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

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BOOK REVIEWS

Julian Hochberg
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Kinesics and Context: Essays on Body Motion Communication
By Ray L. Birdwhistell. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1970. Pp. xiv, 338. Paperback, $3.95.

Ray Birdwhistell is an anthropologist who for more than 20 years has taken as his focus of interest the phenomena of human communication. His concern is with the patterns of human behavior that people manifest when they communicate, and his aim is to describe these patterns. Birdwhistell, who recognizes that communication is mediated by a complex system of behavior that includes speech, movement, and the relations of the communicators to the physical environment, is to be regarded as one of the earliest exponents of what has been distinguished (Duncan, 1969) as the 'structural' approach to communicational behavior, and as such, he has had an important influence upon a number of workers in this field.[1] His main focus, however, has been on the way that body motion functions in communication. In his attempts to set this topic on a systematic footing, he is a pioneer, and for many years he was the only scholar engaged in the task. The book reviewed here brings together Birdwhistell's more important writings. Hitherto, these were hard to obtain, so the appearance of this volume is very much to be welcomed.

The newcomer to Birdwhistell should be forewarned. Anyone who opens this book expecting to find in it a coherent exposition of the role of body motion in communication will be disappointed. If he is looking for philosophical and methodological guidance, however, he may derive much. Birdwhistell is not a systematic writer. In these essays he shows us something of what a systematic study of communication behavior might look like, and he provides the foundations for an approach to the subject that will be of great value if properly understood and applied; in places throughout the book we get brilliant observations on communicational behavior. We do not get a well-worked map of the territory. Despite some reviewers, however, I see no reason why we should have expected such a map. It is only within the last five years that anyone other than Birdwhistell himself, besides a mere handful of workers, has even begun to take this field seriously.

The book is not easy to read. Though Birdwhistell at times writes with simplicity and force, he is often dense, technical, and abstract. To understand what he is saying, the reader must often work rather hard, especially if he is unfamiliar with the approach. In this review I shall try to summarize what I take to be the most important features of Birdwhistell's approach, and I

shall contrast his approach to that commonly taken by psychologists who have interested themselves in body motion. I shall then deal with Birdwhistell's more specific statements on kinesics. In doing this I hope not only to provide a guide for those who would read this book but also to outline an approach to the study of human communication, an approach which is only now beginning to take shape but one which will, when applied in earnest, prove to be of considerable importance.

Birdwhistell is interested in the phenomena of face-to-face communication in people. He is interested in the order or pattern that can be observed in the ways in which people relate their behavior to one another when they are in each other's presence. For him this order or pattern *is* communication: "when we talk about communication, . . . we discuss it as a complex and sustaining system through which various members of the society interrelate with more or less efficiency and facility" (p. 12). The aim of a science of human communication, in his view, would be the systematic description of the systems of behavior by which this interrelatedness is brought about. For Birdwhistell, thus, communication is not something that we may or may not achieve; it is not something that we may or may not do of our own choosing, for whenever we are in the presence of another, to the extent that there is an interrelation between our behavior and that of the other, to this extent communication is going on. For Birdwhistell, communication is to be viewed as a system with a structure that can be described independently of the behavior of particular participants. Particular participants, on given occasions of interaction, might be said to make use of this system. The aim of Birdwhistell's endeavor is to give us an account of this system.

This systemic view of communication is not original with Birdwhistell. It received an earlier formulation in the work of Gregory Bateson, to whom Birdwhistell acknowledges his debt. It is implicit in the views of such anthropological linguists as Sapir and Kenneth Pike and others.[2] Birdwhistell gives it a forceful expression in this book, however, and he shows clearly what its implications are for a methodology for the study of communicative behavior.

By this systemic view of communication, anything that anyone does in the presence of another must be considered as potentially part of the system. Speech and gesture, posture and orientation, touch and relative position in space—all must be taken into account if we are to comprehend communication. We cannot at the outset of our investigations decide not to attend to certain aspects of behavior. So long as it is detectable by the other, it must be presumed communicative until proven otherwise. That is, though we must exclude nothing at the outset, one of the outcomes of our work would be to show what aspects of behavior are *not* part of the system. As Birdwhistell says of body motion, "all of the observed shifts of the human body are not of equal significance to the human communicational system. . . . Which particular behaviors are of patterned communicative value . . . can be determined only by the systematic investigation of the behavior in the communicational context. . . . Our problem is to describe the structure of body motion communication behavior in a way which allows us to measure the significance of particular motions or complexes of motions to the communicational processes" (pp. 76–77).

