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TOIVO U. RAUN

The Revolution of 1905 in the Baltic Provinces and Finland

Historical studies of the Russian empire in upheaval in the first two decades of the twentieth century have tended to be animated by a narrow centralist bias or an equally narrow regional one. Although it is clear that the primary impulse for revolutionary situations in 1905 and 1917 resulted from events in St. Petersburg/Petrograd, a Russocentric approach to a society that was less than 50 percent Russian is surely inadequate. At the same time, studies of individual minority nationalities, however thorough, tend to view these groups in isolation. A comparative perspective, which could identify broader uniformities as well as local peculiarities, is usually lacking. In this article I shall present a synthesizing and comparative overview of the Revolution of 1905 in the Baltic Provinces and Finland.[1] Although these areas constituted only 2 percent of the land area of the Russian empire and had less than 4 percent of its population in 1905,[2] they were among the most modernized in the country, and their ethnic diversity and differing histories provide abundant material for a comparative case study.

Despite their geographical proximity, the Baltic Provinces (Kurland, Livland, and Estland)[3] and Finland experienced significantly different historical de-

1. Neither Soviet nor non-Soviet authors have undertaken the comparison made here. General Soviet works on 1905 emphasize the "great friendship" of Russians and non-Russians and provide merely descriptive material on the Baltic area and Finland; for instance, A. M. Pankratova, *Pervaia russkaia revoliutsiia 1905–1907 gg.*, 2nd ed. (Moscow, 1951), pp. 192–96; *Revoliutsiia 1905–1907 godov v Rossii* (Moscow, 1975), pp. 220–25. Soviet monographs on the Baltic region and Finland in 1905, while also stressing the "great friendship," are organized on the basis of present political and administrative boundaries and do not use a comparative framework. See, for example, Jānis Krastiņš, *1905. gada revolūcija Latvijā,* 3rd ed. (Riga, 1975); Toomas Karjahärm and Raimo Pullat, *Eesti revolutsiooni tules 1905–1907* (Tallinn, 1975); M. N. Vlasova, *Proletariat Finliandii v gody pervoi russkoi revoliutsii (1905–1907)* (Petrozavodsk, 1961); and the articles by Ia. P. Krastyn' [Krastiņš] on Latvia and G. I. Mosberg on Estonia in *Revoliutsiia 1905–1907 gg. v natsional'nykh raionakh Rossii* (Moscow, 1955). Even a recently published slim volume—T. Kar'iakhiarm [Karjahärm], Ia. Krastyn' [Krastiņš], and A. Tila [Tyla], *Revoliutsiia 1905–1907 godov v Pribaltike* (Tallinn, 1981)—which purports to provide a comparative overview of 1905 in the Baltic area, is mainly a narrative of events based on previously published secondary sources and offers little analysis. Among non-Soviet authors, Georg von Rauch's *Russland: Staatliche Einheit und nationale Vielfalt* (Munich, 1953) uses a comparative approach, but the scope is too broad to deal adequately with 1905. It should also be noted that although conceptualizations of the revolution differ—Western historians speak of "1905," Baltic Germans of "1905–1906," and Soviets of "1905–1907"—there is general agreement that a truly revolutionary situation, if there ever was one, no longer existed by the end of December 1905.

2. Edward C. Thaden, et al., *Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland, 1855–1914* (Princeton, 1981), p. 41, *Ezhegodnik Rossii* (1905): 45–46, 55, 58, 65.

3. To avoid confusion with both earlier and later entities (for instance, medieval Livonia and twentieth-century Estonia), the tsarist Baltic Provinces will be referred to by their German names. Designations for cities and districts will also be given in German with the Latvian or Estonian equivalent when the name appears for the first time. It should be noted that before 1917 the Russian terminology for Baltic place names was nearly always a transliteration of the German form. For thorough comparative tables of Baltic toponyms in the late tsarist era, see Patricia K. Grimsted, *Archives and Manuscript Repositories in the USSR: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Belorussia* (Princeton, 1981), pp. 609–11.

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velopments before the twentieth century, most importantly in the social realm. In Kurland, Livland, and Estland, German elites replaced Latvian and Estonian ones, and the local population was enserfed or otherwise relegated to the lower social echelons. By contrast, while Finland became a Swedish province and its upper social strata gradually adopted a Swedish-language culture, its native elites were never declassed, and serfdom never developed as an institution.

Although Finland occupied nearly four times the land area of the Baltic provinces, in 1905 its population was only slightly larger: 2,816,000 in Finland as compared to 2,557,100 in the Baltic provinces.[4] The ethnic composition of the two areas was entirely different, however. The greater accessibility of the Baltic Provinces and their strategic location made them more of a historical crossroads and probably contributed to their ethnic diversity. In 1897 there were four major nationalities in the Baltic provinces:[5]

Latvians	44.8%
Estonians	37.1%
Germans	6.9%
Russians	4.8%

Overall figures for the three provinces do not, however, do justice to the complexity of the ethnic distribution (based on native tongue in the 1897 census), as can be seen in tables 1 and 2. Kurland and the four districts (*uezdy*) of southern Livland comprised 54 percent of the land area and 60 percent of the population of the Baltic Provinces, while the figures for the five districts of northern Livland and Estland were 46 percent and 40 percent.[6] The major reason for the relatively larger population in the southern Baltic area was the drawing power of the region's largest city, Riga. In a comparison of tables 1 and 2, two points in particular stand out: the greater ethnic diversity in the southern Baltic area, especially Kurland, and the greater German presence in the southern region. The German share of the population in Kurland and southern Livland was more than two and a half times as large as in northern Livland and Estland.

Finland, in contrast, was much more homogeneous ethnically. In 1900 the population of Finland was divided as follows according to language:[7]

Finnish	86.8%
Swedish	12.9%
Russian	0.2%
German	0.1%
Other	0.1%

The Swedish-speaking population was mainly limited to the area around Helsinki and the southern and western coastal regions.

