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The Age of Migration

International Population Movements
in the Modern World

4th edition

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Mark J. Miller

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org/issue_feb07.cfm (see also Newland (2007) and other citations above). Castles and Delgado Wise (2008) examines the experience of five major emigration countries. GCIM (2005) contains many insights, and is available on <http://www.gcim.org/en/finalreport.html> – a website that also has many useful papers. World Bank (2006) and Ghosh (2006) provide good analyses of remittance issues, and the IOM's World Migration Reports outline the broader picture (e.g. IOM, 2005). The World Bank website contains many useful papers, including Ellerman (2003); Kapur (2004); Ratha and Shaw (2007): <http://www.worldbank.org/>

Chapter 4

International Migration before 1945

The post-1945 migrations may be new in scale and scope, but population movements in response to demographic growth, climatic change and the development of production and trade have always been part of human history. Warfare, conquest, formation of nations and the emergence of states and empires have all led to migrations, both voluntary and forced. The enslavement and deportation of conquered people was a frequent early form of labour migration. From the end of the Middle Ages, the development of European states and their colonization of the rest of the world gave a new impetus to international migrations of many different kinds.

In Western Europe, 'migration was a long-standing and important facet of social life and the political economy' from about 1650 onwards, playing a vital role in modernization and industrialization (Moch, 1995: 126; see also Moch, 1992 and Bade, 2003). The centrality of migration is not adequately reflected in prevailing views on the past: as Gérard Noiriel (1988: 15–67) has pointed out, the history of immigration has been a 'blind spot' of historical research in France. This applies equally elsewhere, as shown by 'historians' repeated neglect of the scale and impact of immigration on European societies from the Middle Ages onwards' (Lucassen et al., 2006: 7). Denial of the role of immigrants in nation-building has been crucial to the creation of myths of national homogeneity. It is only recently that a new generation of European historians (like Bade, Noiriel and Jan and Leo Lucassen) have questioned the nationalist orthodoxy of the past. Such approaches were obviously impossible in classical countries of immigration such as the USA and Australia (Archdeacon, 1983; Jupp, 2001; 2002).

Individual liberty is portrayed as one of the great moral achievements of capitalism, in contrast with earlier societies where liberty was restricted by traditional bondage and servitude. Neoclassical theorists portray the capitalist economy as being based on free markets, including the labour market, where employers and workers encounter each other as free legal subjects, with equal rights to make contracts. International migration is portrayed as a market in which workers make the free choice to move to the area where they will receive the highest income (compare Borjas, 1990: 9–18). **But this harmonious picture often fails to match reality.** As Cohen (1987) has shown, capitalism has made use of both *free* and *unfree workers* in every phase of its development. Labour migrants have frequently

been unfree workers, either because they are taken by force to the place where their labour is needed, or because they are denied rights enjoyed by other workers, and cannot therefore compete under equal conditions. Even where migration is voluntary and unregulated, institutional and informal discrimination may limit the real freedom and equality of the workers concerned.


Since economic power is usually linked to political power, mobilization of labour often has an element of coercion, sometimes involving violence, military force and bureaucratic control. Examples are the slave economies of the Americas; indentured colonial labour in Asia, Africa and the Americas; mineworkers in southern Africa in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; foreign workers in Germany and France before World War II; forced labourers in the Nazi war economy; 'guestworkers' in post-1945 Europe; and 'illegals' denied the protection of law in many countries today. Trafficking of migrants – especially of women and children for sexual exploitation – is often a form of modern slavery, which is to be found throughout the world.

One important theme is not dealt with here because it requires more intensive treatment than is possible in the present work: **the devastating effects of international migration on the indigenous peoples of colonized countries. European conquest of Africa, Asia, America and Oceania led either to the domination and exploitation of native peoples or to genocide, both physical and cultural.** Nation-building – particularly in the Americas and Oceania – was based on the importation of new populations. Thus immigration contributed to the exclusion and marginalization of aboriginal peoples. One starting point for the construction of new national identities was the idealization of the destruction of indigenous societies: images such as 'how the West was won' or the struggle of Australian pioneers against the Aborigines became powerful myths. The roots of racist stereotypes – today directed against new immigrant groups – often lie in historical treatment of colonized peoples. Nowadays there is increasing realization that appropriate models for intergroup relations have to address the needs of indigenous populations, as well as those of immigrant groups.

Colonialism

European colonialism gave rise to various types of migration (see Map 4.1). One was the large *outward movement from Europe*, first to Africa and Asia, then to the Americas, and later to Oceania. Europeans migrated, either permanently or temporarily, as sailors, soldiers, farmers, traders, priests and administrators. Some of them had already migrated within Europe: Jan Lucassen (1995) has shown that around half the soldiers and sailors of the Dutch East India Company in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were not Dutch but 'transmigrants', mainly from poor areas of Germany.

Map 4.1 Colonial migrations from the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries



Note: The arrow dimensions give an approximate indication of the volume of flows. Exact figures are often unavailable.

The mortality of these migrant workers through shipwreck, warfare and tropical illnesses was very high, but service in the colonies was often the only chance to escape from poverty. Such overseas migrations helped to bring about major changes in the economic structures and the cultures of both the European sending countries and the colonies.

An important antecedent of modern labour migration is the system of *chattel slavery*, which formed the basis of commodity production in the plantations and mines of the New World from the late seventeenth century to the mid-nineteenth century. The production of sugar, tobacco, coffee, cotton and gold by slave labour was crucial to the economic and political power of Britain and France – the dominant states of the eighteenth century – and played a major role for Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands as well. By 1770 there were nearly 2.5 million slaves in the Americas, producing a third of the total value of European commerce (Blackburn, 1988: 5). **The slave system was organized in the notorious 'triangular trade':** ships laden with manufactured goods, such as guns or household implements, sailed from ports such as Bristol and Liverpool, Bordeaux and Le Havre, to the coasts of West Africa. There Africans were either forcibly abducted or were purchased from local chiefs or traders in return for the goods. Then the ships sailed to the Caribbean or the coasts of North or South America, where the slaves were sold for cash. This was used to purchase the products of the plantations, which were then brought back for sale in Europe.

An estimated 15 million slaves were taken to the Americas before 1850 (Appleyard, 1991: 11). For the women, hard labour in the mines, plantations and households was frequently accompanied by sexual exploitation. The children of slaves remained the chattels of the owners. In 1807, following a humanitarian campaign led by William Wilberforce, slave trafficking was abolished within the British Empire – the 200th anniversary of abolition was celebrated with great fanfare in 2007 – while other European states followed suit by 1815. A number of slave rebellions broke out – notably in Saint Domingue (later to become Haiti) (Schama, 2006). Yet slavery itself was not abolished until 1834 in British colonies, 1863 in Dutch colonies and 1865 in the southern states of the USA (Cohen, 1991: 9). Slavery actually grew in extent and economic significance. The number of slaves in the Americas doubled from 3 million in 1800 to 6 million in 1860, with corresponding growth in the area of plantation agriculture in the South-Western USA, Cuba and Brazil (Blackburn, 1988: 544).

Slavery had existed in many precapitalist societies, but the colonial system was new in character. Its motive force was the emergence of global empires, which began to construct a world market, dominated by merchant capital. Slaves were transported great distances by specialized traders, and bought and sold as commodities. Slaves were economic property and were subjected to harsh forms of control to maximize their output. The great majority were exploited in plantations which produced for export, as part of an internationally integrated agricultural and manufacturing system (Fox-Genovese and Genovese, 1983; Blackburn, 1988).

In the latter half of the nineteenth century, slaves were replaced by **indentured workers as the main source of plantation labour.** Indenture (or the 'coolie system') involved recruitment of large groups of workers, sometimes by force, and their transportation to another area for work. British colonial authorities recruited workers from the Indian subcontinent for the sugar plantations of Trinidad, British Guiana and other Caribbean countries. Others were employed in plantations, mines and railway construction in Malaya, East Africa and Fiji. The British also recruited Chinese 'coolies' for Malaya and other colonies. Dutch colonial authorities used Chinese labour on construction projects in the Dutch East Indies. Up to 1 million indentured workers were recruited in Japan, mainly for work in Hawaii, the USA, Brazil and Peru (Shimpo, 1995).

According to Potts (1990: 63–103), indentured workers were used in 40 countries by all the major colonial powers. She estimates that the system involved from 12 to 37 million workers between 1834 and 1941, when indentureship was finally abolished in the Dutch colonies. Indentured workers were bound by strict labour contracts for a period of several years. Wages and conditions were generally very poor, workers were subject to rigid discipline and breaches of contract were severely punished. Indentured workers were often cheaper for their employers than slaves (Cohen, 1991: 9–11). On the other hand, work overseas offered an opportunity to escape poverty and repressive situations, such as the Indian caste system. Many workers remained as free settlers in East Africa, the Caribbean, Fiji and elsewhere, where they could obtain land or set up businesses (Cohen, 1995: 46).

Indenture epitomized the principle of divide and rule, and a number of postcolonial conflicts (for example, hostility against Indians in Africa and Fiji, and against Chinese in South-East Asia) have their roots in such divisions. The Caribbean experience shows the effect of changing colonial labour practices on dominated peoples: the original inhabitants, the Caribs and Arawaks, were wiped out completely by European diseases and violence. With the development of the sugar industry in the eighteenth century, Africans were brought in as slaves. After emancipation in the nineteenth century, these generally became small-scale subsistence farmers, and were replaced with indentured workers from India. Upon completion of their indentures, many Indians settled in the Caribbean, bringing in dependants. Some remained labourers on large estates, while others became established as a trading class, mediating between the white and mixed-race ruling class and the black majority.

Industrialization and migration to North America and Oceania before 1914

The wealth accumulated in Western Europe through colonial exploitation provided much of the capital which was to unleash the industrial revolutions


of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In Britain, profits from the colonies were invested in new forms of manufacture, as well as encouraging commercial farming and speeding up the enclosure of arable land for pasture. **The displaced tenant farmers swelled the impoverished urban masses available as labour for the new factories. This emerging class of wage-labourers was soon joined by destitute artisans, such as hand-loom weavers, who had lost their livelihood through competition from the new manufacturers.** Herein lay the basis of the new class which was crucial for the British industrial economy: the 'free proletariat', which was free of traditional bonds, but also of ownership of the means of production.

However, from the outset, **unfree labour** played an important part. Throughout Europe, draconian poor laws were introduced to control the displaced farmers and artisans, the 'hordes of beggars' who threatened public order. Workhouses and poorhouses were often the first form of manufacture, where the disciplinary instruments of the future factory system were developed and tested (Marx, 1976: chapter 28). In Britain, 'parish apprentices', orphan children under the care of local authorities, were hired out to factories as cheap unskilled labour. This was a form of forced labour, with severe punishments for insubordination or refusal to work.

The peak of the industrial revolution was the main period of British migration to America: between 1800 and 1860, 66 per cent of migrants to the USA were from Britain, and a further 22 per cent were from Germany. From 1850 to 1914 most migrants came from Ireland, Italy, Spain and Eastern Europe, areas in which industrialization came later. **America offered the dream of becoming an independent farmer or trader in new lands of opportunity. Often this dream led to disappointment: the migrants became wage-labourers building roads and railways across the vast expanses of the New World; 'cowboys', gauchos or stockmen on large ranches; or factory workers in the emerging industries of the North-Eastern USA.** However, many settlers did eventually realize their dream, becoming farmers, white-collar workers or business people, while others were at least able to see their children achieve education and upward social mobility.

The USA is generally seen as the most important of all immigration countries and epitomises the notion of **free migration**. An estimated 54 million people entered between 1820 and 1987 (Borjas, 1990: 3). The peak period was from 1861 to 1920, during which 30 million people came. Mass migration is seen by some economic historians as a crucial feature of the 'greater Atlantic economy' (Hatton and Williamson, 1998). Until the 1880s, migration was unregulated: anyone who could afford the ocean passage could come to seek a new life in America. An important US Supreme Court decision of 1849 affirmed the 'plenary power' of the federal government to regulate international migration, thereby thwarting attempts by Eastern seaboard municipalities to prevent the arrival of Irish migrants (Daniels, 2004). However, American employers did organize campaigns to attract potential workers, and a multitude of agencies and shipping companies helped organize movements. Many of the migrants

Map 4.2 *Labour migrations connected with industrialization, 1850–1920*



Note: The arrow dimensions give an approximate indication of the volume of flows. Exact figures are often unavailable.

were young single men, hoping to save enough to return home and start a family. But there were also single women, couples and families. Racist campaigns led to exclusionary laws to keep out Chinese and other Asians from the 1880s. For Europeans and Latin Americans, entry remained free until 1920 (Borjas, 1990: 27). The census of that year showed that there were 13.9 million foreign-born people in the USA, making up 13.2 per cent of the total population (Briggs, 1984: 77).

Slavery had been a major source of capital accumulation in the early USA, but the industrial take-off after the Civil War (1861–1865) was fuelled by mass immigration from Europe. At the same time the racist 'Jim Crow' system was used to keep the now nominally free African-Americans in the plantations of the southern states, since cheap cotton and other agricultural products were central to industrialization. The largest immigrant groups from 1860 to 1920 were Irish, Italians and Jews from Eastern Europe, but there were people from just about every other European country, as well as from Mexico. Patterns of settlement were closely linked to the emerging industrial economy. Labour recruitment by canal and railway companies led to settlements of Irish and Italians along the

construction routes. Some groups of Irish, Italians and Jews settled in the East coast ports of arrival, where work was available in construction, transport and factories. Chinese immigrants settled initially on the West coast, but moved inland following recruitment by railway construction companies. Similarly, early Mexican migrants were concentrated in the South-west, close to the Mexican border, but many moved northwards in response to recruitment by the railroads. Some Central and Eastern European peoples became concentrated in the Midwest, where the development of heavy industry at the turn of the century provided work opportunities (Portes and Rumbaut, 2006: 38–40). **The American working class thus developed through processes of chain migration which led to patterns of ethnic segmentation.**

Canada received many loyalists of British origin after the American Revolution. From the late eighteenth century there was immigration from Britain, France, Germany and other Northern European countries. Many African-Americans came across the long frontier from the USA to escape slavery: by 1860, there were 40,000 black people in Canada. In the nineteenth century, immigration was stimulated by the gold rushes, while rural immigrants were encouraged to settle the vast prairie areas. Between 1871 and 1931, Canada's population increased from 3.6 million to 10.3 million. Immigration from China, Japan and India also began in the late nineteenth century. Chinese came to the West coast, particularly to British Columbia, where they helped build the Canadian Pacific Railway. From 1886 a series of measures was introduced to stop Asian immigration (Kubat, 1987: 229–235). Canada received a large influx from Southern and Eastern Europe over the 1895 to 1914 period. In 1931, however, four preferred classes of immigrants were designated: British subjects with adequate financial means from the UK, Ireland and four other domains of the crown; US citizens; dependants of permanent residents of Canada; and agriculturists. Canada discouraged migration from Southern and Eastern Europe, while Asian immigration was prohibited from 1923 to 1947.

For Australia, immigration has been a crucial factor in economic development and nation-building ever since British colonization started in 1788. The Australian colonies were integrated into the British Empire as suppliers of raw materials such as wool, wheat and gold. The imperial state took an active role in providing workers for expansion through convict transportation (another form of unfree labour) and the encouragement of free settlement. Initially there were large male surpluses, especially in the frontier areas, which were often societies of 'men without women'. But many female convicts were transported, and there were special schemes to bring out single women as domestic servants and as wives for settlers.

When the surplus population of Britain became inadequate for labour needs from the mid-nineteenth century, Britain supported Australian employers in their demand for cheap labour from elsewhere in the Empire: China, India and the South Pacific Islands. The economic interests of Britain came into conflict with the demands of the nascent Australian

labour movement. The call for decent wages came to be formulated in racist (and sexist) terms, as a demand for wages 'fit for white men'. Hostility towards Chinese and other Asian workers became violent. The exclusionary boundaries of the emerging Australian nation were drawn on racial lines, and one of the first Acts of the new Federal Parliament in 1901 was the introduction of the White Australia Policy (see de Lepervanche, 1975).

New Zealand was settled by British migrants from the 1830s. The 1840 Treaty of Waitangi between the British Crown and some 540 chiefs of the indigenous Maori people was the prelude to dispossession and marginalization of the Maori. Entry of British settlers (including white British subjects from elsewhere in the Empire) was to remain unrestricted until 1974. The government provided assisted passages virtually only for Britons, while 'non-Britons' required a special permit to enter. When quite small numbers of Chinese workers were recruited as miners and labourers from the 1860s onwards, public agitation led to strict control measures and a 'white New Zealand' policy. The great majority of the population considered themselves British rather than New Zealanders. British migrants were regarded as 'kin', and a sharp distinction was drawn between 'kin' and 'foreigners'. Maori, of course, were not 'foreigners', as the Treaty of Waitangi made them British subjects (McKinnon, 1996).

Labour migration within Europe

In Europe, *overseas migration* and *intra-European migration* took place side by side. Of the 15 million Italians who emigrated between 1876 and 1920, nearly half (6.8 million) went to other European countries (mainly France, Switzerland and Germany: see Cinanni, 1968: 29). **As Western Europeans went overseas in the (often vain) attempt to escape proletarianization, workers from peripheral areas, such as Poland, Ireland and Italy, were drawn in as replacement labour for large-scale agriculture and industry.**

As the earliest industrial country, Britain was the first to experience large-scale labour immigration. The new factory towns quickly absorbed labour surpluses from the countryside. Atrocious working and living conditions led to poor health, high infant mortality and short life expectancy. Low wage levels forced both women and children to work, with disastrous results for the family. Natural increase was inadequate to meet labour needs, so Britain's closest colony, Ireland, became a labour source. **The devastation of Irish peasant agriculture through absentee landlords and enclosures, combined with the ruin of domestic industry through British competition, had led to widespread poverty. The famines of 1822 and 1846–1847 triggered massive migrations to Britain, the USA and Australia.**

By 1851 there were over 700,000 Irish in Britain, making up 3 per cent of the population of England and Wales and 7 per cent of the population of Scotland (Jackson, 1963). They were concentrated in the industrial cities, especially in the textile factories and the building trades. Irish 'navvies' (a slang term derived from 'navigators') dug Britain's canals and built its railways. Engels (1962) described the appalling situation of Irish workers, arguing that Irish immigration was a threat to the wages and living conditions of English workers (see also Castles and Kosack, 1973: 16–17; Lucassen, 2005). Hostility and discrimination against the Irish was marked right into the twentieth century. This was true of Australia too, where Irish immigration accompanied British settlement from the outset. In both countries it was the active role played by Irish workers in the labour movement which was finally to overcome this split in the working class just in time for its replacement by new divisions after 1945, when black workers came to Britain and Southern Europeans to Australia.

The next major migration to Britain was of 120,000 Jews, who came as refugees from the pogroms of Russia between 1875 and 1914. Most settled initially in the East End of London, where many became workers in the clothing industry. Jewish settlement became the focus of racist campaigns, leading to the first restrictive legislation on immigration: the Aliens Act of 1905 and the Aliens Restriction Act of 1914 (Foot, 1965; Garrard, 1971).

The Jewish experience of social mobility is often given as an example of migrant success. Many of the first generation managed to shift out of wage employment to become small entrepreneurs in the 'rag trade' (clothing manufacturing) or the retail sector. They placed strong emphasis on education for their children. Many of the second generation were able to move into business or white-collar employment, paving the way for professional careers for the third generation. Interestingly, one of Britain's newer immigrant groups – Bengalis from Bangladesh – now live in the same areas of the East End, often working in the same sweatshops, and worshipping in the same buildings (synagogues converted to mosques). However, they are isolated by racism and violence, and show little sign at present of repeating the Jewish trajectory. It seems that British racism today is more rigid than a century ago.

Irish and Jewish migrant workers cannot be categorized as 'unfree workers'. The Irish were British subjects, with the same formal rights as other workers, while the Jews rapidly became British subjects. The constraints on their labour market freedom were not legal but economic (poverty and lack of resources made them accept inferior jobs and conditions) and social (discrimination and racism restricted their freedom of movement). It is in Germany and France that one finds the first large-scale use of the status of foreigner to restrict workers' rights.

In Germany, the heavy industries of the Ruhr, which emerged in the mid-nineteenth century, attracted agricultural workers away from the large estates of Eastern Prussia. Conditions in the mines were hard, but still preferable to semi-feudal oppression under the Junkers (large

landowners). The workers who moved west were of Polish ethnic background, but had Prussian (and later German) citizenship, since Poland was at that time divided up between Prussia, the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Russia. By 1913, it was estimated that 164,000 of the 410,000 Ruhr miners were of Polish background (Stirn, 1964: 27). The Junkers compensated for the resulting labour shortages by recruiting 'foreign Poles' and Ukrainians as agricultural workers. Often workers were recruited in pairs – a man as cutter and a woman as binder – leading to so-called 'harvest marriages'. However, there was fear that settlement of Poles might weaken German control of the eastern provinces. In 1885, the Prussian government deported some 40,000 Poles and closed the frontier. The landowners protested at the loss of up to two-thirds of their labour force (Dohse, 1981: 29–32), arguing that it threatened their economic survival (see also Lucassen, 2005: 50–73).

By 1890, a compromise between political and economic interests emerged in the shape of a system of rigid control. 'Foreign Poles' were recruited as temporary seasonal workers only, not allowed to bring dependants and forced to leave German territory for several months each year. At first they were restricted to agricultural work, but later were permitted to take industrial jobs in Silesia and Thuringia (but not in western areas such as the Ruhr). Their work contracts provided pay and conditions inferior to those of German workers. Special police sections were established to deal with 'violation of contracts' (that is, workers leaving for better-paid jobs) through forcible return of workers to their employers, imprisonment or deportation. Thus police measures against foreigners were deliberately used as a method to keep wages low and to create a split labour market (Dohse, 1981: 33–83).

Foreign labour played a major role in German industrialization, with Italian, Belgian and Dutch workers alongside the Poles. In 1907, there were 950,000 foreign workers in the German Reich, of whom nearly 300,000 were in agriculture, 500,000 in industry and 86,000 in trade and transport (Dohse, 1981: 50). The authorities did their best to prevent family reunion and permanent settlement. Both in fact took place, but the exact extent is unclear. The system developed to control and exploit foreign labour was a precursor both of forced labour in the Nazi war economy and of the 'guestworker system' in the German Federal Republic after 1955.

The number of foreigners in France increased rapidly from 381,000 in 1851 (1.1 per cent of total population) to 1 million (2.7 per cent) in 1881, and then more slowly to 1.2 million (3 per cent) in 1911 (Weil, 1991b: Appendix, Table 4). The majority came from neighbouring countries: Italy, Belgium, Germany and Switzerland, and later from Spain and Portugal. Movements were relatively spontaneous, though some recruitment was carried out by farmers' associations and mines (Cross, 1983: chapter 2). The foreign workers were mainly men who carried out unskilled manual work in agriculture, mines and steelworks (the heavy, unpleasant jobs that French workers were unwilling to take) (see also Rosenberg, 2006).

The peculiarity of the French case lies in the reasons for the shortage of labour during industrialization. Birth rates fell sharply after 1860. Peasants, shopkeepers and artisans followed 'Malthusian' birth control practices, which led to small families earlier than anywhere else (Cross, 1983: 5–7). According to Noiriel (1988: 297–312) this *grève des ventres* (belly strike) was motivated by resistance to proletarianization. Keeping the family small meant that property could be passed on intact from generation to generation, and that there would be sufficient resources to permit a decent education for the children. Unlike Britain and Germany, France therefore saw relatively little overseas emigration during industrialization. The only important exception was the movement of settlers to Algeria, which France invaded in 1830. Rural–urban migration was also fairly limited. The 'peasant worker' developed: the small farmer who supplemented subsistence agriculture through sporadic work in local industries. Where people did leave the countryside it was often to move straight into the new government jobs that proliferated in the late nineteenth century: straight from the primary to the tertiary sector.

In these circumstances, the shift from small to large-scale enterprises, made necessary by international competition from about the 1880s, could only be made through the employment of foreign workers. Thus labour immigration played a vital role in the emergence of modern industry and the constitution of the working class in France. Immigration was also seen as important for military reasons. The nationality law of 1889 was designed to turn immigrants and their sons into conscripts for the impending conflict with Germany (Schnapper, 1994: 66). From the mid-nineteenth century to the present, the labour market has been regularly fed by foreign immigration, making up, on average, 10–15 per cent of the working class. Noiriel estimated that, without immigration, the French population in the mid-1980s would have been only 35 million instead of over 50 million (Noiriel, 1988: 308–318).

The interwar period

At the onset of World War I, many migrants returned home to participate in military service or munitions production. However, labour shortages soon developed in the combatant countries. The German authorities prevented 'foreign Polish' workers from leaving the country, and recruited labour by force in occupied areas of Russia and Belgium (Dohse, 1981: 77–81). The French government set up recruitment systems for workers and soldiers from its North African, West African and Indo-Chinese colonies, and from China (about 225,000 in all). They were housed in barracks, paid minimal wages and supervised by former colonial overseers. Workers were also recruited in Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece for French factories and agriculture (Cross, 1983: 34–42). Britain, too, brought soldiers and workers to Europe from its African and South Asian colonies

during the conflict, although in smaller numbers. All the warring countries also made use of the forced labour of prisoners of war. Many Africans were pressed into service as soldiers and 'carriers' within Africa by Germany, Britain and other European countries. Official British figures put the military death toll in East Africa at 11,189, while 95,000 carriers died. The estimates for civilian casualties go far higher – for instance at least 650,000 in Germany's East African colonies (Paice, 2006).

The period from 1918 to 1945 was one of reduced international labour migration. This was partly because of economic stagnation and crisis, and partly because of increased hostility towards immigrants in many countries. Migration to Australia, for example, fell to low levels as early as 1891, and did not grow substantially until after 1945. An exception was the encouragement of Southern Italian migration to Queensland in the 1920s: Sicilians and Calabrians were seen as capable of backbreaking work in the sugar cane plantations, where they could replace South Pacific Islanders deported under the White Australia Policy. However, Southern Europeans were treated with suspicion. Immigrant ships were refused permission to land and there were 'anti-Dago' riots in the 1930s. Queensland passed special laws, prohibiting foreigners from owning land, and restricting them to certain industries (de Lepervanche, 1975).

In the USA, 'nativist' groups claimed that Southern and Eastern Europeans were 'unassimilable' and that they presented threats to public order and American values. Congress enacted a series of laws in the 1920s designed to limit drastically entries from any area except Northwest Europe (Borjas, 1990: 28–29). This national-origins quota system stopped large-scale immigration to the USA until the 1960s. But the new mass production industries of the Fordist era had a substitute labour force at hand: black workers from the South. The period from about 1914 to the 1950s was that of the *Great Migration*, in which African-Americans fled segregation and exploitation in the Southern states for better wages and – they hoped – equal rights in the North-east, Midwest and West. Often they simply encountered new forms of segregation in the ghettos of New York or Chicago, and new forms of discrimination, such as exclusion from the unions of the American Federation of Labor.