It will also be seen that we cannot regard any one aspect of behavior as necessarily 'more communicative' than another. For instance, when two people talk together, the physical presences of each to the other, their respective orientations and their postures, are all part of the conditions that make the talk possible. They must be considered an integral part of the communicative system, along with the words that are uttered and the gestures that are performed. From Birdwhistell's point of view, those aspects of behavior that establish and maintain relatedness are just as important as those behaviors that transmit new information from one person to another. To focus on language alone or on body motion alone is thus to focus on only a part of the system, and until its relationship with the other parts is also understood, our understanding of communication will be limited indeed. It makes no sense to speak of 'verbal communication' and 'nonverbal communication.' There is only communication, a system of behavior patterns by which people are related to one another. This does not prevent us from looking at the different aspects separately, and indeed it proves useful to do so, up to a point. Birdwhistell's original and still abiding interest is in the part played by body motion in communication, yet he is fully aware that it is but a part and that the decision to study it separately is but a matter of investigatory convenience.

The focus, then, is on what behaviors people characteristically engage in when they interact. Since we do not know what these behaviors are, we must look and see. Most often, an investigator with this orientation will seek to gather records on film or video tape of occasions when people are present to one another and then, by patient and detailed watching, he will try to describe the elements of behavior that occur and the way these elements are patterned in relation to one another. Gradually, as he accumulates examples, he will be able to state the contexts within which the elements he has isolated may be found, and from such statements specify the ways in which these elements function in the communication system he is studying.

The most rigorously developed methodology consonant with this approach is that of descriptive linguistics. Birdwhistell recognized this at an early stage in his career. He sees the methods of descriptive linguistics as a model for those who would examine the structure of other systems of behavior in communication. In developing kinesics he has adapted much from these methods, and he has also adapted much from its terminology. He acknowledges particular debts to the work of H. L. Smith, George Trager, and Norman McQuown in this regard.

I will return later to a more detailed discussion of Birdwhistell's efforts to demonstrate how much of body motion, as it functions in communication, has a structure analogous to that of spoken language. For the moment I would like to point out that suggesting a 'linguistic approach' to the analysis of systems of communicative behavior other than language does not mean supposing that these other systems are languages. It means, rather, adopting the *level of analysis* at which linguists operate when they approach speech and seeking for their *mode of explanation.* Such an approach does assume, of course, that when people interact they make use of a repertoire of behavioral forms that they share with others and use in accordance with sets of shared rules. This does not presuppose the nature of these forms,

however, nor does it presuppose the nature of their rules of patterning. These may be quite different from those that may be found in language.

In recent years many psychologists have become interested in what is often rather unfortunately referred to as 'nonverbal communication,' and they are thus looking at many of the same phenomena that interest Birdwhistell. However, almost all who are working in this area differ from Birdwhistell in that they use an experimental approach. They also ask a different kind of question. It may help to show in more detail what the nature of this difference is. I will do this by contrasting the way 'facial expression' has been traditionally investigated in psychology with the approach to the same phenomena that Birdwhistell would follow.[3]

In the psychological approach to the study of the face, there are two principal methods that have been followed.[4] On the one hand, subjects have been placed in situations in which they have been presented with various stimuli presumed to arouse different emotions, and the behavior of their faces has been recorded in the hope that the patterns appearing there would differentiate in a reliable way the different stimuli presented. In the other, more common approach, the question has been whether people can reliably distinguish facial expressions in terms of different emotions the faces are presumed to be expressing. The usual method here has been to present subjects with photographs of faces in various poses and to ask them to label the photographs in terms of the emotions supposedly being expressed. A number of other methods have been used from time to time, but in all of this work, it will be noticed, it is assumed that the various poses that we can observe on the faces are *expressions of emotion*. The ultimate interest of almost all workers in what is by now a very long tradition has been in the emotions. Interest in the face seems to be limited to the extent to which it can indicate the inner affective states of the person whose face it is. In the experiments in which people are asked to make judgments of photographs of faces, accordingly, the subjects are always directed to consider *only* that the faces are expressing emotion.

