Heidegger, Authenticity and the Self

Themes From Division Two of *Being and Time*

Edited by
Denis McManus

ROUTLEDGE

HEIDEGGER, AUTHENTICITY AND THE SELF

Though Heidegger's *Being and Time* is often cited as one of the most important philosophical works of the last hundred years, its Division Two has received relatively little attention. This collection corrects that, examining some of the central themes of Division Two and their wide-ranging and challenging implications.

An international team of leading philosophers explore the crucial notions that articulate Heidegger's concept of authenticity, including death, anxiety, conscience, guilt, resolution and temporality. In doing so, they clarify the bearing of Division Two's reflections on our understanding of intentionality, normativity, responsibility, autonomy and selfhood. These discussions raise important questions about how we may need to rethink the morals of Division One of *Being and Time*, the broader project to which that book was devoted, the shaping influence of figures such as Aristotle and Kierkegaard, and Heidegger's relationship with his contemporaries and successors.

Essential reading for students and scholars of Heidegger's thought, and anyone interested in key debates in phenomenology, ethics, metaphilosophy and philosophy of mind.

Denis McManus is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Southampton, UK. He is the author of *The Enchantment of Words: Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (2006), *Heidegger and the Measure of Truth* (2012), and editor of *Wittgenstein and Scepticism* (Routledge, 2004).

Contributors: William Blattner, Clare Carlisle, Taylor Carman, Steven Galt Crowell, Daniel O. Dahlstrom, Sophia Dandelet, Hubert Dreyfus, Charles Guignon, Jeffrey Haynes, Stephan Käufer, Denis McManus, Stephen Mulhall, George Pattison, Peter Poellner, Katherine Withy, Mark A. Wrathall.

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Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group
LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published 2015
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

and by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
A catalog record for this title has been requested

ISBN: 978-0-415-67269-6 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-0-415-67270-2 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-315-7718-6-1 (ebk)

Typeset in Goudy
by Taylor & Francis Books

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CONTRIBUTORS

William Blattner is Professor of Philosophy at Georgetown University and is the author of *Heidegger's* Being and Time: *A Reader's Guide* (2006) and *Heidegger's Temporal Idealism* (1999).

Clare Carlisle is Lecturer in Philosophy of Religion at King's College London. She is author of *On Habit* (Routledge, 2014), *Kierkegaard's* Fear and Trembling (2010), and *Kierkegaard's Philosophy of Becoming* (2005).

Taylor Carman is Professor of Philosophy at Barnard College, Columbia University. In addition to his published articles on topics in phenomenology, he is the author of *Heidegger's Analytic* (2003) and *Merleau-Ponty* (Routledge, 2008) and is co-editor of *The Cambridge Companion to Merleau-Ponty* (2004).

Steven Galt Crowell is Joseph and Joanna Nazro Mullen Professor in Humanities and Professor of Philosophy at Rice University. He is the author of *Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning: Paths Toward Transcendental Phenomenology* (2001) and *Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger* (2013).

Daniel O. Dahlstrom is Silber Professor of Philosophy at Boston University. He is the author of *The Heidegger Dictionary* (2013), the translator of Husserl's *Ideas I* (2014), and the editor of *Gatherings*, the annual journal of the Heidegger Circle.

Sophia Dandelet is a PhD student in Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley.

Hubert Dreyfus is Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley. He is the author of *Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's* Being and Time (1991).

Charles Guignon is Professor Emeritus at the University of South Florida, Department of Philosophy. He is the author of *On Being Authentic* (Routledge, 2004) and *Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge* (1983), co-editor of *Existentialism: Basic Writings* (1995), and editor of the *Cambridge Companion to Heidegger* (2006).

Jeffrey Haynes is a PhD student in Philosophy at the University of Essex. His work explores the relationship between Heidegger's *Being and Time* and Kierkegaard's pseudonymous writings.

Stephan Käufer is Professor of Philosophy at Franklin and Marshall College. His *Phenomenology: An Introduction*, co-authored with Anthony Chemero, is forthcoming.

Denis McManus is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Southampton. He is the author of *The Enchantment of Words: Wittgenstein's* Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (2006) and *Heidegger and the Measure of Truth* (2012), and editor of *Wittgenstein and Scepticism* (Routledge, 2004).

Stephen Mulhall is Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy at New College, Oxford. His most recent books are *The Wounded Animal: J. M. Coetzee and the Difficulty of Reality in Literature and Philosophy* (2009) and *The Self and its Shadows: A Book of Essays on Individuality as Negation in Philosophy and the Arts* (2013).

George Pattison is Professor of Divinity at the University of Glasgow. His recent books include *Heidegger and Death* (2013) and *Kierkegaard and the Quest for Unambiguous Life* (2013). He is co-editor of *The Oxford Handbook of Theology and Modern European Thought* (2013).

Peter Poellner is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Warwick. He is the author of *Nietzsche and Metaphysics* (1995) and many papers on Nietzsche, as well as papers on phenomenology (especially on Husserl, Scheler and Sartre).

Katherine Withy is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Georgetown University. Her *Heidegger on Being Uncanny* is forthcoming with Harvard University Press.

Mark A. Wrathall is Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Riverside. He is the author of *Heidegger and Unconcealment: Truth, Language and History* (2010) and the editor of *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger's* Being and Time (2013).

PREFACE

This collection emerged from a series of workshops held in 2011 at the Universities of Essex, Oxford and Southampton under the title, 'Selfhood, Authenticity and Method in Heidegger's *Being and Time*'. The series was organized by Beatrice Han-Pile, George Pattison, and myself, and was made possible by a grant from the British Academy.

Bringing this collection to its final form has taken some time and I would like to thank the contributors and the publishers for their patience. I would also like to thank Tsung-Hsing Ho for excellent editorial assistance, Nigel Hope for equally excellent copy-editing, and, for other forms of assistance along the way, Dermot Moran, Jonathan Webber, Tony Bruce, Adam Johnston and – of course – Beatrice and George.

References in what follows to Heidegger's works use the abbreviations given below. In the case of *Being and Time*, references are to the German original pagination, as this is given in both available English translations, that by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962) and that by Joan Stambaugh and Dennis J. Schmidt (Albany: SUNY Press, 2010). Contributors use various different translations for Heidegger's terms: for example, *das Man* as the They, the One and the Anyone. These have not been regularized as contributors have their reasons for preferring their particular translations.

ABBREVIATIONS

The following abbreviations are used in referring to works by Heidegger. Abbreviations are followed by page numbers except where indicated.

BCAnP	*Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy*, trans. R. Rojcewicz, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2008. [1926]
BCArP	*Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, trans. R. D. Metcalf and M. B. Tanzer, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2009. [1924]
BH	*Becoming Heidegger*, ed. T. Kisiel and T. Sheehan, Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2007.
BPP	*The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, trans. A. Hofstadter, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1982. [1927]
BW	*Basic Writings*, ed. D. F. Krell, revised edition, New York: HarperCollins, 1993.
CP	*Contributions to Philosophy*, trans. R. Rojcewicz and D. Vallega-Neu, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2012. [1936-38]
CPC	*Country Path Conversations*, trans. B. W. Davis, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2010. [1944-45]
CT	*The Concept of Time*, trans. W. McNeill, Oxford: Blackwell, 1992. [1924]
CTR	*The Concept of Time*, trans. I. Farin with A. Skinner, London: Continuum, 2011. [1924]
EG	'On the Essence of Ground', trans. W. McNeill in *P*, pp. 97-135. [1929]
FCM	*The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, trans. W. McNeill and N. Walker, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995. [1929-30]
HCT	*History of the Concept of Time*, trans. T. Kisiel, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1985. [1925]
HJC	*The Heidegger–Jaspers Correspondence (1920-1963)*, ed. W. Biemel and H. Saner, trans. G. E. Aylesworth, New York: Humanity Books, 2003

HM	'"Heidegger, Martin": Lexicon Article Attributed to Rudolf Bultmann', in *BH*, 329-31. [1928]
IM	Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. R. Manheim, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959. [1935]
KJPW	'Comments on Karl Jaspers' *Psychology of Worldviews*', trans. J. van Buren, in *P*, pp. 1-38. [1919-21]
KPM	*Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, trans. R. Taft, fourth edition, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990. [1929]
L	*Logic: The Question of Truth*, trans. T. Sheehan, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2010. [1925/26]
MFL	*The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, trans. M. Heim, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992. [1928]
OHF	*Ontology - The Hermeneutics of Facticity*, trans. J. van Buren, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999. [1923]
OWA	'The Origin of the Work of Art', trans. A. Hofstadter, in *BW*, pp. 139-212. [1936]
P	*Pathmarks*, ed. W. McNeill, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
PIA	*Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle*, trans. R. Rojcewicz, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2001. [1921-22]
PICA	'Phenomenological Interpretations in Connection with Aristotle: An Indication of the Hermeneutical Situation', trans. J. van Buren, in *S*, pp. 111-45. [1922]
PICPR	*Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's* Critique of Pure Reason, trans. P. Emad and K. Maly, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1997. [1927-28]
PRL	*The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, trans. M. Fritsch and J. A. Gosetti-Ferencei, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2004. [1918-21]
PS	*Plato's* Sophist, trans. R. Rojcewicz and André Schuwer, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1997. [1924-25]
PSL	'The Problem of Sin in Luther', trans. B. H. Bowles, ed. T. Kisiel, in *BH*, pp. 187-95. [1924]
S	*Supplements*, ed. J. van Buren, Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002.
SZ	*Sein und Zeit*, Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 17th edition, 1993. [1927]
TDP	*Towards the Definition of Philosophy*, trans. T. Sadler, London: Athlone Press, 2000. [1918-19]
WCT	*What is Called Thinking?*, trans. J. Glenn Gray, New York: Harper and Row, 1968. [1951-52]

WDR	'Wilhelm Dilthey's Research and the Struggle for a Historical Worldview', trans. C. Bambach, in *S*, pp. 147-76. [1925]
WM	'What is Metaphysics?', in *P*, pp. 82-96. [1929]
ZS	*Zollikon Seminars*, trans. F. Mayr and R. Askay, ed. M. Boss, Evanston: Northwestern University Press. [1947-71]

INTRODUCTION

Denis McManus

Heidegger's *Being and Time* is often cited as one of the most important philosophical works of the last hundred years. Divided into two divisions, the book's Division One has had immense influence; the fortunes of its Division Two, on the other hand, have been much more turbulent. Division One is certainly problematic in all sorts of ways: it is expressed in an idiosyncratic terminology and challenges influential philosophical beliefs in seemingly radical but hard-to-evaluate ways. But its concerns and those of the beliefs it challenges are recognizable and – one might even say – recognizably philosophical: subjectivity, knowledge, language, meaning, etc. The concerns of Division Two, on the other hand, provoke quite a different reaction: Heidegger's discussions of death, conscience, guilt, resolution and anxiety – which together articulate his vision of authenticity (*Eigentlichkeit*) – have struck many as deeply puzzling, their very intent hard to gauge. For example, as John Haugeland remarks, when we find in Heidegger's 'technical treatise on the question of being' his 'extensive … treatment of death', 'the foremost exegetical question' that treatment poses 'is what it's doing there at all' (Haugeland 2000: 44).

Within the Continental tradition, which *Being and Time* has so powerfully shaped, Division Two is often seen as committed to notions of identity and selfhood that we have learned – partly by reading Division One – to abandon. But the reception of Heidegger within the analytic tradition exemplifies an even more striking ambivalence. Analytic philosophers turned their attention to *Being and Time* only relatively recently and did so with a pretty clear sense of where 'the useful Heidegger' stops; influenced no doubt by the familiarity of Division One's concerns, analytic philosophers have characteristically closed the book as Division Two begins, the classic illustration of this trend being that the single most influential work on Heidegger in English – Dreyfus's *Being-in-the-World* – devotes itself almost entirely to Division One.

But in recent years, a number of important analytically sympathetic commentators (including – in a change of heart – Dreyfus himself, as well as several of this collection's other contributors) have begun to re-examine this difficult second division and, in particular, its discussion of authenticity.

The suspicion has grown that that discussion articulates important insights into fundamental concepts such as intentionality, normativity, responsibility and autonomy, and has an important bearing on how we ought to view the thoughts set out in Division One, as well as the overarching project to which *Being and Time* was to contribute. The present volume attempts to encourage readers to follow such leads and push on into the murky hinterland of *Being and Time*.

I

When we read Division Two, we do so against a powerfully influential and multi-faceted background; it is a background of which we must make ourselves aware, not least because it is only against it that many of Division Two's deepest puzzles emerge.

We read Division Two against the background of Division One. Central to the latter's widely lauded critique of Cartesianism is its depiction of human beings as essentially embedded within a social, historical, and cultural world. The Cartesian observer – always connected to 'the world outside' by seemingly the slenderest of threads – is juxtaposed with the active, practical and essentially contextualized entity that is Dasein, a creature whose basic mode of being is Being-in-the-world. But already in Division One, Heidegger seems to begin to undo this good work; the above embeddedness which seemingly gives the lie to Cartesianism is already there intimately associated – or is it identified? – with an inauthentic 'absorption' of Dasein in the They (*SZ* 270). A principal task of Division Two would seem to be to elaborate upon this dubious charge. In what seems like stark contrast with our essentially Being-with-Others, Division Two insists on the possibility of a radical 'individualizing' of Dasein (*SZ* 190-91), a possibility we attempt to dismiss by repressing experiences such as anxiety and our knowledge of the certainty of death.

Yet such 'individualizing' may well seem to call for the authentic to achieve – as Cooper puts it – a 'Promethean' 'standing apart from or above the "everyday way" of interpreting things into which one is "thrown"', a feat that would seem 'incompatible with [Heidegger's] insistence' – in Division One – 'on the impossibility of "extrication"' 'from the "everyday way" the world is interpreted' (Cooper 1997: 112, 110, 109). Worries such as this prompt some to conclude that – as Philipse puts it – 'Heidegger's ideal of authenticity marred his book' (1998: 321). In his discussion of Being-with-Others, we see the subject returned to its proper place within a shared world, returned from the exile into which Cartesianism sent it; but the discussion of authenticity may seem to drive the authentic subject back out of that common world once again.[1]

In its crudest form, this perceived tension opposes a 'pragmatist Heidegger' to an 'existentialist Heidegger', and the existentialist tradition makes up

another crucial facet of the background against which we read Division Two. It is central to the broader public perception of Heidegger that he represents a key figure in this movement,[2] the others being equally – and notoriously – difficult thinkers such as Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Sartre. Quite whether there is a well-defined movement or tradition here for Heidegger to belong to is a difficult question beyond the scope of this collection; but it will explore how he stands to two of the above figures: Kierkegaard and Sartre.

Infamously, Heidegger seems to minimize the influence of Kierkegaard on his thought, yet it is very difficult to read a work like *The Present Age* and not believe that Heidegger's reading of it had a role in shaping the final form that *Being and Time* takes; in this collection, the pieces by Carlisle and Pattison subject this difficult relationship to close scrutiny, and Haynes takes a clue from Kierkegaard's *The Concept of Anxiety* in mapping the complex architecture of Heidegger's own treatment of that concept.

Sartre's role in our understanding of Heidegger is complex too. Despite Heidegger clearly influencing Sartre, it is easy to suspect that we may read the former through lenses that the latter provides. Certainly, in the English-speaking world, Sartre's works were well-known and influential long before *Being and Time* was available in translation, and they provide a ready model for an 'existentialist Heidegger'. But how faithful a reader of Heidegger Sartre is, and how their interests align or fail to align are significant questions; in this collection, Mulhall and Poellner explore this second difficult relationship.

In addition to placing Heidegger within this history of existentialism, we also read Division Two against Heidegger's own personal philosophical history, against the background that is his philosophical development. Through the continuing publication of Heidegger's lecture courses and other works from the 1920s, and – over the last couple of decades in particular – the labour of scholars such as Thomas Sheehan, Theodore Kisiel and John van Buren, we have acquired a much clearer picture of the process by which the thoughts that inform *Being and Time* developed.

One interesting upshot of this is that we discover how long-standing Heidegger's interest in themes that become most prominent in Division Two is. There is no doubt that Division Two is a less polished text than Division One; indeed lectures (such as *HCT*) show that a lot of Division One material existed in well-prepared draft form two years before *Being and Time* was published. On this basis, and in the light of what we know about the rushed final composition of *Being and Time*,[3] there is a temptation to see Division Two's concerns as less fully woven into Heidegger's thought – as expressive of unfortunate, ancillary concerns that 'mar[] his book', concerns that are perhaps inchoate because never worked through. But our growing knowledge of Heidegger's actual philosophical development makes clear that many concerns characteristic of Division Two date back to the very beginning of the 1920s and emerge in response to previously unrecognized and sometimes surprising sources. A recognition of the influence on

Heidegger's thought of contemporaries such as Jaspers and of his reading of figures such as Aristotle and Luther aligns that thought with very different concerns than those which, for example, the motif of 'the existentialist Heidegger' might have us consider. How such a realignment ought to reorient how we understand that thought is explored here in the pieces by Guignon, Käufer, Pattison and Withy.

Another important theme that our greater knowledge of Heidegger's development has made vivid is how deeply Heidegger reflected on questions of philosophical method, framing and reframing his thought in different ways at different stages on the path to the composition of *Being and Time*. His reflections on authenticity in that book are inflected by his thoughts on phenomenology and hermeneutics and, of course, by the broader project to which the book we have was to contribute, that of showing that it is '[w]ithin the horizon of time [that] the projection of a meaning of Being in general can be accomplished' (*SZ* 235). I say 'the book we have' because that project was, of course, never completed and I have myself raised doubts elsewhere about whether its particular framing of his thought brings out Heidegger's best thoughts.[4] But it is clear that he saw authenticity as significant partly on metaphilosophical grounds; in their different ways, the pieces here by Carlisle, Dahlstrom, Guignon, Haynes, Käufer and Mulhall all explore this important theme.

II

Division Two is made up of a web of interwoven themes articulated using a collection of puzzling concepts: being-towards-death, the call of conscience, resolution, anxiety, guilt, nullity, being-a-whole, temporality, etc. Each of these concepts poses significant interpretive difficulties. For example, what can it be to heed the call of conscience when [t]he call … has nothing to tell' (*SZ* 273)? How can one be 'ready' for anxiety – as Heidegger tells us the authentic are (*SZ* 297) – if anxiety is an experience of 'an insignificance of the world' (*SZ* 343)? And if authenticity requires of us a genuine Being-towards-death, how can authenticity be more than morbidity, 'a joyless existence … overshadowed by death and anxiety' (Marcuse and Olafson 1977: 32-33)?

The last of these concerns may be allayed when Heidegger distinguishes the 'death' in question from what he calls 'demise' (*Ableben*).[5] But our relief is temporary, as one worry replaces another, in that 'demise' would seem to be precisely what most would take to be death: following Blattner's reading, 'the end of [Dasein's] pursuit of tasks, goals, and projects, an ending that is forced by organic perishing' (1994: 54). Similarly, in arriving at *his* notion of 'guilt', Heidegger insists, the 'ordinary phenomena of "guilt" … *drop out*' (*SZ* 283). So when Heidegger sets familiar words such as 'death' and 'guilt' to work he seems to cut them – and us his readers – adrift from their familiar senses.

Such disorientation is exacerbated by the complex inter-definition of these notions. So, for example, the possibility of '*an impassioned* **freedom towards death**' 'is attested by that which … is familiar to us as the "voice of conscience"'; '[w]anting to have a conscience' is 'a readiness for anxiety' (SZ 266, 268, 296); but 'anxiety' 'is essentially' 'Being-towards-death' (SZ 266). And round the circle once again we go.

Many of the pieces that follow focus on particular concepts within this complex web and attempt to see a way beyond the above puzzles. For example, Carman, Dahlstrom, Mulhall and Pattison explore being-towards-death; Blattner, Mulhall, Pattison and Wrathall explore guilt and the call of conscience; Blattner, Crowell and Haynes explore anxiety, as does my own contribution; and Dandelet and Dreyfus ask us to consider whether Heidegger's own particular presentation of this web may be one of the reasons why we struggle to grasp the vision it aims to express.

At the heart of this vision – and this web – lies the concept of *Eigentlichkeit*, which – for good or ill – is standardly translated as 'authenticity'. That this is the standard translation is one reason I use this term here. But it is noteworthy that, in choosing to use '*Eigentlichkeit*', Heidegger passes over '*Authentizität*' – the German term for what philosophers have traditionally meant by that English term. So why? In ordinary – non-Heideggerian – German, '*eigentlich*' means 'real', 'actual' or 'genuine'. But the adjective '*eigen*' means 'own' – as in having a room or a mind of one's own – and contrasts with '*fremd*' – meaning 'alien' or 'another's'; hence it has often been noted that a more literal translation of '*Eigentlichkeit*' would be 'own-ness' or 'owned-ness'.[6]

So the *kind* of concept that *Eigentlichkeit* is is itself a significant question. It appears to be an ideal of some sort, though Heidegger repeatedly insists that it is not an ethical ideal.[7] Whether it is an attainable ideal is a widespread concern (a version of which we saw above); and whether it is a ideal with content is yet another.[8] Its gloss as 'owned-ness' also invites a variety of construals. Some commentators see it as pointing to our need to 'own up' – in the sense of face up – to the character of our existence as Dasein.[9] Heidegger himself insists, when he introduces the term, '*Eigentlichkeit*', that it is 'chosen terminologically in a strict sense', pointing us to the fact that Dasein 'is essentially something which can be *eigentliches* – that is, something of its own' (SZ 43, 42). But different senses might be assigned to the latter notion too, including that *Eigentlichkeit* calls for a Promethean 'standing apart' from the everyday or for us to behave in unique or otherwise idiosyncratic ways, requiring that we be – in Guignon's excellent phrase – 'odd ducks unlike others' (this volume, p. 15).

But to pick just one theme from what follows, another possibility is that Heidegger's 'owned-ness' points us to the possibility of owning oneself and one's life in the sense of taking responsibility for oneself and one's life. In many of the chapters that follow, we see the exploration of ways in

which taking responsibility for oneself and one's thoughts, feelings and actions might be understood, explorations which are – at the same time – explorations of what thoughts, feelings, actions and – indeed – the self are. Such concerns take many particular twists. Our contributors consider how we understand our taking – or failing to take – responsibility for ourselves in the face of our finitude and our 'thrownness' – in the form of our mortality, the contingency of our place and time, our embeddedness in a given world of others, our affective 'exposure' to that world and those others, and the necessary always 'already-having-been' and 'not-yet' that is our temporality. Division One asks us what knowledge, meaning, understanding and emotion might be once we shake off Cartesianism's myths and recognize these phenomena as feats of an entity that is Being-in-the-world; so perhaps Division Two asks us to think what it might be for such a creature to 'accomplish' a self (*SZ* 268), to make its life its own. What can self-possession and self-determination be for the essentially socially, historically and culturally embedded creature that Division One has convinced us we ourselves are?

***

A collection such as this cannot address all of the many challenges that Division Two poses, nor the many suggestive paths for thought it opens up; nor can it acknowledge the many different perspectives on these matters that may merit our attention. So this collection makes no claim to comprehensiveness or completeness in its consideration of Division Two and its themes.[10] Rather its aim is to encourage a greater engagement with Division Two – with reflections that have long been ignored, especially in the analytic literature on Heidegger, but which Heidegger surely did himself see as crucial to the work of his early *magnum opus*. The grander project to which *Being and Time* was to contribute was never finished and, hence, the book we have is – in Spiegelberg's well-known remark – no more than a 'torso'.[11] But to fixate on Division One at the expense of Division Two is to treat this book as even less than that. This collection's guiding hypothesis is that something of great value is being missed as long as we continue to see *Being and Time* – so widely recognized as a great work of philosophy – as no more than half the book that it is.

Notes

1 Relevant texts here include *SZ* 169 and *HCT* 246 and, of course, Heidegger's insistences to the contrary, such as *SZ* 179's claim that 'authentic existence' is 'not something which floats above falling everydayness' but 'only a modified way in which such everydayness is seized upon'.

2 Kenny's description of Heidegger as 'the father of "existentialism"' is here typical (Kenny 2010: 820).

3 Cf., e.g. Kisiel 1993: Appendix C.

4 Cf. McManus 2012: ch. 9 and, for further relevant discussion, McManus 2013.
5 Cf., e.g., *SZ* 240-41 and 251.
6 Cf. Macquarrie and Robinson's note to *SZ* 43, Guignon 2004: 169 and Inwood 1997: 21-22. Husserl also makes a distinctive use of '*eigentlich*' in describing the 'empty' intentions that intuition 'fulfills'. Cf. Bernet et al. 1993: 117, Guignon (this volume: p. 8) and *L* 87-88, where Heidegger associates these ideas with the observation that 'a broad swath of our knowledge and speech is dominated by empty ideas', perhaps an allusion to 'idle talk', in which '[w]hat is talked about … is meant only in an indeterminate emptiness' (*HCT* 269).
7 Cf., e.g., *SZ* 167, 286, and *HCT* 273, 281, and 283.
8 For example, on Heidegger's call for authentic resolution, see Habermas's depiction of a 'decisionism of empty resoluteness' (1987: 141) and Löwith's report of a fellow student's joking 'I am resolved, only towards what I don't know' (Löwith 1994: 30).
9 Cf., e.g., Carman 2003: 276.
10 For example, there is little discussion here of Heidegger's reflections on history, nor of his turning away from many of the key themes of Division Two in his later work, or of the possible bearing of those themes on his later, disastrous political involvements.
11 Quoted in Kisiel 2005: 189.

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AUTHENTICITY AND THE QUESTION OF BEING

Charles Guignon

The question of Being and the search for a method

According to generally accepted accounts, when Heidegger was put up for a promotion and learned he had to produce a major publication, he retreated to his cabin and wrote a final draft of the first Division of *Being and Time* in about four weeks. This first version of the work made up the book that was published in Husserl's *Yearbook* the next year. Heidegger continued writing during the summer of 1926 and in the end he completed the Introduction and two divisions of the projected three that were supposed to make up the first half of the completed work.[1] Like anyone composing a major monograph, he drew on materials from his lectures and notes from the preceding years. Some of the concepts produced during the high-pressured composition of *Being and Time* seem to be relatively new for him – for instance, the terminology of *zuhanden* and *vorhanden*. Also fairly new, so far as I can see, is the systematic use of the word we translate as "authenticity," the German *Eigentlichkeit*, a neologism based on the very common word *eigentlich*, which means "really or "truly." The word *eigentlich* was used by both Brentano and Husserl to refer to an intentional act that is fulfilled, so it was not surprising to find it used in a text in that tradition. What is surprising is Heidegger's use of the word to refer to a possible way of life or mode of existence for humans, a life that reveals what it is to be human in a privileged way. The idea of an authentic existence turns out to be crucial for disclosing our Being, and that in turn is supposed to provide a path to working out the overall project of *Being and Time*, which is disclosing the meaning of Being in general.

Needless to say, we can find precedents for *Being and Time*'s conception of authenticity in Heidegger's earlier lectures and writings. For example, Oskar Becker reports that Heidegger in 1919 talked about "genuine life-experiences, which grow out of a genuine life-world (artist, religious person)," experiences that produce the phenomenon of "life-intensification" (*TDP* 175-76).[2] However, as Theodore Kisiel, Herman Philipse and Denis

McManus have pointed out, throughout the 1920s Heidegger continually reframed key concepts and theses in the light of the thought of major thinkers or schools of thought that captured his interest at the time.[3] With respect to the concept of authenticity, the frame for this notion in the early 1920s – influenced by the prevailing movement of "life philosophy" – made it plausible to think of the first version of "authenticity" as involving a vocational commitment to some serious calling such as the religious life (e.g., Luther) or art (e.g., van Gogh). In contrast, the frame of *Being and Time* itself, influenced by the Neo-Kantians, made it harder to connect the idea of authenticity to a *vocational* calling, since it presumably is a possibility open to all fully developed instances of Dasein, including people with dull or uninspiring occupations.

In fact, *Being and Time* itself seems to assign various frames and functions to the notion of authenticity. For our purposes here, it is important to see that a key role of the concept is to play a methodological role in the overall project of *Being and Time*. Seen in this methodological light, what Heidegger wants to show is that the goal of understanding the meaning of Being – that is, the job of "fundamental ontology" – is something that can be achieved only by a person who is, or at least fully understands what it is to be, authentic. It is this methodological role I would like to try to clarify in what follows.

The question of Being

Readers of Heidegger are well aware that he starts his *magnum opus* with a question he finds formulated by Plato and other early philosophers, the question that asks in the broadest way possible what is it *to be* anything of whatever sort we happen to be considering. Despite the fact that this might seem to be an extremely simple question, there is room for debate about whether the "to be" (*Sein*) in question is understood in the sense of what is characteristic of a thing of a particular sort (a copular or predicative sense) or whether it is understood in the "existential" sense (e.g., "There is such a thing as a boson"). Heidegger's claim is that "Being" in the sense of the word he wants to clarify is both its being *what* it is (the defining characteristics of something – its *So-sein*) and its "that-being" (*that it is*, in some sense of the word "is" that needs to be clarified – its *Daß-sein*) (*SZ* 5).[4]

The question of being is immediately recast as a question about the *meaning* of Being, the question: What is the meaning of Being? The reasoning here seems to be that, because we can inquire about *what there is* (*das Seiende*) only insofar as anything shows up as counting in some way for us, the question of Being will ask about the meaning or intelligibility of being rather than Being itself. Heidegger holds that we are all equipped to deal with such a question because we all have "an average kind of intelligibility" that enables us to understand what things are at all: in his words, "we already live in an understanding of Being" (*SZ* 4).

A careful reading of *Being and Time* reveals that the question of fundamental ontology – the question of the *meaning of Being* in general – is the definitive focus not only of the two divisions of the book that have come down to us, but of the uncompleted third division and second part as well. Because the question of Being is the central issue of the book, the discussions of selfhood and authenticity, which are taken up primarily in Division Two, must be shown to be subordinate to this larger goal. This order of questions explains why Heidegger at the outset seems to change the subject from an inquiry into being as such to an inquiry into human being (Dasein). The "ontological priority" of Dasein is explained by the fact that Dasein is the entity for whom Being as such is intelligible or comprehensible. *Meaning* and *intelligibility* are correlative terms. In order to ask how anything comes to be intelligible, however, requires that we give an account of that entity for whom things in general can be intelligible, namely, ourselves. As Heidegger says,

> What we are *seeking* is the answer to the question about the meaning of Being in general, and, prior to that, the possibility of working out in a radical manner this basic question of all ontology. But to lay bare the horizon within which something like Being in general becomes intelligible, is tantamount to clarifying the possibility of having any understanding of Being at all – an understanding which itself belongs to the constitution of the entity [*Seiende*] called Dasein.
>
> (SZ 231)

Since any account of the meaning of Being must first give an account of the conditions for the possibility of understanding in general – the frame of reference or "horizon" in which Being is intelligible – and since we (that is, "Dasein") always already have an understanding of Being, the inquiry will begin with an "existential analytic," where this means an account of Dasein as the entity for whom anything can be intelligible. In other words, the claim is that our way of being provides the parameters in terms of which anything like the being of entities can come to appear as it does. To make sense of the project of addressing the question of Being, then, we need to get clear about Heidegger's characterization of Dasein.

The Being of Dasein

In sections 4 and 9 of *Being and Time*, Heidegger provides what he calls the "formal meaning" of Dasein's Being (SZ 43), an initial formulation that "anticipate[s] analyses, in which our results will be authentically exhibited for the first time" (SZ 12).[5] According to this "formal indication," Dasein is an entity that is unique among other entities insofar as it is defined by a *relation* it has to itself. In Heidegger's words, Dasein is distinguished by the fact that, "in its Being [i.e., in living out its life], it has a relationship toward

that Being – a relationship that defines its Being [i.e., defines its identity as a whole]" (*SZ* 12). What this means is that Dasein is not an entity that is simply enduringly present, like a rock or a tree, an entity whose Being can be thought of in terms of the concept of a *sub-stance* with attributes. Rather, its Being consists in its taking a stand on what it is throughout the course of its life as a whole, "from its 'beginning' to its 'end'" (*SZ* 233). Dasein is a *movement*, though not in the way a baseball moves when thrown, where the ball remains what it is despite the throwing. Instead, Dasein is a movement in the sense that its Being just is this movedness: a coming-to-be where the unfolding happening of its movement is its Being. Dasein is conceived of here as an event, a happening (*Geschehen*), or a movement. (Heidegger uses the middle-voice "movedness," *Bewegtheit*.) It is because we are always under way, taking a stand on what our lives are amounting to, that Dasein "can say to itself 'Become what you are'" (*SZ* 145). To say that Dasein is the *stand* it takes on its life in its actions is to say that its doings *express* some overarching sense of what its life is all about, and that its life is nothing other than the ensemble of these actions as they are bound together in a particular way (in a distinctive *How*, to use Heideggerian language).

The formal indication of Dasein's Being gives us a preliminary identification of the subject matter of the published part of *Being and Time*, the attempt to give an account of the Being of Dasein. Yet Heidegger does not say where this initial indication itself comes from. Of course, Kierkegaard had defined the self as a relation that relates itself to itself in the opening pages of *The Sickness unto Death* (1980: 13). But I think that Heidegger has in mind an even earlier source for this conception, namely, Aristotle. To make this claim plausible, we might turn to Heidegger's lecture course of 1926, *Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy*. According to Heidegger's reading of Aristotle there, the kind of Being that is characteristic of humans is motion (*kinein*) (*BCAnP* 230). Humans engage in two basic types of motion:

> *poiēsis*, in the sense of making, producing, "manipulating," and
> *praxis*, acting, in a more fundamental sense than mere making.[6]

With respect to *poiēsis*, the kind of activity we are caught up in for most of our waking hours, the goal (*ergon*) of the activity is something outside the activity itself, as for example building aims at bringing into existence a house, or medical treatment brings about health in a patient. For *poiēsis*, in other words, the projected outcome or accomplishment of the activity is of a different sort than the doing that brings it about – the house, for example, is different from the activity of building. In *poiēsis*, when the outcome is achieved, the activity ends.

In contrast, the aim of *praxis* lies in the activity itself. For example, when one is engaged in building with the aim of becoming a master builder, a central aim is a cultivation of the human capacities that are involved in this

sort of action. Since the goal of becoming a person of a particular sort is brought to realization in the action, the action does not end when that goal is achieved: so a skilled doctor goes on practicing medicine and strives to realize the goal of being a consummate practitioner throughout a lifetime. Mark Okrent sums up this idea when he says, "The end of my act is at once that the environment come to be in some definite way and that I be a certain kind of person" (2000: 300).

Heidegger's Aristotelian view holds that, although the various vocations and particular norms governing action are drawn from the historical culture in which one lives, there is an overarching goal or purpose present in all *praxis*: the goal of *becoming* a person of a particular sort. It is the nature of human beings, on this view, to seek the highest life (*bios*), a life that achieves "the highest possibility of existence, the mode of being in which a person satisfies to the highest degree the proper human potentiality for being, in which a person genuinely *is*" (*BCAnP* 230). Seen from this standpoint, a human agent is not driven by "sheer 'appetite,'" as are lower animals. Rather, humans can be motivated by *understanding* (*nous*), the ability to act on reasons (even when those reasons have not been made explicit in the agent's mind).[7] The condition for such a life is a sense of time: "this opposition between impulse and genuinely chosen, rational action is a possibility open only to those living beings which can understand time" (*BCAnP* 229). Humans therefore have a "double comportment – toward the future [that "for the sake of which they act"] and toward the present"; this double comportment "allows conflict to arise" (*BCAnP* 229).

The Aristotelian conception of the human being as having a double comportment helps to clarify Heidegger's obscure formal indication found in the opening paragraphs of section 4. This indication uses the word "Being" in two different but related senses. The phrase, "in its very Being" (*SZ* 12) may be glossed as "in living out its active, productive life (at any given time)," whereas the "Being [that] is an *issue*" refers to one's life as a whole (who and what one is). Dasein is a *relation* to itself insofar as its activities in the present express and disclose some understanding (no matter how tacit) of what its life as an entirety is adding up to. On this reading, since omissions are often actions, failing to hear the baby cry may be seen as an action that expresses an understanding of what it is to be a father.

The basic idea is that each of us has some constellation of roles and standard actions we undertake, ways of doing things taken from the pool of possibilities made available by what Heidegger calls the "They." This aggregate of possibilities (e.g., vocations, gender identifications, relationships, character traits, etc.) makes up the way we give shape and content to the "potentialities-of-Being" (*Seinkönnen*) we share as humans. The way we bind these together and enact them, constantly revising them while generally maintaining a continuity of identity through change, makes up the *stand* we are taking on the multiplicity of possibilities we embody. What defines our being as humans, then, is the

fact that each of us does instantiate some defining motivational set over large courses of his or her life. We are in motion, we *are* motion, with no *sub-stance* underlying the event. Yet we can, to varying degrees, come to realize some sort of identity (or, as Ricoeur calls it, *ipseity*), through steadiness of the *stance* we take on our lives.[8]

The method to be used in attempting to work out the possibility of the Being of Dasein is phenomenology: letting entities show themselves to us as they are in themselves. This means that we will start from describing the *existentiell* in our own cases, that is, we start from concrete descriptions of ourselves as we are engaged in everyday activities, prior to high-level theorizing.[9] Heidegger begins by describing our "average everyday" ways of being involved in "dealings" in the world, paradigmatic examples of *poiēsis*. In our ways of being "proximally and for the most part," we are found to be participants in the "They," doing what anyone would do according to established norms. We are dispersed, adrift, lacking focus or direction, just handling whatever arises in the various circumstances of life. This description of average, everyday Being-in-the-world occupies most of Division One.

Heidegger's claim is that this everyday conformist way of just *dealing* with things tends to conceal another dimension of our lives, a dimension that can be uncovered only by life-transforming experiences. Seen from this standpoint, whether we realize it or not, our busy activities are always components or constituents of an unfolding happening or story (Heidegger sees a connection between the common German word for "happening," *Geschehen*, and the ordinary word for "story" or "history," *Geschichte*). This concealed dimension of the Being of humans becomes visible to "phenomenological 'seeing'" only when we transform ourselves in such a way that we become a "whole," that is, when we come to fully realize what human life is all about. This occurs when we shift our orientation from the busy dealings of *poiēsis* to a stance that is focused on the "for-the-sake-of-which" of *praxis*. We can grasp what it is to be the entity that has an understanding of the meaning of Being, a "Dasein," only when we gain a "first-hand" insight into what it is to be human, an insight we achieve most effectively by becoming authentic.

The task of becoming authentic

In the opening pages of Division Two of *Being and Time*, Heidegger notes that the interpretation of the Being of Dasein up to this point has been limited to the modes of such Being that are manifested when Dasein is either "undifferentiated or inauthentic" (*SZ* 232). This means that Dasein's "potentiality-for-Being" as *authentic* "has not yet been brought into the idea of existence." That "for the sake of which" we live is whatever goals are currently pursued in our cultural context. As a consequence, the phenomenological account given so far lacks "primordiality" (*SZ* 233).[10] In order to

guarantee that the interpretation is primordial, Heidegger says, we need to (1) ground it in a "basic experience [*Grunderfahrung*] of the 'object' to be disclosed," (2) ensure that the interpretation grasps "the *whole* of the entity," and (3) show that it embraces "the *unity* of those structural items which belong to it" (*SZ* 232). These requirements of a primordial interpretation mean that, if we are to gain an understanding of what it is to be Dasein as a unified whole, we must grasp not only the inauthentic and undifferentiated modes, but the mode of human Being called "authentic." By giving a full account of Dasein – one that embraces its possibility of authenticity – we will disclose the "horizon" in which any understanding of being whatsoever becomes possible.

The first requirement for a primordial interpretation is unproblematic. Heidegger points out that we each have an immediate grasp of what it is to be Dasein: "Dasein is not only close to us," he says, "we *are* it, each of us, we ourselves" (*SZ* 36). The problem here is that our direct self-understanding is often distorted with misinterpretations inherited from the tradition that has come down to us, an inheritance that conditions much of our thinking. In order to avoid these objectifying distortions, Heidegger tries to describe existential characteristics of human life in a terminology that captures Dasein's being under way and fully caught up in the business of living.

As we noted earlier, such early influences on Heidegger as Husserl had used the term "authentic" (*eigentlich*) to refer to an intentional act in which the projected meaning of the act is fulfilled completely in the realization of completion of the act.[11] In the early 1920s, Heidegger thought of life itself as having an intentional structure. For example, in 1922 he wrote, "an explication of the domain of *life* as a particular kind of movement [shows] how 'intentionality' comes into view for Aristotle … as a How of the movement of life" (*PICA* 143). This intentional interpretation of the movement of life is reinforced by the 1921-22 lectures, where Heidegger, speaking of the "fundamental meaning of the relationship of life," says that this meaning [*Sinn*] takes place as a "pointing or sending [*Weisen*] of oneself [which] contains a direction [*Weisung*] which life gives itself … " Immediately following this sentence he adds, "Full sense of *intentionality* in its originality" (*PIA* 74). This conception of life as having an intentional structure is no longer made explicit in *Being and Time*, but the conception of Dasein as a movement grounded in caring about itself is still worked out in terms of an unfolding, story-shaped "happening." Like a story (*Geschichte*), the meaning of the events that make up a life is determined by the projected meaning of the whole: how it will all come out in the long run. Note that "wholeness' here does not refer to an actual course of events, but to an anticipated line of development that the events portend.

In order to grasp Dasein in its potentiality-for-being a fulfilled (that is, authentic) whole, Heidegger describes Dasein's "relationship of being" to itself as a matter of caring about what its life as a whole is amounting to.

To be human is to have your life as an *issue* for you. We *care* about where it is all going. Of course, a full realization of our capacities is something we may or may not achieve "at the end." Indeed, there is properly speaking *no* end for us, because when it is all over, *we* no longer exist. Realization is for us something we achieve perhaps only occasionally in living, though it remains an overarching goal that gives a direction and possible focus to our lives. The goal is to be fully human – a consummate human (in the way one could strive to be a consummate flautist). The key to understanding what the authentic self is is found in the stem of the word *Eigentlichkeit*, the word *eigen*, which means, as well as "really" or "truly," also "one's own" or what one is "properly." What is definitive of one's own is found in "the self-sameness of the authentically existing self" (*SZ* 130), the being that is most properly one's own: one's being as an "individual."

In Heidegger's view of Dasein, individuality is not a *given* for humans, though all humans have a "potentiality-for-Being" individuals. As everyday being-in-the-world, we are "proximally and for the most part" the "They" or "a they-self," doing what anyone would do in the common circumstances of life into which we are thrown. Our capacity for being individuals – entities who can own their actions and own up to what they are – is something that is first revealed in the mood of anxiety. In the mood of anxiety, we discover ourselves as individualized, as *solus ipse*, in the sense that our usual dependence on the world and others breaks down and we find that our lives are up to us alone to live. In anxiety, "*Being-in has been disclosed as a potentiality-for-being which is individualized, pure and thrown*" (*SZ* 188). Heidegger takes pains to distinguish this conception of individuality from the traditional conception of the "I" as a subject of experiences and action. Individualization properly understood has nothing to do with "the identity of the 'I' which maintains itself throughout its manifold experiences [*Erlebnismannigfaltigkeit*]" (*SZ* 130). Instead, it refers to the continuity of self-constituting activity in which the multiplicity of doings and vicissitudes of a life are interwoven through a unifying "for-the-sake-of-which" of *praxis*. We are individuals not in the sense that we can be odd ducks unlike others, but in the sense that we can take meaningful projects and make them the organizing principles that give sense to our activities and projects. In this sense, as we have seen, the agent makes his or her goal "the highest possibility of existence, the mode of Being in which a person satisfies to the highest degree the proper human potentiality for Being, in which the person genuinely *is*" (*BCAnP* 230). What is at issue is being fully and completely oneself.

Anxiety brings to light our ability to be individuals. But the full significance of this recognition of individuality is realized only in the confrontation with death. Facing death reveals not only that one is alone in undertaking one's life, but that this undertaking itself has the form of a happening that is finite: it is directed toward "being-a-whole," which is "constituted by Being towards-the-end" (*SZ* 249). We exist as an unfolding event that is going

somewhere, moving toward an end. But at the same time that "end," unlike the end-states of *poiēsis*, is not a goal that we are set on accomplishing or achieving. Our relation to death is indeed a "being-toward," but it is a being-toward that "cannot have the character of concernfully being out to get itself actualized" (SZ 261). Instead, what is revealed in "being-toward death" is our "being-projected-forward-toward … " as a fundamental structure of human existence, and that means as a structural possibility, a potentiality-of-being, that can be taken over fully in one's being. What is revealed is the possibility of forward-directedness Heidegger calls *Vorlaufen* (literally, "running forward toward"), where this is understood as a focused, committed, intense pursuit of ends that the individual regards as highest or most worthy of a lifetime's undertaking. Regarded as a "How" of being directed toward the future, what emerges is an authentic forward-directedness where the outcome of the projection is not as important as the How of the dedication and engagement of the projecting itself. On this view, Dasein is a *happening* where what unifies the life and binds the parts into a whole is the intensity of the underlying conviction itself. So, for example, a Buddhist who strives to have a compassionate attitude toward all living things gains unity and wholeness of the life-happening through the nature of the striving rather than through whatever good deeds actually result.

Anxiety and being-toward-death are components of what defines an authentic existence, and they contribute to understanding what in such a life can give Dasein's existence *unity* and *wholeness*. Dasein is exhibited in its capacity to be a unified whole in becoming authentic. Why this is so will be clear if we recall that the German word for "authentic," *eigentlich*, contains the connotations of "real" as well as "proper" and "own." Given this significance of the word, it should be evident that discovering what it is to be authentic is not simply a matter of finding a better way of life (though it may also be that). Instead, becoming authentic – being disclosed to oneself as authentic – is a matter of finding out what it is to be really, fully human. For this reason, Heidegger says that "*Dasein* [only] *becomes 'essentially' Dasein in … authentic existence*" (SZ 323, italics added). Discovering what constitutes an authentic existence provides us with a way of understanding what it is to be a *Self* in the technical sense Heidegger gives this word.

Selfhood and temporality

As we saw, the Being of Dasein is determined by the fact that it is an entity with a double comportment: in living out its life, it takes over roles in the situations that arise and, in doing so, it takes a *stand* on what that life amounts to as a whole. The ability to impart wholeness and unity to a life through a steadfast stance is something Heidegger labels "anticipatory resoluteness." Whether or not this conception of life seems like a good way to live, its primary significance is not existential but methodological: it gives

us an understanding of what it is to be fully and completely Dasein, and thereby indicates the frame of reference or horizon in which any understanding of Being is possible. In this respect, it provides a basis for answering the question concerning the *meaning* of Being by bringing to light the parameters that make possible any form of intelligibility.

As a unified whole, authentic Dasein fulfills its potentiality-for-Being in an ongoing, unfolding "happening" that has directedness and cohesion. What makes us Dasein in the fullest sense is our ability to be a happening or movement of a particular sort: an event characterized by constancy and connectedness (*Zusammenheit*) (*SZ* 322). Self-constancy (*Selbstständigkeit*), Heidegger says, is made possible by the fact that the self has "taken a *stand*"[12] and, in doing so, achieves "steadiness and steadfastness" (*SZ* 322). Only in the mode of authenticity can we see the continuity and wholeness of the self that underlies the distinctive temporal unfolding of existence. As Heidegger says, only in authentic existence does the "authentic Being-a-whole of Dasein [become] possible with regard to the unity of its articulated structural whole" (*SZ* 325). Authentic existence reveals "temporality which is primordial and authentic" (*SZ* 327).

What Heidegger's account of authenticity has revealed is that Dasein is not just an entity that happens to be *in time*, but actually *is time*. In a typical early formulation of this idea, in his 1924 lecture to the Marburg Theological Society titled "The Concept of Time," he says that Dasein as "authentic" (defined here as "the outermost possibility of Being") "*is time itself*, not *in* time" (*CT* 14). Because time is neither a property we have nor something we generate, Heidegger claims that all we can say is that temporality [*Zeitlichkeit*] "*temporalizes* itself" (*SZ* 377). The core existential structure of temporalizing – which embraces beenness, being-present, and futurity – provides the blueprint in which any access to what-is is given content. By virtue of the fact that Dasein exists, there is a dynamic happening that creates an open space in which entities can come to appear *as* the temporally determined entities they are. So, for example, Dasein's carrying forward what *has been* defines in part the Being of the entity we call "World War I," Dasein's projection of the unending makes it possible to take the Being of numbers as "subsistent" (*Beständig*), being futural makes possible the entities discovered by meteorology, and so forth. The account that was to be developed in the unwritten Division Three of *Being and Time*, to be entitled "Time and Being," was supposed to draw on the characterization of authentic existence to disclose a frame or scaffolding for articulating the very different types of Being that are accessible to our intelligibility. Because this part of the book was never written, and because all extant notes for it are thin and unhelpful, it remains a matter of speculation how the transition from authentic being to the horizon for any understanding of Being was supposed to go.

William Blattner has given us good reasons to think that the final working out of the *authenticity–time–Being* connection as conceived in *Being and Time*

would have been rather dissatisfying.[13] The fact that we disclose a world in temporal terms, and that we do so because we are temporal beings, does not seem to be a very impressive discovery in the end. Certainly, Heidegger's rich examples and extended discussion of time and Being in *Being and Time*, and in his 1924 lectures and publications on the concept of time, suggest that he had a broad array of concrete ideas about how the attempt to ground the understanding of Being in temporality was to go.[14] And the radical idea of undercutting the split between what is temporal and transient and what *is* in an ultimate sense, a distinction that has been central to the Western intellectual tradition, marks a stunningly original move in the history of philosophy. But we can see why the goal of identifying the "horizon" for any understanding of Being, and even the assumption that there can be such a horizon, turns out to be untenable. The later writings never abandon this project outright, but they are constantly concerned to rethink the method appropriate to asking the question of Being, a difficult task under any conditions.

Notes

1 Cf. Kisiel 1993: 489, and Denker and Schalow 2010: 10.
2 I am indebted to Benjamin Crowe for calling my attention to these texts in a paper we co-authored, "Why Authenticity Matters: Practice and Theory in 'Being and Time' and Before," delivered at the North American Heidegger Conference, Boston University, May 5–7, 2006.
3 This theme is found throughout Kisiel 1993 and Philipse 1998, but it is made especially clear in McManus 2012.
4 I generally use the Macquarrie and Robinson translation of *Being and Time*.
5 I am assuming that Heidegger uses his longstanding methodological device of starting from a formal indication – an indication of the subject matter he will be discussing that does not beg questions about its being and avoids in advance certain misunderstandings – and that this initial meaning will then be fulfilled (made "authentic" in Husserl's language) in the course of the phenomenological descriptions that follow. Heidegger's best-known accounts of formal indication are *PIA* 17, 25-28 and *PRL* 39-45. There is an extensive secondary literature on this topic. For a helpful early account, see Dahlstrom 1994: 775-95.
6 Cf. *Nicomachean Ethics* 6, 4, 1140a2, in Aristotle 1984.
7 As Guignon 2005 should make clear, I agree with Dreyfus's Heideggerian critique of the role typically attributed to the mental by philosophers (see the discussions in Schear 2013). It is important to see that neither I, Dreyfus nor Heidegger want to deny the existence of the mental. Our claim is that the mental may play less of a role than is commonly assumed by philosophers (including perhaps Aristotle!) in understanding human action, and that much of what post facto looks like a result of mental acts is in fact a byproduct of the attitude philosophers adopt when they reflect on how people do what they do.
8 Paul Ricoeur distinguishes "strict" or "logical identity," commonly represented by the formula "A = A," from continuity through change that is sufficient to maintain "sameness" through time (as a ship remains the "same ship" through renovations). The former Ricoeur identifies using the Latin idem and the latter with ipse. See Ricoeur 1992: ch. 1.

9 As to the question of who it is that is undertaking this inquiry, the answer is given in terms of the *existentiell* (concrete, particular) Dasein who is currently conducting this inquiry, namely, we ourselves. This is what Heidegger means when he says that philosophical research must be seized on in an *existentiell* manner as "a possibility of the particular existing [*je existierenden*] Dasein" if we are "to disclose the existentiality of existence" (*SZ* 13). The actual inquirer is anyone who undertakes the project of *Being and Time*. Ontological generalization from the particular case to the "transcendental 'generality'" (*SZ* 199) of the essential structures of any Dasein is made possible by working from the *existentiell* predicament of our own situation to what holds for Dasein in general.

10 The term translated as "primordiality," *Urspriinglichkeit*, should be translated as "originality," a crucial word in phenomenology that refers to the most original experience of a thing together with the original meaning attributed to what is experienced. Phenomenology has as its task the recovery and explication of that original given. Because our original experiences are commonly distorted by tradition and worldly objectification, however, recovering the original can require a "destructuring" of sources of distortion and deformation. Only when we have grasped what something is in its origin can we work out an account of its genesis into the fulfilled form implied by an intentional act.

11 See, for example, Husserl 2001: 305-19.

12 The Macquarrie and Robinson translation of *in dem Sinn des Stand gewonnenhaben* as "in the sense of its having achieved some sort of position" (*SZ* 322 n. 1) is misleading, because it conceals the role of the crucial word *Stand* and suggests that what is at stake is getting a position in the sense of a job.

13 Cf. Blattner 2006: 170. Basing his conclusions on Heidegger's commentaries on Kant, especially *PICPR* and *KPM*, Blattner argues that it is not enough for the Kantian Heidegger to show that time is the source of ontology, but that he also needs to show "that the unity of temporality is rich enough to generate the understanding of being on its own" (Blattner 2006: 170). Blattner's conclusion is that the "pure form of time is not rich enough, it would seem, to generate much of anything!" (ibid.). More can be said about this topic, Blattner acknowledges, but the expectation that a robust, substantive ontology would have been developed through the unwritten Division Three of *Being and Time* seems increasingly implausible.

14 Cf., e.g., *CTR*, especially ch. 3.

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2

OWNED EMOTIONS

Affective excellence in Heidegger on Aristotle

Katherine Withy

Most interpretations of Heidegger's account of authenticity or ownedness (*Eigentlichkeit*) follow Heidegger in focusing on owned understanding: they explain what it is to take up a practical identity ownedly. But we are entities that are not only understanding or projecting; we are also characterized by findingness (*Befindlichkeit*). To be finding is to be open to how we are already situated and to what is already there in our situation. In finding ourselves situated, things – including us – show up as mattering in some particular way. The paradigmatic modes of findingness are moods and emotions (which Heidegger famously does not distinguish). Yet Heidegger barely mentions moods in his Division Two account of ownedness. He says that ownedness involves either anxiety or a readiness for it (e.g. *SZ* 266, 296, 301) and that from this comes joy and equanimity (*SZ* 310, 345). But this cannot be the whole story. First, being owned surely also involves mundane emotions and moods. Second, if there something that it is to *project* ownedly, surely there is something that it is to *find* ownedly. What would it be to have owned emotions?

We might think that it is not possible to have owned emotions since having an emotion is always being put into a condition passively while being owned is always resolving on something or choosing to make a choice. Aristotle confronts the same issue in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (hereafter, *EN*): he knows that excellence or virtue concerns the *pathē* (affects, emotions) but he also thinks that excellence is or involves choice.[1] While on standard readings of *EN* Aristotle does not solve the problem of choice, on Heidegger's reading he does. Given that Heidegger's reading of Aristotle's ethics heavily influenced both his account of ownedness and his understanding of affectivity, working out how Heidegger understands Aristotle's affective excellence is a way of working out what it would be to be ownedly finding.[2] Heidegger discusses the *pathē* and excellence most fully in his lecture course, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*.[3] I will argue that he understands the *pathē* as what I call 'disclosive postures'. Disclosive postures are neither active

nor passive, but they are initially and usually average. In having average *pathē*, we find ourselves 'as one does' and let things matter 'as they do'. Ownedness or excellence consists in resolving to resist the temptation of averageness and so letting things genuinely move us in the *pathē*. Owning our emotions is thus not a matter of choosing them but of choosing to let them be what they are, as genuinely disclosive. This is a meta-level commitment and I argue that we are called to it because of the kind of entity that we each are.

The *pathē* as disclosive postures

In *EN* II.5, Aristotle wants to identify the genus of excellence. He points out that there are three things that 'come to be' (*ginomena*) in the soul. For Heidegger, this means that the soul "has *being in three distinct modes of its coming to be*" (*BCArP* 113). Affectivity can *be* as a capacity to be affected, as an actual *pathos*, or as a *hexis* (having). To which of these ways of being affective does excellence belong? Aristotle notes that excellence and its opposite attract praise and blame and that they involve choice. So, in which modality do the *pathē* attract praise and blame and involve choice – as capacities, as actualities, or as *hexeis*? The argument proceeds by elimination and concludes that excellence is a *hexis*.

The usual reading of Aristotle takes '*hexis*' to mean disposition or character trait.[4] It also takes the criterion of praise and blame to be reducible to the criterion of choice – presumably because we are praised or blamed only for what we are responsible for, and we are responsible only for what we choose. Aristotle's argument thus leaves him with the problem of explaining how choice is involved in having a disposition. Most interpreters seek to solve the problem by locating choice in the process of habituation, through which we acquire the disposition.

Heidegger's reading, however, starts from the question of praise and blame and keeps it separate from the question of choice. On Heidegger's reading, we ask: what opens affective life to praise and blame? How can affectivity be normatively assessable? Aristotle immediately gives us the answer. That in affective life which attracts praise and blame is *how* we are in a *pathos*: "[t]he manner and mode in which I am in a rage, in what situation, on what occasion, against whom – that is what underlies praise and blame, the *pōs* [how]" (*BCArP* 114). If a *hexis* is whatever it is in affective life that opens it to normative assessment, then this *how* of the *pathos* is what Aristotle means by '*hexis*'. The excellence that belongs to this genus is thus not the excellence of a person but the excellence of a *pathos*. An excellent *pathos* is one that has a certain 'how' – one that Aristotle calls 'the mean'.[5] To understand this argument, we need to learn to think *pathē* in terms of their 'hows'.

We are long accustomed to thinking the *pathē* in terms of capacities and actualities. When we do so, we think the *pathē* as potentially or actually felt affects. But the *how* of a *pathos* is not a modality of a felt affect. It is the

intentional structure of a *pathos*. Understood in this way, the *pathos* does not necessarily involve any felt affect.[6] Thus I can be angry at my neighbour for years without feeling angry for years. My anger is not an actual or potential felt affect but a structurally complex intentional relationship. As intentional, each *pathos* has (or at least, most have) a how, a when, a whither and an about which (*das Wie, Wann, Wozu und Worüber*) (*BCArP* 115). (Compare Heidegger's tripartite model for analysing moods in *SZ*, which distinguishes the mood itself, its in-the-face-of-which and its about-which (*SZ* 140, 188)). We could try to express the intentionality of the *pathē* by saying that they have a cognitive dimension, where this is understood in terms of knowing or believing: the *pathē* include judgements or make claims about the world.[7] Heidegger rejects this model; if anything, the *pathē* are ways in which the world claims us. Understanding the *pathē* in terms of judgements misses the same thing that understanding them as bodily feelings or conditions of the soul does – namely, that the *pathē* are ways in which we are out and about in the world, immersed and involved in our situation. To capture this, Heidegger needs a model other than that of a subject knowing an object. He uses the model of standing in a situation. On this model, the *pathē* are what I will call 'disclosive postures'. They are ways of finding ourselves situated, where this means both that they are ways of finding ourselves and our situation (i.e. that they are findingly disclosive) and that they are ways of being situated in the world (i.e. postures). This understanding of the *pathē* accommodates all intentional affective phenomena, including moods and emotions.

First, the *pathē* are postures. They are ways of standing or being positioned in our situation and towards it: "the manner and mode of being oriented toward the world or in the world" (*BCArP* 167). 'Posture' is my term, although it resonates with Heidegger's own pervasive vocabulary of comportment (*die Haltung*, *das Verhalten*), composure (*die Fassung*) and standing (*stehen*). A posture is "the relative disposition of the various parts of something".[8] The *pathē* are particular (affective) arrangements of the world and us, in relation to one another. Thus Heidegger appeals to the second definition of *hexis* or 'having' in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (hereafter, M): a *diathesis* or disposition (M 1022b11) and so an arrangement of something that has parts (M 1022b1). The parts are various dimensions of us and the world, and their arrangement is captured in the complex intentional structure of the *pathos*: the how, when, whither and about which. As so arranged in relation to ourselves and the world, we stand in and towards ourselves and our situation in a particular way. Heidegger puts it by saying that we are in a particular 'comportment', and so understands Aristotle's '*hexis*' as 'comportment' (*BCArP* 126, 144). Different affective comportments or postures in a situation are either different *pathē* or the same *pathos* in a different how.

Second, the *pathē* are postures that *disclose*, which means that having an affective posture is a way of being open. With respect to each dimension of its intentional structure, a *pathos* opens or unveils: us ourselves, entities in

the world, and our relationships to those entities. I will put this by saying that a *pathos* discloses our situation. Strictly, what we are open to in the *pathē* is what Heidegger calls 'possibilities' (*SZ* 148) – things *as* loveable, serviceable, unjustifiable, deplorable, awful or awesome. Put differently, the *pathē* disclose things *as* mattering in some particular way. This disclosiveness is our most basic openness to our situation (*BCArP* 176, *SZ* 137-38).

Specifically, affectivity is that dimension of a disclosive comportment by which things touch, move or encounter us. This haptic or kinetic metaphor has traditionally grasped the passive character of the *pathē*: in them, we receive, withstand or undergo what happens to us. It is true that the *pathē* "befall" us (*BCArP* 132, 163, 165) and that finding ourselves in this way "implies a disclosive 'submission' to the world" (*SZ* 137). But this 'submission' is one "out of which we can encounter something that matters to us" (*SZ* 137-38, cf. *BCArP* 83). That in a *pathos* things are unveiled as mattering is what is properly captured by the haptic and kinetic metaphors of being touched or moved. This shows in what sense the *pathē* are not merely passive. For we do not undergo emotions as we undergo mere affects such as being heated or cooled; our *pathē* are not impacts from the environment. The difference is that *pathē* are disclosive, since this means that in having or undergoing a *pathos* I also have or possess myself and my situation, as disclosed. I am *there* for myself, and my situation and everything in it is *there* for me. To say that things touch me in a *pathos* or show up to me is to say that I *find* myself situated in the world, or that I disclose myself in the situation. I 'allow a matter to matter' (*BCArP* 83). This can be expressed either actively or passively, which suggests that the *pathē qua* disclosive postures properly escape this distinction. As a disclosive posture, a *pathos* is an active receiving or a receptive action.

The *pathē*, thus understood, are not ways in which perception is clouded or coloured but are more like primary modes of perception: the perception of what matters to us or what is meaningful. But the perceptual analogy is misleading, for it suggests that we perceive something that exists independently. It is not that things matter to us and then we register, notice or respond to this mattering in the *pathē*, just as things exist and we register this existence by seeing them.[9] Things do not matter independently of touching us. Being moved by something *is* what it is for that thing to matter to me; if it does not move me in some way, it does not matter to me. Experiencing a *pathos* just is an entity moving me, touching me or mattering. So while a feeling of love might bring to my attention that I do love, my love itself (as a disclosive posture) does not *notice* that I am in love. It *is* my being in love and you being loveable to me. So too, my anger does not notice a perceived slight; my anger *is* my being slighted.

If the *pathē* do not register what matters but constitute that mattering, then it is hard to see where there is room for error or assessment. If my being angry *is* my being slighted, then there seems no way to say that I *should* be

angered when I am not, because there is no way to say that I *am* slighted if I am not angry. Further, if the *pathē* are not reflections or representations of the world but ground-level ways of being open to it, then there is no 'outside' standpoint from which their veracity could be assessed. So how could a *pathos* be right or wrong?

Excellent and vicious *pathē*

Because the *pathē* are not representational states of a subject, they do not get the world right or wrong in the sense of succeeding or failing in corresponding to objective reality. The *pathē* are modes of responsiveness and succeed or fail *as responsive*, in the sense that they give either a perspicuous or distorted access to the situation. Every *pathos*, on this model, does give us access to our situation: the *pathē* are ways in which things (including us) have *already* succeeded in encountering and moving us. 'Having a *pathos*' or 'affectively disclosing' is thus a success term. But we can nonetheless distinguish the *pathos* that discloses well from the *pathos* that does not. The *pathos* that discloses well is one in which our situation shows up clearly – which is to say, one in which things genuinely touch us. The *pathos* that does not disclose well is one in which things meet and move us in a manner that distorts or obscures them.

So when we blame someone for an inappropriate fear or a failure to be angry, we are saying that in her *pathos*, her situation does not show up clearly. If, for example, I am indifferent to the injustice of working conditions in sweatshops, it is because I am not picking up on some aspects of the situation. I do not see the situation well. But I do see it. What touches me about the working conditions in sweatshops is only that they concern other people or are far away. Hence my indifference. In this indifference, I do disclose the situation: people working in sweatshops are indeed outside my community. The problem is that I do not disclose the situation clearly. Some things *should* matter to me or touch me even though they do not. This is so, presumably, if they would matter to the affectively excellent person – the person with a clear line of sight, who discloses her situation in a way that is not distorted.

The affectively excellent person inhabits the disclosive posture that most perspicuously reveals her situation.[10] Aristotle has a special name for this disclosive posture: the mean. The mean is a particular disclosive posture: "a way of comporting oneself in the world", "the 'being-composed that sees' and is open to the situation", "the way that the world itself stands to us, or how we are in it" (*BCArP* 126, 130). Specifically, the mean is that *how* of a *pathos* in which it 'gets it right' with regard to each dimension of its intentionality: "when one ought, and in the cases in which, and toward the people whom, and for the reasons for the sake of which" (*EN* 1106b21-22, Sachs' translation, Aristotle (2002b)). This will not be the same in every case, but in every case

there will be at least one disclosive posture or *pathos* that genuinely opens us to our situation.

As disclosive postures, the *pathē* are inherently oriented towards the mean. To aim at the mean – at genuine disclosure – is not something in addition to having a *pathos* or something towards which we might deliberately or dispositionally direct our *pathē*. A *pathos* is already aiming to disclose the situation as it is; when something touches us, it is inherently aiming to move us. So achieving the mean is fulfilling the *pathos* as what it is. The mean is the *pathos* that has come to pass successfully.

It is insofar as they are disclosive postures and not mere affects that the *pathē* are open to praise and blame. They are praised (or blamed) for (not) disclosing the situation perspicuously. Since the *pathē* are inherently directed towards fulfilling themselves as means, if they do not so fulfil themselves it is because something external has interfered. This interference makes for unowned *pathē*.

We have seen that an excellent *pathos* or disclosive posture is one in which our situation shows up clearly. A vicious *pathos* or disclosive posture will be one in which the situation does not show up clearly, with respect to one or more of the dimensions of the intentional structure of the *pathē*. In this, Heidegger says, our situation is there for us

> as 'more or less'. Thus our comportment toward it is also more or less; we comport ourselves by these degrees in a more or less average way, in order to operate in the world. The manner and mode of the perspicuousness of the world is more or less.
>
> (*BCArP* 115)

This 'more or less' is Aristotle's excess and deficiency, which Aristotle explains thus:

> [I]t is possible to fail in many ways (for evil belongs to the class of the unlimited, as the Pythagoreans conjectured, and good to that of the limited), while to succeed is possible only in one way (for which reason one is easy and the other difficult – to miss the mark easy, to hit it difficult); for these reasons also, then, excess and defect are characteristic of vice.
>
> (*EN* 1106b28-34)

While Aristotle emphasizes how many ways there are to go wrong, Heidegger seizes on how *easy* it is. The "tendency to take things easily and make them easy" (*SZ* 128) is what he will later call unownedness. Excess and deficiency are ways of taking things easy because 'more or less' means 'more or less averagely' (*BCArP* 115, 162) and 'averagely' – as in *SZ* – means in a customary or common way.[11]

Consider action. An 'average' action will be one that takes its lead not from a clear grasp of the concrete circumstances and what they call for but from 'what people do' – public norms of ordinary behaviour. Acting averagely is doing 'what one does' in this sort of situation. This notion of averageness is more fully worked out in *SZ*'s discussion of *das Man*. But in neither that text nor *BCArP* do we get a good sense of how averageness governs affective life specifically. Heidegger mentions in *SZ* that the public has its own moods, which the orator manipulates (*SZ* 138-39), and he discusses affective excellence in *BCArP* in order to support his interpretation of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. But most of the time the crowd is not an orator's audience or an unruly mob, it is a set of internalized social norms. The day-to-day version of being caught up in the *pathos* of the crowd is holding ourselves to these norms rather than holding ourselves open to the situation. Our situation thus shows up to us in a way that is mediated – and distorted – by public norms governing how one is moved and how things matter. One is happy when promoted; one is excited about new things; one is ashamed of mental illness; one loves one's newborn child. It is hard to go against these norms, most of which we have thoroughly internalized. Most of the time we do *not* go against these norms; things matter and move us in just the way that they are supposed to. Letting things matter averagely is part of what it is to be a political or communal creature. But when we are moved 'as one is' and things matter 'as they do', we reveal our situation in a stunted and stereotypical way.

Heidegger's driving intuition is that habits, tendencies and settled dispositions are opposed to human excellence. They are so because they are biases, stereotypes, or the distortions that make up common sense and tradition. At the very least, they are shortcuts and shorthands. These ultimately serve to close us off from our situation, even if initially they are what open up us. But Aristotle does not seem to share Heidegger's Kierkegaardian aversion to conformity; averageness is a concern that seems wholly foreign to *EN*. Indeed, we might think that Heidegger's allergy to habit leads him to overlook the very insight that Aristotle's account is usually held to capture: that our temperament or character affects our openness to the situation. On Heidegger's picture, there is only one (significant) source of affective distortion: averageness. But this seems false; surely there are non-average ways of disclosing the situation poorly.[12] The irascible person, for instance, fails to properly disclose her situation, and yet getting violently angry at parking wardens is not obviously 'what one does'. Heidegger's picture seems to be lacking character. But it may be that all Heidegger needs is a more nuanced account of averageness. 'What one does' is not monolithic but includes a great variety of socially sanctioned identities, projects and possibilities. Some of these are affective identities: the irascible person, the arrogant person, the shy person, the coward. Many are tied up with other socially available identities: the brave man, the friendly woman, the lustful divorcee,

the indifferent office clerk, the bubbly blonde.[13] Much of what we think of as individual temperament can be rethought as a way of being average. But while this strategy saves Heidegger from an obviously false account, it does not absolve him of illegitimately importing a concern with averageness into *EN*. This is an instance in which Heidegger's interpretation of a text does plain violence to it.[14]

Happily, this violence need not concern us. What we are trying to determine is what Heidegger thinks it takes to be owned with regard to the *pathē*. Being average is opposed to such ownedness; it is unowned. As in *SZ*, Heidegger claims that we have a built-in tendency towards such unownedness, which is based on the fact that we are finding.[15] I suggest that we fall into averageness because the *pathē* change. Change is prominent in Aristotle's first and second definitions of '*pathos*' in the *Metaphysics*. The first definition of '*pathos*' is "a quality in respect of which a thing can be altered [*alloiousthai*]" (*M* 1022b15-16) and the second is "[t]he already actualized alterations" (*M* 1022b18-19).[16] Experiencing a *pathos* is always being moved from one disclosive posture into another: "thus-finding-one-self-again-and-again" (*BCArP* 123-24, 132). This "peculiar unrest" of affective life (*BCArP* 124) leads Heidegger – somewhat hysterically but with good Greek sensibility – to translate and interpret '*pathos*' as 'losing-one's-composure' (*Aus-der-Fassung-Kommen*) (*BCArP* 114). The thought, I take it, is that affective life inherently involves change and so is inherently disruptive. This disruption is often negative; thus Aristotle's third and fourth definitions of '*pathos*' are as a suffering or hurt, and as an extreme misfortune (*M* 1022b19-22). We are plausibly constituted so as to minimize this disruption by narrowing or dulling our openness to it. Average ways of letting things matter act like large ships in equalizing and 'levelling down' the stormy waves of affective life;[17] their inertia confines the world's impacts to manageable and familiar ripples. Falling in with the crowd is thus not an individual psychological phenomenon but a tendency built into what we are: a "tendency to take things easily and make them easy" (*SZ* 128). It follows that we initially and usually have average *pathē*. It also follows that being owned cannot be simply not being average. It must be a way of dragging ourselves out of averageness and actively resisting its constant pull on us. It must also be a different way of coping with constantly losing one's composure. So what does it take to experience *pathē* that are not average?

Owned emotions

If Heidegger is right that averageness is the only thing standing in the way of our *pathē* realizing themselves as means, then to let a *pathos* be a mean and so achieve its excellence will consist in resisting or pulling ourselves back from averageness. We cannot extricate ourselves from social norms entirely, nor should we want to – it would be contrary to our political or

social nature. So resisting averageness must be some version of standing off to the side of the crowd so as not to get caught up in its mood. But this in turn cannot simply mean having a *pathos* other than the standard one. That one is happy on one's wedding day should not mean that I ought not to be, for this may be the genuine way of disclosing my situation. Unfortunately, Heidegger says little about what resisting averageness looks like and how it is possible – even when he describes it as methodologically necessary for phenomenological inquiry. In particular, Heidegger does not give us a positive picture of owned affectivity. What little he says about ownedness in *BCArP* is in the context of action, so we will need to borrow from that account.

BCArP makes clear that resisting averageness meets the definition of *prohairesis* or choice, thus confirming the description of excellence as a *hexis prohairetikē* (*EN* 1106b36). Heidegger interprets *prohairesis* as a way of 'taking hold' or 'seizing' something, in such a way that one is *out for* some particular *telos* that is anticipated (*BCArP* 73, 42) and in opposition to that which one has renounced and seeks to avoid. *Prohairesis* is thus being resolved for something and against something (*BCArP* 185). Affective excellence is prohairetic in the sense that it consists in a choice or resolution: the resolution to resist averageness. In closing ourselves to the pull of averageness and holding ourselves open to the situation, we set ourselves *out for* being touched and *against* the customary ways of being so. We choose or resolve to be open. Such excellence is thus not a matter of being average in the 'right amount' as opposed to more or less – and so is, as Aristotle says, an extreme (*EN* 1107a8).

Resisting averageness, as a *prohairesis*, resembles the resoluteness or 'choosing to choose' that we achieve in hearing the call of conscience and which constitutes our ownedness in *SZ*. There, it is a matter of taking over a project in a particular way. Applied to affective life, however, the resolution must operate differently. The clue is that the resolution belongs to the genus of *hexis* – in the first sense of the term. The first sense of '*hexis*' that Aristotle gives is "a kind of activity of the haver and the had" (*M* 1022b4-5). The activity – the *echein* – consists in "direct[ing] in accordance with one's own nature or impulse" (*M* 1023a9-10).[18] This is the most familiar sense of 'having', involving possession and power. In my resolution, I govern or direct my affective life – but not in the sense that I choose whether my abilities to be affected are realized. I do not choose my feelings. This would be to direct my capacity to experience the *pathē qua* felt affects. Instead, I direct the *pathos* in its how, as a disclosive posture (*BCArP* 121). Further, I direct this in accordance with my nature, not my impulse. My nature is to be a living thing and so something to whom things matter (*BCArP* 36). To direct my *pathē* in accordance with this nature is to *let them happen* – and to let them happen in such a way that they fulfill themselves as means.[19]

Because my resolution allows my *pathē* to be means, it "preserves", "maintains" or "saves" the mean (*BCArP* 175, 126, 132). Being in a *hexis* in

the first sense – making the resolution – is thus the condition of possibility of having an excellent *hexis* in the second sense – a *pathos* as a mean arrangement in the situation.[20] I take it that this is why Heidegger reads the second senses of '*hexis*' and '*echein*' as 'further characterizations' and 'more precise determinations' of the first senses of '*hexis*' and '*echein*' (*BCArP* 117, 118). While this is strained as a reading of Aristotle's definitions, it manifests Heidegger's very Aristotelian desire to find a core or focal meaning for important equivocal terms (*BCArP* 116, 119). More importantly, it fits the phenomenon – at least, the phenomenon of affective excellence as Heidegger understands it.[21]

It should now be clear how affective life can involve choice, or how emotions can be owned. I can choose to let my *pathē* be themselves; I can let myself be genuinely moved. Such *letting be* is in some sense active, but it is not a matter of becoming "master of [my] moods" (*SZ* 136) and controlling my *pathē* as might a continent person, who (for example) struggles to be angry at the appropriate person or at the appropriate time.[22] The resolution governs the intentionally complex *pathos* negatively: it is a resolution not to allow public norms to interfere. The effort and control are directed towards removing impediments. The choice or resolution is an exercise of agency that aims at proper receptivity.

Being genuinely open to the situation requires a constant and repeated effort to hold ourselves open. Affective excellence is not a resolution that can be made once and for all, and it is not a resolution that comes to stand automatically – let alone one that gets easier – once it has been made a few times. Like a marriage vow, it is not the sort of thing that we establish or practice but the sort of thing that we renew. The reason is that the pull of averageness is constant, because the *pathē* are always changing. As in a marriage, I must constantly resist this degeneration into habit and routine. A resolution is repeated, each time and in ever new circumstances. It is this ongoing repetition that affords the excellent person stability and composure amidst the tumultuous loss of composure in affective life (*BCArP* 123-24).

The temporality of Aristotelian habituation is thus the temporality of repetition (*BCArP* 128). We are 'habituated' into affective excellence in the sense that we must repeat our resolution against averageness. We might speak of learning to experience certain *pathē* – learning to love or learning to grieve – but this is not a matter of practicing bringing about a particular result. It is a matter of holding ourselves open and letting ourselves be moved, and of doing so every time. So affective excellence, as a resolution, is not a disposition or character trait and it is not acquired in the way that skills are.[23]

In the repeated resolution for genuine openness and against averageness, we make ourselves responsible for the *pathē*. The *pathē* for which we are responsible are not mere feelings (for which we cannot be responsible) but disclosive postures. We *make* ourselves responsible for how the *pathē*

disclose by *taking* responsibility for that disclosure, and we *take* responsibility for whether our *pathē* are means by making it possible for them to be such. In this, we own up to the constant temptation of averageness and we take ownership of our affective life. Our moods and emotions become owned and we become ownedly finding.

So to be ownedly finding and to own one's emotions is not to choose which *pathē* to experience but to take responsibility for whether the *pathē* are means. Why should we want to be owned in this way? Is it blameworthy to fail to (adequately) resolve to resist averageness? Heidegger insists that his account of falling implies no negative evaluation (*SZ* 175), but while this is surely true of falling or everydayness *per se*, it should not be true of unowned falling. We can be blamed for not being owned for the same reason that for Aristotle we can be blamed for not being excellent: it is a way of failing to be what we are. This is not a moral failing but an ontological one.

Consider what the *pathē* are. The *pathē* are the fundamental ways in which our situation shows up to us. It is primarily through the *pathē* that things (including us) are there for us rather than not, and primarily through the *pathē* that things show up for us either as what they are or under some kind of distortion. The *pathē* are our most basic access to the situation – the most basic way in which we are open, in which things are given to us, and in which we are given to ourselves. This means that it is primarily through the *pathē* that things (including us) make demands on us in the sense that they impose themselves on us as something with which we must deal. I say 'primarily' to accommodate the fact that when things show up as mattering, they always do so in light of some particular project that I have taken up. But we do not tell the whole story if we say that it is because I understand myself as a teacher that this stack of ungraded papers shows up as mattering in the way that it does. It is also the case that my situation touches or moves me and so puts me into some particular disclosive posture in it. My situation is always *given* to me as mattering in some way, as something that is already there and with which I must deal.

When I resist averageness in my resolution, I undercut the force of the average norms to which my *pathē* were held. In removing this impediment, I undertake to let the *pathē* be means and so undertake to let my situation show itself to me. This is to say that I let my situation be more than a set of brute facts that I must accommodate; it becomes a standard to which I hold my disclosure (in a way that it was not when I held myself to public norms). The resolution turns the demands that things make into claims on me, and conversely makes me answerable or beholden to what moves me. So resisting public norms amounts to letting my situation be the standard against which my *pathē* are judged.