Meanwhile, Americanization campaigns were launched to ensure that immigrants learned English and became loyal US citizens. During the Great Depression, Mexican immigrants were repatriated by local governments and civic organizations, with some cooperation from the Mexican and US governments (Kiser and Kiser, 1979: 33–66). Many of the nearly 500,000 Mexicans who returned home were constrained to leave, while others left because there was no work. In these circumstances, little was done to help Jews fleeing the rise of Hitler. There was no concept of the refugee in US law, and it was difficult to build support for admission of Jewish refugees when millions of US citizens were unemployed. Anti-Semitism was also a factor, and there was never much of a prospect for large numbers of European Jews to find safe haven before World War II.

France was the only Western European country to experience substantial immigration in the interwar years. The 'demographic deficit' had been exacerbated by war losses: 1.4 million men had been killed and 1.5 million permanently handicapped (Prost, 1966: 538). There was no return to the prewar free movement policy; instead the government and employers refined the foreign labour systems established during the war. Recruitment agreements were concluded with Poland, Italy and Czechoslovakia. Much of the recruitment was organized by the Société générale d'immigration (SGI), a private body set up by farm and mining interests. North African migration to France was also developing. In addition, a 1914 law had removed barriers to movement of Algerian Muslims to Metropolitan France. Although they remained noncitizens, their numbers increased from 600 in 1912 to 60,000–80,000 by 1928 (Rosenberg, 2006: 130–131).

Foreign workers were controlled through a system of identity cards and work contracts, and were channelled into jobs in farming, construction and heavy industry. However, most foreign workers probably arrived spontaneously outside the recruiting system. The noncommunist trade union movement cooperated with immigration, in return for measures designed to protect French workers from displacement and wage cutting (Cross, 1983: 51–63; Weil, 1991b: 24–27).

Just under 2 million foreign workers entered France from 1920 to 1930, about 567,000 of them recruited by the SGI (Cross, 1983: 60). Some 75 per cent of French population growth between 1921 and 1931 is estimated to have resulted from immigration (Decloîtres, 1967: 23). In view of the large female surplus in France, mainly men were recruited, and a fair degree of intermarriage took place. By 1931, there were 2.7 million foreigners in France (6.6 per cent of the total population). The largest group were Italians (808,000), followed by Poles (508,000), Spaniards (352,000) and Belgians (254,000) (Weil, 1991b: Appendix, Table 4). North African migration to France was also developing. Large colonies of Italians and Poles sprang up in the mining and heavy industrial towns of the north and east of France: in some towns, foreigners made up a third or more of the total population. There were Spanish and Italian agricultural settlements in the South-west.

In the depression of the 1930s, hostility towards foreigners increased, leading to a policy of discrimination in favour of French workers. In 1932 maximum quotas for foreign workers in firms were fixed. They were followed by laws permitting dismissal of foreign workers in sectors where there was unemployment. Many migrants were sacked and deported, and the foreign population dropped by half a million by 1936 (Weil, 1991b: 27–30). Cross concludes that in the 1920s foreign workers 'provided a cheap and flexible workforce necessary for capital accumulation and economic growth; at the same time, aliens allowed the French worker a degree of economic mobility'. In the 1930s, on the other hand, immigration 'attenuated and provided a scapegoat for the economic crisis' (Cross, 1983: 218).

Box 4.1 Forced foreign labour in the Nazi war economy

The Nazi regime recruited enormous numbers of foreign workers – mainly by force – to replace the 11 million German workers conscripted for military service. The occupation of Poland, Germany's traditional labour reserve, was partly motivated by the need for labour. Labour recruitment offices were set up within weeks of the invasion, and the police and army rounded up thousands of young men and women (Dohse, 1981: 121). Forcible recruitment took place in all the countries invaded by Germany, while some voluntary labour was obtained from Italy, Croatia, Spain and other 'friendly or neutral countries'. By the end of the war, there were 7.5 million foreign workers in the Reich, of whom 1.8 million were prisoners of war. It is estimated that a quarter of industrial production was carried out by foreign workers in 1944 (Pfahmann, 1968: 232). The Nazi war machine would have collapsed far earlier without foreign labour.

The basic principle for treating foreign workers declared by Sauckel, the Plenipotentiary for Labour, was that: 'All the men must be fed, sheltered and treated in such a way as to exploit them to the highest possible extent at the lowest conceivable degree of expenditure' (Homze, 1967: 113). This meant housing workers in barracks under military control, the lowest possible wages (or none at all), appalling social and health conditions, and complete deprivation of civil rights. Poles and Russians were compelled, like the Jews, to wear special badges showing their origin. Many foreign workers died through harsh treatment and cruel punishments. These were systematic; in a speech to employers, Sauckel emphasized the need for strict discipline: 'I don't care about them [the foreign workers] one bit. If they commit the most minor offence at work, report them to the police at once, hang them, shoot them. I don't care. If they are dangerous, they must be liquidated' (Dohse, 1981: 127).

The Nazis took exploitation of rightless migrants to an extreme which can only be compared with slavery, yet its legal core – the sharp division between the status of national and foreigner – was to be found in both earlier and later foreign labour systems.

In Germany, the crisis-ridden Weimar Republic had little need of foreign workers: by 1932 their number was down to about 100,000, compared with nearly a million in 1907 (Dohse, 1981: 112). Nonetheless, a new system of regulation of foreign labour developed. Its principles were: strict state control of labour recruitment; employment preference for nationals; sanctions against employers of illegal migrants; and unrestricted police power to deport unwanted foreigners (Dohse, 1981: 114–117). This system was partly attributable to the influence of the strong labour movement, which wanted measures to protect German workers, but it confirmed the weak legal position of migrant workers. Box 4.1 describes the use of forced foreign labour during World War II.

Conclusions

Contemporary migratory movements and policies are often profoundly influenced by historical precedents. This chapter has described the key role of labour migration in colonialism and industrialization. Labour migration has always been a major factor in the construction of a capitalist world market. In the USA, Canada, Australia, the UK, Germany and France (as well as in other countries not discussed here) migrant workers have played a role which varies in character according to economic, social and political conditions. But in every case the contribution of migration to industrialization and population-building was important and sometimes even decisive.

To what extent does the theoretical model of the migratory process suggested in Chapter 2 apply to the historical examples given? Involuntary movements of slaves and indentured workers do not easily fit the model, for the intentions of the participants played little part. Nonetheless some aspects apply: labour recruitment as the initial impetus, predominance of young males in the early stages, family formation, long-term settlement and emergence of ethnic minorities. Worker migrations to England, Germany and France in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries fit the model well. Their original intention was temporary, but they led to family reunion and settlement. As for migrations to America and Oceania in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it is generally believed that most migrants went with the intention of permanent settlement. But many young men and women went in order to work for a few years and then return home. Some did return, but in the long run the majority remained in the New World, often forming new ethnic communities. Here, too, the model seems to fit.

As we have seen, many of the migrants moved under difficult and dangerous conditions. Sometimes their hopes of a better life were dashed. Yet they had good reasons to take the risk, because the situation was usually even worse in the place of origin: poverty, domination by landlords, exposure to arbitrary violence – these were all powerful reasons to leave. And many – indeed most – migrants succeeded in building a better life in the new country – if not for themselves, then for their children. Thus we can see important parallels with today's migrations: migrants still experience many hardships but they often do succeed in escaping poverty and hopelessness in their place of origin and finding new opportunities elsewhere. Being a migrant can be very tough but staying at home can be worse.

Clearly the study of migrant labour is not the only way of looking at the history of migration. Movements caused by political or religious persecution have always been important, playing a major part in the development of countries as diverse as the USA and Germany. It is often impossible to draw strict lines between the various types of migration. Migrant labour systems have always led to some degree of settlement, just as settler and refugee movement have always been bound up with the political economy of capitalist development.

The period from about 1850 to 1914 was an era of mass migration in Europe and North America. Industrialization was a cause of both emigration and immigration (sometimes in the same country, as the British case shows). After 1914, war, xenophobia and economic stagnation caused a considerable decline in migration, and the large-scale movements of the preceding period seemed to have been the results of a unique and unrepeatable constellation. When rapid and sustained economic growth got under way after World War II, the new age of migration was to take the world by surprise.

Guide to further reading

Additional texts 4.1 'migration and nation in French history' and 4.2 'migrations shaping African history' are to be found on *The Age of Migration* website at www.age-of-migration.com.

Cohen (1987) provides a valuable overview of migrant labour in the international division of labour, while Potts (1990) presents a history of migration from slavery and indentured labour up to modern guestworker systems. Blackburn (1988) and Fox-Genovese and Genovese (1983) analyse slavery and its role in capitalist development, while Schama charts the history of abolition and its meaning for British and US politics (Schama, 2006).

Archdeacon (1983) examines immigration in US history, showing how successive waves of entrants have 'become American'. Hatton and Williamson (1998) present an economic analysis of 'mass migration' to the USA, while their later work (Hatton and Williamson, 2005) compares pre-1920 migration with more recent patterns. Portes and Rumbaut (2006) analyse historical patterns of entry and their long-term results.

Bade (2003) and Lucassen (2005) analyse the role of migration in European history. Moch (1992) is good on earlier European migration experiences, while many contributions in Cohen (1995) are on the history of migration. Lucassen et al. (2006) examine the history of immigrant integration in Western European societies. Homze (1967) describes the extreme exploitation of migrant labour practised by the Nazi war machine. Cross (1983) gives a detailed account of the role of migrant workers in French industrialization. French readers are referred to the excellent accounts by Noiriell (1988, 2007). Jupp (2001, 2002) provides detailed accounts of the Australian experience.

Migration to Europe, North America and Oceania since 1945

Since the end of World War II, international migrations have grown in volume and changed in character. There have been two main phases. In the first, from 1945 to the early 1970s, the chief economic strategy of large-scale capital was concentration of investment and expansion of production in the existing highly developed countries. As a result, large numbers of migrant workers were drawn from less developed countries into the fast-expanding industrial areas of Western Europe, North America and Oceania. The end of this phase was marked by the 'oil crisis' of 1973–1974. The ensuing recession gave impetus to a restructuring of the world economy, involving capital investment in new industrial areas, altered patterns of world trade, and introduction of new technologies. The result was a second phase of international migration, starting in the mid-1970s and gaining momentum in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. This phase involved complex new patterns of migration. For instance, former emigration areas like Southern Europe experienced large-scale immigration, while Eastern and Central European countries – long cut off from the rest of Europe – now became areas of emigration, transit and immigration, all at once.

This chapter will discuss migratory movements since 1945 to the highly developed countries of Europe, North America and Oceania (Australia and New Zealand). Labour migration to Japan, which did not become significant until the mid-1980s, will be discussed in Chapter 6, in the context of Asian regional migration. This chapter will *not* discuss the long-term impacts of migration on receiving societies, which will be the theme of later chapters, especially 10, 11 and 12. For better understanding of the data presented in this chapter, see the *Note on Migration Statistics* at the beginning of this book.

Migration in the long boom

Between 1945 and the early 1970s, three main types of migration led to the formation of new, ethnically distinct populations in advanced

industrial countries:

- migration of workers from the European periphery to Western Europe, often through 'guestworker systems';
- migration of 'colonial workers' to the former colonial powers;
- permanent migration to North America and Oceania, at first from Europe and later from Asia and Latin America.

The precise timing of these movements varied: they started later in Germany and ended earlier in the UK, while migration to the USA grew rapidly after the immigration reforms of 1965 and, unlike migrations to Western Europe and Australia, did not decline at all in the mid-1970s. These three types, which all led to family reunion and other kinds of chain migration, will be examined here. There were also other types of migration which will not be dealt with here, since they did not contribute decisively to the formation of ethnic minorities:

- mass movements of European refugees at the end of World War II (post-1945 refugee movements were most significant in the case of Germany);
- return migrations of former colonists to their countries of origin as colonies gained their independence.

One further type of migration became increasingly significant after 1968:


intra-European Community free movement of workers, which from 1993 was to become intra-European Union free movement of EU citizens.

This will be covered in Chapter 8 (see also Schierup et al., 2006: Chapter 3). The account in this section is based mainly on the literature listed in the *Guide to further reading* at the end of this Chapter: precise references are given where necessary. Map 5.1 gives an idea of some of the main migratory flows of this period.

Foreign workers and 'guestworker' systems

All the highly industrialized countries of Western Europe used temporary labour recruitment at some stage between 1945 and 1973, although this sometimes played a smaller role than spontaneous entry of foreign workers. The rapidly expanding economies were able to utilize the labour reserves of the less developed European periphery: the Mediterranean countries, Ireland and Finland. In some cases the economic backwardness was the result of former colonization (Ireland, Finland, North Africa). In the case of Southern Europe, underdevelopment resulted from antiquated political and social structures, reinforced by wartime devastation.

Map 5.1 Global migrations, 1945–1973



Note: The arrow dimensions give an approximate indication of the volume of flows. Exact figures are often unavailable.

Immediately after World War II, the *British* government brought in 90,000 mainly male workers from refugee camps and from Italy through the European Voluntary Worker (EVW) scheme. EVWs were tied to designated jobs, had no right to family reunion, and could be deported for indiscipline. The scheme was fairly small and only operated until 1951, because it was easier to make use of colonial workers (see below). A further 100,000 Europeans entered Britain on work permits between 1946 and 1951, and some European migration continued subsequently, though it was not a major flow (Kay and Miles, 1992).

Belgium also started recruiting foreign workers immediately after the war. They were mainly Italian men, and were employed in the coal mines and the iron and steel industry. The system operated until 1963, after which foreign work-seekers were allowed to come of their own accord. Many brought in dependants and settled permanently, changing the ethnic composition of Belgium's industrial areas.

France established an Office National d'Immigration (ONI) in 1945 to organize recruitment of workers from Southern Europe. Migration was seen as a solution to postwar labour shortages and to what the French termed their 'demographic insufficiency'. In view of continuing low birth rates and war losses, massive family settlement was envisaged. ONI also coordinated the employment of up to 150,000 seasonal agricultural workers per year, mainly from Spain. By 1970, 2 million foreign workers and 690,000 dependants resided in France. Many found it easier to come as 'tourists', get a job and then regularize their situation. This applied particularly to Portuguese and Spanish workers, escaping their respective dictatorships, who generally lacked passports. By 1968, ONI statistics revealed that 82 per cent of the aliens admitted by the ONI came as 'clandestines'. In any case, ONI had no jurisdiction over French citizens from overseas departments and territories, or from certain former colonies (see below).

Switzerland pursued a policy of large-scale labour import from 1945 to 1974. Foreign workers were recruited abroad by employers, while admission and residence were controlled by the government. Job changing, permanent settlement and family reunion were forbidden to seasonal workers until the mid-1960s. Considerable use was also made of cross-frontier commuters. **Swiss statistics include both these groups as part of the labour force but not of the population: 'guestworkers' par excellence.** Swiss industry became highly dependent on foreign workers, who made up nearly a third of the labour force by the early 1970s. The need to attract and retain workers, coupled with diplomatic pressure from Italy, led to relaxations on family reunion and permanent stay, so that Switzerland, too, experienced settlement and the formation of migrant communities.

The examples could be continued: the Netherlands brought in 'guestworkers' in the 1960s and early 1970s, Luxembourg's industries were highly dependent on foreign labour, and Sweden employed workers

Box 5.1 The German 'guestworker system'

The German Government started recruiting foreign workers in the mid-1950s. The Federal Labour Office (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, or BfA) set up recruitment offices in the Mediterranean countries. Employers requiring foreign labour paid a fee to the BfA, which selected workers, testing occupational skills, providing medical examinations and screening police records. The workers were brought in groups to Germany, where employers had to provide initial accommodation. Recruitment, working conditions and social security were regulated by bilateral agreements between the FRG and the sending countries: first Italy, then Spain, Greece, Turkey, Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia and Yugoslavia.

The number of foreign workers in the FRG rose from 95,000 in 1956 to 1.3 million in 1966 and 2.6 million in 1973. **This massive migration was the result of rapid industrial expansion and the shift to new methods of mass production, which required large numbers of low-skilled workers.** Foreign women workers played a major part, especially in the later years: their labour was in high demand in textiles and clothing, electrical goods and other manufacturing sectors.

German policies conceived migrant workers as temporary labour units, which could be recruited, utilized and sent away again as employers required. To enter and remain in the FRG, a migrant needed a residence permit and a labour permit. These were granted for restricted periods, and were often valid only for specific jobs and areas. Entry of dependants was discouraged. A worker could be deprived of his or her permit for a variety of reasons, leading to deportation.

However, it was impossible to prevent family reunion and settlement. Often officially recruited migrants were able to get employers to request their wives or husbands as workers. Competition with other labour-importing countries for labour led to relaxation of restrictions on entry of dependants in the 1960s. Families became established and children were born. Foreign labour was beginning to lose its mobility, and social costs (for housing, education and healthcare) could no longer be avoided. When the Federal Government stopped labour recruitment in November 1973, the motivation was not only the looming 'oil crisis', but also the belated realization that permanent immigration was taking place.

from Finland and from Southern European countries. Another case worth mentioning is that of Italy, in which migration from the underdeveloped south was crucial to the economic takeoff of the northern industrial triangle between Milan, Turin and Genoa in the 1960s: this was internal migration, but very similar in its economic and social character to foreign worker movements in other European countries. The key case for understanding the 'guestworker system' was the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), which set up a highly organized state recruitment apparatus (see Box 5.1).

In the FRG we see in the most developed form all the principles – but also the contradictions – of temporary foreign labour recruitment systems. These include the belief in temporary sojourn, the restriction of labour market and civil rights, the recruitment of single workers (men at first, but with increasing numbers of women as time went on), the inability to prevent family reunion completely, the gradual move towards longer stay, the inexorable pressures for settlement and community formation. The FRG took the system furthest, but its central element – the legal distinction between the status of citizen and of foreigner as a criterion for determining political and social rights – was to be found throughout Europe (see Hammar, 1985).

Multinational agreements were also used to facilitate labour migration. Free movement of workers within the EC, which came into force in 1968, was relevant mainly for Italian workers going to Germany, while the Nordic Labour Market affected Finns going to Sweden. The EC arrangements were the first step towards creating a 'European labour market', which was to become a reality in 1993. However, in the 1960s and early 1970s labour movement within the Community was actually declining, owing to gradual equalization of wages and living standards within the EC, while migration from outside the Community was increasing. Table 5.1 shows the development of minority populations arising from migration in selected Western European countries up to 1975.

Colonial workers

Migration from former colonies was important for Britain, France and the Netherlands. Britain had a net inflow of about 350,000 from Ireland, its

Table 5.1 *Minority population in the main Western European countries of immigration (1950–1975) (thousands)*

Country	1950	1960	1970	1975	Per cent of total population 1975
Belgium	354	444	716	835	8.5
France	2,128	2,663	3,339	4,196	7.9
Germany (FRG)	548	686	2,977	4,090	6.6
Netherlands	77	101	236	370	2.6
Sweden	124	191	411	410	5.0
Switzerland	279	585	983	1,012	16.0
UK	1,573	2,205	3,968	4,153	7.8

Notes: Figures for all countries except the UK are for foreign residents. They exclude naturalized persons and immigrants from the Dutch and French colonies. UK data are Census figures for 1951, 1961 and 1971 and estimates for 1975. The 1951 and 1961 data are for overseas-born persons, and exclude children born to immigrants in the UK. The 1971 and 1975 figures include children born in the UK, with both parents born abroad.

Source: Castles et al., 1984: 87–88 (where detailed sources are given).

traditional labour reserve, between 1946 and 1959. Irish workers provided manual labour for industry and construction, and many brought in their families and settled permanently. Irish residents in Britain enjoyed all civil rights, including the right to vote. Immigration of workers from the New Commonwealth (former British colonies in the Caribbean, the Indian subcontinent and Africa) started after 1945 and grew during the 1950s. Some workers came as a result of recruitment by London Transport, but most migrated spontaneously in response to labour demand. By 1951, there were 218,000 people of New Commonwealth origin (including Pakistan, which subsequently left the Commonwealth), a figure which increased to 541,000 in 1961. Entry of workers from the New Commonwealth almost stopped after 1962, partly due to the introduction of severe restrictions through the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962, and partly as the result of the early onset of economic stagnation in Britain.

However, most of the Commonwealth immigrants had come to stay, and family reunion continued, until it in turn was restricted by the 1971 Immigration Act. The population of New Commonwealth origin increased to 1.2 million in 1971 and 1.5 million in 1981. Most Afro-Caribbean and Asian immigrants and their children in Britain enjoyed formal citizenship (although this no longer applies to those admitted since the 1981 Nationality Act). Their minority status was not defined by being foreign, but by widespread institutional and informal discrimination. Most black and Asian workers found unskilled manual jobs in industry and the services, and a high degree of residential segregation emerged in the inner cities. Educational and social disadvantage became a further obstacle to mobility out of initial low-status positions. By the 1970s, the emergence of ethnic minorities was inescapable.

France experienced large-scale spontaneous immigration from its former colonies, as well as from Southern Europe. By 1970 there were over 600,000 Algerians, 140,000 Moroccans and 90,000 Tunisians. Many black workers were also coming in from the former West African colonies of Senegal, Mali and Mauritania. Some of these migrants came before independence, while they were still French citizens. Others came later through preferential migration arrangements, or illegally. Migration from Algeria was regulated by bilateral agreements which accorded Algerian migrants a unique status. Moroccans and Tunisians, by contrast, were admitted through ONI. Many people also came from the overseas departments and territories such as Guadeloupe, Martinique and Réunion. They were French citizens, so there were no migration statistics, though estimates put their number at 250,000 to 300,000 in 1972. All these migrations were initially male-dominated, but with increasing proportions of women as the movement matured. Non-European immigrants in France were relegated to the bottom of the labour market, often working in highly exploitative conditions. Housing was frequently segregated, and very poor in quality; indeed, shanty towns (known as *bidonvilles*) appeared in France in the 1960s. Extreme-right groups began to subject

non-European immigrants to a campaign of racial violence: 32 North Africans were murdered in 1973.

The Netherlands had two main inflows from former colonies. Between 1945 and the early 1960s up to 300,000 'repatriates' from the former Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) entered the Netherlands. Although most had been born overseas and many were of mixed Dutch and Indonesian parentage, they were Dutch citizens. The official policy of assimilation appears to have worked well in this case, and there is little evidence of racism or discrimination against this group. The exception is the roughly 32,000 Moluccans, who wanted to return to their homeland if it could achieve independence from Indonesia. They remained segregated in camps, and rejected integration into Dutch society. In the late 1970s, their disaffection led to several violent incidents. After 1965, increasing numbers of black workers came to the Netherlands from the Caribbean territory of Surinam. A peak was reached in the two years leading up to independence in 1975, at which time the Surinamese (except those already living in the Netherlands) lost their Dutch citizenship. By the late 1970s there were estimated to be 160,000 Surinamese in the Netherlands.

Permanent migration to North America and Oceania

Large-scale migration to the USA developed later than in Western Europe, due to the restrictive legislation enacted in the 1920s. Intakes averaged 250,000 persons annually in the 1951–1960 period, and 330,000 annually during 1961–1970: a far cry from the average of 880,000 immigrants per year from 1901 to 1910. The 1970 Census showed that the number of overseas-born people had declined to 9.6 million, only 4.7 per cent of the population (Briggs, 1984: 7). The 1965 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act were seen as part of the civil rights legislation of the period, designed to remove the discriminatory national-origins quota system. They were not expected or intended to lead to large-scale non-European immigration (Borjas, 1990: 29–33). In fact, the amendments created a system of worldwide immigration, in which the most important criterion for admission was kinship with US citizens or residents. The result was a dramatic upsurge in migration from Asia and Latin America.

US employers, particularly in agriculture, also recruited temporary migrant workers, mainly men, in Mexico and the Caribbean. Organized labour was highly critical, arguing that domestic workers would be displaced and wages held down. Government policies varied: at times, systems of temporary labour recruitment, such as the Mexican *Bracero* Programme of the 1940s, were introduced. In other periods recruitment was formally prohibited, but tacitly tolerated, leading to the presence of a large number of illegal workers. Significantly, the 1952 amendments to US immigration law included the so-called 'Texas Proviso', which was interpreted as barring punishment of employers who hired unauthorized foreign labour.

Canada followed policies of mass immigration after 1945. At first only Europeans were admitted. Most entrants were British, but Eastern and Southern Europeans soon played an increasing role. The largest immigrant streams in the 1950s and 1960s were of Germans, Italians and Dutch. The introduction of a nondiscriminatory 'points system' for screening potential migrants after the 1966 White Paper opened the door for non-European migrants. The main source countries in the 1970s were Jamaica, India, Portugal, the Philippines, Greece, Italy and Trinidad (Breton et al., 1990: 14–16). Throughout the period, family entry was encouraged, and immigrants were seen as settlers and future citizens.

Australia initiated a mass immigration programme after 1945, because policy-makers believed that the population of 7.5 million needed to be increased for both economic and strategic reasons. (see Collins, 1991; Castles et al., 1992). The policy, summed up in the popular slogan 'populate or perish', was one of permanent, family immigration. The initial target was 70,000 migrants per year and a ratio of 10 British migrants to every 'foreigner'. However, it proved impossible to attract enough British migrants. The Department of Immigration began recruiting refugees from the Baltic and Slavic countries, who were perceived as both 'racially acceptable' and anticommunist. Gradually the concept of 'acceptable European races' widened to include Northern Europeans and then Southern Europeans. By the 1950s, the largest sources of migrants were Italy, Greece and Malta. Non-Europeans were not admitted at all, as the White Australia Policy was still in force. There was a male surplus among entrants, leading to schemes to encourage single women to come from Britain and elsewhere. It was not until 1975 that women were allowed to migrate as heads of families.

Immigration was widely regarded as the motor of postwar growth: from 1947 to 1973 it provided 50 per cent of labour force growth. By the late 1960s, it was becoming hard to attract Southern European migrants, and many were returning to their homelands in response to economic developments there. The response was further liberalization of family reunions, recruitment in Yugoslavia and Latin America, and some relaxations of the White Australia Policy. By the 1970s, Australian manufacturing industry relied heavily on migrant labour and factory jobs were popularly known as 'migrant work'.

New Zealand continued its policy of 'kin immigration' from Britain after 1945, with between 9,000 and 16,000 coming each year through the 1950s and 1960s. Britons could enter freely, and could register for New Zealand citizenship (only created in 1949) after one year (although most did not bother to do so). Some white foreigners were admitted too, mainly from the Netherlands or displaced persons originally from Eastern Europe. Entry of Pacific Islanders gradually increased, but many of these came from New Zealand territories and were not considered foreigners. The 1966 Census showed that, of the one-sixth of the population who had been born overseas, about 60 per cent were from Britain, and another

15 per cent from Ireland or Australia. The economic boom of the early 1970s led to government efforts to increase immigration, with a record influx of 70,000 persons in 1973–1974 (McKinnon, 1996).

