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WHY DAOISM IS NOT ENVIRONMENTALISM

The continuing degradation of the environment, and the associated dangers to life on earth as we know it, may constitute the single most important problem awaiting us in the twenty-first century. Indeed, it may turn out to be the most serious challenge that humanity has ever faced. As we have come to learn, environmental problems come in many interrelated forms. There is the problem of pollution, which jeopardizes our sources of food, water, and air; the hole in the ozone layer; and the alarming rise in the number of extinct and endangered species. The most terrible threat of all, meanwhile, may be the prospect of unrelenting global warming, which has the potential to cause inestimable destruction to life at all levels, if it does not, in the end, render the earth utterly uninhabitable.

With the future of the living world uncertain, it is understandable that people from all walks of life have started to investigate how the ongoing process of environmental decay might be halted or reversed. As the problems become more acute, it is inevitable that there will be more and more attention to the environment in one form or another. One particular line of thinking suggests that a basic element of the environmental problem is our everyday conception of the world around us and our place in it. Many environmentalists, with good reason, criticize the familiar view of the world as a garden of natural resources waiting to be found and exploited. The fatal weakness of this outlook, which we have come to appreciate only recently, is that it does not conceive of the world as an organic whole, and it fails to take into account the affects of our own actions on environmental systems. Few people would deny today that we need a more sophisticated understanding of the environment; and many people are voicing the opinion that we also need an entirely new attitude toward the environment.

In this spirit, several scholars have asked whether the basis of a new approach to nature might be found in classical East Asian philosophies and religions.¹ In the 1990s, The Center for the Study of World

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Religions at Harvard University sponsored a well-publicized conference series devoted to the theme of ecology in the religions of the world (including Daoism, Confucianism, and Buddhism); the proceedings have already been edited into book form.² Here I would like to assess the value of the *Zhuangzi*, one of the most promising ancient Chinese texts for this purpose, as a contemporary guide to a healthier ecological attitude.

Before discussing the *Zhuangzi* in detail, however, a few general observations are in order. First, the idea that Buddhism or Confucianism or Daoism might offer some kind of answer to a current problem may be part of a more general contemporary trend—namely, the notion that “Eastern wisdom” may teach us certain mysterious truths about the universe, truths that “Western philosophy,” in its rigidity (and indeed its very Western-ness), has been unable to unlock.³ In principle, there is nothing wrong with entertaining the possibility that Western philosophy could learn something from Eastern philosophy. But proponents of “Eastern wisdom” often disseminate ideas that have little to do with the Eastern traditions they invoke.⁴ Rarely, for example, do Western discussions of Daoism, especially in connection with ecology, engage the ambiguities and anachronisms of the term “Daoism,” an issue raised trenchantly by Nathan Sivin over two decades ago.⁵

In looking to Daoist traditions, however we might define them, for answers to our own problems, we must take care not to fall into the trap of mixing paradigms. For example, as the environmental historian I.G. Simmons reminds us, “Chinese Taoism . . . envisages a quietistic, non-interventionist role in the natural world, but that did not prevent the Chinese of the time from making enormous changes to the land and water around them.” Simmons uses this example to illustrate his larger point, namely, “what people say about nature is not necessarily how they behave towards it.”⁶ He might have pressed the argument even further and questioned whether the “quietism” and “non-interventionism” of Chinese Daoism are environmentally conscious in any significant sense.⁷ That is to say, does Daoism advocate quietism and non-interventionism out of a conviction that other attitudes toward nature might threaten the environment? This is a crucial point, because if Daoist philosophers did not assert explicitly that their arguments might be applied to concerns of ecology or environmentalism, then promoting their work on the grounds that it might help us manage our environment represents a falsification of their ideas and a self-serving appropriation of the past for purposes grounded in the present.⁸