By the beginning of the twentieth century cultural and socioeconomic modernization was proceeding at comparable levels in the Baltic Provinces and Finland, and considerably more rapidly than in European Russia as a whole. While only 23 percent of the entire population, including young children, were able to read in European Russia in 1897, the figures for the Baltic Provinces were more

4. Thaden, *Russification*, pp. 4–5; *Ezhegodnik Rossii* (1905): 45–46, 55, 58.

5. N. A. Troinitskii, ed., *Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis' naseleniia Rossiiskoi Imperii, 1897 g.*, 89 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1899–1905), 19:78–81; 21:78–81; 49:42–43.

6. The figures on land area are taken from *Ezhegodnik Rossii* (1905): 6–7, 16. The total land area of the Baltic Provinces was 81,049 square versts or 36,513 square miles.

7. *Suomen tilastollinen vuosikirja,* 10 (1912): 43. Due to rounding off, the total is 100.1 percent.

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Table 1. *Ethnic Composition of Kurland and Southern Livland, 1897 (in percentages)*

	Kurland[a]	Southern Livland[c,d]	Total[e]
Latvians	75.1	74.1	74.6
Germans	7.6	10.8	9.3
Russians	3.8	6.8	5.4
Jews	5.6	2.8	4.1
Poles	2.9	1.9	2.4
Estonians	0.1	2.2	1.2
Others	4.9[b]	1.4	3.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

[a] n = 674,034
[b] Mainly Lithuanians and Belorussians
[c] n = 753,730
[d] Districts of Riga, Walk (Valka), Wenden (Cēsis), and Wolmar (Valmiera)
[e] n = 1,427,764
Source: N. A. Troinitskii, ed., *Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis' naseleniia Rossiiskoi Imperii, 1897 g.*, 89 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1899–1905), 19:78–81; 21:78–81.

Table 2. *Ethnic Composition of Northern Livland and Estland, 1897 (in percentages)*

	Northern Livland[a,b]	Estland[c]	Total[e]
Estonians	92.0	88.7	90.6
Russians	3.1	5.0	3.9
Germans	3.2	3.9	3.5
Latvians	0.9	0.1	0.6
Jews	0.5	0.3	0.4
Poles	0.1	0.3	0.2
Others	0.2	1.7[d]	0.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

[a] n = 545,635
[b] Districts of Werro (Võru), Pernau (Pärnu), Dorpat (Tartu; Russ. Iur'ev), Ösel (Saaremaa), and Fellin (Viljandi)
[c] n = 412,716
[d] Mainly Swedes
[e] n = 958,351
Source: Troinitskii, *Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis'*, 21:78–81; 49:42–43.

than three times as high (and by far the highest in European Russia): Estland—80 percent, Livland—78 percent, and Kurland—71 percent. In 1900, 81 percent of the population of Finland could read.[8] This strikingly similar pattern is most likely due to the influence of the Lutheran church in both areas.

Urbanization was more advanced in the Baltic Provinces, particularly in the southern half because of the rapid growth of Riga in the half-century before World War I (77,500 in 1863; 282,230 in 1897; 558,000 in 1914) when it became the third largest city in the empire. The only other cities in the Baltic Provinces and Finland at the beginning of the twentieth century with over 50,000 inhabitants were Libau (Liepāja)—64,489 (1897), Reval (Tallinn)—64,572 (1897), and Helsinki—93,217 (1900).[9] Overall, the urban proportions of the population were

8. *Ezhegodnik Rossii* (1907): 80–81; *Suomen tilastollinen vuosikirja*, 29 (1931): 47.

9. A. G. Rashin, *Naseleniie Rossii za 100 let (1811–1913 gg.)* (Moscow, 1956), p. 93; Arvēds Švābe, *Latvijas vēsture 1800–1914*, 2nd ed. (Uppsala, 1962), p. 566; *Helsingin kaupungin tilastollinen vuosikirja*, 37 (1948): 21.

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as follows in 1905:[10]

Russian Empire (including Finland)		12.8%
Baltic Provinces		25.8%
Kurland	24.0%	
Livland	29.2%	
Estland	18.2%	
Finland		13.2%

The ethnic composition of the major cities in the Baltic Provinces at the beginning of the twentieth century differed significantly from the overall figures cited in tables 1 and 2. In the urban areas the German and Russian shares were considerably larger and those of the Latvians and Estonians correspondingly smaller (see table 3). As was the case with the overall ethnic distribution, the southern Baltic cities (Libau in Kurland and Riga in southern Livland) showed greater ethnic diversity than the northern city (Reval in Estland). A similar contrast between overall and urban ethnic composition prevailed in Finland as well. As measured by language groups, the population of Helsinki in 1900 was divided as follows:

Finnish	50.7%
Swedish	42.5%
Russian	4.7%
German	0.8%
Other and Unknown	1.3%

Swedish speakers held a majority in Helsinki as late as the 1880s, but extensive Finnish immigration rapidly changed the situation. By 1905 the share of Finnish speakers had probably reached 55 percent.[11]

The relatively advanced level of industrialization in the Baltic Provinces and Finland is suggested by their extensive railroad networks and the large number of industrial workers. In 1904, when European Russia as a whole had 40.1 versts of railroad tracks per 100,000 inhabitants, the figures for the Baltic region and Finland were as follows: Kurland—55.9, Livland—70.9, Estland—103.1, and

Table 3. *Ethnic Distribution in Major Baltic Cities, 1897 (in percentages)*

	Libau[a]	Riga[b]	Reval[c]
Latvians	38.6	45.0	0.4
Estonians	0.4	1.3	62.7
Germans	23.8	23.8	16.1
Russians	11.3	15.8	15.6
Jews	8.5	6.0	1.6
Poles	9.3	4.8	1.5
Lithuanians	5.6	2.3	0.1
Others	2.5	1.0	2.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

[a] n = 64,489
[b] n = 282,230
[c] n = 64,572
Source: Troinitskii, *Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis'*, 19:78–81; 21:78–81; 49:42–43.

