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Before the Wall Came Tumbling Down: Urban Planning Paradigm Shifts in a Divided Berlin

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Urban planning is conventionally considered to be strongly influenced by the governmental organization and political system within which it operates. Therefore, one would assume that shifts in planning paradigms would spring forth from these areas. Berlin during the years of division (1945–1989) provides a good opportunity for testing this assumption because the diametrically opposed forms of government would have yielded different urban planning outcomes.

This study presents preliminary evidence from six public housing projects that throws these assumptions into question. The findings presented here suggest that planning paradigm shifts are more closely related to factors that are external to governance, such as economic prosperity and social unrest.

ALTHOUGH BERLIN'S WALL CAME DOWN MORE than four years ago, in many respects the city remains divided. The process of grafting the two societies together again is much more difficult and is taking considerably longer than most government officials originally anticipated. Certainly, the physical differences between Berlin's two halves will not be overcome anytime soon; the infrastructural renovation and repair in the Eastern sector is a tedious and costly task.

Many western urban researchers have been quite surprised by the similarity between the physical structures and urban spaces created in the eastern and western sectors of Berlin during the years of division.[1] They contend that architectural movements and urban planning *Leitbilder* (guiding ideals or, more broadly, paradigms) espoused by the West were repeated in the East, albeit with a delay of about ten years. If one compares Berlin's main urban plazas, such as the East's Alexanderplatz and the West's Ernst-Reuter-Platz (formerly Das Knie), one may come to such conclusions.

However, if one focuses less on the large, representative or showcase urban spaces and more on working-class housing, one finds evidence that challenges the conclusions of current research. Not only are there distinct differences in the physical aspects of the housing projects, but there is also no apparent time delay in the shifts of urban design *Leitbilder*. Certainly, the common culture, history, and traditions (at least initially) of the two German nations helped predetermine similarities in the way they rebuilt East and West Berlin, yet the differences cannot, and should not, be simply ignored.

Although in this article I examine some of the physical similarities and differences that currently exist in Berlin due to the legacy of its forty-four-year division, my main interest is not about the details of Berlin per se, but more generally about urban planning. I seek to gain a greater understanding of how urban planning functions under widely divergent political, social, and economic circumstances. In particular, I am interested in the processes by which urban planning paradigms shift: Are there telltale preconditions? Are there institutionalized ways that the profession accepts and disseminates the shifts? What roles do cultural, economic, political, social, or other factors that lie outside a narrow understanding of urban planning play in such shifts? I do not wish to imply that I can fully, or even partially, answer these questions in this article. Instead, these questions should indicate a general direction that the inquiry in the following text pursues. The findings presented here are the results of an initial field investigation and make no claims on exhaustiveness of detail.

Berlin as "Experiment"

The very nature of the object of observation—cities—constrains the usefulness of any comparative research because the ability to draw specific conclusions on how urban planning functions under different circumstances cannot be easily controlled for different variables. Local history, economic or environmental conditions, time, and so on are all variables that cannot be meaningfully constrained in comparative urban research. Berlin in particular, though, currently lends itself to experimental comparative urban research because it gives researchers a unique opportunity to ask questions regarding urban development patterns. Its neighborhoods and boroughs constituted a single entity before division, giving the city a comprehensive (although not necessarily homogeneous) history with respect to cultural, social, economic, and political factors.

This investigation focuses on paradigm shifts of urban planning *Leitbilder* and political rhetoric that ascribed meaning to government-sponsored housing projects. In doing so, I wish to draw some conclusions on the influence that political ideology had in shaping the physical environments and their societal interpretation of East and West Berlin.

The way in which I use the term *political ideology* requires some clarification. Socialism and capitalism are two fundamentally different economic foundations for society. The differences in these foundations profoundly affect the social and political organization of their host societies, and the resulting ideology (coordinated body of ideas or concepts about human life and culture) to which each society subscribes is marked by different values and aims. Given the fundamental differences between the East and West Berlin sociopolitical programs, one might assume that government-sponsored housing projects would mirror the political ideology (as expressed in assertions, doctrines, and statements made by the political or other official apparatus) through aspects of its architectural and urban design.

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This study investigates three pairs of postwar housing projects in two working-class boroughs, Friedrichshain and Wedding, in the former East and West Berlin, respectively. Both boroughs were originally built after the adoption of the 1862 Hobrecht expansion plan. The housing typically found in these boroughs was erected during Germany's rapid industrialization during the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first quarter of the twentieth century. Called *Mietskasernen* (literally, "renter's barracks") because of its poor living conditions, the housing was characterized by small and often damp quarters; rudimentary sanitation facilities offering little or no indoor plumbing; poor ventilation and heating; and minimal exposure to sunlight, greenery, and fresh air. Health risks to the inhabitants were further increased by staggering building densities and severe overcrowding. To compound matters, these buildings often contained sweat shops, warehouses, and retail establishments together with residences and were despised by city leaders and urban planners alike. Hence, it comes as little surprise that architects and planners embraced the bombing of Berlin during World War II as a Janus-faced development: a chance to rebuild and rectify these "slums."

Between 1945 and 1989, three paradigm shifts—appearing at roughly the same time in both East and West Berlin—changed significant portions of the housing stock in these boroughs. In the fifties, the planning paradigms focused on erecting representational housing, that is, housing that reflected the standards and lifestyles of each side's new sociopolitical foundation. With the edifices allegedly rooted in different strands of the German building tradition, East and West Berlin architects erected nearly identical housing complexes, even though the ruling political ideologies and the accompanying propaganda touted them as being radically different from one another. By the late sixties, relative economic prosperity allowed government leaders on both sides to embark on grandiose plans in which they sought to completely rid themselves of the *Mietskasernen*. The projects selected from this raze-and-rebuild period exemplify the vast changes in the urban landscape. Although these paradigmatic changes were really more an extravagant expansion of the goals from the fifties than a shift to something different, many of the differences between the East and West Berlin projects can be directly attributed to ideological influences: Rebuilt urban spaces unmistakably reflected divergent sociopolitical conceptions of society. Speeches by government leaders, informational pamphlets, and scholarly articles underscored the political content of the new urban landscapes.

In contrast, the seventies were turbulent years for East and West Berlin urban planning *Leitbilder*. By the eighties, paradigms on both sides shifted away from large-scale urban renewal to small-scale infill and modernization of the existing stock, but for entirely different reasons: Economic constraints pressed East German officials to reformulate their housing policy and openly embrace the *Mietskasernen* as a central element, whereas social revolt and illegal squatting in West Berlin forced city elders to stop demolition of the old buildings and to create programs to support their rejuvenation.

