REFERENCES
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pean antecedents, particularly Weber and Durkheim and sometimes Malinowski. Yet it seems to me that Cooley is often much closer to this tradition than any sociologist of the generations before Parsons and Merton. Cooley never doubted the reality of social facts, yet in regarding society as an independent entity he managed to avoid many of the pitfalls to which such a view ofen leads. In contrast to Durkheim, for instance, Cooley early pointed out the dangers of reifying social facts and he explicitly separated himself from those who believed in a "collective conscience." Nor did Cooley fall prey to the kind of psychological functionalism which Malinowski adopted in his last theoretical writings. At several places in the triology— *Human Nature and the Social Order, Social Organization* and *Social Process*—Cooley asserts the usefulness of the organic view of society, in contending against the fallacy of "particularism." But while advocating this view, he points to all the difficulties involved if one interprets the organic analogy literally. As he matured, and in spite of his personal identification with the artist rather than the scientist, Cooley became more and more committed to the sociological perspective. In *Social Process* one discovers that

Cooley, whose first book was about human nature and the individual, now regards the person as a category of sociological analysis. The person, he says, is "the most evident differentiation in the process of human life." [14] With quiet power, he used this approach to analyze questions which in recent years have become key issues occupying the attention of professional sociologists—What is the role of social structure in maintaining religious ideas? How important are bureaucracy, on the one hand, and primary group ideals, on the other, in creating social cohesion? What are the functions for society, and what are the functions for the individual, of famliy organization? Under what conditions is class-consciousness likely to arise in a stratification system ordinarily characterized by open classes? What are the relative merits of inheritance and competition as mechanisms for recruiting men into the occupational hierarchy of a society?

In this list of subjects which still engage us we can perhaps see why Cooley was an anomaly in his own time: it is because he speaks so directly to ours.

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[14] *Social Process*, New York: Charles Scribner, 1925, p. 55.

A GENERAL TYPOLOGY OF MIGRATION *

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MOST studies of international migration are focused on the movement from or to one particular country, and virtually all of the other, somewhat broader works are concerned with a single historical era. Moreover, the emphasis is usually on description rather than analysis, so that the theoretical framework into which these limited data are fitted is ordinarily rather primitive. In this paper, an attempt is made to bring together into one typology some of the more significant analyses of both

internal and international migration, as a step toward a general theory of migration.

The best known model for the analysis of migration is the typology constructed some years ago by Fairchild.[1] He classifies

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[1] Henry Pratt Fairchild, *Immigration: A World Movement and Its American Significance*, Rev. edition, New York: Macmillan, 1925, pp. 13 ff. In spite of the fact that it has all the faults of a pioneer effort, this classification has been adopted uncritically in several other works on the subject. See, for example, Maurice R. Davie, *World Immigration with Special Reference to the United States*, New York: Macmillan, 1949, pp. 2–3; Julius Isaac, *Economics of Migration*, London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1947, p. 1. The most recent and in many respects the best text in the field takes over Fairchild's four types and adds a fifth, *com-*

migration into *invasion,* of which the Visigoth sack of Rome is given as the best example; *conquest,* in which "the people of higher culture take the aggressive;" *colonization,* when "a well established, progressive, and physically vigorous state" settles "newly discovered or thinly settled countries;" and *immigration,* or the individually motivated, peaceful movement between well established countries "on approximately the same stage of civilization." That is to say, Fairchild uses, more or less clearly, two main criteria as his axes—the difference in level of culture and whether or not the movement was predominantly peaceful. His four types, thus, can be represented schematically as follows:

it summarizes that the two axes are not the best that could have been chosen. An attempt to distinguish between "high" and "low" cultures is an invitation to ethnocentrism, which Fairchild does not always avoid. The contrast between "progressive" England and "newly discovered" India, for example, can hardly be termed a scientific analysis of *colonization.* Similarly, Rome's *conquest* of her empire was not merely the migration of a people of higher culture: much of Rome's culture was adapted from that of conquered Greece. Nor is the distinction between "peaceful" and "warlike" always an unambiguous one. Colonization is ordinarily neither one nor the other;[3] and the Visigoths' *invasion* of Rome, Fair-

Migration from	Migration to	Peaceful Movement	Warlike Movement
Low culture	High culture		Invasion
High culture	Low culture	Colonization	Conquest
Cultures on a level		Immigration	

Reducing the implicit underlying structure to this schematic form has the immediate advantage of indicating its incompleteness. Two types are lacking from the classification,[2] although they are well represented in history.

Such a paradigm, moreover, suggests even more strongly than the dozen pages of text

pulsory migration; see Donald R. Taft and Richard Robbins, *International Migrations: The Immigrant in the Modern World,* New York: Ronald Press, 1955, pp. 19–20.

