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H. Arnold Barton

Abstract: Sweden's loss of Finland to Russia in 1808-09 was bitterly resented in Sweden but accepted by Finland's elite, who realized that Sweden could ultimately not defend their land. Alexander I made Finland a self-governing Grand Duchy under his suzerainty, although its status remained precarious. By the 1830s Russophobia was again on the rise in Sweden, where the "Scandinavianists" believed the Finns longed for reunification with Sweden. With their new internal autonomy and growing cultural "Fennomania," few Finns had such ideas. The Crimean War, in which Sweden came close to intervening, brought a clear parting of the ways between Scandinavianism and Fennomania.

By October 1853, the "quarrel of monks" over the rights of the Latin and Greek churches in the Holy Land led, after tortuous diplomatic manoeuvring, to war between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. In March 1854, Great Britain and France entered the conflict against Russia, backed by vociferously Russophobic public opinion. The strategic question for the Western Allies was where they might best attack Russia: either in the Black Sea, via the Straits, or in the Baltic against St. Petersburg itself, via the Sound. In the event, by the fall of 1854 they opted for the first alternative, concentrating their forces against the Crimea with its great Russian naval base of Sebastopol.

Nonetheless, the Baltic remained of great strategic interest. Sweden, if it joined Russia's enemies, might play an important role there, both as a base of operations and as an ally in an assault against the Russian capital. This, in turn, would draw Finland into the fray. By 1855, after Sebastopol's fall, Sweden came close to entering the war but was forestalled when the Russians made peace in March 1856. Thus, for Sweden the war itself was a "non-event". Yet in a broader sense, it was a revealing episode and one that would have important long-term consequences for the North.

As Finland covered the approaches to St. Petersburg, it assumed particular strategic significance. But for Sweden there were deeper reasons for concern. Beginning in the twelfth century, Finland had been Christianized and incorporated as an integral part of the Swedish kingdom. Over six hundred years its institutions, higher culture, and cultivated language had become Swedish. Strong ties united the two parts of the

realm and Finns had long played their prominent part in Sweden's government, military forces, economy, and cultural life.

In 1808-09, during the turmoil of the Napoleonic Wars, the Russians invaded and occupied Finland. Tsar Alexander I claimed the territory as a province of the Russian Empire in April 1808 and in June required the Finns to swear allegiance to him. In January 1809, however, he convened a Finnish *Lantdag,* or Diet, at Borgå (Porvoo), at which he declared Finland a Grand Duchy under his own suzerainty, promising to respect its existing constitution, laws, and religion. New central administrative institutions were established, while Swedish remained the official language. At Borgå, Alexander declared that he had placed Finland "in the rank of nations."[1]

The Finnish forces had fiercely resisted the Russian invasion and indeed were still in the field while the Borgå diet was in session. Not until March 1809 did their last remnant capitulate in northern Sweden. By September Sweden was compelled to conclude the Peace of Fredrikshamn (Hamina), ceding Finland to the Russian Tsar, thereby losing a third of its territory and a quarter of its population.

Even while the war lasted, the Swedish-speaking Finnish upper classes accepted this change of status with remarkable equanimity (Bonsdorff 1918; Tommila 1962). For this they were well prepared over the past century. Peter I's establishment of his new capital of St. Petersburg in 1703 and his decisive defeat of Carl XII's Swedish army at Poltava in 1709 during the Great Northern War (1700-21) marked the end of Sweden's seventeenth century "Era of Greatness" and its dominion over the Baltic region. Finland, while it remained under Swedish rule, however, posed a constant threat to the new Russian capital. It was twice invaded and occupied by the Russians, in 1709-21 and again after a rash Swedish attack against Russia in 1741-43. Although it was restored to Sweden both times, the Russians kept parts of southeastern Finland to guard the approaches to St. Petersburg.

The lessons of these wars were not lost on the Finns. It became increasingly evident that Sweden could not in the long run defend them against Russia. At the same time, the Russians no longer seemed as uncivilized as in the past. The cosmopolitan Enlightenment encouraged the utilitarian concept, *ubi bene, ibi patria.* During Sweden's "Era of Freedom," 1718-72, political factions frequently appealed to foreign powers, including Russia, for support. During the war of 1741-43, the Empress Elizabeth, encouraged by disaffected Finns, issued a manifesto offering Finland autonomy under Russian overlordship in return for an oath of allegiance. When Gustaf III again declared war on Russia in 1788, a group of Finnish officers conspired with Catherine II to make Finland a Russian protectorate, although this time Finland escaped occupation and

the loss of further territory. Still, the Russian threat remained and autonomous status under Russia became ever more conceivable (Bonsdorff 1918, 292-93; Barton 1972).

Gunnar Artéus (1999, 113-14) has expressed the Finns' quandary: continued Swedish rule would assure participation in political power and a high degree of civic freedom, at the expense of security against repeated wars with Russia on Finnish soil; incorporation into the Russian Empire would mean loss of guaranteed political and personal rights, but a stable peace, protected by Russia's superior military strength. Alexander sought, as he wrote to his Governor-General in 1810, to offer his new Finnish subjects "incomparably greater advantages than they would have had under Swedish dominion." (Tommila 1962, 46) The new regime provided real benefits to the Finnish elite while reassuring the peasantry of their traditional rights.

The transition was a soft one. Until 1812, Finns who wished to remain Swedish subjects could opt to depart for Sweden, while those in Sweden who chose to become subjects of the new Grand Duchy could relocate in Finland. There was considerable movement in both directions, even after the stipulated period. Emigrés were appointed to high positions on both sides. Until 1840, trade with Sweden continued unhindered and Swedish money circulated freely in Finland (Tarkiainen 1999, 69).

If the Finns appeared to have come to terms with their new status, the loss of Finland was a shattering experience for the Swedes, leading to an outraged search for scapegoats and a wave of impassioned Russophobia and lust for revenge. Blame for the debacle fell mainly upon King Gustaf IV Adolf for his inept leadership in the war. This, in large part, brought about his arrest in March 1808 by a junta of army officers and the calling of a Diet (*Riksdag*) which deposed him and his heirs, elected his elderly uncle King Carl XIII, and drafted a new constitution (Barton 1986, 178-79).

Beyond that, it was widely believed that Finland was lost through weakness and treachery, particularly with the surrender, after only token resistance, of the great fortress and naval base at Sveaborg in Helsingfors (Helsinki) Bay, by its commander, Admiral C. O. Cronstedt. It was too much for most Swedes to accept the fact that they had been beaten by a better led, organized, trained, armed, and supplied foe, with greater battlefield experience and higher morale, and they bitterly resented the Finnish establishment's supine behavior toward the invaders. The Finns, for their part, blamed inept leadership and lack of reinforcement from Sweden during the war (Odelberg 1954; Engman 2000; Hult 1999, 17; Tarkiainen 1999, 17, 73, 75).

For centuries, Swedes had regarded the Russians as their hereditary foes. The war brought an upsurge of Russophobia, with the poet Esaias Tegnér in the vanguard. "Like a thief in the night treacherously they crept / with hidden dagger. / Suddenly their banners flew / among a secure and peaceful folk," Tegnér wrote in 1808. "Our harvests they will scatter / our fathers' bones they will trample, / ravish our women's virtue..." If only the Swedes were still the heroes of yesteryear, he lamented in 1811 (Tegnér 1919, 14-16, 35-38, 64-77).