In Birdwhistell's approach, one begins not with an interest in the emotions but with an interest in the face itself. One would ask first, What are the various things the face does? One would then proceed to determine, by careful observation, the various settings in which repeatedly observed units of facial behavior can be seen to occur, and the question would always be, What functions *for the interaction* do these differentiable units of facial behavior have? From this point of view, in other words, the question of what inner state is supposedly made manifest in the face is not relevant. What is relevant is what difference different facial displays make to the organization of the occasions of interaction in which they occur.

Remarkably little research on facial behavior from this perspective has been carried out. There is some research on the infant smile, summarized by Bowlby (1969), in which the role of the smile in promoting the mother/child interaction has been examined. Van Hoof (1962, 1972), Blurton-Jones (1967), and Grant (1968, 1969) have reported observational studies of facial (and other) behavior in which the principal interest is in its signaling function. Most of this work has been on children of nursery-school age. Rosenfeld (1966) and Reece and Whitman (1962), working within an experimental approach, have reported studies of the influence of smiling on other aspects of interaction. Birdwhistell himself, in the book here reviewed, offers an essay on the smile. In it he points out how the smile in itself is a highly complex phenomenon, with a wide variety of social functions, and that to consider it merely, in his phrase, as a "visible transform of an inner physiological state" would be to miss entirely its significance as a social signal. He also refers, in various places in the book, to how movements in the face may be brought into play in association with speech, and to how these movements, along with movements of the head and limbs, have a complex relationship both with the structuring of the speech as an activity and also with its content. Facial displays can serve to mark out points of emphasis in speech, they can serve to mark off whole segments of speech as distinct units or as contained or embedded units, and they can also provide a sort of commentary on what is being said. If we watch the faces of listeners, too, we can see that nods, smiles, frowns, raised eyebrows, appear frequently in some circumstances and are an important part of the repertoire of the listeners' behaviors and serve to regulate the behavior of the speaker. Though no systematic data are offered by Birdwhistell, his occasional observations are enough to make it clear that work along these lines will be highly illuminating.

Birdwhistell, concerned as he is with the interactional use of the face, and as an anthropologist, aware of how communicative behavior is patterned differently in different societies, has expressed the view that there are no facial expressions that have the same social meaning all over the world. Specifically, he says also that there are no universal gestures of emotional expression. Ekman (1971) and Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1970), though from very different perspectives, have recently challenged this view. Ekman (1971) has gone to considerable lengths to demonstrate that different emotions can be reliably recognized from still photographs of differently posed faces in the same way in a number of widely differing societies. On the basis of these and certain other studies, he claims that there are distinctive patterns of muscular activity in the face that are characteristic of different emotions and that these patterns are universal, part of the expressive equipment we are all born with. Ekman claims that his findings on facial expression constitute a refutation of Birdwhistell, who, he says, "cannot admit the possibility of universals in facial expression and maintain his major central claim that facial and body behavior is a language" (Ekman, 1971, pp. 2–3).

In reply to this, there are two points to be made. In the first place, it should be clear that even if there are "universal forms of emotional expression," this would not mean having to give up the idea that "facial and body behavior is a language." As I have tried to make clear, Birdwhistell's use of the linguistic level of analysis and his adaptation of linguistic terminology reflect his view that it is appropriate to study the behaviors that are used in communication as a system in its own right. There is no *logical* reason we cannot adhere to this level of analysis and recognize that some features of this system are not specific to any given culture.

Secondly, it should be pointed out that Ekman's investigations follow the traditional approach—that he is interested in the face only insofar as it seems to allow one to apprehend the inner states of the individual. He does

