moreover, borrows from Ernest Jentsch's earlier essay on the uncanny. Hertz (1985, 119–20) notes, however, a contradictory footnote at the end of *From the History of an Infantile Neurosis* in which Freud claims he "was the first—a point to which none of my opponents have referred—to recognize . . . " (*SE* 17, 103). I would add that this footnote occurs just before the final chapter, entitled "*Recapitulations* and Problems" (my emphasis); the note recalls the first footnote of "the introductory remarks" dating the essay and explaining that it was written while Freud was "still under the twisted *re*-interpretations of C.G. Jung and Alfred Adler" (*SE* 17, 7, my emphasis). Freud's claim for priority, made more explicitly in the later footnote, is itself subject to uncanny returns and repetitions in Freud's own text.
13. To push the point further, one might note some uncanny features of Greenblatt's anecdote that Greenblatt seemingly encrypts in a rather open fashion. The anecdote involves a double time scheme, for example: the time before and after the conference parallels the time when the woman was alive and the time she was dead, a time marked for Greenblatt only through the delayed posting of the news by his mother. Moreover, Greenblatt's identification in the anecdote with Leontes suggests that the twin sister is akin to Paulina, whom Greenblatt quotes earlier when first mentioning *The Winter's Tale*. If Greenblatt is encrypting and inviting the decryption of such a reading, he is turning himself into a literary character in a manner that resembles Freud's similar literary self-presentation in "Delusions and Dreams in Jensen's *Gradiva*." Greenblatt (2007b) even more overtly "lifts the curtain" to reveal the calculations informing his writing, especially his use of historical and

personal anecdotes in the beginnings of his articles. He skips over the personal anecdotes in his paratexts, however.

14. Greenblatt (1997b). For the second version, see Greenblatt (2000a).
15. Greenblatt (1997b and 2000a) is alert to the doubleness, or what I would call uncanniness, of Geertz's own text. Greenblatt refers to a double negative (21) and notes that Geertz repeats the image of the note in the bottle twice (22).
16. Although he never uses the word "paratext," Greenblatt (1997b and 2000a) is quite alert to the way of the supplemental work of the paratext in narrative framing to conjure the touch of the real. Greenblatt points in the second endnote to both versions how much the paratext contributes to the success of Geertz's ability to convey the touch of the real by framing the anecdote:

    > The promise is conveyed, among other means, by such features as the changed typeface (used, in the case of such a long excerpt, instead of quotation marks) and the brackets that denote the writer's scrupulosity in signaling any additions or alterations to what he had originally written in his journal: "The French [the informant said] had only just arrived." Such printing conventions do a considerable amount of work in establishing the particular nature of the piece of writing.

    The endnote repeats a point Greenblatt (2000) makes in the body of his text about Geertz's notes: "There follows, set off in a different typeface, a wonderful account . . . " (21). At the beginning of the second section in the book chapter, Greenblatt similarly analyzes the minimal paratext of Auerbach's *Mimesis*:

    > This is how the text of Erich Auerbach's great book, *Mimesis*, both in the German-language original and the English translation, begins: no page of acknowledgments, no methodological forward, no theoretical introduction. Between the title (*Mimesis: Dargestellte Wirklichkeit in der Abendlaendischen Litertur*) and the table of contents, there is only an epigraph in English, . . . from Marvell's "To His Coy Mistress": "Had we but world enough and time . . . " In the first edition, published in Switzerland by A. Francke AG. Verlag in 1946, there is along with the copyright information in very small letters, "Mai 1942 bis April 1945." Then we plunge immediately into a close reading of the episode of Odysseus's scar. (31)

    Greenblatt does not discuss the publication history of *Mimesis* and might have added that in his epilogue. Auerbach (1953/2003) mentions that his book has no footnotes: "The lack of technical literature and periodicals may also serve that my book has no notes. Aside from the texts, I quote comparatively little, and that little in was easy to include in the body of that text" (557). A recent reedition (2003) adds an introduction by Edward Said and an appendix "Epilogomena to *Mimesis*" by Auerbach, first published as an epitext in a journal in 1953, in which Auerbach aggressively responds to reviewers of his book.
17. See Fineman (1989). Greenblatt (2000a) invoke Fineman's essay as a precedent: "Like Fineman . . . New Historicists linked anecdotes to the disruption of history as usual, not to practice: the undisciplined anecdote appealed to those of us who wanted to interrupt the Big Stories" (51). See also Greenblatt's (1991) related comments in *Marvelous Possessions:*