The Swedes at first hoped that Finland might be regained, as it had been in 1721 and 1743. Alexander I's Tilsit alliance of 1807 with Napoleon was clearly breaking down. In a foreseeable war between them, Sweden, allied with France, might win back what it had lost. Largely in such hopes, the *Riksdag* elected the French Field Marshal Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte, a commander of proven ability, as Crown Prince Carl Johan, successor to the childless Carl XIII, in August 1810.

Napoleon invaded Russia in June 1812. The new Crown Prince -- by now the real ruler of Sweden -- shared none of the Swedes' emotional attachment to Finland, regarding it as a potential liability if regained, and sought instead to acquire Norway from Denmark in compensation, thereby strengthening the security of the Scandinavian Peninsula. Already in February 1812 he undertook to ally himself with Russia in the event of a French attack, in return for support in acquiring Norway. This alliance was confirmed in August by Alexander I and Carl Johan when they met in Åbo (Turku) in Finland. In a secret protocol, Sweden and Russia guaranteed the integrity of each other's existing domains. This meant that in return for Norway, Sweden renounced any future claim to Finland (Barton 1986, 317-21).

Sweden joined the war against France in early 1813; in return, Russian troops reinforced Carl Johan's Swedish army in a brief campaign against Denmark in December 1813, forcing Frederik VI in January 1814 to relinquish Norway to the king of Sweden. After attempting to establish an independent kingdom, the Norwegians were compelled by November 1814 to join in a dynastic union with Sweden, although under their own constitution and government which limited the powers of the joint monarch. Many Swedes were disillusioned, considering Norway, under such terms, as scarcely an adequate exchange for Finland (Barton 1986, 348-53, and 2003, 28).

With the general European peace in 1814-15, the Swedes seemed compelled to accept the new dispensation, however regretfully, and turned their interests toward their Scandinavian neighbors, Norway and Denmark, and proud memories of their shared Nordic antiquity. This became of the focus of the Gothic League (*Götiska Förbundet*), founded in 1810 among

young intellectuals, most prominent among them the poets Esaias Tegnér and Erik Gustaf Geijer, who sought to inspire a national revival, based on the rude virtues of the Saga age. This vision, which had eighteenth century antecedents, inspired the idealistic Scandinavianist movement that found expression in the periodic meetings of Swedish, Danish, and eventually Norwegian students, beginning in 1842.

Political motives were meanwhile not lacking behind this enthusiasm. The Danes felt increasingly threatened by separatism among the German population in Slesvig and Holstein. Scandinavian solidarity could not only strengthen national sentiment among the Danes in Slesvig, but could also ultimately provide allies against possible German aggression. This in turn reawakened concern for Finland. At the student meeting at Lund in 1843, leading Danish Scandinavianist Carl Plough sought to stir enthusiasm among his Swedish companions by appealing to their sympathy for their Finnish brethren. The Russian government promptly summoned the Swedish Minister to St. Petersburg to express its concern over the radical students, who it feared were "obedient tools for revolutionary intriguers."[2]

To enthusiastic young Scandinavianists, it seemed altogether natural to regard the Finns, with their long common history, Swedish cultural heritage, and entirely Swedish-speaking educated elite, as fellow "Scandinavians," little concerned -- or perhaps hardly aware -- that the great majority of Finland's inhabitants spoke a Ural-Altaic vernacular totally unrelated to the Scandinavian languages.

Nationalism went hand-in-hand with liberalism in Metternich's Europe. The young Scandinavianists ardently sympathized with the various revolutions, national liberation and unification movements on the Continent: German *Burschenschaften,* Italian *Carbonari,* Greek, Belgian, and French revolutionaries. Here traditional Swedish Russophobia joined with the mounting detestation throughout the Western World for Russia as the heart and soul of the Holy Alliance. The infamous "Testament of Peter the Great," a French forgery probably from the late eighteenth century, held that it was Russia's ultimate ambition to dominate all of Europe. Anti-Russian passions rose to new heights in the West with Nicholas I's ruthless suppression of the Polish uprising of 1830-31 and especially his crushing of the Hungarian revolution on Austria's behalf in 1849 (Gleason 1950; Martin 1963; Eriksson 1930). In verse and in song the Scandinavian students gave vent to their mounting Russophobia, revanchism, and outrage over Finland's fate.

Particularly prominent in this regard was the Swede C. V. A. Strandberg (pseud. "Talis Qualis"). In "*Utmaning*" (Challenge) from 1844, for instance, he summoned "the world's Goliath, the giant of the East" to a fair battle against the gallant Swedes. "What you took from us before / you

did not take with the sword, but stole. ... Slave! Thou shouldst be fired / by the thought alone of bleeding on soil that is free ... / and to die among free men!" His "*Vaticinium*" declaimed at the student meeting at Lund in 1845, appealed, "*Finland!* So would I cry out / and from you all find an answer from the depths of your hearts." It foresaw how the stout-hearted students would embark for Finland, where the old love for Sweden needed only their encouragement to break forth. There they would "lay low the bloodied Cossack in the dust!" (Berg 1903, vi 103-12; cf. Tarkiainen 1999, 67).

The example of the valiant Greeks in the Persian Wars against the colossus of their time cannot have been far from these classically educated students' minds. At the same time one may suspect that some in their excitement almost believed that brave toasts and rousing songs might alone suffice to put the craven Muscovite to flight! Moreover, if the oppressed Poles had risen up against the Tsar in 1831, would not the Finns do likewise, with whole-hearted Scandinavian support?

The students reflected widespread liberal opinion in Sweden. By the 1830s there was rising discontent with the regime of Carl XIV Johan, who had come to the throne in 1818 and had become increasingly reactionary. Criticism came to focus largely upon the King's steadfast adherence to his Russian alliance of 1812. The King seemed the compliant tool of the Russian autocrat in both foreign and domestic policy, which posed the greatest obstacle to progressive reform. The question arose why Carl Johan had not regained Finland in 1812 when there might have been a chance (See esp. Holmberg 1946, 66-68).

In 1841, the aging Tegnér, in his poem "*Kronbruden*" (The Crown Bride) warned that "the Russian is the stereotype / of all force and oppression, the constant symbol / enemy not to us alone, but to mankind /. ... Away, away with the barbarian" (Tegnér 1919, 149). The following year the Finnish-born Gustaf Henrik Melin's *Sveriges sista strid* (Sweden's Last Battle) gave a lurid fictional account of a future Sweden, invaded and occupied by an insatiably expansionist Russia, thanks to the treachery or indifference of "many of the noble caste." He proceeded to paint a grim picture of the life that followed, clearly alluding to what was believed to exist in Finland. His particular villains were well-known, high-ranking Swedish reactionaries whom he portrayed as servile lackeys of the all-powerful Tsar.[3]

The liberal opposition thus brought to the fore the question of Finland's actual status within the Russian Empire, leading between 1838 and 1842 to a heated pamphlet war.[4] The first, preemptive blow was struck in 1838 by the prominent Uppsala Professor of Medicine Israel Hwasser, who after several years at Finland's University, first at Åbo, then at

Helsingfors, had returned to his native Sweden in 1830. Hwasser was a staunch conservative and warm admirer not only of Carl XIV Johan but of Tsar Nicholas I as well (Tarkiainen 1999, 72; Runeberg 1962, 216-17).