Comparative perspectives

One common feature in the migratory movements of the 1945–1973 period is the predominance of economic motivations. Foreign worker migrations to Western Europe were caused primarily by economic considerations on the part of migrants, employers and governments. The same is true of temporary worker recruitment for US agriculture. Economic motives played a major part in Australia's postwar migration programme, although population building was also a consideration. The colonial workers who migrated to Britain, France and the Netherlands generally had economic reasons, although for the governments political considerations (such as the desire to maintain links with former colonies) also played a part. Permanent migration to the USA was probably the movement in which economic factors were least dominant. Yet the migrants themselves often had economic motivations, and their labour played a major role in US economic growth. Of course there were also refugee migrations, in which economic motivations were secondary. The overwhelmingly economic motivation for migration was to become less clear-cut in the post-1973 period.

How important was labour migration for the economies of the receiving countries? Some economists have argued that it was crucial to expansion. Migrants replaced local workers, who were able to obtain more highly skilled jobs during the boom. Without the flexibility provided by immigration, bottlenecks in production and inflationary tendencies would have developed. However, other economists have argued that immigration reduced the incentive for rationalization, keeping low-productivity firms viable and holding back the shift to more capital-intensive forms of production. Such observers also claim that social capital expenditure on housing and social services for immigrants reduced the capital available for productive investment. Overall there is little doubt that the high net immigration countries, like the FRG, Switzerland, France and Australia, had the highest economic growth rates in the 1945–1973 period. Countries with relatively low net immigration (like the UK and the USA at this time) had much lower growth rates (see Castles and Kosack, 1973: Chapter 9 and Castles et al., 1984: Chapter 2). Thus the argument that immigration was economically beneficial in this period is convincing.

Another general feature of the 1945–1973 period was growing diversity of areas of origin, and increasing cultural difference between migrants and receiving populations. At the beginning of the period, most migrants to all main receiving countries came from various parts of Europe. As time went

on, increasing proportions came from Asia, Africa and Latin America. This trend was to become even more marked in the following period.

A comparison of the situation of colonial workers with that of guestworkers is instructive. The differences are obvious: colonial workers were citizens of the former colonial power, or had some preferential entitlement to enter and live there. They usually came spontaneously, often following lines of communication built up in the colonial period. Once they came in, they generally had civil and political rights; most (though by no means all) intended to stay permanently. On the other hand, guestworkers and other foreign workers were noncitizens. Their rights were severely restricted. Most came because they were recruited; some came spontaneously and were able to regularize their situation; others came illegally and worked without documentation. Generally they were seen as temporary workers who were expected to leave after a few years.

There are also similarities, however, especially in the economic and social situations of the two categories. Both became overwhelmingly concentrated in low-skilled manual work, mainly in industry and construction. Both tended to suffer substandard housing, poor social conditions and educational disadvantage. Over time, there was a convergence of legal situations, with family reunion and social rights of foreign workers improving, while the colonial migrants lost many of their privileges. Finally, both groups were affected by similar processes of marginalization, leading to a degree of separation from the rest of the population and an ethnic minority position.

Migrations in the period of global economic restructuring

The curbing of organized recruitment of manual workers by industrialized countries in the early 1970s was a reaction to a fundamental restructuring of the world economy. The subsequent period – often characterized as the epoch of *globalization* (see Chapter 3) – has been marked by:

- (a) **changes in global investment patterns:** increased capital export from developed countries in the 1970s and 1980s led to the establishment of manufacturing industries in some previously underdeveloped areas; by the 1990s new centres of economic dynamism had emerged in the Gulf oil states as well as parts of Asia and Latin America;
- (b) the micro-electronic revolution, which has reduced the need for manual workers in manufacturing;
- (c) erosion of traditional skilled manual occupations in highly developed countries;
- (d) expansion in the services sector, with demand for both highly skilled and low-skilled workers;

- (e) **growing informal sectors in the economies of developed countries;**
- (f) casualization of employment, growth in part-time work, increasingly insecure conditions of employment;
- (g) increased differentiation of labour forces on the basis of gender, age and ethnicity, through mechanisms which push many women, young people and members of minorities into casual or informal-sector work, and which force workers with outmoded skills to retire early.

As outlined in Chapter 3, these transformations have had dramatic effects in Africa, Asia and Latin America. In some places, rapid industrialization and social change have taken place. But in large areas postcolonial development strategies have failed. Many countries are marked by rapid population growth, overuse and destruction of natural resources, uncontrolled urbanization, political instability, falling living standards, poverty and even famine. The result is an increase in inequality both within and between regions. Globalization brings about complementary social transformations in North and South that increase the pressure to migrate and generate new forms of mobility. The main trends include:

- (a) a decline of government-organized labour migration to Western Europe followed by emergence of a second generation of temporary foreign worker policies in the 1990s;
- (b) family reunion of former foreign workers and colonial workers, and formation of new ethnic minorities;
- (c) transition of many Southern and Central European countries from countries of emigration to countries of transit and immigration;
- (d) continuation of migration to the 'classical immigration countries' of North America and Oceania, but with shifts in the areas of origin and the forms of migration;
- (e) new migratory movements (both internal and international) connected with economic and social change in the new industrial countries;
- (f) recruitment of foreign labour, mainly from less developed countries, by oil-rich countries;
- (g) development of mass movements of refugees and asylum seekers, generally moving from South to North, but also (especially after the collapse of the Soviet Bloc) from East to West;
- (h) increasing international mobility of highly qualified personnel, in both temporary and permanent flows;
- (i) proliferation of illegal migration and legalization policies.

These movements will be examined in more detail in the next few chapters. The main population flows of the post-1973 period are shown in Map 1.1. in Chapter 1.

Migrants and minorities in Western Europe

Consolidation 1974–1985

The immediate post-1973 period was one of consolidation and demographic normalization of immigrant populations in Western Europe. Recruitment of both foreign workers and colonial workers largely ceased. For colonial migrants in Britain, France and the Netherlands, trends to family reunion and permanent settlement continued. The settlement process, and the emergence of second and third generations born in Western Europe, led to internal differentiation and the development of community structures and consciousness. By the 1980s, colonial migrants and their descendants had become clearly visible social groups.

When the German government stopped recruitment in 1973 and other governments followed suit, they hoped that the now unwanted 'guests' would go away. Many Western European states proclaimed themselves 'zero immigration countries'. In fact some foreign workers did go home, but many stayed. Those who left were mainly from the more developed countries, where there was some prospect of work for returnees. Those who stayed were from less developed areas, in particular Turkey and North Africa. It was above all these non-European groups who experienced socioeconomic exclusion through discrimination and racism, like the former colonial worker groups. Governments initially tried to prevent family reunion, but with little success. In several countries, the law courts played a major role in preventing policies deemed to violate the protection of the family contained in national constitutions.

Foreign populations changed in structure. In Germany, for instance, the number of foreign men declined slightly between 1974 and 1981, but the number of foreign women increased by 12 per cent, while the number of children aged up to 15 grew by 52 per cent (Castles, Booth and Wallace, 1984: 102). Instead of declining, as policy-makers had expected, the total *foreign resident population* of Germany remained fairly constant at about 4 million in the late 1970s, only to increase again to 4.5 million in the early 1980s.

New migrations in the 1980s and 1990s

The brief consolidation was a mere prelude to a new period of rapid change and diversification. By the mid-1980s Southern European countries – the labour reserve for Western Europe, North America, South America and Australia for over a century – were experiencing a migration transition. Economic growth, combined with a sharp fall in birth rates, led to serious labour shortages. Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece all became countries of immigration, using labour from North Africa, Latin America, Asia

and – later – Eastern Europe for low-skilled jobs (King et al., 2000) (see below).

Change became even more rapid after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European socialist states led to instability in Central Europe and undermined many of the barriers that had kept population mobility in check. Populist politicians and sensationalist media spoke of a 'migration crisis' (Baldwin-Edwards and Schain, 1994), and warned that 'floods' of desperate migrants would 'swamp' Western European welfare systems and drag down living standards (Thränhardt, 1996).

But by the mid-1990s it was clear that the 'invasion' was not going to take place. Asylum-seeker entries to European OECD countries peaked at 695,000 in 1992 in response to the Yugoslav civil wars and then declined (although they were to increase again around 2000). East–West movements did increase, but most migrants were members of ethnic minorities moving to so-called ancestral homelands, where they had a right to entry and citizenship: ethnic Germans (*Aussiedler*) to Germany (Levy, 1999; Thränhardt, 1996: 237), Russian Jews to Israel, Bulgarian Turks to Turkey, and Pontian Greeks to Greece. Millions of people moved within and between the successor states of the former Soviet Union (UNHCR, 1995: 24–25). Russia thus became a major country of immigration, with around 2 million ethnic Russians leaving or being displaced from the Baltic states, new Central Asian states, and other parts of the former Soviet Union (Münz, 1996: 206). Movements of Poles, Russians, and other East Europeans to Western Europe in search of work also increased in the 1990s, but did not reach the extreme levels originally predicted.

It soon became clear that the end of the Cold War was not the only factor changing migration patterns. This geopolitical shift coincided with an acceleration of economic globalization, as well as an increase in violence and human rights violations in Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Latin America. Economic change, social transformation and political upheavals all triggered migrations. The new migrants coming to Western and Southern Europe varied widely in their levels of education, and in their economic, political and cultural resources. Many were asylum seekers or irregular workers, but others were highly qualified personnel in search of higher salaries or better opportunities. The result was an ever-greater diversity in the geographical, ethnic, social and cultural backgrounds of migrant populations.

The combination of the unexpected settlement of former guestworkers and their families after 1973, and the new migrations of the 1990s, reinforced the politicization of migration. In the 1990s, asylum seekers were portrayed by the media as economic migrants in disguise, and became the target of widespread hostility. Governments vied with each other in introducing tougher asylum rules. They also believed that admission of migrant workers should be avoided since it would inevitably lead to settlement and unpredictable social impacts. Policy-makers tightened up

national immigration restrictions and increased European cooperation on border control (see Chapters 8 and 9 below).

Migration trends of the new millennium

Migration movements steadied for a while in the mid-1990s due both to restrictive migration rules and to economic and political stabilization in Eastern Europe. But at the beginning of the new millennium migration movements again increased sharply. There were several reasons. Economic globalization continued to increase commercial and employment opportunities, especially for the highly skilled. Many governments introduced preferential entry rules for this category. Yet governments continued to deny the need for low-skilled labour migrants, so demand was met through limited temporary and seasonal recruitment schemes, or, increasingly, by irregular migration. The EU expansion of 2004 brought in 10 new members, while the expansion of 2007 added Romania and Bulgaria. Many nationals of the new member states moved to seek work, especially in the UK and Ireland (see section on Central and Eastern Europe below).

However, despite official rhetoric giving priority to economic migration, the largest single immigration category in the great majority of European countries remains *family reunion*. In 2004, for example, family reunion made up over 60 per cent of all legal long-term inflows in France, Italy and Sweden, and around half in the Netherlands and Germany (OECD, 2006: Part IV). Asylum and other humanitarian entry, by contrast, was well below 10 per cent of all inflows in 2004 for most countries, although it was higher (15–23 per cent) for Sweden, UK and the Netherlands. Asylum entries rose from the late 1990s, peaking at 471,000 for Western Europe in 2001, but had declined to 243,000 by 2005 (OECD, 2006: 253) (see Chapter 8).

Total inflows into European OECD countries (that is, EU25 plus Switzerland and Norway) have been above 2 million for each year since 2000. The trend is upward: the highest recorded year was 2004, with 2.8 million new entrants (OECD, 2006: 233). However, new entries to some of the earlier main immigration countries – like Germany and France – are stagnating or even declining. Germany now has large outflows, so that net migration in 2004 was only 82,000. The UK had its highest-ever inflow in 2004 – 494,000 persons (OECD, 2006: 30) – and net migration was 202,000. The biggest increases in the number of legal migrants occurred in Southern Europe, with 645,800 in Spain and 319,300 in Italy (OECD, 2006: 233). However, most of these apparent newcomers were probably persons already living in the country, who became legal residents through regularization.

One of the biggest public issues in European migration today is irregular immigration and employment. Irregular migration is driven both by labour market demand for lower-skilled workers, and by differentials in potential

income compared with poorer countries of origin in Eastern Europe, African and Asia. The exact numbers are unknown. Düvell notes estimates of between 0.5 and 1.1 million irregular immigrants in Germany, from 50,000 to 0.5 million in the UK and similar fluctuations elsewhere. Overall he estimates the irregular migrant population of the EU25 at 4.1 – 7.3 million (Düvell, 2005: Table 2.1).

Southern Europe

The first decades of the post-Cold War period transformed Southern European societies. Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece comprise a distinctive subgroup of EU states. Until 1973, they were viewed as lands of emigration. Then, at somewhat different junctures, they underwent migration transitions, becoming significant lands of both emigration and immigration. In the post-Cold War period, their roles as lands of emigration have diminished, whereas their roles as lands of immigration have become more pronounced. They have come to share many of the concerns and characteristics of their EU partner states to the north, yet remain demarcated by the key role played by the underground economy in shaping inflows, the preponderance of illegal migration in overall migration and by weak governmental capacity to regulate international migration (Reyneri, 2001).

In *Italy*, numbers of foreigners with residence permits doubled between 1981 and 1991, from 300,000 to 600,000. Inclusive of foreigners under 18 who live with their parents and therefore do not hold residence permits, the total legally resident foreign population reached an estimated 1.5 million or 2.6 per cent of Italy's resident population by 2001 (Strozza and Venturini, 2002: 265). In 2004, 320,000 first-time residence permits were issued with Romanians, Albanians and Moroccans comprising the principal beneficiaries. The total foreign population increased to 2.4 million with the largest net growth among Romanians (OECD, 2006: 190).

Most resident foreigners arrived illegally or violated visa conditions, and subsequently were legalized. The most recent of the recurrent legalizations since 1986 began in 2002 and ended in 2004. It resulted in 650,000 legalizations (OECD, 2006). The upsurge in immigration has coincided with persistently high levels of unemployment at the national level, a dramatic decrease in fertility and acute crises in neighbouring areas like Bosnia, Kosovo and Albania. Nevertheless, the prevalent pattern appears employer demand-driven from the underground economy, which is assumed to be much more pervasive in Italy and other Southern European countries than in Northern Europe. Most immigrants move to areas of Italy where employment is available, not to areas with high unemployment (Reyneri, 2001).

Migration looms very large in Italy's foreign and national security policies. Trafficking of migrants across the Mediterranean to Italy's

far-flung coasts has resulted in a large toll of deaths since 1990. Working with EU and NATO partner states, Italy has played a key role in linking cooperation in prevention of such migration with concrete measures of assistance to governments and societies along the Mediterranean littoral. Cooperation with Albania, Egypt and Turkey in particular led to a drop in illegal arrivals on the coast as numbers of aliens intercepted declined to 14,000 in 2004 from 24,000 in 2002 (OECD, 2006; Pastore, 2006: 118–119). Trafficking from Libya, however, remained very problematic.

Spain went through a similar transformation with profound implications for foreign and national security policies. Prior to 1980, Spain remained a land of emigration and a transit zone for migrants from Africa to Northern Europe. That status quo began to change with post-Franco democratization and rapprochement with the then European Community. The foreign population in Spain grew from 279,000 in 1990 to 801,000 in 1999. By 2005, it stood at 2.6 million, roughly the size of Spain's expatriate population (OECD, 2006).

Virtually all legally resident aliens either entered Spain unlawfully or overstayed visas. Between 1985 and 2005, Spain authorized 12 legalizations (Plewa, 2006: 247). 560,000 persons were legalized in 2005 (OECD, 2006: 216). The recurrent legalizations in Spain and elsewhere in Southern Europe have drawn criticism from other member states of the EU (Kreienbrink, 2006: 192). Unusually, even illegal residents can register with Spanish municipalities (for purposes of education or welfare). Municipal data, which includes both legal and illegally resident aliens, suggested that 350,000 Ecuadorians and 200,000 Romanians registered between 2000 and 2004. Africans tend to work in agriculture, Latin Americans in construction and Europeans in industry (OECD, 2006).

Like the other Southern European states, Spain became part of the new generation of states authorizing temporary foreign worker recruitment policies. Admissions fluctuated in the range of 20,000 to 30,000 foreigners admitted annually and several of the contingents, as they are called, served a backdoor legalization function. That is, foreign workers were not recruited from abroad. Instead, illegal aliens on Spanish soil were given employment and residency authorization (Plewa and Miller, 2005).

Spain's efforts to deter illegal migration and human trafficking from Africa played an important part in foreign and national security policies. The involvement of scores of migrants and persons of migrant background in the bombings in Madrid in 2004 constituted one wellspring (Benjamin and Simon, 2005). Spain's Canary Islands became a major target of human traffickers, especially after Moroccan authorities, at the behest of Spain and the EU, made it more difficult for *pateras* (small boats carrying migrants) to depart. Spain signed a series of bilateral agreements with African states as part of the broader efforts. The agreements typically included a provision for legal recruitment of workers from the African states (see Chapter 7).

Portugal's migration history evolved through three stages. From the mid-nineteenth century to the mid-1970s, Portuguese emigrated, leaving a

legacy of some 5 million Portuguese and their descendants living abroad (OECD, 2004: 254). The revolution of 1974 marked the beginning of significant migration from former Portuguese possessions in Africa. The current stage began in the late 1980s with the prospect of Portugal's accession to what became the EU (Cordeiro, 2006: 235–237). Most recent immigrants arrived illegally or overstayed visas. Again, there have been recurrent legalizations, dating back to 1992 when 38,000 aliens received permits (Cordeiro, 2006: 242). The legalization begun in 2001 ended in early 2004 with 184,000 aliens granted 'stay permits', which grant fewer rights than residence permits. About 40 per cent of Portugal's legally resident aliens have such permits. Another legalization was authorized in 2004–2005 for non-EU foreign workers employed prior to March 2003. Many of those legalized were Brazilians (OECD, 2007: 276).

Migrants from Eastern Europe, Brazil and Africa comprised the bulk of the foreign population. By 2005, there were as many Ukrainians as there were Brazilians and Cape Verdeans (OECD, 2006: 210). Many of the Ukrainians had been smuggled in. As in Italy and Spain, Portuguese authorities struggled to achieve control. Cordeiro wrote: 'Like other EU countries, Portugal hardened its policy of regularization of immigration flows and border control, but without the expected success, which proves the weakness of the state power facing such a complex phenomenon' (Cordeiro, 2006: 243).

Until 1990, international migration to Greece mainly involved repatriation of ethnic Greeks from abroad and arrivals of refugees in transit. In the post-Cold War period, immigration soared and foreigners constituted 8 per cent of the total population of nearly 11 million and 13 per cent of the workforce by 2001 (Fakiolas, 2002: 281). In 2005, 1.1 million foreign-born persons were enumerated, of whom 656,000 were foreigners and 105,000 foreigners born in Greece. Residence permit data from 2004 indicated that there were 686,000 foreigners legally resident, of whom 60 per cent were Albanians (OECD, 2006). Statistical data on international migration to Greece are deficient and should be viewed sceptically (Baldwin-Edwards, 2005). Within two decades, despite high unemployment and public hostility to immigrants, Greece became one of the EU states most affected by international migration that was mainly illegal.

Central and Eastern Europe

This vast and heterogeneous region extends from the Oder–Neisse boundary between Germany and Poland to the Eurasian steppes of the Russian Federation, and from the Baltic states southeastward to the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. As the area formerly comprised a large swath of the Warsaw Bloc, the transition from Communist rule to democracy and market economies has transformed states and societies. Migration figured centrally in the crisis and collapse of Communist regimes, and the early

1990s witnessed significant outflows. Ethnic Germans from the Volga basin and other areas of German settlement migrated to a reunited Germany. Nearly 1 million so-called Soviet Jews went mainly to Israel but also to the USA. The bulk of the population, however, did not share the migration opportunities afforded such minorities.

Instead, these populations endured transitions to democracy and market economies that often increased unemployment, socioeconomic hardship and interethnic tensions. A major goal in the emergent Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU involved aiding consolidation of democratic institutions and economic reforms in Central and Eastern Europe. Prevention of illegal migration westward ranked high among priorities. Germany resumed recruitment of temporary foreign workers, mainly from Poland. Citizens of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary received visa-free entry into the European Union in return for cooperation on immigration control matters, such as readmission treaties wherein the signatories undertook to accept back illegal entrants. After 1993, emigration from Central and Eastern Europe to the EU declined, although significant outflows of temporary foreign workers and of 'tourists' who took up temporary employment in the EU continued. Total numbers of officially admitted temporary foreign workers from Central and Eastern Europe in Germany fluctuated between 200,000 and 300,000 per year (Hönekopp, 1999: 22).

At the same time, more economically advanced states like Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic became immigration lands almost overnight. They were generally poorly prepared to regulate international migration, lacking appropriate laws and administrative agencies. Official statistics did not reflect unregistered migration of 'tourists' who found employment in the informal economy. Poland was thought to have received an estimated 800,000 Ukrainians who took up employment by 1995 (Okólski, 2001: 115). Ukrainians mainly worked in agriculture and construction but were also engaged in trading activities. Disparities in levels of economic development, wages and opportunity played a major role in intraregional migrations. Unemployment in states like Belarus and the Ukraine ran very high: perhaps half of the Ukrainian labour force was unemployed (Bedzir, 2001). Many employed persons were unable to live on the income derived from their jobs in Belarus or Romania. Hence they sought to supplement their incomes through temporary employment abroad (Wallace and Stola, 2001: 8).

Most of the states in the region recorded huge increases in border crossings in the 1990s. Transit migration of third-country nationals moving through Central and Eastern Europe to points west grew fast. There were three major streams:

1. Citizens from countries of the former Warsaw Pact who, until recently, could enter legally without a visa and then attempt to migrate illegally to the EU. Many Gypsies (or Roma) from countries like Romania participated.

2. Refugees from conflicts in the Western Balkans, especially in Bosnia and Croatia (1991–1993) and Kosovo (1999). Hungary and the Czech Republic received many more refugees than Poland.
3. Africans and Asians. The USSR had served as a barrier. When it disintegrated, its successor states became an easy-to-cross bridge between poles of economic inequality (Stola, 2001: 89). People smugglers and traffickers proliferated in this environment and became deeply entrenched, despite countermeasures (IOM, 2000a).

Within the area of the former Soviet Union there were also significant movements of populations between successor states. By 1996 4.2 million persons had repatriated, mainly ethnic Russians going to the Russian Federation. Additionally, there were nearly 1 million refugees from various conflicts and some 700,000 ecological displacees, mainly from areas affected by the Chernobyl disaster (Wallace and Stola, 2001: 15).

Overall, the first 15 years of the post-Cold War period resulted in extremely complex migration patterns. Most migratory movements were thought to be short-term or 'pendular' in nature, as is not unusual in early stages of migration processes. The key question was what would happen to migration after EU enlargement.

On 1 May 2004, 10 new member states gained accession to the EU: the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia (known as the A10). Most of the existing member states (the EU15) decided to restrict migration from the new Eastern and Central European member states (the A8) over the transition period, but Ireland, the UK and Sweden opted not to. This resulted in major influxes of Poles and of citizens of Baltic republics, especially Lithuanians, to the UK and Ireland, but not to Sweden (due to labour market conditions). By 30 June 2006, 447,000 A8 citizens had applied to the Worker Registration Scheme (WRS), which gave them access to employment in the UK (Home Office, 2006: 1). The vast majority of new workers were young and had no dependants living with them.

In Ireland, by 2006, non-nationals employed represented 8 per cent of the entire work force. 31 per cent of non-nationals came from the A8 countries. Non-nationals comprised 9 per cent of the total work force in construction, and more than half came from A8 states (Beggs and Pollock, 2006). Historically, enlargements of what is now the EU have not led to major influxes of workers from the new member states. The pattern was for capital mobility to substitute for worker mobility (Kosłowski, 2000: 117). Should this wisdom be revisited in light of the results of the 2004 enlargement? Apparently not: a European Commission report noted that workers from new member states represented less than 1 per cent of the working-age population in all member countries except Austria and Ireland (OECD, 2006: 107–108).

Nevertheless, the enlargement process appeared to have a significant legalization effect for A8 workers employed illegally in the EU 15 states

prior to 1 May 2004: several hundred thousand benefited from de facto legalization (Tomas and Münz, 2006). Münz held that the accession to the EU of Bulgaria and Romania on 1 January 2007 had a similar legalization effect (Münz et al., 2007). However, the British Government, under pressure from negative media reports, decided to opt out of free movement for workers from Bulgaria and Romania in 2007.

Assessment of the period was less rosy in Poland. One million Poles emigrated between 1 May 2004 and April 2007, principally to the UK, Ireland and Germany. The size of the outflow led to a comprehensive governmental response, which included creation of new consulates. By mid-2007, the euphoria that had accompanied accession and the potential for emigration had given way to growing concerns about migration. A pay strike by medical workers underlined the depletion of the ranks of skilled personnel. Concerns also mounted over abusive treatment of Polish workers abroad, especially in Italy. The Foreign Ministry began to warn Poles about potential risks of emigration.

As the most populous of the A8 states, Poland exemplified the complexities of the migration transition. In 1997, adoption of a new Aliens Law made it more difficult for Ukrainians, Russians and others to shuttle back and forth across Poland's eastern borders. As a result, more migrants took up employment in agriculture and construction. By 2003, when Poland imposed visa requirements upon citizens of Ukraine, Belarus and the Russian Federation, some Polish employers had become dependent on migrant workers. The exodus of Polish workers after 1 May 2004 increased employer fears of labour shortages. Poland, like other Eastern and Central European countries, was experiencing declining fertility and an ageing population. By 2007, the governments of these countries were beginning to see themselves as future immigration lands, and were planning to establish the necessary legal and institutional arrangements.

Poland, like most other A8 states, received vast influxes of foreign direct investments (FDI), especially in the manufacturing sector, as firms moved eastward to benefit from much lower pay than in Germany or France. By 2007, perceived shortages of skilled labour became a concern as the Polish unemployment rate declined to 13.8 per cent. Regionwide, five of the eight states recorded net population losses in 2006 (Perry and Power, 2007). It was in this context that Poland lifted restrictions on short-term workers from Belarus and Ukraine. In 2007, several hundred workers from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan arrived (Perry and Power, 2007).

Ukraine and the Russian Federation have emerged as major source countries for migration to OECD member states since 2000 (OECD, 2006: 34). However, they too face dramatic demographic decline in the future. The bifurcation of the region into EU member states and those on the outside looking in seemed durable, especially after the failed referenda on a constitution for the EU in 2005. While the referenda did not pertain to migration per se, the outcomes reflected voter fear of increased labour migration from A8 countries as well as from Turkey. The question of whether international migration could become a theme of increased

bilateral and regional cooperation stood starkly posed. A major issue in Ukraine–EU relations, for example, concerned Ukraine's reluctance to sign a readmission treaty for fear of becoming a 'dumping ground' for illegal entrants apprehended in the EU space (Pankevych, 2006: 205–206). Much appeared to hinge on whether the EU could introduce the European migration policy called for by the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam but which so far remains unachieved (Straubhaar, 2006).

