

The Politics of Exclusion: The Haiderisation of Europe¹

Ruth Wodak

1 A “New” Racism (Xenophobia/Anti-Semitism)? – The Rise of Rightwing Populism

In many European countries, the extreme right have refined their electoral programs under the rubric of nationalist-populist slogans and have adopted more subtle (i. e. coded) forms of racism.² The move away from overt neo-fascist discourse has in fact allowed these parties to expand their electoral support as *populist nationalist parties* (Rydgren 2005; Delanty/O’Mahony 2002; Wodak/Pelinka 2002; Pelinka/Wodak 2002). In several European countries, such parties form part of the government (or have formed part), like in Austria, Denmark or Italy; in other countries, such parties have recently succeeded (in the elections to the European Parliament, June 2009) to collect more votes (like in the United Kingdom or Hungary). The new coded rhetoric has paradoxically led to an increase in racist and anti-Semitic discourse, not to its decline, since racism now often takes more pervasive, diffuse forms, even to the point of being expressed as the denial of racism (Van Dijk 1989). There is considerable evidence of a normalization of “othering” (racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism) in political discourse, and there is much to indicate that this is also occurring at all levels of society, ranging from the media, political parties, and institutions to everyday life (Race and Class 2001; Wodak 2008a; Van Dijk 2005; Wodak/Van Dijk 2000).

The issues and social phenomena which have to be regarded as salient nowadays are *inter alia* the following:

1. Laws on immigration and their implementation; debates on “multiculturalism” and security policies³
2. Debates on citizenship; implementation of the so-called “citizenship tests”⁴
3. Definitions of “migrants”, “asylum seekers”, and “refugees”: who falls in which category? Or are these notions and meanings merging into one category of “*the* – threatening – other”?
4. Debates on “the headscarf” as a salient symbol of “*the* other”

1 In this paper I draw on the extensive research undertaken in collaboration with Martin Reisigl, Teun van Dijk, Anton Pelinka, John Richardson, and the members of the XENOPHOB project, particularly Gerard Delanty and Michał Krzyżanowski.

2 For research on new-old forms of racism and anti-Semitism see Wodak 2003a; Wodak 2003b; Wodak 2007a; Wodak 2007b; Wodak 2008a; Wodak 2008b; Wodak 2008c; Krzyżanowski/Wodak 2008; Wodak/Pelinka 2002; Wodak/Van Dijk 2000; Pelinka/Wodak 2002; Reisigl/Wodak 2001; Reisigl/Wodak 2009; Wodak/Reisigl 2002; Richardson/Wodak 2009a; Richardson/Wodak 2009b.

3 See European project <http://www.imiscoe.org>; for EU member states <http://www.imiscoe.org/publications/workingpapers/index.html>.

4 See <http://www.imiscoe.org/publications/policybriefs/index.html>.

5. The raise of anti-Semitism and the transition/merging of old anti-Semitic stereotypes with new anti-Israeli/anti-US discourses⁵
6. The blurring of boundaries between, and the recontextualisation, of anti-Semitic stereotypes into anti-Muslim rhetoric – as the symbol of “*the – threatening – other*”
7. Recurrent nationalistic/chauvinist rhetoric accompanying the current financial crisis and rising unemployment across EU member-states (“British jobs for British workers”; Richardson/Wodak 2009a)
8. All these issues are part and parcel of the search of, and of debates about, (a) new European identity/ies and of “belonging” (Delanty et al. 2008)

In this chapter, I will focus on a few relevant aspects of these complex and intricately linked phenomena by analysing recent examples from Austria and attempting to trace their histories. The question poses itself, *if forms of exclusionary rhetoric have changed since 1945 and the end of World War II* – or if they have stayed the same. I claim that indeed – although some continuities can certainly be observed (cf. Krzyzanowski/Wodak 2008; Wodak et al. 1990; Wodak 2009) – new patterns have emerged, which concern the de-tabooization of specific anti-Semitic and racist contents as well as the merging of all types of “others” into one category, be they refugees, asylum-seekers, or migrants. Moreover, the integration/combination of anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim stereotypes can also be encountered. Whenever possible, I will draw comparisons to other EU member states based on new opinion polls (“Eurobarometer 2007”) and recent analyses of the European Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), based in Vienna, of which I co-direct the Austrian National Focal Point (NFP). I will also attempt drawing some distinctions between the various forms of racisms and exclusionary practices, due to their history and contextual dependency.

Moreover, due to reasons of space, I will necessarily have to restrict myself to two forms of discriminatory rhetoric which are salient in constructing *the other*: these are the *discursive construction of “us”* and “*them*” through positive self- and negative other presentation; and *visual forms of discriminatory argumentation*.

In sum, I claim that we are currently dealing increasingly with *syncretic forms of social exclusion and discrimination* where traditional distinctions have become obsolete (Wodak/Reisigl 2002; Wodak et al. 1990). I will illustrate my assumptions with one example from recent research conducted with John Richardson, from Loughborough University, on racist visual argumentation in Austria and the United Kingdom.⁶

2 Some recent incidents occurring (or one week in February 2009)

First, I list a few unsystematic observations from Austria in February 2009 which any reader of the press would have been able to encounter and which illustrate the range of discriminatory practices to be currently visible.