not ask, as Birdwhistell would, How is the face used in interaction? Nor do his findings contribute to any answer to this. When Ekman uses the phrase 'expression of emotion,' he uses it in the traditional sense that the emotion is something 'inside' the individual that 'comes out' on the face in a particular way. Birdwhistell, on the other hand, approaching behavior in terms of its communicative function, rarely discusses emotion as such. He provides no explicit analysis of the concept, but from his perspective it would seem that his concept of emotion would be quite different from Ekman's. Birdwhistell would describe emotion not as an inner state but as a form of behavioral relatedness between individuals. Those displays that we have traditionally called displays of emotion he would describe not in terms of what they express but in terms of how they function in interactions. That is, affect displays would be seen as displays that bring about certain kinds of adjustments in the behavior of others, adjustments distinct from adjustments that occur in association with other kinds of signals. From this viewpoint, it may well turn out that the forms of facial display that Ekman (and also Eibl-Eibesfeldt) find to be universal are nonetheless embedded in interactional sequences in characteristically different ways in different cultures, so that something like Birdwhistell's original statement may still turn out to be correct. As it is, Ekman himself recognizes that societies differ in the kinds of rules they have to govern the display of feeling, rules which include rules about what kinds of facial display a person may use in different situations. A final resolution of this difference between these two investigators will come only when we have a much better understanding of the signaling function of the face, on the one hand, and, on the other, a much better understanding of what 'emotion' is, not from the standpoint of its physiology, but from the standpoint of its place in interaction. In all probability, it will turn out that there is much less difference between Ekman and Birdwhistell than there appears to be. At the moment, it seems likely that they differ mainly because they are not really talking about the same things.

Birdwhistell is very insistent that we can never state the meaning of a behavioral unit except in terms of its place within a context. It may be true that whenever we see a certain facial expression, no matter what the context, we can be sure that the person who shows it has a certain inner state. In this case, there is a sense in which we can say that 'facial display X means inner state Y.' But this is only one kind of meaning, and it is not the kind of meaning with which Birdwhistell is concerned. For him, to ask what a given unit of body motion 'means' is to ask what its *use* is. Questions such as, What does it mean when a person smiles? or What does it mean when a person raises his fist and shakes it back and forth? can only be answered by giving a list of the environments in which these forms are generally seen. In other words, we can answer these questions in terms of the range of use.[5]

Birdwhistell says that his realization that even 'well-known' gestures like the army salute depend on their context for their meaning in any instance was an important step toward his view that gesture and other aspects of body motion could profitably be approached by linguistic methods. He came to the view that some aspects of body motion, at least, could be seen to be organized in a way that is analogous to language. This view is perhaps best expounded through an example.

If we see a man lift his clenched fist and move it rapidly forward and back two or three times, we cannot conclude, as we might be tempted to, that he is 'angry.' He may be engaged in a friendly salutation with someone. He may be engaging in a pictorial gesture, as he describes someone he knows as being tightfisted. His raised and shaken fist may be his reply to a question about what a mutual acquaintance did in a certain situation (with this gesture he makes a statement which in this context means something like 'he was very tough'). The shaken fist as a 'gesture of anger' is only one among many of its uses; and even as a 'gesture of anger,' it may not mean 'I am angry' but rather 'he was angry,' or 'I would be angry if . . . ,' or 'I was angry then,' or even 'I mean anger, not fear.'

Now, in all of these cases, not only is the general context of the appearance of this gesture different, but also the gesture itself, the raised and shaken fist, is only one element within a configuration of several elements, a configuration which is different in each case. When the raised fist appears in the salutation, for example, it may be accompanied by an openmouthed upper-toothed smile and raised eyebrows (a facial display common in greeting situations). When the raised fist appears to illustrate the idea of tightfistedness, it may be accompanied by the statement 'he was very tightfisted,' the speaker's brows fully raised and his lower and upper eyelids drawn together to produce 'slit eyes.' When it appears as a gesture meaning 'I am angry,' it may occur with the head tilted forward and with the brows drawn together over the bridge of the nose, the mouth closed and the lips pressed tightly together and slightly rolled inward. Each of these cases differs in other ways, too, such as in the position of the fist in relation to the head: in the 'angry' case, it was held rather close to the face of the fist shaker; in the salutation example, it was held above the head, somewhat to the right, while the body of the person was facing at right angles to the person he was saluting.

These examples show how a complex statement made in body motion alone or in body motion and accompanying utterances can be made up of a number of separable elements. The raised clenched fist is one such element. The various facial displays that can accompany it are other such elements. These facial displays can also occur in other contexts, independently of fist shaking, and indeed consideration of these facial elements will show that they themselves are combinations of elements of facial behavior that can occur separately. In describing the behavior of the face, it is convenient to consider at least the brows, the muscles around the eyes, the eyelids, the nostrils, and the mouth as separable 'areas of articulation,' each one of which has its own repertoire. Facial configurations then arise from different combinations of elements in these repertoires. It is worth noting that though Birdwhistell was the first investigator to try to deal with the face in this way,[6] similar but quite independent attempts were made by van Hoof (1962) for primate faces and by Ex and Kendon (1964). More recently, Grant (1969) has developed descriptions of different faces along similar lines, and Ekman's visual 'dictionary' of facial elements observes some of the same principles (Ekman, Friesen, and Tomkins, 1971).