Europe's changing population

Over half a century of immigration has transformed European populations. Germany (reunited in 1990 following the collapse of the GDR) is a good example. By 1996, the total *foreign resident population* was 7.3 million – a figure that was to remain fairly constant until 2003. However, in 2004 the figure fell sharply to 6.7 million (OECD, 2006: 274). This was due to a mixture of factors: administrative measures to delete foreigners who had left Germany from the Central Aliens Register, the decline of net migration to Germany, and the decline in the number of births of foreign children, following the 2000 Naturalization Law (OECD, 2006: 182). By contrast, the *foreign-born population* (which includes naturalized immigrants, but excludes German-born children with foreign nationality) increased from 9.4 million in 1995 to 10.6 million in 2003 (OECD, 2006: 262). Thus the foreign resident population made up 8.9 per cent of Germany's total population, while the foreign-born population made up 12.9 per cent.

Such complications underline the fact that migration statistics depend very much on administrative rules and practices. Table 5.2 gives information on the growth of foreign resident populations in some European immigration countries, while Table 5.3 gives information on foreign-born populations.

In 1995 the foreign resident populations of European OECD countries totalled 19.4 million. (OECD, 1997: 30). By 2005, this total came to over 24 million. However, the foreign-born population of these countries was 39 million persons. The foreign resident population of the European OECD countries made up about 5 per cent of the total population, while the foreign-born population accounted for over 8 per cent. If one adds the non-European OECD countries in Table 5.3 (USA, Australia, Canada and New Zealand), the OECD was home to about 89 million foreign-born persons – close to half the world's migrants. Significantly, many European countries now have immigrant population shares on a par with the USA – historically viewed as the most significant immigration country (see IOM, 2005: 139–144).

Such trends have important demographic and economic implications. EU countries are characterised by a low total fertility rate: a lifetime average of 1.5 children per woman – well below the replacement rate of 2.1. Life expectancy is increasing, and populations are ageing, so that fewer people of working age will in future have to support more elderly people (UN,

Table 5.2 Foreign resident population in selected European OECD countries (thousands)

Country	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	Per cent of total population 2005
Austria	283	272	413	724	702	801	9.7
Belgium	–	845	905	910	862	901	8.6
Czech Rep.	–	–	–	159	201	278	2.7
Denmark	102	117	161	223	259	270	5.0
Finland	–	–	–	69	91	114	2.2
France	3,714 ^a	–	3,597	–	3,263 ^b	–	5.6 ^b
Germany	4,453	4,379	5,242	7,174	7,297	6,756	8.8
Greece	–	–	–	–	305	553	5.2
Hungary	–	–	–	140	110	154	1.5
Ireland	–	79	80	94	126	259	6.3
Italy	299	423	781	991	1,380	2,670	4.6
Luxembourg	94	98	–	138	165	189	40.0
Netherlands	521	553	692	757	668	691	4.2
Norway	83	102	143	161	184	223	4.8
Poland	–	–	–	–	49 ^c	–	0.1 ^c
Portugal	–	–	108	168	208	432	4.1
Slovak Rep.	–	–	–	22	29	26	0.5
Spain	–	242	279	500	896	2,739	6.2
Sweden	422	389	484	532	477	480	5.3
Switzerland	893	940	1,100	1,331	1,384	1,512	20.3
UK	–	1,731	1,875	2,060	2,342	3,035	5.2

Notes: For the differences between foreign resident population and foreign-born population, see *Note on Migration Statistics* at the front of this book. The figures for the UK in this table are not comparable with the birthplace figures given in Table 5.1.

The figures for Germany refer to the area of the old Federal Republic up to 1990, and to the whole of united Germany thereafter.

– data not available

^a Figure for 1982

^b Figure for 1999, for metropolitan France only

^c Figure for 2002

Sources: OECD (1992: 131; 1997: 29; 2000; 2001; 2007: 343).

2000). Eurostat projections show that the population of the EU25 as a whole is likely to fall slightly from 457 million in 2004 to 450 million by 2050 (a decline of 1.5 per cent). However, the decline will be much sharper in Germany (9.6 per cent), Italy (8.9 per cent) and the Eastern and Central European states, which joined the EU in 2004 (11.7 per cent). More serious still is the decline in population of working age (15–64): currently in the EU25, 67 per cent of the population are of working age, compared with 16 per cent who are 65 and over. By 2050, a working-age population of 57 per cent will have to support 30 per cent aged 65 and over (CEC, 2005a; Annexe Tables 1 and 2; see also Holzmann and Münz, 2006).

Table 5.3 Foreign-born population in selected OECD countries (thousands)

Country	1995	2000	2005	Share in total population 2005, per cent
Australia	4,164	4,417	4,826	23.8
Austria	–	843	1,101	13.5
Belgium	983	1,059	1,269	12.1
Canada	4,867	5,327	5,896	19.1
Czech Republic	–	434	523	5.1
Denmark	250	309	350	6.5
Finland	106	136	177	3.4
France	–	4,306 ^a	4,926	8.1
Germany	9,378	10,256	10,621 ^b	12.9 ^b
Greece	–	–	1,122 ^c	10.3 ^c
Hungary	284	295	332	3.3
Ireland	–	329	487	11.0
Italy	–	–	1,147 ^c	2.5 ^c
Luxembourg	128	145	152	33.4
Netherlands	1,407	1,615	1,735	10.6
New Zealand	–	663	796	19.4
Norway	240	305	380	8.2
Poland	–	–	776 ^d	1.6 ^d
Portugal	533	523	661	6.3
Slovak Republic	–	119 ^c	249	3.9 ^c
Spain	–	–	2,172 ^c	5.3 ^c
Sweden	936	1,004	1,126	12.4
Switzerland	1,503	1,571	1,773	23.8
UK	4,031	4,667	5,842	9.7
USA	24,648	31,108	38,343	12.9

Notes: For the differences between foreign resident population and foreign-born population, see *Note on Migration Statistics* at the front of this book.

^a Figure for 1999

^b Figure for 2003

^c Figure for 2001

^d Figure for 2002

^e Figure for 2004

Sources: (OECD, 2006: 262; 2007: 330).

As a result, nearly all population growth now comes through immigration. Münz *et al.* (2007) put population growth for the EU27 at 1.9 million persons in 2005, of which 1.6 million was through immigration and 300,000 through natural increase. Many European countries would already have a declining population today if it were not for immigration. The total population of the EU27 in 2006 was 491 million, of whom 40.6 million were legally resident foreign-born persons. Of these, 13.2 million (2.7 per cent of total EU population) were from other EU states, while 27.3 million (5.6 per cent) were from non-EU states (Münz *et al.*, 2007: 2–4).

This represents an important historical shift: Europe went from an area of mass emigration in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, to an area of mainly intra-European labour movement from 1945–1974. Today Europe is an area of large-scale inflows from all over the world. Moreover, this inflow increasingly concerns the whole of Europe – not just the older industrial areas of Northwestern Europe as in the past. This has enormous implications for European society and politics, as will be discussed in later chapters.

North America and Oceania

Migration to the USA grew steadily after 1970. Total immigration, which refers to aliens granted legal permanent resident status, rose from 4.5 million in 1971–1980, to 7.3 million in 1981–1990 and to 9.1 million in 1991–2000. In 2006, 1.3 million Permanent Resident Aliens were admitted. Mexicans, Chinese and Filipinos comprised the largest groups. Most of the new residents already lived in the USA and most had relatives in the USA. Naturalizations rose to 702,587 in 2006 from 604,280. Mexicans, Indians and Filipinos were the most numerous amongst the new US citizens (DHS, 2006a and 2006b).

As for refugees, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which incorporated the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), reported that 41,150 had been admitted in 2006 as compared with 53,813 in 2005. Refugee admissions plummeted in the wake of 9/11 due to more stringent security requirements in processing. Middle Eastern and African refugees were particularly adversely affected. An additional 26,113 persons were granted asylum in 2006, up from 25,257 in 2005. Chinese, Haitians and Columbians formed the largest groups.

Total admissions of temporary foreign workers/trainees and their families have increased markedly in recent years (Martin, 2006). In 2005, 883,706 were admitted but among them only 7,011 were H-2A foreign agricultural workers. This figure compared with 22,141 in 2004 and 14,094 in 2003 (DHS, 2006b). The decline reflected employer dissatisfaction with the programme and the widespread availability of undocumented agricultural workers. Farm workers are the worst-paid group in the US economy and most are Mexicans.

Canada remains one of the few countries in the world with an active and expansive permanent immigration policy, which aims to admit the equivalent of 1 per cent of its total population of about 30 million each year. The 5.4 million foreign-born residents made up 18.4 per cent of the Canadian population at the 2001 Census (Statistics Canada, 2007) – one of the highest shares in any developed country. There is a broad political consensus behind this policy, contrasting sharply with the lack of consensus on immigration policy in the USA.

Canada recorded 251,649 landings, as the Canadians term them, in 2006, of which half went to the province of Ontario. Entries from Asia,

Africa and the Middle East have grown, while European migration has declined. In 2004, the top four countries of origin of permanent immigrants were China, India, the Philippines and Pakistan, followed by the USA, Iran and UK (OECD, 2006: 236). Of the 60,975 new immigrants whose skill level was identified, 31,214 were professional and 23,214 were skilled and technical. These figures reflected a shift in the Canadian system for rating applicants for immigration to award more points for educational and technical skills. Nevertheless, there was concern in Canada that the shift had contributed to growing unemployment and underemployment of immigrants, despite their impressive credentials (Reitz, 2007a, 2007b).

Canada has witnessed a steady increase in temporary foreign workers since 1993. There were 64,871 in 1993 and 112,658 in 2006. Among those were 13,933 Mexican workers in 2006 as compared with 6,133 in 1997 (CIC, 2006). Since 1974, the Mexican and Canadian governments have cooperated on a programme bringing Mexicans to work in Canadian agriculture, particularly the hothouse-based tomato industry in Ontario. Recruitment used to be limited to married men, but recently some women have been recruited as well. The average stay in Canada is 5 months, the minimum 6 weeks. Half to two-thirds of the workers return to the same employer each season.

Immigration has been one the main factors shaping Australia's population and society. The long-term result has been the shift from a predominantly white population of mainly British identity to one of the most diverse multiethnic populations in the world. The abandonment of the White Australia Policy in 1973 coincided with a new official rhetoric that redefined Australia as a multicultural society, built through worldwide immigration. Australia has also maintained its traditional role as a resettlement country for refugees, through its Humanitarian Program. Significant Asian immigration began in the late 1970s with the arrival of Indo-Chinese refugees. Australia also attracted Latin Americans (both workers and refugees) and Africans (in fairly small numbers). New Zealanders (who can enter freely) came in increasing numbers. In the 1990s, economic and political crises brought about new inflows from the former Soviet Union, former Yugoslavia, the Middle East and South Africa. All legal immigrants (including refugees) have the right to family reunion, which has been the largest admission category.

The climate changed in 1996, with the election of a centre-right coalition government sceptical of immigration and multiculturalism. The Howard Government set out to orient immigration policy more strongly to economic needs. Public concern about irregular entry of 'boat people' (actually never more than 4,000 persons a year) led to strict border control measures, including compulsory detention of asylum seekers (often in remote camps). Yet a buoyant economy and labour shortages in many sectors actually led to a growth in planned immigration in the early twenty-first century (Castles and Vasta, 2004).

Permanent nonhumanitarian inflows in 2005–2006 totalled 142,930, the highest for over a decade (Australian migration statistics relate to financial years, from July to June) (DIAC, 2007c). In addition, 14,144 persons were admitted under the Humanitarian Program (also the highest figure for years) (DIAC, 2007b). Temporary migration is also growing: in 2004–2005, 93,513 temporary work visas were granted. Overseas students were also important, with 116,716 visas. Overseas students provide a source of part-time labour while studying, and are now permitted to shift to permanent employment after graduation, if they have skills in demand. Another important source of temporary labour is working holidaymakers (generally young people from other developed countries, with 104,353 visas in 2004–2005 (DIAC, 2007a). It remains to be seen how the Australian Labor Party Government elected in November 2007 will cope with challenges of new types of migration.

New Zealand has also experienced sustained immigration, increasing diversity of origins and a trend towards temporary migration. Permanent immigrant inflows grew in waves, with peaks in the early 1990s (55,600 in 1995), then again in the new century (54,400 in 2001), but declined to 36,200 in 2004. As *New Zealand* emigration (especially to Australia) has also increased, net permanent migration was only 7,000 in 2004–2005. Temporary migration, including temporary workers, students and working holidaymakers, was 145,100 in 2004–2005. Recent policy changes have been concerned with increasing skilled migration and encouraging students to stay on for employment after graduation (OECD, 2006: 202–203, 233).

In 2004, *New Zealand's* total immigrant population was estimated at 763,600 – 18.8 per cent of the total population. Non-Europeans now predominate as a result of increased entries from Asia and the Pacific since the 1980s. In the 2001 Census, UK-born persons made up only 31 per cent of the immigrant population, followed by the Australian-born (8 per cent). Next came Samoa, China, South Africa, Fiji, Netherlands, India, Tonga and Korea (OECD, 2006: 262, 268). In *New Zealand* too, migration has led to fundamental changes, with important consequences for culture, identity and politics.

Conclusions

This overview of international migration to Europe, North America and Oceania since 1945 can lay no claim to completeness. The upsurge in migratory movements in the post-1945 period, and particularly since the mid-1980s, indicates that international migration has become a crucial part of global transformations. It is linked to the internationalization of production, distribution and investment and, equally important, to the globalization of culture. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet bloc added new dimensions to global restructuring. One was the redirection of some investment of the advanced capitalist countries away

from the South towards Eastern Europe. Another dimension was the growth of East–West migration, with previously isolated countries entering global migratory flows.

Many large-scale migrations have been primarily economic in their motivations. Labour migration was particularly significant in the 1945–1973 period. In the following years, other types of migration, such as family reunion and refugee and asylum-seeker movements, took on greater importance. Even migrations in which noneconomic motivations have been predominant have had significant effects on the labour markets and economies of both sending and receiving areas. But no migration can ever be adequately understood solely on the basis of economic criteria. Economic causes of migration have their roots in processes of social, cultural and political change. Furthermore, the effect on both sending and receiving societies is always more than just economic: immigration changes demographic and social structures, affects political institutions and helps to reshape cultures.

In the early 1990s, Western Europe was gripped by fears of uncontrolled influxes from the East and South. By 1995 this scenario had receded, due both to changes in sending countries, and to the tightening of entry rules and border controls. In the second edition of this book (published in 1998) we noted a slowdown in migration to developed countries, but argued that this might be a passing phase, like that of the late 1970s. This indeed proved the case, with significant increases in entry from about 1997, as well as diversification of migratory types. As we noted in the third edition (2003), the main growth at this time was in asylum, irregular migration, and skilled migration. Since then, rich countries have vied with each other to attract skilled migrants, while asylum applications have declined significantly – partly as a result of more restrictive rules in receiving countries. Yet strict border controls, the building of walls (as on the US–Mexico border) and increased marine surveillance (in the Caribbean and Mediterranean) seem to have done little to stop inflows of irregular labour migrants. This conflict between migratory pressures and state measures will be the theme of Chapter 8.

Guide to further reading

The *Age of Migration* website www.age-of-migration.com includes text 5.1, which provides some additional detail on migration to Greece. The website material related to Chapter 11, on Australia, Germany, Canada, the Netherlands and Sweden, is also useful for understanding migration patterns to these countries.

For current data on migration flows, it is best to consult the online sources listed at the end of Chapter 1. For a general overview and analysis for developed countries, the annual *International Migration Outlook* of

the OECD is invaluable. The *World Migration Reports* of the IOM and the regularly updated material provided by the *Migration Information Source* are also highly recommended.

Castles and Kosack (1973) is a comparative study of immigrant workers in France, Germany, Switzerland and the UK from 1945 to 1973, while Miller (1981) provides an early analysis of the political effects of migration. Castles et al. (1984) continue the story for the period following the ending of recruitment in 1973–1974. Portes and Rumbaut (2006) provide a detailed account of migration and settlement in the USA, while Collins (1991) and Jupp (2002) examine postwar migration to Australia. A history of migration to New Zealand can be found in McKinnon (1996).

The recent explosion of literature on migration to developed countries makes it hard to single out reading. A useful global comparative study on migration policy is Cornelius et al. (2004). Geddes (2003) is good on recent politics of migration, Schierup et al. (2006) examine the 'European dilemma' of migration and increasing diversity, Green (2004) gives an account of recent changes in Germany, while Düvell (2005) provides a good overview of irregular migration. Other useful books include, for Western Europe, Messina (2002), for Central Europe Wallace and Stola (2001), and for Southern Europe Baganha (1997), Luso-American Development Foundation (1999), King et al. (2000) and King (2001). Horowitz and Noiriell (1992) and Togman (2002) provide comparisons between France and the USA.

Chapter 6

Migration in the Asia–Pacific Region

Over half the world's population lives in the Asia–Pacific region. In 2000, Asia hosted 53 million out of the world's 191 million migrants (UNDESA, 2004). Strictly speaking, the Asia–Pacific region includes the Gulf oil states, Turkey and the rest of the Middle East. However, that area is covered in Chapter 7, so this Chapter will be concerned mainly with South Asia (the Indian subcontinent), East Asia and South-East Asia. Also part of the Asia–Pacific region is Oceania: Australia, New Zealand and many Pacific islands. Some aspects of this subregion will be discussed here, and others in the chapters on highly developed immigration countries.

In the 1970s and 1980s international migration from Asia grew dramatically. The main destinations were North America, Australia and the oil economies of the Middle East. Since the 1990s, the major growth has been in migration within Asia, particularly from less developed countries with massive labour surpluses to fast-growing newly industrializing countries (NICs). The international movements are often linked to internal migration. Skeldon has shown the complexity of the relationship between internal and international migration, and argued that both should be analysed as a reaction to the penetration of external forces such as colonialism and globalization (Skeldon, 1997, 2006a) (as discussed in Chapter 3). India is experiencing large-scale internal migration and urbanization. In China, massive flows from rural areas in the centre and west to the new industrial areas of the east (especially Beijing, Shanghai and the Pearl River Delta) have created a 'floating population' of 100–150 million people. Indonesia's *transmigrasi* programme has shifted about 1.7 million families from densely populated Java to more sparsely populated islands like Sumatra, Sulawesi and Irian Jaya since 1969 (Tirtosudarmo, 2001: 211). Other countries in the region are undergoing similar changes.

Forced internal displacement is also a major problem (Cohen and Deng, 1998): in 2006, there were 3 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Asia – not including the 2.7 million in the Middle East (IDMC, 2007: 43). The main causes were conflict, violence or human rights abuses. Millions more are displaced by development projects, such as large dams, while others flee environmental change and natural disasters, like volcanoes and floods. In some places, vulnerable groups (especially indigenous peoples or ethnic minorities) may experience multiple types, as in Sri Lanka, where people have been repeatedly displaced by large dam projects, civil war and

then the 2004 tsunami. Internal migration will not be dealt with here, but it is important to realize that it is often the first step in a process that leads to international movement.

Asian governments seek to control migration strictly, and migrants' rights are often very limited. Policy-makers encourage temporary labour migration, but prohibit family reunion and permanent settlement. Most migration in the region is temporary, although trends towards long-term stay are becoming evident in some cases. However, strict entry controls may (as in other parts of the world) prove counterproductive, leading to increased irregular migration, and even to unplanned settlement, as irregular migrants prefer to stay on rather than run the risks of multiple border crossings (Hugo, 2005).

The development of Asian migration

Asian migration is not new: westward movements from Central Asia helped shape European history in the Middle Ages, while Chinese migration to South-East Asia goes back centuries. In the colonial period, millions of indentured workers were recruited, often by force (see Chapter 4). Chinese settlers in South-East Asian countries (Sinn, 1998) and South Asians in Africa became trading minorities with an important intermediary role for colonialism. This often led to hostility – and even mass expulsions – after independence. However, it also helped create the ethnic networks that encouraged more recent migrations (IOM, 2000b: 69). In the nineteenth century there was considerable migration from China and Japan to the USA, Canada and Australia. In all three countries, discriminatory legislation was enacted to prevent these movements.

Migration from Asia was low in the early part of the twentieth century owing to restrictive policies by immigration countries and colonial powers. However, movements within Asia continued, often connected with political struggles. Japan recruited 40,000 workers from its then colony, Korea, between 1921 and 1941. Japan also made extensive use of forced labour in World War II. Some 25 million people migrated from densely populated Chinese provinces to Manchuria between the 1890s to the 1930s, with about 8 million staying on 'to reaffirm China's national territory in the face of Japanese expansionism' (Skeldon, 2006a: 23). In the often violent mass population transfers following Indian Independence in 1947, about 5 million Hindus and Sikhs left Pakistan for India and about 6 million Muslims moved into Pakistan from India (Khadria, 2008).

External movements started to grow from the 1960s. The reasons were complex (Fawcett and Cariño, 1987; Skeldon, 1992: 20–22). Discriminatory rules against Asian entries were repealed in Canada (1962 and 1976), the USA (1965) and Australia (1966 and 1973). Increased foreign investment and trade helped create the communicative networks needed for migration. The US military presence in Korea, Vietnam and other Asian countries


forged transnational links, as well as directly stimulating movement in the shape of brides of US personnel. The Vietnam War caused large-scale refugee movements. The openness of the USA, Canada and Australia to family migration meant that primary movements, whatever their cause, gave rise to further entries of permanent settlers. The huge construction projects in the Gulf oil countries caused mass recruitment of temporary contract workers. Rapid economic growth in several Asian countries led to movements of both highly skilled and unskilled workers.

Asia's massive entry onto the world migration stage in the mid-twentieth century can be seen as the result of the opening up of the continent to economic and political relationships with the industrialized countries in the postcolonial period. Western penetration through trade, aid and investment created the material means and the cultural capital necessary for migration. At the same time, the dislocation of existing forms of production and social structures through industrialization, the 'green revolution' and wars (often encouraged by major powers as part of the Cold War) forced people to leave the countryside in search of better conditions in the growing cities or overseas. Later on, the rapid industrial takeoff of some areas and the continuing stagnation or decline of others created new pressures for migration.

In the early twenty-first century, there were some 6.1 million Asians employed outside their own countries within the Asian region, and about 8.7 million in the Middle East. Hugo estimates that there may be over 20 million Asian migrant workers worldwide (Hugo, 2005). Over the last 30 years, migration has grown in volume and become much more diverse. The Asian financial crisis of 1997–1999 caused only a temporary slow-down (Abella, 2002). Economic migrants can be found at all skill levels, with flows of highly qualified personnel from, to and within the region. Feminization of migration is another important trend (Huang et al., 2005), while family reunion is increasing, and refugee movements continue. Emigration for employment from countries within the region has grown at about 6 per cent a year over the last two decades, with about 2.6 million people leaving their homes in search of work each year (ILO, 2006: 37).

All countries in the region experience both emigration and immigration (and often transit migration too), but it is possible to differentiate between mainly immigration countries (Brunei, Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan), countries with both significant immigration and emigration (Malaysia, Thailand), and mainly emigration countries (Bangladesh, Burma, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Laos, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Vietnam) (Hugo, 2005: 8). (Official names for some countries differ from customary usage. We use Taiwan for what the UN refers to as Chinese Taipei, and Hong Kong for what became the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) of China in 1997. The Republic of Korea (South Korea) is called Korea, unless there is any risk of confusion with North Korea. We use Burma, rather than Myanmar.)

Map 6.1 Migrations within and from the Asia-Pacific region



Note: The arrow dimensions give an approximate indication of the volume of flows. Exact figures are often unavailable.

In this chapter, we will examine the main Asian migration systems: movement to Western countries, contract labour to the Middle East, intra-Asian labour migration, movement of highly skilled workers, student mobility and refugee movements. Most of these movements include substantial irregular migration. This often takes the form of tourist visa-holders overstaying their permits, but smuggling and trafficking of people are also frequent. Hugo quotes estimates of irregular migrants in SE Asia countries in the early 2000s totalling about 3.8 million (Hugo, 2005: 22), although this figure is very approximate.

Asian migration to Western Europe, North America and Oceania

Three European countries experienced large Asian migrations connected with decolonization: the Netherlands from the former Netherlands East Indies (Indonesia); France from Vietnam; and Britain from the Indian subcontinent and Hong Kong. There were also some smaller movements, like those from Goa, Macau and East Timor to Portugal. Such movements had declined considerably by the late 1970s. In the 1980s, Vietnamese workers were recruited by the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic. Although often called trainees, these migrants shared many of the characteristics of contract workers. After German reunification in 1990, many stayed on, often moving into small business, sometimes initially in illicit cigarette trading, and then in more mainstream enterprises.

Most Asian migrants are in the traditional immigration countries (USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand), but a recent trend is the growth of Asian migration to Europe: China, India, Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam and Thailand are all significant sources (OECD, 2007: 40). The migrants include medical and information technology personnel, female domestic workers (especially in Southern Europe), and manual workers (often moving irregularly). Censuses in OECD countries around 2000 showed the presence of around 2 million migrants (aged 15 and over) from China and a similar number from India, making up about 5.5 per cent of all immigrants in OECD countries (OECD, 2007: 44).

The largest Asian movement was that to the USA after the 1965 Immigration Act. The number of migrants from Asia increased from 17,000 in 1965 to an average of more than 250,000 annually in the 1980s (Arnold et al., 1987) and over 350,000 per year in the early 1990s (OECD, 1995: 236). Most Asians came to the USA through the family reunion provisions of the 1965 Act, though refugee or skilled worker movements were often the first link in the migratory chain. Since 1992, Asia has been the source of about one-third of all immigrants, and by March 2000 there were over 7 million residents of Asian origin. In 2005, India was the second largest source of new immigrants, with 84,700 (following Mexico with 161,400). China came third with 70,000, while the Philippines, Vietnam and Korea were also among the top 10 source countries (OECD, 2007: 316).

Asian immigration to Australia developed after the repeal of the White Australia Policy, with additional stimulus from the Indo-Chinese refugee movement at the end of the 1970s. Among Australia's top 10 source countries in 2005 were China (third after New Zealand and the UK), India, the Philippines, Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Hong Kong (OECD, 2007: 303). The 2001 Census put the Asia-born population at over 1.2 million (about a quarter of all immigrants), while 2005 estimates put the Asian-born at about 7 per cent of the total population of 20.1 million (Migration Information Source, 2007a).

In Canada, it was the 1976 Immigration Act, with its nondiscriminatory selection criteria and its emphasis on family and refugee entry, which opened the door to Asian migration. Since 1993, over half of all immigrants have come from Asia. In 2005, the top four source countries for new entrants were China, India, the Philippines and Pakistan, followed by the USA (OECD, 2007: 239). By the 2001 Census, the roughly 2.1 million residents of Asian origin made up over a third of the total immigrant population of 5.6 million (Migration Information Source, 2007b).

New Zealand also abandoned its traditional racially selective entry policies. From the 1950s, economic and political links with nearby Pacific islands gave rise to new inflows (Trlin, 1987). From 1991, policies encouraged immigration of people with professional skills and capital for investment. Most of these came from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea and Japan (Lidgard, 1996: 6). In 2005, China was the second largest source country (after the UK). India, Korea and Philippines were also in the top 10, as were the Pacific islands of Samoa, Fiji and Tonga (OECD, 2007: 273). New Zealand's ethnic composition has become more complex: by 2001, Maori people had grown to 14.7 per cent of the total population of 3.6 million. Pacific Islanders made up 6.5 per cent and Asians 6.6 per cent (Ministry of Social Development, 2006). This has led to heated public debates and electoral campaigns focusing on immigration policy (IOM, 2000b: 282–283).

