

QUESTION 35

Pain or Sadness in Itself

Next we have to consider pain (*dolor*) and sadness or sorrow (*tristitia*). And on this topic we have to consider, first, sadness or pain in itself (question 35); second, its cause (question 36); third, its effects (question 37); fourth, the remedies for it (question 38); and, fifth, its goodness or badness (question 39).

On the first topic there are eight questions: (1) Is pain (*dolor*) a passion of the soul? (2) Is sadness or sorrow (*tristitia*) the same as pain (*dolor*)? (3) Is sadness or pain contrary to pleasure? (4) Is every instance of sadness opposed to every instance of pleasure? (5) Is there any sort of sadness opposed to the pleasure of contemplation? (6) Is sadness to be avoided more than pleasure is to be desired? (7) Is exterior pain greater than interior pain? (8) What are the species of sadness?

Article 1

Is pain a passion of the soul?

It seems that pain (*dolor*) is not a passion of the soul:

Objection 1: No passion of the soul exists in the body. But pain can exist in the body; for in *De Vera Religione* Augustine says, “The pain that is said to belong to the body is a sudden corruption of the health of a thing that the soul has subjected to corruption by using it badly.” Therefore, pain is not a passion of the soul.

Objection 2: Every passion of the soul has to do with the appetitive power. But pain has to do more with the apprehensive power than with the appetitive power; for in *De Natura Boni* Augustine says, “The sensory power effects pain in the body when it resists a more powerful body.” Therefore, pain is not a passion of the soul.

Objection 3: Every passion involves an animal appetite. But pain pertains more to a *natural* appetite than to an *animal* appetite; for in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 8 Augustine says, “If nothing good had remained in the nature, there would be not be any pain involved in losing a good through punishment.” Therefore, pain is not a passion of the soul.

But contrary to this: In *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine claims that pain is among the passions of the soul, citing this passage from Virgil: “Through [these seeds] they fear and desire, they rejoice and sorrow (*hinc metuunt, cupiunt, gaudentque dolentque*).”

I respond: Just as two things are required for pleasure, viz., (a) the conjoining of something good [to the appetite] and (b) the perception of this conjoining, so also two things are required for pain, viz., (a) the conjoining of something bad (which is bad because it deprives one of some good), and (b) the perception of this conjoining.

Now if what is conjoined does not have the character of being good or bad for what it is conjoined to, then it cannot be a cause of pleasure or pain. From this it is clear that the object of pleasure or of pain is something taken *as good* or *as bad* (*aliquid sub ratione boni vel mali*). But the good and the bad are, as such, the objects of appetite. Hence, it is clear that pleasure and pain have to do with appetite.

Now every appetitive movement or inclination that follows upon an apprehension involves either an *intellective* appetite or a *sentient* appetite. For as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 103, aa. 1 and 3), a *natural* appetite’s inclination does not follow upon an apprehension on the part of the very thing that has the appetite. Therefore, since pleasure and pain presuppose a sensory power or some sort of apprehension within the same subject, it is clear that pain, like pleasure, exists in either an intellective appetite or a sentient appetite. But as was explained above (q. 22, aa. 1 and 3), every movement of the sentient appetite is called a passion—and especially those movements that bespeak a defect.

Hence, insofar as it exists in the sentient appetite, pain called a passion of the soul with complete propriety (*propriissime*), just as bodily maladies are properly called passions of the body. Hence, in *De*

Civitate Dei 14 Augustine specifically calls pain a sort of sickness (*dolorem specialiter aegritudinem nominat*).

Reply to objection 1: Pain is said to belong to the body because the *cause* of pain exists in the body—for instance, when we suffer some injury to the body. But the *movement* of pain always exists in the soul, since, as Augustine says, “The body cannot be in pain without the soul’s being in pain” (*corpus non potest dolere nisi dolente anima*).

Reply to objection 2: Pain is said to belong to the sensory power not because pain is an act of a sentient power, but because the sensory power is required for bodily pain, in the same way that it is required for bodily pleasure.

Reply to objection 3: Pain at the loss of a good shows the goodness of the nature not because the pain is an act of a natural appetite, but because the nature desires something as a good, and when it is sensed that this thing is being removed, the passion of pain follows in the sentient appetite.

Article 2

Is sadness or sorrow the same as pain?

It seems that sadness or sorrow (*tristitia*) is not the same as pain (*dolor*):

Objection 1: In *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine says, “Pain (*dolor*) is in bodies.” But sadness (*tristitia*) is in the soul instead. Therefore, sadness is not pain.

Objection 2: Pain (*dolor*) exists only with respect to a present evil. But sadness (*tristitia*) can exist with respect to a past evil or a future evil; for instance, repentance (*poenitentia*) is sadness about the past, and anxiety (*anxietas*) is sadness about the future. Therefore, sadness is altogether different from pain.

