Substitutes for Wisdom: Kant's Practical Thought and the Tradition of the Temperaments

Mark J. Larrimore

Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 39, Number 2, April 2001, pp. 259-288 (Article)

Published by Johns Hopkins University Press
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2003.0103

Substitutes for Wisdom: Kant's Practical Thought and the Tradition of the Temperaments

MARK LARRIMORE

FOR MUCH OF Western history, the theory of the four temperaments played a vital part in medicine, anthropology, and moral reflection. The Hippocratic foursome of sanguine, choleric, melancholy, and phlegmatic survives on the margins of modernity, but its role in moral theory and practice has been largely forgotten. Premodern understandings of human diversity based in climate, temperament, and politics collapsed with the Galenic medical tradition with which they harmonized. Yet temperament continued to be a feature of moral philosophies and philosophical anthropologies even into the twentieth century, and arguably has had a symbiotic relationship with the egalitarian aspirations of modern moral and political thought. This essay surveys the development and practical consequences of the theory of the temperaments developed by one of the greatest prophets of modern values, Immanuel Kant.

Temperament was a feature in Kant's course in anthropology from the 1760s until the end of his life. Kant's teachings on temperament are by turns creative and conservative, and bespeak a deep understanding of the logic and rationale of humoral characterology in ethics. But as Kant moves from an ethics based in feeling to an ethics based on the possibility of autonomy, his theory of temperament also changes. In 1764's *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime*, Kant eloquently celebrates the melancholy as the temperament capable of "genuine virtue" (*Obs* 2:217–18/60); by the time of *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (1798), he is commending instead "phlegma as strength" (a variant of a temperament he had earlier dismissed), which can serve as a "substitute for wisdom" (*Ant* 7:290/155).[1] Both of these

[1] References to Kant's works will be made in text to *Kants gesammelte Schriften*, ed. (Königliche) Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 29 vols. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1902-) [*AK*], and to the relevant page in the translations I have used (and sometimes amended):

positions are distinctive, especially for an eighteenth-century thinker. As we will see, however, they are not without precedent in the tradition of temperament theory. Whether Kant knew he was developing countertraditions of temperament or not, his arguments in each case creatively exploit tensions in the humoral system which go back to its origins in ancient Greece.

The mature Kant defended the classic foursome at a time when it had come under fire from many quarters. The early nineteenth century historian of temperament theories Harro Wilhelm Dircksen thought Kant played a decisive role in saving the classical theory from oblivion.[2] Why did Kant think it worth retrieving? One would expect him to reject a category which eighteenth-century German *Popularphilosophie* understood as a proto-psychological category bridging the gap between body and mind, nature and freedom. Yet, as I shall argue, the very things which might seem to render a theory of temperament incompatible with his mature ethics of autonomy make it important to

---

Neg: "Attempt to introduce the concept of negative magnitudes into philosophy" (1763) in Immanuel Kant, *Theoretical philosophy, 1755–1770*, David Walford with Ralf Meerbote, trans. and ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 204–41

Obs: *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime* (1764), John T. Goldthwait, trans. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960)

Idea: "Idea for a Universal History with Cosmopolitan Purpose," (1784), H. B. Nisbet, trans., in Hans Reiss, ed., *Kant's Political Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 41–53

LE: *Lectures on Ethics*, Peter Heath and J. B. Schneewind, eds., Peter Heath, trans. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997)

G and *MM*: *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785) and *The Metaphysics of Morals* (1797), in Immanuel Kant, *Practical Philosophy*, Mary J. Gregor, trans., and Allen Wood, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 37–108 and 353–603

CJ: *Critique of Judgment* (1790), Werner S. Pluhar, trans. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987)

Rel: *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone* (1793), Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson, trans. (San Francisco: Harper, 1960)

Ant: Anthropology *from a Pragmatic Point of View* (1798), Mary Gregor, trans. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974).

All other translations are my own, including those from:

BB: Immanuel Kant, *Bemerkungen in den "Beobachtungen über das Schöne und Erhabene,"* Marie Rischmüller, ed. (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1991), a more reliable edition than *AK* 20.

LA: Immanuel Kant, *Vorlesungen über Anthropologie*, 2 vols., Bearbeitet von Reinhard Brandt und Werner Stark (*AK* 25.2) (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1997).

[2] Dircksen credited Kant and Christoph Wilhelm Hufeland with reviving a moribund four-temperament theory in the late eighteenth century; see *Die Lehre von den Temperamenten, neu dargestellt* (Nürnberg und Sulzbach, 1804), 62. Hufeland (mis)quotes Kant as sharing his view that the best temperament is "the sanguine, tempered with some phlegma" (*Die Kunst das menschliche Leben zu verlängern* [Jena, 1797] VIII.4, 266). Kant's discussion decisively shaped the arguments of influential nineteenth-century thinkers like Friedrich Schleiermacher (*Psychologie aus Friedrich Schleiermacher's handschriftliche Nachlasse und nachgeschriebenen Vorlesungen*, L. George, ed. [Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1862], 475–80, 529) and Hermann Lotze (*Microcosmus* VI.2, 4th ed., Elizabeth Hamilton and E. E. Constance Jones, trans. [Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1885], II 25ff). Kant's views were praised as late as Alfred Fouillée's *Tempérament et caractère selon les individus, les sexes et les races*, 4th ed. (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1901), 33ff, 54, 71f, 74.

Kant. An understanding of human embodiment and diversity like that of the tradition of the temperaments forms part of the background to Kant's practical thought, and ethical formalism makes more rather than less sense if difference is taken seriously. For the same reason, it is important to have the right account of diversity. The complicated view of temperament in the *Anthropology* furnishes a microcosm of Kant's understanding of the fraught role of empirical considerations in recognizing and promoting freedom in rational agents embodied in human form(s).

In this essay I will provide (1) a brief survey of the tradition of temperament theorizing before Kant, and expound Kant's (2) early and (3) mature views of temperament in the context of this tradition, as well as in the context of his emerging practical philosophy.[3] Some well-known parts of Kant's ethics make a new kind of sense when read in the light of the fact that their author thought humanity subdivided into temperaments.

1. THE TRADITION OF THE TEMPERAMENTS

1.1. The history of moralizing about and through the temperaments is complex and—once one moves beyond the melancholy—largely uncharted. Here I will consider only figures and trends which are important to an understanding of Kant's place in this tradition. Because Kant cites no sources for his views, it is difficult to know when he knowingly revived a neglected option in the sprawling logic of temperamental theorizing. As a guide to the tradition of the temperaments in Kant's formative years, I will use Georg Walch's *Philosophical Dictionary*,[4] with some help from Raymond Klibansky, Erwin Panofsky and Fritz Saxl's magisterial study, *Saturn and Melancholy*.[5]

"Brought into order by *Hippocrates*, improved by *Aristotle* and elaborated by *Galen*,"[6] the theory of the temperaments had by the eighteentth century become an issue of interest no less to moralists than to doctors. "Temperament" means mixture, but also balance. In the context of humoral medicine, it refers to the mixture of phlegm, yellow bile, black bile, and blood in the body.

---

[3] I use the terms "early" and "mature" rather than "precritical" and "critical" because the revolution of the *Critiques* had little significance for Kant's anthropology. The decisive shift in Kant's ethical thinking, meanwhile, happened well before the *Critiques*. See J. B. Schneewind, *The Invention of Autonomy. A History of Modern Moral Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 483–507.

[4] Johann Georg Walch, *Philosophisches Lexicon*, 2nd edition (Leipzig, 1733). The articles concerning the temperaments are with few changes reprinted in Johann Heinrich Zedler, *Grosses vollständiges Universal-Lexicon aller Wissenschaften und Künste*, published over the course of the 1730s and 40s.

[5] Raymond Klibansky, Erwin Panofsky and Fritz Saxl, *Saturn and Melancholy. Studies in the History of Natural Philosophy, Religion and Art* (London: Nelson, 1964).

[6] Walch, article "Temperament des Leibes," *Philosophisches Lexicon*, col. 2525; repr. *Zedlers Grosses Vollständiges Universal-Lexicon . . .*, XLII (Halle & Leipzig, 1744), col. 767.

Against the backdrop of a Pythagorean understanding of health as an equilibrium among—preferably four—elements, "temperament" originally meant the ideal balance of humors. This equilibrium soon came to be thought unattainable, however, and "temperament" came to refer instead to the imbalances characterized by the preponderance of one or other of the humors.

Galen's systematization of the tradition found temperament determinative of character for three of the four humors:

> [A]cuteness and intelligence of the mind come from the bilious humours [choleric], steadiness and solidity from the atrabilious [melancholy], but from the blood [sanguine] simplicity bordering on foolishness. But phlegm by its nature does not contribute to the formation of character.[7]

The stock of each of the four temperaments rose and fell with the centuries. In the middle ages, Christian thinkers interpreted temperament as part of the imbalance of the world after the Fall; the choleric lost ground to the sanguine, which was seen as closest to the temperament of prelapsarian man. The bottom of the heap was occupied by the melancholy and phlegmatic, who by the early modern period had in some contexts become interchangeable.

The humors were correlated to the spatial as well as the temporal structure of the cosmos. The basic schema assembled by the author of the Hippocratic *On the Nature of Man* looked like this:

Temperament	*Humor*	*Season*	*Qualities*
Sanguine	Blood	Spring	Warm and Moist
Choleric	Yellow Bile	Summer	Warm and Dry
Melancholy	Black Bile	Autumn	Cold and Dry
Phlegmatic	Phlegm	Winter	Cold and Moist

The temperaments were further correlated with foursomes of other kinds—times of day, stages of the life cycle, cardinal directions and virtues, planets, etc. From earliest times, climatic theory correlated temperaments also with nations. Southern peoples were already characterized as bilious in the Hippocratic *Airs, waters, and places*, northerners as phlegmatic.[8]

The eleventh and twelfth centuries witnessed a veritable "revival of the ancient characterological doctrine within the framework of Christian moral

---

[7] Commentary on *On the Nature of Man*, qtd. in *Saturn and Melancholy*, 58.