The basic idea I have tried to illustrate in the discussion above is that different parts of the body can be viewed as having repertoires of elements and that these elements can occur together in different combinations to

produce more complex configurations. These more complex configurations, such as the gestural statements described above, can themselves be seen to behave as units and to occur in complex relationships with each other. It will be further seen that these more complex units are truly 'emergent' units, in that the alteration of only one element may completely alter the whole complex.

The idea that we can talk of elements of body motion that occur in different combinations, combinations which themselves behave like elements in *other* combinations, is one of the most central ideas in Birdwhistell's conception of kinesics. The parallel with conceptions developed in structural linguistics will not be missed, and Birdwhistell has tried hard to develop this parallel in some detail. Thus he suggests that the smallest elements be referred to as kinemes, named in direct analogy to phonemes. A kineme, for Birdwhistell, is a class of movements whose members may vary among themselves, but this variation is not such as to make a difference to the larger units of which it is a part. Thus, in any two examples of a facial display that includes raised brows, let us say, so long as the facial display is 'the same' in function despite any actual difference in the degree to which the brows are raised in the two cases, then, in the terminology Birdwhistell has developed, the two cases of brow raising may be regarded as *allokines* of one another and raised brows in general as a *kineme*. Other examples of kinemes here would be knitted brows and puckered brows. Birdwhistell provides a list of many of the kinemes he has established, though unfortunately he does not give any detailed data about them.

Kinemes, in Birdwhistell's conception, combine in various ways into configurations that he calls *kinemorphs*. The various facial displays I described above in the examples of the raised fist are examples of the sort of thing Birdwhistell means by kinemorphs. The total configuration, fist plus facial display, which I called a 'gestural statement,' is a combination of kinemorphs, which Birdwhistell would call a *kinemorphic construction*.

Such gestural statements or kinemorphic constructions as 'fist shaking in salutation' or 'fist shaking to illustrate tightfistedness' occur, of course, in larger contexts, and to handle these Birdwhistell suggests some additional ideas. If we think of the 'fist shaking to illustrate tightfistedness,' for instance, we note that this construction occurs in association with a linguistic construction that, in a very loose sense, it may be said to illustrate. Prior to this, and following it, other linguistic and kinesic constructions may occur, all, for example, while the speaker is sitting in a particular posture in an armchair that is at an angle of roughly 90 degrees to another armchair in which another person is sitting. In other words, this linguistic-kinesic construction occurs within a conversation. When people 'have conversations,' they arrange themselves in space in relation to one another in one of a limited number of ways, and the sustained postural and orientational arrangement here functions as a frame within which the succeeding constructions are seen to occur. This frame serves to bind together such sequences of constructions. It serves to cross-reference them, as Birdwhistell would put it, as constructions belonging to this conversational unit. For the individual, Birdwhistell uses the term *stance* to refer to those features of behavior that have this cross-referencing, binding, or framing function. Some of the phenomena at this level of functioning in the kinesic stream have been explicated more fully by Scheflen (1964).

A stance, it will be seen, is not a construction of smaller elements but an element in its own right, an element which, as I have indicated, functions to 'frame' sequences of constructions. It is important that this be brought out, for some readers of Birdwhistell get the impression that he regards all of body motion, as it functions in communication, as being built up of elementary units, or kinemes. On the contrary, the constructions that do emerge from combinations of kinemes must be joined together and they must always occur within a 'transfixing' frame, which is supplied by such enduring aspects of behavior as posture and relative position in space.