Migrations from Asia to North America and Oceania have certain common features. Unexpectedly large movements have developed mainly through use of family reunion provisions. The countries of origin have become more diverse. Vietnamese and other Indo-Chinese refugees were a dominant flow in the 1970s and 1980s; Hong Kong became a major source in the run-up to incorporation into China in 1997, although there has been some return migration since. Movements from these countries continue and have been joined by flows from the Philippines, India, Japan and Korea. The most important trend is the growth in migration from China. All the immigration countries have changed their rules to encourage entry of skilled and business migrants. A global labour market for highly skilled personnel has emerged, with Asia as the main source.

Contract labour migration to the Middle East

Labour migration from Asia to the Middle East developed rapidly after the oil price rises of 1973. Labour was imported by oil-rich countries first

from India and Pakistan, then from the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand and Korea, and later from Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. In the 1970s, most migrants were male workers employed as manual workers in the many construction projects. Governments of sending countries like India, Pakistan and the Philippines actively marketed their labour abroad, and made labour-supply agreements with Gulf countries. Korean construction companies were encouraged to take on contracts in the Arab region, which included provision of labour. The Asian labour-sending countries also allowed private agencies to organize recruitment (Abella, 1995).

By 1985, there were 3.2 million Asian workers in the Gulf states, but the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf War in 1990–1991 led to the forced return of some 450,000 Asians to their countries of origin. After the war, recruitment of Asian workers increased again, partly due to reconstruction needs but also through the replacement of 'politically unreliable' Palestinians in Kuwait and Yemenis in Saudi Arabia (Abella, 1995). Israel began to recruit Thais and Filipinos for agriculture, construction and domestic work, after security measures blocked entry of Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza.

The temporary decline of the construction sector after 1985 encouraged more diverse employment of contract workers, particularly a shift into services. There was an upsurge in demand for domestic workers, nurses, sales staff and other service personnel, leading to a marked feminization of migrant labour flows, with Sri Lanka and Indonesia as the main sources. In later years, other countries in the Middle East – Lebanon, Jordan and Israel – also became labour-importing countries (Asis, 2008). Women domestic workers are highly vulnerable to exploitation and sexual abuse, and it is difficult for the authorities of their countries of origin to provide protection (Gamburd, 2005). The governments of Bangladesh, Iran, Nepal and Pakistan banned some types of female migration to the Gulf, but found the ban impossible to enforce, due to the activities of illegal recruitment agents. The bans have mostly been lifted, although some limitations remain – especially in the case of Pakistan and Bangladesh. Only Sri Lanka actively encourages female migration to the Gulf (IOM, 2005: 110).

Asian migration to the Middle East has become more differentiated over time. While many migrants remain low-skilled labourers, others have semi-skilled or skilled jobs as drivers, mechanics or building tradesmen. Others came with professional or para-professional qualifications (engineers, nurses and medical practitioners). Many managerial and technical posts are filled by Asians, although sometimes they come second in job hierarchies to senior personnel recruited in Europe or North America. In many cases, Asian labour migrants were not part of the unemployed rural and urban poor at home, but people with above-average education, whose departure could have a negative effect on the economy (Skeldon, 1992: 38).

Labour demand is the key driver of migration. The small national labour forces of the six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are concentrated in the public sector, leaving huge gaps in the private

sector. The result is extreme dependence on foreign labour. By the late 1990s, Saudi Arabia, with a population of 20 million, had a foreign labour share of 28 per cent. The smaller GCC states had even higher foreign shares: Kuwait 65 per cent, Bahrain 37 per cent, Qatar 77 per cent, United Arab Emirates (UAE) 73 per cent and Oman 27 per cent. As flows became more diverse, undocumented migration grew sharply (IOM, 2000b: 107–115). Around 2002, Asian workers in the Middle East were estimated at 3 million Indians, 1 million Pakistanis, 1.8 million Bangladeshis, 0.9 million Sri Lankans, 1.5 million Filipinos and 0.4 million Indonesians (Hugo, 2005: 10).

The strategy of the Gulf states from the 1970s to the 1990s was to recruit the labour needed for accelerated capital investment through rigid contract (or guestworker) systems. These had strict rules designed to prevent long-term residence and family reunion (Abella, 1995). Yet structural dependence on migrant labour and the desire of employers to retain trained workers make it hard to completely prevent longer-term stay. Moreover, the strikes and demonstrations by migrant workers in Dubai in early 2006 (BBC News, 2006) show the difficulty of permanently suppressing worker rights. From the late 1990s, Gulf states introduced strategies to reduce dependence on Asian labour, through recruitment of local workers, restricting new entries, and deporting irregular migrants. The completion of some large construction projects was a further factor reducing labour inflows (especially of male manual workers) (IOM, 2005: 105).

Asians in Arab countries encounter difficult conditions, due both to the lack of worker rights and the very different cultural values. Workers are not allowed to settle or bring in dependants, and are often segregated in barracks. Employers may retain migrants' passports, and sometime trade (illegally) in work visas. Migrants can be deported for misconduct and often have to work very long hours. The big attraction is the wages: unskilled workers from Sri Lanka can earn eight times more in the Middle East than at home, while Bangladeshis earn 13 times more (IOM, 2000b: 119). Many migrant workers are exploited by agents and brokers, who take large fees (up to 25 per cent of wages) and often fail to provide the jobs and conditions promised.

Labour migration within Asia

Since the mid-1980s, rapid economic growth and declining fertility have led to strong demand for labour in the new industrial economies of East and South-East Asia. Labour migration within Asia grew exponentially in the first half of the 1990s. There was some return migration during the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1999, but labour migration resumed quickly. While existing flows from countries like Bangladesh, Indonesia and the Philippines continued, new source countries like Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Burma became more significant. In all the 'tiger economies',

migrant workers are doing the '3D jobs' (dirty, dangerous and difficult – or just low-skilled and poorly paid) that nationals can increasingly afford to reject. It is impossible to deal in detail here with the complex experience of each Asian country. Instead we will discuss some general trends and look briefly at a number of countries.

The most obvious trend is the increase in intra-Asian labour migration. However, in relative terms, the contribution to labour forces in receiving countries is still quite low: Asian migrant workers make up 40–70 per cent of the workforce in Gulf states, but only about 4 per cent in East and South-East Asia. In Japan, for instance, fewer than 2 per cent of all employees are migrants. However, the situation is different in Singapore and Malaysia, where migrants make up 28 and 12 per cent of the respective workforces (ILO, 2006: 40). Another important trend is increasing diversity: early flows were mainly low-skilled. In recent years flows of the highly skilled have increased throughout the region, and demand for health and care workers is increasing.

Feminization of migration

A key recent development is the feminization of migration (IOM, 2005: 109–110). There was little female labour migration in Asia before the late 1970s. Then demand for female domestic workers surged, first in the Middle East, and, from the 1990s, within Asia. In 2004, 81 per cent of registered new migrant workers leaving Indonesia were women (ILO, 2007). The main official flows from Indonesia were to Malaysia and Saudi Arabia; in the former women were only in a slight majority, while in the latter they outnumbered men 12 to one (Hugo, 2005). The female share among first-time migrant workers from the Philippines rose from 50 per cent in 1992 to 61 per cent in 1998 (Go, 2002: 66), and to 72 per cent by 2006 (ILO, 2007).

Most migrant women are concentrated in jobs regarded as 'typically female': domestic workers, entertainers (often a euphemism for prostitutes), restaurant and hotel staff and assembly-line workers in clothing and electronics. These jobs offer poor pay, conditions and status, and are associated with patriarchal stereotypes of female docility, obedience and willingness to give personal service. Demand for caregivers is likely to be a major factor in the future, due to population ageing in many destination countries. Female migration has considerable effects on family and community dynamics in the place of origin. Married women have to leave their children in the care of others, and long absences affect relationships and gender roles. The increase in domestic service reflects the growth of dual-career professional households in Asia's new industrial countries.

Another form of female migration is for marriage. Asian women moved as brides of US servicemen from the 1940s – first from Japan, then Korea and then Vietnam. From the 1980s, a new phenomenon emerged: so-called

'mail order' brides to Europe and Australia (Cahill, 1990). Since the 1990s, foreign brides have been sought by farmers in rural areas of Japan and Taiwan, due to the exodus of local women to more attractive urban settings. This is one of the few forms of permanent immigration permitted in Asia. The young women involved (from the Philippines, Vietnam and Thailand) can experience severe social isolation (IOM, 2000b: 65).

By the early twenty-first century, marriage migration to Korea was increasing, and brides for Indian men were being recruited in Bangladesh. Chinese farmers called for wives from Vietnam, Laos and Burma – China's one-child policy has led to severe gender imbalances, with 118 male versus 100 female births (IOM, 2005: 112). International marriages accounted for almost 14 per cent of all marriages in Korea in 2005, with even higher percentages in rural areas. Marriages are often arranged by agencies (OECD, 2007: 260). By 2003, 32 per cent of brides in Taiwan were from the Chinese mainland or other countries, and births to immigrant mothers made up 13 per cent of all births (Skeldon, 2006b: 281). This has important cultural implications: the countryside is frequently seen as the cradle of traditional values, and the high proportion of foreign mothers is seen by some as a threat to national identity.

Migration agents and irregular migration

A further feature of Asian labour migration is the major role played by the 'migration industry'. Most recruitment of migrant workers both to the Gulf and within Asia is organized by migration agents and labour brokers:

This scheme has given rise to irregularities and abuses at all stages of the migration process, exacting costs on migrants and their families. Excessive placement fees, contract substitutions, contract violations, low wages, non-payment of wages are widespread, especially among women migrants in domestic work and entertainment. Unauthorized migrants and trafficked persons are rendered more vulnerable because they are seen as immigration violators and have limited or no access to support and redress of grievances. (Asis, 2005: 18)

According to an ILO study: 'the high degree of commercialization of migration processes in Asia not found in other regions explains the rapid expansion and relative efficiency of the system. But there have been serious problems with fraud and abuse, making migration a costly and risky undertaking' (ILO, 2006: 43). The dominance of private agents is partly due to the unwillingness of receiving states to make bilateral agreements on labour-supply with countries of origin. Where the latter try to set minimum wages for their nationals, these workers may be priced out of the market.

While some agents carry out legitimate activities, others deceive and exploit workers. There is sometimes no clear division between organizations

providing legitimate recruitment and travel services, and those indulging in people-smuggling or trafficking (IOM, 2005: 112–114). *Smuggling* means helping migrants obtain illegal entry to a state, by assisting in transportation and border crossing. People-smuggling organizations sometimes include former migrants and officials of both sending and receiving countries, as well as middlemen along the route, and may be motivated by the desire to help migrants, as well as by profit. *Trafficking* involves the use of violence, coercion or deception to exploit workers, treating people as commodities to be traded (compare ILO, 2006: 42). Trafficking may involve forcing both men and women into new forms of slavery, but applies particularly to providing women and children for the sex industry. Trafficking often involves organized criminal gangs (see Chapter 8 below).

Irregular (or undocumented) migration has grown rapidly and affects many countries in the region. Labour flows from Indonesia to Malaysia have been largely undocumented. Thai workers move irregularly to Malaysia and other countries for work, while Thailand itself hosts up to 1.7 million undocumented workers, mainly from Burma (IOM, 2005: 110–112). Hugo points to the complexity of irregular migration, arguing that there is a continuum from voluntary individual movement, through use of middlemen, to trafficking and bonded labour (Hugo, 2005: 25). The growth of irregular migration is linked to the unwillingness of governments to effectively manage migration and to the desire of employers for easily available and exploitable workers. Spontaneous undocumented migration can meet labour needs effectively, but creates a situation of insecurity and rightlessness for workers. Moreover, they can become scapegoats for social problems like crime, disease and unemployment. Recently, governments' enhanced desire to combat drug trafficking and terrorism has led to attempts at multilateral cooperation to prevent irregular migration (IOM, 2005: 111–112).

Length of stay

As already pointed out, intra-Asian migration is perceived by policy-makers as temporary labour migration, and is not expected to lead to settlement. This understanding matches the wishes of the main actors. Employers want low-skilled workers to meet immediate labour needs. Many migrant workers wish to work abroad for a limited period to improve the situation of their families at home. Sending-country governments do not want to lose nationals permanently. Ideas from Europe, North America or Oceania on the benefits of multiculturalism are unpopular in most Asian countries, while turning immigrants into citizens is unthinkable. The dominant policy in Asian countries can be summed up in the principles: immigration is not good for the nation-state and should only be a temporary expedient; migration policies should be concerned mainly with restriction not

migration management; immigrants should not be allowed to settle; foreign residents should not normally be offered citizenship; national culture and identity should not be modified in response to external influences (see Castles, 2004b; Hugo, 2005). A key question for the future is whether this exclusionary model can be sustained. We will return to this below.

East Asia

In East Asia the combination of rapid economic growth, fertility decline, ageing populations and growing undocumented migration has led to serious contradictions, most evident in Japan, but also emerging in Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and China (the latter will be discussed below in the section on countries of emigration).

Japan has experienced considerable and varied labour immigration since the mid-1980s. The foreign population of Japan increased from 817,000 in 1983 to 2 million in 2005 (OECD, 2007: 349). About 39 per cent are permanent residents (MOJ, 2006), mainly descendants of Koreans, who were recruited (sometimes by force) as workers before and during World War II. In 2005 there were 599,000 Koreans. Other main groups, mainly resulting from more recent labour migration, were Chinese (520,000), Brazilians (302,000), Filipinos (187,000) and Peruvians (58,000) (OECD, 2007). However, government policies and public attitudes remain opposed to recruitment of foreign labour and to long-term stay, for fear of diluting the perceived ethnic homogeneity of the population. In view of the continuing inflows, this policy leads to considerable strains.

Korea exported labour to the Gulf in the 1970s and 1980s, but has since passed through a migration transition: by 1995, the GDP per capita was US\$10,000 and labour departures had fallen sharply. In 1994 the government introduced the 'industrial trainee system' as a disguised framework for import of low-skilled labour. 'Trainees' did not enjoy the legal rights of workers and were paid below the minimum wage. In a situation of labour scarcity, trainees left their posts and found irregular work, with better pay and conditions. In response, the Korean Government introduced an employment permit system in 2004, which gives migrants the same rights and treatment on the labour market as Koreans, including the right to change jobs. However, permits are only for three years, and only from countries with which Korea has bilateral agreements (China plus several South-east and Central Asian countries). An amnesty gave legal status to existing irregular workers (IOM, 2005; OECD, 2007: 260). Korea's foreign resident population of 485,000 surpassed 1 per cent of total population for the first time in 2005. Apart from migrant workers, this includes foreign brides (see above) and Chinese of Korean ethnic origin. The government set up a Foreigner Policy Commission in 2006 to address discrimination against foreigners, seen as a source of potential social conflict. Legal measures are planned to regulate marriage agents and to allow entry and

employment of ethnic Koreans with Chinese nationality (OECD, 2007). Such measures represent major shifts for a country very concerned about ethnic homogeneity.

Between the 1950s and reunification with China in 1997, *Hong Kong* was transformed from a labour-intensive industrial economy to a postindustrial economy based on trade, services and investment. Highly qualified expatriate workers from North America, Western Europe and India were recruited for finance, management and education. Unskilled workers from China entered illegally in large numbers. Due to fears about reunification, many highly skilled Hong Kong workers emigrated to the USA, Canada and Australia in the 1990s (Skeldon, 1994), though many returned once they had gained overseas residence rights or citizenship (Pe-Pua et al., 1996). After reunification, Hong Kong became a Special Administrative Region (SAR) with its own laws and institutions. The 2006 Census showed a total population of 6.9 million, of whom 60 per cent were Hong Kong-born, 34 per cent born elsewhere in China and 6 per cent in other countries (HKCSD, 2007). Low-skilled workers from the Mainland are not admitted to Hong Kong, but some 380,000 mainlanders were allowed in from 1997–2004 through family reunion provisions – nearly all women and children. Most of the women are employed as cleaners and restaurant workers (Sze, 2007). In October 2005, there were 223,394 foreign maids in Hong Kong, 53 per cent from the Philippines, 43 per cent from Indonesia and 2 per cent from Thailand. Foreign maids are guaranteed the minimum wage, but have limited-duration permits, and are not permitted to change jobs (HKG, 2006).

Taiwan introduced a foreign labour policy in 1992, permitting recruitment of migrant workers for occupations with severe labour shortages. Duration of employment was limited to two years. Workers came mainly from Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia. Most recruitment was carried out by labour brokers. Many workers stay on illegally after two years, or change jobs to get higher wages and to escape repayments to brokers (Lee and Wang, 1996). Today, statistics vary widely: official figures show 322,771 legal workers in 2005 (Skeldon, 2006b: 279), while Hugo quotes an estimate of 600,000 foreign workers in total for 2004 (Hugo, 2005: 10). The Taiwanese Government has signed labour agreements with Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, Mongolia and the Philippines, in an effort to regulate the activities of recruitment agencies. However, the complex network of agencies spanning Taiwan and the origin countries adds greatly to the costs of recruitment (Skeldon, 2006b: 290).

South-East Asia

South-East Asia is characterized by enormous ethnic, cultural and religious diversity, as well as by considerable disparities in economic development.

Governments of immigration countries are concerned about maintaining complex ethnic balances, and combating possible threats to security.

Singapore is a country lacking in natural resources, which has successfully built a first-world economy through specialization in modern service industries. It relies heavily on import of labour at all skill levels. The 2000 Census revealed a total population of 4 million, of whom 3.3 million (81.2 per cent) were residents and 754,000 (18.8 per cent) nonresidents. Between 1990 and 2006, the nonresident workforce grew from 248,000 to 670,000 and is now nearly a third of the total workforce. About 580,000 migrants were classified as lower-skilled in 2006 (Yeoh, 2007). They come from Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, India and China. Foreign men work in construction, shipbuilding, transport and services; women are mainly in domestic and other services. The government imposes a foreign worker levy to encourage employers to invest in new technology rather than hiring migrants. However, this has led to downward pressure on migrants' wages, rather than reductions in foreign employment. Unskilled workers are not permitted to settle or to bring in their families. Migrants usually work long hours, six days a week, and live in barracks. However, the government favours entry of skilled workers and professionals and gives them a privileged status (IOM, 2000b: 82). There were 90,000 skilled-employment pass holders in 2006 (Yeoh, 2007). Such migrants – especially those of Chinese ethnicity – are encouraged to settle permanently.

Malaysia is another industrializing economy in SE Asia that has become heavily dependent on immigration. Rapid economic growth since the 1980s had made Malaysia into a 'second-wave tiger economy' with severe labour shortages, especially in the plantation sector. The estimated total foreign labour force was recently put at 2.6 million (Skeldon, 2006b), of whom nearly half are irregular workers. Due to Malaysia's complex ethnic composition, immigration has been an area of particular controversy, and successive governments have struggled to find appropriate approaches. *Thailand* became a major exporter of workers to the Gulf in the 1980s and then to Taiwan, Malaysia, Japan and Singapore in the early 1990s. Fast economic growth in the 1990s initiated a migration transition. Construction, agricultural and manufacturing jobs have attracted large numbers of workers from Burma, Cambodia, Laos and Bangladesh. Many of the Burmese are fleeing violence in their homeland and it is hard to distinguish clearly between migrant workers and refugees. Most of the migrants are irregular: Skeldon quotes estimates of 100,000 legal foreign workers in 1999–2000, and perhaps another 1 million irregulars. The total number of foreign workers in Thailand in 2004 was put at 2 million, and the Thai authorities had created a category of 'registered workers' to allow migrants who entered irregularly to work legally (Skeldon, 2006b: 285). Some Thais still go to other countries in search of work, and trafficking of Thai women for the sex industry remains a problem (Hugo, 2005: 24–25). Yet with falling fertility and fast economic growth, many Thais are no

longer willing to do 3D jobs, and Thailand's transition to an immigration country is well underway (Skeldon, 2006b: 285).

Countries of emigration

Just as the Mediterranean periphery fuelled Western European industrial expansion up to the 1970s, industrializing Asia has its own labour reserve areas: China, the South Asian countries, the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Burma have all become major labour providers for the region and indeed for the rest of the world. Asian sending-country governments have set up special departments to manage recruitment and to protect workers, such as Bangladesh's Bureau of Manpower, Employment and Training (BMET) and India's Office of the Protector of Emigrants – recently incorporated into a new Ministry for Indians Overseas. The governments of labour-sending countries see migration as economically vital, partly because they hope it will reduce unemployment and provide training and industrial experience, but mainly because of the worker remittances (see Chapter 3 above; and Hugo, 2005: 28–33). However, by the early twenty-first century, change was apparent: industrial development was spreading to new regions, and migration patterns were gaining in complexity. Some sending countries were also attracting migrants – such as highly skilled personnel or spouses – to make up for demographic imbalances.

China is a vast country with major internal migration – especially from the agricultural regions of the west and centre to the fast-industrializing eastern seaboard. With regard to international migration, China is still mainly seen as an area of emigration, with streams to North America, Europe and – most recently – Africa. The latter is strongly linked to China's emerging trading interests in countries like Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Sudan. However, it must be noted that 'the era of cheap labour in China is ending' (Skeldon, 2006b: 282). The rapid economic expansion and the sharp decline in fertility due to the one-child policy mean that China's rural labour reserves are being depleted. Labour shortages have been reported in the industrial cities of the East coast, especially for highly skilled personnel. Professional mobility from Hong Kong, Taiwan and other countries is helping to fill the gap, while emigration of workers from China continues. In the long run China may well become a significant immigration destination for economic migrants as well as brides.

India too has experienced large-scale emigration, and today the 'Indian diaspora' is estimated at around 20 million persons (including persons of Indian origin now holding other citizenships). Indians still go in large numbers to the Gulf as manual workers, and to the USA and other developed countries as highly skilled personnel (IT professionals, medical practitioners etc.). However, export of the highly skilled has been matched by return flows of skills and capital, which are contributing to the development of

modern manufacturing and service industries in some parts of India (Khadria, 2008).

The Philippines is a major emigration country. Eight million Filipinos are abroad, roughly 10 per cent of the country's 85 million people, and they are to be found all over the world. Labour export has been an official policy since the 1970s, and a 'culture of emigration' has developed, so that going abroad to work and live has become a normal expectation for many people. The Philippines has developed strong institutions to manage labour export and to maintain links with the diaspora. Nonetheless, migration is a topic of controversy within the Philippines, and it is far from clear that it has contributed to economic and social development of the country (Asis, 2008).

Highly qualified migrants and students

Most Asian migration is of low-skilled workers, but mobility of professionals, executives, technicians and other highly skilled personnel is growing. Since the 1960s, university-trained people have been moving from less developed countries in the South to take up jobs – and often to settle permanently – in North America, Oceania and Europe. This 'brain drain' can mean a serious loss of human capital in medicine, science, engineering, management and education, and be a major obstacle to development. Student migrants often already have bachelor's degrees, and go to more developed countries for graduate studies. Many of them remain there after graduation and are lost to their home countries.

However, in recent years, perceptions of skilled migration have changed, with analysts identifying potential positive effects of the international mobility of skilled personnel, based on the development of diasporas. These can be a source of remittances and investment for countries of origin, and help homeland producers gain new markets abroad. Diasporas can transmit knowledge and skills, and can facilitate temporary or permanent return of experts (see Hugo, 2005: 33–37). Today, a key debate centres on what can be done (especially by states) to minimize 'brain drain' and to facilitate 'brain circulation'. Yet policies of developed countries are still designed to attract the scarce human resources of the South. These issues were examined in Chapter 3 above. Here we will merely look at some of the Asian trends.

Country studies show substantial skill losses for Asian countries in the 1980s and 1990s. In the case of the Philippines, 40 per cent of permanent emigrants had a college education, and 30 per cent of IT workers and 60 per cent of physicians emigrated. For Sri Lanka, academically qualified professionals comprised up to one-third of outflows (Lowell et al., 2002). The opposite side of the coin is reliance on immigrant professionals in the North. The US Census showed that 4.3 million foreign-born persons were college graduates, making up 13 per cent of all college graduates in the USA. Half

of the graduates who arrived in the 1990s were from Asia, with India and China as the largest sources. Almost one-third worked in natural and social sciences, engineering and computer-related occupations. The college-educated foreign-born were almost twice as likely as the native-born to be physicians and surgeons (Batalova, 2005). Indian and Chinese IT experts played a key role in the rise of Silicon Valley. Today, European countries like the UK, Germany and France are competing with the USA, Australia and Canada to attract the highly skilled.

Another form of highly qualified migration concerns executives and experts transferred within multinational enterprises, or officials posted abroad by international organizations. Capital investment in less developed countries may be seen as an alternative to low-skilled migration to developed countries, but it leads to movements of skilled personnel in the opposite direction. China had some 200,000 foreign specialists in 2000, while Malaysia had 32,000 and Vietnam about 30,000. They came from other Asian countries, but also from the USA, Europe and Australia (Abella, 2002). Capital investment from overseas is a catalyst for socio-economic change and urbanization, while professional transients are not only agents of economic change, but also bearers of new cultural values. The links they create may encourage people from the developing country to move to the investing country in search of training or work. The returning professional transients bring new experiences and values with them, which can lead to significant changes at home.

Student mobility is often a precursor to skilled migration. Between 1998 and 2003, 2.6 million Asian students went to study in other countries. The 471,000 Chinese were the largest group, followed by South Koreans (214,000), Indians (207,000) and Japanese (191,000) (Hugo, 2005: 12). There is considerable competition among developed countries to attract fee-paying students. Many former students stay on in developed countries upon graduation, especially those with PhDs (Abella, 2002). Australia changed its immigration rules in 1999: in the past, students had to leave Australia on graduation and wait at least two years before applying to migrate to Australia. Now they are allowed to remain in the country as they pursue their immigration applications.

An important emerging trend is the growth of highly skilled mobility within Asia. Regional migration flows are becoming far more diverse, and India, Japan, Singapore, Taiwan, Korea and Malaysia are all trying hard to attract overseas professionals – either on a temporary or a permanent basis. Like Northern countries, they have introduced privileged immigration and residence regimes for this category. Often Asian countries are seeking to lure back their own diasporas – the professionals and students who left in the past when there were few opportunities at home. Taiwan has been especially successful in maintaining contacts with expatriates and drawing them back as industrialization progressed (Hugo, 2005: 35–37), and other countries are now trying to follow this example. The Chinese diaspora has been a crucial source of capital and expertise in the Chinese economic takeoff.

The changing face of skilled migration is a reflection of the major shifts taking place in Asia. For instance, the annual number of Chinese travelling abroad (for both business and tourism) shot up from less than a million in 1990 to about 15 million by 2003 (Hugo, 2005: 11). A corresponding change is the increasing quality of tertiary education within the region, with Japan, China and Korea all competing for foreign students. Fewer Chinese students are going abroad, while foreign student inflows (especially from Thailand) are increasing. Japan has had substantial growth in foreign students: by 2003, 109,508 were enrolled (IOM, 2005). North America, Oceania and Europe are beginning to lose their dominant position within the international education industry.