[8] As the center of Western thought moved slowly northward from the Mediterranean, the temperate zone—the happy medium of climate which elicited the happiest temperament—obligingly shifted to accommodate the location of the theorists. Through his lectures on Physical Geography, Kant seems to have been the one to redefine the temperate zone so as to include Germany; see Gonthier-Louis Fink, "Von Winckelmann bis Herder. Die deutsche Klimatheorie in europäischer Perspektive," in Gerhard Sauder, ed., *Johann Gottfried Herder, 1744–1803* [*Studien zum Achtzehnten Jahrhundert* 9] (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1987), 156–76, 167.

theology."[9] Thinkers like Hugo de Folieto argued that the temperaments need to be harmonized in—and by—the life of the Christian.[10] Increasingly, domination by one temperament was linked to a species of vice. By the seventeenth century, the choleric was regularly linked to the vice of pride, the sanguine to lust, and the melancholy to greed. The lethargic phlegmatic was correlated with sloth.

In the late sixteenth century doctors like Michael Medina (*Christianae paraenesis, sive de recta in Deum fide*, 1564) changed the question from what the best temperament was to what temperament was best for a given profession.[11] At the same time, works like Juan Huarte de San Juan's extraordinarily influential *Examen de ingenios para las sciencias* (1575) made humoral characterization the main language of a genre of books designed to help people read others' temperaments—and conceal their own. This genre was variously known as "Characteristic," because of its roots in Theophrastus' portraits of the varieties of human shortcomings in his *Characters*, or "Moralistic," after the French "moralistes" like La Bruyère who revived Theophrastian characteristic in the seventeenth century. It was presumably these "moralists" Walch had in mind when he wrote that in modern times, temperament had been discussed not only by doctors, but also by "philosophers, especially by the moralists," who discussed it in their ethics "to show what the temperaments contribute to dispositions [*Gemüths-Neigungen*] and mores."[12]

In the eighteenth century, a specifically German form of this genre arose which was often referred to as *Die Kunst, der Menschen Gemüther zu Lesen.* The progeny of this "art of reading people"—"*the* program of enlightenment psychology, insofar as it develops empirically in the 18th century"[13]—include important branches of Enlightenment *Popularphilosophie*, Lavater's revival of physiognomy, *Erfahrungsseelenkunde*, Ernst Platner's "anthropology," and Knigge's radical etiquette. Kant's anthropology belongs in this lineage, too, as the very title ("Anthropologische Characteristik") and subtitle ("Die Art, das Innere des

---

[9] *Saturn and Melancholy*, 106.

[10] "[T]he mind also makes use of the four humours. In place of blood it has sweetness, in place of red bile bitterness, in place of black bile grief, in place of phlegm equanimity. For the doctors say that the sanguine are sweet, cholerics bitter, melancholys sad, and phlegmatics equable. Thus in contemplation lies sweetness, from remembrance of sin comes bitterness, from its commission grief, from its atonement equanimity. And one must keep watch lest spiritual sweetness be tainted by worldly bitterness or the bitterness arising from sin corrupted by fleshly sweetness, lest wholesome grief be troubled by idleness or weariness or the equable spirit brought into confusion by unlawfulness." Qtd. in *Saturn and Melancholy*, 107.

[11] Winfried Schleiner, *Melancholy, Genius and Utopia in the Renaissance* (Wolfenbütteler Abhandlungen zur Renaissanceforschung, 10) (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1991), 32–38.

[12] Walch, "Temperament des Leibes," col. 2525; repr. *Zedlers*, col. 767.

[13] Gernot Böhme, *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht. Darmstädter Vorlesungen* (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1985), 269.

Menschen aus dem Äußeren zu erkennen") of the second part of his *Anthropology* attest (*Ant* 7:283/149).[14]

These discussions did not focus exclusively on temperament, but their problematic was shaped by the part-medical, part-moral tradition of humoral characterology. The motivational tendencies and experiential susceptibilities this literature explored were shared by all people but in different constellations. Their symbiotic workings could strengthen individuals and societies; disorder could produce unnecessary conflict. Knowing their value (and their telltale signs) thus was of considerable practical importance. At the same time, the temperaments sat atop the most vexing problem of modern philosophy—the mind-body problem. They did not solve it. At best, the problem was reproduced at the level of temperament in a distinction between "temperaments of body" and "temperaments of soul."[15]

1.2 Minority views: Melancholy and Phlegmatic

The mainstream of the tradition saw the sanguine and choleric as the healthy temperaments, phlegmatic and melancholy as inherently sick. Perhaps because it was held in place by correlation with other foursomes, however, the tradition of the temperaments was stable enough also to contain a few minority views.

Saturn and Melancholy has made one such countertradition relatively well-known. The view that melancholy, the occupational hazard of intellectual labor, was also the conduit to rapturous states of inspiration (and madness) and so the precondition for greatness in prophecy, art and philosophy, derives from the pseudo-Aristotelian Problem XXX, 1.[16] This view was never dominant, however, and its spread even among intellectuals has probably been exaggerated. Its vogue in the early modern period was probably also shaped by theological developments. As H.-Günter Schmitz has argued, "the religious conception of an affinity between religious struggle and faith, suffering and

[14] For a genealogy of modern anthropology and Kant's debt to the moralists as part of it, see Hans Robert Jauß, "Zur Marginalität der Körpererfahrung in Kants *Anthropologie* und der in ihr vorgegebenen moralistischen Tradition," in Rudolph Behrens and Roland Galle, eds., *Leib-Zeichen: Körperbilder, Rhetorik und Anthropologie im 18. Jahrhundert* (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1993), 11–21. Mary Gregor's translation of "Charakteristik" as "Characterization" obscures the affiliation of Kant's discussion.

[15] Walch's discussion is divided into subsections on "Temperament des Leibes" and "der Seele"; we will see Kant invoke the same dichotomy in his *Anthropology*. For a critique of the whole tradition as dodging the key metaphysical problem, see Raimund Betzold, *Popularphilosophie und Erfahrungsseelenkunde im Werk von Karl Philipp Moritz* (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1984), ch. 3, esp. 140–49.

[16] For the text and an English translation of Problem XXX, 1, see *Saturn and Melancholy*, 18–29. Klibansky et al. argue that the text was written by Theophrastus at 33–41.

election to a certain degree helped shape the intellectuals' view of the affinity between melancholy and inspiration."[17]

The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries saw the publication of numerous German works offering consolation to melancholy people stricken by religious doubt and despair. These *Trostschriften* argued that temperaments were assigned by God in a providential way.[18] Building on Philip Melanchthon's claim that God works through human affects,[19] Lutheran writers like the Pietist Philipp Jacob Spener argued that the wisdom with which God gives "that temperament, which is most convenient" to the spiritual path of each individual—some through joy and other through "darkness, sadness and fears"—will be clear to us in the next life, if not in this one.[20]

These tracts were mostly addressed to—and written by—sufferers of melancholy, and often went so far as to suggest that the melancholy was in fact the most fortunate of temperaments. Precisely because of his susceptibility to such torments, the melancholy person is ideally equipped for recognizing the sinful creature's need of salvation. Pietism's appropriation of melancholy was one reason why, as Hans-Jürgen Schings has argued, melancholy was the "other" of the *Aufklärung*, which defined itself against especially religious enthusiasm, fanaticism and superstition.[21]

A second counter-tradition—in some contexts surely a response to secular and theological valorizations of the melancholy—praised the phlegmatic. This minority view has escaped the notice of melancholy scholars. Yet from its innocuous beginnings as the humour that does not affect character in Galen the phlegmatic came sometimes to be seen as representing a stable balance in contrast to the other temperaments' imbalance. One of the most influential texts in the history of temperament thinking, the *Letter to Pentadius* by Augustine's friend Vindician, characterized the phlegmatic as "constant, wakeful,

---

[17] H.-Günter Schmitz, "Das Melancholieproblem in Wissenschaft und Kunst der frühen Neuzeit," *Sudhoffs Archiv* 60 (1976): 135–62, 155. I am grateful to Thomas Rütten for introducing me to this extraordinarily helpful article.

[18] Works of this kind date back at least to Chrysostom's exhortation to Stagirius (380 CE); see *Saturn and Melancholy*, 75–77.

[19] See Heikki Lempa's account of *Loci communes* I.44 in *Bildung der Triebe. Der deutsche Philanthropismus (1768–1788)* (Turku, Finland: Turun Yliopisto, 1993), 27. Melanchthon discusses the temperaments in *Liber de Anima*, in *Philippi Melanthonis Opera . . .*, Carolus Gottlieb Bretschneider, ed., XIII (Halis Saxonum: C. A. Schwetschke, 1846), 79–87.

[20] "An eine schwehrer anfechtung und unempfindlichkeiet des glaubens stehende person, so ihres glaubens zu versichern" (1682) in *Herrn* D. *Philipp Jacob Speners . . . Theologische Bedencken, Und andere Briefflíche Antworten auf geistliche, sonderlich zur erbauung gerichtete materien . . .*, II, 3rd edition (Halle: Waysenhaus, 1713), 805–17, 807–9.

