

COGNITIVE POETICS AND LITERARINESS: METAPHORICAL ANALOGY IN *ANNA KARENINA*

David S. Danaher – University of Wisconsin-Madison

1 Introduction

What is cognitive poetics (CP), how has it been applied, and what is its relationship to literariness? In this article, I offer an overview of CP, in theory and practice, and examine criticisms of CP that lead to a reconsideration of its value for literary analysis.¹ I address the question of whether CP has been, or could be, used to enhance appreciation of literariness in two ways: through an exploration of the meaning of “literariness” in terms of Václav Havel’s distinction between “explaining” and “understanding” and through an analysis, partly grounded in but not limited to CP, of Tolstoj’s use of metaphorical analogy in *Anna Karenina*. Along the way, I also propose standards for evaluating CP’s success or failure as a tool of *literary-critical* analysis.

2 What is CP? What criticisms have been directed against it?

CP is, broadly speaking, the application of discoveries in cognitive linguistics and/or cognitive science about language and the mind to textual analysis (for book-length introductions to CP, see Semino and Culpeper 2002, Stockwell 2002, and Gavins & Steen 2003). As has been repeatedly noted, CP is not a monolithic framework.² I will be limiting my discussion to its application to literary analysis, and I will be excluding from consideration certain approaches that fall outside of what might be considered a mainstream understanding of CP (e.g., Reuven Tsur’s work on poetics, which even CP theoreticians view as outside of the CP mainstream; see Tsur 1992).

Theorists and practitioners of CP have made rather strong claims about its value for literary studies. It has been suggested that an approach to literary

analysis that foregrounds cognitive theory will revolutionize literary criticism. Stockwell, for example, has written that CP “is not simply a shift in emphasis, but is a radical reevaluation of the whole process of literary activity” (2002: 5); it represents a “democratisation of literary study” and a “new science” of literature and reading (2002: 11). Similar aggressively polemical claims vis-à-vis so-called “traditional” literary-critical practices can be found in Turner’s books on the subject (Turner 1991 and 1996).

While not denying the value of certain aspects of CP for the study of literature, some “traditional” literary analysts have criticized CP on the following grounds (see, for example, Gross 1997, Adler and Gross 2002 as well as the series of replies to the latter in the subsequent issue of *Poetics Today*):

- (1) Its claim to being revolutionary is dramatically overstated. Gross understands such hyperbole as a predictable rhetorical strategy resulting from an attempt to introduce a “new paradigm” for literary studies that must necessarily compete for attention with so-called traditional paradigms (1997: 271-2). It is remarkable, however, that more than a decade after CP’s formulation, theorists still seem to find it necessary to repeat the same polemical claims and that a more moderate rhetorical stance has not been adopted within the CP community. Do existing CP analyses of literary texts provide enough evidence to justify these continued claims or is it time to reevaluate their validity?
- (2) Many aspects of CP merely affix cognitive labels to concepts with a long and proven tradition in literary criticism without adding significant content or power to them. To the extent that this criticism is valid, it might not be too surprising given that CP derives from a general theory of cognition, and its treatment of poetics is therefore part of a broader theory of mind. But, as Gross has argued with regard to literary analysis, cognition “should be the ground, not the figure” (1997: 293). The question here is: does CP reconceptualize in a way that is productive to literary analysis or just “cognitivize” the discussion? Does a given CP analysis foreground the cognitive or the poetic?

(3) In actual practice, CP is reductionist and has proven itself incapable of enhancing our appreciation of literariness. In a recent book on the value of reading and teaching literature, Mark Edmundson has written: “Virtually every critic or school of criticism that matters has worked to reduce literary experience, vast and varied as it is, into a set of simple terms” (2004: 49). To what extent does CP, which claims to “radically reevaluate” thinking about literature, also fall into this trap?

3 Literariness

I am well aware of the potential difficulties involved in trying to define the term “literariness,” and I will not attempt to define it directly.³ For the purposes of this article, I will describe it indirectly by relying on the opposition between *explaining* and *understanding* that is a recurrent theme in the writings of Václav Havel.

