The Silent Counter-Revolution

Article *in* European Journal of Political Research · May 2006

DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-6765.1992.tb00303.x

1 author:

Piero Ignazi
University of Bologna
64 PUBLICATIONS **1,153** CITATIONS

European Journal of Political Research **22**: 3–34, 1992.

The silent counter-revolution
Hypotheses on the emergence of extreme right-wing parties in Europe

PIERO IGNAZI
University of Bologna, Italy

Abstract. This article has two aims. The first attempts to define the 'extreme right' political family. The three criteria adopted – spatial, historic-ideological, attitudinal-systemic – have led us to identify two *types* of the extreme right party. One type comprises parties with a fascist imprint (old right-wing parties); the other comprises recently-born parties with no fascist associations, but with a right-wing antisystem attitude (new right-wing parties). The second aim of this article is to explain the recent 'unexpected' rise of the new right-wing parties. Changes in the cultural domain and in mass beliefs have favoured radicalization and system polarization on one side, and the emergence of attitudes and demands not treated by the established conservative parties on the other one. These two broad changes have set the conditions for the rise of extreme right parties.

Party system change and the emergence of extreme right parties

West European party systems are facing a period of change (Crewe and Denver 1985; Dalton 1988; Dalton et al. 1984; Daalder and Mair 1983; Mair 1984, 1989a,b; Wolinetz 1988). This change is observable at two levels, electoral and partisan.

At the electoral level, intraparty volatility has progressively accelerated in the 1980s and 'there is little evidence that this flux is likely to abate' (Mair, 1989b: 169). At the partisan level, a series of indicators show the accelerated process of 'decomposition of established party ties' (Dalton, 1988). The decline of party identification, of the number of party members and of the degree of partisan involvement (Mair, 1984) all indicate that the previous enduring ties between the electorate and established parties are progressively fading away, thus enabling the emergence of new parties and/or new agencies for the aggregation of demands (Mair, 1984, 1989a; Reider, 1989).

Party system change: causes

The origin of such change is related to modifications in society and in the polity.Relevant modifications in society concern: long term change in the socioeconomic structure (Bell, 1973) which has liberated the citizen by tradi-

tional alignments, fidelities and ties; a shift in the value system toward autodirection (as opposed to eterodirection) and self-affirmation (as opposed to group solidarity) (Inglehart, 1977; Dalton, 1988). As a result, voting is no longer the confirmation of 'belonging' to a specific social group but becomes an individual choice (not necessarily a rational one), an affirmation of a personal value system: the 'issue voter' tends to replace the traditional 'party identification voter' (Nie et al., 1979; Dalton et al., 1984).

The third vector of change has to do with the party itself. The organizational change from the mass party to the catch-all party has brought about a weakening of the party-membership linkage (Lawson and Merkl, 1988b). Moreover, the spread of the mass media, of 'video-power' (Sartori, 1989), and of a new 'party personnel' of experts and special advisers (Panebianco, 1988: 264ff) reinforce this tendency. This organizational change, still in the making, determines looser loyalities in the relationship between party and electorate: the party no longer offers voters a strong and clear cue.

Party system change: outcomes

According to the present debate (Daalder and Mair, 1983; Flanagan and Dalton, 1984; Mair, 1984, 1989b), party system change should lead to three main outcomes: a higher electoral volatility, the rise of new parties and the decline of party as such. Leaving aside the third potential outcome (party decline), the first two elements could account for the sudden rise or revival of extreme right parties (hereafter ERPs) in the 1980s. In most European countries, parties generally defined as 'extreme right' have gained parliamentary representation (in many cases for the first time) or have dramatically increased their votes (see Table 1). This upsurge has been totally unexpected by almost all politicians and opinion leaders but, even more, has not been taken into account as a possible outcome by scholars of party system change. There are three main reasons for this omission.

First, a widespread and well-grounded pessimism about the probability of new or marginal parties emerging. As Pedersen (1982, 1991), Harmel and Robertson (1985), Müller-Rommel and Pridham (1991) and Rose and Mackie (1988) have shown, few new parties have emerged, even in the turbulent and highly politicized 1970s. Moreover, those that did emerge tended to have a short life-span; the very few that succeed in passing the threshold of 'relevance' (Pedersen, 1991: 98), do not persist for a long time – disappearing or falling back into a marginal role.[1]

Second, changes at the societal and partisan level have not undermined the cleavage structure. Socioeconomic change, secularization, new value systems and party re-organisation have affected the relation between citizens and

politics in the direction of less involvement, less emotional attachment, a less ideological approach and, finally, less partisan loyalty. But votes remain overwhelmingly within each political family, switching between related parties (Bartolini and Mair, 1990; Mair, 1989a, b). As a consequence, it is difficult for a new party *outside the main blocs* to profit from the higher volatility. As convincingly argued by Bartolini and Mair (1990), the long-awaited 'unfreezing' of partisan alternatives has yet to come.

Third, Inglehart's thesis of the silent revolution (Inglehart, 1977) focuses on value change on the left pole of the political spectrum, omitting the right.[2] In many of his publication, Ronald Inglehart has been arguing that a new materialist/postmaterialist dimension is shaping political attitudes in the West and Japan. The emergence of a new set of values which emphasises non-materialist values (such as freedom, participation, self-realization) have given rise to the New Politics (Inglehart, 1984; Dalton, 1988). For Inglehart, this shift in the value system towards a steady and progressive increase of postmaterialism (Inglehart, 1988: 252) affects partisan preferences. In particular, the postmaterialists are massively inclined in favor of leftist parties (Inglehart, 1987: 1299–1302, 1989: 89 ss). In other words, value change has produced new political alignments and new political movements *on the left side* of the political spectrum.

The unaccounted for outcome: the rise of extreme right parties

The two more structured interpretations of outcomes of party system change – the persistence of cleavages and the rise of 'new politics' left-wing parties – do not account for the emergence or recovery of EPRs in the 1980s.

Mair's persistence thesis could hold only if ERPs were considered part of the conservative area. But this is not the case: ERPs have a peculiar distinctivness and they cannot merely be assimilated to other neighbouring political families. Moreover, ERPs' peculiarity consists in their capacity to mobilize votes from all social strata and from all previous political alignments. As shown by the interwar electoral earthquakes caused by the ERPs' ancestors[3] and by electoral studies of several present-day ERPs, extreme right parties differ from conservative parties in being able to attract highly diversified voters (on the French Front National see Mayer and Perrineau, 1990; Perrineau, 1989; Ysmal, 1989, 1990a; on the German Republikaner see Westle and Niedermayer, 1990; in comparative terms see Betz, 1990a; Oppenhuis, 1990; Ysmal, 1990b).

The inconsistency of Inglehart's thesis with the rise of ERPs is even more puzzling. Why, in an era of mounting postmaterialism and economic growth, do we find an increasing number of rightwing voters? And why has the

affirmation of the new politics not shrinked the space for the extreme right? Our hypothesis is that, together with the spread of postmaterialism, in Western countries in the 1980s, a different cultural and political mood, partially stimulated by the same 'new politics' (Minkelberger and Inglehart, 1989; Flanagan, 1987) has also been taking root. This change in beliefs and attitudes has been partially expressed in the so-called neoconservatism (and has been partially interpreted by conservative parties). But, to a large extent, it remained underground until the recent rise of ERPs. Such an underground melting pot of attitudes and sentiments includes the emergence of new priorities and issues not treated by the established parties, a disillusionement towards parties in general, a growing lack of confidence in the political system and its institutions, and a general pessimism about the future.

In a sense, it could be said that the Greens and the ERPs are, respectively, the legitimate and the unwanted children of the New Politics; as the Greens come out of the silent revolution, the ERPs derive from a reaction to it, a sort of 'silent counter-revolution'.

But before arguing our thesis on this point, however, we need to specify and describe the extreme right parties rather more precisely.

A family of extreme right parties?

Klaus vom Beyme has recentely regretted the near impossibility of finding common ground around the right wing pole (von Beyme, 1988). The variation in historic references, issues and policies is certainly relevant on the right, but probably not much higher than in other 'political families'. The point is that, in our opinion, the fascist or extremist or right wing family has been frequently considered in previous classifications as a sort of residual category[4] with an easily identifiable pivotal party, the Italian MSI (plus, *in secundis*, the German NPD) and a series of other 'protest' or 'populist' parties.

Previous classifications

Daniel Seiler, who has elaborated an ambitious theoretical framework for the analysis of party families inspired by the categories of Marx and Rokkan, defines the extreme right parties as 'deviant cases', distinct from the bourgeois parties. His extensive and accurate overview of this family – which he subdivides into the categories of 'nostalgic reaction', 'fascist reaction', 'common man protest', rural pauperism' and '*incivicisme* of the guaranteed' – is significantly labelled as '*le bestiarie du conservatisme*'. (Seiler, 1980: 207–213; see also Seiler, 1986).

This classification difficulty is due to an underestimation of the need for rigorous criteria in defining party families in general and the extreme right family in particular. Most of the authors who aggregate parties by types or families (von Beyme, 1985: 29–31; Smith, 1989: 124; Lane and Ersson, 1987: 94–97; Henig, 1969: 515 ss) do not escape this pitfall. Lane and Ersson's classification of parties[5], for example, adopts an ad hoc criterion for defining 'ultra rightist parties'. In this case, after having recognized that 'it is difficult to point out parties that belong to the set of ultra-right parties' they utilize the ideological criterion, while in the case of 'discontent parties' they refer to a set of different elements: issues (protest), ideology (populism) and style of leadership (charismatic) (Lane and Ersson, 1987: 103).

Finally, perhaps the best-documented survey of 'contemporary right wing extremism' (Husbands, 1981) among the very few devoted specifically to this family, is not based upon analytical distinctions.

In sum, the existing literature does not provide a set of shared criteria for identifying the family of ERPs. Therefore we face a twofold problem. On one hand we need to identify some common feature of the parties we label 'extreme right'; on the other hand we need to trace a clearcut borderline between ERPs and their neighbours, the conservative/confessional/centrist liberal parties.

The alternative approach that we propose points to three distinct criteria:
a) placement in the political spectrum (spatial);
b) declared party ideology and its reference to fascism (historic-ideological);
c) attitude toward the political system (attitudinal-systemic).
The combination of those criteria will be used to identify the family of extreme right parties.