To detect major shifts in planning paradigms, I noted changes in street patterns; formal characteristics of the areas, such as construction styles, scales, and the urban spaces created; and land uses. Yet, to understand why the paradigms shifted, we also need to know how economic and social factors affected the political situation on each side. Therefore, this study focuses on changes in both the physical and political landscapes.

The next sections present a more detailed view of the six projects. They are followed by some concluding remarks on the nature of urban planning paradigm shifts as they unfolded in Berlin.

The Fifties: One-upmanship between East and West Berlin

By the late forties, Berlin's streets were generally cleared of rubble, and most residents had found some form of shelter—either in shared existing housing or in other temporary shelters. As the first signs of order and normalcy were returning to the city physically, though, politically the situation was much different. Divided into four sectors (American, British, French, and Soviet), the city's fate mirrored that of the country, where the Soviets unequivocally rejected the idea of a joint administration of the conquered territories. The eleven-month blockade of Berlin's western sectors during 1948–1949 and the ensuing declaration by the Soviets that the territories under its dominion were henceforth to be seen as a separate nation, not only killed all hope for a quick reunification of the city, but also heightened the sensitivity of those living in West Berlin to their insular location.

Yet, the new political realities did not substantially disrupt daily life in the divided city. Trips to work and for shopping caused many people to cross the new frontier on a daily basis. This ease of crossing placed both East and West Berlin governments in positions in which they had to demonstrate the superiority of their new societal organization to attract and retain residents through measures such as the quality and quantity of newly constructed public housing. Thus, the stage was set for the two governments to wage a war of one-upmanship.

Surrounded by vitriolic statements de-

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crying the corrupt, exploitative, and belligerent capitalistic government in the West, East Berliners built a pilot housing project in 1949 called the *Hochhaus an der Weberwiese* (High Rise on the Weavers' Meadow). Designed by Hermann Henselmann, an architect who gained national prominence through this pilot project as well as its full-scale successor, the *Stalinallee*, the *Weberwiese* was fashioned according to the aesthetic guidelines brought back from Moscow[2] (Figure 1). Sporting a glass "crown" on the top floor and reliefs of happy, burly worker families, the style, known as Socialist Realism—and disparagingly dubbed *Zuckerbäckerstil* (confectioner's style) in the West—is noted for its classical trimmings and other modest ornamentation.[3] East German officials declared that this style was a direct descendant from the German neoclassicism of the late eighteenth century, even if the impetus for its resumption was brought on by Soviet mandates.[4]

1. *Hochhaus an der Weberwiese* (ca. 1955) (Source: Landesarchiv Berlin).

The high rise, replete with vertically oriented windows and modern amenities, such as central heating, telephones, elevators, and a garbage chute, was hailed a renter's "palace" when compared to the "barracks" it replaced. This was precisely the goal of the new socialistic housing: barring no expenses to build housing commensurate with the central role that the working class played in the "worker and farmer state." Speeches by high-ranking government officials and pamphlets by city leaders wasted no time in pointing out that the *Weberwiese* was only a token symbol of the bright, new future that the Socialist state would provide its citizenry. In time, all workers would live in such palaces. They further stated that although life was improving in the East, it was deteriorating in West Berlin as the government, a mere puppet regime of the belligerent United States, was diverting all revenues into rebuilding the war machinery and forcing its citizens to endure great hardship and a deteriorating quality of life.[5]

An L-shaped project, the *Weberwiese* is composed of a nine-story tower and two five-story flanking buildings. The small footprint of the high rise departs dramatically from the *Mietskasernen* in the neighborhood, and the wide facades of the lower buildings keep local tradition by facing the street, thereby framing the small communal park after which the project is named. Situated behind the subsequently constructed Stalinallee, the project forms an accent in the neighborhood's skyline, and the open-spaced arrangement of the adjoining buildings further sets the ensemble apart from the rest of the neighborhood.

The *Weberwiese* retained only scant ties to the mixed residential, commercial, and industrial uses typical of the *Mietskasernen.* Industrial uses were completely eliminated from the site, and only two small commercial tenants (a florist and a butcher) reside in the ground floor of the high rise today.

In 1954, Felix Hinssen brought the Bauhaus style back to West Berlin in his Phase I of the *Ernst-Reuter-Siedlung*, named after Berlin's leading functionary of the Social Democratic Party and mayor (Figure 2). Situated directly at the boundary to East Berlin, this complex was clearly the West's answer to the *Weberwiese.*[6] In the same manner that East Berlin architects blended national traditions with Moscow's mandates on Socialist construction, architects in West Berlin returned to the Bauhaus school because it had become the architecture of choice in capitalistic countries as propagated by German expatriots. Openly courting Western—that is, American—ideas, the adoption of this style demonstrated a firm commitment to break ties with Germany's recent past and consciously link to the traditions that flourished during the Weimar Republic. Hitler's discreditation of the Bauhaus school for being too "internationalistic" made West Berlin architects even more eager to adopt it.

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2. Ernst-Reuter-Siedlung (1955) (Source: Landesbildstelle Berlin).

Situated in a parklike setting, painted a uniform white, and having no external ornamentation, the *Reuter* development signified a sleek, green, and antiseptic future for the residents of West Berlin. The *Reuter* development "serves as an example for the reconstruction of formerly densely populated areas. That which had been the breeding grounds for diseases of the body and soul because of the building sins of the past decades, should now and will become a model garden city," said the retired West Berlin Senator Paul Hertz at the dedication speech.[7] Of course, Hertz's message was not intended solely for domestic consumption: "Ernst Reuter saw the importance of the garden city not only in the happiness of the people that will live here, but for him it was also very important that this extraordinary construction program might show our fellow countrymen in East-Berlin and in the Eastern Sector what new and beautiful things a free and democratic organization, without pressure or force, can produce."[8]

Whereas the masses had access to the meadow of the *Weberwiese*, the green space in the *Reuter* project was divided into garden plots to be used by the dwellers of the ground-floor apartments. The prejudice toward the wants of the individual over the needs of the masses may seem trivial in this instance, but other instances of this split between the sociopolitical programs of the East and the West were not as superficial. West Berlin faced numerous hurdles in rebuilding because the legal system favored the property and tenant rights of individuals over the needs of society. Although the *Reuter* site already belonged to a single owner (thereby eliminating the need to negotiate settlement costs with several owners), strong tenant rights laws kept the city from evicting residents. For example, the groundbreaking of project's second and third phases was delayed for several years because one remaining tenant, who ran an ice cream store out of her apartment could not be evicted.[9]

East Berlin did not have such problems. Its new societal organization placed the needs of the masses first, and when these needs conflicted with individual liberties, the individuals invariably lost. For example, the property (land and existing buildings) for the *Weberwiese* was simply collectivized, razed, and readied for construction. State collectivization in the East usually meant that owners received only token compensation for their loss, if even that.[10]

The *Reuter* development is composed of a fourteen-story high rise surrounded by several five-, seven-, and nine-story strip buildings. The strip build-

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ings extend into the block, thereby breaking with the tradition of displaying a continuous facade along the street, and a new street through the block provides access to the interior. In contrast to the *Weberwiese*, the break with the past in terms of land uses is complete: There are no mixed uses—only residential—in keeping with the tenets of the Athens Charter,[11] West Berlin's undisputed urban planning *Leitbild*.

