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JEFFREY WIEAND

Can There Be an Institutional Theory of Art?

AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY of art undertakes to define or otherwise elucidate the nature of art by reference to social institutions. Since art itself, conceived as a body of works, cannot be an institution, an institutional theory must show that objects are works of art because they bear a relation to an institution or are embedded in an institutional context. The context must be institutional because only an institution (a social practice or organization) will be rich enough to endow objects with a special metaphysical or aesthetical character. I believe that in the case of art there is no institution which can do this. I will argue in this paper that theories of art which are supposed to be institutional are not in fact *institutional* theories at all, and that it is unlikely that a truly institutional theory can be developed.

1

There are many kinds of institutions, and the word "institution" is often used to refer to anything which has become settled or established over a period of time. There are, nevertheless, two sorts of institutions which might play a theoretically interesting role in theories of art. I will call the first kind "A-institutions" (the "A" standing for "action"). An A-institution is an action-type whose tokens are particular performances of that type of action. A-institutions are distinguished from other kinds of acts and

social practices because they are rule-governed; there are various rules and constraints which must be observed if an act is to be a performance of an A-institutional type. Thus someone who wishes to make a promise must follow certain rules and observe certain constraints if his act is to be an act of promising at all. Someone who wishes to dig a ditch, on the other hand, need not worry about such rules and constraints. An A-institution, then, is simply a kind of *conventional* act. Examples of such acts include promising, christening, saluting, and marrying; examples of social practices which are not A-institutions include smoking cigarettes and driving to work; examples of acts which are neither A-institutions nor non-A-institutional social practices include digging, walking, and complaining.¹

The second sort of institutions are what I will call P-institutions (the "P" standing for "person"). P-institutions function as quasi-persons or agents; they perform actions and may be held responsible for them. The Catholic Church, for example, may hold a fund drive or condemn an injustice. In general, a P-institution acts through those of its members who are empowered to act on its behalf.

There is, then, a certain ambiguity in the expression "institutional act." An act may be institutional because it was *performed* by an institution, or it may be institutional because it is a *token* of a certain *type* of act, that is, a conventional act. Many of the acts

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performed by P-institutions are A-institutions, but not all of them are. The Catholic Church makes promises, but it also gives alms. Moreover, many P-institutions perform A-institutional acts which are peculiar to them, and which are not and could not be performed by any other person or institution. In cases like this, the P-institution enters into the concept of the act itself. For example, since only the head of the Catholic Church (the Pope) can issue a Bull, reference must be made to the Catholic Church in order to say what sort of act "issuing a Bull" is. There are also acts which may only be performed by certain *kinds* of institutions. War can be declared, for example, only by a government or nation. Finally, there are acts, practices, and perhaps A-institutions which, while they are not (or need not be) performed by some P-institution, require nonetheless the existence or context of a P-institution for their performance. Burning a draft card is an example of this kind of act.

The distinction between A- and P-institutions is thus a distinction between institutions as acts, or rather *kinds* of acts, and institutions as agents. Note, however, that just as A-institutions are not *simply* acts, but acts embedded in conventions, so P-institutions are not *simply* groups of persons who act in concert (like a mob) or who have something in common (like pool players or parachutists). The difference between such groups and P-institutions lies in the fact that the members of the former act as separate agents and act in concert only *per accidens*. Thus the actions of the "members" cannot also be described as the action of an institution. But when members of a P-institution act on its behalf the institution acts through them, and the actions of the members may be described *both* as the actions of particular people *and* as the actions of an institution. Only the acts of P-institutions may be described in this way.

2

With these features of institutions in mind, we can turn to a consideration of pur-

ported institutional theories. The chief candidate is George Dickie's theory, as it is found in *Art and the Aesthetic: An Institutional Analysis*.² An institutional theory is also supposed to be found in several of Arthur Danto's well-known papers.³ The focus will be on Dickie because his effort is exemplary of the possibilities of institutional theories and gets nearly far enough, in sufficient detail, to discover that there is no theory to be formulated. Thus in discussing Dickie's view, I mean to show not only that he is mistaken, but also that the kind of theory he tries to present is impossible.