    > If anecdotes are registers of the singularity of the contingent . . . they are at the same time recorded as representative anecdotes, that is, as significant

> in terms of a larger progress or pattern that is the proper subject of a history perennially deferred in the traveler's relation of further anecdotes. Anecdotes . . . are among the principal products of a culture's representational technology, mediators between an undifferentiated succession of local moments and a larger strategy toward which they can only gesture. (3)

Like Fineman, Greenblatt differentiates between the anecdote from "the *grand récits* of totalizing, integrated, progressive history, a history that knows where it is going" (2). If I had more time, I would discuss Gallagher and Greenblatt's attempts to assimilate Fineman's psychoanalytic account of the anecdote as an interruption in grand, teleological narratives to their historicist account of the anecdote as a counterhistory and hence capable of being assimilated to the "rebellious" and "undisciplined" New Historicism. Their grand synthesis of the greatest hits of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s—psychoanalytic formalism of Fineman, the structuralism of Roland Barthes, the radical British history of Raymond Williams, the counter-memory of Michel Foucault, and the new historicism—depends on the uncritically held assumption that everything can be narrated: the difference is only a matter of scale, *petit récit* versus *grand récit*. My concern is less the way Gallagher and Greenblatt overlook Fineman's "psychoanalytic language" than the way they overlook the anec-post-it-notal character of Fineman's account of the anecdote: Fineman attends to a narratological problem in the anecdote (it is in narrative yet outside it) that we may locate not only in Fineman's account of the anecdote as being outside of narrative "without a framing successivity" but in the way Fineman's article paratextually bears marks of its initial delivery as a published conference talk and announces itself as such in the first endnote, written, Fineman says, like "amplified" endnotes, after the talk and hence not delivered at the conference itself. Fineman's article presents itself as a transcription of a conference paper delivered from notes, like Lacan's *Ecrits* were transcribed from recordings of Lacan's live lectures, but with its endnotes, or like a Derridean *post*-card from the dead that will only arrive in writing. Fineman begins his article by stating "I will be speaking, for the most part, informally from notes rather than reading a paper" (59). His essay is a "prefatory prolegomenon" and "introductory material" (60). He tells us that the article was a conference paper, the first endnote, under "Notes": "This paper was originally delivered as a talk at a conference on 'The New Historicism: The Boundaries of Social History,' at the West Coast Humanities, Stanford University, on Oct. 9, 1987" (60). In this same note, which would usually stand as a headnote above the endnotes, Fineman draws attention to the hybridized status of his article: "I have retained the marks of oral presentation but I have added and amplified some footnotes for the sake of publication in this anthology" (76, note 1). Yet the article is also about Fineman's apparent inability to deliver the paper he planned to give and that he took for the title of his conference talk. At the beginning of the article, Fineman talks about his paper not in terms of large or small scale but in terms of extension:

> hence the following, rather extended, set of remarks—quite extended; they will likely take up the entirety of the time I am allotted. If so, when time will tell, I plan at the end of these preliminary remarks very quickly

> to sketch out what was I wanted to say about 'Stephen Greenblatt's Fiction and Friction,' and its relation to the New Historicism, in the paper that, finally, in the event, I may not get to deliver today, a paper that is called "The History of the Anecdote: Fiction and Fiction."

Fineman ends his paper by stating: "Turning from a large thing . . . to Stephen Greenblatt's 'Fiction and Friction,' I here conclude my introductory remarks to the talk I will now not finally deliver, 'The History of the Anecdote: Fiction and Fiction'" (76).