[21] Hans-Jürgen Schings, *Melancholie und Aufklärung. Melancholiker und ihre Kritiker in Erfahrungsseelenkunde und Literatur des 18. Jahrhunderts* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1977).

thoughtful,"[22] and a widespread early modern representation of the temperaments depicted the phlegmatic as a couple making music.[23]

Klibansky, Panofsky, and Saxl dismiss these positive representations as "mistakes."[24] However the widespread commendation of balance, detachment, even of a kind of indifference to the blandishments of this world in ancient as well as Christian philosophy make approbation for the phlegmatic a natural move. Phlegma was in fact a much-recommended antidote especially to the gloomy or enthusiastic excesses of the melancholy. Representative is the way Molière's misanthrope, Alceste, is put in his place by the balanced, phlegmatic Philinte:

> J'observe, comme vous, cent choses tous les jours,
> Qui pourroient mieux aller, prenant un autre cours;
> Mais, quoi qu'à chaque pas je puisse voir paroître,
> En courroux, comme vous, on ne me voit point être,
> Je prends tout doucement les hommes comme ils sont;
> J'accoutume mon âme à souffrir ce qu'ils font,
> Et je crois qu'à la cour, de même qu'à la ville,
> Mon flegme est philosophe autant que votre bile.
>
> *Le Misanthrope* I i

Molière here seems to take for granted a tradition which sees the phlegmatic as superior to the melancholy—as well, perhaps, as the other temperaments.

An explicit valorization of the phlegmatic in Germany came from no less a figure than Christian Thomasius, the father of the *Aufklärung*.

> He who has proper *phlegma* is the most reasonable person, and must necessarily also be capable of the greatest happiness and *rational love*. A *phlegmatic* is a properly *honnét homme*, and in all things pursues the *true honor of virtue*, although he is not held in especially high esteem, indeed scorned by the mass of men.[25]

While Thomasius was influenced by Epicurian ideas and by savvy manuals on reading others while making oneself illegible from Latin lands (he introduced Balthasar Gracian's *Hand-Oracle* to Germany), he argues for the phlegmatic as the ideal of *Christian* life.

Shaking up the traditional correlations of temperaments with elements,[26]

---

[22] *Saturn and Melancholy*, 60ff.

[23] The sanguine couple, by contrast, is embracing, the choleric fighting, the melancholy asleep. See, for instance, *Saturn and Melancholy*, plates 89a (First German Calendar, Augsburg, c. 1480) and 90b (Strasbourg Calendar, c. 1500).

[24] *Saturn and Melancholy*, 65n177 and 299–300.

[25] Christian Thomasius, *Einleitung zur Sittenlehre* (Halle 1692; repr. Hildesheim: Olms, 1995 [*Christian Thomasius, Ausgewählte Werke* X]), folio 4r-5.

[26] Thomasius' phlegmatic is linked not with water but with "die reine und heitere Himmels-*Lufft*." Cf. Christian Thomasius, *Ausübung der Sittenlehre* (Halle, 1696; repr. Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1968), 162. The trademark vice of the phlegmatic, sloth, is transferred to the sanguine, too, while the phlegmatic is busily cheerful.

Thomasius divides humanity into "calm people" (the phlegmatic), those who "suppress human nature" (sanguine), those who "elevate human nature too much" (choleric), and those moved by "other creatures below man" (melancholy). Compared to the imbalance of the choleric's love for honor, the melancholy's love for "earthly creatures" and the sanguine's love of sensual pleasure, the phlegmatic represents the balance which corresponds to "patient, softhearted," "rational," "Christian love."[27] Of the four cardinal virtues, temperance ends up correlated to the sanguine, prudence to the choleric, fortitude to the melancholy, and justice—the greatest of the virtues—to the phlegmatic. Thomasius' phlegmatic temperament is really no longer a temperament in the imbalance sense. His phlegmatic embodies the completeness or balance originally denoted by the term "temperament."

Several developments enabled Thomasius to make this argument. Harvey's discovery of the circulation of the blood in 1628 undermined the humoral basis of temperament theory, and opened the field to new derivations of the temperaments, as well as providing a new chance for older alternatives. Paracelsus had already challenged the derivation of the temperaments from the common elements, tracing the sanguine instead to mercury, the choleric to sulfur, and the melancholy to salt. (Thomasius seems to have been influenced by Paracelsus.) Huarte had traced them to moisture, heat and dryness.

Like these older views, new medical hypotheses tended to discern active sources for the sanguine, choleric and melancholy, but at best passive ones for the phlegmatic. Theories tracing temperament to the humors gave way to theories pointing to elements of the blood, and when these particles proved unverifiable, new theories arose, attending to blood density and temperature, and the balance of solid and liquid parts of the body. During Kant's lifetime, a theory deriving the temperaments from the size and texture of blood vessels and nerves enjoyed a brief vogue.

Yet thinkers had begun to question the foursome itself by the time Kant came of age. By mid-century several theorists had reduced the number of temperaments to three, dismissing the phlegmatic as a "monster" [*Mißgeburt*] of a temperament, no more than a pale variant either of the sanguine or the melancholy.[28] Others would soon argue for five, or six, or eight temperaments. Others dared to wonder whether temperament existed at all.

---

[27] See Thomasius, *Ausübung der Sittenlehre*, ch. 7: "Gegeneinanderhaltung der vier Haupt-Leidenschafften, Vernünfftiger, Ehr- Geld- und Wohllust-Liebe." The discussion is summarized at 170–73.

[28] Walch, "Temperament des Leibes," col. 2524; *Zedlers*, col. 765 (article "Temperament"). See also Walch, article "Phlegma, Phlegmatisches Temperament," *Philosophisches Lexicon*, col. 2001; *Zedlers*, XXII (Halle & Leipzig, 1741), col. 2158. Friedrich Jakob Floerken confirms that it was at mid-century that scholars began "to delete the phlegmatic temperament as a *Neutrum*" (Johann Georg Krünitz, *Ökonomisch-technologische Encyklopädie* . . . fortgesetzt von Friedrich Jakob Floerken, LXXV (Berlin, 1798), 226n (article "Leidenschaft").

These uncertainties notwithstanding, in the *Kunst, der Menschen Gemüther zu lesen* theorizing about human qualities and characters in the framework of the four temperaments flourished. The four temperaments remained too well-connected, too basic a way of approaching the diversity of human nature and experience to abandon. Works like Johann Wilhelm Appelius' *Historisch-Moralischer Enwurff der Temperamenten* of 1733 elaborate a linked system of stereotypes of nations and sexes, ages and vices framed by the foursome of the temperaments.[29] (Many of the same views turn up in Kant's lectures.) Appelius is representative also in depicting the phlegmatic as free of virtue—or vice.

1.3 Temperament and Moral Philosophy

The concerns of the *Kunst, der Menschen Gemüther zu lesen* may strike us as remote from moral philosophy, but discussion of the temperaments is to be found also in works explicitly devoted to that subject. Kant owned at least two books containing such discussions, Christian August Crusius' *Anweisung, vernünftig zu leben* and Joachim Georg Darjes' *Erste Gründe der philosophischen Sitten-Lehre.*[30] The book Kant used as the basis of his lectures on ethics, Alexander Baumgarten's *Ethica philosophica,*[31] also included a discussion decisive for the unfolding of Kant's view.

The importance of Crusius's thought for Kant's ethics has long been recognized. The *Anweisung, vernünftig zu leben* correlates the three perfections of the will—"liveliness, emphasis, endurance"—to the sanguine, choleric and melancholy temperaments, respectively. The goal of ethics is the complete state in which all these perfections are equally present. However this state cannot be called a temperament, Crusius insists, since it is "the state of completeness/perfection [*Vollkommenheit*]." Temperaments are *im*balances. Likewise unclassifiable as temperaments, he notes, are the state of equal mediocrity in all

---

[29] Johann Wilhelm Appelius, *Historisch-Moralischer Enwurff der Temperamenten und der hieraus entstehenden Neigungen des Gemüths, Sitten und Naturells; mit einiger Erläuterung der dahin gehörigen Lehren aus der Moral* . . . (Hamburg, Theodor Christoph Felginers Wittwe, 1733). Appelius' book is mentioned appreciatively by Walch.

[30] Christian August Crusius, *Anweisung, vernünftig zu leben, Darin nach Erklärung der Natur des menschlichen Willens die natürlichen Pflichten und allgemeinen Klugheitslehren im richtigen Zusammenhange vorgetragen werden,* 2nd edition (Leipzig, 1751); Joachim Georg Darjes, *Erste Gründe der philosophischen Sitten-Lehre* . . . , 3rd edition (Jena, 1762). (Kant had the 1755 edition, which I was unable to consult.) See Arthur Warda, *Immanuel Kants Bücher* (Berlin: Martin Breslauer, 1922), 47; Warda warns that not too much should be concluded from a book's having been part of the library Kant left. Kant's library also included other works containing discussions of the temperaments (like Ernst Platner's *Philosophische Aphorismen*), but these postdate the development of Kant's own view.

[31] Alexander Baumgarten, *Ethica philosophica* (Halle, 1751), repr. in *AK* 27:733–1028. For Baumgarten's ethics, see J. B. Schneewind's introduction, *LA* xix–xxv.

perfections—and the phlegmatic. Characterized by "all-sided incompleteness/imperfection," the phlegmatic is really "*Unvollkommenheit* itself" (§§64–65). Once again in a class of its own, the phlegmatic for Crusius is a kind of negative of virtue.