Moreover, we must avoid at all costs the myth that the ancients were somehow more in tune with nature, or that the deterioration of

the environment is an exclusively modern phenomenon arising from the peculiar deficiencies of the modern outlook. The manipulation of the environment—and the destruction of the environment—is as old as the species *homo sapiens* itself. *Homo sapiens*, maybe; *homo destruens*, certainly. Many scholars point to the so-called “Pleistocene overkill” hypothesis, which suggests that the startling rates of extinction among large mammalian herbivores in the Pleistocene and early Holocene periods are a direct consequence of human migration and settlement. Prehistoric hunter-gatherers caused permanent changes to the environment virtually all over the world, and the calculated use of fire was one of their most effective tools. As Stephen Pyne observes, the great prairies of North America (which European settlers took to be primeval, but which were originally forested) were in most cases created by aboriginal populations, “the product of deliberate, routine firing.”⁹ The fact that the most visible environmental problems today can be traced to the habits of our post-industrial society does not mean that pre-industrial humans had a more profound comprehension of ecology or a more laudable attitude toward nature. On the contrary, the historical record suggests that populations of the past did not do more damage to the environment only because they were technologically incapable of it.¹⁰ This is why the problem of the environment may prove to be the most serious challenge in the history of our species: it is a problem that no human society has ever solved.

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Chapter 18 of the *Zhuangzi*, “Zhile” (“Supreme Joy”), contains some of the most memorable passages articulating a characteristic theme in the compendium.¹¹ All matter is in constant flux, changing from form to form constantly and inexorably. The chapter ends with a vivid description of the recycling of matter throughout the universe:

There are originative germs for all species. When they obtain water, they become silky filaments.¹² When they are between water and land, they become “frog’s-clothing” [i.e. moss]. When they grow on elevated ground [by the riverbank], they become plantains. When plantains obtain fertile soil, they become “crow’s-feet” [i.e. another kind of aquatic plant]. The roots of the “crow’s-feet” become maggots and the leaves become butterflies. The butterflies quickly transform into insects that are born beneath stoves; they appear as though having shed their skin, and are called *quduo*. In a thousand days, the *quduo* becomes a bird called *ganyugu*. The spittle of the *ganyugu* becomes a *simi*; the *simi* become “pickle-flies.” The *yilu* is born of the “pickle-fly”; the *huangkuang* is born of the *jiuyou*; “grain-grubs”¹³ are born of “rot-worms.” When the “goatherd” is paired with

the “no-shoots,” the “enduring-bamboo” produces the *qingning*. The *qingning* produces leopards;¹⁴ leopards produce horses; horses produce people; and people finally return to the originative germs [of nature]. The Myriad Things all emerge from the originative germs and return to the originative germs.¹⁵

The details in this playful passage are obviously not intended to be precise. One could hardly imagine any ancient writer earnestly believing that horses give birth to humans.¹⁶ But the larger point is clear, and it squares well with the rest of the *Zhuangzi*: we are all born of an endless sequence of mysterious transformations, of which our existence as human beings represents only one temporary stage. When we die, our material will be transformed again into some other entity somewhere in the universe.

The chapter expands on this idea to argue against excessive displays of mourning for a loved one. Thus we read that when Zhuangzi’s wife died, his boon friend Huizi (i.e., Hui Shi) came to offer his condolences and was shocked to find Zhuangzi banging on a basin and singing.

Huizi said: “You lived with her; she raised your children and grew old. Now that she is dead, it is enough that you do not weep for her; but banging on a basin and singing—is this not extreme?”

Zhuangzi said: “It is not so. When she first died, how indeed could I not have been melancholy? But I considered that in the beginning, she was without life; not only was she without life, but she was originally without form; not only was she without form, but she was originally without *qi*. In the midst of mixing with cloud and blur, there was a change and there was *qi*; the *qi* changed and there was form; the form changed and there was life; and now there is another change, and there is death. This is the same as the progression of the four seasons, spring, autumn, summer, winter. Moreover, she sleeps now, reclining in a giant chamber; if I were to have accompanied her, weeping and wailing, I would have considered myself ignorant of destiny. So I stopped.”¹⁷

Zhuangzi’s point is that mourning is irrational because his wife’s death not only is inevitable, but also is caused by the same cosmic transformations that originally brought about her very life. To love his wife entails accepting her death as another one of the world’s mysterious processes, and our unreflective differentiation between “life” and “death” is shown to be one of those artificial distinctions that the text loves to discredit. Life and death are nothing more than two complementary aspects of the same ineffable cosmic truth.¹⁸

For modern readers, part of the allure of that view, with its “crow’s-feet” and “pickle-flies,” must be that it is so strikingly similar to our own. To be sure, we do not believe that maggots and butterflies are born of the roots and leaves of a plant, but how different is the idea, in its essentials, from what we read in *Hamlet*?