Although embarking on housing programs that emanated from two supposedly opposite directions, the similarities between the *Weberwiese* and the *Reuter* projects are striking. Indeed, their appearance seems nearly identical, especially because the contrast to the surrounding *Mietskasernen* is so strong. Both broke from the *Mietskasernen* through their layouts as well as their reduced—or in the *Reuter* case, elimination of—mixed land uses. Strong commonalities between the projects also exist in their composition (a variegated skyline employing a single, dominating high rise), their minimal changes in the existing street patterns, and their setting among greenery. Another commonality was their status as a prototype: Both sides modeled subsequent developments after these projects.[12]

Yet, when one views the official statements that surrounded each project without knowing how each project looked, one is led to believe that these projects were as different as night and day. For example, East Germany's new "Sixteen Principles of Urban Planning" specifically denounced the "garden city" movement as anti-urban.[13] By dissolving the city into the countryside—as East Germans charged the West with doing—their intent was not only to separate people and keep them from becoming engaged in political affairs, but also to make an atomic war seem more palatable. Spreading the population over a wider area was an integral part of the West's continued escalation toward nuclear conflict, eastern propaganda claimed, because any damage inflicted by a counterstrike would thereby be limited. Of course, Westerners lobbed verbal bombshells as well. Denouncing dictatorial regimes and the inefficiency of centralized planning, they wasted no time in stating that Socialism's political and economic organization was socially depraved.[14]

3. Leninplatz (today: Plaza of the United Nations) (1992) (Source: Senatsverwaltung für Bau-und Wohnungswesen V).

Eradicating the Slums: Urban Renewal Writ Large

East Berlin's political and economic climate had changed dramatically by the sixties. Nikita Khrushchev took charge of the Soviet Union after Joseph Stalin's death in 1953 and quickly instituted many policy changes, some of which were directed at the housing industry. Convinced by mounting economic pressures that true Socialists did not need handcrafted "palace" apartment houses and desirous of breaking away from the Stalinist legacy, his new building mandates pushed "industrialized" construction, that is, prefabrication. Commonly known by the slogan, "Better, Cheaper, Quicker Construction," East German architects turned to prefabrication, sacrificing all architectural ornamentation and variation as cost-saving measures in both the manufacture and assembly processes.[15] Heralding the "Victory of Socialism," workers were instructed to take pride in the increased volumes and the allegedly rising quality standards of public housing achieved through central planning.[16]

Razed and rebuilt according to the new building guidelines, the *Leninplatz* (formerly *Landsbergerplatz*, now Plaza of the United Nations) represented a milestone in the industrialized construction process (site layout: Hermann Henselmann; principal architect: Heinz Mehlan) (Figure 3). New serially prefabricated units increased the variety of strip building shapes, a three-tiered high rise was erected in record time, and a supermarket had 3000 square feet of retail space to serve the surrounding population of 13,000—all out of prefabricated pieces. The plaza was dedicated on the one hundreth anniversary of Lenin's birth, and East German government officials felt sure that the milestones reached through the adherence to "socialistic production methods" would make the plaza's namesake proud. Billed as "one of the most impressive ensembles of the capital city," the *Leninplatz* was sure to become one of the strongest attractions in East Berlin: "Everything is available there, that a visitor could want."[17]

The *Leninplatz* has no correlation to its predecessor or to the surrounding neighborhoods. The explicit motivation for this discontinuity was the desire to completely rebuild East Berlin along Socialist ideals: the large-scale developments with plazas that dwarfed their predecessors were symbols for a broad-minded, liberal, Socialist *Weltanschauung* (outlook on the world). Walter Ulbricht, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the German Socialist Unity Party (SED), declared that Socialist

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urban space must be large-scale "to be commensurate to the dignity of the Capital of the German Democratic Republic."[18]

Of course, large pieces of land were needed to carry out these urban renewal plans. The *Leninplatz*, covering roughly 250,000 square meters, was only one project in a renewal area of approximately 800,000 square meters. Large new traffic arteries supplanted the network of small residential streets in a complete redesign of the street network to give better access to Berlin's traditional center. Even the actual location of the new plaza had no link to the past: The Leninplatz was rebuilt more than two hundred meters farther to the west.

Three apartment buildings comprise the residential portions of the *Leninplatz*. A three-tiered monolithic high rise of 17, 21, and 25 stories and two 9-story, curved apartment building strips frame the central plaza and break unambiguously with the former scale of 5-story *Mietskasernen*. A prefabrication "breakthrough" created trapezoidally shaped units, where these segments, when interspersed with the standard rectangular ones, let the strip buildings curve into S and V shapes.[19] The plaza's large scale seems even more daunting today because the ensemble has lost its artistic centerpiece and visual focal point, the statue of Lenin. The 19-meter-tall statue mimicking the three tiers of the high rise (sculptor: Nikolai Tomski, president of the Soviet Academy of the Arts) was removed after reunification.

In terms of land uses, the *Leninplatz* is predominantly residential. A supermarket located by the S building and several shops in the ground floor of the highrise introduce commercial uses, whereas industrial uses are absent.

West Berlin, in contrast, faced other challenges during the sixties. The construction of the wall on August 13, 1961 wreaked havoc on the entire city. Employment and shopping patterns changed overnight, and the West's now heightened insular location kept the "economic miracle" that West Germany was experiencing at bay. An aging and shrinking population further hampered the city's tenuous economic situation.[20] Only through generous subsidies from West Germany was a normal daily life made possible in West Berlin. The German government even offered cash incentives to anyone willing to move to the city.

Because the wall followed political boundaries, it cut a circuitous path that disregarded neighborhoods and traffic flows. Brunnenstrasse, once the main artery and commercial corridor in southeastern Wedding, was severed by the wall. Previously only a ten-minute trolley ride away from the city's center, this area was now paradoxically relegated to a fringe position. Separated from its residential base, Brunnenstrasse lost its commercial importance. Department stores closed, leaving behind only small grocery and retail stores that served the immediate neighborhood. As the area slipped further into decline, city elders seized the opportunity to try out a new urban renewal strategy.