Fineman is able to deliver his advertised paper only through an extension that hybridizes oral conference paper with written, published article and that thereby inverts the usual relation between text and paratext. Extension operates in Fineman's account as a spatial metaphor that is also temporal, both for the entire time he allotted and the entire space of the ages of his paper—he gives his account of the anecdote only by getting an extension, by writing past a deadline. The oral aspects of the article qua conference paper—"I will be speaking"—create static because the paper was obviously written when delivered, not a spontaneous talk from notes, as he maintains: Fineman knew when he delivered it that he would not be able to deliver the paper promised by his title. The paper is fictional in its own performative status, then. The paratextual supplement of the conference—the addition of endnotes—may seem more transparent than the talk itself, given that they conform to published articles. Yet the endnotes are also aberrant. "Some footnotes" that Fineman says in his first endnote he amplified in the conference paper turn out to be thirty-four endnotes, and the last endnote, which is three and a half pages of single space writing, turns out to be a version of the paper Fineman says he did not deliver. His final endnote is the three and a half page essay he promised to deliver, in which "I would like here briefly to remark both what I disagree and what I admire in Stephen Greenblatt's 'Fiction and Friction.'" He says this endnote, however, is not the paper itself but only a "gesturing towards the paper to which the above stands as introduction" (83, note 34). The extended edition of the conference paper, itself an extension, produces weird aberrations from the norms of scholarly publication. Yet the extension falls short, not only in failing to give the advertised paper: publication of a paper as a note alters the paper, making it a gesture toward the paper yet to be written rather the final, ready to be published draft of the paper, or rough cut, so to speak. Moreover, in failing, the notes from which he ostensibly spoke during the conference talk are not published in the article: they remain before the talk in a realm of fiction and fiction: of they existed, he did not speak from them but read the published conference paper which generated them. In the context of a discussion of the anecdote in metaphors of hole, rim, orifice, and circumcising circumscription, Fineman's verb "anecdotalized" and his reference to the anecdote being "plugged" by teleological narration begin to sound like he is describing an obscene sex act. The same may be said for the "not insignificant difference between rubber and leather" he notes when discussing gloves on p. 86, note 34 where he sounds like he is talking about fetish gear. Perhaps even more perverse are Fineman's spatial metaphors—open hole and plugged up hole in their impossible spatiality. The hole is a hole in narrative, yet narrative is what plugs up the hole, making narrative whole; yet in future a narrative will tear a new anecdotal hole in narrative. Fineman's perverse

metaphorics and arguably perverse performance of a paper that has (yet to) come return us to what Genette (1997) repeatedly refers to in *Paratexts* as a "perverse effect" in the paratext, the way its playfulness often derails its pragmatic functions. However, Fineman's paratextual perversity enables us to see, *pace* Genette, that the subject, the anecdote, and fiction are always already perverse in their functions. There is no original, rational, pragmatic or programmatic function that is subsequently capable of being perverted by an ironic or playful effect. Fineman alerts us to the way narrative history, rather large or small, takes the form of the anec-post-it-note, a supplement that arrives after the fact and, taking the form of a fetishistic disavowal, both delivers and does not deliver the text promised and advertised by the title, and a non-narratable cryptogram or (un)buried, (un)published "autobiographeme" encoded in the transmissions relayed from conference talk to publication, from text to endnote and epigraph. These "undisciplined" paratextual aberrations cannot, then, properly be synthesized as part of a rebellious counterhistory insofar as they are remains that cannot be fully decoded, explicitly narrated, and historicized in the first place.

18. Pages 14–22, 28, 29, notes 5–7 (1997) and pages 20–31, 212, notes 1–7 (2001) are exactly the same in both versions of "The Touch of the Real"; pages 23–28, 29, notes 8–14 (1997) and pages 31–48, 212–13, notes 8–13 are totally different.
19. Let me stress again that there is nothing scandalous about this fact, no secret truth that is being hidden or repressed and that I am now bringing to light. There is no need for Greenblatt to mention the differences between the two versions or to assume that anyone would care if he did (or didn't do) so. Greenblatt's practice is not consistent, however: sometimes he does not note differences and sometimes he does. I do not mean to suggest that he *should* be consistent; although some readers may regard it as disturbingly transgressive, perhaps even impolite of me to discuss at such an unusual length his deeply fascinating and stimulating writing, I do so because it discloses, much more fully and more strangely than most academic writing, aberrations arising from the ways in which unstated rules often fail to regulate the institution and profession of criticism. *My focus is on Greenblatt's writing, especially the personalization of his writing, not his person(ality); my anec-notal theory analyzes the way he often acts out a problem in historicism in his paratexts by telling autobiographical anecdotes that have a literary finish to them; his paratexts thus involve a double (para)textual play that reaches both outward and inward at the same time, such that history and fiction mix.* Like Hollywood historical films, Greenblatt's autobiographical anecdotes and his New Historicist practice are always "based on a true story." For example, he does very carefully note differences between previously published material and its revision in the acknowledgments to *Shakespearean Negotiations* (1988): (one chapter, he says, was published in two different versions; another was published in three different versions, and another chapter was published only once (1998, viii). His book brings "together revised and expanded versions of them . . . along with material that has not before appeared in print" (viii). "None of these essays was 'occasional' in origin or design" (viii), Greenblatt adds, folding the differences between various versions into a teleological, semigrand, unifying narrative of the book's genesis and completion. In this case, Greenblatt felt some pressure to justify the publication of a book in which three out of five chapters,