Birdwhistell also recognizes some other aspects of body motion that cannot be handled in terms of constructions. For example, he points out that although we may describe a piece of an individual's behavior in interaction in terms of a succession of constructions (together with the frames within which these construction sequences occur), there is also considerable variation in how these units are enacted. We all recognize this in an informal way. When we recognize a 'weak handshake' or a 'vague smile,' for instance, we recognize the occurrence of a construction for what it is, but we also remark on the quality of its performance. Birdwhistell thus distinguishes *motion qualifiers*, which refer to the intensity, the duration, and the range of movement in a construction. These qualifiers may inform the whole of a person's performance (and thus may signal something that we call 'mood'). They may also inform different constructions in different ways and in doing so they may thus modify the meanings of given constructions. For instance, X may shake hands 'vigorously' with Y, but 'limply' or 'briefly' with Z. In doing this he may be said to 'state' differences in his attitudes or feelings about Y and Z.

In the exposition above, I have tried to deal with what seem to me to be the most important features of Birdwhistell's conception of how body motion is organized in interaction. Most of Birdwhistell's ideas on this particular aspect of the phenomena of communication are to be found in chapter 26 of the collection under review. This chapter represents his most comprehensive attempt to state, in a systematic way, his views on the organization of body motion, and it well repays careful study. Unfortunately, however, it provides very few examples, and for some of the most important ideas he gives no examples at all. For this reason, the chapter is very difficult to read. It is of the greatest value—as is indeed the whole book—to those who have already worked in kinesics. However, this chapter opens with a superb analysis of a specific interactional event in which two young men try to 'thumb a ride' from a passing car. More than anything else in this book, this example should give the reader a clear feel for the sort of analysis Birdwhistell seeks to advocate. Birdwhistell would have done his readers a much greater service, however, if he had provided many more examples of this type, using them to show just how the concepts he develops in the abstract are to be applied.

The phenomena Birdwhistell exemplifies in greatest detail have to do with how movement is patterned in relation to speech. He apparently sees this as a somewhat separate phenomenon, and it is something he has only looked

at closely in recent years. Part Three of the present collection includes three papers on this topic.

For example, when someone speaks, he always moves more than just his mouth. We can see eyeblinks, eye movements, brow movements, and movements of the mouth that are not part of the articulatory movements required by what is being said. We may often see head movements, and not uncommonly, other parts of the body, such as the hands and arms, are moved as well. These movements are highly patterned, and a close analysis shows that they are so highly interlinked with speech that they must be considered as part of a total act which includes speaking.

The way in which these movements relate to speech is a very complex matter, and no simple statement can be made. It may be shown, for instance, that syllabic units, phrasal units, and units of speech comprised of groupings of phrases are all marked off in distinct ways by movement units. This aspect of the phenomenon referred to by Birdwhistell has been demonstrated in detail in some recent work of my own (Kendon, 1972). However, movements that co-occur with speech also relate to the content of what is being said in quite complicated ways. People may parallel their speech output with gesticulations to illustrate what they are saying, either by drawing pictures in the air of what they are talking about or, if they are talking about something abstract, by making movements that appear to make partially concrete their abstract talk (as when someone, in making a succession of points in an argument, places his hands in a succession of different places in front of him as he talks, a new place for each point). Some of these aspects of the relations between gesticulation and speech are treated by Efron (1942). They have been summarized recently by Ekman and Friesen (1969).

In the present collection, Birdwhistell does not deal in detail with either of these two examples of ways in which movement may be related to speech (although he is, of course, aware of them) but rather with two aspects of how movement may mark some of the internal details of the utterance. These two aspects are linguistic stress, which he shows is also often marked kinesically, and the kinesic marking of certain syntactic classes.

In his treatment of linguistic stress, Birdwhistell shows, by a series of examples, how contrastive movements can often be observed to co-occur with the points of linguistic stress in an utterance. Such movements may be very slight and consist in small movements of the brows, eyeblinks, or slight movements of the head. It is important to note that Birdwhistell does not mean, as some (Dittman and Llewellyn, 1969, for example) have thought, that there will be 'more movement' at points of stress than elsewhere. There is movement all the time. What Birdwhistell means is that there will be a contrasting pattern of movement at points of stress. If the reader attunes himself to this phenomenon by working through Birdwhistell's examples—by repeating the utterances in front of a mirror, or by getting a friend to say them—he can easily confirm for himself much of what Birdwhistell is saying about kinesic stress. Systematic analysis, of course, which will be the only way Birdwhistell's finding can be further investigated, requires the use of sound-synchronized film and suitable film-analysis equipment.