The spatial criterion

The first criterion takes into consideration the placement of the parties along the left-right continuum, identifying those parties which have been placed most on the right. In the absence of universal and comparative data rating *all* the parties along the left-right continuum (minor parties are often disregarded in comparative data sets) we have to refer both to mass survey evidence and expert judgements.[6] When we set out to select the parties most to the right we immediately face the crucial problem of deciding how far to the right a party should be in order to be included in the extreme right family. In the absence of a standard measure we cannot give a definite answer to that, *Rebus sic stantibus,* the spatial criterion is limited to providing a broad overview of the right pole of the political spectrum.

Moreover, the spatial criterion cannot alone determine membership of the

extreme right family, without the contribution of other criteria. Even if the widely debated relationship between the concepts of left and right on one hand, and 'conservative' and 'progressive' on the other, could support the mechanical transfer between spatial location and political values (Huber, 1989; Fuchs and Klingemann, 1989), we cannot infer too much from the spatial location in itself.

Keeping in mind this limitation, we proceed by listing the parties located most to the right in each European country. The following list includes all the parties that contested elections at least once in the 1980s and disregards either that parties vanished (the French Parti des Forces Nouvelles, for example) or minor chapels devoted to violent actions and/or *gestes exemplaires*.[7]

This initial mapping includes:

Italy:	MSI (Movimento Sociale Italiano – Italian Social Movement)
France:	FN (Front National – French National Front)
Germany:	REP (Die Republikaner – The Republicans)
	NPD (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands – National Socialist Party)
	DVU (Deutsche Volksunion List D – German People's Union)
Great Britain:	BNP (British National Party)
	NF (National Front)
Greece:	EPEN (Ethniki Politiki Enosis – National Political Union)[8]
Belgium:	VlB (Vlaams Blok – Flemish Bloc)
	FNb (Front National – National Front)
	PFN (Parti de Forces Nouvelles – New Forces' Party)[9]
Netherlands:	CD (Centrumdemocraten – Centre Democrats)
	CP'86 (Centrumpartij '86 – Centre Party '86)
Spain:	AP (Alianza Popular – Popular Aliance), now PP (Partido Popular – Popular Party)
	FNs (Frente Nacional – National Front)[10]
Switzerland:	AN (Action Nationale – National Action)
Austria:	FPÖ (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs – Austrian Liberal Party), and the NDP/BRB/EHI[11]
Denmark:	FRP (Fremskridtspartiet – Progress Party)
Norway:	FRPn (Fremskrittspartiet – Progress Party)

Portugal:	CDS (Partido do Centro Démocratico Social – Democratic Social Center Party)
	PDC (Partido do Democracia Cristà – Christian Democratic Party)[12]
Ireland:	FF (Fianna Fáil – Soldiers of Destiny)
Sweden:	MS (Moderata Samlingspartei – Moderate Party)
Finland:	KK (Kansallinen Kokoomus – National Coalition Party)

As one can see, such a list includes long established parties and brand new ones, large parties as well as small ones at the verge of *groupusculaire* status (NF and BNP in Great Britain, Frente Nacional in Spain, EPEN in Greece, PFN in Belgium, the various Gruber's Formations in Austria, and the new born Portugese Forca National). Moreover, it raises immediate and legitimate problems about the plausibility of including all these parties – which range from *sui generis* conservative parties such as FF to neo-fascist parties such as MSI, from the bourgeois moderate MS to the racist FN, from the 'liberal' FPÖ to xenophobic – in the same class. Therefore, it is necessary to use a more substantive criterion (and one that is much more difficult to handle), that of party ideology.

The ideological criterion

Let us start with a bold statement. The *only* ideological corpus for the extreme right has been provided by fascism. This reference to fascist ideological doctrine instead of the widely used psychoanalytical approach (Adorno, et al. 1950) or middle class extremism (Lipset, 1960), is motivated by three considerations. First, fascism is the only ideology more or less unanimously recognized as an extreme right ideology.[13] Second, fascist ideology (except in some marxian-Third international interpretations of fascism as a variant of bourgeois domination – see Guerin, 1956 (orig. ed. 1936); Kühnl, 1973), is different and, in some ways alien from conservative thought. Third, up until the 1970s, all extreme right groups and parties had referred to and were inspired by the most influential party of this tendency in Europe, the Italian MSI which was patently, by any standard, a neofascist party (Caciagli, 1988, Ignazi, 1989a, 1989b). The MSI openly stated its inspiration in fascist doctrine, recruited old fascist party members and, for a long time, was active in promoting meetings and supporting 'neo-fascist' groups all over Europe (Del Boca and Giovana, 1969; Gaddi, 1974).

Taking for granted the centrality of fascist ideology in defining our *tendance*, we now have to stipulate some basic traits of this ideology. This is a very difficult task because fascist ideology is a *mare magnum* where different sources melt together. Such sources range from anarcho-syndicalism to nationalism and revanche, from futurism to clericalism, from a revolutionary

aspiration towards a new order and a new man to petty-bourgeois conservatism, from industrial modernism to ruralism, from authoritarian corporatism to *laisser faire*[14] (Cofrancesco, 1986; De Felice, 1969, 1975; Gentile, 1974; Nolte, 1967 (ed or 1963); Payne, 1980; Sternhell, 1976, 1989; Zunino, 1985).

The strongholds of fascist ideology common to all of its various streams[15] are: belief in the authority of the state over the individual; emphasis on natural community – hence nationalism, ethnocentrism and racism; distrust for the individual representation and parliamentary arrangements; limitations on personal and collective freedoms; exhaltation of the strength of the state; collective identification in a great national destiny – against class or ethnic or religious divisions; and acceptance of hierarchical criteria for social organisation. In extreme synthesis, state or nation comes prior to the individual.[16]

The heritage of fascism can be seen either in terms of references to myths, symbols, slogans of the interwar fascist experience, often veiled as nostalgia, or in terms of a more explicit reference to at least part of the ideological corpus of fascism. Given the crucial importance of aesthetics and image in fascism (Mosse, 1975 (ed or 1974)) we have to account for both elements. However while aesthetic expression is a probable indicator of adhesion to fascist ideology and recall of the fascist interwar experience, the reverse might not be true. In order to avoid stigmatization, ERPs could have toned down symbolic references to fascism.

If we apply an ideological criterion to the parties mentioned above, controlling for party manifestos/platforms and leader's interventions (our unit of analysis is party not individual members or voters as in Falter and Schumann (1988), Oppenhuis (1990), Ysmal (1990b)) then we can identify parties linked to fascist tradition. These include:

- the Italian MSI (Ignazi, 1989a, b, 1990);
- the German NPD and DVU (Stöss, 1988; Westle and Niedermayer, 1990);
- the British BNP and NF[17] (Husbands, 1988; Lewis, 1987; Thurlow, 1987);
- the Greek EPEN (Seferiades, 1986; Groupes des Droites Européennes (s.d. but 1986); Clogg, 1987; Papadopoulos, 1988);
- the Austrian NDP/BRB/EHI (Gartner, 1990);
- the Spanish FNs (Gunther et al., 1986);
- the Portuguese PDC (Costa Pinto, 1990);

and, with some cautions:

- the Dutch CP86 (Voerman and Lucardie, 1990).

Even if in some cases the distinction is not always very sharp, all of the above parties either recall keystones of fascist ideology of whatever internal tendency, or regret the glorious part, or exhibit the external signs of such imagery or, finally, call for a third way beyond capitalism and communism; in short, they themselves indicate their roots in the interwar fascist experience.[18] Other

parties on the extreme right do not show a clear linkage with fascism, with the exception of the Spanish AP.

The case of the AP is worth a brief discussion however, to highlight the main problems we face when making such classifications. First, we might question the presence of AP (and many parties, as we will see later on) in the extreme right family. AP is member of the European Democratic Union and the European People's Party grouping in the European Parliament, and is defined a conservative party by many scholars of the Spanish party system (see, for all, Lopez Nieto, 1988). Nevertheless the spatial self-placement of the party supporters and expert judgements of the party's location on the left-right scale are unequivocal. In 1986, 53 per cent of the electorate placed AP at the 'extreme right' and 42 per cent at 'right'. In 1984 the mean score on the 1–10 left-right scale of AP leader Manuel Fraga was 8.3; between 1982 and 1986 AP supporters moved from right to extreme right (Montero, 1988: 156 ss). As Josè Montero says, 'AP voters have become more conservative. The distance between AP and the other political parties had widened' (Montero, 1988: 159). And the same trend has been highlighted by the time-series survey data presented by Sani and Shabad (1986: 620–621). Thus, as far as the spatial criterion is concerned, AP identification is not questionable. Concerning ideology, however, even if AP represents some continuity with the Francoist regime, and given that Fraga himself was an old Franco Minister, it should be recognized that, in the transition to democracy, AP has left to Fuerza Nueva (now Frente Nacional) the role of the fascist-like party. (Nostalgia for the past is often, however, present in AP political discourse; see, for example, Gunther et al., 1986: spec. 346–347).

Attitude to the system

The third criterion adopted to highlight the distinctiveness of ERPs involves their role in (and their relationship to) the political system. This approach highlights the role of opposition parties in democratic regimes.

Kirchheimer identifies two types of opposition (Kirchheimer, 1966a: 237). The first is opposition of principle, where 'goal displacement is incompatible with the constitutional requirements of a given system'; the second is loyal opposition, which implies just a 'goal differentiation'. In the same tradition, Sartori defines an 'antisystem party' as one characterized by activity that undermines the legitimacy of the regime, and 'a belief system that does not share the values of the political order within which it operates' (Sartori, 1976: 133). More recently, Gordon Smith has proposed a typology which combines 'compatibility of aims and acceptability of behaviour' and has underlined the

existence of a 'grey zone of acceptability' according to different time and context; in other terms, what is considerated 'incompatible with the system in one era may be accomodated in other' (Smith, 1987: 63–64). The evolution of the socialist parties illustrate very well how parties can progressively accommodate themselves to the system's rules.

In theory, the extreme right parties should exhibit an 'opposition of principle' and should express an ideology which undermines the constitutional rules of the democratic regime. If we refer to fascism as *the* extreme right ideology, this ideology is, by any standard, alien and extraneous to liberal-democracy; but, by proceeding this way, we come back to our previous criterion, the ideological one. In order to excape from this vicious circle we will not refer to a well structured ideology, but will inquire about the presence of 'antisystem' political attitudes and beliefs. This distinction reflects Sartori's differentiation between 'a broad and strict definition of 'antisystem'' (Sartori, 1976: 132).