Refugees

At the end of 2004, UNHCR counted 3.4 million refugees in the Asia-Pacific, 33 per cent of the global total of 9.2 million. This was a substantial reduction compared with 2000, when there were 5.4 million refugees in Asia, 44 per cent of the global total of 12.1 million (UNHCR, 2006b: 213). The decline reflects a political stabilization since the latter half of the twentieth century, when Asia was affected by violent turmoil arising from colonial liberation struggles and the Cold War. In the wider sense of forced migration (see Chapter 8), millions of people are displaced by violence, disasters and development projects, but the majority remain in their own countries. Here our concern is with those who cross international boundaries. At the end of 2006, Afghanistan remained the biggest global source of refugees, with 2.1 million (21 per cent of the global refugee population) in 71 different asylum countries. Iraq came second with 1.5 million refugees, mainly in Jordan and Syria. In fact, global refugee numbers grew in 2006 for the first time since 2002, mainly due to the Iraq War (UNHCR, 2007a). However, East Asia and the Pacific were relatively peaceful compared with the Middle East and Central Asia.

Asia's three largest refugee emergencies resulted from the 1947 Partition of India, and later from the wars in Indo-China and Afghanistan. Over 3 million people fled from Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia following the end of the Vietnam War in 1975. Many left as 'boat people', sailing long distances in overcrowded small boats, at risk of shipwreck and pirate attacks. Over the next 20 years, 2.5 million found new homes elsewhere, while 0.5 million returned. Over a million were resettled in the USA, with smaller numbers in Australia, Canada and Western Europe. China accepted about 300,000 refugees, mainly of ethnic Chinese origin. Other Asian countries were unwilling to accept settlers. In 1989, a 'Comprehensive Plan of Action' was adopted by all the countries concerned. People already in the camps were to be resettled, while any new asylum seekers were to be screened to see if they were really victims of persecution. Those found to be economic migrants were to be repatriated. In 1979 Vietnam introduced

an 'Orderly Departure Programme' to permit legal emigration, particularly of people with relatives overseas. By 1995, most of the camps were closed and the emergency was considered over (UNHCR, 2000b: 79–103).

Up to a third of Afghanistan's 18 million people fled the country following the Soviet military intervention in 1979. The overwhelming majority found refuge in the neighbouring countries of Pakistan (3.3 million in 1990) and Iran (3.1 million) (UNHCR, 2000b: 119). There was hardly any official resettlement overseas. The Afghan emergency came just after the Indo-Chinese exodus, and there was little willingness in Western countries to provide homes for new waves of refugees. Moreover the *mujahedin* (Islamic armed resistance) leaders wanted to use the refugee camps as bases for recruitment and training. For political, humanitarian, religious and cultural reasons, Pakistan and Iran were willing to provide refuge for extended periods. Pakistan received substantial military, economic and diplomatic support from the USA. Iran, on the other hand, received very little external assistance, despite being one of the world's principal havens for refugees (UNHCR, 2000b: 118).

The different handling of the Vietnamese and Afghan cases is an example of the way refugee movements can become part of wider foreign policy considerations for major powers (Suhrke and Klink, 1987). With the end of the Soviet intervention in 1992, about 1.5 million Afghan refugees returned home. However, the seizure of power by the fundamentalist Taliban, a four-year drought and the devastated condition of the country delayed the return of the rest. To help fund the costs of rebuilding their villages, increasing numbers of Afghans went to work in the Gulf states, while others sought asylum in Western countries (UNHCR, 1995: 182–183).

The events of 11 September 2001 made the world aware of the consequences of protracted situations of conflict. Afghanistan had become the centre of the global Al-Qaida terrorist network. It was also the world's leading producer of heroin. The huge Afghan refugee diaspora came to be seen as one component of a threat to global security. The US-led invasion of Afghanistan was designed to destroy Al-Qaida and the Taliban, establish a legitimate government, and permit the return of the refugees. In March 2002, the Afghan Transitional Authority and UNHCR started a mass return programme. By July, more than 1.3 million Afghans had returned, 1.2 million from Pakistan and 100,000 from Iran. This unexpectedly rapid repatriation put severe strain on UNHCR finances (UNHCR, 2002). Western countries – willing to spend billions on armed intervention – were not ready to top up relief funds. Meanwhile, the governments of Australia, the UK and other Western countries began sending back Afghan asylum seekers, even though it was far from clear that conditions were safe in Afghanistan. The intensification of hostilities between the US-led forces and the Taliban from 2005 hindered further returns. Pakistan and Iran continued to host the largest refugee populations in the world – around a million each (UNHCR, 2007a).

Apart from these two huge refugee movements, there have been many exoduses smaller in numbers, but no less traumatic for those concerned. After the failure of the democracy movement in 1989, thousands of Chinese sought asylum overseas. Conflicts linked to the break-up of the former Soviet Union led to mass displacements in the 1990s affecting many new states, including Georgia, Chechnya, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Tajikistan. At least 50,000 North Koreans have fled to China. Other long-standing refugee populations include Tibetans and Bhutanese in India and Nepal, and Burmese in Thailand and Bangladesh. In 2005–2006 Muslims from both southern Thailand and southern Philippines fled to Malaysia to escape persistent internal conflict. The long civil war in Sri Lanka has led to mass internal displacement as well as refugee outflows. In 2001, an estimated 144,000 Sri Lankan Tamils were living in camps in India, while other Tamils were dispersed around the world. The resurgence of fighting in 2006 led to new displacements of some 200,000. The majority of the population of East Timor was forced to flee by violence at the time of the vote for independence in 1999. Most were able to return after the UN peacekeeping mission, but new violence forced 150,000 from their homes in 2006. The major political shifts in Indonesia after 1998 led to massive internal displacements, as well as refugee flows from areas of civil war, such as Aceh. Again, recent peace settlements have allowed many people to return (UNHCR, 2006a).

The Asian experience shows the complexity of refugee situations in situations of rapid regional change: they are hardly ever a simple matter of individual political persecution. Almost invariably, economic and environmental pressures play a major part. Refugee movements, like mass labour migration, are the result of the massive social transformations currently taking place in Asia (Van Hear, 1998). Long-standing ethnic and religious differences exacerbate conflicts and often motivate high levels of violence. Resolution of refugee-producing situations and the return home of refugees are hampered by scarcity of economic resources and lack of guarantees for human rights in weak and despotic states. Western countries have often become involved in struggles about state and nation formation in Asia, and responses to asylum seekers have been conditioned by such experiences.

Conclusions: perspectives for Asian migration

Recent Asian migration got under way through permanent settlement flows to North America, Oceania and Europe from the 1950s, and then grew rapidly from the 1970s, driven by labour demand in the Gulf region and then by rapid but uneven industrial expansion within the region. Most governments still see Asian migration primarily in economic terms – receiving countries emphasize the importance of temporary labour supplies, while sending countries look at the economic benefits of

remittances or the development potential of diasporas. But Asian migration is rapidly moving beyond purely economic impacts, and is on the way to becoming a major element of demographic, social and political change.

The early twenty-first century has been a period of growing diversity in Asian migration. Economic migrants can be found at all skill levels: the lower-skilled still migrate out of the region but increasingly also within it; many highly skilled people move to Northern countries, but increasing numbers go to other Asian countries, while expatriates from other world regions are attracted to areas of economic growth. Feminization of migration is highly significant: Asian women are in increasing demand in many occupations, while migration for the purpose of marriage is growing fast, mainly as the result of demographic change in East and South Asia. Increased length of stay of economic migrants appears to be leading to family reunion and formation. Refugee and other forced migrant populations still remain large and vulnerable.

Greater diversity also applies at the national and subregional levels. The old distinction between predominantly emigration and predominantly immigration countries is breaking down: virtually all Asian countries now experience simultaneous in- and outflows of varying types, and many have transit flows as well. Some of the labour-surplus countries of a generation ago – like Korea, Thailand and Malaysia – are now poles of attraction. Some former source countries of highly skilled migrants – notably Taiwan, but also Korea and incipiently China – have successfully reversed the brain drain, and are profiting from the skills of their returnees.

Asian migration has become much more complex, yet some general features remain. One is the lack of long-term planning: movements have been shaped not only by government labour policies, but also by the actions of employers, migrants and the migration industry. Irregular migration is very high, and agents and brokers play a major role. The weakness of migration management in some countries contrasts with the dominant Asian model of migration, based on strict control of foreign workers, prohibition of settlement and family reunion, and denial of worker rights. Asian governments refer explicitly to the European experience, in which temporary guestworkers turned into settlers and new ethnic minorities, leading to significant changes in national cultures and identities. East Asian authorities emphasize the importance of maintaining ethnic homogeneity, while South-east Asian governments wish to safeguard existing ethnic balances. Yet the globalization of migration is bringing about rapid changes and it is far from clear that Asian governments will be able to prevent unforeseen shifts.

When Western Europeans tried to reduce foreign populations in the 1970s, they found it difficult for several reasons: their economies had become structurally dependent on foreign labour, employers wanted stable labour forces, immigrants were protected by strong legal systems, and the welfare state tended to include noncitizens. Such pressures are beginning to make themselves felt in Asia too. There are signs of increasing

dependence on foreign workers for the '3D jobs' as labour force growth slows in industrializing countries and local workers reject menial tasks. In these circumstances employers seek to retain 'good workers', migrants prolong their stays, and family reunion or formation of new families in the receiving country takes place. This applies particularly when migrants have scarce skills – the privileged entry and residence rules for the highly skilled may well become a factor encouraging permanent settlement and greater cultural diversity.

The feminization of migration is likely to have important long-term effects on demographic patterns and cultural values. Trends towards democracy and the rule of law also make it hard to ignore human rights. The growth of NGOs working for migrants' rights in Japan, Malaysia and the Philippines indicates the growing strength of civil society. It therefore seems reasonable to predict that settlement and increased cultural diversity will affect many Asian labour-importing countries; yet Asian governments are just beginning to think about the need for plans to deal with long-term effects of migration.

Despite the rapid growth, movements are still quite small in comparison with Asia's vast population. Migrant workers make up a far smaller proportion of the labour force in countries like Japan and Korea than in European countries (although the proportion is large in Singapore and Malaysia). However, the potential for growth is obvious. The fast-growing economies of East and South-east Asia seem certain to pull in large numbers of migrant workers in the future. This may have far-reaching social and political consequences. The twenty-first century has been dubbed the 'Pacific century' in terms of economic and political development, but it will also be an epoch of rapidly growing migration and population diversity in the Asian region.

Guide to further reading

Asia is half the world and generalizations are extremely difficult. Our account here is inevitably fragmented and superficial. *The Age of Migration website* www.age-of-migration.com includes additional text 6.1 on the situation of foreign maids in Singapore and provides brief case studies of the migration experiences of Japan (6.2), Malaysia (6.3) and the Philippines (6.4).

Literature on Asian migration has grown exponentially in the last few years, yet there still seems to be no single work that provides a comprehensive treatment. Overview articles by Asis (2005), Hugo (2005) and Skeldon (2006b) are a useful beginning, and the IOM *World Migration Reports* (e.g. IOM, 2005) have useful regional overviews. The publications of the Scalabrini Migration Center (Quezon City, Philippines) (<http://www.smc.org.ph/Cuerpo.htm>) provide ongoing and varied sources of information and analysis, especially the *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal* (APMJ).

and the magazine, *Asian Migrant*. The Asia Pacific Migration Research Network (<http://apmrn.anu.edu.au>) is useful for contacts and information. Appleyard (1998) is good on emigration from South Asia. Huang et al. (2005) is very useful on domestic work and more generally on female migration. On Japan, Komai (1995), Mori (1997) and Weiner and Hanami (1998) provide good studies in English. The chapters on Japan and Korea in Cornelius et al. (2004) present useful summaries. For most other countries, journal articles are still the best sources.

Migration in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, and Latin America

Most global population growth in coming decades will occur in the three regions covered in this chapter, together with Asia (Chamie, 2007). Nevertheless, much of North Africa and Mexico are going through demographic transitions resulting in plummeting birth rates which will likely reduce the levels of future emigration. International migration involving each of the three regions has become more varied, complex and politically and diplomatically relevant in recent decades. The following sections can only highlight the key historical and contemporary patterns, though the six key trends demarcating the age of migration, presented in Chapter 1, are amply evidenced in each of them.

Sub-Saharan Africa: mobility within the continent and beyond

Africans are a global people. Every human being can trace his or her genetic roots to the first humans who migrated from Tanzania's Great Rift Valley up to 200,000 years ago. Some historical and contemporary studies claim that Africa – with 25 percent of the world's landmass and 10 percent of its total population – is the continent with the world's most mobile population (Curtin, 1997). Although the evidence for such claims is far from conclusive, they help shape current perceptions of Africa as a 'continent on the move', which have given rise to myths of mass illegal flows across the Sahara and the Mediterranean to Europe. In fact the great majority of African migrants move within the continent. Flows to Europe have increased, but are still quite small compared with intracontinental movements (Bakewell and de Haas, 2007).

In precolonial times, frequent migrations resulted from the ancient traditions of small ethnic groups whose primary sustenance came from hunting, gathering, agriculture and pastoralism. As these lifestyles were tied closely to the whims of nature, people had to relocate whenever herds moved in search of grazing, vegetation was lacking, or land lost fertility. More permanent migrations were driven by warfare, population growth and economic factors. One of the greatest migrations in human history was

that of the Bantu people, who left the area now encompassing Nigeria and Cameroon and formed settlements throughout the entire southern half of the continent, bringing their languages and joining with indigenous groups along the way. Beginning in the sixteenth century, 400 years of the Atlantic slave trade resulted in upwards of 15 million forced migrants from the continent, and the legacies of European colonialism laid the groundwork for many of the migration patterns that followed.

Today, some groups maintain traditional ways of life that include seasonal and cyclical mobility for pastoralism and agriculture. But, increasingly, migration is driven by economic, political and social change (Mafukidze, 2006). Millions of people move within their own states in search of work or better living conditions. Others are displaced internally by violence or persecution. Many Africans move across international borders as migrant workers, professionals, refugees or as family members of all of these categories. Both internal and international movements are often, at the same time, rural–urban migration. However, migration of Africans is becoming more globalized. Whereas the population of Europe was three times that of Africa in 1950, the two were roughly equal by 2007. Africa's population is expected to triple that of Europe by the year 2050 (Chamie, 2007). Flows to Europe and beyond have become major political themes, even though they are far lower in volume than migrations within the continent.

In 2006, 39 of the world's 50 least developed countries were in Africa (UNDP, 2006). With over 70 percent of citizens in some states living on less than the equivalent of \$1US per day, migration has become a way to escape crushing poverty. In 2005, there were an estimated 17 million international migrants in Africa (ECOSOC, 2006). Refugees represented 18 percent of international migrants (approximately 3 million), a higher proportion than in any other continent (UNFPA, 2006). The number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) was estimated at over 11 million throughout sub-Saharan Africa in 2006 (IDMC, 2006). (Categories of forced migration are discussed in Chapter 8 below.)

It is very difficult to acquire reliable data on African migrants (especially forced migrants). Some states have never conducted a proper census, many individuals possess no identification documentation, and laws regarding immigration, emigration, and citizenship vary considerably. For example, the Ivory Coast views children born of immigrants within its borders as immigrants, whereas many other African countries would find such a child to be a citizen due to the place of birth (Kress, 2006).

In this section we will discuss migration affecting sub-Saharan Africa, while North Africa will be examined in the next section, along with the Middle East. However, it should be noted that recent scholarship is questioning the idea that the African continent is split in two by the Sahara:

Throughout known history, there has been intensive population mobility between both sides of the Sahara through the trans-Saharan (caravan)

trade, conquest, pilgrimage, and religious education. The Sahara itself is a huge transition zone, and the diverse ethnic composition of Saharan oases testifies to this long history of population mobility. (Bakewell and de Haas, 2007: 96)

Today, ancient caravan routes are once again migration routes as many Africans cross the Sahara. However, for many, the final destination is Libya, Egypt or Morocco, and only a minority seek to move on across the Mediterranean.

Colonial roots of migration


African mobility has been shaped in many ways by colonial practices. The nineteenth-century 'cutting of the African cake' into politico-administrative entities often imposed arbitrary borders, dividing established African nations. As a result, members of a single ethnic group could become citizens of two or more states and most African societies included members of several ethnic groups. Many individuals continued to regularly cross colonial boundaries. Today, African states often have very porous borders.

The colonial period brought European administrators and farmers throughout the continent, as well as Syro-Lebanese merchants to West Africa, and merchants and labourers from the Indian subcontinent to East and Southern Africa. In the postindependence period, these populations generally became privileged but vulnerable minorities, often with a key role in trade. In the 1970s, Ugandan residents of Indian origin were expelled by the Idi Amin regime, eventually finding refuge in the UK. In Sierra Leone, individuals of Lebanese descent whose families have been in the country for generations are still not allowed to vote because they are not African by bloodline (USDS, 2006).

Colonialism was always concerned with control of mobility, in order to provide African labour for European-owned plantations and mines (Bakewell, 2007). Colonial labour recruitment was based on temporary migration, since permanent concentrations were seen as a potential threat to order, yet colonialism in fact started processes of rapid urbanization that continue today. In 2007, cities in sub-Saharan Africa were growing at a rate of 4.6 percent annually. By 2030, it is estimated that 54 percent of Africans will live in cities due to migration from rural areas (UN-HABITAT, 2007). The growth of cities has resulted in increased populations of slum dwellers, homeless people, and the impoverished. Extreme poverty coupled with high population density has fostered the spread of diseases in cities.

Outflows of intercontinental migrants, mainly to Western Europe, have traditionally been to former colonial powers, such as Congolese emigrating to Belgium, Senegalese to France or Nigerians to the UK. In the 1990s, the transition from white minority to black majority rule in Southern Africa resulted in an exodus of whites, mirroring the outpourings of the

Map 7.1 Migrations within and from Africa



Note: The arrow dimensions give an approximate indication of the volume of flows. Exact figures are often unavailable.

1960s during the independence era. A quarter of a million white South Africans have emigrated since the end of Apartheid in 1994; however, the Republic of South Africa remains home to 80 percent of the continent's 5 million whites (SAMP, 2005). Such emigration has had serious economic consequences, as whites played key roles in agriculture, business, and government.

Forced migration

Most African countries experience both economic and forced migration. In some regions, forced migration has been the main form of mobility, as a result of long-drawn-out and recurring wars, both internal and external. This has applied throughout the postcolonial period to the Horn of Africa, East Africa, the Great Lakes Region and Central Africa – especially the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In West Africa and Southern Africa, economic migration has predominated most of the time, but with large refugee flows during the liberation wars in Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe and South Africa from the 1960s to the 1990s, and during civil wars in Nigeria in the 1960s and in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire in the 1990s and the early 2000s (Mafukidze, 2006).

During the period of colonial liberation, millions of people fled brutal conflicts with colonial powers reluctant to relinquish control (Algeria, Kenya, Congo, etc.) or with white settler groups determined to cling to their privileges (e.g. Zimbabwe, South Africa). Yet, the defeat of old-style colonialism and the establishment of independent states often did not mean a return to peaceful conditions. During the Cold War, East and West fought proxy wars in Africa. Political and economic pressures, arms supplies, mercenaries and even direct military intervention were factors causing new conflicts or the continuation of old ones (Zolberg et al., 1989). Struggles for domination in Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia involved massive external involvement, with great human costs for local populations. The large refugee flows of this period remained mainly within Africa. In the post-Cold War period, several of the conflicts continued. Violence mainly took the form of internal warfare and persecution of minorities, although sometimes spilling over into cross-border conflicts or international interventions (Duffield, 2001; Kaldor, 2001).

Over half of Africa's refugees have been displaced from the Horn of Africa and East Africa regions (Bakewell and de Haas, 2007: 100; Oucho, 2006: 132). The Horn of Africa has been an area of turbulence, with protracted and repeated armed struggles concerning Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia. The failed US-led military intervention of 1992–1993 in Somalia only made matters worse, while the new US-backed intervention by Ethiopia in 2006 has also failed to restore stability. Large numbers of Somalis have fled to Kenya, Yemen, Europe and North America, and remittances have become crucial to the survival of many Somalis (Lindley,

2007). In addition to warfare, the Horn of Africa region has experienced drought, famine and government schemes to shift people for economic and political reasons. All of these upheavals have led to internal displacement and refugee flows – often under appalling conditions (Turton, 2006).

In East Africa the Great Lakes Region has been particularly violent: long-drawn-out civil wars in Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and DRC have led to millions of deaths and mass displacement. The Rwanda genocide of 1994 is particularly notorious. Sudan has lived through over 30 years of warfare and massive internal and international displacement. In early 2008, political and ethnic violence came to Kenya too, in the wake of a disputed presidential election. However, most East African countries have received refugees, even in the middle of their own conflicts: Uganda has admitted Rwandans, Burundians and Sudanese; Ugandans have gone to Sudan. Tanzania has had between 400,000 and 800,000 refugees for the last 40 years – they have come from South Africa, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Malawi, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and DR Congo. The international community came to rely on this 'African hospitality' to restrict flows of refugees to the North, but the expulsion of Rwandan refugees by Tanzania in 1996 signalled a shift. Since then African states have become more restrictive in hosting refugees (Bakewell and de Haas, 2007).

Today, the overall security situation in Africa has improved, and the number of refugees recorded by UNHCR has declined from 6.8 million in 1995 (UNHCR, 1995) to 2.4 million in 2006 (UNHCR, 2006d). However, many of those remaining are in what UNHCR calls 'protracted refugee situations' (UNHCR, 2004) – that is, they have been living in camps for five years or more, and have little hope of returning home or improving their often isolated and impoverished life situations. However, where peace agreements have been successfully implemented, large-scale repatriations of refugees and resettlements of IDPs have occurred. The end of the apartheid regime in South Africa removed a major cause of conflict. In Mozambique, South Africa had funded and armed the RENAMO rebel movement, and by the early 1990s there were an estimated 5.7 million uprooted Mozambicans, including 1.7 million refugees and 4 million internally displaced persons. By 1996, most had returned home (USCR, 2001).

The twenty-first century has seen the end of brutal conflicts in Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the Great Lakes Region. Each is now at a different stage of postconflict development and reconciliation, but the mass return of people to their homes reflects growing stability. However, states that have experienced the uprooting of large numbers of people are poorly equipped socially, economically, politically, and physically to deal with the mass return of these persons, making stability difficult to maintain.

In other places new conflicts have broken out. The tenuous peace agreement between Northern and Southern Sudan in 2005, which ended 22 years of civil war, heightened focus on the violence in the western province of Darfur, where an estimated 400,000 Sudanese have died. The conflict has spilled over into neighbouring Chad. By 2006, 648,000 refugees

had fled from Sudan to other countries, while 5.3 million persons were internally displaced within the country. Yet Sudan was also host to 231,000 refugees, mainly from Eritrea (USCRI, 2006). The strain of these huge forced migrations on the population of a very poor country stands in stark contrast to the much lower refugee numbers in the rich countries of the North (see Chapter 8). Another recent case of mass flight concerns Zimbabwe: millions of people have fled deteriorating economic conditions as well as political repression, with the majority seeking work and refuge in South Africa.

Economic migration within Africa

Economic migration is important throughout Africa – even in areas strongly affected by forced migration. As Akokpari points out (Akokpari, 2000: 3–4), in situations of stress and conflict, it is extremely hard to differentiate between refugees escaping violence and migrants who move because their livelihoods are destroyed by economic collapse. He suggests that the latter should be regarded as ‘economic refugees’ – which questions the neat categories that underlie official asylum rules. However, in many parts of Africa, economic migration is dominant, and important migration systems have evolved, centring on areas of economic growth such as Libya in the North, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Gabon in the West, and South Africa and Botswana in the South (Bakewell and de Haas, 2007: 96).

West Africa is often seen as the most mobile part of the continent. A UN study showed an international migrant population of 6.8 million (2.7 per cent of West Africa’s total population) in 2000 (Zlotnik, 2004). Precolonial circular and seasonal mobility for farming, trade and religion was replaced in the colonial period first by the transatlantic slave trade and then by recruitment for mines, plantations, police and army. Migration based on cycles of rainfall and drought persists today in the Sahel region (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad). The largest contemporary movements are from the northern inland to the southern coastal regions, where migrants seek work in factories, mines and plantations, or in the service economies (both formal and informal) of fast-growing cities like Lagos, Dakar and Accra.

International migration has largely been spontaneous. In periods of rapid growth, governments have often welcomed labour migrants, while in times of economic crisis migrants have often been expelled in large numbers. For instance, in the 1950s and 1960s large numbers of migrants from Togo and Nigeria were attracted to Ghana. After the 1966 coup in Ghana and the subsequent economic decline, the government ordered a mass expulsion of some 200,000 migrants, mainly Nigerians. With Nigeria’s new oil wealth after 1973, millions of Ghanaians and other West Africans sought work there – including many teachers, doctors and administrators. But corruption and misguided economic policies precipitated a crisis, and in 1983–1985 an estimated 2 million low-skilled West

Africans were deported, including over one million Ghanaians (Bakewell and de Haas, 2007: 104). One scholar has enumerated 23 mass expulsions of migrants conducted by 16 different African states between 1958 and 1996 (Adepoju, 2001).

West African migration patterns changed dramatically due to economic decline in the 1980s and civil wars in Sierra Leone (1991–2001), Liberia (1989–1996 and 1999–2003), Guinea (1999–2000) and Côte d’Ivoire (since 2002) (Bakewell and de Haas, 2007). Mass flows of refugees and IDPs took place, and labour migration patterns were disrupted. For instance, the seasonal labour migration of many Burkina Faso citizens to Côte d’Ivoire had been important since before French colonization in 1886. However, instability and the launch of an anti-foreigner campaign resulted in over 365,000 persons returning to Burkina Faso in 2006 and 2007 (Kress, 2006).

Today, multidirectional patterns of labour migration within the region persist – often of a temporary nature. However, increasing numbers of West Africans, both highly skilled and less-skilled, now seek work outside the region. Many are attracted by the new migration poles in the north (Libya) and south (South Africa, Botswana) of the continent. Others seek opportunities in Europe, North America and even Japan and China.

Post-apartheid South Africa is the economic powerhouse of sub-Saharan Africa, and draws in migrants from the rest of the continent. The roots of migration go back to the mine labour system developed between 1890 and 1920 to provide workers for the gold and diamond mines. Workers were recruited during the apartheid period from Mozambique, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi. Mainly young men were hired. They had to live in squalid hostels, and were required to return home after one or two years of work. The absence of economic opportunities in their home countries made employment in South African mines the only possibility for many, despite the high risk of injury or death. There was also considerable illegal immigration from neighbouring countries. Security measures, including an electrified fence along the border with Mozambique, made illegal entry dangerous.