Because what moves me makes a claim on me only by virtue of my resolution, this claim is in some sense a product of one of my projects. But it is a product of a very special kind of project. First, as we know, the project

is negative: the resolution to let the *pathē* be means is the resolution to resist the interference of averageness. The project has no positive content of its own. It is an affective project: not a project of *being* this or that but a project of *letting be* (*qua* letting matter).

Second, the project in question is not optional and is not tied to any particular practical identity. Heidegger says that excellence "is not optional and indeterminate" and that "[b]eing-there must, *for itself*, take the opportunity to cultivate this being-composed as a possibility" (*BCArP* 119, 122). The reason is that "in *hexis* lies the primary orientation to the *kairos*" or the concrete situation (*BCArP* 119, 42). In resolving against averageness, we direct ourselves towards the situation as it is. The question 'why do this?' is not a genuine question for Heidegger. I am *already* in the business of finding myself in my situation, and I am already in this business because of what I am: my nature as a discloser. Being the entity that I am is not a project that I can choose to take up or leave, for the simple reason that I am already and necessarily engaged in it. It is a project into which I am thrown (*SZ* 42, 144, 189, 192, 284, 383). To ask why I should take the extra step of aiming at excellence in this project is not like asking why someone should aim at being a good teacher rather than a merely mediocre one. People do sometimes aim to be mediocre, and they do so because they are aiming to be excellent at some competing project. They aim to be excellent parents, excellent amateur wrestlers, or even excellent slackers. But at the level of the project of being what I am, there are no competing projects that might require sacrifice. The resolution against averageness is a meta-level commitment – a step above, beyond or below the particular projects that we each take up. Perhaps we could imagine a social or political climber who committed to averageness to achieve a particular social or political goal, but such a person is appropriately reprimanded for sacrificing the truth for personal gain. It is possible to fail to resolve to resist averageness and it is possible to do so deliberately. But doing so is blameworthy.

Since fulfilling our nature is a project we are necessarily involved in, and one with which other projects cannot compete, we are legitimately praised (or blamed) for (not) pursuing this project excellently – that is, competently (*BCArP* 55). Thus we can and should praise (or blame) people for (not) being ownedly finding. As a proxy, we can and should hold people responsible for whether their *pathē* are means. To put the same point differently: we are called to take responsibility for our *pathē* because it already matters to us that things genuinely touch us. This care for truth is part of what we are thrown into when we are thrown into being what we are. Being ownedly finding is owning up to what already matters – taking over our thrownness. We do this by owning up to the fact that we are "delivered over to [*überantwortet*] entities" and so are answerable (*beantwortbar*) to them (*SZ* 364). So we can and should hold people responsible for whether they make themselves beholden to the entities that move them and so whether they

allow entities to constitute a standard governing their disclosure. It is incumbent upon us, as the kind of entity that we each are, to let the world make claims on us. When we do, we are ownedly finding and have owned emotions.[24]

Notes

1 All quotations of Aristotle are from Aristotle 1984 unless otherwise noted. I cite the Bekker numbers, which are provided in the margins of many English translations. Quotations of the Greek text are transliterated from Aristotle 1934.
2 For the influence of Aristotle's ethics on Heidegger, see Bernasconi 1989, Brogan 1989, Brogan 2005, Kisiel 1993 and Volpi 1992. For Aristotle's influence on Heidegger's understanding of affectivity, see Hadjioannou 2013 and Ruin 2000.
3 I cite the pagination of the English translation (*BCArP*) and I transliterate Greek terms.
4 Interpreting *hexis* in *EN* as disposition is so pervasive that some translators, such as Rowe (Aristotle 2002a), simply translate '*hexis*' as 'disposition'. I have found only two substantial explorations of what '*hexis*' means: Brickhouse 1976 and Garver 1989. For discussions of virtue as a specifically affective disposition, see Dustin 1993, Kosman 1980, Leighton 1982, Roberts 1989, and Sherman 1993.
5 Thus Aristotle can go on to say that "excellence is a kind of mean" (*EN* 1106b27-28) (*mesotēs tis ara estin hē aretē*) or that excellence 'lies in' a mean (*EN* 1106b36-1107a1) (*hē aretē … en mesotēti ousa*). See also *EN* 1107a7–8: "in respect of its substance and the account which states its essence [it, sc. excellence] is a mean" (*kata men tēn ousian ton to ti ēn einai legonta mesotēs estin hē aretē*).
6 Although the *pathē* are essentially somatic (*BCArP* 137), feeling is not the only way in which the body is in-the-world.
7 For readings of Aristotle along these lines, see Leighton 1982 and Sherman 1993.
8 See "posture, n.". OED Online, June 2013, Oxford University Press. http://www.oed.com.proxy.library.georgetown.edu/view/Entry/148707?rskey=uyOc7y&result=1& isAdvanced = false (accessed September 1, 2013).
9 Compare Sherman's interpretation of Aristotle: emotion is "a mode of affectively attending to events and objects that hold importance for us. It is a way of being affected, a way of noticing and reacting" (1993: 25). See also Haugeland's interpretation of Heidegger: "Moods are Heidegger's favorite example of a response to what matters in a situation" (2013: 196).
10 Compare *SZ* 300: "Resoluteness brings the Being of the 'there' into the existence of its Situation".
11 Heidegger also explicitly connects excess and deficiency to unowned falling in (*PIA* 81). Like Aristotle's excess and deficiency (see Hursthouse 1981), Heidegger's 'more or less' is not really a quantitative measure (cf. *BCArP* 126). However, since it is averageness that makes for vice rather than the excess or deficiency *per se*, being less average is better than being more average for Heidegger. For Aristotle, excess and deficiency are equally vicious.
12 Further, there might be particular *pathē* that always disclose the situation poorly, as Heidegger's discussion of fear in *SZ* implies (*SZ* 141).
13 Compare Agosta 2010: 338ff, although it cannot be right to say (as Agosta does) that the *pathē are* social pretences. Pretences or identities are projects or possibilities onto which we project ourselves, while the *pathē* are modes of finding.
14 Heidegger frequently describes his interpretations as violent. He does so because he understands the task of interpretation as "setting forth what is not prominently there" in a text (*BCArP* 47).

15 [Findingness] not only discloses Dasein in its thrownness and its submission to that world which is already disclosed with its own Being; *it is itself the existential kind of Being in which Dasein constantly surrenders itself to the 'world' and lets the 'world' 'matter' to it in such a way that somehow Dasein evades its very self*. The existential constitution of such evasion will become clear in the phenomenon of falling.

(*SZ* 139, my italics)

A similar line of thought can be found in *BCArP*, where Heidegger grounds *logos* as talking-with-one-another in the *pathē* (specifically, fear) (*BCArP* 175) and takes the basic Greek concern with *logos* to be about resisting sophistry and idle talk (*BCArP* 74). (For more on these dimensions of Heidegger's reading of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, see Smith 1995.)

16 Cf. *BCArP* 131.

17 Cf. *SZ* 127.

18 Translation from Aristotle 1933; cf. *BCArP* 116.

19 Compare Heidegger's reading of Aristotle's own example: a person *has* her garment. This does not mean that she can do what she will with it. It means that in being worn the garment comes to its *telos* and *energeia* (*BCArP* 118) as something to-be-worn. It is directed by being allowed to be what it is.

20 Thus Heidegger: "The *hexis* as *diathesis*, as *taxis*, springs from *prohairesis*: the proper finding-oneself in the being-allotted of the moment" (*BCArP* 119).

21 Still, I am sympathetic with Gonzalez's claim that Heidegger's interpretation of *hexis* involves "a sudden and unexplained leap" (2006: 139).

22 Thus I disagree with Gonzalez, who takes Heidegger to collapse virtue into continence (Gonzalez 2006: 142).

23 As Heidegger describes it here, acquiring a skill involves accomplishing the same result every time and so does not permit a radical openness to what is particular in the situation (*BCArP* 128). Either this is an inaccurate characterization of skill acquisition or we must distinguish acquiring a skill from developing mastery. The master craftsperson *is* open to what is distinctive in her particular situation, and this is what has led people like Hubert Dreyfus to interpret the owned person as a version of Aristotle's *phronimos* (see, e.g., Dreyfus 2000).

24 I am grateful to audiences at the Marquette Summer Seminar in Aristotle and the Aristotelian tradition (2013) and the International Society for Phenomenological Studies annual meeting (2013) for many helpful comments and questions. Thanks especially to David Chan for the example of being happy on one's wedding day and the associated insight, and to Joe Rouse for pointing out that the *pathē* disclose possibilities. I also thank Nate Zuckerman for extensive comments on several drafts of this essay.

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3

A TALE OF TWO FOOTNOTES

Heidegger and the Question of Kierkegaard

Clare Carlisle

We know that by the beginning of the 1920s Heidegger's intellectual trajectory had brought him close to Kierkegaard. In the decade leading up to this time, his studies initially focused on Catholic theology, and especially medieval scholasticism. But in turning to authors such as Augustine, Eckhart, Luther, Schleiermacher and Kierkegaard he underwent, at least intellectually, a kind of Protestant conversion. By 1920 Heidegger was arguing that 'the original experience' of 'primordial Christianity' had been distorted by Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic philosophy (*PRL* 49) – and he sought in his work to retrieve this early Christian form of existence.[1] At the same time, he was pursuing a philosophical inquiry into time and history. In his 1920-21 lecture course at the University of Freiburg on the phenomenology of religious life he suggests that 'Christian religiosity lives temporality as such'; 'Christian experience lives time itself' (*PRL* 55, 57). The first half of this lecture course focused on Paul's letters to the Galatians and Thessalonians, with a view to illuminating the 'core phenomenon' of 'the historical'.[2] Heidegger explored how Paul's teaching on the Second Coming involved a conception of time as *kairos*, 'fullness of time', or moment (*Augenblick*).[3] He discussed at length how the early Christian's relationship with God encompassed, in each moment, the temporal-existential dimensions of 'having-become' (*Gewordensein*) and expectant waiting-toward the future (*Zukunft*).[4] This prefigures the analysis of Dasein's authentic existence in terms of repetition, anticipation and 'the moment' in Division Two of *Being and Time*. According to Heidegger, the 'kairological time' uncovered in Paul's writings indicates 'a new becoming' (*PRL* 69), an authentic mode of temporality to be contrasted with quantifying, calculating 'chronological time'.[5] Heidegger did not in his lecture course mention Søren Kierkegaard's reflection on the concepts of repetition, anticipation and the moment, but he was evidently aware of this. In 1919 he read and reviewed Karl Jaspers's *The Psychology of Worldviews*, which discusses the Kierkegaardian moment, and he refers to Jaspers's book in the second of two short footnotes on Kierkegaard in *Being and Time*.

Although these footnotes acknowledge a debt to Kierkegaard, they also emphasise the latter's shortcomings as a philosopher. Heidegger suggests that Kierkegaard offers 'penetrating' interpretations of the 'problem of existence' and 'the phenomenon of the moment of vision', but that in both cases his approach is 'existentiell' rather than 'existential' (*SZ* 235 n. vi, 338 n. iii). Moreover, Kierkegaard 'clings to the ordinary conception of time' (*SZ* 338 n. iii), and 'as regards his ontology, he remained completely dominated by Hegel and by ancient philosophy as Hegel saw it' (*SZ* 235 n. vi). Heidegger repeats and elaborates on this judgement in his 1950-51 lecture course 'What Is Called Thinking?':

> By way of Hegelian metaphysics, Kierkegaard remains everywhere philosophically entangled, on the one hand in a dogmatic Aristotelianism that is completely on a par with medieval scholasticism, and on the other in the subjectivity of German idealism. No discerning mind would deny the stimuli produced by Kierkegaard's thought that prompted us to give renewed attention to the 'existential'. But about the decisive question – the essential nature of Being – Kierkegaard has nothing whatever to say.
>
> (*WCT* 213)

This, then, seems to be Heidegger's consistent view of Kierkegaard. Nevertheless, Kierkegaardian ideas underlie some of the most significant passages in Division Two of *Being and Time*, and Heidegger's two footnotes do not do justice to his engagement with the Danish thinker. There is a tension between the extent and significance of this engagement, on the one hand, and Heidegger's assessment of Kierkegaard's contribution to philosophy, on the other. In this essay I will focus on one aspect of this tension: the importance for Heidegger of Kierkegaard's analysis of spiritual existence, notwithstanding the attempt in *Being and Time* to move beyond the conception of the human being as spirit that characterises Christian thought. Heidegger's 1927 text is, I suggest, haunted by spirit, and particularly by the spirit of Kierkegaard.

I will begin by discussing the idea of spirit as such, as this appears in *Being and Time* and in various works by Kierkegaard. I will then examine in turn the three temporal concepts – repetition, anticipation and the moment – which fill out the Kierkegaardian account of human spirit, and which are taken up by Heidegger in Division Two of *Being and Time*. My essay ends with a brief conclusion which begins to reassess Kierkegaard's contribution to Heidegger's philosophical project.

'The human being is spirit. But what is spirit?'

Heidegger's rather cursory references to Kierkegaard in *Being and Time* can be supplemented by his more general remarks about the concept of spirit.

He includes 'spirit' among those designations which 'remain uninterrogated with regard to their Being and its structure, in accordance with the way in which the question of Being has been neglected' (*SZ* 22). One consequence of this failure to ask about the ontological meaning of 'spirit' is a misunderstanding of human being:

> When … we come to the question of man's Being, this is not something we can simply compute [*errechnet*] by adding together those kinds of Being which body, soul and spirit respectively possess – kinds of being whose nature has not as yet been determined.
>
> (*SZ* 48)

The 'ontological foundations' of the distinction between nature and spirit, argues Heidegger, 'remain unclarified' (*SZ* 89). Insofar as 'spirit' is a Christian category, it is 'the anthropology of Christianity' which 'stands in the way of the basic question of Dasein's Being (or leads it off the track)' (*SZ* 48; see also 56). In addressing anew the question of being, Heidegger insists that the theological conception of the human being as spirit be replaced with a purely philosophical conception of human 'existence': 'man's '*substance*' is not spirit as a synthesis of soul and body; it is rather *existence*' (*SZ* 117).[6]

From a Kierkegaardian point of view, it is difficult to maintain this distinction between spirit and existence. His account of spirit is thoroughly existential, and his account of existence is fundamentally spiritual. Throughout Kierkegaard's work we find an attempt to protect and preserve the spiritual meaning of human existence in a modern age that is characterised by 'spiritlessness'. This project reaches its clearest expression in *The Sickness unto Death* (1849), where Kierkegaard (writing as the pseudonym of Anti-Climacus) states that spirit is at once our ontological constitution and our ethical task: we *are* spirit, but because we lose ourselves as spirit, we have the task of *becoming* spirit.[7] Thus a movement of repetition, retrieval or redoubling is implicit in the very idea of spirit. Although human beings *are* spirit, they have a tendency to ignore, forget, or conceal from themselves this fact, and the tasks that it brings. As Kierkegaard's pseudonym Vigilius Haufniensis puts it in *The Concept of Anxiety* (1844), 'The lostness of spiritlessness, as well as its security, consists in its understanding nothing spiritually and comprehending nothing as a task' (*CA* 95).[8]

At the beginning of *The Sickness unto Death*, Anti-Climacus writes: 'The human being is spirit. But what is spirit?' (*SUD* 13). Much of the analysis of human existence offered in Kierkegaard's authorship can be regarded as an attempt to answer this question in a new way.[9] Like other Christian thinkers, he understands spirit as a relational category, and he emphasises that a relationship is not something static, but a movement, at once active and passive, that involves both consciousness and will. For Kierkegaard, the relationality of spirit encompasses relationships to oneself, to God, to others, and to the

world as a whole. However, he offers a philosophical gloss on the Christian idea of spirit by emphasising that these relations involve both actuality and possibility.[10] All of the spiritual self's constituent relationships are possible ways for it to be, and often what it relates to is itself a possibility. So, for example, in praying to God a person establishes herself in relation to a certain possibility, and this relation has its own actuality – in this case, the actuality of prayer. In *The Sickness unto Death* the possibilities available to the human being considered as spirit are schematised in terms of an 'interplay of knowing and willing' (*SUD* 48): the degree to which we are conscious or unconscious of ourselves, and willing or unwilling to be ourselves. The relationality of spirit, then, encompasses both consciousness and will.

However, we can draw from some of Kierkegaard's earlier pseudonymous works a more explicitly temporal account of human spirituality, according to which the relations to self, God, others and world involve relations to the past and the future as well as to the present. This produces a very complex account of the self: relations to a variety of objects (if for a moment we may use this unfortunate term), each in the mode of both possibility and actuality, each involving both consciousness and will, are further multiplied by threefold temporal dimensions. If, for the sake of simplicity, we were artificially to isolate the human being's relation to herself (which can be separated neither ontologically nor practically from her other constituent relations), then we could say that in relating to herself a person relates to her past, to her present and to her future. (This temporal reflexivity is simply an explication of the idea of self-relationship.) In other words, she relates to possibilities that have been, that are, and that will be, and in each case these relationships involve knowing and not knowing, wanting and not wanting. The appropriation of *these* possibilities as her own – whether through knowledge or ignorance, desire or aversion – is itself something actual and concrete. Kierkegaard develops concepts through which to think the complex relational temporality of human being: the relation to the past is 'repetition'; the relation to the future is 'anticipation'; and the relation to the present is 'the moment'. In each case, a relation to possibility constitutes the actuality of a person, considered as a temporal being. Kierkegaard's concepts of repetition, anticipation and moment suggest an answer to the question of the meaning of human being, whether this is considered as 'spirit' or as 'existence'.

Before examining these three concepts in more detail, we should note parallels between Kierkegaard's understanding of human being in terms of spirit, and Heidegger's analysis of Dasein in Division One of *Being and Time*. Like 'spirit', 'Dasein' indicates an irreducibly relational way of existing: the human being is not a thing that, perhaps in distinction from other kinds of thing, has a relationship to itself and to others; rather, the human being *is* this complex relationship. Dasein is Being-in-the-world and Being-with-others, and of course it is a relation to itself: a relation of concern about its own being (Care). The 'fable' about care cited in sec. 42 suggests that 'spirit' is

integral to the being of Dasein, and Heidegger highlights this in his discussion of the myth.[11] Understood in this way, Dasein is not to be conceived according to the category of substance: insofar as it is essentially relational, it is not 'in itself'. The manner of its being encompasses possibility as well as actuality – indeed the former has a priority over the latter.[12] According to Heidegger, 'in each case Dasein *is* its possibility' (*SZ* 42). And just as, for Kierkegaard, 'spirit' names both an ontological constitution and an existential task, so Heidegger states that 'because Dasein is in each case essentially its own possibility, it *can*, in its very Being, "choose" itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself, or only "seem" to do so' (*SZ* 42). Heidegger's discussion of the inauthentic tendencies of this relational structure draws on Kierkegaard's account of spiritlessness. He adopts the concepts of idle talk, ambiguity, curiosity and levelling that are used in *Two Ages* (1846) to describe the condition of 'the present age'.[13] Having appropriated the Kierkegaardian account of human spirituality in Division One, it seems only natural that when in Division Two Heidegger analyses Dasein's relational structure in terms of temporality, he employs the concepts of repetition, anticipation and moment.

Repetition

Shortly after Kierkegaard published *Repetition* (1843), under the pseudonym of Constantin Constantius, the book was reviewed by the influential writer and critic J. L. Heiberg. Heiberg was most interested in repetition in the natural world, and he assumed – wrongly – that Kierkegaard's text was concerned with this kind of repetition. Heiberg's review provoked Kierkegaard to explain, in the name of Constantin Constantius, that his book was not about the natural repetitions seen in planetary and lunar cycles, in the seasons, and in the routines and habits of plants, animals and human beings, but about repetition in the world of spirit. The pseudonym explains that this 'domain of the spirit' cannot, as in Hegel's philosophy, be conflated with 'the world-historical process', for it denotes 'a spiritual existence that belongs to individuals' (*R* 287). Throughout Kierkegaard's authorship it is this domain, which he sometimes designates as 'the existing individual', or simply as 'inwardness', that he endeavours to defend in the face of the totalising force of the Hegelian system. At stake in this domain is human freedom, 'all the tasks of freedom' that constitute the individual's inner life. The words 'spirit', 'individual' and 'freedom', hardly mentioned in *Repetition* itself, proliferate in the response to Heiberg:

> As soon as one considers individuals in their freedom … – then what meaning repetition has in the domain of the spirit, for indeed, every individual, just in being an individual, is qualified as spirit, and this spirit has a history. Here … the question becomes: what

> meaning does repetition have here? More particularly, the question concerns the relation of freedom to the phenomena of the spirit, in the context of which the individual lives, inasmuch as his history advances in continuity with his own past and with the little world surrounding him. Here the question becomes that of repetition within the boundaries of his life … The issue will arise at this point again and again, insofar as the same individual in his history makes a beginning many times, or the question will again be whether each individual is capable of it, or whether he is lost through his initial beginning, or whether what is lost through his initial beginning is not recoverable. Here the individual does not relate contemplatively to the repetition, for the phenomena in which it appears are phenomena of the spirit, but he relates to them in freedom.
>
> (*R* 288-89)

As Heidegger indicates in the footnote (quoted on p. 38 above) to his introduction to Division Two of *Being and Time*, much of Kierkegaard's philosophy of existence can be understood as a response to Hegelian historicism. Faced with a teleological view of history as an inexorable progress towards a goal that could be posited in advance, Kierkegaard seeks to leave room for human freedom while retaining the basic Hegelian insight that we are historical beings whose identity – both individual and collective – is to a large extent shaped by the past, and moving towards a future. His rather obscure discussion of repetition seems to have been a response to this philosophical inheritance.

At the heart of Kierkegaard's account of repetition – as a concept of freedom and as a category of spirit – is the idea of possibility. In this kind of repetition it is a possibility, rather than something actual, that is repeated. This is why a naturalistic interpretation of repetition, which is concerned with the reiteration of physical movements, misses the point. This misunderstanding is indeed exemplified by Constantin Constantius, in a way designed to indicate indirectly the real, spiritual meaning of repetition (a circuitous strategy that, unsurprisingly, confused not only Heiberg but also many subsequent readers). Although he recognises that 'the question of repetition … will play a very important role in modern philosophy' (*R* 131), Constantin fails to understand that this kind of repetition does not repeat something actual or concrete. He searches for a repetition by visiting Berlin a second time, staying in the same hotel, seeing the same play at the same theatre, and so on. When he cannot find repetition, he decides to give up his philosophical quest. In this way, he unwittingly conveys the message that repetition concerns not a particular action or experience, but rather the moment of freedom itself. If, for example, at some point in the past one faced a choice between two possibilities – such as getting married or not getting married; travelling to Berlin or remaining in Copenhagen – a

repetition would consist not in a second engagement or a second journey, but in a renewal of the decision itself, and thus in a return of the freedom that this decision expresses. While repetition of something actual merely produces habit (which Kierkegaard regards as a deadening mechanisation of life), repetition of the possible *as possible* produces spiritual freedom.[14]

In several of Kierkegaard's texts from the early 1840s, repetition is invoked to explain continuity, endurance or consistency through time in terms of freedom and movement. This appeal to repetition emerges in various contexts: discussions of ethical life, of divine creation, and of the doctrine of original sin. In *Either/Or* (1843) Kierkegaard's pseudonym Judge William argues that the stability of character that is central to ethical life is to be explained not by a lapse into habit, but through the renewal or repetition of key decisions – and here repetition expresses an 'existentialist' insight concerning the requirement to choose repeatedly in order to maintain one's freedom and responsibility. In *Repetition*, Constantin Constantius suggests that temporal existence is sustained by God neither through static preservation, nor by a perpetual reinvention:

> What would life be if there were no repetition? Who would want to be a tablet on which time writes something new every instant or to be a memorial volume of the past? … If God himself had not willed repetition, the world would not have come into existence. Either he would have followed the superficial plans of hope or he would have retracted everything and preserved it in recollection. This he did not do. Therefore, the world continues, and it continues because it is a repetition.
>
> (*R* 132-33)

In *The Concept of Anxiety*, repetition is invoked to navigate the theological dilemma of original sin, according to which sin is inherited, and yet our own responsibility. Rejecting a biological explanation of the inheritance of sin, Kierkegaard's pseudonym Vigilius Haufniensis suggests that when we repeat Adam's first sin, we are repeating the act of choice that institutes the fall into sin. This idea of repetition provides a way of understanding the continuity of sin through the human race, which is traced back to Adam, while accentuating the freedom through which each individual takes responsibility for his or her own sinfulness. Through repetition, the state of sinfulness that characterises humanity as a whole is preserved, while new acts of sin continually come freely into being.

When the concept of repetition is invoked in these ways, it seems to offer a relatively straightforward account of continuity through time that brings together identity and change, being and becoming. Repetition signifies a relationship to the past which brings that past into existence – which, in other words, appropriates the past as a possibility to be engaged with and

decided upon anew. This conception of repetition is adopted by Heidegger in Division Two, Chapters IV and V of *Being and Time*: 'anxiety brings one back to one's thrownness as something *possible* which *can be repeated*' (SZ 343); 'the resoluteness which comes back to itself and hands itself down, then becomes the *repetition* of a possibility of existence that has come down to us. *Repeating is handing down explicitly* – that is to say, going back into the possibilities of the Dasein that has been there' (SZ 385). For Kierkegaard, repetition is a way of thinking about how the human being as spirit, and thus freely, relates to the past – both the past within a person's own lifetime, and the historical event of the Incarnation that represents the truth of Christianity to be appropriated be each individual believer. Similarly, for Heidegger, the discussion of repetition in *Being and Time* seems to refer at once to a personal past and to the collective past, both of which, of course, constitute Dasein's possibilities and shape its destiny. This is to be understood not as a determination of Dasein's existence, but, rather, as its freedom.

Indeed, Heidegger's relationship to Kierkegaard's work provides an example of this idea of repetition as the appropriation of one's intellectual and cultural inheritance. In a letter to Karl Löwith in 1920, he suggests that a thinker's relationship with the tradition he has inherited, even if this relationship is one of appropriation and repetition, should be critical and questioning. Furthermore, he points out that critique might be the most faithful way of honouring one's philosophical ancestors. 'What is of importance in Kierkegaard must be appropriated anew, but in a *strict* critique that grows out of *our own* situation', writes Heidegger. 'Blind appropriation is the greatest seduction … Not everyone who talks of "existence" has to be a Kierkegaardian. My approaches have already been misinterpreted in this way.'[15] We can detect in this remark a rather defensive dissociation from Kierkegaard that seems to reflect Heidegger's personal frustration at contemporary attitudes: he did not want to be seen as following a fashion for Kierkegaardian ideas. But it is also a statement of philosophical principle that is itself true to Kierkegaard's insistence that a genuine, spiritual repetition is always free, creative, and open to the new, in contrast with a mindless, slavish, habitual repetition that merely copies what has gone before.

However, Kierkegaard's idea of repetition also expresses something more profound and enigmatic about the distinctive structure of Christian life – and here it is a question of disruption rather than continuity, and of transformation rather than consistency. Heidegger does not seem to recognise this aspect of Kierkegaardian repetition. Especially when it is linked to the concept of 'the moment', as it is in *The Concept of Anxiety*,[16] repetition points to a new temporal-ontological category that is required in order to think philosophically about Christian teachings concerning forgiveness and salvation. This repetition is not simply 'spiritual', but 'transcendent', insofar as it not only revisits the past, but transforms it, or redeems it. Such a radical conception of repetition is specifically Christian, since it refers both to the doctrine of

original sin, and to the doctrine of forgiveness and justification. On this point, though, Kierkegaard's cryptic comments about repetition have to be interpreted and reconstructed more forcefully.

In *Repetition* Constantin Constantius states that 'repetition is *conditio sine qua non* [the indispensable condition] for every issue of dogmatics' (*R* 149), and in his response to Heiberg's review of the book he indicates that repetition has implications concerning sin and atonement (see *R* 313). In a journal entry of 1843, which constitutes a sort of sketch of the thought of repetition, Kierkegaard writes that 'the problem of sin … is the second repetition' (*JP* III 3793). These remarks suggest that the concept of repetition has a particular significance for Christian theology, although this significance is not explained directly. *The Concept of Anxiety* accentuates the distinction, already invoked in *Repetition*, between a 'Greek' or 'pagan' philosophy 'whose essence is immanence', and a 'modern' or 'Christian' philosophy 'whose essence is transcendence or repetition' (*CA* 21).

Kierkegaard is notoriously eager to emphasise the paradoxical character of Christian faith, and one tension that he explores is between the idea that, as sinners, we are all constituted by our past sins, and the idea that the condition of sinfulness can be radically altered through faith and grace. On the one hand, sin is constitutive of selfhood – we *are* sinners – and on the other hand it is possible to be liberated from sin. Indeed, this brings into tension the two basic elements of the Christian task: recognising that one is a sinner, and believing in the forgiveness of sins. 'Christianity is as paradoxical on this point as possible', writes Kierkegaard's pseudonym Anti-Climacus.

> It seems to be working against itself by establishing sin so securely as a position that now it seems utterly impossible to eliminate it again – and then it is this same Christianity that by means of the Atonement wants to eliminate sin so completely as if it were drowned in the sea.
>
> (*SUD* 100)

From the point of view of an existing person, this paradox has a temporal character. Insofar as someone recognises herself as a sinner, she views herself as constituted by her past actions, which, precisely because they are past, are impossible to change. But insofar as she hopes for forgiveness, this person who is constituted by her history anticipates a future in which this history can be transformed. This is what Constantin Constantius is getting at when he writes, in response to Heiberg, that 'the question [is] whether each individual is capable of [repetition], or whether he is lost through his initial beginning, or whether what is lost through his initial beginning is not recoverable' (*R* 288-89).

From a merely human point of view, we must accept that the past is as it is, or rather as it was. Possibility seems to belong only to the future: once

possibilities have been chosen, acted upon, converted into actuality, they slide into the past; decisions must be repeated anew, with fresh possibilities, if freedom is to be sustained. What is past remains contingent insofar as it *might have been* otherwise, but nevertheless it is unalterable – it *cannot be* otherwise. This is an important point with respect to the idea of repentance. Repentance involves recognising the possibility of the past, for in taking responsibility for her past actions a person confesses that she made a choice, and could have acted differently. But this human action is powerless to alter the choice that has been made. This gives human life a tragic aspect: we are beings who are not only constituted by, but responsible for, a past that we are powerless to change.

In relation to God, however, the possibility of the past can be restored in a stronger sense. Although the past is not erased, or indeed altered in its content, its significance can be transformed so that it no longer constitutes a person's identity: instead of being a sinner, and thus condemned to despair, she becomes a sinner who is thus forgiven. Kierkegaard repeatedly refers his readers to Jesus' saying, recorded in all three of the synoptic gospels, that for God all things are possible (see Matthew 19:26; Mark 10:27; Luke 18:26). In *The Sickness unto Death* this becomes the stronger claim that, 'since everything is possible for God, then God is this – that everything is possible' (*SUD* 40). Here Anti-Climacus goes on to accentuate the ontological import of this thought, asserting that 'the being of God means that everything is possible, or that everything is possible means the being of God'. If we interpret 'everything' or 'all things' here as denoting – or at least as encompassing – the past, the present, and the future, then faith in God comes to signify a transformation in the temporality of the self. If what is past can retain, or can regain, its character of possibility, then it can be taken again, repeated *qua* possibility. Kierkegaard's appropriation of Aristotle's distinction between *dunamis* and *energeia* turns out to ground a distinctive philosophical interpretation of the Lutheran characterisation of the faithful Christian as at once righteous and a sinner.[17] As actual events or actions, one's past sins remain, and thus one is constituted as a sinner. But insofar as they have become possibilities they can gain a new meaning, according to which they are no longer counted as sins. And as her past is changed in this way, the individual gains a new being: she has become righteous. This is what Kierkegaard means by a transcendent, religious repetition – and in this connection Vigilius Haufniensis quotes Paul's proclamation in II Corinthians: 'Behold all things have become new' (*CA* 17). If 'all things' are possible for God, even the past can 'become new'.

Anticipation

Just as the spirituality of human being involves a relationship to the past in the form of repetition, so it involves an analogous relationship to the

future. In several of Kierkegaard's works this relationship is explored through the idea of anticipating death. In *The Concept of Anxiety*, Kierkegaard's pseudonym Vigilius Haufniensis emphasises the contrast between the meaning of death for human beings, and the death of other organisms such as animals and plants: 'The beast does not really die, but when the spirit is posited as spirit, death shows itself as the terrifying' (*CA* 92). This fear of death follows from the fact that, as spirit, the human being has, and indeed *is*, a relationship to herself. On this point, Vigilius's analysis coheres with what Anti-Climacus will say in *The Sickness unto Death* about the human being's spiritual self-relation being a matter of both consciousness and will. What Vigilius regards as 'really' dying involves not simply biological death, but a relationship to the fact of finitude, according to which a person is aware or unaware of her mortality, and wants or does not want to die.

This relationship does not, of course, take place only at the moment of death (when, strictly speaking, it is too late). According to Johannes de silentio, the pseudonymous author of *Fear and Trembling* (1843), such a view represents a 'crass materialism' (*FT* 46). This, incidentally, offers a critique of the famous Epicurean argument that it is irrational to fear death since 'death is nothing … either to the living or to the dead' because 'when we are, death is not come, and, when death is come, we are not' – an argument that presupposes that death 'is' only an actuality, and not also a possibility.[18] (This is an example of the presumption that 'to be' means 'to be present, to be actual' that Heidegger criticises.) In his 1845 discourse 'At a Graveside', Kierkegaard describes Epicurus' dismissal of death as the 'jest' of a 'cunning contemplator', and states that 'it is certain that death exists' (*TDIO* 73, 83). The 'earnestness of death', he suggests here, recognises the significance of death throughout life, 'This very day' (*TDIO* 83, 85). When it is appropriated earnestly, the prospect of death is 'impelling in life', and the uncertainty of the time of death 'inspects every moment' (*TDIO* 100).

In *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* Kierkegaard's pseudonym Johannes Climacus echoes some of the themes of 'At a Graveside', and he also suggests that relating to death takes the form of an 'anticipation'. He asks 'whether death can be anticipated and *anticipando* [by being anticipated] be experienced in an idea [in other words, as a possibility], or whether it is only when it actually is' (*CUP* I 168). Climacus then directs his reader's attention to 'the question about what death is and what it is for the living person, how the idea of it must change a person's whole life if he, in order to think its uncertainty, must think it every moment in order to prepare himself for it' (*CUP* I 168).[19]

This Kierkegaardian idea that, as spiritual beings, we relate to death as a possibility at 'every moment' is applicable to the death of others as well as to our own mortality. The discussion of the biblical story of Abraham and Isaac presented in *Fear and Trembling* illustrates this. In this text, a father faces the death of his son – the death, that is, of another person whose life

is more precious to him than his own. Implicit in Johannes de silentio's philosophical exploration of Abraham's willingness to sacrifice Isaac is the suggestion that the possibility of death is, from an ethical and spiritual point of view, at least as significant as actual death. Focusing on actual death allows the reader of Genesis 22 to gloss over Abraham's existential situation, since in the end Isaac was allowed to live. However, Abraham's journey to Mount Moriah, which for Kierkegaard symbolises the Christian's journey of faith in relation to a paradoxical God, is undertaken in anticipation of Isaac's death. Johannes de silentio's interpretation of the story emphasises that this apparently extraordinary circumstance in fact expresses the truth of every finite human relationship: 'every moment to see the sword hanging over the head of the beloved, and yet to find, not rest in the pain of resignation, but joy by virtue of the absurd' (*FT* 50). *At every moment*, then, love is haunted by the possibility of death, and thus by anticipation of loss.

Just as Vigilius Haufniensis highlights the difference between human, 'spiritual' death and organic death, so Heidegger distinguishes between Dasein's death, and the 'perishing' of organisms, which is simply a physiological, biological process.[20] And just as Climacus wonders whether death has being as 'an idea', or only as an actuality, so Heidegger, in discussing Dasein's relationship to its death, argues that an authentic relationship to death regards it as a possibility, whereas an inauthentic relationship to death treats it as an actuality.[21] As a possibility, death has being, and meaning, and relevance to the individual at every moment; if it is viewed as an actuality, then it becomes an event that has not yet happened and is not yet a matter of concern. The latter kind of attitude, insists Heidegger, constitutes an 'evasive concealment in the face of death', a covering-up of 'what is peculiar in death's certainty – *that it is possible at any moment* … Thus death's ownmost character as a possibility gets veiled' (*SZ* 253, 258). Authentic Being-towards-death 'understands' and 'cultivates' death '*as a possibility*', and this means '*anticipation of this possibility* [*Vorlaufen in die Möglichkeit*]' (*SZ* 261, 262).

In Division Two of *Being and Time* Heidegger develops the Kierkegaardian theme of anticipation of death into a more detailed and systematic account of existing authentically as a finite being. However, if his description of Dasein's 'anticipatory resoluteness' is taken at face value as concerned with the existing individual's relationship to his own mortality, this suggests a narrower conception of anticipation than that offered by Kierkegaard. For the latter, as we have seen, anticipation of death is a response to the finitude of other people, and of human relationships themselves, as well as to the prospect of each individual's own death. Moreover, Kierkegaard's understanding of finitude embraces not just human life, but cultural life – and in particular the Christian form of life – which he perceived as extremely fragile in the face of accelerating tendencies of modernisation and secularisation.[22] To

suggest that we live in anticipation of loss is to point out that even as we engage in ethical activity we are confronted with the vulnerability of those beliefs, practices and concepts which give meaning to this activity.[23]

It is also important to note that in Kierkegaard's thought, the idea of anticipation relates not just to an end – whether this is one's own death, a bereavement, or a collective, cultural loss – but to the possibility of a new beginning.[24] If the Christian relates through repetition to the historical event of the Incarnation, she also relates through anticipation to the future prospect of eternal happiness. And this eschatological anticipation is blended with an anticipation of religious fulfilment in this life. Abraham, then, is someone who is 'great by virtue of his expectancy' because he 'expects the impossible' (*FT* 16): the restoration of his relationship to Isaac. The claim that this kind of anticipation is integral to Christian existence is borne out by the recurrent theme of expectation in Kierkegaard's religious discourses, such as those on patience and on the 'expectancy of faith'. For Heidegger, the future of Dasein seems to present only death, while for Kierkegaard it holds the possibility of what Paul calls 'new life' and a 'new creation'.

The moment

The most direct link between Kierkegaard's thought and Division Two of *Being and Time* is the section of *The Concept of Anxiety* that discusses 'the moment'.[25] Both of the footnotes in *Being and Time* that concern Kierkegaard allude to this text. The analysis of 'the moment' presented by Vigilius Haufniensis is difficult to follow, partly because it proceeds dialectically, considering several views in turn, and partly because the problem it addresses remains rather unclear. Nevetheless, it is possible to identify certain claims concerning the moment. First, it is a category of spirit, not of nature, arising from the fact that the human being is 'a synthesis of the temporal and the eternal' (*CA* 85). On this point, Vigilius Haufniensis echoes Constantin Constantius's claim that repetition belongs to nature rather than to spirit. Second, the moment is the medium within which significant change, or transition, occurs. The kind of change in question here seems to concern the events that structure the Christian life: conversion, repentance, atonement, redemption, and resurrection. All of these events involve a radical transition, that is to say a transition to a new kind of being, rather than a continuous progression or growth. Third, a proper understanding of 'the moment' cannot be based on a naive, everyday understanding of time as a succession of 'now' moments.[26] On the contrary, the moment signifies 'the fullness of time'.

This conception of the moment represents a philosophical appropriation of the Pauline theology that was so influential for Heidegger during the years leading up to the publication of *Being and Time*. 'The fullness of time' references Galatians 4:4, and Vigilius Haufniensis suggests that 1 Corinthians

offers a 'poetic paraphrase' of the moment. Here Paul writes of a resurrection to eternal life:

> Listen, I will tell you a mystery! We will not all die, but we will be changed, in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trumpet. For the trumpet will sound, and the dead will be raised imperishable, and we will be changed.
>
> (1 Cor. 15:51-2)

These biblical references confirm that 'the moment' and 'the fullness of time' signify a temporality in which extraordinary spiritual events occur. Events such as the Incarnation, final judgement, and resurrection of the dead do not take place *within* time, as this is ordinarily conceived. Instead, they point to a transformation or a rupture of this ordinary temporality; to a new possibility of a meeting-point between time and eternity, and between human beings and God. According to Vigilius Haufniensis, then, 'the moment' names a radically new conception of temporality, in which past and future – that is to say, the dimensions of time – are joined together in eternity:

> If the moment is posited, so is the eternal, but also the future, which reappears as the past … The pivotal concept in Christianity, that which made all things new, is the fullness of time, but the fullness of time is the moment as the eternal, and yet this eternal is at once the future and the past.
>
> (CA 90)

This is a difficult passage to make sense of, but we can at least recognise that the concept of the moment has both metaphysical and ethical implications. The idea of a meeting-point between time and eternity underlies the whole Christian doctrine of incarnation and salvation, but insofar as this has a metaphysical character it might be supposed to belong to a domain of theological speculation that lies beyond the legitimate reach of philosophy. However, as an existential and ethical idea, it indicates that the human being's encounter with God is a possibility that may occur at every moment of his or her life. In this sense, it is the possibility of living this life 'before God'. Of course, this can itself be interpreted in different ways. It may involve accepting a summons to examine one's conscience in the light of a demand such as loving one's neighbour as oneself; it may mean receiving each new day, whether happy or painful, as a gift from God; or it might mean repeatedly recognising one's own sinfulness, and maintaining hope for the fulfilment of a promise of eternal life. Understood as an ethical concept, 'the moment' renders the individual's temporal existence ecstatic. Even as it is implicated in the worldly time measured by minutes and hours and days, it remains open to something beyond itself that can cast it in a new light and thus reveal its meaning from the perspective of eternity.

If the moment signifies on the one hand a form of time that encompasses the past and the future, and on the other hand an existential possibility, this suggests that not only the future, but also the past can be encountered in the mode of possibility. Vigilius Haufniensis states that 'the past [may] stand in a relation of possibility to me … because it may be repeated, i.e., become future' (*CA* 91). This repetition of the past *qua* possibility indicates an account of freedom that can underpin the Christian message of forgiveness – an account according to which there can be freedom in relation to the past as well as in relation to the future. Thus the specifically Christian understanding of temporality that Kierkegaard seems to be reaching for in his pseudonym's discussion of the moment is not simply, or even primarily, a cosmological time for events such as incarnation and resurrection. It is also a time in which the being of existing individuals can be transformed, insofar as redemption from sin through forgiveness becomes possible.

Like the Danish *Øiblikket*, the German *Augenblick* means 'glance of an eye', and for this reason Robinson and Macquarrie translate it as 'moment of vision'.[27] In *Being and Time* Heidegger does not properly acknowledge his debt to Kierkegaard with respect to the moment, and to the issue of temporality more generally. Indeed, he criticises Kierkegaard for remaining bound to the ordinary conception of time: 'When Kierkegaard speaks of "temporality", what he has in mind is man's "Being-in-time". Time as within-time-ness knows only the "now"; it never knows a moment of vision' (*SZ* 338 n. iii). However, in his Freiburg lecture course on 'The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics' (1929-30) he states that:

> What we here designate as 'moment of vision' is what was really comprehended for the first time in philosophy by Kierkegaard – a comprehending with which the *possibility* of a completely new epoch of philosophy has begun for the first time since antiquity.
>
> (*FCM* 150)

Just as Kierkegaard's 'moment' encompasses all three temporal dimensions, so Heidegger's 'moment of vision', in being joined with 'repetition' (of the past) and 'anticipation' (of the future), testifies to the 'ecstatic' character of Dasein's temporality. And, as for Kierkegaard the individual's encounter with 'the eternal', or God, within the time of her own life is an ethical call to responsibility, so for Heidegger the moment of vision is a time for resolution or decision. However, this resoluteness connects the individual not to God, but to her whole temporal existence, stretched between what has been and what is to come. The *Augenblick* is 'the resolute self-disclosure of Dasein to itself' (*FCM* 149): it is, according to this formulation, a movement of self-relating that involves both consciousness (self-disclosure) and will (resoluteness). If, as Heidegger wants to argue in *Being and Time*, the human being simply *is* its time, and if the human being equally *is* its relationship to

itself and to its world, then existing authentically – that is to say, in a way that is true to one's own being – means taking up or appropriating one's own past and future in each moment.

The concept of the 'moment of vision', then, illustrates the close connection between the ethical and the ontological concerns at work in Heidegger's 1927 text. The question of who Dasein is – the question of the meaning of its being, which is itself inseparable from the question of the meaning of Being as such – leads directly to the question of how to live authentically, and vice versa. Again, this echoes the distinctive blend of ethical and ontological issues in Kierkegaard's works.

The meaning of being spirit

In this essay I have tried to argue that Kierkegaard's account of the human being as spirit is explicated in three temporal concepts – repetition, anticipation and the moment – which Heidegger appropriates in Division Two of *Being and Time*. Of course, this does not itself undermine Heidegger's claim in his footnotes on Kierkegaard that although the Danish thinker proposes some interesting concepts, he does not move beyond an 'existentiell' perspective, and thus fails to address the ontological questions proper to philosophy. As we have seen, Heidegger argues that thinking about human existence according to the category of spirit leaves the meaning of spiritual being uninterrogated – and Kierkegaard (and/or many of his pseudonyms) certainly belongs to the group of Christian 'spirit-thinkers' that Heidegger seeks to criticise. However, if Heidegger's own account of Dasein's temporality in terms of repetition, anticipation and the moment constitutes a legitimate philosophical working-through of the question concerning the meaning of human existence, then why is Kierkegaard's account of human life – and especially Christian life – in terms of these same three concepts not a legitimate philosophical response to the question of the meaning of being spirit? This latter question is, surely, the horizon for Kierkegaard's strange and diverse authorship. But if so, then Heidegger's judgment that Kierkegaard has 'nothing whatever to say' about the question of being must itself be interrogated further.

The present essay contributes to this interrogation by suggesting that the question of how we should appropriate our past – not just as philosophers, but as existing (and spiritual) human beings – is an important axis of the Heidegger–Kierkegaard relationship, as well as a central theme in Division Two of *Being and Time*. In invoking a concept of 'repetition' to articulate an authentic reception of history, Heidegger reactivates Kierkegaard's solution to an explicitly Christian dilemma concerning historicity and freedom. The very fact that Kierkegaard's Christian thought so lends itself to Heidegger's attempt to address the question of being through an existential analytic of Dasein calls into question Heidegger's attempt to distance himself from his

theological inheritance. But a further question underlies this one: whether Heidegger's repetition of key Kierkegaardian concepts produces something new – and, if it does, whether this is an impoverished account of the human spirit, or a liberated one.

Notes

1 On Heidegger's interest in early Christianity, see Van Buren 1994b and Kisiel 1994.
2 See *PRL* 22-39.
3 See *PRL* 72, 106-7; and Sheehan 1979.
4 See *PRL* 65-78.
5 See Van Buren 1994a: 163-4.
6 In his 1935 lecture 'An Introduction to Metaphysics' (*IM*) Heidegger seems to change his mind about 'spirit' and actually emphasises the link between 'spirit' and his existential conception of 'world', argues that 'spirit is the sustaining, dominating principle' of *Dasein*, and warns of the 'spiritual decline of the earth' in the modern, technological age. For a discussion of Heidegger's ambivalent attitude to the concept of spirit, see Derrida 1991.
7 See Hannay 2003: 64-75.
8 References to Kierkegaard's works use abbreviations given after their listings in this chapter's bibliography.
9 On the Hegelian background to Kierkegaard's concept of spirit, see Walsh 2009: 52-54.
10 See *SUD* 15.
11 See *SZ* 197-99.
12 See *SZ* 38.
13 See *Two Ages* (1846); *SZ* 127, 166-80; and Hoberman 1984.
14 See Carlisle 2013.
15 Letter to Karl Löwith, 20 September 1920. (See *BH* 97.)
16 See *CA* 18-19.
17 See Luther 1972: 257. It might however be argued that something like this is already implicit in Luther's own thought, which draws on Aristotelian categories, including that of *kinēsis*. For a discussion that touches on this question, see Van Buren 1994a: 168-70.
18 See Laertius 1979-80: 650-51.
19 For a discussion of Kierkegaard's analysis of death that highlights its influence on Heidegger, see Theunissen 2006.
20 See *SZ* 240-41, 246-49.
21 See *SZ* 260-67.
22 See Carlisle 2010: 21-24, 196-97.
23 See Lear 2006.
24 There are also echoes here of Climacus' claim in the *Postscript* that authentically becoming a Christian involves the transformation of 'an initial being-Christian into a possibility' – that is to say, the transformation of an (apparent) actuality into a possibility – and that precisely this movement constitutes the individual's 'appropriation' of Christianity.
25 *Øiblikket*, derived from *Øiets Blik*, 'a glance of the eye'; see Magurshak 1985; Pöggeler 1994.
26 See *CA* 82, 85-86.
27 See *SZ* 328, and p. 376 n. 2 in the Macquarrie and Robinson translation.

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4

DEATH, GUILT, AND NOTHINGNESS IN LUTHER, KIERKEGAARD, AND *BEING AND TIME*

George Pattison

In chapter I of Division Two of *Being and Time* Heidegger demonstrates how the seemingly impossible task of grasping Dasein's being-as-a-whole leads fundamental ontology to consider the question of death, for death would seem to be the moment when 'Dasein reaches its wholeness' (SZ 237). And yet, in that very same moment, Dasein 'simultaneously loses the Being of its "there"' (SZ 237). How is this contradictory event, this possibility that is at one and the same time impossible and my 'ownmost', to be understood? Mostly, Heidegger suggests, we prefer not to engage with it at all and flee into one or other way of concealing its real significance for us. However, he also suggests that it is possible to conceive of an existential stance in which Dasein can 'anticipate' or, as the German more graphically puts it, 'run towards' its death (SZ 262), accepting the reality that the existence into which it has been thrown is, in the end, thrown towards death, that it itself, as thrown, is thrown towards its own annihilation. It is such running towards death that gives 'the possibility of understanding one's *ownmost* and uttermost potentiality-for-being – that is to say, the possibility of *authentic existence*' (SZ 263). Following further analysis of what this involves Heidegger sums up:

> *anticipation [running-towards] reveals to Dasein its lostness in the they-self, and brings it face to face with the possibility of being itself, primarily unsupported by concernful solicitude, but of being itself, rather, as an impassioned* ***freedom towards death*** *– a freedom which has been released from the Illusions of the "they", and which is factical, certain of itself, and anxious.*
>
> (SZ 266)

All this, of course, is utterly central to what I am tempted to say is the average everyday way in which *Being and Time* has been understood,

namely, that it is a 'philosophy of death' in which authentic existence is found only in the unremittingly anxious eye-to-eye confrontation with death and, as such perhaps, a modern rewriting of ancient philosophical and religious traditions of the *memento mori*. I shall return to the question of Heidegger's relation to these traditions later in this chapter with particular reference to Luther and Kierkegaard, generally seen both as offering particularly radical Christian versions of the *memento mori* tradition and as having played an especially significant part in the genesis of *Being and Time* itself. With the further addition of Augustine, their role is clearly flagged in the 1928 article on Heidegger written for the encyclopaedia *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart* by Rudolf Bultmann in collaboration with Heidegger himself. There, Bultmann and Heidegger write:

> His work … repeats the problems of ancient ontology in order to radicalize them and outlines universal ontology which in addition includes the region of history. The fundament of this problematic is developed by starting from the "subject" properly understood as "human Dasein," such that, with the radicalizing of this approach the true motives of German idealism come into their own. Augustine, Luther, and Kierkegaard were influential [Heidegger's own preferred wording was 'philosophically essential'] for H. in the development of the [H.: a more radical] understanding of Dasein …
>
> (HM 331)

The article goes on to speak also of the parts played by Dilthey, Aristotle, scholasticism, Husserl, Rickert and Lask. Clearly, much of this goes beyond the question we are concerned with here, and all I want to emphasize by quoting it is the centrality of the contributions of Augustine, Luther, and Kierkegaard to the radicalizing of the understanding of human Dasein. However, it should also be said that although neither Luther nor Kierkegaard is specifically mentioned in the discussion of death, n. iv on p. 190 of *Being and Time*, where Heidegger is discussing anxiety, does refer to each of them, with particular emphasis on Kierkegaard as 'the one who has gone furthest in analysing the phenomenon of anxiety' (SZ 190). However, the intrinsic connection between anxiety and death in Heidegger's own analysis indicates that these two phenomena are effectively mutually defining. Strikingly, the notes taken on Heidegger's 1924 seminar on the problem of sin in Luther end with a quote from Kierkegaard that underlines just this connection: 'The principle of Protestantism has a special presupposition: a human being who sits there in *mortal anxiety* – in fear and trembling and great spiritual trial' (PSL 195, italics added).

As indicated, I shall return later to the question of how Luther's and Kierkegaard's understanding of death may relate to what we read in *Being and Time*. But first I want to continue where I broke off from considering

the argument of Division Two, Chapter 1. Heidegger has arrived at the characterization of an authentic freedom towards death that he describes as an existential projection of an ontological possibility. But, suddenly, in what might be seen as a Kierkegaardian pang of intellectual conscience, he wonders whether all of this might, 'from an existentiell point of view' seem to be 'a fantastical exaction' (*SZ* 266). In other words, putting it crudely, how does this relate or what difference might it make to human beings living their lives in the world. Isn't all this perhaps just a piece of philosophical speculative fancy? The charge that Heidegger's interest in pursuing a fundamental ontology does indeed blind him to the problems of concrete existence has been made by a number of critics, including, e.g., K. E. Løgstrup (1950: 51). However, Heidegger himself seems here to be acknowledging the force of such a complaint and attempting to address it. This provides him with the task now taken up in Chapter 3: 'an authentic potentiality-for-Being of Dasein, which will be attested in its existentiell possibility by Dasein itself' (*SZ* 267). Heidegger also glosses this as the question of the who or the self of Dasein, and asks how the they-self of the average everyday manner of existing that provided his starting-point might be modified so as to arrive at such 'an authentic potentiality-for-Being'. His answer leads him to the phenomenon of conscience, which, in his terms, proves to be what provides the required existentiell attestation to Dasein's 'potentiality-for-being-its-self' (*SZ* 268). Conscience, in turn, becomes refined into a kind of resoluteness that is prepared to accept itself as guilty for its own 'being-the-basis-of-a-nullity' (*SZ* 283).

The speed and confidence of Heidegger's move from a consideration of being-towards-death to the question of conscience might lead us to overlook some surprising elements in what he is asking us to accept. The problem, we recall, is how to find an existentiell attestation to an authentic comportment vis-à-vis death. The solution we seem to be being offered is derived from the analysis of conscience. But how can *conscience* help us in relation to death? Isn't the *Sitz-im-Leben* or form of life to which conscience most naturally relates that of moral life and the discernment of right and wrong as they bear upon my own moral conduct? And isn't that essentially independent from the question of death? Don't they belong to essentially different language-games? Of course, conscience has a certain culturally attested relation to death, as when the dying are required to examine their consciences and be ready to put right what conscience reveals to be wrong, and this is very much a part of a traditional (Christian and non-Christian) *ars moriendi*. But even in this situation the demands and directives of conscience are valid in their own right and are merely made more urgent by the imminence of death: it is not as if their content or obligatoriness is altered in any way by their association with death. But what is no less striking is that, given the fact that Heidegger has led us to considerations of conscience as a way of grounding the possibility of an authentic relation to death, death is never explicitly thematized in the entire chapter on conscience, except insofar as

we may legitimately read what is said about Dasein's being as characterized by nullity (*Nichtigkeit*) as an implicit reference to its annihilation in death.

Heidegger himself is not unaware of this oddity. As he asks at the beginning of Chapter 3 'What can death and the "concrete Situation" of taking action have in common?' (SZ 302) and even invites us to consider that the joining together of 'resoluteness' and 'anticipation' is 'an intolerable and quite unphenomenological construction, for which we can no longer claim that it has the character of an ontological projection, based upon the phenomena' (SZ 302). Heidegger's response is to ask two further rhetorical questions, to which (I believe) he implies a positive response.

> What if it is only in the anticipation of death that resoluteness, as Dasein's *authentic* truth, has reached the *authentic certainty* which *belongs* to it? What if it is only in the anticipation of death that all the factical '*anticipatoriness*' of resolving would be authentically understood … ?
>
> (SZ 302)

How, then, are we to understand the connection between conscience (resoluteness) and death (being-towards-death)? Let us look more closely at the text itself.

What Heidegger has to say about the call of conscience, how it calls, and how it 'discourses' will already strike many readers as strange. Dasein is revealed as both called and caller, and all it can say therefore is to 'report from the uncanniness of its thrown being' concerning the anxiety that, in this uncanniness, reveals it to itself as a being thrown towards nothingness (SZ 277). What it has to say about itself to itself therefore is, essentially, 'nothing'. As Heidegger puts it, 'the call discourses in the uncanny mode of *keeping silent*' (SZ 277). The silence of the grave, perhaps? But if that (i.e., nothing!) is what conscience *says*, how is Dasein itself to hear and to understand what is said? To what does conscience, in this case, direct it? Or what does it mean to be thus directed, by conscience, towards nothing?

Referring to the fact that 'all experiences and interpretations of the conscience are at one in that they make the "voice" of conscience speak somehow of "guilt"' (SZ 280), Heidegger asserts that the voice of conscience is only truly heard when the one concerned acknowledges his guilt. This, of course, is to be understood precisely and exclusively as an ontological guilt, not as a moral or legal guilt. That guilt is accepted 'as a predicate of the "I am"' (SZ 281) (rather than, let us say, 'I have done') is, however, only the starting point, since we must also remember that guilt – the German term means literally 'debt' – involves the idea of owing something or being responsible for it.[1] In the case of ontological guilt, then, being-guilty means being responsible for the being that I am. But Dasein's being, as we have seen, is defined by its being thrown towards death, its 'I am' is an 'I am not to persist in being'.

Ontological guilt, then, is, as Heidegger emphatically puts it, '"*Being-the-basis of a nullity*"' (*SZ* 283) or, more precisely still, a *thrown* nullity, such that the nullity of that in which and towards which it is thrown becomes determinative for the character of all its projected possibilities. Our 'guilt' thus extends to the entirety of our existence as finite beings who find themselves 'born to die'. We are guilty, that is, of our mortality. But this, I suggest, is strange. Acknowledging that neither Dasein nor, in this case, Dasein's mortality is to be viewed as if it were some kind of entity present-to-hand (i.e., 'mortality' is not an attribute of the 'substance' humanity but a certain 'how' of its manner of existing), it is strange – isn't it? – that a secular philosopher can come to portray Dasein's being-towards-death as something in relation to which it is appropriate to speak of *guilt*? Even if Heidegger has removed all forensic associations from his use of the word, in what way could we possibly be *responsible* for our having to die? Why not just acknowledge death as sheer, meaningless contingency, 'an accident', as Simone de Beauvoir put it (1969: 92)?

In terms of Heidegger's project, such an acknowledgement would be an act of surrender, an admission that we simply can't get a grasp on our being-as-a-whole. Even if we are ready to run towards our death, unless or until we are able to see ourselves as guilty, i.e., responsible, for our having to die our death will always, as it were, elude us and we all never, quite, catch up with who we really are. Of course, phrases such as 'impossible possibility' and the expressed doubt that he is making a 'fantastical exaction' in requiring a truly courageous and clear-sighted being-towards-death as the ground of existential authenticity indicate Heidegger's awareness that he is pushing at the boundaries of what can meaningfully be said. Yet he does – and, in his own terms, perhaps must – say it.

Must he? Again, why *guilt*? And why be guilty for the fact of my nullity, i.e., my thrownness towards death? Even if Heidegger does not want to go the way of French existentialism and embrace mere absurdity, why can he not limit himself to saying something like: and I am responsible for everything that falls this side of the limit at which I lose all possibility of self-consciousness? Why not invoke the old adage that where death is, I am not and where I am, death is not? On that basis, death would cease to be definitive of human being. It would be, as many experience it as being, a merely extrinsic characteristic of human being that does not, in fact, really define who I am at all. Death may be the end of my life, but it is not its *telos* and it is a purely illusionary reflection of the assumed 'forwards' movement of time that leads to our conflating 'end' and '*telos*' in this case. Perhaps this is merely to restate de Beauvoir's position (1969), although it does not involve what she further says of death: that in every case it is 'an unjustifiable violation' of human existence. No. It is too external to existence even to count as a 'violation'. Yet were Heidegger to make such a move he would have to surrender the ambition of grasping the whole. If ceasing to be is a

feature of the human condition it has somehow to be brought into the circle of self-understanding.

Nevertheless, I repeat, there is something strange happening here – strange, that is, for a secular philosopher. Of course, if we suddenly switch roles and begin to think as Christian theologians there is nothing strange about it at all! Is not one of the most widely testified elements of popular Christian teaching the claim that human beings are condemned to die as a consequence of their sin in disobeying God's command not to eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil? As Paul definitively stated in Romans 5.12: 'sin came into the world through one man [Adam], and death came through sin, and so death spread to all because all have sinned'; 'and all was for an apple … ' This Pauline argument is especially salient in the Augustinian tradition and, perhaps most vividly, in the articulation of that tradition by Luther and other theologians of the Protestant Reformation. The Augsburg Confession, a normative symbol of the Protestant Reformation, stated in its second article that:

> after the fall of Adam, all human beings are born in sin, that is, they are without fear of or trust in God, are full of concupiscence, and that this inborn sickness is truly sin that damns and throws to eternal death all those who are not then reborn through baptism.[2]

That death is in this way conceived (a) as a total and all-encompassing characteristic of human existence; (b) as a punishment for which each of us is rightly regarded as guilty and that (c) it is inseparable from the fact of our being born at all makes it entirely reasonable – in the Lutheran theological context – to speak of human beings as guilty of their having-to-die and also to understand this having-to-die as an essential and defining feature of humanity as it is and not a mere absurd excrescence.

Heidegger's strange move, then, seems entirely explicable if we read it against the background of such a theology. This is not to suggest that it is itself really only a piece of covert theologizing. Even on a purely phenomenological basis, why should not the 'theological' texts of Paul, Luther and others – as human texts – also be read as revealing fundamental truths of the human condition, albeit demythologized and stripped of their extra-worldly significations?

Now it has to be said that there is no direct paper trail to support a textual claim concerning this derivation of Heidegger's logic. The notes on Heidegger's 1924 Luther seminar do not directly mention death. Nevertheless, both they and the Luther texts he is expounding are focussed precisely on the issue of sin that Heidegger, following Luther, sees as indicating a radical *corruptio* of human existence that leads to horror, despair (PSL 189-90), and flight from the presence of God, revealing how fallen human beings 'are shaken and unsettled in their very being' (PSL 193). This flight seems to

plunge on into infinity and is compounded by the excuses and lies with which Adam, called to account by God, seeks to avoid responsibility for his fault (PSL 193). As I have just stated, Heidegger does not expressly mention the place of death in all this (nor is it salient in the Luther texts he is interpreting), but it is clear that Lutheran theology sees death as nothing if not the epitome and end of this entire situation of alienation from God. As in the previously cited quotation from Kierkegaard with which the seminar notes conclude, it is a cumulative portrait of human existence as indelibly marked by 'mortal anxiety'. The stage seems well-prepared for *Being and Time*.

Is what Heidegger says about the interconnection of death, guilt, and the defining nothingness of human existence simply a secularized version of radical Protestant theology? As I have said, a positive answer to this question would not of itself discredit his procedure, any more than the fact that other aspects of his thought involve interpretations of Aristotle or Plato. I am not therefore interested in unmasking a hidden theological agenda in Heidegger nor, for that matter, speaking as a theologian, am I interested in claiming him for theology as opposed to philosophy. Instead, what I want to do in the remainder of this chapter is to argue that, insofar as the existential structure unfolded in the discussion of death, conscience, and guilt is developed from the ontic material that Heidegger finds in the historical testimony of a particular line of Christian theologians, his use of this material occludes key elements that are present in the theologians – primarily Luther and Kierkegaard – under consideration. This is not just a matter of his not wanting to say anything about God, but the omission of what is anthropologically decisive for Luther and Kierkegaard themselves. Another way of saying this is that I shall argue that whatever we make of him as a philosopher, Heidegger is not, in fact, a very good theologian. That is to say, he is not a good reader of the texts on which he draws so that, by using a flawed 'ontic' base his own further 'ontological' investigation is significantly distorted. Nor – I should point out in advance – is the issue simply his self-limitation to the horizons of a methodological atheism. Rather, as I hope to show, it concerns in the first instance the purely human meaning of the texts.

I shall begin with some comments on Heidegger's reading of Luther and then go on to say something also about his interpretation of Kierkegaard, before seeing how what he omits might be retrieved at a phenomenological level, without regard to whether it also requires commitment to theological assumptions. In other words, insofar as what I am about to argue is theological it is, nevertheless, an exercise in theological anthropology that leaves open the further question as to whether or how this anthropology is grounded in or points beyond itself towards the formative power of a transcendent God in human life.

As I have indicated, Heidegger's own Luther seminar emphasizes the mortal anxiety of human existence under the sway of sin. Nor is he untrue

to the original texts in doing so. Sin is to be understood as a basic disposition, a fundamental affect rather than an accumulation of particular 'sins' (PSL 190), and, as such, is characterized by horror, suffering, presumption, pride, corruption, flight, hatred, despair, impenitence, excuses, and lies. As such it is a rejection of basic belief in the goodness of God and of God's command. Also – and interesting with regard to the *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart* article's mention of the role of Aristotle and the scholastics for defining certain ontological problems – Luther (as Heidegger notes) repeatedly polemicizes against both Aristotle and the scholastics. In Luther's own words 'no one can become a theologian unless he becomes one without Aristotle' (1957a: 12). He objects both to Aristotle himself and questions whether the scholastics have rightly understood him – although in one of the texts discussed, *The Heidelberg Disputation*, Luther does commend Plato and Anaxagoras at the expense of Aristotle for privileging the Infinite above form (Luther 1957b: 41). Even human beings' good actions are sinful since sin encourages us in an inappropriate self-confidence (what Luther, following Paul, calls 'boasting'), so that if we are to come into a positive relation to grace we must empty ourselves through suffering: 'To be born anew, one must consequently first die and then be raised up with the Son of Man. To die, I say, means to feel death at hand' (Luther 1957b: 55).

In relation to all of this, Heidegger seems to be in line with Luther's own thinking. But, of course, the seminar is based on a rather small selection of works from a rather large authorship, and three of these texts are specifically polemical in intent ('The Question of Man's Capacity and Will without Grace' (1516), the 'Disputation against Scholastic Theology' (1517); and 'The Heidelberg Disputation' (1518)), whilst the fourth, the commentary on Genesis, deals only with those passages discussing the Fall. But if we turn to Luther's pastoral and devotional works, we find something more that seems not to have interested Heidegger but that (I suggest) he might have benefited from attending to. Take for example the sermon on preparing to die from 1519. Here, and seemingly anticipating Heidegger's own insistence on the need to run towards death with open eyes, Luther writes that 'we should familiarize ourselves with death during our lifetime, inviting death into our presence when it is still at a distance and not on the move' (1969: 101-2). But what does such a familiarization with death involve? First, it means not allowing ourselves to get obsessed by devils, sin and punishment.

> The one and only approach is to drop them entirely and have nothing to do with them. But how is that done? It is done in this way: You must look at death while you are alive and see sin in the light of grace and hell in the light of heaven, permitting nothing to divert you from that view.
>
> (Luther 1969: 103)

Or, we should look on death 'only as seen in those who died in God's grace and who have overcome death, particularly in Christ and then also in his saints' (Luther 1969: 104). In fact, 'death, sin, and hell will flee with all their might if in the night we but keep our eyes on the glowing picture of Christ and his saints' (Luther 1969: 106). This is because, on the cross, Christ humbled himself under his suffering and focussed only on the will of the Father, which we too must emulate when and as we let images slip away and hold only to what the sacraments themselves really point to: 'God's words, promises, and signs' (Luther 1969: 109).

For Luther, human nothingness is not only or even primarily the nothingness of death, as it is for Heidegger, but it – and the nothingness also of death – is a nothingness before God and as such is the possibility also of being raised to life. In his lectures on the Magnificat (Mary's song of praise to God for having chosen her to be the mother of the Christ: see Luke 1.46-55), Luther draws a strong parallel between God's work in creation and in redemption: as God worked in creating the world, so too does he work in renewing it, and characteristic for every form of divine work is that God works alone and unaided:

> Just as God in the beginning of creation made the world out of nothing, whence he is called the Creator and the Almighty, so His manner of working continues unchanged. Even now and to the end of the world, all His works are such that out of that which is nothing, worthless, despised, wretched and dead, He makes that which is something precious, honourable, blessed and living. On the other hand, whatever is something, precious, honourable and living, he makes to be nothing, worthless, despised, wretched, and dying. In this manner no creature can work, no creature can produce anything out of nothing.
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> (Luther 1955: 299)

This is precisely what Luther sees exemplified in Mary, of whom he says, 'she boasts with heart leaping for joy and praising God, that He regarded her despite her low estate and nothingness' (1955: 301). But of this aspect of Luther, Heidegger says – and *Being and Time* reflects – nothing.

If we turn to Kierkegaard – another of the theological sources that Heidegger deemed 'philosophically necessary' for his project of radicalizing ontology – we see a comparable omission. Take Kierkegaard's 1846 discourse 'At a Graveside'. It is certainly possible and even likely that Heidegger encountered this particular discourse when a German translation was published in the Spring 1915 edition of *Der Brenner*, a radical Austrian cultural journal read by Heidegger and, in this case, especially memorable by virtue of its dedication to the memory of Georg Trakl and the inclusion of Trakl's *Last Poems* (amongst them *Heimkehr*, to which Heidegger would many years later

devote an important interpretative essay). The relevance of this particular discourse to Heidegger's position has also been argued by Michael Theunissen (2006), who claims that Heidegger's position is both close to and yet less radical than that of the Danish Christian writer.

Very much like Heidegger Kierkegaard insists that the only way to talk appropriately about death is to do so in such a way as to keep one's own death in view. Against Epicurus' statement that where death is I am not and where I am death is not, the person who thinks seriously about death does so as to confront death 'under four eyes', to use Kierkegaard's vivid Danish expression. The Epicurean ruse – or jest, as Kierkegaard refers to it – imagines death as something external, as a characteristic of 'the race', but not as my own. 'If one merely thinks death but not oneself in death' then one is jesting no matter how gruesomely one depicts the horrors of death (Kierkegaard 1998: 444). 'To think of oneself as dead is seriousness; to be witness to another's death is whimsy' (1998: 445).

A key theme is the distinction Kierkegaard draws between what he calls 'mood' (or, as I have just translated it, 'whimsy') and 'seriousness'. 'Mood' is, essentially, thinking about death in a thoughtless, sentimental, and non-serious way that fails to take into account another key term of the discourse, death's 'decisiveness'. 'Mood' and 'seriousness' think the same thoughts about death only they think them differently. Both recognize that, in death, 'all is over'. But 'mood' pictures this as a 'sleep' and thereby weakens the impression of death's decisiveness. However, as Kierkegaard says, 'the one who sleeps in death does not blush like a sleeping child, he does not renew his energy, like the man who is strengthened by sleep, nor do friendly dreams attend him in his sleep as they do the aged' (1998: 451). Seriousness too understands that in death 'all is over', but its attitude is 'let death then keep its power so that "all is over", but let life too keep its power to work while it is still day' (1998: 454). 'Death says: "maybe even today", but then seriousness says that whether or not it is today, I say: even today' (1998: 454). This is death's decisiveness, namely, that it turns us around so as to see what is really decisive – that is, what we are doing in our lives. Thus, as often in Kierkegaard, what we might take as the immediate or obvious sense of a word or phrase is transformed into its opposite: death's 'decisiveness' is precisely the revelation that death is not decisive.

Kierkegaard makes a similar point when he goes on to discuss how 'mood' and 'seriousness' respond differently to death's indeterminateness. By calling death 'indeterminate' he means that it is the same for all and it therefore seems impossible to characterize it in any specific way: death makes no distinction with regard to whether one is rich, poor, a leader of many, a world-historical personality, or just one of the crowd – and no one can be more or less dead when they're dead than anyone else. Reflecting on this, 'mood' consoles itself with the thought that all the inequalities and inequities under which I have suffered in life will be done away with in

death. But such an attitude is motivated by resentment against life and offers an intrinsically false consolation since those who can be satisfied with it will not be there to enjoy it when they are dead! Seriousness also understands the negation of worldly differences in death, but it understands them in quite another way. For serious persons will not let themselves be envious of others' distinctions but face to face with the prospect of annihilation will see in this a reminder of the equality of all human beings before God, an equality grounded in their common likeness to God. Not in the grip of violent images of destruction, serious persons do not wish the ruin of others' wealth or achievements but see the equality of death as a means of curing themselves from the vice of comparison, from desiring 'this man's gift and that man's scope' as Eliot would put it. Similarly, faced with the infinite varieties in which death can come, 'mood' seeks a logic or a meaning in this multiplicity, trying to come up with some explanation as to why one person dies a violent death and another lives to a ripe old age. But none of this is of concern to seriousness, which looks past the variety and uncertainty to the simple fact of death's certainty. This certainty, that the axe is already laid to the root of the tree, inspires the serious person

> to live each day as if it was the last and at the same time as if it was the first in a long life and to choose how he will live without regard to whether his actions will need a long life in order to be completed or merely a short time in which to have made a good beginning.
>
> (1998: 464)

Finally, Kierkegaard argues, death is inexplicable. Of course, people have explained it in many ways, as 'a transition, a transformation, a suffering, a battle, the final battle, a punishment, the wages of sin' and each of these, he adds, implies a whole view of life (1998: 466). But, Kierkegaard insists, these explanations do not 'explain' death so much as explain the enquirer's life. The question is not whether they are correct – since this cannot be answered, death being inexplicable – but whether they are able to have retroactive power in relation to how the individual is living. Death and our attitude to death are, in the end, a test of how we are living. This, Kierkegaard concedes, doesn't tell us all that much about death itself, but, as he adds, this very ignorance can remind us that 'knowing much is not an unconditional good' (1998: 468). And if death can indeed be regarded as rest for the weary or comfort for the sufferer, this can only be genuinely said by those who have earned such knowledge over time, who 'wearied themselves in good deeds, who walked courageously on the right path, who were afflicted in a good cause and who were misunderstood when they strove for what is noble' (1998: 468). In short, it is how we are in life that determines our relation to death and not vice versa. Death's inexplicability means that it cannot be incorporated into life, and for both these reasons the being of the living

human individual is not a being-towards-death. Rather, the blank wall of death, beyond which consciousness simply cannot penetrate, throws the individual back into life and designates life as his proper field of concern.

Noting that there is absolutely nothing in this discourse that introduces the Augustinian notion of death being a punishment for sin and therefore requiring human beings to adopt an attitude of guilt in relation to it, I agree with Theunissen that 'the discourse scarcely gives expression to the content of what Heidegger refers to as anticipation ("running-towards")' (2006: 338). Indeed it does not, since, as we see in Kierkegaard's polemic against speculation, he has from the beginning renounced Heidegger's ambition of leading the existing human individual to view himself as a whole.

Yet for Kierkegaard too, death would seem to be a barrier, marked, as Heidegger might put it, by a 'not'. In the light of death, we must turn back to life, but we do so knowing that life has no permanent or abiding substantial being and that to live is to be handed over to nothingness. At the same time, Kierkegaard is in essential agreement with Luther that since this is a nothingness before God it is also a site of potential transformation.

The theme of nothingness and transformation or, to use the religiously charged term 'transfiguration' that more fully reflects Kierkegaard's Danish, is found in many of his upbuilding discourses. In the discourse 'To desire God is a human being's highest perfection', for example, Kierkegaard tells the story of a self that grows dissatisfied with merely being a part of the world or nature rather than a self-directing centre of conscious freedom. As a result, it sets about trying to master itself and to get control of its own life. But this is not so easy. In fact, Kierkegaard seems to think, it is downright impossible, since no one is stronger than their self. In seeking to get a grip on ourselves, to permeate our existence with subjective freedom, we put ourselves in a scenario that Kierkegaard likens to a wrestling match between two exactly equal combatants. In such a situation, the self is fated to fight itself to a standstill, an impasse, in which it effectively annihilates itself. Yet this 'annihilation is his truth' (Kierkegaard 1990: 309) and, to the extent that a person accepts this annihilation as his subjective truth, the new possibility of the God-relationship, a relationship that restores him to himself but on a new and unshakeable basis. The shipwreck of human will and understanding clears a space for a foundational dependence on God that encompasses and permeates every aspect of the subject's life in the world. 'He who is himself altogether capable of nothing, cannot undertake even the smallest thing without God's help, that is to say, without being aware that there is a God' (1990: 322). To know that he is nothing is his truth, it is 'truth's secret', entrusted to him by God: in the acceptance of his nothingness he comes to know God.

Similarly in another discourse – 'The person who prays aright strives in prayer and triumphs by allowing God to triumph' – Kierkegaard will write that:

> At last it seems to him that he has become an utter nothing. Now the moment has come. Who should the one who thus struggles wish to be like if not God? But if he himself is anything [in his own eyes] or wants to be anything, then this something is enough to prevent the likeness [from appearing]. Only when he himself becomes utterly nothing, only then can God shine through him, so that he becomes like God. Whatever he may otherwise amount to, he cannot express God's likeness but God can only impress his likeness in him when he has become nothing. When the sea exerts all its might, then it is precisely impossible for it to reflect the image of the heavens, and even the smallest movement means that the reflection is not quite pure; but when it becomes still and deep, then heaven's image sinks down into its nothingness.
>
> (1990: 399)

As another discourse from the collection *Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits* (1847) will argue, this is the basic structure involved in being able to say that human beings are created out of nothing yet in such a way as also to be the living image of God.[3] As in Luther, the pattern of God's redemptive action vis-à-vis the anguished soul repeats his action in creation, each time creating out of nothing.

But could Heidegger have followed Luther and Kierkegaard in these further steps 'beyond nothingness' (if I may put it like that) without committing himself to their doctrinal beliefs about God's transcendence and, more particularly, about God's action in creation and redemption? I suggest that he could. Lévinas, of course, had his own theological commitments (although they were not those of Luther or Kierkegaard), but he too criticized Heidegger for seeing human beings' ultimate future solely under the rubric of being-towards-death. Appealing to all the work that remains to be done in the world for the building up of common human life and also to Ernst Bloch's philosophy of hope, Lévinas suggested that hope might be no less basic to being human than the anxiety of being eye to eye with death. And Bloch himself, despite his utopian tendencies, consistently stated his position as one of resolute atheism (Pattison 2011: 126-28). More recently and in a different philosophical key – but also without any direct invocation of the religious – Jonathan Lear (2008) has argued for radical hope as a basic possibility of human existence. But these names are mentioned here only indicatively. This is not the point at which to begin to develop a phenomenology of hope, secular or religious, that might comprise all that Heidegger has to say about death but not be limited by it. However, we can and perhaps should indicate that the decisive issue lies in the question of how far human beings find the ground of existential meaning in their mutual relations – Lévinas's ethics and Bloch's common work. Lear similarly locates the issue of hope in the fate of a human community that has been

threatened in its most basic values and the responsibility falling to the leader of that community to direct his people to a new future.