Several other discussions are decidedly better than Fairchild's, though not nearly so well known. I found two particularly stimulating—Rudolf Heberle, "Theorie der Wanderungen: Sociologische Betrachtungen," *Schmollers Jahrbuch,* LXXV:1 (1955); and Ragnar Numelin, *The Wandering Spirit: A Study of Human Migration,* London: Macmillan, 1937. See also Howard Becker, "Forms of Population Movement: Prolegomena to a Study of Mental Mobility," *Social Forces,* 9 (December, 1930), pp. 147–160 and 9 (March, 1931), pp. 351–361.

[2] It is patent that this omission was not intentional; this is not an example of what Lazarsfeld terms "reduction"—that is, the collapsing of a formally complete typology in order to adjust it to reality. See Paul F. Lazarsfeld, "Some Remarks on the Typological Procedures in Social Science," mimeographed translation of an article that appeared originally in *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung,* vol. VI, 1937.

child's main example of this type, was predominantly a peaceful interpenetration of the two cultures, accomplished (as Fairchild points out) over more than two centuries.[4]

[3] Accordng to Fairchild, "while the resistance of the natives may be so weak as to make the enterprise hardly a military one, yet colonization is carried on without the consent, and against the will, of the original possessors of the land, and is, consequently, to be regarded rightly as a hostile movement. . . . [Moreover,] not infrequently the rivalry of two colonizing powers for some desirable locality may involve them in war with each other" (*op. cit.,* p. 19). In spite of this hedge, classifying *colonization* as "peaceful" is in accord with his main argument, for this is how he distinguishes it from *conquest.*

[4] On the one side, Germans were taken into the Roman army, granted land in the border regions and civil rights in the city; on the other side, after Wulfilas's translation of the Bible into Gothic, Roman culture made deep inroads among the Germans through their conversion to Christianity. The relation between the two cultures, therefore, was expressed not merely in a sharp confrontation on the field of battle, but also in the divided loyalties of marginal types. Alaric, leader of the Visigoths, was a romanized German, a former officer in the Roman army, a Christian; and Stilicho, the *de facto* emperor after Theodosius's death, was a German-Roman, a German by descent who had reached his high post through a successful army career. Alaric's purpose was not to overthrow Rome but, within the framework of the Empire,

This criticism of Fairchild's classification illustrates two general points: that it is useful to make explicit the logical structure of a typology, and that the criteria by which types are to be distinguished must be selected with care.

PSYCHOLOGICAL UNIVERSALS

Together with most other analysts of migration, Fairchild implies that man is everywhere sedentary, remaining fixed until he is impelled to move by some force. Like most psychological universals, this one can be matched by its opposite: man migrates because of wanderlust. And like all such universals, these cannot explain differential behavior: if all men are sedentary (or migratory) "by nature," why do some migrate and some not? If a simplistic metaphor is used, it should be at least as complex as its mechanical analogue, which includes not only the concept of forces but also that of inertia.

Thus one might better say that a social group at rest, or a social group in motion (e.g., nomads), tends to remain so unless impelled to change; for with any viable pattern of life a value system is developed to support that pattern. To analyze the migration of Gypsies, for example, in terms of push and pull is entirely inadequate— no better, in fact, than to explain modern Western migration, as Herbert Spencer did, in terms of "the restlessness inherited from ancestral nomads." [5] If this principle of inertia is accepted as valid, then the difference between gathering and nomadic peoples, on the one hand, and agricultural and industrial peoples, on the other hand, is

to get land and increased pensions (!) for his followers; Stilicho's purpose, similarly, was not to oust the Visigoths, whom he sought as allies against Constantinople, but to keep them under control. The interpenetration of the two cultures, that is to say, was a complex and subtle process, not too different from the present-day acculturation of immigrant groups. That Alaric put pressure on the Senate by marching his army into Italy was not the characteristic of "a rude people, on a low stage of culture," but the time-honored mode of lobbying used by Roman generals. Historical studies substantiate this account of the facts; I have used principally J. B. Bury, *The Invasion of Europe by the Barbarians,* London: Macmillan, 1928.

[5] Herbert Spencer, *The Principles of Sociology,* 3rd edition, New York: Appleton, 1892, I, p. 566.

fundamental with respect to migration. For once a people has a permanent place of residence, the relevance of push and pull factors is presumably much greater.

Sometimes the basic problem is not why people migrate but rather why they do not. The vast majority of American Negroes, for example, remained in the South until the First World War, in spite of the Jim Crow pattern and lynch law that developed there from the 1870's on and, as a powerful pull, the many opportunities available in the West and the burgeoning northern cities.[6]

If wanderlust and what might be termed sitzlust are not useful as psychological universals, they do suggest a criterion for a significant distinction. Some persons migrate as a means of achieving the new. Let us term such migration *innovating*. Others migrate in response to a change in conditions, in order to retain what they have had; they move geographically in order to remain where they are in all other respects. Let us term such migration *conservative*. When the migrants themselves play a passive role, as in the case of African slaves being transported to the New World, the migration is termed innovating or conservative depending on how it is defined by the activating agent, in this case the slave-traders.