Known as the First Urban Renewal Program, the West Berlin Senate embarked on what was to become the largest urban renewal project in the entire country. Constructing large modernist satellite communities on the outskirts of the city and offering incentive packages to lure the inner-city residents into the new communities, the city began buying each and every parcel of land surrounding Brunnenstrasse. In doing so, they hoped to demolish and completely rebuild the area and finally rid the city of the *Mietskasernen* "slums."

The thirty-five-block area, known as the *Renewal District Wedding-Brunnenstrasse* encompassed 14,700 apartments and affected 40,000 people as well as 1,760 businesses.[21] Set aside for wholesale renovation, the driving political idea was to upgrade the borough massively, changing its image—not necessarily its actual nature—from a dirty and decaying district to one that reflected the West Berlin housing and demographic means.[22]

In the early sixties, western paradigms for urban renewal embraced only modernistic visions. Commissioning all eleven urban planning departments at the various West German universities and technical schools, the West Berlin Senate hoped to collect the most advanced redevelopment ideas. None of the plans retained the *Mietskasernen*, the feel of the neighborhood, or the mix of land uses. Instead, freestanding housing blocks and terraced strip buildings in the midst of spacious green areas—well separated from other uses, naturally—comprised the planning visions. The plan submitted by Fritz Eggeling of the Technical University Berlin was the most conservative (and thus the least costly) because it largely retained the existing street pattern and subterranean infrastructure.[23]

Blocks 257 and 258 in the renewal district, constructed in 1969–1976, give a good testimonial of the renewal approach: raze and rebuild (Figure 4).[24] Of the approximately eighty postwar usable buildings, only a church and one apartment house (constructed after the war) still stood after renewal.[25] Building records indicate that many of the demolished structures were showing signs of neglect and age: damp and moldy cellar apartments, leaking roofs, nonfunctioning toilets, or completely lacking sanitary facilities.[26] Yet, other properties that had been renovated or modernized after the war were not spared from the wrecker's ball.[27]

Although the street pattern was unchanged, other factors such as building setbacks, heights, and scales, changed the neighborhood completely. For example,

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4. *Brunnenstrasse* Blocks 257 and 258 (1992) (Source: Senatsverwaltung Für Bau-und Wohnungswesen V).

the new building setbacks along Demminer Strasse, a residential street, broke from the *Mietskasernen* tradition of a homogeneous frontage at the minimum setback permitted by law (architect: Stranz). The new construction deviated from this norm dramatically with building setbacks varying more than twenty-five meters. Their height varied as much as their setbacks: going from eleven to six to ten to eight stories. Typical of this time is also the use of housing "bridges" over the street. Buildings on either side of a street were connected with apartments suspended over the roadway. For example, block 257 is joined to block 258 to the east and to block 250 to the north through two bridges.

With respect to land uses, block 257 contains an interesting experiment. Because large department stores could no longer survive in the area because of the Wall and planners wanted to keep the remaining stores out of the residential areas, all retail establishments were congregated along Brunnenstrasse. Occupying the ground floor of the eleven-story residential buildings that front Brunnenstrasse, a semicovered pedestrian mall was added in front of the apartment buildings to house the overflow of displaced retailers. As far as industrial uses are concerned, all were eliminated from these two residential blocks.

Prefabrication was not a construction technique championed only by the East; the West also experimented with this approach. Many of the buildings were partially prefabricated. Yet the look and feel of this project does not resemble its cohort, the *Leninplatz*. Color, ornamentation, and architectural variation are present in *Brunnenstrasse*, even if prefabricated. Whereas the two blocks on Brunnenstrasse were built mainly in this fashion, the East Germans would come to rely on prefabrication almost exclusively.

One of the main differences between *Brunnenstrasse* and *Leninplatz* cannot be seen yet affected their planning dramatically: the legal system. As mentioned earlier, questions of private ownership or compensation in East Berlin were quickly and easily settled; if a property was needed for a project, the government collectivized it, without granting the owner recourse to the law.[28] However, an entirely different situation was unfolding in the West. Acquisition was proving to be not only a costly process, but also one that took years longer than expected. In one case, the owner of one lot in block 257 refused to sell his property for more than fifteen years.[29] After repeated unsuccessful negotiation attempts, the owner finally agreed to binding arbitration in which he retained the deed to the land and received equal space for his restaurant in the new public housing.[30] Although the details of this case are singular, this incidence demonstrates how strongly the West Berlin government, in the form of its commissioned rehabilitation agents, was hampered in carrying out urban renewal plans in a timely fashion.[31]

Although the *Leninplatz* and *Brunnenstrasse* projects do not resemble each other as closely as the projects from the fifties do, their similarity in how they treated the existing city is identical. On both sides of the Wall, government leaders eliminated the *Mietskasernen* and rebuilt the urban fabric from scratch. Neither side wished to retain any trace of the neighborhoods or the mixed land uses that once existed. Although one would expect similar problems of aging to occur on both sides of the Wall at the same time because the *Mietskasernen* were built at more or less the same time, one would not necessarily expect that the two societies—with fundamentally different goals for society and different methods for attaining those goals—would come to the same conclusion with respect to the fate of the existing stock. It seems more than coincidental that both East and West Berlin shifted planning paradigms at the same time to raze-and-rebuild strategies.

Rediscovering the *Mietskasernen*: "Cautious" Renovation and Modernization

Perhaps more than anything else in its domestic policy during the seventies, East Germany grappled with the housing situation. Immediately after succeeding Walter Ulbricht as the head of the Central Committee of the SED in 1971 at the Eighth Political Convention of the SED, Erich Honecker outlined a new housing program that strove to meet pent-up demand. Attaining a peak in 1961 with 92,000 units, housing construction dropped off dramatically in East Germany during the sixties, reaching a low of 65,300 apartment units in 1966.[32] Yet, too few new constructions were not the only issues plaguing government leaders. The existing stock suffered from years of neglect of basic maintenance. This exacerbated the housing situation, driving dissatisfaction levels among the public so high that some tenants were refusing to pay rent until repairs were carried out on their buildings.[33]

Honecker attacked the problem from two angles. In his Five-Year Plan from 1971 to 1975, he gave the highest priority to new construction, while rank-

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ing renovation and modernization ("reconstruction" in East German parlance) of old buildings such as the *Mietskasernen* second.[34] Recognizing the great amount of invested wealth that still remained in the existing stock and given the cost relative to constructing new units, the political elite simply could not abandon the housing they already had, even if the political propaganda from headier days boldly foretold a future in which all traces of the deplorable "capitalistic inheritance" would be eliminated.[35] Thus, the old structures, in a dramatic turn of official policy, became a central component in the housing policy.