5 See http://www.fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/attachments/Antisem_Overview_Janv2_2008_en.pdf.

6 I will, however, have to neglect the British examples in this chapter and concentrate on the Austrian rhetoric. For the comparison, I refer readers to Richardson/Wodak 2009a; Richardson/Wodak 2009b.

- Since end of January 2009, debates about the Pope's decision to rehabilitate Bishop Williamson, a Holocaust denier, have led to huge protests in Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish circles. The Pope has posed an ultimatum to Williamson to withdraw his explicitly stated opinions, albeit without a final date. On February 20th, Williamson was refused residence in Argentina.
- February 13th, an Austrian Muslim religion teacher was suspended because he had distributed leaflets in a Viennese school, appealing to the children, "not to buy in Jewish shops".
- Friday, February 13th, the walls of the former Nazi concentration camp Mauthausen were smeared by neo-Nazis with the following slogan: "Our fathers dealt with *the Jew*; we need to be aware of Muslims – the Third World War – crusade 0 8" [my translation].
- Sunday, February 15th, the designated new bishop of Linz (Upper Austria), Karl Wagner, resigned due to massive protests inside the church because of discriminatory remarks aimed against homosexuals, women, – and the hurricane Katrina.
- Sunday, February 15th, an African-American man was beaten up by the police when he left the tube in Vienna. The police stated that they had assumed that the man was a drug dealer. In fact, he is a sports teacher in the International School in Vienna and a US citizen. He had to be taken to hospital. The police started an investigation and apologised.
- Monday, 16th February, a TV documentary in ORF2 (Austrian state-owned broadcasting company; program "Thema"), presented extreme human rights violations: refugees from Gambia had been ordered to appear at the police in Vienna to be confronted with people from the Gambian embassy – apparently to make sure that they "really" were citizens from Gambia – although they were frightened that they would be recognised and deported. Human rights lawyers intervened and succeeded in protecting the refugees; they were not subjected to such an interview which would have been a blatant violation of European Law.

Many more incidents could be listed, in Austria, and in other European countries. In fact, the European country with most racist incidents is currently Greece.⁷ For example, the following document was recently published:

"The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights addressed a letter in December 2006 (made public in 2007) to the Greek government regarding the evictions of Roma in Patras. In the letter he stated:

'I saw Roma families living in very poor conditions. Also, I met with a family whose simple habitat had been bulldozed away that same morning. It was obvious that the 'procedures' for making them homeless were in total contradiction to human rights standards I referred to above. I was also disturbed to notice that non-Roma people appeared on both sites during my visit and behaved in an aggressive, threatening manner to the extent that my interviews with some of the Roma families were disturbed. I had expected that the police would have offered more obvious protection and I did not get the impression of a principled, clear position by the local authorities against such xenophobic, anti-Ziganistic tendencies.'

7 See http://www.fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/products/publications_reports/ar2008_part2_en.htm.

In response, the Greek government indicated that they had not answered the Commissioner's letter, because they did not possess "adequate information".⁸

Racism, it would appear, despite the absence of clearly defined or definable "races," is alive and well. But how pervasive is it, and what kind of claims can be made about the extent of racial discrimination within politics, social institutions, and in everyday life on the other? Taking the Austrian examples as point of departure, I would like to provide some understanding of the many socio-political, historical, discursive, and socio-cognitive processes involved in such expressions of *political*, *institutional* and *everyday* racism – processes which are not always evident from more overt expressions of racism. Moreover, in this way, we can explore continuities and discontinuities in the expression of discrimination since 1945.

3 Cultural and Linguistic Meanings of "Racism" – the "Racialized Subject"

I rely on a working definition of "racism" that considers at least two levels: firstly, the level of ideology and beliefs (about groups, minorities, "others") and secondly, the level of social practices (Who is included? Who is excluded?). The multidimensional nature of racism is usefully captured by the concept of "syncretic racism", which encompasses concepts such as everyday racism, xeno-racism and other forms of racism (such as racialization, otherism, etc). By "syncretic racism" I mean the construction of "differences" that serve ideological, political and/or practical discrimination within all levels of society. Old and new stereotypes and prejudices form a mixed bag of exclusionary practices; they are used whenever they are seen to be politically expedient – such as in gaining votes.⁹

Moreover, it is important to stress that the term "racism" means different things in different languages: The radicalized "race" theory of the German anti-Semites and National Socialists in the tradition of Arthur de Gobineau, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, and Georg Ritter von Schönerer tied together in a syncretic manner various forms of religious, nationalist, culturalist, economic, and biologicistic racism and anti-Semitism, which then served as the ideological basis for the legitimization of systematic, industrialized genocide. It was this use of "race theory" that stimulated a more thorough critical appraisal of the idea of "race" in Europe and North America and the creation of the concept of racism in the 1930s (Miles 1993: 29).

Since 1945, the use of the term "race" (*Rasse*) in the German speaking countries of Germany, Switzerland, and Austria has been strictly taboo for politicians, for academics, and even for the people in general. In France, the expression *relations de race* would also be regarded as racist (Wieviorka 1994: 173). On the other hand, the term "race relations" is still commonly used in the United Kingdom and in the United States.