Dickie's theory seems to involve both A- and P-institutions. In *Art and the Aesthetic* Dickie defines art as follows:

A work of art in the classificatory sense is (1) an artifact (2) a set of the aspects of which has had conferred upon it the status of candidate for appreciation by some person or persons acting on behalf of a certain social institution (the artworld).⁴

On Dickie's view the conferral of the status of candidate for appreciation seems to be an A-institution, a particular sort of conventional act. But the definition apparently refers to a P-institution when it specifies that such acts are performed on behalf of the artworld.

Dickie, however, in effect denies that the artworld is a P-institution:

Let me make clear what I mean by speaking of the artworld as an institution. Among the meanings of "institution" in *Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary* are the following: "3. That which is instituted as: a. An established practice, law, custom, etc. b. An established society or corporation." [This corresponds *roughly* to my distinction between A- and P-institutions.] When I call the artworld an institution I am saying that it is an established practice. Some persons have thought that an institution must be an established society or corporation and, consequently, have misunderstood my claim about the artworld.⁵

Similarly, in a recent lecture, Dickie said that his intent in *Art and the Aesthetic* "was to give an account of the artworld as the broad, informal cultural practice that I conceive it to be."⁶

Now all “established” or “cultural” practices are not institutions in what I have called the A-institutional sense. Having a nightcap is a practice, but it is not an institution (a conventional act). Still, it is a necessary condition for something’s being an A-institution that it is also a practice, and since Dickie is explaining what he means by calling the artworld an institution, we can assume that the established practice he has in mind is an institutional one, that is, an A-institution. But it is impossible to accept such a construal of the artworld given how Dickie actually treats it. The objections begin with the word itself. Why call an established practice the “artworld”? The term “artworld” hardly suggests a kind of practice or act. Sailing may be an established practice, but the world of sailing is certainly not.

That the artworld is not the sort of thing which can be an established practice is evident from what Dickie says about it. He refers to the “core personnel of the artworld,”⁷ but this makes no sense if the artworld is an A-institution. A *P-institution* is the sort of thing that can have members or personnel. (There may, of course, be people who characteristically participate in a practice, but these people are not “part of” the practice itself.) Later in *Art and the Aesthetic*, in the course of his discussion of institutional powers, Dickie says that the artworld “is an example of an institutional structure which generates the power to confer the status of art.”⁸ He goes on to distinguish highly organized institutions from “rather loosely organized groups such as the artworld.”⁹ Clearly Dickie is thinking of the artworld in both these cases as a social group and not as an established practice. Finally, art is defined by Dickie as what is put forward *on behalf of* the artworld. But while people do things on behalf of other people, or groups of people, or institutions which are like people, they do not do things on behalf of established practices.¹⁰ They do things out of respect or admiration for, loyalty to, and in accordance with such practices. The conclusion seems inescapable that in calling the artworld an established

practice Dickie has made a grammatical and conceptual error.

3

I suggest, then, that Dickie is either guilty of a category mistake, or that he does not really think of the artworld as an established practice. There *is* something on Dickie’s view which will count as an established practice, and this is the conferring of the status of candidate for appreciation. But then what is the artworld? It is natural to suppose that it is a P-institution, but the whole point of calling the artworld an established practice was precisely to distinguish it from “an established society or corporation.” It is easy to see why Dickie does not want the artworld to be construed as an established society or corporation: no such thing exists. The artworld does not pay taxes and is not listed in the phone book. But perhaps all P-institutions are not like established societies and corporations. Consider the following passage:

Some may feel that the notion of conferring status within the artworld is not as clear-cut as the conferring of status within the legal system, where procedures and lines of authority are explicitly defined and incorporated into law. The counterparts in the artworld to specified procedures and lines of authority are nowhere codified, and the artworld carries on its business at the level of customary practice. Still there is a practice and this defines a social institution. A social institution need not have a formally established constitution, officers, and bylaws in order to exist and have the capacity to confer status—some social institutions are formal and some are informal.¹¹

Thus when Dickie says that the artworld is not an established society or corporation what he has in mind is that the artworld is not formally constituted—it has no constitution, officers, bylaws, and so on. Many P-institutions *do* have these characteristics, and the possession of them may even be a sufficient condition for being a P-institution. But it is not a necessary condition. In order for something to be a P-institution it must be capable of acting, and a constitution or a hierarchy of authority does not seem

to be required for this. For example, a small *ad hoc* committee of a larger body may have no constitution, laws, or chairperson, but it may nevertheless make a report or recommendation, issue a statement, and the like. A committee member who makes a report to the larger body acts thereby on behalf of the committee, and the minutes may record that the *committee* made its report. As long as the committee functions as an agent, a quasi-person, it will count as what I have called a P-institution. Consequently, by describing the artworld as an "informal institution" and not as a society or corporation, Dickie may simply be saying that the artworld can act without the benefit of officers, laws, and a constitution. In particular, it will be possible for someone to confer the status of candidate for appreciation *on behalf of* the artworld.