The fact that the familiar push-pull polarity implies a universal sedentary quality, however, is only one of its faults. The push factors alleged to "cause" emigration ordinarily comprise a heterogeneous array, ranging from an agricultural crisis to the spirit of adventure, from the development of shipping to overpopulation. Few attempts are made to distinguish among underlying causes, facilitative environment, precipitants, and motives.[7] In particular, if we fail to distinguish between emigrants' motives and the social causes of emigration—that is, if we do not take the emigrants' level of

[6] See Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy,* New York: Harper, 1944, Chapter 8, for an extended discussion of this point. For an international example, see William Petersen, *Planned Migration,* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1955, Chapter 3, which discusses the several factors in prewar Holland that seemingly should have induced a large emigration, but did not.

[7] Cf. R. M. MacIver, *Social Causation,* Boston: Ginn, 1942.

aspiration into account—our analysis lacks logical clarity. Economic hardship, for example, can appropriately be termed a "cause" of emigration only if there is a positive correlation between hardship, however defined, and the propensity to migrate.[8] Often the relation has been an inverse one; for example, the mass emigration from Europe in modern times developed together with a marked *rise* in the European standard of living. As has been shown by several studies, the correlation was rather with the business cycle in the receiving country,[9] and even this relation explains fluctuations in the emigration rate more than its absolute level. Nor can the class differential in the rate of emigration be ascribed simply to economic differences. The middle class lived in more comfortable circumstances, but for many a move to America would have meant also a definite material improvement. During the period of mass emigration, however, this was stereotyped as lower-class behavior, as more than a bit unpatriotic for the well-to-do. For a middle-class person to emigrate meant a break with the established social pattern; therefore in the middle class, especially marginal types like idealists or black sheep left the country, and these for relevant *personal* reasons. Once a migration has reached the stage of a social movement, however, such personal motivations are generally of little interest.

This kind of confusion is not limited to economic factors. Religious oppression or the infringement of political liberty was often a *motive* for emigration from Europe, but before the rise of modern totalitarianism emigrants were predominantly from the

European countries least marked by such stigmata. An increasing propensity to emigrate spread east and south from Northwest Europe, together with democratic institutions and religious tolerance. Again, we are faced with the anomaly that those who emigrated "because" of persecution tended to come from countries where there was less than elsewhere.

When the push-pull polarity has been refined in these two senses, by distinguishing innovating from conservative migration and by including in the analysis the migrants' level of aspiration, it can form the basis of an improved typology of migration. Five broad classes of migration, designated as primitive, forced, impelled, free, and mass, are discussed below.

PRIMITIVE MIGRATION

The first class of migration to be defined is that resulting from an ecological push, and we shall term this *primitive* migration. Here, then, primitive migration does not denote the wandering of primitive peoples as such, but rather a movement related to man's inability to cope with natural forces. Since the reaction to a deterioration in the physical environment can be either remedial action or emigration, depending on the technology available to the people concerned, there is, however, a tendency for primitive migration in this narrower sense to be associated with primitive peoples.

Many of the treks of preindustrial folk seem, moreover, to have been conservative in the sense defined above. "There is often a tendency for [such] a migrating group to hold conservatively to the same type of environment; pastoral people, for example, attempt to remain on grasslands, where their accustomed life may be continued."[10] Such conservative migrations are set not by push and pull, but by the interplay of push and control. The route is shaped by both natural and man-made barriers: mountains, rivers, or rainfall or the lack of it; and the Great Wall of China or other, less monumental, evidences of hostility toward aliens. If they are indifferent about where they are going,

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[8] Similarly, no principled difference is usually made between what is sometimes termed "absolute overpopulation," which results in hunger and starvation, and milder degrees of "overpopulation," which reflect not physiological but cultural standards. In the first case the aspiration of emigrants can be ignored, for it is a bare physiological minimum that can be taken as universal; but in the second case it is the level of aspiration itself that defines the "overpopulation" and sets an impetus to emigrate.

[9] Harry Jerome, *Migration and Business Cycles,* New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1926; Dorothy Swaine Thomas, *Social and Economic Aspects of Swedish Population Movements, 1750–1933,* New York: Macmillan, 1941, Chapter 9.

[10] Roland B. Dixon, "Migrations, Primitive," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences,* New York: Macmillan, 1934, Vol. X, pp. 420–425.

men migrate as liquids flow, along the lines of least resistance. Conservative migrants seek only a place where they can resume their old way of life, and when this is possible they are content. Sometimes it is not possible, and any migration, therefore, may be associated with a fundamental change in culture.