Research into racism must take these differences in language use into account. Misinterpretations can lead to difficulties in translation and even to mistakes in constructing the

8 Thomas Hammarberg, Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights (2006): "The situation of Roma in Greece", Letter addressed to Mr Prokopis Pavlopoulos, Hellenic Minister for the Interior, Public Administration & Decentralisation (01.12.2006).

9 This term was in analogy to the term "syncretic anti-Semitism," which captures certain forms of anti-Semitic discourses and actions after World War II more adequately than the traditional concepts of Christian, racial, or economic anti-Semitism; cf. Mitten 1992.

different analytical categories to be used when dealing with the issue of racism (Wieviorka 1994: 173). I have to forego a more detailed discussion of terminology here; however, it is important to note that this historical semantic legacy also poses major methodological difficulties for cross-cultural and trans-national comparisons, as already shown in previous studies (cf. Reisigl/Wodak 2001 for an extensive discussion).

An important question to ask at this stage is: Who is currently the subject of the racist discourse disseminated by different agents and actors in the public sphere? There are three important points I would like to stress here (cf. Delanty/Wodak 2005 for more discussion):

- First, the racialized subject today is different from that in the past because skin colour and physical signs of racial difference have become less important. It may be for this reason that “the veil and the scarf” are currently key symbols of racially constructed “others” and that the debate about them has become integral to discourse about liberal values rather than merely a response to direct assertions of inferiority. A significant number are poor “whites” who come from within Europe and are not identifiable in traditional “race” terms (Richardson 2004).
- Second, non-European migrants generally fall into two categories: asylum-seekers or refugees on the one hand, and “economic” migrants on the other. Those in the first group are more likely to come from Africa, Afghanistan, Iran or Iraq and are smaller in number than other racialized groups. The second group is more likely to come from European member states or Asia and is more likely to be educated and, unlike refugees, have a quasi-permanent right to work in areas of the economy that require service workers or even professionally qualified workers. Moreover, European laws allow for mobility and working permits across the European Union, except for so-called “transition stages” for people from the former Communist countries (apart from the UK, Sweden, and Ireland who have not implemented such transition stages). The new semantic process used here in public discourses is to conflate two notions, “refugees” and “migrants”, and to push both groups discursively towards “criminality” and “illegality”. How would one otherwise explain the term “illegal refugees” or “bogus asylum seekers”?¹⁰
- The third category presents the greatest difficulty for any comparative study since it calls into question the adequacy of the notion of “migrant” in general (Delanty/Wodak/Jones 2008). Migrants do not constitute a coherent, homogeneous group into which all “others” who are not national citizens can be subsumed. Indeed, it could be argued that if “migrant” refers only to non-national citizens, it fails to address some of the most pervasive forms of racial discrimination, namely those associated with ethnic and/or religious groups and “others” who have already obtained citizenship in an EU country (Camus 2005).

Hence, we are presented with the paradox that the racialized subject is not easily connected with a simple and clearly defined person or group. The extreme example of this phenomenon

10 This is even more salient if one considers migrants in prestigious professions or from rich countries, such as “mobile academics” who are considered to be “flexible.” The ranking of migrants from different countries and differing economic backgrounds is obvious; see also the recent ESRC funded project on “The representation of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers in the British press”, Lancaster University (Baker et al. 2008).

is the existence of strong anti-Semitism in Poland, where Jews do not exist in any significant numbers and yet anti-Semitism is rife. Marin has labelled this phenomenon, also true for Austria, as “anti-Semitism without Jews and without anti-Semites” (Marin 2000: 33) (because of the constant denial of anti-Semitism in public discourses and the results of opinion polls that show that anti-Semitism is strongest when no Jews live in the area concerned and, moreover, when the interviewees have never actually met any).

4 Forms of discriminatory rhetoric – the discourse-historical approach (DHA)

4.1 Core elements of the DHA

According to Reisigl and Wodak, racism/discrimination/exclusion manifests itself discursively: “Racist opinions and beliefs are produced and reproduced by means of discourse [...]. Through discourse, discriminatory exclusionary practices are prepared, promulgated and legitimized” (Reisigl/Wodak 2001: 1). Hence, the strategic use of many linguistic indicators to construct in- and out-groups is fundamental to political (and discriminatory) discourses in all kinds of settings. It is important to focus on the latent meanings produced through pragmatic devices (e. g. implicatures, hidden causalities, presuppositions, insinuations and certain syntactic embeddings), as frequently manifest in the rhetoric of rightwing-populist European politicians, such as Jörg Haider, HC Strache, Jean Marie Le Pen or Silvio Berlusconi (see Wodak/Pelinka 2002; Rydgren 2005; Krzyżanowski/Wodak 2008). To be able to analyse our examples, it is important to introduce some analytic concepts of the discourse-historical approach (DHA):

Systematic qualitative analysis in DHA takes four layers of context into account:

- the intertextual and interdiscursive relationships between utterances, texts, genres and discourses;
- the extra-linguistic social/sociological variables;
- the history and archaeology of texts and organizations,
- and institutional frames of the specific context of a situation.

In this way, we are able to explore how discourses, genres, and texts change and are recontextualised due to socio-political contexts.

“Discourse” in DHA is defined as being

- related to a macro-topic (and to the argumentation about validity claims such as truth and normative validity which involves social actors who have different points of view);
- a cluster of context-dependent semiotic practices that are situated within specific fields of social action;
- socially constituted as well as socially constitutive;
- integrating various differing positions and voices.