Darjes' *Erste Gründe der philosophischen Sitten-Lehre* correlates all four temperaments to possible grounds of human action. Yet here too the phlegmatic is qualitatively distinct from the other temperaments. Darjes finds the sanguine moved to act by "the pleasure of the senses," the choleric by "the achievement of honor," the melancholy by "achievement of worldly wealth," and the phlegmatic (somewhat paradoxically) by "liberation from activity" (§146). The origin of temperament lies in qualities of the blood, and since these origins are distinct from each other, there can, strictly speaking, be no mixtures of temperaments (§176). The first three of these tendencies are inherently good, becoming vicious only when corrupted. (The sanguine's susceptibility to lust, the choleric's to pride and the melancholy's to greed [§§149–53] are entirely traditional.) These drives can be appealed to in educating those who have gone astray; the melancholy is especially so educable (§179). The conspicuous exception is the phlegmatic state, which is always vicious. Darjes asserts that it "can effect nothing but evil." Lacking the inherently good tendencies of the other temperaments, phlegmatics are unsalvageable. There is no point even discussing their situation in a book of ethics. Their care must be left to doctors (§177).

Despite profound differences in their views of ethics and temperament, Crusius and Darjes are representative not only in their venomous views of the phlegmatic, but also in their inability to see any possibility of virtue in apathy. This Stoic virtue had defenders in Germany, however. Christian Wolff (whom both Darjes and Crusius criticized) was sympathetic to the Stoa. His follower Alexander Baumgarten went so far as to argue that a "moral *phlegma*" was necessary for a good life.

Baumgarten does not discuss the temperaments *per se* in the *Ethica philosophica*, but in his discussion of the virtues of temperance and fortitude, he identifies a defect in appetite as "*moral phlegma* in the *bad sense*." In the "*good sense*," however, *moral phlegma* seems the conspectus of the cardinal virtues. It is "the just dose of temperance and fortitude prudently pursuing goods" (§249; *AK* 27:938). Like Georg Friedrich Meier in his popularizing German translation and expansion of Baumgarten's work, *Philosophische Sittenlehre*, Kant glosses "*phlegma morale bono significatu*" in his copy of the *Ethica Philosophica* as "*cold blood.*"[32]

All the elements which will play a part in Kant's evolving views of tempera-

[32] Georg Friedrich Meier, *Philosophische Sittenlehre* §662 (III [Halle: Carl Hermann Hemmerde, 2nd edition, 1764 (1st edition, 1756)], 378). For Kant's marginal gloss, see *AK* 27:939.

ment have now been introduced: the correlation of temperaments with moral dispositions, as well as with other typologies of human diversity; the uncertain status of the phlegmatic as a non-, sub- or super-temperament; the idea of a positive *phlegma*, and its correlation with the language of cold-bloodedness. It is not likely that Kant was aware of this whole history, but his changing views show a powerful grasp of the inner logic and possibilities of this tradition.

2. KANT'S EARLY VIEW OF TEMPERAMENT

2.1 At what point Kant started thinking and teaching about temperament is not clear. Kant began lecturing on "Physical Geography" in 1756, but well before he split the course into an anthropological and a geographical part in 1772, he had included discussion of human diversity. In print, Kant speculated about interplanetary diversity in the 1755 *Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens*, but first entered the fray of discussion of human diversity only in 1764 with his *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime.*

The purpose of *Observations* ostensibly is to argue the fruitfulness of the newly-paired categories of the beautiful and sublime. Since it does so by showing how well these categories square with other categories already in place, however, *Observations* also functions as a Rosetta stone for the discourses of diversity in Kant's milieu. The beautiful and the sublime are defined in terms not only of objects of aesthetic experience, natural as well as artificial, but also of traits of individual character, gender, and nationality. In the process, these categories are revealed to be mutually intertranslatable.

In the *Observations* Kant correlates temperament with gender and national character via the beautiful and the sublime. The most explicit example of such a cluster of ideas links the French and women; both are beautiful rather than sublime in character and understanding—and sanguine in temperament. Since women's "beautiful understanding" does better with geography and history than with philosophy, it makes perfect sense that a work like *Spirit of the Laws* should be so suitable a text for the education of women, and that its author should hail from France. Kant's correlations of temperament with gender and national character are standard fare, differing only occasionally from the commonplaces in works like Appelius' *Historisch-Moralischer Enwurff der Temperamenten.*

The discussion of the temperaments in *Observations* appears at the end of the second chapter, "Of the Attributes of the Beautiful and Sublime in Man in General" (*Obs* 2:218–27/62–75). This discussion is the hinge between a general aesthetic and moral discussion and an account of a structured diversity in human nature and experience in discussions of gender, national character, etc. (The discussion of temperaments will serve as a comparable hinge in the *Anthropology* of 1798.)

The discussion that ends with the temperaments starts with an account of three kinds of virtue. "True" or "genuine" virtue, involves acting according to principles, and is instantiated in action moved by the "*feeling of the beauty and the dignity of human nature*" (*Obs* 2:217–18/60). "Adoptive virtue" comprises actions motivated by "sympathy" and "complaisance." These acts are beautiful the way virtuous acts are supposed to be, and while not themselves virtuous, they are "ennobled by the relationship" with virtue, and "even . . . gain its name" (*Obs* 2:218/60–61). Finally, the "*sense of honor*, and its consequence, *shame*" lead people to virtuous acts they would not otherwise perform. While "not even so closely related to genuine virtue as goodheartedness," the "sense of honor is a fine feeling," and the "semblance of virtue which is motivated by it" can be called *Tugendschimmer*, the "gloss of virtue" (*Obs* 2:218/61–62).

These three kinds of virtue are immediately correlated with the temperaments. Kant finds that "genuine virtue based on principles has something about it which seems to harmonize most with the *melancholy* frame of mind in the moderated understanding," since

> A profound feeling for the beauty and dignity of human nature and a firmness and determination of the mind to refer all one's actions to this as to a universal ground is earnest, and does not at all join with a changeable gaiety nor with the inconstancy of a frivolous person. It even approaches melancholy, a gentle and noble feeling so far as it is grounded upon the awe that a hard-pressed soul feels when, full of some great purpose, he sees the danger he will have to overcome, and has before his eyes the difficult but great victory of self-conquest. (*Obs* 2:219/62–63)

The changeableness of the sanguine shows an affinity with "adoptive virtue," while the "sense of honor has usually been taken as a mark of the *choleric* complexion" (*Obs* 2:219/63).

Like many contemporaries, Kant has run out of types of virtue to distribute by the time he comes to the phlegmatic.

> Never is a man without all traces of finer sensation; but a greater deficiency of it, a comparative apathy [*Fühllosigkeit*], occurs in the character of the *phlegmatic*, whom one deprives moreover of even the gross motives, such as lust for wealth, which nevertheless we can leave to him anyhow, together with other related inclinations, because they do not belong in this outline. (*Obs* 2:220/64)

As Kant goes on to give more detailed descriptions of the temperaments, including mixtures of the three he discusses (something he will later foreswear), the discussion of the phlegmatic shrinks before vanishing altogether. Like Crusius and Darjes, Kant correlates the other three temperaments with morally productive dispositions, leaving the phlegmatic dangling as different in a somehow qualitative way.

It is clear why the other temperaments should matter in *Observations*' discus-

sion of moral motivation: Kant at this stage was a kind of moral sentiment thinker. The correlation of moral motivations with temperaments would not in any way have been a surprise to his readers, any more than the dismissal of the phlegmatic. People have to be moved to act by *some* kind of feeling. About the unfortunate who has no affects there is, literally, nothing to be said. The phlegmatic disappears in *Observations*, except in the last chapter, "Of National Characteristics, so far as They Depend upon the Distinct Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime," where we find the familiar claim that the Dutchman is a "very phlegmatized German" (*Obs* 2:249/105). (The German, meanwhile, is an optimal mix of melancholy and sanguine, mediated by the choleric.[33])

What was idiosyncratic in Kant's discussion of temperament in 1764 was his celebration of the melancholy as the only temperament capable of attaining true virtue. Klibansky, Panofsky, and Saxl have noted the uniqueness of Kant's discussion.

> Kant was not untouched, perhaps, by the Renaissance view [associating melancholy with genius], but it was rather, in all probability, a deep feeling of sympathy which led him to endow the melancholy character, limited though its traits were by tradition, with the stamp of the "sublime", and, point by point, to interpret every trait of melancholy as the expression of a great moral consciousness. . . . The "sadness without cause" [of melancholy] was based on his possession of a moral scale which destroyed personal happiness by the merciless revelation of his own and others' worthlessness.[34]

However Kant's praise of the melancholy can also be seen as an extension and transformation of the standard negative associations of this temperament. Like the avaricious melancholy of Thomasius, Walch, Appelius and Darjes, Kant's noble melancholy was deaf to human concerns—uninterested in reputation, and unmoved by human affections. Thomasius' melancholy is drawn to the cold impersonality of money and land; Kant's is attracted by the cool impersonality of principle.

2.2 *A Theodicy of Temperament?*

I have spoken of three kinds of virtue, but Kant's point in this discussion may have been that there is no moral merit in any but the melancholy's ways. If this is so, what may be thought of as a kind of theodicy problem arises.[35] Are

---

[33] Cf. *Obs* 2:248/104: The German "has a fortunate combination of feeling, both in that of the sublime [=melancholy] and in that of the beautiful [=sanguine]; and if in the first he does not equal an Englishman, nor in the second a Frenchman, he yet surpasses both so far as he unites them."

[34] *Saturn and Melancholy*, 122.

[35] I use the term "theodicy" broadly for a question about the moral order of a world. *Observations* is full of claims about the wise dispensations of a provident nature in setting things up the way they are.

sanguine, choleric and phlegmatic to be condemned for failing to achieve a level of virtue constitutionally inaccessible to them? Admitting to being troubled by the diversity of temperaments, Kant ends his discussion of temperament in the *Observations* by deferring to an imagined perspective from which the variety and distribution of temperaments manifest a providential wisdom.