Objection 3: Pain (*dolor*) seems to follow upon the sense of touch alone. But sadness (*tristitia*) can follow upon any of the senses. Therefore, sadness is not pain, but instead exists in more cases.

But contrary to this: In Romans 9:2 the Apostle says, “I have great sadness and continuous pain in my heart”—where he is using ‘sadness’ and ‘pain’ for the same thing.

I respond: There are two sorts of apprehensions by which pleasure and pain can be caused, viz., (a) an apprehension on the part of the *exterior* sensory power and (b) an *interior* apprehension on the part of either the intellect or the imagination.

Now interior apprehension extends to more things than does exterior apprehension, since whatever falls under exterior apprehension falls under interior apprehension, but not vice versa. Thus, as was explained above, only the sort of pleasure that is caused by interior apprehension is called ‘joy’ (*gaudium*). And, similarly, only the sort of pain (*dolor*) that is caused by interior apprehension is called ‘sadness’ or ‘sorrow’ (*tristitia*). And just as the sort of pleasure that is caused by exterior apprehension is called ‘pleasure’ but not ‘joy’, so, too, the sort of pain that is caused by exterior apprehension is called ‘pain’ but not ‘sadness’ or ‘sorrow’. So, then, sadness or sorrow (*tristitia*) is a species of pain (*dolor*), in the same way that joy (*gaudium*) is a species of pleasure (*delectatio*).

Reply to objection 1: In the place cited here, Augustine is talking about the use of the word, since ‘pain’ (*dolor*) is used more in the case of bodily pains, which are more known to us, than in the case of spiritual pains.

Reply to objection 2: The exterior sensory power perceives only what is present, whereas the interior cognitive power can perceive what is present, past, or future. And so sadness or sorrow can exist with respect to the present, the past, or the future, whereas bodily pain, which follows upon apprehension by the exterior sensory power, can exist only with respect to something present.

Reply to objection 3: The sensible objects of touch are painful not only to the extent that they are

disproportionate to the apprehensive power, but also to the extent that they are opposed to the nature. By contrast, the sensible objects of the other senses can be disproportionate to the apprehensive power, but they are not opposed to the nature except in relation to the sensible objects of touch.

Hence, only man, who is the animal that is complete with respect to cognition (*animal perfectum in cognitione*), takes pleasure in a sensible object of the other senses in its own right, whereas the other animals, as *Ethics* 3 explains, take pleasure in such an object only insofar as it is related to the sensible objects of touch. And so pain, insofar as it is contrary to natural pleasure, is not attributed to the sensible objects of the other senses; instead, what is attributed to them is sadness, which is opposed to joy that belongs to the soul (*quae contrariatur gaudio animali*).

So, then, if ‘pain’ is used for bodily pain, which is the more common usage, then pain is divided off from sadness as its opposite, in accord with the distinction between interior apprehension and exterior apprehension—even though, as regards their objects, pleasure extends to more things than does bodily pain.

On the other hand, if ‘pain’ is taken in a general sense (*communiter*), then, as has been explained, *pain* is the genus for *sadness*.

Article 3

Is sadness or pain contrary to pleasure?

It seems that sadness or pain is not contrary to pleasure:

Objection 1: One of two contraries cannot be a cause of the other. But sadness can be a cause of pleasure; for Matthew 5:5 says, “Bless are they who mourn, for they shall be comforted (*consolabuntur*).” Therefore, they are not contraries.

Objection 2: One of two contraries does not denominate the other. But in some individuals pain or sadness is itself pleasurable. For instance, in *Confessiones* 3 Augustine says, “In the case of stage plays (*in spectaculis*), pain often gives pleasure.” And in *Confessiones* 4 he says, “Crying is a bitter thing, and yet sometimes it gives pleasure.” Therefore, pain is not contrary to pleasure.

Objection 3: One of two contraries is not the matter of the other, since contraries cannot exist together at the same time. But pain can be the matter of pleasure. For instance, in *De Poenitentia* Augustine says, “A penitent is always sorrowful (*doleat*), and he rejoices over his sorrow (*de dolore gaudeat*).” And in *Ethics* 9 the Philosopher says, conversely, that “a bad man feels pain at what he has taken pleasure in.” Therefore, pleasure and pain are not contraries.

But contrary to this: In *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine says, “Gladness (*laetitia*) is an act of will consenting to what we will, whereas sadness is an act of will dissenting from what we will the opposite of.” But consenting and dissenting are contraries. Therefore, gladness and sadness are contraries.