Furthermore, we distinguish between “discourse” and “text”: Discourse implies patterns and commonalities of knowledge and structures, whereas a text is a specific and unique realization of a discourse. Texts belong to “genres”. Thus, a discourse on exclusion could manifest itself in a potentially huge range of genres and texts, for example in a TV debate on domestic politics, in a political manifesto on immigration restrictions, in a speech by an expert on migration matters, and so forth (Wodak 2008a). A text only creates sense when its manifest and latent meanings (*inter alia*, implicature, presupposition, allusion) are read in connection with “knowledge of the world” (Chilton 2004).

In accordance with Bakhtin’s seminal work, we take “intertextuality” to refer to the linkage of all texts to other texts, both in the past and in the present (Bakhtin 1981). Indeed, no text is ever isolated in space and time as many studies illustrate; thus, intertextuality is inherently part and parcel of meaning making in context (see Van Dijk 2004). Bakhtin’s term “heteroglossia” captures this point adequately: every text manifests and integrates many voices – the voice of the author as well as (possibly also contradictory) voices of “others” who are talked or written about (Lemke 1995). Intertextual links can be established in different ways: through continued reference to a topic or to its main actors; through reference to the same events as the other texts; or through the reappearance of a text’s main arguments in another text. The latter process is also labelled “recontextualization”. By taking an argument out of context and restating it in a new context, we first observe the process of de-contextualization, and then, when the respective element is implemented in a new context, of recontextualization. The element then acquires a new meaning, because, as Wittgenstein claimed, meanings are formed in use (Wittgenstein 1967). Hence, arguments from parliamentary debates on immigration, from political speeches or in the mass media are recontextualized in a genre-adequate way in the texts analysed below through the use of salient visual and verbal features and elements.

The construction of in-and out-groups necessarily implies the use of *strategies of positive self-presentation and the negative presentation of others*. Here, I am especially interested in five types of discursive strategies, all involved in positive self- and negative other-presentation, which underpin the justification/legitimization of inclusion/exclusion and of the constructions of identities. “Strategy” generally refers to a (more or less accurate and more or less intentional) plan of practices, including discursive practices, adopted to achieve a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic goal.¹¹

First, there are *referential, or nomination strategies*, by which social actors are constructed and represented, for example, through the creation of in-groups and out-groups. This is done through a number of categorization devices, including metaphors, metonymies and synecdoches, in the form of a part standing for the whole (*pars pro toto*) or a whole standing for the part (*totum pro parte*).

Second, social actors as individuals, group members or groups as a whole, are linguistically characterized through predications. *Predicational strategies* may, for example, be realized as evaluative attributions of negative and positive traits in the linguistic

11 All these strategies are illustrated by numerous categories and examples in Reisigl/Wodak 2001: 31–90. It would be impossible to present all these linguistic devices in this paper, owing to space restrictions.

form of implicit or explicit predicates. These strategies aim at labelling social actors in a more or less positive or negative manner. They cannot be neatly separated from the nomination strategies.

Third, there are *argumentation strategies* and a fund of *topoi* through which positive and negative attributions are legitimized or justified. For example, it can be suggested that the social and political inclusion or exclusion of persons or policies is legitimate.

Fourth, we focus on the *perspectivation, framing* or *discourse representation*. Through framing speakers express their involvement in discourse, and position their point of view in the reporting, description, narration or quotation of relevant events or utterances.

Fifth, there are *intensifying strategies* on the one hand and *mitigation strategies* on the other. Both of these help to qualify and modify the epistemic status of a proposition by intensifying or mitigating the illocutionary force of utterances. These strategies can be an important aspect of the presentation inasmuch as they operate upon it by either sharpening it or toning it down.

Positive self- and negative other-presentation requires justification and legitimation strategies, as elements of “persuasive rhetoric”. Reisigl and Wodak define *topoi* as parts of argumentation which belong to the obligatory, either explicit or inferable premises (Reisigl/Wodak 2001). As such they justify the transition from the argument or arguments to the conclusion. *Topoi* are central to the analysis of seemingly convincing fallacious arguments which are widely adopted in prejudiced and discriminatory discourses (Kienpointner 1996: 562). Hence, any *topos* should be understood as a quasi “elliptic” argument where the premise/claim/standpoint is followed by the conclusion without giving any evidence while taking the conclusion to confirm, and relate to, existing knowledge (*commonplace*).

In Table 1, I list the most common *topoi* which are used when writing or talking about “others”, specifically about migrants. These *topoi* have been investigated in a number of studies on election campaigns (Pelinka/Wodak 2002), on parliamentary debates (Wodak/Van Dijk 2000), on policy papers (Reisigl/Wodak 2001), on “voices of migrants” (Delanty et al. 2008; Krzyżanowski/Wodak 2008), and on media reporting (Baker et al. 2008). Most of them are used to justify the exclusion of migrants through quasi-rational standardized arguments (“they are a burden for the society”, “they are dangerous, a threat”, “they cost too much”, “their culture is different”, and so forth). In this way, migrants are constructed as scapegoats. They are blamed for unemployment or for causing general discontent (with politics, with the European Union, etc.), for abusing social welfare systems or they are more generally perceived as a threat for “our” culture. On the other hand, some *topoi* are used in anti-discriminatory discourses, such as appeals to human rights or to justice.