This might seem, paradoxically, to bring us back to the question mooted at the start of this chapter, namely, the connection between our relation to death and that of what we might call the moral or ethical sphere in which, I suggested, conscience has its natural *Sitz im Leben*. However, although both Lévinas and Bloch connect common ethical life with the possibility of hope, this is not seen by them as primarily a response to our having to die. And we have already seen something similar in Luther's and Kierkegaard's Christian reworkings of the question of death, which certainly allow the prospect of death to sharpen and give a certain urgency to our strivings to live according to the will of God, but which fundamentally ground our obligation to live lives of charity in our relation to God as creator and not in our mortality. It is perhaps worth adding (to underline the point), that, in their religious perspective, living in love will still be the business of our lives in heaven, when we have sloughed off mortality. There is an obligation that, literally, outlives mortality. That perspective, obviously, is not available to those who do not share their faith, but my point here is not to commend that faith, merely to highlight how it underwrites the independence of conscience from being-towards-death. They acknowledge anxiety in the face of death as a natural human response to ceasing to be, but their way of dealing with it is precisely to turn away from the vision of death itself to what should be engaging us in our lives. And it is in this regard that, as I suggested earlier, I see Heidegger as missing a key element in his own ontic 'religious' sources.

The question we have been considering is connected with another important interpretative question relating to *Being and Time*, namely, whether or in what way Heidegger there opens up the possibility of a fully ethical relation to others and whether and in what way such a relationship might be integral to authentic existence. Heidegger himself asserts that 'Resoluteness brings the Self right into its current concernful Being-alongside what is ready-to-hand, and pushes it into solicitous Being with Others' (SZ 298). Indeed, he adds, so little is conscience 'individualistic' that 'When Dasein is resolute, it can become the "conscience" of Others. Only by authentically Being-their-Selves in resoluteness can people authentically be with one another' (SZ 298). However, I suggest, this is something different from saying that the primary focus of conscience is on the need of the other or the cry of the oppressed, and there would seem to be a clear difference between the view (1) that the primary locus of authenticity is my relation to my own thrownness towards death and (2) that this locus is found in the relation to the Other. Where in Heidegger do we find the credo of Dostoevsky's Elder Zosima, that all of us are guilty of everything and before everyone and I more than others – a credo that was seminal for Lévinas's ethical view of life (Toumayan 2004)?

That Heidegger's early philosophy is not merely neutral with regard to such ethical possibilities but actively excludes them – and does so precisely by the

way in which it links conscience and death – was argued by the Danish philosopher of religion K. E. Løgstrup in a comparative study of Kierkegaard and Heidegger (1950). Heidegger does not imagine that human beings are the foundation of their own existence any more than Kierkegaard, but neither is there any infinite or eternal power to demand anything of us. The task of becoming who we are is a task to be undertaken in the face of – nothing at all: or, in other words, in the face of the sheer and simple fact that we were 'born to die'. Existence is only 'existence towards death' – and nothing more (Løgstrup 1950: 40-41). Facing up to death and realizing that it is what Heidegger calls one's 'ownmost possibility' reveals the finitude of all our existential possibilities, breaks the spell of the illusions spread by 'idle talk' and '*das Man*' and gives us a freedom for death (Løgstrup 1950: 43).

Both Heidegger and Kierkegaard address the question as to how we are to live authentically, but whereas for Heidegger becoming and remaining authentic is possible solely on the basis of confronting and accepting our own individual mortality in a radical and unflinching way, Kierkegaard makes the experience of the infinite demand absolutely central (Løgstrup 1950: 44-45). Løgstrup will go on to criticize Kierkegaard's limitation of this infinite demand to the divine–human relationship and the exclusion of mutual human relationships, but the case of Heidegger, he argues, is worse, since Heidegger's focus on the primacy of the self's relation to its own death leaves no scope at all for ethics. Ethical responsibility is always threefold: A is responsible to B for C, but Løgstrup sees such a structure as entirely lacking in Heidegger (and, for that matter in Kierkegaard). But, he comments, Heidegger is not a philosopher of *Existenz* (like Jaspers perhaps?) but an ontologist for whom the analysis of existence is only preliminary to a fundamental ontological interpretation and is not a means of clarifying actual, *existentiell* issues (Løgstrup 1950: 51). In this sense, the absence of ethics does not fundamentally worry him, since ethical issues arise only in and for those engaged with life in such an actual, existentiell way.

These few comments do not, of course, settle the matter,[4] but it is the argument of this chapter that, against the background of a misreading of such 'philosophically necessary' religious sources as Luther and Kierkegaard, Heidegger's account of conscience *at the very least* displaces the primacy of the ethical requirement in religious views of conscience and, by relating the phenomenon of conscience to being-towards-death as closely as he does, he also significantly weakens whatever grounds there may, in a humanistic perspective, be for hope in the face of death.

Notes

1 Thus the German version of the Lord's prayer is perhaps literally translatable into a form familiar from the Scottish version: 'forgive us our debts, as we also forgive our debtors'.

2 Cf. *Die Bekenntnis-Schriften der Evangelisch-Lutherischen Kirche* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1930), pp. 52-53.
3 Cf. Kierkegaard 2009.
4 On the other side, see, e.g., Hodge 1995 and Olafson 1998. However, it is perhaps not coincidental that in another study Olafson (1995) gives only three pages to the question of death, which seems surprising, given the central role that Heidegger himself attributes to it.

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5

ANXIETY'S AMBIGUITY

Being and Time through Haufniensis' lenses

Jeffrey Haynes

> I suppose that an evil spirit has put a pair of glasses on my nose, one lens of which magnifies on an immense scale and the other reduces on the same scale.
> (Kierkegaard 1987: 24)

In *The Concept of Anxiety*[1] (Kierkegaard 1980, hereafter CA) Vigilius Haufniensis tells us that while anxiety's 'object' is '*nothing*' – and this has various interrelated meanings including 'not something definite', 'not understanding sinfulness', and 'the nothing that pertains to one's being able' – anxiety's 'relation' to the 'nothing' is *ambiguous*: "the relation of anxiety to its object, to something that is nothing … is altogether ambiguous" (CA 43). Haufniensis spells out the ambiguity in this way: the relation to the 'nothing' is part *sympathetic*, part *antipathetic*.

> the individual's ambiguous relation, sympathetic and antipathetic.
> (CA 61)

> he stands in an ambiguous relation to it (sympathetic and antipathetic).
> (CA 97)

> The ambiguity lies in the relation … The relation, as always with the relation of anxiety, is sympathetic and antipathetic.
> (CA 103)

Insofar as anxiety is made up of an antipathetic and sympathetic aspect – two 'lenses' – it is a starkly ambivalent phenomenon. On the one hand the relation to the 'nothing' is disquieting, hostile, terrifying, provoking fleeing; on the other hand it is sweet, friendly, joyful, captivating. In short, the antipathetic 'lens' is repulsing – it repels one away from the 'nothing'; while the sympathetic 'lens' is attracting – it attracts one towards the 'nothing'. Thus we have a grip on anxiety's ambiguity: anxiety's object is 'nothing' and anxiety's relation to this 'nothing' is part antipathetic, part sympathetic.

However, in his central citation on anxiety Haufniensis demonstrates that what we are dealing with here is "elastic ambiguity" (CA 41):

> When we consider the dialectical determinations of anxiety, it appears that exactly these have psychological ambiguity. Anxiety is *a sympathetic antipathy* and *an antipathetic sympathy*.
>
> (CA 42)

On this fuller account anxiety's ambiguity has become intensified, for one 'dialectical determination' – the '*sympathetic antipathy*' – is itself made up of a sympathetic and antipathetic relation to the 'nothing', yet here the antipathetic aspect is the more aggravated; while the other 'dialectical determination' – the '*antipathetic sympathy*' – is likewise itself made up of an antipathetic and sympathetic relation to the 'nothing', yet here the sympathetic aspect is the more aggravated. Anxiety is spiraling in ambiguity as the sympathetic and antipathetic aspects intertwine in elasticity.

In this essay I will interpret the anxiety in *Being and Time* through Haufniensis' lenses. That is, I will show that Heidegger's anxiety is *ambiguous* in that it is structurally constituted by an *antipathetic* and *sympathetic* aspect, relating to 'nothing', and further, that these aspects continually entwine in elasticity. I will conclude by showing a crucial role that this ambiguous anxiety plays in the leading theme of *Being and Time* – the inquiry into the meaning of Being.

I

In Division One of *Being and Time* Heidegger characterizes what he calls anxiety's "general structure" (SZ 140). This is a tripartite structure made up of: 'anxiousness', anxiety's 'in the face of which [*Wovor*]', and anxiety's 'about which [*Worum*]'. 'Anxiousness' differs from the *Wovor* and *Worum* insofar as these latter structures have specific disclosures whereas 'anxiousness' highlights the fact that these disclosures *matter* to Dasein in some particular way (SZ 141). Heidegger tells us that anxiety is a distinctive state of mind because anxiety's *Wovor* and *Worum* "coincide" (or are "selfsame" (SZ 188)) insofar as "Dasein" (or "Being-in-the-world" (SZ 188)) is the disclosure of both.

> Anxiety … has its character formally determined by something *in the face of which* [*Wovor*] one is anxious and something *about* which [*Worum*] one is anxious. But our analysis has shown that these two phenomena coincide. This does not mean that their structural characters are melted away into one another … Their coinciding means rather that the entity by which both these structures are filled in is the same – namely Dasein.
>
> (SZ 342-43)

Rather than "melted away into one another", the *Wovor* and *Worum* are distinguished in that they are different "points of view" (SZ 140) – two 'lenses' – which serve as different "ways of looking at" (SZ 140) Dasein (or Being-in-the-world). In §41 Heidegger specifies the distinction: anxiety's *Wovor* discloses Dasein's *thrown Being*-in-the-world, while anxiety's *Worum* discloses Dasein's *potentiality-for-Being*-in-the-world.

> The entire stock of what lies therein may be counted up formally and recorded: anxiousness as a state-of-mind is a way of Being-in-the-world; that in the face of which [*Wovor*] we have anxiety is thrown Being-in-the-world; that which we have anxiety about [*Worum*] is our potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world. Thus the entire phenomenon of anxiety shows Dasein as factically existing Being-in-the-world.
>
> (SZ 191)

While anxiety's *Wovor* discloses Dasein's thrown Being and anxiety's *Worum* discloses Dasein's potentiality-for-Being, 'anxiousness' highlights the fact that these disclosures matter to Dasein in some particular way. I will now show that the disclosure of anxiety's *Wovor* matters in an *antipathetic* way – it is repulsing; while the disclosure of anxiety's *Worum* matters in a *sympathetic* way – it is attracting. In this way I will show that the *Wovor* is anxiety's antipathy, while the *Worum* is anxiety's sympathy. However, each 'lens' is not hermetically sealed off from the other, but rather each 'lens' has the disclosure of the other in its periphery. Thus, to speak precisely, the *Wovor* is anxiety's '*sympathetic antipathy*' while the *Worum* is anxiety's '*antipathetic sympathy*'.

Anxiety's 'sympathetic antipathy'

In the grip of anxiety's *Wovor* Dasein's absorption in the world is collapsed. In §40 Heidegger writes,

> Nothing [*Nichts*] which is ready-to-hand or present-at-hand within the world functions as that in the face of which [*wovor*] anxiety is anxious. Here the totality of involvements of the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand discovered within-the-world, is, as such, of no consequence; it collapses into itself; the world has the character of completely lacking significance.
>
> (SZ 186)

In the *Wovor* "[n]othing [*Nichts*] which is ready-to-hand or present-at-hand" is significant – that is, "[h]ere the totality of involvements" of intraworldly entities "collapses into itself", which means that in the *Wovor* equipment and other Daseins are not available for concern and solicitude but merely

show themselves in an "empty mercilessness". In §68(b) Heidegger emphasizes a specific implication of this collapse. Dasein's absorption in the world being 'collapsed' reveals that the possibility of inauthentic 'worldly' understanding is collapsed …

> In particular, that in the face of which [*Wovor*] one has anxiety is not encountered as something definite with which one can concern oneself … The present-at-hand must be encountered in just *such* a way that it does *not* have *any* involvement *whatsoever*, but can show itself in an empty mercilessness. This implies, however, that our concernful awaiting finds nothing [*nichts*] in terms of which it might be able to understand itself; it clutches at the "nothing" [*Nichts*] of the world … Anxiety discloses an insignificance of the world; and this insignificance reveals the nullity [*Nichtigkeit*] of that with which one can concern oneself …
>
> (SZ 343)

The fact that absorption in the world is collapsed, and intraworldly entities do "not have any involvement" but show themselves "in an empty mercilessness", "implies" or "reveals" that Dasein cannot understand itself inauthentically in terms of the 'world' while in the grip of anxiety's *Wovor*. For while it implies "that our *concernful awaiting* finds nothing [*nichts*] in terms of which it might be able to understand itself", note that 'concernful awaiting' is a technical term which characterizes this inauthentic understanding (SZ 337). Thus, if Dasein tries to understand itself in this way while in the grip of the *Wovor*, this is an "impossibility" (SZ 343), it merely "clutches at the "nothing" [*Nichts*]", for this inauthentic understanding is here rendered a "nullity [*Nichtigkeit*]". This deprivation is what Heidegger calls *forsakenness*. This "forsakenness" "radically deprives Dasein of the possibility of misunderstanding itself by any sort of alibi" (SZ 277).

But recall Heidegger's definition of the *Wovor*,

> that in the face of which [*Wovor*] we have anxiety is thrown Being-in-the-world …
>
> (SZ 191)

Thus in forsakenness [*Verlassenheit*] Dasein is *abandoned* [*Überlassenheit*] to its thrown Being-in-the-world. Heidegger's technical term for the disclosure of Dasein's thrown Being in anxiety is the disclosure of the '*that it is*' – "Anxiety … brings one back to the pure "that-it-is" of one's ownmost individualized thrownness" (SZ 343). This consists of a disclosure of the way Dasein always already is and must be – "the Being of Dasein can burst forth as a naked 'that it is and has to be'" (SZ 134). Heidegger tells us that this is an enigmatic disclosure, for questions which Dasein may pose

regarding its thrown Being-in-the-world – 'why', 'whence', 'whither' – remain unanswered: "The pure 'that it is' shows itself, but the "whence" and the "whither" remain in darkness" (SZ 134); "*That* it is factically, may be obscure and hidden as regards the "*why*" of it; but the '*that-it-is*' has *itself* been disclosed to Dasein" (SZ 276). In this way anxiety's *Wovor* reveals Dasein's thrownness – "the "that-it-is" … stares [Dasein] in the face [*vor*] with the inexorability of an enigma" (SZ 136).

Heidegger systematically states that the disclosure of anxiety's *Wovor* – both forsakenness and abandonment – matters in such a way that it is *threatening* – "That in the face of which [*Wovor*] one has anxiety is … threatening" (SZ 186). Dasein's forsakenness is threatening – "the threatening does not come from what is ready-to-hand or present-at-hand, but rather from the fact that neither of these 'says' anything any longer" (SZ 343) – and the revelation of its enigmatic 'that it is' is threatening – "That in the face of which [*Wovor*] one has anxiety is characterized by the fact that what threatens … is already 'there', and yet nowhere; it is so close that it is oppressive and stifles one's breath, and yet it is nowhere" (SZ 186).

Since anxiety's *Wovor* is threatening, it motivates Dasein to *flee* in the face of it and cover over and disguise this disclosure – that is, it motivates Dasein to flee into inauthenticity, which thereby "*tranquilliz*[*es*]" (SZ 177) anxiety (in inauthenticity Dasein is absorbed in the world such that intraworldly entities have involvement, and inauthentic Dasein is "fascinated" (SZ 76, 176) with these intraworldly entities to the extent of covering over anxiety's disclosure). Accordingly, Heidegger systematically states that Dasein flees in the face of its thrown Being-in-the-world ("uncanniness"), which is the disclosure of anxiety's *Wovor*.

> By this time we can see phenomenally what … fleeing, flees in the face of [*wovor*] … we flee in the face of [*vor*] the uncanniness which lies in Dasein – in Dasein as thrown Being-in-the-world, which has been delivered over to itself in its Being.
>
> (SZ 189)

And finally, note the etymological connection that Heidegger is making with anxiety's *Wovor* when he systematically refers to what motivates Dasein's fleeing as "that in the face of which [*Wovor*] Dasein flees", or as that which Dasein "flees in the face of [*vor*]" (SZ 184-85). Thus "that in the face of which [*Wovor*] Dasein flees" *is* "that in the face of which [*Wovor*] one has anxiety". It is the threatening *Wovor* which motivates Dasein's fleeing.

But now that I have sketched anxiety's *Wovor* I have shown that it is *antipathetic* – it repels Dasein away from anxiety's disclosure. The *Wovor* is anxiety's antipathy. However, the *Wovor* is not hermetically sealed off from the *Worum*, for in revealing the 'that it is' it has the disclosure of the *Worum* (potentiality-for-Being) in its periphery – "the '*that-it-is*' has *itself* been

disclosed to Dasein. … This … brings Dasein … face to face [*vor*] with the fact 'that it is, and that it has to be something with a potentiality-for-Being as the entity which it is'" (*SZ* 276). But since the disclosure of Dasein's potentiality-for-Being in the *Worum* is, as I will show in the next section, sympathetic, this means that the *Wovor* though primarily antipathetic has sympathy in its periphery – the *Wovor* is the '*sympathetic antipathy*'.

Anxiety's 'antipathetic sympathy'

Recall Heidegger's definition of anxiety's *Worum*,

> that which we have anxiety about [*Worum*] is our potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world.
>
> (*SZ* 191)

Heidegger tells us that Dasein's "potentiality-for-Being, lies existentially in understanding" (*SZ* 143). Heidegger is clear that what he means by 'understanding' here is simply "'being competent to do something'", and more specifically "that which we have such competence over is not a "what", but Being as existing" (*SZ* 143). Dasein's understanding is its competence (as existing), and Dasein's potentiality-for-Being is, likewise, its ability (as existing). Further, while Dasein's potentiality-for-Being marks this ability, there are two basic, antithetical, *existentiell* ways in which Dasein may enact this ability – "as potentiality-for-Being, understanding has itself possibilities … Understanding is either authentic … or inauthentic" (*SZ* 146). That is, Dasein's potentiality-for-Being allows for either an authentic or inauthentic existentiell potentiality-for-Being.

Now, anxiety's *Worum* reveals Dasein's potentiality-for-Being, and therewith discloses the existentiell authentic variety of this potentiality-for-Being. Heidegger writes in §40,

> Therefore, with that which it is anxious about [*Worum*], anxiety discloses Dasein *as Being-possible* … Anxiety makes manifest in Dasein its *Being towards* its ownmost potentiality-for-Being – that is, its *Being-free for* the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself. Anxiety brings Dasein face to face with its *Being-free for* (*propensio in*…) the authenticity of its Being, and for this authenticity as a possibility which it always is.
>
> (*SZ* 187-88)

Thus anxiety's *Worum* reveals Dasein's potentiality-for-Being – "Anxiety makes manifest in Dasein its *Being towards* its ownmost potentiality-for-Being" – and therewith discloses Dasein's existentiell authentic potentiality-for-Being. Indeed, Heidegger had already stated this second point,

> Anxiety throws Dasein back upon that which it is anxious about [*worum*] – its authentic potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world.
>
> (SZ 187)

Dasein's existentiell authentic potentiality-for-Being in its fullest expression is *anticipatory resoluteness*, which is not defined in regard to the content of particular for-the-sakes-of-which – for "[t]hat which anxiety is profoundly anxious about [*Worum*] is not [*nicht*] a *definite* … possibility" (SZ 187) – but is defined in regard to the *form* in which any for-the-sakes-of-which are taken up. This form is such that Dasein projects in a way in which anxiety's disclosure is transparent (i.e. it is not covered over and disguised by fleeing). Heidegger tells us that anticipation is a form of projection such that Dasein does "*not evade* … or *cover up*" anxiety's disclosure "by thus fleeing from it", but projects "without either fleeing it or covering it up" (SZ 260). Likewise resoluteness is a form of projection which does not flee from anxiety and cover over its disclosure, but has "a readiness for anxiety" (SZ 296) and indeed "exact[s] anxiety of oneself" (SZ 305).

As the quote above specifies, anxiety's *Worum* discloses Dasein's authentic potentiality-for-Being (anticipatory resoluteness) as a possibility which can be chosen – "Anxiety makes manifest in Dasein … its *Being-free for* the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself". In such a choice Dasein chooses its authenticity, and retains a transparency of anxiety's disclosure (in authenticity Dasein is absorbed in the world such that intraworldly entities have involvement, yet authentic Dasein is not fascinated with these intraworldly entities but retains a transparency of anxiety's disclosure while absorbed). But also note that in the above quote Heidegger specifies that the *Worum* actually expresses a *propensity towards* this authenticity – "(*propensio in* …) the authenticity of its Being".

The possibility of anticipatory resoluteness matters in such a way that it gives Dasein an 'unshakable *joy*' – "there goes an unshakable joy in this possibility" (SZ 310). Heidegger tells us that this is joyful because this possibility gives Dasein "power" over its existence in such a way that (absorbed in the world with intraworldly entities) "Self-concealments" and "Illusions" are dispelled: "Anticipatory resoluteness is … the possibility of acquiring *power* over Dasein's *existence* and of basically dispersing all fugitive Self-concealments. … it brings one without Illusions into the resoluteness of 'taking action'" (SZ 310). With anxiety's disclosure transparent 'Self-concealments' and 'Illusions' are dispelled, and projecting with such a lucidity (and yet absorbed) gives Dasein the 'unshakable joy'.

But now that I have sketched anxiety's *Worum* I have shown that it is *sympathetic* – it attracts Dasein towards anxiety's disclosure. The *Worum* is anxiety's sympathy. However, the *Worum* is not hermetically sealed off from the disclosure of the *Wovor*, for in revealing Dasein's potentiality-for-Being (possibility), it has the disclosure of the *Wovor* (thrownness) in its

periphery – "Dasein is Being-possible which has been delivered over to itself – *thrown possibility* through and through. Dasein is the possibility of Being-free *for* its ownmost potentiality-for-Being" (*SZ* 144). But since the disclosure of Dasein's thrownness in the *Wovor* is antipathetic, this means that the *Worum* while primarily sympathetic has antipathy in its periphery – the *Worum* is the '*antipathetic sympathy*'.

***

Thus Heidegger's anxiety is constituted by a '*sympathetic antipathy*' and an '*antipathetic sympathy*', and further, these 'dialectical determinations' are simultaneous, for each 'lens' indeed has the disclosure of the other in its periphery. Both the *Wovor* and *Worum* disclose Dasein (or Being-in-the-world) and anxiousness highlights the fact that these disclosures matter in some particular way. Through the 'lens' of the *Wovor* Dasein's absorption in the world is collapsed implying that Dasein is deprived of its inauthentic 'worldly' understanding. In this forsakenness Dasein is abandoned to its thrown Being and the enigmatic 'that it is' is revealed. Both the forsakenness and the 'that it is' threaten. This motivates Dasein to flee in the face of this threat, into inauthenticity (and fascinated absorption), and cover over and disguise (tranquilize) anxiety. The *Wovor* repels Dasein away from anxiety, yet it has attraction in its periphery. Through the 'lens' of the *Worum* Dasein's potentiality-for-Being, and therewith the existentiell authentic variety, are disclosed. Anticipatory resoluteness is the potentiality-for-Being which projects in such a way that anxiety's disclosure is transparent. Here Dasein has a propensity towards this potentiality-for-Being, and, if chosen, Dasein retains a transparency of anxiety's disclosure in its authenticity (and non-fascinated absorption), and projecting with such a lucidity brings Dasein the 'unshakable joy'. The *Worum* attracts Dasein towards anxiety, yet it has repulsion in its periphery. Anxiety is ambiguous – "Anxiety is a *sympathetic antipathy* and an *antipathetic sympathy*".[2]

II

Whereas in Division One of *Being and Time* Heidegger lays out the 'general structure' of anxiety, in Division Two Heidegger echoes this structure in relation to two 'forms' of anxiety – what I will call conscience-anxiety and death-anxiety. Heidegger writes of "[t]he fact of the *anxiety of conscience*" (*SZ* 296) and tells us that "Being-towards-death is essentially anxiety" (*SZ* 266). I will show that, being 'forms' of anxiety, both conscience-anxiety and death-anxiety themselves express anxiety's 'general structure' – that is, they are both *ambiguous* in that they are both themselves structurally constituted by the *antipathetic Wovor* and *sympathetic Worum*. Now, what is distinctive about conscience-anxiety is that it relates to the 'nullity [*Nichtigkeit*]' of Dasein, while death-anxiety is distinctive in that it relates to the 'nothing

[*Nichts*]' of Dasein. But, to be precise, I will show that while conscience-anxiety has an antipathetic (*Wovor*) and sympathetic (*Worum*) relation to the *Nichtigkeit*, here the *sympathetic Worum* is the more intensified. And while death-anxiety has a sympathetic (*Worum*) and antipathetic (*Wovor*) relation to the *Nichts*, here the *antipathetic Wovor* is the more intensified. That is, conscience-anxiety is the '*antipathetic sympathy*' while death-anxiety is the '*sympathetic antipathy*'.

Anxiety's 'antipathetic sympathy'

Heidegger writes of "[t]he fact of the *anxiety of conscience*" and tells us that the call of conscience is "a mode of *discourse*" (SZ 269). All modes of discourse include the two structural aspects – "*something said-in-the-talk*" (SZ 162) and "[t]hat which the discourse is *about* [*Worüber*]" (SZ 161) – and these two aspects have an internal relation to one another. For Heidegger tells us that in (genuine) discourse the former is "drawn *from*" the latter so that the latter is made "manifest" (SZ 32) by the former. Now, 'what is said' in the call of conscience is "nothing [*nichts*]" (SZ 273), and the call's *Worüber* is Dasein's "ownmost potentiality-for-Being" (SZ 272-73). Thus,

> 'Nothing' [*nichts*] gets called *to* this Self, but it has been *summoned* to itself – that is, to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being.
>
> (SZ 273)

With this introduction to the call of conscience Heidegger is laying the grounds for an ambiguous account of conscience-anxiety. When Dasein hears the call, it will be listening to *nichts*, which implies that Dasein's inauthentic "listening-away [to the "they" and its 'idle-talk'] … get[s] broken off" and "the "*they*" collapses … into insignificance" (SZ 271, 273). The "they" (and its 'idle-talk') provides a "protecting shelter" (SZ 170) from anxiety, and when Dasein hears the call "the appeal has robbed [Dasein] of this lodgement and hiding-place" (SZ 273). This listening to *nichts*, and therewith the collapse of the "they" into insignificance, expresses the forsakenness of anxiety's *Wovor* – that is, hearing the *nichts* "reveals the nullity [*Nichtigkeit*] of that with which one can concern oneself". But also this *nichts* of 'what is said' makes 'manifest' the call's *Worüber* – Dasein's "ownmost potentiality-for-Being" – and this *Worüber* expresses anxiety's *Worum* (note the etymological connection).

Heidegger goes on to specify in more detail his account of ambiguous conscience-anxiety. He first echoes the 'general structure' of anxiety – that "that in the face of which [*Wovor*] we have anxiety is thrown Being-in-the-world ['uncanniness']; that which we have anxiety about [*Worum*] is our potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world":

> Uncanniness reveals itself authentically in the basic state-of-mind of anxiety; and, as the most elemental way in which thrown Dasein is

> disclosed, it puts Dasein's Being-in-the-world face to face [*vor*] with the "nothing" [*Nichts*] of the world; in the face of this "nothing", Dasein is anxious with anxiety about [*um*] its ownmost potentiality-for-Being.
>
> (*SZ* 276)

After echoing this 'general structure', Heidegger then specifies how conscience-anxiety expresses this structure. For he then tells us that the "caller" (who is 'saying' *nichts*) is the disclosure of conscience-anxiety's *Wovor*, and what Dasein is "summon[ed] … towards" in the call (the call's *Worüber*) is the disclosure of conscience-anxiety's *Worum*:

> The caller is Dasein in its uncanniness: primordial, thrown Being-in-the-world as the "not-at-home" – the bare 'that-it-is' in the "nothing" [*Nichts*] of the world. … But what is Dasein even to report from the uncanniness of its thrown Being? *What* else remains for it than its own potentiality-for-Being as revealed in anxiety? How else is "it" to call than by summoning Dasein towards this potentiality-for-Being, which alone is the issue?
>
> (*SZ* 276-77)

The "caller" is defined by Heidegger as "Dasein in its uncanniness: primordial, *thrown* Being-in-the-world … the bare '*that-it-is*' in the "nothing" [*Nichts*] of the world" – thus the caller is conscience-anxiety's *Wovor*. And the caller "summon[s] Dasein towards" "its own potentiality-for-Being *as revealed in anxiety*" – thus what Dasein is 'summoned towards' is conscience-anxiety's *Worum*.

Heidegger highlights that both the *Wovor* and *Worum* are disclosed in the call by systematically writing that the call simultaneously calls *back* and *forth* – "We have not fully determined the character of the call as disclosure until we understand it as one which calls us back in calling us forth" (*SZ* 280). The call calls forth to conscience-anxiety's *Worum* ('summoned towards' the call's *Worüber*),

> the call … calls Dasein forth (and 'forward') into its ownmost possibilities, as a summons to its ownmost *potentiality*-for-Being-its-Self.
>
> (*SZ* 273)

However, the call simultaneously calls Dasein back to conscience-anxiety's *Wovor* (the 'caller' 'saying' *nichts*),

> the call 'says' *nothing* [*nichts*] … but the "whence" from which [the caller] calls does not remain a matter of indifference for the calling.

> This "whence" – the uncanniness of thrown individualization – gets called too in the calling; that is, it too gets disclosed. In calling forth to something, the "whence" of the calling is the "whither" to which we are called back.
>
> (*SZ* 280)

Now, what is distinctive about conscience-anxiety is that in this 'form' it is the *Nichtigkeit* of Dasein that is revealed. For Dasein "*is permeated with nullity* [*Nichtigkeit*] *through and through*" (*SZ* 285) – and this permeation of *Nichtigkeit* is what Heidegger calls Dasein's 'Being-guilty'. Thus while the call calls back to the *Wovor* and forth to the *Worum*, regarding this 'Being-guilty' (*Nichtigkeit*) Heidegger specifies,

> The voice does call back … back to the Being-guilty into which one has been thrown … But at the same time, this calling-back calls forth to *Being*-guilty, as something to be seized upon in one's own existence …
>
> (*SZ* 291)

Thus in conscience-anxiety Dasein is called back to the *Wovor* ('caller' 'saying' *nichts*) which reveals the *Nichtigkeit* that permeates Dasein's thrownness – "the Being-guilty into which one has been *thrown*"; and Dasein is called forth to the *Worum* ('summoned towards' the *Worüber*) which reveals the *Nichtigkeit* that permeates Dasein's potentiality-for-Being, and which reveals Dasein's authentic potentiality-for-Being – "*Being*-guilty, as something to be seized upon in one's own *existence*". But the former disclosure is antipathetic while the latter is sympathetic.

The call calls Dasein back to the *Nichtigkeit* of the *antipathetic Wovor*:

> As being, Dasein is something that has been thrown; it has been brought into its "there", but *not* [*nicht*] of its own accord. … as long as Dasein is, *Dasein … is* constantly its 'that-it-is' … Although it has *not* [*nicht*] laid that basis *itself* … The Self … can *never* [*nie*] get that basis into its power … Thus "Being-a-basis" means *never* [*nie*] to have power over one's ownmost Being from the ground up. This "*not*" [*Nicht*] belongs to the existential meaning of "thrownness". It itself, being a basis, *is* a nullity [*Nichtigkeit*] of itself.
>
> (*SZ* 284)

Hearing the *nichts* collapses Dasein's absorption in the world implying the *Nichtigkeit* of inauthentic 'worldly' understanding, and in this forsakenness the enigmatic *Nichtigkeit* that permeates the 'that it is' – the way Dasein always already is and must be – is revealed in the *Wovor*. Here Dasein faces the enigma that while it *is* its 'that it is' – "*Dasein … is* constantly its 'that-it-is'" – it did *not*

[*nicht*] lay this basis itself of its own accord – "but *not* [*nicht*] of its own accord … it has *not* [*nicht*] laid that basis *itself*". In this sense it is revealed that Dasein "*is* a nullity [*Nichtigkeit*] of itself". This reveals Dasein's *powerlessness*, for it reveals that Dasein "can *never* [*nie*] get that basis into its power". Dasein finds itself always already thrown into its basis, and as such, it is forced to face the fact that not only has it "not [*nicht*]" laid that basis itself of its own accord, but that it can "never [*nie*]" get "back behind" (*SZ* 284) that basis and lay it itself of its own accord, even though it is this basis. This powerlessness is constitutive of Dasein's thrownness and conscience-anxiety's *Wovor* reveals this.

Conscience-anxiety's *Wovor* is an antipathetic disclosure. In hearing the *nichts* of the call "the "they" collapses … into insignificance" – Dasein is powerless in the face of the *Nichtigkeit* of inauthentic understanding – while the enigmatic *Nichtigkeit* that permeates the 'that it is' reveals the powerlessness that is constitutive of Dasein. This disclosure "threat[ens]" Dasein (*SZ* 277), and motivates it to cover over and disguise the *Nichtigkeit* by fleeing into inauthenticity which tranquilizes anxiety. Conscience-anxiety's *Wovor* repels away from the *Nichtigkeit*.

> In the face of [*vor*] its thrownness Dasein flees to the relief which comes with the supposed freedom of the they-self. This fleeing has been described as a fleeing in the face of [*vor*] the uncanniness which is basically determinative for individualized Being-in-the-world.
>
> (*SZ* 276)

Conscience-anxiety is ambiguous and the call simultaneously calls Dasein forth to the *Nichtigkeit* of the *sympathetic Worum*:

> in having a potentiality-for-Being it always stands in one possibility or another: it constantly is *not* [*nicht*] other possibilities, and it has waived these in its existentiell projection. … *as projection* it is itself essentially *null* [*nichtig*]. … The nullity [*Nichtigkeit*] we have in mind belongs to Dasein's Being-free for its existentiell possibilities.
>
> (*SZ* 285)

The *Worum* reveals Dasein's potentiality-for-Being, and in conscience-anxiety the *Nichtigkeit* that permeates this potentiality-for-Being is revealed – "*as projection* it is itself essentially *null* [*nichtig*]". Here it is revealed that Dasein's potentiality-for-Being is such that when Dasein projects upon a possibility, it is thereby "*not* [*nicht*] other possibilities" – "one's not having chosen [*Nichtgewählthabens*] the others and one's not being able to choose [*Nicht-auchwählenkönnens*] them" (*SZ* 285) is revealed. Now, anxiety's *Worum* not only reveals Dasein's potentiality-for-Being – and for conscience-anxiety this also means the *Nichtigkeit* that permeates this potentiality-for-Being – but also therewith reveals Dasein's authentic existentiell potentiality-for-Being.

Indeed here the *Nichtigkeit* is integral in providing Dasein with power, for "[t]he nullity [*Nichtigkeit*] we have in mind belongs to Dasein's Being-free for its existentiell possibilities" and in particular anxiety's *Worum* discloses Dasein's "*Being-free for* (*propensio in* …) the authenticity of its Being".

Dasein's authentic potentiality-for-Being is not defined in regard to the content of particular for-the-sakes-of-which but is the form of projection – such that anxiety's disclosure remains transparent – and this means for conscience-anxiety that the *Worum* presents the form of projection in which the *Nichtigkeit* is transparent. This is the meaning of the above citation which specified that the call calls Dasein forth to "*Being*-guilty, as something to be seized upon in one's own existence". The call calls forth to the *Worum* and presents Dasein with the form of projection which 'seizes upon' 'Being-guilty' (*Nichtigkeit*). This form of projection is *resoluteness* – "We have defined "resoluteness" as a projecting of oneself upon one's own Being-guilty" (*SZ* 382). Dasein's authentic potentiality-for-Being gives Dasein an 'unshakable joy' since it is "the possibility of acquiring *power* over Dasein's *existence* and of basically dispersing all fugitive Self-concealments". Thus conscience-anxiety's *Worum*, in presenting resolute projection, presents Dasein with an expression of its *power*. With 'Self-concealments' dispelled, and the *Nichtigkeit* transparent, Dasein can seize its power in its authenticity, and projecting with such a lucidity brings Dasein the 'unshakable joy'. Conscience-anxiety's *Worum* attracts towards the *Nichtigkeit*.

Thus conscience-anxiety is ambiguous. While the call of conscience is a mode of discourse, and thus includes the two structural aspects – the 'caller's' 'what is said' and the *Woriiber* – each of which has an internal relation to the other, Dasein is called back to the 'lens' of conscience-anxiety's *antipathetic Wovor* which reveals the former, while Dasein is simultaneously called forth to the 'lens' of conscience-anxiety's *sympathetic Worum* which reveals the latter.

Now, not only is conscience-anxiety ambiguously constituted by the *Wovor* and *Worum*, but in conscience-anxiety the *sympathetic Worum* is the more intensified. As noted, 'what is said' in (genuine) discourse is 'drawn from' and makes 'manifest' the *Woriiber*. Thus the "tendency" (*SZ* 273) of the call is precisely to 'make manifest' the *Worum*. This is emphasized by Heidegger when he systematically writes (with italics) that the call is an "*appeal*" and a "*summon*[*s*]" (*SZ* 269, 273, 279) to the disclosure of the *Worum*. The call is the strongest expression of that propensity towards – "*propensio in* …" – Dasein's authenticity which is constitutive of anxiety's *Worum*. Indeed, Heidegger emphasizes the sympathetic *Worum* so much in conscience-anxiety that he feels obligated to clarify that the *Wovor*, though diminished, is not extinguished: he feels obligated to note that the *Wovor* "gets called *too* in the calling; that is, it *too* gets disclosed". Thus, while conscience-anxiety is constituted by the antipathetic *Wovor* and sympathetic *Worum*, relating to the *Nichtigkeit*, the *Worum* is the more intensified – conscience-anxiety is the '*antipathetic sympathy*'.

Anxiety's 'sympathetic antipathy'

Heidegger's existential conception of death is "Being-towards-death" (or "Being-towards-the-end") and, after telling us that existential death is "a way to be" (SZ 245), Heidegger writes, "Being-towards-death is essentially anxiety". Heidegger defines death as made up of the two structural aspects – 'Dasein's *possibility* (potentiality-for-Being)' and 'the *impossibility* of Dasein' – which have an internal relation to one another. For Heidegger defines death as 'the possibility of the impossibility of Dasein'.

> Death is the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein.
> (SZ 250)

> [Death is] *the possibility of the impossibility of any existence at all*.
> (SZ 262)

> [Death is] the possibility of the measureless impossibility of existence.
> (SZ 262)

Heidegger further specifies this interplay between 'possibility' and 'impossibility' by way of what he calls death's *indefiniteness*. Heidegger first tells us that death is such that it remains 'indefinite' as to 'when' the *impossibility becomes possible* (i.e. 'when' the impossibility of Dasein 'becomes' Dasein's possibility):

> [Death is] a potentiality-for-Being which is certain and which is constantly possible in such a way that the "when" in which the utter impossibility of existence becomes possible remains constantly indefinite [.]
> (SZ 265)

Heidegger then tells us that death is such that it remains 'indefinite' as to 'when' the *possibility becomes an impossibility* (i.e. 'when' Dasein's possibility 'becomes' the impossibility of Dasein):

> [Death is] a possibility which is constantly certain but which at any moment remains indefinite as to when that possibility will become an impossibility.
> (SZ 308)

What these citations are expressing is that it is 'indefinite' as to 'when' the possibility will become impossibility, or the impossibility will become possibility, because, for the existential conception of death, Dasein's possibility and the impossibility of Dasein constantly stand in *opposition* to one another (in a manner of speaking, 'Dasein's possibility' will *never* 'become'

'the impossibility of Dasein', and vice versa). That is, while 'Dasein's possibility' and 'the impossibility of Dasein' are the two structural aspects which make up the existential conception of death, and while these have an internal relation, the two constantly stand in opposition. Heidegger is here warding off a misunderstanding of his conception of death – the idea that existential death is something that can be "actualized" (*SZ* 261, 262) (in a manner of speaking, the idea that 'Dasein's possibility' can 'become' 'the impossibility of Dasein', and vice versa). For if death were 'actualized', "Dasein would deprive itself of the very ground for an existing Being-towards-death" (*SZ* 261) – Dasein would be "annihilated" (*SZ* 236) – and thus there would be no 'ground' for an existential conception of death (for existential death is 'a way to be').

Through his explication of death's 'indefiniteness' the grounds are laid for an account of ambiguous death-anxiety. For Heidegger tells us,

> The indefiniteness of death is primordially disclosed in anxiety.
> (*SZ* 308)

As mentioned above, Heidegger notes that while anxiety's *Wovor* and *Worum* both disclose Dasein, "[t]his does not mean that their structural characters are melted away into one another". Accordingly, death-anxiety discloses the indefiniteness of death, that is, it simultaneously discloses 'the impossibility of Dasein' and 'Dasein's possibility' such that these constantly stand in opposition (in a manner of speaking, they are not 'melted away into one another'). As I will now show, it is death-anxiety's *antipathetic Wovor* which discloses the impossibility of Dasein, while it is death-anxiety's *sympathetic Worum* which discloses Dasein's possibility.

Heidegger first echoes the 'general structure' of anxiety – that "that in the face of which [*Wovor*] we have anxiety is thrown Being-in-the-world; that which we have anxiety about [*Worum*] is our potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world" – now in relation to death-anxiety:

> That in the face of which [*Wovor*] one has anxiety is Being-in-the-world itself. That about which [*Worum*] one has this anxiety is simply Dasein's potentiality-for-Being. … This anxiety … amounts to the disclosedness of the fact that Dasein exists as thrown Being *towards* its end.
> (*SZ* 251)

After echoing anxiety's 'general structure', Heidegger then goes on to specify in more detail how death-anxiety expresses this structure, which is to say he specifies that death-anxiety's *Wovor* reveals the impossibility of Dasein which is always already impending, while death-anxiety's *Worum* reveals Dasein's possibility.

> Dasein's mood brings it face to face [*vor*] with the thrownness of its 'that it is there'. *But the state-of-mind which can hold open the utter and constant threat to itself arising from Dasein's ownmost individualized Being, is anxiety*. In this state-of-mind, Dasein finds itself *face to face* [*vor*] with the "nothing" [*Nichts*] of the possible impossibility of its existence. Anxiety is anxious *about* [*um*] the potentiality-for-Being of the entity so destined, and in this way it discloses the uttermost possibility.
>
> (*SZ* 265-66)

In death-anxiety's *Wovor* Dasein's absorption in the world collapses – "concern and solicitude fail us" (*SZ* 263) – which implies that Dasein's inauthentic 'worldly' understanding is rendered an "impossibility" (*SZ* 343). Dasein impotently "clutches at the "nothing" [*Nichts*]", yet in forsakenness Dasein's abandonment to the 'that it is' is revealed – "Dasein's mood brings it face to face [*vor*] with the thrownness of its 'that it is there'". This is the enigmatic disclosure of the way Dasein always already is and must be. In death-anxiety a strange feature of this 'that it is' is revealed. Namely, the impossibility of Dasein – the *Nichts* – is revealed: "In this state-of-mind, Dasein finds itself *face to face* [*vor*] with the "nothing" [*Nichts*] of the possible impossibility of its existence." For while death is 'the possibility of the impossibility of Dasein' (here, "the possible impossibility of its existence"), the *Wovor* reveals the *Nichts* of this – i.e. it reveals the impossibility of Dasein. More specifically, it is revealed that the impossibility (*Nichts*) of Dasein is always already impending – "The end is impending for Dasein" (*SZ* 250) – and this "stares [Dasein] in the face [*vor*] with the inexorability of an enigma". This is the strongest expression of the enigma which is constitutive of the *Wovor*.

This aggravated enigma is threatening to Dasein. As quoted above, "face to face [*vor*] with … its 'that it is there' … *the state-of-mind which can hold open the utter and constant threat to itself arising from Dasein's ownmost individualized Being, is anxiety*." The *Nichts* (impossibility) of its inauthentic understanding is threatening, and the enigmatic *Nichts* (impossibility) which is disclosed as always already impending threatens. This revelation of the *Wovor* motivates Dasein to cover over and disguise the *Nichts* by fleeing into inauthenticity which tranquilizes anxiety. Death-anxiety's *Wovor* repels away from the *Nichts*.

> Having been thrown into Being-towards-death, Dasein flees … in the face of [*vor*] this thrownness, which has been more or less explicitly revealed.
>
> (*SZ* 348)

Death-anxiety is ambiguous and its *Worum* simultaneously reveals Dasein's possibility. Continuing our citation above,

> Anxiety is anxious *about* [*um*] the potentiality-for-Being of the entity so destined, and in this way it discloses the uttermost possibility. (*SZ* 266)

Dasein is "destined" for impossibility (this is the disclosure of the *Wovor*). However, the *Worum* reveals "the *potentiality-for-Being* of the entity so destined". That is, while death is 'the possibility of the impossibility of Dasein', death-anxiety's *Worum* reveals Dasein's possibility (potentiality-for-Being). Anxiety's *Worum*, in disclosing Dasein's potentiality-for-Being, therewith discloses Dasein's authentic existentiell potentiality-for-Being, thus death-anxiety's *Worum* not only reveals Dasein's possibility, but it therewith reveals Dasein's authentic existentiell possibility – "and in this way it discloses the uttermost possibility".

Dasein's authentic possibility is not defined in regard to the content of particular for-the-sakes-of-which but is the form of projection, and in death-anxiety this form is such that Dasein projects with the *Nichts* (impossibility) transparent. When Dasein projects with such a transparency, such projections "are determined by the *end* and so are understood as *finite* [*endliche*]" (*SZ* 264). These projections give Dasein its existentiell "*whole potentiality-for-Being*" (*SZ* 264), and this existentiell wholeness is *anticipation* – "anticipation goes to make up Dasein's authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole" (*SZ* 309). The possibility of anticipation gives Dasein an 'unshakable joy', for while part of this joy is the fact that one projects "without Illusions", Heidegger tells us that anticipation is "*an impassioned* **freedom towards death** – *a freedom which has been released from the Illusions of the "they", and which is … anxious*" (*SZ* 266). With the 'Illusions' of the "they" dispelled, and the *Nichts* transparent, Dasein can seize its wholeness in its authenticity, and projecting with such a lucidity brings Dasein the 'unshakable joy'. Death-anxiety's *Worum* attracts towards the *Nichts*.

Thus death-anxiety is ambiguous. For while the existential conception of death is made up of the two structural aspects – 'Dasein's possibility' and 'the impossibility of Dasein' – each of which has an internal relation to the other and yet each is held in opposition to the other, the 'lens' of death-anxiety's *antipathetic Wovor* reveals the latter, while the 'lens' of death-anxiety's *sympathetic Worum* simultaneously reveals the former.

But while death-anxiety is ambiguously constituted by the *Wovor* and *Worum*, death-anxiety's *antipathetic Wovor* is the more intensified. For while the disclosure of this *Wovor* is characterized as utterly threatening, Heidegger notes that this threat – emanating from the *Nichts* (impossibility) – cannot be "tone[d] … down" (*SZ* 265). This is the strongest expression of the threat which is constitutive of the *Wovor*. And while the threat of the *Wovor* is intensified, the motivation to flee in the face of this threat is thus "aggravate[d]" (*SZ* 253). But while death-anxiety's antipathetic *Wovor* is thus intensified, its *Worum* is diminished. For death-anxiety's *Worum* discloses existentiell

anticipation, but Heidegger tells us, "[n]evertheless, this existentially 'possible' Being-towards-death remains, from the existentiell point of view, a fantastical exaction" (SZ 266). Death-anxiety's *Worum*, while not extinguished, is nevertheless diminished considerably. Thus, while death-anxiety is constituted by the antipathetic *Wovor* and sympathetic *Worum*, relating to the *Nichts*, the *Wovor* is the more intensified – death-anxiety is the '*sympathetic antipathy*'.

***

Thus Heidegger's anxiety is constituted by an '*antipathetic sympathy*' and a '*sympathetic antipathy*', yet a question remains regarding the relation between these 'dialectical determinations'. For example, Dasein's authentic potentiality-for-Being in its fullest expression is anticipatory resoluteness, and I have merely shown how conscience-anxiety reveals resoluteness while death-anxiety reveals anticipation. However, both 'forms' of anxiety must harmonize for anticipatory resoluteness to be revealed. Indeed, in §62 Heidegger describes how anxiety tends to potentiate itself in that each 'form' of anxiety tends towards unveiling the other. Heidegger writes regarding death-anxiety,

> The indefiniteness of death is primordially disclosed in anxiety. … It moves out of the way everything which conceals the fact that Dasein has been abandoned to itself. The "nothing" [*Nichts*] with which anxiety brings us face to face [*davor*], unveils the nullity [*Nichtigkeit*] by which Dasein, in its very *basis*, is defined …
>
> (SZ 308)

This citation refers to the *Wovor* of death-anxiety – the disclosure of being "abandoned to" the *Nichts* (impossibility). Now, as Heidegger writes, "[t]he "nothing" [*Nichts*] … unveils the nullity [*Nichtigkeit*] by which Dasein, in its very *basis*, is defined". Since it is conscience-anxiety's *Wovor* which discloses the *Nichtigkeit* of Dasein's "basis", this means that death-anxiety's intensified *Wovor* tends to "unveil" conscience-anxiety's diminished *Wovor* (and, following from this, death-anxiety's *Worum* (including anticipation) tends towards unveiling conscience-anxiety's *Worum* (including resoluteness)). Death-anxiety tends towards unveiling conscience-anxiety.

The same can be said regarding conscience-anxiety. Heidegger writes regarding the call of conscience-anxiety,

> The call of conscience … individualizes Dasein down to its potentiality-for-Being-guilty … The unwavering precision with which Dasein is thus essentially individualized down to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, discloses the anticipation of death …
>
> (SZ 307)

This citation refers to the *Worum* of conscience-anxiety – the disclosure of Dasein's "potentiality-for-Being-guilty" – and, as Heidegger writes, this

"discloses the anticipation of death". Since it is death-anxiety's *Worum* which discloses anticipation, this means that conscience-anxiety's intensified *Worum*, while disclosing resoluteness, tends towards unveiling death-anxiety's diminished *Worum* – "resoluteness … tends towards the mode delimited by anticipation" (SZ 309) (and following from this, conscience-anxiety's *Wovor* (*Nichtigkeit*) tends towards unveiling death-anxiety's *Wovor* (*Nichts*)). In this way anxiety potentiates itself – in this way death-anxiety tends towards unveiling conscience-anxiety and vice versa – and a harmonization of these two 'forms' is what is required for anticipatory resoluteness to be revealed. Anxiety tends towards this harmonization, for anxiety is ambiguous – "Anxiety is a *sympathetic antipathy* and an *antipathetic sympathy*".

III

I have now – in §I and §II – shown how the anxiety in *Being and Time* is elastically ambiguous – that is, I have shown how this anxiety is made up of an *antipathetic* and *sympathetic* aspect, relating to 'nothing', which continually intertwine in elasticity. I will now conclude by showing a crucial role that this anxiety plays in the leading theme of *Being and Time* – the inquiry into the meaning of Being.

In the Introduction of *Being and Time* Heidegger tells us that "Being" always means the Being of entities, and that to inquire into the meaning of Being one must interrogate entities in regard to *their* Being (SZ 6). Heidegger then tells us that Dasein is a privileged entity in this regard since Dasein is distinguished in that its own Being is always in some way disclosed to it – "with and through its Being, this Being is disclosed to it" (SZ 12) (yet, this disclosure is "not yet tantamount to 'developing an ontology'" (SZ 12) – it is 'pre-ontological'). Given this distinguishing feature of Dasein, Heidegger tells us that in his inquiry into the meaning of Being "*that which is interrogated*" is Dasein in regard to *its* Being (SZ 5, 7).

The methodology with which Dasein is interrogated is 'hermeneutic phenomenology', and Heidegger tells us that there are two (proper) significations of 'phenomenon' ('showing itself in itself'). A phenomenon in the '*ordinary* signification' is simply an *entity* 'showing itself in itself' (SZ 28), while a phenomenon in the '*phenomenological* signification' is the *Being* of entities (SZ 35). More specifically, by way of an analogy with Kant Heidegger tells us that the phenomenological phenomenon is comparable to the transcendental condition for the possibility of the ordinary phenomenon (SZ 31).[3] The method of hermeneutic phenomenology, as applied to Dasein, is comprised of phenomena in both of its senses: on the one hand it must let Dasein as an entity 'show itself in itself' (ordinary phenomenon – and this is 'pre-ontological'), so that it can use this phenomenon as the 'clue' to interpret the Being of Dasein (phenomenological phenomenon – the condition for the possibility of the ordinary phenomenon); and on the other hand it

will use the Being of Dasein as the 'clue' to interpret the ordinary phenomenon – and in this interplay between the two significations of 'phenomenon' Dasein's Being becomes ever more explicitly grasped.

Now, *ambiguous* anxiety plays a central role in this procedure, for this anxiety serves as the "*most primordial*" (SZ 182) ('pre-ontological') ordinary phenomenon of Dasein. Accordingly, in Division One Heidegger uses ambiguous anxiety as his clue to interpret Dasein's "totality of Being" (SZ 182) as 'care' (phenomenological phenomenon). First, regarding anxiety's '*antipathetic sympathy*':

> Being-free *for* one's ownmost potentiality-for-Being, and therewith for the possibility of authenticity … is shown, with a primordial, elemental concreteness, in anxiety. But ontologically, Being towards one's ownmost potentiality-for-Being means that in each case Dasein is already *ahead* of itself in its Being. … This structure of Being … we shall denote as Dasein's "*Being-ahead-of-itself*".
>
> (SZ 191-92)

The first sentence of this citation is referring to the ordinary phenomenon of this 'lens' – Dasein as an entity showing itself in itself "with a primordial, elemental concreteness". But this disclosure is possible only if Dasein has an ontological structure "*Being-ahead-of-itself*" – the disclosure of "Being-free *for* one's ownmost potentiality-for-Being" and therewith anticipatory resoluteness (with thrownness in the periphery) is possible only if Dasein's Being is "*ahead* of itself". So in this way anxiety's '*antipathetic sympathy*' provides the clue for the ontological structure 'Being-ahead-of-itself'.

Turning now to anxiety's '*sympathetic antipathy*':

> To Being-in-the-world, however, belongs the fact that it has been delivered over to itself – that it has in each case already been thrown *into a world*. The abandonment of Dasein to itself is shown with primordial concreteness in anxiety. "Being-ahead-of-itself" means, if we grasp it more fully, "*ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-in-a-world*".
>
> (SZ 192)

The first two sentences of this citation are referring to the ordinary phenomenon of this 'lens' – Dasein as an entity showing itself in itself "with primordial concreteness". But this disclosure is possible only if Dasein has an ontological structure '*Being-already-in*' – the disclosure of Dasein's forsaken "abandonment" to its "thrown" enigmatic 'that it is' (with its potentiality-for-Being in the periphery) is possible only if Dasein's Being is 'Being-already-in'. So in this way anxiety's '*sympathetic antipathy*' provides the clue for the ontological structure 'Being-already-in'.

Further, since each 'lens' indeed has the disclosure of the other in its periphery, this shows that they are simultaneous, and in turn provides the clue that 'Being-ahead-of-itself' and 'Being-already-in' are 'equiprimordial' ontological structures – "*ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-in-a-world*". And finally, since the '*sympathetic antipathy*' motivates Dasein towards inauthenticity such that Dasein is absorbed in the world and fascinated with intraworldly entities (while the '*antipathetic sympathy*' motivates Dasein towards authenticity such that Dasein is absorbed yet not fascinated with these intraworldly entities) this provides the clue that "*Being-alongside*" intraworldly entities (*SZ* 192) is a third 'equiprimordial' ontological structure – for Dasein can flee into inauthenticity and fascinated absorption with intraworldly entities (or choose authenticity and absorption) only if Dasein's Being is 'Being-alongside'. In this way Heidegger uses ambiguous anxiety as the clue that Dasein's Being is comprised of the three 'equiprimordial' ontological structures 'Being-ahead-of-itself', 'Being-already-in', and 'Being-alongside'. That is, Heidegger uses ambiguous anxiety to interpret Dasein's totality of Being as 'care':

> The formally existential totality of Dasein's ontological structural whole must therefore be grasped in the following structure: the Being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the-world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world). This Being fills in the signification of the term "*care*", which is used in a purely ontologico-existential manner.
>
> (*SZ* 192)

Whereas in Division One Heidegger uses ambiguous anxiety as the clue to interpret Dasein's Being as 'care', in Division Two Heidegger uses 'care' as his "clue" (*SZ* 246, 276) to interpret ambiguous anxiety. First, regarding anxiety's '*antipathetic sympathy*':

> *Conscience manifests itself as the call of care*: the caller is Dasein, which, in its thrownness (in its Being-already-in), is anxious about its potentiality-for-Being. The one to whom the appeal is made is this very same Dasein, summoned to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being (ahead of itself …). Dasein is falling into the "they" (in Being-already-alongside the world of its concern), and it is summoned out of this falling by the appeal. The call of conscience – that is, conscience itself – has its ontological possibility in the fact that Dasein, in the very basis of its Being, is care.
>
> (*SZ* 277-78)

The disclosure of the antipathetic *Wovor* – (the 'caller's' 'what is said') the powerless forsakenness of the *Nichtigkeit* and the abandonment to the powerlessness of the *Nichtigkeit* – finds the condition for its possibility in

the ontological 'Being-already-in'; while the disclosure of the sympathetic *Worum* – (the *Worüber*) the power of the *Nichtigkeit* and powerful resoluteness – finds the condition for its possibility in the ontological 'Being-ahead-of-itself'. And regarding this 'form' – the '*antipathetic sympathy*' – as the *sympathetic* 'lens' is the more intensified, Heidegger uses the movement of being "summoned out of" fascinated absorption *towards* authenticity and non-fascinated absorption in the world with intraworldly entities as the phenomenon which finds the condition for its possibility in the third ontological structure 'Being-alongside'. Thus, anxiety's '*antipathetic sympathy*' is interpreted using 'care' as the "clue" (*SZ* 276): "The call of conscience – that is, conscience itself – has its ontological possibility in the fact that Dasein, in the very basis of its Being, is care".

Turning now to anxiety's '*sympathetic antipathy*':

> The ontological signification of the expression "care" has been expressed in the 'definition': "ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in (the world) as Being-alongside entities which we encounter (within-the-world)". … If indeed death belongs in a distinctive sense to the Being of Dasein, then death (or Being-towards-the-end) must be defined in terms of these characteristics.
>
> (*SZ* 249-50)

The disclosure of the antipathetic *Wovor* – the forsakenness of the *Nichts* (impossibility) and the abandonment to the impossibility (*Nichts*) of Dasein – finds the condition for its possibility in 'Being-already-in'; while the disclosure of the sympathetic *Worum* – Dasein's possibility and the possibility of anticipation – finds the condition for its possibility in 'Being-ahead-of-itself'. And regarding this 'form' – the '*sympathetic antipathy*' – as the *antipathetic* 'lens' is the more intensified, Heidegger uses the movement *towards* inauthenticity and fascinated absorption with intraworldly entities as the phenomenon which finds the condition for its possibility in 'Being-alongside':

> For factical existing is not only generally and without further differentiation a thrown potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world, but it has always likewise been absorbed in the 'world' of its concern. In this falling Being-alongside, fleeing from uncanniness announces itself; and this means now, a fleeing in the face of one's ownmost Being-towards-death. … *As regards its ontological possibility, dying is grounded in care.*
>
> (*SZ* 252)

Thus anxiety's '*sympathetic antipathy*' is interpreted using 'care' as the "clue" (*SZ* 246): "*As regards its ontological possibility, dying* [i.e. "the existential

conception of death"] *is grounded in care*" (SZ 252). In this way Heidegger uses 'care' as the clue to interpret ambiguous anxiety:

> Care harbours in itself both death and guilt equiprimordially.
> (SZ 306)

To conclude, it is in the above way that ambiguous anxiety – "Anxiety is a *sympathetic antipathy* and an *antipathetic sympathy*" – plays a crucial role in Heidegger's inquiry into the meaning of Being. For in this inquiry Dasein is interrogated in regard to its Being, and it is a hermeneutic phenomenological treatment of this elastically ambiguous anxiety – i.e. the interplay between: from anxiety to 'care', and from 'care' to anxiety – in which Dasein's totality of Being becomes explicitly grasped.[4]

Notes

1 'Vigilius Haufniensis', the watchman, is the pseudonymous author of this text.
2 For two articles which argue, contra the position of Dreyfus 1991, that the anxiety in *Being and Time* collapses Dasein's inauthentic possibilities and therewith reveals Dasein's authentic possibilities as ones which can be chosen, see Ewing 1995 and Bracken 2005.
3 See also Han-Pile 2005.
4 Special thanks to Béatrice Han-Pile for the helpful conversations and comments on drafts of this chapter. Thanks also to William Bracken, Daniel Watts, and Denis McManus.

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6

JASPERS, LIMIT-SITUATIONS, AND THE METHODOLOGICAL FUNCTION OF AUTHENTICITY

Stephan Käufer

Jaspers and Heidegger

In 1919 Karl Jaspers published his *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen* (*Psychology of Worldviews*, hereafter *PdW*) and in the following two years Heidegger wrote a lengthy review of this book ('Anmerkungen zu Karl Jaspers' *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen*').[1] This review affords us an early glimpse of many of the main themes of Division Two of *Being and Time*. In the space of very few pages it discusses death, guilt, the whole of Dasein, the existential conception of the self, historicality, extendedness, authenticity, and temporality. It showcases a kernel of unity that ties together the apparently disjointed chapters of Division Two. My aim in this chapter is to argue that Heidegger uses the phenomenology of authentic Dasein to solve a methodological problem he first articulates in the Jaspers review. Once we get clear about the methodological function of authenticity, we can outline the structure of the overall argument of of *Being and Time* and, in particular, of Division Two. I proceed as follows: in the next section 2 I give an overview of the key chapter of *PdW*. Then I lay out the methodological problem as Heidegger articulates it in his review of *PdW*. The next two sections show how this concern about method shows up in Heidegger's notions of existentiality and authenticity, two basic concepts that shape the argument of *Being and Time*. Next I argue that Heidegger uses his own version of the limit-situations of death and guilt to solve the methodological problem. Finally, I outline the course of the overall argument in light of this role of the discussions of death and guilt.

There is circumstantial reason to expect that Jaspers had substantial impact on *Being and Time*.[2] Heidegger did not publish his review of Jaspers's book, but privately sent it to Jaspers in hopes of prompting philosophical discussion and a closer relationship. Jaspers and Heidegger indeed became friends, of a sort, joining together in what Heidegger describes as a

Kampfgemeinschaft, engaged in the struggle against the staleness of entrenched philosophy.[3] There was mutual encouragement and inspiration, and evidently also some personal respect. They corresponded actively and visited one another regularly during the early 1920s as they explored new avenues of philosophical thought. They both disdained the established *Professorenphilosophie*, especially the work of Heinrich Rickert, who had supervised Heidegger's dissertation and who, as Jaspers's senior colleague, opposed Jaspers's rise in the philosophy department in Heidelberg. This adventurous intellectual climate surely fostered the innovations of *Being and Time*.

However, their substantial collaboration on philosophical ideas was limited. In his review of *PdW* Heidegger does not engage the central claims of Jaspers's book in any substance. Instead he broadly dismisses the very fundamentals of the book. He criticizes Jaspers's approach to the analysis of human existence, an approach that integrates individual psychology, clinical observations, and the philosophy of life (*Lebensphilosophie*). Heidegger claims that existence cannot be analyzed in the attitude of a detached observer, and that Jaspers's analysis fails to genuinely grasp its object. Jaspers, for his part, mostly ignores the review, and shows little interest in the questions Heidegger raises about his work. Later, Jaspers (1977: 98f.) did not really read the copy of *Being and Time* Heidegger sent him. In subsequent years their correspondence turned mostly to practical questions regarding Heidegger's professional prospects.

Jaspers's *Psychology of Worldviews*

Jaspers studied medicine and psychiatry and in 1913 he published the very successful *Allgemeine Psychopathologie* (*General Psychopathology*, hereafter *AP*), in which he describes and classifies a broad range of psychiatric disorders. With its clear, evocative descriptions of myriad manifestations of psychiatric disorders, this massive tome serves as a reference work to this day. In *AP*, Jaspers argues that psychiatry is a science of disorders of the person, rather than the mind. The concept of a person defines the entity that psychiatry is about, and it plays a key role in describing and diagnosing psychiatric disorders.

Despite the centrality of the concept, Jaspers perceives a "stagnation" in psychiatric theory and research about *Persönlichkeit*, and he is convinced that he can find clearer, more developed articulations of this concept in the humanities and, in particular, in philosophy.[4] This expectation drives much of the philosophical interest that leads Jaspers to *PdW*. Jaspers aims for a better understanding of what a person is, as well as a better method for conceptualizing personality, and *PdW* is conceived as an inquiry into existence, the self, and "life as a whole," informed by psychiatry, psychology, and phenomenology. *PdW* thus is a transitional work, seeking to unite the basic concerns of psychiatry and philosophy. Jaspers takes an ambitious approach to the concept of a person in *PdW*. He goes beyond his interest in

psychiatric disorders and tries to give a complete overview of what it means to exist as a person.

Like *AP*, which was written as a reference work, Jaspers's instinct in *PdW* is classificatory. The book is structured as a system of dispositions and world-images, leading up to a complete classification of spiritual types (*Geistestypen*). Jaspers's explicit model is Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, viewed as a systematic presentation of all possible shapes of consciousness in a structured whole. Some of Jaspers's spiritual types are the same as Hegel's shapes of consciousness. For instance he discusses skepticism, rationalism, and romanticism. But the principle of classification is different. Jaspers does not historicize his types, and he does not construct dialectical necessity claims that order spiritual types into a logical sequence. Instead of a Hegelian system, he limits his work to "many criss-crossing schemes … at times taking up one method, at times another" (*PdW* 11). He develops his wide-ranging descriptions of dispositions and spiritual types by taking up exemplars from the history of philosophy, by anthropological observation, or by drawing on his clinical experience and knowledge of psychiatric cases.

Like Hegel, Jaspers thinks that spiritual types can be understood as reactions to experiences of contrariety or impossibility. Jaspers calls such experiences limit-situations. He discusses struggle, death, contingency, and guilt (*Kampf*, *Tod*, *Zufall*, *Schuld*) as examples, and points out that there are many more. Any experience in which we feel the impossibility of a basic value or way of life counts as a limit-situation.

Limit-situations prompt the constitution of a spiritual type. Depending on how one responds to a limit-situation, one may be classified as a nihilist, a rationalist, a mystic, etc. Limit-situations are

> essential situations that are unavoidably given in finite existence. … These situations can be felt, experienced and thought everywhere at the limits of our existence. … There is nothing fixed, no indubitable absolute, no hold (*Halt*) that could stand firm (*standhalten*) against every experience and every thought. These limit-situations as such are unbearable in living, and therefore we almost never experience them in all clarity, but factically almost always have a hold in the face of limit-situations. Without such a hold, living would come to an end. … What hold a person has, how he has it, seeks it, finds and keeps it, is the characteristic expression of the forces alive in him. When we ask about the type of spirit (*Geistestypus*), we are asking in what the person has his hold (*worin der Mensch seinen Halt habe*).
>
> (*PdW* 202)

The "hold" you have, how you manage to go on living and avoid the suffering experienced in limit-situations reveals your spiritual type. Pessimism, nihilism,

etc. show themselves as relatively stable forms in which individuals come to terms with experiences of limit-situations. A given spiritual type can govern one's responses to any of the limit-situations.

Jaspers distinguishes three possible reactions to limit-situations, which correspond to three broad groups of spiritual types. The first possibility is that a person is destroyed. "As the antinomies appear more clearly, uncertainty begins to paralyze all acting, knowing, and living" (*PdW* 212). Nothing stands firm, and the person becomes unable to exist. In the framework of *AP*, this first reaction constitutes the general case of certain psychopathologies as diseases of the person. In *PdW* Jaspers broadens his scope to include more abstract versions of such incapacitating paralysis, such as nihilism and skepticism. These theoretical attitudes are not themselves psychiatric disorders, because, as Jaspers points out, in actual cases theoretical skeptics and nihilists still maintain a firm core in some "primitive, egoistic self" (*PdW* 261). If, however, the skeptical doubt becomes pathological, as in the case of schizophrenic patients, that firm core is destroyed.

The second type of reaction is to substantially ignore the conflicts and contradictions presented in the limit-situations. One shirks them, resorts to compromises and easy formulas, "neutralizes the antinomy in an appearance," constructs justifications for anything and everything and derives easy solace from the "unavoidable" (*PdW* 212). This attitude corresponds to various versions of what Jaspers calls "rationalism." The antinomies presented in limit-situations are rearranged, or not taken as fundamental, so that one goes on existing through reasoning and justifications grounded in apparently firm principles. Such a reaction, Jaspers maintains, requires willful blindness towards the conditions of existing. Though he calls such attitudes "rationalism," in practice they may manifest themselves as irrationalism or anti-intellectualism. One may construct inadequate and inconsistent justifications, just for the sake of having them; or one may stubbornly ignore the glaring need for any justification at all.

Finally, one may "gain strength" through the antinomy. "The concrete situation requires fulfillment. … The person marches forth on an infinite path without hesitation, to a decision (*Entschluss*) that belies no reason and obeys no reason" (*PdW* 213). Unlike the facile rationalism that ultimately fails to confront the antinomies presented in limit-situations, this third type of reaction embraces the antinomy and finds a commitment to values and certainties that cannot be rationally justified. Jaspers's model for this stance is Kierkegaardian faith, and he sees it instantiated in the spiritual types of religiousness and mysticism, but also in reflective thought that pursues the life of the mind as an infinite enterprise, an ongoing intellectual engagement that does not count on the possibility of final certainties.

This discussion of limit-situations has some obvious parallels to various passages in Division Two of *Being and Time*. Like *PdW*, Heidegger phrases his basic question in Division Two as a concern for existence as a whole

(*das Dasein als Ganzes*, *SZ* 233), and just as in Jaspers, what counts as such wholeness is in question. Both for Jaspers and for Heidegger limit-situations play a privileged role in making existence as a whole accessible to philosophical analysis, because they reveal limits and impossibilities of existence. The specific descriptions of the limit-situations also have some resemblances. Like Heidegger, Jaspers distinguishes between ordinary versions of guilt and the essential guilt that characterizes existence as such. Similarly, both treat death as a structure inherent in existing, rather than an event at the end of life, and both emphasize the individual relation to death: "Every human being has a unique relation to his own death, which cannot be compared to the general or specific experience of the death of others" (*PdW* 230; cf. *SZ* 240). Jaspers's description of the second type of reaction to limit-situations resembles some of Heidegger's claims about fleeing and inauthentic Dasein, a type of comportment that covers up the fundamental structure of existing. And the description of the third type of reaction recalls certain aspects of authentic resoluteness, a commitment that is not grounded in deliberate reasoning but resolves to act in a concrete situation.[5]

Such detailed parallels are evidence of a convergence in style and themes that unite Jaspers and Heidegger, and of the debt Heidegger owes to *PdW*. Heidegger is deeply interested in Jaspers's discussion of death, guilt, struggle, and contingency as human limit-situations. In the review Heidegger calls this chapter "the solid core that sustains the whole of Jaspers's work" (KJPW 10), and in *Being and Time* he claims that limit-situations are "fundamental for existential ontology" (*SZ* 301n).[6]

However, such details should not cover up the fundamental difference in approach between *PdW* and *Being and Time*. Heidegger pursues an existential ontology, i.e. he articulates necessary conditions for an entity to count as existing. Jaspers, on the other hand, pursues a wide-ranging, systematic catalog of actual modes of existing. Hence in *Being and Time* Heidegger refers to *PdW* as an "existential anthropology," whose task is to "render the main features and connections of factical-existentiell possibilities and to interpret their existential structures" (*SZ* 301). Jaspers's observations about, say, nihilism and skepticism as ways of dealing with death, contingency and guilt fall short of Heidegger's *ontological* purpose of showing what existence is so that these situations must be an issue for it.[7]

Heidegger's review of *Psychology of Worldviews*

Jaspers claims that "since all objectivities can be formed rationally, all processes of destruction and all contrarieties can be thought as contradictions," and hence the experience of limit-situations can be analyzed in terms of conceptual contradictions (*PdW* 203). For example, "death contradicts life, [and] contingency contradicts necessity and significance" (*PdW* 204). The spiritual types are, first and foremost, philosophical views that somehow

overcome this "antinomial structure." On this point Heidegger disagrees fundamentally with Jaspers. In his review, Heidegger writes that in casting experiences of limit-situations as conceptual contradictions they "lose their genuine (*eigentlicher*) sense" (KJPW 22). Heidegger does not deny that one can develop conceptual articulations of these experiences. But, he maintains, such articulations are "reinterpretations" that fail to capture what is essential about limit-situations for existence. This basic disagreement makes the bulk of Jaspers's analyses of spiritual types irrelevant for Heidegger, since they respond to conceptually articulated antinomies and hence miss the "genuine" phenomena. Consequently Heidegger's review ignores the vast majority of *PdW*, and instead focuses on an attempt to spell out what is genuine in Jaspers's insight into limit-situations.

We can distinguish three aspects of Heidegger's criticism. The first is a phenomenological point. Heidegger claims that Jaspers gets the phenomenology of limit-situations wrong. They are not conceptual contradictions. Instead Heidegger suggests that we experience the antinomy in a lived experience of the limit-situation. Losing and regaining one's hold is therefore not a matter of adopting an intellectual attitude (KJPW 22).

This leads to a second phenomenological point. Heidegger points out that existence must be understood as temporally extended, as including its own history, and as "concernful" (KJPW 26ff.). The basic concernful experience (*Bekümmertes Haben*) makes up the genuine (*genuin*) having of existence. For Heidegger this "having" is the basic experience of having-yourself (*Grunderfahrung, in der ich mir selbst als Selbst begegne, Grunderfahrung des Mich-selbst-habens*, KJPW 25, 27). It is an essentially first-personal process of self-understanding.

Third is an ontological point. Jaspers relies on observation and conceptual analysis, and thinks of existence as a species of a type, within the "region of being" of the psychical. "Jaspers has a preconception of the whole of life as a thing-object (*Dingobjekt*). … Life is there in the objective medium of the psychical, it occurs there (*kommt vor*), it takes place there" (KJPW 15). Heidegger calls this an "objectivating pre-conception." By accusing Jaspers of treating existence as a "thing-object" Heidegger is not claiming that Jaspers fails to grasp mental events, or fails to distinguish between physical and psychical objects.[8] Mental and physical entities share a mode of being: they occur or take place in an objectively determinable way, at specific times in an objectively determinate sequence. But, Heidegger claims, this is not the only mode of being, and not the appropriate framework for an analysis of human existence. Existence does not "occur" in an objective medium and Jaspers is therefore making an ontological mistake. This ontological mistake derives from Jaspers's method or, better, his lack of reflection on the proper method for thematizing existence.

In the language of *Being and Time* we can put this threefold criticism of Jaspers's method as follows: Jaspers fails to interpret an authentic (*eigentlich*)

existing because he ignores its essential mineness (*Jemeinigkeit*) and mistakes existence as an occurrent (*vorhanden*) entity.

Nevertheless, Jaspers does not completely miss the mark. Heidegger's review distinguishes between intending an object and grasping it. Jaspers does not genuinely *grasp* existence, but he genuinely *intends* the "I am" (*Ich bin*), or being of the self (*Sein des Selbst*). The effect of Jaspers's pre-conception, says Heidegger, is that a "surrogate intuition and concept" gets in the way, pretending to be the genuine phenomenon, while the *eigentliches* phenomenon recedes (KJPW 9):

> The object in question can indeed somehow be genuinely (*echt*) intended, even without strict awareness of the methodological problems of explication; but only insofar as a surrogate gets in the way of intuition and conception. … In the end, the surrogate obtrudes in such a way that it presents itself as the genuine (*echt*) phenomenon, while the authentic (*eigentlich*) phenomenon disappears for the genuine possibility of experiencing it. … Formally indicating, we can fix the object in question as *existence*.
>
> (KJPW 9)

So while Heidegger claims that Jaspers's "objectivating approach" mishandles the first-personal, temporally extended phenomena of existence, the section on limit-situations intends, or points to these phenomena. What is needed is a better method for grasping these phenomena in concepts.

Heidegger's criticism of Jaspers in the review is about the proper method for interpreting human existence. But we should be careful to note that it is not *merely* about method. Jaspers's methodological mistake is grounded in his failure to recognize the ontology of existence. In *Being and Time* Heidegger writes that "genuine method is grounded in an adequate perspective on the basic constitution of the 'object' that is to be disclosed … . Genuine methodological reflection, therefore, also gives an indication of the way of being of the entity in question" (SZ 303). In other words, questions about method have implications about the "substance" (a term Heidegger eschews) of existence. In the Jaspers review Heidegger presents an even stronger claim about the connection between existence and method. "[Existence] is what it is only by virtue of its very own 'method,' that partially makes it up" (KJPW 9). So the proper *method* for intuiting and conceptualizing existence is part of the ontological *makeup* of existence. This sounds puzzling, but it follows from the basic claim that part of existing is construing yourself. "The being of Dasein comprises self-construal" (SZ 312). Self-construal (or self-interpretation, *Selbstauslegung*) partly makes up Dasein, and if we wish to articulate the being of Dasein in explicit concepts, then we need to do so in the manner of construal that is proper to existing itself. Asking

ontological questions about ourselves, as Heidegger does in *Being and Time*, is an attempt to work out in concepts this implicit self-understanding. Hence "every explicit ontological question about the being of Dasein is already predisposed by the mode of being of Dasein" (SZ 312).

Existentiality and method in *Being and Time*

We now fast forward to *Being and Time* and note how Heidegger addresses the methodological problem he articulates in the Jaspers review. First, Heidegger makes a basic ontological distinction between human existence and other kinds of entities, claiming that these two kinds of entities require two distinct sets of basic concepts that cannot be reduced to one another. "Existentialia and categories are the two basic possibilities for characteristics of being. Entities that correspond to them require different kinds of investigation: an entity is either a *who* (existence) or a *what* (occurrence in the broadest sense)" (SZ 45).[9] Human existence must be understood in terms of an existential ontology, while other entities are properly understood in terms of the ontology of categories.

Division One of *Being and Time* develops this existential ontology in detail. It analyzes *existentialia*, i.e. basic concepts of existential ontology, in the context of ordinary everydayness. These include Heidegger's conceptions of world, being-in, being-with, disposedness, competences and abilities. Existence is such that its own being is always an issue for it, and therefore existence is always self-construing. We confront the question of how to exist, and we answer it by pressing into a set of possibilities and understanding the world and ourselves in terms of our ability to take up these possibilities.

In Heidegger's existential sense, possibility means a possible way to be, something that it makes sense for us to do. Say, for example, that I am a parent. This means that I exist for the sake of being a parent, that parenting is my "ability-to-be." As ability, the self always finds itself in a world it discloses. "As ability-to-be, being-in is always ability-to-be-in-the-world" (SZ 144). The world affects us, matters to us and draws us in. Traffic dangers and pedestrian crosswalks, for example, are especially salient to me insofar as I exist for the sake of parenting. Heidegger's existential ontology bottoms out in this coupling of abilities and possibilities. In particular, Heidegger writes, "Dasein is not an occurrent thing that, in addition, has the property of being able to do something. It is fundamentally being-possible" (SZ 143). And "possibility, understood as an existentiale, is the most originary and ultimate positive ontological determination of Dasein" (SZ 143f.). Being a parent is not a property I have. From Heidegger's existential vantage point it is not a biological or social fact about me. Rather, being a parent is my existential make-up, constituted by deploying my parental know-how and experiencing the world as soliciting me accordingly.

Genuineness and authenticity

A second hallmark of methodological reflection in *Being and Time* is Heidegger's explicit distinction between the terms genuine (*echt*) and authentic (*eigentlich*).[10] Authenticity concerns specifically the phenomena of existence. It is the more central and important concept in Heidegger's argument, and we will look at its methodological importance below. It is helpful, however, to pay attention to *Echtheit* briefly. *Echtheit* is a broader notion that applies to interpretations of all kinds of things, not merely of existence, and captures whether the meaning of an expression is properly tied to its underlying phenomena.