This reading of Dickie seems even more plausible when we consider the actions which Dickie has compared to conferring:¹²

- a king's conferring of knighthood
- a grand jury's indicting someone
- the chairman of the election board certifying that someone is qualified to run for office
- a minister's pronouncing a couple man and wife
- the congress or a legally constituted commission [conferring] the status of national park or monument on an area or thing
- the conferring of a Ph.D. degree on someone by a university
- the election of someone as president of the Rotary
- the declaring of an object as a relic of the church

These actions are all performed by a P-institution or by someone acting on behalf of a P-institution. (Moreover, they all seem to be conventional acts.) The relevant sense of "acting on behalf of" will be as follows:

A person *S* acts on behalf of a P-institution *T* only if *S*'s action may be described, not only as the action of *S*, but also as the action of *T*.

Unfortunately, the artworld does not even seem to have the measure of formality essential to an *informal* institution. Unlike the P-institutions in Dickie's analogies, the artworld (1) has no clear membership; (2) has designated no one to act on its behalf and has no procedure for doing so; (3) has

no criteria for saying what is to count as "acting on its behalf." Dickie, of course, does not think that anyone must be *designated* to act on behalf of the artworld; he thinks that anyone who *sees himself* as an agent of the artworld *is* one. But in that case it is hard to see how anyone can really act for the artworld. An institution imposes at least informal constraints on what is to count as an action on its behalf. Thus in my example of an informal institution, where a member of a committee makes a report, there are criteria according to which his action either is or is not an action of the committee as well. If, for example, he makes statements contrary to the consensus of the committee, other members of the committee will point out that he is speaking for himself and not for them. They will deny, in other words, that he is acting on their behalf in the sense defined. But when Dickie's artworld denies that someone is acting on *its* behalf, this denial has no force or legitimacy. It will be possible for me to make something a work of art despite the fact that everyone in the artworld is prepared to deny that I have. It would be absurd, under these circumstances, to say that I was acting on behalf of the artworld.

It might be suggested that conferring itself requires that the artworld be a P-institution. The argument for this would rest on Dickie's remark (quoted above) that a practice defines a social institution. This thesis, however, is false. Walking a dog is a practice, but no institution is required or defined by it. Of course, dog walking is not a conventional practice, and the claim may be that only conventional practices (A-institutions) define social institutions. But this claim is either trivial or false. If any sort of institution will do, the claim is trivial because an A-institution will always define at least one institution, namely itself. On the other hand, the claim is false if what is meant is that every A-institution defines a P-institution. What P-institution does promising define? As a last resort, Dickie might claim (as it sometimes looks like he is claiming) that conferring is the sort of A-institution which can *only* be performed by a certain P-institution, as only the Senate can

try the president of the United States. He might then argue that acts of this kind define the institution which performs them. But of course to make this argument we would have to know in advance that conferring *is* this kind of A-institution, and to know *that* is already to know what the argument wants to prove.

The objection to regarding the artworld as a P-institution may be restated as follows: anyone who claims to act on behalf of a P-institution must somehow be responsible to the wishes and opinions of the other members of the institution and to the institution as a whole. But there is no way in which the members of the artworld are accountable to it. This just shows that conferring cannot be done on behalf of the artworld (in the sense of "on behalf of" which I defined earlier). Since there is no other way in which the artworld functions as an agent, it must be concluded that the artworld is not a P-institution. But neither is the artworld an A-institution. Consequently, the artworld is not, in any theoretically interesting sense, an institution at all.

4

Denying that the artworld is an institution does not, however, do away with Dickie's theory. All the denial really entails is that *the artworld* is not what confers the status of candidate for appreciation. The possibility remains open that there is some other relation between conferring and the artworld.