As far as we know from the content analysis of party manifestoes, platforms and leaders' writings and speeches, ERPs share some common features which are clearly antisystem. These include antiparlamentarism, antipluralism and antipartism. Even if such parties do not openly advocate a non-democratic institutional setting, they nevertheless undermine system legitimacy by expressing distrust for the parliamentary system, the futile discussions provoked by ambitious leaders, escessive freedom, the weakness of the state, the disruption of the traditional natural communities, and 'unnatural' egalitarism.

In sum, while most ERPs do not share any 'nostalgia' for the interwar fascist experience, and may even refuse any reference to fascism, they nevertheless express antidemocratic values throughout their political discourse. Their criticism is inspired by a refusal of modernity, a hate of divisions and a search for harmony, an exhaltation of natural community and a hostility towards foreigners, a faith in hierarchical structures and a distrust of parliamentary debate.

New and old ERPs

Summing up, our search for a valid *criteria definitionis* of the extreme right *tendance* has produced a typology according to which parties more on the right of the political spectrum are categorized according to the presence or absence of a fascist heritage and the acceptance or refusal of the political system. In order to be included in our class of 'extreme right' parties, the most rightwing parties, should either fulfil the historic-ideological fascist criterion, or should exhibit a delegitimizing impact, through a series of issues, values, attitudes (rather than a structured and coherent ideology), which undermines system legitimacy. If a party fits the historic-ideological criterion as well as the systemic one, we can think of it as belonging to the 'old right' type. If a party is

not linked to fascism but has an antisystem profile, we can think of it as belonging to the 'new right' *type*.[19]

The adoption of this framework helps us to settle on the borderline between ERPs and conservative parties. The different spatial location (the conservative parties are more to the centre), the different ideology (conservatism belongs to another ideological class), the different attitudes toward the system (conservatives are supportive or engage in 'goal opposition', but never endanger system legitimacy) clearly make the distinction between the two classes.

The 'new right-wing' party type in practice

Doubtful cases

As we have already indicated, not all parties at the right-wing end of the left-right scale can properly be considered to be extreme right parties. In the first place, we can remove from our analysis the rightmost parties of Sweden, Ireland and Finland. While the Moderata Samlingspartei, Fianna Fáil and the Kansallinen Kokoomus may be seen as the most right-wing parties of their respective countries they do not exhibit any antisystem attitudes (nor, *a fortiori,* fascist tendencies).

In the case of FF, given the low distance from its closest competitors (Fine Gael and the Progressive Democrats) and its position on the left-right spectrum – not exceeding point 7.0 on a 1–10 left-right scale (see Gallangher, 1985) – the exclusion of this party is uncontentious. In the two other cases, the Finnish KK is surely located close to the right-wing pole (Sani and Sartori, 1983) but it is a conservative, pro-establishment party; and the same goes for the Swedish Moderata party. Therefore, while conservative, both cannot be seen as having antisystem attitudes.

While the three parties considered above are unequivocally outside the extreme right family, the cases of AP, CDS, FPO, FRPn and FRP are debatable and need to be treated carefully.

The Spanish Alianza Popular has already been partially discussed; it is located at the extreme right but, thanks to the presence of a declared neofascist party, Frente Nacional, (plus other minor groups as the Falange de la JONS), it is not an old right-wing party. However, the attitude expressed by party's declarations and programmes clearly points to it having a delegitimizing impact on the Spanish system. AP moved to the right in the early 1980s, which suggest that it is 'becoming increasingly representative of the rightist and authoritarian sectors of the Spanish politics' (Montero, 1988: 157). Moreover, AP seems unable to overcome its 'deficit of democratic legitimacy and to modernize its ideological proposals on the same track of neoconservatism'. AP

emphasizes an 'excessive conservatism (not devoid of a certain authoritarism) and a rigid defence of traditional values' (Montero, 1987: 9). Yet, after Fraga's dismissal from the party leadership in 1986 and the renewal of the coalition with a new name, Partido Popular (PP), most of the antisystem attitudes seem to have been replaced by a concern with 'goal opposition'. Thus, while the new PP is probably moving away from the ERP class, for a large part of the 1980s AP should be considered full member of this class.[20]

An inverse route has being followed by the FPÖ. The 1986 takeover of the party leadership by the Harder faction has swept away the liberal group (the 'Attersee circle') which had conquered the party in the late 1970s. The short predominance of an authentically liberal leadership had been incapable of modyfing the nationalistic and antidemocratic heritage of the party. Even in the mid 1980s 'authoritatarian, anti-semitic and similar attitudes' (Luther, 1988: 232) had their largest concentration in the FPÖ. And while Richard Luther warns against a superficial labelling of FPÖ as antisystem he must recognize that after the change of leadership 'the FPÖ had opted . . . to revert to its traditional role of a party of protest rather than a party of government' (Luther, 1988: 247). The new leadership and the dubious past of Harder's inner circle (Gartner, 1990), the non-discouraged support from minor radical right groups, the anti-semitic, xenophobic and nationalistic issues highlighted, suggest the post-1986 FPÖ as a member of the extreme right class.

Beyond the marginal PDC – which does not overcome the 1 per cent threshold – and the new comer Forca Nacional, the Portuguese right lies in the CDS.[21] But is it conservative or 'extreme right'? The spatial location of CDS in 1986 would support the latter hypothesis; the mean location on a 1–10 left-right scale is 7.7 and 36 per cent of respondents put it at the extreme right (points 9 and 10) (Bacalhau, 1989: 253). Moreover, as Nogueira Pinto clearly states, the 'the rightmost party of the Portuguese system is the CDS' (Nogueira Pinto, 1989: 204). However, as far as ideology and attitudes towards the system are concerned, the party's inclusion in the ERP class is questionable. The CDS recruited some supporters and leaders of the old regime but the party does not manifest any particular attachment to this regime, nor any fierce opposition to the democratic decision-making process and institutions. Its presence in government for some years together with the PSD has inevitably helped the CDS to rid itself of antisystem attitudes. Finally, the CDS is member of the European People's Party. On the basis of this evidence, we are inclined to drop the CDS from the extreme right class.

The remaining two parties, the Norwegian Progress Party (FRPn) and its Danish counterpart, FRP, present quite different stories. Both erupted in the political scene in the early 1970s mainly as single-issue anti-tax parties. Both then went beyond their 'single' issue, which anyway comprehended many

topics related to the welfare system and government spending, by dealing with immigration, as well as law and order issues.

While there is full agreement on the extraneousness of both Progress Parties to the fascist tradition (minuscule chapels keep this ideology alive in Denmark and Norway: see O'Maolàin, 1987) more debatable is their antisystem attitude. On one side Lars Bille (1989: 49–50) argues that, taking Sartori's broad definition of antisystem, the FRP 'tried to undermine the legitimacy of the regime of the old parties in the sense that by regime is understood the ideology, norms, rules and habits of the welfare *state* system' (Bille, 1989: 49). If we add to this narrow concern with the welfare state regime a set of attitudes that expresses distrust with parties *as such*, party system, and parliamentarism, (Andersen, 1991, Andersen and Bjørklund, 1990) then we have a delegitimizing impact on the democratic system. To the extent that the FRP is moving along these lines, it should be included in the ERP class. However after the 1984 change of leadership (when the founding father of the party, Mogens Glistrup, went to jail) the FRP has softened its policy and bargained its support for the bourgeois coalition.

The case of the Norwegian FRPn is similar. Kurt Heidar considers the Progress Party 'an alloy of extreme economic liberalism and right-wing populism' and he defines it as 'an anti-consensus party (but not an antisystem)' (Heidar, 1989: 147). On the other side, William Lafferty underlines FRPn's radical opposition to the social democratic state, negative attitudes toward immigrants, and violent attacks on 'politicians' and 'bureaucrats'. Consequently he includes the FRPn in the extreme right category (Lafferty, 1989: 95–96), and we agree with this classification. More recently, Valen (1990: 281–282) has shown that the centrist electorate rejects every hypothetical coalition with the FRPn[22] (see also Madeley, 1990).

Therefore, while some perplexities still remain, as highlighted by Andersen and Bjørklund's (1990) thorough analysis of both Progress Parties, we include them in the 'new right-wing' type of the extreme right party family.

To summarize this discussion of doubtful cases three parties have proved, by any standard, extraneous to the extreme right class – these are FF, MS and KK. The same applies (with somewhat more uncertainty) to the CDS. The other parties that we have considered – AP, FPO, FRP and FRPn – do appear to be sufficiently qualified for inclusion in the 'new right-wing' type.

Prototypes new right parties:
FN, REP, FNb, VlB, PFN, CD, AN/Vigilantes

The French Front National, the German Republikaner, the Belgian Front

National, Vlaams Blok and Parti de Forces Nouvelles, the Dutch Centrumdemocraten and the Swiss Action National plus its Geneva sister party Vigilantes, are the most representative parties of the new right-wing type. They refuse any relationship with traditional conservative parties, they define themself outside the party system, they are constantly in fight against all the other parties, they accuse the 'ruling class' of misconsideration of the 'real' problems of the people, they blame the incapacity of the system to deal with the most salient issues, law and order and immigration. Finally, they deny any reference to fascism.

Sources of ERP success in the 1980s: hypotheses on 'the silent counter-revolution'

New and old ERPs: a diverging electoral performance

In the previous section we highlighted a cleavage between old right-wing parties and new right-wing parties, defined by the persistence of a fascist imprint in party ideology, value system or aesthetics. In the first group we found parties that declared themselves to be the heirs of the collapsed fascist regimes, including the leader of postwar neo-fascism, the MSI, and the less successful NPD, DVU, EPEN, Frente Nacional, NDP/BRB/EHI, BNP, NF, CP86, PDC.

If we look at the recent electoral outcomes (Table 1) we see that the old right-wing parties have tended to decline or even to disappear. (The few exceptions are due to the most recently-born party (CP86), the DVU-Liste D in the Bremen Land election of 1987 and the NPD in the Frankfurt local election of 1989).

On the other side, the parties of the new right-wing type have generally increased (Table 2).

What are the conditions for the development of the new right-wing type all over Europe? Are there any changes in the Western societies that can account for the rise of new right-wing parties? Is there any common feature that links these parties and might explain their success.