10. *Ezhegodnik Rossii* (1905): 45–46, 55, 58, 65.
11. *Helsingin kaupungin tilastollinen vuosikirja*, 37 (1948): 27.

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Finland—105.3.[12] In 1900 the Baltic Provinces had 88,000 industrial workers (over half of them in Riga) while Finland had 74,700, that is, 3.6 and 2.8 percent, respectively, of the total population in the two areas. In contrast, industrial workers comprised about 1.4 percent of the entire population of the Russian Empire in 1905.[13]

While industrialization led to substantial transformation in the urban areas, the agricultural sectors tended to resist change and retain much of their traditional character, particularly in patterns of landholding. In contrast to the ethnically Russian areas of the empire, nearly all rural land in the Baltic Provinces and Finland was owned either privately or by the state. The Baltic serfs had been emancipated in 1816–1819, and by mid-century they had been offered the opportunity to become landowners. Nevertheless, only a minority was able to obtain land, either as owners or renters; estimates for the proportion of landless agricultural households in the Baltic Provinces at the start of the twentieth century range from about 60 to 85 percent, although the upper end of this range appears too high to be credible.[14] Furthermore, agrarian life continued to be dominated by the Baltic German landed estates (*Rittergüter*), which in 1905 averaged 2,255 dessiatines in size compared to 496 dessiatines for landed estates in European Russia as a whole. In terms of peasant landownership at the start of the twentieth century, Kurland had the most favorable position (with 38.1 percent of the rural area as allotment land), followed by Livland (34.8 percent) and Estland (23.7 percent).[15] In Finland, however, there were only modest noble estates, and in 1901 the proportion of landless agricultural households was, at 48 percent, considerably smaller than in the Baltic Provinces. Nevertheless, although Finland had no history of serfdom, the condition of the landless laborers and many of the renters (*torpparit*) was hardly enviable. Before 1905 very little was done to regulate labor conditions or rental contracts, and because of growth in the rural population the landlords remained in a powerful position.[16]

The differing political traditions in the Baltic Provinces and Finland provide one of the major contrasts between the two areas and help explain their dissimilar experiences in 1905. At the beginning of the twentieth century the Diets (*Landtage*) in Estland, Livland, Kurland, and on the island of Ösel (Saaremaa) remained the exclusive preserve of the Baltic German nobility. Thus in one of the most modernized parts of European Russia, and the most literate one, there was less political participation at the provincial level than in many less developed

12. *Ezhegodnik Rossii* (1905): 372–74.

13. Otto Karma, *Tööstuslikult revolutsioonilt sotsialistkikule revolutsioonile Eestis* (Tallinn, 1963), p. 234; Švābe, *Latvijas vēsture,* p. 568; C. Leonard Lundin, "Finland," in Thaden, *Russification,* p. 408; Troinitskii, *Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis',* 19:81; 21:81; 49:43; *Ezhegodnik Rossii* (1905): 45–46, 55.

14. Andrejs Plakans, "Modernization and the Latvians in the Nineteenth-Century *Baltikum,*" in Arvids Ziedonis, Jr. et al., eds., *Baltic History* (Columbus, Ohio, 1974), p. 134; *Eesti NSV ajalugu,* 3 vols. (Tallinn, 1955–1971), 2:76; A. Köörna, "Oktoobrirevolutsiooni sotsiaalmajanduslikest eeldustest Baltimaadel," *Eesti NSV Teaduste Akadeemia Toimetised: Ühiskonnateadused,* 16 (1967): 32–33; *Revoliutsiia 1905–1907 gg. v Latvii: dokumenty i materialy* (Riga, 1956), p. xi.

15. *Eesti NSV ajalugu,* 2:313; *Ezhegodnik Rossii* (1907): 210–11.

16. D. G. Kirby, *Finland in the Twentieth Century* (London, 1979), p. 7; Osmo Jussila, *Nationalismi ja vallankumous venäläis-suomalaisissa suhteissa 1899–1914* (Helsinki, 1979), p. 22; Lundin, "Finland," p. 413; Jussi Teljo, *Suomen valtioelämän muutos 1905–1908* (Porvoo, 1949), pp. 13–15.

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areas with zemstvo institutions. In contrast, the Finnish Diet, inherited from the pre-1809 Swedish system, had met regularly since the 1860s and included representatives from four estates: nobility, clergy, burghers, and peasantry. On the eve of 1905 about 10 percent of the adult population in Finland were eligible to vote in the elections to the Diet.[17]

Although the Latvian and Estonian national movements, which began in the 1860s, at first tended to emphasize cultural matters, they soon became increasingly politicized. By the early 1880s Latvian and Estonian leaders were calling for the administrative unification of the areas inhabited by their respective nationalities (that is, Kurland and southern Livland by Latvians and northern Livland and Estland by Estonians) and the replacement of the provincial Diets by zemstvos.[18] After the mid-1880s certain administrative reforms on the central Russian model improved the Latvian and Estonian position vis-à-vis the Baltic German elite, but no changes in administrative divisions or in provincial political institutions occurred, in large part because of the strength of the Baltic German lobby in St. Petersburg. At the same time central government efforts at cultural Russification not only failed but even began to break down traditional Latvian and Estonian loyalties to the tsarist regime.[19] In the absence of representative institutions at the provincial—not to speak of the national—level, legal political organizations in the Baltic Provinces had no basis for development before 1905.