To further underscore the importance placed on renovation in the housing program, Honecker declared a "solution of the housing problem by 1990" at the Tenth Political Convention of the SED in 1973. This "solution" entailed the construction or renovation of up to 3 million units by 1990; new construction would be paramount until 1980, with renovation increasing in importance thereafter.[36]

The first large renovation projects were the *Arnimplatz* and *Arkonaplatz* (1974–1984) in the East Berlin boroughs of *Prenzlauer Berg* and *Mitte*, respectively. Suffering the most damage, not from wartime bombing, but from years of utter neglect, these projects attempted to modernize and improve the *Mietskasernen* in those characteristics that made them so despised by planners and city leaders: the preponderance of one- and two-bedroom apartments, minuscule courtyards that separated the buildings stacked into the block, rudimentary plumbing (if any at all), and a nearly complete lack of green and open spaces. These two projects laid the groundwork of experience for complex reconstruction, that is, the renovation and modernization of a whole street or several blocks.[37] Working out the kinks of "industrializing" the reconstruction process, the efforts of the participating architects and planners met with success.[38]

5. Frankfurter Allee (1994).

Armed with these experiences, attention moved by the early eighties to the south side of the *Frankfurter Allee* (urban design: Till Dorst) (Figure 5). It seems only fitting that this street was chosen to parade the latest changes in the housing policy. Of all the streets in East Berlin, none other displayed the different periods and architectural styles of Socialist Germany as distinctly.[39] Under the banner of "Unity of New Construction, Reconstruction, Modernization, and Preservation," work began in 1983 to restore this street.[40]

As the motto states, the *Frankfurter Allee* was not simply renovated, but vacant lots were also built upon. New policies required that the existing fabric, structure, and life of a neighborhood be retained and strengthened by renovation efforts. However, in contrast to previous exertions where the prefabricated infill houses did not mimic the *Mietskasernen*, the urban planning concept for the *Frankfurter Allee* tried to "recreate the existing structure of the area, retain building setbacks and heights, as well as give the heavily frequented shopping street a suitable character through a variety of social establishments [that is, shops, restaurants, and so on]."[41] Clearly, the, movement away from planning paradigms that disregarded existing structures and street layouts was complete. Using modified units of the WBS (*Wohnungsbauserie*, or apartment building series) 70, the new buildings kept the historic scale of the street. Mimicking the traditional feeling even went as far as giving the ground-floor social establishments the same ceiling heights (4.2 meters) as the turn-of-the-century stock. Nonetheless, the ceilings in the residential floors were not this high. Although the *Mietskasernen* had a total of five floors in a

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twenty-five-meter building height, the new buildings had up to eight.

Although the modified WBS 70 did make concessions to the existing stock, the result was not a *Mietskaserne*. The special treatment bestowed on the facades engendered a look that is unmistakably East German, but it was a definite enhancement over unmodified units. Admitting that the prefabricated buildings still needed much improvement,[42] new elements like bay windows and balconies helped make the facades look more three-dimensional, and stairways showcased through windows reaching from floor to ceiling did reduce repetition and monotony.

At the same time that the new construction went up, the old buildings were renovated. Drawing from the experiences gained at the Arnimplatz and Arkonaplatz and using a newly developed prefabricated assemblage for modernizing the kitchen/bath/toilet area (in essence, plug-in modules connected to a plumbing cluster servicing 4 to 5 apartments),[43] the time needed for modernization apparently could be reduced to only 10 to 12 days per apartment.

Yet, other factors slowed down progress. Apparently because only a master plan, as opposed to a person or an organization, was responsible for coordinating the different phases of redevelopment, much time was wasted when one contractor, for example, the *Tiefbau Kombinat* (subterranean contractor), suffered delays, causing the entire project to derail from its time plan. "The tasks can only be completed if each partner assumes responsibility not only for his part, but also for the quality of the project as a whole, reminded Ernst Kristen, chief architect of the borough *Mitte* (City Center), who could see the problems of the project with greater personal distance.[44] It seems that the advantage that East Berlin would have had over the West through its simplified legal measures to obtain property titles was negated by an obtuse and ill-functioning central planning mechanism.

Table 1 Overview of Projects

Time	Description	West Berlin	East Berlin
1950s	Project	Ernst-Reuter-Siedlung	Hochhaus an der Weberwiese
	Goal	"Capitalism Is Better"	"Socialism Is Better"
	Main influence	Athens Charter, Bauhaus	Sixteen Principles of Urban Planning
	Construction	Traditional brick	Traditional brick
	Δ in street pattern	Slight—new street to interior	Substantial—cut block in half
	Δ in formal characteristics	Substantial—15-story high rise: 5-, 7-, and 9-story strip buildings; narrow side to main streets	Substantial—9-story high rise; 5-story strip buildings; wide side to main streets
	Δ in land use	Substantial—residential only	Presumably none
	Δ in residents	N/A	N/A
1960s/ 1970s	Project	Brunnenstrasse blocks 257 and 258	Leninplatz
	Goal	Raise area to West Berlin average	Create new, socialist urban space
	Main influence	First Urban Renewal Program	"Quicker, Better, Cheaper Construction"
	Construction	Partial prefabrication	Prefabrication type P2 "Berlin"
	Δ in street pattern	None	Total—moved plaza several hundred feet west; new traffic arteries
	Δ in formal characteristics	Total—jumbled skyline and setbacks	Total—25-story high rise; 9-story s-shaped strip buildings
	Δ in land use	some—residential with senior citizens and small retail	substantial—residential and large supermarket
	Δ in residents	Nearly total—Turk immigrants; original people living elsewhere	N/A—presumably substantial, apartments awarded for merit
1980s	Project	Schulstrasse blocks 122 and 140	Frankfurter Allee Süd
	Goal	Appease social unrest; maintain neighborhood; provide affordable housing	"Solve the Housing Problem by 1990"
	Main influence	Second Urban Renewal Program; community input	"Complex Reconstruction"
	Construction	Brick infill; variegated renovation of existing stock	Modified prefab infill; renovation of existing stock
	Δ in street pattern	None	None
	Δ in formal characteristics	Slight—infill the same as existing stock; interior of blocks as playground	Substantial—infill poorly mimics existing stock
	Δ in land use	Slight—residential, retail	Slight—residential, retail
	Δ in residents	Slight—little turnover after renovation	N/A—presumably slight, option to reoccupy

Δ = change.
N/A = not available.