In the Jaspers review, Heidegger uses these terms interchangeably, but in *Being and Time* he makes the contrast explicit. In his discussion of understanding – i.e. his phenomenology of competence, or know-how – in section 31 of Division One, he writes that "authentic as well as inauthentic understanding can, in turn, be genuine or non-genuine (*echt oder unecht*)" (SZ 146). As an example he cites the phenomena of everyday understanding of the world, which, he writes, is "inauthentic understanding in the mode of genuineness"(SZ 148).[11]

We can glean Heidegger's definition of "genuine" from several passages. In the introduction to *Being and Time*, Heidegger writes that according to Aristotle "in discourse, insofar as it is genuine (*echt*), what is said should be drawn from (*geschöpft*) that which is talked about" (SZ 32). In general, Heidegger denotes an expression of an understanding, i.e. a phrase, construal, expression or concept, as *echt* if it is drawn from that which is understood. It is *unecht*, i.e. not genuine, if it does not have this origin in the underlying phenomena. For example, in chapter 5B of Division One, the analysis of falling, *Echtheit* is the opposite of idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity. In these modes of everyday activity, expressions and phrases are simply repeated and passed along. Their meaningfulness is taken for granted, but their sense is not drawn from the underlying phenomena. Similarly, section 6 of the introduction motivates the task of a "destruction" of the ontological tradition by faulting it for covering up the sources from which philosophical concepts and categories were, sometimes, "genuinely drawn" (*in echter Weise geschöpft*; SZ 21). Later in the book Heidegger claims for instance that Aristotle's concept of time was "genuinely drawn" (SZ 421).

The notion of a genuine conception or expression, then, is tied to the idea that such concepts are *drawn* from entities or phenomena. The German *schöpfen* can mean both to create (God's creation is the *Schöpfung*) and to draw, as in drawing water from a well (a ladle is a *Schöpfer*). In these passages Heidegger mostly uses the latter sense, implying that genuine concepts and expressions maintain the substance of the phenomena they refer to and give them a certain determination that makes them available for understanding and communication. Accordingly Heidegger says in general that

"construal (*Auslegung*) can draw (*schöpfen*) concepts from the entities themselves, or it can wedge them into concepts that the entities resist, in keeping with their way of being (*gemäß seiner Seinsart*)" (*SZ* 150).

Accordingly, an interpretation of existence is genuine if its concepts are in keeping with the way of being of existence. In other words, the interpretation must grasp existence using the concepts of existential ontology. Heidegger claims that only a persistent focus on existentiality enables us to grasp the "who" of existing, i.e. the self, without falling into a misconstruing preconception. "Only the existential-ontological mode of questioning is a suitable approach to the problem of existence" (*SZ* 117). And "the ontological question about the being of the self must be unfastened from the … focus on a persistently occurring self-thing" (*SZ* 323, cf. 130, 303).

While genuineness refers to the manner in which concepts are drawn from given phenomena, *authenticity* denotes the appropriate phenomena themselves. Some phenomena of existence will not yield insight into the ontology of existence, no matter how carefully they are described and interpreted. An interpretation of existence can be misled if it pays attention to the wrong phenomena. Indeed, Heidegger claims, this is usually the case in the self-construal of everyday Dasein: "Everyday Dasein draws the pre-ontological construal of its being from the nearest way of being (*Seinsart*) of the anyone. Ontological interpretation for the most part follows this tendency. … This is the root of the ontological misinterpretation" (*SZ* 130).[12] A successful interpretation of the self must draw its concepts from *authentic* phenomena of existence. "The self that is unveiled in the reticence of resolute existence is the originary phenomenal ground for the question about the being of the 'I'" (*SZ* 323).

Heidegger takes advantage of two distinct meanings of "*eigentlich*." The first is a substantial, philosophical sense. "*Eigentlich*" means an existence that is owned, or taken hold of.[13] Heidegger claims that in its "nearest way of being" everyday Dasein is *inauthentic*, since it is dispersed into the publicness of the anyone and has not taken hold of itself. Authentic Dasein is not dispersed. Second, Heidegger also appeals to the colloquial sense of "*eigentlich*." In ordinary language "*eigentlich*," especially in its adverbial usage, means "actually," "intrinsically," or "really." Heidegger's basic argument in Division Two is that these two senses coincide, i.e. that an analysis of Dasein that has taken hold of itself gives us insight into the ontological structure of Dasein. This is how the notion of authenticity solves Heidegger's methodological worries. Authenticity is the "phenomenal ground" of an existential ontology of the self, i.e. it exhibits phenomena that show what the self actually, really is.[14]

This distinction sharpens Heidegger's charge in the review of *PdW* that Jaspers intends, but does not grasp, human existence. Owing to his "objectivating preconception" Jaspers's interpretation of existence is *unecht*. His concepts do not fit the existentiality of his object and he is limited to

describing a surrogate that gets in the way of proper intuition and conception. And yet, Jaspers's analysis points to the right phenomena. His discussion of limit-situations may be objectivating, occurrent, and intellectualizing, but limit-situations are exactly what we should pay attention to if we are to grasp the ontological structure of existence. They are, in this sense, the *authentic* phenomena.

In *Being and Time* Heidegger broadens his methodological criticism. He claims that the entire ontological tradition, including Descartes and Kant, perpetuates a mistaken ontology of the existing self. This mistaken ontology forces the phenomena of existence into inadequate concepts of the self, conceiving of the self as a substance or a subject. Such conceptions make both mistakes that Heidegger's methodological distinctions aim to forestall. They cast the self as an occurrent, rather than an existential, entity and hence they are not genuine. And they take their starting point in inadequate phenomena of everyday existence, rather than authentic phenomena. Heidegger argues that Descartes' *cogito* and Kant's transcendental apperception are theorized versions of the ordinary experience of "saying I." This starting point is inauthentic. "The anyone-self says 'I-I' the loudest and most often, because at bottom it is not authentically (*eigentlich*) its self and avoids authentic ability-to-be" (*SZ* 322). Everyday self-construal presents itself as an "I think" and as an occurrent subject, and it does not show what the self really is.

Everydayness and lostness

In Division One of *Being and Time*, Heidegger gives an interpretation of everyday existence in terms of abilities and disposedness. Despite its focus on existentialia, this analysis of everyday being-in-the-world does not yet provide an adequate interpretation of the self. Its limitation is not – as it was for Jaspers, Descartes, and Kant – that occurrent terms get in the way, but rather that the phenomena of everyday existence are unsuitable for an ontology of the self. In fact, Heidegger claims, being-in-the-world tends to cover up its own basic make-up. In the terminology of Heidegger's methodological reflection, the interpretation is *genuine* – i.e. it is conceptualized in terms of abilities, disposedness and other existentialia – but *inauthentic*, insofar as it does not provide the proper phenomenological ground for an analysis of the existing self. This shortcoming of Division One motivates the argument of Division Two, particularly the role of "limit-situations" in *Being and Time*. Hence it is worth looking at it in some detail.

An essential part of everyday existing is what Heidegger calls "falling" (*Verfallen*) or absorption (*Aufgehen*) in the world of everyday concerns. In our everyday experiences the things we have to do with, the business we pursue, is salient. Insofar as we have our selves in view at all, it tends to be framed in terms of the nexus of these things. "After all one *is what* one deals with," Heidegger writes, emphasizing the "whatness," the thing-likeness of the

worldly things we are absorbed in (SZ 322). The stability and meaningfulness of our absorption in things is centered on the public way of doing things and talking about them. So, in falling into the world we typically also fall into this public understanding and get *lost* in it. "Such absorption in … usually has the character of being lost in the publicness of the anyone. First and foremost Dasein has always already fallen into the 'world' and away from itself as authentic ability-to-be-a-self" (SZ 175, cf. p. 322). For example, being a parent highlights the myriad of paraphernalia and activities one does as a parent. This gives rise to a self-understanding in terms of a generic conception of parenting in which the anyone "has already decided the tasks, rules, and measures … of being-in-the-world" (SZ 268). A vague, public notion of parenting dictates an appropriate stance on traffic dangers, pre-schools, "screen time," or dietary concerns. These things become salient in the experience of a parent in the way "a parent" cares about them.

Heidegger assures us that there is nothing wrong with falling into the public understanding of the anyone, and that he intends no "negative valuation" of existing this way (SZ 175). Being lost in the public understanding of parenting does not make you a bad parent. Heidegger's point is rather that lostness draws attention away from what it means to exist as a parent in the first place. Existing as a parent involves a choice or commitment to parenting which, in turn, creates the solicitations by the relevant features of the world. One's orientation towards the elaborate network of child-rearing equipment is derivative of such self-understanding, not constitutive of it. Hence Heidegger claims that fallenness hinders a proper understanding of the structure of being our selves.

> Because such absorption into the world skips over the phenomenon of world, things that occur in the world take its place. … It is the make-up of being-in-the-world itself in its everyday way of being that misses itself and covers itself up.
>
> (SZ 130)

The self-understanding misses the basic structure, insofar as it articulates itself in terms of worldly entities that already matter to it.

There is no such thing as "un-absorbed Dasein," which could eliminate the comportment towards worldly entities and somehow give us a better view of the ontological structure of the self. Dasein is being-in-the-world, and when absorption ends, so does existing. Heidegger appears to be stuck in an ontological dead end. Absorbed existence has a self, but that self withdraws into the background in order to allow Dasein to cope smoothly with the equipment that solicits it in its everyday concerns. So the self is there, but not available for phenomenological interpretation. Dasein's ordinary self-interpretation overlooks the background and fastens onto the equipment instead. The solution lies in the realization that the obstacle for

the ontology of the self is not *absorption*, but the *lostness* that usually accompanies absorption and produces a self-construal in terms of inner-worldly entities. Hence in Division Two Heidegger turns to the phenomena of death and guilt to sketch a phenomenology of Dasein that is engaged in the world, but not lost in it.[15]

Authenticity and limit-situations in *Being and Time*

Dasein that is not lost in the world is *eigentlich* in both the colloquial and philosophical sense we distinguished above. It is authentic insofar as it is has taken hold of itself. And it is *eigentlich* Dasein insofar as it provides the phenomena for an existential ontology of the self. Note that Heidegger characterizes two poles of lostness. Usually he says that inauthentic Dasein is lost in something else. It is lost in worldly entities, "in the stuff that it deals with" (SZ 422), "in the anyone" (SZ 383), or "in the anyone-self' (SZ 317). Occasionally, though, he also makes clear that lost Dasein has lost *itself*, "not yet 'chosen' or achieved itself" (SZ 42), or "not yet found itself" (SZ 128). To take hold of itself and become authentic, Dasein must not understand itself in terms of worldly entities.

This does not mean that authentic Dasein exists in isolation, apart from the world of equipment and ordinary concerns. On the contrary, it exhibits the conditions that "precisely bring the self into concernful being-amidst the available and push it into solicitous being-with others" (SZ 298). Heidegger distinguishes between the world and worldly entities. The world is the background network of cultural practices in which particular entities show up as significant. Lost Dasein skillfully participates in those background practices, but understands itself in terms of the worldly entities with which it deals. Authentic Dasein deals with the same things, experiences the same solicitations, and exercises the same skills as the lost Dasein. It is "not something that floats above fallen everydayness, but existentially it is just a modified way of taking up everydayness" (SZ 179). However, rather than seeing significance as vested in the things, authentic Dasein understands itself in terms of the world, i.e. its commitment to background practices.

Heidegger says Division One falls short of an analysis of the self because its description of Dasein is not originary. The analysis of Dasein in its everydayness has "an essential deficiency … Until the structure of authentic ability-to-be is included in the idea of existence, the existential interpretation is *not sufficiently originary*" (SZ 233, emphasis added). Authentic Dasein expresses the *origin* of absorption. This origin, for Heidegger, consists of a basic commitment to a way of life that explains why certain aspects of the world show up as significant in the first place. Roughly put, a choice or commitment to being a parent explains why traffic dangers and pre-schools matter to me. These worldly entities gain significance in light of my underlying self-identification as a parent. On Heidegger's conception, such self-identification

or self-understanding is not a conscious or reflective "detection and contemplation of a self-point" (*SZ* 146). As always in Heidegger, understanding does not mean a cognitive act, but an ability, in this case a basic ability that Heidegger calls "ability-to-be-a-self" (*Selbstseinkönnen*). This consists of knowing how to pursue a purpose for the sake of which we live and in light of which certain features of the world become salient and solicit us. It also implies that we make adjustments to our identification with this purposive structure, so that the world continues to be relevant and solicit us. We maintain an orientation in a context of significant possibilities because we exist for the sake of something.

All Dasein is in the world, so all Dasein has always already taken a purposive stance that constitutes its self-understanding. In the case of lost, inauthentic Dasein, the norms of significance implicit in this purposive stance are understood and interpreted by the public anyone-self. If I am lost in publicness, things matter to me as they matter to anyone. This makes it difficult to draw attention to the basic ability through which we gain and maintain an orientation in the world. If things go smoothly the ability-to-be-a-self withdraws to the background. What shows up instead are the entities we deal with and that already solicit us, while the origin of these solicitations is covered up. Everydayness, therefore, does not lend itself to a phenomenology of the ability-to-be-a-self.

If, however, one's everyday world collapses catastrophically and entirely, this background ability comes into focus. If a Dasein really knows how to be itself only in terms of the worldly things that it ordinarily deals with, such world collapse will leave that Dasein nothing to be. Authentic Dasein, on the other hand, shows that we can take a purposive stand in the world independent of the stability of any particular possibilities. Thinking about the possibility of world collapse, therefore, highlights the existential structure of the self. This is Heidegger's goal in his analysis of death. By existential death Heidegger means that any particular mode of existing can collapse completely. Death, he writes, is "the possibility of the impossibility of any particular comportment, any existing" (*SZ* 262). One can lose interest, or suffer from depression or deep boredom. The contextual conditions that make a certain kind of life possible may change. A priest loses faith, a factory shuts down, or an industry is wiped out. A parent may be separated from a child due to illness, divorce, or tragedy. In each such case some mode of comportment loses all sense and a mode of life becomes impossible. The everyday self-understanding loses its grip on the world, and Dasein is thrown back onto its ability-to-be-itself. It has to know how to make adjustments to its basic purposive stance.

Heidegger's analysis of death is not about actual cases of world collapse. In particular, he does not claim that an inauthentic Dasein could not in fact find a way to keep going, or that an authentic person will always be fine. It is difficult to imagine actual cases of total world collapse, in which nothing

at all matters to a person, and if we do imagine such a case, it is difficult to imagine how an authentic person could regain her footing.[16] To look for such claims in *Being and Time* misses the point of the argument. Indeed, as far as Heidegger's argument regarding existential death is concerned, there might not be any actual, authentic people. The phenomenology of existential death is designed to show a *structural* point, that at a level more fundamental than any particular skill or solicitation there must be the ability to take a stand so that everyday caring comportment becomes possible in the first place. *Selbstseinkönnen* is constitutive of caring. It is what Dasein *eigentlich* is, even though it is not expressed in the self-construal of everyday Dasein. The analysis of death reveals this existential-ontological structure of Dasein, and Heidegger concludes his discussion of death with the observation that it has established "a mere ontological possibility" (SZ 266).

While the phenomenology of death is limited to this formal point about a "mere existential possibility" of authentic existence, Heidegger's interpretation of guilt provides a concrete "attestation of an authentic ability-to-be" (SZ 267). Guilt is Heidegger's term for the existential structure that "in existing, Dasein can never get behind its thrownness," i.e. that it always must "project itself onto possibilities into which it is thrown" (SZ 284). For instance, we cannot determine or control biological or cultural factors that constrain the possibilities available to us. There is no "thing" in the background that determines that I should identify as a parent and that the possibilities and paraphernalia of parenting should matter to me. The only basis for disclosing the world through parenting skills and for being solicited by child-relevant aspects of the world lies in committing oneself to being a parent. There is no extra-existential backstop that would guarantee the disclosure. Dasein "must itself lay the ground for being itself" (SZ 284). Each Dasein is therefore the ground for what does and does not matter to it. I press into parenting-possibilities, so traffic dangers and pre-schools have a specific significance for me, while a lot of other things do not. This pattern of solicitations is due to my self-understanding as existing for the sake of parenting, and hence, in Heidegger's use of the term, I am guilty of it.

Like existential death, the discussion of guilt highlights the origin of everyday absorption. But unlike catastrophic world-collapse, existential guilt shows up in ordinary experience. This attestation lies in the familiar experience of the call of conscience. In this case we experience a call or a voice that urges us to act, perceive, or revise our understanding of a given situation towards which we feel guilty. This call has a peculiar structure. We experience some aspect of it as if somebody else reprimands or enjoins us, but of course we also recognize the call as coming from ourselves. Heidegger argues that the familiar experience of the call of conscience derives from a structurally similar, but more fundamental existential call. He writes that "insofar as Dasein is concerned with its own being, it summons itself to its ability-to-be" (SZ 287). This summons does not enjoin us to do anything in

particular, nor is it tied to feelings of guilt about specific situations. It is a characteristic of discourse (*Rede*), the pre-linguistic articulatedness of Dasein, but it does not have specific semantic content (*SZ* 269). Heidegger describes it as a summons (*Aufruf*) that compels Dasein to exist. Hearing that call and being able to follow it forces us to make a commitment to exist for the sake of something. Heidegger therefore points out that this more fundamental structure is the call of *care*. The very structure of existence summons us to exist.

Heidegger can thus point to familiar phenomena in order to draw attention to the existential notion of the self. Importantly for Heidegger's methodological concerns, the attestation of Dasein's existentiality makes an authentic self-construal possible. If Dasein hears the summons authentically, i.e. hears it for what it really is, we cannot answer it by being lost in the world. Lost Dasein always understands itself in terms of entities whose significance is already constituted. But the call of care summons Dasein to guiltily be the *ground* of such significance. Hence Heidegger says that it summons Dasein to its "*ownmost* ability-to-be-a-self" (*SZ* 269).[17]

Guilt and the summons of care are closely related to Heidegger's existential notion of death. Both are aspects of Dasein's existentiality. Dasein does not have a nature or essence, but exists by understanding itself in terms of a purpose and skillfully pressing into possibilities that solicit it on the basis of this basic purposive structure. This existential structure is covered up in our everyday dealings, but it becomes explicit when everyday significance breaks down or when we experience the summons to be the ground of such significance. When authentic Dasein expresses this existential structure in its ability-to-be-a-self, its own ontological structure becomes "transparent to itself in an existentiell manner" (*SZ* 309). Hence Heidegger's description of authentic Dasein provides the phenomenological basis for the existential ontology of the self. Inauthentic Dasein also exists guiltily and as being-towards death, but it covers up the basic structures Heidegger aims to reveal. "Even in its average everydayness, Dasein is constantly concerned with death" (*SZ* 254). In average everydayness death is understood as a far-off one-time event, and guilt is taken over by adherence to public norms and standards. The result is that one's mode of being seems unassailable, and the hold one has on existence is buttressed by the impersonal, yet stable, self-certainty of the anyone. Heidegger calls this inauthentic understanding of death and guilt "fleeing." Fleeing maintains a hold on existing, but it does so by misleading Dasein about its own being and hence undermines attempts at explicit ontology.

This sketch of the methodological role of death and guilt explains why Heidegger's review of *PdW* seizes on Jaspers's discussion of limit-situations as the most important section of the book. Like Jaspers, Heidegger thinks that death and guilt are extraordinary phenomena at the limit of existence that can reveal important parts of the structure of human existence as such. For both Jaspers and Heidegger, this insight lies in the way a person can recover

from the possibility of a total breakdown and gain an orientation in the world, or a "hold" in Jaspers's words. Heidegger's idea, influenced by Jaspers, is to explain the structure of the self in terms of a basic ability to remain engaged in the face of the fundamental threat to this engagement posed by limit-situations.

Outline of Heidegger's argument

Heidegger's analysis of existential death and guilt takes up the first two chapters of Division Two. In this final section I want to sketch how these chapters fit into the overall argument of the book. The goal of *Being and Time* is to produce an explicit conceptual interpretation of the structure of existence. In attempting to do so, Heidegger is at pains to elude two problems. First he wants to avoid the "objectivating pre-conception" that leads Jaspers, Descartes, Kant, and traditional ontology to cast existence as an occurrent entity. And second he needs to eschew the tendency motivated by everyday Dasein to construe itself in terms of worldly entities.

Heidegger begins the argument in Division One with a first formal indication of the idea of existence, that its being is always an issue for it and that it is in each case mine. He fleshes out this formal sketch with the detailed phenomenology of everyday Dasein. This analytic of Dasein makes its existentiality explicit, but remains indifferent between authentic and inauthentic modes of existing. One important focus of the analytic of Dasein is understanding and construal. These are central phenomena of existence, and they serve to prepare the methodological reflections that structure Division Two. Hence Heidegger concludes Division One: "We clarified understanding itself, and by doing so we guaranteed the methodological transparentness of the understanding-construing procedure of the interpretation of being" (*SZ* 230).

Division Two begins with a series of methodological reflections (sec. 45, 46) in which Heidegger sets the stakes for his interpretation of authenticity by raising the "apparent impossibility of an ontological grasp and determination of the whole of Dasein" (*SZ* 235). Heidegger then sets this doubt to rest by establishing the phenomena of authenticity as the "phenomenal ground for the question about the existential constitution of Dasein" (*SZ* 267). This happens in two steps. In the first chapter the discussion of the existential concept of death starkly brings out the vulnerability of everyday existence, thus revealing the limits of the analysis of everydayness in Division One. The second chapter on conscience and guilt adds a more concrete phenomenology of an existence that understands itself, i.e. knows how to be itself, in light of such vulnerability. This issues in a first description of authentic Dasein (sec. 60).

Heidegger begins the third chapter by arguing that competently existing towards existential death and competently taking over one's guilt are the same basic ability. This is not surprising, since death and guilt are two aspects of the

same contingency of existence. He names this fundamental ability to exist in such a way as to master this contingency "forerunning resoluteness" (sec 62). This sketch of authentic Dasein serves as the phenomenal ground for the conceptual analysis of existence that follows it. Heidegger thus punctuates his argument at this point with another methodological reflection (sec. 63) in which he states that the earlier worries about method have been addressed and that we now see "the phenomena of authentic Dasein as a whole" (SZ 310).

The explicit conceptual structure of existence is what Heidegger calls "temporality." He claims that "temporality is *experienced* in a phenomenologically originary way in Dasein's authentic being-whole, i.e. in the phenomenon of forerunning resoluteness" (SZ 304). This is how the description of forerunning resoluteness makes genuine conceptual articulation possible. The remaining sections of chapter 3 carry out the explicit articulation of temporality as the conceptual structure of the existing self (sec. 64, 65). Heidegger's analysis of the originary past, present, and future constitutes his account of the ontological makeup of the self. Heidegger's argument thus culminates in section 65.[18] In the remainder of Division Two Heidegger substantiates his account of temporality by applying it to interpretations of everydayness (chapter 4), and a range of interconnected questions about history and tradition, diachronic identity, and ordinary notions of time (chapters 5 and 6).

Conclusion

I have argued that Heidegger has a methodological conception of authenticity, that this conception is motivated by philosophical concerns first expressed in his review of Jaspers's *PdW*, and that a focus on the methodological function of authenticity helps clarify the overall structure of Heidegger's argument in Division Two. This conception is driven by three basic commitments of Heidegger's existential phenomenology: that Dasein is an existential, not occurrent entity; that Dasein is essentially self-construing; and that ordinarily Dasein's self-construal mistakes its own ontological makeup.

This methodological reading has minimal implications for the substantial conception of authenticity as a mode of self-owned existence. The only necessary condition for Heidegger's argument to work is that some such mode of authenticity is existentially possible, and that this possibility is attested by some phenomena in experience. There need not be actual authentic people, and authentic people need not know that they are authentic. This methodological reading is therefore compatible with a deflationist interpretation of authenticity. Such deflationism would argue that the various structures of authenticity are mere existential possibilities that are not met in actual experience, and that Heidegger does not think that authenticity is demanded of us.

But my focus on method does not require deflationism. Heideggerian authenticity is a rich notion that plays in other registers besides Heidegger's concerns about method. This reading is compatible with substantial views

of authenticity, such as Christian, Kierkegaardian, Aristotelian, or pragmatist readings. Such substantial views need to vindicate aspects of authenticity – including forerunning into death, wanting to have a conscience, guilt, and the related phenomena of resoluteness, readiness for anxiety, and uncanniness – by phenomenological evidence, rather than methodological considerations.[19]

Notes

1 Translated as KJPW, though all translations in this chapter are mine.
2 There are, of course, many influences besides Jaspers on Division Two. Heidegger's review of Jaspers, like the correspondence and conversations between the two, is informed by thoughts about Augustine, Aristotle, and more. One particularly important influence on Heidegger's thought about death and guilt is Kierkegaard, whom both Jaspers and Heidegger "discover" for mainstream German-speaking philosophy. Further, Heidegger's analysis of originary temporality is thoroughly shaped by his interpretation of Kant's threefold synthesis, the chapter on historicalness is shaped by his reading of Dilthey, and so on.
3 This is how Heidegger describes their collaboration in a letter to Jaspers on June 27, 1922. For this, and further correspondence that provides a fascinating glimpse into their relationship, see *HJC*. See also the remarks on Heidegger in Jaspers 1977: 92-111. For discussion of the relationship, see the essays in Olson 1994, especially the essays by Paul Tillich and Karsten Harries. The relationship between Jaspers and Heidegger is often discussed in the context of Heidegger's de-Nazification hearings, during which Jaspers's evaluation of Heidegger's work raised the crucial question about whether the philosophical content of Heidegger's texts can be separated from his political involvement with the Nazis. The genesis of *Being and Time*, however, is tied to an earlier chapter of their relationship.
4 In *AP*, this concern leads Jaspers to display his philosophical bent by adopting Husserlian phenomenology and Dilthey's *verstehende Psychologie* as the methods of psychiatry.
5 There is also some resemblance between Heidegger's remark that a self-understanding skeptic will be driven to despair and suicide (*SZ* 229) and Jaspers's description of the skeptic who either maintains a primitive egoistic self or succumbs to a self-destroying pathology.
6 Heidegger refers specifically to *PdW* ch. 3, sec. 3, pp. 202-47. Interestingly, there is little to be learned about the details of Heidegger's notoriously obscure conceptions of death and guilt from Jaspers's discussion of these two limit-situations in *PdW*. Heidegger takes more from Kierkegaard and Jaspers may have pointed him to Kierkegaard, both in his writings and in person (cf. the footnote on *SZ* 338 and Jaspers 1977: 94). For an excellent survey of the Kierkegaardian features of Heidegger's notion of death, see Thomson 2013.
7 William Blattner has laid out the extent and limitations of this comparison with respect to death in his 1994.
8 Of course, part of the motivation of *PdW* for Jaspers is to get better purchase on the notion of personality that can be deployed in psychiatric evaluation, and with his background in psychiatry, Jaspers has a range of sophisticated ways of determining psychical entities.
9 There are other phenomena, distinct from but related to human existence, which have the mode of being of Dasein, i.e. must be understood in terms of existential ontology. These include sense and meaning (*SZ* 152), truth, and language.

10 Heidegger also uses the German term *genuin*, which, like *echt*, is translated as "genuine." As far as I can tell he uses this word in its ordinary sense, not in a technical sense. It has no bearing on the distinction between *echt* and *eigentlich*.
11 Heidegger does not explicate, but presumably the construal of, say, hammers as suitable for a job is *genuine* (*echt*) insofar as it is drawn appropriately from the underlying competences of hammering, but *inauthentic* (*uneigentlich*) because these would not be the right phenomena to attend to in attempting to expressly articulate existence. They are about tools, not Dasein. While Heidegger allows for the possibility of *non-genuine, authentic* understanding, he gives no specific examples of this. In what follows I suggest that Jaspers's *PdW* is an example of such non-genuine, authentic interpretation of Dasein.
12 Note that the available English translations of *Being and Time* (Macquarrie and Robinson; Stambaugh and Schmidt) both mistranslate this passage. *Verfehlung* of the ontological interpretation of the being of Dasein does not mean that it is missing, as in absent; it means that it is very much present, but mistaken.
13 Hence "authentic," from the Greek roots *autos* and *hentes*, for self-doing, is the usual translation.
14 Heidegger does occasionally use "*eigentlich*" adverbially, bringing out this methodological function of authenticity more clearly. As below on *SZ* 322, and, for example: "Dasein is really itself [*Dasein ist eigentlich es selbst*] only insofar as it … projects itself onto its ownmost ability-to-be" (*SZ* 263). "Resoluteness does not detach Dasein from the world. And how should it, since as authentic resoluteness it is nothing other than really, actually being-in-the-world [*das In-der-Welt-sein eigentlich ist*]" (*SZ* 298). The same connotation is also clear in some adjectival uses. See, e.g.: "How can we tell what makes up the 'actual/authentic' existence of Dasein [*was die 'eigentliche' Existenz des Daseins ausmacht*]?" (*SZ* 312).
15 Death and guilt are two of Jaspers's limit situations. Heidegger does not call his own notions of death and guilt "limit-situations" (*Grenzsituation*). Besides two footnotes referring to the notion in Jaspers's work, he uses the term twice in the text, in scare quotes, to address "the 'limit-situation' of being towards death" (*SZ* 349, 308). He does not use the term for his existential notion of guilt.
16 William Blattner has suggested that cases of clinical depression are examples of existential death. See, e.g., Blattner 2006: 160.
17 Heidegger does not give specific details on how one's ownmost ability-to-be shows up in existentiell cases. Interestingly, he defers to Jaspers on this point. As we saw above, Heidegger writes that "It is the task of existential anthropology to render the main features and connections of factical-existentiell possibilities and to interpret their existential structures" (*SZ* 301), noting in a footnote to this sentence that Jaspers's *PdW* was the first attempt to provide such an interpretation.
18 For a detailed interpretation of section 65, see Käufer 2013.
19 I am deeply grateful to Denis McManus, and to the members of the American Society for Existential Phenomenology, for providing helpful comments and questions on earlier versions of this chapter.

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7

ESSENTIAL GUILT AND TRANSCENDENTAL CONSCIENCE

William Blattner

> This essential being-guilty is equioriginarily the existential condition of the possibility of the "morally" good and evil, that is, for morality in general and its factically possible formations. Originary being-guilty cannot be determined by morality, because the latter already presupposes the former.
>
> (*SZ* 286)[1]

In this passage from Division Two of *Being and Time*, Heidegger identifies what he calls "essential guilt" and asserts that it is more fundamental than moral guilt. Language such as this might lead one to read the treatise as amoralist in nature. When allowed to resonate with Nietzsche's aspirations to live "beyond good and evil" and Kierkegaard's conception of the "teleological suspension of the ethical"[2] – existentialist authors with whom Heidegger is often thought to be a fellow traveler – Heidegger's language might well suggest a demotion of morality to secondary status, perhaps even an imperative to override morality in the name of some existentialist conception of "authenticity." Such a reading is, however, unnecessary. Furthermore, it ignores the literal language of the passage and the structure of Heidegger's thought in Division Two of *Being and Time*.

We do not even need to know what "essential guilt" is to see that the passage describes it as "the existential condition of the possibility of the 'morally' good and evil." This transcendental gesture in Heidegger's characterization is reinforced by the formulation at the end of the passage in which he states that morality presupposes essential guilt. So, rather than arguing that essential guilt overrides or displaces morality, Heidegger here instead identifies it as a presupposition of morality, something that makes moral guilt possible in the first place. What then is this essential guilt, and how does it serve as a condition of the possibility of moral guilt?

Heidegger identifies guilt (in the "formal existential" sense) as "being-the-ground for a being that has been determined by a not – that is, being-the-ground

of a nullity" (SZ 283). Of course, to understand this definition we must first define being-the-ground:

> Thrownness, however, does not lie behind Dasein as an event that has factually befallen it, that has as a matter of fact suddenly fallen upon and then fallen away from Dasein; rather, Dasein is constantly – as long as it is – its "that" as care. In existing, it is the ground of its ability-to-be as this entity, delivered over to whom it can exist solely as the entity that it is. Although it has not itself laid its ground, it rests in its weight, which attunement makes manifest to it as a burden.
>
> (SZ 284)

Dasein is the ground of its ability-to-be. Here I must quickly connect some dots that I have worked through elsewhere.[3] Dasein's ability-to-be is its capacity to press forward into some self-understanding, which itself is constituted by concrete possible ways of living. Heidegger identifies thrownness as that in virtue of which Dasein is the ground of this pressing forward, and the relevant dimension of thrownness is that which is disclosed to Dasein in attunement (*Stimmung*). Among other things, attunement reveals the way things matter to Dasein. How things matter to Dasein grounds how it presses forward into possibilities. How?

Although abstractly speaking Dasein can choose either option when confronted with a decision, it is usually already disposed one way rather than another.

> Dasein is its ground existingly, that is, in such a way that it understands itself in terms of possibilities, and as such it is in understanding itself a thrown entity. Herein lies this, however: being able-to-be, it stands in each case in one or another possibility, it constantly is not another, and it has relinquished [*begeben*] it in its existentiell projection.
>
> (SZ 285)

When facing the choice between sacrificing professional advancement and betraying a friend, I have already "relinquished" the option of betraying my friend because I already stand within one possibility, that is, within one self-understanding, rather than another. In his analysis of self-understanding in Division One Heidegger puts the point this way: Dasein's ability-to-be is not a "free-floating ability-to-be in the sense of the 'indifference of choice' (*libertas indifferentiae*)" (SZ 144). The expression "indifference of choice" ("*Gleichgültigkeit der Willkür*") – which Macquarrie and Robinson obscure in their translation by rendering it as "liberty of indifference," as if it were just a translation of the Latin "*libertas indifferentiae*" – evokes resonances with Kant. Kant uses the term "*Willkür*" to name the capacity to choose, and he

denies that freedom of choice consists in the indifference of *Willkür*.[4] To be free is, according to Kant, to be subject to the moral law. And so it is not surprising to find that Heidegger identifies freedom as subjection to being-guilty: "Freedom is, however, only in the choice of one [possibility], that is in bearing not having chosen and not being able to choose the others" (SZ 285).

The metaphor of "bearing" resonates with that of "burden." Attunement discloses our thrownness as a burden; we must carry burdens. I am not free to be anyone I would like to be because I am already someone determinate. There are a number of ways in which this is so that have been emphasized in the literature on Heidegger. I can be neither a Swabian dairy farmer nor a Roman legionnaire because those possibilities belong to a culture foreign to me and another epoch of the West, respectively. I cannot be the Dodgers' center fielder because I do not enjoy the physical prerequisites for the job. All of this is true, but does not cut to the heart of the matter in Heidegger's eyes. Most importantly of all, I am not free to drop my life and join the circus, not because I am not literally capable of making that choice, but rather because I am already entangled in my current life, a life in which all sorts of things matter dearly to me, especially people. The point here is not that the attunements that disclose the way things matter prevent choosing against them. People do forsake what is dear. Attunements do not function as causes that determine our choices. Rather, whenever we do forsake what is dear to us, we do so in opposition to and defiance of a normative call to act otherwise. That is to say, then, that freedom for Heidegger is not to be able, in the words of Harry Luck in *The Magnificent Seven*, to "turn Mama's picture to the wall and get out," but rather to be responsive to the demands to which one already finds oneself attuned. (And note that Harry returns to the village for the climactic battle, no longer willing to disentangle himself from the village and its future.)

There is a clear sense in which all of this adds up to a limitation, something defined by a "not," what Heidegger calls a "nullity." In general I am not indifferent to the possibilities accessible to me; I am not free to disregard what matters to me. This nullity limits my projection, that is, limits the projection for which I am the ground. It is my "being-the-ground of a nullity," my essential guilt. So, now we have an account of what Heidegger means by "essential guilt": essential guilt is Dasein's being subject to demands that inhere in who it already is.

In order for Dasein to be subject to these demands in anything more than a purely notional sense, it must be responsive to them. It must have uptake on its subjection to the demands. About a decade ago Steven Crowell (2001; 2007) and Rebecca Kukla (2002) simultaneously and independently proposed a new reading of Heidegger's concept of "conscience," one inspired in part by John Haugeland's interpretation of Division Two of *Being and Time* (1992; 2000).[5] Kukla coined the elegant term "transcendental conscience" to name the phenomenon. Before proceeding, let me draw attention to a couple

of aspects of this language of "responding to norms." "Responding to a norm" means acting from or in light of a norm, rather than merely in accordance with one. Consider Kant's distinction between acting from the moral law and acting from prudential considerations. In the *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals* Kant denies moral praise to the shopkeeper who treats her customers fairly because she foresees a better reputation and more robust business from doing so. The shopkeeper is guided by the maxim, "Act so as to promote the success of one's business," rather than the moral law. Although she ends up acting in accordance with the moral law, in that she does what the moral law commands, she does not act *from* the moral law. It is prudence, rather than the moral law, that motivates her reflection and practical reasoning.

We can use this same example to make a second observation as well. The shopkeeper applies her prudential maxim to the circumstances and draws the required practical conclusion that she should treat her customers fairly. But why does she draw this conclusion from the premises? Because she responds to the logical norms of inference. And why does she act on the basis of the conclusion of her practical reasoning? Because she responds to the normative force of prudence. Whether she is acting from a moral norm or from some other sort of norm, she is acting from norms. And so if we use the term "norm" to refer not just to moral norms, but to any sort of deontic regulation, any obligation, permission, or prohibition, then subjection to norms characterizes all aspects of human agency, not just situations in which morality is at stake. There are not just moral norms, but also logical norms, epistemic norms, norms of instrumental practical rationality, and norms of social propriety.

To be responsive to moral norms is to have a moral conscience. Moral conscience "calls upon" one to make a choice, avoid a temptation, or live in a definite way. The "conscience" of which Heidegger writes is a generalized form of such calling and being called upon. To have a conscience in Heidegger's sense is to be called upon to respond to norms of any sort, that is, to be called upon by norms at all. We can now see why Heidegger describes conscience as a summons:

> The call of conscience has the character of calling Dasein to its ownmost ability-to-be-itself, and that in the manner of summoning it to its ownmost being-guilty.
>
> (*SZ* 269)

Conscience is, thus, Dasein's being summoned to its essential being-guilty, to its subjection to norms. Kukla's term "transcendental conscience" is thus apt, for this conscience is a condition of the possibility of conscience in more ordinary senses of the word, including especially moral conscience.

To sum up our results to this point, I have interpreted Heidegger's notion of essential guilt as Dasein's subjection to norms, and (following

Crowell and Kukla) his concept of conscience as Dasein's responsiveness to norms. As Haugeland argues in "Truth and Finitude," Division One of *Being and Time* presupposes that Dasein is subject to and responsive to norms. Without that assumption, many of the phenomena Heidegger explores in Division One make no sense: for example, the appropriateness of specified uses of equipment, and Dasein's being disposed to press forward into life in this way rather than that. Division One does not clarify or explain Dasein's responsiveness to norms, however. That project is left to Division Two, in which Heidegger develops the phenomenology of "guilt" and "conscience," which together are conditions of the possibility of the normative responsiveness. Division One requires Division Two.

Now, if Heidegger's notion of conscience designates a formal or transcendental characteristic of all human agency, then why does Heidegger state that conscience "call[s] Dasein to its ownmost ability-to-be-itself, and that in the manner of summoning it to its ownmost being-guilty" (SZ 269, emphasis altered)? Does not "Dasein's ownmost ability-to-be" refer to the authentic self? Why would a transcendental condition of the possibility of all agency, something that is allegedly engaged in all human deliberation and choice, call Dasein to its "ownmost" or authentic self?[6] To explore this question, I want now to turn to Crowell's analysis of Heidegger's concept of conscience. Crowell argues that conscience addresses Dasein's subjectivity, which, he argues, is neither the authentic self nor the everyday self, but rather "a hidden condition" of both of them. I will argue, in contrast, that conscience in fact addresses Dasein's authentic self, which is who I in each case am.

Conscience as individualizing: Crowell on subjectivity and conscience

Crowell argues that conscience is the locus of subjectivity in Heidegger's analytic of Dasein. On its face this seems difficult to accept: is not the rejection of the language of subjectivity a central thrust of *Being and Time*? Crowell points to passages in which Heidegger characterizes conscience as functioning like the the first-person pronoun "I." Like the first-person pronoun, conscience "reaches the self univocally and unmistakably" (SZ 274). The self that conscience "reaches" is not the "Anyone-self" (*das Man-selbst*), that is, the everyday self of Dasein, Crowell insists, but a first-personal dimension of Dasein that underlies and makes possible the everyday self. Crowell cites the following passage to support his reading:

> In so far as it is understood in a worldly fashion for others and for itself, Dasein is passed over in this call. The call to the self takes not the least notice thereof. Because only the self of the Anyone-self is addressed and brought to hear, the Anyone collapses.
>
> (SZ 273)

The call of conscience ignores all of Dasein's publicly identifiable features and addresses itself strictly to Dasein's self. That is, my conscience addresses me, simpliciter, and ignores my being a father, a professor, a friend, and so on. Just as the pronoun "I" refers to me regardless of my worldly characteristics and entanglements, conscience addresses the self as such and ignores what Dasein is understood as. If we follow Crowell in appropriating Christine Korsgaard's term "practical identity" (Korsgaard 1996) to refer to all of these worldly characteristics, then we may say that the call of conscience ignores my practical identity.

But why would the call of conscience ignore my practical identity? On Crowell's analysis, whereas conscience is a first-personal phenomenon, Dasein's practical identity is third-personal. He writes,

> As Heidegger argues, 'the self of everyday Dasein is the Anyone-self' … and it becomes evident from his description of the Anyone-self that it understands (is aware of) itself wholly in third-person terms … .
> (Crowell 2001: 437)

This interpretation conflates two philosophical distinctions, however: that between the first, second, and third persons, on the one hand, and that between the typicality and distinctiveness of possible ways of existing. The distinction between the first, second, and third persons is a distinction among various stances one can occupy in relation to persons. I occupy a first-person stance when I relate to my life as mine, when I experience it as its subject or agent. I occupy a second-person stance when I address myself or another. When I call a friend to task for the way he's behaving, I occupy a second-person stance expressed by second-personal pronouns, as when I say, "You really shouldn't do that." Finally, I occupy a third-person stance when I observe a person as a social spectator. When I describe my neighbor as a lawyer and social activist, I am observing her and expressing my observations in the form of descriptions.

Now, in characterizing everydayness in *Being and Time* Crowell slides seamlessly from the "third-person" standpoint to talking about "typical" forms of life or activities. It is true that when I describe my neighbor from a third-person point of view, I usually rely upon generalized descriptions, such as "lawyer" and "social activist." These are descriptors that apply to many other people as well. Of course, if I just point at her and say "she," I am likewise occupying a third-person point of view. I can, moreover, address my neighbor and say, "Wait a minute! You're a lawyer. You tell me!" In saying this I occupy the second-personal stance of addressing her, but in the process I deploy descriptions that, once again, apply to many other folks as well. Finally, I can use descriptions to characterize myself, as when I say, "I am a teacher and a father." What does this show? It shows that Crowell's expression "third-person terms" conflates the third-personal stance with

typical or generic descriptive resources. Let me approach this from another angle in order to drive the point home.

We can take up a third-person stance on ourselves. Suppose I want to improve my teaching and so ask the teaching support crew at my university to videotape me in action. I can then watch myself as any observer could. If I catch myself in the mirror as I'm walking through the hotel lobby, I might momentarily view myself as any observer would. Such episodes are uncommon and artificial, however. This is what makes the propensity of celebrities and politicians to refer to themselves in the third person so amusing and distressing. They are so used to being talked about that they have come partly to think of themselves as public personae. Note that when they do talk about themselves in the third-person, they sometimes rely on self-descriptions that are meant to capture something special about themselves. (When Omar Little goes to a parlay with Stringer Bell in Butchie's bar in episode 11 of Season 2 of *The Wire*, Butchie's men approach Omar to frisk him for a weapon. Omar just says, "Unh uh, big man. That ain't gonna work for Omar." If you understand who Omar is, you have to know you can't frisk him. Omar says this about himself in the third person, relying on his distinctive persona, known to all. Seinfeld takes this to its logical extreme, of course, in the Season 6 episode, "The Jimmy.")

The grammatical person – whether first, second, or third – of one's stance towards a person – whether oneself or another – is orthogonal to the typicality or distinctiveness of his or her actions and undertakings. Characters, personae, and personalities can be either typical or distinctive, and we can relate to them either first-, second-, or third-personally. There is no inherent incompatibility between the first-personal stance and a typical practical identity. If I am a man of little imagination, I might well first-personally embrace a rather typical or standard-issue practical identity. If I am eccentric or insist on "marching to my own drummer," I can understand myself first-personally as someone distinctive. Thus, I conclude that Crowell has run two distinctions together: the tripartite distinction between the first, second, and third persons, on the one hand, and that between distinctive and typical characters, personae, or self-understandings on the other.[7]

With this conflation cleared out of the way, we may focus on Crowell's central thesis, namely: "What Heidegger here misleadingly calls the 'Self' is, I believe, more properly thought as the subjectivity, or first-person self-awareness, of Dasein" (Crowell 2001: 442-43). Crowell's reasoning is that the addressee of conscience "is neither the Anyone-self (who says 'I' but not as 'I myself'), nor the authentic Self (a 'modification' of the Anyone-self), but the hidden condition of both" (Crowell 2001: 444). What could this hidden condition of both the Anyone-self and the authentic self be? All we have to go on, Crowell implicitly reasons, is that conscience addresses itself to this phenomenon and in doing so unerringly hits its mark. The addressee of conscience must therefore be Dasein's subjectivity, Dasein's capacity to address itself in the first person.

But Crowell's argument for this conclusion involves a critical exegetical error. The authentic self is not an existentiell modification of the Anyone-self. In fact, Heidegger says precisely the reverse: "It was shown that primarily and usually Dasein is not itself, but rather is lost in the Anyone-self. The latter is an existentiell modification of the authentic self" (*SZ* 317).[8] What does it mean to say that the Anyone-self is an existentiell modification of the authentic self, and does this help identify the addressee of conscience?

Using the clue highlighted by Crowell, namely, that conscience infallibly addresses the self and always hits its target, we can develop a fairly straightforward interpretation of Heidegger's language. Transcendental conscience addresses itself to the authentic self. The authentic self is who one in each case is. Why does Heidegger not then simply call the authentic self the "I"? It is not exactly wrong to do this, but rather unilluminating. Heidegger's way of putting the point is to say that the pronoun "I" is a "non-committal formal indicator" of the self (*SZ* 116). Yes, whenever I say "I" I am referring to myself. Whom does the call of conscience address? Whom does it summon? Conscience summons whomever it is who is responsive to norms. And who is in each case responsive to norms? I am. I may exist in the mode of the Anyone-self, but this Anyone-self is a modification of the authentic self, that is to say, a way of being the addressee of conscience. When in my average everydayness I am called upon to act in some way, say, to lecture to my students, I am called upon to deliver the lectures. The unerring address of conscience reaches me. This should seem obvious, but it's hard to state the point if we follow Crowell in interpreting the Anyone-self as a third-personal phenomenon. Framed third-personally, the normative status would be, "Blattner should deliver the lectures for Philosophy 98." It's something that someone could say about me; it does not capture my first-personal experience of being called. Now, if in the mode of the Anyone-self Dasein is "typical" or "generic," then we can say things such as that "If one is an instructor, one should deliver lectures in one's assigned courses." That standardized norm can then be instantiated and applied to me, as when the dean upbraids me for failing to deliver my lectures.

However, even if I am a person of little imagination, leading a standardized early twenty-first-century professorial professional life, I still experience the normative demand to deliver lectures as addressed to me. Recall the sentence from one of the passages on which Crowell relies: "Because only the self of the Anyone-self is addressed and brought to hear, the Anyone collapses" (*SZ* 273). Conscience addresses the self of the Anyone-self. Conscience in each case addresses me, even when I am living in the mode of the Anyone-self. The addressee of conscience in *Being and Time* is, then, the self. The self is the authentic self, and primarily and usually this self lives in a concretely modified form as an Anyone-self.

So, why does Heidegger say that conscience calls Dasein to its ownmost ability-to-be-itself, to its ownmost being-guilty? Because conscience addresses

the authentic self, which is Dasein's ownmost self. There is no need to posit, as Crowell does, a hidden condition beneath or behind both the authentic and everyday selves, for it is the authentic self who is in each case addressed by conscience. This authentic self lives, primarily and usually, in the mode of the Anyone-self, however.

Kukla on conscience, anxiety, and authenticity

Conscience appears to play another role in *Being and Time* as well, however, a role that one might think does not sit well with my reading: conscience calls Dasein out of its everydayness and to something more authentic. Recall that Heidegger states that "Because only the self of the Anyone-self is addressed and brought to hear, the Anyone collapses" (SZ 273, emphasis altered). He adds several pages later:

> The caller can be determined by nothing in a "worldly" fashion with respect to its Who. It is Dasein in its uncanniness, the originary thrown being-in-the-world as not-at-home, the naked "that" in the nothing of the world.
>
> (SZ 276-77)

I have argued conscience addresses the authentic self, which in everyday life exists in the modified form of the Anyone-self. When I am called upon by my role to deliver lectures, this call addresses me, and calls me to live up to my professional obligations. But isn't this all too anodyne to accommodate the language of "nothingness," being "not-at-home," and the "*collapse*" of the Anyone? In fact, it may well be that Crowell's motivation for denying that the authentic self is the addressee of conscience was to avoid the implication that when I am called upon to deliver lectures, I am addressed from out of nothingness and some fundamental "not-at-home" in the world.

Kukla wrestles with precisely this dilemma in her analysis of conscience. She argues that "moments of authenticity" must occur episodically in one's life in order for one to be able to act in the light of norms (rather than merely in accordance with them):

> The bulk of our action must always remain inauthentic, for sustained authenticity would require that we negotiate our world through an ongoing alienated uncanniness that would amount to a crippling form of psychosis. But our having moments of authenticity is a transcendental condition for the possibility of any action, and these moments are a response to hearing the call of conscience which issues forth from the uncanny.
>
> (Kukla 2002: 13)

To heed the call of conscience is to refuse to flee from the uncanniness of anxiety. "In cutting off my capacity for unreflective, fallen action, the uncanny reveals that everyday practices never did simply determine my actions as the laws of nature can determine my movements" (Kukla 2002: 10). In anxiety a previously unreflective subject comes to feel "not at home" in the world, i.e., uncanny. She is "alienated" from everyday practices and thus cannot be merely "carried along" by them. She must "make active choices, and thus take responsibility for what" she does (Kukla 2002: 9-10). Conscience is the demand that she do this. To heed the call of conscience (to "want to have a conscience," "*Gewissen-haben-wollen*," in Heidegger's formulation) is to embrace that demand, to take responsibility for what she does. Only by taking responsibility for her choices and actions, however, does she respond to norms as norms, rather than merely get carried along by them as if they were laws of nature determining her action. This is why Heideggerian conscience is a "transcendental condition for the possibility of any action," according to Kukla. It would also explain why Heidegger would say that conscience calls Dasein to its ownmost self.

What is the decisive point in Kukla's contrast between norms and laws of nature? It cannot be that whereas we can fail to conform to norms or even flout them, we cannot do so with respect to laws of nature. (One cannot defy Newton's Second Law of Motion, as if sticking one's tongue out and saying, "Just watch me violate F = ma!") That much is obvious. Rather, the point seems rather to be that norms are always challengeable. That is, their status as binding may always be called into question.

> Hence Heidegger may argue that the [Anyone] is 'always already' normative, but this normativity can only make a genuine a claim on us in the context of our ability to step out of our lostness in the everyday and commit to norms by taking responsibility for their legitimacy, rather than taking them as simply found.
>
> (Kukla 2002: 4-5)

To take a norm as "simply found" is to treat its bindingness as unquestionable. In particular, the question, "Should I commit to this norm or reject it?" cannot arise in so far as one relates to a norm as simply found. To explicate this idea, Kukla reminds us of Hegel's analysis of Antigone:

> The problem here harkens back to that raised by Hegel for 'immediate ethical life' through his reading of the Antigone myth. Antigone, we may remember, seemed to be the most committed possible agent with the strongest possible form of normative responsiveness, because her relationship to the norms governing her world was immediate – she took them as laws of nature with no origin and no room for interrogation. But for just this reason, it turned out that

> her relation to them was not normative at all. She could not actually recognize their claims, because, as transgression was not a disclosed possibility for her, she could not step back from them so as to see them as making a claim upon her, which she had a responsibility to live up to in virtue of her commitment to their legitimacy.
>
> (Kukla 2002: 4-5)[9]

Antigone treated the norms to which she was subject as given, as unchallengeable. Because they were unchallengeable, the question could not arise for her whether she ought to violate them. (Of course, unlike laws of nature, the question can arise whether she has violated them, but that's a different question.) Because the question whether she ought to obey cannot arise for Antigone, the norms she follows are not genuine norms. To be a norm is to be challengeable, and to recognize oneself as subject to a norm is to take responsibility for the norm, to commit to it. To commit to a norm is to be prepared to defend it against challenge.

Now, the connection between this Hegelian argument against the givenness of norms and Heidegger's analysis of authenticity and anxiety, as Kukla interprets them, runs like this. To be able to challenge a norm requires that one achieve some distance between oneself and the norm. Kukla's argument is that for Heidegger that distance is imposed by anxiety. But how precisely is such an imposition of anxious distance supposed to work? Kukla writes, recall, that "In cutting off my capacity for unreflective, fallen action, the uncanny reveals that everyday practices never did simply determine my actions as the laws of nature can determine my movements" (Kukla 2002: 10).

Anxiety does not just put some distance between the agent and this particular norm; it cuts off the "capacity" for unreflective, fallen obedience to norms. Because anxiety is a global attunement, it inflicts an alienation from all norms, not just a particular norm in a particular context. After all, primarily and usually, when one does reflect on a norm and either commit to it or reject it, one does so in terms of other norms. At some point over the past forty years the traditional norm that required a man to give his seat on the bus to a woman was transformed into the norm of an able-bodied person giving up his or her seat to someone for whom standing is challenging, whether the person be especially young, or old, physically impaired, or what have you. That a passenger who enters the bus is a woman is no longer grounds in and of itself for a man to offer his seat to her. In fact, the offer to do so, when there is no other reason, can appear demeaning or condescending.[10] This transformation in norms – one that men of my generation experienced reflectively, but whose results my sons, for example, have just been unreflectively socialized into – was driven by competing normative considerations. Gender equality defeated a traditional norm of politeness. Anxiety could not explain how this normative transformation took place, because anxious Dasein would have been just as alienated from

the modern norm of gender equality as from the traditional norms of politeness. So, what kind of transformation could anxiety work?

By alienating Dasein from all norms, anxiety could only enforce a sense that no norm is simply found, merely given. Because this sort of existential insight cannot make any specific difference within the field of norms, it can only make a difference to how Dasein relates to norms in general. And this is where the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity can come into play. Before examining this connection, I must raise two preliminary exegetical challenges to Kukla's reading of Heidegger.

Kukla treats "moments of authenticity" as roughly equivalent to episodes of anxiety. She then also describes the condition to which we return after the episode of anxiety has subsided as "inauthenticity." There are two exegetical issues that arise here. First, it is not at all clear that authenticity involves episodically experiencing anxiety. Kukla assumes it does in her explanation of why authenticity cannot be sustained; she reasons that since doing so would require living in a continuous state of anxiety it would result in "a crippling form of psychosis." (After all, if Dasein is alienated from all norms, then there can be no considerations for or against any concrete course of action.) However, the text of *Being and Time* is ambiguous about whether authenticity necessarily involves anxiety, even in the critical paragraph that defines authentic disclosedness, which he calls "resoluteness":

> The disclosedness of Dasein that lies in wanting-to-have-a-conscience is accordingly constituted by the disposedness of anxiety, by understanding as projecting-itself on its ownmost being-guilty and by discourse as remaining silent. This exceptional disclosedness, which is attested in Dasein itself by conscience – the silent self-projection upon one's ownmost being-guilty that is ready for anxiety – we call resoluteness.
>
> (*SZ* 296-97)

In these two sentences Heidegger first states that resoluteness is constituted by anxiety, but then subsequently identifies resoluteness as requiring merely "readiness for anxiety." If we opt for the interpretation that requires only readiness for anxiety, then we can begin to drive a wedge between alienation and authenticity.[11] What would this wedge get us?

Here the second exegetical issue becomes relevant. Hubert Dreyfus has argued that apart from authenticity and inauthenticity, there is a third mode of Dasein's existence, which Heidegger occasionally calls the "undifferentiated mode" (Dreyfus 1991: ch. 13). Dreyfus seizes upon the following passages in *Being and Time*:

> Dasein should not at the outset of the analysis be interpreted in the differentiated character of a determinate existing, but rather uncovered

> in its undifferentiated primarily and usually. This undifferentiated character of Dasein's everydayness is not nothing, but rather a positive phenomenal characteristic of this entity. All existing, such as it is, is out of this sort of being and back into it again. We call this everyday undifferentiated character of Dasein averageness.
>
> (SZ 43)

> As in each case mine, however, the ability-to-be is free for authenticity or inauthenticity or the modally undifferentiated character of them.
>
> (SZ 232)[12]

The idea is that Dasein's average everydayness is a condition or mode of living in which authenticity and inauthenticity are not differentiated. If the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity is induced by one's response to anxiety, a response in which one either owns (takes responsibility for) or disowns (rejects responsibility for) norms, then what would the undifferentiated mode be? Presumably it would be a condition in which one neither takes nor rejects such responsibility.

There's a difference between fleeing from the choice whether to obey a social norm (inauthenticity) and responding to the norm without currently experiencing the demand that one assess its legitimacy. Put differently, suppose that one becomes aware of a demand that one choose whether to obey a norm. One can respond to this awareness in one of two ways: one can embrace the demand and decide whether to obey the norm, or one can flee from the demand by throwing oneself into an aggravated form of conformism in which one pushes back against the awareness of responsibility and refuses to entertain any challenges to the norm. Prior to encountering the challenge to a norm, the legitimacy of the norm is not in question; nothing forces the issue whether to respect the norm. Now, we saw above that anxiety, if it alienates us from norms, must alienate us from all norms, not just a particular norm. So we must ask whether this "innocence" about the legitimacy of a norm can serve as a model for the undifferentiated mode. The undifferentiated mode, if it exists, would have to be a condition in which Dasein has not encountered anxiety, and so it has not experienced the generalized alienation from norms that anxiety inflicts.

Kukla argues that there can be no such "innocence." Her motivation seems to be the thesis that it belongs to the logic of norms that one may always challenge their legitimacy. Norms are by their very nature inherently questionable. No norm is simply given. That this is a result of the logic of norms does not, however, entail that each case of Dasein is aware that every norm is challengeable.[13] Consider the following two sentences from Kukla's argument:

> On the other hand, she must equally be able to serve as an authority with respect to the legitimacy of the claim on her action. In order

> to count as normatively responsive, she must own the action in the sense of taking on the responsibility that comes with a personal commitment to its rightness.
>
> (Kukla 2002: 5)

In these two sentences Kukla moves from the weaker thesis that an agent must be able to serve as an authority for the norms that have a claim on her action, to the stronger thesis that she must own the action by taking on the responsibility for the legitimacy of the norm. That is, Kukla moves from the capacity or ability to own a norm to the achievement of owning it. Kukla does not, however, provide an argument for this move.

One reason why an argument for this step in the analysis might be missing is that Kukla has set up the entire discussion in order to motivate a deep and fascinating interpretation of the temporality of conscience. She wants to argue that there is no condition of "innocence" prior to an encounter with anxiety, because all norms have always already been called into question. Dasein has always already experienced anxiety. Consider the way in which Kukla sets up the problem. She argues that an agent who is responsive to norms must always already have been alienated from the norms by way of what she calls "moments of authenticity," that is, anxiety. This thesis suggests an insoluble paradox, however, in that if we assume that there is some first episode of anxious alienation in the biography of a given agent, then before that episode the agent is not responding to norms. She is rather merely conforming to strictures as merely found, almost as if those strictures were laws of nature. In other words, there is a moment of transition from non-agency to agency. What's more, if an agent were somehow to avoid anxiety her entire life, she would not even be an agent, that is, not even be responsive to norms. Kukla resolves this paradox by arguing that Dasein has always already experienced anxiety.

The "already" in this formulation refers not to the agent's biographical history, but to a non-sequential past of originary time. That is to say that if we describe an agent as always already having experienced anxiety, we do not mean that at some past moment of his biography he has experienced anxiety. The originary past is not earlier in sequential, biographical time. To develop this line of thought further, one would have to explicate the notion of temporality that is in play here, and that in turn would require striking out into the bog of Heidegger's account of temporality.[14] We can avoid the bog, however, for the adversion to originary time is a creative solution to an avoidable problem.

Restating Heidegger's view

First, let us characterize the undifferentiated mode as the condition in which one has not confronted anxiety and so does not take responsibility for

norms in general, even if one does sometimes encounter challenges to particular norms for which one subsequently sometimes takes responsibility. It could well be that most human life is lived like this: going about one's business, doing what one does, without confronting and thereby either responding to or burying challenges to most of the norms that guide one's actions. Second, when a norm is challenged, one is called upon either to own the norm or disown it, by either defending it or abandoning it. Such challenges can elicit something like what Heidegger calls "anxiety," for when faced with such a challenge one may well feel as if the ground is shifting under one's feet, as if one does not know where to stand to mount a defense or even to consider the reasonableness of a challenge. Then again, a challenge need not bring such an anxiety-like experience in its wake. In the example I gave above of the abandonment of the norm of giving up one's seat on a bus to a woman, most men who abandoned the norm did so readily and with no anxiety. Third, some cases of Dasein encounter anxiety, in which the legitimacy of all norms is called into question. Once Dasein does confront its responsibility for the legitimacy of all norms, it can respond to this challenge by owning or disowning the responsibility. If one disowns responsibility for norms, one flees into an aggravated form of conformism. The challenge to any particular norm can evoke one's background awareness that one is oneself responsible for the bindingness of all norms, and so inauthentic Dasein tends to reject challenges to norms.

What would the normative responsiveness of authentic Dasein then look like? To own responsibility for all norms is not to reject all extant norms, to deviate radically from life as one has known it. Rather, the awareness of this responsibility would entail simply that one is flexible about challenges to norms. Here's how Heidegger characterizes the transformation worked by resoluteness:

> Running-forth [*Vorlaufen*] discloses to existence that giving itself up is its most extreme possibility and thus shatters all rigidity about the existence that it has in each case attained.
>
> (SZ 264)[15]

The "rigidity" that authenticity "shatters" need not be the egregious conformism we discussed above; it need not be an aggressive suppression of all difference and non-conformity. Heidegger's German word for rigidity is "Versteifung." The adjective "steif" is sometimes used in contemporary German to mean personally or socially "stiff," "square," that is, inflexible.[16] If this stiffness is relaxed, if one "loosens up" and allows one's imagination to expand, one integrates the insight that one is oneself responsible for the choice whether to conform to social norms. This integration need not be in the form of ongoing anxiety. The encounter with anxiety brings one face to face with one's responsibility for assessing the legitimacy of the norms

in the light of which one lives. If one embraces this responsibility and begins to live authentically, this has the effect of loosening up stiffness, without anxiety needing to be constantly up front in one's experience. We can think of authenticity as a sort of stretching, a loosening up, a becoming flexible. It is important to note that the flexibility that Heidegger has in view is a formal flexibility, so to speak. That is, authenticity does not require that one be a non-conformist, that one live on a commune and break the rules of bourgeois society. If the community one inhabits is a "non-conformist" community, then the flexibility that authenticity provides requires that one shatter tenacity, stiffness, or rigidity about that non-conformism.

A life lived with this greater flexibility is inflected by authenticity, though still lived within the everyday. One must return authentically to the everyday, for there is nowhere else to live. As Heidegger writes,

> This authentic disclosedness modifies then equioriginarily the uncoveredness of the world that is grounded in it and the disclosedness of the being-with of others. The "world" that is available does not become a different one with respect to its "content," the circle of others is not exchanged for a new one, and indeed understanding and concernful being towards the available as well as solicitous being-with others is now determined from out of one's ownmost ability-to-be-oneself.
>
> (*SZ* 297-98)

The everyday provides the content of an authentically inflected life; authenticity provides the inflection. This last point allows me to return briefly to one issue I left hanging in my discussion of Crowell's interpretation of conscience.

Recall that Heidegger states that the Anyone-self is an existentiell modification of the authentic self. He also says, however, "Authentic being-oneself is determined as an existentiell modification of the Anyone" (*SZ* 267). That is, when one learns to live authentically, one modifies the Anyone. Putting this together with the idea that authenticity returns one to the everyday, the idea must be that one lives in the everyday differently than one has heretofore. Authenticity inflects the everyday, which in turn continues to provide the "content" of one's life: one's circle of intimates, one's social roles, etc. This inflection does not change the unerring address of the call of conscience. Rather, it is a way of "hearing" or responding to that call. The call in each case addresses me, the authentic self, and it calls me to be-myself authentically.

So, in conclusion, the picture I have been painting is this: my being is mine insofar as I am responsive to norms. I am responsive to norms in my average everydayness even before I encounter anxiety (which, modulo the detour through originary temporality, Kukla denies). I am thrown into this public world and act in light of, that is, as responsive to the norms that

constitute it. I am not merely an automaton who executes commands. I am, however, comparatively stiff in my response to norms. I do not typically challenge the everyday norms in the light of which I act, and this means that my life is circumscribed within comparatively narrow confines. In the everyday I do not act third-personally for the sake of being who I am, as Crowell argued, but I am not terribly imaginative about it either. Once I encounter anxiety, I am temporarily alienated from the public norms in the light of which I live, and I thereby come to see them as negotiable in a way I had not before. I can respond to this disclosure in one of two ways: I can flee from it by rushing back to the public world of my everyday existence and aggressively rejecting challenges to public norms, thereby burying myself in an aggravated form of conformism. Or I can return to the everyday world of public norms loosened up and flexible, able to entertain challenges to these norms and imagine alternative ways of living.[17]

Notes

1 All translations are my own. I have tried to indicate my divergences from the standard translation (by Macquarrie and Robinson) by putting the original German for technical terms in parentheses or flagging differences, where needed.
2 Cf. Nietzsche 1989 and Kierkegaard 2003.
3 Cf. Blattner 2006.
4 But freedom of choice [*Willkür*] cannot be defined – as some have tried to define it – as the ability to make a choice [*Vermögen der Wahl*] for or against the law (*libertas indifferentiae*), even though choice as a phenomenon provides frequent examples of this in experience.

(Kant 1996: 380)

Kant's use of the Latin "*libertas indifferentiae*" makes Heidegger's language all the more an allusion to Kant's.
5 Cf. Crowell 2001, 2007, Kukla 2002 and Haugeland 1992 and 2000.
6 We shall see later on that it does not actually do this. Conscience addresses the authentic self and calls it to be itself authentically, calls it to its ownmost being-itself. At this point in the discussion, however, we do not have all the distinctions on board.
7 In a related view Taylor Carman interprets authenticity as residing in the first-person stance:

> Authentic modes of existence, in this strictly formal sense, are those in which Dasein stands in a directly first-person relation to itself, in contrast to the second- and third-person relations in which it stands to others, and which it can adopt with respect to itself, at least up to a point.
>
> (Carman 2005: 285)

8 Crowell runs this passage together with another one, in which Heidegger writes, "Authentic being-oneself is determined as an existentiell modification of the Anyone" (SZ 267). I'll discuss the latter passage later in this chapter.
9 The footnote is printed on page 31.
10 I cannot say how widespread through the US this transformation has been. It certainly has taken hold in urban areas of the Middle Atlantic, Pacific Coast, and

New England regions, which are the areas to which my experience is pretty much limited in anything but the most casual way. It's a big country!

11 Another strategy could rely on Katherine Withy's argument that "anxiety" is a systematically ambiguous term in *Being and Time*, sometimes referring to the mood or attunement of uncanny alienation, sometimes referring to an ontological condition of being fundamentally not at home in the world. See Withy 2012.

12 One might seek to blunt the force of these passages by arguing that by "undifferentiated" Heidegger means merely to indicate that it is possible for our analysis of Dasein's being to abstract from the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity, not that one can actually live in a concretely undifferentiated mode. The second of the two passages quoted (*SZ* 232), however, militates against that reading: one cannot be free for an abstraction, an analysis that merely abstracts from the distinction between ownedness and disownedness.

13 By "aware" here I do not mean simply intellectually or reflectively aware. Intellectual, or even more casual reflection, is always a secondary phenomenon in Heidegger's account. Rather, I mean that Dasein does not acknowledge the challengeability of all norms in practice. No challenge may have arisen to the norm, or perhaps one cannot make sense of any alternative to the norm in question.

14 I have explored this bog myself, in Blattner 1999.

15 This passage concerns running forth into death ("anticipation of death" in Macquarrie and Robinson's rendition), not authenticity per se. The phenomenon of running forth into death is incorporated into authentic existence, and so it is legitimate for me to rely on this passage.

16 Although seemingly a less common usage in the 1910s or 1920s, the *Digitales Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache* (http://www.dwds.de) records some relevant entries from this time period. For example, there is an entry from 1923 that reads thus: "Frauen flüsterte man sich zu, die man mit ihm in Berührung brachte. Vor Wichtigkeit fast berstend brachte eine den Namen der Schauspielerin hinzu, Schwester der steifen Französischlehrerin. Ein Springbrunn von Gekicher sprühte hoch." (Jader, Annie, Most, in: *Vossische Zeitung* (Morgen-Ausgabe) 06.03.1923, S. 6, S. 3, as cited in the DWDS's *Kernkorpus*.) Here the "stiff French teacher" is contrasted with her sister, an actress.

17 I have presented this chapter a number of times over the past several years, and I would like to thank all who participated in discussions of it in these various venues: the conference "Conditions of Experience – Language, Tradition, Subjectivity," Århus University, Denmark, March 2009, organized by the Department of Philosophy and the History of Ideas, Århus University, and the Centre for Subjectivity Research, University of Copenhagen; the Eleventh Annual Meeting of the International Society for Phenomenological Studies, July 2009; "Mind, Meaning, and Understanding: The Philosophy of John Haugeland," the University of Chicago, May 2010; the Departments of Philosophy at Bryn Mawr College, Temple University, and the University of Heidelberg. I would also like to thank several individuals who gave me feedback on various versions of this chapter: Steve Crowell, Toni Koch, Rebecca Kukla, Oren Magid, Denis McManus, Tommaso Pierini, and Kate Withy.

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8

THINGS FALL APART

Heidegger on the constancy and finality of death

Taylor Carman

In a famous paper pondering what he calls "the tedium of immortality," Bernard Williams steers a middle course between two inadequate conceptions of death. The first is the Epicurean idea that death is nothing to fear, or even regret, since to be dead is not to be, hence not to suffer. Your future nonbeing, after all, cannot possibly matter to you when it would have to matter to you in order to constitute a misfortune, namely, when you are dead. The second conception is the far more widespread and stubbornly persistent attitude of sheer existential anguish, often followed up by the fanciful thought that we would be better off not having to die at all.

Williams thinks neither conception is tenable. Death is indeed a kind of misfortune – not because being dead is somehow unpleasant, but because the loss of (our own) life is a loss we genuinely suffer, depriving us, as it does, of the ultimate condition for acting to satisfy "categorical desires," by which he means desires that do not presuppose our being alive to enjoy their satisfaction, but that instead give us reasons to want to keep living (Williams 1973: 86).[1] Against the desperate yearning for immortality, however, Williams maintains that an endless life would be literally unlivable – not just contingently boring, but necessarily incoherent, impossible to comprehend as *one* life, as the life of someone perpetually absorbing and learning from new experiences and being engaged with the world.

Williams's reflections go a long way toward showing that death, far from being a mere unlucky accident, positively shapes and conditions a life as a (potentially) meaningful whole, in contrast to the inevitably desolate expanse of an interminable existence. The concept of death he takes for granted, however, and indeed the one prominent in most philosophical discussions of the subject, fails to identify not only the way in which death is deeply interwoven with life, but also the deep source of our anxiety about it. For Williams, as for both common sense and the philosophical tradition, that is, dying is simply the final event marking the termination of a life, the transition from being alive to being dead.

That kind of dying is not what Heidegger means by "death" in the existential sense, and yet we can hear in Williams's argument a faint echo of the ontological and quasi-ethical upshot of Heidegger's account of death in *Being and Time*, namely, that dying is an essential structure of human existence, and that embracing our finitude is a necessary condition of caring resolutely and wholeheartedly for the things we care about, which is to say, the cares that make us who we are and make our lives worth living.

The thirty-odd pages of the first chapter of Division Two of *Being and Time*, entitled "The Possibility of Dasein's Being Whole and Being toward Death," are some of the most fascinating, but also some of the most puzzling and problematic in the book. Heidegger's purpose is to show how and why dying is not just an external contingency, a *de facto* stroke of bad luck that befalls us at the end of our lives, but a structural dimension of existence, a kind of necessary limit or boundary constitutive of being-in-the-world.

Crucial to his argument is the essential asymmetry, indeed the ontological incommensurability, of *my* death with the deaths of *others*. For we experience the deaths of others by surviving them, and once they are dead, Heidegger says, we can still be said to be "with them," mourning them, burying them, and so on (SZ 238–39).[2] My own death, by contrast, is nothing like that, for the obvious reason that it is the one death that, necessarily, I do not survive. As Wittgenstein says in the *Tractatus*, "Death is not an event (*Ereignis*) in life: we do not live to experience death" (1974: 6.4311). That I do not survive my own death sounds obvious, even trivial; and that my own death is my own is, formally speaking, a tautology. Nevertheless, such propositions are not empty, for they point up the fact that we are each related to our own death in a uniquely uncircumventable way. Heidegger writes,

> *No one can take another's death away from him.* … Dying is something every Dasein must take upon itself … Death, insofar as it "is," is in every case essentially mine. … Dying shows that death is ontologically constituted by mineness and existence. Dying is not an event (*Begebenheit*), but rather a phenomenon to be understood existentially …
>
> (SZ 240)

Delmore Schwartz once said, "Existentialism means that no one else can take a bath for you" (1987: 7). That quip, it seems to me, far from exposing what Heidegger calls the "mineness" of death as something trivial, instead indicates its structural analogy with the mineness of the body. For just as I cannot survive my own death, neither can I step back and observe my own body, for as Merleau-Ponty says, "I would need a second body to be able to do so, which would itself be unobservable" (2012: 93). Similarly, like the edge of my visual field, I cannot apprehend sideways on or objectively the limit or boundary that is my own death: "The region surrounding the visual

field is not easy to describe, but it is certainly neither black nor gray" (Merleau-Ponty 2012: 6). The same can be said of death. Again, Wittgenstein: "Our life has no end in just the way in which our visual field has no limits" (1974: 6.4311).

I "have" my own death and my own body, then, in a fundamentally different way than I have, say, my own friends and my own money. That I cannot in principle shed them, give them up, get around them, or exchange them for new ones marks them as occupying a different ontological status in relation to me. Or better yet, like my body, my death stands in no mere *relation* to me, but is, as Heidegger says, "nonrelational" (*unbezüglich*) (SZ 263). It is not anything distinct from me, but constitutes me by individuating me, marking me as the one I am. This is why Heidegger says at one point, "death is just one's own (*je nur eigener*)" (SZ 265).

That death is a nonrelational, individuating dimension of our finitude is an idea Heidegger and Wittgenstein share. Heidegger goes farther, however, in a crucial way. To say that death is nonrelational is not just to say that it is "essentially mine," but moreover that it

> must be taken over by Dasein alone. Death does not just "belong" indifferently to one's own Dasein, but rather *lays claim to* (*beansprucht*) it *as a single individual* (*als einzelnes*). The nonrelationality of death … individualizes (*vereinzelt*) Dasein down to itself.
>
> (SZ 263)

This idea – that Dasein must somehow take up or take on its own death – follows from, or is at least consonant with, Heidegger's conception of Dasein as the entity whose existence is an issue for it. Death, understood as a constitutive structure of existence, that is, does not just *individuate* Dasein the way the matter or form of an object individuates it. It also *individualizes* Dasein by laying claim to it, or more precisely by *looming* as an issue, a question, a problem, something "standing before" us, "something *toward which* Dasein *comports itself*" (SZ 250).

How do we "comport" ourselves toward our own death? Here it is necessary to draw some distinctions. It has become a commonplace among Heidegger scholars to say (as I often find myself saying) that by "death" Heidegger does not mean what we ordinarily mean by that word, namely the momentary event marking the transition from being alive to being dead, an event that I can observe (and survive) in others, but not in myself. "Perishing" (*Verenden*) is Heidegger's name for "the ending of a living thing" (SZ 240). But "Dasein does not simply perish"; in fact, Heidegger says, "Dasein never perishes" (SZ 247). The death of a human being is not mere organic extinction, any more than dining is mere digestion. When Dasein "dies," its death is "demise" (*Ableben*), which Heidegger calls "an intermediate phenomenon" between organic perishing and "authentic" (*eigentlich*) existential

dying. Demise, Heidegger says, is Dasein's "ending without authentically dying" (SZ 247). Dying "authentically" does not here mean *really* dying or dying *resolutely*, but as William Blattner puts it, dying "ownedly" (2006: 146). The reason "ownedly" is a good translation of *eigentlich* in this context is that it refers to the death that is one's own, in contrast to the ending of a life that one survives, namely someone else's. Demise is thus not an "inauthentic" kind of death in the quasi-ethical sense of that word, but rather death regarded as not one's own, from a third-person point of view – precisely the view I can never have of my own death.

Why does Heidegger apply the word "demise" to something unique to Dasein, something over and beyond mere perishing? He doesn't say so, but I take it the point is to mark the ending of a "life" in the *biographical* as opposed to the biological sense of that word. A life in the biographical sense is what we describe when we tell the story of a person's life; a life in this sense is intelligible to us in the form of a *narrative* (or a cluster of loosely connected narratives, or even failed or incoherent narratives). A life in this sense can come to an end well before a person's vital functions cease. Heidegger doesn't put it this way, but I would suggest that a person's life ends in this biographical sense when the story of her life comes to an end, that is, when there is nothing, or rather nothing significant, left to say about what she did or suffered.

"Death" in the *existential* sense of the word is something else again. It is neither biological perishing nor biographical demise; it is not any terminal event at the end of life at all, understood either organically or narratively. And yet it does in some sense loom or stand before Dasein as its own. Existential death is some other kind of looming or impending finitizing limit viewed from my own first-person perspective. Unlike the biological or biographical event marking the end of my life, existential death is something phenomenally manifest in my existence, and indeed as soon as and as long as I exist. It is the manifest finitude of my existence, temporally coextensive with my life, from beginning to end. "Death is a way of being that Dasein takes on as soon as it is" (SZ 245);[3] "Dasein is factically dying as long as it exists" (SZ 251).

What kind of limit or finitude can this be, if not merely the chronological limit marked by the hour of my demise? The answer lies in what it means to say that Dasein comports itself toward its own death. To make sense of that claim, consider first Heidegger's definition of existential death, namely "the possibility of no-longer-being-able-to-be-there" (*Nicht-mehr-dasein-können*), "the possibility of the utter impossibility of being-there" (*Daseinsunmöglichkeit*) (SZ 250), and "*the possibility of the impossibility of any existence* (Existenz) *at all*" (SZ 262). What kind of possibility is that?

The single most important innovation in the account of death in *Being and Time*, I believe, lies in Heidegger's invocation of the existential concept of possibility as something *into which Dasein projects*, in contrast to the more traditional and familiar categorial notion of contingency or potentiality,

something that simply might or can be. That phrase, "might or can be," shows that categorial possibility is parasitic on actuality: to be possible is to be possibly actual. Existential possibility, by contrast, grounds the very different form of actuality peculiar to Dasein. So, for instance, actually being, say, a friend or a teacher or a recluse is grounded in the worldly possibilities, or what William James calls "live options" (James 1956: 3), into which one projects by way of taking up and taking on those identities.