The contrast in movement, or the discrete movement unit that co-occurs with points of stress in an utterance, is not merely contrastive, however. Birdwhistell shows that there may be a systematic relation between the direction of movement and the kind of word receiving linguistic stress. Thus in utterances in which the pronouns 'I' or 'me' or such deictic words as 'here' or 'this' are stressed, the movement made as they are uttered is a movement toward the self. With similarly stressed words such as 'you' or 'him' or with words such as 'there' or 'that,' the movement is away from the self. Words that have a temporal reference take a forward movement if the reference is to the present or future, but they take a backward movement if they refer to the past. Birdwhistell also says that movement contrast can be shown to mark plurality, the tense of verbal phrases, and also prepositions. Once again, if the reader works with the examples Birdwhistell gives, and so attunes himself to the phenomenon, he can pick up some of it as he watches others speak. Systematic analysis using sound film and analysis equipment is much needed, however. Examples of some of these kinesic marker phenomena are described in some detail by Kendon (1972).

The movements that co-occur with speech often have multiple functions. In all the examples Birdwhistell gives—examples of movements that function both as markers of stress and as markers of types of phrase—the movements appear as a kind of parallel to the speech output. Often, however, such movements actually add to what is being said. One example from my own collection must suffice here to illustrate this. A husband, at the end of the day, was sitting in the living room talking with his wife in a casual way about what the children had done during the day. At one point he said: "They made a cake, didn't they?" (He was referring to something he had been told by one of the children earlier, that they had made a cake of mud in the garden.) As he said 'cake,' this received not only primary linguistic stress but also kinesic stress, in a rightward tilt of the head. The tilt of his head was toward the window overlooking the garden. The direction of the head tilt thus built into the utterance a reference to where the cake had been made and hence to the *mud* cake the children had made, not some other cake. Part of what was conveyed by his utterance was thus conveyed not in words or tone of voice but in the directionality of the kinesic stress marker that co-occurred with his words. By the way a speaker patterns his movements with his speech, therefore, he may 'pack in' far more content than is apparent if we consider the words alone. Examples of this sort are not hard to find if one makes one's observations with care, and they provide a rather convincing demonstration that we must consider movement as well as speech if we are to understand what is entailed in what we somewhat loosely refer to as an act of speech.

Throughout this review I have used the term body motion, as Birdwhistell himself often does, as if it can be regarded as a unified system. In various places in these essays, however, we can find remarks that suggest that this may not be Birdwhistell's view. I have already said that Birdwhistell appears to regard the patterning of movement in relation to speech as a phenomenon that can be given separate treatment. In several places, he makes reference to systems of sign language and to such specialized systems of gesture as may be found in Indian classical dancing, but only to show he is not concerned with these. He also, in one place, seems to

shunt to one side those elaborate demonstrative or pictorial movements that people use when they describe something: a man describing how he played and landed a trout, for example. Birdwhistell says, "At the moment I am inclined to regard such behavior as examples of derived communicational systems. As such, they are not the primary subject matter of kinesics at present" (p. 126). Birdwhistell thus implies that kinesics deals with only a part of communicatively significant body-motion phenomena. However, he never makes clear, in so many words, what this is. Presumably this would become apparent as the study of the whole system of communicative behavior progresses.

It seems likely that ultimately we will have to think of the system of human communicative behavior as analyzable into a number of subsystems, subsystems distinguished in terms of which aspect of an occasion of interaction they 'take care of.' For a conversation, for example, one aspect would be the conversation as an occasion. By a variety of behavioral devices, each participant will signal to the other that he *is* a member of the conversational unit. Another aspect of the system will have to do with the situational role each participant has in the conversation, and another set of behavioral devices will refer to this. Yet another aspect of the system will have to do with ideas or thoughts or stories that the participants are conveying to one another. Each of these interactive systems will be seen as making use of one or more of a number of available codes, of which language is the most obvious example.

There are also a number of body-motion codes, however. The patterning of movement in relation to speech that Birdwhistell describes may be one of them. The postural system that Scheflen (1964, 1965) has described might be regarded as another. The system of kinemorphs and kinemorphic constructions that Birdwhistell refers us to may be yet another. Specialized sign languages constitute additional ones. Each of these codes has emerged in response to a somewhat different demand made by the interactional situation, and it presumably will be found to have properties tailored to match. The principles by which one of these is organized will not necessarily be generalizable to another. These codes, it should be noted, are probably best thought of as separable only in the analytic sense. In practice they are interrelated in highly complex ways, which are far from being understood.