Hamlet. Your worm is your only emperor for diet: we fat all creatures else to fat us, and we fat ourselves for maggots; your fat king and your lean beggar is but variable service, two dishes, but to one table—that's the end.

King. Alas, alas!

Hamlet. A man may fish with the worm that hath eat of a king, and eat of a fish that hath fed of that worm.¹⁹

And the *Zhuangzi* contains another famous scene with an identical point:

Zhuangzi was about to die, and his disciples wished to bury him richly. Zhuangzi said: "I take Heaven and Earth as my coffin and sarcophagus, the sun and moon as my linked jade disks, the stars and constellations as my pearls, and the Myriad Things as my mortuary gifts. Will my funerary appurtenances not be sufficient? Why add all this?"

The disciples said: "We are afraid that the crows and kites may eat you, Master."

Zhuangzi said: "Above, it will be the crows and kites that eat me; below, it will be the crickets and ants that eat me. You would take from one to give to the other—why be partial?"²⁰

Zhuangzi, Hamlet, and we ourselves—with our concepts of the "food-chain" and the "law of the conservation of matter"—observe that we are made of the same material as the animals and vegetables that we eat, and the worms and maggots that eat us after death.²¹

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Another basic idea in the *Zhuangzi* that may be relevant to the question of environmentalism is *wuwei*, or "non-action." *Wuwei* is a pregnant term in classical Chinese philosophy with various nuances in different contexts. In the *Zhuangzi*, *wuwei* is generally understood as an attribute of the Way. "The Way has its essence and evidence, but it is without action or form."²² Since the basic tenet of the *Zhuangzi* is that the world will naturally order itself if we only comply with the Way, it is clear that the *wei* in *wuwei* does not have precisely the same connotations as the English word *action*. Rather, *wei* implies action that is undertaken from a partial or parochial worldview, an intervention in discord with the spontaneously perfect and all-encompassing flow of the *dao*.

The *Zhuangzi* is replete with descriptions of legendary sages—"ultimate people" (*zhiren*), in the parlance of the text—who have learned to accept the Way in its ineffable totality, and who pattern their own behavior on its august model. Thus *wuwei* is also a cardinal attribute of enlightened human beings. "When a noble man cannot avoid being the superintendent of the world, there is no better means than non-action."²³ And similarly:

The four seasons have different *qi*. Heaven does not favor [any of them]; thus the year is completed. The Five Officers have different duties. The lord does is not partisan [to any of them]; thus the state is orderly. The great man does not favor either the civil or military realms; thus his virtue is fulfilled. The Myriad Things have different principles. The Way is not partisan; thus it has no name.²⁴

In this passage, the various civil and military agencies of state are taken to be analogous to the natural order of the four seasons. In other words, the enlightened ruler governs his state just as Heaven governs the year: by not interfering and simply allowing the natural processes of the world to play themselves out.

The theme of “not interfering” with the natural world comes through in the famous anecdote that concludes the so-called “Inner Chapters” of the *Zhuangzi*, cited here in the witty translation of Victor H. Mair:

The emperor of the Southern Sea was Lickety, the emperor of the Northern Sea was Split, and the emperor of the Center was Wonton. Lickety and Split often met each other in the land of Wonton, and Wonton treated them well. Wanting to repay Wonton’s kindness, Lickety and Split said, “All people have seven holes for seeing, hearing, eating, and breathing. Wonton alone lacks them. Let’s try boring some holes for him.” So every day they bored one hole, and on the seventh day Wonton died.²⁵

“Wonton” is more than just the Emperor of the Center; “Wonton” is *hundun*, the primordial chaos that engendered the entire universe. In this story, Lickety and Split surely mean well, but their woeful inability to see the world from any perspective other than their own leads to the unintended death of their benefactor, Wonton.²⁶ This is the classic *Zhuangzian* allegory about the dire consequences of fiddling with nature. If we attempt to carve nature in our own image, nature will die.