Before we can guess what this relation might be we must have a better idea of what the artworld is. I suggest that we regard the artworld as a kind of *community*. When I was in college in a small town in Vermont we used to speak of the "college community," by which we meant, not only the students and employees of the college (of the institution), but also people more or less connected with the college—retired faculty and alumni living in the township, shopkeepers who did business with students and the college, people who used the college facilities, read the college newspaper, and so on. The community, in other words, con-

sisted of all those people whose lives were affected by the college and who, in turn, affected it. I suggest that the artworld is a community rather like this. One difference, however, between my old college community and the artworld is that the former was built around a single P-institution, the college,¹³ whereas the latter is partially composed of a great many P-institutions, including art galleries, orchestral associations, movie studios, art classes, and journals of criticism.

When I argued that no one could be said to act on behalf of the artworld, what I meant by "acting on behalf of" was any action which a person (or group of persons) performed which might also be described as the action of a P-institution. But one can also act "on behalf of" something if one acts *in its interest* or for its benefit. In this weaker sense of "acting on behalf of" it makes perfect sense to say that someone confers the status of candidate for appreciation on behalf of (for the benefit of) the artworld. This may not be an accurate description of what people do when they make works of art, but it is not absurd to think that they do this, and whether or not they do is open to empirical investigation.

These considerations, however, do not by themselves entail that art is institutional. If the artworld is seen as a community, Dickie's theory will be *institutional* only if conferring is a conventional act. Although Dickie does not call conferring a conventional act, there are grounds for supposing that he thinks of it as one. First, conferrals of any kind, particularly conferrals of some *status*, are conventional acts. This much is evident from two of Dickie's examples of acts which are like conferring: conferring knighthood and conferring a Ph.D. degree. Second, the rest of the acts which Dickie compares to conferring are all conventional acts, that is, A-institutions. Finally, Dickie said that the artworld is an institution because it is an established practice, but conferring is the only genuine practice referred to in his definition. Thus in calling the artworld an established practice, Dickie may have meant that what he saw as the acts of the artworld—conferrals of status—were

instances of an established practice. If this is so, we can suggest that conferring is a conventional act, one which requires the background of a social community (the art-world) in the sense that conferring is performed in the interest of or for the benefit of this community. Conferring in this case is not the act of an institution; it is an A-institutional act which can be performed, as Dickie says, by anyone who is aware of the existence of the art community. Thus I propose to consider in the remainder of this paper the plausibility of the claim that conferring is an A-institution.

5

Before doing this, however, let me remove an objection which has been advanced against the idea that conferring is a conventional act. In a well-known paper, "The Possibility of Art,"¹⁴ Ted Cohen has argued that if conferring is a conventional act, it ought to be part of the conventions governing the performance of the act that the object on which the status can be conferred is, or at least seems to be, capable of being appreciated. If *everything* can be appreciated, what is the point of conferring status? But even if Cohen is right about this, and not all artifacts can be appreciated, it does not follow that an unappreciable artifact cannot be made a work of art. It is open to Dickie to claim that it is more or less understood that no one will confer the status of candidate for appreciation on an artifact which he himself does not appreciate or think worth the attention of others. In recommending an artifact to our attention, any conferrer with integrity will try not to waste our attention on relatively uninteresting artifacts. Dickie can claim, in other words, that a maxim rather like those introduced by H. P. Grice as maxims of conversational implicature¹⁵ is enforced on the conferring of status. This maxim might be: confer status only on those objects which you deem capable of being appreciated and worthy of the attention of others. Now Grice's maxims are not inviolable: a speaker can flout the appreciability maxim without thereby failing to make a work of art.

This idea can help Dickie explain a great deal about modern art, including the significance of Duchamp. Thus Dickie need not claim that all artifacts can be appreciated, provided he is willing to allow that conferring is governed by something like the appreciability maxim I have suggested.

But although Dickie can deal with this objection, Cohen may nevertheless be right: conferring may not be an A-institution. Consider what is involved in conferring knighthood. A ceremony is performed in which a person is dubbed a knight of the realm by an official empowered to do this. Thus one disparity between conferring status and conferring knighthood has already been noted: knighthood is conferred by someone acting on behalf of a P-institution; status is not. It follows that Dickie must make out the notion of conferring as a conventional act without saying that conferring is performed by or on behalf of (in the strong sense of "acting on behalf of") a P-institution. Moreover, the conferring of knighthood occurs in a ceremony—certain words are uttered and certain actions are performed. There is, then, another way to pick out the conventional character of this act beyond saying that it is an act of conferring knighthood.