For Havel, this opposition seems to capture the essence of the modern crisis of identity. He illustrates this in the following passage:

Cows are no longer animals: they are machines that have their “inputs” (feed) and their “outputs” (milk) and that have their own production plans and production supervisors... Cows serve us quite efficiently, but the natural price of this service is that they are no longer cows... In apprehending the world, we have de facto lost it... By depriving the cow of the last remnants of its cow-ness, we have ourselves lost our own sense of human-ness and personal identity. (Havel 1990 [1982]: 349-50; my translation)

Explaining is a mode of relating to our environment that depersonalizes, fragments, and destroys the integrity of being; it is rational and maximally objective. Its aim is to demystify by resolving questions in a scientific and technical manner, and one consequence, perhaps unintended, of the *explaining* mindset is the loss of a cow’s sense of cow-ness as well as our own sense of self.

In opposition to the *explaining* mode is *understanding*, which is for Havel grounded in more or less unique and human-level experience of phenomena and is essentially a form of aesthetic perception underlying ethical evaluation.

We can *understand* something and still preserve the essential mystery of the phenomenon whereas the *explaining* mode explains away that mystery and effectively kills its subject for the sake of a more exact, mechanical accounting.

In a course that I taught on Havel several years ago, one of my students captured the essence of this opposition in the following insightful way: Imagine the experience of accidentally hitting one's hand on the corner of a hard surface. The subsequent pain can be scientifically *explained*: the stimulation of nerve endings can be measured, an increase in blood-pressure monitored. The experience of pain, however, the dilemma of being a creature in pain, the pain's interruption of identity – none of this can be accounted for by a mere *explanation* of pain. It is what is *unexpla inable* about pain that gives it significance.

Similarly, we could grasp the pragmatic effect of this difference if we think of a joke: when you tell a joke and someone fails to understand the humor, then you are forced to explain why the joke should have been funny. An *explanation* of a joke is technically possible, but an *understanding* of the joke as humor will be lost. *Understanding* a phenomenon is then a form of insight that is not grounded in analytical reasoning about it; in other words, while *explaining* is a bottom-up, parts-to-whole form of conceptualization, *understanding* is top-down and gestalt-oriented.

Of course, this distinction is not original with Havel, although he illustrates it exceptionally well, and I am also reminded of a passage from the American pragmatic philosopher and semiotician Charles S. Peirce, in which a similar opposition is described:

Take a corpse: dissect it, more perfectly than it ever was dissected. Take out the whole system of blood vessels entire, as we see them figured in the books. Treat the whole systems of spinal and sympathetic nerves, the alimentary canal..., the muscular system, the osseous system, in the same way. Hang these all in a cabinet so that from a certain point of view each appears superposed over the others in its proper place. That would be a singularly instructive specimen. But to call it a man would be what nobody would for an instant do or dream. Now the best definition that ever was framed is, at best, but a similar dissection... It will enable us to see how

the thing works, in so far as it shows the efficient causation. The final causation..., it leaves out of account. (1931, 1: 220)⁴

Explaining is both the “instructive specimen” resulting from the idealized dissection as well as a verbal definition of a concept, both being for Peirce representations of “efficient causation.” Opposed to this is *understanding*, which is represented by the living person, the concept as it is enacted, the phenomenon understood with regard to final causation.⁵

In borrowing this opposition from Havel (and Peirce) and in applying it to the concept of literariness, I would like to suggest that exploring literariness is essentially a matter of *understanding* literature and not only, or even primarily, a matter of *explaining* it. That is, while *explaining* literary dynamics is not necessarily unimportant to an exploration of literariness, it should be, as Gross has argued, the ground and not the figure in literary analysis.