In an anonymous 109-page pamphlet Hwasser declared that while he recognized the deep sorrow in Sweden over the loss of Finland, the Finns themselves were now satisfied with their new situation and had no desire to return to Swedish rule. "The foster son does not wish to seem ungrateful to his foster father, but he wished to leave his house to seek his fortune on his own," he wrote. Reunion with Sweden would only bring war and would impede Finland's internal progress.

The heart of Hwasser's argument was meanwhile that even before Sweden renounced all claims to Finland at the Peace of Fredrikshamn, the Finns had "emancipated themselves from their former condition" and, at the Borgå Diet in March 1809, had concluded their own separate peace. The Tsar of Russia thereupon made Finland "a state in its own right," guaranteeing its "own representative government, own constitution, and own laws." It was hardly to be expected that the Finns would willingly give up their new status. Taking a broader view, Hwasser considered that as Finland had received western civilization from Sweden, it was its historic destiny to convey it to Russia, from whence it would in time spread eastward to the wild inhabitants of Asia. Sweden's wisest policy was to leave Finland alone and look instead to its morally justified union with Norway (Hwasser 1838, esp. 15-21, 29, 38-40, 76-77, 83-90, 99-105). It seems not unlikely that Hwasser may have been secretly encouraged to write his tract by the King himself, who was adept at manipulating the press.

Hwasser's pamphlet promptly drew a sharp rebuttal from "Pekka Kuoharinen," a pseudonym for the emigré Finn Adolf Ivar Arwidsson. At Åbo, Arwidsson had been a leader in the early student movement for cultivation and use of the Finnish language. In 1821, after his appointment as a Docent in history, he established a newspaper, *Åbo Morgonblad,* in which he sought to arouse civic spirit and criticized existing conditions. This caused anxiety among the Finnish authorities and with the Tsar's authority the newspaper was shut down after only nine months. Arwidsson was dismissed from his academic post. Failing to find other employment in Finland, he emigrated in 1823 to Sweden, where he devoted himself to literary pursuits and was eventually appointed Royal Librarian (Carpelan 1903, 123-26; cf. Castrén 1951; Hornborg 1933, 101-2; Wuorinen 1931, 46-55; Jutikkala 1962, 201-2, 203).

In response to Hwasser, Arwidsson described Finland's guaranteed privileges within the Russian Empire as a sham. In June 1808, Alexander I had proclaimed Finland annexed for all time as a "province of Russia," and

this was what, step by step, it was becoming. The Finns had therefore not concluded a separate peace and renounced Swedish sovereignty of their own free will. At Borgå the Tsar had allowed the Diet no more than consultative functions. "This politically fictional house of cards thus collapses," Arwidsson declared. Finland lacked any firm guarantee against Russian encroachment. Moreover the Diet had not been convened for the past thirty years, since Borgå (Kuoharinen 1838, esp. 9-23, 36-41, 61-64; cf. Klinge, "Nordens säkerhet" 157).

At the end of 1838, Erik Gustaf Geijer, now Professor of history at Uppsala, brought out a survey of Swedish-Russian relations over the centuries, ending with a brief discussion of the dispute between Hwasser and Arwidsson. He agreed with Arwidsson that Finland was a Russian conquest and that its autonomy was illusory. Still, the illusion had its own reality for the Finns. He dismissed as unrealistic the idea that Sweden might have regained Finland in 1812. Even if recovered, it would prove impossible to hold. Geijer held that Sweden's union with Norway had, "like all sound policies, been determined by *true* conditions," and that the dual monarchy's present course was the best possible (esp. 310-25, 600).

Arwidsson brought out an augmented version of his pamphlet in 1839-40. Hwasser countered with a new pamphlet on the Borgå Diet, offering detailed juridical arguments to demonstrate that it had possessed authority to act on behalf of Finland, guaranteed by its "contract" with the Tsar. In Sweden he deplored the blind Russophobia and exaggerated praise for "the Finland that had been," together with contempt for the new Finland. "They speak so much of threats from the East, but it actually seems as if they rather wish for them than believe in them." The real menace came from Sweden's own bitter internal conflicts. Hwasser urged the Swedes to forget the past and concentrate on their country's own development (Hwasser 1839, esp. 3, 35, 54-58; cf. Klinge, "Nordens säkerhet," 160-61).

This was followed in 1841 by a pamphlet by "Olli Kekäläinen." Its author was presumed to be Arwidsson, but this has recently given rise to controversy. The actual author appears to have been the Helsingfors law Professor Johan Jacob Nordström, who left not long after for Stockholm, where in time he was appointed the Royal Archivist, and who took a more cautious approach to avoid giving the Russians justification for further repression in Finland.

"Kekäläinen's" brochure undertook to reconcile the opposing views of Hwasser and Arwidsson. "Whoever closely follows this exchange will easily discover that Herr Hwasser confuses that *should be* with what *is,* and that Pekka Kuoharinen presents the situation as it *is,* without considering how it *should be.*" They argued on different levels. Although Finland was a conquered land, Alexander I had concluded a "true contract" with its

inhabitants, even though this had not been always been honored in letter or spirit. Unfortunately the exact nature of Finland's status had not been clearly set forth from the beginning. In theory, if one party did not live up to a contract, the other was no longer bound to it. But it would be unrealistic to expect that Russia would accept such an interpretation. Meanwhile, Finland was growing into its new role both economically and culturally. Thus a true friend of Finland could only urge it to live scrupulously up to its side of the bargain, to avoid any risk of losing the rights it presently enjoyed. Secret conspiracies or open resistance could only invite disaster, as the recent Polish uprising had proved (Kekäläinen 1841, esp. 25-28, 35, 40-43, 47-48; cf. Klinge, "Nordens säkerhet," 161-63).

In 1842, the Finnish emigré Carl Fredrik von Burghausen, under the pseudonym "Paavo Suomalainen," responded to "Kekäläinen," depicting the latter's presentation as confused, inconsistent, and inconclusive. The Swedes knew little or nothing about present conditions in Finland, he wrote. But what did the Finns themselves know under heavy-handed censorship and with no chance of forming any kind of opposition? The conduct of their government was "an impenetrable secret." Finland's only real constitution was the Tsar's will alone, which was often in violation of that supposedly guaranteed at Borgå -- the former Swedish constitution of 1772, as amended in 1789. Von Burghausen thereupon detailed numerous ways in which he held that this existing constitution had been violated. He concluded with attacks on various Finnish officials whom he regarded as the corrupt haiduks of the Tsar (Suomalainen 1842, esp. 3-10).

Thereafter Swedish opinion turned for the time being to other concerns. In 1844 Carl XIV Johan died and was followed on the throne by his son, Oscar I, in whom the liberals placed high hopes.