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The story of Wonton has obvious relevance to the problem of environmentalism today. We are in the process of learning—the hard way—that nature suffers each time we bore another hole into it. Similarly, we appreciate only too keenly *Zhuangzi*’s statement that if the kites and crows do not get him, the worms and bugs will. By observing that we eat other animals in life, but that other animals eat us in death, the *Zhuangzi* exhibits all the necessary elements of the concept of a food-chain.

Consider another well-known anecdote:

Zhuang Zhou was wandering in the preserve²⁷ at Diaoling. He saw an extraordinary magpie flying from the south. Its wingspan was seven feet, its eyes a full inch in diameter. It touched Zhou's forehead and then alighted in a chestnut grove. Zhuang Zhou said: "What bird is this? Its wings are huge, but it can hardly fly; its eyes are large, but it can hardly see." He gathered up his robes and scampered ahead; he grasped his crossbow and stalked it. He saw a cicada that had just found some beautiful shade and forgot about [protecting] its body; so a praying mantis, shielding itself [with a leaf], caught [the cicada]. Seeing what it had just obtained, [the praying mantis] forgot about [protecting] its physical form, so the magpie took advantage of it. But the magpie, seeing its own advantage, forgot about keeping itself intact. Zhuang Zhou was startled, and said: "Ah! Creatures are surely tied to each other; two kinds invoke each other." He set down his bow and ran away.²⁸

Whereupon Zhuang Zhou discovers that he himself, distracted by his own "advantage," has been observed by a watchman—who promptly interrogates him for poaching.²⁹

To readers of an environmentalist bent, this allegory is surely appealing. Zhuang Zhou discovers that all species survive by ambushing their prey, only to succumb to predators who prey on the predators themselves. He then draws the conclusion that "all creatures are surely tied to each other": no creature can exist without other creatures. Only his deduction is more correct than even he imagines, and he is shamed by learning from the watchman that one cannot hunt wildlife with impunity. The living world is an organic system, as any modern systems ecologist would agree.

However, in an important respect, the text of the *Zhuangzi* does not quite reach the concept of ecology itself, because the text does not consider what might happen if there is an artificial disturbance in the equilibrium between predators and prey. What problems may arise when one or a number of species are removed from (or introduced to) the food chain, thereby upsetting the balance—or, in Zhuangzi's terms, when there are too many cicadas and not enough magpies? The *Zhuangzi* views the natural world as a single and constant system, essentially static, in which various species feed off each other in order to survive. The text does not enter into the possibility that any number of ecological equilibria may be possible, and that the current balance among magpies, praying mantises, and cicadas may be affected by any number of factors, including climatic change, adaptability of species, and so on. In other words, what is absent in this anecdote is the concept of the "feedback loop," the idea that nature is a continually fluctuating and self-regulating network, in which the presence of human beings is neither intrinsic nor permanent.

Finally, the conclusion to the above story is illuminating.

Zhuang Zhou returned home and was unhappy for three months. Thereupon Lin Ju asked him: “Master, why have you been unhappy for so long?”

Zhuang Zhou said: “I was protecting my physical form and forgot about my body; I was observing muddy water and was distracted from the clear depths. Moreover, I have heard my Master say: ‘When you enter the vulgar world, follow their rules.’ Recently I was wandering in Diaoling and forgot about my body. An extraordinary magpie touched my forehead, then wandered over to a chestnut grove and forgot about keeping itself intact. The watchman in the chestnut grove thought I was a poacher. This is what I am unhappy about.”³⁰

The figure of Zhuang Zhou does *not* take the opportunity to comment on the various ecological or environmentalist insights that might have been derived from his experience. Rather, he seems to bemoan the fact that the extraordinary magpie seduced his sensibilities, leading him away from “the clear depths,” and understands the encounter with the watchman as his just punishment for having forgotten to protect his physical body. Perhaps the point is that Zhuang Zhou did not practice what he preaches; after all, concern for our physical safety was one of his own basic teachings. The moral is not that human beings are both predators and prey, like any other animal, but that human beings who follow Zhuangzi’s philosophy should be wary enough not to let themselves be preyed upon.