4 CP and literariness

According to Stockwell, CP “models the processes by which intuitive interpretations are formed into expressible meanings, and it presents the same framework as a means of describing and accounting for those readings” (Stockwell 2002: 8). While I can only admire CP practitioners who pursue this kind of analysis and while I consider many analyses in this tradition valuable contributions both to scholarship and teaching, I am not convinced that this line of research will result in a radical reevaluation of the whole process of literary activity (Stockwell 2002: 5). It is clear that CP, as it has generally been practiced to date, has not achieved such a radical reevaluation, perhaps partly because it largely fails to address the question of literariness. CP has been used primarily to *explain* literature rather than to contribute to an *understanding* of it; it has failed to meet its stated goal because it has foregrounded the “cognitive” at the expense of, and not in service of, the “poetic.”

I will briefly illustrate this through a critical account of the essays in the book *Cognitive Poetics in Practice* (Gavins & Steen 2003), the companion volume to Stockwell (2002). This volume contains an introductory survey of the CP field that emphasizes its diversity while at the same time making some of the

same strong claims about CP that I have cited earlier. In addition, there are eleven individual essays written by different contributors that are meant to represent “master-class” analyses in the CP line (Stockwell 2002: 165). Of these eleven essays, two are written by cognitive scientists, and both of these make use of literature to discuss aspects of the mind: in these contributions, the cognitive is clearly the figure. One of the remaining essays is by Tsur, who, as I noted previously and as the editors of the volume readily admit, has his own distinct profile in CP.

Of the remaining eight essays, five could be said to profile the cognitive over the poetic. One of these borrows the notion of profiling from cognitive grammar to analyze a single poem, and the editors notes that it provides “a practical illustration of some of our most basic cognitive processes at work in our experience of literary texts” (Gavins & Steen 2003: 55). Another “explores the nature of the knowledge structures needed by readers during their interpretation of love poetry in its numerous forms” (Gavins & Steen 2003: 67), and the emphasis in the contribution is almost entirely on cognitive modeling. Two essays are concerned with text-worlds and with “understanding how readers build and maintain complex mental representations of their narratives” (Gavins & Steen 2003: 129), and another is an application of possible-worlds theory and mental-space theory to a short story by Hemingway that is concerned less with the story itself than with alternate theories of text modeling, although the author does provide insightful analysis of semantic detail.

Moreover, five of the eight essays fail to contextualize the CP analysis in literary-critical terms: they make only minimal attempts, or no attempt, to cite existing critical treatments of the literature under discussion. In all of these cases, it would be natural to expect that an analysis foregrounding poetics and claiming, at least implicitly, to present a new perspective on the literature would be somehow situated within the broader literary-critical discussion. For example, three of these essays discuss surrealism, a sonnet by Shakespeare, and a poem by D. H. Lawrence, and all of these topics must surely have been written about at length, but the CP analyses offered in the volume do not

situate themselves in any extended literary discussion. Surely any analysis aimed at *understanding* rather than just partial *explanation* ought to be critically contextualized simply as a matter of course.

All things considered, these “master-class” examples of CP in practice disappoint as *literary-critical* analyses. All three main criticisms of CP seem to be upheld:

(1) The analyses do not represent radical reevaluations of the literature being discussed. Indeed, with the exception of the chapter on surrealism, none is particularly ambitious in a literary-critical sense. At the very least, the claim that CP revolutionizes literary studies has not been proven.

(2) On the whole, the analyses offer more relabeling than reconceptualizing: the cognitive is the figure. A claim about the advantages of “cognitively grounded” analysis appears, in one form or another, in many CP critical treatments. While frequently stated, it is almost never proven by explicit argumentation. Moreover, it erroneously suggests that “traditional” literary-critical notions have always been devoid of cognitive content or somehow “cognitively ungrounded.”

(3) Literariness is not particularly well addressed. Most of the essays emphasize cognitive *explaining* (dissection of the text on the basis of how the mind works), and only a few enhance, in strategic ways, our *understanding* of the literature that they discuss.⁶ Most of them also seem to have been written under the assumption that nothing else is required for poetic analysis other than what has been undertaken, as if cognitive science had already so revolutionized literary studies that “traditional” modes of criticism (including all previous critical discussion of the literature being analyzed) have been rendered irrelevant.