the first of which is introductory, have already appeared. It is notable that *Shakespearean Negotiations* stands alone in Greenblatt's books in having neither a preface nor an introduction. Differences in the way an author notes differences between versions of his or her republished material are a matter of an inconsistent practice (by no means confined to Greenblatt): authors may explain their genesis in perfectly reasonable terms of writing as a process of revision, changing one's mind about a position, and so on. More significantly, this irreparable (because impossible to narrate fully) inconsistency registers the lack of explicitly formal, institutional, professional norms governing how one cites the republication of one's materials and whether one needs to explain them or make them at all explicit. The uncanny mechanisms of republication exceed and outstrip an author's ability to control or anecnote them. Anec-notal repetitions in practice may blur the difference between plagiarism and signature. Whereas Greenblatt's repeated use of autobiographical anecdotes constitutes a signature effect, Slavoj Žižek's repetitions of his own work is a kind of self-plagiarism rather than a garden-variety example of self-citation into his signature. See also Burt (2008c), for further discussion of two versions of a related anecdote (2005 and 2007a) about Greenblatt meeting President Bill Clinton (Greenblatt quotes the 2007a version in 2007b) as well as an anecdote Greenblatt (2001) tells about picking up two fellow dinner party guests, Nadine Gordimer and Carlos Fuentes, at the airport, both of whom thought he was just the chauffeur and ignored him. Nadine Gordimer and Fuentes each tell about their having met Clinton, and Greenblatt intervenes when they disagree about when Clinton first read William Faulkner's *The Sound and the Fury*. Greenblatt comically says his comment was met with "a terrible silence" (49).

20. They recall Greenblatt's (1989) stated desire to speak with the dead in *Shakespearean Negotiations*. See also the epilogue in Greenblatt (1980, 255–57); the prologue to Greenblatt (2001), especially 5–9; and Greenblatt (2003).
21. See Greenblatt (1991), for example.
22. Miller (2005) continues: "Although his parents weren't great readers, at some deep, atavistic level, Greenblatt's early love of books did connect him with his family heritage, which stretches back to the Jewish communities of Lithuania, where his mother's grandfather was a scholar 'who sat in a back room studying the Talmud.'" http:// books.guardian. co.uk/ departments/ biography/ story/ 0,6000, 1425299,00.html. Greenblatt tells his own version of this story in Greenblatt and Strier (2007a). See also Greenblatt (2003).
23. Freud wrote his book on jokes before he wrote his essay on the uncanny, but his discussion of jokes shares the feature of doubling with the uncanny. See *Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious* (*SE* 8, 214–15, 235).
24. Much of Strachey's editorial apparatus in the *Collected Works of Sigmund Freud* consists of attempts to assign chronological order to the revisions in the published version. This arguably antipsychoanalytic attempt to order Freud's canon is resisted by Freud's own practice of writing more than one essay or book at a time and thinking through the same concept in stereo.
25. See Niel Hertz (1985, 97–121), especially 97–103. On Marx on "conjuring tricks" and Freud's exorcism, see Derrida (1994), "Apparition of the Inapparent: The Phenomenological 'Conjuring Trick'" (125–76).
26. See also Greenblatt's reference to "the high-resolution area of perception" (1992, 26).

27. The "cut" and related metaphors of wounding, bruising, and tearing return in a psychoanalytic vocabulary of repression in a discussion of a problem of making visible the invisible in Paolo Ucello's "miracles of the bleeding Host" panel of his *The Profantion of the Host*: "the wall is neatly, one might say, surgically cut away . . . the surgical cut . . . Aporias are . . . the tears where . . . repressions flow out into the world" (Greenblatt 2000b, 109). The "cut" out fourth wall effectively turns the space represented in the painting into a film set. See also Greenblatt's opening anecdote about a dinner party he attended in honor of a celebrated anthropologist at which the topic of Jewish circumcision came up as well as Greenblatt's endnote at the end of that anecdote elaborating on it. (See 1997c, 321–22, 237–38, n. 1.)
28. See also Auerbach's (1953/2003, 247–48) two mentions of Charlie Chaplin, the second comparing Chaplin to Shakespeare in the chapter on Cervantes' *Don Quixote*.
29. Greenblatt (2007) seems to have softened on this point, commenting on his opening anecdote about meeting President Clinton,