I respond: As the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* 10, contrariety is a difference with respect to form. But the form or species of a passion or movement is taken from its object or terminus. Hence, since the objects of pleasure and of sadness or pain are contraries, viz., a present good and a present evil, it follows that pain and pleasure are contraries.

Reply to objection 1: Nothing prevents one contrary from being a *per accidens* cause of the other. And it is in this sense that sadness can be a cause of pleasure:

In one way, insofar as sadness about the absence of a thing or about the presence of its contrary leads to more forceful seeking after what one takes pleasure in (*tristitia vehementius quaerit id in quo delectetur*); for instance, someone who is thirsty more forcefully seeks after drink as a remedy for the sadness that he is suffering from.

In a second way, insofar as because of his great desire for some pleasure, an individual does not shy

away from undergoing sadness (*non recusat aliquis tristitias perferre*), in order that he might attain that pleasure.

It is in both of these ways that present mourning (*luctus praesens*) leads one toward the comfort (*ad consolationem*) of the future life. For by the very fact that a man mourns over his sins or over the postponement of glory (*luget pro peccatis vel pro dilatione gloriae*), he merits eternal comfort. Similarly, one likewise merits this comfort by the fact that in order to attain it, he does not shy away from undergoing hardships and difficulties for its sake (*labores et angustias propter ipsam sustinere*).

Reply to objection 2: Pain can itself be pleasurable *per accidens*, viz., insofar as it has wonder adjoined to it (*admirationem adiunctam*), as in the case of stage plays, or insofar as it causes a memory of a thing that is loved and makes one perceive his love for that whose absence he grieves over. Hence, since this love is pleasurable, the pain and everything else that follows upon the love are likewise pleasurable to the extent that the love is felt in them. And it is likewise for this reason that the pain felt in the case of stage plays can be pleasurable to the extent that some sort of conceptualized love (*amor conceptus*) is felt for those who are portrayed in the plays.

Reply to objection 3: The will and reason reflect upon their own acts insofar as acts of will and act of reason are themselves understood as good or bad (*inquantum ipsi actus voluntatis et rationis accipiuntur sub ratione boni et mali*). And it is in this sense that sadness is able—*per accidens* and not *per se*—to be the matter for pleasure, or vice versa, viz., insofar as both are understood as good or bad.

Article 4

Is every instance of sadness contrary to every instance of pleasure?

It seems that every instance of sadness is contrary to every instance of pleasure (*omnis tristitia omni delectationi contrarietur*):

Objection 1: Just as whiteness and blackness are contrary species of color, so pleasure and pain are contrary species of the passions of the soul. But whiteness and blackness are universally opposed to one another. Therefore, pleasure and pain are, too.

Objection 2: Remedies (*medicinae*) are effected through contraries. But as is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics 7*, every instance of pleasure is a remedy for every instance of sadness. Therefore, every instance of pleasure is contrary to every instance of sadness.

Objection 3: Contraries are such that they impede one another. But as is clear from what is said in *Ethics 10*, every instance of sadness impedes every instance of pleasure. Therefore, every instance of sadness is contrary to every instance of pleasure.

But contrary to this: Contraries do not have the same cause. But the same habit is the source of someone's rejoicing over one thing and being sad about its opposite; for instance, it is out of charity that it is possible to "rejoice with those who rejoice and weep with those who weep," as Romans 12:15 puts it. Therefore, it is not the case that every instance of sadness is contrary to every instance of pleasure.

I respond: As *Metaphysics 10* says, contrariety is a difference with respect to form. But form is both generic and specific. Hence, some things happen to be contrary with respect to the forms of their genera (*secundum formam generis*), e.g., *virtue* and *vice*, and some things are contrary with respect to the forms of their species (*secundum formam speciei*), e.g., *justice* and *injustice*. Note, moreover, that certain things, e.g., substances and qualities, are specified by *absolute* forms, whereas other things are specified *in relation to something outside themselves* (*per comparationem ad aliquid extra*), in the way that passions and movements receive their species from their termini or their objects.

Thus, in the case of things whose species are thought of in accord with *absolute* forms, it can happen that the species contained under contrary genera are not contrary to one another with respect to

the notion of their species (*non esse contrarias secundum rationem specie*), and yet they do not happen to have any affinity to or agreement with one another. For instance, *intemperance* and *justice*, which fall under contrary genera, viz., *virtue* and *vice*, are not contrary to one another with respect to the notions of their proper species, and yet they do not have any affinity to or agreement with one another.