Generally lacking in these analyses is a sense of literature as a living entity. The essays analyze the conceptual building-blocks of the works while a sense of them as works of art (aesthetic gestalts) is diminished or lost altogether. CP is used to define (in Peirce’s sense) the literary and to reduce its manifestation to a set of fundamental cognitive principles. The dynamic experience of literariness, to cite the subtitle of Gross’ article, “disappears in the mind.”

Let me be absolutely clear that I consider myself both a cognitive linguist and a practitioner, to some extent, of CP, and there is nothing inherently wrong with analyses that profile the “cognitive” over the “poetic.” These can be, like most of the essays that I have briefly commented on above, expertly-argued analyses that contribute to our understanding of cognitive principles, stimulate thinking on a range of related questions, and often encourage a rereading of the literature under discussion from a somewhat new perspective. However, it does not necessarily follow from this that they radically reevaluate “the whole process of literary activity,” nor that they are adequate as *literary-critical* analyses, and I simply do not see what we as cognitive linguists and practitioners of CP gain by pretending that they do and that they are.

There is room for a middle-ground here, or rather there is need for a decidedly less hyperbolic and more reasonable statement of the CP mission statement that recognizes the difference between *explaining* and *understanding* literature. The new version of the hypothesis might read: “CP offers a valuable approach to the study of literature. When used strategically and in cooperation with other modes of analysis, it can enhance appreciation of literariness and contribute to literary-critical evaluation.”

At the same time that we consider a more reasonable proposal for the value of CP for literary studies, we should also consider standards by which we could judge the success or failure of a given CP analysis *in literary-critical terms*. For example, we might ask the following questions:

- (1) Does the use of CP principles in the analysis constitute a true reconceptualization of “traditional” literary-critical notions that has direct implications for our understanding of literariness, or has CP been used merely to relabel? In other words, do we really need CP or not?
- (2) Does the analysis cite previous criticism on the subject and make a clear argument for how the use of CP improves upon these treatments? Simply reiterating the standard line about the “advantages of cognitive grounding” should not count as an argument. An essential part of literary studies, and of a focus on *understanding* literature as opposed to just *explaining* it, is active participation in an on-going dialogue about the meaning of a text; this is an

ever-evolving conversation, and practitioners of CP, if they want to be taken seriously as literary analysts, should be taking part in it.

(3) Does the analysis, generally speaking, profile the “poetic” or the “cognitive”? Does knowledge of the mind enhance our appreciation of literariness or does the literature “disappear in the mind”?

In their seminal work on cognitive linguistics applied to literary analysis, Lakoff and Turner wrote:

Great poets can speak to us because they use the modes of thought we all possess. Using the capacities we all share, poets can illuminate our experience, explore the consequences of our beliefs, challenge the ways we think, and criticize our ideologies. To understand the nature and value of poetic creativity requires us to understand the ordinary ways we think.
(1989: xi)

There is no reason not to take this stance seriously, and there is every reason to make strategic use of the concepts and tools that cognitive science and CP offer to literary studies. At the same time, however, we ought to recognize that the study of literature is not merely a subset of the study of the mind. In other words, CP does not have to be used in a way that heavily profiles *explaining over understanding*. In remainder of this paper, I develop an analysis of Tolstoj’s use of metaphorical analogy in *Anna Karenina* that attempts to illustrate my restatement of the CP hypothesis, to take seriously the criticisms that have been directed against CP, and to adhere to the three standards for evaluating, in literary-critical terms, the effectiveness of an analysis of literature in the CP line (see also Danaher 2003).