    > Could I make my crucial points without the anecdote? Yes . . . The president's comment, fascinating as it is, does not in fact work as an overarching interpretive insight for Shakespeare; it belongs instead to a much later world, the world of Immanuel Kant or John Rawls, not the world of Machiavelli and Montaigne. . . . My point is that the opening anecdote, though it may at first seem merely decorative or entertaining, serves to situate and greatly to intensify the phrases "by any means necessary" and "information vital for national security." (2007b)

30. On this point, see Derrida (1994, 133, 172–73, 195–96, n. 38). Derrida notes that Freud writes "Es spukt," "it ghosts," rather than "der Spuk," "the ghost." Greenblatt (2003) uses "repetition compulsion" to characterize negatively literary studies based on identity politics in a manner that implies that the kind of literary studies Greenblatt espouses do not run what he calls "the risk of repetition" (58).
31. If endnotes could have titles, the title of the present one would be either "Whip Lash" or "Hard Drive." By closely reading Greenblatt's *NYRB* review of Niklaus Largier's *In Praise of the Whip*, entitled "Stroking" (2007), specifically the title and the contributor's note, I want to attend to three significant shifts in Greenblatt's work: from historicism to fiction; from historicism to psychohistoricism; and from the placement of a historical anecdote at the beginning of his essay to placing it at the beginning the second section of the review (beginning the review itself with a discussion of a quotation from a play). More broadly, my reading of Greenblatt's review challenges the New Historicist idea that the anecdote or any other sort of narrative fragment delivers a counter-history or counter-memory; any such claim constitutes an attempt to exorcize historicism from the spectral repetitions and aberrations generated by the paratext; and any such attempted exorcism performed with the (un)conscious aim of separating decisively correct cognition from cognitive error, the human from the machine, determinacy from indeterminacy, the reflex from the gesture, reading from rereading, is destin(err)ed to fail. Complicating Greenblatt's customary distinction between fabricated history and fiction, the *NYRB* contributor's note goes beyond even Greenblatt's bibliographic endnote in *Will in the World* (2004b, 392) in which he includes novels and the film *Shakespeare in*

Love among his sources: "Stephen Greenblatt is John Cogan University Professor of the Humanities at Harvard. His play, *Cardenio*, coauthored with Charles Mee, will be performed next year by the American repertory theater and the Public Theater" (3). Greenblatt is identified in the note not as a historicist critic but as a playwright, and the title of the play bears the same title, some readers will know, of a lost play by Shakespeare and John Fletcher based on an episode in Cervantes's *Don Quixote*. Neither of the original authors are mentioned, however, nor is the fact that the title of Greenblatt and Mee's play repeats a title by Shakespeare and Fletcher. (Following Gary Taylor's Oxford edition *William Shakespeare: The Complete Works*, Greenblatt's edition of *The Norton Shakespeare* includes "CARDENIO: A Brief Account.") Greenblatt moves in this contributor's note entirely over to the side of fiction in which restoration and fiction mix. What survives for scholars like Gary Taylor and Jonathan Bate as *Cardenio* is derived from Lewis Theobald's play uncannily titled *Double Falsehood, or the Distressed Lovers* (1727), an adaptation based on several manuscripts of *Cardenio*, though Theobald did not include it in his own edition of Shakespeare's works. *Cardenio* had earlier been relegated to Shakespeare's apocrypha. See Tucker Brooke (1918).

The repetition of the title *Cardenio* marks a radicalization of historicism in that the loss of the past, at once both literary and historical, is left unmarked as such: the traces of the past will never be fully recovered (fiction is a simulation, not authentic) nor even recognized—paratextually—as such. The note radicalizes Greenblatt's historicism through a related spectralization of authorship. Shakespeare is not the only missing author. Authors of contributor's notes are never identified, of course, but we may reasonably infer that Greenblatt wrote the note as contributors usually supply them. It may have been edited, however, and hence be a collaborative text. An uncanny doubling of authorship happens as authorship is spectralized: Greenblatt is both a double of Shakespeare (both are authors of a play entitled *Cardenio*) and a double of his coauthor. A similar point may be made about titles, often assigned by editors rather than authors: there is a disjunction between the title of Greenblatt's review given on the cover of the *NYRB* issue, namely, "In Praise of the Whip" and the title given on the table of contents page, namely, "Stroking."