In his pamphlet from 1838, A. I. Arwidsson ("Kuoharinen") had stopped short of urging Finland's reunification with Sweden. Since 1809, the Finns had begun to develop a "feeling of nationality of their own," finding inspiration in their "own inner folk life." Here he alluded to his own role while in Åbo as an early proponent of the Finnish language. "Olli Kekäläinen" likewise declared in 1841 that the Finns had begun to discover their own indigenous roots. "A people is not dead," he declared, "as long as it possesses his own language ... for language is the distillate of the nation's whole antiquity, destiny, and history" (Kuoharinen 1838, 35-37, 61-64; Kekäläinen 1841, 47-49).[5]

For centuries language and status had gone together in Finland. Swedish had been the language of all official business and of higher culture, while Finnish -- or rather various dialects of Finnish -- remained the peasant vernacular, except in some coastal areas. To rise in social and

occupational standing required a knowledge of Swedish and normally a Swedish name. Only by the later eighteenth century did interest in Finnish language and folklore begin awaken in academic circles. After Finland's separation from Sweden, however, the Finns needed to find a new direction. "The Emperor wants to make good Finns of us," wrote Baron Gustaf Mauritz Armfelt already in 1811, "and in God's name let us fulfill our destiny." The same idea soon recurred in a dictum customarily attributed to Arwidsson: "Swedes we are no longer, Russians we shall never be, therefore let us be Finns!" (Bonsdorff 1918, 224; Klinge 1996, 38).[6]

The one area in which the Finns were free to develop their own sense of nationality was the cultural. The young enthusiasts at the University, first in Åbo, then in Helsingfors after its transfer there in 1827, were inspired by German romanticism with its creed of one nation, one faith, one tongue. Like romantics elsewhere, the idealistic students were liberals. Although deriving from the Swedish-speaking elite, they aspired to unite their countrymen by promoting use of the indigenous language of the majority. This would in time bridge the gap between the classes and the masses by bringing enlightenment to the peasantry, which would require effort and sacrifice on the part of the educated classes, translation of literature into Finnish, and establishment of Finnish schools. In their idealistic combination of liberalism and cultural nationalism, the young "Fennomanes," as they came to be called, closely resembled the young Scandinavianists across the Baltic. As long as the movement remained focused upon language and culture alone, it found favor in St. Petersburg for loosening Finland's old ties to Sweden. The Russians welcomed and even supported the Finnish Literary Society (*Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura*) founded in 1831.

Enthusiasm for the uniquely Finnish was strongly reinforced by the publication of the epic *Kalevala* in 1835, based on the devoted research of Elias Lönnrot in Karelia, revealing a wealth of ancient lore still preserved in folk memory. The expeditions of the philologist Mattias Alexander Castrén during the 1840s explored the Finns linguistic relationship to the widely scattered Fenno-Ugric peoples of northern Russia and Siberia. Part I of *Fänrik Ståls sägner* (The Tales of Ensign Stål) by Johan Ludvig Runeberg, widely considered the most outstanding poet writing in Swedish during the mid-nineteenth century, described in 1848 Finland's heroic defense by its own forces in the war of 1808-09, powerfully strengthening Finnish pride. His epic also became immensely popular in Sweden, where it could, however, be interpreted in a different light. The stalwart loyalty of the Finnish soldiers could there be seen as proof of their devotion to Sweden, which seemed further confirmed by their Swedish names. In

Finland it was clear that the fatherland they fought for was Finland itself (Berg 1903, iii; Klinge 2004; Tarkiainen 1999, 72-73, 78-79).[7]

By the mid-1840s Johan Vilhelm Snellman emerged as the Fennomanes' leading ideologue, bringing a new doctrinaire stridency to the movement. In his Swedish-language journal, *Saima,* established in 1844, he spoke out forcefully against the continued Swedish cultural and linguistic hegemony in Finland. Not that Snellman did not appreciate Sweden. He was born in Stockholm of Finnish parents and spent his first seven years there, but he rejected its pale imitation in Finland. He forthrightly described the Swedish regime there as a "conquest" and "occupation" by an alien people for its own benefit, which had crippled the development of the native culture. While he appreciated that Sweden had brought Finland into the western cultural orbit, he held that its debt had been amply paid in Finnish blood during Sweden's wars.

Snellman saw in the Finnish language the foundation of Finland's nationality and its bulwark against Russification. He urged that it could and should supplant Swedish entirely, except as a tolerated local dialect on the coasts and islands. Finland's literature in Swedish, he held, lacked national character; this could only find true expression in the indigenous tongue. He accused Finland's Swedish-speaking upper classes of indifference to the needs of the people, when they should take the lead in unifying the nation.[8]

Together with most of the early Fennomanes, Snellman nonetheless wrote almost exclusively in Swedish, for the Swedish-speaking elite. Johannes Salminen has indeed described him as one of the great masters of *Swedish* prose in the nineteenth century. He never fully mastered Finnish. Still, as Salminen points out, enough of his followers would Fennicize themselves that they would provide a unique example in Europe of a dominant linguistic minority that took the majority's needs to heart and acted accordingly (Salminen 1981, 5, 11-12).

Snellman stoutly denied the argument that the day was still remote when Finnish could become an adequate vehicle for all official and cultural purposes, and that abandoning Swedish would unfailingly lower the nation's cultural level (Salminen 1981, 86-91). Still, it would require devoted efforts, most notably by Pastor Gustaf Renvall and Elias Lönnrot, to combine the main regional dialects into a fully developed, standardized, and versatile language (Klinge 1996, 40-41).

Although they initially favored the Fennomane movement, the Russian authorities became fearful, following the European revolutions in 1848-49, of the possible spread of radical ideas to the broader masses and in 1850 severely limited and censored publications in Finnish over the next four years. But there could be no turning back the national awakening.

Despite Fennomania, interest in Scandinavianism -- above all in its political liberalism -- was meanwhile not lacking among the Finnish students. Indeed, at first the boundaries between the two movements with their shared liberal sympathies were somewhat indistinct. Braving official disapproval, four Finnish students managed to attend the Scandinavian student meeting at Lund and Copenhagen in 1843, although one, a Fennomane, remained sceptical. All four were thereafter suspended from Helsingfors University (Pipping 1920; Johansson 1930, esp. 222-33; Juva 1957). It would be impossible to judge how strong Scandinavian sentiment may have been in Finland at the time because of official censorship, but it cannot be discounted.

The coming of the Crimean War, beginning in the fall of 1853, brought all these forces into play.[9] Sweden, it appeared that Finland's liberation and reunification with the old motherland lay within reach. King Oscar I was of a cool, calculating, and secretive nature. In his youth he had confidentially expressed grave concern over Russia's power and ambitions, although up to now he had held to his father's "Policy of 1812." (Söderhjelm and Palmstierna 1944, 185-87; Eriksson 1930, 15-17; Jansson 1961, 86-89; Hallendorff 1923, esp. 73-91, 115-35).

He played his cards carefully, knowing that the Baltic would be great strategic importance. Already on 15 December 1853, anticipating war, Sweden and Denmark issued a joint declaration of neutrality, declaring their harbors, save only a few naval ports, open to the vessels of any belligerent power. The declaration clearly favored Britain and France, with their larger fleets, and it did not fail to draw protests from Russia (Jansson 1961, 78-79, 92-93; Halisz 1977).