Death understood as a possibility in this existential sense, then – that is, as something into which I project – cannot be the event at the end of my life, but must instead be a dimension of existence accessible to me, something immanent in the phenomenal structure of my being-in-the-world. How is my own death manifest and accessible to me while I am still alive? Not in my being-at-an-end (*Zu-Ende-sein*), Heidegger says, but in my being toward the end (*Sein zum Ende*). Indeed, Heidegger says, "Death is Dasein's ownmost (*eigenste*) possibility" (*SZ* 263).

So, to call death "the possibility of no-longer-being-able-to-be-there," the possibility "*of the impossibility of existing at all*" (*SZ* 262), is not to say that it *might* happen to me and that it will thereafter be impossible for anything to happen to me, because I will be dead. That would be categorial, not existential, possibility. An existential possibility is something into which I project. So, what am I projecting into in projecting into my own death? The impossibility of existence. But again, that cannot mean being dead. Impossibility, like possibility, must be an existential notion, and if possibilities are what define me, then impossibilities are what define me negatively. They are what or who I am not, or rather *cannot* be. And indeed, we are always dying inasmuch as all projecting into possibility is at once a projecting into impossibility, that is, negative determinations of what or who I am. For every possibility that opens up for Dasein, others are constantly being closed off. What Heidegger's existential account of death reveals, then, is that Dasein's projection into future possibilities turns out to have a twofold structure: every possibility open to Dasein leaves in its wake other possibilities that have been shut down, rendered null and void. All possibility is bounded and conditioned by a horizon of impossibility.

Our possibilities are thus constantly dropping away into nullity, and this is what Heidegger means when he says – what might sound otherwise either hyperbolic or just false – that "Dasein is factically dying as long as it exists" (*SZ* 251). To say that we are always dying is to say that our possibilities are constantly closing down around us. We can simply resign ourselves to this fact, which is what Heidegger calls disowned or inauthentic dying, merely "expecting" (*Erwarten*) death, or we can embrace our projection into impossibility wholeheartedly in what he calls owned or authentic "running forth into death" (*Vorlaufen in den Tod*) (*SZ* 263).

But now we have a problem. The foregoing account of existential death is the one I myself proposed some years ago.[4] But it can't be right. Yes,

possibilities are always closing down, dying off to us as we die to them. Likewise, though, as critics were quick to point out, "Possibilities are also always opening up" (Dreyfus 2005: xxi), and Heidegger calls death the possibility not just of *an* or *some* impossibility of existence, but of the "utter" (*schlechthinnig*) impossibility of being-there (*Dasein*), the impossibility of existing "*at all*" (*überhaupt*). Though *constant*, death is also, in a word, *terminal*. My interpretation (unlike others) explains Heidegger's claim that we are *always* dying, that "Dasein is factically dying as long as it exists" (*SZ* 251). But it fails to make sense of the *utterness* of the impossibility. My reconstruction, that is, captures the constancy but not the finality of death, as Heidegger conceives it. Can both features be accommodated in his account?

Or more to the point, does my construal of the constancy of dying as the constant closing down of possibilities leave room for an account of death's finality *without* merely reverting to the terminal character of death ordinarily conceived, namely the perishing or demise that occurs at the end of life, and only then? To say that Heidegger must, contrary to his intentions, avail himself of those ordinary notions would be to admit defeat, to concede that the existential concept of death in *Being and Time* is not really distinct from the ordinary notion, after all, hence that the existential account, far from providing any deep original insight into the finitude of human existence as such, is just a rehashing of familiar platitudes about death and dying ordinarily conceived. As we have seen, viewed in light of the ordinary concept of death, the claim that "*No one can take another's death away from him*" (*SZ* 240) sounds either false or trivial. That death "is coming" and is "certain" (*SZ* 257) is true enough, but banal. Even Heidegger's claim that "Dasein is factically dying as long as it exists" (*SZ* 251) loses all appearance of profundity, if it means only what the fourteenth-century poet Johannes von Tepl meant, namely, that you're never too young to die, or what Saint Augustine (at least sometimes) seems to have meant, namely, that there is no sharp temporal boundary between living and dying (as opposed to being dead), just as there is no unique point at which the sun *begins* to set (as opposed to *having* set). To say that we are already dying as soon as we are living in *that* sense is like saying that the sun is already setting as soon as it rises – an assertion that can be true only by being uninteresting.

William Blattner has come very close to satisfying this *desideratum* by reminding us that Heidegger conceives of existential death as very nearly identical, or more precisely coextensive, with anxiety (*Angst*). In its psychological manifestation, existential *Angst* is very like what we ordinarily call "anxiety" or "depression." Phenomenologically, it is a feeling of uncanniness or unsettledness (*Unheimlichkeit*), of "not being at home" (*Nicht-zuhause-sein*) (*SZ* 188). Consonant with my own construal of existential death as the closing down of possibilities, Heidegger says that in anxiety, "Everyday familiarity collapses" (*SZ* 189). Like death, "Anxiety individualizes Dasein for its ownmost being-in-the-world" (*SZ* 187). And if that weren't enough,

"Being toward death is essentially anxiety" (*SZ* 266). For Heidegger, Blattner says, "Death turns out to be the same experience as anxiety" (2006: 140).

Heidegger maintains that Dasein always has an understanding of itself and is always in some mood or other, and Blattner very plausibly proposes that anxiety is the mood proper to or congruent with the understanding of ourselves as finite, vulnerable selves, threatened in our very being by the possible collapse of our world and our identity, which is to say, our sense of who we are and what we're living for. "Death," Blattner writes, "is the self-understanding that belongs to this experience, anxiety is its mood" (2006: 140). He continues:

> No self-understanding is immune to being undercut by anxiety; anything we take for granted about ourselves can be dissolved by the corrosive effects of anxiety. Dasein's existential finitude (limitedness) is its constant, because essential, vulnerability to anxiety/death. … death is the end of Dasein in the sense of the limit-situation in which the finitude of our being as ability-to-be is exposed.
>
> (Blattner 2006: 149)

Moreover, "To be existentially certain of death is to understand that it is always possible that it could strike at any moment. … there is nothing about us that shields or protects us from the threat of existential anxiety" (Blattner 2006: 149-50).

Blattner is right that Heidegger very nearly equates death and anxiety, both explicitly and implicitly by saying the same things about the two. His reading also finds support in Heidegger's remark that "*The disposedness* (Befindlichkeit) *that is able to hold open the constant and utter threat to itself arising from Dasein's ownmost individualized being, is anxiety*" (*SZ* 265–66). The mood that exposes us to the threat of death is anxiety.

Blattner's interpretation also has an obvious advantage over mine (my former view), since my account of death as the constant closing down of possibilities says nothing about that syndrome dwindling down to a zero point in the "utter" impossibility of existence, the final termination of *all* possibilities. The existential collapse of our world and our identity in anxiety, by contrast – that is, our losing our sense of who we are and what we're living for – can indeed be total, which is to say *final* or *terminal*, though again not necessarily having anything to do with the chronological end of life.

Unfortunately, Blattner's account fails to satisfy the *desideratum* that my account does (or did) satisfy, in spite of its other flaws. That is, Blattner construes existential death as anxiety, but anxiety in its concrete *psychological* manifestation, namely, as an occasional contingent episode in which our everyday familiar world collapses, along with our sense of who we are and what we're living for. This kind of extreme, even catastrophic psychological crisis, it seems to me, is what Heidegger refers to when he says, "With the

dominance of falling and publicness, 'authentic' (*eigentlich*) anxiety is rare" (SZ 190). That is, thanks to our typical average everyday shallowness and distraction, palpable episodes of genuine anxiety, in which we come face-to-face with our radical *Unheimlichkeit*, our not being at home in the world, very seldom actually occur. Because Blattner equates existential dying with that concrete but rare psychological occurrence, his account leaves no room for Heidegger's insistence that "Death is a way of being that Dasein takes on as soon as it is" (SZ 245), that "Dasein is factically dying as long as it exists" (SZ 251).

Further, on Blattner's account, understanding oneself authentically by "running forth into death" coincides with an authentic disposedness or attunement that Heidegger calls "readiness for anxiety" (*Bereitschaft zur Angst*) (SZ 296). Authentic resoluteness, for Blattner, involves "throwing oneself into the possibility of death, and being prepared for the attendant anxiety" (2002: 314). But again, this makes it sound as if the "possibility" of death is the mere *categorial* possibility of something that might (or might not) happen, rather than the kind of possibility into which one projects – and indeed, in the case of death, into which one is *always* projecting as one's "ownmost" possibility – and that resolute Dasein's "readiness" for it is something like the readiness of the fire department to put out fires, just in case they happen to occur.

But anxiety is not, for Heidegger, just an occasionally occurring psychological episode; it is the kind of existential disposedness or attunement, felt or unfelt, that discloses our essential uncanniness, our not-at-homeness, or – as Hubert Dreyfus translates *Unheimlichkeit* – our *unsettledness*. Human existence, understood as inhabiting a world and pressing into an identity, is not just vulnerable to collapse as a contingent disposition, in the way a glass is vulnerable to shattering; existence is instead essentially, constantly, permanently unsettled, whether we explicitly know or feel its unsettledness or not. Anxiety does not just befall us sometimes; we are instead at bottom existentially anxious. Heidegger writes, "anxiety, as a fundamental disposedness (*Grundbefindlichkeit*), belongs to the essential constitution of Dasein's being-in-the-world" (SZ 189), and "anxiety always already latently determines being-in-the-world" (SZ 189).[5]

Combining the virtues of Blattner's account and mine, then, it looks as if we need to say *both* that existential death is the *total* (not just partial) closing down or dying off of possibilities *and* that that total closing down or dying off of possibilities is something that is *always* (not just sometimes, let alone rarely) happening. On the one hand, it is not enough to say that worlds and lives sometimes collapse in the way glass sometimes shatters and houses sometimes burn down. On the other hand, it is absurd to say that human lives are constantly spiraling into psychological anxiety and despair. The (perhaps slow, quiet) collapse of possibilities that constitutes existential dying, that is, must be modally undifferentiated: it is neither a merely contingent categorial *possibility* nor a demonstrable *necessity*, but instead a primitive fact

about, or primordial structure of, being-in-the-world. Another way of putting this is to say that Heidegger's assertion that Dasein projects into death, its ownmost possibility, as the *utter* impossibility of existence, the impossibility of existing *at all*, is unarticulated with respect to quantification: the claim is neither merely that *some* possibilities die off (and some don't) nor that *all* do, but rather that possibilities just *do* die off. Not that they *might* or *must*, or that *some* or *all* do – but simply that *they do*. In the words of William Butler Yeats (and, following him, Chinua Achebe), *things fall apart*. They just do.

The sentence "things fall apart" is what linguists call a *generic* (Leslie 2008). The semantics of generic sentences is notoriously difficult to represent formally precisely because they can't be paraphrased with explicit quantifiers such as *all*, *most*, or *some*. Obviously, "birds fly" is true, even though not *all* birds fly. Most do. But the sentence "birds lay eggs" and "sharks attack swimmers" are also true, even though not even *most* do that. And the sentences "chickens are hens" and "chickens are roosters" are both false, even though *most* chickens are hens and *some* chickens are roosters. Interestingly, whereas the formal representation of the truth conditions of generics is a subject of controversy among linguists and philosophers of language, three-year-olds seem to have no trouble using and understanding them, well before they master the seemingly more straightforward quantifiers *all*, *most*, and *some*.

What I want to suggest is that the proposition that Dasein's possibilities close down into nothing – that they just *do*, not that they might or must – should be understood as a *generic*, asserting neither the mere possibility nor the strict necessity, but rather the bare actuality – in Heidegger's jargon, the *facticity* – of that terminal closure. Or, to put the point in terms of quantification rather than modality, the claim is neither merely that *some* possibilities close down nor that *all* do without exception, nor even that *most* (say, more than half) do, but again, simply that *they do*. Projects and commitments just *do* tend to unravel and fall apart with the passage of time and the effects of fatigue and age, even if not *all* of them do, and even if they do not do so as a matter of strict or demonstrable necessity.

The primitive intelligibility of generics, readily available even to very young children, arguably lies in their drawing either on paradigm cases that intuitively define or at least characterize a kind ("birds fly") or on cases made especially salient by danger or anxiety ("sharks attack swimmers"). Existential death obviously qualifies on both counts: mortality has defined or at least characterized human existence for as long as recorded history testifies ("*Must I die?*" Gilgamesh cries); moreover, mortality is salient for us precisely because it is the cause and occasion – perhaps *the* cause and occasion *par excellence* – of anxiety.

Recognizing the claim about the closing down of possibilities as a generic, I believe, helps makes sense of Heidegger's characterization of authentic

resoluteness as a "readiness for anxiety." For just as anxiety is not an occasional psychological episode, but an attunement to the essential unsettledness of existence, so too resolute Dasein's readiness for anxiety cannot just consist in being prepared for it or expecting it to happen. Indeed, merely "awaiting" (*Gewärtigen*) or "expecting" (*Erwarten*) possibilities, including death, to come along – to become actual, to become present – is, according to Heidegger, the inauthentic or disowned (*uneigentlich*) way of projecting into the future (SZ 261–62, 337). To project into the future authentically is not merely to await or expect it *qua* actuality, but to "run forth" (*Vorlaufen*) into it *qua* possibility. And indeed, *Bereitschaft* in German, like "readiness" in English, can mean either *preparedness* for some future event, or (something like) *ability*, *competence*, or *willingness* with respect to something. In short, being "ready for" something means being *up to* it.[6] Again, the fire department is "ready" for fires by being *prepared* to put them out. By contrast, when I "readily" admit something, I do so easily, without difficulty or hesitation. When Hamlet says, "The readiness is all" (5.2.218), he is saying that instead of worrying about exactly *when* one will die ("If it be now, 'tis not to come; if it be not to come, it will be now; if it be not now, yet it will come"), one ought to act with wholehearted commitment – in his case, the commitment he has finally resolved upon to avenge his father.

To acknowledge that "things fall apart," that lives are not just in principle vulnerable, not just susceptible to potential crisis, but rather – like soap bubbles – essentially and constantly *prone* to dissolution and collapse, is to recognize that lives and the projects that make them worth living are delicate, indeed *precious*. Dying understood as that essential proneness to collapse just *is* the preciousness of life. Without it, life would be empty, much in the way Bernard Williams supposes it would be, were it merely interminable.

Notes

1 I think Williams is right to say that the loss we suffer in dying consists precisely in *dying* rather than in being dead. Still, it's worth bearing in mind that dying is *terminal* only by being a dwindling down to nothing. Hence Thomas Nagel's remark, "I should not really object to dying if it were not followed by death" (1979: 3 n. 1).

2 The translations of *Sein und Zeit* are mine.

3 Here, for good measure, Heidegger quotes *Der Ackermann aus Böhmen* (1400) by the poet Johannes von Tepl: "As soon as a man comes to life, he is at once old enough to die."

4 See Carman 2003.

5 Macquarrie and Robinson's translation, "anxiety is always latent in being-in-the-world," makes it sound like we're always subliminally psychologically anxious.

6 According to the *OED*, in its early use "readiness" is not always easily distinguished from the archaic "rediness," which meant *wisdom*, *discretion*, *prudence*.

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9

AUTHENTICITY AND THE ABSENCE OF DEATH

Daniel O. Dahlstrom

> Mitten wir im leben sind
> mit dem Tod umbfangen
> Wen suchen wir, der hulffe thu,
> das wir gnad erlangen
> (Luther 1923: 453)

> Nur das Wie ist wiederholbar.
> (CT 19)

Death, then and now

For the individual who is dying – and that, Heidegger reminds us, includes all of us – death's absence is like no other (SZ 245, 259). The reason is simple. We can experience all sorts of deaths as long as the death is not our own. We can experience the death of a pet, a lake, a nation, a way of life, the death of a family member, perhaps even the death of God, but in all the ways that we experience these deaths, we cannot experience our own. This is not to deny perfectly legitimate senses in which we may be said to experience ourselves dying, but we can have the experience only as long as we are not yet dead. Since the late 1960s, in the wake of new technologies, medical professionals and governments have increasingly defined death as brain death, the irreversible cessation of any functions or electrical activity in the entire brain or, in other words, the absence of any sign of the sort of neurological activity required for perception and cognition.[1] In short, once we are dead, we are no longer here to experience our death; as long as we are here to experience the deaths of others, we are not yet dead.[2]

We can, to be sure, imagine our bodies lying on a slab in a morgue or decked out in a casket for review at a wake. Yet, strictly speaking, we can never be corpses. Corpses are our remains when in a specific, unmistakable sense we no longer exist. To the extent that we are aware of ourselves precisely in or, better, as living bodies interacting with our respective

environments, we have simply no way of experiencing ourselves as dead. Herein lies the particularly puzzling prospect of conceiving of our own death, of securing, in Heidegger's jargon, "an *existential* concept of death."[3]

And yet, despite being beyond our experience, our deaths are not irrelevant to us. We seem to be hard-wired to preserve ourselves, an inveterate instinct that is no doubt nature's way of keeping us going as a species in the evolutionary process. Being matters to us, as Heidegger repeatedly puts it. In historical terms, at least, we have become very savvy, technologically quite sophisticated, and perhaps even obsessed at postponing our date with the grim reaper. Not coincidentally, in the last century, life expectancy from birth in the United States has jumped 57 percent (from 47 to 77 years), a remarkable figure even if most of the increase is due to prevention of early death. We have learned the merits of remaining fit and of closely monitoring our cholesterol levels and blood pressure on a regular basis; judging from the ever-mounting media coverage of health issues, we have become avaricious for the latest findings of medical research and the best available professional medical advice. We are preoccupied with security, not only against life-threatening disease, but also against the prospects of violence, as we increasingly arm ourselves and live in heavily guarded, gated communities (and nation-states). In short, our lifestyles demonstrate that death has by no means lost its relevance for us; like our forefathers, we typically do everything we can to avoid death or, at least, what leads to death and, on the whole, we seem to be getting better at it.[4]

At the same time, even with all our security and medical systems in place, we are not under any illusions about the fact that we will die. The thought is uncomfortable, it can be paralyzing, and we often console ourselves that death is not imminent, but we know too well that it may be quite sudden (hence, Dickinson's chilling words: "Because I could not stop for Death, he kindly stopped for me"). We know that each moment we are alive, death is a constant and ultimately inexorable possibility, and it is probably safe to assume that reaching the proverbial age of reason means having an inkling of the fact that not dying is no more an option than being born was. We also know that we cannot somehow overtake or outrun our death and that no one else can die our death for us – what Heidegger calls the "existential fact of the matter" (*existenzialen Tatbestand*) and the key to the "existential phenomenon of death" (*SZ* 240).[5] So we make out living wills and take steps to make sure that we are leaving our loved ones with what inheritance we can. We take out life insurance policies which would be perhaps better named 'death insurance policies' since they provide for others when we are no longer here to do so. In this way, at least, we try to see to it that our spouses, children, and friends are at least the "beneficiaries" of our deaths. All such phenomena provide ample evidence of our cognizance of the inevitability of our own unique death and, indeed, as an inevitability that may only come "like a thief in the night" (1 Thessalonians 5: 1-4). They also

testify that this cognizance of death's inevitability by no means makes us less concerned about it.

Yet why is death so important? Or is it perhaps the case that death itself is not important, even though its consequences might be? Indeed, could it be that we should not assign death any particular importance? Certainly not all philosophers have thought that we should. Some like Epicurus – "Death is nothing to us"[6] – contend that death is unimportant precisely because of its absence or, more precisely, the absence of sensation that it signifies. Echoing this sentiment, Nietzsche remarks how happy it makes him to see that people have no desire to think of death at all and how he wants to do what he can to make the thought of living "a hundred times *more valuable* [*denkwerter*] to them" (Nietzsche 1980: fourth book, § 278). As a culture we are in fact long removed from the death cults of ancient Etruscans and Egyptians who devoted their lives to planning elaborately for their deaths. Monasteries have become a curiosity and with them monastic life's "Memento mori" and daily reminders that this life is but a pilgrimage. Indeed, we do not normally think of dying as something that we have to learn to do at all.[7]

Yet as evident as our deaths are to us and as troubled as we at times are about it, we also have a knack for putting it out of mind by throwing ourselves into the cares of daily life, repressing any hint of mortality, almost as though we were trying to evade or flee the very thought of it. Whether or not this represents the salutary ascendance of the Epicurean–Nietzschean view of death's impotence and insignificance, Heidegger registers telltale signs that it is increasingly commonplace. Nor do his remarks apply only to his era. Today, too, we console or at least tell ourselves that we are consoling the dying by lying to them about the direness of their lot. Even with the sure knowledge that death can come at any moment, it is hard to escape the human, all-too-human tendency to comfort ourselves with the thought that our death is something that will happen only some day far off, but not now. In the process we think of death in terms of the daily experience of others' "demise" (*Ableben*), an event on hand within the world we inhabit together (*SZ* 252-58).[8]

But, then, one might reasonably protest, how else are we supposed to think about death? We are not Etruscans and, for most of us, a monk's life is no less remote a possibility. What else is death but the event that eliminates us from the face of the earth, marking the fact that we are no longer present, no longer on hand in the world? Inasmuch as we cannot even experience our deaths as others can, is not this absence of death, precisely as an absence – leaving aside its possible consequences for others – truly "nothing for us," as Epicurus put it?

Death and authenticity

Epicurus' remark is telling, not least because it displays a philosopher's penchant for understanding death in ontological terms. At least on this

score, Heidegger fully agrees and, indeed, it is death's ontological significance as signaling a distinctive absence that makes it a centerpiece of the project of *SZ*.[9] In the rest of this chapter I focus on the relationship between Heidegger's analyses of death and authenticity. But first I would like to devote a few lines to the general implications of those analyses for that project. (I beg your indulgence for this summary; precisely because of its elementary character I hope it sheds important light on the analysis of death.)

The absence of death and the project of Sein und Zeit

On the opening page of *SZ* Heidegger tells us that his aim is to elaborate concretely the question of the sense of 'being' and, at least in a provisional way, to interpret time as the possible horizon for any understanding of being at all.[10] In much of the remainder of the opening chapter of *SZ*, he makes a case for beginning this project with an analysis of the manner of being proper to entities for whom, in some preontological way, being matters and who, for that very reason, are capable of asking what it means to be. The basic contention is that the proper starting point for any study of what it means to be must be the distinctive manner of being of those entities with an understanding of being (and with a stake in being, coinciding with that understanding). Heidegger identifies this distinctive, irreducible manner of being as *Da-sein* (being-here or being-there). He understands *Da-sein* as the worldly manner of being of the entity that, in a way essential to its worldly demeanor and projects, *cares* and thus *discloses* various senses of being, its own and others, whether tacitly (preontologically) or explicitly (ontologically).[11]

In an attempt to make precise the primacy and irreducibility of being-here, relative to other manners of being, Heidegger appeals to a particular conception of existence. By 'existence,' he means being-here's own being, to which it inevitably relates or deports itself (*sich verhalten*) in one way or another. In an important sense, for Heidegger the fact that being matters fundamentally to being-here is equivalent (albeit not identical) to the fact that "being-here always understands itself on the basis of its existence, a possibility of being itself or not being itself" (SZ 12) or, as he also puts it later, being authentic or inauthentic (SZ 42f). Whether, in being-here, we understand ourselves authentically or not is only decided by how each of us respectively exists, and Heidegger accordingly dubs the operative self-understanding here "existentiell." He labels the complex of structures involved in this self-understanding "existentiality" and its analysis the "existential analysis" of being-here. What supposedly keeps the analysis "honest" is existing itself and the respective existentiell or ontic self-understanding guiding it.[12]

We have already noted that Heidegger places the phrase "a possibility of being itself or not being itself" in apposition to existence and, indeed, does so precisely to hammer out the distinctiveness of being-here. The sense of possibility at work here (in this conception of existence) is fundamental and

distinctive, but its distinctiveness is not restricted to our possibility of being ourselves or not. To the contrary, this possibility coincides with the way that Dasein is constituted by possibilities generally or, better, *is* its possibilities, but precisely by at once inheriting and projecting them (from such possibilities as seeing or running to speaking a language or even acquiring a virtue).[13] The projection of these possibilities is, it bears iterating, guided by a certain self-understanding or, equivalently, a preontological (existentiell) understanding of being that is the object of the existential analysis.

For all the reasons just mentioned, Heidegger puts existential analysis in the service of the project of fundamental ontology.[14] Herein lies – at least *prima facie* – one of the basic tensions at the heart of the project of *SZ* and the source of much confusion about it.[15] The immediate aim is to elaborate what makes sense of existence, but the horizon or aim of the investigation of existence is decidedly ontological. To be sure, existence or the way in which Dasein relates to its being is the key to its manner of being, but the aim of the existential analysis is fundamental ontology. The question of being is the horizon that dominates the question of existence.[16]

There is one further elementary point made in the introduction that bears essentially on these concerns. Heidegger claims that traditional ontology (of the sort expressed in Epicurus' remark that death is "nothing for us") has failed to attend adequately to the many different and irreducible ways in which entities are said to be and that this forgottenness of being can be traced to a tendency to equate being with the presence of things. By interpreting being in terms of what is present and on hand, traditional ontology has privileged not only the temporal present but also a particular interpretation of temporality.[17]

Herein lies the critical importance of the absence of death for Heidegger's project of fundamental ontology in *SZ*. If Heidegger succeeds in demonstrating the critical role of this absence in constituting the underlying temporal significance of what it means to be-here (*da zu sein*) authentically, he is in a position to expose the blind spot of traditional ontology and all disciplines that, explicitly or implicitly, take their cues from it.[18] However, in order to make this case, Heidegger has to make sure that this absence is like no other, an enterprise that admittedly risks vitiating any talk of death's absence. The next part of this chapter reviews Heidegger's efforts to demonstrate death's distinctive absence.

Death and other absences in Sein und Zeit

Heidegger takes several steps to single out the distinctive absence of death, especially in the first chapter of the second division of *SZ*. Yet throughout the entire text Heidegger is elaborating various constitutive absences. For example, the manner of being of implements is a function of absences; in order to function optimally, they have to be as absent from consideration

as the saccadic movements of our eyes in the act of seeing. At the same time, in a breakdown another absence, what the tools *are for* – loosely understood as the world (SZ 86) – also announces itself. These two absences are obviously joined at the hip: the absence of the tool in use and the absence of what it is for, made apparent, at least at some level, by the breakdown.

Death might be regarded as the ultimate breakdown, particularly if we construe our bodies as implements. However, for reasons amply discussed already, there is nothing on-hand that announces itself to us in our death the way it does when a tool fails or is missing. Nor is there something that our death is for in the way that a tool is for a world or, more precisely and ultimately, for some being-in-the-world. Death marks an end of being-here but, as we all know too well, that ending by no means signifies anything like the completion or full realization of our potential. "For the most part," as Heidegger puts it darkly, speaking of Dasein, "it ends unfulfilled or else broken down and used up."[19]

In the chapter on death, Heidegger glosses still other sorts of absences, also different from the absence of death, in his attempt to provide an existential conception of death.[20] I have in mind the absence of the deceased (*Verstorbene*), the absence of life in perishing (*Verenden*), the absence of Dasein that he labels its "demise" (*Ableben*), and absence of what is "not yet." In regard to the deceased, our loss is not theirs nor can it be, not simply because they are no longer here but also because, from an existential point of view, death is not shared. In Heidegger's jargon, death is inherent, not in *Mitdasein* but in *Dasein*.

In the case of the perishing of something alive, death's absence is framed as the transition to something that is on hand (SZ 241). To equate death's absence with what has perished amounts to taking death to be the absence of vital signs or, better, the cessation of vital functions, and that is precisely to imply that being-here *ante mortem* is being-alive-and-on-hand. Or, more correctly, dying is not perishing because perishing entails the accessibility of what perishes as something present-at-hand, *ante mortem* and *post mortem*. But being-here is never accessible even to itself as something present-at-hand, even something alive-and-present-at-hand. The reason for this inaccessibility is the complex fact "being-possible pertains in a unique way to the sort of being it is" and that death is pre-eminent among the possibilities of being-here.[21]

Heidegger identifies several distinct investigations of death in the sense of Dasein's demise: biological-physiological, medical, psychological, biographical-historical, ethnological, and theological. Here he is more cautious, recognizing that the concept of demise is an "intermediate phenomenon," co-determined by conceptions of perishing and the existential conception of dying. But the fact that it presupposes the existential conception is sufficient warning against conflating them.[22]

Nor, finally, is the absence of death anything like the absence of what is *not yet* the case – an unpaid bill, a full moon, a ripened fruit. Here, too, Heidegger identifies the common error:

> Were dying, as being-at-the-end, understood in the sense of an ending of the discussed type, then Dasein would be posited thereby as something present-at-hand or ready-to-hand. In death Dasein neither is completed nor has it simply disappeared, nor has it become finished at all or fully accessible as something ready-to-hand.
>
> (SZ 245)

Death and authenticity as defining existential possibility

How is death to be conceived existentially or, in other words, how are we to understand our own death? Heidegger's answer to this question turns on his conception of us as being in such a way that being matters to us. The fact that being matters to us runs together with the fact that we can disclose things on hand, one another, and our individual selves for what they are, in the course of projecting possibilities for them (using and uncovering things, encountering others, and finding oneself). While Dasein defines itself by the possibilities it projects, this existence is also something into which it has been thrown and, indeed, thrown as finite. "Being-possible," as a metonym for "being-here" and "existence," always also signifies the possibility of no longer being possible. With this in mind, Heidegger submits that death is the possibility of being-here that is "most its own" (*eigenste*), precisely as "the possibility of no-longer-being-able-to-be-here" (SZ 250). Note that death is not itself an absence, like the absence of a tool or the absence of life. Instead it is the possibility of its complete absence and, indeed, the possibility that Dasein willy-nilly projects, even if by way of repressing it. Given this characterization of death, it follows that for me to be here authentically, disclosing and projecting myself for what I am, I have to project this possibility for myself.

Dasein's possibility of "being itself or not being itself" is a possibility that it is always already under way to achieving or obstructing, redoing or undoing, in the course of projecting possibilities for itself. As the certain but indefinite possibility of the complete undoing of being-here, death is the pre-eminent possibility that throws being-here back on itself alone, capable of empowering it to be itself – if it, indeed, understands itself and projects its being-in-the-world in terms of this defining possibility. Dasein understands itself and projects its being-in-the-world in terms of this defining possibility. In other words, authenticity and inauthenticity, the possibility of being oneself or not, turn on the way it projects the defining possibility for it, the possibility of the absence of possibilities. In one way or another, being-here is always already caught up in the act of projecting possibilities that are part

of the worldly existence that, like its death, is its lot (thrownness). To be here is precisely to disclose what it means to be (for oneself, for others, and for things on hand) precisely by projecting and thus constituting determinate, factical possibilities, the only possibilities available to us as entities thrown into the world. But all the while we are projecting the possibility of being ourselves or not and deporting ourselves towards the respectively impending, individual possibility of no more being able to. Projecting the latter possibility coincides with projecting the possibility that is most our own, i.e., understanding ourselves as "being towards death" (*Sein zum Tode*).[23]

This pre-eminent possibility that we have by virtue of being-here is also, to iterate my opening remarks, a possibility that cannot be relinquished, passed on to someone else, or in any way forfeited, a possibility that can no more be outrun than it can be shared and, not least, a possibility that remains as certain as its timing is uncertain. It escapes the realm of what we can take care of (*Besorgen*) as well as the field of our solicitous relations with others (*Fürsorge*) (SZ 263). It is the defining possibility of our existence not least because, like a great love, it is most intimately ours – and yet not of our choosing (SZ 250f, 257ff, 263). At the same time, as glossed at the outset, it is a possibility that we are prone in our fallenness to ignore, elude, and conceal – all of which presumes, of course, that we are nonetheless fully cognizant of its status as the very possibility that is most our own.[24] For all these reasons, explicitly – or, as Heidegger also puts it, "transparently" – projecting this possibility or not is the key to existing authentically and, thereby, to existential analysis, to understanding what, in our case, it means to be in the most complete and fundamental sense.

Getting concrete: verifying authenticity

After elaborating this existential conception of death, Heidegger sets for himself the task of specifying the existential conditions of the concrete (existentiel) possibility of authentically projecting one's death (SZ §53) and that possibility itself (SZ §62).[25] Authentically deporting ourselves towards this possibility cannot be an attempt to realize it as though it were something ready-to-hand for some purpose. Not only is this possibility not something ready-to-hand and purposive in that way, its realization would mean the demise of being-here and thus the removal of any basis for existing with a view towards one's death. Nor can deporting ourselves authentically towards death take the form of brooding about it or expecting it as though, once again, it were something that could be actual for us. In contrast to these other ways of behaving towards death, ways of behaving that enfeeble or undermine it purely as a possibility, authentically relating to death must reveal and sustain it precisely as the pre-eminent, constantly imminent possibility that it is for me alone.

Heidegger characterizes the authentic way of relating to death as anticipating, literally "running ahead into" (*Vorlaufen in*), the possibility and, indeed, not as the possibility of anything that can be actual for me or that I can make actual, but precisely as the possibility of the absence of possibilities. To anticipate death in this way is to appreciate and project this possibility for myself. Death is an existential possibility, which is to say that, while the possibility is not reducible to the projection of it, neither is it in any sense independent of the projecting. Anticipating this defining possibility discloses the finality and finitude of existence, enabling us, Heidegger submits, to become free for it and, hence, free to understand and choose among finite, factical possibilities authentically. Dasein projects its death as its own, as the possibility of the absence of its possibilities. Anticipating this absence accordingly breaks the hold of any obdurate (inflexible or hardhearted) identification with some previously attained or expected possibilities. Being free for this ultimate possibility also guards against being with others inauthentically, either by mistaking their possibilities for ours or by foisting our possibilities on them (SZ 264). In all these ways, anticipating death exposes our forlornness (i.e., the sense of being left to ourselves as separate individuals), retrieves us from the inertia of conformity, and confronts us with the possibility of being ourselves as individuals, each on his or her own, within any enterprise we undertake in concern for one another (SZ 266).

With this characterization of what it means to anticipate death, Heidegger has sketched the ontological conditions for being-here to understand itself in terms of the ultimate possibility that is all its own or, equivalently, the existential conditions of the possibility of existing authentically.[26] What remains to be shown – from the vantage point of being-here itself (*aus dem Dasein her*) – is "the corresponding ontic potential to be."[27] Heidegger finds this potential in the connection between anticipation and resoluteness or, more precisely, by projecting "these existential phenomena onto the existentiell possibilities prefigured in them" (SZ 302f). To be resolute is to exist authentically, precisely by choosing to choose or, more precisely, choosing to be oneself by choosing to choose. But what exactly or even approximately does this mean?

Once again, Heidegger is playing off what he calls the 'fallenness' of human existence. Fallenness is a human condition, no doubt supported by mirror neurons and neural emulators. It is the instinctive tendency to imitate and adopt the behavior of others as our own before we even have a chance to realize that we are doing so. Through the force of habit, acquired and regularly reinforced, we are prone to accommodate ourselves to the perspective-based representations of others or, better, what we take to be their perspectives. We are always more or less caught up in this fallen condition, routinely making choices that concern the possibilities we incessantly project.

Yet each of us has been thrown into the world as the sort of being who, without having chosen to be at all, individually projects and chooses among possibilities. From this fact Heidegger concludes that a distinctive,

individuating indebtedness and responsibility (*Schuldigsein*) pervades our existence. We do not know *why* in the end we are here; we lack an ultimate ground or reason for being-here, "never having in our power from the ground up the manner of being that is most ours" (SZ 284), and hence to be here at all is to incur this *debt* or, better, to enact this *indebtedness* (or, as we might put it in a more colloquial vein, to live on *borrowed* time). At the same time, however, we are *responsible* for much of what we become in a process that inevitably involves nullifying some possibilities in the course of pursuing others. *To exist at all* is to be thrown into the world as the sort of entity who, because existing matters to it, inevitably projects and chooses some possibilities over others, all of which stem from (have roots in) that same world into which it has been thrown.[28] *To exist resolutely and thus authentically* is to project concrete possibilities for ourselves with a view to the aforementioned indebtedness and responsibility that is most native to us. It is, in effect, to take upon ourselves the burden of individual existence by "choosing to choose" (SZ 270). "Resoluteness means allowing oneself to be called up from a forlorn, mindless conformity to others," a condition obviously not to be confused with an independence from social conventions (SZ 299). Rather, "in resoluteness what matters to being-here is the potential-to-be that is most his or her own, a potential-to-be that, as thrown, can project itself only onto definite factical possibilities" (SZ 299). Precisely in this way, Heidegger submits, being resolute first discloses the situation that we find ourselves in (not merely as part of a crowd or collective, but inasmuch as each of us respectively projects for himself or herself an authentic, worldly self), situating us in a place as well as in the circumstances, involvements, and relationships and, indeed, with a view to disclosing the factical possibilities therein.

But what does being resolute in this sense have to do with death, existentially conceived, with anticipating it as the possibility of our impossibility? For Heidegger, the link here consists in the constancy (*Ständigkeit*) that being authentic requires. In order to be authentically resolute, assuming this responsibility concretely (ontically), Dasein must understand its responsibility as constant or, in other words, as something that must be borne to the end.

> Thus the existentiell assumption of this guilt in resoluteness is enacted then only if the resoluteness in its disclosing of Dasein has become so transparent that it understands this being-guilty *as constant* … Resoluteness authentically becomes what it can be, *as being oriented to the end in a way that understands*, that is to say, by way of anticipating or running ahead into death.
>
> (SZ 305)

Or, as he puts it later in the text, "Only being-free *for* death provides being-here the goal in an unqualified way and plunges existence into its finitude" (SZ 384).

The difficulty here is understanding the supposedly concrete or existentiell character of this account, required in order to insure that the analysis has not been an "arbitrary construction" (*SZ* 303). The difficulty might even seem to be exacerbated by Heidegger's insistence on a constancy that ironically must be ready to "take back" or "give up" any specific resolution (*SZ* 264, 308, 391). Yet this interplay is the key to his account of authenticity. For, while he emphasizes the need to locate the existential analysis in the way we concretely exist (existentiell), he does not identify the concrete, authentic existence, signaled by anticipatory resoluteness, with some specific possibility or resolution. He identifies it instead with a certain freedom for the finitude of being-here in the respective, concrete (factical) situation which the resolute individual "*presents* herself with and *brings* herself into" (*SZ* 307). Being free for the possibilities of that situation cannot mean rigidly identifying ourselves with them. Instead, to be resolute in a manner that anticipates death is to come back *repeatedly* to oneself and one's factical situation ("dependent upon a 'world' and existing with others"), disclosing the respective possibilities of the situation "*on the basis of the legacy*" that one takes over in being thrown into the world (*SZ* 383). Resolutely anticipating death provides a fulcrum for individual responsibility, the ultimate source of a capacity to step back from every possible commitment or projection, not least those traditional possibilities that have become second nature, and consider or reconsider them in light of the defining possibility of our individual existence (*CT* 117). Death confirms our finitude and incompleteness in Heidegger's analysis but precisely by constituting the ultimate sense in which we are inherently possibilities, always ahead of ourselves. In light of this analysis, authentically projecting death alone serves as the existentiell way of insuring our openness (*Ent-schlossenheit*) to the future over against any foregoing commitments to other existentiell possibilities (*CPC* 93). Cognizant of our fallibility and the opacity of things, we have the ability, the responsibility, and the freedom to retrieve and make explicit to ourselves the choices that we have made and continue to make. Whether it reinstates or repudiates previous choices, this retrieval re-enacts the resoluteness that comes with anticipating death. This explicit repetition or retrieval (*Wiederholung*) is our way – our only way, Heidegger submits – of renewing our mortal, individual selves.

With this account of "anticipatory resoluteness" Heidegger presents what he considers the linchpin of his investigation, the concrete (existentiell) enactment of an authentic existence that supposedly validates the existential analysis. His account supposes, as he himself puts it, "a particular ontical way of conceiving authentic existence, a factical ideal of Dasein, underlying the ontological interpretation of Dasein's existence" (*SZ* 310). This factical ideal does not entail the projection of any concrete possibilities on our part. Instead, that factical ideal consists in a freedom for death that supposedly empowers us to be free for any concrete possibilities, free to embrace them or not, free to repeat them or not. As Heidegger puts the matter in another

context, we cannot repeat or retrieve what (*Was*) we are or have been; we can only repeat how (*Wie*) we are and that means, quite literally, how we are dying, how we exist, choosing and projecting possibilities in the face of the ultimate homelessness of our existence.[29]

Reservations

In my remarks I have tried to show how Heidegger conceived the relation holding between authenticity and death, existentially conceived and concretely enacted. His conception of that relation is compelling and, most importantly for his purposes, it sets the stage for his account of the sort of time that provides the underlying sense of these phenomena, i.e., the sort of time that makes sense of both the absence of death and the resolute projection of it. In this connection the absence of death has a critical significance for Heidegger's project of fundamental ontology and its destructive side, debunking the tendency to conceive being in terms of presence.

However, I do not want to leave his analysis of authenticity and death without mentioning some reservations that I have with the account. In my view, Heidegger does not adequately clarify the 'ideal' that, in his own words, underlies the existential analysis. It would seem strange if the factical ideal of a death-anticipating resoluteness did not entail some concrete (ontic) determinations, perhaps even norms, for being-here and being-with-others and preclude other such determinations. Heidegger's interpretation of the detachment involved in death-anticipating resoluteness probably does not entail the "meta-stable" existence of ironists who must reconcile themselves to a split between their private and public lives (a post-modern remake of the Romantic beautiful soul). Yet does or should Heidegger's interpretation have the resources to preclude this sort of inference? Indeed, for all the differences between them, particularly regarding the ontological status of absence, it is difficult not to hear in Heidegger's text unmistakable echoes of Epicurus' teachings. Consider, for example, Heidegger's reminders of our mortal condition, his warnings against fear of death, his a-theistic methodological restrictions on thinking of death theologically or as a passage to another world, his insistence that existing authentically demands a critical distance towards the many, his commitment to a life of thought, his notion of being free for death, and not least, his observation that those who exist authentically always have time. Each theme bears a striking resemblance to elements of Epicurus' portrait of the sage.[30]

But there is another avenue of criticisms that I would like to address by way of conclusion. The criticism concerns the extent of the ontological difference between being-here and others' being-here-with-us (*Mitdasein*). The issue is not that there are absences of various sorts critical to this other way of being but that any understanding of the absence represented by death, precisely as the possibility of my impossibility, appears to trade on

analogies with these other sorts of absence – analogies informed, moreover, by specific historical and cultural interpretations. Heidegger has, to be sure, tried to forestall such misgivings (see especially *SZ* §§ 47-49). But, without gainsaying the richness of his account of the absence represented by my death as the possibility of my impossibility, I can only make sense of this absence, so understood, by interpreting it as the possibility of no longer being able to project possibilities I share with others.[31] To put the matter as plainly (and crudely) as possible for the sake of discussion, I can only authentically project the possibility of my impossibility because I experience the absence of those I love and have lost.

Notes

1 Cf. Beecher 1968, Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain-death 1968, and President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Policy in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research 1981. The controversy over this determination of death continues, however; see Wijdicks 2002, Truog and Robinson 2003, and Joffe 2005.

2 *SZ* § 47, 237: "Der Übergang zum Nichtmehrdasein hebt das Dasein gerade aus der Möglichkeit, diesen Übergang zu erfahren und als erfahrenen zu verstehen." As for so-called near death, out of body experiences, these appear to be, not rare instances of experiencing death, but instead symptoms of insufficient oxygen in relevant ophthalmological and neural networks.

3 See *SZ* 234: "Dieses Ende, zum Seinkönnen, das heißt zur Existenz gehörig, begrenzt und bestimmt die je mögliche Ganzheit des Daseins." SZ 236: "Solange das Dasein als Seiendes *ist*, hat es seine >>Gänze<< nie erreicht. Gewinnt es sie aber, dann wird der Gewinn zum Verlust des In-der-Welt-seins schlechthin. *Als Seiendes* wird es dann nie erfahrbar."

4 This point is controversial, given a sufficiently long evolutionary trajectory and the Rousseauian prospect that conventional medicine reinforces the temporary survival of the less fit.

5 See *SZ* 258f (and elsewhere): "*Der Tod als Ende des Daseins ist die eigenste, unbezügliche, gewisse und als solche unbestimmte, unüberholbare Möglichkeit des Daseins.*" What the gloss up to this point does not capture is the sense of "*Möglichkeit*" and "*eigenste*," namely, the sense in which death is a possibility and, indeed, the sort of possibility that has an existential significance, and the sense in which that possibility is most our own; see below for an attempt to elaborate these crucial senses.

6 See Oates 1940: 35. Heidegger seems to echo this sentiment with his remark about the inauthenticity of "having no time"; see *CT* 119: "Gerade das Dasein, das mit der Zeit rechnet, mit der Uhr in der Hand lebt, dieses mit der Zeit rechnende Dasein sagt standing: ich habe keine Zeit."

7 As Art Buchwald puts it somewhere, "Dying is easy, parking is hard."

8 In Heidegger's jargon, death is construed as an: "*innerweltlich vorkommendes Ereignis*" (*SZ* 253), "*ein öffentlich vorkommendes Ereignis*" (*SZ* 253); "*ankommende[s] Ereignis*" (*SZ* 254); "*umweltlich begegnendes Ereignis*," "*Erfahrungstatsache*" (*SZ* 257).

9 See *CT* 118-20; Authentic Dasein never is at a loss for time, i.e., it always has all the time it needs because it is time. There is no need to hurry since haste suggests that something attainable is slipping away or could slip away from our grasp but the time that we are never slips away nor is it ever in our grasp. The

same holds, in spades, for authentic time, namely, the possibility of our impossibility. On one level, this authenticity coincides with the Epicurean insight that a person's death is nothing, i.e., nothing that could be present-at-hand for her. Yet, on another level, Dasein's death is never something that can be grasped or lost the way that something present-at-hand can be. Instead, it is the possibility, projected by Dasein, of its impossibility (and it is *that* possibility only as long as Dasein projects it).

10 In keeping with this announcement of the aim of *SZ* on its opening page, there are two central theses to the project, one corresponding to the manner of *being* to be investigated, the second concerning the sort of *time* that any assignment of meaning to that manner of being presupposes. Thesis 1: The manner of being of entities whose being matters to them and who at some register, in their very way of being in the world, have an understanding of what it means to be, is irreducible to other modes of being. Thesis 2: What enables and gives meaning to this distinctive mode of being – to being-here – is a primordial and genuine sort of temporality. This thesis is, to be sure, not as ambitious as Heidegger's intention regarding the interpretation of time that he announces on the opening page of *SZ* ("*mögliche[r] Horizont eines jeden Seinsverständnisses überhaupt*"). The reason for the lesser claim is in part the fact that Heidegger does not publish the work in its entirety as planned, though he leaves ample clues as to how, in general, he views the relation between time and being. See, too, his development of this project in *BBP* and *MFL*.

11 Dasein stands at times for this manner of being, at other times for the entity with this manner of being.

12 *SZ* 13: "Die existenziale Analytik … ist letzlich *existentiell*, d.h. *ontisch* verwurzelt"; see also *SZ* 310, 312, 316. The interpretation of everyday, existentiell conceptions of death may signal a flight from death that underwrites its existential significance; see *SZ* §§49, 51-52.

13 This existence to which each of us relates is best understood as a potential-to-be or capability-of-being (*Seinkönnen*). While this capability is always engaged in projecting possibilities, on various levels, as long as Dasein is and while they are possibilities into which we have always already been cast, the respective projections and, with them, the respective existence can be authentic or not.

14 See *SZ* 13: "Daher muß die *Fundamentalontologie*, aus der alle andern erst entspringen können, in der *existentialen Analytik des Daseins* gesucht werden."

15 This confusion led to the overly existentialist readings of *SZ*. Heidegger rued this confusion himself, judging by his efforts to counter it, and it may have motivated him to burn the rest of the manuscript of *SZ*.

16 Not that this horizon was always evident to Heidegger's readers. Along with his later insistence that his existential analyses are not to be confused with existentialism and his complaints about the misreadings of *Sein und Zeit*, he acknowledges as one of the fundamental weaknesses of the work its failure to elude the trappings of metaphysics and keep the proper focus on the *Seinsfrage*. In the decade following the publication of *Sein und Zeit*, Heidegger insisted that the question of what it means to be is the fundamental question and this insistence led him to turn from transcendental phenomenology and a thought centered on Dasein to a way of thinking being historically.

17 The notion of presence in German, namely, *Anwesen*, includes one of the connotations of *ousia*, namely, the presence of a place or property ("real estate"). Heidegger exploits temporal, spatial, and subjective connotations of presence that he claims to find in philosophical conceptions of being, beginning with the Greeks: being the present or potentially present presence of something to someone.

18 As noted earlier, fundamental ontology, the ontology "from which alone all others can spring," must be sought in the existential analysis (*SZ* 13).

19 *SZ* 244: "Zumeist endet es in der Unvollendung oder aber zerfallen und verbraucht." Is Heidegger slipping with this last observation? For at least the final phrase certainly seems to play strongly on the similarity of Dasein to a tool or piece of machinery. Indeed, while the broken down and used up machine gives way to something on hand, its utility and thus its being is genuinely lost. Yet the key difference in the being "used up" (*verbraucht*) is the sense in which Dasein (in contrast to a machine) is time, rather than *in* time (see the opening quotation). The "used up" or "broken down" machine gives way to something on hand – but *in* time. The same might be said for Dasein that has met its end, were it not for the case that the absence of Dasein, *stricto sensu*, entails the absence of time.

20 I begin by following somewhat broadly and freely the opening sections in which Heidegger sets the table, as it were, for his existential conception of death (*SZ* §§47-49).

21 See *SZ* 248: "Wenn schon das Dasein überhaupt nie zugänglich wird als Vorhandenes, weil zu seiner Seinsart das Möglichsein in eigener Weise gehört, dann darf um so weniger erwartet werden, die ontologische Struktur des Todes einfach ablesen zu könnne, wenn anders der Tod eine ausgezeichnete Möglichkeit des Daseins ist."

22 Moreover, Heidegger adds, a psychology of dying provides more information about the life of the one dying than about dying itself, a further indication that "being-here does not first die or genuinely die at all" in the experience of its factual demise (*SZ* 247). The arguments glossed here may hold with respect to the sciences of historical and cultural conceptions of death, but it leaves open the question of the isolability of the individual's death – indeed, its being towards death – from these actual conceptions. One might argue not only that death is essential to my being-in-the-world but also – contra Heidegger – that my being-in-the-world is essential to my death. In that case, my dying is very much a being *of* the world, including both culture and nature, or, more to the point, traditional cultural and natural conceptions of dying. To the extent that dying and conceiving death have these traditional trappings, differentiating existential and the existentiell conceptions of death becomes suspect if not simply unsustainable. From this vantage point, Dasein would seem to have a cultural and natural constitution such that its individuality or, more precisely, its respective "mineness" (*Jemeinigkeit*), is never its alone – even if its DNA is its alone. Notably, the singular – I am tempted to write "transcending" – importance of "being towards death" survives Heidegger's shift from transcendental philosophy in the late 1920s to his repudiation of transcendental philosophy in favor of thinking being historically from the early 1930s on; see *CP* 221-24.

23 Being-here is always ahead of itself, concretely constituting – and – disclosing itself as a possibility by projecting itself onto possibilities as part of its being-in-the-world. Moreover, it does so, not only in a world of possibilities into which it has been thrown but also as itself a possibility that has been cast into the world, attuned or out of tune with the fact (*SZ* 144ff). This last clause "attuned or out of tune with the fact" is meant to signal the difference between angst and fear in relation to death, the authentic and inauthentic dispositions towards death; see *SZ* 254, 265f.

24 Heidegger devotes §51 of *SZ* to establishing how everyday interpretations of Dasein corroborate this flight from death, from its transformation into an event not yet on hand to a kind of death-defying stoicism. Taking his cues from the earlier analysis of the They, Heidegger examines the temptation, sedation, and alienation of fallenness at work in the everyday interpretation.

25 Heidegger actually identifies three tasks, namely, the determination of: (1) the existential conditions of the existentiell possibility of authentically being towards

death (*SZ* §53), (2) the testimony by being-here itself to this possibility, testimony in the form of conscience's call to being-here to guilt and resoluteness (*SZ* §§54-60), and (3) the existentiell authenticity of resolutely anticipating death (*SZ* §62). For the purposes of this chapter, I focus on (1) and (3), though an adequate treatment of Heidegger's analysis would require consideration of all three steps together.

26 *SZ* 263: "*Das Vorlaufen erweist sich als Möglichkeit des Verstehens des* eigensten *äußersten Seinkönnens, das heißt als Möglichkeit* eigentlicher Existenz."

27 *SZ* 266: "Und trotzdem bleibt doch dieses existenzial>>mögliche<<Sein zum Tode existenziell eine phantastische Zumutung. Die ontologische Möglichkeit eines eigentlichen Ganzseinskönnens des Daseins bedeutet solange nichts, als nicht das entsprechende ontische Seinkönnen aus dem Dasein selbst erwiesen ist. Wirft sich das Dasein je faktisch in ein solches Sein zum Tode?" See, too, *SZ* 234: "Daseinsmäßig aber *ist* der Tod nur in einem existentiellen *Sein zum Tode*." The demand for this factical, ontic evidence recalls Heidegger's insistence on the "ultimately *existentiell*, that is to say, *ontic*" roots of the existential analysis (*SZ* 13).

28 This formulation can be misleading. As Heidegger stresses in this connection, it is not that the possibilities are lying around at hand, but that they are constituted by our very projections of being-here; to take a homely example, the possibilities of looking to the right or to the left are constituted by projecting them and choosing them, but they are not on hand or independent of our being-here; so, too, are the possibilities of finding some things within the world fearful, others appetizing, and still others awesome; see *SZ* 298: "*Der Entschluß ist gerade erst das erschließende Entwerfen und Bestimmen der jeweiligen faktischen Möglichkeit*."

29 See the remark from *CT* quoted at the beginning of this essay. In other words, this constancy is a fidelity not to some ontic possibility with which we have identified, but to being-here authentically, taking concrete responsibility for ourselves as finitely disclosive of our worldly being. Resolutely anticipating death does not entail or prescribe any factical possibility, but it does empower us *on an existentiell level* to take responsibility for the concrete possibilities that we project and to renew them or not. Far from being a sign of irresoluteness, re-evaluating commitments already made is precisely to be resolute authentically, taking responsibility for who one is. Heidegger entitles *SZ* §62 "Dasein's existentielly authentic capability of being whole as anticipatory resoluteness." With this account of the existentiell phenomenon, he supplies the verification for his existential analysis that he calls for at the conclusion of *SZ* §53.

30 Epicurus, *Letter to Menoeceus* in Oates (1940: 31):

> But the many at one moment shun death as the greatest of evils, at another yearn for it as a respite from the evils in life. But the wise man neither seeks to escape life nor fears the cessation of life, for neither does life offend him nor does the absence of life seem to be any evil.

See, too, *Vatican Collection*, X, XXX, XLI in Oates (1940: 40-44).

31 One implication of this suggestion is that Heidegger's claim to be able to ground all accounts of *Ableben* in *Sterben* reflects an overly constricted assessment of those accounts (supposedly categorizable as scientific or everyday) and a unjustified pretension of the primacy of the ontological or existential conception of dying over demise.

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10

ANXIETY, CHOICE AND RESPONSIBILITY IN HEIDEGGER'S ACCOUNT OF AUTHENTICITY

Denis McManus

This chapter offers an interpretation of the role that anxiety plays in Heidegger's discussion of authenticity. I take as my starting point a widely held view of these Heideggerian reflections, and explore some ways in which one might solve the serious problems that that view raises. Though I conclude that these solutions do not work, I draw on them – as well as on an exploration of some parallels with ideas in the Wittgensteinian rule-following literature – in developing an alternative reading of my own. What emerges is – I believe – an interesting and plausible understanding of taking responsibility for oneself and one's actions, and of a meaningfully lived life.

Anxiety, authenticity and death

According to Heidegger, '[a]nxiety reveals an insignificance of the world' (*SZ* 343).[1] When we have this experience, we find ourselves 'face to face with the "nothing" of the world' (*SZ* 276). This 'does not signify that the world is absent' (*SZ* 187), 'annihilated by anxiety, so that nothing is left' (WM 90). But 'what is environmentally ready-to-hand', which Heidegger typically identifies with entities with which we can actively engage, 'sinks away' and an 'utter insignificance … makes itself known' (*SZ* 187).[2] Most commentators understandably take such remarks to depict anxiety as 'an experience of utter meaninglessness' (Dahlstrom 2013: 208), of 'universal meaninglessness' (Philipse 1998: 395): '[a]nxiety is the condition in which nothing matters' (Blattner 1999: 80), in which 'all meaning and mattering slip away' (Dreyfus and Rubin 1991: 332).

That Dasein can have such an experience is *prima facie* puzzling. Dasein is the entity that 'understands Being', where Being is 'that on the basis of which [*woraufhin*] entities are already understood [*verstanden*]' (*SZ* 12, 6). Heidegger identifies '*the "upon-which"* [*Woraufhin*] *in terms of which something becomes*

intelligible [*verständlich*]' precisely with 'meaning [*Sinn*]' (*SZ* 151), in which case – if 'all meaning' were to 'slip away' – Dasein would seem to be deprived of the 'object' that it – as an understanding of Being – must grasp if it is to exist. Similarly, when Heidegger insists that Dasein is Being-in-the-world, this 'does not signify anything spatial at all but means primarily *being familiar with* [*vertraut sein mit*]' (*HCT* 158). A meaningful, surrounding world – 'the world, as that which is familiar to me in such and such a way [*als dem so und so Vertrauten*]' (*SZ* 54) – seems necessary then for Dasein to so much as exist. 'In anxiety', Heidegger tells us, 'one feels "*uncanny*"', where 'uncanniness' means 'not-being-at-home' (*SZ* 188). But Dasein, one might presume, has to 'be-at-home' in a meaningful world.[3]

There are further complications. Anxiety also plays a role in revealing, in some way, the possibility of authenticity:

> In anxiety there lies the possibility of a disclosure which is quite distinctive; for anxiety individualises. This individualization brings *Dasein* back from its falling, and makes manifest to it that authenticity and inauthenticity are possibilities of its Being. These basic possibilities of *Dasein* … show themselves in anxiety as they are in themselves – undisguised by entities within-the-world, to which, proximally and for the most part, *Dasein* clings [*klammert*].
>
> (*SZ* 190-91)

So here Heidegger weaves his reflections on anxiety into a notably more upbeat discussion. Anxiety reveals to us the possibility of a kind of self-determination; it plays a role in our assuming responsibility for ourselves, our genuinely being ourselves – rather than succumbing to the conformist charms of *das Man* ('the They' as Macquarrie and Robinson translate it) – and in what Heidegger calls our 'choosing ourselves'. 'Anxiety makes manifest in *Dasein* … its *Being-free for* the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself' (*SZ* 188); and '[w]hen *Dasein* has chosen itself, it has thereby chosen both itself and choice' (WDR 168). Anxiety poses for us then a challenge, one for which some of us – the authentic – are 'ready' (*SZ* 296, 297).

What complicates matters further still is that Heidegger links anxiety very closely to what he calls 'death'. Indeed he says that 'Being-towards-death is essentially anxiety' (*SZ* 266). So-called 'world collapse' readings of the Being-towards-death discussion, which Dreyfus (2005) endorses as the best available and Thomson has deemed to represent the 'cutting edge' of Heidegger scholarship (Thomson 2013: 263), give us a very straightforward account of the connection between anxiety and death by – roughly speaking – identifying them,[4] death now understood as 'something we can live through' (Thomson 2013: 268).[5] Though I have a rather different view of my own of Heidegger's discussion of 'death',[6] I will accept this identification for the purposes of the present chapter.

Liberation, paralysis and motivation

A widely held interpretation of Heidegger's discussion of anxiety/death takes the following form:

> [I]n 'being-towards-death' Dasein recognizes, for the first time, that its normal or everyday practical context is simply one possibility among others, *one which is thereby subject to its own free choice*. This context need not be taken up unquestioningly from tradition or society, or even from the past choices that Dasein itself has already made. 'Being-towards-death' thus opens up the possibility of a very particular kind of liberation – the possibility of a truly 'authentic' existence in which Dasein's own choices and decisions rest on no taken for granted background framework at all.
>
> (Friedman 2000: 51)

According to such a view, anxiety/death liberates us by making it possible for us to choose how to live without any 'taken for granted background framework at all', this being 'a "resolute" and thoroughgoing decision, a decision that goes all the way down, as it were' (Friedman 2000: 51-52). Instead of acting on a set of merely inherited possibilities, principles or reasons, the authentic person chooses her own; in doing so, she faces up – owns up – to the need for such choice and takes responsibility for herself and the course her life then takes. She thereby exhibits a form of autonomy and her life a form of 'ownedness', as Heidegger's '*Eigentlichkeit*' might be more literally translated.

Iain Thomson offers a recent example of such a view. He identifies Heidegger's 'anxiety' and 'death' with 'an anguished experience of the utter desolation of the self' (2013: 262), in which 'all of our projects … break down simultaneously' (p. 270). This is a condition out of which we can emerge, however: we can perform a 'passage through death' in the form of a 'reflexive reconnection to the world of projects lost in death' (Thomson 2013: 272-73 and 2004: 453). Indeed our experience of anxiety/death makes this reconnection one in which we have 'the *freedom* to choose' which projects to reconnect to. This experience 'break[s] the previously unnoticed grip arbitrarily exerted upon us by *das Man's* ubiquitous norms of social propriety, its pre- and proscriptions on *what one does*' (Thomson 2013: 273, 274 and 2004: 455); instead we now 'become capable of "choosing to choose"', and – having made such a choice – acquire 'the subsequent responsibility for having so chosen' (Thomson 2013: 273).

Despite the popularity of this kind of reading, the view it ascribes to Heidegger has also long been thought to be deeply problematic.[7] The principal objection is that – as Dreyfus puts it – if 'nothing matters', '*Dasein* is paralyzed' (2005: xx). To see how, let us consider, for example, our

'reconnecting' choices. If we take these to rest upon considerations that favour particular projects over others, then we would not seem to have made 'a decision that goes all the way down'; we are not – as the rhetoric goes – genuinely 'liberated' after all, in that the choice will be being made on the basis of a 'taken for granted background framework', one which declares certain projects praiseworthy and others not. So if we imagine making such a choice in the face of anxiety, it cannot be the case that it is 'universal meaninglessness we experience in *Angst*' (Philipse 1998: 395). But if such choices are not made on the basis of any such considerations, they would instead seem arbitrary, little better than the tossing of a coin. It is hard to see the making of such a 'choice' as constituting our taking responsibility for our lives; rather it would seem to be a perfect example of not doing so. As Tugendhat puts it

> A choice … that is not made in the light of reasons … is a choice in which I leave how I choose to accident; and in this respect we have to say that it was not I who chose.
>
> (Tugendhat 1986: 216)

I will refer to this problem as 'the Motivation Problem' (MP). In a sense, it reaffirms a worry that the opening section of the chapter raised – that Dasein's existence, as a performer of meaningful actions, is incompatible with 'the meaninglessness of existence' (Dahlstrom 2013: 15) – and we can see MP at work in Thomson's discussion. He talks of our being 'stranded (as it were)' in 'th[e] paralysis of our projects experienced in death' (Thomson 2013: 271, 273 and 2004: 453, 454). But a solution to MP is implied in remarks Thomson makes when insisting that the freedom that anxiety/death reveals to us 'is always constrained' (2013: 273 and 2004: 454): the constraints include Dasein's 'ontic talents, cares, and predispositions' and 'the pre-existing concerns of our time and "generation"' (Thomson 2013: 273). The 'solution' to MP emerges as Thomson slides away from treating these constraints as mere constraints. He tells us that, against the background they provide, 'it … *matters* that this particular role has been chosen by this particular *Dasein*', because some choices will 'develop its particular ontic and factical aptitudes as these intersect with the pressing needs of its time and generation' (2013: 274, italics added).[8] So the choices we make in reconnecting to the world are motivated by, or grounded in, our 'ontic cares' and the 'pressing needs' and 'concerns' of our 'time and generation'.

But this will not do. Assuming that we want to avoid MP, *something* must indeed move us if we are to 'pass through' anxiety/death; and perhaps this something includes 'ontic cares' and the needs of our time and generation. But if we have these cares and find these needs pressing in anxiety/death, then the latter cannot be the 'catastrophic collapse' Thomson describes it as being. Being moved by such cares and needs, our choices made in the face

of anxiety may not be arbitrary. But if we are so moved, this undermines the vision of liberation through anxiety/death that views of this sort espouse and the accounts of 'choosing choice', taking responsibility, etc. that this vision underpins.

Questioning the Meaninglessness Assumption – I

One way to respond to these difficulties is to question whether anxiety really does reveal that 'nothing matters'. This section and the following consider two ways of doing that.

One is to claim that, though there are genuine sources of motivation, anxiety/death blinds us to them: it is, in some sense, a deceptive or delusional state. One of the first advocates of a 'world collapse' reading, Bill Blattner, has offered a not-dissimilar view in his recent work. Blattner depicts anxiety as 'a complete collapse of the structure of meaning in which one lives' (Blattner 2006: 139-40) but also insists that:

> Heidegger is *not* claiming that in anxiety we realize the 'deep truth' about our lives, that everything is worthless or meaningless. … Anxiety is a kind of breakdown experience, breakdown in the living of a human life, rather than a window onto the truth.
>
> (Blattner 2006: 142, 144)

But such a view will not solve the difficulty set out at the end of the previous section, because motivation to which we are blind cannot motivate 'passage through' anxiety/death. I do not wish to imply that Blattner assumes his view *does* solve that kind of difficulty; but we do pass close by here a criticism that Dreyfus has made of his account, namely, that it is not clear on Blattner's view 'what a life of readiness for an anxiety attack would be like' (Dreyfus 2005: xx). If such readiness is meant to help one deal (in some sense) with anxiety when it strikes – to *do* something in the face of anxiety – then it is hard to see what that something might be when one faces (what one at least experiences as) a 'complete collapse of the structure of meaning in which one lives'. One could propose that anxiety/death simply passes, coming to an end all by itself, so to speak. But if so, it is unclear why the authentic would count as any more 'ready' for the experience in question than the inauthentic are.

Interestingly, there is, I think, a way of reconstructing Thomson's view such that it follows Blattner's in taking anxiety/death to be delusional but has the advantage over Blattner's of understanding that delusion as one for which one *can* be ready. Yet more interestingly, this reconstruction would spare Thomson the MP. But it comes at other – and, for Thomson, excessive – costs.

To begin, let us consider what happens in anxiety/death as a result of which our 'life-projects' collapse. In it, Thomson tells us, our projects 'founder[] on

the reef of their own contingency' (2013: 271). To believe that the contingency of projects renders them meaningless would seem to require that one operate with a rather particular standard of meaningfulness;[9] and Thomson identifies one, the rejection of which he also declares to be key to 'passage through death': we realize that 'there is ultimately nothing about the ontological structure of the self which could tell us what specifically we should do with our lives' (p. 270).[10] *If* one's notion of a meaningful project is one dictated by 'the ontological structure of the self', *then* our life-projects 'founder on the reef of their own contingency'.

Thomson tells us that our 'reconnection to the world' 'turns on our giving up the unreflexive, paralysing belief that there is a single correct choice to make' (Thomson 2013: 273 and 2004: 453, 454).[11] One way this 'giving up' could be key is that we would then see through a confused denigration of our 'factical' sources of motivation: we could 'reconnect to' our 'ontic cares' and the 'concerns' of 'our age and generation' because we would no longer dismiss them on the grounds that they are not reflective of 'the ontological structure of the self'. This would also suggest an understanding of how one might be ready for anxiety. *If* one accepts the 'paralyzing belief's' distorted standard of meaningfulness, then recognition of the contingency of one's life projects will seem to entail their meaninglessness. But if one doesn't, it won't: one will be ready for anxiety in that one does not hold a belief – the 'paralysing belief' – that one must hold if the above recognition is to precipitate a 'global' and 'catastrophic collapse' of 'all of our life-projects' (Thomson 2013: 271, 269).

But this reconstruction will not do either. For Thomson, giving up the 'paralysing belief' is key to our 'reconnection to the world' because 'recognizing that there is no such correct choice (because there is no substantive self to determine such a choice) is what gives us the *freedom* to choose' (Thomson 2013: 273 and 2004: 454). But this would be a *non sequitur* on the above reconstruction. According to that reconstruction, 'giving up' the 'paralysing belief' removes a slander that has been hanging over our existing, 'factical', contingent sources of motivation; but that gives us no reason to think that our *choosing* our forms of motivation makes sense. One's being freed from a confusion that obscures real reasons one has for acting restores one, as it were, to one's real motivational world; it does not give one a (more or less) free hand to reshape it.

Blattner does not face this problem, because his picture of authenticity differs. When authentic, rather than being 'lost in the Anyone' (Blattner's preferred rendering of *das Man*), one responds to 'the demands of one's situation and one's disposition': 'to find oneself and win oneself is to see what is factically possible and important and to carry through with it' (Blattner 2006: 166). To hold such a view – and this will be an important thought later – is to acknowledge what one might think of as the 'given' – 'found' rather than 'chosen' – character of our motivation at its most fundamental level: '[t]o be *Dasein*, to be a person', Blattner proposes, 'is to find oneself

differentially disposed towards the possibilities the world has to offer, differentially disposed by way of confronting those possibilities in terms of which they matter to one' (p. 155). What allows Blattner to adopt these views while seeing anxiety/death as an experience in which 'none of [Dasein's] possibilities matter to it differentially' (Blattner 1994: 67) is his denial that this experience is 'a window onto the truth'. But, as mentioned above, what remains unclear about his view is how the authentic person might be 'ready' for that experience.

Questioning the Meaninglessness Assumption – II

Perhaps then we must question in a more radical way the assumption that what anxiety reveals is that 'nothing matters'. Reason to doubt whether Heidegger really does endorse a picture of anxiety as an experience of 'utter' or 'universal meaninglessness' – delusional or otherwise – is given by passages such as the following:

> He who is resolute … understands the possibility of anxiety as the possibility of the very mood which neither inhibits nor bewilders him. Anxiety liberates him ['He who is resolute'] *from* possibilities which 'count for nothing' ['*nichtigen*'], and lets him become free *for* those which are authentic.
>
> (*SZ* 344)[12]

Readings that place such passages at the heart of Heidegger's understanding of anxiety certainly promise to escape MP. But the most obvious problem that such readings face is that of squaring such passages with the other remarks that Heidegger makes about anxiety. Heidegger may well say that anxiety leaves one with 'authentic possibilities', but how can he say that while also saying that anxiety reveals 'the "nothing" of the world', an 'utter insignificance … mak[ing] itself known'?

We see a version of this difficulty in Burch's recent attempt to solve MP. Burch proposes that 'anxiety nullifies the factical claims of my *current* context … [b]ut this does not rule out remembering past experiences of satisfaction' (2010: 223). It is these 'traces' – these 'aspects of the self that remain intact in death' – that 'motivate *Dasein*'s return to the world' (p. 221). Burch identifies these 'traces' as 'the desire for hedonic repetition', 'a desire for an idiosyncratic repetition' (underpinned by 'an ever-ready constellation of dispositions and habits available for repeating a familiar self–world arrangement') and a 'desire to recover' 'eudaimonistic satisfaction' (pp. 222-23).

As he himself says, Burch's account 'goes beyond interpretation to construction' (p. 233, cf. p. 227) and some of the constructive notions invoked strike me as rather unHeideggerian in spirit (the first and third form of 'trace', for example). But it also raises a version of the worry raised above: it is not clear why our commitments are 'suspended' in anxiety – even if only

'momentarily' (p. 220) – if '[t]hese traces are always there in the background of experience', 'ever-ready' (p. 223).

Burch's is a complex account and I cannot do it justice here. Instead in the remainder of this chapter, I will offer an interpretation of my own of what anxiety involves, one which has some similarities to Blattner's more recent view and yet more to my reconstruction of Thomson's. But as a final prelude, let us remind ourselves of four requirements that have emerged in our discussion so far and which – it seems – an account of anxiety should strive to meet. It needs to identify

(1) an experience of the meaninglessness of things
(2) which does not necessarily paralyse us (*pace* MP)
(3) for which we can – in some sense – be ready, and
(4) which can play a role in a story about choosing oneself, choosing choice, assuming responsibility, etc.

Burch's view seems to fail to meet requirement (1), Thomson's view (2), Blattner's recent view (3), and my reconstruction of Thomson's view (4). My own interpretation, I will argue, meets all four.

Heidegger's depiction of inauthenticity – I: intimations of an alternative picture of anxiety/death

To begin, I want to draw attention to some interesting twists in the formulations which Heidegger uses to characterize anxiety, formulations which paint a very particular picture of the inauthentic.

In anxiety, the possibility of authenticity is revealed 'undisguised by entities within-the-world, to which, proximally and for the most part, *Dasein* clings' (SZ 191, quoted above). Now 'the "world" can offer nothing more': '[a]nxiety … takes away from Dasein the possibility of understanding itself, as it falls, in terms of the "world" and the way things have been publicly interpreted' (SZ 187). Similar notions can be found in remarks on death:

> The possibility of death means that … at some time … the world will have nothing more to say to me, that everything to which I cling, with which I busy myself, and about which I am concerned will have no more to say to me and will no longer be of help to me. (WDR 168)

The person whom anxiety/death rocks back on her heels is then the person who 'clings' to entities; she wants to 'understand [her]self … in terms of the "world" and the way things have been publicly interpreted', and has turned to the world in search of 'something on the basis of which [she is] able to live' (WDR 168). But in anxiety/death, I see that this world 'to which I cling, [and] with which I busy myself', has 'no more to say to me' and is 'no longer … of help to me'.

But what kind of 'help' did I expect? What did I hope this 'world' – that to which I 'cling' – *would* 'say' to me? It would seem that I hoped it would (somehow) determine for me how to live. As the 1925-26 *Logic* lectures put it, '[i]n inauthentic concern', Dasein 'places itself into its concern about things in such a way that its conduct [*Verhalten*] is determined in terms of the object of that concern': 'the things with which I am involved ultimately determine me and my being' (*L* 193). But in anxiety/death, we see that such things provide no such 'determination', no such 'help'.

Such passages present a picture of a craving for legitimation or justification being thwarted. The following three sections will elucidate this picture by exploring some parallels with thoughts found in Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations. These parallels will help us see what this craving might be, how it might seem to be satisfied, why it must – in fact – be thwarted, and how that realization might lead to the shocking conclusion that the world is meaningless – provoking both fears of paralysis and a vision of 'liberated' free choice. But these parallels also suggest, I will argue, a different way in which Heidegger might be read.

A Wittgensteinian analogy

Central to Wittgenstein's discussion of rule-following is his well-known discussion of ostensive definition and its apparent limitations. I may point at a London bus and say 'That is what we mean by "red"'. But the notion that such an explanation serves to justify or ground that word being used in some particular way collapses once one recognizes that, though this object is indeed red, it is also in England, heading to King's Cross Station, at 30 mph, in the rain, on a Tuesday, etc. etc. The object is indeed a sample of something red; but it also instantiates these other (and indefinitely numerous) concepts. The bus's being red is a reason for describing it as red; but it is a reason to describe it as red rather than blue, and not a reason to describe it as red rather than in England, heading to King's Cross Station, etc. etc.

The same difficulty will arise – I suggest – if I hope to read a 'basis on which I am able to live' off the objects with which I deal. Every object presents an indefinite number of differently meaningful faces to us, corresponding to an indefinite number of different ways in which we might deal with – live around – it. This is no challenge to the truth of the descriptions of the objects under which we see these objects when we deal with them in these ways. But it does draw our attention to the fact that I cannot expect those objects to – as it were – themselves dictate their meaning for me, the aspects of them that are *worth* my describing and which I *ought* to consider when I act: they cannot 'determine me and my being'.

But who would ever think that they would or could? No one – wittingly. But the above Wittgensteinian reflections show how naturally we fall into this kind of confusion. The confusion about the samples exposed above arises

out of our taking the objects around us to be – so to speak – exclusively and inherently what they represent in the practices in which we merely happen to be engaged; we treat the bus's redness as something like its essential meaning, when, in fact, it is merely the particular aspect of it in which we happen to be taking an interest. (To adapt an expression of Wittgenstein's, '[w]e predicate of the thing what lies in the mode of representation' (Wittgenstein 1967: §104).) But crucially, for many of us, our first encounter with Wittgenstein's reflections on ostensive definition is precisely an experience of surprise, in light of which indeed we look at our samples – to which we have previously turned without pause in explaining our words – as now somehow strangely dumb, exposed as unfit to convey the meaning we intend because – as we now recognize – they carry a babble of indefinitely many meanings. In our engaging with the entities in question in a way informed by our use of particular concepts, the entities present themselves to us – up until such moments of reflection – in those terms; and the surprise comes because we have – so to speak – fallen into the habit of taking these entities to simply – essentially, exclusively – *be* what those terms present them as being. The fact that we are shocked reveals that we have 'fallen' in this way.

There is, one might suggest, an animistic quality to our confused ambition for our samples here: it is as if we expect an entity to determine which of the many concepts under which it falls we should use in thinking of it. That very multiplicity means no answer is there to be found and what we hear when we allow ourselves to think that one is is merely an echo of the concepts which we already happen to be applying to these entities. By forgetting, as it were, that we are already describing and living around these entities in these ways, and that we could – and perhaps at other times do – describe and live around them in other ways, we succumb to an illusion that the former ways are *the right* ways of describing and living around these entities. In this way, this animistic fantasy supports and is supported by a fantasy of a certain anonymity: I am an anonymous observer who simply deals with the world as the world itself dictates it should be dealt with, the legitimacy – indeed necessity – of the way I relate to the world seeming to follow from a simple description of what is there before my eyes.

Wittgenstein shows us how natural this confusion is. But more importantly given our present concerns, this is a confusion that tallies closely with the inauthentic person's experience of his world as Heidegger describes it.

Heidegger's depiction of inauthenticity – II: the desire to be 'lived' by the 'world'

That the way we deal with an entity – embodied in our understanding of its 'Being' – might be read off that entity is a confusion that Heidegger clearly identifies and links to inauthenticity. As he puts it, 'Being can never be explained by entities but is already that which is "transcendental" for every

entity': 'entities can be experienced "factually" only when Being is already understood' (*SZ* 208, 315).[13] But 'common sense' 'fails to recognize' this; '[w]hat is distinctive in common sense is that it has in view only the experiencing of "factual" entities, in order that it may rid itself of an understanding of Being' (*SZ* 315); and 'common sense', of course, Heidegger associates with inauthenticity.[14]

When inauthentic, I 'cling' to 'what is proximally at [my] everyday disposal' (*SZ* 195) – which I suggest we identify with the entities I encounter as they are understood within the life I happen to lead. 'I deal with this object, this person, this piece of land, etc. in this way because that's what it is!', I insist. And, of course, it may be. But that will be only one of the indefinitely many things that it is, and my way of dealing with it only one of many possible ways of dealing with it. Inauthenticity could be seen as a motivated forgetting of this; as Heidegger puts it, this is a 'levelling off of Dasein's possibilities to what is proximally at its everyday disposal' (*SZ* 195), an obscuring of the indefinitely many possible ways in which those objects might be lived around and found meaningful. In this condition – this 'dimming down of the possible as such' – I take the way the world presents itself to me to simply and exclusively *be* the world – *the* world, 'the facts'; all 'other possibilities' are 'crowded out' or 'closed off' and what remains – those entities so understood – 'becomes the "real world"' (*SZ* 195). I have 'rid myself' of the understanding of the Being of these objects that I bring with me – in that I have forgotten the role that my living the life that I live around such objects plays in determining the meaningful face that they present to me; but thereby, I allow myself to imagine before me a justification for my way of life, for the understanding of Being that that life expresses: 'I deal with this object in this way because that's what it is!'