Table 1 List of Prevailing Topoi in Immigration Discourse

1. Usefulness, advantage	9. Economy
2. Uselessness, disadvantage	10. Reality
3. Definition	11. Numbers
4. Danger and threat	12. Law and right
5. Humanitarianism	13. History
6. Justice	14. Culture
7. Responsibility	15. Abuse
8. Burdening	

Similarly there is a more or less fixed set of metaphors employed in exclusionary discourse (Reisigl/Wodak 2001), such as the likening of migration to a natural disaster, of immigration/immigrants as avalanches or floods, and of illegal immigration as “dragging or hauling masses”.

Furthermore, Reisigl and Wodak (2001) draw on Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1994) and Kienpointner (1996) when providing the list of general common fallacies. Frequently employed fallacies include, first, *argumentum ad baculum*, i. e. “threatening with the stick”, thus trying to intimidate instead of using plausible arguments. Second, *argumentum ad hominem*, which can be defined as a verbal attack on the antagonist’s personality and character (of her or his credibility, integrity, honesty, expertise, competence and so on) instead of discussing the content of an argument. Finally, the *argumentum ad populum* or *pathetic fallacy* which consists of appealing to prejudiced emotions, opinions and convictions of a specific social group or to the *vox populi* instead of employing rational arguments. These fallacies frequently prevail in rightwing populist rhetoric (see Rydgren 2005).

4.2 Visual Rhetoric

Academic work on rhetoric and persuasion has recently taken a visual turn, expanding empirical and analytic foci from linguistic discourse (whether spoken or written) to include pictorial and visual artefacts in many disciplines and fields, from text linguistics and discourse analysis to literary criticism and rhetoric.¹²

Blair suggests that those who argue against the possibility of arguments being visual tend to base this claim on two reasons. The first “is that the visual is inescapably ambiguous or vague. The other is related to the fact that arguments must have propositional content” (Blair 2004: 46), or, more specifically, that images cannot assert and thus cannot advance a standpoint. It is, of course, obvious that the meanings of the visual are frequently ambiguous. However, *ambiguity* and *vagueness* are also a feature of verbal argumentation, specifically of persuasive rhetoric. Hence, vagueness on its own should not be viewed as a reason against the possibility of arguments being visual: vagueness is certainly an inherent feature of political communication and

12 Van Leeuwen/Jaworski 2003. For a detailed justification of the effects and patterns of visual argumentation in populist rhetoric, see Richardson/Wodak 2009b. In this chapter, I only summarize the most salient points.

also of advertising, particularly in images or metaphors (see Charteris-Black 2006 for a detailed discussion). Indeed, one could suggest that several interpretations should be offered due to the inherent ambiguity of visual arguments, where contextual information becomes decisive in opting for one or another reading. This is why the DHA becomes relevant as a specifically context-sensitive discourse-analytic approach. Such a linguistic reconstruction cannot fully replace the original, given the evocative power of visual communication (Hill/Helmers 2004), but rather is comparable to the translation of one language into another (see Richardson/Wodak 2009b).

It is important to emphasise at this point that visual texts which are used as advertisements or for political election campaigns also strongly address emotions and cause affective responses (as does pathos-oriented rhetoric in general). Such rhetoric and argumentation frequently relies on fallacies which try to evoke positive or negative responses by applying simplistic “we-discourses” or seductive metaphors as unifying elements. Hence, viewers and readers are confronted with patterns of argumentation which are very complex and integrate cognitive and emotional, rational and irrational (fallacious) elements. Moreover, “unreasonable” argumentation strategies also form an intentional and inherent part of rightwing populist rhetoric, frequently relying on pragmatic devices such as irony and sarcasm (see above).

Only systematic reception studies would allow investigating the many and predictably systematically differing ways of understanding such images and slogans. Lutz and Wodak (1987), Wodak et al. (2009) and Kovács and Wodak (2003), for example, were able to illustrate in large studies about media reception in various contexts that focus group participants offered different readings of the same text due to social class, previous experience, ethnic origin, and political affiliation. Unfortunately, no empirical study about the posters under investigation exists to date.

5 Inclusion and Exclusion – The Example

5.1 *Austria: the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) and the Bündnis Zukunft Österreich (BZÖ)*

After the Second World War, in 1949, “liberals” with a strong German National orientation and no classical liberal tradition (see Bailer-Galanda/Neugebauer, 1993: 326), who felt unable to support the SPÖ or the ÖVP, founded the VDU (“Verband der Unabhängigen”). This party became an electoral home for many former Austrian Nazis. The FPÖ, founded in 1956, was the successor party to the VDU, retaining an explicit attachment to a “German cultural community”.¹³ In its more than 50-year-old history, the FPÖ has, therefore, never been a “liberal” party in the European sense, although there were always tensions between more liberal and more conservative members of the party. For instance, in 1986, Jörg Haider was elected as leader of the party and unseated Norbert Steger, a liberal leader.