In Finland, by contrast, the Diet, though hardly a modern parliament, gradually expanded its powers and by 1886 was able to introduce legislation on its own initiative. At the same time informal political groupings developed around the major issue of Finnish politics in the late nineteenth century—the language problem. While in the Baltic Provinces the historical gap between Baltic Germans on the one hand and Latvians and Estonians on the other proved too great to bridge, a significant portion of Finland's Swedish-speaking elite decided that the healthy development of the country required the linguistic equality of Finnish with Swedish. Although the Finnish (Fennoman) and Swedish (Suecoman) parties lacked definite organization and programs, they and other factions, Leo Mechelin's liberal grouping for instance, helped provide Finland's elites with a preliminary education in parliamentary politics. Yet, ironically, the first political party in Finland to have a national organization and an explicit program was one not represented in the Diet—the Labor (later Social Democratic) Party, established in 1899.[20]

In regard to the immediate background of the outbreak of the Revolution of 1905 in the Baltic Provinces and Finland, it must first be stressed that for all the diversity in the Russian Empire there would have been no revolutionary situation without Bloody Sunday in St. Petersburg and no October Manifesto or "Days of Freedom" without the Moscow railroad strike; the Revolution of 1905 was *Russian*. The outlying areas and borderlands helped prolong the government's woes, but the primary motivating force at each stage came from the

17. Teljo, *Suomen valtioelämän muutos,* p. 44.

18. Andrejs Plakans, "The Latvians," in Thaden, *Russification,* p. 229; Hans Kruus, ed., *Eesti ajaloo lugemik,* 3 vols. (Tartu, 1924–1929), 3:292–94.

19. For analyses of the impact of Russification in the Baltic Provinces, see the parts by Michael H. Haltzel ("The Baltic Germans"), Andrejs Plakans ("The Latvians"), and Toivo U. Raun ("The Estonians") in Thaden, *Russification.*

20. Teljo, *Suomen valtioelämän muutos,* pp. 31–32.

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central Russian core. In addition, the dislocating effects of industrialization, the economic problems of the years before 1905, the Russo-Japanese War, and other supraregional factors guaranteed a degree of commonality throughout the empire. Nevertheless, local conditions in the Baltic Provinces, and especially in Finland, were also significant in determining the course of events in those areas.

In the Baltic Provinces the opposition movement had a limited base before 1905. Although cultural Russification had alienated many Latvians and Estonians, it had led to little active opposition. Indeed, in the conditions prevailing in the Russian empire (excluding Finland) such a movement would have had to be clandestine and underground. As a result of the rapid industrialization in Riga and the contact of Latvian intellectuals with Marxism, a social democratic opposition movement developed in the southern half of the Baltic Provinces by the mid-1890s. On the eve of the Revolution of 1905 two illegal Latvian parties emerged, both in the Latvian areas of the Baltic and in West European exile: the Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party (established 1904) and the Latvian Social Democratic Union (established 1903). In addition, sections of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party and the Jewish Bund existed in Riga by 1905.[21] In the northern and less industrialized half of the Baltic Provinces revolutionary organizations were slower to develop. Only the rudiments of a Reval Committee of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party had been established before January 1905.[22]

During the nineteenth century Finland had been one of the most loyal regions in the Russian state. Polish-style separatism did not emerge, largely because Finland had no historical memories of independence and was permitted to develop its own autonomous institutions. Finnish attitudes changed quickly, however, with the implementation of several Russification measures under Governor-General Nikolai Bobrikov: the February Manifesto in 1899, which effectively eliminated local control over legislation; a decree in 1900 to begin the use of Russian as the language of administration; and the Military Service Law of 1901, which disbanded the Finnish army and required Finnish recruits to serve outside Finland.[23] The attack from St. Petersburg split Finnish society, but only a minority led by the Old Finns (as the more conservative Fennomans came to be known) was willing, for fear of worse, to accept the decrees of the central government. The other political parties in Finland—the Swedish Party, the Young Finns (who, de-emphasizing the language issue, had split off from the Old Finns), and the Social Democrats—all considered the actions of the tsarist regime illegal. The Swedish Party and the Young Finns—together known as the "constitutionalists"—led a strong passive resistance movement, and the Social Democrats' critique of Finnish society was temporarily blunted by their belonging to a na-

21. Ernest F. Ames, ed., *The Revolution in the Baltic Provinces of Russia* (London, n.d.), pp. 4–10; von Rauch, *Russland,* p. 150; Krastyn', "Revoliutsiia 1905–1907 gg. v Latvii," *Revoliutsiia 1905–1907 gg. v natsional'nykh raionakh Rossii,* pp. 256–57; Henry J. Tobias, *The Jewish Bund in Russia: From Its Origins to 1905* (Stanford, Calif., 1972), pp. 283–84.

22. Karjahärm and Pullat, *Eesti revolutsiooni tules,* pp. 41–42. Mikhail Kalinin notes that in 1901 he was the only Russian employed in the Volta factory in Reval; M. Kalinin, "Prebyvanie v Revele," *Proletarskaia revoliutsiia,* 3 (1921): 241–42.

23. Kirby, *Finland in the Twentieth Century,* pp. 26–27; Osmo Jussila, "Vuoden 1905 suurlakko Suomessa, sen historialliset edellytykset ja seurakset, *Historiallinen Arkisto,* 72 (1977): 73; Lundin, "Finland," pp. 421, 438.

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tional front against Russification. A small, revolutionary opposition movement, which coalesced as the Finnish Party of Active Resistance in November 1904, cooperated with Japan and with other revolutionary groups in the Russian empire.[24] Thus on the eve of 1905 a majority of Finland's political elite had important experience in organizing passive resistance and grass-roots support against tsarist policies.