What I am experiencing – to adapt an expression from *BPP* 174 – is actually no more than 'a mirroring back of the self from things' and, in anxiety, I see through this fantasy. I become aware that there are no 'meanings' to objects that are 'inherent' or 'essential' in this sense: objects lack 'importance in themselves' (*SZ* 187). Instead I see that the meaning of the objects that I encounter is determined by the life I happen to be living, a responsibility that this fantasy – illicitly and confusedly – projects on to the objects themselves.

When one is in the grip of this fantasy, the realization that entities have no such inherent or essential meaning will indeed come in the form of a kind of dizzying alienation, a certain (hazily imagined) basis for those lives being swept away: '[e]veryday familiarity collapses' (*SZ* 189) and one feels 'uncanny', 'not-at-home' in the world. But Heidegger identifies the 'being-at-home', of which we there feel the loss, with a confused state, and our discussion explains why: this state of 'tranquillized self-certainty [*beruhigte Selbstsicherheit*]' (*SZ* 188) is one in which – *per impossibile* – the entities I find around me 'help' me, 'determin[ing] me and my being'.

We see here the combination of animism and a craved anonymity that the Wittgensteinian analogy suggested, a combination that Heidegger evokes in yet more striking formulations. What anxiety reveals as doomed is a desire of Dasein's to 'lose itself in' – to 'absorb' itself in, or to 'submit' to – 'something with which it might be concerned' (*SZ* 344, 186, 348). Dasein 'allow[s] itself to be *chosen* by whatever it immerse[s] itself in' (*CTR* 50), desiring to be '*lived by* … the world which concerns it in this or that way' (*HCT* 245, italics added).[15] Anxiety disrupts this comforting but confused illusion. In anxiety, entities present themselves as *vorhanden*, merely present, merely occurrent,[16] showing up, as Heidegger vividly puts it, in a *leere Erbarmungslosigkeit* – an 'empty mercilessness' or 'pitilessness' (*SZ* 343). We cannot be 'lived' by such entities, because they have no 'life' of their own; or, as one might instead put it, they have too many lives, and no particular interest in – or pity for – ours.

The upshot of the fantasy being recognized

What then is the upshot of this? Does it follow that our lives *are* meaningless? Or that the way we live our lives in this world is a matter of a 'liberated' 'free choice' that 'goes all the way down'? There are indeed analogues of these thoughts in the rule-following literature. As mentioned, our samples can now seem dumb, and that can seem to show that 'meaning vanishes into thin air' (Kripke 1982: 22); or – to the realization that '[t]here is nothing … which forces [us] to apply a word in the way [we] do' (Glendinning 1998: 102) – one might be tempted to add 'so it's up to us': it's a matter of convention. But such views – meaning scepticism and conventionalism – are both deeply problematic;[17] and, significantly, there is quite a broad consensus in that literature that they are not the morals to be drawn from the rule-following considerations. I want to suggest that their analogues are not the morals to be drawn from Heidegger's discussion of anxiety either.

An alternative response to the rule-following considerations is often thought to lie in the fact that certain extrapolations of series of samples simply come naturally to us, 'there being no need for hesitant and questionable interpretation' (Sullivan 2011: 185): while others strike us as artificial or odd, these extrapolations 'speak to us', one might say, just as – without need for justification or other persuasion – we naturally take arrows to point from tail to tip (Wittgenstein 1969: 141).

There are a number of quite different ways in which one might develop these thoughts. Some philosophers see them as providing the basis for reductive, natural*istic* accounts of meaning, according to which meaning is determined by, among other things, our shared dispositions to react to samples. But others see them as playing a role within an anti-reductionist strategy, according to which we should reject the *need* for the kind of underlying justification or determination of our ways of thinking

and talking of which meaning scepticism and conventionalism feel the absence.[18]

The latter approach derives sustenance from the fact that our grasping *any* explanation of how a word should be applied presupposes that we already see the world in the terms that that explanation itself uses. But this would seem to show that eventually – at the end of any such chain of justifications – I must simply find myself '[a]t home in the world', in a condition in which 'I can simply say what I see' (Sullivan 2011: 184). Despite the fact that the entities I encounter have an indefinite number of different things to 'say' to us in instantiating an indefinite number of different possibilities, it remains the case – to adapt Blattner's words – that I must 'find myself differentially disposed towards the possibilities the world' – these entities – 'has to offer'. Among those possibilities must be ones that I have not been persuaded ought to be attended to or taken as salient, as mattering. Here, as Wittgenstein puts it, reasons 'come to an end' (Wittgenstein 1967: §1).[19]

Whether either the naturalistic or the anti-reductionist understandings of these themes ultimately can be defended is the subject of much controversy in the rule-following literature;[20] and I won't pursue those matters here. Instead I want to develop an analogue of the anti-reductionist view in filling out my reading of Heidegger's discussion of anxiety. I will argue that the resultant reading has some independent philosophical plausibility, meets our interpretive requirements (1-4), and offers a viable alternative to the analogues of meaning scepticism and conventionalism that we found at work in the existing readings of Heidegger that we reviewed earlier.

Projects that speak to us

Consider then the possibility that certain projects strike us as worthwhile in themselves, and as *not needing* justification. Prime examples for many of us might be taking care of our loved ones and pursuing our vocations.[21] I may see that there are many other, perhaps recognizably worthwhile ways in which a person might spend his or her life, and I can offer no reason – no case – for being a good father being the – or indeed a – good way for me to spend my life. But reasons 'come to an end', and it may be precisely here that I feel no *need* for such a reason: I do not experience the absence of such a case as a failure or an embarrassment. That absence leaves me – at least when outside of my philosophical closet – unmoved, my commitment to these activities unshaken: I lead that life 'without justification' but – I feel – 'not without right' (Wittgenstein 1967: §289).

Characterizing our relationship to such projects is difficult and we inevitably reach for metaphors. Such projects might be said to 'speak to me', though not in the sense of *telling* me what to do or ordering me to do such-and-such; I respond to them without any sense of needing to be compelled or

persuaded to respond. To give a twist to a metaphor of Heidegger's which we have already seen Sullivan echo, we feel 'at home' in such activities, though not in the sense that I see them as somehow determined as the right ways to behave by the fabric of the world around me. Similarly, they strike me as 'natural', but – again – not in the sense that they conform to the 'inherent' meaning of the entities I encounter – or, for that matter, to 'the ontological structure of the self'. Rather they strike me as natural in that I feel no need for a confirming conformity with any such validating standard.[22]

Such projects need not be unique to me or otherwise idiosyncratic: my grasp of fatherhood and of my vocation clearly arose out of my enculturation in the kind of society in which I live. But were my society to abandon the values that inform such projects, my reaction would be 'So much the worse for that society!' Those values have become my values; those ways of finding the world significant have become my ways of finding the world significant; and the reasons that they give one to act have become my reasons.

Given that society isn't likely to transform in the ways described, it falls to anxiety to reveal this. '[A]nxiety individualises', as Heidegger puts it (*SZ* 190-91, quoted above), in that it throws into relief those projects in which I continue to feel 'at home' even when 'the world' – 'and every other' Dasein – have 'nothing more to say to me' (*HCT* 291). In anxiety, the 'world' 'become[s] *hinfällig*' – superfluous or unnecessary (WM 90). But, with respect to my being a good father, this is just what it is: I feel no need of 'the world's' 'mercy', 'pity' or 'help'. In this respect, I am 'ready for anxiety'.

I may be ready with respect to being a good father; but am I ready full-stop? Many of the projects we undertake in life will not speak to us in this way – my standing in this queue, or filling in this form, or walking up this hill with these heavy bags. Some of these projects may be tied to particular offices I hold, roles I occupy, or norms current in my society. I may or may not find those offices, roles and norms themselves intrinsically meaningful and, where I do not, some may still be tied to serving further projects which I do. The 'tranquilizing' fantasy that anxiety/death sweeps away is that the entities with which we deal somehow take care of these issues for us, and that sweeping away forces upon us once again the question of which of my activities fall within which of these categories. If one were to label those projects that speak to me 'my ownmost', those that here and now serve my 'ownmost' 'provisional',[23] and those that do not 'accidental', one might then say – with Heidegger – that, in anxiety/death, Dasein 'understands itself unambiguously in terms of its ownmost distinctive possibility',[24] 'every accidental and "provisional" possibility driven out'; such an experience 'snatches one back from the endless multiplicity of possibilities which offer themselves as closest to one' – not in order to force us to choose what 'our ownmost' possibilities are to be – but rather to help us recognize what they are: it 'gives *Dasein* its goal outright' (*SZ* 384).

Our requirements revisited

Let us return now to requirements (1-4). Obviously enough, the above account solves MP (requirement (2) above); and it does so while preserving senses in which anxiety reveals that the world is meaningless (1), and its being an experience for which some of us – the authentic – are ready (3). Interestingly, this account also accommodates the thought that Dasein is a creature of a meaningful world, which – as we noted at the beginning of this chapter – seems to be a consequence of other important themes in Heidegger's thought.

According to the above account, *if* one understands the world as the source of a particular kind of justificatory meaning, *then* anxiety reveals that the world is – in this sense – meaningless; in this way, anxiety embodies a 'window on the truth'. This realization paralyses some of us – the inauthentic – who have 'clung' to such justifications. But others amongst us do not need the 'pity' that that fantasy promises. The authentic are 'ready for anxiety' because they have tied their lives to projects that speak to them and for which they feel no need of such a justification: anxiety 'neither inhibits nor bewilders' them. There is then also a sense in which our anxious experience of the meaninglessness of things is deceptive: the meaning that we come to see things lack is essential only to a fantasy of what it takes for our lives to have meaning, and recognizing this fantasy for what it is is crucial to the real moral, so to speak, of anxiety.

Herein lies the similarity to my reconstruction of Thomson's view. Central to that was the idea of identifying and rejecting a fantastical vision of what a meaningful life-project is: in that case, 'the ontological structure of the self' determining the 'single correct choice to make'. The place of delusion in my view too is that anxiety shocks those who *bring a delusion with them*, a fantastical conception of what would make the world and our lives meaningful. But it is a conception to which some of us cling, because it serves – as *SZ* 190-91 quoted above puts it – to 'disguise' the real demands of a meaningfully lived life; and once that disguise is removed, a second – and genuine – revelation of meaninglessness becomes possible: I may now come to see that, as a matter of contingent fact, my life has been meaningless – genuinely meaningless, one might say – in being devoted not to projects that I myself find intrinsically worthwhile, but to 'the endless multiplicity' of 'accidental' possibilities which merely 'offer themselves as closest to' me. The collapse of this delusion, like the collapse of Thomson's 'paralysing belief', restores us – as I put it earlier – to our real motivational world in that it reveals the real touchstones for meaning in our lives: the projects that strike us as intrinsically worthwhile but with which our lives, as a matter of fact, may fall out of alignment.

However, our earlier reconstruction of Thomson's view failed: the fact that the fantasy upon which it focused is a fantasy does not entail that one

is free to choose one's life-projects (even if only constrainedly), as Thomson's view maintains. It is no consequence of my view either that we might choose which projects speak to us. But fortunately, my view points to a quite different understanding of the role that notions of responsibility, 'choosing to choose' and 'choosing oneself' play here (requirement (4)), as well as to a quite different understanding of the challenge that being authentic is.

Choice, responsibility and authenticity revisited

The authentic person's acting on those possibilities that speak to her can, I suggest, be understood as her having 'chosen to choose'. Heidegger tells us that, '[w]ith *Dasein*'s lostness in the "They"', '*Dasein* makes no choices, [and] gets carried along by the nobody [*Niemand*]' (SZ 268); deciding how one will live 'from one's own Self' (SZ 268), on the other hand, is choosing to let one's own fundamental projects – those that strike one as worthwhile in themselves – guide one's life. To act on one's own reasons – rather than those of others or the They – is to have chosen to choose oneself how to live, rather than letting others – and their reasons – decide for one. Similarly, when Heidegger talks of 'choosing one's self', the 'choosing' in question is not choosing *one's self* – as if one had freedom to select from a range a self and its view of what a worthwhile life is – but choosing *oneself* – choosing to be guided by one's own fundamental commitments rather than those of others. It is my choosing myself over 'the world' or 'the public', as Heidegger puts it – my choosing to act on reasons that speak to me, rather than those of the They.

I suggest we see such a choice described in the passage from WDR 168 from which I quoted earlier:

> Dasein can comport itself in such a way that it chooses between itself and the world; it can make each decision on the basis of what it encounters in the world, or it can rely on itself. Dasein's possibility of choosing offers the possibility of fetching itself back from its having become lost in the world, that is, from its publicness. When Dasein has chosen itself, it has thereby chosen both itself and choice.

To echo the last sentence here, in making decisions on the basis of my own reasons, I am deciding both to decide and to be the one who decides. I am choosing myself as the one who will choose – rather than deferring the judgement in question to someone else – to 'the world' or the They – and their assessment of what matters. This is also recognizably something that could be called 'assuming responsibility for oneself and one's actions'. The above passage continues:

> This choosing … is the *choice* of *responsibility* for itself that *Dasein* takes on and that consists in the fact that in each instance of my acting I make myself responsible through my action.

Willingness to make decisions oneself – choosing to choose – is not choosing – *per impossible* – what to care about, but choosing to live in line with what one fundamentally cares about. The challenge in doing so is acknowledging that one has an opinion, refusing to disburden oneself of one's own judgment; and accepting this burden – actually acting on that opinion, that judgment – is taking responsibility oneself for one's actions.

Such a person manifests what one might well call a form of '*eigentliche Selbstsein*' (*SZ* 268), a form of 'being-oneself' [*Selbstsein*] and an 'authentic' or 'owned' [*eigentliche*] form at that. The authentic 'own' their existence in that they take responsibility for their lives; they themselves take as much control as they can of the course their lives take, in endeavouring to shape their lives to their own sense of what matters: they attempt – as *SZ* 188 quoted above puts it – to 'take hold of' themselves. The inauthentic, on the other hand, renounce that task and thereby hand this responsibility on to the They by default. 'The public relieves Dasein of its choice, its formation of judgments, and its estimation of values'; in doing so, 'it relieves *Dasein* of the task, insofar as it lives in the They, to be itself by way of itself' (*HCT* 247).

Two possible philosophical objections

There is a naturalness now, I would suggest, to many of Heidegger's other claims about the authentic, such as that their 'readiness for anxiety' is their '[w]anting to have a conscience', the '*call* of conscience' 'summoning' them to themselves (*SZ* 296, 273). But clearly it is beyond the scope of a chapter of this length to embed my reading within a full account of the cluster of concepts that Heidegger's reflections on authenticity involve (including 'conscience', 'guilt', the 'nullities', 'being a whole', and, of course, 'Being-towards-death'), those that inform his more fine-grained description of inauthenticity (including 'idle talk', 'curiosity', 'distantiality', and 'ambiguity') or those that inform *Being and Time*'s broader project and its 'Question of Being'. The previous section contributes a little to the first process; but I cannot hope to complete any of them here.[25] Instead I will end by looking at two philosophical objections that my account may seem to invite. The first asks 'Isn't there something worryingly uncritical about my governing my life by projects that "speak to me"?' The second asks 'What if *nothing* "speaks to me"?'[26]

There are several points to make in reply to the first objection.

(i) Let us first be clear about what my account does rule out: criticism of a person's projects on the basis of their mismatch with the fantastical standard that is the 'inherent/essential meaning' of entities. I hope that, by this stage, any felt need to defend the possibility of that particular kind of criticism has dissipated.

(ii) As indicated above, my account does, in fact, make central critical reflection on one's supposed authenticity, in the form of reflection on

whether our day-to-day activities are indeed tied to our 'ownmost' projects. Being a good father is not something one can do in the abstract; rather one does it by doing other things: by taking one's children to that after-school club, by refusing to buy them yet another present, etc. But one might also perform such activities for other reasons – such as because everyone else takes their children to that club and because one is miserably tight-fisted – and identifying the reasons that are actually driving our acts certainly calls for some critical and possibly painful reflection.[27]

(iii) There is a danger, moreover, that we may not see the wood for the trees here. The projects that we recognize as those that speak to us pass a very particular test: they withstand trial by anxiety, while many others do not. The latter reveal themselves as 'provisional' or 'accidental' for us, while we come to see that we will act on the former come what may, irrespective of whatever legitimation or confirmation 'the world' may offer.[28]

(iv) We also need to recognize that in praising someone for living her life in line with her 'ownmost' possibilities, we are doing *no more* than acknowledging her authenticity, her 'ownedness'. We may criticize her on the grounds that those possibilities are immoral, misguided or the like; but that does not mean that we cannot recognize that she has indeed devoted herself to them. Irrespective of the value or disvalue of the possibilities to which I believe I devote myself, the question of whether I actually do devote myself to them remains, as a question of the 'internal economy' of my life, so to speak. Similarly, trial by anxiety may not reveal the most morally admirable or least misguided path for me to take; but it can reveal what I fundamentally *take* to be the most morally admirable or least misguided, *and* whether I am indeed taking that path. The genuine meaninglessness that anxiety may reveal to me is my having 'abandon[ed myself] to whatever the day may bring', my 'distraction' by 'entertaining "incidentals"' (SZ 345, 338, 310). This is a misalignment not with some external standard of meaningfulness but – first and foremost – with my own deepest sense of what matters. So there is at least *prima facie* reason to think of the assessment of authenticity – as I have suggested it be understood – as a different dimension on which a person – good or bad – might be assessed, just as we may assess him by reference to how imaginative or energetic or determined he is. We do so despite the fact that we may wish – in the case of the bad – that he were not quite so imaginative, energetic, determined or – the case in point – authentic.

(v) In criticizing someone's weddedness to a particular project we must also recognize that we do so by reference to some other standard or commitment. Among the consequences of this is that, if my account is correct, then the only such critical judgment that we may ourselves

> 'own' – or make on our own behalf, one might say – is one by reference to another standard or commitment that speaks to us. A judgement by any other standard might be correct in some other sense – my actions may indeed be immoral, for example – but my accepting that judgment will be my deferring to an opinion I have perhaps been told to adopt, or to an opinion I am merely going along with, rather than truly sharing. One sometimes perhaps should act in that way, that 'should' being a moral, aesthetic or rational imperative, say; but it still represents a falling short of a recognizable ideal of how we govern our lives.

Finally, let us turn to the second objection, that *nothing* may 'speak to us'. That, one might indeed suggest, is 'the modern condition', the malaise of modern humanity to which existentialism gives striking expression and, in particular, in its explorations of anxiety.

It is not my concern to deny the possibility of such an experience – which might well be compared with 'world collapse' – or to deny its broader cultural and philosophical significance: it may well be a focal concern of some philosophers we label 'existentialists'. But such an experience cannot play the role that anxiety (or death) plays in Heidegger. In particular, it is an experience in the face of which one can do nothing; and, therefore, it cannot be the experience for which the authentic are 'ready' and the inauthentic not. I have argued instead that the challenge that the former meet and the latter fail is one set for those to whom some possibilities *do* speak. Those to whom none speak have problems of their own.

I touched above on Wittgensteinian views according to which our life with language rests on contingent facts about our readiness to find natural certain reactions to samples and other multiply-interpretable explanations; and it is tempting to propose that the very possibility of meaningful action requires that there be projects that similarly speak to us – that strike us as worthwhile in themselves.[29] This returns us once again to the notion that Dasein must be 'at home' in – is a creature of – a meaningful world. Indeed both of the objections that this final section considers invite a further response in the form of an *ad hominem* argument: those whose views I have questioned here themselves *need* possibilities to 'speak to us'. Blattner believes one's existence as a person depends on one's 'find[ing] oneself differentially disposed towards the possibilities the world has to offer'; he sees the authentic in particular as recognizing 'that we are called upon to answer to the situation, and not just the Anyone', 'to *see* what is factically possible and *important* and carry through with it' (Blattner 2006: 155, 167, 166, italics added). Thomson too needs us to find the 'needs of [our] time and generation' 'pressing' and ourselves possessed of 'ontic cares' – or at least he must if he wants our choices in the face of anxiety/death to be more than merely arbitrary choices (even if constrained arbitrary choices). We must – Thomson says – be 'responsive to the emerging solicitations of … [our] particular

existential "situation"' (2004: 454).[30] So although notions such as that of possibilities that 'speak to us' and in which we are 'at home' are obviously metaphorical and pose difficulties, it would appear that I am not alone in feeling that – at some stage or other – we must turn to some such notions.[31]

Notes

1 In what follows, I generally follow the established translations of Heidegger's works and, in the case of *SZ*, that of Macquarrie and Robinson.
2 Cf. also WM 88-92. For difficulties involved in the interpretation of 'readiness-to-hand' and 'presence-at-hand', see McManus 2012: ch. 3.
3 Compare a worry of Okrent's:

> it does not follow from the fact that it is possible to doubt each of our identities that it is possible to doubt them all at once. … And the fact that under duress some of us despair of each of our identities does not imply that we can ever be human without any such identity.
>
> (1999: 73)

4 See, e.g., Blattner 2006: 140: 'Death turns out to be the same experience as anxiety.'
5 Another influential proponent of a 'world collapse' view is Haugeland, whose reading I discuss in McManus forthcoming-a.
6 See n. 25 below.
7 For criticisms of the form to be discussed, see Murdoch 1970: 36, Scruton 1983: 165-66, and Taylor 1985 and 1991.
8 Cf. Thomson 2004: 455 and 2009: 41-42.
9 Cf. Blattner's criticism of Dreyfus and Rubin 1991 in his 2006: 161.
10 Cf. Thomson 2004: 450 and 452, and 2009: 39. Thomson 2013: 288 mentions two other understandings of how the 'contingency' of such projects renders them 'vulnerable', but neither would seem to render these projects meaningless.
11 Experience of anxiety/death might lead us to give up this belief – I believe Thomson believes – because this experience reveals that 'what is most basic about us' is 'the pure, world-hungry projecting we experience when we are unable to connect to our projects': we come to see that we are 'a *projecting* into projects' – 'not any particular self or project' – and that shows that there is no 'substantial self' that might determine 'a single correct choice' for us (Thomson 2013: 271-72). The work described in n. 25 raises further worries about this view.
12 Cf. *SZ* 270 on *Dasein* 'project[ing] on possibilities of its own or … [being] absorbed in the "they"'.
13 For further discussion, see Young 2002: 6-7 and McManus 2012: sec. 2.1.
14 Cf. *SZ* 288 on '[t]he common sense of the "They"'.
15 For other examples of this motif of 'being lived', see *PRL* 170, *CTR* 45, WDR 118, and *SZ* 195 and 299.
16 See n. 2 above.
17 For criticisms of conventionalism, for example, see Baker and Hacker 1985, who see it as leading to 'a kind of logical existentialism' (p. 95).
18 See, e.g., Minar 2007: 199: 'Our ordinary reasons as they operate in our practices' – our ordinary explanations of our words – 'do not stand in need of the support of anything deeper to constitute them as reasons.' Cf. McDowell 1987.

19 McManus (2006) argues that these themes – along with others from the preceding three sections – can also be found in the early Wittgenstein. Cf., in particular, pp. 106-18, 185-86, 203-12, and 227-29.
20 For example, Sullivan worries that Wittgenstein's invocations of natural human inclinations and the like actually jeopardize the anti-reductionist view (Sullivan 2011: 174-75).
21 Cf. Parfit's list of 'the best things in life', 'the best kinds of creative activity and aesthetic experience, the best relationships between different people', etc. (Parfit 2004: 18).
22 Clearly, I might say a great deal in response to the question of why being a good father matters to me. But the important question here is whether what I say provides an independent ground for its mattering, rather than being an expression of its mattering to me, as might my insistence, for example, that 'I now can't imagine life any other way'.
23 Serving them is a 'hypothetical imperative', as it were.
24 Complex questions I will not discuss here are: ought there only to be one project that ultimately 'speaks to me' – for some relevant discussion of which, see Thomson 2013: 285 and 2004: 444, 462 and 464 – and what sense can we make of the idea of 'my judgement' (see below) if there are many, and/or these fluctuate with time?
25 I attempt to take further steps in McManus forthcoming-b, forthcoming-c, and as-yet-unpublished papers on conscience and death.
26 Other chapters in this collection raise issues for my proposals here, and vice versa. To take just five examples, how does my reading stand to Haynes's complex mapping of the anxiety discussion, Käufer's account of Jaspers's 'spiritual types', Withy's account of our 'owning' of our *pathē*, Wrathall's discussion of 'fluid action', and the claim that 'normative force' can never be a 'given' (discussed by Blattner (pp. 126–27) and Crowell (pp. 219)), which might well seem incompatible with my notion of projects that 'speak to us'? But I won't address these issues here, as this editor feels he ought not to give himself the last word.
27 A further complexity that this touches on is that our ongoing engagement with life – with the many situations demanding of action that we encounter – constitutes an ongoing trial of what we take our 'ownmost' possibilities to amount to. This brings into play Heidegger's elusive discussion of 'the Situation' (*SZ* 302) and his appropriation of the notion of *phronēsis*. But I will not discuss these matters further here.
28 This ties naturally into some familiar thoughts about what confrontation with death reveals to us, though I must leave those for another day, as I must some other ways in which worries related to that raised above might emerge: what if, for example, certain possibilities speaking to me is the product of my being brain-washed? Such cases may indeed show that there is more to our understanding of autonomy and of having reasons of one's own than the above account captures.
29 Cf. Okrent's remarks quoted in n. 3 and Taylor's discussions of 'strong evaluation' and 'inescapable horizons' (in, e.g., Taylor 1991: ch. 3).
30 Thomson (2004: 456) also quotes with approval Guignon's talk of the need to 'identify what really matters in the historical situation in which you find yourself' (Thomson 2004: 69). For other examples of commentators endorsing the need for such 'found' meaning, see Crowell 2002: 109, Kukla 2002: 21, Mulhall 2005: 142-43 and Poellner (this volume, pp. 243–44).
31 For helpful comments on material on which this chapter is based, I would like to thank Bill Blattner, Taylor Carman, David Cerbone, John Collins, Steven Galt

Crowell, Sophie Edwards, Tom Greaves, Chris Janaway, Oskari Kuusela, Conor McHugh, Sasha Mudd, Mark Okrent, Jean-Philipe Narboux, Mihai Ometita, Matthew Ostrow, George Reynolds, Aaron Ridley, Joe Rouse, Joe Schear, Genia Schönbaumsfeld, Matthew Shockey, Jonathan Way, Daniel Whiting, Kate Withy, and Fiona Woollard. I would also like to thank the University of Southampton and the Arts and Humanities Research Council for periods of research leave during which work on which this chapter is based was done.

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11

REORDERING THE BEGINNING CHAPTERS OF DIVISION TWO OF *BEING AND TIME*

Sophia Dandelet and Hubert Dreyfus

Reading the first three chapters of Division Two of *Being and Time* is extremely difficult. We want to explain the source of the difficulty and suggest how to remove it. Our basic intuition is that the first two chapters of Division Two are in the wrong order. This creates confusion in the third chapter. It would seem natural to take the "not yet" – the projection – and add to it the "already being" of thrownness: that is, to begin Division Two with an account of resoluteness. Death would not be introduced until the last page of the first chapter. Being-towards-death would then be analyzed as anticipation in Chapter 2, and finally, Chapter 3 would put resolution and anticipation together as resolute anticipation.

To begin with, we give some reasons for thinking that Heidegger's order is illogical and confusing. We point out several puzzling comments in Division Two where Heidegger tries to illuminate the phenomena of being-towards-death. These comments are puzzling because they suggest that a single way of being, being-towards-death, is characterized by contradictory phenomena. We argue that the confusion arises because there is not in fact a single way of being that is being-towards-death. Rather, being-towards-death can be realized in different ways, depending on whether the Dasein in question is resolute or irresolute. The phenomena described in the aforementioned quotes seem contradictory because they belong to two different ways of being: irresolute being-towards-death and anticipatory resoluteness (the being-towards-death possible in resolute Dasein). We argue that if the chapters were in what we claim is their natural order, Heidegger would have had the tools to make this critical distinction between irresolute and resolute being-towards-death. As it is, he is unable to make this distinction.

We argue that the current order of the chapters runs against the order of dependence between resoluteness and anticipation. Heidegger describes anticipation as a possibility of resoluteness, and he says that resoluteness

tends towards anticipation. This suggests that any explanation of anticipation will be incomplete without some prior understanding of resoluteness. In describing Dasein's structure in Division One, Heidegger always puts the past dimension (being-already) before the future dimension (being-not-yet). For example, he explains thrownness before he explains the projection which is made possible on the basis of thrownness. Likewise, he describes disposedness before he describes understanding. At the beginning of Division Two Heidegger seems poised to continue the pattern of describing past before future; he says quite naturally that he will describe "the whole of Dasein from 'beginning' to 'end'" (SZ 233). But, he proceeds instead to describe Dasein from end (death) to beginning. Later, Heidegger seems to realize he has made the serious mistake of leaving out thrownness altogether. Where he says, "as long as Dasein exists, it must in each case, as such an ability-to-be, *not yet be* something," he notes in the margin of his copy "at the same time, *already* being" (SZ 233).

In the last section, we offer a speculative "just-so" story about why Heidegger might have ended up with the chapters in this confusing order.

Confusing quotes, contradictory phenomena

Heidegger begins the chapter on anticipatory resoluteness by asking, "how are … anticipation and resoluteness, to be brought together?" (SZ 302). Owing to the disorder of the previous two chapters, this question seems hopelessly difficult to answer. Indeed, in chapters 1 and 2, Heidegger often makes it seem as if the phenomena of resoluteness and anticipation are utterly incompatible. He describes resolute Dasein as opened up to the concrete Situation, drawing on past experience to respond in a way that is uniquely appropriate. In contrast, he references Ivan Illych (SZ 254, n. xii) as a Dasein that is being-towards-death, and he insists that in being-towards-death, being-with-others fails us completely (SZ 263). Because Heidegger has not characterized this kind of being-towards-death as irresolute (because he has not yet discussed resoluteness at this point in the book), the reader is led to believe that in anticipatory resoluteness, these two seemingly incompatible phenomena (resoluteness and irresolute being-towards-death) are brought together. This is not the case. The being-towards-death that we see in Ivan Illych is the being-towards-death that is characteristic of *irresolute* Dasein. Anticipatory resoluteness, on the other hand, is only open to *resolute* Dasein. So, it is a mistake to try to bring together the incompatible phenomena of resoluteness and irresolute being-towards-death.

The phenomenon of resoluteness

Heidegger points out that the average, everyday way of acting is to do what one does. He describes "Dasein's lostness in the one", as following "the

tasks, rules, and standards … of concernful and solicitous being-in-the-world" (*SZ* 268). In contrast, Heidegger's resolute Dasein recognizes that the practices of the One are groundless. It rejects the banal, average, public standards in order to respond to the unique situation. In Heidegger's terms, irresolute Dasein responds to the general situation (*Lage*), whereas resolute Dasein responds to the concrete Situation (*Situation*). As Heidegger puts it, "for the one … the concrete Situation is essentially something that has been closed off. The one knows only the 'general situation'" (*SZ* 300), while "resolute Dasein" is in touch with the "concrete Situation of taking action" (*SZ* 302). The distinction between these two kinds of life seems to come out of nowhere in *Being and Time*, but it clearly has its origin in Heidegger's detailed discussion of *phronesis* in his 1925 *Plato's Sophist*. There he says:

> Dasein, as acting in each case now, is determined by its situation in the largest sense. This situation is in each case different. The circumstances, the givens, the times and the people vary … It is precisely the achievement of *phronesis* to disclose the respective Dasein as acting now in the full situation …
>
> (*PS* 101)[1]

Resolute response is immediate, and Heidegger sees that "resoluteness does not first take cognizance of the Situation … ; it has put itself into the Situation already. As resolute, Dasein is already *taking action*" (*SZ* 300). Or, as Heidegger already puts it in his 1924 lectures drawing on Aristotle : "in *phronesis* … in a momentary glance I survey the concrete situation of action, out of which and in favor of which I resolve [*entschliesse*] myself" (*PS* 114). Also, since there are no rules that dictate that what the *phronimos* does is the *correct* thing to do in that *type* of situation, the *phronimos*, like any master, cannot explain why he did what he did. Heidegger holds the same view in *Being and Time*:

> The Situation cannot be calculated in advance or presented like something occurrent which is waiting for someone to grasp it. It only gets disclosed in free resolving which has not been determined beforehand but is open to the possibility of such determination.
>
> (*SZ* 307)

So when Heidegger asks rhetorically, "But on what basis does Dasein disclose itself in resoluteness?" he answers:

> *Only* the resolution itself can give the answer. One would completely misunderstand the phenomenon of resoluteness if one should suppose that this consists simply in taking up possibilities that have been proposed and recommended.
>
> (*SZ* 298)

All the master can do is stay open and let himself be drawn to act on the basis of his past experience. Resoluteness, Heidegger tells us in his later work, always meant *Ent-schlossenheit*, or opened-up-ness.[2] The resulting resolute response defines the Situation. As Heidegger puts it, "The Situation *is* only through resoluteness and in it" (*SZ* 300).

Like the *phronimos*, resolute Dasein presumably does what is retroactively recognized by others as appropriate, but what he does is not the *taken-for-granted*, *average* right thing – not what *one* does – but what his past experience leads him to do in this particular Situation. Moreover, as we have seen, since the Situation is specific and the *phronimos*' past experience unique, what he does cannot be *the* appropriate thing to do. It can only be *an* appropriate thing.

It is important to note that even as resoluteness frees Dasein from doing what One does, "Resolution does not withdraw from 'actuality', but discovers first what is factically possible" (*SZ* 299). In other words, resolute Dasein does not extricate itself from the shared, cultural background. Nor does it cease to be with others. Rather, resolute Dasein exists in a state of concernful solicitude with regard to others (*SZ* 298).

The phenomenon of irresolute being-towards-death

The phenomenon of irresolute being-towards-death is, unsurprisingly, incompatible with that of resoluteness. Following Heidegger's example, we use Ivan Illych (*SZ* 254, n. xii) as an example of a Dasein who has broken out of the One's attitude towards death, but who is still irresolute.

When Ivan is forced by a fatal illness to face up to death as his ownmost possibility, he falls into a state of rage and despair. It is clear from Tolstoy's portrait that Ivan is decidedly irresolute: firmly entrenched in the One, he cares deeply about his reputation. As Ivan's illness worsens, he is wrenched out of the One. When he hears his former friends enjoying pastimes that he had once enjoyed, Ivan thinks, "none of them know or wish to know [death], and they have no pity for me … the beasts!'" (Tolstoy 1960: 127). Because he has been forced to give up the One's attitude towards death, Ivan feels completely cut off from those who are still in the One. They are oblivious to the truth about death that Ivan has discovered; as a result he hates and resents them for what he perceives to be their complacent cover-up. In this way, being-with-others "fails [him] completely" (*SZ* 263), and he can find no solace in it. Similarly, being-amidst the things with which he once concerned himself (his material possessions, his status, etc.) fails him too. He sees clearly that these things cannot save him from his death.

Importantly, Ivan does not become resolute when he is wrenched from the One by death. Far from disclosing and responding to the unique Situation, Ivan is unable to respond to any situation. He sees everything as meaningless, so he has no reason to act; he just lies on the sofa facing the

wall (Tolstoy 1960: 145). And, far from existing in a state of concernful solicitude, Ivan is completely isolated from all others.

Elucidating the phenomena of anticipatory resoluteness

Having introduced the anticipation chapter before the resoluteness chapter, and having thereby obscured the distinction between irresolute being-towards-death and resolute being-towards-death, Heidegger must now face the challenging task of explaining how "these two phenomena of anticipation and resoluteness [can] be brought together" (*SZ* 302) in anticipatory resoluteness.

As we have seen, the phenomena of resoluteness and irresolute being-towards-death are straightforwardly incompatible. Resolute Dasein responds to the unique Situation, while irresolute Dasein which has faced up to death can't respond to any Situation; resolute Dasein has faced up to its thrownness, while irresolute being-towards-death has not; irresolute being-towards-death isolates Dasein from others, while resoluteness "pushes [the Self] into solicitous being with Others" (*SZ* 298). Clearly, the phenomena of anticipatory resoluteness cannot include all of these contradictory features. Because of this, the relationship between the phenomena of resoluteness, being-towards-death, and anticipatory resoluteness looks hopelessly unintelligible.

This confusion results in part from Heidegger's failure to distinguish between resolute and irresolute being-towards-death. When he introduces death, he doesn't have the tools to distinguish between irresolute and resolute being-towards-death, *because he has not discussed resoluteness at all*. If the chapters were in what we claim is the natural order (resoluteness before death), Heidegger would be able to invoke the resolute/irresolute distinction to explain the difference between Ivan Illych's being-towards-death and the being-towards-death of anticipatory resolute Dasein. If we tease apart the phenomena of irresolute being-towards-death from that of anticipatory resoluteness, we can get a much clearer picture of the phenomenon of anticipatory resoluteness.

The teleology of anticipatory resoluteness as a reason to reorder the chapters

The teleological relationship between anticipation and resoluteness is a further reason to reorder the chapters. By "teleological relationship," we mean the way in which "*resoluteness … point[s] forward to anticipatory resoluteness as its ownmost authentic possibility*" (*SZ* 302). Heidegger's teleological explanation of anticipatory resoluteness consists in two claims: (1) anticipation is a possibility of resoluteness, and (2) resoluteness tends towards anticipation (*SZ* 306).

Claim (1) has the structure [B is a possibility of A] and claim (2) has the structure [A tends towards B]. By common sense, if B is a possibility of A,

one should explain A first, and then explain B in the established context of A. An explanation of B without any mention of A will be incomprehensible. Similarly, if A tends towards B, one should explain A before B, and in doing so explain how A becomes B. In Heidegger's order, these common-sense principles are violated. In explaining anticipation before resoluteness, Heidegger explains B before A, and so his explanation of anticipation makes no sense.

The teleological relationship is also attested to in the phenomena of resoluteness and anticipatory resoluteness. In resoluteness, Dasein realizes that the practices of the One are groundless. But, resolute Dasein does not realize that the cultural background is also groundless; resolute Dasein, like the *phronimos*, is a master of the culture. In *anticipatory* resoluteness "sober anxiety" in the face of death frees Dasein from taking over the cultural background shared by everyone. Thus, in anticipatory resoluteness, Dasein moves from the *partial* groundlessness of resoluteness (in which the practices of the One are groundless) to a *total* groundlessness (in which *everything* is groundless). As Heidegger puts it, "In its death, Dasein must simply 'take back' everything" (*SZ* 308).

Because it is easy to see how partial groundlessness could be conceived of as tending towards total groundlessness, this is a natural phenomenological extension of Heidegger's claim that resoluteness tends towards anticipatory resoluteness. Barring compelling reasons in favor of explaining total groundlessness first, it seems natural to explain the partial groundlessness first, and then show why and how it becomes total groundlessness. Heidegger's order violates this natural intuition.

Why Heidegger might have put the chapters in the current disorder

We've argued that resoluteness ought to be explained before death. But Heidegger chose to put the chapter on death before the chapter on resoluteness, and this needs some explanation.

In many ways, it seems as if Heidegger was simply unclear about the appropriate phenomenological order for the first two chapters of his own book. For example, as we've seen, Heidegger admits in a marginal note at the beginning of the chapter on death that he's left out thrownness altogether. This sort of hasty amendment seems to support the idea that Heidegger was unclear about which order to put the chapters in.

Here is a possible "just-so" story about why Heidegger might have put the chapters in the order he did. In the 1925 lectures, he gives an extensive analysis of death, but only a brief mention of resoluteness. This suggests that Heidegger developed a full understanding of death before he developed the notion of resoluteness. Then, in writing *Being and Time*, he simply laid out death and resoluteness in the order in which he developed them (death, followed by resoluteness). But why wouldn't Heidegger have revised the

order in *Being and Time* to exhibit the phenomenological order? Our hypothesis is that, because he was under pressure quickly to finish enough of *Being and Time* to be named to a chair, he did not have time for such major revisions.

Given our considerations in favor of introducing resoluteness before death, and lacking a reason to adhere to Heidegger's order, future readers and teachers of *Being and Time* might want to consider reading the resoluteness chapter before the death chapter, thereby setting up a more coherent third chapter on anticipatory resoluteness. This would be to abandon any attempt to give a justification, logical, pedagogical, or phenomenological, of Heidegger's order.

Notes

1 In *PS*, Heidegger has not yet made a clear distinction between *Lage* and *Situation*. In this lecture course, he uses both terms interchangeably to refer to the concrete situation. Cf, e.g., *PS* 102: "out of the constant regard toward that which I have resolved, the situation [*Situation*] should become transparent. From the point of view of the *proaireton*, the concrete situation [*konkrete Lage*] … is covered over."

2 We are following Heidegger in reading *Ent-schlossenheit* as openness, not determination: "The resoluteness (*Ent-schlossenheit*) intended in *Being and Time* is not the deliberate action of a subject, but the opening up of human being … to the openness of being" (OWA 192).

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12

AUTONOMY, AUTHENTICITY, AND THE SELF

Mark A. Wrathall

According to what I'll call "the autonomy thesis," a bodily movement or change only counts as an action if it stands in the right kind of relationship to the self. According to what I'll call "the authenticity thesis," it is an ideal of human existence to act in a way that is "true" to the self. Obviously, I've formulated these theses in very broad terms, leaving it wide open how we might fill in the details. There are a variety of different ways, for instance, to conceive of the "right" way for the self to ground actions so as to render them autonomous. Likewise, there are a variety of ways to think about the idea of being true to yourself. And, of course, there are any number of ways to conceive of the self. One should note also that the authenticity thesis is a normative claim about an ideal form of action, while the autonomy thesis is an ontological claim about the enabling conditions of action.[1]

In this chapter, I am interested in exploring Heidegger's account of the self as it figures in questions of autonomy and authenticity. As a crude but nonetheless informative generalization, one might say that in Division One of *Being and Time*, Heidegger's interest in the self centers on the autonomy thesis, on the way the self figures in action. In Division Two, by contrast, Heidegger's discussion of the self centers on the authenticity thesis. Heidegger's *Being and Time* connects the autonomy thesis and the authenticity thesis in a distinctive way. The way to be authentic or "true" to the self, Heidegger argues, is to achieve self-constancy (*Selbst-ständigkeit*) in one's existence. But a lack of self-constancy would undermine the possibility of autonomy (*Selbstständigkeit*). Thus, Heidegger concludes that authenticity is an ideal inherent in autonomous agency itself – one we "demand of ourselves" insofar as we are agents at all.

One defining feature – some might say 'peculiarity' – of Heidegger's approach is that he gives methodological priority to authenticity over autonomy. That is, Heidegger argues that one cannot understand what the self is, let alone figure out the right way for the self to ground action, until one has grasped authenticity as an ideal of human existence. This is, in part,

because inauthenticity involves concealing the nature of the self from oneself as a way of avoiding the burden of being true to oneself. Thus, it is in a recognition of authenticity as a human ideal that we first discern what the self truly is, and how it grounds action as such. Only in understanding authenticity can we discern the features of the self that are essential to constituting bodily movements and changes as actions.

Despite the fact that extended portions of *Being and Time* are devoted to working out an account of the self, Heidegger never offers a concise summary of his account, nor of his version of the autonomy and authenticity theses. The aim of this chapter is thus to offer a reconstruction of the concept of the self that informs Heidegger's thought. In reconstructing Heidegger's account of the self, I start by reviewing two different paradigms for thinking about action. This will help focus the inquiry into the self as it figures in the autonomy thesis. I'll look more closely at the role of the self in the argumentative strategy of *Being and Time* in the next section, before turning to Heidegger's account of authenticity. I'll conclude by explaining how the self that is disclosed in authenticity grounds autonomous action.

Autonomy

In the context of the autonomy thesis, the inquiry into the self focuses on understanding the conditions under which an event, a happening in the world, counts as an action. One such condition is that the event has its "determinative cause" in the agent, a self, rather than "further back" in the causal chain (EG 126). To be an autonomous self is to play an ineliminable role in the production of actions.

Consequently, the way we think about the autonomous self depends on the way we conceive of action. So let's consider two different models of actions – models which, I think, shape much of the discussion of autonomy in the analytic and existential-phenomenological traditions respectively.

Analytic agency theory takes deliberative action as its paradigm – that is, action in which the agent aims at an end or goal that he or she envisions, and pursues that end in a rational way. The pursuit of the end is rational if the actions the agent performs are, or could be reconstructed as being, the result of a judgment issuing from deliberation about how best to achieve one's ends. On the model of deliberative action, an action is constituted by bodily movements which are caused by a prior intention to make those bodily movements, in order to perform the action. The intention, in turn, is caused by some conjunction of desires directed at some end, and beliefs about what actions will satisfy those desires. This model is supported by three important and interrelated assumptions:

(1) An action is explained by identifying an occurrent sequence of causes that culminate in the action in question.

(2) The decisive explanatory grounds of action are internal to the agent – representations that lie within the economy of mental events and states that produce the bodily movements.

This is not to deny that those mental events and states are causally impacted by events in the world, but rather that the causal impingements from the world cannot themselves constitute the responding bodily movements as actions. The action must trace its foundation as an action to some intermediate state or event internal to the agent. Finally,

(3) Consummate action – action at its best – is thought to result from deliberation, understood as the assessment and weighing of reasons in order to determine which course of action is the most rational way to pursue the purposive ends of the agent.

Together, these assumptions encourage one to search for the self within the chain of causes internal to the person.

Philosophers working in the existential-phenomenological tradition of philosophy base their accounts of the self on a very different model of action. Let's call this the model of "fluid action." Here, the paradigm is action in which an agent responds as fluidly as possible to the solicitations of a situation. Think of highly skilled activities – for instance, an athlete responding to the complex and dynamic movements of bodies and balls on a field. Consider Superbowl MVP Phil Simms' recollection of what it was like to play American football at a professional level:

> You take the ball. You get it. And man, you react and you throw it. And you go, "well I don't know why I did that, but I did it, and let's just move on." … You know, my mind couldn't focus on anything too much. It really, it just reacts. It's amazing. You react to: well, I saw a helmet move. And you whoa! And you think, "gosh, why did I do that?" Then you see the film, and everybody parted … and you go, "ohhh, that's why I did it."[2]

As this description suggests, highly skilled, fluid actions are experienced, not as the deliberative outcome of my aims and desires and beliefs, but as being drawn out of me directly and spontaneously by the particular features of the situation, without the mediation of occurrent mental or psychological states or acts. Of course, the actions that are solicited or drawn out of the agent depend on his or her current way of being involved in the situation. But the key point is that when I am engaged in fluid action – "in the flow," as we say – my ability to stay in the flow depends not on a deliberative assessment of competing desires and motivations, but rather on the world drawing me into and sustaining me in a single clear course of action – the

one which will allow me to maintain a sure-footed stance in the world. Notice that this view does not locate the decisive explanatory grounds for action exclusively within the agent, but also in the setting that solicits the agent to respond. In addition, when I am acting fluidly, the mere appearance of alternate possibilities is enough to disrupt my grip on the situation. Thus, fluid action is sustained, not by the weighing and examining of "reasons," but by the withdrawal of reasons. Competitors for my attention recede, leaving me to respond without distraction to the flow of solicitations that arise in response to my bodily movements – movements which themselves are drawn out of me by the solicitations of the world. As Merleau-Ponty puts it, the agent's "projects polarize the world, bringing magically to view a host of signs which guide action, as notices in a museum guide the visitor" (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 112).

Taking the three assumptions I identified in reverse order, then, we can see that, from the perspective of the paradigm of fluid action:

(3) The deliberative weighing of reasons, far from being the distinguishing feature of consummate action, is a mark of action impaired.
(2) The explanatory grounds of action lie jointly in the state of the world and in the agent's skillful involved stance.

As Merleau-Ponty puts it, "it would not be sufficient to say that consciousness inhabits this milieu [of action]. At this moment consciousness is *nothing other than* the dialectic of milieu and action" (Merleau-Ponty 1963: 169). Or compare Sartre's description of the way a closed door presents itself to a jealous lover who suspects his beloved is in the room beyond with another:

> [B]ehind that door a spectacle is presented as "to be seen," a conversation as "to be heard." The door, the keyhole are at once both instruments and obstacles; they are presented as "to be handled with care"; the keyhole is given as "to be looked through close by and a little to one side," *etc*. Hence from this moment "I do what I have to do." No transcending view comes to confer upon my acts the character of a *given* on which a judgment can be brought to bear. My consciousness sticks to my acts, it *is* my acts; and my acts are commanded only by the ends to be attained and by the instruments to be employed. My attitude, for example, has no "outside"; it is a pure process of relating the instrument (the keyhole) to the end to be attained (the spectacle to be seen), a pure mode of losing myself in the world, of causing myself to be drunk in by things as ink is by a blotter in order that an instrumental-complex oriented toward an end may be synthetically detached on the ground of the world.
>
> (Sartre 1948: 347-48)

In fluid action, Merleau-Ponty and Sartre agree, the agent "becomes one" with her setting. The agent doesn't know desires. She doesn't deliberate about her mental states. She doesn't have occurrent beliefs about objects as possible means to an end. She simply *is* the attitude, and the attitude simply is purpose-guided action. The very distinction between inner mental systems and outer causes breaks down. Finally,

(1) the task for an explanation of action is not to reduce the agent to some cause within an occurrent sequence of causes; the task rather is to understand the self as a particular style of communion with the world – a communion out of which solicitations can arise and function as grounds for our actions.

Within the paradigm of fluid action, then, the "right way" for an agent to ground bodily movements is for the whole self to surrender to, or "merge" with, the solicitations of the world.

The problem for the paradigm of fluid action, however, is preserving the idea that bodily movements are "full-blooded actions," as opposed to a merely instinctive, animalistic response to stimulations. One way to draw the distinction is to show how a genuine agent plays a role in generating fluid actions. But this option might itself seem unlikely, given that advocates of the paradigm of fluid action tend to describe the person as so fully merged with the situation that one cannot even discriminate a self at work. Sartre, for example, concludes from the phenomenology of fluid action that, as long as I am fully absorbed this way in responding to the setting, "there is no self to inhabit my consciousness, nothing therefore to which I can refer my acts in order to qualify them" as actions of a self (Sartre 1948: 347). Similar considerations have encouraged the thought that Heidegger has no role for the self in his account of purposive action. Bert Dreyfus, for instance, has argued that Heidegger's goal in *Being and Time* is to "annihilate the self-sufficient Self all together" (Dreyfus 2013: 146) (although Dreyfus does concede that Heidegger did not succeed in doing so in *Being and Time*). Dreyfus argues that the ideal of fluid action, when taken to its logical completion, requires that there be no individual self that one could regard as the source of those actions.

Now, the point of the Sartre–Dreyfus type opposition to the self is, I suppose, that we expect anything that deserves the appellation "self" to be a discriminable individual that plays a vital or ineliminable role in the production of actions. Moreover, to count as an individual, the self needs to be a coherent, distinct unity that endures across time, playing the same role in the production of action in each different situation. And it is hard to recognize in the account of fluid action any plausible candidates for satisfying that description. This much is true: Dreyfus is quite right in thinking Heidegger wants to annihilate the idea of a self-sufficient substance that plays the role of the self. But I think it's equally clear that Heidegger doesn't

believe that the paradigm of fluid action can dispense altogether with a notion of the self. So what, we should ask, is it that Heidegger thinks endures from context to context as a recognizable, action-producing individual? To help prime us to recognize Heidegger's version of the self, it is worth reviewing the central place that the self holds in the argumentative strategy of *Being and Time*.[3]

The role of the self in the argumentative structure of *Being and Time*

The thought that Heidegger has no place for the self in his phenomenology is encouraged by the fact that Heidegger's few concise and direct assertions regarding his positive understanding of the self are dispersed throughout Division Two of *Being and Time*. Meanwhile, his critical remarks regarding traditional accounts of the self are prominent and clearly articulated. This understandably might create the impression that there is little place or need for the self in Heidegger's account of human existence.

And yet, Heidegger announces right from the outset, and reaffirms at pivotal moments throughout the book, that his task is the analysis of the self, world, and being-in as necessary "constitutive moments" of human being in the world (see *SZ* 41, 190, 220). So the book presents something of a puzzle: where is Heidegger's account of the self? Division One of *Being and Time* devotes a very short chapter[4] to the self of everyday existence, but most of this chapter is spent explaining what the self is *not*. The self that is relevant to active, purposive being in the world, Heidegger claims, is not the self of personal identity through time – we don't find out what grounds action, in other words, by identifying some persistent entity that endures across changes in our experience, our motives, our character, our dispositions, and so on. "A gulf separates the selfsameness of the authentically existing self," Heidegger insists, "from the identity of that 'I' that maintains itself throughout its manifold experiences" (*SZ* 130). The 'existing self' is not a subject (*Subjekt*) or an "I-thing" (*Ich-ding*) or a "soul substance" (*Seelensubstanz*) or the materiality of consciousness (*Dinglichkeit des Bewußtseins*) or the objectivity of the person (*Gegenständlichkeit der Person*) or an occurrent corporeal thing (*ein vorkommendes Körperding*) or the synthesis of soul and body (*die Synthese von Seele und Leib*) (see *SZ* 114, 117, 119, 130). Heidegger regards any effort to identify the self with some particular thing-like entity as resulting from the "perverse assumption" (*SZ* 117) that the self should be akin to other occurrent objects in the world. Moreover, Heidegger argues that the self of everyday existence isn't even successfully picked out by the use of the personal pronoun "I":

> To be sure, in saying "I", Dasein intends the entity that it is itself in each case. But the everyday interpretation of the self has the

> tendency to understand itself from the perspective of the "world" with which it is concerned.
>
> (SZ 321)

Consequently, when I intentionally refer to myself with the personal pronoun, there's a good chance that I mistake myself for something that is not really functioning as the self: "'I' expresses the self that, proximally and for the most part, I am not really (*eigentlich*)" (SZ 322). As Heidegger remarks in his own marginal notes to *Being and Time*, what the "I" refers to in ordinary discourse is "in a certain sense the 'nearest,' the foreground, and thus the fictitious self" (SZ 317). I shall argue that this distinction between the foreground versus the background self is vital to making sense of Heidegger's account of the self. Heidegger's interpretation of the self consequently "refuses to follow along with the ordinary discourse about the 'I'" (SZ 322).

Thus, although the first division of *Being and Time* has plenty to say about what the autonomous self is *not*, the chapter that is dedicated to the self has very little to offer by way of a positive account of the self. Heidegger does insist that the self is "a way of existence," and not an occurrent entity at all. And he acknowledges that this is "tantamount to the evaporation of the real 'core'" of human existence (SZ 117). But pending an ontologically adequate account of selfhood, Heidegger warns, "the word 'I' is to be understood only in the sense of a non-committal formal indicator" (SZ 116) – that means, we are to suspend any assumptions about the nature of the self until we have worked out the ontological role of the self. One searches in vain in this chapter, or anywhere in Division One, for an explanation of the "way of existing" that amounts to selfhood.

It is not until much later – five chapters later – that Heidegger returns to the problem of the self, in a brief section entitled "Care and Selfhood" (SZ §64). Once again reasserting that "the self belongs to the essential attributes of existence," Heidegger acknowledges that "the question concerning the ontological constitution of selfhood remained unanswered" (SZ 317). By the end of the third chapter of Division Two, Heidegger claims to have completed his account of the self: "selfhood now has been expressly taken back into the structure of care, and therefore of temporality" (SZ 332). Moreover, he claims to have adequately secured the account of the self "against ontologically inappropriate questions about the Being of the 'I' in general" (SZ 332). These claims are striking, however, in that Heidegger devotes §64 primarily to a critique of Kant's account of the self, and scarcely mentions selfhood in the other sections of the chapter. So the mystery remains: where is Heidegger's positive account of the self?

A vital clue is offered in §64: "Selfhood is to be discerned," Heidegger explains, "only in one's authentic ability to be a self – that is to say, in the authenticity of the being of existence as care" (SZ 322). That suggests that the first three chapters of Division Two of *Being and Time*, the "existentialist"

chapters devoted to Heidegger's account of authenticity, death, guilt, anxiety and resoluteness, *are* his account of the ontological structure of the self of autonomy.

As we turn to Heidegger's discussion of authenticity, let's recall briefly what the paradigm of fluid action calls for in understanding the self. We are looking for an individuated person, something distinct from other actors and environmental causes that contributes to the production of the action. In addition, the self is an irreducible or ineliminable element in the explanation of the actions. In fluid action, the self's role (as far as the autonomy thesis is concerned) is to unify the elements that are necessary for action in the right kind of way. When these elements are properly unified, they will coordinate in such a way as to produce fluid action. So, to put it concisely, a good account of the self will let us see that fluid bodily movements, in responding skillfully to the situation, count as actions because they express the unified, individuated, and ineliminable being that the self is.

We know now that the self for Heidegger is not any sort of substantive or occurrent entity. "The ontological question concerning the being of the self must be turned away," Heidegger insists, from any assumption of a "persistently occurrent self-thing" (SZ 323). So what is it? I will argue that Heidegger thinks that the self, rather than functioning as a foreground entity that plays an explanatory role as a cause within the causal production of bodily movements, instead can be understood as a kind of background to purposive action. An understanding of authenticity is supposed to let us discern such a self.

Heidegger and the authentic self

It's not hard to say in a loose sense what authenticity is. Authenticity is living life in your own way, rather than submitting yourself to the expectations and desires of others. This depends on being able to distinguish between the things that are really proper to you and the things that aren't. Of course, in cashing out this vague idea of authenticity, one runs into an immediate problem: what is the real self to which one ought to be true, the genuine self that one's actions truly express? For instance, if one is already completely conventional in one's ideas, attitudes, dreams, modes of dress, habits, tastes, and so on, then being true to oneself would amount to being a conformist – the very opposite of what authenticity is supposed to mean. And, of course, most of us are made up of incompatible and conflicting ideas, desires, motives, and so on. So one might try to identify some genuine core of one's inner states and attitudes to play the role of the real self. But philosophers working in the existential-phenomenological tradition regard such a project as misguided, since, before we ever come to a consciousness of ourselves as selves, we've already been shaped by the social norms within which we grow up. Even after we become aware of the possibility of choosing for ourselves, Heidegger writes, the public "maintains

and consolidates a stubborn dominion. Everyone is the other and no one is himself" (*SZ* 128). Consequently, it is just not possible to sort out what is owed to peculiarities of our individual dispositions, and what is "second nature" that we've acquired from others.

Thus, for Heidegger, authenticity is not a matter of realizing the true substantive core of one's personal desires and aspirations, but rather a matter of recognizing and living in recognition of the structure of the self as such – the self as we've outlined it so far in our preliminary consideration of the autonomy thesis. In working out his version of the authenticity thesis, Heidegger looks for those attitudes and experiences in which we discover ourselves to be a unified, individuated, and ineliminable ground of our existence. In *Being and Time*, the primary instances where we have the chance to see ourselves in this way are anxiety in the face of death and consciousness of our guilt. Heideggerian authenticity, then, will involve engaging with the world in a way that coherently takes account of our mortality – Heidegger calls this "anticipation of death" – and perspicuously recognizes our guilt – Heidegger calls this "resoluteness": "Anticipatory resoluteness," Heidegger explains, "is the understanding that follows the call of conscience and releases for death the possibility … of fundamentally dispersing every fugitive covering-up of the self" (*SZ* 310).

Although I'll have a few things to say about anticipation of death in passing, I want to focus on the contribution that guilt makes to constituting us as selves. When Heidegger claims that guilt is one of the central phenomena through which we come to see what is most our own, he has in mind what we might call "existential guilt" in order to distinguish it from ordinary forms of guilt – for instance, moral guilt or legal guilt. Heidegger claims that existential guilt is the condition of the possibility of ordinary guilt. But we miss Heidegger's point if we think that he is simply transferring the name "guilt" to some arbitrary structure that makes ordinary guilt possible. Heidegger believes that existential guilt is recognizably a species of guilt – structurally similar enough to ordinary forms of guilt that existential guilt can pass itself off as a kind of moral guilt. His analysis in fact begins with a definition of guilt that is "sufficiently formalized" to encompass all "those ordinary phenomena of 'guilt' that are related to concernful being with others" (*SZ* 284). Heidegger offers the following definition:

> the formal concept of being guilty in the sense of having become responsible to another thus may be defined as: [1] being a reason [2] for a lack (*Mangel*) in the existence of an other, [3] indeed in such a way that this being a reason itself is determined as "lacking" or "inadequate" ["*mangelhaft*"] with respect to what it is a reason for. [4] This inadequateness is the insufficiency compared to the demand which is issued to our existing being-with other people.
>
> (*SZ* 282, numbers supplied)

There are four essential elements of guilt on this elegant analysis.

First, I am guilty only if I am in some way a *ground* – *reason* or *basis* – for my actions.[5] "Reason" needs to be understood here in the broadest possible sense. The German word that it translates – *Grund* – can mean a reason in the narrower sense of a proposition that explains or rationalizes. But it also can mean a foundation or basis – something, in other words, which offers support to something else. And it can mean the ground in the sense of a background against which something can emerge. Heidegger wants to keep all of these senses in play. So in choosing to translate Heidegger's term as "reason," I don't mean to suggest that the focus is on reasons in a narrowly epistemic sense. Despite the risk of being misconstrued in this way, I prefer "reason" as a translation, because Heidegger's concern is explanation in a broad sense. My guilt is a matter of the role I play in an explanation of my actions, even if there are no propositionally articulable states that play a role in motivating or structuring the action.

Second, I am a reason for a *lack* in the existence of another person – that is, for someone not possessing something that they deserve or need.

A third noteworthy element of this formal definition is that I am guilty only if the reason or basis is "lacking" – that is, it is an *inadequate* or *insufficient* reason for the lack I produce in another. For instance, if I am legally entitled to deprive another of her property, and I follow all legal requirements in taking her property from her, I bear no guilt before the law with respect to her loss of property. I am the reason for a lack in another, but it is a good or adequate reason in that case (at least as far as the law is concerned).

Finally, the "goodness" – the sufficiency or adequacy – of the reason is determined *with respect to the obligations I bear to others in virtue of our shared way of being in the world*. It is at this point that the ordinary conception of guilt connects with norms and normality, for what counts as an adequate or inadequate reason for being the cause of a lack in another, on the ordinary conception, is determined by the rules and standards for dealing with each other that govern our particular forms of shared existence.

When it comes to applying this formal definition to our *existence*, however, as opposed to our other-regarding *actions*, this formulation needs to be generalized and formalized in certain respects. Heidegger drops the fourth element – the requirement that the sufficiency of the reason be measured according to the norms of our shared way of being with others.

He offers no explanation for this change, but one can imagine why he might find it necessary to do this. Karl Jaspers, in accounting for the phenomenon of German guilt in the aftermath of the Holocaust, also found it necessary to divorce what he called "metaphysical guilt" from any specific moral or legal obligations. Metaphysical guilt, Jaspers argued, is a transformed orientation to the world that results from witnessing the horrific and inhumane treatment of other human beings. One ought to be changed by such an experience, even when one bears absolutely no direct

responsibility for their suffering, and would in fact be powerless to do anything to prevent it. There is no moral or legal demand that could make one guilty for events for which one bears no responsibility. Nevertheless, Jaspers concluded, it is appropriate to experience oneself as guilty simply for continuing to live in such a world:

> there exists a solidarity among men as human beings that makes each co-responsible for every wrong and every injustice in the world, especially for crimes committed in his presence or with his knowledge. … That I live after such a thing has happened weighs upon me as indelible guilt.
>
> (Jaspers 2001: 26)

While Heidegger's account of existential guilt differs in important respects from Jaspers' account of metaphysical guilt,[6] Heidegger's rejection of the idea that existential guilt depends on a pre-existing shared adherence to norms bears a close affinity to Jaspers' account of metaphysical guilt. There is a kind of guilt that draws on or reawakens a sense for our transcendence as human beings, and that takes us beyond existing norms. Guilt for our existence doesn't and shouldn't turn on the particularities of the social norms we grow up in. In addition, as I shall argue, the lack of a governing normativity is essential to Heidegger's account of the constitution of the self, since that is what renders the self an ineliminable element in the explanation of action.

With respect to the second and third elements, Heidegger is also concerned that describing the failure of justification as a "lack," a *Mangel*, will be misleading, to the extent that it suggests that what is lacking could and should be provided. But Heidegger wants to be open to the possibility that there are states or conditions that are constituted by an absence which cannot and should not be corrected. A background, for instance, is a kind of absence (of a foregrounded entity) that we would fill in only by destroying the very thing that allows us to see and attend to foreground objects. So the background is a kind of absence, a nothingness, which isn't a deficiency or a lack. A "lack" is a species, then, of a more general condition of not-being, of "nullity" [*Nichtigkeit*]. To avoid any assumptions about the character of the absence that makes up existential guilt, Heidegger henceforth speaks of guilt as involving a nullity or nothingness rather than a lack.

The "formally existential idea of guilt" is thus reformulated in the following way: "the being of existence means … being the (null) reason of a nullity" (SZ 285). But now we need to give this formal concept some phenomenological content. What is the phenomenon that Heidegger is describing? In what way is our existence characterized by a nothing or a nullity? What is the "not-character of this nothing" (SZ 283), the peculiar "not-character" that distinguishes existential guilt from the lack produced

by ordinary guilt? And why should I think that I am essentially a null reason of a nullity?

Let's start with the second nullity – the sense in which my being (for which I am the reason) is itself characterized by a nullity. Heidegger calls the process of self-determination, through which I undertake an identity by pursuing particular possibilities, "existence" (*Existenz*). A human agent, Heidegger claims, "always understands itself in terms of its existence, in terms of a possibility of itself – its possibility of being itself or not itself" (SZ 12). These possibilities are sometimes "chosen," sometimes "stumbled into," and sometimes we find ourselves having "grown up in them already" (SZ 12). But in any case, existence is always decided in the singular and concrete: "the question of existence never gets straightened out except through existing itself" (SZ 12). Heidegger describes here a phenomenon with which we are all intimately familiar. Each of us becomes who we are by committing, more or less consciously, to some of a broad range of possibilities open to us. Only in doing so, do we become a particular "ability-to-be." Thus, Heidegger explains, human existence "in each case stands in one possibility or another," and that means, "it constantly is *not* another possibility, and has renounced it in the existentiell projection" (SZ 285). An "existentiell projection" is Heidegger's term for a concrete, particular way of understanding the possibilities afforded by the world. In my existence, I am "a being determined by a nothing" (*ein durch ein Nicht bestimmtes Sein*), because in taking up an identity and in determining who I am, I necessarily nullify at the same time other possibilities in terms of which I could interpret myself. Thus, every way of being is itself a nullification of other possible ways of being. In saying that the projection is "null," Heidegger emphasizes, he is in no way suggesting that it is "unsuccessful" [*erfolglos*] or "unworthy" [*unwertig*]: "what we have here is rather something existentially constitutive of the structure of the being of projection" (SZ 285). Projection involves an element of freedom – of not being uniquely destined for one possibility: "the nullity we have in mind belongs to existence's being free for its existentiell possibilities. But freedom is only in the choice of one possibility, that means, in enduring the not having chosen and not being able to choose the others" (SZ 285).

But in what way does my identity lack justifications – that is, in what sense am I a "null reason" for my way of living? The source of this nullity is what Heidegger calls "thrownness." Humans are born into and shaped by a world that they do not control, saddled with traits and characteristics they do not and cannot choose. Let's call this inheritance of traits, dispositions, preferences, and so on, our "initial disposedness." "In being a reason – that is, in existing as thrown," Heidegger argues, each person

> constantly lags behind its possibilities. It is never existent before its reason, but rather in each case it is existent only from *it* and as *this*

> reason. Being a reason accordingly means *never* having power over one's ownmost being from the ground up.
>
> (SZ 284)

My initial disposedness is the reason why I take on certain identities, pursue particular roles, and inhabit particular possibilities. It is the foundation of dispositions or traits or preferences or affective responses that guide me as I settle into a particular way of understanding myself. Thus, I am the reason for who I am in the sense that my disposedness governs the roles I take up, the purposes and ends I adopt. But there is no self outside of my dispositions and traits that can consult them, as if it were a neutral observer, in order to decide which features of my disposedness to draw on in determining which possibilities to pursue. My disposedness is not for me a reason to be who I am. *I am* the reason that I am who I am, insofar as I am disposed. And because I never have power over this reason from the ground up, I can't really justify the reason that I am. Any justification I could offer would be rooted in my initial sense of what is good and bad, right or wrong, meaningful or irrelevant, and so on, but that initial disposedness isn't justified. It just is. For instance, I cannot offer, nor do I have, any ultimate explanation why I am the sort of person who found myself drawn to the academic life rather than to being a prosecuting attorney. I can point to certain preferences; I can trace out a few formative influences. But, in the end, I lack reasons sufficient to explain this because I was already disposed for the world before I was in a position to offer an account, or to reason about why I should be this person rather than that. I lack a justification for the reason that I am, and thus I ultimately lack a justification for who I am – for my existence. The particular being that I am – the dispositions I have that lead me to undertake the roles I play, and the activities through which I understand myself – is thus determined by a lack of reasons.

Such considerations might lead one to conclude that there is a fundamental innocence, rather than guilt, which characterizes existence. Nietzsche, for instance, argued that:

> no one *gives* man his qualities, neither God, nor society, nor his parents and ancestors, nor *man himself*. … *No one* is responsible for simply being there, for being made in such and such a way, for existing under such conditions, in such surroundings.
>
> (Nietzsche 1998: 32)

Nietzsche concludes that what Heidegger calls "thrownness," far from rendering us guilty, actually "re-establishes the *innocence* of becoming."

But, as Heidegger notes, our initial disposedness is something upon which we are able to act, at least to some degree. We are "released from our reasons to ourselves" (SZ 285). That is, our reasons or grounds do not

exhaust who we are, and we are "released" from them in the sense that we can modify, alter, and resist them. So even though it is not up to me which dispositions, habits, and standards I inherit as a result of the accidents of my birth and upbringing, when I begin to pursue certain possibilities, I do so by developing and refining and selectively appropriating certain features of my disposedness. The world affords me numerous different and perhaps incompatible possibilities to pursue. I inhabit these possibilities by developing skills and capacities for pursuing them – by being an "ability to be." In doing this, Heidegger argues, I "take over being a reason" (*SZ* 284) as I adapt my initial disposedness to my chosen practical role.

So where ordinary guilt is being an inadequate reason for a lack in another, existential guilt is being an inadequate reason for not being a different person.

Now, for Heidegger, this is not a bad thing. In saying that it is a kind of guilt, he is not also claiming that it is a moral defect. Existential guilt is rather the condition under which I become an ineliminable part of any explanation for what I do.[7] If in deciding my existence, there were always fully adequate reasons for my having the dispositions that I do, or pursuing the possibilities of existence that I do, then we could eliminate me as a reason for what I do by invoking the reasons that moved me. But if my being who I am is a necessary background to making sense of what I do, then my actions are necessarily constituted by the fact that they are *my* actions. Incidentally, this is precisely the outcome that Heidegger believes inauthentic people are trying to avoid. They focus on whether the action they perform has a reason judged to be adequate by the shared social standards of their community (be they legal, moral, etiquettical, and so on). In doing so, they can overlook the extent to which their actions are ultimately grounded in their being who they are – a being for which they lack adequate justification. Because the inauthentic are who they are by taking over tasks, rules, standards, etc., as already fixed and decided, they are "relieved of the burden of expressly choosing these possibilities" (*SZ* 268). What motivates inauthenticity, on Heidegger's account, is a desire to avoid the anxiety and responsibility that come from being answerable for my self. The authentic person, by contrast, sees her actions as grounded in her being a null reason for a nullity, and resolutely owns up to this structural truth of being a self: that to be a self is to be a reason for an action that necessarily figures in the explanation of that action as an action.

Once I accept my ineliminable and unjustifiable role in the production of my actions, and stop trying to find in the shared social norms and standards of behavior reasons or justifications for existence, I can be who I am more consistently and steadily and coherently. That is, I will be able to commit more fully to being the individual I am – which means that I can develop and adapt my dispositions so that they allow me to pursue my practical identity (the possibilities into which I project). At the same time, I will interpret my identity for myself, based on my own dispositions.

An authentic self, therefore, tends toward a stable or consistently individuated whole and ineliminable unit because its disposedness and projections are coherently integrated with one another. Heidegger calls a successful (in the sense of coherent) integration "achieving a stand."

> But the phenomenon of the authentic ability-to-be also opens up the view of *the constancy of the self* in the sense of having achieved a stand. *The constancy of the self* [autonomy], in the double sense of the continuous stability-of-a-stand [*Standfestigkeit*] is the authentic counter-possibility to the non-self-constancy [lack of independence] of irresolute falling. "*Self-constancy*" [autonomy] signifies existentially nothing other than anticipatory resoluteness. The ontological structure of anticipatory resoluteness reveals the existentiality of the selfhood of the self.
>
> (*SZ* 322)

If authenticity does indeed provide us with an ideal of being a self, then the ideal is to be a *consistent*, *coherent* and *well-integrated* disposedness and projection. We can infer from this that a self in general is an integration of disposedness and projection. In apprehending the world, for instance, an inauthentic person is guided by what '*they* say you should do', or what '*anyone* would do under those circumstances'. (This is so even, or especially when, he or she understands him- or herself as rejecting or failing to do what one should do.) But such guidance leads to a state of constant distraction or dispersion – whenever I get preoccupied with how one should feel, what one should do or what ends one should pursue, I disrupt the tendency toward adapting my own disposedness and projections to one another so that they can achieve a consistent and coherent integration.

Because inauthentic people see and respond to public, conventionally shared solicitations and affordances, there is a sense in which they are letting their lives be lived for them: "existence, as a they-self, gets 'lived' by the common-sense ambiguity of that publicness in which nobody resolves upon anything but which has always made its decision" (*SZ* 299). What they do, Heidegger argues, is attributable to a "they-self": "the self of everyday existence is the they-self, which we distinguish from the authentic self, that is, the self that is taken hold of in its own way [*das eigens ergriffene Selbst*]" (*SZ* 129). This they-self lacks the integrated, stable coherence of an authentic self – it achieves only momentary integration between its particular disposedness and the current project to which it submits itself.

But how does this account of the authentic self help us to understand the self of autonomy? Let's return to the context of fluid action, and consider how an integrated unity of thrown projection might provide the background against which bodily movements can count as actions.

Return to the problem of the autonomous self

Recall that the task posed by the autonomy thesis was that of finding a place for the self in the explanatory order of the world. Since our paradigm is fluid action rather than deliberative action, we will not expect the primary role of the self to consist in disrupting unreflective action, provoking review of, and adjudicating the rational credentials of our motives.[8] Rather, given that the action producing mechanism is me-in-the-world, the world drawing my actions out of me, the self will be some individuated unit, stable and recognizable across the different situations I encounter, that allows the solicitations to arise. As I've suggested already at several points, Heidegger thinks that this self should be understood as a consistent background, rather than as a determinate foregrounded cause. Let me briefly elaborate now on this claim.

Grounds in the broadest sense support entities and events. The ground lets the entity be; it lets the event happen. Knowing what grounds something is thus vital to explaining it. Why did *E* happen? Why is *E* the way that it is? Why are there any *E*'s at all? Every answer to a "why"-question cites a ground as an answer.

Heidegger often differentiates, however, between two types of grounding. The first notion of grounding is oriented to production – to the way that one occurrent entity or event or state of affairs or proposition is generated out of another. One thing grounds the production of another when it is the causal, motivational, or logical reason why something is, and why it is the way that it is. Heidegger refers to this first class of grounds as *Gründungen*, "establishing grounds" because they are a founding source for that which is grounded by them.

Establishing grounds include epistemic grounds – reasons that offer a foundation for grounding beliefs. But they also include causes. A cause is the reason why an entity is at all, or is the way that it is. Grasping the causes contributes to an understanding of the entity *because* these causes establish the existence of the entity. So, without denying that there are important differences between, for instance, efficient causes and epistemic reasons, I want to emphasize the important family resemblance between these otherwise quite distinct kinds of grounding relations. An establishing ground is present to and bears upon that which is grounded in it. So what they have in common is that they explain one thing by tracing it back to another thing.

Perhaps less familiar than establishing grounds is the next class of grounds that Heidegger identifies. The most readily recognizable members of this class are *backgrounds*. A background allows a figure to show itself in the foreground. The background doesn't cause the figure *per se*. It doesn't establish the figure, or give reasons that determine the way that it is or appears. The background, instead, grounds the figure by withdrawing, by *not* touching it, *not* shaping it. Heidegger refers to such grounds in general as

Abgründe. Normally we'd translate *Abgrund* as "abyss," but I propose that we call these "withdrawing grounds." Heidegger sometimes hyphenates the word to emphasize that an abyss, an *Ab-grund*, can be a kind of ground – namely, one that grounds by being *ab-*, away, absent, withdrawn.

One might be tempted to try to reduce the second class of grounds to the first. One might point out, for instance, that a background isn't a cause of the foregrounded entity, but it is a cause of our *experience* of that entity. Now this much is true: *the fact that* we can only experience a figure against a background, is an important part of explaining our experience. So withdrawing grounds are like establishing grounds in that they also play a role in explanation. But the background doesn't exactly cause us to experience the entity, nor does it give us a reason to see the entity, although it certainly contributes to our ability to see it. The experience of the foreground object indubitably depends on the qualities of the background. But its contribution to that experience is indirect and indeterminate, since to be a background is precisely to withdraw from the experience, to exist without definite qualities of its own, and only on the horizon of the experience.

A central theme of Heidegger's work is that, much as a background provides a kind of indefinite, "withdrawing" ground to our *experience* of foregrounded objects, so too the *existence* of entities depends on a kind of withdrawing ground – a ground that can't be reduced to and treated as a species of establishing grounds. The self is just such an existence-sustaining, withdrawing ground. The "right way" for the self to relate to its actions is by allowing obstacles to fluid action to withdraw from the scene.

To explain, let's start with a brief overview of Heidegger's account of the world. For Heidegger, selfhood is inseparable from the world in which selves are always immersed. As we have seen, he regards the self and the world as two reciprocally constituting "structural moments" of a unified phenomenon of being-in-the-world. The world we immediately inhabit, according to Heidegger, is not articulated into occurrent objects with determinate properties. Instead, the basic structure of the lived world is what he calls a *Bewandtnisganzheit*, a totality of affordances. There is considerable perplexity over the proper translation of the noun *die Bewandtnis*, and the associated passive verbal construction Heidegger uses, *bewenden lassen*. Macquarrie and Robinson translate these as "involvement" and "let be involved" respectively. Stambaugh translates them as "relevance" and "let be relevant." Kisiel translates *Bewandtnis* as "deployment." Hofstadter translates them as "functionality" and "letting function." This wide disparity in translations is a mark of the fact that Heidegger is using these words in a rather unconventional fashion, although the different translations all seem to center on a *Bewandtnis* as having to do with the way use-objects function in a particular setting or context.

Since Heidegger never clearly defines the term, however, we have to rely on etymological and contextual clues to figure its meaning out. In its archaic

uses, *bewenden* meant "to use" or "to employ" a thing (Grimm and Grimm 1854). It was a synonym for *anwenden* and *verwenden*. The prefix *be-* in this case probably has the force of 'supplying or endowing.' *Bewenden*, then, would mean "to supply or endow or offer something to be used or utilized." The use of the passive construction (*bewenden lassen*) indicates that it is the entities in the world which are themselves supplying or offering us their use, so as to open up a possibility for changing the circumstances. Like English, German lacks a word that readily says this – we don't typically describe things as offering themselves for use. J. J. Gibson, in struggling to come up with an English word to express this thought of the "offerings of nature, these possibilities or opportunities," described them as "affordances," as in, "the door affords entry and egress" (Gibson 1986: 18). Context suggests that Heidegger is trying to express the same notion with his term "*Bewandtnis*." The *Bewandtnis* of an entity is always described in terms of the activity or use it affords in a particular context.