Completely opposite to the paradigm that guided the construction of the *Leninplatz*, perhaps it was the worsening economic situation in East Germany that caused political convictions to change to the point that the despised *Mietskasernen* were now embraced as housing adequate for socialist consumption after all. Ule Lammert, a prominent and oft-published East German urban planner, softened the ground for this complete change in political will by declar-

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ing that earlier views on the *Mietskasernen* (the "capitalistic inheritance" as incompatible with Socialist ideals) were flawed because they did not see the buildings in light of the Marxist dialectic: The renovation of the existing stock was not a solution borne out of predicament; instead, modernization *transformed* the old buildings to exemplary "socialist residential complexes."[45]

If the impetus for reexamining the *Mietskasernen* came from economic pressures on the government in the East, in West Berlin tenants—or more precisely, illegal squatters—ultimately forced city planners to abandon their raze-and-rebuild urban renewal approach. Even though West Germany had caught up with its demand for housing by the early seventies, West Berlin still faced large shortages.[46] These shortfalls were largely due to an unabated demolition of antiquated apartments and to a steady immigration of "guest workers" and students into the city. By the mid seventies, housing shortages were so severe that students (often coming to Berlin to avoid military conscription) and low-income ethnic minorities saw themselves as having no option but to illegally occupy the *Mietskasernen*, even though they were slated for demolition.

Another factor that caused paradigms to shift in the West was a grass-roots movement that swept over West Germany and West Berlin by the mid-seventies that condemned the drastic effects urban renewal wreaked in the cities. The bombs of World War II brought one wave of destruction to German cities, but urban renewal's *zweite Zerstörung* (second destruction) brought about much harsher changes. Architects and planners advanced measures to flatten historic city cores all over West Germany to make room for American-style, central business district-type downtowns. Decrying these changes, the general public struggled to dislodge such planning paradigms. Too much, they felt, was being removed of the old culture and society.

In West Berlin, the situation was no different: Modernist planners and residents were on a collision course. At first, city leaders paid little attention to the politically marginal illegal squatters, but as the public became more vociferous in its protests and students refused to vacate in face of the wrecker's ball, the political elite realized that changing West Berlin's renewal paradigm was unavoidable. The modernist strategies—which had, incidentally, become far costlier and more complex than anticipated[47]—were slowly supplanted by new approaches that favored rehabilitation for the existing stock.[48]

Hardt-Waltherr Hämer, a renegade architect who had demonstrated the economic and social sagacity of renovating *Mietskasernen* in Wedding and Charlottenburg in the sixties and early seventies, at long last received an audience of city leaders to present the results of his renovation methods. However, the members of West Berlin's Senate were not ready to shift from the modernist planning paradigm. Instead, they created a special fund to sponsor an International Building Exhibition, part of which would be set aside for renovation of the existing stock as a test case.

As the city began to reconsider its planning paradigms, the goals for rehabilitation also changed. The Borough of Wedding was no longer ultimately to mirror the average of West Berlin's housing stock, nor would its residents be reshuffled to reflect a demographic mean. Paradoxically, the *Brunnenstrasse* project had actually concentrated ethnic minorities and low-income residents in Wedding. Nearly all of the project's original, middle-income residents moved away to find shelter elsewhere in preparation for demolition. Though as redevelopment stalled, many buildings were left empty, yet standing. The city government, in a pinch to find housing for the rapid influx of foreign workers, began placing people "temporarily" in the soon-to-be demolished *Mietskasernen*. When it came time to move out so the building could be demolished, residents refused to move because the replacement housing was too expensive.

Facing these problems, the government of West Berlin was forced to adopt new approaches to providing affordable housing. Reexamining the *Mietskasernen*, city officials accepted the fact that these buildings, which had been deemed unfit for human habitation practically since their creation, indeed had great potential. Under the banner of "Cautious Urban Renewal," the Senate passed the Second Urban Renewal Program in late 1979.[49] Its small-scale approach favored modernization and renovation over new construction. Now specific blocks or even individual houses within blocks could receive public assistance to defray renovation costs.

Blocks 122 and 140 of the *Examination Region Schulstrasse* are typical examples of how blocks looked after renovation. Even though large portions of the blocks' interiors were converted to playgrounds and green spaces, the street-side facades today appear much as they did at the turn of the century. Renovation procedures repaired roofs, facades, balconies, and windows and combined smaller apartments to create larger units. Modernization measures brought bathrooms and toilets, central heating, and new kitchens into the rejuvenated buildings.[50]

Aside from several structures on the inside of blocks 122 and 140, only one building facing the street was demolished. In this case (Liebenwalderstrasse 56—block 140), the city declared the structure too decrepit to warrant renovation. Going as far as bending the laws restricting the ceiling height in public housing, government lead-

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6. *Liebenwaldstrasse* 57-50 (1994) "New" *Mietskaserne* No. 56 second from left.

ers encouraged builders to maintain the existing look of the neighborhood even to the point that floor heights of new buildings matched those of their neighbors. Today this house blends in so seamlessly that if one did not know it was a new construction, it would be assumed that it, too, was a renovated *Mietskaserne* (Figure 6).

One of the main points of conflict between the city and the residents during the seventies was the inability for tenants to stay in the same apartment, building, or even neighborhood once renovation was completed. New government programs addressed these concerns and in most cases led to mutually agreeable resolutions. For example, in Oudenarderstrasse 25 and 26 (block 122), tenants were temporarily moved from the front house to the empty ones to the rear and side. After renovation was done in the front house, tenants had the option to move back into their old units—without being forced out of the neighborhood through significantly higher rents.[51]

The land uses in these blocks did not change much. Never having housed heavy industry, there was no need to relocate obnoxious uses, and the existing residentially compatible industrial and commercial uses were allowed to remain on site, in place.

What was remarkable about the projects carried out in West Berlin under the Second Urban Renewal Program was not what one saw, but the things that one did not see. The complete about-face by city planners from the *tabula rasa* methods of the sixties to the "cautious urban renewal" of the eighties was astonishing. The catalyst for change may have been tenant revolts, but the mounting renewal costs and the legal difficulties encountered in evicting tenants also played their part in forcing West Berlin to discard its modernist urban planning paradigms.

Conclusions

Conventionally, urban planning is considered to be an animal closely linked to the political process. This is even more so the case in Europe, where governments have traditionally played much greater roles in shaping the planning, design, and architectural styles of their cities. Conventional thought also states that there are great differences among the values, methods, and goals of a socialist government, as compared to a capitalist one. Based on these assumptions, one might think that urban planning in two different areas would yield distinctly different outcomes since they are part of governmental organizations that are diametrically opposed. Yet, the preliminary findings presented here seem to throw the conventional wisdom into question. Further research must be done on this subject before such statements can be accepted with a greater degree of certainty.

What conclusions can be drawn from the findings presented here? First, competing political ideologies in East and West Berlin did not necessarily create different planning paradigms. Second, the life spans of the paradigms were only as long as economic and social conditions could sustain them. Finally, no amount of governmental entrenchment could keep paradigm shifts at bay if economic or social conditions warranted changes. The greatest surprise is perhaps that the planning paradigm shifts came at the same time on both sides of the wall. Going from total redevelopment schemes of small areas in the fifties to wide-area approaches of the *Mietskasernen* "slums" in the sixties, and then to completely casting off these practices in the eighties in favor of an embrace of the *Mietskaserne* seems to be more than mere coincidence would allow. Because both societies shifted their planning paradigms at the same time and in the same di-

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rection, this may suggest that urban planning, as an urban maintenance process, may not necessarily be intimately tied to a particular form of social organization and government, but instead receives its stimulus for change from outside influences, such as economic or social pressures. At least in these six instances in Berlin, reality forced political policy to change.