From the point of view of revolutionary process, the Baltic Provinces and Finland followed divergent paths. In general the revolutionary experience in Kurland, Livland, and Estland conformed to the central Russian pattern, but there were important local peculiarities as well as differences within the Baltic area itself. Finland remained aloof from the Russian model in 1905 as it had throughout the nineteenth century. With regard to mass participation, violence, and attempted revolutionary change of institutions, the Latvian areas of the Baltic Provinces were among the most active in the entire Russian empire. Based on figures compiled by the tsarist authorities, Livland had the highest rate of strikes per worker (4.98) in the empire in 1905.[25] Clearly Riga and the Latvian areas of the province played the leading role since there were no industrial centers in northern Livland. A Soviet survey provides data for calculating the rate of repeated walkouts (that is, the average number of times a striking worker actually went on strike) in European Russia, Poland, and the Caucasus. According to these statistics, Livland again held first place with a rate of 4.8 times, and Kurland was not far behind in fifth place with 4.2. Estland had a considerably lower rate of repeated walkouts—3.1—but was still above the average of 2.4 for these three areas of the empire.[26]

Although in the Baltic region, as in Russia, the Revolution of 1905 began in the cities, it spread to the rural areas in the second half of the year. The pattern was the same in all three provinces—strikes by agricultural laborers, arson, and some attacks on landlords—but again the movement was strongest in the Latvian areas, especially Kurland. The tsarist authorities declared martial law in Kurland (following massive strikes by rural workers) already on August 6/19[27] as compared to November 22/December 5 in Livland, December 10/23 in Reval and the surrounding district, and December 26/January 8, 1906 in the rest of Estland.[28] Table 4 provides statistics on the destruction of Baltic German estates by arson or other means and confirms the greater level of violence in the southern half of the Baltic Provinces. Unfortunately, it is not easy to determine the exact number of landed estates in the Baltic Provinces in 1905. Historically, the number and often the names of these estates were in flux.[29] A Baltic German source published in 1916 suggests a total of 1,914 *Rittergüter,* including 648 in Kurland, 804 in Livland, and 462 in Estland, and these figures are probably

24. Eino Jutikkala and Kauko Pirinen, *A History of Finland* (New York, 1962), pp. 233–36; Jussila, *Nationalismi,* pp. 23–24; William R. Copeland, *The Uneasy Alliance: Collaboration between the Finnish Opposition and the Russian Underground, 1899–1904* (Helsinki, 1973), pp. 16, 203; Kari O. Virtanen, *Ahdistettu kansakunta 1890–1917* (Porvoo, 1974), pp. 205, 210.

25. Švābe, *Latvijas vēsture,* pp. 626–27.

26. A. S. Amal'rik, "K voprosu o chislennosti i geograficheskom razmeshchenii stachechnikov v Evropeiskoi Rossii v 1905 godu," *Istoricheskie zapiski,* 52 (1955): 174.

27. To avoid confusion, all dates will be provided according to both Old and New Style.

28. Ames, *Revolution in the Baltic Provinces,* pp. 31, 41; *Baltische Revolutions-Chronik,* 2 vols. (Riga, 1907–1908), 2:213.

29. *Eesti ala mõisate nimestik* (Tallinn, 1981), pp. 2–4.

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Table 4. *Total or Partial Destruction of Manorhouses and Estates in Kurland, Livland, and Estland, 1905–1906*[a]

	No. of Estates	Damages (millions of rubles)
Kurland	229	5.01
S. Livland	183	3.83
Total	412	8.84
N. Livland	47	0.41
Estland	114[b]	2.80
Total	161	3.21

[a] The great majority of acts of destruction took place in fall 1905.
[b] *Eesti NSV ajalugu,* 3 vols. (Tallinn, 1955–1971), 2:409 indicates "over 120."
Source: *Krasnyi arkhiv,* 11–12 (1925): 279–80.

within 5 percent of the actual number in 1905.[30] If the *Rittergüter* in Livland are divided between the four Latvian districts (423) and five Estonian ones (381), then the proportion of destroyed or damaged estates in Kurland and in southern Livland was double the comparable figure for nothern Livland and Estland: 38 percent compared to 19 percent. More graphically, as seen in table 4, the ruble value of the damages caused in the southern part of the Baltic Provinces was nearly three times that in the northern part.

Another indication of the broader basis and greater militancy of the movement for change in the Latvian areas was the widespread replacement of the traditional rural township[31] governments by democratically elected revolutionary or "managing" (Lat. *rīcības*) committees (both men and women had the vote). It is striking that 80 percent of the rural townships in Kurland and 60 percent in southern Livland elected such committees compared to only slightly over 10 percent in the Estonian areas of the Baltic Provinces.[32]

No satisfactory explanation for these differences between the northern and southern parts of the Baltic Provinces has yet been proposed. Certainly the role of Riga as by far the largest, most industrialized, and most international city in the region as well as the more developed Latvian revolutionary movement may explain much of the contrast in the cities. The contrast in the rural areas remains puzzling, however. To be sure, the influence of urban revolutionaries in the rural areas was important (for example, in the July strike of agricultural workers in Kurland), but the Latvian countryside appears to have had a will of its own in 1905. Even Soviet scholars, who might be suspected of a pro-urban bias, note the independent and organized role of the rural township governments in the destruction of landed estates in Kurland and southern Livland. In the Estonian areas, where agrarian conditions were very similar to those in Latvia, the rural population proved much less active. Indeed, most of the destruction of estates in Estland and northern Livland took place through the initiative of urban work-

30. Valerian Tornius, *Die baltischen Provinzen* (Leipzig, 1916), p. 67. Tornius's figures for Livland and Kurland are very close to those in *Malyi entsiklopedicheskii slovar',* 2nd ed., 2 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1907–1909), 2:367 (819 estates in Livland) and *Courland, Livonia and Esthonia* (London, 1920), p. 55 (650 estates in Kurland).