After 1994, unauthorized entry grew enormously. At the same time, many South African refugees came back. Widespread unemployment and lawlessness further complicated the picture. An Immigration Act was passed in 2002, but proved difficult to implement. Emphasis was placed on recruiting people with high skill levels, but it also continued the system of temporary labour recruitment for mines and farms, and introduced heavy penalties for unauthorized immigration. Recruitment of mineworkers from Mozambique, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland grew: the share of foreign workers in the mine labour force was 60 percent by the late 1990s. The economic dependence of neighbouring states also continues: some 81 per cent of the citizens of Lesotho (a small state surrounded by South African territory) have worked in South Africa, while the figures for Mozambique and Zimbabwe were 20 and 23 percent respectively (Crush, 2003).

Since the 1990s Africans from as far away as Ghana, Nigeria and DR Congo have flocked to the South African ‘Eldorado’. Many brought with

them qualifications and experience in medicine, education, administration and business. Others joined the informal economy as hawkers, street food-sellers or petty traders. Over a million migrants have been deported since 1994 (Crush, 2003). Most irregular migrants enter legally, although some risk injury crossing the border fence illegally. Large inflows from neighbouring Zimbabwe have occurred recently. Once in the country, work is available in both the formal and informal sectors, but hostility to immigration has hindered the development of legal mechanisms for employment and regularization. Xenophobia has become a major problem. In the first eight months of 2006, no less than 28 Somalis were murdered in Western Cape Province (*Cape Times* 1 September 2006). In May 2008, there was an explosion of violence against immigrants: many were killed, beaten, raped or forced to flee, by gangs of youths from the poor townships.

African migration to Europe and other regions

Historically, African migration has been predominantly intracontinental, with populations crossing borders into neighbouring countries or circulating throughout the region. This remains the case today: even in West Africa, the part of sub-Saharan Africa with the highest rate of migration to industrialized countries, regional migration is at least seven times higher than movement to the rest of the world (Bakewell and de Haas, 2007: 111). Despite the media hysteria on the growth of African migration to Europe, actual numbers seem quite small – although there is a surprising lack of data. According to an IOM study, there were about 3.5 million Africans in Europe in 2000 (IOM, 2003: Table 12.1, p. 219). On this basis, the ‘African diaspora in Europe’ would be equivalent to just 0.5 percent of Europe’s population.

However, the period of accelerated globalization since the 1980s has created the conditions for increased movement from Africa to developed countries. The increased role of global capital in Africa has not improved average incomes, but has instead led to an income decline for many – both in absolute terms and relative to the rest of the world (Akokpari, 2000). The structural adjustment policies of the IMF and the World Bank have not brought the expected stimulus to industry and trade, but have often reduced middle-class employment in the health, education and administrative sectors (Adepoju, 2006). These factors have increased motivation for migration northwards, while technological advances – cheaper transport and communications – have facilitated movement.

The intercontinental migration of Africans to Europe and the Middle East has increasingly involved poorly educated labour migrants and irregular migration. The areas receiving the most international attention include those closest to the African Mediterranean coast – namely Spain, the Canary Islands, Italy, and Malta. Tighter control measures and naval patrols by EU countries have forced irregular migrants to take longer sea

routes, increasing the risks and the death rate. An estimated 31,000 illegal migrants arrived in the Canary Islands in 2006, a 600 percent increase from 2005. At least 6,000 others were thought to have died in their attempts to reach the islands (BBC News Online, 2006). In an effort to stop boats before they start, Frontex, the EU’s border control agency, has been patrolling the shores of Senegal and Mauritania. However, while some West African nations have increased security measures, others – such as Gambia – have opened up smuggling ports (Fleming, 2006). African nationals who successfully reach Europe often face unemployment, racism, and homelessness, but these are risks they are willing to take to escape the lack of opportunity faced at home. Some low-skilled Africans have gone as far afield as Russia and Japan in search of work, while Ghanaian traders have been reported in China.

EU and African Union (AU) nations are now working together to combat illegal immigration. The Spanish government signed several bilateral immigration treaties with West African nations in 2006. Senegal, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, and Gambia agreed to help stop potential illegal migrants before they left and to facilitate the repatriation of those caught once they arrived on Spanish shores. In return, Spain agreed to provide each nation with several million Euros in aid over a five-year period and authorized some recruitment of skilled and unskilled African labourers. In addition, the EU has drafted treaties aimed at reducing illegal migration and trafficking, attracting skilled labour, and creating a brain circulation rather than a brain drain. The EU also allocated 40 million Euros to foster job creation within West Africa.

Many of the Africans migrating to developed countries are highly educated, and one of the major issues in African development is the brain drain (see Chapter 3 above). In the USA, Africans possess the highest average level of education of any immigrant group: 49 percent of African immigrants hold a bachelor’s degree, 19 percent have earned their master’s degree and 30,000 have their PhD before entry into the USA (‘African Immigrants...’, 1999–2000). Many Africans entering developed nations are attracted by ‘the good life’ portrayed in international media which promises success based on individual merit. Many of their home nations, rife with patronage and corruption, no longer hold such promise. However, a ‘brain waste’ – underutilization of skills accompanied by underpayment in employment – is often experienced. Annual household incomes of Africans in the USA are still reportedly an average of US\$11,600 less than those of Asian immigrants (‘African Immigrants...’ 1999–2000). Education, training, and job experience abroad often hold little value in immigration countries, and immigrants are forced to work at jobs far below their skill level.

One of the most troubling aspects of the brain drain involves the healthcare sector. Developed nations are scooping up the most promising African doctors and nurses (whether trained in Africa or in the receiving country) with incentives like the potential to earn up to 20 times their current salaries (Kaba, 2006) and international recruitment drives (Batata, 2005). The World Health Organization’s minimum standard for basic healthcare is

one doctor for every 5,000 people. In sub-Saharan Africa, 38 countries fall short of this standard, and 13 have one or fewer doctors for every 20,000 people. Niger, the nation with the lowest Human Development Index in 2006, had only three doctors for every 100,000 people (UNDP, 2006). Increased morbidity and mortality rates of diseases such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria throughout the continent have compounded this problem, resulting in a 'dual brain drain' – of emigration and death. Malawi, for example, has one nurse for every 5,900 people (Hamilton and Yau, 2004) and a 14.2 percent HIV infection rate (CIA, 2007).

Remittances

Africans abroad – whether within the continent or outside, high or low-skilled, regular or irregular migrants, refugees or economic migrants – send money home to their families. Remittances provide a crucial form of income to millions of people. According to the World Bank, remittance flows to Africa in 2007 totalled US\$10.8 billion (Ratha and Zhimei, 2008). Remittances often reach poor households more readily than other forms of aid and help to boost disposable incomes, to provide for children's education, to build homes, and to start small businesses (see Chapter 3 above). Remittances have become so important in some areas that mobile phone companies in Kenya and Tanzania started working in 2007 to allow migrants to send money transfers via text message (Mwakugu, 2007). Remittances are a central theme in debates on migration and development (see Ghosh, 2006; Lindley, 2007; Ratha and Shaw, 2007; World Bank, 2007).

Regional organizations

Sub-Saharan Africa has witnessed the creation of numerous international organizations for the purpose of removing barriers to trade and the free movement of goods, capital, and people. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the South African Development Community (SADC), the East African Community (EAC) and the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) have all introduced rules for free movement of nationals between their member states. Opinions vary on the effectiveness of such measures. Generally, these agreements have been poorly implemented or contradicted by the policies and practices of member states (Ricca, 1990; Adepoju, 2001). Despite the existence of many zones in which there is nominally freedom of movement, there is nonetheless a great deal of irregular migration. South Africa still restricts migration from other SADC states. ECOWAS did facilitate movement of Nigerians and Ghanaians in the 1970s and 1980s, but did not prevent mass deportations when governments deemed it expedient (Akokpari, 2000: 77). Today free movement between the 16 ECOWAS states does seem to be leading to

more mobility and better protection of migrants in that region. Oucho draws attention to visa-free movement and common passports in East Africa, but mentions the challenges of harmonizing national legislation, policies and practices (Oucho, 2006: 131).

The Middle East and North Africa: A geostrategically critical region

This region stretches from the Atlantic beaches of Morocco to the western border of Pakistan. It includes both the Arab states and non-Arab states such as Turkey, Iran and Israel. It comprises an area where enormous political, cultural and economic diversity has resulted in many varied types of migration and mobility. Yet, for all the heterogeneity, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) can also be seen as an area united by certain commonalities of history, geography, religion and culture, which have given rise to some shared migration experiences. At the same time, as pointed out above, North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa are strongly linked through political and economic relationships, which have led to mobility across the Sahara (de Haas, 2006d). Regional boundaries have never been rigid, and are becoming even more porous in the age of migration.

Provision of a comprehensive overview of migration in the MENA is challenging for two main reasons. The first arises from a lack of research. Existing literature focuses mainly on emigration from the MENA to Western countries, overshadowing the more complex networks of migration within the region. Until recently, migration in the MENA has been viewed mainly through the lens of economic push-pull factors. More recent literature calls for research to reflect systematic fieldwork, better theoretical frameworks (such as networks theory) and use of new social scientific tools such as analysis of social and cultural capital. In addition, information is rather uneven: there is much literature on certain cases, like Jordan, but other important migration areas, like Libya, are little studied.

The second reason is the complex pattern of migration both within and from the region. The official categories often do not correspond to the human realities. A pilgrimage to Mecca can also be the opportunity to foster contact with trading partners; Palestinian migrants to the Gulf are often both refugees and labour migrants. Until 1990, it was fairly easy to distinguish 'receiving states' from 'sending states' – usually oil-rich countries as receiving states and non-oil-producer countries as sending states. However, over the last two decades, it has become more difficult to distinguish between the two, as receiving states have tended to restrict immigration while former sending states now receive immigrants or transit migrants (Fargues, 2007).

Current migrations in the MENA include six major types: traditional forms of mobility; migration for settlement within the MENA; emigration

Map 7.2 Migrations within and from the Middle East and North Africa



from the MENA to other parts of the world; labour migration within the region; flows of refugees within the region; and transit migration. Analysis of these different types requires understanding of related issues that affect the region, such as weak political systems, demographic change, deprivation of basic rights, globalization, and poverty in some places compared with abundant resources and wealth in others.

Traditional forms of mobility: nomads, traders and pilgrims

The MENA has historically been a region of high mobility. Reasons for this include the existence of desert or semi-desert areas allowing the persistence of nomadic ways of life, the presence of numerous holy places encouraging pilgrimages (Chiffolleau, 2003), and a long history of large empires and loose borders which have fostered the exchange of goods and knowledge (Laurens, 2005: 25–27). During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, mobility decreased due to increased state regulation. Nomadic populations became the primary victims of stronger structures as states implemented forced sedentarization policies in order to control and tax such groups. Likewise, states regulated the movement of pilgrims and traders. For example, Saudi Arabia limits the number of pilgrims travelling to Mecca and Medina by means of country of origin quotas (Chiffolleau, 2003).

Despite increased state regulation, traditional forms of mobility have persisted due to the ability of migrants to adapt and reinvent their practices within a new context. States have also lacked the logistical capability to fully control population movements. There has been a revival of pilgrimage mobility due primarily to an increase in Muslim pilgrims from the former Soviet countries, as well as from the US and Europe (Balci, 2003; Chiffolleau, 2003). Furthermore, modern traders have replaced former caravan traders. These ‘suitcase’ migrants, who come from the former Soviet Union and North Africa, are particularly attracted to the new economic hub that has sprung up in the Gulf countries such as Dubai (Jaber, 2005: 20).

Settlement immigration

For centuries, the various empires of the region used migration and population displacement as strategic tools to stabilize newly conquered lands. For instance, as the Ottoman Empire expanded, the government ordered Muslim subjects to settle in recently acquired lands, a process known as ‘surgun’ (Tekeli, 1994: 204–206). With the contraction of the Ottoman Empire and the creation of new nation-states in its wake, policies of national preference developed. The concurrent expulsion of ‘non-nationals’ and welcoming of ‘nationals’ reflected a national approach

to migration which resulted in population transfers such as the 1923–1924 population exchange between Greece and Turkey that resettled hundreds of thousands of displaced people (Mutluer, 2003: 88–94).

The tendency to view migration along national lines became institutionalized in the immigration policies of states in the MENA region. In 1934, Turkey promulgated the Law of Resettlement, which authorized ethnic Turks from areas formerly comprising the Ottoman Empire to emigrate to and settle in the Turkish Republic (Tekeli, 1994: 217). This policy continued throughout the twentieth century: as recently as the 1980s, 310,000 ethnic Turks from Bulgaria fled to Turkey to avoid persecution, though many of them later returned to Bulgaria. Conflicts in the Western Balkans also led Muslims to seek refuge in Turkey: approximately 25,000 Bosnians in 1992, 20,000 Kosovars in 1999 and 20,000 Albanians in 2001 (İçduygu, 2000: 362–363; Danis and Pérouse, 2005: 97).

However, Turkey is not the only country to apply national criteria to its immigration policy. Israel's Law of Return encourages the 'return' of Jewish populations to Israel. During the 1990s, Israel received approximately 1 million new immigrants from the former Soviet Union. This wave of immigration by the 'Russians,' as they are commonly called, has had important demographic and political effects (see Chapter 12 below). Overall, Israel's population grew from 800,000 in 1947 to 6 million in 1998, with immigration accounting for 40 percent of the total population growth (Kop and Litan, 2002: 23–25).

Like Turkey and Israel, some Arab states have adopted national preference policies. In general, Arab countries have exclusively granted the right to settle and to gain citizenship to persons with historic or ethnic ties to the country. The concept of the 'Arab nation' has had little impact on immigration policy, except in the 1960s and 1970s when Arab labour migrants were preferred to non-Arab migrants in oil-rich countries like Iraq (Lavergne, 2003). The large and recurrent influxes of refugees, especially Palestinians but also Kurds and Iraqis, have challenged the immigration and naturalization policies of Arab countries.

By the early twenty-first century, Turkey had revised its immigration and asylum policies due, in large part, to pressure from the EU and has gradually been moving away from the traditional preference given to ethnic Turks from abroad (Kirişci, 2006). In the Gulf countries, a still rather rigid conception of the national is having contradictory effects on migration patterns as Arab labour migrants are often seen as a threat to the national order, which, in turn, encourages the immigration of non-Arab migrants, often from South or South-east Asia (Lavergne, 2003; Laurens, 2005: 33).

Emigration from the MENA

The most thoroughly documented type of migration involves emigration from the MENA region to other parts of the world, especially Western countries. Emigration from Turkey and the North African countries has been

well researched due to the large numbers of immigrants from these countries in Germany, Netherlands and France. The statistics are impressive. In 2005, it was estimated that the Mediterranean MENA countries (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestinian Territories, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey) counted between 12 and 15 million first-generation emigrants. The principal destination is Europe, which has about 6 million migrants of MENA origin (mainly Turks and North Africans). The second most popular destination is the Gulf oil states, where most intraregional migrants come from Egypt, Palestine, Syria and Jordan. It is estimated that emigration from the Mediterranean MENA countries is on the rise, with the notable exception of Turkey, where emigration levels have declined (Fargues, 2007).

The underlying reasons for the high levels of emigration were an explosive increase in the under-30 population coupled with high unemployment and underemployment. The area from Morocco to Turkey was, until recently, a region of enormous population growth. Places like Beirut, Gaza and the lower Nile Valley are densely populated areas where the gap between job creation and the entry of new cohorts into the labour market has helped to propel emigration. Nearby are lightly populated desert wastelands and zones of rapid economic growth made possible only through the massive recruitment of foreign labour. However, the demography of the MENA has dramatically changed during the last two decades, with a sharp decline in birth rates. As a result, it seems likely that there will be less pressure on employment markets and, perhaps, less emigration by 2010–2015 (Fargues, 2007). In recent years, research on emigration from the MENA countries has tended to place less stress on economic factors and more on psychological and social factors such as the subjective level of satisfaction towards the country of origin and the expectations of the host country; the so-called 'Western lure' (De Bel-Air, 2003; Mutluer, 2003). Others have insisted on the centrality of social capital and migratory networks that create and maintain patterns of migration (Roussel, 2003; Hanafi, 2003).

The consequences of this emigration are considerable. Remittances have a major economic impact on countries of origin. In 2007 Morocco received US\$5.5 billion in remittances, 9.5 percent of its GDP (Ratha and Zhimei, 2008). Migrant remittances similarly had an important effect on the economies of Tunisia and Algeria, although many cash flows to Algeria go unrecorded. In 2004, Saudi Arabia paid out US\$13.5 billion in international worker remittances (Adams, 2006).

Emigration can cause or exacerbate political conflicts between sending and receiving states. For instance, in 1973, Algeria unilaterally suspended emigration of its citizens for employment in France following a wave of violence against Arabs in southern France. When migration resumed, French President Giscard d'Estaing (1974–1981) sought to deny renewal of residency and employment authorization to several hundred thousand Algerians. Algerian President Boumedienne declared that nothing could stop migration northward to Europe, but Boumedienne's prophecy did

not hold true. Even during the violent conflict in Algeria in the 1990s, relatively few Algerians were able to move to Europe. Nevertheless, migration remained a source of considerable tension, especially when the strife in Algeria spilled over into France. Turkey and Morocco have experienced similar problems; the former due to German attempts to limit the inflow of Turkish migrants in the 1970s and 1980s; Morocco due to recent Spanish attempts to deter irregular migration of Moroccans and sub-Saharan Africans.

Labour migration within the MENA region

The 1973 oil crisis had a substantial impact on migration patterns in the MENA region. The sudden rise in the price of oil generated financial resources to undertake costly construction projects in oil-exporting countries. However, this construction boom required the hiring of thousands of foreign workers, generating sizeable population movements. From the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, most migrants were Arabs, mainly Egyptians, Yemenis, Palestinians, Jordanians, Lebanese and Sudanese. Today, the share of non-Arab workers is much higher. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) have an estimated combined population of over 3 million, of whom at least 75 percent are migrants. Three-fifths of migrants are from South Asia while approximately one-quarter are from the MENA (Rycs, 2005) (see Chapter 6).

Migrants have often been used by their host countries or countries of origin to further political agendas. Libya provides an extreme example. In the 1970s and 1980s, Libya admitted large numbers of Egyptians, Tunisians and Palestinians, but Libya expelled thousands of Egyptians when diplomatic relations soured as a result of Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat's reorientation of foreign policy towards the West (Farrag, 1999: 74). A similar fate befell Tunisian workers during a period of tension between Tunisia and Libya. Likewise, after Yasser Arafat signed the Oslo Accords in 1993, Libya ordered thousands of Palestinian migrants to leave. Since 1989, citizens of the four other Maghreb Union states (Morocco, Tunisia, Mauritania and Algeria) have theoretically been able to enter Libya freely, but the regional integration framework has had little effect (Safir, 1999: 89). From the early 1990s, President Gaddafi positioned himself as an African leader and encouraged entry of workers from Sudan, Chad and Niger. These countries became transit regions for migrants from further south. However, since 2000, black Africans in Libya have experienced xenophobia, violent anti-immigrant riots and mass expulsions. Libya remains both a destination for migrant workers and a transit area for Africans seeking to move on to Europe (Bakewell and de Haas, 2007: 98–99).

During the 1970s, the Gulf monarchies grew increasingly worried about the possible political repercussions of their migrant populations. Palestinians, in particular, were viewed as subversive. They were involved in efforts to organize strikes in Saudi oil fields and in civil

Box 7.1 The system of sponsorship (*Kafala*) in the Gulf

The sponsorship system has been a central feature of immigration policy in Gulf countries. Originally, the sponsorship system was based on an agreement between the local *emir* and foreign oil companies in which a *kafil* (sponsor) would find trustworthy men (usually Bedouins) to work on the oil sites. With the oil industry taking off and the national workforce insufficient to fulfil the needs for manpower, the *kafils* had to recruit men from abroad. With time, recruiting and 'sponsoring' foreign workers became the main activities of the *Kafala*. Today, in order to enter a Gulf country, each migrant must find a sponsor. This requirement applies to various forms of migration including construction workers, domestic servants, foreign tradesmen and businessmen. The *kafil* is the official intermediary between the foreigner and the administration, authorities and local society. The *Kafala* system structures the relationship between the state, national *kafils*, and foreigners. Granting *kafil* status to nationals permits the state to delegate some administrative work, to control the foreign population and to reward nationals for their services. But *kafils* often exploit migrants by denying them proper wages and conditions, and retaining their passports, or threatening to report them to the police. Employment contracts are often illegally sold on to other employers. However, Gulf states have begun to abandon the *Kafala* system in order to gain more control over foreign populations.

Source: Rycs, 2005.

strife in Jordan and Lebanon. Yemenis were implicated in various anti-regime activities in Saudi Arabia (Halliday, 1985: 674). Non-Saudi Arabs were involved in the bloody 1979 attack on Mecca, which was subdued only after the intervention of French troops. One result of these political repercussions was the increased recruitment of workers from South and South-East Asia, who were seen as less likely to get involved in politics and easier to control. The politicization of migration came to a head during the first Gulf War.

Reports of precarious conditions, absence of rights, mass expulsions, violence and abuse are regularly made in MENA countries such as Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Israel and Libya. As the Moroccan scholar Boudahrain has argued, disregard for the rights of migrants is commonplace despite the existence of treaties designed to ensure protection (Boudahrain, 1985: 103–164). The feminization of migration resulting from the growth of foreign domestic servant employment is also contributing to the fragile and vulnerable situation of labour migrants in the MENA (Jureidini, 2003; Baldwin-Edwards, 2005). Unfortunately, the increase in the numbers of South and South-East Asian migrants in MENA countries has developed in parallel with the deterioration of the working conditions of these migrants. In most Gulf countries, the use of the *Kafala* system (see Box 7.1) reinforces the vulnerability of migrants (Lavergne, 2003).

The trends identified above – the replacement of Middle Eastern workers by Asian workers, the feminization of labour migration flows, the vulnerability and exploitation of migrants and the dependency upon labour migration – are also relevant to labour migrant flows to non-oil-producing states. In Jordan during the mid-1970s, approximately 40 percent of the domestic workforce was employed abroad, primarily in the Gulf (Seccombe, 1986: 378). This outflow prompted a replacement migration of foreign workers into Jordan. However, much of the Jordanian labour abroad was skilled. While the majority of the labour that Jordan received was also skilled, there were major inflows of unskilled Egyptians and Syrians. By the 1980s, these inflows were thought to have contributed to the higher unemployment levels among Jordanian citizens and resident aliens. Wages in industries heavily affected by foreign workers also declined (Seccombe, 1986: 384–385).

On the other side of the Jordan River, the Israeli labour market was opened up to workers from Gaza and the West Bank after the 1967 war, as part of a strategy to integrate the occupied territories into the Israeli economy (Aronson, 1990). Most of the workers had to commute daily to work in Israel and were required to leave each evening. Palestinians found jobs primarily in construction, agriculture, hotels, restaurants and domestic services (Semyonov and Lewin-Epstein, 1987). Illegal employment of Palestinians from the territories was fairly widespread (Binur, 1990). In 1984, some 87,000 people, roughly 36 percent of the total workforce of the Occupied Territories, were employed in Israel. However, by 1991, immigration from the former Soviet Union began to limit employment opportunities for Palestinians. The Israeli government sought to replace Palestinian labour in construction and agriculture, yet its efforts to employ Soviet Jewish immigrants met with little success, since many of them wanted different jobs or found the pay and working conditions unsatisfactory (Bartram, 1999: 157–161).

It was difficult to measure the displacement of Palestinians because other factors were also at work. A wave of attacks by Palestinians from the Occupied Territories on Jews in Israel during the first *Intifada* (the uprising of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza that began in 1987), and the First Gulf War, heightened tension in Israel. Israeli authorities introduced restrictive regulations aimed at weakening the *Intifada*, as well as ensuring greater security. As a result, there was a sharp decline in Palestinian employment in Israel after 1991. Increasingly, foreign workers from Romania, the Philippines and Thailand were recruited to replace Palestinian labour. Concurrently, the closure of Gulf state labour markets to Palestinians worsened the economic plight of Palestinians. This threatened the leadership of the Palestinian Authority and the entire regional peace process.

In 2002, the Israeli government ‘declared war’ on the illegal employment of foreigners, but measures like employer sanctions and deportation appeared to have little deterrent effect, in part because fines were too

low. The sharp contrast between the governmental generosity afforded to Jewish immigrants and the lot of foreign workers in Israel prompted soul-searching and calls for a phase-out of foreign worker recruitment (Kop and Litan, 2002: 108). Faced with the day-to-day reality of coping with issues like the education of the children of illegally resident migrants, some municipal governments, such as Tel Aviv, took steps to foster integration of the growing non-Jewish, non-Arab population comprised of legally admitted foreign workers, illegally resident foreign workers and families, as well as non-Jewish family members of the so-called Soviet Jews. About 20 percent of the ‘Russians,’ in fact, were not Jewish (Bartram, 2005).

Forced migration

The recurrent political instability in the region, due to a combination of wars, internal conflict and repressive governments, has regularly caused large flows of forced migration within and from the MENA. Historically, the region has created, as well as received, diverse flows of refugees. During the last century of the Ottoman Empire from the 1820s to the 1920s, approximately 5 million people sought refuge in the Empire while several million people fled from it (McCarthy, 1995).

Today, the issue of refugees remains centred on the Palestinians. As of 2006, the United Nations Works and Relief Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNWRA) reports that some 4.3 million Palestinian refugees are scattered throughout the region and the world. The Israeli–Palestinian peace accords of the 1990s have done very little to alter their plight, although thousands of Palestine Liberation Organization officials and military or police personnel have been authorized to return to the area under the control of the Palestinian Authority. The status of Gaza remains unsettled after factional fighting in 2007. Negotiations concerning refugees, repatriation, compensation, reparations and access to the territory are among the most difficult aspects of the Peace Process. Israeli and Palestinian viewpoints and positions differ enormously, starting with the estimated number of refugees. With the Palestinian population of the West Bank and Gaza in dire economic straits, prospects appear bleak for the mass repatriation of Palestinian refugees from Lebanon and Syria. Since the beginning of the second *Intifada* in 2000, roughly 100,000 Palestinians have fled from the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Additionally, most Palestinian refugees living in Iraq had to flee in 2006 after many refugees were killed (Fargues, 2007).

Since 1990, another mass population of refugees has appeared in the MENA region. Between 1990 and 2002, some 1.5 million Iraqis left their country due to the First Gulf War and Saddam Hussein’s repressive regime. In the following years, about 500,000 Iraqis left Iraq through Turkey and Jordan, and tens of thousands left through Iran and Syria. The US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and its aftermath have triggered a second wave of Iraqi displacement. The UNHCR reports that there are over 4 million

displaced Iraqis around the world, including 1.9 million displaced within Iraq and 2 million in neighbouring MENA countries, primarily in Syria and Jordan (UNHCR, 2007c).

In addition to Palestinian and Iraqi refugees, the UNHCR is particularly concerned with the unabated flow of asylum seekers and migrants from the Horn of Africa (Somalia, Eritrea, and Ethiopia) to Yemen and with the growing number of Sudanese refugees in Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Israel. Moreover, events in Lebanon in 2005 and 2006 have reactivated flows of forced migration. In 2005, several hundred thousand Syrian workers fled Lebanon following the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, the subsequent withdrawal of Syrian armed forces from Lebanon and a series of attacks on Syrian workers. Israel's bombing of Lebanon in 2006 led to the repatriation of several thousand foreign workers (mainly Asian female domestic workers). An unknown number of Lebanese, probably close to 1 million, also fled Lebanon (Fargues, 2007). Most of these Lebanese refugees found temporary refuge in Syria and then returned home after hostilities had come to an end.