As the upsurge of ERPs is a recent phenomenon and comparative research is at a very early stage (Falter and Schumann's, 1988 essay represents a pioniering attempt but utilizes data up to 1985) it is difficult to give a final answer to these questions. However, there is a series of possible explanations both on the societal side and on the side of the party system. Without pretending to give full account of all aspects of this, and while relying on existing empirical evidence, we will focus on the following elements:

a) the rise of a new 'neo-conservative' cultural mood;

Table 1. Electoral results of ERP's in the 1980s; percentages of vote

Country	Party	81	82	83	84	84E	85	86	87	88	89	89E
Austria[1]	FPÖ	–	–	5.0	–	–	–	9.7	–	–	–	–
Belgium[2]	VlB	1.1	–	–	–	1.3	1.4	–	1.9	–	–	4.1
Denmark	FRP	8.9	–	–	3.6	3.5	–	–	4.8	9.0	–	5.3
France[3]	FNs	0.2	–	–	–	11.2	–	9.8	–	9.6	(14.4)[4]	11.7
Germany[5]	NPD	–	–	0.6	–	0.8	–	–	0.6	–	–	1.6
	REP	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	7.1
Greece	EPEN	–	–	–	–	2.3	0.6	–	–	–	0.3	1.2
	KP	1.7	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Italy	MSI	–	–	6.8	–	6.5	–	–	5.9	–	–	5.5
The Netherlands[6]	CP + CP86	0.1	0.8	–	–	2.5	–	0.4	–	–	–	–
	CD	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.1	–	–	0.9	0.8
Norway	FRPn	4.5	–	–	–	–	3.7	–	–	–	13.0[7]	–
Portugal	PDC	–	–	0.6	–	–	0.7	–	0.5E	–	–	0.7
Spain	AP	–	26.2	–	–	–	–	26.0	24.7E	–	25.8	21.4
	FNs	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.6E	–	–	0.4
	Falange	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.1E	–	0.1	0.2
Switzerland[8]	AN/ Vigilantes	–	–	3.5	–	–	–	–	2.9	–	–	–

[1] The other minor parties have been excluded from the table. For more details on these parties, see note 10 in the text.

[2] The relevance of the Flemish Vlaams Blok and the Walloon PFN and FNb is provided by their recent electoral scores in local elections. In 1989 Bruxelles regional election they got, respectively, 2.1%, 1.0% and 3.3%. But the strength of the Vlaams Blok is better ascertained by looking at its scores in some large Flemish cities. For example, at the 1988 local election in Anvers, the second largest city in Belgium, VIB reached 17.8% of the votes.

[3] Computed on the 'expressed votes' (*suffrages exprimées*) at the first ballot.

[4] 14.4% refers to Le Pen score at the 1988 Presidential election, first ballot.

[5] The Republikaner score at the European Election comes after a series of successes in Lander elections and, above all, in Berlin, 7.5% (1989). See Westle and Niedermayer (1990).

[6] In the 1990 local election CD and CP86 have dramatically increased their votes; in the four main Dutch cities their scores range from 1.2% to 3.3% (CP86) and from 3.8% to 4.4% (CD). See Voerman and Lucardie (1990).

[7] This result has been anticipated by the unforeseen success in the 1987 local election: 12.3%.

[8] There is a striking difference between AN and Vigilantes scores at federal and local level; at local level their electoral trend is upward. For example, in recent communal elections AN got 10.9% (+ 5.1%) in Bern, 9.9% (+ 6.0) in Zurich, 14.2% (+ 14.2%) in Lausanne and the Vigilentes reaches 19.0% (+ 11.3) in Geneva cantonal election. See Husbands, 1988, 1990.

b) a tendency toward radicalization and polarization;
c) the presence of an underground but mounting legitimacy crisis of the political and (above all) party system;
d) security and immigration issues.

The impact of neo-conservatism

As Daniel Bell underlined, some intellectuals in the 1970s, mostly disillusioned by leftist ideology, oriented themselves toward the right creating a neoconservative movement for the first time since World War II (Bell, 1980: 149–150). Neoconservatism emerged as a reaction against the postwar consensus on Keynesian political economy and the 'collectivist age', and the rapid growth and cost of the Welfare system. This movement advocates, in contrast to the 'overloading' burden of the state provision, the revival of the liberal *laisser faire* principles of the free market, individual entrepreneurs, privatization of the public sector, and cuts in the welfare system. This new attitude

Table 2. Size, type and electoral trend of ERP's in the 1980

Type	Size	Electoral trend	
		Stable/decreasing	Increasing
Old	small (−5%)	EPEN PDC FNs + Falange NDP NDP/BRB/EHI NF	CP86
	large (+5%)	MSI	
New	small (−5%)		CD FNb PFN
	large (+5%)		AP AN/Vigilantes FN Rep. FRP FRPn FPO VIB

to socio-economic policy came together with major value changes, as a result of which authority, patrotism, the role of the family and traditional moral values have been partly re-emphasized and partly redefined in response to postmaterialist issues. As a consequence, the new cultural movement of the 1980s is nurtured by different and even contradictory contributions: " 'liberals' concern with liberty, freedom and progress does not correspond with conservatives' emphasis upon the organic unity of society and the state, hierarchy and the negative consequences of economic activity' (King, 1987: 24–25). However, in our opinion, the dominant emphasis is not on freedom and individualism against the danger of a bureaucratic and collectivistic society but rather on traditional and neo-conservative values.

The distinction between traditional and neo-conservative values is necessary because contemporary conservatism does not just recall the traditional moral values of the past but also offers an 'alternative and parallel view of reality' in juxtaposition to the leftist-progressive one (Girvin, 1988: 10). The main future of neo-conservatism, in fact, lies in presenting itself to the mass public as a non-materialistic answer to the agenda of the New Politics: 'the New Left issues ... have helped to crowd the economic issues off the agenda and have provoked the emergence of the ... New Right set of moral and religious issues. ... This new set of issues includes right to life, antiwomlib, creationism, antipornography, support for traditional and moral values, strong defence, patriotism, law and order enforcement, antiminority rights, xenophobia'. (Flanagan, 1987: 1308, 1312).

This cultural movement has become highly influential all over Western societies in the 1980s and it has contributed in the affirmation of conservative-confessional-liberal parties. Great Britain, West Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, Portugal (and France for two years, 1986–88) turned to the right and were governed by conservative parties or coalitions, And, even where the socialists gained or kept control of the government as in Spain and France, they were obliged to take into account some of the liberal creeds.

The tendency towards polarization

The effects of this new cultural mood are important. Neo-conservatism has provoked, directly and indirectly, a higher polarization both in terms of ideological distance and in terms of ideological intensity (Sartori, 1976: 126). Such reasoning could hold only if – at the risk of being accused of sociological bias (Sartori, 1969) – we identify the *primum mobile* of the process of polarization at the cultural-ideological level. Therefore, if we assume that the 'conservative' parties (we adopt the term conservative for sake of parsimony, but they might be confessional, or agrarian, or liberal) have absorbed the

neo-conservative tendency and thus have moved to the right, we should see an increase in the ideological intensity and distance in the political system. As conservative parties moved to the right and the leftist parties kept their positions, polarization should have increased.

If this is true we face another problem. Since party systems have become more polarized thanks to a shift to the right of conservative parties, how can we account for the emergence of new right-wing parties? According to spatial theory, a party that moves toward the right pole of the left-right continuum should occupy this territory and thus inhibit the rise of more extreme right-wing parties. Yet, the mechanics of polarization implies the development of a politics of outbidding, according to which either a 'conservative' party or a radical right-wing party move more and more to the right. The first possibility is quite risky for a conservative party. As it moves more and more to the right, leaving its traditional 'hunting territory', a potentially successfull competitor might emerge on its left. The conservative party risks losing its ties to its traditional electorate by moving too much to the right. Therefore, the second outcome seems more plausible: a new right-extremist party may voice the most radical promises without any strategic hindrance. Apparently, this latter outcome did materialize, the shift to the right of the conservative parties did not inhibit the emergence of more extreme parties – as spatial theory postulates – rather, it paved the way for ERPs.

Does this theoretical scheme fit the reality of 1980s party systems? In the absence of comprehensive cross-national time-series data on the party locations on the left-right continuum (for a useful summary of existing data see Laver and Schofield, 1990), we should refer to country specific analyses. To the best of our knowledge, the literature does indicate a general move to the

Table 3. ERP's presence and party system ideological status

	Non polarized	Polarizing	Polarized
No ERP's	Ireland Sweden		Finland
New ERP's	Austria Spain (AP) Switzerland	Belgium Denmark France Germany (Rep.) Netherlands Norway	
Old ERP's	Great Britain Portugal Spain (FNs)	Germany (NPD) Greece	Italy

right by conservative parties followed, in some cases, by a simultaneous shift to the left by socialist parties – as in Great Britain, the Netherlands and West Germany in the early-mid 1980s (Girvin, 1988a). It also documents the rise of Green parties and ERPs at the two extremes of the left-right scale.

Table 3 presents a tentative classification of party systems into those that are non-polarized, 'polarizing' and polarized. Needless to say, given the scope of this essay, we do not pretend to offer a full-scale alternative typology of party systems, rather, we focus on Sartori's ideological 'control variable' (Sartori, 1976: 132), leaving aside his 'format variable'. Keeping in mind this single-variable approach, we can say that most countries have experienced, or are experiencing, a process of radicalization which has led to an increasing ideological distance in the party system and which has favoured the development of extreme parties. As a consequence, many segmented societies are driven toward 'polarization', looking only at party ideologies and not taking into account the *relevance* of the new parties. This seems to be the case in France, Belgium, Norway, Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark and Greece.[23] Moreover, Table 3 suggests a relationship between the polarizing drive of a party system and emergence of ERPs. Indeed, the new right-wing parties are overwhelmingly concentrated in the polarizing systems. This suggests that a process of radicalization at the cultural-ideological level, favouring the enlargement of the political space and hence increasing ideological distances, has been a propitious condition for the development of ERPs.

System legitimacy

The third factor that may be related to the rise of new right-wing parties concerns the specific issues or value systems promoted. As we have already stated, neoconservatism had introduced or revitalized themes which have been only partially interpreted by the 'conservative' parties. Thanks to the radicalization we have just been discussing, more extreme positions have gained 'legitimacy' but 'conservative' parties have not identified themselves with these positions. Inevitably, the ERPs have claimed the right to represent such positions more adequately. Specifically, ERPs ask for the total dismantling of the welfare system, an aggressive nationalism, a form of social darwinism, the restoring of moral traditionalism, an authoritarian state and xenophobic policies towards foreigners.