After their entry into the war in March 1854, Great Britain and especially Napoleon III's France showed a strong interest in a Baltic theatre of operations and thus did their best to draw Sweden into the conflict. In secret negotiations they offered Oscar I the Åland Islands, where the fortress at Bomarsund was Russia's advance base threateningly close to Stockholm. The King set as his conditions a guarantee of all of Finland, without which the Åland Islands would be untenable, Austria's participation in the war, and large subsidies. Even the siege and destruction of Bomarsund by the French in August 1854, which was clearly intended to force his hand, failed to move him. Already in early 1853, his Foreign Minister had told a Danish diplomat that if Sweden were to enter a war with Russia, it would do so as late as possible (Jansson 1961, 89).[10]

The king privately busied himself with speculative war plans, while the liberal press in Sweden clamored for intervention and the reconquest of Finland (Lappalainen 1984). The radical *Folkets Röst* wrote excitedly on 13 March 1854 that "it would take no more than a word to call to our side

all our Finnish brothers, poor in all but iron and heroism, to take up arms against the threatening colossus, who surely at our first appeal would rise up as one man against Russian force and oppression." An anonymous pamphlet published in Gothenburg (Göteborg) in 1854 declared:

> It would be an eternal stain on the Swedish name were not every Swedish heart to pound with joy at the possibility of the liberation of Finland from the Russian yoke and were not the whole Swedish nation to rise up as one man if indeed they are called on to take part in the great struggle which our brothers on the other side of the Baltic are certain to wage against the 'Northern giant'. (Blomstrand 1854, 26-27)

Aftonbladet, by far the most widely read Swedish newspaper, declared on 24 April 1854, that as in the Thirty Years War, the great powers of Europe now "draw the sword to defend a great and sacred principle."

Sven Eriksson has shown that Oscar I secretly encouraged and directed this agitation, not only in Sweden but abroad as well, clearly to prepare opinion for an intervention against Russia when the time was right. There was also enthusiasm for a war to revive Sweden's former military glory in conservative circles, most notably Crown Prince Carl (later Carl XV) and his coterie of young aristocratic "Junkers."[11]

During that summer and the following the British and French carried on naval operations in the Baltic, using Swedish Fårösund as their main base and returning home during the winter months. They destroyed enemy shipping -- almost all of it Finnish -- and devastated points along the Finnish coast, most notably Brahestad (Raahe), Uleåborg (Oulu), and Lovisa (Loviisa), arousing bitter public indignation and spirited local resistance. Aside from the destruction of Bomarsund, they accomplished little directly and by September 1854 the British and French began their main offensive against Russia in the Crimea. For the time being activist ardor cooled in Sweden. The Allies' Baltic operations nevertheless contributed significantly to their ultimate victory by tying down large Russian forces in the north that could otherwise have been sent to Crimea (Hornborg 1933, 4:139-45; Paasivirta 1981, 96-97; Klinge 1996, 170-73, 176-79; Greenhill and Giffard 1988; Borodkin 1904).[12]

Piedmont-Sardinia joined the Allies in January 1855, to gain a place at the eventual peace table. In February, the energetic Lord Palmerston became British Prime Minister, and Tsar Nicholas I died, to be succeeded by his son, Alexander II. By September the Russians, after a nearly year-long siege, sank their Black Sea fleet and abandoned Sebastopol. The Allies looked once again to the Baltic and to Sweden. Oscar I now felt the time was ripe.

Activist interest in Sweden revived as Russia's defeat seemed imminent. A. I. Ståhl (pseudonym for L. T. Öberg) came out with a belligerently Russophobic collection of verse. "While the Britons over their dead / sweep their flag, proud and free, / and France (may heaven give its grace!) / is our hope and fate, / what do we?," demanded the fiery "Talis Qualis" in 1855. Meanwhile, the most passionate appeal for action now came from the Finn, Emil von Qvanten, who after adventures in the Far East and South Africa, had established himself in Sweden in 1853 (Berg 1903, vi, 106-7; Ståhl 1855).

Writing under the pseudonym "Peder Särkilax," von Qvanten brought out in 1855 a two-part tract entitled *Skandinavism och Fennomani* -- Scandinavianism and Fennomania -- in which he sought to reconcile the two movements and direct them both toward the liberation of his homeland (Särkilax 1855; cf. Bååth-Holmberg 1893). Like liberals throughout the West, von Qvanten saw the ongoing conflict as the unavoidable, fateful showdown between two totally incompatible worlds: eastern barbarism, backwardness, and despotism versus western freedom, enlightenment, and progress. Russia, with its unlimited lust for conquest, must be contained and expelled from its western outposts. No compromise was possible, for a lenient peace would uphold the "inner Russia" of reactionaries everywhere in Europe. Bordering on the Russian colossus, Sweden and Norway should be especially concerned. Should Sweden now join the Western Alliance, or was it prepared to become a "Russian" province, like Finland?

The Finns, with their western cultural heritage, were now joined to a people with completely alien values: "in Russia slavish despotism, an inheritance from Asia, in Finland free Germanic institutions, the centuries-old motherly gift from Sweden." Having seized Finland from Sweden by "treachery and force," the Russians slowly but surely sought to eradicate its western traditions. After 1809 the Finns, abandoned by Sweden, had nowhere to turn but to their own roots. From the need to create national feeling and solidarity arose the Fennomane movement, since "five-sixths" of the nation spoke Finnish. Even under Sweden, Finns had shown distinctive characteristics. Von Qvanten disagreed with Snellman by maintaining that Finland's literature in Swedish was truly Finnish in the spirit revealed by the *Kalevala* and native folk poetry and song. If the Finns had shown little enthusiasm for Scandinavianism, this was not due only to Russian oppression but to their realization that they had their own path to follow.

Von Qvanten understood how Fennomania could cause confusion and alarm in Sweden, but he insisted that it was neither unnecessary nor ungrateful toward the Swedish cultural heritage. The movement was headed by idealistic Swedish-speakers and thus demonstrated the strong

sense of nationality shared by both language groups. Some of the extreme Fennomanes, von Qvanten admitted, had gone too far in questioning any further need for Swedish in Finland. He believed, however, that this would be only a passing phase and he saw no reason why Finland should not have two languages. Even so, he pointed out, the Fennomanes sought no more than the uniformity in language that other countries -- including Sweden since 1809 -- required.

Returning to the war, von Qvanten urged that it was vital that Sweden intervene. The union with Norway did not provide sufficient security. Sweden would be of decisive importance for an Allied offensive in the Baltic, with its strategic coastline, its army of 50,000 men, and not least its skerry fleet (*skärgårdsflotta*) of shallow-draft vessels for close inshore operations. Most important of all, Sweden's entry into the war would give heart to the oppressed Finns, long kept ignorant under strict censorship, and open their eyes to the true nature of the momentous struggle of West versus East. The British and French, after their wanton depredations, could never accomplish this. Responding to those who believed the Finns were contented with their present status, von Qvanten held that only officially approved views could be freely expressed in Finland, whereas -- for good reasons -- his countrymen were far less satisfied than they showed. He did not deny that Finland had made some progress since 1809, but it could hardly compare in that regard to the West, including Sweden. A free Finland would have made far more.