We mustn't jump to the conclusion that the melancholy are best, Kant argues, for we cannot really *argue* the superiority of any of the sentiments he has discussed, or even their superiority as a group to "coarser sensation" and "self-interest."

> If I examine alternately the noble and the weak side of men, I reprimand myself that I am unable to take that standpoint from which these contrasts present the great portrait of the whole of human nature in a stirring form. For I willingly concede that so far as it belongs to the design of nature on the whole, these grotesque postures cannot give anything but a noble expression, although one is indeed much too shortsighted to see them in this relation. (*Obs* 2:226–27/73)

Kant nevertheless tries to discern a pattern in the relative frequency of the temperaments. Melancholy principle-followers are "but few." On reflection Kant finds that this "is extremely good, as it can so easily happen that one errs in these principles, and then the resulting disadvantage extends all the further, the more universal the principle and the more resolute the person who has set it before himself" (*Obs* 2:227/74). The sanguine types "who act out of *goodhearted impulses*" are "far more numerous" than the melancholy. This too, Kant hypothesizes, is "most excellent." Even they are a minority, however. Most men "have their best-loved selves [*ihr allerliebstes Selbst*] fixed before their eyes as the only point of reference for their exertions, and . . . seek to turn everything around *self-interest* as around the great axis." Yet Kant conjectures that this too is a blessing in disguise. "Nothing can be more advantageous than this," Kant hazards,

> for these are the most diligent, orderly, and prudent; they give support and solidity to the whole, while without intending to do so they serve the common good, provide the necessary requirements, and supply the foundation over which finer souls can spread beauty and harmony. (*Obs* 2:227/74)

The symbiotic system Kant proposes here can be seen as a temperament argument writ large. Society as a whole is best off with a variety of types, whose strengths and weaknesses provoke each other and keep each other in check. (The phlegmatic have no role, of course.) The suggested symbiosis of temperaments is akin to the symbiosis of man and woman adverted to in the next chapter of the *Observations*—although articulated in a far less decisive way. The temperamental variety which Kant has correlated with the variety of moral

types troubles him in ways in which diversity of gender or national character do not.

2.3 *The Sensitive Soul at Rest*

The extensive notes Kant wrote in the margins and the interleaved blank pages of a special edition of the *Observations* he had printed for himself in 1765 confirm that temperamental diversity constituted a sort of theodicy problem for Kant. The *Bemerkungen in den Beobachtungen* are recognized as marking a turning point in Kant's thinking. Shaken and inspired by his reading of Rousseau, Kant has learned "to honor men"—or at least humanity as a whole (*BB* 38). Newton and Rousseau have revealed the harmonious lawlikeness of the natural and human worlds; "God is justified and now Pope's teaching is true" (*BB* 48). Indeed, Kant thinks a Rousseauian understanding of the debilitating effects of culture explains his era's concern with theodicy. Luxury spoils us, and makes people complain about divine government as well as the government of kings (*BB* 35). The most powerful reflections on divine justice and wisdom, however, are written on the pages interleaved with the *Observation*'s discussion of temperament (see esp. *BB* 54).

Kant's reading of Rousseau does not stop him from thinking in temperamental terms. The *Bemerkungen* are full of jottings about the different proclivities of sanguine, melancholy and choleric in dress, speech, society, scholarship, religion, etc. (There is still next to nothing about the phlegmatic.) There is one important shift, however. The most fortunate is no longer the melancholy but rather the "sensitive soul at rest [*die gefühlvolle Seele in Ruhe*]," which embodies "the greatest perfection/completeness [*Vollkommenheit*]" (*BB* 11). This is something unclassifiable in the terms of Kant's early theory of temperament. Sanguine, melancholy and choleric after all lack tranquility, while the phlegmatic lacks feeling. For the next decade, Kant would seek and eventually find a way of integrating the ideal of the sensitive soul at rest and the theory of the temperaments.

Kant had long been interested in the uses of the concept of *Ruhe* in science. In "Attempt to introduce the concept of negative magnitudes into philosophy," published in 1763 (shortly before the *Observations*), Kant made the intellectual breakthrough which would allow him eventually to assimilate Baumgarten's "phlegma morale" into a theory of temperament. Kant's central point in this essay is to distinguish "logical" from "real" ways in which attributes can be opposed to each other. The former kind of opposition, which Kant calls "lack," is "*nothing at all*"; the latter opposition, "deprivation," is "*something.*"[36] What

[36] Cf. *Neg* 2:171/211: "Two things are opposed to each other if one thing cancels [aufhebt] that which is posited [gesetzt] by the other. This opposition is two-fold: it is either *logical* through

Kant has in mind is the equipose of forces. "Negative magnitudes" can be helpful in ethics, too:

> The lack of both pleasure and displeasure, in so far as it arises from the absence of their respective grounds, is called *indifference* [Gleichgültigkeit] (*indifferentia*). The lack of both pleasure and displeasure, in so far as it is a consequence of the real opposition of equal grounds, is called *equilibrium* [Gleichgewicht] (*aequilibrium*). Both indifference and equilibrium are zero, though the former is a negation absolutely, whereas the latter is a deprivation. (*Neg* 2:180/220)

The distinction between the limp indifference which is *nothing* and the energetic equilibrium which is *something* will be Kant's way of appropriating the distinction between bad and good *phlegma* when he articulates a temperament theory harmonious with the mature ethical view which emerged in the mid 1760s.

3. KANT'S MATURE VIEW OF TEMPERAMENT

3.1 It took Kant some time to rework his temperament theory to fit his ethics. In the anthropology lectures which he began to deliver in 1772, Kant eventually began to distinguish a strong and weak phlegmatic. What he will call "phlegma as weakness" remains despicable to the end, but student notes indicate that a positive kind of phlegma was mentioned already in Kant's first series of lectures. It would however take a few years for this phlegma to be explicitly correlated with the phlegmatic *temperament*.[37]

In his lectures of 1772/73, Kant recounted that the theology of the "Brahmins" tells that the God Brama communicated four temperaments to human beings—the melancholy to the priests, the sanguine to manual laborers, the choleric to soldiers, and the phlegmatic to merchants (*LA* 25.2:221–22)—something he would repeat in later years. Phlegma is mentioned in the context of a discussion of the temperaments, but a connection to the phlegmatic temperament is not yet explicit. Kant reportedly argued that the slowness to react which results from "*phlegma*" was a virtue in generals but not in soldiers, and in men but not in women (*LA* 25.2:431; cf. 220).

In the lectures of 1775/76, Kant reports without comment that the phlegmatic has the "worst reputation." "Phlegma is no real passion, but just a great degree of inactivity," and "however active he may be," the phlegmatic "always

---

contradiction, or it is *real*, that is to say, without contradiction. . . . The consequence of the logical conjunction is *nothing at all* (*nihil negativum irrepraesentabile*) . . . The second opposition, namely real opposition, is that where two predicates of a thing are opposed to each other, but not through the law of contradiction. Here, too, one thing cancels that which is posited by the other; but the consequence is *something* (*cogitabile*)."

[37] The careful edition and collation of many different sets of notes in *LA* significantly mitigates the dangers inherent in using student lecture notes.

strives for his peace" (*LA* 25.2:639). The phlegmatic does not really even belong to society; the "negative in vice[s] cannot be called good, and who does nothing, counts for nothing." Invoking a common stereotype, Kant suggests that the phlegmatic so single-mindedly seeks inactivity that he will sell everything he has for straw on which to sleep (*LA* 25.2:647–48)! Yet some of the terms which will be part of Kant's mature view of the phlegmatic as the sensitive soul at rest are already in use. Earlier in his lectures, Kant discusses the role of "cold blood" in dampening affects and passions which would otherwise prevent us from acting in accordance with reason. One must achieve, Kant reportedly said,

> an intermediate state between the affects and cold blood. The state of cold blood is the state of reflection and weighing of the object through reason but this cold persuasion lacks a motive to give it emphasis. The motive is affect and passion, it must however stand under the direction of reason, so that it is preserved in the moment, for once it gets going, one can no longer stop it. (*LA* 25.2:616)

By the time of the anthropology lectures of 1777/78, Kant's final view has emerged. Phlegma, the state of being without affect, is usually mere lack of liveliness, he reportedly says, but there is also a "fortunate phlegma." Here the motives to activity are present, but operate in such a way that they "leave room for reflection." It is "the best of all temperaments" (*LA* 25.2:801, 821).

This view is elaborated in the lecture notes known as the *Menschenkunde* (1781/82?), where phlegma in its good sense is characterized by the striking phrase "principled cold-bloodedness [*Kaltblütigkeit nach Grundsätzen*]" (*LA* 25.2: 1162). Phlegma is one of the most desirable attributes, Kant here asserts, both for those who have it and for others. He who has "Phlegma in the temperament" is "very happy; for it always observes the insignificance [*Nichtigkeit*] of things." This enables its bearer to cleave to his purposes, making him reliable and principled. His phlegma's indifference to things makes him happier even than the sanguine, who often has occasion for distress (*LA* 25.2:1166). Indeed, "A person who has phlegma is sometimes held for a philosopher: and insofar as he is inclined to reflection, he really can bring that about through himself, which philosophy brings about through much reflection" (*LA* 25.2:1167).[38] This connection between the phlegmatic and philosophy, which we have seen

[38] What kind of philosopher does Kant have in mind? It might seem to be the Stoic, but Kant's several correlations of philosophy, religious temper and temperament suggest otherwise. The most elaborate is *Reflexion* #1146: "Orthodoxy is choleric: the Stoic /Fanaticism melancholy: the Platonist. /Superstition phlegmatic. /Unbelief sanguine: The epicurean" (*AK* 15.2:508). The melancholy's propensity for enthusiasm [*Schwärmerey*], the sanguine's for libertinism, the phlegmatic's for superstition and the choleric's for orthodoxy were a regular part of Kant's anthropology lectures (e.g., *LA* 25.2:432ff and 1168), and appear—albeit in a self-undermining footnote—in the *Anthropology* itself (*Ant* 7:291n/157n).

already in Molière's Philinte, remains a part of Kant's view on the temperaments to the end.