By contrast, in those things whose species are taken in accord with *a relation to something extrinsic*, it can happen that the species of contrary genera are not only not contrary to one another, but also have some sort of agreement with and affinity to one another. For to be related in the same way to contraries induces contrariety, in the way that moving toward whiteness and moving toward blackness have the character of contrariety, whereas to be related in contrary ways to contraries has the character of likeness, as in the case of receding from whiteness and moving toward blackness. This is especially evident in the case of contradiction, which is the source of opposition (*principium oppositionis*), since opposition consists in the same thing's being affirmed and denied (*in affirmatione et negatione eiusdem consistit oppositio*), e.g., *white and non-white*. But there is agreement and likeness in affirming the one opposite and denying the other, as in the case of *black and non-white*.

Now since sadness and pleasure are passions, they are specified by their objects. And, to be sure, they have contrariety with respect to their genera (*secundum genus*), since the one has to do with *pursuing* and the other with *avoiding*—which, as *Ethics* 6 says, stand to one another in the case of the passions as affirmation and negation stand to one another in the case of reason. And so sadness and pleasure with respect to the same thing have opposition to one another with respect to their species. However, sadness and pleasure with respect to diverse things, where those diverse things are disparate but not opposites, do not have opposition to one another with respect to the notions of their species, but are likewise disparate, e.g., being saddened at a friend's death and taking pleasure in contemplation. But if the diverse things in question are contraries, then pleasure and sadness not only do not have contrariety with respect to the notions of their species, but even have agreement and affinity, e.g., rejoicing over something good and being saddened at something bad.

Reply to objection 1: Whiteness and blackness do not have their species from a relation to anything exterior to them, in the way that pleasure and sadness do. Hence, the argument is not the same in the two cases.

Reply to objection 2: As is clear from *Metaphysics* 8, the genus is taken from the matter. Now in the case of accidents, the subject takes the place of the matter; and it has been explained that pleasure and sadness are contraries with respect to their genera. So in every instance of sadness there is a disposition of the subject that is contrary to the disposition that exists in every instance of pleasure. For in each instance of pleasure the appetite is disposed toward accepting what it has, whereas in every instance of sadness the appetite is disposed toward fleeing from what it has.

Reply to objection 3: From this the reply to the third objection is clear.

An alternative reply is that even if not every instance of sadness is contrary to every instance of pleasure with respect to its species, it is nonetheless the case that they are contrary with respect to their effects. For the nature of an animal is comforted by the one, but troubled by the other.

Article 5

Is there a sadness that is contrary to the pleasure of contemplation?

It seems that there is a sadness that is contrary to the pleasure of contemplation (*delectationi contemplationis sit aliqua tristitia*):

Objection 1: In 2 Corinthians 7:10 the Apostle says, "The sadness that is in accord with God works penance steadfast unto salvation." But to look to God pertains to higher reason, one role of which,

according to Augustine in *De Trinitate* 12, is to devote itself to contemplation. Therefore, there is a sadness opposed to the pleasure of contemplation.

Objection 2: Contraries are the effects of contraries. Therefore, if one contrary, when contemplated, is a cause of pleasure, then the other will be a cause of sadness. And so there will be a sadness that is contrary to the pleasure of contemplation.

Objection 3: Just as the object of pleasure is the good, so the object of sadness is the bad. But contemplation can have the character of something bad; for in *Metaphysics* 12 the Philosopher says, “There are some things that it is wrong to meditate on.” Therefore, there can be a sadness that is contrary to the pleasure of contemplation.

Objection 4: As *Ethics* 7 and 10 say, any operation is a cause of pleasure insofar as it is not impeded. But there are many ways in which the operation of contemplation can be impeded, so that it either does not exist at all or else exists with difficulty. Therefore, in contemplation there can be a sadness that is contrary to the pleasure.

Objection 5: The affliction of the flesh is a cause of sadness. But Ecclesiastes 12:6 says, “Frequent meditation is an affliction of the flesh.” Therefore, contemplation involves a sadness that is contrary to pleasure.

But contrary to this: Wisdom 8:16 says, “Her”—i.e., wisdom’s—“conversation has no bitterness nor her company any tediousness, but gladness and joy.” But wisdom’s conversation and company come through contemplation. Therefore, there is no sadness that is contrary to the pleasure of contemplation.

I respond: There are two ways to understand the pleasure of contemplation:

First, in such a way that the act of contemplating is a *cause* of the pleasure and *not its object*. And in this sense the pleasure is directed not toward the contemplation itself but toward the thing that is being contemplated. Now it is possible to contemplate something disagreeable and sorrowful (*aliquid nocivum et contristans*), just as it is possible to contemplate something agreeable and pleasurable. Hence, if the pleasure of contemplation is understood in this sense, then there is nothing to prevent there being a sadness that is contrary to the pleasure of contemplation.