But the distinctiveness of ERPs is based not just on the 'intensity' of their neoconservative approach. They are distinct because they endanger the legitimacy of the system. The adoption of a more radical version of neoconservative values by ERPs is intended to undermine the foundation of the system by delegitimizing the parties and the party system, the parliamentary procedure,

the principle of equality, and sometimes even the rule of law. Why has there been a move toward such antisystem positions?

Our tentative answer points to the emergence of what we might think of as a 'silent counter-revolution'. As neoconservatism has flourished at the cultural-intellectual level, there has also been a change in attitudes and behaviours in the mass public. This change has been perceived only very partially because few studies have been designed to looked at it (Flanagan, 1987, Minkenberg and Inglehart, 1989, Minkenberg, 1990). In particular, Inglehart's thesis about the continuous growth of postmaterialism is a good example of this misperception.

It is well known that Inglehart's paradigm of materialism/postmaterialism is based on four crucial issues and that the 'materialist' issues concern inflation and order. While there is no doubt about the 'materialist' substance of those issues, the point is that in the 1980s *they were no longer salient.* In the wake of the 1970s – when the research on the silent revolution took off after the student turmoils – inflation and order in the streets were salient issues for tapping materialist concerns. But in the 1980s, when inflation declined sharply and clashes with the police were replaced either by consumerism or by peaceful demonstrations on ecologist/antimilitarist themes, the old materialist issues had lost much of their salience. Therefore we have had a bias towards the 'progressive' side of the change in Western societies and an underestimation of the 'conservative' side.

In addition to this probable misperception of value change in Inglehart's scheme, there are scattered pieces of evidence of a general feeling which could account for the growth of antisystem attitudes, the creeping legitimacy crisis in Western societies. This 'crisis of confidence' can be analysed at two different levels, the behaviourial and the attitudinal.

At the level of observable individual behaviour, two indicators are pertinent: the decline in electoral turnout and the decline in party and trade-union membership. Even if such general trends have been reversed in some cases (Norway for example) there is wide consensus on this point. One may argue that this evolution might be counterbalanced by the growth of non-partisan politics (Dalton, 1988, Smith, 1987) or by new parties not organized along the mass membership model (Heidar, 1989, Kitschelt, 1989). However, these two indicators show the existance of a certain malaise *vis-a-vis* the traditional parties. And, while there seems to be a higher interest in politics in general, thanks to new non-party movements (Dalton, 1988: 23), we agree that 'parties are increasingly under pressure and may have to give away some of their original ground to other intermediary organizations' (Kaase, 1990a: 64; see also Lawson and Merkl, 1988a: 5).

Turning to attitudinal data, the decline in party identification (Harding et al., 1988, Mair, 1989b) reinforces the argument. As far as the system support is

concerned, the prevailing interpretation, points to a widening gap between the citizen and the system (Kaase, 1988: 131). As Russell Dalton summarizes, 'feelings of mistrust have gradually broadened to include evaluations of the political regime and other institutions in society. The lack of confidence in politics and political institutions is widespread' (Dalton, 1988: 239). Following the same track, Ulrich Wiedmaier, on the basis of the Globus Model, has hypothesized that 'regime legitimacy will decline' (Wiedmaier, 1990: 152; see also Wiedmaier, 1988: 239). Lipset and Schneider (1983: 382) take a step further, arguing the prevalence of a 'general anti-elitist, anti-power ideology'. In sum, even in absence of definitive empirical evidence, it could be sustained that the Western public has experienced a period of malaise, probably repressed and cooled by the time of the economic recovery after 1982.

But what is the relationship between the weakening legitimacy of Western systems and the rise of ERPs? Dissatisfaction towards parties, the way in which democracy works and the output of the system in relation to physical security tend inevitably to feed opposition and/or antisystem parties. The distrust facing parties and institutions and the loss of confidence in the traditional channels of participation (Harding et al., 1988: 77–81, Kaase, 1990) have thus found their expression not only in new left politics but also in the extreme right. Only ERPs offer the electorate a right wing radical alternative to the establishment's political discourse. Only ERPs want to 'throw the rascals out' and modify the rules, kicking out politicians and hiring honest technicians. Only ERPs offer simple remedies to unemployment and tax burden. Only ERPs play upon an harmonious and idyllic past where conflicts and anxiety about the future did not exist. Only ERPs, *last but not least,* invoke law and order and a xenophobic policy against Third world immigrants.

Immigration, law and order

As already underlined, attitudes to immigration and security are indicators of a new value dimension. The issue of immigration, in particular, has been transformed into a salient political theme all over Europe only in the 1980s – only Switzerland and Great Britain had faced the problem in an earlier period (European Parliament, 1985, European Commission, 1989, Husbands, 1988, Layton-Henry, 1988). The inability of the established parties to provide an answer to this problem in due time, has favoured the development of extreme right parties which advocate xenophobic and racist positions.

The case of the French Front National is, in a way, exemplary. Numerous studies have demonstrated that the FN supporters and voters place the highest priority on the immigration issue, closely followed by that of security (Charlot, 1986, Ignazi, 1989c, Lagrange and Perrineau, 1989, Mayer and Perrineau,

1990, Taguieff, 1985, 1988, 1989). The ability of Le Pen's party to 'politicize' a hidden issue is generally recognized as the keystone of its success. In a way or another, the same has happened in countries such as Belgium (Delwit, 1990), Norway (Lafferty, 1989, Madeley, 1990), Denmark (Andersen and Bjørklund, 1990), the Netherlands (Voerman and Lucardie, 1990), West Germany (Betz, 1990b, Westle and Niedermayer, 1990), Great Britain (Husbands, 1983), Switzerland (Church, 1989: 44, Husbands, 1988: 714–716).

In the world views of many extreme right supporters, immigration is closely linked to security. Where the immigrants are concentrated it is assumed that delinquency increases.

Law and order issues have been also agitated by moderate-conservative parties from time to time, independently of immigration. But no conservative party has ever put as much emphasis on these issues, nor taken as extreme positions, as the ERPs have done.

Therefore, the inability of the established parties to perceive, and to deal with relevant issues such as immigration and security, and the failure of conservative parties to suggesting tough policies, are related to the rise of ERPs.

In conclusion, the new cultural movement of neoconservatism has engendered a process of radicalization and antisystem polarization not controlled by the 'conservative' parties, from which the more extreme right-wing parties have benefited. In addition, mass public attitudes and behaviour characterized by a growing crisis of confidence in institutions, parties and party systems, the working of democracy, and by non-response to salient issues such as immigration and security, have favoured the development of ERPs.

Conclusion

In this paper we have tried to identify and define more clearly the category of the extreme right party. In so doing we have stated three criteria: spatial, historic-ideological and attitudinal-systemic. The first has been employed as a preliminary screening, in order to identify parties on the extreme right of the left-right continuum. The second criterion applies to the shared ideology inside the ERP family. Having adopted the reference to fascism as the distinctive element, we noted that only a minority of parties located on the extreme right retain a fascist heritage. The third criterion, the presence of antisystem attitudes, enables us to identify those non-fascist parties that belong to the ERP class and not to the conservative one. All of the parties located at far right which show a fascist heritage and/or which manifest antisystem attitude are included in the class of the extreme right. This class is composed by two types, according to the existence of fascist imprint: the old right wing

parties (MSI, EPEN, NPD, NF, BNP, FNs, PDC, NPD/BRB/EHI, CP86) and the new right-wing parties (FN, AN/Vigilantes, FPO, FNb, PFN, Vlb, Rep, FRPn, FRP, AP, CD). While some difficulties emerge about the inclusion of a party in one type or the other (in particular CP86 and AP) we are quite confident in the inclusion of FRPn, FRP, FPO and AP in the extreme right class. To the best of our knowledge, their political discourse tends to undermine the legitimacy of the democratic system by discrediting the parliamentary decision-making process, party government and the representative procedure; finally, through their strong xenophobic stances, they undermine one of the keystones of democracy, equality of men.

The second aim of this paper has concerned the attempt to highlight the origins of the recent rise of many ERPs. First, we noted the different fortunes of old and new ERPs. While old ERPs are stable or declining (with the exception of the recently born CP86 and the German DVU and NPD), the new ERPs which have emerged in the 1980s have attained considerable success, even more than 10 per cent of the votes (FN, FRPn, AP). The explanation of this sudden success lies in two basic changes – one at the cultural level, and the other at the societal level.

At the cultural level, the neoconservative mood has legitimized a series of 'right-wing' themes which were previously almost banned from political debate, pushing the 'conservative' parties to the right. This in turn has enlarged the political space and provoked an increased polarization; in this process of outbidding, the more extreme right parties have succeeded.

At the societal level, a different but simultaneous movement was taking place during the 1980s. The decline of the party as such has been coupled with a growing dissatisfaction *vis-a-vis* the political system and a corresponding decline in confidence in its efficacy. A mounting sense of doom, in contrast to postmaterialist optimism, has been transformed into new demands, mainly unforeseen by the established conservative parties. These demands include law and order enforcement and, above all, immigration control, which seems to be the leading issue for all new right-wing parties. This value change, stimulated by the reaction to postmaterialism and by new combination of authoritarian issues, might be identified as a silent counter-revolution.

Acknowledgements

A very preliminary version of parts of this paper was been presented at the ECPR workshop on 'The Extreme Right in Europe', Bochum, April 2–7, 1990. I wish to thank Stefano Bartolini, Lorenzo Ornaghi, Angelo Panebianco, Colette Ysmal and all of the participants of this workshop for their insightful comments.