31. Latvian *pagasts,* Estonian *vald,* Russian *volost'.*

32. Plakans, "The Latvians," p. 265; Karjahärm and Pullat, *Eesti revolutsiooni tules,* p. 121; *Eesti NSV ajalugu,* 2: 216; Krastiņš, *1905. gada revolūcija,* p. 192, gives a figure of "about 90 percent" for Kurland.

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ers.[33] The traditional Baltic German view that differences in national character among Latvians and Estonians help to account for these contrasts remains inadequate.[34] Soviet scholars, for their part, have either ignored the comparative issue in the Baltic Provinces or, citing Lenin, have stressed the advanced level of capitalism and cultural development in the Latvian areas.[35] But as we have seen, Estonia was about equally advanced in these respects. Thus, a thorough explanation of the contrasting experiences in the Baltic Provinces in 1905 must await the work of scholars proficient in both Latvian and Estonian who also have access to relevant archival sources.

Nevertheless, a hypothesis based on census data can be suggested. It is possible that the greater level of rural violence in the southern half of the Baltic Provinces was related to the larger German presence there. Tables 5 and 6 provide a comparison by rank of two variables: size of rual German population by district, and proportion of estates destroyed or damaged in the Latvian and Estonian areas of the Baltic Provinces. In table 5 it is striking that the top six districts are the same for both rankings. Furthermore, the correlation coefficient R for the two variables in table 5 proves to be 0.80 with $R^2 = 0.64$, suggesting that nearly two-thirds of the variation can be attributed to the influence of the relationship.[36] Other factors (what groups were involved in the rural violence and who led them) need to be considered as well, and ideally a thorough study would entail an estate-by-estate analysis. Still, the strength of the relationship between German presence and estate destruction argues for further examination of this hypothesis in the case of Kurland and southern Livland.

On the other hand, table 6 shows that rural Germans were much less visible in the northern part of the Baltic Provinces than in the south. Eleven of the fourteen Latvian districts had more rural Germans per 100 square kilometers than any of the nine Estonian ones, and the German presence in the six most violent Latvian districts was over three times as great as in Reval, the most violent Estonian district. Moreover, R for table 6 is -0.08 with $R^2 = 0.01$, indicating that virtually no relationship exists between the variables. This result confirms the evidence presented above that violence in rural Estonian areas resulted mainly from urban initiative. Thus, no particular relationship between presence of rural Germans and proportion of destroyed estates in northern Livland and Estland would be expected, and none is found. Taken together, the data in tables 5 and 6 suggest that a rural German visibility of at least 60 persons per 100 square kilometers may have been the "threshold" necessary for triggering extensive violence among the rural population. This corollary of the hypothesis would also seem to merit further investigation.[37]

33. Andrew Ezergailis, *The 1917 Revolution in Latvia* (New York, 1974), p. 7; Švābe, *Latvijas vēsture,* pp. 599, 629; *Revoliutsiia 1905–1907 gg. v Latvii,* p. xxxi; *Eesti NSV ajalugu,* 2: 406–409; Alfred Kliimann, ed., *1905. aasta verepulm Eestis,* 1: *Harjumaa* (Paide, 1932), p. 7.

34. [Astaf von Transehe-Roseneck,] *Die lettische Revolution,* 2 vols. (Berlin, 1906–1907), 2: 398; Alexander von Tobien, *Die livländische Ritterschaft in ihrem Verhältnis zum Zarismus und russischen Nationalismus,* 2 vols. (Riga, 1925; Berlin, 1930), 2: 215.

35. Krastyn′, "Revoliutsiia 1905–1907 gg. v Latvii," p. 259.

36. The correlation coefficient R is calculated according to the formula in Roderick Floud, *An Introduction to Quantitative Methods for Historians* (Princeton, 1973), p. 138.

37. In order to test the hypothesis and corollary it would be necessary to establish the residence patterns and social categories of rural Germans in the Baltic Provinces. Furthermore, the timing and circumstances surrounding the destruction of individual estates would need to be determined.

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Table 5. *Size of Rural German Population and Proportion of* Rittergüter *Destroyed or Damaged in Southern Livland and Kurland*

District	Rural Germans per 100 sq km (1897)	Rank	Percent of Total Number of Estates Damaged or Destroyed (1905–06)	Rank
Goldingen (Kuldīga)	75	1	81	1
Riga	74	2	58	4.5
Hasenpoth (Aizpute)	68	3	55	6
Grobin (Grobiņa)	67	4	65	2
Talsen (Talsi)	63	5	58	4.5
Wenden (Cēsis)	62	6	61	3
Doblen (Dobele)	49	7.5	16	12
Tuckum (Tukums)	49	7.5	34	7
Illuxt (Ilūkste)	46	9	11	13
Windau (Ventspils)	41	10	28	9
Bauske (Bauska)	32	11	0	14
Wolmar (Valmiera)	26	12	20	11
Walk (Valka)	23	13	33	8
Friedrichstadt (Jaunjelgava)	20	14	23	10

Sources: Troinitskii, *Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis'*, 19:78–79; 21:78–79; Valerian Tornius, *Die baltischen Provinzen* (Leipzig, 1916), p. 67; *Krasnyi arkhiv*, 11–12 (1925): 279–80.

Table 6. *Size of Rural German Population and Proportion of* Rittergüter *Destroyed or Damaged in Northern Livland and Estland*

District	Rural Germans per 100 sq km (1897)	Rank	Percent of Total Number of Estates Damaged or Destroyed (1905–06)	Rank
Werro (Võru)	27	1.5	13	5
Weissenstein (Paide)	27	1.5	9	6
Wesenberg (Rakvere)	23	3	2	8
Pernau (Pärnu)	20	4.5	29	2
Fellin (Viljandi)	20	4.5	8	7
Reval (Tallinn)	19	7	59	1
Dorpat (Tartu)	19	7	15	4
Hapsal (Haapsalu)	19	7	19	3
Arensburg (Kuressaare)	13	9	0	9

Sources: Troinitskii, *Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis'*, 21:78–79; 49:42–43; Tornius, *Die baltischen Provinzen*, p. 67; *Krasnyi arkhiv*, 11–12 (1925): 279–80.