Since 1986, the FPÖ has gained many votes, peaking with 26.9% of all the votes cast in Austrian elections of October 1999 (1,244,087 voters). By 1993, the FPÖ’s party policy and politics were conspicuously anti-foreigner, anti-European Union and widely populist, close

13 For further political and historical information about the FPÖ as successor party to the former NSDAP, see Scharsach 2000, Bailer-Galander/Neugebauer 1997.

to Le Pen's *Front National* in France (Reisigl/Wodak 2000; Wodak/Iedema 2004) From the summer of 1995, the FPÖ almost completely ceased to stress the closeness between the Austrian and the German cultural community because opinion polls demonstrated that the majority of Austrian citizens no longer accepted such a self-definition. In the autumn of 1997, the FPÖ presented a new party program, which, in its strategically employed "calculated ambivalence" (see Engel/Wodak 2009), emphasized Christian values.

From February 4th 2000, the FPÖ constituted part of the Austrian government, having formed a coalition with the conservative ÖVP. This development caused a major upheaval internationally and nationally, and led to the so-called "sanctions against the Austrian government" by the 14 other member states of the European Union. In September 2000, the EU found an exit strategy and the sanctions were lifted due to a report of "Three Wise Men". Nevertheless, the report stated that the FPÖ should be regarded as a "right wing extremist populist party, a right wing populist party with radical elements".

In May 2005, a section of the FPÖ splintered off to form a new party, the *Bündnis Zukunft Österreich* (BZÖ). Haider, a chief architect of the creation of the BZÖ, remained regional governor in Carinthia, but Peter Westenthaler took over the leadership of the party. Heinz-Christian Strache, a kind of "modern clone" of Haider, took over the more far right, traditional and less populist FPÖ (*Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs*). The FPÖ still thrives on explicit xenophobia, pan-Germanic sentiments, anti-Semitism, and Islamophobia in contrast to the BZÖ, which has continued its more populist program with xenophobic and anti-Semitic subtexts (Wodak 2007a). However, the BZÖ continuously lost votes, as the governmental role does not seem to fit right-wing populist parties – their strength seems to lie in their oppositional role, not in taking over governmental responsibilities (Krzyżanowski/Wodak 2008). In the elections of October 1st 2006, the Social-democratic Party (SPÖ) gained the majority in Austria after having been in opposition for six years. The BZÖ proportion of the vote was reduced to barely 5%, securing only 7 seats in parliament; the FPÖ attracted around 11% of the vote and is also represented in parliament.¹⁴

In sum, for a considerable period of time, the FPÖ has, more than any other Austrian party, persuasively set a "xenophobic" anti-foreigner tone in Austrian domestic policies. For more than a decade, the FPÖ has almost always profited electorally from the populist business of sowing uncertainty and irrational xenophobic and anti-Semitic anxieties, which – as already mentioned above – have been willingly adopted, for different reasons, by a considerable proportion of voters. This mantle has now been also adopted by the younger and more populist BZÖ, as illustrated below.¹⁵

14 On October 11th 2009, Haider died in a car accident because he drove too fast and was also drunk. Since then, the BZÖ has mainly retained a large electorate in Carinthia, whereas HC Strache has been able to gain huge amounts of votes in various regional elections and in the election for the European Parliament, mostly due to a blatant and explicit anti-Muslim and anti-Semitic rhetoric (see Wodak 2009).

15 In this paper, I focus mainly on xenophobic exclusionary meanings. However, the BZÖ attacks the Jewish community, specifically its president Dr. Ariel Muzikant, from time to time with different agenda and functions: 2001, in the regional election campaign in Vienna, Jörg Haider tried to raise his chances by opposing restitution claims for Jewish victims of the Shoah (this restitution should compensate the so-called "Aryanisation" of Jewish belongings, etc.). However, these agenda were opposed vehemently by the SPÖ and Haider lost many votes (see Pelinka/Wodak 2002; Wodak 2007a).

5.2 Posters and Analysis

In December 2007 and January 2008, both traditional and less known – “new” – exclusionary discourses suddenly (re)appeared in the public sphere. This was triggered, I believe, by three primary factors: the expansion of the Schengen area (border controls between Austria, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia were abolished on December 21st, 2007); the possible accession of Turkey and related debates; and new strict immigration laws in Austria and in other EU member states. Xenophobic slogans from the FPÖ, such as *Lieber Schweinskotelett statt Minarett* (“Rather pork cutlets than minarets”), “decorated” the streets of Vienna. In the city of Graz, during its city council elections in early 2008, exclusionary racist rhetoric was posted by the BZÖ (www.sauberesgraz.at), which focused on the term *säubern* (to clean/ cleanse). This functions as an obvious allusion to Nazi propaganda and anti-Semitic ideology proposing “cleansing cities of Jews” – a euphemism for ethnic cleansing and genocide (*Säuberung von Juden; judenrein*). The images below, taken from posters and postcards distributed by the BZÖ, illustrate the many negative ethnic, religious, and national stereotypes which were (re)produced during this campaign, i. e. stereotypes of the “Poles as thieves” and the “drug-dealing African”:

Figure 1 BZÖ, Graz, *Kampagne Aufsteller*



(“We are cleansing Graz” say Peter Westenthaler and Gerald Grosz; they are cleansing Graz of “political corruption, asylum abuse, beggars, and foreign criminality”)

Figure 2 BZÖ, Graz, Postkarte Autoknacker



(Wojciech K., serial car thief, states: “Do not vote for the BZÖ because I would like to continue with my business dealings”)

Figure 3 BZÖ, Graz, Postkarte Drogendealer



(Amir Z, asylum seeker and drug dealer, states: “Please do not vote for the BZÖ because I would like to continue with my business dealings”)

These three Austrian posters and postcards condense many features of racist and discriminatory rhetoric. Most importantly, the allusion to Nazi rhetoric is apparent both in the choice of words, and in the use of visual metaphors, insinuations, and symbols (“cleansing the streets with brooms”). This also applies to the stereotypes of “drug dealing black asylum seekers”, and “Polish thieves” (as nominations), which are common in Austria. In this way, by applying several visual and verbal *topoi*, the BZÖ attempts to construct itself as the “law and order” party that can save Austrians, and the citizens of Graz specifically, from “immediate and huge threats”.