Notes

1. Peter Mair (1991: 61–63) has shown that the 'small' parties born after 1950 have an upward tendency in electoral terms. This finding contrasts with the pessimistic outlook above underlined (and shared by Pedersen (1982, 1991)). The point is that Mair includes in his analysis parties with up to 15% after vote which contested at least three elections: our 'intuitive' idea of small parties refers to much smaller ones.
2. This is the main criticism by Flanagan (1987). However, in a recent contribution coauthored with Minkenberg, Inglehart recognizes the influence of the New Politics for the emergence of non-materialist right-wing attitudes (Minkenberg and Inglehart, 1989).
3. The electoral attractivness across social classes of fascist and nazi parties has been highlighted by Gentile (1989: 544–571) and Petersen (1975) for the PNF and by Childers (1983: spec. 253–257), Kater (1983: spec. 236–238), Muhlberger (1987: spec. 96, 124–125) for the NSDAP. *Contra* see Hamilton (1982).
4. It should be underlined that even Stein Rokkan did not include fascist parties in his analysis. In a sense, this might be related to the *terminus ad quem* of the process of democratization: the mass enfranchisement in the early 1920s on the eve of the rise of the two new political phenomena of the twentieth century, fascism and communism. But, in reality, communism is led back to the cleavage structure, and the Bolshevik Revolution is considered a sort of fourth ' critical juncture' (Rokkan, 1970: 131). On the other hand, fascism is totally ignored; it is not included in the set of alternatives offered to the citizens. Only in his last contributions Rokkan started to reflect on the emergence of fascist parties and regimes, including them in his geopolitical-geoeconomic macro-model (Hagvetet and Rokkan, 1980). However, his study on fascism was mainly focused on regimes and the process of democratization (or breakdown of democracy) rather than on the origin of the fascist *parties*.
5. Lane and Ersson (1987: 97) divide the parties in *structural and non-structural* ones; while the former group includes the parties derived or by attached to a major societal cleavage the latter does not display any distinctive origin. Following such a scheme, they are not at ease dealing with the so called 'non-structural' parties.
6. Laver and Schofield (1990: 245) have recently reported four methods of constructing empirical scales: (1) expert judgements, (2) analysis of legislative behaviour, (2) analysis of mass survey and (4) analysis of content of policy documents. However, these four methods could be reduced to just two categories according to whether the *researcher judgement* is present (first, third and fourth method) or not (second method): precisely as we argue. At any rate, Laver and Schofield's Appendix B provides a useful survey of the various attempts at locating political parties on empirical policy scales.
7. There is one exception to this rule and it regards the two British parties, National Front and British National Party. The peak of their political fortunes, in particular of the National Front, goes back to the 1970s, but even then they were not able to present candidates all over the country. However, the very poor vote shares they got are also related to the peculiarity of the English electoral system. At any rate, while electorally irrelevant (the National Front has presented just one candidate at the 1989 European Election receiving 0.8% of the votes), both parties have been regarded as a political presence in the British landscape. The numerous studies carried on them highlights this: Husbands, 1983, 1988, Lewis, 1987: 231–256, Taylor, 1982, Thurlow, 1987: 275–297, Walker, 1977.
8. Few words should be spent for justifying the exclusion of the Greek conservative party, Nea Democratia (New Democracy). The ND spatial location is very skewed to the right pole: according to Papadopulos (1988: 63) 'ND appears paradoxically as a far-right party: 34.8 per cent of its electorate is located at level 10' (on the 1–10 left-right continuum). But despite the consequent remarkable ideological distance between ND and Pasok electorates, the same

author denies the 'presence of any presumably 'antisystem' party' (Id. 68). In fact ND, while strongly conservative, has not shown any clear antidemocratic stance (see also Featherstone, 1989, 1990; Seferiades, 1986; Verney, 1990). However, the virtual disappearing of the extreme right parties after the four elections of 1989–90 may have an impact on ND attitudes in the short run.

9. The two francophone extreme right parties, Parti des Forces Nouvelles and Front National, presented candidates in few *arrondissements* in the 1985 and 1987 legislative elections, and no list in the 1989 European election. However their presence and score in the 1988 municipal and 1989 regional elections (see note 2 to Table 1) qualify them for inclusion in our analysis. Another Belgian party has been frequently labelled as an extreme right-wing party: the UDRT (Union Démocratique pour le Respect du Travail – Democratic Union for the Respect of Labour); however, its brief life – founded in 1978 and disappeared in 1985 – and its ideology suggest exclusion from our analysis (Delwit, 1990). Finally, some minor extreme right groups contested legislative elections in the 1980s but without any follow-up: the UN (Union Nationale des Francophones – National Union of French speaking): 0.3% in 1981; the UND (Union Nationale et Démocratique – National and Democratic Union): 0.6% in 1985; the PLC (Parti de la Liberté du Citoyen – Citizens' Freedom Party): 0.5% in 1985 and 0.6% in 1987 (Delwit, 1990).
10. Frente Nacional is the heir of the better known Fuerza Nueva. It was founded in 1987 by the historic leader of Spanish neofascism, Blas Pinar, former leader of Fuerza Nueva. Another – even smaller – representative of the Spanish extreme right is the Falange Espanola de las JONS (Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalistas) – Spanish Phalanx of the Boards of the National-Syndicalist Offensive. This movement and Fuerza Nueva contested together the 1979 parliamentary elections in the Uniòn Nacional alliance.
11. We have grouped together three minor movements, different but linked in many ways. The NDP (Nationaldemokratische Partei – National Democratic Party) was founded in 1967 by Norbert Burger, a prominent representative of the Austrian extreme right. The most relevant NDP success is due to Burger candidacy for Presidency in 1980 when he got 3.2% of the votes. When the NDP was banned (1988) Burger created the BRB (Burger Rechts Bewegung – Movements for Citizens' Rights). The third group, EHI (Einz Herz fur Inlander – A Heart for the Indigeneous), is a small neo-nazi party locally based in Lower Austria where it got 1.2% in the 1988 local elections. The systemic relevance of these movements is modest (Gartner, 1990).
12. A new party, Partido Forca National, was founded in 1989 by the merging of two youth organizations: Forca National and Nova Monarquia (National Force and New Monarchy) (Costa Pinto, 1990).
13. One could argue that the counter-revolutionary thought pertains to the domain of extreme right ideology; but, while this observation is true, the coming of fascism has, in a way, superimposed itself on that tradition, reducing to a handful the followers of de Bonald and de Maistre. Moreover, another frequently used term, 'populism', is still in search of a clear definition outside the specific context where it is employed – XIX-XX century United States and Russia, XX century Latin America (see Curtis, 1985).
14. The Italian leading scholar on fascism, Renzo de Felice, has suggested reducing the variety of fascist cultural and ideological references by distinguishing between fascism-regime (corporatist, statecraftic, clerical) and fascism-movement (revolutionary, anticapitalist, antibourgeois) (de Felice, 1975).
15. As Zeev Sterhell has acutely synthetized '(fascist) political culture is communitarian, anti-individualist and anti-rationalist, and it is founded, first, on the refusal of the Enlightment and of the French Revolution heritage, and then, on the elaboration of a total overthrowing' (Sternhell, 1989: 15).

16. The distinction between state and nation refers to the two streams highlighted by the Felice (see note 13); the emphasis on the *state* points to the power of a hierarchical organisation while the pre-eminence of the *nation* points to a 'spiritual fusion' in a collective body, the nation.
17. At present the National Front is split in two factions: the Pierce-Webster faction is traditional neo-fascist (antisemitic, authoritarian), while the Griffin-Holland faction is moving towards an Evolian (Ferraresi, 1988) and ecological path (Husbands, 1988). The Griffin-Holland faction might be difficult to classify in our scheme.
18. The Dutch CP86 seemed having gone through a remarkable radicalization, reviving fascist references and defining itself as 'the Dutch vanguard of the New Order in Europe' at the time of its decline. Its recovery and unexpected success in very recent years has apparentely encouraged the party to abandon its fascist inspiration (Voerman and Lucardie, 1990).
19. In order to avoid a misunderdesting it should be stressed that, while the English term 'New Right' refers *grosso modo* to the neoconservatism, the French term 'Nouvelle Droite' refers to a totally diffirent cultural-ideological stream. The 'Nouvelle Droite' has arosen in France, in the mid-1970s, around the philosopher Alain de Benoist. It is exclusively a cultural movement, with branches almost everywhere in Europe, which looks for a new theoretical foundation for the right (see Taguieff, 1985).
20. AP is the most dubious case in our classification. We have to decide the AP fits into ERP class or not and, if so, into which type. Our final decision is in favour of inclusion, but we recognize that AP is a limit case.
21. A further right-wing party closely linked to the CDS is the PPM (Partido Popular Monarquico – Monarchist Popular Party); on the basis of the scattered information available on this party, it should not be considered an extreme right-wing party (Gallagher, 1989).
22. Madeley states in fact that 'the great majority of parliamentarians (treats) the PP ... as an antisystem or pariah party' (Madeley, 1990: 292).
23. The polarizing cases have been identified on the basis of the most recent country studies. Moreover, it should be underlined that, while the consensus on the polarizing tendency in France, Norway, Greece and Denmark seems quite general, Belgium and the Netherlands collect different evaluations; and Germany is clearly a puzzling case due to the dramatic changes undergone since November 1989. A more rigorous analysis has been carried out, up to the mid 1980s, by Powell who has adopted an 'index of polarization' created by 'the standard deviation of the left-right scores of the electorate grouped by means scores of the supporters of each party' in order to classify some Western countries. On the basis of his index, in the mid 1980s, Austria and Great Britain appear as 'depolarizing', Belgium, Switzerland and Germany as 'reflective' and Italy, France, Denmark and Finland as 'polarizing' (Powell, 1987: 179).

References

Adorno, T.W. et al. (1950). *The Authoritarian Personality*. New York: Harper and Row.

Andersen, J.G. (forth.). 'Denmark. The Progress Party: Populist Neoliberalism and Welfare State Chauvinism', in Harmsworth, P. (ed.), *The Extreme Right in Postwar Europe and USA*. Lonodn: Francis Pinter.

Andersen, J.G. and Bjørklund, T. (1990). 'Structural Changes and New Cleavages: the Progress Parties in Denmark and Norway', *Acta Sociologica* forthcoming.

Bacalhau, M. (1989). 'Mobilidade e Transferéncia de voto através dos sondagens', pp. 237–256 in: Coelho, M.B. (ed.), *Portugal. O Sistema Politico o Costituional 1974–1987*. Lisboa: Istituto de Ciencas Socias de Universidade de Lisboa.

Bartolini, S. and Mair, P. (1990). *Identity, Competition and Electoral Availability*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bell, D. (1973). *The Coming of Post-Industrial Societies*. New York: Basic Books.

Bell, D. (1980). *The Winding Passage*. Cambridge MA: ABT Books.

Betz, H-G. (1990a). 'Political Conflict in the Postmodern Age: Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Europe', *Current Politics and Economics of Europe* 1: 11–27.

Betz, H-G. (1990b), 'Politics of Resentment. Right-Wing Radicalism in West Germany', *Comparative Politics*. 23: 45–60.

Beyme, K. von (1985). *Political Parties in Western Democracies*. Aldershot: Gower.

Beyme, K. von (1988). 'Right-Wing Extremism in Post-War Europe', *West European Politics*, 11: 1–18.