What I take to be a radicalization of Greenblatt's historicism in the note is signaled in the structure of his review as well. In an Auerbachian vein, Greenblatt begins his review with a literary passage from Shakespeare's *Antony and Cleopatra* rather than with the historical anecdotes he once used. A historical anecdote about self-flagellating fourteenth century Dominican nuns residing in Colmar, drawn from Largier's *In Praise of the Whip*, follows in a new section numbered "2" just after Greenblatt discusses part of Enobarbus's description of Cleopatra's barge, focusing especially on its stroking, beating oars, remarking that "desire as Shakespeare imagines it in *Antony and Cleopatra* . . . is a state of arousal, and if this state of arousal is linked to any hope at all, it is only the hope of remaining aroused" (18). Greenblatt returns to this passage at the end of the section of his review.

Greenblatt's central criticism of Largier's book is that it does not "follow Freud and Kraft-Ebing" or offer a "psychological or psychohistorical" explanation of whipping, preferring instead to celebrate the "subversive power" of Georges Bataille and Michel Foucault: "the concept of arousal, so central to

this book, comes to seem empty or elusive, a strategy to avoid asking, let alone attempting to answer, key questions"(21). Another disjunction appears here between the adjectives Greenblatt uses to describe an adequate explanation and the "key questions" that define the explanation itself. The explanation Greenblatt wants is not historical but "psychological or psychohistorical." (The terms are Largier's, but Greenblatt accepts them without comment after first mentioning them: first, Greenblatt writes that "Largier is not interested in psychological explanations of either of these very strange figures—or indeed of the whole phenomenon of flagellation—nor is he greatly interested in historical or medical explanation" (19)—and second, Greenblatt quotes directly from Largier: "'We are interested,' he writes at the outset, 'neither in psychohistorical explanations nor in the psychological motives that feed the desire for the whip'" (21); Greenblatt effectively adopts Largier's terms as his own, I would maintain by undertaking to review the book.) Apparently, either kind of explanation would do. Both the optional discipline here is history, not psychology. Largier could have dropped history, but not psychology. Yet the key questions Greenblatt asks sound historical in the first question and then, as the word "certain" drops out in the second and third questions, become psychological: "Why are certain people in certain times and places drawn to a particular form of arousal/. . ? Why do some imaginations like to feast on the spectacle of blood on the back or buttocks? Why should any human experience of pleasure be intertwined with pain?"

Why should Greenblatt turn from history to psychology in this quiet and indirect manner? By way of a partial answer, we may say that Greenblatt's radicalization of his historicism depends on his reading and nonreading of the paratextual title. What drives Greenblatt's critique of Largier's book—its failure to explain is figured as intellectual detumesence—begins to become clear when he figures that failure through the paratext itself (titles of forbidden books become the ultimate texts designed for one hand reading). Greenblatt faults Largier because "he refuses to follow Freud and Kraft-Ebing" (21). Greenblatt returns implicitly to the links between his historicism and psychoanalysis, as if they were entirely compatible, and only then begins to whip Largier in earnest by reducing his book to a bibliography: "Having rejected all psychological and psychohistorical explanation, and having refused to credit any therapeutic or medical accounts of flagellation, in *Praise of the Whip* begins as a loving reconstruction of mystical experience and ends as something like an anthology of scabrous passages conjoined to an intelligently annotated scholarly bibliography." Greenblatt ends his review by quoting Largier linking titles of books to their ability to excite the reader: "'To read the assembled titles,' Largier writes, in sentences befitting a scholar who spent years ferreting out the fugitive traces of flagellation, 'excites the fantasy in a manner altogether comparable to that of reading the texts themselves. Indeed, the experience is perhaps even stronger'" (21).