The posters employ many nominative and predicative strategies whereby the “others” are named and certain generic characteristics are attributed to them. Both the men in Figures 2 and 3 are referred to by using the same combination of referential and predicative strategies:

Wojciech K., *Serienautoknacker* (Wojciech K., serial car thief)

Amir Z., *Asylwerber und Drogendealer* (Amir Z., asylum seeker and drug dealer)

The first component in each construction – providing their given name but only the initial of their family name – paradoxically acts to anonymise the two men – they are constructed as *generic types*. This strategy works in conjunction with the ways that both their faces are concealed, either by a balaclava in Figure 2 or the black censor’s rectangle in Figure 3. Following their (foreign sounding) given names, the second component of the nominalization attributes negative generic characteristics to the men. The predicative strategy in each case is an intensified criminalisation. Thus, Wojciech K. is not *just* a car thief, but is a serial, or *career*, car thief. In the case of Amir Z., this intensification is achieved through an additional negative actional anthroponym (Reisigl/Wodak 2001): thus, he is not *just* a drug dealer, but is also an asylum seeker – that is, someone who, in the eyes of the BZÖ, is already “burdening Our society” (*topos* of burden) and so should not be “taking advantage of Our generosity” (*topos* of abuse).

The BZÖ leaders are contrasted in positive ways. They are not generic, but individuals, with full given and family names, colourful, handsome, and fore-grounded, whereas the “others” are back-grounded through the dark – “dirty” – colours used. In this way, even the colours are employed as part of the argument: cleaning the streets of dirt which is – conventionally – brown and black, not white and orange. The two men are also smiling while “cleaning the street”. This ironic connotation can be viewed as part of “calculated ambivalence” (Engel/Wodak 2009). In this way, they are addressing viewers in multiple ways and also might signal that they knowingly employ the embedded allusion to Nazi rhetoric. In this way, the images combine *metaphorical, metonymic, and pragmatic devices* in intricate ways. The latter devices are employed as *argumentation and intensification strategies*. The *topoi* range from “abuse, criminality” to “law and right”, “threat for our culture”, and “justice”.

Moreover, all posters utilize layout and fonts in black and white and explicit paradoxical statements which serve as *presuppositions* to contrasting latent meanings: the real and right norms and values are implied through the subtext – the opposite meanings. These persuasive strategies (*implicature by contrast*) all belong to the political sub-field of advertising; hence we are dealing with a case of hybridity, *mixing the genres* of advertising and political communication (Fairclough 2003).

Due to the fact that we are discussing images where the depiction of the “others” employs biological characteristics, like skin colour, certain hairstyles, dark eyes, etc., we conclude that racist meanings are intentionally (re)produced as persuasive devices. At this point, we should explore the context of the election campaign in much greater detail, the history of the two parties involved, as well as the broader historical context in Austria, where similar slogans and meanings were employed by Nazi rhetoric before and during World War II. The theme of “cleansing” streets/stores/towns of “others” (Jews, Slavs, Roma, etc.) stems from such fascist rhetoric and has now been recontextualized to apply to Poles, migrants from Africa, among others, for this context.

The concept of *Säuberung* (cleansing; using precisely this wording in German) is readily notable in historical Nazi sources or reading old dictionaries.¹⁶ Looking in Nazi brochures, propaganda, Nazi editions of dictionaries, and even in Hitler’s “Mein Kampf” (1927: 270, 359) the concept is frequently related to, or collocated with, *Judenrein* as well as *Rassenrein* (clean of Jews, pure race, respectively, again precisely this wording in German). There, the purity of blood depends on “cleansing Germany and the German race from Jewish influence and destruction” (*Zersetzung*). The “cleansing” should, so Nazi ideology argues, lead to *Entjudung* (“De-Judaification”) (see Schmitz-Berning 2007: 189). Accordingly, Jews should, first, be removed from all professions and businesses; second, all alleged and so-called “Jewish influence” should be destroyed; third, all Jewish possessions should be taken over by force (*Arisierung*); and fourth, in the so-called “final solution” (*Endlösung*), *Säuberung* referred euphemistically to the policy of murder, deportation, and mass extermination (gassing).¹⁷ In the 13th edition *Der Duden* from 1947 (the standard lexicon for German language), these concepts were deleted – which provides more evidence for the fact that everybody knew that these terms were an inherent and explicit part of Nazi jargon.