But if Finland were liberated, what should become of it? Over the past half-century the Finns had developed their own sense of nationhood and would never consent to returning to their old status as a Swedish "province." The Fennomanes would oppose a reunified state in which the Finnish-speaking element would be submerged by a Swedish majority. The Finns' national feeling would not disappear. If they were to fight, it must be for their own independence. At the same time, von Qvanten rejected the idea of a completely independent Finnish state, too weak to resist Russian influence and eventual reconquest. The solution would thus be Finland as part of a freely concluded Nordic dynastic union, together with Norway and hopefully in time Denmark, strong enough to resist outside threats. Von Qvanten recognized the flaws in the existing Norwegian-Swedish union and proposed new ground rules for an all-Nordic union. Meanwhile, if decisively defeated and pushed back, the Russians should become disillusioned with their Tsars' policy of conquest and demand civilization and freedom for themselves, after which they would carry these blessings into the interior of Asia (Särkilax 1855, Part I: 5-6, 15, 17-24, 32-34, 41-45, 54, Part II: 3-4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 15-17, 21-23, 26-36, 60-61; cf. Jansson 1961, 66; Johansson 1930, 149-51).

Von Qvanten's appeal gives evidence that there was now growing scepticism in Sweden toward intervention, largely due to resentments aroused by the Fennomanes, together with the thorny problem of the future of a liberated Finland. Kari Tarkiainen has pointed out that Swedish reactions to Fennomania still remain largely unexplored. Before the 1850s, he holds, most Swedes had hardly even been aware that most Finns spoke a different language. As ever more reports showed opposition in Finland to Swedish involvement, disillusionment set in among liberals and Scandinavianists. As early as January 1855, *Aftonbladet* wrote indignantly that the Finns were welcome to their enthusiasm for Russia and that if their Fennomania should cause them to forget all their previous history and culture, acquired from Sweden, "we Swedes should not grieve too much over it." Even A. I. Arwidsson wrote to a friend early that year that he now wished only for peace, for Finland would be of no benefit to Sweden with its "petit-bourgeois Fennomane arrogance ... filled with hostility toward Sweden." (Johansson 1930, 253-56; Runeberg 1962, 321-22, 327-28; Tarkiainen 1999, 79; Zetterberg 1999, 104).

The most powerful reaction to von Qvanten's pamphlet came meanwhile from none other than August Sohlman, editor of *Aftonbladet* and one of Sweden's most steadfast and prominent liberals and Scandinavianists, first anonymously in his newspaper, then as a pamphlet under his own name. "Peder Särkilax," he conceded, had given the most unbiased presentation thus far by a Finn. Still, it was one-sided and called for examination from a Swedish perspective. While Sohlman recognized the legitimacy of the Finnish movement per se, he took "Särkilax" to task for downplaying the extreme Fennomanes' manifest hostility toward the Swedish heritage and language. Swedes could hardly view with equanimity efforts to arouse among the Swedish element itself in Finland "antipathy toward everything Swedish and create an altogether false conception of the past relationship between Sweden and Finland."

Sohlman dismissed the ultra-Fennomanes' attempts to depict pre-Christian Finland as a highly developed society suppressed by the Swedish conquest. "Young Sweden," he wrote, had also heard "the powerful voice of nationality" and resented such accusations. Before the Swedes came, there was no Finland or Finnish nationality. Finland was "a creation of Swedish culture," even though Sweden had never sought to impede the development of the Finnish language. Finland's literature was, he claimed, essentially the work of authors of Swedish background writing in Swedish, and showing no distinctive Finnish characteristics. What had been written in Finnish since 1809 was of little value. To believe that "the Finnish nationality is capable alone of sustaining culture and social life in Finland," was a dangerous illusion.

Waxing hot, Sohlman declared that no people had shown itself so incapable of an independent existence as the Finns, indeed as "the entire Tschudic race."[13] if they were to cut themselves off from Swedish culture, they would revert to barbarism. The revered *Kalevala,* Sohlman claimed, was as nothing compared to the Scandinavian myths of gods and heroes. Finnish poetry was weak and nebulous, revealing only a "monotonous melancholy," in stark contrast to the bold and enterprising Scandinavian spirit. While he hoped for Finland's liberation from the Russian yoke, Sohlman urged that it then be joined to Sweden as a self-governing region, like Slesvig-Holstein under the Danish crown (*Aftonbladet,* 5, 23 May 1855; Sohlman 1855, esp. 9-26, 32-43, 55-58; cf. Johansson 1930, 252; Runeberg 1962, 324; Juva 1957, 337-38).

Such a solution, Sohlman recognized, raised the question of reactions in Norway, Sweden's partner within the dual monarchy. He cited a recent article in *Norsk Maanedsskrift* by the foremost Norwegian historian of the time, Peter Andreas Munch, agreeing that the Finns, without Swedish culture and left to their own devices, would revert to "Tschudish" backwardness, that it was in the interest of all of Europe that Russia be weakened, and that Finland together with Sweden in an enlarged union would be no threat to Norway's position. Some Norwegians indeed believed that an independent Finland, together eventually with Denmark, would dilute Sweden's preponderance within a future union. Still, others feared that Norway's status would thereby be weakened.

On balance, the Norwegians, who did not share the Swedes' nostalgic dreams of military glory or their traditional Russophobia, were skeptical, if not hostile, toward a Swedish intervention against Russia on Finland's behalf. This difference in views stirred up Swedish resentments against the troublesome union partner. In Denmark, too, attitudes were notably cool toward a Swedish reconquest of Finland. Even in Sweden itself, there were growing misgivings in liberal circles that Finland, if reincorporated into Sweden, would bolster the forces of conservatism through an influx of "half-Russian barons" into the Noble Estate of the Riksdag (Sohlman 1855, 55-60; cf. Johansson 1930, 236; Runeberg 1962, 335-47). Within less than two years the Scandinavianists' high hopes for Finland went up in smoke.

But what of opinion toward a Swedish intervention within Finland itself? It was as von Burghausen ("Suomalainen") wrote in 1842: what could the Swedes, or for that matter the Finns themselves, know about the true state of affairs there? It is nonetheless evident that sanguine expectations, both in Sweden and abroad, that the Finns would rise up in rebellion against their Russian masters at the first sight of the Swedish colors were highly -- indeed wildly -- optimistic.

Faint though they might be, any signs of opposition in Finland raised suspicion and alarm among the Finnish authorities and the Russian government. Only the emigrés in Sweden could express their views freely. To put Russian fears to rest, official reports protested the overwhelming loyalty of the Finns to the Empire and their determined opposition to any Swedish intervention. Even in the Swedish-speaking coastal districts, it was stated, the peasantry was determined to resist any Swedish attack and defend the benefits they now enjoyed (Jansson 1961, 97; Holmberg 1946, 216-20, 233, 240-42, 310-12; Johansson 1930, 237-48).