Like all actions, conventional actions can be described in many ways, but not all of these ways are relevant to the conventional character of these actions. For example, a physiological description of a speech act will not show that the act was an act of promising. I will call a description of an act "conventional" if it indicates that the action was a conventional act. The *name* of an act will usually function as a conventional description; to say that the queen "conferred knighthood" is to indicate that the queen performed a conventional act. But we could also indicate this by saying that the queen said such-and-such words under such-and-such circumstances (where these words and circumstances are filled out). This second kind of conventional description refers to features of the ceremony in which knighthood is conferred; it identifies some of the conventions (rules and constraints) actually in play in conferring knighthood

and gives marks of the act by which someone could tell that the act was an act of conferring knighthood.

Now in the case of conferring status there is evidently (1) nothing which corresponds to the ceremony in the conferring of knighthood; (2) no conventional description available apart from the naming of the act. The first of these is true because no one has to do any *particular* thing in order successfully to confer the status of candidate for appreciation. Evidently, there is an indefinite number of ways in which this status can be conferred. I might, for example, confer status on a painting by hanging it on a wall, but I could do the same thing by showing it to someone, by carrying it about, or by keeping it in a special cabinet. Small wonder then that there is no general conventional description which obtains for all of these acts apart from the one which says that they are all cases of conferring status.

But if there is no informative conventional description of conferrals, how are we to distinguish conferrals from other acts? How, for instance, are we to distinguish hanging something on a wall in order to make it a work of art from hanging something on a wall in order to do something else? Dickie, of course, thinks that in the first case I am acting on behalf of the artworld, but since the artworld is not a P-institution we have seen that what Dickie must mean by "acting on behalf of" is something like "acting in the interest or for the benefit of." But this weak sense of "acting on behalf of" will not help us to distinguish conferrals of status from other acts. Imagine a fund drive in which patrons of the arts are encouraged to pledge contributions by taping on a wall slips of paper which tell how much they are willing to pledge. A patron who does this will be acting on behalf of the artworld, but it will be hard to specify any conventions which distinguish his act from the act of some artist who is also present at the fund drive and who tapes a slip of paper on the wall in order to confer upon it the status of candidate for appreciation. Actually, there *are* conventions which signal a difference, but they are all on the side of the patron: it is a rule of the fund drive that

taping a slip on the wall counts as *pledging a contribution*. But why does it not also count as conferring the status of candidate for appreciation? It cannot be denied that the patron acts on behalf of the artworld (in the weaker sense), so the difference does not lie here. We still do not know what conventions govern the artist's act or why his act counts as a conferral of the status of candidate for appreciation.

The only difference which I can see between the artist's act and the patron's act (beside the fact that the *patron's* act may be governed by conventions) is a difference in *intent*. I submit that what is supposed to make the artist's act an act of conferring status is that he *intends* to do it. But in this case it is no use saying that the artist's act is a conventional act. It is not enough merely to *intend* to perform an act one imagines to be conventional; there must actually be conventions governing the act. Dickie has said nothing whatever about such conventions; nor has he said *anything* about the act of conferring status apart from the fact that in performing it one intends to make something a candidate for appreciation. Thus the only conventional description he has furnished of conferring status is the name of the act itself.

Suppose a painter asks Dickie how he can go about conferring status on one of his paintings. Dickie can explain that the painter should call attention to the painting in some way. He can show it to people, display it in a conspicuous place, put it up for sale, and so on. Any such action can reasonably be described as one which is likely to maximize the chances that the painting will be appreciated in the way in which works of art are appreciated. But perhaps the painter has already done these things; what *further* thing, he may ask, must he do in order to confer the status of candidate for appreciation on his painting? This is a reasonable question to ask because there did not seem to be anything in showing or displaying the painting which caused it to have any particular status. Dickie can only reply that the status has already been conferred, but this answer is curious for two reasons. (1) If intention really is crucial in conferring

status, how can the painter confer status without realizing it? (2) How can there be a convention in accordance with which people act when no one (at least until Dickie's book) was aware of the existence of such conventions? No one knew, in other words, that hanging a painting on the wall had the significance of making it a work of art. It is a very odd convention indeed which operates without being recognized even implicitly.