Bille, L. (1989). 'Denmark: The Oscillating Party System', *West European Politics* 12: 42–58.

Caciagli, M. (1988). 'The Movimento Sociale Italiano-Destra Nazionale and Neo-Fascism in Italy, *West European Politics*, 11: 19–33.

Charlot, M. (1986), 'L' Emergence du Front National', *Revue Francaise de Science Politique*, 36: 30–45.

Childers, T. (1983). *The Nazi Voter. The Social Foundation of Fascism in Germany 1919–1933*. London: Chapel Hill.

Church, C.H. (1989). 'Behind the Consociational Screen: Politics in Contemporary Switzerland', *West European Politics*, 12: 33–54.

Clogg, R. (1987). *Parties and Election in Greece*. London: C. Hurst and Co.

Cofrancesco, D. (1986). 'Fascismo: Destra o Sinistra?', pp. 55–140 in: Bracher, K.D. and Valiani, L. (a cura di) *Fascismo e Nazionalsocialismo*. Bologna: Il Mulino.

Commission d'enquete sur la montée du fascism et du racisme en Europe (1985). *Rapport sur les Resultats des Travaux*. s.l.: Parlement Européeen.

Commission of the European Communities (1989). *Eurobarometer*, 32.

Costa Pinto, A. (1990). 'The Radical Right in the Contemporary Portugal: An Introduction', paper delivered at the ECPR Joint Session of Workshops, Bochum.

Crewe, I. and Denver, D.T. (eds.) (1985). *Electoral Change in Western Democracies*. New York: St. Martin's.

Curtis, M. (1985). 'Populismo: Destra o Sinistra?' *Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica*, 15: 455–466.

Daalder, H. and Mair, P. (eds.) (1983). *Western European Party Systems*. Beverly Hills: Sage.

Dalton, R.J. (1988). *Citizens Politics in Western Democracies*. Chatham: Chatham House Publishers.

Dalton, R.J., Flanagan, S. and Beck, L. (eds.) (1984). *Electoral Change in Adavanced Industrial Democracies*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

De Felice, R. (1969). *Le Interpretazioni del Fascismo*. Bari: Laterza.

De Felice, R. (1975). *Intervista sul Fascismo*. Bari: Laterza.

Del Boca, A. and Giovana, M. (1969). *Fascism Today: A World Survey*. New York: Pantheon.

Delwit, P. (1990). 'L'Emergence de l'Extreme Droite en Belgique', paper delivered at the ECPR Joint Session of Workshops, Bochum.

Duverger, M. (1951). *Les Partis Politiques*. Paris: Armand Colin.

Falter, J.W. and Schumann, S. (1988). 'Affinity towards Right-Wing Extremism in Western Europe', *West European Politics*, 11: 96–110.

Ferraresi, F. (1988). 'Julius Evola: Tradition, Reaction and the Radical Right', *European Journal of Sociology*, 28: 107–151.

Flanagan, S.C. (1987). 'Value Change in Industrial Society', *American Political Science Review*, 81: 1303–1319.

Flanagan, S.C. and Dalton, R.J. (1984). 'Parties under Stress: Realignment and Dealignment in Advanced Industrial Societies', *West European Politics*, 7: 7–23.

Fuchs, D. and Klingemann, H.D. (1989). 'The Left-Right Schema', pp. 203–234 in: Jennings, M.K. *et al. Continuities in Political Action.* Berlin-New York: de Gruyter.

Gaddi, G. (1974). *Neofascismo in Europa.* Milano: La Pietra.

Gallangher, M. (1985). *Political Parties in the Republic of Ireland.* Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Gallagher, T. (1989). 'Portugal', *Electoral Studies,* 8: 317–321.

Gartner, R. (1990). 'The Extreme Right in Austria and its Connections to the FPO', paper delivered at the ECPR Joint Session of Workshops, Bochum.

Gentile, E. (1974). *Le Origini dell'Ideologia Fascista.* Bari: Laterza.

Gentile, E. (1989). *Storia del Partito Fascista.* 1919–1922. *Movimento e Milizia.* Bari: Laterza.

Gibbins, J.R. (ed.) (1989). *Contemporary Political Culture.* London: Sage.

Girvin, B. (ed.) (1988a). *The Transformation of Contemporary Conservatism.* Beverly Hills: Sage.

Girvin, B. (1988b). 'Introduction: Varieties of Conservatism', pp. 1–12 in: Girvin, B. (ed.) (1988a). *The Transformation of Contemporary Conservatism.* London: Sage.

(Le) Groupe des Droites Européennes (s.d. but 1986). *Un Espoir pour l'Europe* (booklet).

Guerin, D. (1956; ed. or. 1936). *Fascismo e Grande Capitale.* Milano: Schwartz.

Gunther, R., Sani, G. and Shabad, G. (1986). *El Sistema de Partidos Politicos en Espana. Genesis y Evoluciòn.* Madrid: CIS.

Hagtvet, B. and Rokkan, S. (1980). 'The Conditions of Fascist Victory: Towards a Geoeconomic-Geopolitical Model for the Explanation of Violent Breakdowns of Competitive Mass Politics', pp. 131–151 in: Larsen, S.U., Hagtvet, B. and Myklebust, J.P. (eds.) *Who Were the Fascists?* Bergen: Universitetsforlaget.

Hamilton, R. (1983). *Who voted for Hitler?* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Harmel, R.H. and Robertson, J.D. (1985). 'Formation and Success of New Parties: A Cross-Analysis Survey', *International Political Science Review,* 6: 101–124.

Harding, S. Phillips, D. and Fogarty, M. (1988). *Contrasting Values in Western Europe.* London: Macmillan.

Heidar, K. (1989). 'Norway. Levels of Party Competition and System Change', *West European Politics,* 12: 143–156.

Henig, S. (ed.) (1969). *Political Parties in the European Community.* London: Allen and Unwin.

Huber, J.D. (1989). 'Values and Partisanship in Left-Right Orientations: Measuring Ideology', *European Journal of Political Research,* 17: 599–621.

Husbands, C.T. (1981). 'Contemporary Right-Wing Extremism in Western European Democracies: A Review Article', *European Journal of Political Research,* 9: 75–100.

Husbands, C.T. (1983). *Racial Exclusion and the City: The Urban Support of the National Front.* London: Allen and Unwin.

Husbands, C.T. (1988). 'The Dynamic of Racial Expulsion: Racist Policy in Western Europe', *European Journal of Political Research,* 16: 701–720.

Husbands, C.T. (1990). 'Aggregate-Data Analyses of Urban Racist Voting: Lessons and Experiences from France, The Netherlands, The Federal Republic of Germany and Switzerland', paper delivered at the ECPR Joint Session of Workshops, Bochum.

Inglehart, R. (1977). *The Silent Revolution.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Inglehart, R. (1984). 'The Changing Structure of Political Cleavages in Western Societies', pp. 25–69 in: Dalton, R.J., Flanagan, S. and Beck, L. (eds.) *Electoral Change in Advanced Economic Democracies,* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Inglehart, R. (1987). 'Value Change in Industrial Society', *American Political Science Review,* 81: 1289–1303.

Inglehart, R. (1988). 'The Renaissance of Political Culture', *American Political Science Review,* 82: 1203–1230.

Inglehart, R. (1989a). 'Political Value Orientations', pp. 67–102 in: Jennings, M.K. *et al. Continuities in Political Action.* Berlin-New York: de Gruyter.

Inglehart, R. (1989b). 'Observations on Cultural Change and Postmodernism', pp. 251–256 in: Gibbins, J.R. (ed.) *Contemporary Political Culture.* London: Sage.

Ignazi, P. (1989a). 'La Cultura Politica del Movimento Sociale Italiano', *Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica,* 19: 431–466.

Ignazi, P. (1989b). *Il Polo Escluso. Profil del Movimento Sociale Italiano.* Bologna: Il Mulino.

Ignazi, P. (1989c). 'Un Nouvel Acteur Politique', pp. 63–81 in: Mayer, N and Perrineau, P. (dir.) *Le Front National à Decouvert.* Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques.

Ignazi, P. (1990). 'MSI Values: European Trend or National Specificity?', paper delivered at the ECPR Joint Session of Workshops, Bochum.

Kaase, M. (1988), 'Political Alienation and Protest', pp. 114–142 in: Dogan, M. (ed.) *Comparing Pluralist Democracies. Strains on Legitimacy.* Boulder, Co.: Westview Press.

Kaase, M. (1990a). 'Mass Participation', pp. 23–64 in: Jennings, M.K. *et al., Continuities in Political Action.* Berlin: de Gruyter.

Kaase, M. (1990b). 'Political Violence and the Democratic State', *Scandinavian Political Studies,* 13: 1–19.

Kater, M. (1983). *The Nazi Party. A Social Profile of Members and Leaders 1919–1945.* Cambridge.: Harvard University Press.

King, A. (1987). *The New Right. Politics Markets and Citizenship.* Houndmills and London: Macmillan Education.

Kirchheimer, O. (1966a). 'The Vanishing Opposition', pp. 237–259 in: Dahl, R. (ed.) *Political Opposition in Western Democracies.* New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Kirchheimer, O. (1966b). 'The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems', pp. 177–200 in: La Palombara, J. and Weiner, M. (eds.) *Political Parties and Political Development.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kitschelt, H. (1989). *The Logics of Party Formation.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Kühnl, R. (1973; ed. or. 1971). *Due Forme di Dominio Borghese: Liberalismo e Fascismo.* Milano: Feltrinelli.

Lafferty, W. (1989). 'The Political Transformation of a Social Democratic State: As the World Moves in, Norway Moves Right', *West European Politics* 11: 79–100.

Lagrange, H. and Perrineau, P. (1989). 'La Syndrome Lepéniste', pp. 228–246 in: Mayer, N. and Perrineau, P. (dir.) *Le Front National à Decouvert.* Paris: Presses de la Fondation National des Sciences Politiques.

Lane, J.E. and Ersson, S.O. (1987). *Politics and Society in Western Europe.* London: Sage.

Laver, M. and Schofield, N. (1990). *Multiparty Government. The Politics of Coalition in Europe.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lawson, K. and Merkl, P. (1988a). 'Alternative Organizations: Environmental, Supplementary, Communitarian and Antiauthoritarian', pp. 3–12 in: Lawson, L. and Merkl, P. (eds.) *When Parties Fail.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Lawson, K. and Merkl, P. (eds.) (1988b) *When Parties Fail.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Layton-Henry, Z. (1988). 'The Political Challenge of Migration for West European States', *European Journal of Political Research* 16: 587–595.