There is a second way in which the pleasure of contemplation can be thought of, viz., in the sense that the act of contemplation is *an object and a cause* of the pleasure—as, for instance, when someone takes pleasure in the very fact that he is engaged in contemplating. And in that case, as Gregory of Nyssa says, “There is no sadness opposed to the pleasure that follows upon contemplation (*ei delectatione quae est secundum contemplationem*).” And the Philosopher says the same thing in *Topics* 1 and *Ethics* 10.

However, this has to be understood as speaking *per se*. The reason for this is that an instance of sadness is *per se* contrary to an instance of pleasure that is directed toward a contrary object; for instance, sadness directed toward the cold is contrary to pleasure directed toward heat. However, the object of contemplation has nothing contrary to it. For the notions of contraries (*contrariorum rationes*) are not, insofar as they are apprehended, themselves contraries; instead, the one contrary is a means for understanding the other (*unum contrarium est ratio cognoscendi aliud*). Hence, speaking *per se*, there cannot be any sort of sadness that is contrary to the pleasure that exists in contemplating. But neither does this pleasure have any sort of sadness adjoined to it, as do corporeal pleasures, which are, as it were, remedies for certain troubles; for instance, someone takes pleasure in drink because he is troubled by thirst, but when his thirst has been completely driven away, the pleasure of drinking also ceases. For the pleasure of contemplation is not caused by the fact that some trouble is being driven off, but is instead caused by the fact that contemplation is pleasurable in its own right; for as has been explained (q. 31, a. 1), the act of contemplating does not involve generation, but is a certain complete operation.

However, sadness is mixed in *per accidens* with the pleasure of apprehension—and this in two ways: first, on the part of the organ and, second, because of impediments to apprehension. On the part of the organ, sadness or pain is mixed in with the apprehension either directly in the apprehensive powers of the sentient part, which have a corporeal organ, or because of a sensible thing that is contrary to the

normal condition of the organ, e.g., the taste of something bitter or the smell of something fetid, or because of the prolongation of an agreeable sensible object which, as was explained above (q. 33, a. 2), overwhelms the natural condition and is such that a sensible apprehension that was at first pleasurable becomes wearisome. However, these two considerations do not play a role directly in the case of the mind's act of contemplating, since the mind does not have a corporeal organ. This is why the passage cited above claims that the mind's contemplation has no "bitterness or tediousness."

Still, because in its act of contemplating the mind makes use of the sentient apprehensive powers, in whose acts weariness occurs, it follows that some affliction or pain is mixed in indirectly with contemplation. However, sadness is not contrary to the pleasure of contemplation in either of the two ways in which it is adjoined *per accidens* with contemplation. For the sadness that derives from an impediment to contemplation is not contrary to the pleasure of contemplation, but instead has an affinity or agreement with it, as is clear from what was said above (a. 4). And the sadness or affliction that derives from bodily weariness does not belong to the same genus and is thus altogether disparate.

And so it is clear that there is no sadness that is contrary to the pleasure that comes from contemplation itself, and there is no sadness adjoined to that pleasure except *per accidens*.

Reply to objection 1: The "sadness that is in accord with God" is not directed toward the mind's contemplation itself, but is instead directed toward something that the mind contemplates, viz., sin, which the mind considers to be contrary to God's love.

Reply to objection 2: Insofar as things that are contraries in nature exist in the mind, they do not have contrariety. For it is not the case that the notions of contraries are themselves contraries; instead, the one contrary is a means for understanding the other. It is for this reason that one and the same science deals with the relevant contraries (*est una scientia contrariorum*).

Reply to objection 3: In its own right (*secundum se*), contemplation never has the character of something bad, since contemplation is nothing other than the consideration of what is true, and this is the intellect's good. Instead, contemplation has the character of something bad only *per accidens*, viz., either because the contemplation of what is more vile impedes the contemplation of what is better, or because the appetite is attached in a disordered way to the thing that is contemplated.

Reply to objection 4: As has been explained, the sort of sadness that is directed toward an impediment to contemplation is not contrary to the pleasure of contemplation, but instead has an affinity to it.

Reply to objection 5: As has been explained, the "affliction of the flesh" is related *per accidens* and indirectly to the mind's act of contemplating.

Article 6

Is sadness to be avoided more than pleasure is to be desired?

It seems that sadness is to be avoided more than pleasure is to be desired (*magis sit fugienda tristitia quam delectatio appetenda*):

Objection 1: In 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says, "There is no one who does not avoid pain more than he desires pleasure." But what everyone generally agrees to seems to be natural. Therefore, it is natural and fitting that sadness be avoided more than pleasure is desired.