This story highlights the issues in which the text does and does not display an interest. The notion of “non-intervention” and of “complying with the *dao*” are to be understood as life philosophies, with ramifications in metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics; but these concepts are not applied consciously to problems that one might fairly categorize as environmentalist. Nowhere in the text is there any discussion of pollution, the extinction of species, soil erosion, ecology, or the concrete consequences of environmental mismanagement. Of course, no one expects to find references to acid rain or global warming in ancient texts, because those are generally understood as modern phenomena resulting from the widespread burning of fossil fuels. But that is the crux of the issue: our own awareness of the environment—indeed, our very awareness that our awareness is imperfect—arises directly from the fact that our experience with environmental problems, in both scope and depth, is incomparably greater than that of any previous generation. It was only after the discovery of acid rain and the possibility of global warming that we began to realize how much damage had already been done. Part of the reason why we have allowed environmental degradation to progress as far as it has must be that until recently no one imagined the magnitude of the problem.

Therefore, as sympathetically as we may regard the philosophy of the *Zhuangzi*, we must remember that we cannot possibly find in its pages all the answers to our environmental challenges. The solutions that we discover, whatever they may be, will have to be solutions that we discover for ourselves. We cannot ask thinkers of the past to help us with issues that they themselves never imagined.

Nevertheless, we may still be inspired by the Zhuangzian ideal of an enlightened person who lives in harmony with the external world, rather than viewing nature, in the typical Judaeo-Christian way, as a place for humanity to dominate.³¹ It is only when we begin to see the world as a network of interconnected systems, in which we play but one part of many, that we will have any hope of fashioning a more constructive ecological attitude. In sailing through our present uncharted territory, let us take some guidance from the example of Lickety and Split, and refrain from drilling the seventh hole.

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ENDNOTES

1. For an overview, see J.J. Clarke, *The Tao of the West: Western Transformations of Taoist Thought* (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 81–89. One of the most frequently cited articles in this vein is Po-keung Ip, “Taoism and the Foundation of Environmental Ethics,” *Environmental Ethics* 5 (1986): 335–343.
2. N.J. Girardot et al., eds., *Daoism and Ecology: Ways within a Cosmic Landscape*, Religions of the World and Ecology (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Center for the Study of World Religions, 2001); Mary Evelyn Tucker and John Berthrong, eds., *Confucianism and Ecology: The Interrelations of Heaven, Earth, and Humans*, Religions of the World and Ecology (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Center for the Study of World Religions, 1998); and Mary Evelyn Tucker and Duncan Ryūken Williams, eds., *Buddhism and Ecology: The Interconnection of Dharma and Deeds*, Religions of the World and Ecology (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Center for the Study of World Religions, 1997). Other religions represented in the series include Jainism, Hinduism, Christianity, and “indigenous traditions.”
3. Cf. Joseph S. Wu, “Western Philosophy and the Search for Chinese Wisdom,” in *Invitation to Chinese Philosophy: Eight Studies*, ed. Arne Naess and Alastair Hanney, Scandinavian University Books (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1972), 4f.
4. Cf. Jordan Paper, “‘Daoism’ and ‘Deep Ecology’: Fantasy and Potentiality,” in Girardot et al., 9–12; and J.J. Clarke, *Oriental Enlightenment: The Encounter between Asian and Western Thought* (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), 177f.
5. “On the Word ‘Taoist’ as a Source of Perplexity: With Special Reference to the Relations of Science and Religion in Traditional China,” *History of Religions* 17 (1978): 303–330. See also Russell Kirkland, “The Historical Contours of Taoism in China: Thoughts on Issues of Classification and Terminology,” *Journal of Chinese Religions* 25 (1997): 57–82; Michel Strickmann, “On the Alchemy of T’ao Hung-ching,” in *Facets of Taoism: Essays in Chinese Religion*, ed. Holmes Welch and Anna Seidel (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1979), 164ff.; and E. Zürcher, *The Buddhist Conquest of China: The Spread and Adaptation of Buddhism in Early Medieval China*, *Sinica Leidensia* 11 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1972), I, 288–290.