How do these findings compare with other current research? Although little comparative research has been done on the planning paradigms of Berlin's working-class housing, reigning conventional thought states that East Berlin did roughly the same things as in the West, but with a delay of about ten years. I would agree with the first part of this statement, but the notion of a time delay between East and West Berlin seems to be completely unfounded. Furthermore, the idea that the differences between the East and West are principally cosmetic is also not the case. The dissimilarities between the *Leninplatz* and *Brunnenstrasse* on the one hand, and the *Frankfurter Allee* and *Schulstrasse* on the other, point this out unambiguously. Although conventional wisdom and factual data agree that the architectural quality of the East Berlin prefabricated houses are not on par with their Western cohorts, the differences run deeper than that. The urban spaces, stores, streets, and neighborhoods identify to this day—what lay east and west of the Berlin wall.

Acknowledgments

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Archives

The following archives were used in this research: Landesarchiv Berlin, Staatsarchiv Berlin, Archive of the Deutsche Gesellschaft zur Förderung des Wohnungsbaus (DeGeWo), Bezirksamt Wedding, Bezirksamt Friedrichshain, Senatsbibliothek, and Haus der Bauinformation.

Notes

1. Klaus von Beyme et al., "Leitbilder des Wiederaufbaus in Deutschland," in Klaus von Beyme *et al.*, eds., *Neue Städte aus Ruinen: Deutscher Städtebau der Nachkriegszeit* (Munich: Prestel-Verlag, 1992); Simone Hain, "Berlin Ost: Im Westen wird man sich wundern," in von Beyme *et al.*, eds., *Neue Städte aus Ruinen;* and Dieter Geffers, "Stadterneuerung als politisches Instrument der Stadtentwicklung" in Senatsverwaltung für Bau- und Wohnungswesen, ed., *Stadterneuerung Berlin: Erfahrungen, Beispiele, Perspektiven* (Berlin: Reiter Druck, 1990).

2. In 1950, shortly after East Germany received statehood, several notable East German architects went to Moscow to learn about "Socialist" architecture and urban design. Upon their return, the "Sixteen Principles of Urban Planning" were drafted. However, these principles soon slipped into disuse, although they were never officially renounced. By the early eighties, new guidelines were drafted, but they did not receive even the initial embrace that the Sixteen Principles did. For an English translation of both sets of guidelines, see Doug Clelland, "From Ideology to Disenchantment," *Architectural Review* 52/11–12 (1982): 41–45.

3. Gerhard Abeken, *Bau- und Wohnungswesen: Sonderdruck aus Berlin Sowjet Sektor* (Berlin: Colloquium Verlag Otto H. Hess, 1967); and Hermann Henselmann, "Aus der Werkstatt des Architekten," *Deutsche Architektur* 1952/4 (1952): 156–64.

4. Kurt Liebknecht, "Zur Frage der Fensterformen," *Deutsche Architektur* 1952/2 (1952): 87–89.

5. Bezirksverwaltung Friedrichshain, *Friedrichshain baut auf* (n.p., n.d.).

6. Hauptwirtschafter für das Notstandsprogramm, ed., *Ernst-Reuter-Siedlung: Zur Erinnerung an die Einweihungsfeier am 18. Juli 1954* (Berlin: E. Heckendorff K.G., n.d.), p. 12; and Harald Bodenschatz, *Platz frei für das neue Berlin! Geschichte der Stadterneuerung in der 'grössten Mietskasernenstadt der Welt' seit 1871* (Berlin: Transit, 1987), p. 159.

7. Hauptwirtschafter, *Ernst-Reuter-Siedlung*, p. 11.

8. Ibid., p. 12.

9. Bodenschatz, *Platz frei für das neue Berlin!* p. 159.

10. Frank Werner, *Städtebau: Berlin Ost* (Berlin: Kiepert, 1969), p. 13.

11. The Athens Charter, adopted by the International Congress of Modern Architecture (CIAM) in 1933, stipulated, among other things, a complete spatial separation of residential, commercial, and industrial land uses.

12. The *Weberwiese* was the prototype for the Stalinallee, the East's demonstration housing project of the National Construction Program of 1952. The *Reuter* development was an unofficial prototype to the completely restyled Hansaviertel, which was rebuilt under the title "INTERBAU 1957," West Berlin's showcase building exhibition, which included such modernist heavyweights as Le Corbusier, Walter Gropius, and Oskar Niemeyer.

13. Lothar Bolz, "Grundsätze des Städtebaues," *Planen und Bauen* 4/9 (1950): 288–93.

14. Paul Hertz said in his speech at the dedication of the *Reuter* project: "The goal of social housing is functional construction. We do not want pompous buildings nor advertisement facades, where the exterior is more important than the interior. It seems to be the prerogative of every dictatorial regime to turn a small feat into an historical event through considerable show of propaganda. But how little does one Stalinallee mean against the roughly 1000 construction sites in West-Berlin, where 18,000 apartments will be built this year? In one month—in May 733 apartments were ready to be moved into and in June 1452—we have done more than East-Berlin will this whole year." Hauptwirtschafter, *Ernst-Reuter-Siedlung*, p. 12.

15. Andreas Schätzke, *Zwischen Bauhaus und Stalinallee: Architekturdiskussion im östlichen Deutschland 1945–55* (Braunschweig: Vieweg, 1991), p. 68.

16. Deutsche Bauakademie, ed., *Probleme des Städtebaus und der Architektur im Siebenjahrplan: Thesenhafte Kurzfassung des Referats auf der Theoretischen Konferenz der Deutschen Bauakademie Oktober 1960* (Berlin: Zentrale wissenschaftliche Bauinformation, 1960), p. 3.

17. Dieter Bolduan and Siegfried Dziadek,

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Die Hauptstadt und ihre Bauleute: Eine Chronik des Berliner Bauwesens (n.p., 1970), pp. 58–59.

18. Ibid., p. 64.

19. *Wohnungsbauserie* (apartment building series) "Berlin" P2; and Heinz Mehlan, "Zur architektonischen Gestaltung des Leninplatzes," *Deutsche Architektur* 1969/3 (1969): 138–42.