Greenblatt's implicit rebranding of historicism as psychohistoricism depends on his repressing the paratext of his own historicist practice as well as the author's hand (note Shakespeare's personification of the oars as stroking the water amorously; the selection of *Antony and Cleopatra* is rather odd, since the self-flagellating novice nun Isabella of Shakespeare's *Measure for Measure* would seem the more obvious candidate). Greenblatt reads the paratext only in order to condemn what he regards as the fruitlessness of nonhistoricist work. The title of his essay, "stroking," is obviously key, but it

has to remain unread, an exterior fragment outside of historicist explanation, in order for Greenblatt's critique of Largier to function by letting the reader silently activate the too crude to say explicitly in the review itself a bawdy pun on "stroking," meaning both flagellation and masturbation. The title "Stroking," we come to understand, means that Largier's book is just an exercise in mental masturbation. The really sad thing, perhaps, is that the attempt to arouse fails: Largier can't even keep it up. Unwilling to explain, he ends up impotently flailing around as he revels in pornographic subversion that would mean "achieving 'a permanent state of 'undisciplined and undisciplinable arousal'" (21).

Yet the title of Greenblatt's review is general rather than specific, its range of application extending well beyond Largier's book. Indeed, the logic of Greenblatt's own argument implies that he (and other critics who ask key questions) is able to keep "stroking" not because he historicizes but because historicism involves exteriorization and explanation, not interiorization. The difference between Greenblatt's desire for an explanation and Largier's refusal to provide one does not involve a difference between sexually reproductive thought and mental masturbation but between the ability to remain mentally aroused and intellectual detumescence. See Greenblatt's (2004) daring equation of masturbation and solitary reading in his *NYRB* review of Thomas Laquer's *Solitary Sex: A Cultural History of Masturbation*:

> There is a second modern innovation that similarly focused the anxieties attached to solitary sex: solitary reading. . . . For it was reading—and not just any reading, but reading the flood of books churned out by the literary marketplace—that seemed from the eighteenth century onward at once to reflect and to inspire the secret vice. The enabling mechanism here was the invention of domestic spaces in which people could be alone, coupled with a marked increase in private, solitary, silent reading.

According to Greenblatt, as I noted above, "the concept of arousal, so central to [Largier's] concept, comes to seem increasingly empty or elusive." Greenblatt is disappointed and saddened by Largier's book, it would appear, because it stops arousing him. Why? As a tentative answer I suggest that Greenblatt's lashing out at Largier reveals why he veers from historicism into psychology, even after rejecting psychoanalysis in his essay on Martin Guerre, and begins his review with a literary passage before relating a historical anecdote. The veer into fiction and psychology is a way out of predictability, a jerking off to an interesting but too familiar track, so to speak, a track we have all been down many times before. He associates the predictable and the programmatic entirely with Largier: "When, in the latter half of *In Praise of the Whip*, Largier turns to the fate of flagellation in modern society, there is, perhaps *predictably*, a falling off . . . Sade's libertines are the best of the lot, in Largier's view, because they *programmatically* reject all conventional heterosexual intercourse . . . " (21, my emphasis).

Psychohistoricism doesn't follow the now predictable route of historicism, which, by virtue of its predictability, one might compare to porn, the ultimate genre of predictability, easily identified through the use of bawdy puns in its titles. Indeed, the barge scene comes to life as a sadomasochistic spectacle in Bob Guccione's and Tinto Brass's *Caligula* (1979), a huge ship's oars begin rowing mechanically as men whip various orgy participants on deck above. (See also the miniature of the barge with rowing oars in Cecil B. DeMille's *Cleopatra* [1934].)

Certain mechanisms and repetitions remain, however, in Greenblatt's more expansive fictional/spectral/psychohistoricism: Greenblatt divides Largier's *In Praise of the Whip*, into a strong first part and a weaker second part as it approaches the more recent past, for example, much as he does Auerbach's *Mimesis* in "The Touch of the Real." The desire to explain the modern history of flagellation with a blend of psychology and historicism emerges as the erotics of the repetition compulsion, as a desire to stroke the dead as much as speak with them. (Yet is the stroke a gesture or a reflex? Is stopping a gesture or mechanical? Is the desire for the new fated to be the frustration of finding itself already old, the desire for the new itself being part of the program?)