I conclude that, although what Dickie says about conferring makes it seem as though it is supposed to be a conventional act, there is not the slightest reason to suppose that it is or can be. If conferrals are conventional, it should be possible to give a conventional description of them apart from calling them conferrals of the status of candidate for appreciation. I cannot *prove* that such a description does not exist, but under the circumstances the burden of proof properly lies with anyone who wishes to maintain that conferrals are conventional, especially since for a long time no one was aware that they were doing anything like "conferring the status of candidate for appreciation." For the present we can rest content with the assumption that conferring is not conventional and that it is therefore not an A-institution.

6

Thus Dickie has not shown that art is institutional or that its nature depends on institutions simply because no institutions are referred to in his theory. It must not be thought, however, that Dickie still has a *theory*, only not an institutional one, for whatever plausibility his view possessed rested entirely on its *apparent* institutional character. If the artworld is not an institution it will not be able to confer status, and if conferring is not an institution there can be no such act at all. (What would it mean to *confer* some kind of *status* in the absence of any conventions or rules governing either the act of conferring or the possession by some object of the status as a result of the action?)

It would be equally wrong to regard

Danto's views about art as institutional. Danto never said that he had an *institutional* view of art, but such a view has been attributed to him because of the importance he attaches to the artworld. The view which Danto defends in several places may be described as follows: *x* is a work of art at time *t* if and only if the theory held by the artworld at *t* canonizes *x*. It has been shown, however, that the artworld is not an institution, although it may be regarded as a kind of community. It might be suggested that the artworld according to Danto can be an institution because it is supposed to hold, at a given time, a given theory of art. But all this would mean is that the "members" of the artworld have certain beliefs, and the fact that persons share beliefs is not enough to make them members of an institution. There is nothing in Danto's writings on art which will serve to justify the view that something is a work of art because of its relation to some human institution.

Is art institutional? In one sense the answer is yes, certainly. Art is an established and characteristic feature of our society—like the automobile or running water. But the sense of "institution" here is not theoretically interesting and does not advance our understanding of the nature of art. If art itself were an institution in an *interesting* sense it would either be a kind of conventional act or a social group. But art, understood as a body of works or as an activity, is plainly neither of these things. This is why an institutional theory of art will try to show that a work of art must bear a relation to a supposed institutional act (like conferring) or to a supposed P-institution (like the artworld). Any such move seems destined to fail. Art is inextricably bound up with social institutions and artistic conventions, but none of these is so crucial or pervasive as to determine the nature of art itself.

¹ Readers who do not think that types of conventional acts are properly called "institutions" have no quarrel with the argument of this paper, for if conventional acts are not institutions, no theory of art can be institutional simply because it makes reference to such acts.

² (Ithaca, N.Y., 1974).

³ See "The Artworld," *Journal of Philosophy* 61 (1964): 571-84, and "Artworks and Real Things," *Theoria* 39 (1973): 1-17.

⁴ *Art and the Aesthetic*, p. 34.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 31. Cf. George Dickie, "A Response to Cohen: the Actuality of Art," in *Aesthetics: A Critical Anthology*, ed. George Dickie and Richard J. Sclafani (New York, 1977), p. 198.

⁶ A paper delivered at the meetings of the American Society for Aesthetics in Tucson, October 1979. I wish to thank Prof. Dickie for making this paper available to me.

⁷ *Art and the Aesthetic*, p. 35.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 80.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ Monroe Beardsley makes this point in "Is Art Essentially Institutional?" in *Culture and Art*, ed. Lars Aagaard-Mogensen (Atlantic Highlands, NJ, 1976).

¹¹ *Art and the Aesthetic*, p. 35.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 34-35. I have omitted "acquiring the status of common law marriage" from this list because it is not clear that this is an action. If art is really like common law marriage, it will be pos-

sible for things to become works of art without anyone conferring anything on them or regarding them in any special way. People acquire the status of common law marriage when they fulfill certain conditions. To fulfill these conditions, no one (not even the "married couple") must even so much as regard the couple as married according to common law. (Cf. becoming eligible for the draft.)

¹³ The college itself, of course, is composed of smaller P-institutions (e.g., the board of trustees).

¹⁴ Ted Cohen, "The Possibility of Art: Remarks on a Proposal by Dickie," *Philosophical Review*, 82 (1973), 69-82.

¹⁵ H. P. Grice, "Logic and Conversation," in *The Logic of Grammar*, ed. Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman (Belmont, Calif., 1975).

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