Lewis, D.S. (1987). *Illusions of Grandeur. Mosley, Fascism and British Society, 1931–1981.* Manchester, Manchester University Press.

Lipset, S.M. (1960). *Political Man.* New York: Doubleday and Company.

Lipset, S.M. and Schneider, W. (1983). *The Confidence Gap.* New York: Free Press.

Lopez Nieto, L. (1988). *Alianza Popular: Estructura y Evoluciòn Electoral de un Partido Conservator (1976–1982).* Madrid: CIS

Luther, K.R. (1988). 'The Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs: Protest Party or Governing Party?', pp. 213–251 in: Kirchner, E.J. (ed.) *Liberal Parties in Western Europe,* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Luther, K.R. (1989). 'Dimensions of Party System Change: The Case of Austria', *West European Politics* 12: 3–27.

Madeley, J. (1990). 'Norway's 1989 Election: the Path to Polarized Pluralism', *West European Politics* 13: 287–292.

Mair, P. (1984). 'Party Politics in Contemporary Europe: A Challenge to Party', *West European Politics,* 7: 170–183.

Mair, P. (1989a) 'The Problem of Party System Change', *Journal of Theoretical Politics,* 1: 251–276.

Mair, P. (1989b). 'Continuity, Change and the Vulnerability of Party', *West European Politics,* 12: 169–186.

Mair, P. (1991). 'The Electoral Universe of Small Parties in Postwar Western Europe', pp. 41–70 in: Müller-Rommel, F. and Pridham, G. (eds.), *Small Parties in Western Europe,* London: Sage.

Mayer, N. and Perrineau, P. (dir.) (1989). *Le Front National à Decouvert.* Paris: Presses de la Fondation National des Sciences Politiques.

Mayer, N., Perrineau, P. (1990). 'Why do they vote for the National Front?', paper delivered at the ECPR Joint Session of Workshops, Bochum.

Merkl, P.H. (1988). 'Comparing Legitimacy and Values among Advanced Democratic Countries', pp. 19–64 in: Dogan, M. (ed.) *Comparing Pluralist Democracies. Strains on Legitimacy.* Boulder, Co.: Westview Press.

Minkenberg, M. (1990). 'The New Right in West Germany', paper delivered at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Bochum.

Minkenberg, M. and Inglehart, R. (1989). 'Neoconservatism and Value Change in the USA: Tendencies in the Mass Public of a Postindustrial Society', pp. 81–109 in: Gibbins (ed.) *Contemporary Political Culture. Politics in a Postmodern Age.* London: Sage.

Montero, J.R. (1987). 'Los Fracasos Politicos y Electorales de la Derecha Espanola: Alianza Popular, 1976–1986', *Revista Espanola de Investigaciones Sociològicas,* 39: 7–43.

Montero, J.R. (1988). 'More Than Conservative, Less than Neoconservative: Alianza Popular in Spain', pp. 145–163 in: Girvin, B. (ed.) *The Transformation of Contemporary Conservatism.* London: Sage.

Mosse, G. (1975; ed. or. 1974). *La Nazionalizzazione delle Masse.* Bologna: il Mulino.

Mühlberger, D. (1987). 'Germany', pp. 40–139 in: Mühlberger, D. (ed.) *The Social Basis of European Fascist Movements.* London: Croom Helm.

Müller-Rommel, F. and Pridham, G. (eds.) (1991). *Small Parties in Western Europe.* London: Sage.

Nie, N., Verba, S. and Petrocick, J. (1979). *The Changing American Voter.* Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.

Nolte, E. (1967 ed. or. 1963). *I Tre Volti del Fascismo.* Milano: Mondadori.

Noguera Pinto, J. (1989). 'A Dereita e o 25 de Abril. Ideologia, Estrategìa e Evolucào Politica, pp. 193–213 in: Coelho, M.B. (ed.) *Portugal. O Sistema Politico o Costitutional 1974–1987.* Lisboa: Istituto de Ciencas Socias de Universidade de Lisboa.

O'Maolàin, C. (1987). *The Radical Right:* A World Directory. Harlow: Longman.

Oppenhuis, E. (1990). 'Extreme Right Voting in Germany, France and Italy', paper delivered at the ECPR Joint Session of Workshops, Bochum.

Panebianco, A. (1988). *Political Parties. Organization and Power.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Papadopulos, Y. (1988). 'Parties, the State and Society in Greece: Continuity within Change', *West European Politics* 12: 55–71.

Payne, S.G. (1980). 'The Concept of Fascism', pp. 14–25 in: Larsen, S.U., Hagtvet, B. and Mykelbust, J.P. (eds.) *Who Where the Fascists.* Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

Pedersen, M. (1982). 'Towards a New Typology of Party Life-Spans and Minor Parties', *Scandinavian Political Studies* 5: 1–16.

Pedersen, M. (1991). 'The Birth, Life and Death of Small Parties in Danish Politics', pp. 95–114 in: Müller-Rommel, F. and Pridham, G. (eds.) *Small Parties in Western Europe.* London: Sage.

Perrineau, P. (1988). 'Front National: l'Echo Politique de l'Anomie Urbaine', pp. 22–38, in: *La France en Politique.* Paris: Fayard-L'Esprit-le Seuil.

Perrineau, P. (1989). 'Les Etapes d'un Implantation Electorale (1972–1988)', pp. 37–62 in: Mayer, N. and Perrineau, P. (dir.) *Le Front National à Decouvert.* Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques.

Petersen, J. (1975). 'Elettorato e Base Sociale del Fascismo Italiano negli Anni Venti' *Studi Storici,* 16: 627–669.

Powell, G.B. (1987). 'The Competitive Consequences of Polarized Pluralism', pp. 173–189 in: Holler, M.J. (ed.) *The Logic of Multiparty Systems.* Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff.

Reider, H.L. (1989). 'Party Decline in the West. A Skeptic's View', *Journal of Theoretical Politics,* 3: 325–348.

Rokkan, S. (1970). *Citizens, Elections, Parties.* Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

Rose, R. and Mackie, T.T. (1988). 'Do Parties Persist or Fail? The Big Trade-off Facing Organizations', pp. 533–558 in: Lawson, K. and Merl, P. (eds.) *When Parties Fails.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Sani, G. and Sartori, G. (1983). 'Polarization, Fragmentation and Competition in Western Democracies', pp. 307–340 in: Daalder, H. and Mair, P. (eds.) *Western European Party Systems.* Beverly Hills: Sage.

Sani, G. and Shabad, G. (1986). 'Adversario o Competitores? La Polarizacion del Electorado', pp. 587–624 in: Linz. J. and Montero, J. (eds.) *Electores y Partidos en la Espana de los Anos Ochanta.* Madrid: Centro du'Estudios Costitucionale.

Sartori, G. (1969). 'From the Sociology of Politics to the Political Sociology' in Lipset, S.M. (ed.) *Politics and the Social Sciences.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Sartori, G. (1976). *Parties and Party Systems.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sartori, G. (1989). 'Videopolitica', *Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica,* 19: 185–198.

Seferiades, S. (1986). 'Polarizzazione Partitica a Non-Proporzionalità Elettorale in Grecia', *Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica.* 16: 401–437.

Seiler, D.L. (1980). *Partis et Familles Politiques.* Paris: PUF.

Seiler, D.L. (1986). *De la Comparaison des Partis Politiques.* Paris: Economica.

Smith, G. (1987). 'Party and Protest: The two Faces of Opposition in Western Europe', pp. 55–76 in: Kolinsky, E. (ed.) *Opposition in Western Europe.* London: Croom Helm.

Smith, G. (1989 5th). *Politics in Western Europe.* Aldershot: Gower.

Sternhell, Z. (1976). 'Fascist Ideology', pp. 315–377 in: Laqueur, W. (ed.), *Fascism. A Reader's Guide.* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Sternhell, Z. (1987 2th). *Ni Droite ni Gauche. L'Ideologie Fasciste en France.* Paris: Editions Complexe.

Sternhell, Z. (1989). *Naissance de l'Ideologie Fasciste.* Paris: Fayard.

Stöss, R. (1988). 'The Problem of Right-Wing Extremism in West Germany' *West European Politics*11: 34–46.

Taguieff, P.A. (1985). 'Les Droites Radicales en France' *Les Temps Modernes* 41: 1780–1842.

Taguieff, P.A. (1988). *La Force du Préjugé,* Paris: La Découverte.

Taguieff, P.A. (1989). 'Un Programme 'Revolutionaire'?', pp. 195–226 in: Mayer, N. and Perrineau, P. (dir.) *Le Front National à Decouvert.* Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques.

Taylor, S. (1982). *The National Front in English Politics,* London: McMillan.

Thurlow, R. (1987). *Fascism in Britain: A History 1918–1985.* Oxford: Basic Blackwell.

Valen, H. (1990). 'The Storting Election of 1989. Polarization and Protest', *Scandinavian Political Studies,* 13: 277–290.

Voerman, G. and Lucardie, P. (1990). 'The Extreme Right in the Netherlands: The Centrists and Their Radical Rivals', paper delivered at the ECPR Joint Session of Workshops, Bochum.

Ysmal, C. (1989). *Les Partis Politiques sous la V° République.* Paris: Montchrestien.

Ysmal, C. (1990a). *Le Comportement Electoral des Francais.* Paris: La Decouverte.

Ysmal, C. (1990b). 'The Browning of Europe. Extreme Right Parties in the 1989 European Election', paper delivered at the APSA meeting, San Francisco.

Walker, M. (1977). *The National Front.* Glasgow: Fontana.

Westle, B. and Niedermayer, O. (1990). 'Contemporary Right-Wing Extremism in West Germany: 'The Republicans' and Their Electorate', paper delivered at the ECPR Joint Session of Workshops, Bochum.

Wiedmaier, U. (1988). 'Tendencies toward an Erosion of Legitimacy', pp. 143–167 in: Dogan, M. (ed.) *Comparing Pluralist Democracies, Strains on Legitimacy.* Boulder, Co.: Westview Press.

Wiedmaier, U. (1990). 'Political Stability in OECD Nations', *International Political Science Review* 11: 219–242.

Wolinetz, S. (ed.) (1988). *Parties and Party Systems in Liberal Democracies.* New York and London: Routledge.

Zunino, P.G. (1985). *L'Ideologia del Fascismo.* Bologna: Il Mulino.