One may read Greenblatt's review as an exercise in self-flagellation with a "rod . . . more mock'd than fear'd" required to arouse rather than conjure the dead in order to address them: the reduction of Largier's book to a book title (and using the brevity of the book review to do so) serves to close down an inquiry into the relation of historicism, the paratext, and psychoanalysis. And as for what one could call, following Greenblatt, the "key questions" regarding the erotics of historicist reading, the libidinal energy that drives its compulsive repetitions? The whip comes down here, automatically, as it were. Greenblatt's review seems designed to avoid asking them, let alone attempting to answer them. More precisely, we might note that in his review and in his play *Cardenio*, Greenblatt searches after a doubly lost corpus, the dead as missing body and missing text surviving only as a lost fragment of Shakespeare's corpus. (The paratext of the play has been itself subject to fragmentation in the *Norton Shakespeare* [1997]: in the Oxford edition of *William Shakespeare: The Complete Works* [1986] on which the Norton is based, the title interestingly goes missing, changing from the table of contents, where it is given as "CARDENIO: A Brief Account" [x] to the account of the play, where the title becomes "Cardenio: A Short Account" [1365]; similarly, the *Norton Shakespeare* table of contents gives "CARDENIO: A Brief Account" [vii] while the page on *Cardenio* gives only "CARDENIO" [3109] as the title.) The second edition of the *Norton Shakespeare* [2008] retains the discrepancy (see vi and 3117) but the note now has "Revised by Stephen Greenblatt" after "The Oxford Editors" at the bottom of page 3117. At the time of this writing, Celia McGee interviewed me for an article she was writing on Greenblatt's *Cardenio* (co-authored with Charless Mee) published in the *New York Times*, May 4, 2008. I have also heard that before delivering a lecture in March 2008, Greenblatt told an anecdote about co-writing *Cardenio* and joked about "Mee" and I punning on "Mee and I punning" on "Mee" and "me". Now perhaps he may joke about "Mee and Ms. McGee." In merging the psychological and historical into key questions, Greenblatt does not examine the death drive that accompanies his psychohistorical questions, however, and so ends up going blind, unable to see that he stands up at the same place Largier stalls out, namely paratextual road remarkings of what Walter Benjamin calls the standstill in his *Der Ursprung des Deustchen Trauerspiel* [*The Origin of the German Mourning Play*, 1929/1977]. Just before Benjamin begins discussing *Hamlet* (which he introduces via a quotation from the play that, as a fragment about midnight being the witching time the dead may return from Hell, becomes itself a kind of unmarked grave of a missing corpus), he writes:

> There is a good reason for associating the dramatic action with night, especially midnight. It lies in the widespread notion that this hour time stands still like the tongue of a scale. Now since fate, itself the true order

> of eternal recurrence, can only be described as temporal in an indirect, that is, parasitical sense, its manifestations seek out the temporal dimension. They stand in the narrow frame of midnight, an opening in the passage of time, in which the same ghostly image constantly reappears . . . The midnight hour of the *Trauerspiel* stands in contrast to the daytime setting required by every tragic action. "'Tis now the very witching time of night/When churchyards yawn, and Hell itself breathes out/Contagion to this world." The spirit world is ahistorical. To it the *Trauerspiel* consigns its dead. (133)

As we saw in the introduction to the present book, reading the temporality of fragmentation itself rather than reading the fragment per se is crucial. The stand still involves both a gesture and a reflex that spatializes time and barely opens a door and reframes the past, making possible the reappearance of the dead, who "reside" and are preserved in an eternal time outside the empty homogenous time of history. The living may then engage the dead in dialogue. Greenblatt's move from conjuring to arousing brings the stroke of time into play as a way of opening contact with the dead: the dead have to be aroused (which is a potential danger, since they may want to stay dead and thus may be unhappy to be called back) before the living can be aroused by them (which can be channeled only through reading the text as a fragment; the fragment, for Benjamin reboots the reader's memory by recalling to him or her that the fragment once belonged to a larger piece, but this larger piece can never be fully recovered and the partially recovered text was always already, because it had a paratext, subject to fragmentation). The whole of the fragment is never a totality because the ontology of the text entails its (s)lacking. The standstill, especially the stopping of the clock, for Benjamin is an accident, a breakdown that generates a new kind of time frame. But the accident is also a wounding, a severed human hand figured as the origin of production, or the ingestion of the Other figured as its crushing, a blow to self-esteem (as when Freud sees his double on the train). The stroke, or whiplash, in Greenblatt's review, is an endlessly repetitive mechanism, however, a way of stalling thought about how the temporality of the stand still lies outside history. Greenblatt thus remains caught in the sadomasochistic dynamic of the book review—a (re)viewing that does not extend to his own repetition compulsion (the need to refine the new title, new for scholars perhaps because it was long forgotten) in order to keep getting aroused by scholarship about the historical past. Unlike Benjamin's, Greenblatt's uncanny historicism doesn't stop history; rather, its necromantic and interiorizing subjectivity effects depend on making the dead roll over in their graves.

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