Behind Finnish imperial loyalism lay various motives. There was unquestionably a sincere attachment to the Empire among much of the Swedish-speaking element, since Finland now enjoyed greater economic benefits than previously under Swedish rule. Aside from the Russian Governor-General, only Finns of the Lutheran faith were permitted hold official appointments in Finland, whereas they were eligible to serve throughout the Russian Empire. There were far wider opportunities than before for official careers, both within Finland and beyond. Over 3,000 Finns served as officers in the Russian military forces during the imperial period, including several generals and admirals, and two Finns even served as Governors of Russian Alaska. There was a large Finnish colony in St. Petersburg. The Swedish-language poet Zacharias Topelius, a Fennomane and staunch loyalist, lauded the Empire in verse, "from Åland's skerries to Sitka's -- one realm alone." The great peasant majority had practical reasons for contentment under the present regime.

According to Juhani Paasivirta (1981, 96-97), the bitterness caused by the ravages of the British fleet inspired a stronger imperial loyalism than had ever existed since 1809. Significantly their principal victims were Swedish-speaking inhabitants of the coasts and small seaports. Not least, although opinion in Sweden sought to downplay the Fennomane movement, its hostility toward a new Swedish domination was a potent factor (Engman, 2000, esp. 24, 26; Klinge 1997 and 2004; Johansson 1930, 247-48, 252-53, 271, 332-33; Runeberg 1962, 207-28, 314). In sum, most Finns felt they had little cause for complaint and were well aware that they enjoyed milder treatment than the Russians themselves, even though their special status remained vulnerable.

Above all it was a matter of sober realism for Finns to wish fervently that Sweden would refrain from intervention. War would bring devastation to the land. They would moreover find themselves confronted with a terrible dilemma: it seemed unthinkable to bear arms against their Swedish brethren, while to aid them would unfailingly bring retribution through the loss of Finland's autonomy and its complete incorporation as a Russian province. Even if Sweden might conceivably regain Finland, it would

never be able to hold it in the long run and the result would be the same. To turn against Russia would be political suicide. As for the students at the Imperial Alexander University in Helsingfors, most of whom were preparing for official careers in church or state, no matter how liberal, Scandinavian, or apprehensive of Fennomane hostility some of them might feel, they were well advised to keep such views to themselves.

The loyalists were no less patriotic than the Russophobe exiles in Sweden and their quiet sympathizers in Finland. Each sought their nation's ultimate freedom in the way they thought best. Realism, patriotism, and morality in such situations can be relative concepts, as Gunnar Artéus reminds us. The emigrés believed that Finland *could* be liberated by Sweden and the Western Allies and thereafter remain secure within a strengthened Nordic union. The loyalists saw as the only realistic course unwavering loyalty to the Empire in hopes of gaining ever greater autonomy, while fostering their nation's own cultural uniqueness. Finland, Topelius wrote -- prophetically -- to a friend in 1855, must above all be spared from direct incorporation into Russia and "await the day when the Russian colossus will collapse from within, for only then will its time have come." There can be little doubt in retrospect that the loyalists were justified in fearing a war that would have been ruinous for Finland, in both the short and long run (Artéus 1999, 118-19; Hornborg 1933, 4:146-47; Johansson 1930, 247; Runeberg 1962, 318-19, 331-33; Paasivirta 1981, 96-101; Klinge 2000).

The bitterness aroused among the Fennomane loyalists by the attacks of their emigré countrymen would be forcefully expressed by J. V. Snellman in 1858, two years after the Crimean War ended. He branded as cowardly and unpatriotic the "pens -- persons we can hardly call them" -- who claimed to speak for "Young Finland". A. I. Arwidsson, who in Stockholm had largely inspired his own devotion to the Finnish national movement, Snellman treated with cautious respect, but for the rest he had only contempt. Seldom have emigrés served their countries well, he declared. "He who can compromise everything and everyone, protecting only himself, lacks the moral nerve that gives power to those who are capable of acting." Those of "manly character" recognized it as their duty "to remain where Providence has placed them, to endure what they must, and, whatever the circumstances may be, to find within them room for useful activity." (Snellman, "Finska emigrationen"; cf. Juva 1957, 338-39).

The end of the Crimean War came as an anticlimax for Oscar I. In November 1855, Napoleon III sent General François Canrobert, the hero of Sebastopol, on a triumphal visit to Stockholm. Oscar I presented him with an ambitious war plan for a combined British-French-Swedish-Danish offensive against St. Petersburg the following year. Secret negotiations

followed. As a preliminary step toward intervention, Sweden concluded the November Treaty with Britain and France, guaranteeing the dual monarchy of Sweden and Norway against territorial encroachment by Russia. Unbeknown to the King, however, the French Emperor was already seeking to end the war and had sent Canrobert to Stockholm to bring further pressure on Tsar Alexander II to come to terms. Faced with the threat of intervention by both Sweden and Austria, Russia gave way and the Peace of Paris was concluded on 30 March 1856. Oscar was bitterly disappointed after unwittingly having helped to deprive himself of the opportunity he had eagerly awaited. The most he was able to gain in the peace settlement was the demilitarization of the Åland Islands (Jansson 1961, 104-9; Söderhjelm and Palmstierna 1944, 384-89; Lappalainen 1984).

The Crimean War -- the war that no responsible European statesman really wanted -- had profound consequences for European international relations. It brought a definitive end to the Concert of Europe established at Vienna in 1814-1815. Both Russia and Britain now largely isolated themselves from European affairs for a generation or more, clearing the way for the continental wars and national unifications of the 1860s and early 1870s, the period dominated by Napoleon III, Cavour, and Bismarck.[14]

Sweden's near-intervention meant the end of Carl XIV's "Policy of 1812," but established neutrality ever more firmly as the bedrock of Swedish foreign policy. Thereafter, Swedish interest in Finland declined. As time passed, Alexander II's liberal regime in both Finland and Russia lessened Swedish anti-Russian prejudices. The Swedes became ever more concerned with their own internal questions and, turning westward, once again with Scandinavian affairs.

The Finns turned eastward as Alexander II's regime offered new hope for increasing autonomy, including measures favoring the Finnish language. In attacking the Finnish emigrés in 1858, Snellman described them as belonging to the privileged Swedish-speaking element that looked down upon the Finnish-speaking masses and feared that they themselves would be overshadowed. There was nevertheless only one direction for the nation to go, Snellman proclaimed, and those who refused to recognize it would have to give way (Snellman, "Finska emigrationen" 139).

Fennomania during its earlier phase had enjoyed broad support among the elite, even among those who, envisioning a bilingual Finland made no effort to learn Finnish. Emil von Qvanten, for instance, regretted during the 1840s that he had not grown up in the Finnish wilderness with the Finnish language. But already by then a fissure appeared between the moderate and the extreme Fennomanes who rejected everything Swedish. The pamphlet

debate during the 1840s and above all the stresses of the Crimean War exacerbated the split between Fennomane loyalism and western-oriented liberalism, most strongly represented among the Swedish-speaking elite. The Fennomanes accused the latter of disloyalty and Scandinavianist sympathies. Mutual antipathy led by the 1860s to the "Suecomane" movement to protect Swedish language and culture in Finland. The conflict between the two camps would bedevil Finnish internal politics down to World War II. But to this day Finland remains bilingual (Johansson 1930, 222, 228, 272; Bååth-Holmberg, 1893 219; Paasivirta 1981, 99, 102-3; Hämäläinen 1968).