6. *Environmental History: A Concise Introduction*, New Perspectives on the Past (Oxford and Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1993), 157. Cf. also J. Baird Callicott and Roger T. Ames, "Epilogue: On the Relation of Idea and Action," in *Nature in Asian Traditions of Thought: Essays in Environmental Philosophy*, ed. J. Baird Callicott and Roger T. Ames, SUNY Series in Philosophy and Biology (Albany, 1989), 279ff.; and Vaclav Smil, *The Bad Earth: Environmental Degradation in China* (Armonk N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1984), e.g., 8. The classic article is Yi-Fu Tuan, "Discrepancies between Environmental Attitude and Behaviour: Examples from Europe and China," *The Canadian Geographer* 12 (1968): 176–191, reprinted in *Ecology in Religion and History*, ed. David and Eileen Spring, Basic Conditions of Life (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), 91–113.
7. Cf. Holmes Ralston III, "Can the East Help the West to Value Nature?" *Philosophy East and West* 37, no. 2 (1987): 172–190.
8. This is the fallacy of "presentism," as defined in David Hackett Fischer, *Historians' Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), 135–140.
9. *Fire in America: A Cultural History of Wildland and Rural Fire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 84.
10. Despite J. Baird Callicott, *In Defense of the Land Ethic: Essays in Environmental Philosophy*, SUNY Series in Philosophy and Biology (Albany, 1989), 203–219, who vigorously opposes the oft-heard contention that Native Americans preserved their environment only because they lacked the requisite technology to harm it.
11. The following examples are taken from Paul R. Goldin, "A Mind-Body Problem in the *Zhuangzi*?" in *Hiding the World in the World: Uneven Discourses on the Zhuangzi*, ed. Scott Cook, SUNY Series in Chinese Philosophy and Culture (Albany, 2003), 226ff.
12. Following the commentary in Guo Qingfan (1844–1896), *Zhuangzi jishi*, ed. Wang Xiaoyu, *Xinbian Zhuzi jicheng* (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1961), 6B.18.625n.2. Most commentators read *jue* here, but Guo Qingfan's father explains the merits of the reading *xuduan*, which are silky filaments found in water. See also the commentary in Wang Shumin, *Zhuangzi jiaoquan*, 2nd edition, Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan Lishi Yuyan Yanjiusuo zhuankan 88 (Taipei, 1994), II, 659n.6.
13. I assume that the *maorui* is the same creature as the *maozai*, which appears in the *Odes* as an insect infesting grain. See Mao 264, "Zhan'ang," *Mao-Shi zhengyi*, in Ruan Yuan (1764–1849), *Shisan jing zhushu fu jiaokan ji* (1817; rpt., Beijing: Zhonghua, 1980), 18E.577b. (The name *maozai* is still used with this meaning in modern Mandarin.)
14. Following the commentary in *Zhuangzi jiaoquan*, II, 665n.19. On the various plants and animals in this passage, see also Fukatsu Tanefusa, "Kodai Chūgokujin no shisō to seikatsu: 'Yō ka i kyū' ni tsuite," *Nishō Gakusha Daigaku Tōyōgaku Kenkyūjo shūkan* 13 (1982), 85ff.
15. *Zhuangzi jishi* 6B.18.624f. For further discussions of this passage, see Roel Sterckx, *The Animal and the Daemon in Early China*, SUNY Series in Chinese Philosophy and Culture (Albany, 2002), 167f.; Benjamin I. Schwartz, *The World of Thought in Ancient China* (Cambridge, Mass., and London: Harvard University Press, Belknap Press, 1985), 220; and Joseph Needham, *Science and Civilisation in China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954–), II, 78.
16. Nevertheless, we must not overestimate the ancients' knowledge of nature and ecology. As late as the eleventh century, for example, Cheng Yi (1033–1107) suggested in all seriousness that fireflies are born of decaying grass and that lice are born spontaneously in new clothes. See Zhu Xi (1130–1200), *Henan Chengshi yishu* (*Guoxue jiben congshu*), 18.220. Cf. also A.C. Graham, *Two Chinese Philosophers: The Metaphysics of the Brothers Ch'eng*, 2nd edition (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1992), 36.
17. "Zhile," *Zhuangzi jishi* 6B.18.614f.
18. See e.g. Duan Dezhi, "Shang yu zaowu zhe you, er bu yu wai sisheng wu zhongshi zhe wei you"—Dui Zhuangzi shengsiguan de yige kaocha," *Sanxia Daxue xuebao: Renwen sheke ban* 2001.2, 9; Chen Guying, *Zhuangzi qianshuo* (Hong Kong: Shangwu, 1991), 27ff.; A.C. Graham, *Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in*