The frequent designation for migrations of prehistoric primitives used to be "wandering of peoples," a translation from the German that, however inelegant, is nevertheless appropriate, for it denotes two of the characteristics that define it. For usually peoples as a whole migrate, not merely certain families or groups, and they leave without a definite destination, as "wander" implies in English. Let us, then, term migrations induced by ecological pressure as the *wandering of peoples*. Unintended movements over the ocean—an analogous type of primitive migration, which can be termed *marine wanderings*—have occurred more frequently than was once supposed.

> There are countless examples . . . [of] more or less accidental wanderings from island to island over oceanic expanses of water, brought about by winds and currents. The space of time and extent of these voyages seem to play a subordinate part. Journeys covering 3,000 miles are not unusual. They may last six weeks or several months. Even without provisions the natives can get along, as they fish for their food and collect rainwater to drink.[11]

Contemporary primitives also often move about in a way directly related to the low level of their material culture. A food-gathering or hunting people cannot ordinarily subsist from what is available in one vicinity; it must range over a wider area, moving either haphazardly or back and forth over its traditional territory. Such movements can be called *gathering*. The analogous type of migratory movements of cattle-owning peoples is called *nomadism,* from the Greek word meaning to graze. Gatherers and nomads together are termed *rangers*.

The way of life of rangers is to be on the move, and their culture is adapted to this state. Their home is temporary or portable; some Australian peoples have no word for

"home" in their language. Their value system adjudges the specific hardships of their life to be good; the contempt that the desert Arab feels for the more comfortable city Arab is traditional. Although their ordinary movement is usually over a restricted area, bounded by either physical barriers or peoples able to defend their territories, rangers are presumably more likely to migrate over longer distances (apart from differences in the means of transportation) simply because they are already in motion. Whether any particular nomad people settles down and becomes agricultural does not depend merely on geography. Geography determines only whether such a shift in their way of life is possible—it is barely feasible on the steppe, for example; but even when physical circumstances permit a change, the social pattern of ranging may be too strong to be broken down. The Soviet program of settling the Kirghiz and other nomad peoples on collective farms, for example, succeeded because it was implemented by sufficient terror to overcome their opposition.[12] That is to say, ranging, like wandering, is typically conservative.

A primitive migration of an agrarian population takes place when there is a sharp disparity between the produce of the land and the number of people subsisting from it. This can come about either suddenly, as by drought or an attack of locusts, or by the steady Malthusian pressure of a growing population on land of limited area and fertility. Persons induced to migrate by such population pressure can seek another agricultural site, but in the modern era the more usual destination has been a town: the migration has ordinarily been innovating rather than conservative. The Irish immigrants to the United States in the decades following the Great Famine, for example, resolutely ignored the Homestead Act and other inducements to settle on the land; in overwhelming proportion, they moved to the cities and stayed there. Let us term such an innovating movement *flight from*

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[11] Numelin, *op. cit.*, pp. 180–181.

[12] For a documentation from two sources of divergent political views, see Rudolf Schlesinger, *The Nationalities Problem and Soviet Administration,* London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1956; Walter Kolarz, *The Peoples of the Soviet Far East,* New York: Praeger, 1954.

the land (again, an inelegant but useful translation from the German).

To recapitulate, primitive migration may be divided as follows:

Primitive	Wandering	Wandering of peoples
		Marine wandering
	Ranging	Gathering
		Nomadism
	Flight from the land	

These are the types of migration set by ecological push and controls, usually geographical but sometimes social.

FORCED AND IMPELLED MIGRATIONS

If in primitive migrations the activating agent is ecological pressure, in forced migrations it is the state or some functionally equivalent social institution. It is useful to divide this class into *impelled* migration, when the migrants retain some power to decide whether or not to leave, and *forced* migration, when they do not have this power. Often the boundary between the two, the point at which the choice becomes nominal, may be difficult to set. Analytically, however, the distinction is clearcut, and historically it is often so. The difference is real, for example, between the Nazis' policy (roughly 1933–38) of encouraging Jewish emigration by various anti-Semitic acts and laws, and the later policy (roughly 1938–45) of herding Jews into cattle-trains and transporting them to camps.

A second criterion by which we can delineate types of forced or impelled migration is its function, defined not by the migrant but by the activating agent. Persons may be induced to move simply to rid their homeland of them; such a migration, since it does not ordinarily bring about a change in the migrants' way of life, is analogous to conservative migration and can be subsumed under it. Others are induced to move in order that their labor power can be used elsewhere; and such a migration, which constitutes a shift in behavior patterns as well as in locale, is designated as innovating.