3.2 Pragmatic Anthropology

The version of the lecture series Kant published as *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* in 1798 is representative of the views on temperament expressed for the last two decades of his course. "Pragmatic anthropology," Kant explains, concerns not what nature makes of man, but what man can and must make of himself (*Ant* 7:119/3). In its quest to understand man as a "*citizen of the world* [*Weltbürger*]" (*Ant* 7:120/3), "pragmatic" anthropology is related to the philosophy of history and society Kant inaugurated in his 1784 "Idea for a universal history with cosmopolitan [*weltbürgerlicher*] intent" (*Idea* 8:15–32). As in his writings on history and politics, Kant often seems to means by "man" not the individual but the species.

The *Anthropology*'s pragmatic "knowledge of the world" is contrasted with "physiological" or "theoretical" knowledge. Kant's illustration is revealing. "[E]ven knowledge of the races of men as produced by the play of nature is not yet part of pragmatic, but only of theoretical knowledge of the world," Kant writes (*Ant* 7:120/3–4)—but he nevertheless includes a section on the "Character of Race" in his work (*Ant* 7:320–21/182). The *Anthropology*'s discussion of race is abbreviated. The fuller account of race elaborated in Kant's three essays on the subject and described in student notes was presumably more than merely "physiological" because of Kant's claim that the structuring of the human species into races and varieties could and must be understood in terms of the final end of creation.[39] In the last of his essays on race, "On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy" (1788), Kant argued that races were an *a priori* accessible solution to the problem of human habitation of a climatically varied globe—a goal which a "cosmopolitan" human science must take to be nature's end (*AK* 8:163–66). The brief discussion of "race" in the *Anthropology* adds an observation about the way the further structuring of humanity into varieties and "*family stamps*" serves the end also of "diversify[ing] to infinity the members of the same stock and even of the same clan, in both their bodily and spiritual traits" (*Ant* 7:320/182).

Is there a comparable argument to be made for the varieties of temperament? In a passage reminiscent of the close of chapter two of the *Observations*, Kant seems at once to posit a providential point to temperament and to despair of our ever grasping it. After quoting a famous actor who opined that the Maker's hand is less than legible in marking scoundrels, Kant writes,

---

[39] I have tried to lay out Kant's rather complicated view of race in "Sublime Waste: Kant on the Destiny of the 'Races'" in Catherine Wilson, ed., *Civilization and Oppression* (*Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume* 25 [1999]): 99–137.

> In order to pass sentence so emphatically we should need more power than any mortal can claim to distinguish between the play that nature carries on with the forms it develops in order merely to produce more multiplicity of temperament, and that which it hereby does or does not do for morality. (*Ant* 7:302/166; my translation)

This sentence is difficult to unpack, but it clearly raises the question of nature's purpose in the temperaments. Coming at the end of the section on the "Character of the Person," it invites comparison with the conclusions of the other sections of the "Anthropological Characteristic." In each of these others, a purposiveness of nature is discerned in some kind of human diversity, and a pragmatic conclusion derived. The differences are there for a reason, and we should not (and perhaps could not) overcome them.

However, the place of temperament in the "Anthropological Characteristic" is more ambiguous. Temperament is the topic not of a section of its own but is part of a discussion of the "Character of the Person" which begins with "nature" [*Naturell*] (*Ant* 7:285–86/151–52) and leads through temperament (7:286–91/152–57) to a discussion of "character" (7:291–95/157–60) and an extended note on physiognomy (7:297–302/160–66). Echoing his opening definition of "pragmatic anthropology," Kant starts this chapter with the assertion that the discussion of character "shows what man is prepared [*bereit*] to make of himself," while temperament and *Naturell* merely "indicate what can be made of man" (*Ant* 7:285/151). Shouldn't this mean that temperament and *Naturell* have no place in pragmatic anthropology? Perhaps they serve in Kant's argument only as a foil for "character," which transcends the physical variety of human beings altogether. If so, however, it is difficult to explain why the passage about nature's end in producing the temperaments comes at the end of the whole chapter, *after* the discussion of character.

In fact, since character is, after all, contrasted with every kind of difference, "Character of the Person" can be seen as a microcosm of the whole "Anthropological Characteristic." Temperament's position as a bridge between *Naturell* and character in "Character of the Person" is representative of the status of all the categories of human diversity Kant discusses in the *Anthropology*. Like the elements of "physiological anthropology," *Naturell* represents man as part of the world of nature; like ethics, character represents him as a participant in the world of freedom. The gap between them is as unbridgeable in theory as it must be believed bridgeable in practice. Temperament links yet holds apart the worlds of nature and freedom. Its connections to the former are determinate in a way its connections to the latter can never be.

Because of this paradoxical position as a bridge between unbridgeables, Kant's account of temperament is full of tensions. This is not just sloppiness. The distance between empirically observable human behavior and free acts is one we can never cross, although we are constantly tempted to try to do so: as interpreta-

tion of the "two standpoints" in Kant's ethics has made clear, every free act can *also* be seen as the result of natural laws.[40] This is instantiated in a set of distinctions and subdistinctions Kant uses in discussing temperament. Repeatedly making *the same* distinction between nature and freedom, they function like Zeno's paradox of motion. The distinction between "feeling" and "activity"—effectively the same distinction Kant employs to define "pragmatic" anthropology—keeps bisecting the remaining distance between nature and freedom.

Naturell, Kant writes, has more to do with "subjective" questions of "feeling" than with the "objective" matters of "activity" involved in temperament (*Ant* 7:286/152). Yet temperament is not about activity *as opposed to* feeling. It can be regarded as both; from the perspective of character it is feeling. Kant distinguishes between a "*physiological* point of view" of temperament and his own "*psychological* point of view." Where the former takes temperament to be no more than "physical *constitution*" and "*complexion,*" his own view looks to "temperament of the soul" in its "feeling and appetitive capacities" (*Ant* 7:286/152). This distinction at once evokes Kant's opening distinction between a "physiological" and "pragmatic" anthropology (*Ant* 7:120/3) and the distinction between temperaments of body and of soul familiar from earlier theories of temperament like Walch's.

The picture is complicated even more when Kant functionalizes the contrast of feeling and activity also in his schematization of the differences *among* temperaments. Compared to *Naturell,* all temperaments are active; but compared to each other, some temperaments seem not to be active at all. Kant lays out the four temperaments:

Temperaments of Feeling[41]
The Sanguine Temperament of the Light-Blooded
The Melancholy Temperament of the Heavy-Blooded
Temperaments of Activity
The Choleric Temperament of the Warm-Blooded
The Phlegmatic Temperament of the Cold-Blooded (*Ant* 7:287–89)[42]

In Kant's mature ethics we shall see confirmed the suspicion that the sanguine and melancholy temperaments are more like *Naturell,* or at least farther from "Character," than the choleric and phlegmatic.

---

[40] For the classic exposition, see Lewis White Beck, *The Actor and the Spectator: The Ernst Cassirer Lectures (1974)(* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975).

[41] Kant's discussion remains uncertain until the end. He changed the name from "Temperament der Empfindung" to "Temperament des Gefühls" when the *Anthropologie* was revised in 1800.

[42] "Leichtblütigen . . . Schwerblütigen . . . Warmblütigen . . . Kaltblütigen." Gregor acknowledges that she obscures this in rendering "Leichtblütigen" as "volatile" and "schwerblütigen" as "grave" (153–55).

Arguably, Kant knows exactly what confusion he generates by using the same distinction (feeling/activity) to distinguish *Naturell* and temperament from character, *Naturell* from temperament, *and* the sanguine and melancholy from the choleric and phlegmatic temperaments. With the ground constantly moving under one's feet, one becomes less confident that one is ever entirely in the realm of freedom—or nature. The status of temperament is *supposed* to be unsettled and unsettling, as Kant's explicit evocation of affinities with qualities of blood makes clear. Kant explains that, from a psychological point of view, he

> introduce[s] those terms derived from the composition of the blood only because of an analogy that the play of feelings and appetites has with corporeal causes of movement (the most prominent of which is the blood). From this it follows: that the temperaments which we ascribe merely to the soul may well have the corporeal factors in man, too, as covertly contributing causes . . . (*Ant* 7:286/152)

The "psychological" perspective on temperament uses (outdated) physiological categories as analogies, but Kant also leaves open the possibility that they're not *only* analogies. What is pragmatically important is not the physiological basis of temperament (if it has one), but the *possibility* that every virtuous act is the result not of character but of temperament.