5 Metaphorical analogy in *Anna Karenina*

Tolstoj is generally thought of as a metonymic realist, and his use of metaphor has not received much specific critical attention. Studies of Tolstoj that have dealt with his use of metaphor tend to fall into two kinds: (1) studies that use a purposefully broad definition of metaphor (metaphor as symbolism) and that discuss Tolstoj’s writing in these sweeping terms (for example, Gustafson 1986 and Silbajoris 1990); and (2) studies that focus on specific figurative motifs in

this or that work, and there are of course many of these on *Anna Karenina*. Both of these approaches to Tolstoj are valuable; indeed, I have learned as much about language and meaning from Gustafson, Silbajoris, and other “traditional” literary scholars as I have from cognitive scientists and cognitive poetics. However, both of these kinds of studies overlook – or rather are not primarily concerned with – the cognitive dimensions of metaphor. As a result, they have missed the significance of metaphorical analogy as a coherent conceptual strategy in the novel.⁷

Certain features of metaphor have been well discussed in cognitive linguistics, and these include the following: metaphor is a dynamic structural mapping between two domains of experience, that is, a special kind of analogical blend; metaphor is primarily a conceptual phenomenon (the mapping itself) and only secondarily a matter of language (the language that instantiates the mapping); metaphor is not a marginal or aestheticized way of thinking about the world, but rather a feature of everyday cognition; metaphorical language is not, functionally speaking, merely referential but also expressive: it often evokes feelings and emotions tied to personal experience (Dirven 1993, Gibbs 2002); a metaphor can be used to establish a conceptual frame that influences how we think, broadly speaking, about a particular phenomenon and, in this regard, metaphor often does not deliver the final word on a subject, but rather serves as an invitation to further cognition. Tolstoj exploits all of these features in his use of metaphorical analogy in *Anna Karenina*, and a cognitive account of metaphor can thereby serve as a ground for a more concrete understanding of how he does so and what the pragmatic meaning of this strategy is. No previous study of *Anna Karenina* has yet appreciated the full extent to which Tolstoj profiles analogy as a privileged way of thinking about the world, and a cognitive account of metaphor provides the means for investigating this question.

What do I specifically mean by “metaphorical analogy” and what is its status in the novel? Note the following examples:

- (1) Levin comes to Stiva’s place of work, and Stiva suggests that they go into his office to talk: “Ну, пойдём в кабинет, – сказал Степан Аркадьич,

знавший самолюбивую и озлобленную застенчивость своего приятеля; и, схватив его за руку, он повлек его за собой, *как будто провожда между опасностями.*” (I, v)⁸

(1) “Well, let’s go into my office,’ said Stepan Arkad’ich, who was aware of his friend’s touchy and irritable shyness; and, taking him by the arm, he drew Levin after him, *as though guiding him through dangers.*”

(2) One of Levin’s happier moments as he prepares to marry Kitty:

“Проводя этот вечер с невестой у Дolly, Левин был особенно весел, и объясняя Степану Аркадьичу то возбуждённое состояние, в котором он находился, сказал, что ему весело, *как собаке, которую учили скакать через обруч, и которая, появив, наконец, и совершив то, что от неё требуется, взвизгивает и, махая хвостом, прыгает от восторга на столы и окна.*” (V, i)

(2) “Spending the evening with his fiancée at Dolly’s, Levin was in particularly good cheer. In explaining to Stepan Arkad’ich that exalted state in which he found himself, he said that he was happy *like a dog who has been trained to jump through a hoop and who, having finally understood what was wanted and, having accomplished it, barks and wags its tail and jumps for joy onto the tables and windowsills.*”

(3) Anna prepares to throw herself under the train: “Надо было ждать следующего вагона. Чувство, подобное тому, которое она испытывала, когда купаясь, готовилась войти в воду, охватило её, и она перекрестилась.” (VII, xxxi)

(3) “She had to wait for the next car. A feeling similar to the one that she always experienced when about to enter the water for a swim seized her, and she crossed herself.”

There are approximately 680 analogies similar to these examples in the novel, which results in an average of almost three per chapter.⁹ As the above examples illustrate, there are different kinds of analogies in the novel: there is a group of what we might call standard metaphorical analogies that are introduced by *как* (“like”) or similar conjunctions (our second example); there are analogies evoked by memory and analogies grounded in visual perception (*казалось* ‘or “it seemed”); there are analogies that are hypothetical or spontaneous judgements

that are introduced by the phrases *kak budto* (“as though”) and *kak by* (“as if”), as in our first example¹⁰; and there are also analogies, illustrated by the third example, that I call “feeling metaphors.” Although Tolstoj uses a variety of rhetorical strategies to introduce analogy, in all of these cases he asks readers to engage in one and the same cognitive process, that is, to explicitly map the structure of one experiential domain onto another or to simulate one form of usually quite common experience while reading about another, usually less common or more complex, kind. Moreover, the process of mapping through analogy carries with it the features of metaphor outlined above with the help of a cognitive account of metaphor, and Tolstoj’s systematic use of this strategy therefore has certain conceptual implications.