Four types are thus defined, as follows:

In all of human history, *flight* has been an important form of migration. Whenever a stronger people moves into a new territory, it may drive before it the weaker former occupants. The invasion of Europe during the early centuries of the Christian era thus was induced not only by the power vacuum resulting from the disintegration of the Roman Empire, but also by a series of successive pushes, originating from either the desiccation of the Central Asian steppes (Huntington) or the expansion of the Chinese empire still farther east (Teggart).[13]

Many more recent migrations have also been primarily a flight before invading armies.[14] In modern times, however, those induced to flee have often been specific groups among the population, rather than everyone occupying a particular territory. Political dissidents, of course, always were ousted when they became a danger to state security; but with the growth of nationalism ethnic as well as political homogeneity has been sought. The right of national self-determination proclaimed by the Treaty of Versailles included no provision for the minorities scattered through Central Europe; and in the interwar period the League of Nations negotiated a series of population transfers designed to eliminate national minorities from adjacent countries or, more usually, to legitimate expulsions already effected.[15] The separation of Pakistan from India, another example, was accompanied by one of the largest migrations in human history, in part induced by terrorist groups

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[13] Ellsworth Huntington, *Civilization and Climate,* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951; Frederick Teggart, *Rome and China: A Study of Correlations in Historical Events,* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1939.

[14] See, for example, Eugene M. Kulischer, *Europe on the Move,* New York: Columbia University Press, 1948.

[15] Cf. Stephen P. Ladas, *The Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey,* New York: Macmillan, 1932, p. 721: "Both conventions [of Neuilly and Lausanne], and especially that of Lausanne, proved to be agreements confirming accomplished facts," and the Greek-Turkish exchange, while "voluntary in theory, became in fact to a great extent compulsory."

	Impelled	Forced
To be rid of migrants (conservative)	Flight	Displacement
To use migrants' labor (innovating)	Coolie trade	Slave trade

on both sides and in part arranged under
official auspices.

It is useful to distinguish between two
classes of those who have fled their home-
land—*émigrés,* who regard their exile as
temporary and live abroad for the day when
they may return, and *refugees,* who in-
tend to settle permanently in the new coun-
try. Under otherwise similar circumstances,
the acculturation of the latter would pre-
sumably be much more rapid than that
of persons still living spiritually in another
country.

Frequently, even the pretense that the
movement is voluntary has been lacking.
As part of its European population policy,
Nazi Germany exported Jews to camps and
imported forced laborers from all occupied
countries. The latter movement was a mod-
ern variant of the earlier slave-trade, but
the largely successful attempt to kill off
some millions of persons because of their
supposed racial inferiority was something
new in history. In the jargon of official
bureaus, those that survived such forced
migration have been termed "displaced per-
sons," a designation that clearly implies
their passive role. The forced movement
itself is here called *displacement.*

The forced migrations under Soviet aus-
pices have typically served two purposes,
to remove a dissident or potentially dissident
group from its home [16] and to furnish an

unskilled labor force in an inhospitable area.
During the first two five-year plans, several
million "kulaks" were removed en masse
to the sites of cities-to-be, and the inhabit-
ants of the five national units of the USSR
abolished during the war were deported
wholesale to forced-labor camps.[17] Such
movements combine displacement with *slave
trade,* or the forcible migration of laborers.
While the overseas shipment of Africans dur-
ing the mercantile age differed in some re-
spects from the use of forced labor in an
industrial economy, the two criteria that
define the type are the same—the use of
force and the supply of labor power.

The analogous form of impelled migra-
tion is termed *coolie trade.* This includes not
only the movement of Asians to plantations,
the most typical form, but also, for example,
the migration of white indentured servants
to the British colonies in the 18th century.
Such migrants, while formally bound only
for the period of a definite contract, very
often are forced into indebtedness and thus
to extend their period of service indefi-
nitely.[18] But as in other cases of impelled
and forced migration, even when the dif-
ference between historical instances becomes
blurred, the analytical distinction is clear.
Another important difference between slave
and coolie migration is that many coolies
eventually return to their homeland. The
total emigration from India from 1834 to
1937, for example, has been estimated at
slightly more than 30 million, but of these

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[16] For example, after Poland was divided be-
tween Nazi Germany and Communist Russia in
1939, the more than a million Poles deported to
Asiatic Russia were chosen not merely on the
basis of actual or alleged opposition to their coun-
try's invasion but more often as members of a
large variety of occupational groups, which were
defined as potentially oppositionist. "Regarded as
'anti-Soviet elements,' and so treated, were ad-
ministrative officials, police, judges, lawyers, mem-
bers of Parliament, prominent members of political
parties, non-communist non-political societies, clubs,
and the Red Cross; civil servants not included
above, retired military officers, officers in the
reserve, priests, tradesmen, landowners, hotel and
restaurant owners, clerks of the local Chambers
of Commerce, and any class of persons engaged
in trade or correspondence with foreign countries—
the latter definition extending even to stamp col-
lectors and Esperantists—were also deported. Many
artisans, peasants, and laborers (both agricultural
and industrial), were banished too, so that, in effect,
no Polish element was spared." Edward J. Rozek,
Allied Wartime Diplomacy: A Pattern in Poland,
New York: Wiley, 1958, p. 39.