Objection 2: The action of a contrary contributes to the velocity and intensity of a movement; for instance, as the Philosopher says in *Meteorologia*, "Hot water freezes more quickly and more solidly." But an aversion to sadness (*fuga tristitiae*) arises from the saddened individual's contrariety, whereas the desire for pleasure does not arise from anything contrary but instead proceeds from the object's being agreeable to the individual who takes pleasure in it. Therefore, the aversion to sadness is greater than the

desire for pleasure.

Objection 3: The more someone fights a stronger passion in accord with reason, the more praiseworthy and virtuous he is, since, as *Ethics 2* says, virtue has to do with what is difficult and good. But the courageous individual, who resists the movement by which pain is avoided, is more virtuous than the temperate individual, who resists the movement by which pleasure is desired; for in *Rhetoric 2* the Philosopher says, “It is the courageous and the just who are most highly honored.” Therefore, the movement by which pain is avoided is more forceful than the movement by which pleasure is desired.

But contrary to this: As is clear from Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, the good is stronger than the bad. But pleasure is desirable because of the good, which is its object, whereas the aversion to sadness is because of the bad. Therefore, the desire for pleasure is stronger than the aversion to sadness.

I respond: Speaking *per se*, the desire for pleasure is stronger than the aversion to pain (*appetitus delectationis est fortior quam fuga tristitiae*).

The reason for this is that the cause of pleasure is an agreeable good, whereas the cause of pain or sadness is some bad thing that is repugnant. But it is possible for a good to be agreeable without any sort of disagreeableness (*conveniens absque omni dissonantia*), whereas there cannot be anything that is totally bad and repugnant without any sort of agreeableness. Hence, it is possible for an instance of pleasure to be complete and perfect (*integra et perfecta*), but an instance of sadness is always partial. Hence, naturally speaking, the desire for pleasure is greater than the aversion to pain.

A second reason is that the good, which is the object of pleasure, is desired for its own sake (*propter seipsum*), whereas the bad, which is the object of sadness, is to be avoided because it is the privation of a good. But what is such-and-such in its own right (*per se*) is stronger than what is such-and-such through because of another (*per aliud*). A clear indication of this is found in natural movements. For every natural movement is more intense at the end, when it is approaching the terminus that befits its nature than at the beginning, when it moving away from the terminus that does not befit its nature; it is as if a nature tends toward what befits it more than it flees from what is repugnant to it. Hence, speaking *per se*, the inclination of an appetitive power tends toward pleasure more strongly than it flees from sadness.

However, it is possible *per accidens* for someone to flee from sadness more intensely than he desires pleasure. There are three ways in which this happens.

First, on the part of *the apprehension*. For as Augustine says in *De Trinitate 10*, “Love is felt more strongly when a lack [of the good] produces it.” But from the lack of the thing loved comes sadness, which proceeds from the loss of some good that is loved or from the incursion of some contrary evil. Pleasure, by contrast, does not involve a lack of the thing that is loved, but instead comes to rest in that thing once it is possessed. Therefore, since love is a cause of pleasure and of sadness, the greater the aversion to sadness, the more strongly the love is felt in the face of what is contrary to the love.

Second, on the part of the *cause* that saddens one or inflicts pain, when this cause is repugnant to a good that is loved to more than is the good in which we are taking pleasure. For instance, we love the body’s natural condition (*consistentiam corporis naturalem*) more than the pleasure of food. And so out of fear of the pain that comes from blows or other things of this sort, we forsake the pleasure of food or of other such things.

Third, on the part of the *effect*, viz., insofar as the sadness impedes not only a single instance of pleasure, but all of them.

Reply to objection 1: What Augustine says, viz., that pain is avoided more than pleasure is desired, is true *per accidens* and not *per se*. This is clear from what he adds: “For we see that even the most savage animals are deterred from the greatest pleasures by their fear of pain,” where the pain is opposed to life, which is loved above all else.

Reply to objection 2: A movement that is from within differs from a movement that is from

without. For as was explained above for the case of a natural movement, a movement that is from within tends toward what is agreeable instead of receding from a contrary. By contrast, a movement that is from without is intensified by the contrariety itself, since each thing tries in its own way to resist its contrary, in the same way that it strives to conserve itself. Hence, a violent movement is intensified at the beginning, and becomes less intense at the end (*motus violentus intenditur in principio et remittitur in fine*).

Now a movement of the appetitive part of the soul is from within, since it moves from the soul to the things. And so, speaking *per se*, pleasure is desired more than sadness is avoided. But the movement of sentience (*motus sensitivae partis*) is from without and is, as it were, from the things to the soul. Hence, what is contrary to a greater degree is sensed to a greater degree. And so, *per accidens*, insofar as the sensory power is required for pleasure and sadness, sadness is avoided more than pleasure is desired.