So 'to afford' in this context means 'to offer the possibility of performing some activity.' For instance, the way a chair shows up in the everyday world is not: rigid, spatially extended object with a flat surface parallel to the floor. It is rather: an affordance for sitting. These affordances, the way things in the world offer themselves to be used by us, are contextually determined. In Heidegger's jargon, an affordance is always *for* (*bei*) something, and *with* (*mit*) something: "within the affordance is: letting use for something with something" (*SZ* 83). The clearest example Heidegger offers is that of the hammer: "what we call a hammer," Heidegger explains, "has an affordance (*Bewandtnis*) for hammering, with hammering, it has an affordance for fastening, with fastening, it has an affordance for protection from the weather." Note how, as the contexts change (the *with*), so do the affordances (the *for*). In addition to being contextually determined, affordances, unlike objects, are inherently indexed to our skills and bodily capacities for action. "What we call a hammer" would not afford hammering to a creature who lacked hands with opposable thumbs.

To a skillful actor, then, the world shows up as a shifting and richly interconnected context of affordances. But that something affords something – that the door affords going in and out of, for instance – is not yet a *reason* to act on the affordance, and the mere presence of affordances doesn't *cause* me to do anything. Fluid action requires that entities in the world do not merely afford action, they must actually *solicit* it. A *solicitation* is an affordance that draws the agent into engaging with it.

But the world cannot solicit a response from me without my complicity. It is in this complicity that we should look to find the self. According to Heidegger, this complicity involves at least two forms of grounding, or two distinct contributions to converting affordances into solicitations. We've already been introduced to these two forms in the idea of the self as a thrown projection. First, the affordances of the world need to be organized

into some kind of coherent order, one that will sort through a bewildering plethora of options for action and align them into coordinated patterns of possibilities. Heidegger calls this form of grounding *Stiften*, "donation" because in *projecting* a purposive end to our activities – a "for-the-sake-of-which" (*Worumwillen*) – we *donate* to or *endow* upon the affordances an order and direction. In this way, we "disclose the particular factical affordance character of the circumstances" (*SZ* 300; *der jeweilige faktische Bewandtnischarakter der Umstände*). With a final aim in view, we polarize the affordances into those that serve our purposes, and those that detract from them. The affordances that serve our purposes, moreover, are aligned into sequences of activities. Because of my purposive orientation toward eating, for example, the door's affordance for egress solicits me, drawing me toward the sidewalk's affordance for walking to the restaurant, which affords ordering food. It is toward the for-the-sake-of-which that the milieu lights up like 'notices in a museum that guide the visitor'. But affordances only light up and solicit to the extent that other affordances sink away, and are not experienced as offering us reasons for action. "Existence 'clears away,'" Heidegger says, "insofar as it factically exists" (*SZ* 299).

Organizing and orienting affordances is a necessary but not sufficient condition of their soliciting us. Another type of grounding is also required – one that Heidegger calls "taking up" or "taking over" a "ground," *bodennehmen*. From the perspective of the self of authenticity, this is what owning one's guilt amounts to. Humans are born into and shaped by a world that they do not control, with traits and characteristics they do not choose. We've called this our "initial disposedness," a ground of dispositions and character traits with which we find ourselves saddled. My initial disposedness inclines me to be moved by some affordances rather than others, and to seek some purposive ends and not others. It is the foundation of preferences or affective responses that guides me as I settle into a particular way of projecting into the world. As I engage with the affordances around me, the dispositions I initially just *have* get actively *taken up*, altered and refined. My initial dispositions, after all, are not all equally suited to the various for-the-sake-of-whichs that I can project into the world, and as I commit to some purposive ends rather than others, I will foster and develop some aspects of my initial disposedness at the expense of others. And, of course, this refined attunement amounts to a further polarization of the field of affordances – I learn to automatically respond to the affordances to which I am tuned, allowing them to solicit me more forcefully; the affordances for which I lack skillful dispositions sink into a deeper inconspicuousness. The affordances of the world that contribute to my existence start drawing on my ready skillful responsiveness.

The conjunction of (1) endowing purposiveness on the world by committing to a project, and (2) becoming thoroughly attuned to the affordances that are salient, allows select affordances to stand out as reasons that solicit

us. But this grounding is akin to the way that a background withdraws to make way for salient objects. Particular affordances solicit us because our engaged stance amounts to "waiving" or "relinquishing" (*begeben*) other possibilities. Projecting onto a *Worumwillen*, Heidegger notes, "is, as a projection, itself essentially nullifying" (SZ 285). In other words, although we contribute a purposive end that converts some affordances into solicitations for acting, this contribution takes the form of orienting ourselves toward the world in such a way that competitors are withdrawn:

> The ready possession of possibilities belongs to existence, however, because, as projecting, it is disposed in the midst of beings. Certain other possibilities are thereby already withdrawn from existence, and indeed merely through its own facticity. Yet precisely this withdrawal of certain possibilities pertaining to its ability to be-in-the-world – a withdrawal entailed in its being absorbed by entities – first brings those possibilities of world-projection that can "actually" be seized upon toward existence as its world.
>
> (SZ 63)

The self of autonomous action, then, is not a direct causal contributor to the production of the action. It is rather a withdrawing ground – a coherent, unified way in which affordances and dispositions are withdrawn to clear the way for fluid action.[9]

Conclusion

But why should we call this background to action a "self"? The self, we said, is that which *grounds autonomous action* – action that is attributable to an agent because it begins with her in some sense, a *doing* rather than a mere *happening*. What distinguishes a doing from a happening, on the model of fluid action, is that the solicited action is the result of the individual that I am – that it would not have been solicited were I not myself, and I would not be myself were I not individuated from other possible actors. My particular way of integrating my thrownness and projection is what individuates me, and it is also what brings together into a coherent unit the sub-agential elements that constitute me.

The analysis of authenticity shows that the self is nothing but the unified coherence of projection and disposedness as it gets solicited or drawn into action: the self is the "unity" (*Einheit*) that "'holds together' the wholeness of this structural whole" (SZ 318). In the most stable form of selfhood, the projections and dispositions mutually support each other. I am a self because I am that particular disposedness that allows my projection to flourish in the world, and I am that particular projection that explains the pattern my disposedness takes on. An integrated disposedness and projecting give rise

to a distinctive form in which the field of solicitations lights up for me, and so individuates me and distinguishes me from other agents. But this self isn't a cause within a sequence of causes; rather, it is a certain style, carrying over from situation to situation, of allowing specific affordances to solicit bodily responses as other competitor affordances withdraw from the scene, thereby nullifying any inconsistent dispositions. The self introduces a rupture into the world – it is a background that allows certain causes and reasons and motivations to sink into obscurity so that others can stand forth as drawing us into action. Thus, as Heidegger concludes, selfhood is not properly understood as a type of entity. Selfhood is, rather, "a way of existing, and that means not as an occurrent entity."

On the model of fluid action, then, to act autonomously is to have some measure of integration to my thrownness and projection, thereby forming the background against which solicitations arise. The most stable self – the one that is most independent or autonomous – is the self that is a consistent, stable, and coherent integration of thrownness and projection.[10]

Notes

1 One might consider maximal autonomy to be an ideal in its own right – that is, one might see us as subject to a demand to get all (or as many as possible) of our bodily movements to stand in the right relationship to the self. But I shall not consider here Heidegger's views about autonomy as an ideal, nor shall I have much to say about the relationship between the *ideal* of autonomy and the ideal of authenticity.

2 "All Things Considered," National Public Radio, February 4, 2010: http://www.npr.org/player/v2/mediaPlayer.html?action=1&t=1&islist=false&id=123380173&m=123380123.

3 In doing so, I build on recent work by scholars like Steven Crowell and Bill Blattner, who have argued that Division Two of *Being and Time* offers us an account of the transcendental or constitutive conditions of agency. Crowell has argued for many years that *Being and Time* offers an account of human subjectivity. (Cf. Crowell 2001, 2008a and 2008b.) Bill Blattner has also argued that Heidegger's account of conscience and guilt in Division Two "designates a formal or transcendental characteristic of all human agency" (this volume, p. 120).

4 The chapter devoted to the self, chapter 4, is only seventeen pages long. By contrast, the chapters on the world and being-in, each approximately fifty pages long, are some of the densest and richest portions of the book.

5 The article is important here – I need not be "the" sole or unique reason for the lack. It is sufficient for guilt that I am a (contributing) reason for the lack in another.

6 Existential guilt, for instance, is not contingent on any awareness of actual wrongs or injustices in the world.

7 And thus a candidate for either moral praise or blame. For more on this issue, see Wrathall forthcoming.

8 A full account of the self *should*, however, explain why the desire to act in accordance with reason also belongs to the self, alongside and often in harmony with the mechanisms of fluid action. This is not a question I address here.

9 This is probably the phenomenon Sartre was describing when he wrote:

> I am absolutely nothing. There is nothing *there* but a pure nothingness encircling a certain objective ensemble and throwing it into relief

> outlined upon the world, but this ensemble is a real system, a disposition of means in view of an end.
>
> (Sartre 1948: 349)

10 This essay has a long and convoluted history. I have had the chance to work through different elements in my interpretation of Heidegger's account of selfhood, guilt, and authenticity in a variety of settings, including presentations at the annual meeting of the American Society for Existential Phenomenology; a workshop in the *Selfhood, Authenticity and Method in Heidegger's* Being and Time series sponsored by the British Academy; the History of Philosophy Workshop held at the Humanities Research Center at Rice University; the University of New Mexico; Claremont Graduate University; the annual meeting of the Southwest Seminar in Continental Philosophy; at *Ungründe: Perspektiven Prekärer Fundierung*, a conference sponsored by the Freie Universität Berlin; at the 2013 meeting of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association; and at the Philosophy Forum at Deakin University in Melbourne, Australia. I've benefited from numerous discussions, questions, and challenges posed to the interpretation on offer here, and I'm grateful to all those people who participated in these events. Among the many who have helped me think through these issues, several are deserving of special acknowledgment, including Steve Crowell, Wayne Martin, Taylor Carman, Samantha Matherne, Beatrice Han-Pile, Iain Thomson, David Cerbone, Charles Siewert, Denis McManus, Julian Young, Kaity Creasy, Joseph Spencer, John Fischer, Ben Mitchell-Yellin, and Bill Bracken.

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13

RESPONSIBILITY, AUTONOMY, AFFECTIVITY

A Heideggerian approach

Steven Galt Crowell

Introduction: care and reason

If there is one thing that commentators agree on, it is that Heidegger rejects the definition of man as rational animal, substituting for it the ontologically more perspicuous notion of care (*Sorge*). The human being is defined not as an animal that happens to possess a distinctive property – *logos*, *ratio* – but as a being "in whose being that very being is an *issue* for it" (SZ 12). Thus what it means to be rational, or animal, is not simply given but is at stake for Dasein. This merely specifies the general principle of Heidegger's transcendental-phenomenological approach in *Being and Time*: there can be no philosophical determination of the being of anything – including Dasein itself – without reference to how Dasein's "understanding of being" makes intentional directedness toward that thing possible. Thus "the ontology of Dasein … is *superordinate* to an ontology of life"; and "only if this kind of being" – life, animality – "is oriented in a privative way to Dasein can we fix its character ontologically" (SZ 247, 246). Similarly, our rationality cannot be understood ontologically by beginning with developed logical systems or the "derivative" (*abkünftig*) domain of theoretical assertions in the sciences. Its meaning must be clarified through categories of Dasein's being as care.

Regarding the ontological roots of reason, I have elsewhere argued that Division Two of *Being and Time* represents Heidegger's phenomenological reconstruction of the concepts of autonomy and responsibility; it thereby uncovers the conditions thanks to which anything can appear as *my* reason for believing something or acting in some way.[1] But this requires us to reconsider what is traditionally designated "animality." According to Heidegger, the self is not autonomous and responsible thanks to its rational nature; rather, it can *have* a rational nature because its animality – those aspects of it which fall under the existential category of facticity – is

inseparable from a kind of autonomy and responsibility. Thus, to understand existential responsibility and autonomy requires an understanding of facticity.

Of the many phenomena that bear witness to our facticity, those belonging to *affective* life clearly reflect how the ontology of care transforms the traditional conception of being human. Here I will explore this through a contrast with Kantian moral psychology, on the one hand, and with the psychoanalytic view of the self, on the other. The former is often criticized for an overly rationalistic approach to our animal nature. Examining Heidegger's account of affective life should allow us to assess the relation between his understanding of autonomy and responsibility and Kant's. Psychoanalysis, on the other hand, like Heidegger, challenges the conception of human being as rational animal. Appealing to "the unconscious," it introduces an affective source of meaning and "thinking" which, however, eludes autonomous control. Thus a critical look at the psychoanalytic alternative should help clarify Heidegger's view of what it is to be responsible for our affective life. By way of orientation, I will first offer a *précis* of the account of our "rational" nature found in Division Two of *Being and Time*.

Responsibility and reason-giving

Together, Division One and Division Two of *Being and Time* lay out the conditions for existing in a "world." The argument runs in two stages, where the second stage makes explicit the tacit presupposition of the first. Division One describes the self absorbed in its everyday practices. Heidegger's point is to show that the intelligibility that belongs to things depends on there being an appropriate use for such things; it cannot be derived from the "rational" representational capacities of an individual mind, such as judging. "Thinking," in this sense, cannot be the original source of meaning. The sort of representation of what it means to be a hammer that is available to someone who doesn't know how to use one, for instance, depends on there being someone who can *in fact* use the hammer appropriately.[2]

Appropriate use – what things are good for or are supposed to be – cannot be determined unless what is being *done* can be specified. And for Heidegger, following Aristotle, this requires that there be something for the sake of which it is being done. For instance, if I experience this old camera as defective because my photographs are blurry, this is because I am trying to capture the moment for my family. If I experience the same camera as quite suitable, this is because I am trying to make the prototype for a painting in the style of Gerhard Richter. What decides whether I am trying to do one or the other? According to Heidegger, it is because in the one case I am acting for the sake of being a father, while in the other I am acting for the sake of being an artist. To act for the sake of being a father or an artist is to care about *succeeding or failing* at being one. Heidegger writes that "the 'for-the-sake-of'

always goes back to the being of Dasein, for which, in its being, that very being is essentially an issue" (*SZ* 84). Thus the intelligibility of practices is grounded not in one's capacity for reason but in one's concern about succeeding or failing at being what one is trying to be, one's commitment to a certain kind of *measure*.

The measures in light of which I act always reflect publicly accepted patterns of behavior. In Heidegger's terms, I "understand" myself in practice as the "one-self" (*das Man-selbst*): I do what one does, because if I did not I could not be recognized, even by myself, as doing anything at all. I can try to be a father or teacher in my own way, but unless I do so within the broad parameters of what counts as being a father or a teacher for the others among whom I am, the notions of succeeding or failing can get no grip. "Dasein is for the sake of the 'one' [*das Man*] in an everyday manner, and the 'one' itself articulates" the world (*SZ* 129). Meaning is *always* a matter of understanding myself within publicly available normative space. Even when I deliberate and reflect critically on my practices, I do so in terms of public parameters for what counts as moral, prudential, and so on. Thinking is not rigidly determined by my historical or cultural situation, but I cannot think or deliberate in a way that makes no connection whatsoever with the normative resources available to all of us. I *negotiate* them, as a kayaker negotiates a turn in the rapids.

If I were nothing more than the "one-self" described in Division One, however, my sensitivity to the normative would be unintelligible. This is because *trying* to be something requires that I be able to act not merely in accord with the measures of these roles, but in light of them. To act in light of a measure is to recognize that it measures not just "us" but *me*, addresses me in the first-person singular. And this requires that I be able to grasp myself as "I-myself," independent of the roles I occupy and the practices I engage in. Division Two of *Being and Time* describes this radically first-personal aspect of the self. Though it culminates in an account of "anticipatory resoluteness" as Dasein's "authentic" selfhood, authenticity is only a "modified way in which … everydayness is seized upon" (*SZ* 179): "When Dasein thus brings itself back from the 'one,' the one-self [*Man-selbst*] is modified in an existentiell manner so that it becomes authentic being-one's-self" (*SZ* 268).[3] Like inauthentic Dasein, authentic Dasein is a practical agent who acts for the sake of being *something* – father, artist, teacher – the difference being that authentic Dasein occupies its role "transparently" (*SZ* 299). Transparency is not defined in the analysis of authentic practice, however, but in the analysis of a liminal condition in which Dasein "is" without being "anything." When the one-self *breaks down*, I discover an ability-to-be I-myself in the absence of further qualifying descriptions, a radical form of first-person self-awareness.

Heidegger analyzes this breakdown in the sections on anxiety, death, and conscience, which represent a distinct configuration of the "equiprimordial"

elements of the structure of care: *Befindlichkeit*, *Verstehen*, and *Rede*. In the *Befindlichkeit* of anxiety the world ceases to matter at all; it is "completely lacking significance" (*SZ* 186). I am no longer gripped by the public norms that enable a world; I do not register their normative force and so cannot gear into any practice for the sake of anything. This entails a certain mode of self-understanding (*Verstehen*): since I understand myself in terms of my abilities, in anxiety I can no longer understand myself *as* anything. Nevertheless, I am self-aware, and such awareness is what Heidegger calls existential death, "the possibility of the no-longer-being-able-to-be-there" (*SZ* 250). Death is the ability to be without being able to be anything.[4] In this condition I am thus disclosed with a certain paradoxical kind of intelligibility, one that is "articulated" in conscience, a mode of *Rede*. According to Heidegger, the call of conscience articulates my being "guilty" (*SZ* 280), and what is thereby given me to understand is what it means to be I-myself.

If ordinary guilt depends on an "ought or law" that one has transgressed, ontological guilt is the condition of possibility for any ought or law (*SZ* 283). Heidegger's characterization of this condition yields the existential meaning of autonomy and responsibility. He notes, first, that Dasein is "thrown"; it has been "brought into its 'there,' but *not* of its own accord" (*SZ* 284). This is not a contingent circumstance but a "ground" (*Grund*) that belongs to the care structure itself.[5] Thus, even though Dasein "can *never* get that ground into its power," thrownness *is* a ground "*only* in that [Dasein] projects itself on possibilities," that is, only because, "as existing, [Dasein] must take over being-a-ground." Thus the two sides of the care structure – facticity and existentiality – yield two senses of "ground," neither of which can be understood apart from the other. Factic grounds are *grounds* only as taken over in my ability-to-be a ground. "To be its own thrown ground is that ability-to-be which is the issue for care" (*SZ* 284). The basic thought here is that Dasein is not some entity that is "grounded" in a context that is simply there; it is not "determined" by objective social, historical, and biological "factors." Rather, any such objective factor is itself determined *as* a "ground" only to the extent that Dasein tries to be something – that is, takes responsibility for its own success or failure. For instance, it is *because* I am trying to be a teacher that I discover my "factic" irascibility as an aspect (ground) of my being that must be normatively dealt with. Outside of some such project irascibility is not even identifiable as such, and thus to think of it as an independent determining "ground" of Dasein is an inadmissible ontological abstraction. All this will be explored in more detail in the section 'Facticity and affectivity' below.

To be "guilty," then, is to be such that one is called to take over being-a-ground – that is, be responsible for oneself. As thrown, Dasein is not responsible for itself in the sense of creating itself. Rather, it is responsible for standing toward its factic grounds in light of its ability-to-be, that is, in light of *possibility*. As thrown, I have an impulse to react angrily to a slight,

but as able-to-be I do not merely undergo this impulse; I *can* act on it or not, and this "can" poses the question of whether I should, whether it is *best* to do so. In reacting angrily to a slight I do not respond in an automatic way; I "take over" or endorse my factic ground as a justifying reason. In this way I give it a *normative* force that is independent of whatever force it has as part of my thrownness.[6] Thus, to take over being-a-ground ("resoluteness") is to enter the space of reasons. To be I-myself is to be responsible for the normative force of the norms according to which I act, and this is just what Heidegger calls the "transparency" of authentic Dasein.

Heidegger's position here is very close to Kant's, since it entails that nothing can have normative force in the absence of a being who takes responsibility for it.[7] And this notion of responsibility entails an existential version of autonomy: to be a self is to be self-legislating in the sense that I-myself am not beholden to any norms whose normative force I would merely have to *accept*. But unlike Kant, Heidegger does not ground autonomy in rationality. Dasein is not autonomous because it is rational; rather, justifying reasons are possible at all because Dasein, as care, is autonomously responsible for its being. Specific norms of teaching, fatherhood, citizenship, and the like – whether tacit or explicit – are part of any world, but *being* a teacher, father, or citizen is never something determinate: what it *means* to be such things is always *at issue* in what I do. To put this another way: while I must accept that these and those prevailing norms of teaching or fatherhood belong to my world, that such norms are given and I cannot try to be a teacher without acknowledging them, their *normative force* (their character as justifying reasons) is never given in this way since it is tied to what being a teacher *means*, and this is not determined by the prevailing norms but is at *stake* in my trying to be one. I-myself am responsible for meaning. In contrast to the Kantian picture of autonomy, reason does not precede such responsibility but derives from it.

Psychoanalysis seems to challenge this picture of the self. As the philosopher and psychoanalyst Jonathan Lear notes, the "second division of *Being and Time* is an investigation into what is involved in taking responsibility for our thrown natures," which includes "the ethical categories, cultural values, and scientific theories of the age." But he believes that psychoanalysis radicalizes this picture "beyond anything Heidegger imagined," since Freud has shown that our thrownness also includes "a world of meanings whose significance is pervasive, idiosyncratic, and largely unconscious." As a function of "impulses" – that is, of my affective life – such meanings are "idiosyncratic"; they pertain to Dasein's "interior" life, outside the scope of public norming and so also (presumably) independent of what I-myself think is best. "What," Lear asks, "is involved in taking responsibility for that?" (2005: 105-6).

Curiously, Lear omits the affects from his list of what Heideggerian "thrown nature" involves, but affectivity is central to Heidegger's notion of

facticity, and so also to his ontological conception of autonomy and self-responsibility. Our question thus becomes: Can Heidegger's notion of responsibility as taking over being-a-ground accommodate the sort of "unconscious" affective life that psychoanalysis invokes?

Facticity and affectivity

In Heidegger's phenomenology, affects do not appear as part of an *additive* conception of the self – "notionally separable" elements of an entity (rational animal) whose other element, reason, could be independently analyzed. Aspects of the care structure can be understood only in their phenomenological unity. Thus Heidegger warns that philosophy goes astray when it measures affective phenomena against "the apodictic certainty of a theoretical cognition of something which is purely present at hand." But, he continues, "the phenomena are no less falsified when they are banished to the sanctuary of the irrational. When irrationalism, as the counterpart of rationalism, talks about the things to which rationalism is blind, it does so only with a squint" (SZ 136). To think of anger as a failed mode of rational cognition (e.g., as a "confused" way of representing the world) is to falsify its phenomenological character, but to banish it to the irrational is no less a falsification. Traditional philosophy reveals its ontological inadequacy by attempting to bridge the divide: on the one hand, "reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions"; on the other, "the heart has its reasons that reason doesn't know." But such expedients only reveal the tradition's "squint" when it comes to affective life. A proper ontological approach requires rejecting the additive conception of the self. In the ontology of care *reason is thrown*, but also *thrownness enables reason.*

The category to which the affects belong is *Befindlichkeit* ("affectivity"), whose ontic manifestation Heidegger identifies with "mood" (*Stimmung*). Heidegger mentions, but does not consistently distinguish between, moods (fearfulness, anxiety, joy), emotions (love, anger, sadness), and feelings (fatigue, irritability, lust). But a clear distinction can be drawn between those affects that are occurrent intentional states – fear that this tiger will attack me, anger at a referee's bad call, resentment about a slight I have received – and Heideggerian "moods." The latter, which Matthew Ratcliffe calls "existential feelings", are not intentional states but ways in which I "find" myself, my sense of "belonging to the world" (2008: 52, 47). Affective intentional states depend on how one *negotiates* one's belonging to the world, while an existential feeling is an ontological condition for being a self at all.

Though Heidegger acknowledges a range of moods (joy, boredom, anxiety, pallid indifference), he emphasizes their commonality: they manifest Dasein's being as a "burden." From a psychological point of view this seems arbitrary. A buoyant mood is not necessarily a feeling of having been released from some burden. But Heidegger's point does not concern how I

"feel"; rather, it concerns the fact that *whatever* I feel, the *reason* for feeling this way is not available to me: "Dasein cannot know anything of the sort because the possibilities of disclosure which belong to cognition reach far too short a way compared with the primordial disclosure belonging to moods" (SZ 134). A buoyant mood – in contrast to the feeling of delight I take when enjoying a sunset – is not an intentional state whose content could provide a reason for that state. In Heidegger's jargon, a mood does not "discover" entities but "discloses" something about the kind of being that I am. If moods reveal my being as a burden, then to be a self is to have been "delivered over" (*überantwortet*) to myself. I do not just happen to have a mood; rather, "having a mood brings being to its 'there'." This means that my individuation – what it is to be I-myself – is grounded in mood, through which I have "been delivered over to the being which, in existing, [I have] to be" (SZ 134). Affect is the *primary* way in which the factic ground that I must take over shows itself.[8]

Heidegger does not follow up this brief introduction with a phenomenology of various moods. Rather, without signaling it, he summarizes his subsequent analysis of *Angst*: "even in the most indifferent and inoffensive everydayness," he writes, "the being of Dasein can burst forth as naked 'that it is and has to be.' The pure 'that it is' shows itself, but the 'whence' and the 'whither' remain in darkness" (SZ 134). Heidegger thus wants to suggest that what shows itself explicitly in the "methodologically distinctive" (SZ 184) mood of *Angst* is already part of the disclosure of every mood – namely, my "thrownness" or the "*facticity of* [my] *being delivered over*" (SZ 136). As the affective disclosure of my being delivered over, facticity is just not the sort of thing about which one could sensibly ask: Who or what delivered me over, and to what end? In moods generally, then, the "that it is" of my "there" "stares [me] in the face with the inexorability of an enigma" (SZ 136).

Everyday Dasein has resources for addressing this enigma which, as an enigma, seems to demand explanation. Dasein is often "'assured' in its belief about its 'whither'"; for instance, the Bible promises me the Kingdom of God. And, "in rational enlightenment," it often "supposes it knows about its 'whence'," by appeal to evolutionary theory, for example. But "all this counts for nothing as against the phenomenal facts of the case," namely, that as a constituent element of selfhood mood discloses an enigma of being (SZ 136). Ontology cannot simply banish the enigmatic character of my being to the irrational, however. An enigma is intelligible, but only *as* an enigma; it calls for phenomenological elucidation, not explanatory dissolution. Heidegger provides such elucidation in his account of the self as "guilty," as a thrown being who nevertheless is called to take over being-a-ground.

Strictly speaking, then, the category of facticity refers to this affectively disclosed enigma. The literature on facticity tends to employ the category more expansively, including in its scope aspects of the world – history,

culture, language, embodiment, nature – that are said to situate or determine me in ways that elude reflection. But this is to treat Heidegger's ontology as a kind of ontic social theory and to conceal the enigma of facticity with reassuring identifications of its "whence and whither." To take up facticity existentially is to stand toward it in light of measure, but Heidegger's phenomenology of affectivity shows that there is nothing "there" to stand *toward* except the enigma of my having to be. Any so-called "factic" determinant of my being that can be *named* already depends on the way in which the affectively disclosed "burden" has been taken up into existence – measured – and thereby "thrust aside" *as* an enigma. Because I am always already in a world that has been articulated in specific ways, I will encounter facticity, the enigma of being, in the guise of things like bodily feelings, inclinations, social mores, historical narratives, and political arrangements of power – things whose normative claim on me becomes my responsibility. But such particulars already represent ways in which I (and we) have negotiated the enigma of facticity; they are not themselves *part* of my facticity.[9] This becomes clear if we consider what Heidegger says about the connection between mood and world.

To be delivered over to oneself in mood implies "*a disclosive submission to the world*" (SZ 137). Here "world" is not the outer to some mental inner; it is that wherein Dasein affectively "finds" itself, and its disclosure is not a representation but the condition of all representation, that which "makes it possible first of all to direct oneself toward something." When in our practical dealings things show up as "unserviceable, resistant, or threatening," they have a kind of motivational force. They are not merely represented by me; their being this way or that matters to me, moves me. In order that "what it encounters in the world can '*matter*' *to* it in this way," Heidegger argues, the world must be disclosed, in mood, as mattering (SZ 137). But then world cannot be an encountered object; nor can it be identified with the sum-total of the particulars of my "factic situation," since those particulars take on the meaning they have (and so can be encountered) only *in* the world. They already signify ways that Dasein has appropriated that space of meaning for the sake of which it is. Mood discloses the world as mattering to Dasein because mood discloses Dasein as mattering to *itself*.

This sort of mattering is quite different from an animal's struggle for life. Ontological "submission" to the world is not equivalent to instinct or natural causality; it is a transcendental condition on meaning. Meaning (world) is possible for a being for whom it matters whether it succeeds or fails at being what it is trying to be, a being who is at issue for itself, and affectivity is a necessary condition on this. A purely rational being could not care for itself or anything else; however skilled it was at calculating and reasoning, if it lacked affect nothing could matter to it. But being an issue for oneself cannot be derived from the animality of embodiment or life either. Without something like a first-person orientation toward measure, we cannot

make sense of what it would mean to say that bodily feelings and drives represent the animal's "trying" to be or do something. And if animal striving *as such* is not normatively structured, a capacity for reasoning cannot supply such structure: the latter *presupposes* an orientation toward measure but cannot account for it.[10] Precisely this orientation is embedded in Heidegger's idea that mood discloses the way a *world* matters, since "world" (as an element of being-in-the-world) already includes the *necessary* connection between affectivity and the rest of the care structure. One cannot, therefore, treat the meaning-constituting contribution of affectivity as an independent variable – for instance, as a kind of "desire" whose "logic" would be common to all "life."[11]

We thus return to the question that guides our approach to the relation between Heideggerian ontology and the Kantian and psychoanalytic pictures of the self: What does it mean to take responsibility for the way the world affectively matters to me? Heidegger writes that "[f]actically, Dasein can, should, and must, through knowledge and will, become master of its moods," and in some cases "this may signify a priority of volition and cognition" (*SZ* 136). Given that moods "assail us" and disclose the facticity of our being delivered over, the idea of becoming master of our moods might seem peculiar. A thought makes a claim to truth, and even if it "just comes to me" I can become master of it, in a certain sense, simply by avowing it or withholding my assent. In this sense, I am responsible for what I think: I am responsible for whether I endorse it. When a mood assails me, in contrast, the world matters to me in a way that I am condemned to endure for as long as the mood lasts. In this sense, it seems that I am not responsible for my moods. I am not their author.

But being the author of something is not the only way to be responsible for it. Having authored something is a property, whereas *taking* responsibility for something is a response to a demand addressed to me. Thus to say that Dasein "can, should, and must" is to say both that it is *possible* for it to become master of its moods and that it is *obligated* to do so. Whence comes this demand? If it comes from others, what establishes its normative force? Others may find me an unpleasant person to be around if I am always angry or spiteful, but so what? I may find them unpleasant to be around because they are always cheerful and sunny. But if the demand comes from myself, what sort of entity must I be? It seems that I must be divided within myself in some sense – that the one who obligates and the one who is obligated differ in some way – and this raises the question of what sort of unity is possible here. The Kantian tradition provides one sort of answer and psychoanalysis provides another. Heidegger, I shall argue, falls somewhere between the two.

Self-unity and practical identity

When Heidegger talks about becoming master of our moods through reason and will, he does not attend to the distinction between moods as

existential feelings and moods as emotions or affective intentional states. Existential feelings cannot be mastered; I cannot make the world as a whole matter to me otherwise than it does. But affective intentional states *can* be mastered because they are reason-responsive. They involve a relation not merely to things, but to things taken *as* this or that; and this as-structure involves something like a claim to truth. The anger I feel when cut off by a careless driver targets the driver *as* careless, and if I find that he was trying to avoid a child on a bicycle, my anger will disappear. Such affective intentional states, then, are norm governed: they can be appropriate or inappropriate, and in a rational being the monitoring of this appropriateness can become an end. Aristotle, for instance, holds that feelings and emotions can be habituated through example and training such that attending to their reason-responsiveness becomes "second nature" or virtue. Thus, on this view, I can become master of my affective intentional states because I have been habituated from childhood so that the "fit" between the feeling and the right reasons for it is natural to me. Further, where such training is lacking (or where it breaks down), a person can be brought to recognize this failure of reason-responsiveness and act against the promptings of the affect.

But why *should* such a person act against those promptings? If an Aristotelian answers that one ought to master one's emotions because that's what it means to be a good rational animal, I still need not be committed to being such an animal; living my life that way need not be something that *I* ought to do. To answer this question, Kant turns the idea of rational animality in a different direction, connecting the claims of reason directly to the first-person situation of action. For Kant, the obligation to master one's emotions does not derive from their reason-responsiveness but from the autonomy of the rational agent, who fails to be an agent just to the extent that he fails to master his affective life in the appropriate way. I am obligated to master my moods only because this is entailed by a law of practical reason which I cannot fail to obey without falling into contradiction with myself, with my own will.

In subordinating the reason-responsiveness of the affects to a normative law of rational agency that establishes what *ought* to be done, Kant provides a standard for regulating affective motivational force. In non-rational animals, affects motivate action directly; in rational animals an action's motivational structure is, in Barbara Herman's phrase, "over-determined" (1993: 31). My anger at the careless driver provides me with a (defeasible) motivating reason to act in a certain way, but I can also forbear to act in that way even when the reason is *not* defeated, if so acting conflicts with the conditions for being a rational agent as such – just as I can act on my anger while *also* obeying the "motive of duty."[12] But how does the practical law that defines agency get a grip on me at all? Must I care about what being an agent demands? What constitutes the normative force of such a law from the first-person point of view?

Christine Korsgaard's concept of "practical identity" provides an answer that suggests how normativity and self-identity are inextricably linked. A practical identity is a "description under which you value yourself and in terms of which you find life worth living" (Korsgaard 1996: 101). As a "description," a practical identity is something like a role defined by more or less explicit normative success conditions. To say that you "value" yourself under that description is to say that acting in accord with that identity is affectively motivational. If being a teacher is my practical identity, then I am moved to live up to its standards. Without this affective investment, the norms that define the identity would lack motivational force and would not give *me* reasons to act on them. Thus, a rational animal can act at all only if she is already committed to certain norms from a first-person point of view. On the Aristotelian account it is possible to wonder why I should care about what a good rational animal is, even when I am one; but on the Kantian account it is not possible to ask why I should care about what a good teacher is when I am acting as one: I am already committed to that *practical* identity. Thus from my own point of view there is a perfectly intelligible sense in which I "should and must" master my moods – i.e., conform my incentives, as maxims, to the demands of the identity in question. "Autonomy" is the name for this sort of commitment, thanks to which my animal nature takes on a kind of meaning that is transparently subject to normative regulation. Such commitment "constitutes" my self-identity, my unity as a self.

Heidegger's ontology of care has room for this concept of practical identity. Our affective life is inseparable from that for the sake of which we exist as practical agents, our "competence over … being as existing" (*SZ* 143). In everyday practical life – including the practices of thinking and deliberating – things show up in the ways they do because I am exercising an ability-to-be, acting for the sake of some practical identity. In exercising my ability to teach, for instance – acting for the sake of being a teacher, exercising that competence over being – I try to live up to the norms of what it means to be a teacher, and because the meaning of teaching is at issue, things show up as appropriate or inappropriate to the task. This holds of my affective intentional states as well, whose reason-responsiveness is tied to what I am currently trying to be. For instance, as I lecture I notice a student sleeping and I become angry. A sleeping student is not inherently a reason to get angry, but given my practical identity as a teacher it is an instance of what Heidegger might call "obtrusiveness" (*SZ* 73) and constitutes a (defeasible) reason for anger. But while Heidegger can thus accommodate the idea of practical identity, the phenomenology of existential breakdown – which neither Kant nor Korsgaard takes into account – requires us to revise how we think about the relation between autonomy and self-identity.

For Korsgaard, autonomy grounds self-identity because we are rational beings; reason, as self-legislation, provides a norm for unifying the self. The

categorical imperative emerges directly from our ability to take reflective distance on our affects and, in deliberation, measure them against reason's "form of law" (universality). For Heidegger, in contrast, there is no such rule of self-identity: in the *breakdown* of my deliberative ability in *Angst*, when all the descriptions under which I have valued myself have lost their grip on me, my responsibility for taking over being-a-ground is disclosed. This is not a particular measure for my being but a *demand* for measure; I am disclosed as a being who, to be anything at all, must act in light of a distinction between better and worse, success or failure. What "better or worse" *means* is precisely what is at issue in what I do, and what I do will *exemplify* what I take that meaning to be. Though commitment – responding to the demand for measure – will yield something like justifying reasons and so will be caught up in the issue of their universal scope, the orientation toward measure is not itself an orientation toward law.[13] Thus Heideggerian autonomy does not bring my animal nature under law; autonomy is responsibility for the meaning that is always at stake in what I do.

If the condition of anxious breakdown is thus ontologically basic for selfhood, we must understand the reason-responsiveness that affective intentional states take on within practical identities *not* as the result of some natural axiological order but as a result of how we negotiate the ever-present possibility of collapse. Though Heidegger acknowledges an "authentic" way of doing so – which he calls being "ready for anxiety [*Angstbereit*]" (*SZ* 296) – he focuses largely on the "inauthentic" strategy: *fleeing* from anxiety toward a concern with things. "Fear," for instance, "is anxiety, fallen into the 'world'" (*SZ* 189), a way of domesticating our uncanny "homelessness" by outfitting affectivity with a specific correlate *in* the world. My anger at the student is reason-responsive *given* my commitment to teaching and its socially defined norms, but its very rationality is a kind of hedge against the ontologically ungrounded character of those norms. *Angst* reveals that my commitment – and so the relevance of the reasons it makes possible – is itself at issue, capable of breaking down as a whole. Here we find one point of contact between Heideggerian autonomy and the psychoanalytic model of the self.

The psychoanalytic view of affective intentional states also recognizes that they can serve as hedges against anxiety.[14] Anger at a sleeping student is reasonable, but it is only a short step away from a kind of sputtering fury, which is also "reasonable" – in the sense that the student is correctly grasped as disruptive – but affectively *excessive*. Psychoanalysis sees such excessiveness (a sort of failure of reason-responsiveness) as a sign that the affect is serving a different purpose altogether: indemnifying my practical identity against the outbreak of anxiety. Thanks to a set of "structured positions" (Lear 2005: 123, 140) that shape my psychic life, this disruptive student is now the object of an infantile rage whose meaning eludes my practical competence. Affective excess thus points toward an affective *system*,

an "idiosyncratic world" (2005: 124) whose structure owes nothing to my autonomy, an "unconscious" source of meaning that is independent of my taking over being-a-ground. If Heideggerian autonomy entails that affective mattering yields meaning only in connection with trying to be something, psychoanalysis finds an affective "world" of meaning that matters to me, and so constitutes me, *independently* of my trying to be anything. If for Heidegger transparency (authenticity) means acting in light of my responsibility for normative force, for psychoanalysis it comes to mean something like sharing "my" world with a "ghostly twin" whose affective life has a normative force of its own. The remainder of this chapter examines this contrast in more detail.

Affectivity and unconscious mental life: fractal identity?

There are, of course, a great many versions of the psychoanalytic thesis; fortunately, for our comparison with Heidegger we need not examine them all. Using Korsgaard's terminology, psychoanalytic positions can be divided into two types: those that conceive unconscious mental functioning as something "in us," part of our "nature" in the Kantian sense, and those that treat it as "us," part of our self-identity. The first sort might look something like Freud's early "hydraulic" theory of the mind or develop in the direction of a cognitive neuroscience. But it might also treat the unconscious as a kind of language, where "language" is a syntactic system or "'formal' organization" that *enables* meaning though "in itself has no meaning."[15] The second type, in contrast, conceives unconscious mental functioning as something that has a normative claim on me independently of what I am trying to be. It is as though it were its own kind of existential trying or acting for the sake of something, thereby constituting a meaning that I must simply *endorse*.

However varied they may be, an ontology of care can accommodate theories of the first type in the same way that it accommodates the Kantian concept of practical identity. They do not really challenge autonomy as a model of self-integrity, since the processes involved yield symptoms, but no meaning, until they are taken up by the practical agent. They are, in this sense, just more "nature" in us, with no more (normative) claim to being "me" than my hair color or genetic make-up. Theories of the second type *do* challenge it, however, since I must take over a ground that is also trying to take *me* over. Crudely: the ego (my trying) is caught between two principles – the super-ego (the normative claims of *das Man*) and the "id," the locus of claims that are not grounded in my commitments but are nevertheless *normative* for me, and disclosed as such – first in anxiety and ultimately in analysis.

Jonathan Lear offers an example of this latter type. In his Tanner Lectures, *A Case for Irony*, Lear defends the philosophical importance of psychoanalysis by criticizing the adequacy of the Kantian picture, represented by

Korsgaard, in which we achieve integrity through reflective distance on our animal nature. Because his approach involves a phenomenological analysis of what he calls "the experience of irony," and because such irony is identified as a "peculiar species" of Heideggerian "uncanny anxiety" (Lear 2011: 98), Lear's position affords a perspicuous way to assess whether Heidegger's approach to self-identity is equally vulnerable to the psychoanalytic challenge.

For Lear, the experience of irony is expressed in Kierkegaard's paradoxical question, "In all of Christendom, is there a single Christian?" Someone who is gripped by this sort of question is conversant with all the practices that define Christianity as a way of life – including critical reflection on whether current practices have strayed from their true meaning – and these practices matter to him. Being a Christian is his practical identity. Undergoing an experience of irony, however, he is incapable of "going on" because he suddenly wonders what *any* of these practices have to do with being a Christian (2011: 18). He is possessed by the feeling that "all [his] previous attempts" to live a Christian life "fall *wildly* short of its requirements" (2011: 100). On Lear's account, irony lives from the disruption of the sort of practical thinking to which Korsgaard appeals; it is an experience of "the *ground* of my practical thinking weirdly haunting itself" (2011: 102). The "weirdness" here is the "uncanny" (*unheimlich*) affect of the familiar becoming radically unfamiliar; irony is thus a species of Heideggerian anxiety. But it also has "surprising features of its own" (2011: 98) which motivate a psychoanalytic interpretation.

For Heidegger, *Angst* renders "the totality of involvements … discovered within the world … of no consequence; it collapses into itself" (SZ 186). Because anxiety is that pathology of affectivity in which nothing matters to me, I cannot gear into the world in terms of any practical identity. The experience of irony, in contrast, disrupts the "totality of involvements" belonging to a *particular* practical identity without, however, affecting my *commitment* to that identity (Lear 2011: 98). Here anxiety lies not in the feeling that my act does not live up to my principle but that "my principle falls weirdly short of itself," as though there were "an internal instability in the signifier" that names it, e.g., "Christianity" (2011: 101, 117).[16] Irony is thus something like a *quarantined* form of *Angst* – not a disclosure of I-myself but an experience of the gap between one of my practical identities and *all* of the commonplaces that structure it, including the reflectively self-critical ones. Like Heidegger, then, Lear recognizes that practical agency is not sufficient for self-identity. For both, the experience of the *breakdown* of practical agency reveals an aspect of selfhood without which the Kantian sort of autonomy is not possible. But Lear's interpretation of this aspect as something like a "ghostly twin" (2011: 99), whose commitment can live on after the collapse of any way to go on, does challenge the Heideggerian view. According to the latter, the normative force necessary for meaning depends on my gearing into the world for the sake of some practical

identity; that's just what commitment *is*. If my ability to go on in some practical identity breaks down – if, in Heideggerian terms, I am no longer able-to-be a teacher because I have been disabled by irony – what can it mean to say that I am still *committed* to it? Here we encounter Lear's appeal to the psychoanalytic thesis of unconscious mental life.

Lear insists that the unconscious – the "elemental structures of mental activity that dominate one's life" – cannot be conceived as a set of repressed "contents" or beliefs (2005: 49). Beliefs are holistically interdependent and reason-responsive (2005: 24-28), whereas the deliverances of unconscious mental activity are not rationally unified in this way. For instance, they do not obey the principles of non-contradiction and negation, and they are not "tensed" (2005: 44f; Freud 1963b: 134-36). Instead, unconscious mental functioning is affectively driven and, in contrast to content-holism, exhibits a "fractal nature" over which it is the goal of therapy to attain "practical mastery" (Lear 2005: 50). Such practical mastery cannot be conceived on the Kantian model, according to which one either endorses or rejects the promptings of our animal nature in light of law, because unconscious mental activity does not belong to our animal nature as, say, instinct or inclination does. Rather, "the Freudian unconscious is its own form of *thinking*" (Lear 2011: 89). Like rational thought, it is a *form-giving* process and so, in Kantian terms, falls on the side of spontaneity, not receptivity. Hence it cannot simply be subordinated to self-conscious thinking: "the unconscious acts as its own formal principle, treating self-conscious mental activity as *its* matter" (Lear 2011: 89).

Unconscious mental activity seizes upon some manifest intentional content – say, a sleeping student – and imbues it with a form of its own, compels it to occupy a structured position that has been established in my affective life. My rage at the student is excessive because he is no longer merely a student but occupies the "fantasy" position originally occupied by my father. Since my infantile desire to inflict harm on my father is forbidden or repressed, its approach to consciousness (in the form of the student) threatens me with anxiety, and my excessive rage is there to divert me from an outbreak of the latter.[17] My unreasonable rage at the student thus has *two* meanings – an overt response to the impropriety of his behavior, and an "unconscious" reaction to the threat of anxiety that takes the diversionary form of infantile rage. To gain "practical mastery" over this latter kind of "fractal" meaning – to unify myself – thus consists "in finding routes of accommodation between differing forms of mental activity" (Lear 2011: 89).

We cannot here pursue the details of such unconscious forming – wish-fulfillment, fantasy, condensation, displacement, transference, and so on.[18] Instead we shall focus on the *fractal* character of the meaning to which it gives rise. I take this to mean that the structured fantasy positions generated by unconscious affective life behave like the patterns that repeat themselves at every level of a fractal.[19] Thus intentional contents that differ in my

practical life can "mean" the same thing in unconscious mental life. My reasons for being enraged at the sleeping student are different from my reasons for boiling over at the administrator who criticizes me for my behavior toward the student, but the student and the administrator both occupy the same position – exhibit the same fractal pattern – in my unconscious life, as does the analyst to whom I finally turn to find out why I am excessively angry all the time.

The algorithm of this fractal "meaning" belongs neither to my animality, nor to my autonomy, nor to the prevailing norms of *das Man*. It stems from a "spontaneity" that "takes over" manifest content idiosyncratically and functions to keep anxiety at bay. Because my unconscious "identity" has this sort of fractal character, I might be able to *explain* it (and so understand my behavior), but I cannot take responsibility for it in the sense of having first-person authority over its reason-responsiveness. While it is not "brute" nature in me, it will never obey what Richard Moran calls the "transparency condition" – namely, that in "owning" or "avowing" it, I am precisely acknowledging its *appropriateness* in the sense of reason-responsiveness. According to Lear, "there are huge swathes of fantasy-life in which it does not make sense to seek transparency conditions"; indeed, "fantasy-life resists transparency" (2011: 71).[20] Rather, it is an objectless desire that, from the agent's first-person point of view, is like a private language: an impossible attempt to constitute meaning on the basis of wholly idiosyncratic stipulations.

Unconscious mental activity is thus analogous to what I-myself do in taking over being-a-ground. For this reason, Lear rightly objects when Korsgaard reduces it merely to something that acts "in" us but is not "us." To treat it as "nature" is to approach "a powerful and primordial source of psychic unity … as though it were just another impulse" (Lear 2011: 64). Though it operates "in" us in a way that resists first-person avowal, our fractal identity is *us* and not mere nature. It is "what matters" in our "inner life" (Lear 2005: 67), *interior* identity: "a vibrant organizing part" of ourselves (Lear 2011: 64). Failure to recognize this in our deliberations can yield the opposite of integrity: critical reflection on what I should do can speak with the voice of a "punishing super-ego" whose choices yield a "brittle self-image that is out of touch with psychic reality" (Lear 2005: 220-21).

Like the ontology of care, psychoanalysis thus points beyond the additive conception of the self as rational animal. Freud's emphasis on sexuality, according to Lear, does not aim "reductively to emphasize our animal nature" but to "highlight our distinctively erotic nature," the "astonishingly complex and distinctively human" character of our affective life (Lear 2005: 19). Indeed,

> if we think of the ancient classification of humans as *rational animals*, there is a real question of where we could locate sexuality as Freud understands it. It is certainly not a manifestation of our

> rationality; but it doesn't express our animal nature either (in the way that breathing or digestion does).
>
> (Lear 2005: 75)

Heidegger would concur: our affective life is already "us," bound up with meaning and not just (Kantian) nature. But Heidegger has little to say about where phenomena of imagination, fantasy, wish-fulfillment and, in general, the "inner life," belong in an ontology of care.[21] Thus if such phenomena are seen, with Lear, as a form of thinking and thus as a "source of psychic unity" (2011: 64) distinct from the unity I establish in authentically taking over being-a-ground, it might appear that Heidegger's ontology leaves something out. For the sorts of failure of reason-responsiveness that support the psychoanalytic thesis seem to entail that affectivity possesses a "logic" of its own, a kind of normative authority whose claim on me must simply be accepted, accommodated in my deliberations lest I perpetuate those (Kantian) rationalizations that contribute to a "brittle self image." Can the kind of fractal meaning that psychoanalysis uncovers be accommodated within the Heideggerian concept of autonomous self-identity?

Normativity and transcendence

Let us begin by noting a significant point of overlap between Lear and Heidegger, namely, their common appeal to the (Platonic) idea of "transcendence." For Lear, the experience of irony reveals that our desire always outstrips our circumstances; a gap can always open up between the prevailing normative "pretenses" that govern my trying (desire) to be a teacher and "an aspiration or ideal" that is "embedded in the pretense" but "seems to transcend the life and the social practices" in which it is embedded (2011: 11). Desire is meaningful, in this sense, because it is ideal. In ironic disruption of any way to "go on," then, all that remains to me is a kind of "Platonic Eros: I am *struck* by teaching – by an intimation of its goodness" (2011: 20). And by its very nature this is a kind of aspiration: "What is peculiar to irony is that it manifests passion for a certain *direction*"; it is "an experience of *would-be-directed* uncanniness," a longing "to go in a certain direction" (2011: 19). It is this *directed* longing that suggests, on Lear's psychoanalytic interpretation, that desire or affectivity can have a logic of its own and can constitute a *distinct* locus of psychic unity, independent of the care structure.[22]

For Heidegger, too, the measure of what it means to be a teacher is never something given but always only *at issue* in what I do. What Lear calls an "internal instability in the signifier" that names my practical identity (2011: 101), an instability that shows up in irony, is thus, for Heidegger, a consequence of Dasein's being an issue for *itself*. In practice, what it means to be a teacher is at stake for me; I am "directed" toward an exemplary meaning that transcends whatever I may in fact do. In Heideggerian terms,

acting for the sake of something is "transcendence," and, like Lear, he links this to Plato's Idea of the Good beyond "being" (*epekeina tes ousias*): "Yet may we interpret the *agathon* as the transcendence of *Dasein*? … The essence of the *agathon* lies in its sovereignty over itself as *hou heneka* – as the 'for the sake of … '" (EG 124).[23] Care is thus orientation (directedness) toward measure, toward the "good." But this is not the cognitive application of norms in the sense of rules. When I commit myself to a practical identity I do not subordinate myself to a "norm" that I simply find somewhere; rather, in acting I *exemplify* one answer to the question of what it means to be a teacher. In Lear's terms, I "put myself forward *as* a professor" (2011: 11).

For instance, it is a prevailing norm of teaching that one provides students with information, trains them in certain skills, and evaluates their progress. But such a norm establishes meaning only when I try to live up to what I understand it to entail. In doing so my actions *express* what I take to be the meaning of teaching, embody my "reflective judgment" in the sense of Kant's third *Critique*. In acting for the sake of what I take to be best, in measuring myself against what I take to be the meaning of teaching, my behavior exhibits what Kant calls "exemplary" necessity: "a necessity of the assent of everyone to a judgment that is regarded as an example of a universal rule that we are unable to state" (Kant 1987: 85). Though public, the reasons generated in this way are *my* reasons in the sense that they depend on my commitment to teaching. But this commitment can collapse in *Angst*, leaving nothing but the "transcendent" orientation toward measure as such. For Heidegger too, then, meaning, as grounded in care, *always* involves the sort of "pretense-transcending aspiring" which, according to Lear, is revealed in irony (2011: 20).

On Lear's psychoanalytic account, however, the transcendence of desire is said to constitute an *independent* source of psychic unity; irony reveals the workings of a fractal logic that competes with my own commitment. Unconscious mental activity, a form of transcendent desire, yields something like an "unconscious practical identity": emotionally "laden motivationally charged structures of meaning" that "tend toward the expression of an unconscious worldview, whereby all experience is interpreted in its terms." Indeed, the "core-fantasy … provides an imaginative answer to the question: Who am I?" (2011: 46). It is thus very much like a Sartrean "fundamental project." "Unconscious fantasy provides an alternative source of unity for the self"; each of us "has an unconscious unifying principle" (2011: 45).[24] Unconscious mental activity does not merely *disrupt* the unity of autonomous self-constitution; it unfolds as a story that is mine in the way that a fate is mine. I do not choose my fate, but it has a normative claim on me beyond what I commit myself to.

Comparison of their mutual appeals to the Platonic picture of transcendence thus reveals a fundamental difference between Lear and Heidegger. For the latter, everyday Dasein is "directed," oriented by the norms that

prevail in *das Man*, set on its way toward exemplifying what it means to be what it is trying to be. In *Angst*, these "pretenses" fall away but Dasein's "would-be-directedness," as orientation toward measure, remains. For Lear, in contrast, irony signifies a third option: a breakdown that reveals not the orientation toward measure as having to take over being-a-ground, but "a passion for a *certain* direction" (2011: 19). The hint of determinateness here (some *particular* direction) seems to allow for, or even demand, another principle of self-unity, a "fractal" meaning whose normative claim on me must be accommodated. And because my desire is itself *out for* something in this way, we must "rethink what it is to be a unified self." Ironic disruption of practical life reveals that "the unity that is available to us is a peculiar form of disunity" (2011: 43). From a Heideggerian point of view, however, there are problems with this picture.

As we saw, being taken up into "existence" imposes constraints of its own on what it is to be a self, conditions without which talk of unconscious practical *identity* is hard to cash in. Above all, such a being must be "competent over being as existing," that is, able to be something in the sense of *trying* to be it. Taking this condition seriously means that we cannot speak of *two* unifying principles but only of two aspects of one and the same unifying principle. Why? Affective life cannot *try* to be anything because there is nothing *at stake* for it, even if we imagine that affects – considered as evolutionary adaptations, perhaps – are out for something. Their fractal character implies as much. Whatever sense one might make of unconscious mental functioning as a form of spontaneity, conditions for attributing *agency* to it are lacking. Even if such processes seize upon manifest intentional content in a way that serves the purpose of deflecting an outbreak of anxiety, for instance, we cannot say that such processes do so *for the sake of* deflecting such an outbreak. In psychoanalytic terms, this would be to attribute ego-functioning to what is supposed to be an altogether different sort of principle.

The Heideggerian concept of facticity does not rule out a fractal affective mental functioning, and it certainly does not reduce the contribution of affective life to the avowal or rejection of mere "impulses" and the promptings of our "animal nature". But it leaves no room for an independent form of selfhood, an affective *project*. If to be a teacher is to try to be one, then to be a self *as such* is to try to be one. Since it is hard to see how affective life *as such* (even one that operates "fractally" with fantasy contents) can fulfill this condition, it is hard to see, from a Heideggerian point of view, how we can speak of an independent unconscious practical *identity*. Whatever identity there is – whatever story my affective and therefore fateful life involves – cannot be a "me" that matters independently of the "autonomous" I who takes responsibility. Another way to put this is to say that the sort of transcendence that Lear attributes to desire – its ability to serve, in the guise of a fantasy image, as a "kind of formal cause" that

"holds together myriad and pervasive activities and features of one's life" (2011: 49) – is possible only as an integral *aspect* of a being who is capable of taking over being-a-ground. The transcendence of desire as "a *would-be-directed* uncanniness" (2011: 19), its being out for something, could constitute meaning and identity only if it could take responsibility for itself. But since my fantasy "identity" cannot commit *itself* to anything, "resolute" Dasein cannot take up its affectivity *as though* it possessed independent normative authority.

Consider again Lear's analysis of the experience of irony. In exercising my practical identity as a teacher it can happen that I am brought up short by the transcendence of my commitment: it feels as though all my previous attempts to live up to what it means to be a teacher fall *wildly* short of that meaning. But is this sort of quarantined anxiety even conceivable? If what it means to be a teacher can be identified neither with the everyday practices of teaching nor with the critical examination of how those practices fall short, what gives content to my commitment? What distinguishes it from commitment to being a father or a politician? In irony we are always on the verge of losing our grip on what we are committed to. Certainly, I will still *talk* as though I am committed to "teaching," but the word has lost its sense. On Heideggerian grounds, then, quarantined anxiety appears to be an unstable phenomenon. We should expect that the experience of irony, so described, will tend toward a global collapse of meaning in which my "commitment" to being a teacher will be revealed for what it is: the demand that, to be a self, I take responsibility for (the normative force of) the measures in terms of which I measure myself – i.e., for measure as such, not this one or that.

Lear's appeal to fantasy as a unifying principle, to an unconscious practical *identity*, glosses over this point. For it is not as though what shows itself in irony is that my unconscious practical identity is *to be a teacher*. Rather, in the collapse of the meanings ("pretenses") that enable me to go on as a teacher, I am overwhelmed by an inchoate "desire" that, though fractally patterned, cannot be identified with any of my particular practical identities. In this sense I cannot *name* what is at stake in irony. For Heidegger, the transcendence in which affectivity is implicated means orientation toward measure; for Lear, psychoanalysis suggests that my desire is for the sake of something specific, which would be the "me" that matters. But while *something* matters to me, enigmatically, in my affectivity, what it *is* can be determined only insofar as I take it over in being-a-ground, make it the stakes of my trying to be.

Thus to the extent that psychoanalysis is correct in treating affects as already more than "nature," as already meaningful, it must be taken to *confirm* Heidegger's claim that facticity is not an independent source of meaning but has always already been "taken up into existence." The kind of "thinking" that characterizes unconscious mental activity is possible only

for a being whose affectivity ("desire") is responsive to normative distinctions. The fantasy equivalences employed by such thinking can function *as* equivalences only in such a being. Because non-human animals do not have this sort of fantasy life, they cannot be neurotic; their desire is not transcendent, because what it means to be is not at stake for them. Lear admits that "fantasy life feeds off of (and informs) real-life experiences in oblique ways," insisting only that it "is also insulated from them" (2011: 71). Such insulation, however, cannot mean that fractal mental life is a world of meaning whose ersatz – because unconscious – commitment (to a "core fantasy" or "fundamental value") would introduce a principle of disunity into the care structure. Fantasy life is parasitical on practical experience in Heidegger's sense, even if it has been impressed into the service of a fractal logic. The kind of affectivity or desire that Freud describes is possible only *within* the unity of the care structure because affectivity is not by itself "transcendent." It becomes so in a being for whom its being is an issue for it. The unconscious must be grasped as a modification of care.

Vulnerable reason: two models of transparency

This is not a trivial point, for it requires us to rethink Lear's idea of what it is to achieve integrity. To conclude, then, let us return to the question of what taking responsibility for my affective life might be, where the latter includes something like the unconscious mental activity that psychoanalysis discovers. On Heidegger's view, authentic existence is a kind of transparency regarding my relation to the things that claim me in the world – the norms of my practical identity and the affective mattering of the world as a whole. In taking over being-a-ground transparently, I experience myself as responsible for the normative *force* of the measures according to which I act – that is, I recognize that that very force is at issue in what I am trying to be, since the meaning of my identity is at stake. Heidegger describes this sort of transparency as "wanting to have a conscience" that has become "readiness for anxiety" (*SZ* 296). This is how responsibility for measure is *enacted* in the very same practical identities that constitute the "pretenses" of the everyday. Formally, this tracks what Lear, too, sees as the kind of self-knowledge "available to creatures like us," which he calls "ironic existence" (2011: 30). To appreciate the points of convergence and divergence between Lear and Heidegger here, we will do well to examine what Lear identifies as the goal of therapy, namely, the cultivation of a "capacity for irony" (2011: 57).

For Lear, the goal of therapy – and so also the goal of one who does not need therapy because she is not suffering in a way that would lead her to it – is a mode of being which is both committed (norm-responsive) and also "poetic," i.e., a flexible, "creative, life-enhancing way of negotiating internal and external realities" (2011: 71). In order to bring the *whole* self into this process it is not enough to be "autonomous" in the sense of evaluating a course

of action in light of my commitment to the norms of some practical identity; rather, I must establish "creative and vibrant communication between id, ego, and super-ego." This allows me to "speak for myself" for the first time, to develop a "practical skill" at constituting the self (Lear 2005: 222).

This practical skill – "cultivating a capacity for irony" – is Lear's version of authentic transparency. In explicit contrast to Richard Rorty's understanding of the ironist – who has developed radical "doubt" or skepticism about the truth-claims of her own "final vocabularies," having been impressed by the multiplicity of such vocabularies and the apparent impossibility of any rational way of deciding between them – Lear understands ironic existence as fostering "a more earnest commitment" to what one ultimately cares about (2011: 38).[25] It is not the groundlessness of our commitments that is revealed in irony, but their "vulnerability": existing ironically, I will simultaneously act in light of "my best understanding" of what it means to be (say) a teacher, while remaining open to the *possibility* of "ironic disruption" (2011: 31). Ironic existence is thus a form of "truthfulness," since it enacts my awareness that "the concepts with which we understand ourselves and live our lives have a certain vulnerability built into them" (2011: 31), a certain "instability in a master signifier that has been installed within me" (2011: 117).

Like Heidegger, Lear's model of transparent self-responsibility rejects the Kantian idea that self-identity is constituted *through* rationality, i.e., through imposing the form of law on the material supplied by one's animal nature. Also like Heidegger, Lear sees self-transparency as connected to a notion of reason that takes its own vulnerability into account (2011: 31, 67). Nevertheless, there are some significant differences in how my responsibility for reasons is construed in the two accounts, differences that stem from different stances toward affectivity. For Lear, the goal of therapy is to attain "practical mastery" over the "fractal nature" of the "elemental structure that dominates [one's] life" – that is, "to recognize this structure *as it is unfolding*" in the moment of decision and action "and to acquire the ability to intervene and change its course" (2005: 50). Being rational, thus, is the practical skill of creating "communication" between the fractal meaning belonging to desire, on the one hand, and the meaning constituted in self-conscious reasoning, on the other. And this defines self-responsibility.

> Psychoanalytically understood, free speech is correlative to my ability to take responsibility for myself. For I am now responsive to myself in ways that eluded me before; and thus when I take a stand in speech or action, it is I who take the stand.
>
> (2005: 222)

In order to accomplish this, however, it is not enough that I understand, cognitively, the elemental structure that has me in its grip. Because it is essential to the model of transparency as communication that the fractal

operations of fantasy life are not (directly) available to me, I cannot take responsibility for my affective life merely by *recognizing*, for example, that my excessive anger at the sleeping student is an infantile reaction that fractally reflects a recurring, anxiety-inhibiting swerve toward the world. Such cognitive avowal cannot establish the right kind of unity between the aspects of my self; indeed, it can facilitate the fractal pattern that led to the disruption of my practical life in the first place. The proper way of "living with one's fantasies," according to Lear, "cannot be adequately grasped by our ordinary understanding of what it means to be self-consciously aware – and able to articulate verbally what our fantasies and emotions are" (2011: 124). Rather, I must "express" them; in doing so "I am *putting myself into words*. I am right there in the words that are expressing (as well as perhaps describing) who I am" (2011: 59). The expressive aspect distinguishes this from the sort of avowal of reason-responsive appropriateness that Moran describes, but it nevertheless affords me a certain "first-person authority with respect to" the "organizing fantasy of my affective life" (2011: 59). Such first-person authority, embodied in a capacity for irony, is a way of letting "interiority" (fantasy, rather than the "world") be in such a way that it "facilitates my ability to shape my practical identity" (2011: 59). Expressive avowal provides me with *vulnerable* reasons for going on in a certain way. The way I take responsibility for reasons must be an expression *of* my affectivity.

Formally, then, Lear's criticism of Kantian moral psychology tracks the Heideggerian move from the conception of the self as rational animal to care, in which one's relation to reasons is a function of the transcendence toward measure that precedes any relation to "law or ought." For Heidegger, too, affectivity (including unconscious mental activity) is not antithetical to reason but informs what (human) reason *is*.[26] But if unconscious mental life is *insulated* from the ego's self-reflection, Heidegger's conception of self-responsibility might seem to be a recipe for rationalization. If Heideggerian autonomy were equivalent to cognitive avowal, treating factic grounds as potentially justifying reasons might seem to be a way of substituting excuses, explanations, or wishes for what really motivates me. However, this is not how Heideggerian self-transparency is structured. Existential commitment and avowal, like the capacity for irony, already attest to the vulnerability of my reasons insofar as they are grounded in "wanting to have a conscience" that has become "readiness for anxiety" (SZ 296).[27]

Consider again the example of being a teacher. If my ongoing activity is disrupted by anxiety, I-myself am revealed as responsible for the measures according to which I act. In this condition I can neither act nor deliberate. But anxiety *passes*, and when it does I will once again be affectively drawn to (some of) my previous involvements – for instance, being a teacher. If I act authentically, I will transparently enact my responsibility for what being a teacher *means* – that is, I will be *ready* for the anxious breakdown of what I nevertheless avow as what is best, of the "rule" that I cannot state but

which orients my behavior. This is not to endorse some proposition or to avow the reason-responsiveness of some affect; it is to take over the enigma of being in risking myself as an example, a *living* acknowledgement that there is "an internal instability" in the "signifier" that names what I am trying to be (Lear 2011: 101). Heideggerian transparency (exemplarity) thus involves the sort of poetic openness that Lear champions: I do not apply a law (the Kantian model) but *feel my way* toward what lives up to the stakes of being a teacher. Taking responsibility for what being a teacher means thus comes quite close to cultivating a capacity for irony, since it lives from the recognition that meaning is always at stake (or "ideal"), that there is always a gap between ontic "pretenses" and my transcendence toward their measure. On this basis I will act on what I take to be the best thing to do – that is, what moves me will take the form of a (vulnerable) reason. In Lear's terms, it gives me a *kind* of first-person authority (2011: 59). The reason is vulnerable not just because it is defeasible, but because it is not a transcription ("articulation") of what is going on at the level of unconscious fantasy. Rather, it *expresses* that fantasy, responds to its pull in a way that allows my behavior to exemplify what it means for me to be. Responsibility for one's affective life is not, therefore, a matter of subordinating one's impulses to a law whose absence would leave the self an incoherent bundle; it is a way of holding one's affective life *and* one's deliberative ability to an orientation toward measure. The meaning of my desire, and what gets articulated as my reasons, both arise from this sort of responsibility.

When I transparently take over my anger as a reason for acting in a certain way toward the student I may, of course, be entirely unaware of its fractal meaning. That I have failed to get to the bottom of my anger does not mean that I am not acting as I-myself. I am taking responsibility (in a defeasable way) for my affectivity, i.e., for its being the sort of motive on which in this case I find it normatively appropriate to act. But I will also be aware of the *vulnerability* of my reason, the possibility that its claim to be what is best could "fall *wildly* short" of the meaning at stake in my commitment. If part of such vulnerability stems from the presence of a fractal affective complex that functions right alongside the exercise of my existential responsibility, I may have to undergo analysis to discover that. But if subsequently I transparently let it inform my behavior, give it voice poetically by acknowledging its *desire* to mean something, this is not equivalent to unifying myself in a way other than taking over being-a-ground. To become *sensitive* to the proto-meaning that matters to me in my unconscious mental life is not equivalent to granting it the normative status of another self-identity. I have not simply *acquiesced* in the direction that my affective fantasy life wants to take me; I have brought it "expressively" into a "unified deliberative field"[28] where it can take on meaning for the first time as more than a mere impulse by becoming a pattern that "is" me in the way that affectivity is inseparable from care.

Suppose, for instance, that I have learned, through analysis, that my rage expresses a certain constellation of fantasy meaning. I might use this understanding cognitively to modify my behavior – perhaps acting with more forbearance toward the student than I would if I lacked this insight; or perhaps I poetically give it free rein in order to enable the offending individual to feel my pain. But no matter *how* I deal with that understanding, responsibility for my affective life will take the form of a reason: I treat the student this way rather than that because I hold it best to do so; I take responsibility for what my anger will mean here and now.

This sort of vulnerable reason is certainly capacious enough to incorporate a system that is insulated from direct reflective access. Because vulnerable reasons arise from I-myself in the unity of the care structure and not from one "faculty" that imposes the form of "law" on another, Heideggerian rationality, no less than Lear's psychoanalytic version, is a matter of "being in one's words," having the fantasy meaning "right there in one's words." Therefore, the kind of integrity this establishes is not so much an alternative to the Heideggerian model of the self as autonomous and responsible for taking over being-a-ground as it is a version of it – a way of being responsible for reasons by being responsive to how my commitments reflect what affectively matters to me, even when they pull in contrary directions (Lear's sense of "disunity"). Whatever I know or feel about my unconscious fractal identity will make *sense* only so far as I take it over *as* my ground, treat it as a potentially justifying reason for me to act. This is neither to rationalize nor to explain my behavior but to bring it into the *logos*. It is what we might call "conscience" in the ordinary sense: I act this way here and now because I feel that it is right, that it "trues up" who I *am* – even though I cannot name what is affectively at issue in the enigma of my being. To be transparently at stake beyond the pretenses of the normative order I inhabit is a form of irony – wanting to have a conscience that has become readiness for anxiety – and this is a way of being responsible for reasons. My affective fantasy life does not bind me in a normative way, even if it *claims* me as a fate which I must endure. The normative question is what I am to *do* about it.[29]

Notes

1 Further elaboration of this point, and of the argument in the section "Responsibility and reason-giving" below, can be found in Crowell 2007a and Crowell 2013.

2 Heidegger's argument is actually more general: it is not merely equipment whose intelligibility cannot be traced to the rational capacities of an individual mind; the point holds as well of mathematical entities, natural entities, and so on. But the complications do not affect the argument of this chapter.

3 Of course, in various places (including the page preceding the quote above) Heidegger also says that "Authentic being-one's-self takes the definite form of an existentiell modification of the 'one' [*das Man*]" (*SZ* 267), and even that the one-self is an "existentiell modification of the authentic self" (*SZ* 317).The

philological issues cannot be sorted out here, but the phenomenological grounds for my preferring the reading introduced in the text are sketched below and elaborated in Crowell 2001 and Crowell 2013.

4 See the seminal paper by William Blattner 1994, who introduced this idea.

5 The point here is nicely expressed by Katherine Withy: "[T]hrownness is something more original or more basic than the fact that we are always in particular situations" (Withy 2011: 12).

6 One might be tempted to say that I endorse the normative force that it *already* has in the social world I inhabit; there is, after all, a norm that holds "slighting" someone, disrespecting him or her, to be morally blameworthy. But the point here concerns the connection between my *affect* and my behavior: in *acting* on my anger (say, by calling out the person in question), I make it *my* reason and only in this way does the norm have normative force or motivational efficacy at all. From the standpoint of the one-self it will appear that the norm in question has normative force all by itself, but this is precisely the view that is challenged in the analysis of the radical first-person singular in Division Two.

7 This is true even for the self as analyzed in Division One, for there "they" (*das Man*) take responsibility for normative force: They "deprive the particular Dasein of its answerability." They can "be answerable for everything most easily, because [they are] not someone who needs to vouch for anything" (SZ 127).

8 It is certainly not unreasonable to approach affectivity through its connection with the body, as Ratcliffe (2008: 105-16) does. Heidegger himself makes the connection in his *Zollikon Seminars*. But even here he does not attribute priority to the concept of body (*Leib*) in the analysis of affect; rather, as in *Being and Time*, body, as "bodying forth" (*leiben*), is understood from the unity of the care structure. Body is disclosed through affectivity and projection; it is no more an independent *explanans* than is "consciousness" or reason, both of which, too, are understood on the basis of care: "Bodily being [*das Leibliche*] is founded upon responding [*Entsprechen*] [to a world]. Bodily being is *not* first something present for itself … through which a relationship-current [*Bezugstrom*] is then transmitted, like a current transmitted through the hand" (ZS 186).

9 As Withy (2011: 14) puts the point: "That we are thrown *into* the human *situation* does not make pure thrownness a dimension of our situation."

10 See Crowell 2007b for an argument against Christine Korsgaard's derivation of the "normative question" from self-consciousness.

11 Some examples include Barbaras 2006 and Figal 2006. We shall examine a psychoanalytic variation of this view below.

12 Herman (1993: 11-12) writes:

> The key to understanding Kant is in the idea that moral worth does not turn on the presence or absence of inclination supporting an action, but on its inclusion in the agent's maxim, *as* a determining ground of action: as a motive. Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his *reasons* for acting. An agent may take the presence of a desire to give him a reason for action as he may also find reasons in his passions, principles, or practical interests. All of these, in themselves, are 'incentives' (*Triebfedern*), not motives, to action. It is the mark of a rational agent that incentives determine the will only as they are taken up into an agent's maxim. Indeed, it is only when an agent has a maxim that we can talk about his motive.

13 On this point see Crowell 2013: ch. 10, "Being Answerable: Reason-Giving and the Ontological Meaning of Discourse."

14 Freud's understanding of anxiety is of course not identical to Heidegger's. For instance, Heidegger does not commit himself to the Freudian explanation of anxiety as the "quantitative element" of a displaced instinctual impulse (Freud 1963a: 112). But as I will argue in the following section, the two concepts overlap in holding anxiety to be an objectless affect that yields patterns of flight or "repression."
15 This is Simon Glendinning's way of characterizing Derrida's departure from the sort of transcendental phenomenology found in Husserl and Heidegger (Glendinning 2007: 201), but it is an apt description of many broadly structuralist approaches to meaning. See also Thomas Khurana's (2002) analysis of the Freudian unconscious as a precursor to the approaches of Lacan and Luhmann, which explicitly enact this de-substantializing of meaning and the psyche, its "dispersion" into structure. Lear ascribes a version of this idea to Freud (Lear 2005: 108).
16 This "instability," as we shall see below, is precisely Dasein, who cannot be without being an issue for itself.
17 Lear discusses these matters – which, constitute but one way in which such activity functions – at Lear 2005: 124-43.
18 For a philosophically informed account of unconscious mental processes see Gardner 1993.
19 What I know of fractals is entirely due to the helpful guidance of Jeffrey Yoshimi, to whom I am grateful for criticisms of an earlier version of this section. He is, of course, innocent of any misuse I may have made of that guidance.
20 For Moran's response see "Psychoanalysis and the Limits of Reflection", in Lear 2011: 103-14.
21 Though Heidegger's *Zollikon Seminars* include conversations with psychoanalysts that have implications for our theme, treatment must be postponed to another occasion.
22 For Lear, this is already a function of the *teleological* structure of normal emotional development, and in this way his position conforms to the neo-Aristotelian "life"-philosophies mentioned in note 11 above. See Lear 2005: 33ff. and 2011: 123.
23 For a fuller discussion of this point, see Crowell 2007a.
24 Lear interprets Freud himself in these terms. Freud's analysis of his own dreams shows "that Freud had already organized his life around a fundamental value – to amount to something in his father's eyes – without realizing that he had" (Lear 2005: 97).
25 Lear discusses Rorty at Lear 2011: 37ff. Whether he can ultimately distinguish his own view from Rorty's is not altogether clear, however.
26 In this respect the findings of psychoanalysis can help us to understand the scope and implications of Heidegger's own "fundamental ontology," which is methodologically sketchy on issues of philosophical anthropology.
27 William Blattner (2012: 166-174) does a nice job of glossing Heidegger's account of the "vulnerability of one's deepest entanglements and commitments," and my concept of "vulnerable reasons" is something of an extension of his discussion.
28 I borrow this notion from Barbara Herman, since it seems better suited to characterize the deliberative situation than the model of an agent subsuming animal nature under rational law – that is, it more closely approximates the Heideggerian conception of an agent who stands toward its "inner" and "outer" realities as toward a field, or world, in which it must negotiate various putatively normative claims, including those of its fractally patterned desires. In a unified deliberative field "what matters, what is of value, including both the agent's preferences (her interests, in the traditional sense) and the moral features of her circumstances, is presented" (Herman 1993: 182). Heidegger and Lear would both agree, I think, that the deliverances of unconscious mental activity belong

to such a field. As Herman notes, "Attention to all of the elements of the field is not automatic and may not even be possible." But it is I-myself, in taking over being-a-ground, who makes it precisely a *unified* deliberative field.

29 For their very helpful criticisms and comments on earlier drafts of this chapter, I would like to thank William Blattner, Jonathan Lear, Denis McManus, Inga Römer, Joseph Rouse, Joseph Schear, László Tengely, Katherine Withy, and Jeffrey Yoshimi.

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14

EARLY HEIDEGGER AND SARTRE ON AUTHENTICITY

Peter Poellner

Authenticity in *Being and Time*

One of the most intriguing aspects of the existential philosophies of the early twentieth century – above all, Heidegger's and Sartre's – is their complex, ambiguous relation to ideas of transcendence associated with traditional religious conceptions. In the case of Heidegger's early existential phenomenology, commentators have often identified affinities between his concept of authenticity in *Being and Time* and ideas of conversion familiar from such traditions.[1] Heideggerian *Eigentlichkeit*, the possible human self-relation described, or pointed to – 'formally indicated' – in Division Two of *Being and Time* discloses Dasein to itself as necessarily in the world but not of the world. Authenticity, whatever else it is, involves a modification of human being-in-the-world in which Dasein not merely recognizes but *enacts* in a self-perspicuous manner its existential truth: a truth which encompasses a number of conceptually distinguishable structural elements or moments in an essentially unified concrete mode of comportment. These moments include, at least, the following: In authenticity, Dasein (1) understands itself transparently as being other than any possible object or instrument – being neither just occurrent (*vorhanden*) nor available (*zuhanden*) – and this self-understanding is not, or at least not fundamentally and essentially, a matter of judgement (since judgement represents entities as *intentional objects*). Positively, authentic Dasein (2) understands itself as essentially possibility or ability-to-be, as projection towards possibilities, while not being constituted or defined by the content of any possible intra-worldly project. Authentic Dasein, further, (3) enacts an understanding of itself as finite, as thrown projection, and this in a twofold sense: it grasps the grounds of its projection as not within its own power. All projection towards existentiell possibilities – being a writer, revolutionary, and so on – has part of its normative basis in an affective attunedness with which Dasein *finds* itself, which cannot be actively chosen, conferred or disposed over by

Dasein itself. This is true not only for inauthentic Dasein that identifies itself, whether reflectively or pre-reflectively, with some publicly available intraworldly set of ends or social roles, but also for authentic being-in-the-world that understands its non-identity with any intraworldly project or role. Dasein cannot fully transcend or leave behind the public structures of normativity in which it finds itself (*SZ* 130),[2] and even the privileged affective attunedness that discloses to Dasein its non-identity with anything intraworldly is not within Dasein's power. The second aspect of authentic Dasein's perspicuous self-disclosure as finite is the phenomenon Heidegger calls 'forerunning towards death', indicating a particular manner in which Dasein grasps, as indefinite yet certain beyond evidence, the impending of its *own* impossibility (*SZ* 260-67). Authentic Dasein thus enacts an understanding of itself as finite thrown projection bounded by two impossibilities: the impossibility of being its own ground and the certain, distinctively impending impossibility of its ability to exist. Dasein essentially is ontic transcendence without the possibility of a certain kind of ontological transcendence envisaged in the religious traditions: there can be no transcendence of its constitutive incompleteness, of the very structure of thrown projection Heidegger has described. Dasein, if it relates to itself truthfully, understands itself through the attunement of anxiety, the call of conscience, and forerunning towards death, *as* inescapably finite projection.