Other comments about these analogies, considered collectively, prove relevant. Firstly, their distribution is not even throughout the novel: they tend to cluster in thematically key chapters or chapters that describe dramatic moments in the characters’ lives. For example, the chapter describing Levin’s meeting with Kitty at the ice-skating rink contains ten metaphorical analogies (two of which are feeling metaphors), two *kak by* phrases and one *kak budto* phrase (I, ix); one of the chapters devoted to the ball, when Kitty understands that Anna and Vronskij have fallen in love, has nine metaphors (two feeling metaphors), two *kak budto* as well as two *kak by* analogies (I, xxiii); Anna’s deathbed scene features three metaphorical analogies, two *kak budto* phrases, and three *kak by* phrases (IV, xvii); and the chapter devoted to Levin’s musings about married life has seven metaphors (five feeling metaphors) and one *kak budto* analogy.¹¹ Readers of the novel come to understand the significance of many of the novel’s most dramatic moments largely by means of the metaphorical analogies that are concentrated in these and other chapters.

Secondly, some of the individual analogies are used to frame the structure of a whole chapter or series of contiguous chapters (for example, Kitty’s feeling like a soldier before battle in I, xiii, which figuratively frames the subsequent proposal scene), and, not unrelated to the framing function, analogies also serve as the nexus for the novel’s intricate network (or “labyrinth,” in Tolstoj’s words) of symbolic motifs, many of which have been thoroughly documented

in the critical literature. In the interests of space, I will not provide further details of either phenomenon here, but I will simply say that both of these facts testify to the role of analogy, as well as analogizing, in the overall architecture of the novel.

Finally, not all of the analogies originate with the narrator: characters themselves also analogize, although some do so more often and more insightfully than others (this is true of our second example, where the analogy is attributed to Levin). This fact is extremely interesting given the implications of a cognitive account of metaphor (metaphor as a special way of thinking) as well as the importance of direct speech in the novel: for example, Schultze has calculated that nearly 90 percent of the chapters record speech by at least one major character (1982: 18) and C. J. G. Turner has noted that, in general, “the proportion of dialogue in the final text... is appreciably higher than in the draft” (1993: 33). How the characters speak – and how they think – becomes only more important when interior monologues, a hallmark of Tolstoj’s writing, are taken into account. For example, what might readers of the novel conclude from this skewed distribution of analogical thinking among the characters, especially given the prominence of analogizing elsewhere in the novel’s structure?

Given these facts and the extensive critical literature on *Anna Karenina*, it is odd that metaphorical analogy has been overlooked as a coherent stylistic (and structural) element in the novel. This becomes only more evident when we try to read significant passages in the novel with the analogies removed and observe the effects of the removal. Two short passages, each with a *kak budto* analogy, can serve as good examples (the analogies are enclosed in brackets):

(4) At Stiva’s dinnerparty, where Levin and Kitty become engaged, the narrator notes: “Совершенно незаметно, не взглянув на них, [а так, как будто уж некуда было больше посадить,] Степан Аркадьич посадил Левина и Китти рядом.” (IV, ix)

(4) “Quite casually, without looking at them, [and as though there were no other place to put them,] Stepan Arkad’ič sat Levin and Kitty next to each other.”

(5) Having returned in haste from Moscow, Karenin enters the room where Anna is lying on her presumed deathbed: “Вдруг она сжалась, затихла и с испугом [как будто ожидая удара, как будто защищаясь,] подняла руки к лицу. Она увидела мужа.” (IV, xvii)

(5) “All of a sudden she shrank back, fell silent, and in terror [as though expecting a blow, as though in self-defense,] raised her hands before her face. She saw her husband.”