Reply to objection 3: It is not just any sort of pain or sadness that a courageous individual is praised for not being overcome by in accord with reason. Rather, he is praised because he is not overcome by pain or sadness that involves the danger of death. This sort of sadness is fled from more intensely than the pleasures of food or sex, which are the objects of temperance, are desired, just as life is loved more intensely than food or sexual intercourse are. By contrast, as is clear from *Ethics* 3, the temperate individual is praised for not pursuing the pleasures of touch rather than for not fleeing from the contrary sorts of sadness.

Article 7

Is exterior pain greater than the interior pain of the heart?

It seems that exterior pain is greater than the interior pain of the heart:

Objection 1: Exterior pain is caused by a cause which attacks the good condition of the body that life consists in (*ex causa repugnante bonae consistentiae corporis in quo est vita*), whereas interior pain is caused by an act of imagining evil. Therefore, since life is loved more than an imagined good is, it seems that, given what has already been said, exterior pain is greater than interior pain.

Objection 2: A real thing moves one more than a likeness of a thing. But exterior pain comes from the real conjoining of some contrary [to the appetite], whereas interior pain comes from the apprehended likeness of a contrary. Therefore, exterior pain is greater than interior pain.

Objection 3: A cause is known from its effect. But exterior pain has more forceful effects; for a man dies because of exterior pains rather than because of interior pains. Therefore, exterior pain is greater than, and is fled from more intensely than, interior pain.

But contrary to this: Ecclesiasticus 25:17 says, “The sadness of the heart is all wounds, and the wickedness of a woman is all evils.” Therefore, just as the wickedness of a woman surpasses all wickedness—which is what is meant here—so, too, the sadness of the heart exceeds all exterior wounds.

I respond: Interior and exterior pain agree in one respect and differ in two respects. They agree in that each, as was explained above (a. 1), is a movement of the appetitive power, whereas they differ in the two things that are required for pain and pleasure, viz., the *cause*, which is a conjoined good or a conjoined evil, and the *apprehension*.

For the *cause* of exterior pain is a conjoined evil that attacks the body, whereas the cause of interior pain is a conjoined evil that attacks the appetite. Also, exterior pain follows upon the sensory power’s apprehension—and especially the sense of touch—whereas interior pain follows upon an interior apprehension by the imagination or even by reason. Therefore, if the cause of interior pain is compared with the cause of exterior pain, the one belongs *per se* to the appetite, to which both sorts of pain belong, whereas the other belongs to the appetite through something else (*per aliud*). For a pain is interior by the

fact something is attacking the appetite itself, whereas a pain is exterior from the fact that something is attacking the appetite because it is attacking the body. But it is always the case that what is such-and-such *per se* is prior to what is such-and-such through another (*per aliud*). Hence, on this score interior pain surpasses exterior pain (*dolor interior praeeminet dolori exteriori*).

The same thing holds on the part of the *apprehension*. For apprehension by reason and the imagination is higher than (*altior quam*) apprehension by the sense of touch. Hence, speaking absolutely and *per se*, interior pain surpasses (*potior est quam*) exterior pain. An indication of this is that an individual voluntarily undergoes exterior pain in order to avoid interior pain. And to the extent that exterior pain does not attack the interior appetite, it becomes in some sense pleasurable and agreeable by an interior joy.

However, sometimes exterior pain exists along with interior pain, and in such a case the pain is increased. For not only is interior pain greater than exterior pain, but it is also more general, since whatever is repugnant to the body can be repugnant to the interior appetite, and whatever is apprehended by the sensory power can be apprehended by the imagination and reason—but not vice versa. And the reason why the passage cited above explicitly says, “The sadness of the heart is all wounds” is that even the pain of exterior wounds is included under the interior sadness of the heart.

Reply to objection 1: Interior pain can also be directed at what is contrary to life. And so the comparison of interior pain with exterior pain should be made not according to the different evils that are the cause of the pain, but according to the different relations of this cause of pain to the appetite.

Reply to objection 2: Interior pain does not proceed from the likeness of an apprehended thing as its cause; for a man is saddened interiorly not by the apprehended likeness itself, but by the thing that it is a likeness of. This thing is apprehended more perfectly to the extent that the likeness is more immaterial and more abstract. And so, speaking *per se*, interior pain is greater insofar as it is directed toward a greater evil; for an evil is better known by an interior apprehension.

Reply to objection 3: Corporeal changes are caused to a greater extent by exterior pain, both because (a) the cause of exterior pain is a corrupting thing that is conjoined to the body (*corrumpens coniunctum corporaliter*), and this is a requirement for apprehension by the sense of touch; and also because (b) the exterior sensory power is more corporeal than the interior sensory power is, just as the sentient appetite is more corporeal than the intellective appetite is—and because of this, as was explained above (q. 22, a. 3 and q. 31, a. 5), the body is changed to a greater degree by a movement of the sentient appetite. And, similarly, the body is changed to a greater degree by an exterior pain than by an interior pain.