[17] The Volga-German ASSR, the Kalmyk ASSR,
the Chechen-Ingush ASSR, the Crimean ASSR,
and the Karachayev Region were designated as
"disloyal nationalities," and the major portion of
the 2.8 million inhabitants were removed from
their immemorial homeland. The million or so
Tatars brought into Crimea to replace the deportees
also proved to be unreliable, and in 1945 most of
these were also deported to forced labor. See
David J. Dallin and Boris I. Nicolaevsky, *Forced
Labor in Soviet Russia,* New Haven: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1947, pp. 274–277. According to a
decree dated January 9, 1957, the survivors among
five of the uprooted peoples are to be shipped back
to their homes over the next several years. Even
under this new policy, however, the Volga Germans
and the Tatars are presumably to be left in their
Siberian exile (*New York Times,* February 12,
1957).

[18] See, for example, Victor Purcell, *The Chinese
in Southeast Asia,* London: Oxford University
Press, 1951, p. 345.

almost 24 million returned, leaving a net emigration over the century of only six million.[19]

FREE MIGRATION

In the types of migration discussed so far, the will of the migrants has been a relatively unimportant factor. A primitive migration results from the lack of means to satisfy basic physiological needs, and in forced (or impelled) migration the migrants are largely passive. We now consider the types in which the will of the migrants is the decisive element, that is, *free* migrations.

Overseas movements from Europe during the 19th century afford important illustrations of this class of migration. Because of the excellence of its formal analysis, Lindberg's monograph on emigration from Sweden [20] has been chosen as an example. Lindberg distinguishes three periods, each with a characteristic type of emigrant. During the first stage, beginning around 1840, emigrants came principally from the two university towns of Upsala and Lund; they were "men with a good cultural and social background, mostly young and of a romantic disposition" (p. 3). Since the risks in emigration were great and difficult to calculate, those who left tended to be adventurers or intellectuals motivated by their ideals, especially by their alienation from European society during a period of political reaction. The significance of this *pioneer* movement was not in its size, which was never large, but in the example it set: "It was this emigration that helped to break the ice and clear the way for the later emigration, which included quite different classes" (p. 7). These pioneers wrote letters home; their adventures in the new world were recounted in Swedish newspapers. Once settled in the new country, they helped finance the passage of their families or friends.

Imperceptibly, this first stage developed into the second, the period of *group migration*—the emigration, for example, of Pietist communities under the leadership of their pastor or another person of recognized authority. Even when not associated through their adherence to a dissident sect, emigrants banded together for mutual protection during the hazardous journey and against the wilderness and the often hostile Indians at its end. Again, the significance of this group migration lay not in its size but in the further impulse it gave. During the decade beginning in 1841, an average of only 400 persons left Sweden annually, and during the following decade, this average was still only 1,500.

MASS MIGRATION

Free migration is always rather small,[21] for individuals strongly motivated to seek novelty or improvement are not commonplace. The most significant attribute of pioneers, as in other areas of life, is that they blaze trails that others follow, and sometimes the number who do so grows into a broad stream. Migration becomes a style, an established pattern, an example of collective behavior. Once it is well begun, the growth of such a movement is semi-automatic: so long as there are people to emigrate, the principal cause of emigration is prior emigration. Other circumstances operate as deterrents or incentives, but within this kind of attitudinal framework; all factors except population growth are important principally in terms of the established behavior. As we have already noted, when emigration has been set as a *social* pattern, it is no longer relevant to inquire concerning the *individual* motivations. For the individual is, in Lindberg's phrase, in an "unstable state of equilibrium," in which only a small impulse in either direction decides his course; hence the motives he ascribes to his emigration are either trivial or, more likely, the generalities that he thinks are expected.[22]

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[19] Kingsley Davis, *The Population of India and Pakistan*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951, p. 99.

[20] John S. Lindberg, *The Background of Swedish Emigration to the United States: An Economic and Sociological Study in the Dynamics of Migration*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1930.

[21] As in general throughout this essay, the words used to designate the classes or types of migration are terms in common usage rather than neologisms. Since they are here more precisely defined than in most contexts, however, they denote a narrower range of meaning; thus free migration is not all unforced migration, for it is one of five rather than two classes.