20. West Berlin, although it served as a transit or even the end station of the 100,000 fugitives leaving East Germany and the areas of Poland formerly under German dominion each year, was rapidly losing its population to West Germany. Intensive Berlin advertisements in West Germany lured some workers to the city, but the flow was not enough to offset low birth rates and the exodus of the young. Only by 1985 did West Berlin's population stabilize and rise. This change was partially due to the rapid influx of guest workers, mainly from Turkey, whose numbers had risen to 262,000, or 13 percent of the total population, by 1987. See Wolfgang Ribbe and Jürgen Schmädeke, *Kleine Berlin-Geschichte* (Berlin: Stapp, 1989), pp. 213–214. Thereafter, the flow of non-Germans to Berlin skyrocketed until just recently, as immigration into the reunited city has subsided.

21. Bezirksamt Wedding von Berlin—Abt. Bauwesen, ed., *Der Wedding im Wandel der Zeit* (Berlin: Koll, 1985), p. 40.

22. Just as physical renewal stood at the forefront of previous rebuilding efforts, human renewal was now equally targeted. The district, and the entire borough, was to be changed from working class to the much praised "Berlin average." See Katrin Zapf, "Die Wohnbevölkerung im Sanierungsgebiet," *Stadtbauwelt* 1968/18 (1968): 1350–52.

23. Bezirksamt Wedding von Berlin—Abt. Bau- und Wohnungswesen, *25 Jahre Stadterneuerung für Menschen in Wedding* (Berlin: FAB Verlag, 1988), p. 28.

24. Various architects were involved with this project. Among them are Werner Weber, Gino Gerth, Heinrich Suhr, Edvard Jahn, and Stranz.

25. The church, located at 28 Ruppinerstrasse, was retained since it suffered no wartime damage and was public property. The apartment house, 11 Stralsunder Strasse, was built after the war as part of the Aufbau Berlin program.

26. Information obtained from the following files in the Landesarchiv Berlin: Rep. 203, Acc. 2113, No. 6714, 6715, 6767.

27. For example, the house Vinetaplatz 7 at the corner of Swinemünderstrasse received a new stucco facade, one tenant installed a coal-burning heater, another switched from a coal-burning heater to an oil-burning one—all in 1960—, and a third tenant added a gas-burning hot water heater in 1969. See Landesarchiv Berlin Rep. 203, Acc. 2113, No. 6787.

28. Not only was the property confiscated, but if any mortgages existed on the property, the East German government demanded that these be paid off by the owner as well. See Werner, *Städtebau*, p. 13.

29. In blocks 257 and 258, the city began negotiating settlement amounts with owners in 1963.

30. Peter Weninger, et al., "Nach Jahren endlich komplett—der neue Block 257," *DeGeWo Sanierungsspiegel* 1977/3 (1977): 9–11.

31. Mr. Hehlke, the owner, is reputedly the only private citizen who holds title to a public housing unit.

32. Gerlinde Staemmler, *Rekonstruktion innerstädtische Wohngebiete in der DDR* (Berlin: Universitätsbibliotek der Technischen Universität Berlin, 1981), p. 32.

33. Ibid., p. 33.

34. Out of the projected goal of 500,000 units, 383,500 to 387,000 were to be newly constructed, and 113,000 to 116,500 were to be renovated. Staemmler, *Rekonstruktion innerstädtische Wohngebiete in der DDR*, p. 34.

35. Peter Doehler, "Die sozialistische Umgestaltung der alten Wohngebiete der Städte in der DDR: Ziele, Aufgaben und Wege," *Deutsche Architektur* 1963/8 (1963): 459–460.

36. Staemmler, *Rekonstruktion innerstädtische Wohngebiete in der DDR*, p. 35.

37. Hans Stimmann, *Stadterneuerung in Ost-Berlin vom "sozialistischen Neuaufbau" zur "komplexen Rekonstruktion": Überblick und Materialien* (Berlin: Hörnicke-Druck, 1988), p. 16.

38. "Industrialization" meant standardizing procedures and developing prefabricated replacement parts that could be used for renovation and modernization.

39. Beginning in 1949, the *Laubengang* (arcade) buildings (architect: L. Herzenstein) were the last links to the Bauhaus tradition of the 1920s; in 1952, the Stalinallee, later renamed Karl-Marx-Allee (architects: H. Henselmann, R. Paulick, H. Hopp, and others) demonstrated the look of "Socialist Realism" between Proskauer Strasse and Strausberger Platz; after 1959, "industrial" construction marked the section from Strausberger Platz to Alexanderplatz; and finally in 1983, the method of complex reconstruction renovated the street between Proskauer Strasse and the S-Bahn (urban commuter railway) station Frankfurter Allee.

40. Ernst Kristen, "Zur Gestaltung der Frankfurter Allee in Berlin," *Architektur der DDR* 1985/3 (1985): 148–52.

41. Till Dorst, "Innerstädtischer Wohnungsbau am Standort Berlin-Friedrichshain, südliche Frankfurter Allee," *Bauzeitung* 39/2 (1985): 60–63.

42. Till Dorst, et al., "Weiterentwickelte WBS 70 am Standort Frankfurter Allee Süd Teil II: Fassadenaufgliederung durch Loggien und Erker," *Bauzeitung* 41/8 (1987): 349–50.

43. Horst Adami, "Erprobung neuester wissenschaftlich-technischer Ergebnisse bei der Neugestaltung des Gebiets Frankfurter Allee Süd in Berlin," *Architektur der DDR* 1985/10 (1985): 585–88. Whether or not this time estimate was actually attained in practice cannot be ascertained from the literature.

44. Kristen, "Zur Gestaltung der Frankfurter Allee in Berlin," p. 150.

45. Ule Lammert, "Aufgaben des Städtebaus zur Erfüllung des langfristigen Wohnungsbauprogramms bis 1990 als Beitrag zur Lösung der Hauptaufgabe des VIII. Parteitages: Aus dem Referat auf der 31. Plenartagung der Bauakademie der DDR," *Architektur der DDR* 1975/5 (1975): 135–42.

46. Klaus von Beyme, *Der Wiederaufbau: Architektur und Städtepolitik in beiden deutschen Staaten* (Munich: Piper, 1987).

47. Land acquisition expenditures, as well as construction delays, radically increased the costs of rebuilding.

48. Bezirksamt Wedding, *25 Jahre Stadterneuerung für Menschen in Wedding*, p. 86.

49. *Behutsame Stadterneuerung*, or "Cautious Urban Renewal," was also the official motto of the International Building Exhibition 1987. Led by Hämer, the renovation done within the frame of this exhibition championed his urban renewal methods, which were sensitive to tenants' wishes.

50. Senator für Bau- und Wohnungswesen, *Stadterneuerung Berlin: Untersuchungsbereich Schulstrasse* (Berlin: Senator für Bau- und Wohnungswesen, 1982).

51. Ibid.

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