Some countries have been particularly affected by the large influx of refugees. By the early 1990s, Iran had become the world's most important haven for refugees. Most came from Afghanistan, but Iran also received large numbers of Azeris fleeing advancing Armenian forces in Azerbaijan. Despite attempts at repatriation (USCR, 1996: 111), 1.5 million Afghan refugees remained in 2000 and their numbers increased during the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 (USCR, 2001: 174). Today many Afghans remain mainly because they have jobs in Iran, but no employment chances at home: the distinction between refugees and economic migrants has become blurred.

Turkey and Egypt have also become central crossroads for refugee flows. Turkey received substantial flows of Balkan, Iraqi, Iranian and Central Asian populations while Egypt has been host to many Palestinian, Sudanese and other population flows from Africa. Turkey is also a country of origin for the many Kurdish refugees who have fled to Greece, Germany, Sweden and other countries to escape ethnic conflicts.

Transit migration through the MENA

Transit migration through MENA countries has grown significantly in recent years. The main pole of attraction is Europe, while transit migration involves Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Mauritania for sub-Saharan migration flows, and Lebanon and Syria for Middle Eastern and Central Asian migration flows. Additionally, Yemen has become a transit country for migrants from Africa eager to reach the rich countries in the Gulf. Accurate figures on the number of transit migrants are lacking.

The fate of transit migrants is sometimes tragic, as many fail to reach their destinations in Europe. Many live under difficult conditions illegally

in a transit country while others take perilous risks to enter Europe (Fargues, 2007). However, in view of the difficulties of onward migration, many sub-Saharan African migrants decide to settle in North African countries like Morocco and Egypt, which have previously been seen as transit countries. Libya has been an important destination for labour migrants for many years, but has recently also become a transit country for onward movement to Europe. Thus a rigid distinction between transit and destination areas is increasingly untenable. Transit migration is a source of considerable tension. European states and the EU pressure MENA countries to control their borders and to curb illegal migration, while the MENA countries complain of having to bear the burden of these illegal migrants alone.

Migration policies in the MENA

The proliferation of migration flows, as well as the growing awareness of their political and economic importance, has led several MENA states to take measures to regulate migration. However, the results have been mixed. Many MENA countries view emigration as a 'solution' that reduces unemployment and increases revenue through remittances. Such countries have implemented policies promoting emigration as well as attempting to mobilize diasporas to support national development. Turkey, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan and Yemen have all improved their banking systems to better channel remittances, have included emigration and remittance issues in diplomatic negotiations with host countries, and have instituted special organizations to manage emigration (De Bel-Air, 2003; Fargues, 2006). These countries have also instituted cultural policies to maintain the link between migrants and their country of origin, including mother tongue classes, return travel and religious education (Castles and Delgado Wise, 2008).

By contrast, public policies to regulate immigration and labour migration have been less developed. Initially, oil-rich countries did little to regulate the entry and living conditions of foreign labour. Recent developments have included protectionist measures seeking to give nationals first priority for employment. Some countries, such as Turkey and Morocco, have taken major steps to curb illegal immigration due to pressure from the EU. Most measures remain restrictive and often raise humanitarian concerns (Fargues, 2006).

Currently, many MENA countries lack refugee policies, and only a few are party to the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention. There are few domestic laws concerning the right of asylum, and this often remains unclear and discretionary. Some governments are aware of the need to resolve refugee issues. However, the relationship between the UNHCR and local authorities remains tense, leading one commentator to characterize the current situation of refugee policy in the Middle East as one of deadlock (Zaiotti, 2005).

An important future issue is likely to be the integration of migrants into host countries. Most MENA countries have a very strict, often national or ethnic understanding of citizenship. The rising trend of immigrants remaining for longer periods of time renders discussion of increased societal diversity and multiculturalism urgent (Fargues, 2006). Greater protection and the granting of basic rights to migrants have entered the national discourse of MENA countries even if such reforms have yet to be achieved. Recently, the government of Dubai announced its intention to implement reforms in this direction (DeParle, 2007). Granting of citizenship to foreigners is rejected by most governments, but may become a significant issue, especially in Gulf oil states, where migrants outnumber nationals.

Latin America and the Caribbean: from immigration to emigration region


The vast and highly diverse region south of the USA is sometimes portrayed as consisting of four principal areas. A number of countries do not fit neatly into these four areas, but the categorization serves to underscore how immigration since 1492 has differentially affected the area as a whole:

1. The Southern Cone includes Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay and Paraguay. These countries have substantial populations of European origin due to massive immigrant settlement from Europe. There were also inflows from elsewhere: for example, Brazil received African slaves into the nineteenth century and Japanese workers from the late nineteenth century until the 1950s.
2. The Andean area to the north and west differs in that Indians and *mestizos* (persons of mixed European-Indian background) comprise the bulk of the population. Immigration from Europe during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was less significant.
3. Central American societies are largely comprised of persons of Indian and *mestizo* background, although there are exceptions, such as Costa Rica, where 94 percent of the population is white and *mestizo*.
4. Caribbean societies predominantly consist of people of African origin, but there are also many people of Asian and European descent.

From European settlement to intraregional migration

De Lattes and de Lattes (1991) estimate that Latin America and the Caribbean received approximately 21 million immigrants from 1800 to 1970. The bulk of immigrants came from Spain, Italy and Portugal, and most migrated to the Southern Cone. The single largest migration was the estimated 3 million Italians who settled in Argentina. Argentina and Uruguay encouraged immigration until the interwar period, when the

Map 7.3 Migration within and from Latin America



Note: The arrow dimensions give an approximate indication of the volume of flows. Exact figures are often unavailable.

economic depression of the 1930s brought significant changes in policies. Mass immigration from Europe declined sharply by the 1930s (Barlán, 1988: 6–7). A significant exception to this general pattern was Venezuela, which had received few European-origin immigrants until the rule of Perez Jimenez, from 1950 to 1958. About 332,000 persons, mainly of Italian origin, settled in Venezuela under his regime. However, the so-called open-door policy stopped with the overthrow of the military government in 1958 (Picquet, Pelligrino and Papail, 1986: 25–29) and Venezuela became a country of emigration.

As intercontinental inflows from Europe waned, intracontinental migrations developed. Labour migration predominated. In 1935, seasonal labour migration from Bolivia to Argentina commenced, lasting for decades until mechanization reduced labour needs. This labour flow was largely unregulated until the signing of a 1958 bilateral agreement protecting Bolivian migrants (Barlán, 1988: 8–9). Similarly, Paraguayan and Chilean labour migrants began to find employment in Northeastern Argentina and Patagonia in the 1950s and 1960s respectively. Foreign workers spread from agricultural areas to major urban centres. Single, mainly male, migrants were soon joined by families, creating neighbourhoods of illegal immigrants in some cities. Beginning in 1948, the Argentine government adjusted laws and policies to enable illegal foreign workers to rectify their status. Irregular or illegal migration has been the predominant form of migration in Latin America, but it was not viewed as a problem until the late 1960s (Lohrmann, 1987: 258).

Historically, Venezuela has relied on Colombian seasonal workers to help harvest the coffee crop. The reduction of immigration from Europe after 1958 and oil-related economic growth resulted in millions of Colombians flocking to Venezuela. In 1979, the Andean Pact was signed, obliging member states to legalize illegally resident nationals from other member states (Picquet, Pelligrino and Papail, 1986: 30). However, despite estimates ranging from 1.2 to 3.5 million illegal residents out of a total Venezuelan population of some 13.5 million, only some 280,000 to 350,000 aliens were legalized in 1980 (Meissner, Papademetriou and North, 1987: 11). By 1995, 2 million persons were thought to be residing illegally in Venezuela, most of them Colombian (Kratochwil, 1995: 33). Additionally, another 2 million aliens resided legally (Dávila, 1998: 18).

In Venezuela, the early twenty-first century was characterized by continued political and economic instability. The unrest encouraged further emigration from Venezuela, particularly to the USA, which saw an increase in the number of Venezuelan immigrants from 2,630 in 1995 to 5,259 in 2002 (IOM, 2005: 93). Spain also became a major destination country for Venezuelan immigrants, mainly from rural areas. However, Venezuela continued to receive significant migration flows from neighbouring countries whose economies and political environment were suffering, especially Colombia (O’Neil, Hamilton and Papademetriou, 2005: 4).

Argentina remains a country of both immigration and emigration. Most of Argentina’s immigration is intraregional, and over 65 percent

of the foreign-born population are from other South American countries (Jachimowicz, 2006). Most unauthorized migrants in Argentina work in domestic service, construction, and textile factories. In 2006, Argentina announced a new regularization programme with the potential to benefit an estimated 750,000 undocumented residents, mostly Paraguayans and Bolivians. This followed a tragic fire in a textile factory in which six Bolivians died, including four children. Afterwards, thousands of people marched in the streets of Buenos Aires in protest at poor migrant working conditions (BBC Mundo, 2006). Successful applicants to the programme received two-year work permits. After five years, they would get the opportunity to apply for permanent residence (Migration News, 2006). Argentina also instituted a regularization programme for non-MERCOSUR citizens, mostly Chinese and Koreans. By November 2005, over 900 people had participated in the programme (Jachimowicz, 2006).

The legalization policies implemented in Argentina and Venezuela provide evidence of the changing character of migration within Latin America. Intraregional migration has continued in the early twenty-first century. However, trends to emigration from the region also started emerging from the 1970s, and have become much more marked in recent times (see below).

Regional initiatives

The post-Cold War period in Latin America and the Caribbean has been marked by efforts to reinvigorate and expand the many regional integration organizations such as MERCOSUR and the Andean Group (GRAN) (Derisbourg, 2002). MERCOSUR includes Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela and encompasses a total population of 250 million. More than three-quarters of the economic activity in South America involves the MERCOSUR region (BBC News, 2007). The Andean Group includes Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, with a total population of 98 million (Comunidad Andina, 2006). The movement of persons across national borders within these regional blocs has been an important concern. However, inadequate information has stymied coordination and cooperation (Maguid, 1993). After analysing earlier efforts within the Andean Group to regulate labour migration, Kratochwil concluded that a ‘significant amount of work has been ultimately ineffective and the administrative agencies have collapsed erratically’ (Kratochwil, 1995: 17). As in the MENA and sub-Saharan Africa, Latin American and Caribbean regional integration projects have had a weak record of managing international migration.

Forced migration

A second significant feature of the post-Cold War period in Latin America and the Caribbean also echoed developments elsewhere: there were

significant repatriations of refugees subsequent to peace accords in some countries, but the eruption of new conflicts in the region produced new refugee flows. The most significant peace accords were reached in Central America where fighting in El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala abated. In the 1980s, approximately 2 million Central Americans were uprooted, but only some 150,000 were recognized by the UNHCR as refugees (Gallagher and Diller, 1990: 3). The 1990s saw significant repatriations of Guatemalans from Mexico, Nicaraguans from the US and Costa Rica, and Salvadorans from the USA.

However, the political situation in all three countries remained tense. Several killings of returning Guatemalans, many of whom were Indians, were reported. Guatemalan migrants continued to come to the USA and their presence became increasingly evident in labour-intensive agriculture and poultry-processing. Most Guatemalans, Salvadorans and Nicaraguans in the USA did not repatriate, despite the peace accords. Between 1984 and 1994, over 440,000 Central Americans applied for asylum in the USA. The majority of applications were denied, but most applicants stayed nonetheless (Martin and Widgren, 1996: 35). The adoption of a 1986 law to curb illegal immigration prompted then President of El Salvador, Napoleon Duarte, to write a complaint to the US president that the US law threatened El Salvador's stability, since remittances from Salvadorans in the USA were vital to the Salvadoran economy (Mitchell, 1992: 120–123). Similarly, while there was some repatriation of Nicaraguans from Costa Rica, many stayed put.

The USA remained a common destination for fleeing Haitians and Cubans, who often travelled illegally by boat. In 2002, the number of Cubans entering the USA reached 28,270. Haiti suffered further political unrest in 2004, when a rebel uprising forced President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to flee the country. However, contrary to expectations, there was no significant refugee outflow from the crisis. This may have been due to the restrictive immigration policies of the USA and several Caribbean countries, rather than a lack of desire to leave Haiti (IOM, 2005: 93–95). A key motive behind the US-led invasion of Haiti in 2004 was the prevention of mass emigration.

Emigration from the region

The Haitian outflow to the USA was part of the broader shift in Latin America and the Caribbean from a region of immigration to one of emigration. By the 1970s, the Caribbean subregion was a net exporter of people. The underlying reasons for this historic change are many, and the transition did not occur overnight. Since the colonial period, Caribbean migrants had been arriving on the eastern and southern shores of what is now the USA. These northward flows were accentuated during World War II, when Caribbean workers were recruited for defence-related employment and agricultural work. The origins of the British West

Indies Temporary Foreign Worker Programme, which continued into the twenty-first century as the H-2A programme, were not unlike the far larger temporary foreign worker programme established between Mexico and the US from 1942 to 1964.

Temporary labour recruitment helped set in motion the massive northward flows of legal and illegal immigrants from Latin America and the Caribbean to the USA and Canada after 1970. But the causes of the shift are to be found in other factors as well: the declining economic fortunes of the region, its demographic explosion, rural–urban migration, political instability and warfare. Many of these additional factors cannot be viewed as strictly internal. Policies pursued by the USA, such as its political and military intervention in Central America, clearly played a role. The linkage was clearest in the case of the Dominican Republic, where US involvement in the assassination of the Dominican president Trujillo in 1961 led to a mass issuance of visas to Dominicans to forestall a Cuban-style revolution (Mitchell, 1992: 96–101).

The most important factor behind the rise in emigration from the region (apart from demand for foreign labour in the USA, Europe and Japan) was the economic woes of Latin America: GDP per capita declined sharply in the 1980s, which some called the 'decade lost to debt' (Fregosi, 2002: 443). Democratic renewal and a trend toward liberalization in the early and mid-1990s briefly buoyed Latin American economies before a succession of economic crises ravaged the area. According to a UN report, 209 million people (40 percent of the region's population) were living below the poverty line in 2005 (ECLAC, 2006). Moreover, in Latin America and the Caribbean, 10 percent of the population earned less than \$1 per day (GCIM, 2005). Economic liberalization policies increased already severe inequality in countries like Mexico and Argentina. One consequence was that, according to a 2001 poll, 21 percent of all Argentineans wanted to emigrate. That applied to one-third of persons between 18 and 24 years of age (Fregosi, 2002: 436).

Although intraregional migration remains important in the early twenty-first century, increasing numbers of Latin Americans emigrate to other continents. This is reflected in both the accelerating flows of migrants to the USA and an increasing number of 'return migrants', people who return to their own or their ancestors' country of origin in Europe or Asia, often under preferential agreements (IOM, 2005: 91). Dominican migrants, for instance, used to go mainly to Venezuela. However, increased political and economic instability there has caused a shift in migration flows to the USA and Spain.

Brazilian emigrants are increasingly travelling outside of Latin America, especially to Portugal, the USA, and Japan. Reflecting historical and colonial ties, Portugal is a top destination of Brazilians, who comprise the largest foreign group – 11 percent of Portugal's 191,000 legal immigrants. In 2003, Portugal implemented a regularization programme specifically for irregular Brazilian residents to encourage further immigration (Padilla and Peixoto, 2007). Most are skilled and middle-class, although there

are also increasing numbers of medium and low-skilled Brazilians, who find employment in retail, construction and the hotel industry (Pellegrino, 2004: 36) (see also Chapter 5 above).

The Brazilian population in the USA rose from 82,500 legal residents in 1995 to 212,400 in 2000. The primary destinations were Florida, Massachusetts, and New York (IOM, 2005: 93). Brazilians are also moving to Japan along with other Latin Americans of Japanese descent. In 2005, the 302,000 Brazilians represented Japan's second largest foreign-born group, after the Chinese. Peruvians were the fourth largest with 58,000 (OECD, 2007). Migration from Latin America to Japan was facilitated by the 1990 revision of Japan's Immigration Control Act, which established a preferential agreement for Japanese descendants and improved training and employment opportunities for skilled migrants (O'Neil, Hamilton, and Papdemetriou, 2005: 20).

Traditionally a country of immigration, Argentina, since the 1990s, has seen a new wave of emigration to the USA, Spain, Italy, and Israel fuelled by low employment at home, strong labour demand abroad, and preferential agreements in destination countries. Emigration from Argentina during the recent economic crisis also included return migration to countries that had high levels of migration to Argentina during the 1990s, including Chile, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Peru (IOM, 2005: 92). By 2005, it was estimated that more than 1 million Argentines lived abroad – double the 1985 figure. In the USA, most Argentine migrants live in California, Florida, and New York, and, while some are temporary workers, many come under family reunification programmes.

Spain and Italy have particularly favourable citizenship policies for Argentines. Under Italy's dual-citizenship policy, foreign citizens who can prove Italian descent can apply for Italian citizenship (Padilla and Peixoto, 2007). By 2004, there were 157,323 native-born Argentines living in Spain. In Italy, there was a marked increase in immigration of Argentines from 5,725 in 1999 to 11,266 in 2003 (Jachimowicz, 2006). However, after Argentina's economy recovered, emigration slowed and returned to pre-crisis rates of approximately 1500 departures per year (O'Neil, Hamilton, and Papdemetriou, 2005: 18–19).

Europe has become a major destination for Latin American migrants. Reasons include high unemployment and economic and political instability at home, demand for labour and governmental worker recruitment in European countries, and increasingly strong social networks. In addition, stricter immigration controls introduced in the USA after 11 September 2001 stimulated a shift in migration to Europe (Pellegrino, 2004: 40–45).

Spain signed bilateral labour recruitment agreements with several countries and now hosts the largest Latin American population in Europe. The over 1 million Latin Americans account for 35 percent of Spain's foreign population. Ecuadorians make up the second largest foreign group with 376,000 citizens, second only to Moroccans (Padilla and

Peixoto, 2007). Other European countries with large Latin American and Caribbean populations are Italy, Portugal, the UK, Switzerland, and Sweden (Pellegrino, 2004: 7). In Italy, the largest Latin American populations are Peruvians and Ecuadorians. There are also significant numbers of Brazilians, reflecting historic migration ties between the two countries (Padilla and Peixoto, 2007). Another notable trend in Europe is the feminization of Latin American migration, especially from the Dominican Republic and Colombia (Pellegrino, 2004: 38). In Spain, the majority of Latin American immigrants are women. This reflects a growing labour demand in the domestic sector (Pellegrino, 2004: 28–30).

Recent trends

The Inter-American Bank estimated that remittances to Latin America were US\$62.3 billion in 2006, up from US\$52 billion in 2005. An estimated 65 percent of the 25 million Latin Americans living outside their country of origin sent remittances home on a regular basis (Economist Intelligence, 2006). Most remittances came from the USA, but there were also significant inflows from Spain, Canada, and Italy. Mexico received US\$23 billion in remittances, the highest amount in the region and 3 percent of its GDP. World Bank Economist Humberto Lopez estimated that remittances alone were responsible for the reduction in the share of Latin Americans living in poverty from 28 percent in 1991 to 25 percent in 2005 (Migration News, 2006). Remittances are likely to continue to be stable sources of income for many Latin American households.

Growing trafficking of persons was in evidence throughout Latin America. Many countries served as transit points for trafficking mainly to the USA and Canada and, with increasing frequency, to Europe. The CIA estimated that approximately 50,000 women and children are trafficked to the USA each year, many of them from Latin America and the Caribbean. The Dominican Republic was a major source and transit location, and many women were trafficked to Europe and South America through Santo Domingo. Furthermore, 50,000–70,000 women from the Dominican Republic were working abroad in the sex trade. Trafficking throughout the region was expected to continue increasing.

However, many Latin American countries began cooperating with each other and international organizations to reduce trafficking (IOM, 2005: 97–98). Combating irregular migration was a major goal of the Puebla Process, formally the Regional Conference on Migration, begun in 1996. Eleven North American and Latin American states had become participants by 2000 and five other states were observers. Of the 11 regional consultative processes monitored by the IOM, the Puebla Process was regarded as one of the most successful (Klekowski von Koppenfels, 2001: 34–38). However, bilateral and regional cooperation on many issues related to irregular migration remained very problematic.

In 2007, the government of Mexico estimated that at least 4500 migrants had died on Mexico's side of the border since the US Government drastically increased border controls in 1994 (Emmott, 2007). An additional 3000 known deaths were recorded on the US side from 1998 to 2005 (Lomonoco, 2006; Marosi, 2005). Yearly deaths have at least doubled since 1995. US Border Patrol measures like 1994's Operation Gatekeeper include deployment of supplementary border-monitoring personnel, physical barriers and enhanced surveillance equipment (Cornelius, 2001). This has led migrants to rely on traffickers who often attempted to cross into the US through remote, dangerous areas (Andreas, 2001): Arizona's deserts became the busiest illegal migrant corridor. Exposure to the desert's extreme heat and cold, lack of adequate food and water, drowning, and car accidents were the leading causes of migrant deaths. In addition, several cases of killings by Border Patrol Agents, vigilantes, and 'coyotes' (migrant smugglers) were recorded. There were 13,500 border patrol agents in 2007, compared with fewer than 4000 in 1993. The US government plans to add 9,600 more patrol agents by 2012. A 700 mile-long border fence is planned, and 'virtual fences' with cameras, drones, sensors, vehicle barriers, and satellites are being constructed in desert areas (Emmott, 2007). (See Box 1.1 in Chapter 1 and Chapter 5 above.)

Overall trends and patterns in Latin American migrations already discernible in the 1990s seemed likely to endure. Most emigration will continue to go to the USA and to Canada and the scale of intraregional migrations will pale in comparison. The frequency of legalizations in Argentina rivalled those in Southern Europe. Further growth of emigration to Europe also appeared likely.

Conclusions

This chapter has dealt with three vast and diverse regions that are undergoing rapid change. Generalization is even more difficult than in the case of Asia (see Chapter 6). We hope our account here will whet the reader's appetite to go into greater depth – perhaps initially by following up the cited literature on specific areas and populations.

Yet for all the differences, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America do reflect some of the general tendencies in global migration mentioned in Chapter 1. They all show trends to globalization and acceleration of migration – that is, more countries are affected more profoundly by growing flows of migrants, to and from an increasing variety of destinations. Differentiation of migration is obvious too, with new types of mobility and the blurring of boundaries between bureaucratic categories. Feminization of migration is inescapable: women play an increasing part in both economic and forced migration, and are often the initiators and the majority in specific flows. Politicization of migration continues: it has become a key issue in both popular mobilization

and elite discourses everywhere. The tendency to migration transition is increasingly significant: North Africa, large parts of the Middle East (e.g. Iran and Turkey) and Central America can no longer be seen simply as regions of origin for migrants. They are also transit and destination areas. Some of the oil-rich states (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Libya, Venezuela) are principally immigration zones today.

Each area has its specific historical and cultural experiences, yet all reflect global trends – albeit in specific ways. In a long historical perspective it is possible to see that all the migratory movements of the South have common roots. Western penetration triggered profound changes, first through colonization, then through military involvement, political links, the Cold War, trade and investment. The recent upsurge in migration is due to rapid processes of economic, demographic, social, political, cultural and environmental change, which arise from decolonization, modernization and uneven development. These processes seem set to accelerate in the future, leading to even greater dislocations and changes in societies, and hence to even larger migrations. Thus the entry of the countries of the South into the international migration arena may be seen as an inevitable consequence of the increasing integration of these areas into the world economy and into global systems of international relations and cultural interchange.

Guide to further reading

The Age of Migration website www.age-of-migration.com includes additional text on 'migrations shaping African history' (4.2), 'remittances to Somalia' (7.1), 'the Gulf War Crisis of 1990–1991' (7.2), 'major events affecting refugees and refugee policies in the Middle East (1990–2003)' (7.3), and 'Haitian Migrant Labour and Trafficking in the Dominican Republic' (7.4).

Up-to-date information on forced migration all over the world can be found at <http://www.forcedmigration.org/>. Remittance data for all regions and countries can be found in Ratha and Zhimei (2008), accessible at www.worldbank.org/prospects/migrationandremittances. For experiences and strategies of emigration countries see Castles and Delgado Wise (2008). Useful overviews of African migration include Adepoju (2006); Bakewell and de Haas (2007); Cross et al. (2006); Curtin (1997); Mafukidze (2006); Manuh (2005); and Zlotnik (2004). See <http://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/> for information and links on African migration.

Concerning the MENA, a very useful website is www.carim.org. Baldwin-Edwards' report to the GCIM is also extremely useful with an extensive and up-to-date bibliography. The 2003 special issue of the *Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales* contains both French and English-language articles which can be accessed at <http://remi.revues.org/sommaire167.html>. On remittances and MENA see Adams (2006). On Turkey, see Kirişçi (2006) and Mutluer (2003). On Israel, see Bartram (2005).

On Latin America, the 2005 report written by O'Neil et al. for the GCIM provides an overview and can be accessed at www.gcim.org/en. IOM country reports are also helpful. For example, Venezuelan Facts and Figures can be accessed at www.IOM.int/jahia/Jahia/pid/451. Philip L. Martin's Migration News also is a very good source on Latin America as elsewhere. On Latin American migration to Europe, see Padilla and Peixoto (2006) and Pellegrino (2004). On Argentina, see Jachomiowicz (2006). The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) also remains a valuable resource. Its Social Panorama of Latin America 2006 report can be accessed at www.eclac.cl/id.asp?id=27484.

Chapter 8

The State and International Migration: The Quest for Control

International migration to highly developed states entered a new phase during the global economic recession of the early 1970s. To combat illegal immigration, postindustrial democracies such as France, Germany, and the USA embarked on what can be termed a 'quest for control' over cross-border movements. This quest entailed sustained efforts to prevent illegal migration and the abuse or circumvention of immigration regulations and policies.

This chapter appraises key components of governmental strategies designed to better regulate immigration flows. Although focusing on transatlantic states, many of the issues addressed in this chapter are relevant to, and have implications for, other regions discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. The policies examined include employer sanctions enforcement, legalization or amnesty programmes (also called regularizations), temporary foreign-worker admission programmes, asylum and refugee policies, regional integration approaches, and measures against human smuggling and trafficking. Testifying to the growing significance of migration, cooperation on such issues has become a central feature of international politics. Migration policy has evolved over time from reflecting national-based and often short-term economic and political interests to broader and more comprehensive international (if not global) management strategies.

Employer sanctions

Since the 1970s, the USA and most European states have implemented laws punishing employers for the unauthorized hiring of undocumented aliens. Known as employer sanctions, they are often coupled with legalization programmes which give work and residence permits to undocumented workers who meet certain criteria. These carrot-and-stick measures, it is argued, remove the motivation for undocumented work since employers may be punished for hiring illegal aliens while formerly undocumented workers will regularize their legal status. However, in practice, these programmes have met resistance as employers often had the political