Awareness of the imprint of temperamental differences on human lives—a given in eighteenth-century literature and *Popularphilosophie*—is thus mobilized in the service of the vigilance and discipline indispensable to a life of freedom. This kind of use of analogy is a standard (if insufficiently studied) Kantian move. Certain things in our experience, as in our cultural inheritance, are worth holding on to not because they seem to be true—even if they *are* true—but because they give us powerful ways of appreciating and assimilating the implications of Kant's revolution in philosophy. Indeed, it can be argued that Kant's approach to inherited categories and narratives is generally just such an openness to potential "parerga"—things which "do not belong to" but "border upon" an understanding of the human condition based in practical reason (*Rel* 6:52n/47n).[43]

In directing attention away from the physiological origin of temperament, as in anachronistically asserting that there "in all, only four temperaments,

---

[43] In *Religion*, much of Christian life is redefined as "parerga" to religion within the limits of reason alone. The term "parerga" appears also in the discussion of ornamentation and picture-framing in §14 of the *Critique of Aesthetic Judgment*, §14 (*CJ* 5:226/72), for which see the incisive discussion in Jacques Derrida, *The Truth in Painting*, Geoff Bennington and Ian McLeod, trans. (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 53ff. The experience of beauty operates in a parergon-like way as the "symbol of morality" (*CJ* §59, 5:351–54/225–30). Arguably, faith in progress is a parergon to moral life, too. Kant's appreciation for human diversity may help explain the range (and ill mutual fit) of his late writings: all (or most) people need the cognitive supplements of parerga, but because of temperamental and other differences they can't all use the same ones.

each of them simple" (*Ant* 7:291/156),[44] Kant may seem to be concerned less with reviving than with disabling the theory of the temperaments. Is his purpose in teaching about temperament really to co-opt and disarm a way of thinking about human diversity he thinks dangerous to a social life based on mutual respect? This question—which goes to the heart of the significance of the "Anthropological Characteristic" for Kant's anthropology, and more generally of the *Anthropology* for Kant's practical philosophy—is raised forcefully by the most interesting development within the specific accounts of the temperaments in Kant's late thought—the exaltation of the phlegmatic. In the *Anthropology*, as before, the phlegmatic is associated with the philosopher.

> The cold-blooded man has nothing to regret if nature gives him a quite ordinary portion of reason but also adds phlegma, so that, without being spectacular, he still proceeds from principles and not from instinct. His fortunate temperament is a substitute for wisdom [*vertritt bei ihm die Stelle der Weisheit*], and even in ordinary life we call him a philosopher. (*Ant* 7:290/155)

Elsewhere in the *Anthropology*, Kant writes that "phlegma (taken in the good sense of the term) is the temperament of cool reflection and perseverance in the pursuit of one's ends, together with endurance of the difficulties encountered along the way." Significantly, this claim, reminiscent of Baumgarten's definition of *phlegma in significatu bono* as the conspectus of virtues, appears in a discussion of the national character of the German, whose "talent for right understanding and profoundly reflective reason" is here seamlessly joined to phlegma as strength (*Ant* 7:318–19/180).[45]

Not every phlegmatic is a philosopher, of course. Like Appelius and Crusius, Kant still views most phlegmatics as worthless people without any inclinations at all. "Phlegma as *strength*," defined as "the quality of not being moved easily or *rashly* but, if slowly, still *persistently*," is sharply distinguished from the "phlegma as *weakness*" of "voluntarily useless" people inclined "only to satiety and sleep" (*Ant* 7:289–90/155).

---

[44] Dircksen says Kant was the first to make this "evident and irrefutable" claim (*Die Lehre von den Temperamenten*, 111–12).

[45] As the temperament that isn't a temperament, phlegma as strength has kin in other departments of Kant's mature thinking about human experience. The national character of the German moves from being an insecure combination of active temperaments in 1764 (see note 33 above) to phlegma as strength. Having at the ready all the inclinations found severally among the nations, the Germany of *Anthropology* is in a sense the nation that isn't a nation. Analogously, Kant's theory of race includes a race which isn't one. Races are defined by their one-sided development of "seeds [*Keime*]," dispositions and motives, but the white race seems to contain all seeds, dispositions and motives, and so could be defined as the race that isn't a race. (I have argued that Kant understood the races in temperamental terms, correlating the white not-quite-race with the phlegmatic; see my "Sublime Waste," [note 39 above], 104, 122–23.)

All of these views develop at the same time as Kant's mature view of a moral life which, to put it crudely, involves a feeling which isn't a feeling.

Phlegma as strength can be understood in terms of an equilibrium of inclinations, well-ordered and at-the-ready. It sounds like the perfect state of balance Crusius encourages—which Crusiusm, however, asserts is not a temperament. Like Thomasius' phlegmatic, Kant's phlegma as strength seems to reclaim the state of (temperament-as-) balance, of the wholeness disrupted by man's fall into temperament-as-imbalance.

3.3 Temperament and Kant's Mature Ethics

The assimilation of phlegma as strength into Kant's view of temperament invites us to bring awareness of his thinking on temperament into those places in his moral works where phlegma as strength and its cognates cold-bloodedness and apathy are discussed. New light can be shed on some much-discussed passages in Kant's mature practical philosophy when it is borne in mind that their author consistently thought humanity subdivided into temperaments.

The *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785) finds some characteristics of temperament helpful for a moral life, but insists they have no worth of their own (*G* 4:393/49). Even "moderation in affects and passions, self-control and calm reflection" are good only if the person who possesses them has "*inner* worth" (*G* 4:394/50). Kant may be thinking of phlegma: he goes on to illustrate the bad uses to which this self-control can be put by a bad person by noting that the "cold blood"[46] of a criminal makes him even more contemptible in our sight (*G* 4:394/50).

Shortly thereafter, however, Kant *praises* the temperamentally cold. Benevolence is a duty, but the fulfillment of this duty accrues no merit to the naturally sympathetic person. Kant notoriously adds that this person's acts *would* have merit if he were driven by experience to lose all interest in helping others, and performed benevolent acts "without any inclination at all, but solely from duty." But the embittered ex-sanguine is not the only kind of meritorious agent.

> Still further: if nature had put little sympathy in the heart of this or that man; if (in other respects an honest man) he is by temperament cold and indifferent to the sufferings of others . . . ; if nature had not properly fashioned such a man (who would in truth not be its worst product) for a philanthropist, would he not still find within himself a source from which to give himself a far higher worth than what a mere good-natured temperament might have? By all means! It is just then that the worth of character comes out, which is moral and incomparably the highest, namely that he is beneficent not from inclination but from duty. (*G* 4:398/54)

Where duty is concerned, the phlegmatic is a natural. Struggle is not necessary, just freedom

---

[46] Gregor's "coolness" doesn't capture the resonances of *kaltes Blut*.

Kant's contemporaneous lectures on ethics (1784–85) make explicit the argument about cold blood merely hinted at in the *Groundwork*.

> A cold-blooded temper towards others is one that evinces no loving affection or stir of emotion. The man to whom such stirrings of good-will are unknown, is cold. Yet cold-bloodedness should not, on that account, be censured. The poets may rejoice at being steeped in warm feeling and affection, and heap abuse on cold-bloodedness; but if it is accompanied by principles and good dispositions, those who possess it are at all events people who can be relied on. A cold-blooded guardian who means me well, an advocate or patriot of that type, are people of steadfast character, who will surely do their utmost on my behalf. Whereas cold-bloodedness in an evil-doer is all the worse on that account, in a good man–though it may not sound so well–it is actually better than a warm feeling of affection, since it is more constant. (*LE* 27:420/182)

An engagement with the role of temperament in moral life seems to run beneath the surface even of Kant's most formalist ethical work. Fairly radical measures seem needed to counteract the temperamental inclinations of the sanguine sympathy-lover, the prideful choleric and the misanthropic melancholy. The phlegmatic seems, by contrast, already to be where he needs to be—provided he has a good heart. In making possible a life at once dedicated to duty and contented, phlegma as strength truly is a "fortunate temperament" (*Ant* 7:290/155).

A different temperamental contrast is made in §29 of the "Analytic of the Sublime" of the *Critique of Judgment* (1790). Kant defines "*enthusiasm*" as "the idea of the good accompanied by affect." Evoking the alleged connection between melancholy and genius, Kant notes that enthusiasm seems sublime since it is generally believed that "nothing great can be accomplished without it." However, every affect prevents the mind from "deliberation about principles with the aim of determining itself according to them," so reason does not approve of it. Of what does reason approve?

> [E]nthusiasm is sublime aesthetically, because it is a straining of our forces by ideas that impart to the mind a momentum whose effects are mightier and more permanent than are those of an impulse produced by presentations of sense. But (strange though it seems) even [the state of] *being without affects* (*apatheia, phlegma in significatu bono*) in a mind that vigorously pursues its immutable principles is sublime, and sublime in a far superior way, because it also has pure reason's liking on its side. Only a cast of mind of that sort is called noble. (*CJ* 5:272/133)

In the *Observations*, sublimity and true morality were linked. A quarter century later, Kant has thought better of this connection and describes only the undramatic phlegmatic as truly, that is *morally*, sublime. Many reasons for the demotion of the melancholy may be adduced here, from Kant's disgust at the

"enthusiasm" of his erstwhile student Herder to the rise of *Sturm und Drang*—and his own advancing age.[47]

In the *Metaphysics of Morals* (1797), finally, Kant speaks of a Stoic-sounding "duty of *apathy*," which, while not in itself freedom, is a prerequisite for "reason['s] hold[ing] the reins of government" in us (*MM* 6:408/536). The familiar wording of the first few lines of the next section makes clear that Kant thinks about *phlegma* and apathy as analogous. It is entitled "Virtue Necessarily Presupposes *Apathy* (Regarded as Strength)."

> The word "apathy" has fallen into disrepute, as if it meant lack of feeling and so subjective indifference with respect to objects of choice; it is taken for weakness. This misunderstanding can be prevented by giving the name "*moral apathy*" to that absence of affects which is to be distinguished from indifference, because in cases of moral apathy feelings arising from sensible impressions lose their influence on moral feeling only because respect for the law is more powerful than all such feelings together. (*MM* 6:408/536)

Lumping together the sanguine and melancholy, the "temperaments of feeling," Kant asserts that we are mistaken to suppose that cultivating "a lively sympathy for *what is good*" conduces to freedom. It only gives rise to "enthusiasm."