The reaction of the Fennomanes against the Swedish element following the Crimean War raises the question of just how strong liberal Scandinavianism actually was in Finland at its height. To be sure, it faded after the war. Modern Finnish historians have generally dismissed it as relatively insignificant (see, for example, Klinge 1988, 262 and 1996, 180-81). But loyalist Fennomane and Russian reactions suggest that it may have been more widespread than it has since appeared. As Russia's defeat in the war appeared imminent, von Qvanten ("Särkilax")'s Nordic vision of Finland's future apparently did arouse some ferment, even in some Fennomane circles, especially at the University in Helsingfors. Scandinavianism -- or perhaps more properly Nordism -- would leave its distinctive imprint upon Finnish liberalism, as it developed by the end of the century.[15] Looking ahead, it would be the Swedish element that would most resolutely resist Nicholas II's "Russification" policy in Finland after 1899, while most of the Fennomanes -- the so-called "Old Finns" -- still clung to their policy of loyalty and compliance.

During the second half of the nineteenth century Finland made considerable progress materially and intellectually. But, it may be asked, *how* much progress? After the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of President Urho Kekkonen's policy of accommodation, this question has again came to the fore. Opposing Professor Matti Klinge's favorable treatment of Finland's imperial period, his colleague at Helsinki University, Docent Marti Häikiö -- echoing Emil von Qvanten ("Särkilax") in 1855 -- has maintained that Finland's progress during that era remained far more modest than in Sweden, Norway, or other western countries, or than it would have been in an independent Finland. "For half a century," Häikiö wrote in 1999, "Finland descended into the same torpor as the eastern European countries after World War II" (226-31; cf. Klinge 1996; Särkilax 1855, 17-18; Engman 2000, 18-21). Klinge and Häikiö thereafter debated this point. A completely independent Finland was, however, virtually inconceivable in 1809 and it is doubtful whether its unique culture

could ever have developed as vigorously as it did had it remained part of Sweden

There would be a brief sequel seven years after the Crimean War ended that showed that Russophobia, together with dreams of both a Greater Scandinavia and of military glory had not yet entirely died out in Sweden. In 1863, the Poles rose up in a second rebellion against Russian rule and, confident of liberal sympathies in the West, looked abroad for help. In Sweden there was strong liberal opinion to intervene, based on the optimistic belief that Great Britain and France would do likewise. It was hoped, meanwhile, that the valiant Poles would arouse unrest in Finland as well, opening the way for its liberation. Once again, Finnish emigrés, above all Emil von Qvanten, agitated in Stockholm. King Carl XV was strongly tempted to act and secretly proposed a war plan to Napoleon III.

But the *Riksdag* and, in particular, the King's Ministers were far more cautious, and in the end issued only a vague statement of sympathy. The British and French governments did no more. Russia, with support from Prussia, crushed the Polish uprising. Nonetheless, there was consternation and alarm in the Fennomane camp. J. V. Snellman feared that Sweden's willingness to intervene in the crisis would determine whether or not Finland would be invaded, which would bring sheer disaster (Jansson 1961, 80-88; Snellman "Krig"). While harshly penalizing the rebellious Poles, Alexander II rewarded the Finns for their loyalty in 1863 by convening the *Lantdag* for the first time since 1809, after which it would continue to meet regularly. The same year, by imperial decree, Finnish was made the second official language in Finland, co-equal with Swedish.

The failure of Sweden-Norway to come to Denmark's aid in its German war in 1864, resulting in its loss of Slesvig-Holstein, is regarded as the deathblow of political Scandinavianism. As far as Finland was concerned, it was already moribund. No one could still seriously believe that the Finns longed to be reunited with Sweden and were prepared to rise up in rebellion to throw off the Russian yoke.

Still, the old bonds between Sweden and Finland would again be reaffirmed by the Swedish volunteers who joined the White forces in fighting for Finland's complete independence during the Finnish Civil War of 1918 and by those who served in Finland's defense against the Soviet Union during the Winter War of 1939-40. Since World War II, Finland and Sweden have been drawn ever closer together through Nordic cooperation and more recently the European Union. There is now a freer flow of persons, products, and ideas across the Baltic than at any time since 1809.

Notes

1. See my *Scandinavia*, 300-1. In keeping with the usage of the time, I use the Swedish names for Finnish towns. I also use the older spellings for monarchs' names, e.g. Carl for Karl, Gustaf for Gustaf, etc.
2. For Scandinavianism and its attitudes toward Finland, see Clausen 1900, esp. 59; my "The Swedish Succession"; and *Sweden and Visions of Norway,* 59-61; Holmberg 1946, 66-68, 75-76.
3. On the upsurge of Russophobia and revanchism in Sweden at this time, see esp. Zetterberg 1999, 102-3; Klinge, "Rysshatet," 256; Tarkiainen, 72-74.
4. This polemic battle is well summarized by Matti Klinge's "Nordens säkerhet". See also Tarkiainen 74-77. The pamphlets themselves [except for that of "Paavo Suomalainen" (see below)], are bound together in a single volume at the Royal Library in Stockholm, under Hwasser's title *Om Allians-Tractaten.* They were also published in German as *Finnlands Gegenwart und Zukunft,* trans. R. Adolf Regnér (Stockholm, 1842), likewise at the Royal Library.
5. Overall, for the rise of the Finnish ethno-linguistic movement, see Wuorinen 1931.
6. For the Finnish elite, Wirilander 1982.
7. It was common practice at that time for the Swedish-speaking officers to assign Swedish names to their soldiers, even if they spoke no Swedish. On the critical role of the University and its students in Finland's cultural and political development, see Klinge, et al., *Kejserliga Alexanders universitet.*
8. A useful anthology of Snellman's writings, well introduced, is Salminen 1981, esp. 7-30, 70-75, 79, 81-91. His collected writings during this period are found in Snellman, *Samlade arbeten,* 4, 5. Cf. Hornborg 1933, 4:124-33; Wuorinen 1931, 87-94; Jutikkala 1962, 202-6.
9. On the war in general, see, for example, Royle 2000. For a good, brief summary, see Ramm.
10. The best brief accounts of the Crimean War in the North are Anderson, "Scandinavian Area" and "Crimean War," based on an evidently book-length manuscript that was never published. See also Paasivirta 1981, 87-96.
11. On Swedish activism at the beginning of the Crimean War, see Eriksson 1930, 30-60; Runeberg 316-18. See also Holmberg 1946, 50-52, 232-33; Johansson 1930, 235; Jansson 1961, 90-91.
12. In his *Regnbågen,* the Finnish-Swedish author Runar Schildt gave a fictional account of the burning of Lovisa.
13. "Tschudic" comes from the Old Slavonic *chud* -- related to the Russian *chudnói,* strange -- used for Fenno-Ugric neighbors of the northern Slavs.
14. On the overall impact of the war for Europe, see, for example, Craig 1960, esp. 267-73.
15. For the impact of Scandinavianism upon Finnish liberalism, see Bååth-Holmberg 1893, 225-26; Hornborg 1933, 4:152-53; Johansson 1930, 222-25, 273-74, 331; Wuorinen 1931, 109-10; Paasivirta 1981, 99, 102-3.

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