Compared to the Baltic Provinces and other parts of the Russian empire, Finland remained relatively calm in 1905, and the tsarist authorities did not find it necessary to proclaim martial law. In the urban areas the population expressed itself in mass demonstrations and meetings to condemn the tsar's policies, rather than in strikes, and in the countryside calm prevailed. The Finnish working class was concerned above all with the problems of Finnish society and remained part of the anti-Russian front of the pre-1905 era. The tenant farmers and landless peasants, perhaps because they shared a belief—however unconscious—in a legal

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tradition, chose not to express their discontent through violence.[38] With few exceptions, Finland held itself apart from the revolutionary activism in Russia and awaited a time when the hated Russification policy could be most effectively attacked. That moment came in October: Finland concentrated its activism into a one-week period, the Great Strike of October 17/30 to October 24/ November 6. While almost all Finns participated in the strike, they shunned violence, and although workers and radical socialists raised the prospect of revolutionary change, the tsar's accession to the demands for revoking the worst aspects of Russification and for implementing universal suffrage (in the manifesto of October 22/November 4) provided the means for compromise among the opposing social forces and helped avert a potential civil war.[39] Thus, the strong constitutional and legal tradition in Finland and quick concessions by the tsarist regime contributed to a peaceful resolution of the Great Strike. The Finns were also fortunate that a man favorably disposed toward conciliation, Sergei Witte, had the tsar's ear at the crucial moment.[40]

In the Baltic Provinces the Revolution of 1905 brought open political debate for the first time, and a number of new political parties emerged. The Baltic Constitutional Party, the organ of the Baltic Germans, accepted the October Manifesto and called for gradual reform in Russia, but the Baltic German nobility proved unwilling to share power in provincial institutions at home.[41] Among the Latvians the nonsocialist political spectrum, ranging from the conservative, protsarist Latvian National Party to the radical Latvian Democratic Party, was decidedly broader than among the Estonians, whose only formal nonsocialist organization was the Estonian Progressive People's Party, ideologically close to the Russian Constitutional Democrats. This contrast suggests the existence of a larger and more differentiated Latvian bourgeoisie and landowning peasantry. On the left side of the political spectrum four of the five social democratic parties in the Baltic Provinces were already in existence before 1905. While all of them followed the Erfurt Program of the German Social Democrats, the Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party and the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party adopted an essentially centralist position, stressing all-empire matters over local ones. The Latvian Social Democratic Union, the Jewish Bund, and the Estonian Social Democratic Workers' Party (the one new social democratic party in 1905) took a federalist view and emphasized local autonomy.[42]

Two congresses held in the second half of November 1905 gave broad expression to Latvian and Estonian public opinion. The Latvian Congress of Rural

38. Virtanen, *Ahdistettu kansakunta,* pp. 214–15, 224; Jussila, *Nationalismi,* pp. 58, 71; Lundin, "Finland," pp. 412, 416.

39. Jussila, "Vuoden 1905 suurlakko," pp. 81–86; Hannu Soikkanen, "Suurlakko," in Päiviö Tommila, ed., *Venäläinen sortokausi Suomessa* (Porvoo, 1960), pp. 178–86; Lundin, "Finland," p. 444.

40. Howard D. Mehlinger and John M. Thompson, *Count Witte and the Tsarist Government in the 1905 Revolution* (Bloomington, Ind., 1972), p. 73.

41. *Bericht über die Tätigkeit der Baltischen Konstitutionellen Partei 1906* (Riga, 1907), pp. 4–5, 22; Gert von Pistohlkors, *Ritterschaftliche Reformpolitik zwischen Russifizierung und Revolution* (Göttingen, West Germany, 1978), pp. 256–57.

42. Margarethe Lindemuth, "Die lettischen Parteien 1905 und ihre Programme," *Baltische Hefte,* 15 (1969): 75–86; Lindemuth, *Das lettisch-deutsche Verhältnis vor dem 1. Weltkrieg auf Grund der lettischen Presse* (Hannover-Döhren, West Germany, 1976), pp. 29–33; Plakans, "The Latvians," pp. 261–63; J. George Longworth, *The Latvian Congress of Rural Delegates in 1905* (New York, 1959), pp. 52–53, 90; von Rauch, *Russland,* p. 150; Raun, "The Estonians," pp. 338–39.

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Delegates began in Riga on November 18/December 1 with approximately nine hundred representatives of rural townships present; the All-Estonian Congress opened in Dorpat (Tartu) on November 27/December 10 with some eight hundred delegates from both urban and rural areas. It immediately split into radical and moderate wings. Although there were differences in emphasis and disagreements especially concerning tactics, both congresses agreed that democratization was urgently needed and that the future form of government in the empire should be decided by an all-Russian constituent assembly elected by universal suffrage. The Latvian Congress and the moderate ("Bürgermusse") wing of the Estonian Congress also stressed cultural and political autonomy in the Baltic Provinces, while the radical ("Aula") Estonian wing, calling for the immediate overthrow of the tsar, concentrated on all-Russian questions and tactical matters.[43]