> An affect always belongs to sensibility, no matter by what kind of object it is aroused. The true strength of virtue is a *tranquil mind* with a considered and firm resolution to put the law of virtue into practice. That is the state of *health* in the moral life, whereas an affect, even one aroused by the feeling of *what is good*, is a momentary, sparkling phenomenon that leaves one exhausted. (*MM* 6:408–9/536)

In the moral life, every temperament but phlegma as strength is a form of weakness, indeed of ill health. Moral health is the state where the agent chooses his inclinations with reference to the moral law, instead of being led along by them. The "sensitive soul at rest" so important already to Kant in 1765 has found a home.

If apathy—phlegma as strength—is a duty, it must be accessible to all people, regardless of the temperament with which they start out. Since they *must*, sanguine, choleric, melancholy, and even perhaps the worthless phleg-

---

[47] Perhaps because of the praise of the melancholy in the *Observations*, Kant has a reputation as self-consciously melancholy. While he remained impressed by the power of melancholy, however, Kant seems later to have regarded the effusions of 1764 as a youthful indiscretion. In the anthropology lectures of 1777/78, Kant asserted that youth has the character of the sanguine, old age [*das hohe Alter*] of the phlegmatic, and the middle years [*das mittlere Alter*] of the choleric. Ever the iconoclast, he added: "Old age tends to be characterized as melancholy, but this is to be found rather in the transition from youth into the middle years" (*LA* 25.2:820). The rest of the discussion makes clear that this "transition" happened around the age of forty—exactly Kant's age when he published the *Observations*! Kant comes across as cheerfully phlegmatic in Reinhold Bernhard Jachmann's *Immanuel Kant, geschildert in Briefen an einen Freund*, in *Immanuel Kant: Ein Lebensbild nach Darstellungen der Zeitgenossen Borowski, Jachmann, Wasianski*, 2nd ed. (Halle: Hugo Peter, 1907), 135.

matic presumably *can* achieve phlegma as strength on top of their native temperaments. (They can't change them entirely.) This will take a lot of the "discipline" Natalie Brender has shown is an indispensable part of Kant's understanding of moral life.[48] Without phlegma their lives as rational agents can hardly get off the ground. Whether phlegma as strength is a temperament or an anti-temperament, its positive importance for freedom forces us to confront the negative importance of the traditional temperaments.

4. CONCLUSION

Kant and many in his age approached (or bypassed) the problem of mind-body interaction by means of the concept of temperament, a middle being between nature and freedom. They knew that there are no abstract human beings. When Kant thought of human beings (as opposed, say, to disembodied rational beings) he thought not of the mob of individuals we think of today, but rather of a species composed of various sub-groups. When he recommends counteracting egoism with a "pluralism" which involves "the attitude of not being occupied with oneself as the whole world, but regarding and conducting oneself as a citizen of the world" (*Ant* 7:130/12) he surely has more in mind than recognizing diversity of individual interests.

Kant's practical philosophy looks different if we take him always to be conceiving of humanity as plural in this way: Kant is not a dualist thinker in all things. For instance, the "unsociable sociability" that makes social life necessary, fruitful and fraught (introduced at *Idea* 8:21/45) describes a much more complex set of interactions than the mere push and pull of misanthropic egoism and philanthropy. The several vices which propel history until reason can take over from feeling, for instance,[49] are arguably attached in Kant's mind to different kinds of people. The many kinds of friction and cooperation possible among temperaments are not replaced but summarized by "unsociable sociability." Whether Kant thought this plurality a good thing is a question as vexed as whether he thought that those "passions" which nature has wisely given us to tide us over until the age of freedom were good or not. Yet as we have seen, an anthropology shaped by an understanding of man's destiny as a *Weltbürger* dignifies many forms of human diversity with a kind of providential legitimacy—if only for the time being.

In this essay I have tried to show Kant's involvement in the tradition of the temperaments, and to suggest some of the ways in which his practical philoso-

[48] See Natalie Brender, "Precarious Positions: Aspects of Kantian Moral Agency," PhD. dissertation, Johns Hopkins, 1997.

[49] See *Idea* 8:21/44–45, *CJ* 5:433/320, *Ant* 7:271–74/138–40 for a trio of key vices. In *Rel* 6:93/85 they play a somewhat different role.

phy bears the mark of this involvement. Kant's evolving view of the temperaments shows us a thinker creatively appropriating popular traditions of moralizing and adapting them to fit his changing philosophy. We have also seen, however, that the moves Kant makes are already options in the tradition he inherits. Kant's idiosyncratic praise of the melancholy in 1764 and his celebration of phlegma as strength after the mid-1770s are both ways of amending temperament theories to accommodate his ethical insights; both also have precedents in the long history of humoral characterology. It is tempting to wonder if Kant's understanding of human diversity was not only articulated in but also guided by this tradition.

Kant arguably was able to develop so formalist an ethics not because he had no sense of human embodiment and diversity, but precisely because an awareness of diverse human embodiment was the starting point for the eighteenth century German moral thought of which Kant's "Anthropological Characteristic" is a part. Kant's ethical formalism is designed to work against the backdrop of the experience of diversity. The specific shape and most of the content of the eighteenth century's schemas of human diversity have been abandoned,[50] but Kant's formalist ethics may be expected to remain compelling as new understandings of human diversity rise and fall.[51]

Princeton University

[50] The theory of the temperaments has recently been revived by psychologists like Jerome Kagan; see his *Galen's Prophecy: Temperament in Human Nature* (New York: Basic Books, 1994). Temperament theory is also alive and well—as an alternative to "humanistic psychology"—in evangelical Christian circles. Building on Lutheran theologian Ole Hallesby's *Temperament and the Christian Faith* (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1962 [Norwegian original 1940]), Tim and Beverly LaHaye have written million-selling self-help books describing temperament theory as compatible with the Bible; Beverly LaHaye suggests that Hippocrates no more than gave names to the four temperaments identified "500 years before" by Solomon in Proverbs 30:11–14 (*The Spirit-Controlled Woman*, rev. ed. [Eugene, OR: Harvest House, 1995 (originally 1976)], 30). Interestingly, Hallesby defines the phlegmatic as the "well-balanced temperament" (79); Tim LaHaye finds that "unsaved Phlegmatics often act more like Christians than many Christians do" (*Spirit-Controlled Temperament* [Wheaton, IL.: Tyndale, 1994 (originally 1966)], 284). Tim LaHaye describes Kant as the figure "probably most influential in popularizing the four temperaments throughout Europe" (*Transformed Temperaments* [Wheaton, IL.: Living Books, 1993 (originally 1971)], 6.

[51] Research for this article was made possible by a generous stipend from the Herzog August Bibliothek in Wolfenbüttel, Germany. I am grateful for responses when I presented earlier versions of this material in an ASECS panel on Kant's *Anthropology* in March 1996 and at a Stipendiatenenkolloquium in Wolfenbüttel in November 1997, as well as for the helpful comments of Natalie Brender, Jennifer Herdt, Heikki Lempa, Steven Lestition, Sara Paulson Eigen, Thomas Rütten, C. Hannah Schell, J. B. Schneewind, Susan Shell, and two anonymous readers for *JHP*.

From plans for an anthropology course of the 1770s or 1780s. (*Reflexionen* #1495–6, *AK* 15.2:758–65)

	SANGVINEO	CHOLERICO	MELANCHOLICO	PHLEGMATICO
In der religion	[indifferent] Freygeist.	orthodox. Herrschende Kirche/ Pracht. Italien.	Schwärmer.	indifferentist
Im Amt	Unordentlich und nachlaßig,	befehlshaberisch und ordentlich,	peinlich und bewahrer der Gebräuche,	Jaherr.
In Wissenschaften	[auf] *populair*,	[wählt] gründlich,	tief. Laune, original.	[Unverständlich Verwirrt] Langweilig.
In Kleidung	*gout*	Pracht		
Gemüth und Herz	gut	guter character und schlimm gemüth		
Fehler	Leichtsinn, Unbestand, Unordnung, Freyheits geist, (Vertraulichkeit)	troz, rechthaberey, herrschsucht, Ordnung, auffahrend.	Mißtrauen, Heimlichkeit, Blodigkeit, Hartnakigkeit, erbittert.	Gleichgültigkeit, Nachlaßigkeit, Aufschub.

	SANGVINEO	CHOLERICO	MELANCHOLICO	PHLEGMATICO
[Laster]	Freymüthigkeit.	Dreustigkeit.	Entschloßenheit.	Kaltblutigkeit.
	Unbesonnenheit.	Formalitaet.	Unschlüßigkeit.	Verdrossenheit.
	galant.	politisch.	*grandezza.*	
Im Unglük:	[Kleinmuth] Weichmüthigkeit.	Grimm (Entrüstung).	Verzweiflung.	Niederträchtigkeit
	Offenherzig.	gekünstelt (prahlerisch).	Zerstreut.	friedlich.
	[spricht viel] Gesprächig.	dogmatisch (wiedersprechend).	Nachdenkend.	Jaherr.
In Ansehung der Ehre:	[Freundlichkeit] Geselligkeit.	Rang und Ansehen.	Persohnliches Verdienst.	Gemachlichkeit.
In Ansehung des Geldes	Freygebig.	Habsüchtig.	Karg.	Unbesorgt
Witz	Scharfsinn.	Tiefsinn.	Nachahmung.	Gedächnis.
	Üppigkeit.	Herrschsucht.	Bosheit	Nichtswürdigkeit
	Guter Leibhaber.	Herschsüchtiger Ehemann	Zartlicher Ehemann.	Gleichgültiger Ehemann.