Such is the view of the organization of communicative behavior implied by Birdwhistell. It seems to me, at least, that the picture which finally emerges will look something like this. But whatever the details of that picture turn out to be, there is little doubt that it will owe much to the perspective Birdwhistell provides, and for this reason, if for no other, his writings deserve careful study.

To conclude, I must return to the book itself. Unfortunately, taken as a whole, it is not very satisfactory. This is because the editor, Barton Jones, has tried to make a coherent whole from an assemblage of very diverse pieces. He has done this by arranging the papers in topical groupings and omitting passages that are repetitive. Sometimes he has forged a new chapter by putting together different papers. The result, however, is not a book, but a collection of fragments. These fragments, furthermore, are not presented

to us in chronological order, even within the topical sections. So it is impossible to follow the development of Birdwhistell's thinking. Yet, if we compare earlier papers with the later ones, it is clear that Birdwhistell's thinking has evolved considerably, particularly in regard to his view of the nature of communication.

If the reader tries to read the book consecutively, therefore, he will come across a number of inconsistencies. Unfortunately, these are nowhere explained. For example, Birdwhistell's use of the term *kine* undergoes a change. The use he makes of this term in chapter 26 (written about 15 years ago) is different from the use he makes of it in papers written later—notwithstanding the fact that these papers appear earlier in the book. Some editorial apparatus to iron out these problems is badly needed. There are also many inconsistencies between the bibilography in the back (in itself a very useful one) and references in the text. There is no index, which is especially unfortunate in this book, for in order to trace Birdwhistell's views on a given topic it is necessary to jump around in the text. In view of the importance that I believe Birdwhistell's views have, these drawbacks are unfortunate, especially because he is often far from easy to understand. Nonetheless, had it not been for the insistence of Erving Goffman (the coeditor of the series in which this book is published) and the work done by Barton Jones, we might never have had these papers in print. For this we must be very thankful.

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Notes

1. Others who share this perspective and who have been influenced by Birdwhistell include Erving Goffman (1963, 1971), Albert Scheflen (1964, 1965), and E. T. Hall (1959, 1966).

2. See Bateson and Mead (1942) and Reusch and Bateson (1951). Bateson, with Margaret Mead, also pioneered the use of film for the recording and analysis of human social behavior, which was to become a central technique in Birdwhistell's methodology. For the work of Sapir, see Mandelbaum (1963); for that of Pike, see Pike (1967).

3. I do not mean to imply that all psychologists who have worked on 'nonverbal communication' have been concerned with the emotions. However, as Duncan (1969) has pointed out, in most of this work the investigator looks for how the particular behavioral parameters he is interested in correlate with, and so can be regarded as indexes of, other aspects of the psychological state of the subjects. For example, most of the work on direction of gaze in interaction has been of this type: typically, measurements are made of how much a person looks at an interlocutor and these are then related to such things as amount of liking or degrees of embarrassment. Alternatively, some aspect of the behavior of one interactor is systematically varied, and an effort is made to find out how someone else's judgment of the individual is affected. These are questions of a different sort from those asked in Birdwhistell's perspective.

4. For a recent comprehensive review, see Vine (1970).

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5. In Birdwhistell's words, " 'What does X mean' translates as 'How do you know the place of this phenomenon in that larger pattern you are describing?' It is this question that the methodology of kinesics is designed to answer" (p. 185). This view that the meaning of an item is accounted for when we have described its context of occurrence is widely held in linguistics. Compare, for example, W. Haas (1956, quoted in Waldron, 1967, p. 207): "To ... what is the meaning of (say) *house*? we shall answer: It is its distinctive occurrence in certain linguistic frames, or (as I would prefer to say) in certain sentential functions such as (using x, y, z, etc., to mark positions) This x is big, I wish to buy a y, John's z, etc. *House* may be substituted in x, y, z., etc.; that is its meaning." In some ways, Birdwhistell's view of meaning is closest to that known as the context-of-situation theory, originally stated by Malinowski (1923) and later developed by J. R. Firth (1957).

6. Birdwhistell has dealt with all areas of the body, of course, not just the face. Two of his notational systems are given as appendixes to the volume here under review.

7. See also the work of William Condon (Condon and Ogston 1966, 1967).

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