[22] Hansen has pointed out that the migrant's motivation was likely to be pruned to suit the

The development of migration as collective behavior is aptly illustrated by the Swedish case. During the decade 1861–70, when the average number of emigrants jumped to 9,300 per year, the transition to the third stage of *mass* emigration began. Transportation facilities improved: railroads connected the interior with the port cities, and the sailing ship began to be replaced by the much faster and safer steamer. While its relation to mass migration was important, this improvement in transportation facilities was not a cause; rather, it is "possible and even probable that emigration and the development of transportation were largely caused by the same forces" (p. 15, n. 17). Not only was the geographical distance cut down but also what Lindberg terms the social distance: as communities in the new country grew in size and importance, the shift from Sweden to America required less and less of a personal adjustment. Before the migrant left his homeland, he began his acculturation in an American-Swedish milieu, made up of New World letters, photographs, mementoes, knick-knacks. There developed what the peasants

person asking for it. The official in the home country was told of material difficulties, but to cite these in America would confirm the natives' belief that the foreigner was a dangerous economic competitor. The village clergyman, should he attempt to dissuade a prospective migrant, was told that his sons were growing up without a future and becoming lazy and shiftless; but in America these moral motives would give point to the argument that immigrants were depraved. Hence, "the newcomer said, 'I came to the United States to enjoy the blessings of your marvelous government and laws,' [and] the native warmed to him and was likely to inquire whether there was not something he could do to assist him. Immigrants soon learned the magic charm of this confession of faith. They seized every opportunity to contrast the liberty of the New World with the despotism of the Old." Marcus Lee Hansen, *The Immigrant in American History*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940, pp. 77–78.

This is a good example of why public opinion polling can be deficient as a method of social—rather than social psychological—analysis. Each respondent queried replies in terms of his own norms, and for the whole sample these may differ considerably, depending on how heterogeneous the respondents are with respect to the subject of the poll. To sum up the Yes's and No's without taking into account the criteria that determined these replies is appropriate only when we are interested solely in the sum, as in an election.

called "America fever": in some districts, there was not a farm without some relatives in America, and from many all the children had emigrated. According to a government report that Lindberg quotes, children were "educated to emigrate," and he continues—

When they finally arrived at a decision, they merely followed a tradition which made emigration the natural thing in a certain situation. In fact, after the imagination and fantasy had, so to speak, become "charged with America," a positive decision *not* to emigrate may have been necessary if difficulties arose. (pp. 56–57.)

The Swedes who migrated to Minnesota became farmers or small-town craftsmen or merchants. In a more general analysis, it is useful to distinguish two types of mass movement according to the nature of the destination—*settlement,* such as Lindberg described, and *urbanization,* or mass migration to a larger town or city. No distinction in principle is made here between internal and international migration, for the fundamentals of the rural-urban shift so characteristic of the modern era are generally the same whether or not the new city-dwellers cross a national border.

CONCLUSIONS

The typology developed in this paper is summarized in the attached table. Such a typology is a tool, and it is worth constructing only if it is useful. What is its utility?

This question may be answered against a perspective of the present undeveloped status of migration theory. Classifications of modern migrations tend to derive from the statistics that are collected, whether or not these have any relevance to theoretical questions. It is as if those interested in the *causes* of divorce studied this matter exclusively with data classified according to the *grounds* on which divorces are granted. Even the principal statistical differentiation, that between internal and international migration, is not necessarily of theoretical significance.[23] Similarly, when the species *migrant*

[23] The movement westward across the United States, for example, included a swing northward to the western provinces of Canada at the turn of the century, and today American cities attract both Americans and Canadians. In both cases, one

is set off from the genus *traveler* by arbitrarily defining removal for a year or more as "permanent" migration, such a distinction clearly has little or no theoretical basis, and it is not even certain that it is the most convenient one that could be made.[24] The preferable procedure in any discipline is to establish our concepts and the logical relation among them, and to collect our statistics in terms of this conceptual framework. The principal purpose of the typology, then, is to offer, by such an ordering of conceptual types, a basis for the possible development of theory. "Since sound sociological interpretation inevitably *implies* some theoretic paradigm, it seems the better part of wisdom to bring it out into the open," first of all because such a paradigm "provides a compact parsimonious arrangement of the central concepts and their interrelations as these are utilized for description and analysis." [25]

Migration differs from fertility and mortality in that it cannot be analyzed, even at the outset, in terms of non-cultural, physiological factors, but must be differentiated with respect to relevant social conditions. This means that the most general statement that one makes concerning migration should be in the form of a typology, rather than a law.[26] While few today would follow Ravenstein's example by denoting their statements

"laws," [27] most treatments of migratory selection still imply a comparable degree of generality. Even the best discussions [28] typically neglect to point out that selection ranges along a continuum, from total migration to total non-migration, or that the predominance of females in rural-urban migration that Ravenstein noted must be contrasted with male predominance in, for example, India's urbanization. As we have seen, the familiar push-pull polarity implies a universal sedentary tendency, which has little empirical basis in either history or psychology. Analogously, the distinction between conservative and innovating migration challenges the usual notion that persons universally migrate in order to change their way of life.