- Ancient China* (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1989), 202–204; Kimura Eiichi, *Chūgoku tetsugaku no tankyū*, Tōyōgaku sōsho 22 (Tokyo: Sōbunsha, 1981), 352ff.; and Fung Yu-lan, *A History of Chinese Philosophy*, tr. Derk Bodde, 2nd edition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), I, 236–239. Compare also “Zhi bei you,” *Zhuangzi jishi* 7B.22.733: “The birth of a human being is the accumulation of *qi*. When it accumulates, there is life; when it dissipates, there is death. Since death and life are in league with each other, what should I be vexed about?”
19. *Hamlet* IV.iii.21–28; text in G. Blakemore Evans, ed., *The Riverside Shakespeare* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974), 1171.
 20. “Lie Yukou,” *Zhuangzi jishi* 10A.32.1063.
 21. In drawing this comparison, it is important to remember that Shakespeare was writing within a tradition that extended back to the Bible (e.g., Proverbs 22:2) and the Apocrypha (e.g. Ecclesiasticus 10:11).
 22. “Da zongshi,” *Zhuangzi jishi* 3A.6.246.
 23. “Zaiyou,” *Zhuangzi jishi* 4C.11.369.
 24. “Zeyang,” *Zhuangzi jishi* 8C.25.909.
 25. “Yingdi,” *Zhuangzi jishi* 3C.7.309; tr. in *Wandering on the Way: Early Taoist Tales and Parables of Chuang Tzu* (New York: Bantam, 1994; rpt., Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1998), 71.
 26. For various interpretations of this passage, see, e.g., N.J. Girardot, *Myth and Meaning in Early Taoism: The Theme of Chaos (hun-tun)*, Hermeneutics: Studies in the History of Religion (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 81–98; Max Kaltenmark, *Lao Tzu and Taoism*, tr. Roger Greaves (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), 101; Needham, II, 112ff.; Arthur Waley, *Three Ways of Thought in Ancient China* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1939), 66ff.; Marcel Granet, *La pensée chinoise*, Bibliothèque de “L’évolution de l’Humanité” (Paris: La Renaissance du Livre, 1934; rpt. Paris: Albin Michel, 1999), 320f.; and *idem*, *Danses et légendes de la Chine ancienne*, ed. Rémi Mathieu, 3rd edition, Orientales (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1994), 544.
 27. Or perhaps “in the wilderness” (following the variant *ye* for *fan*).
 28. “Shanmu,” *Zhuangzi jishi* 7A.20.695.
 29. Despite Philip J. Ivanhoe, “Zhuangzi’s Conversion Experience,” *Journal of Chinese Religions* 19 (1991), 18ff., who argues that Zhuangzi was not poaching, but unintentionally trespassing. Recently excavated documents show that the laws did in fact distinguish between trespassing (*lanru*) and poaching (*daoru*), though both were considered punishable crimes; see *Longgang Qinjian* (Beijing: Zhonghua, 2001), esp. 76 (note to strip 13). On parks generally, see Sterckx, 111ff.; Mark Edward Lewis, *Sanctioned Violence in Early China*, SUNY Series in Chinese Philosophy and Culture (Albany, 1990), 150ff.; and Edward H. Schafer, “Hunting Parks and Animal Enclosures in Ancient China,” *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 11 (1968): 318–343.
- Ivanhoe’s discussion of this passage as a “conversion experience” is intended as a response to the earlier work of David S. Nivison, “Hsun Tzu and Chuang Tzu,” in *Chinese Texts and Philosophical Contexts: Essays Dedicated to Angus C. Graham*, ed. Henry Rosemont, Jr., *Critics and Their Critics* 1 (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1991), 132ff.; A.C. Graham, *Chuang-tzū: The Inner Chapters* (London and Boston: George Allen & Unwin, 1981; rpt., Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett, 2001), 117f.; and Henri Maspero, “Essai sur le Taoïsme aux premiers siècles de l’ère chrétienne,” in Maspero’s *Mélanges posthumes sur les religions et l’histoire de la Chine*, Publications du Musée Guimet: Bibliothèque de diffusion 57–59 (Paris: Civilisations du Sud, 1950), vol. II (i.e., *Le Taoïsme*), 215f. But Zhuangzi’s behavior (including the repetition of his master’s motto—see below) does not support the interpretation that this story represents a “conversion” from one belief system to another. Rather, the figure of Zhuangzi is shown to have forgotten, in a moment of distraction, something that he knew from the beginning.
30. “Shanmu,” *Zhuangzi jishi* 7A.20.697–698.
 31. This point was made long ago by Lynn White, Jr., “The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis,” *Science* 155 (1967): 1203–1207, reprinted in Spring and Spring, 23ff.;