Article 8

Is Damascene’s division of sadness into four species correct?

It seems that Damascene incorrectly identifies the four species of sadness as listlessness (*acedia*), distress (*acthos*) (or anxiety (*anxietas*), according to Gregory of Nyssa), pity (*miser cordia*), and envy (*invidia*):

Objection 1: Sadness is opposed to pleasure. But no species are assigned to pleasure. Therefore, neither should species be assigned to sadness.

Objection 2: Repentance is a certain species of sadness. And, as the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric 2*, so are indignation (*nemesis*) and jealousy (*zelus*). But they are not included among the aforementioned species. Therefore, the division noted above is insufficient.

Objection 3: Every division should be made by means of opposites. But the aforementioned species are not opposed to one another. For according to Gregory, “Listlessness is sadness that cuts off

speech, anxiety is sadness that weighs one down, envy is sadness about goods that belong to others, and pity is sadness about evils that belong to others.” But it is possible for someone to be sad about both another’s goods and another’s evils, and at the same time both to be weighed down interiorly and to lose his voice exteriorly. Therefore, the aforementioned division is incorrect.

But contrary to this is the authority of the two of them, viz., Gregory of Nyssa and Damascene.

I respond: It belongs to the notion of a species (*ad rationem speciei*) to be had by an addition to the genus. Now there are two ways in which something can be added to a genus:

In one way, what is added pertains to the genus *per se* and is virtually contained within it, in the way that *rational* is added to *animal*. And as is clear from the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 7 and 8, this sort of addition effects genuine species of a given genus (*facit veras species alicuius generis*).

On the other hand, something may be added to a genus as something extraneous to its notion, in the way that *white*, or something of this sort, is added to *animal*. And this sort of addition does not effect genuine species of the genus in the sense in which we commonly speak of a genus and its various species. Nonetheless, once in a while something is said to be a species of a given genus because it contains something extraneous to which the notion of the genus is applied, as when *glowing coal* and *flame* are said to be species of *fire* because of the way the nature of fire is applied to some outside matter (*ad materiam alienam*). And by a similar way of speaking, astronomy (*astrologia*) and the science of perspective (*perspectiva*) are called species of mathematics, insofar as mathematical principles are being applied to natural matter. It is in this way that the species of sadness are being identified here through the application of sadness to something extraneous.

Now this extraneous thing can be taken either from the side of the *cause*, i.e., the *object*, or from the side of the *effect*.

The proper *object* of sadness is (a) something bad that is (b) one’s own (*proprium malum*).

Hence, an extraneous object of sadness can be taken from *just one* of these (*secundum alterum tantum*), viz., in the sense that it is *something bad that is not one’s own*, and in that case there is *pity* (*miseriordia*), which is sadness about an evil that belongs to someone else insofar as it is nonetheless counted as one’s own evil.

Or the object can be extraneous with respect to *both* of them, viz., in the sense that the object of sadness is neither one’s own nor anything bad, but is instead *the good of another*, and in that case there is *envy*.

Now the proper *effect* of sadness consists in (a) a certain aversion (b) on the part of the appetite (*in quadam fuga appetitus*).

Hence, what is extraneous with respect to the effect of sadness can be taken from *just one* of these, viz., in the sense that the aversion is removed, and in that case there is *anxiety*, which weighs the soul down in such a way that there does not appear to be any escape—this is why it is also called by another name, viz., *emotional constriction* (*angustia*).

If, on the other hand, this heaviness proceeds in such a way that it immobilizes the exterior members from their work, then this pertains to *listlessness* (*acedia*), so that the effect will be extraneous in both respects, since neither is there an aversion nor does the effect exist in the appetite. And the reason why listlessness is specifically said to cut off speech is that among all the exterior movements, it is the voice that most expresses one’s interior conceptions and affections, not only among men, but, as *Politics* 1 says, among the other animals as well.

Reply to objection 1: Pleasure is caused by the good, which has [just] one sense. And so not as many species of pleasure are specified as are species of sadness, which is caused by evil; for as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, evil “occurs in many ways” (*multifariam contingit*).

Reply to objection 2: Repentance concerns one’s own evil, which is the proper object of sadness. Hence, it is not relevant to the species that concern us here. On the other hand, as will become clear below (*ST* 2-2, q.36, a. 2), indignation and jealousy are contained under envy.

Reply to objection 3: The division in question here is taken not from the opposition of the species but instead, as has been explained, from the diversity of the extraneous things that the nature of sadness is drawn to.