It should also be noted that “cleansing the streets” in this poster does not only refer to the way the Nazis used the term *Säuberung*. It also implicitly indexes the material consequences of this policy, in the form of the Jews who had to kneel on their knees and wash the streets, often with their tooth brushes, while the SA and SS and many bystanders jeered and laughed. Thus, this image is doubly meaningful. On the one hand, the rather clear insinuation to Nazi jargon and cleansing; on the other hand, there is the subtext, related to the “washing and cleaning of Austrian streets by Jews”. Now “the Aryans” are doing this themselves, though smiling, standing, and with brooms.

One cannot claim that everybody who views the above-depicted poster will be able to deconstruct the visual and textual insinuation. However, many viewers certainly will be able to guess the latent meanings as these terms are explicitly taboo in public and official discourses. Schoolbooks, films, and documentaries all contain pictures of Nazi times with such slogans – for example of Jewish shops where these words were painted on the windows, and/or of Jews forced to wash the streets. Thus, one can assume a wide collectively shared knowledge of these historically so connotated words in the Austrian context to which politi-

16 For example: Meyers Lexikon, 8th edition, Leipzig 1936–1942; Duden, 12th edition, Mannheim 1941, 13th edition, Mannheim 1947; or consulting specialist dictionaries of NS jargon (Poliakov/Wulf 1965: 146–149, 179; Schmitz-Berning 2007: 333–334; 511–519).

17 See also Duden, 10th edition, 1929, 11th edition 1934, 12th edition 1941.

cians refer intentionally – although they would, of course, always deny such intentions (see Wodak/Reisigl 2002; Richardson/Wodak 2009a). In this way, we encounter an obvious case of continuity of past meanings.

The argumentative chain that is implied runs as follows:

1. The BZÖ cleans the streets and keeps our city clean.
2. Wojciech, a Polish foreigner, steals cars as his daily business.
3. If you vote for BZÖ, Wojciech will not be able to continue stealing.
4. Hence, Wojciech (and all other criminals) oppose the BZÖ.
5. Voting for the BZÖ will establish “clean – orange – streets” once more.
6. BZÖ stands for law and order.

Moreover, explicit actions are depicted. The BZÖ actually “cleans” the streets; this implies that they “clean out” the – generically depicted – criminals and drug dealers. They do not have to appeal for action in indirect or coded ways; they are, if one follows the explicit metaphorical argument, already acting. Here, the broken, distressed font of the “undesirable elements” being cleansed from the streets of Graz acts as an intertextual link between the Campaign Poster and the Postcards. For each of the four problems that the BZÖ will brush away, there is a more detailed postcard providing an exemplar or illustration. Thus, if we were in any doubts about Wojciech’s nationality (“he sounds foreign, but he could be Austrian...”), the campaign poster provides *Ausländerkriminalität* as a recontextualised generalisation of his activities. Similarly, the transformed generalisation relating to “Amir Z.” explicitly reiterates the interpretative gloss that draws on the *topos of abuse*, implicit in the postcard. These intertextual links, signalled visually through the use of the distressed font, function to project the exemplars, detailed in the postcards, into the principal Campaign Poster (*argumentum ad exemplum*): the visual rhetoric leads us to visualise “undesirables” like Amir Z. and Wojciech K. being swept away by the cleansing broom of the BZÖ – an example of *re-semiotisation*.

6 Conclusions

One of the major problems facing Europe seems to be the legacy of the liberal idea of tolerance. There is a curious revival of this idea today with the notion that Europe is Christian, although little attention is given to the meaning of the term “Christianity” and to what its relationship to Europe might be. In several countries the question has been posed as to where the limits of tolerance lie: does tolerance have to translate into solidarity with others, or does it simply breed indifference? Does tolerance amount to accepting and respecting others who are different and themselves possibly intolerant? In France one already hears of a paradoxical reversal in liberal discourse: the liberal belief in respecting “the other” as different entails the separation of cultures in order to protect her/him (Delanty et al. 2008).

The case study in this chapter illustrates the claims made at the outset on salient dimensions: in this example, we find the many faces of the “Other” merged into various prototypes which – furthermore – are all constructed visually as dangerous. Secondly, the explicit use of Nazi jargon insinuates continuity with the anti-Semitism of the Nazis and implies the

connotations attributed to specific lexical items, such as *säubern* and the related images. Hence, in Austria, exclusionary rhetoric combines anti-Semitic with anti-Muslim and other generic ethnic stereotypes. Thirdly, we encounter – in spite of the obvious implicatures, insinuations, and presuppositions employed in the posters and postcards, i. e. “indirect and coded” devices – a massive de-tabooization of exclusionary meanings. There was little explicit opposition or resistance voiced against the public posting of such discriminatory rhetoric although it clearly could be viewed under any law forbidding hate incitement. The presence of such racist discourses and images in the public sphere can certainly be perceived as a significant shift to rightwing propaganda.

It also emerges clearly that all dimensions of language and communication can be functionalized in order to achieve inclusion or exclusion of “others.” The construction of in-groups and out-groups is a constitutive element of the re/production of racism, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism in all its direct and indirect forms. Discursive exclusion in its many manifestations is often perceived as the first step towards more violent forms of discrimination. Thus, this chapter aims to raise awareness of the “power of the written and spoken word” within all public and private contexts in our lives. Blatant racist beliefs and prejudices are easily deconstructed; the prevailing “new” indirect and “coded” forms of discrimination, however, require careful and critical reading/listening and viewing in order to understand their implied exclusionary meanings.

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