In Finland the Great Strike and Nicholas II's manifesto of October 22/November 4 promising a Diet elected by universal suffrage led to the emergence of modern political parties. During the strike itself Finland divided along class lines. The Social Democrats, the major force behind the strike, pressed for a Finnish constituent assembly elected by universal suffrage. The constitutionalists, that is, the Swedish Party and the Young Finns, desired above all the restoration of the pre-Bobrikov system. Nevertheless, the massiveness of the Great Strike led to fears that a Finland caught up in civil war would be easy prey for tsarist Russifiers and forced both constitutionalist parties and the Old Finns also to accept the principle of universal suffrage. All three nonsocialist parties argued for legal continuity rather than a revolutionary constituent assembly, however: the Diet should reform itself with the tsar's blessing. For their part, the Finnish Social Democrats looked to West European, not Russian models, and universal suffrage was seen as a logical way-station on the road to a future socialist revolution. In the meantime the majority of Finnish socialists agreed that no excuses for intervention in Finland should be given to the tsarist regime.[44]

Outwardly, the changes wrought by the Revolution of 1905 in the Baltic Provinces do not seem momentous. To be sure, the Baltic population benefited from a number of concessions made at the empire level: establishment of a State Duma, religious toleration, restoration of autonomy for the universities, and abolition of pre-censorship. The most important changes in the Baltic area occurred, however, not in institutions but in attitudes. The Baltic Germans, shocked by the violence and feeling abandoned by the tsarist regime, began to turn to imperial Germany as a potential source of support for their traditional privileged position in Kurland, Livland, and Estland.[45] Violence in the Baltic Provinces begot the counter-violence of punitive expeditions, which were among the bloodiest in the Russian empire and made compromise between Baltic Germans on the one hand and Latvians and Estonians on the other even less likely than it

43. Longworth, *The Latvian Congress,* p. 103; Švābe, *Latvijas vēsture,* pp. 616–17; Raun, "The Estonians," pp. 312, 339; Toivo U. Raun, "1905 as a Turning Point in Estonian History," *East European Quarterly,* 14 (1980): 328–31.

44. Virtanen, *Ahdistettu kansakunta,* pp. 242, 269; Jussila, "Vuoden 1905 suurlakko," pp. 81–82; Jussila, *Nationalismi,* pp. 50, 112, 137–38; D. G. Kirby, ed., *Finland and Russia: From Autonomy to Independence* (London, 1975), pp. 106–11, 117–18.

45. C. Leonard Lundin, "The Road from Tsar to Kaiser: Changing Loyalties of the Baltic Germans, 1905–1914," *Journal of Central European Affairs,* 10 (1950): 225–26.

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had been.[46] For the Latvians and Estonians, however, it was changes in political and social consciousness and a greater level of self-confidence that were most significant. Although debates, congresses, and revolutionary activity had not led to the desired results, the experience itself provided an invaluable political education.[47]

In Finland the consquences of 1905 involved far-reaching changes in both institutions and attitudes. The democratization of suffrage increased tenfold the size of the electorate, which included women for the first time in Europe, and despite later tsarist harassment Finland's modern parliament can be dated from 1905. Although the relationship between Russia and Finland was not resolved and new tsarist attacks began in 1907, it is significant that Finland was the only area in the empire to obtain concessions in the realm of national autonomy in 1905.[48] Ironically the Great Strike, a moment of national unity against tsarist oppression, was also a time of discovery of internal social differences. Even more than in the Baltic Provinces, political consciousness now began to reach the entire adult population of Finland, including the previously excluded lower classes. The myth of the success of the Great Strike, which conveniently ignored the role of the all-Russian upheaval in October 1905, encouraged a militant labor movement, and a deeply divided Finland was revealed in the first democratic elections in 1907.[49]

A comparative overview of the Revolution of 1905 in the Baltic Provinces and Finland shows strikingly different patterns. Judged from the Finnish perspective, the differences *within* the Baltic Provinces appear minor except for the greater level of rural unrest in Kurland and southern Livland. Although modernization had fostered certain similarities in the Baltic Provinces and Finland, they were not decisive in determining the attitudes and actions of these societies in 1905. Finland remained aloof from the revolutionary violence that occurred in Kurland, Livland, and Estland in large part because the possibility of gradual change already existed in its political institutions. Furthermore, Finland was more homogeneous ethnically, its agrarian relations were less intractable, historically it had looked to Sweden and the West for models, and Russification on the eve of 1905 served to unify the majority of the population and paper over social differences.

Despite these contrasting patterns, the goals were the same in the Baltic Provinces and Finland. The majority of the population in both areas sought democratization and autonomy; the crucial difference was that the Finns were calling for the restoration of their autonomy while the Latvians and Estonians were demanding the establishment of theirs for the first time against the opposition of the well-entrenched Baltic German elite. Finland's calm in 1905 also

46. Sidney Harcave, *The Russian Revolution of 1905* (London, 1970; first published, 1964), p. 241. A recent Soviet source suggests that over 2,000 people in the Latvian areas of the Baltic Provinces and about 300 in the Estonian areas were killed by the punitive expeditions, 595 others were sentenced to execution by courts-martial throughout the three provinces, and hundreds more received jail sentences, forced labor, or exile as punishment. See Karjahärm and Pullat, *Eesti revolutsiooni tules,* pp. 151–53.

47. Raun, "1905," pp. 327–30; Arnolds Spekke, *History of Latvia: An Outline* (Stockholm, 1957), p. 314.

48. Harcave, *The Russian Revolution of 1905,* p. 258.

49. Jussila, "Vuoden 1905 suurlakko," pp. 89–90; Soikkanen, "Suurlakko," p. 189; Kirby, *Finland in the Twentieth Century,* p. 32.

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helps to account for its success in democratization. The hard-pressed tsarist regime rewarded Finland for good behavior and sought to preempt yet another center of social unrest. In the Baltic Provinces the widespread violence and revolutionary activism meant that the only hope for success lay in the overthrow of the tsarist regime. That, however, did not occur in 1905.[50]

50. I wish to thank Professors Andrejs Plakans and Rein Taagepera for helpful advice on the quantitative aspects of this article.

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