Sometimes an analytical problem can be clarified by defining more precisely the two more or less synonymous terms that denote a confusion in concepts. For example, the question of whether the secular decline in the Western birth rate was due to a physiological deterioration or to new cultural standards was often not put clearly until *fecundity* was precisely distinguished from *fertility*. Several such pairs of terms are differentiated here. Whether a movement from the countryside to towns is *urbanization* or *flight from the land* can be a very important distinction; the discussion of Canada's immigration policy, for example, has largely centered on this point.[29] While the distinction between *urbanization* and *settlement* would seem to be so obvious that it can hardly be missed, one can say that the national-quota system of American immigration law is based in part at least on neglect of the implications of this differentiation.[30] The most useful distinction in the

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may interpret English-speaking North America as a single labor market, with the international border acting primarily as an added friction to free mobility. See Brinley Thomas, *Migration and Economic Growth: A Study of Great Britain and the Atlantic Economy* (National Institute of Economic and Social Research), London: Cambridge University Press, 1954, pp. 134–138.

[24] Thus in his recent study of British migration, Isaac found it useful to distinguish between those who intend to settle elsewhere permanently and what he termed "quasi-permanent" migrants or those who leave for a year or more but intend to return. See Julius Isaac, *British Post-War Migration* (National Institute of Economic and Social Research), Occasional Paper XVII, Cambridge University Press, 1954, p. 2.

[25] Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*, Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1949, p. 14. For an interesting article exemplifying the usefulness of such a typology, see Merton, "Intermarriage and the Social Structure: Fact and Theory," *Psychiatry*, 4 (August, 1941), pp. 361–374.

[26] This point is very effectively argued by Heberle, *op. cit.*

[27] E. G. Ravenstein, "The Laws of Migration," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, XLVIII (June, 1885), pp. 167–235; LII (June, 1889), pp. 241–305.

[28] See, for example, Dorothy Swaine Thomas (ed.), *Research Memorandum of Migration Differentials*, New York: Social Science Research Council, Bulletin 43, 1938; E. W. Hofstee, *Some Remarks on Selective Migration*, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1952.

[29] See Petersen, *op. cit.*, pp. 202 ff.

[30] The main source of immigration to the United States shifted from Northwest Europe to Southern and Eastern Europe at about the same time that

Relation	Migratory Force	Class of Migration	Type of Migration	
			Conservative	Innovating
Nature and man	Ecological push	Primitive	Wandering	Flight from the land
			Ranging	
State (or equivalent) and man	Migration policy	Forced	Displacement	Slave trade
		Impelled	Flight	Coolie trade
Man and his norms	Higher aspirations	Free	Group	Pioneer
Collective behavior	Social momentum	Mass	Settlement	Urbanization

typology, perhaps, is that between *mass* migration and all other types, for it emphasizes the fact that the movement of Europeans to the New World during the 19th century, the migration with which we are most familiar, does not constitute the whole of the phenomenon. When this type of mi-

gration declined after the First World War, largely because of new political limitations imposed by both emigration and immigration countries, this was very often interpreted, not as a change to a different type, but as the end of significant human migration altogether.[31] A world in which hardly anyone dies in the place where he was born, however, can hardly be termed sedentary.

the American economy underwent a fundamental transformation from an agrarian to an industrial base; consequently *some* of the observed differences between the "old" and the "new" immigration were due not to variations among European cultures, as is assumed in the law, but to the different rate of acculturation of peasants undergoing settlement or urbanization.

[31] The two best known statements of this point of view are W. D. Forsyth, *The Myth of Open Spaces*, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1942, and Isaiah Bowman (ed.), *Limits of Land Settlement*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1937.

URBANIZATION AND NATURAL RESOURCES:
A STUDY IN ORGANIZATIONAL ECOLOGY

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THIS paper describes an attempt to formulate and test a theory designed to explain differences among countries with respect to two related phenomena—*urbanization* and *metropolitanization*. In the former case the theory seeks to account for differences in the proportion of the population residing in cities as such, while in the case of metropolitanization the concern is with differences in the proportion of the population residing in large cities. No attempt at a formal definition of "city" is made, but, as later sections will show, the term as used here conforms to generally accepted practice.[1]

[1] It is recognized that in any international comparison of urbanization or metropolitanization the investigator inevitably faces the technical and theo-

ORGANIZATION FOR SUSTENANCE

A matter that has received insufficient attention from sociologists is social organization designed to obtain material sustenance, i.e., *objects of consumption*, for the population.[2] This relative neglect of organization for sustenance probably results from the dominance of economics and geography in this area, and a tendency on the part of soci-

retical problems revolving around the lack of a common technical definition of "city," but the writers prefer at this stage to concentrate on elaboration of the theory itself.

[2] By "objects of consumption" is meant material things, raw or processed, that are consumed by a population. Thus the "natural resources" of an area may or may not be objects of consumption at any given time.