This brief and partial gloss on Heideggerian authentic resolvedness (*Entschlossenheit*) skims over many details and interpretative problems. But it is perhaps sufficient as a springboard for three questions I would like to look at in this chapter. It is clear that Heidegger, like other existential philosophers, wishes to *recommend* the stance of authenticity. The existential self-perspicuousness which he points towards is touted as somehow superior to 'fallenness' in a motivational sense – to the motivated absorption by intraworldly ends, goods, or desires. This raises the following pressing questions: (1) What are the *motives* of the existentiell transformation indicated in Division Two of *Being and Time*? (2) Can there be anything like a *justification* for the privilege Heidegger accords to the stance or orientation he calls authenticity? Can that valorization, mostly implicit yet palpable throughout the text of *Being and Time*, be made intelligible in terms of some suitably broad understanding of *reasons*? And (3), if it is correct to say that there is a partial affinity with traditional conceptions of conversion in Heidegger's account of authenticity (Merker 1988: 166-68), why is it that the possibility of ontological transcendence is excluded by Heidegger and by other existential philosophers influenced by him? It is probably fair to say that in *Being and Time* none of these questions are addressed explicitly and in detail. With respect to the first question, the global breakdown of significance marked by the term 'anxiety' is said to *separate* Dasein from the referential totalities or contexts of significance which had absorbed Dasein in its everyday taking care of (*Besorgen*) and caring-for (*Fürsorgen*), both

governed by the anonymous normative structures of the Anyone (*das Man*) (SZ 186-89). And this attunedness of not-being-at-home in the world makes possible the disclosure of ontological 'guilt' or 'nullity' (finitude) revealed in the call of conscience (SZ 283-86). Anxiety 'reveals in Dasein a being towards its ownmost ability-to-be, that is, a being free for the freedom of choosing and seizing itself. Anxiety confronts Dasein with its being-free-for … the authenticity of its being as possibility, which it always already is' (SZ 188). I am tempted to read this passage as suggesting that anxiety, by severing Dasein from any intraworldly end (for-the-sake-of-which), explicitly or thematically discloses Dasein to itself as pure individualized ability-to-be, as not constituted by any wordly end or role or project, and it confronts Dasein with the possibility of 'choosing' itself as such. Heidegger says that this 'authenticity of its being as possibility' is one that Dasein 'always already' is, meaning presumably that its not-at-homeness in the world only becomes *explicit*, as it were full-blown, in authenticity while being *implicit* even in average everydayness: 'anxiety latently determines being-in-the-world always already' (SZ 189), and it is therefore the basic attunement (*Grundstimmung*). And it seems clear that Heidegger has to say that even tranquilized average everydayness is implicitly anxious, and thus not-at-home in the world, if anxiety is to bring Dasein explicitly face to face with its truth, rather than distorting it or evincing a deficient mode of being-in-the-world. This perhaps also explains why Heidegger can say without inconsistency that the call of conscience, the explicit disclosure of Dasein's ontological 'guilt', can issue from 'Dasein itself in its unsettledness, [… from] being-in-the-world as non-being-at-home' (SZ 276). This might *seem* inconsistent, since the call of conscience is supposed to be the phenomenon through or in which Dasein is brought back to itself from its lostness in the anonymous Anyone.[3] If the call is to issue from Dasein in its unhomeliness, it might seem to be either unnecessary, since Dasein would have to be already individuated as not-at-home-in-the-world, or impossible. But the structure of Heidegger's account, it seems to me, enables him to say that the violent rupture with everyday familiarity which is the call of conscience is an auto-affection that can in certain circumstances issue from an always present, if *normally implicit*, anxiety, that very anxiety which fundamentally characterizes Dasein as 'not-being-at-home' in the world. Explicit, un-covered-up anxiety and the call of conscience are equiprimordial phenomena, both depending upon 'latent anxiety', which 'always already determines being-in-the-world' (SZ 189). In his description of the call of conscience Heidegger gives further important clues as to what Dasein's 'choosing and seizing itself' might involve:

> The Anyone hides even its tacit unburdening of Dasein with respect to any explicit *choice* [*ausdrückliche Wahl*] of … possibilities. … This choiceless getting carried along by Nobody, whereby Dasein

> entangles itself in inauthenticity, can only be reversed by Dasein's bringing itself back to itself from its lostness in the Anyone. But this bringing back must have the very mode of being by the *neglect* of which Dasein has lost itself in inauthenticity. This bringing-itself-back from the Anyone, that is to say, the existentiell modification of the Anyone-self towards authentic selfhood, must be accomplished by the *re-taking of a choice*. Re-taking of a choice means, however, *choosing that choice*, deciding upon an ability-to-be from one's own self.
>
> (SZ 268)[4]

There is much that is going on in this typically dense passage, but one point that seems to be made quite unequivocally is that Dasein's 'seizing itself' involves explicit choosing as opposed to the absorbed, non-reflective projection guided by public norms, the comportment-type that is constitutive of the inauthentic anonymous Anyone-self. Anxiety discloses Dasein as individualized ability-to-be, and the call of conscience calls for this ability-to-be to manifest itself as choice in a demanding sense, as explicit and *reflectively endorsed* decision. Understanding myself authentically would thus seem to involve, roughly, choosing explicitly in the lucid awareness of my double finitude, in such a way that the public significances upon which my choice necessarily remains parasitic show up for me neither as worldly impositions or demands nor as fully expressive of or defining who I am in terms of their *content*, but rather as significances which owe their normative authority, at least in part, to my choice. Value or significance for Heidegger's authentic Dasein seems to depend, in self-transparent manner, on explicit choice, and this implies that what is affirmed by authentic Dasein must include most fundamentally its 'being-free' for such choice: hence Heidegger's remark that authentic selfhood essentially involves 're-taking of a choice' and that this implies 'choosing that choice', i.e. affirming or *endorsing choice* as what (in part) normatively grounds my commitment. Thus, no commitment to any specific worldly value-content or significance seems to be either necessary or sufficient for Dasein to be authentic, but a certain relation to Dasein's own choosing is at least necessary and arguably also sufficient.

Assuming for the moment that this interpretation is not completely misguided, let me return to question (1): what should *motivate* Dasein to 'choose itself', if 'choosing itself' means, roughly 'explicitly choosing, endorsing, itself as a situated, finite, thrown chooser', a 'finite freedom' (SZ 384)? Heidegger speaks of this 'authentic resolvedness' as 'going along with' a 'fortified joy' (*gerüstete Freude*; SZ 310), and this might suggest some kind of eudaimonism, purified no doubt of the ontological inadequacies of classical eudaimonism. But such an understanding of what might motivate authentic resolvedness seems off the mark for a variety of reasons. To begin with, the correlation between choosing oneself and the joy that is said to 'go with' it

seems at best contingent. It would be highly implausible to claim that anything that might count as self-choosing in the sense outlined would have to be necessarily joyful. Or at least, if such a claim were to be made appealing, more would need to be built into the idea of self-choosing than can be found explicitly in Heidegger's text. But second, such an ontologically purified eudaimonism also sits uneasily with Heidegger's insistence throughout *Being and Time* that Dasein is always disposed to disburden itself, to *flee* from anxiety into absorption by the world (cf. SZ 134-35). Thus, what Heidegger tells us explicitly about Dasein's motivation for 'choosing itself' seems insufficient to explain why Dasein should not seek to return to absorption if this possibility presents itself – and it would be hard to argue that such a possibility simply can no longer beckon if anxiety has once become explicit. It seems to me that Heidegger's text is equally elusive with respect to the other two questions I mentioned earlier: what is the *justification* of the evaluative privilege accorded, mostly implicitly, but in at least one passage also explicitly (SZ 310), to authentic self-understanding? And why does the Heidegger of *Being and Time* exclude the possibility of what I have called ontological transcendence: a transcendence of Dasein's *Seinsverfassung* as finite projection? There may be hidden resources in Heidegger's text towards answering these questions, but I want to approach them in the remainder of this chapter by turning to another writer in the existential tradition who spent much effort on addressing them quite explicitly: Jean-Paul Sartre. The differences between the early Sartre's and the early Heidegger's projects and approaches are well-known, but there is perhaps, contrary to what is often claimed, a sufficiently large area of convergence to make Sartre's answers at least relevant to Heidegger's analysis. If nothing else, they invite us to reflect on why Sartre's answers are not available to Heidegger, if indeed they are not.

Early Sartre on the conversion to authenticity

Corresponding to Heidegger's being-in-the world we find, in Sartre's writings of the 1930s and 1940s, the concept of the *for-itself* or the *human reality*. The for-itself is essentially embodied consciousness in necessary correlation with a world of objects (Sartre 2003: 27, 329). The phenomenologically basic mode of givenness of objects is in terms of instrumental features that are determined by, and reflect, the for-itself's projects. Sartre, unlike Heidegger, sees no difficulty in thinking of items encountered in an equipmental context as, in their most basic practical mode of presentation, intentional objects, arguably for two reasons. First, an object, in Sartre's use of the term, is an item which manifests itself or appears as *transcendent* to any one experience in which it is encountered (Sartre 2003: 7-8). This means that it is given as other than, as over-against, the consciousness to which it is given. This over-againstness is a function of what he calls an object's essential opacity. For something to be given to me as an object it is necessary and sufficient

that it should appear in any experience of it as having additional aspects or profiles not currently given, and providing for the possibility of reidentifying the item as the same under these different manners of presentation. The object is in this sense necessarily opaque to, or equivalently, transcendent of, the experience. An imagined unicorn is an object for me, for I am only imagining a *unicorn* if I take the referent of my imagining act to have all manner of aspects which I do not currently imagine but which, were I to imagine them, could be experienced by me as presenting the *same* animal or animal-type under a different aspect.

Second, Sartre holds that all consciousness of a world either includes, or more weakly, depends on, attentional thematizing, which is necessary for anything to be given as an object: it is what makes object-representation possible. And he claims that the fact that all world-consciousness involves such a thetic or positional component implies that all conscious comportment in or towards the world, including all practical engagement, includes or depends on an awareness of items which are given as objects. Heidegger, by contrast, on a familiar and plausible interpretation of his analysis of taking-care-of (*Besorgen*) available equipment, denies that either of these two elements is essentially involved in this mode of comportment.[5] In taking-care-of an item of equipment it need neither be presented to me as transcendent or over-against-me in Sartre's sense, nor, therefore, need it be attentionally thematized; equipment is typically unthematic or 'inconspicuous'. Sartre is thus committed to rejecting the Heideggerian analysis of taking-care-of equipment as the fundamental mode of intentional comportment.

Now, there are two objections that immediately spring to mind here, combining Husserlian and Heideggerian insights. First, it might be said, *contra* Sartre, that attentional thematizing may be necessary but is not sufficient for objecthood: objecthood also involves the idea of *decontextualization*. Something is only an object for me at a time if at the time I have the actual ability to re-present or re-identify the object as the same on possible other occasions (Husserl 1973: § 13; Cf. McDowell 1994: 56-60, 170-74). And this, Heidegger may be taken plausibly to suggest, is an ability I need not have with respect to the items I encounter as equipment. Second, Heidegger seems right in insisting that in taking-care-of (coping with) equipment I need not be, and usually am not, thetically conscious of the equipment, which accordingly cannot be given as an object – as *vorhanden* – to me (SZ 69).[6] I think Sartre might respond to these objections by weakening his claim: not all consciousness of worldly items may be thetic (objectifying), but all such consciousness depends on thetic experience. In coping with equipment, an item of equipment may indeed be inconspicuous, but not *everything* in the equipmental nexus can be inconspicuous, unless we are talking not about adaptable, personal-level *Besorgen*, but about a subpersonal automatic routine (Schatzki 2000: 30-38). As regards the decontexualization point, Sartre might reply that I can only use an item as equipment in a context-dependent

way if I have previously objectified it or items of its type: the violin player's absorbed skill depends on long, painstaking, analytical-objectifying practice. Practical engagement with an instrumental complex therefore involves or is dependent on object intentionality. The important point in the present context is that, since Sartre takes object intentionality as fundamental at least in the sense I have just adumbrated, it is readily intelligible why he should insist that all experience involves a *fissure*, an at least residual and implicit awareness of the world as over-against or other than consciousness, as *not*-consciousness (Sartre 2003: 163). And this claim is at least part of his motivation for the idea, which he emphatically shares with Heidegger, that the human reality is always at least latently aware of being in the world but not of the world, of not being at home in it. (Note that on Heidegger's analysis of average everydayness in Division One, the warrant for this idea is less clear.)

Consciousness's experienced non-identity with its objects is one aspect of its mode of existence, which Sartre calls nihilation. It is intimately connected with another aspect, the much-vaunted freedom of consciousness. I cannot do justice here to the complexities of Sartre's view of this, but a few words are indispensable as background for the remainder of my argument. I think we need to distinguish two features in Sartre's account of freedom, one of which seems to me extremely insightful and important, the other deeply problematic. For a variety of reasons, Sartre thinks that consciousness is always aware not only of its objects, but also of itself, and this self-awareness always involves a pre-reflective, non-thetic, non-objectifying dimension (Sartre 2003: 8-10). When I am thetically focused on and angry about the Iraq war I am aware not only of an object – in this case, a real state of affairs – but also, without needing to reflect, of my *anger*; when I thetically imagine Ulysses' homecoming, I am aware not only of a fictional state of affairs, but also, without needing to reflect, of my *imagining* it, and so forth. When Sartre speaks of consciousness, he usually means such *experiential attitudes* towards some objective content, although he sometimes also uses the term to refer to this *plus* the content as-experienced. Since the basic mode of my awareness of my own experiences is necessarily non-reflective, and reflective self-consciousness is founded on it, self-consciousness is at the fundamental level non-thetic, and hence does not have an act–object structure; consciousness is pre-reflectively aware of itself not as something *over-against* itself: it is aware of itself by being itself. Its being *is* its non-thetic self-awareness as being thetically aware of some object distinct from itself. It follows that pre-reflective consciousness has no opacity, since opacity is sufficient for object-being. Every experiential attitude is translucent – fully present – to itself.

Now, Sartre argues that if consciousness-as-lived is necessarily conscious (of) itself – if every experience is non-thetically, non-cognitively, *self-manifesting* – and if it has no opacity (no hidden profiles), it follows that consciousness is,

in a sense, *absolute* (Sartre 2003: 11-12). Consciousness-as-lived (i.e. every experience-as-lived) being necessarily translucent, it cannot be determined by anything unless it *experiences* itself as determined, and hence it cannot be determined by anything of which it is unconscious. There is therefore a sense in which consciousness-as-lived is continually self-determining: nothing that I am not presently conscious of can now determine me qua lived consciousness, and this is true for every 'now'. Since Sartre defines freedom as 'determining oneself by oneself' (Sartre 2003: 505), he concludes that consciousness is free in every 'now', determining itself by itself. This is where the problems start, but it is worth reflecting whether Sartre might not have the resources to defend the essentials of his view against some of the more familiar objections. On the face of it, it seems clear that he is guilty of an equivocation on the phrase 'outside consciousness'. If we accept the essentials of his argument so far, consciousness-as-lived is indeed necessarily not determined in any lived present by anything that it is *unconscious of* (by brain processes, genetic dispositions, unconscious traces of childhood traumas, etc., considered as such). But of course it does not follow that my present consciousness is not determined by anything that is 'outside it' in the sense in which this table, or you, or another person's pain, or a promise I made in the past and currently remember, are all outside it. Sartre wants to say that my present consciousness necessarily experiences itself as free, not only in *not* experiencing itself as in any way determined by what it is *unconscious* of, but also in not experiencing itself as determined by any of its *intentional objects* (Sartre 2003: 464). And if consciousness-as-presently-lived does not *experience* itself as externally determined in any of these senses, then, as per the foregoing, it *is* qua lived consciousness not externally determined, hence, as far as phenomenology is concerned, it determines itself, hence it is free.

Both the strengths and the difficulties of the position that Sartre ends up with are best illustrated by his account of emotions, corresponding to Heidegger's analysis of attunements. Leaving aside the special case of anguish, emotions, for Sartre, are a form of object intentionality – they are apparent perceptions of objects under value-aspects which are intuitively given as features of the object through the emotion (Sartre 2002: 34-35). For example, in fear, some object is presented under the value-aspect of being (disagreeably) *threatening*. Behaviour motivated by emotions such as fear is intentional action, involving the necessary and sufficient condition of action, namely *choice* (Sartre 2003: 465-67). Emotional behaviour is chosen in so far as it includes the three essential constituents of choice: a consciousness of a valued end, the apprehension of instrumental reasons (*motifs*), and what Sartre calls an effective motive (*mobile*), which is a particular kind of apprehension of an instrumental reason as conclusive in light of a consciousness of an overriding end, distinguishing a behaviour we ascribe to ourselves as an *action* from reflex or passive behaviour. So, in the case, say, of a soldier's fleeing panic-stricken from the threat of an enemy assault, we usually have

an instance of a intentional action which is chosen, although it is not deliberatively or reflectively 'willed', in Sartre's terminology. The soldier's specific way of experiencing his fear includes the way in which an instrumental reason, namely the need to avoid the imminent enemy onslaught, is revealed to him as conclusive in light of a more comprehensive end or value, namely *the negation of a mortal threat to his life*, which is also revealed to the soldier as his end through his fear. His effective motive (his *mobile*) is his grasping of that *motif* and that end as conclusive. Given this analysis of affective intentionality it is understandable why Sartre says that we have *free choice* here, for the soldier acts in the light of reasons, assuming that saving his life from mortal threat is indeed a reason. Of course, these reasons are not reflectively grasped, but this, for Sartre, is no objection – indeed he argues that our most basic and comprehensive ends can only subsequently be reflectively grasped. All reflective or deliberative choice ('willing') is necessarily parasitic on unreflective choice (Sartre 2003: 465). Now, in so far as unreflective, affective behaviour is action in light of a consciousness of (genuine) reasons, there is a sense in which such behaviour can be said to be free or self-determining. *Acting in the light of reasons* is after all a familiar component in many accounts of ontological freedom ('freedom of the will'). While some would argue that it is sufficient for freedom, Sartre would dissent: if by 'freedom' we mean self-determination, then at least the ultimate or fundamental reasons cannot be given to consciousness by the object-world – as they appear to be in many emotions – but must in some sense be generated by consciousness itself.

When Sartre says that we are *responsible* for all our choices, including our affective choices, at least part of what he is saying is that we should acknowledge that our affects normally disclose our ends – they disclose what we value at the time – and we are in bad faith when we deny this. One aspect of Sartrean authenticity is the acknowledgment of our affective choices as genuinely *ours*, as co-constituting what we are at the time. Sartre calls this stance the 'assuming' of one's choices:

> To assume does not at all mean to accept … to assume means to adopt as one's own, to claim responsibility … Thus the first assumption that human reality can and must make … is the assumption of its freedom. Which can be expressed by the following formula: one never has any excuse. … Of course, it's a question not just of recognizing that one has no excuse, but also of willing it. For all my cowardices, all my stupidities, all my lies, I bear the responsibility. … For – at the very moment when I lose my grip, when my body 'overcomes me', when under physical torment I confess what I wanted to keep secret – it is of my own accord, through the free consciousness of my torment, that I decide to confess.
>
> (Sartre 1999: 113-14)

It is clear that 'assuming responsibility' in Sartre's sense is an acknowledgement of ownership through which human reality becomes perspicuous to itself, and needs to be distinguished from accountability to others in the sense of deserving reward or punishment, praise or blame. The person who confesses under torture may not deserve blame, but if we accept Sartre's description he made a choice, and that choice was genuinely his: it revealed what he was at the time. Sartre would have little patience with the response that his effective desires at the time did not express his values, or were out of line with his second-order desires, and that therefore he was unfree. What my overriding values really are, at a time, is authenticated in my actions, barring factual ignorance.

Everything that Sartre has argued up to this point seems to me independent of, and more attractive than, a stronger claim that he sometimes also makes about our affective choices. According to this stronger claim, the receptive dimension of emotions – their apparent perceptual character, disclosing values or disvalues in the phenomenal world – is itself fully determined by a deeper, pure spontaneity. I experience the emotions that I do because of the ends or projects that I have chosen, and these ends, while they are revealed in my emotions, are not in any way *determined or motivated* by those emotions' intentional contents. So, the pain of another person, or the enemy attack, only have the normative authority disclosed, respectively, in sympathy or fear, because I have already, *independently of them*, chosen certain kinds of ends. Sartre is ambiguous on whether this picture is to be taken as a fully general account of affective motivation.[7] If it is, then consciousness, in making its basic choices, would be radically self-determining, not only unaffected by anything of which it is *unconscious*, but also unaffected by any of its *intentional objects*. The emotions would then not reveal a fundamental dimension of passivity, thrownness, affectedness, as they do in Heidegger's account, but would be expressions of a deeper, pure spontaneity. Like many critics, I find it difficult to make sense of radical freedom in this sense, but it seems to me that much of what Sartre has to say on authenticity does not depend on it. On the other hand, his analysis of the necessary failures of inauthentic consciousness may depend on this strong thesis about freedom, as I shall call it.

I started out with three questions: (1) what are the motives for embracing authenticity, i.e. of what Sartre calls 'conversion'? (2) what is its normative basis or justification? (3) why can there be no ontological transcendence of Dasein's, respectively the for-itself's, mode of existence as finite projection? Sartre's answers to these questions, as one might expect, turn out to be intimately connected. To appreciate both the virtues and defects of these answers one further aspect of his analysis needs to be mentioned. One of the most striking theses of *Being and Nothingness* is that all the projects of inauthentic human reality can be interpreted as moments or aspects of a total comprehensive orientation of the for-itself which Sartre calls the

fundamental project and whose correlate is the world in which a for-itself finds itself. While this overall, comprehensive orientation is of course not fixed, Sartre claims that all inauthentic fundamental projects exhibit a common structure: the original, basic, generic desire of the human reality is to be a *consciousness that is complete*. Completeness is an essential feature of object-being. An object, considered in abstraction from its instrumental role in human projects, lacks nothing: it is what it is (at any one time, if it is a temporal object). Often Sartre puts the point that the human reality originally aims at, projects itself towards, completeness by saying that it aims at being an *in-itself-for-itself*, or at *substantiality*: an entity that has the characteristics of consciousness, but also the completeness of object-being, lacking nothing. This claim, and the particular way it is fleshed out, has, I think, two sources, one of which is specific to Sartre's phenomenology, the other is not. The non-Sartrean source is concisely articulated by Thomas Aquinas:

> Absolutely speaking, it is not possible to proceed indefinitely in the matter of ends … since if there were no last end, … the intention of the agent [would not] be at rest … Hence Augustine (*De Civ. Dei* xix.1): *In speaking of the end of good we mean now … that it is perfected so as to be complete* … It is therefore necessary for the last end so to fill man's appetite, that nothing is left besides it for man to desire. Which is not possible if something else be required for this perfection.
> (Aquinas 1981: IaIIae, qu. 1, articles 4 and 5)

Aquinas's point here may be read as about the structure of desire. If we understand by 'desire' a conative state that consciously projects some state of affairs as 'to be realized' or 'to be maintained', then, in desiring it, I must be aware of some aspect of the present situation as actually or potentially lacking something which *should* be actual or which I *want* to be actual. When I experience desire in this sense, I experience the present state of affairs as deficient, even if the deficiency is only the fragility of a present good that needs to be actively safeguarded against possible loss. But let us assume, says Aquinas, that I envisage the end state aimed at by my desire as giving rise to further desires of this kind. This implies that I envisage that end state as *also* deficient, and so on for any further projected ends, as long as they are envisaged as generating yet more desires. If we call such ends 'incomplete' ends, we may say that, in so far as I desire (what I take to be) incomplete ends, I desire states which I also recognize as in some significant respect deficient. Aquinas's central claim in the remarks I have quoted is that I cannot lucidly and unqualifiedly desire *only* incomplete ends, on pain of becoming unintelligible to myself. For to desire thus would be to envisage as unqualifiedly desirable what I also recognize as deficient. Aquinas concludes that the ideal of a complete end is integral to the structure of desire and agency. In existentialist language, the human reality is constitutively

such as to project itself towards a *transcendence of itself qua finite projection* – what I have called ontological transcendence – and this truth has its ground in the very structure of desire. Aquinas, of course, like the entire tradition to which he belongs, thinks of such a self-transcendence as possible, if it is possible, only through a *receptive* relation to a radical alterity.

Sartre accepts the point that human reality originally strives for ontological transcendence in this sense – for completion – but he gives it a particular twist which fundamentally alters its significance:

> Human reality by which lack appears in the world must be itself a lack. … *The existence of desire as a human fact is sufficient to prove that human reality is lack*. … In its coming into existence human reality grasps itself as an incomplete being. … Human reality is a perpetual surpassing toward a *coincidence with itself* which is never given. … Thus this perpetually absent being which haunts the for-itself [consciousness] is itself fixed in the in-itself [object-being]. It is the impossible synthesis of the for-itself and the in-itself; it would be its own foundation … as being and would preserve within it the necessary translucency of consciousness along with the coincidence with itself of being-in-itself. … Let no one reproach us with capriciously inventing a being of this kind; when by a further movement of thought the being and absolute absence of this totality are hypostatized as transcendence beyond the world, it takes on the name of God. … Is not God a being who is what he is – in that he is all positivity … and at the same time … self-consciousness and the necessary foundation of himself?
>
> (Sartre 2003: 113-14; italics mine)

What 'completion' for human reality would have to be is a transformation into, or a self-recognition as, a *self-grounding* entity that lacks nothing. This interpretation of the desire for ontological transcendence has historical precedents – notably in German Idealism – but it relies in Sartre's case on the strong thesis about freedom: at least the ultimate or fundamental goods or values recognized by a for-itself cannot be the result of an affection at all, whether by the object-world or by other subjectivity, but are produced or conferred by the for-itself's spontaneous, active projection of ends. Hence completion, a final satisfaction of desire, if it were possible, could not be *given to* consciousness, but would have to be self-produced. The traditional conception of ontological transcendence as a relation to an irreducible alterity is therefore not available to Sartre because of the strong claim about the freedom of consciousness. He therefore both acknowledges that desire as fundamental for human reality, and yet is compelled to reinterpret it as the project of a *self*-completion: literally, a self-divinization. But that project necessarily fails, for it rests on a misunderstanding of consciousness's

ontological structure – not an accidental misunderstanding but one that is co-originary with the upsurge of consciousness itself, owing to the very structure of desire which it is. Much of Sartre's lengthy discussion of being-for-others in the later parts of *Being and Nothingness* is devoted to charting the various forms of breakdown of that fundamental project for self-completion. However diverse these forms of breakdown superficially are, they all have a common root: the for-itself exists by choosing self-generated fundamental ends which through that choice are presented as requiring to be realized or maintained. But any such projection of ends is incompatible with completion. Hence inauthentic human reality is necessarily an 'unhappy consciousness'. Like Sartre's particular interpretation of the desire for wholeness or completion, the inevitable failure of that desire is premised on the strong claim about the freedom of consciousness. Sartre, then, has an answer to our questions (1) and (3): we can have a *motive* for not being inauthentic, since inauthentic desire is necessarily frustrated. And ontological transcendence is excluded from any authentic self-understanding because it is incoherent. Both of these answers rest on a claim which sharply distinguishes Sartre's account from Heidegger's, and which is Sartre's most problematic, albeit not consistently maintained (see below), commitment: the idea that human consciousness is a totally unconditioned projection that in the final analysis does not and cannot depend on anything affecting it.

Let me finally turn to Sartre's idea of authenticity. I want to conclude by suggesting that his characterization of this adumbrates a normative rationale for it – our question (2) – which is independent of the strong claim about freedom and in fact in conflict with it. In a brief footnote to his discussion of the failure of concrete relations with others Sartre says: 'These considerations do not exclude the possibility of an ethics of deliverance and salvation. But this can be achieved only after a radical conversion which we cannot discuss here' (Sartre 2003: 434). In other writings of the period, especially in the *War Diaries* and the *Notebooks for an Ethics*, he does discuss this conversion at some length, and what he says there underpins his programmatic outline of an existentialist ethics in the well-known 1946 lecture 'Existentialism is a Humanism'. The destructive failures of inauthentic relations with others detailed in *Being and Nothingness*, as well as the failures of everyday 'impure' reflection, have a common ground: the desire for ontological transcendence which is co-originary with consciousness. So any deliverance from these failures would have to involve a modification of this desire: an assuming or endorsing of oneself as inescapably a finite freedom (Sartre 1999: 112-14). Sartre sometimes seems to want this to be understood in a sense consonant with the strong claim about freedom: deliverance is only possible if I assume myself, will myself, as the spontaneous foundation of my values. But if we find the strong claim implausible, it is possible to read this in a weaker, though still substantive sense: authenticity would have to involve an endorsement of myself as a consciousness that is free in the sense of

determining itself in the light of reasons, the most basic of which are constituted by consciousness itself (not necessarily just my own), rather than by anything in the object-world. Much, though perhaps not all, of what Sartre has to say on authenticity, makes sense on this weaker reading.

Assuming or endorsing myself as a finite freedom, in either sense, requires a thematic consciousness of freedom. Thematic self-consciousness is reflective consciousness, so assuming myself as freedom requires a certain kind of reflection, a *pure*, non-distorting, non-objectifying reflection (Sartre 1992: 473-74). Since pure reflection on my experience has to be non-objectifying, it cannot be adequately described as 'introspection' or self-contemplation. All contemplative introspection involves a distancing from one's conscious engagement, a disruption of it, whereas, Sartre claims, pure reflection *does not abolish the project* (Sartre 1992: 473). Like Heideggerian resolvedness, it is an *engaged* kind of self-understanding. Pure reflection is not a contemplation of my experiencing but more like an *intensification* of it.[8] Like Husserl's transcendental reflection, it highlights, makes explicit, not just my experiential attitude towards an intentional content, but the essential correlation between that content and consciousness of it; in particular, it reveals the *dependence* of ends qua values on consciousness of them. Moreover, Sartre claims, pure reflection reveals my ends as, so to speak, fragile, as always in question:

> As regards feelings, as we have seen, they reduce to undertakings [projects]; hate and love are oaths. But because [in pure reflection] I grasp myself as freedom, they will always preserve a problematic aspect … since the feeling is upheld in its being by choice, the oath that structures it stops short of the future and has to be renewed … So in love itself, at its heart, there will be, if it is authentic, this being or not being, and thus a fundamental anxiety that this love might not be. And just as love is [chosen] at the same time that it is felt, this anxiety too must be willed in authenticity … And authenticity must precisely lay claim to live this very situation: this will be love as tension.
>
> (Sartre 1992: 476-77)

When a project survives being made explicit, and thus called into question, through pure reflection, we might say that I have *endorsed* it; but what is being endorsed then is not only the end pursued, but also the freedom of consciousness as sustaining it, as its condition of possibility: hence Sartre calls pure reflection a decision for autonomy (Sartre 1992: 478). But Sartre is very clear that, when a project survives pure reflection, what is being endorsed for its own sake is both my end and my freedom. In authenticity, I do not act for the sake of myself, in particular, I do not act for the sake of being authentic. On the contrary, in authenticity, my ends have an essential other-directed aspect: I act, say, for the sake of a thirsty-person-who-needs-water, or against a

regime that oppresses its people, but in the simultaneous awareness of the essential dependence of those ends qua reasons on the (not necessarily just *my*) freedom of consciousness (Sartre 1992: 480-81).

The conversion to authenticity requires pure reflection as sketched above but it is not exhausted by it. Once it has been chosen, it engenders *rational* demands. These are stated bluntly, and slightly hyperbolically, in the famous 1946 lecture:

> I declare that freedom, in respect of concrete circumstances, can have no other end and aim but itself; and when once a man has seen that values depend on himself, in that state of forsakenness he can will only one thing, and that is freedom as the foundation of all values.
>
> (Sartre 1980: 51)

The hyperbolical element here is the strong claim about freedom, which we have no good reason to accept. But there is also a more plausible point being made in this passage: If all value depends on consciousness, and if consciousness is freedom in *either* of the senses outlined earlier – weak or strong – then, if I affirm any value at all (and I cannot avoid affirming some value since freedom is projection and projection requires valued ends), I must also affirm the constitutive condition of possibility of value, namely freedom itself. No values I commit myself to are rationally compatible with the rejection of freedom, and hence I must value freedom. Sartre concludes from this that authentic human reality is rationally committed to, obliged by, its own and others' freedom:

> In thus willing freedom, we discover that it depends entirely upon the freedom of others, and that the freedom of others depends on our own. Obviously, freedom as the definition of a human being does not depend upon others, but as soon as there is a commitment, I am obliged to will the freedom of others at the same time as mine. I cannot make freedom my aim unless I make that of others equally my aim.
>
> (Sartre 1980: 51-52)

I take it that what Sartre means here by 'making freedom my aim' is what he elsewhere calls 'assuming' or 'willing' it, i.e. explicitly affirming it. In the *Notebooks* he says in a similar vein:

> The human element, the element of morality is … the liberation of oneself and others in a mutual recognition … No love without a deeper recognition and mutual understanding of freedoms (a dimension that is absent in *Being and Nothingness*).
>
> (Sartre 1992: 414)

An affirmative relation to another's freedom seemed impossible according to the analysis of the 'look' and being-for-others developed in *Being and Nothingness* (Sartre 2003: 430-34). But the 'hell' described in that text was a description of inauthentic human reality. As Sebastian Gardner notes:

> the logic of Sartre's position entails that, as long as I have renounced the fundamental project of becoming God, there is a possibility that I will be able to relate to the Other-as-subject without attempting their objectification – the purified for-itself can, in principle, remain conscious of the … quasi being-in-itself of the Other without *reducing* the Other to it.
>
> (Gardner 2009: 196-97)

But presumably any kind of affirmative relation to the Other requires that I do not experience the Other's subjectivity as necessarily objectifying and alienating me. That is, I can only affirm the Other as freedom insofar as I take the Other as capable of not regarding *me* as simply an object, or as a freedom to be appropriated. Therefore I can only have a non-appropriative and affirmative stance towards the Other's subjectivity insofar as I take the Other as herself having renounced, or as able to renounce, the project of becoming God-like, that is, insofar as I take the conversion to authenticity as a possibility for her. I cannot have an affirmative relation to the Other's freedom, except on condition that I am both authentic myself and also take the Other to have the ability to be authentic.

But Sartre asserts something more ambitious: If I am to be authentic, it is not just *possible* but *necessary* that I affirm the freedom of Others. How might one justify this more ambitious idea in Sartrean terms? In the *Notebooks*, Sartre offers some reflections on the good which might help here:

> The good must be done. This means, that it is the end of action, no doubt. But also that it does not exist outside the action that does it. A Platonic good, which existed in itself and by itself would have no significance … The good is necessarily that towards which we transcend ourselves, it is the noema of a specific noesis, namely of action … The good cannot be thought outside of an acting subjectivity, and yet it is the beyond of that subjectivity. It is *subjective* in that it must always emerge from a subjectivity and must not force itself upon subjectivity from outside, and it is *objective* in that in its general essence it is strictly independent of subjectivity … The universality-character of the good implies the positing of another. … Let us maintain that the general structure of the good is necessary as giving it its transcendence and its objectivity. To posit the good by doing it implies positing another who ought to do it … The concept of the good requires the multiplicity of consciousnesses …

> It is not only my ideal, but my ideal is also that it be the ideal of another. Its universality is not *de facto* but *de jure*.
>
> (Sartre 1992: 555-56)

I think that Sartre is not just making the point here that all basic reasons for action are necessarily public or agent-neutral, and that there could be no basic reasons which are essentially reasons *just for me*, essentially agent-relative. One may well accept this, but it does not yield the conclusion Sartre wants, namely that if I understand myself authentically, I must value the freedom of others. For acknowledging the essential publicness of reasons is compatible with holding that everybody should value his or her own freedom, without by itself committing anyone to value the freedom of another.

Sartre's point seems to be different. Pure reflection requires me to 'assume', to affirm, my freedom. But it requires me to affirm my freedom because of what it is, namely *freedom*, the condition of possibility of value, not because it is *my* freedom. If I were to affirm freedom merely because and insofar as it is *mine*, I would not be affirming it as the condition of value, for the phenomenological transcendence of value (its universality character, which it shares with other properties) requires me to acknowledge that it is not ontologically dependent on me, on this particular subjectivity. So the acknowledgement of any value whatever requires me to acknowledge what makes its transcendence possible, namely the freedom of a potential open multiplicity of subjects, indeed, the freedom of any subjects potentially capable of recognizing or instantiating that value. In this way, authenticity is inseparable from an ethics of mutual recognition.

Conclusion

With respect to the three questions about authenticity with which this chapter has been concerned, we have seen that Sartre, unlike Heidegger, gives explicit answers to them. He tells us what might motivate the 'conversion' to authenticity, what gives authentic existence its normative authority, and why authentic self-transparency essentially involves the recognition that the aspiration towards what I have called ontological transcendence – transcending finite projection – is both constitutive of human reality and necessarily 'unrealizable'. On all these central questions, Sartre's explicitness makes Heidegger's reticence stand out even more starkly in contrast. Indeed, it is plausible to think that Sartre's statements on these issues are in part motivated by his awareness of the gaps in Heidegger's phenomenological ontology of Dasein. It is tempting, for example, to read Sartre's reflections on the structure of all inauthentic fundamental projects – the for-itself's desire to attain self-grounding being, its continual flight from its existence as a free, self-determining 'nothingness' – as expanding on Heidegger's elusive remarks on everyday Dasein's 'fleeing' from itself and from its

'nullity' as thrown, ultimately contingent, projection. Whether Heidegger could accept Sartre's gloss and his analysis of the necessary failure of that flight is doubtful. Given the problems of Sartre's analysis highlighted above, this is perhaps just as well, but nevertheless the sense remains that there is a lacuna in Heidegger's text that calls for something functionally analogous to Sartre's story. As for the motives of the conversion to authenticity and the normative basis of privileging it over (unqualifiedly) inauthentic existence, an appeal to rationality is evidently central to Sartre's account of both. What both motivates and justifies 'conversion' is the recognition of the necessary failure of the fundamental aspiration of inauthentic existence due to its alleged inconsistency. Not only do we not find anything comparable in Heidegger, it is doubtful whether this kind of approach is available to him. Rational self-reflection of the kind engaged in by Sartre when uncovering the commitments entailed by authentic existence, while it takes its departure from non-objectifying 'pure' reflection, is clearly not exhausted by it. It also essentially requires the entertaining of certain propositions about oneself and inferences from them, and it therefore involves a relation to oneself as (also) an object of judgement. It is not clear that Heideggerian authentic resolvedness could *essentially* include such an objectifying self-relation.

Notes

1 Cf., e.g., Merker 1988: esp. 166-93; Pauen 1994: 263-97.

2 I have occasionally modified the Macquarrie and Robinson translation of *Being and Time*, and also the translations of Sartre's writings listed in the bibliography.

3 Cf. Mulhall 2005: 144-145.

4 I have chosen the literal 're-taking' as a translation of *Nachholen*, which seems preferable to Macquarrie and Robinson's 'making up for'. One can make up for a failure by doing something else than what one failed to do. But this seems to be precisely what Heidegger wants to exclude. *Nachholen* is standardly used for such things as re-sitting or belated taking of an examination.

5 I am thinking, of course, of Dreyfus's (1994) groundbreaking interpretation, whose central claim about Heideggerian *Besorgen* – that it is a mode of intentional comportment that does not, or at least need not, involve conceptualizing representation (judgement) – still seems to me correct and insightful.

6 Heidegger places great emphasis on the mode of being, and mode of presentation, of *Zuhandenheit* being such that entitities given in this mode of presentation show up, at least at the fundamental level, (a) inconspicuously and (b) in terms of a particular holistic context, i.e. as context-bound. In both of these respects, basic-level *Zuhandenheit* contrasts with *Vorhandenheit*. Since these are also the respects in which *Zuhandenheit* contrasts with the essential formal characteristics of intentional objects, it is tempting to think that Heidegger uses the term *Vorhandenheit* for what Husserl (and Sartre) call the being of intentional objects, and for the most general mode of presentation of anything that shows up as an intentional object. I cannot argue the case for this interpretation here; in any event, nothing in my central argument depends on it. It might be said, and Heidegger would agree, that *zuhanden* entities can surely be made into intentional objects. Clearly I can make judgements about the instrumental characteristics of equipment, e.g.

'this karabiner is very handy for climbing'. I take it that Heidegger's point is that such judgements – making the relevant instrumental characteristics into intentional objects for me – can only be properly understood on the basis of familiarity with skilled practical modes of comportment (*Besorgen*) which themselves need not, and typically do not, involve judgement.

7 By far the largest part of Sartre's analysis of the emotions in the *Sketch* is devoted to defending the theory that many emotions are themselves chosen on the basis of ends independent of what they reveal (Sartre 2002: 34-55). This theory seems to be generalized in certain passages in *Being and Nothingness*:

> But what will make me decide to choose the magical [emotional] or the technical aspect of the world? It can not be the world itself … the for-itself appears as the free foundation of its emotions as of its volitions.
> (Sartre 2003: 467)

On the other hand, in the *Sketch* Sartre also briefly outlines an account of a second 'main type' of emotions as apprehensions of value or disvalue in the world that are 'motivated by the object itself' and have 'no finality', i.e. no conscious purposiveness (Sartre 2002: 57, 55). In Poellner (forthcoming), I argue that the essentials of Sartre's account of freedom are compatible with recognizing the central role in rationalizing action of this second type of emotion. What Sartre needs for his theory of freedom as the self-determination of consciousness is not the implausibly strong thesis that our emotions are themselves chosen, but the different idea that the for-itself's *fundamental* reasons (non-instrumental values) are not given to it by the world, but are generated or determined by consciousness itself, although not necessarily and exclusively by the consciousness of the respective agent herself.

8 Cf. Zahavi 1999: 181-94.

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15

NOTHINGNESS AND PHENOMENOLOGY

The co-disclosure of Sartre and Heidegger

Stephen Mulhall

One way of addressing the central preoccupation of this collection – that of evaluating the significance of Division Two of Heidegger's *Being and Time* – is to attempt to measure the differences between it and the text through whose composition Sartre at once articulated and aspired to transcend his indebtedness to that text of Heidegger's, namely *Being And Nothingness* (hereafter *BN*). For it is in Division Two of *Being and Time* (well before texts such as his inaugural lecture 'What is Metaphysics?') that Heidegger makes central to his existential analytic of Dasein, and so to his articulation of the question of fundamental ontology, the very concept that is explicitly central in Sartre's re-formulation of existential phenomenology – that of nothingness, nullity, or negation. So even the beginnings of a systematic comparison between these two thinkers' ways of setting this concept to work ought to make the individuality or idiosyncrasy of each a little clearer. Such, at any rate, is the motivating assumption of the following chapter.

Heidegger: death, guilt, conscience

Division Two of *Being and Time* accounts for its own existence by offering reasons for viewing Division One's concluding, overarching and apparently decisive characterization of Dasein's Being in terms of care as actually incomplete or lacking, as if it left some phenomenological debts outstanding; more specifically, Heidegger questions whether that characterization is truly 'primordial' – whether it penetrates to the source or origin of the phenomenon under investigation (cf. *SZ* 334). Otherwise put, he seeks assurance that this interpretation can be grounded in a basic experience of the phenomenon, and that it really takes it in as a whole; but he quickly declares that no such grasp of Dasein's underlying unity has as yet been established. 'Its fore-having never included more than the *inauthentic* Being of Dasein,

and of Dasein as *less* than a *whole*' (SZ 233). That is: Division One's focus on Dasein's *average* everydayness occludes the possibility of its existing non-averagely or authentically, and its focus on Dasein's *everydayness* (on the diurnal rebirth and extinction of its comprehending, worldly existence between birth and death) foregrounds its Being-ahead-of-itself, its intrinsic existential relation to what it is not yet, hence its (apparently essential) incompleteness.

It follows that the desired primordiality of Heidegger's account can be secured only by bringing into his interpretation both Dasein's end (that towards which it *is* outstanding every day of its life, namely its death) and its capacity for existing authentically; and it turns out that one stone will kill both birds – that there is such a thing as Dasein's potentiality for authentically Being-a-whole (that is, authentically Being-towards-death), and that the voice of conscience is its existentiell attestation, the basic experience by means of which this underlying unity is phenomenologically secured. But this prospect is no sooner dangled before our eyes than it threatens to recede from our grasp. For Dasein's death amounts to the annihilation of its existence as such – its complete and utter non-being; when death arrives, Dasein is no longer there, so its death is not an event in its life, not even the last. But the human capacity to comprehend anything is (on Heidegger's account) a matter of allowing it to manifest itself to us as it is in itself; so if our death is not something we encounter, it is something that we cannot possibly comprehend. And this is not a matter of our essentially comprehensible life sooner or later reaching its utterly incomprehensible end; for on Heidegger's understanding, Being-towards-death is not a matter of us having a finite as opposed to an infinite lifespan – it is rather that every moment of our existence might be our last, hence that each is equally intimately related in its being to the incomprehensible possibility of our utter non-being.

To be sure, if (part of) what is at issue for us at each moment of our existence is our (possibly not) Being-in-the-world as such, then properly grasping that our Being is Being-towards-death will entail grasping our existence as a limited whole; for if all that we are is, in principle, at stake in every moment of it, the sheer contingency of each such moment (in both content and actuality) is metonymic of the sheer contingency of the whole life they serve to constitute, a life lacking external grounding or necessitation at every point from its beginning onward. Accordingly, attaining such a grasp on the thoroughgoing non-necessity of our existence is exactly what makes possible (by setting in train) the transition from inauthenticity to authenticity; because our death is our ownmost, non-relational, not-to-be-outstripped possibility, its resolute anticipation brings into focus the all-too-often-repressed fact that our existence as such is our ownmost, non-relational, not-to-be-outstripped responsibility – ours to own (or to disown, as when we relate to that existence in the mode of *das Man*, as if its form or content or continuation were beyond question or alteration, hence not an issue for us).

However, what thereby appears as a condition for the possibility of authentic Being-in-the-world does so precisely by virtue of its constitutive refusal to appear as it is in itself, its resistance to intelligibility; our mortality forces on us the question of the meaningfulness of our lives precisely because it indicates that every moment of those lives, freighted with whatever meaning it has accrued from our diurnal projections of the discursive, worldly structures of signification into which we have been thrown, is internally related to something of which we can make no sense. For Heidegger's characterization of death as our ownmost, non-relational, not-to-be-outstripped possibility cannot coherently be thought of as rendering death directly intelligible, since it presupposes that death is an existential possibility, when Heidegger himself has repeatedly insisted that it cannot be so understood. It is only by virtue of being first driven to characterize it this way, and then realizing the necessary failure of that attempt, that we find that death's refusal to make sense in these terms discloses life as having the kind of sense that just these terms articulate.

In other words, the primordial meaning of my life (as capable of authenticity or its absence) appears as displaced or referred from (and so as conferred upon it by) my death, hence as informing that life only insofar as each moment of it is internally related to its ungraspable but absolute negation – that is, only insofar as Dasein's Being is Being-towards-death. Accordingly, to grasp ourselves as potentially authentic individuals is not so much to comprehend our incomprehensibility as it is to comprehend that the kind of sense our existence makes is the kind that emerges from and returns to non-sense, the indispensable but ungraspable background or horizon of our capacity to grasp the Being of beings, our own included. Little wonder that Heidegger began his book by remarking that 'in any [mode of human] Being towards entities as entities there lies *a priori* an enigma' (SZ 4).

However, this primordial enigma – being an effect of death's utter refusal to manifest itself as it is in itself – is not just an inherent feature of the existence of any being whose Being is that of Dasein; it must also be a feature of any genuinely phenomenological account of the Being of such a being, and so must dictate the appropriate form of that account. More specifically, a properly phenomenological grasp of Dasein as Being-towards-death must acknowledge the necessity of incorporating death in its account whilst conceding the impossibility of ever doing so directly. It must articulate Dasein's Being as oriented towards (and so as oriented by) something essentially unreachable or ungraspable, call it disorienting; it must demonstrate that we cannot understand Dasein's Being without understanding that it is internally related to that which lies beyond phenomenological representation. For nothingness is not a representable something, and not an unrepresentable something either; hence it can be represented only as beyond representation, as the beyond of the horizon of the representable – as the self-concealing and self-disrupting condition of Dasein's comprehending and questioning

relation to Being. Accordingly, phenomenological philosophy can only acknowledge 'the nothing' as such (that is, allow it to appear as it is) by allowing it first to conceal itself and then to disrupt its concealment *in the phenomenological analysis itself* – that is, to appear within the analysis as the unthematizable theme in relation to which the analysis as a whole is at once made possible and shipwrecked. Only by presenting itself as essentially beyond completing, as completed and completable only by that which lies beyond it, could an existential analytic of Dasein achieve the kind of completion that its condition allows and its object discloses.

Heidegger accordingly recommences his inquiry by invoking a new horizon or broader context for the whole of his existential analytic of Dasein as presented in Division One of *Being and Time*: the requirement to relate every element of it to that which is neither a phenomenon nor of the logos, to that which cannot appear as such or be the object of a possible discursive act. To invoke 'the nothing' as a broader context for the analysis of Division One is in one sense to add nothing whatever to that analysis – for it provides no specific analytical ingredient in addition to those laid out in the care-structure, and so nothing in Division Two implies that this characterization is incomplete. In another sense, however, introducing this relation to 'the nothing' as internal to Dasein's Being precisely means adding 'nothing' to this analysis; for it means re-presenting every element in the articulation of the care-structure as related to 'the nothing', and so as to be reconsidered in its uncanny light. Division Two thereby shows that the analysis of Division One, while lacking nothing, is essentially incomplete, and essentially beyond completion, in a sense that goes beyond the familiar hermeneutic idea that essentially finite human understanding is always capable of further and deeper spirals of articulation. For it suggests that there is something essentially beyond representation in the being whose Being is structured by care, hence something about Dasein that is beyond the grasp of Division One, or of any conceivable supplementation or deepening of the analysis it contains.

This is why Division Two traces out our internal relation to nothingness not just in the analysis of death, but also in that of guilt, of conscience, and of temporality (which includes the analyses of everydayness and historicality); Dasein's Being-towards-death is thereby further articulated as a matter of Dasein's Being-guilty, its Being-a-whole and its Being-temporal. And these ontological structures are also shown to underlie the articulated unity of the care-structure, whose concluding delineation aspired to gather up the various ontological dimensions of Being-in-the-world initially displayed in Division One. Accordingly, Division Two's presentation of the way in which Dasein's mortality – its internal relation to nothingness – discloses itself as beyond disclosure is equally a presentation of the way in which Being-in-the-world discloses itself as Being-towards-death. Heidegger's phenomenology of death thus amounts to nothing less than the whole of Division Two's recapitulation of Division One of the book; *Being and Time* is thereby

retrospectively disclosed as essentially or primordially a phenomenology of death.

That said, Heidegger plainly gives certain aspects or elements of this multiple articulation of Dasein's Being-towards-death more priority than others; for he ends the first chapter of Division Two by explicitly presenting the voice of conscience as the fundamental way in which our Being-towards-death (and so the meaning of our life as potentially ours to own, as authentically a whole) is given existentiell attestation – as *the* way in which Dasein gives testimony to the fact that resolute anticipation of its internal relation to nothingness is not only possible but necessary, something it demands of itself.

> If we analyse conscience more penetratingly, it is revealed as a *call*. Calling is a mode of *discourse*. The call of conscience has the character of an *appeal* to Dasein by calling it to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being-its-Self; and this is done by way of *summoning* it to its ownmost Being-guilty.
>
> (SZ 269)

Calling, appealing, summoning, testifying – these seem disturbingly evangelical modalities of discourse, the cadences of a revivalist meeting; and yet their fervent discursive form is paired with a counter-intuitive discursive content. For when Heidegger asks himself what the call of conscience says to Dasein, he answers: 'Taken strictly, nothing. The call asserts nothing, gives no information about world-events, has nothing to tell … Conscience discourses solely and constantly in the mode of keeping silent' (SZ 273). Taken strictly, then, what conscience says to Dasein is not nothing in particular or nothing at all, but precisely 'nothing': the voice of conscience is the articulation of the nothingness or nullity of death or mortality, the primary existentiell attestation of the internality of nothingness to Dasein's Being.

Taking Heidegger's point literally here does not entail claiming either that each existentiell irruption of the voice of conscience has no specific content, or that it always has the same specific content, namely 'nothing'; it is rather that its Being as call always goes beyond its specific content in the direction of the nothingness of death, here manifesting itself as the ownmost, non-relational not-to-be-outstripped claim or demand that Dasein makes on itself. For in addressing us with specific guidance about our concrete situation, and thereby addressing us as the occupant of that situation (with specific cares and commitments), it implicitly discloses us as beings capable of and condemned to such situatedness – that is, as beings whose Being is an issue for us, and for whom individuality is a possibility. This dimension of the voice of conscience must, therefore, be non-specific; it must say nothing, because by revealing us as at every moment subject to some particular demand, it also discloses the fact that we are the kind of being who is

subject to demand, that our existence as such is something for which we are answerable. This is why such silent voicings can disrupt the they-self; for it manifests the fact that Dasein is responsible for its existence, that it has a life to own, and that it typically disowns it – to the point at which it represses the very idea of its life as capable of being its own.

The silence of the voice of conscience thereby articulates Dasein's essential failure to coincide with itself, its not being itself; the state in which it finds itself is not, is never, all that it is or could be (since that situation might have been otherwise, and is anyway a situation within which it must choose how to go on), and so its present state is never something with which it can fully identify or to which it can be reduced. It is always uncanny or not-at-home: because its existence is Being-towards-death, its mode of Being-in-the-world is also one of not-wholly-Being-in-the-world or Being-not-wholly-in-the-world, of being primordially oriented towards that from which distinctively worldly Being (and hence the comprehensibility of beings in their Being) originates and to which it returns. Authenticity is a matter of living out this essential non-self-identity – the gap between what it is and what it might be, between its existentiell actuality and its existential potential. Hence, inauthenticity must be understood as a matter of living as if one coincided with oneself – as if what one presently is and does is simply what there is to be and do, as if the course and continuation of one's existence is fated or necessary, as if one's existence really were entirely lacking in self-differentiation.

Sartre: questioning, gambling and the gaze

Distinctively human being as a matter of non-self-identity: it doesn't sound all that distant from Sartre's definition of the for-itself as being what it is not and not being what it is – the primary site at which *Being and Nothingness* conjoins its two titular concepts. But two disanalogies between Sartre's and Heidegger's ways of presenting that understanding of human existence immediately present themselves. First, where Heidegger stages his articulation of human non-self-identity as a belated and radically subversive irruption into his phenomenological analysis, the notion governs Sartre's analysis pretty much from the outset – certainly from the introductory revelation of the pre-reflective cogito. Second, where Heidegger finds that Dasein's non-self-identity is primarily disclosed by means of the voice of conscience's attestation of human mortality, Sartre's presentation of the for-itself's non-self-identity appears to disarticulate Heidegger's medium from its message: for he preserves the disclosive significance of the human capacity for authenticity (by utilizing scenarios of bad faith very early in his analysis), whilst denying (or at least giving us no reason to believe) that what is thereby disclosed relates primarily to death or mortality. But are these differences as significant, or even as real, as they may appear?

The first difference – call it one of timing – might equally be read as a sign of Sartre's perceptiveness as a reader of Heidegger, in at least two ways. To begin with, anyone hoping to inherit the project of *Being and Time* (however originally) is obliged to acknowledge the consequences of his belatedness – primary amongst them the fact that one's own readers will have read *Being and Time*. They will accordingly already have undergone the disruptive revelation of the primordiality of Dasein's Being-towards-death (of our internal relation to nothingness as the horizon against which Dasein's worldliness must be understood), and so stand in no need of a repeat staging. They will also have begun to appreciate that what was thereby revealed – however belatedly – was already implicit at the outset of Heidegger's investigation, which means at the beginning of *Being and Time*. What might therefore be worth staging at the outset of any successor project would be an explicit acknowledgement of that latter implication, thereby staking a claim not only to be a genuinely comprehending reader of Heidegger's book but also one whose originality will (because it must) take the form of proposing a new reading of that book, a reinterpretation of its predecessor which finds a new way forward by re-reading that predecessor's point of origin in the light of its own conclusion.

Sure enough, the first chapter of *Being and Nothingness* begins by attempting to derive the non-self-identity of the for-itself from an analysis of the very phenomenon which Heidegger employed to orient the analysis of *Being and Time* – that of Dasein's capacity to inquire into things. Just like Heidegger, Sartre begins by asking whether any mode of human conduct might illuminate the general relation of human beings to the world, points out that in so doing he adopts a questioning stance to the world, and then asks himself whether this interrogative mode of conduct might be the illuminating instance he seeks. Reflecting further, he claims that questioning is conditioned by a threefold negation: the questioner makes manifest his state of non-knowing, he presupposes the possibility that the world will not provide what he seeks (since his question might equally well receive a negative as a positive answer), and insofar as it does provides a positive answer, it must do so in the form of a limitation ('it is thus and not otherwise'). Hence, for Sartre, 'the permanent possibility of non-being, outside us and within, conditions our questions about being' (*BN* 5).

This non-being is an element of reality, not merely an effect manifest in the realm of judgement alone. When I expect to see Pierre in the café, and he is not there, this is a positive intuition of absence – not the registration of all that is there in the café to be apprehended, supplemented by a judgement that my expectation has not been met: phenomenologically speaking, I apprehend his not being there as part of my apprehension of the café, hence of the world I inhabit. The café as a whole appears as the ground of an expected figure; all of its constituent objects and people are apprehended primarily as the background for his appearance, and more specifically as the

ground for his non-appearance: his absence haunts the café in a doubly negating or nihilating way (he is not there, and the café appears as nothing more than the ground of that absence).

Nevertheless, the reality of non-being is a function of the presence of human beings in the world that exists independently of them: it may not be reducible to a function of judgement, but it is there at all only because of the way human beings can relate to that world – the way exemplified in questioning, which presupposes the questioner's capacity to step back from that world, his refusal to be carried along by or away with the wholly determinate network of cause and effect.

> It is essential … that the questioner have the permanent possibility of dissociating himself from the causal series which constitutes being and which can produce only being. If we admitted that the question is determined in the questioner by universal determinism, the question would thereby become unintelligible and even inconceivable … [I]nsofar as the questioner must be able to effect in relation to the questioned a kind of nihilating withdrawal, he is not subject to the causal order of the world; he detaches himself from Being … This disengagement is then by definition a human process. Man presents himself at least in this instance as a being who causes Nothingness to arise in the world, inasmuch as he himself is affected with non-being to this end.
>
> (*BN* 23)

Since all questioning involves disclosing the possible non-being of an existent, and disclosing oneself as both not-knowing and capable of coming to know (hence, capable of being other than one presently is), it presupposes the freedom of the questioner; and it thereby raises the possibility that the human being's responsibility for the arising of nothingness in the world (which would otherwise constitute a plenum, a wholly self-determining and hence self-sufficient totality) is not separable from its responsibility as such – its relating to itself as responsible or accountable for what it thinks, says and does.

This suggestion is not exactly explicit in the corresponding introductory stretches of *Being and Time*, although it is plainly implicit in the perspective supplied by its second Division; and Sartre's way of raising it invites us to consider the possibility that, if nothingness arises out of human being, it is because human being as such is possessed of freedom – more precisely, that freedom is another way of characterizing the human capacity to secrete (or rather, distinctively human being as the secretion of) nothingness. What, then, is human freedom if it is through it that nothingness comes into the world? And in what mode of consciousness is the nothingness of freedom most clearly manifest?

This would have been an obvious point at which to move directly to the Sartrean analogue to Heidegger's voice of conscience and its disclosure of the self's capacity for authenticity or its opposite – namely, the notion of bad faith (and its opposite). However, although that notion's appearance is not long delayed, delayed it nevertheless is – to the beginning of the second chapter of *Being and Nothingness*; and in the textual gap between the for-itself as interrogator and the for-itself as in flight from its own non-self-identity in love and labour, call it reproduction and survival (in the form of the woman and the waiter), Sartre inserts his own refraction of Heidegger's refraction of the Kierkegaardian conception of angst – using vertigo and gambling to disclose the human being's nihilating relation to himself.

In vertigo, I am afraid not of falling over the precipice but of throwing myself over. Angst is generated not by the fear that external circumstances (a crumbling path, a jutting stone) might cause me to stumble, but rather by the fear that my strategies for avoiding such dangerous features of the environment might not be realized, because whether they are implemented or not ultimately depends on me, and I am not in this respect functioning as a cause that determines its effects. Vertigo reveals that nothing can compel me either to pursue or to avoid any given form of conduct in the future; for I am not the self that I will be, the self that will either take or not take the relevant course of action (I am separated from that self by time, and nothing in me or my world can close that gap by determining what I will do or be). And yet the self that I will be is nevertheless the self that I am – otherwise its possible fate would not induce horror in me, would not be horror over *my* fate. Nothingness thereby slips into the heart of my relation to my (future) self: I am not the self that I will nevertheless be.

Our anguish over the past manifests itself (by contrast) in the experience of a gambler who, having made a sincere decision not to gamble any more, feels all his resolution melting away as he approaches the gaming table. His resolution both is and is not his: he realizes that it is a resolution that he and no other actually made; but if it is to be effective now, it must in effect be remade by him now, must be assented to anew by the self he now is, the self whose assent or dissent is not determined by the self he was. Seen now, not gambling is no more than a possibility; nothing – certainly nothing he resolved in the past - prevents him from realizing it. He both is and is not the self that he was.

Putting together the disclosures of vertigo and akratic gambling, Sartre concludes that 'consciousness confronts its past and its future as facing a self which it is in the mode of not being' (*BN* 34). Between motive and action lies nothingness, non-identity – freedom is the transcendence of immanent causal determination. But it would falsify his vision to think of gambling and vertigo as each revealing a different portion or component of the self's non-identity, as if its relation to its past and to its future were two entirely separable aspects of its structure. To begin with, both concern

vulnerability: the future-oriented experience of vertigo concerns the self's capacity to overcome its physical vulnerability to the causal nexus it inhabits by asserting its own projects, whereas the past-oriented experience concerns the self's capacity to protect itself against psychic and social damage by that means. Furthermore, the experience of vertigo is a kind of gambling: it registers the anguish of the fact that one's most deeply rooted instincts of self-preservation might not be enough to protect oneself against oneself, against finding oneself compelled to risk absolutely everything. And the akratic gambler likewise experiences a kind of vertigo: he finds himself on the edge of a precipice of risk, and discovers that what is most likely to impel him over it to his utter destruction is not external factors and forces but himself. In both experiences, then, a ruinous outcome is positively courted by the one whom it will destroy: both amount to revelations of the self as not only related to that which it is not, but as related to its own annihilation.

In effect, then, the phenomenological scenarios that prepare the ground for Sartre's restaging of the Heideggerian conjunction between human non-self-identity and human authenticity implicitly anticipate the other concept that is equally active in it – that of death or mortality. Sartre's analysis of angst thereby confirms two key assumptions of its Heideggerian source-text, or rather, two key disclosures resulting from re-reading Division One in the light of Division Two: first, that the most fitting object of objectless anguish is human mortality as such; and second, that death is Dasein's ownmost, non-relational and not-to-be-outstripped issue or question – it is that which is implicitly in question whenever and wherever Dasein relates to Being as an issue (which means, throughout its worldly existence). To this extent, Heidegger would not dissent from Sartre's invocation of 'a world in which a threat of death to human reality is hidden[;] … if the world *is*, it is because it is mortal in the sense in which we say that a wound is mortal' (*BN* 248).

It might also seem that Sartre's re-staging confirms Heidegger's apparent sense of our internal relation to nothingness as manifest in the first instance in our self-relation, hence as always already internal or interior to our Being, so that our being-towards-death is above all a matter of our being-towards-ourselves. Heidegger is certainly often taken to view our self-relation in mortality as standing in opposition to any relation in which we might stand to others: how else, after all, are we to envisage death's non-relationality – the fact that no-one can die our death, any more than another's death can give us access to our own death (in all its mineness)? If this is our view of Heidegger, then it will seem both significant and significantly helpful for phenomenology's claims on our allegiance to note that death makes another, rather later appearance in Sartre's analysis of the for-itself, and does so in an essentially interpersonal context - in the detailed analysis of 'the gaze' with which the first chapter of Part Three of *Being and Nothingness* culminates.

The central phenomenological scene of this analysis is, of course, that of a voyeur who, 'moved by jealousy, curiosity or vice [has] just glued [his] ear to the door and looked through a keyhole' when 'all of a sudden [he] hears footsteps in the hall. Someone is looking at [him]' (*BN* 259-60). Immediately, the voyeur experiences shame, which embodies the recognition that he is the object at which the Other is looking:

> This self which I am – this I am in a world which the Other has made alien to me, for the Other's look embraces my being and correlatively the walls, the door, the keyhole. All these instrumental-things in the midst of which I am, now turn towards the Other a face which on principle escapes me. Thus I am my *Ego* for the other in the midst of a world which flows towards the Other … [T]his internal haemorrhage [is] the flow of *my* world … [a] flight without limit; it is lost externally, the world flows out of my world and I flow outside myself. The Other's look makes me be beyond my being in this world and puts me in the midst of the world which is at once *this world* and beyond this world.
>
> (*BN* 261)

Thus the for-itself, who (as a being who is its possibilities) is what he is not and is not what he is, now *is* somebody; his possibilities escape him insofar as they are usurped by the Other and his possibilities, and so are subtly alienated from him. That dark nearby corner, for example, in which the voyeur might hide, is now apprehended by him as too risky, insofar as the Other might illuminate it with his flashlight:

> [The Other] apprehends it in me insofar as he surpasses it and disarms it. But I do not grasp the actually surpassing; I grasp simply the death of my possibility. A subtle death: for my possibility of hiding still remains *my* possibility; inasmuch as I *am* it, it still lives; and the dark corner does not cease to signal to me, to refer its potentiality to me. But … my very possibility becomes an instrumentality … *For the Other* my possibility is at once an obstacle and a means as all instruments are. It is an obstacle, for it will compel him to certain new acts … It is a means, for once I am discovered in this cul-de-sac, I 'am caught' … I grasp the Other not in the clear vision of what he can make out of my act but in a fear which *lives* all my possibilities as ambivalent. The Other is the hidden death of my possibilities in so far as I live that death as hidden in the midst of the world.
>
> (*BN* 264)

The matter is delicate. On the one hand, insofar as I am a being who is its possibilities, to experience the death of those possibilities is to experience

my own destruction or ruination. On the other hand, the gaze that brings about this self-ruination is not the Other's alone: indeed, his gaze reveals me as gazing, as looking (through the keyhole) as well as being-looked-at; and I can turn that gaze upon him, thereby viewing 'his possibilities [as] possibilities which I refuse and which I can simply contemplate, [or] consider as possibilities of surpassing me which I can always surpass – hence [as] dead-possibilities' (*BN* 288). Moreover, to experience one's possibilities as dead is not exactly to be dead:

> Only the dead can be perpetually objects without ever becoming subjects – for to die is not to lose one's objectivity in the midst of the world; all the dead are there in the world around us. But to die is to lose all possibility of revealing oneself as subject to an Other. (*BN* 297)

So Sartre, no more than Heidegger, regards death as one of the for-itself's possibilities; but for him, death comes closest to the for-itself, hence closest to being phenomenologically graspable, insofar as it infiltrates the field of the for-itself's possibilities by virtue of the gaze of the Other, through which the for-itself at once relates to its own possibilities as dead, and also discovers that it is always already gazing at Others, hence at once relating to those Others' possibilities as dead and forcing them to do so as well.

Does the internal relation Sartre implies here between death, the for-itself's possibilities and Being-for-Others doubly differentiate his recounting of human non-self-identity from that of Heidegger? I would like to suggest otherwise. For first, there is an analogue in Heidegger's account to Sartre's view that death is rendered graspable to Dasein primarily as an inflection of its relation to its possibilities. This is because Heidegger no sooner draws our attention to the 'nothing' with which the call of conscience addresses us than he further specifies this call as 'positive, in that it discloses Dasein's most primordial potentiality-for-Being as Being-guilty' (*SZ* 288); and he articulates our Being-guilty as our null Being-the-basis of a nullity. By this, he means (at least) that we are not wholly responsible for the situation in which we find ourselves (that is, are not self-grounding or self-sufficient but thrown); that we cannot project ourselves into an existential possibility without negating that possibility qua possibility and thereby negating the other possibilities available in that situation as ours, as possibilities through which we might choose to realize ourselves; and that each and every concrete instance of thrown projection is also a negation or nullification of our possible non-existence – in that its sheer actuality presupposes that our death has not-yet-happened and that we have decided against death (by choosing not to commit suicide). In other words, Being-guilty articulates our relation to our possibilities as always internally related to nothingness: for a finite being, for a possibility to be ours is for it to be internally related to death – its

own and ours. On this understanding, all human possibilities are dead-possibilities: we can only relate to them as related to their own utter non-possibility; so what the gaze of the Other reveals to the for-itself about its own possibilities would seem to be exactly what the voice of conscience reveals to Dasein.

But should it not be a matter of some significance whether this revelation of our possibilities as dead is effected by others or by oneself? After all, phenomenologically speaking, what is revealed and the mode or medium of its revelation are internally related: so if one assumes that the internal relation of possibilities to nothingness can be revealed only through subjection to the gaze of the other, one implies that this internal relation is a function of the social dimension of human existence; whereas if one assumes that it can be revealed through the appeal of an inner voice, no such relation to the interpersonal seems to be entailed. However, a closer examination of Heidegger's conception of the voice of conscience puts this assumption of an absent entailment in question.

We might begin by recalling Heidegger's claim that:

> Indeed the call [of conscience] is precisely something which *we ourselves* have neither planned nor prepared for nor voluntarily performed, nor have we ever done so. 'It' calls, against our expectations and even against our will. On the other hand, the call undoubtedly does not come from someone else who is with me in the world. The call comes *from* me, and yet *from beyond me*.
>
> (SZ 275)

Case closed, one might think: Heidegger flatly asserts that the call of conscience doesn't come from someone else. And yet, he seems distinctly uncomfortable with simply saying instead that it comes from the one whose conscience it is; he adumbrates a number of ways in which one might take such an assertion, all of which would be flatly, phenomenologically wrong; and he seems ultimately willing to accept the idea that this voice is mine only if we simultaneously acknowledge its beyondness to me. Now suppose we conjoin this concluding formulation with two others. The first, advanced when discussing the idea of conscience in the context of an account of language, talks of 'hearing the voice of the friend whom every Dasein carries with it' (SZ 163). The second is advanced a little later:

> Dasein's resoluteness towards itself is what first makes it possible to let the Others who are with it 'be' in their ownmost potentiality-for-Being, and to co-disclose this potentiality in the solicitude which leaps forth and liberates. When Dasein is resolute, it can become the 'conscience' of others.
>
> (SZ 298)

How might we find an underlying coherence in these apparently conflicting remarks about conscience and its locatability (or dislocatability)?

We have already seen that the existentiell reality of the voice of conscience attests to the fact that Dasein is a being whose present state is always open to question from the perspective of a state that it might (although it does not yet) occupy, a being for whom to live is a matter of asking and answering oneself, hence conversing with oneself about, how to live. Dasein's differentiation of itself from itself thus engenders two perspectives that any self can take upon itself, and one's mode of existing is determined by the way in which one manages the relation between them. Either the perspective of one's attained state eclipses that of one's unattained but attainable state, or one's attainable state provides a potentially critical perspective on that provided by one's attained state; in the former (inauthentic) case, there is no room for any genuine inner dialogue, but in the latter the self can really speak to itself because it is (as Heidegger puts it) speaking from beyond itself.

However, Division One is insistent not only that there is an internal relation between Dasein's modes of Being-oneself and its modes of Being-with, but that a primary domain in which the inauthentic and the authentic inflections of these internally related relations realize themselves is that of conversation or speech – more specifically discourse. For the human capacity to disclose the reality of something is discursive: 'in discourse, so far as it is genuine, what is said is drawn from what the talk is about, so that discursive communication, in what it says, makes manifest what it is talking about, and thus makes this accessible to the other party' (*SZ* 32). The discourser is both receptive to the way things really are and receptive to others' best attempts to make manifest the way things are; the point of discourse is always to apprehend what is there to be apprehended, and it is always open to the apprehension of others, hence it is always open to the possibility of being put in question either by the phenomenon or by others' apprehensions of it, but always with a view to deepening our collective apprehension of what is there to be understood.

Thus, by actualizing its capacity to be other to itself, authentic Dasein actualizes its capacity to have something of its own to say to others, and to take what others have to say as potentially other than what it has to say, hence as potentially expressive of their individuality, as the contributions of potential partners in a genuinely open conversation. In inauthenticity, by contrast, Dasein's repression of its answerability to itself corresponds to the way in which the sovereignty of idle talk dissolves each Dasein into the other, destroying the differentiation between self and other without which conversation is impossible. One might say: the self's otherness to itself, and the self's otherness to other selves, hang together. Dasein's way of relating to itself can thus be envisaged as a kind of Being-with, and its Being-with (-others) as a kind of Being-oneself.

Beyond anything in particular that authentic others say, therefore, the sheer fact of their saying it also bespeaks their non-self-identity, and so either reinforces the non-self-identity we have managed to attain or appeals to our currently occluded capacity to be other to ourselves. The existence of such another is not lost in *das Man*, so she cannot confirm inauthentic Dasein in its lostness (by mirroring it unquestioningly back to him), and she thereby prevents Dasein from relating inauthentically to her. Indeed, insofar as inauthentic Dasein seeks to mirror others, he can mirror this other (who is separate, self-determining and relating to others as other) only by relating to her as other and relating to himself as other to himself. An encounter with a genuine other thus disrupts Dasein's lostness by awakening – call it speaking for or in the name of – that Dasein's otherness to itself; in this way, Dasein's relation to that other instantiates or goes proxy for a mode of its possible self-relation (a relation to itself as beyond itself); insofar as it is an appeal from someone who is with this Dasein in the world, it is so only insofar as it is essentially impersonal, insofar as the other's actual non-self-identity speaks solely and constantly for the mere possibility of its other's unattained non-self-identity rather than aspiring to determine what its actuality might turn out to be.

This, I submit, is what Heidegger means by resolute Dasein's capacity to co-disclose and liberate another Dasein's potentiality-for-Being; and his account of conscience not only allows for such a possibility, but also invites us to consider the possibility that our own redemption from inauthenticity will take such a form proximally and for the most part (for given that the self-identity induced by inauthenticity precisely removes the internal gap across which the voice of conscience might speak of nothingness, its recovery or re-establishment cannot coherently come from within). So, Sartre's presentation of the gaze of the Other as integral to grasping the internal relation of our possibilities to nothingness cannot be regarded as introducing an interpersonal dimension that is essentially absent from Heidegger's analysis. How, after all, could an account of Dasein that treats Being-oneself and Being-with as equiprimordial aspects of its Being ever be criticized for occluding the interpersonal?

This is the misunderstanding underlying the familiar complaint that Heidegger's phenomenology of death gives illegitimate (even solipsistic) priority to one's own death over that of others. For all Heidegger claims is that the phenomenological significance of my own death for myself is not something to which I can gain access by considering the phenomenological significance of another's death (whether for her or for myself); and such a claim is entirely consistent with regarding another's death as a matter of deep significance – for me, for my understanding of death, and so for my understanding of what it is to be mortal. Indeed, Heidegger's analysis rather implies that death's resistance to our grasp will show up just as much in the issues posed by our relation to the death of others as in those posed by our

relation to our own. To acknowledge that this resistance is internal to the mineness of death (and so of life) is to say both that it is internal to the significance of my death to me *and* that it is internal to the significance of another's death to her; and that in turn entails that this resistance is internal to the significance of another's death to me (and so to the significance of my death to another). If death (not my death, but the mineness of death, its always being the death of someone in particular) is at issue whatever the actual issues Dasein confronts in its existence, then it is at issue in our relations to others whatever the particular issues any specific relations to actual others may pose.

Nevertheless, the particular ways in which death, nothingness, authenticity and interpersonal relations are conjoined in Heidegger and Sartre may seem to resist any complete assimilation to one another; and I want to conclude this discussion by evaluating one dimension of that apparent resistance. One might locate it in the difference between characterizing interpersonal relations as modes of Being-with, and as modes of Being-for; or as Sartre himself puts it in his brief, highly critical discussion of Heidegger preparatory to his analysis of the gaze, 'the empirical image which best symbolizes Heidegger's intuition is not that of a conflict but rather a crew. The original relation of the Other and my consciousness is not the *you* and *me*; it is the we' (*BN* 246). For Sartre, in other words, the limitation of Heidegger's position is not a tendency towards solipsism or the occlusion of the other; it is rather a tendency to assume that ontologically guaranteed openness to others somehow tends towards essentially collaborative modes of ontic co-existence. From Sartre's perspective, this occludes the necessarily violent dimension of Being-for-others – the sense in which wielding and suffering the gaze is inherently a matter of wounding and being wounded.

The value of Sartre's emphasis on violence is, it seems to me, significantly misrepresented if it is characterized as essentially melodramatic, or even pathological – a testament to the immaturity of one unwilling to accept the reality of others except as an affront to oneself (and so as merely attesting to Sartre's own temptation towards paranoid solipsism). For such a characterization itself profoundly misrepresents just how difficult it is properly and fully to acknowledge the reality of other human beings, how truly demanding it is not just to say that 'the world we inhabit is a with-world' but to mean it – to internalize and live in accordance with the fact that the world in which we lead our lives is ours, that the mineness of worldly existence is also its not-mineness (in part, because it is yours as well, as much your world as mine, and in part because my life is not wholly mine, is rather a matter of endlessly reclaiming it as mine in the light of its disclosure as not-wholly-mine to ground or to direct). Philosophy, religion and psychoanalysis (to name but three modes of human self-understanding) have testified from their outset to the deep-rooted tendency of the human animal to take itself to be the centre of the universe, or more precisely to experience the inevitable disclosure of its non-centrality as a displacement, a

loss of some more primordial centrality – so that the reality of our coexisting with others in an independently-existing world keeps on appearing as an injury that reality does to us, and finitude takes on the aspect of woundedness.

The pertinence of violence is, if anything, intensified if we restrict our focus to what is involved in becoming an authentic human individual – an achievement without which the full acknowledgement of the reality of others would anyway be beyond us. For Heidegger's analysis of the process as one of overcoming *das Man* presents it as a movement from self-identity to non-self-identity – a rending of the self both from itself and from its world that could not but be experienced as a de-centring or displacing of the self both from the world and from itself. And if we further restrict our focus to the kinds of interpersonal encounter by means of which such self-rending is typically initiated (in which, as Heidegger would have it, one Dasein attempts to co-disclose and liberate another's potentiality-for-Being), then Sartre's characterization of the primary mood or mode of attunement of that violence becomes equally significant. For he dramatizes the other's upsurge as inducing – not guilt, as Heidegger emphasizes, but – shame. The hubristic attempt to look at others whilst denying their capacity to return our gaze (as if possessed of a God's-eye view) is chastened by the shaming realization that one is inherently incapable of placing oneself altogether beyond the gaze of others – that, beyond any particular difficulty posed by a specific other who happens to gaze at us, we are as such vulnerable to the-gaze-of-the-Other.

To assess the full range of implication activated by this retuning of the mood through which the internal relation of our possibilities to death is disclosed, one would have to call upon a more systematic and penetrating comparison of guilt with shame than I can currently muster; but one initial step seems worth taking in conclusion. For (although Heidegger shows little sign of registering or fully grasping this) one might expect that encountering an authentic other when in a state of inauthenticity oneself would induce shame, and of a specifically impersonal kind. After all, that of which I am thereby made ashamed is not so much some feature of my existence that is particular to me, but rather an utterly common failure to make something individual of myself; overcoming that absence of individuality demands only that I activate resources and capacities open to all by virtue of their Being; and the relationship that incites their activation is equally available to all. Here, one might say, Sartre is a better reader of Heidegger than he knew, or was prepared to admit; for although he adopts a conflictual stance to his predecessor, the originality of his perception – its beyondness to his teacher – is also a collaborative co-disclosure of that teacher's potentiality-for-Being-a-thinker.

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