see also Arnold Toynbee, "The Religious Background of the Present Environmental Crisis," in the same volume, 141ff. Compare, more recently, J. Baird Callicott, *Earth's Insights: A Survey of Ecological Ethics from the Mediterranean Basin to the Australian Outback* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1994), 1–43.

CHINESE GLOSSARY

Chen Guying	陳鼓應	"Shanmu"	山木
Cheng Yi	程頤	"'Shang yu zaowu zhe you, er bu yu wai sisheng wu zhongshi zhe wei you'—Dui Zhuangzi shengsiguan de yige kaocha"	
"Da zongshi" <i>daoru</i>	大宗師 盜入		
Duan Dezhi <i>fan</i>	段德智 樊		"上與造物者游，而不 與外死生無終始者 為友"—對莊子 生死觀的一個考察
Guo Qingfan <i>Guoxue jiben congshu</i> 國學基本叢書	郭慶藩		
<i>Henan Chengshi yishu</i> 河南程氏遺書		<i>Shisan jing zhushu fu jiaokan ji</i> 十三經注疏附校勘記	
Hui Shi	惠施	Wang Shumin	王叔岷
Huizi	惠子	Wang Xiaoyu	王孝魚
<i>hundun</i>	渾沌	<i>wuwei</i>	無為
<i>jue</i>	絕	<i>ye</i>	埜
<i>lanru</i>	闌入	"Yingdi"	應帝
"Lie Yukou"	列禦寇	"Zaiyou"	在宥
<i>Longgang Qinjian</i> 龍崗秦簡		"Zeyang"	則陽
<i>maorui</i>	瞽苒	"Zhang'ang"	瞻仰
<i>Mao-Shi zhengyi</i> 毛詩正義		"Zhi bei you"	知北遊
<i>maozei</i>	蝥賊	"Zhile"	至樂
Ruan Yuan	阮元	<i>zhiren</i>	至人
<i>Sanxia Daxue xuebao:</i> <i>Renwen sheke ban</i> 三峽大學學報： 人文社科版		Zhu Xi	朱熹
		<i>Zhuangzi</i>	莊子
		<i>Zhuangzi jishi</i>	莊子集釋
		<i>Zhuangzi jiaoquan</i>	莊子校詮
		<i>Zhuangzi qianshuo</i>	莊子淺說

JAPANESE GLOSSARY

*Chūgoku tetsugaku no
tankyū*

中國哲學の探究

Fukatsu Tanefusa

深津胤房

Kimura Eiichi

木村英一

“Kodai Chūgokujin no shisō to
seikatsu: ‘Yō ka i kyū’ ni tsuite”

古代中國人の思想と生活：鷹化
為鳩について

Nishō Gakusha Daigaku

Tōyōgaku Kenkyūjo shūkan

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