In both of these examples, as in most cases, the analogies provide unnecessary plot details, yet they are the stylistic focus of each passage. Moreover, they are, arguably, what makes each passage distinctly Tolstoyan. When the passages are read with the analogies removed, the narrative reads more or less like a straightforward accounting of events: “Stiva sat Levin and Kitty next to each other,” and “Anna moved and gesticulated in certain ways upon seeing her husband.” The analogies perspectivize the narrative and transform a flat accounting into a more natural, dynamic, and vivid scene: it is as if the reader actually sees what is going on, is perceptually (and, in the second example, emotionally) thrust into the scene and invited to think through who might be observing the characters and making the judgement. Borrowing terms from Stockwell (2002: 165ff), we could then say that the analogies in these two examples and elsewhere are both “visible” elements in the novel as well as essential parts of the novel’s aesthetic “texture;” that is, they contribute significantly to the novel’s literariness.

Is the use of analogy in *Anna Karenina* a carefully crafted strategy on Tolstoj’s part? A look at the history of metaphorical analogy in two of his major works prior to *Anna Karenina* (prior to the 1870s) suggests that it may well be.

In the *Sevastopol’ Stories* of the 1850s, Tolstoj makes systematic use of the *как будто* construction but little use of metaphor proper. The *как будто* phrases contribute to what Morson has called Tolstoj’s poetics of didactic fiction by reinforcing the following effect: “A series of metafictional devices [second-person narration, the controlling metaphor of a ‘travel guide’] constantly break frame; and we are allowed to reconstitute the frame only so that it may be broken again. Involuntarily, the reader of the fiction becomes an actor in the

fiction” (Morson 1978: 467). Morson does not mention the *kak budto* construction as a source of “leakage” outside the narrative frame, but clearly it has that effect in these stories as also in *Anna Karenina*. The *kak budto* phrase acts as a trigger for the construction of a modal discourse space that contains an evaluative observation of the particular moment in the text. It suggests a strong viewpoint component and presents a thoughtful evaluation or judgement of the scene. In the *Sevastopol’ Stories*, the phrase pulls the reader into the text as an observer and evaluator, implicating him or her in the scenes and events being described. In *Anna Karenina*, this is also true but sometimes the judgement seems to be filtered through the eyes of a character involved in the scene: in example four, someone at the dinner party might be observing and appreciating Stiva’s social deftness while in example five, it may be Karenin himself who has just entered the room, who interprets Anna’s action. More often than not, however, the observer’s identity is not specified, and we are left wondering if the evaluation is attributable to a character, the narrator, the reader – or possibly all of these sources at once.

In *War and Peace* (1860s), *kak budto* is still an often-used construction (and *kak by* is more frequently present¹²), but there is also a growing use of metaphor proper and feeling metaphors. By the 1870s and *Anna Karenina*, Tolstoj has kept *kak budto* (and *kak by*) and significantly increased his use of metaphor proper and especially feeling metaphors. The evidence on Tolstoj’s increasing use of metaphorical analogy is consistent with treatments of *Anna Karenina*, such as Mandelker (1993), which advance the argument that the work cannot be considered a typical “realist” novel and that Tolstoj may be better read as a “post-realist” or “pre-symbolist” writer who “rejects... the established canon of realist literature as a fundamental failure of representation” (57) and “whose prose experiments point in the direction of symbolism and modernist innovations” (76).

Tolstoj was also strongly influenced by the Victorian novel, and *Anna Karenina* may be read as a rewriting of the Victorian novel to conform to Tolstoj’s own aesthetic principles. Mandelker, for example, argues that Tolstoj “borrows Victorian social and textual conventions in order to expose them; he

does this by criticizing the ethos and mores of bourgeois society and by rewriting the Victorian novel so that it transcends the boundaries of its conventions” (1993: 66). In this regard, it is worth noting that metaphorical analogy is a frequent device in the Victorian novel (for example, in the novels of Trollope, whom Tolstoj admired), but that it is used in a very different way. A typical analogy in Trollope is the following:

Though doubt and hesitation disturbed the rest of our poor warden, no such weakness perplexed the nobler breast of his son-in-law. *As the indomitable cock preparing for the combat sharpens his spurs, shakes his feathers, and erects his comb*, so did the archdeacon arrange his weapons for the coming war, without misgiving and without fear. (1986: 36)

Trollope’s analogies are decorative and often delivered with a smirk; they are playful and sometimes even bawdy. While Trollope’s analogies make use of metaphorical language, they do not profile the conceptual features of metaphor to the extent that Tolstoj’s analogies do. Tolstoj may have borrowed the rhetorical strategy, but he has fundamentally changed the intent: his analogies are not mere sources of entertainment, but are meant to engage the reader in the text in way that requires serious reflection. Oatley, specifically citing Tolstoj, has observed that novelists use emotion language in a way that prompts the reader to simulate the emotional experience that a given character is undergoing (1992: 125-6). The same might be said of the great majority of Tolstoj’s, but certainly not Trollope’s, analogies: they encourage *experiential simulation* by the reader of the events in the novel and the characters’ reactions to these events.

I have established that metaphorical analogy represents a coherent and, in all likelihood, deliberate strategy on Tolstoj’s part and that the analogies, along with related strategies, contribute to Tolstoj’s distinct voice. What then is the pragmatic effect of metaphorical analogy in the novel or, in other words, what is its meaning for the reader? I will limit my discussion of the pragmatic effect of analogy to two main points: Tolstoj’s focus on experiential simulation and his emphasis on analogy as a way of thinking.

I have already suggested that analogy is a key strategy in furthering Tolstoj’s “poetics of didactic fiction” and that lying behind this is an appeal to the reader

to engage in experiential simulation of the novel's events. This is perhaps best captured by the kind of analogy that I have called "feeling metaphors," another example of which is this famous passage that describes Anna's and Vronskij's feelings after making love for the first time:

(6) "Она, глядя на него, физически чувствовала свое унижение и ничего больше не могла говорить. Он же чувствовал то, что должен чувствовать убийца, когда видит тело, лишенное им жизни. Это тело, лишенное им жизни, была их любовь, первый период их любви." (II, xi)

(6) "Looking at him, she felt her degradation physically and could not speak. He felt what a murderer must feel when he looks at the body he has deprived of life. The body he had deprived of life was their love, the first stage of their love."

In this example, typical for the feeling metaphors as well as most of the analogies in the novel, Tolstoj attempts to circumvent what cognitive linguists refer to as hypocognition or "the lack of the ideas you need, the lack of a relatively simple fixed frame that can be evoked by a word or two" (Lakoff 2004: 24). Since our experience of meaning is greater than those aspects of experience that language conventionally encodes, conventional language often falls short. Zwicky has written that metaphorical analogy carries "the experience of the inadequacy of language to comprehend the world" (2003: 34); in other words, metaphors exist outside of the conventional language game because they are linguistic structures whose meaning is their *use* (Zwicky 2003: 110). Tolstoj makes systematic use of metaphorical analogy precisely for this reason.

In this regard, analogy is related to a number of other rhetorical strategies that form the backbone of the novel's style and, taken collectively, bring the reader into the textworld as co-participant and judge because all imply an unspecified external observer or evaluator and thereby suggest the need for a reader's simulation of the perspective on the events. These strategies include Tolstoj's recurrent use of "seeing" (*bylo vidno, vidimo*) and "seeming" (*казалось*) phrases that cannot be directly attributed to a specific character's viewpoint as well as his obsessive references to the characters' feelings (as in the example

above). Jackson has proposed that Tolstoj's writing is an invitation to visual judgement (1993: chapter 2), and the strategies in *Anna Karenina* make clear that the judgement is not merely visual, but rather experiential across all senses. To broaden Jackson's proposal, we might therefore say that Tolstoj's writing is a deliberate invitation to experiential simulation.¹³

Another pragmatic effect on the reader of Tolstoj's use of analogy derives from the way in which he privileges analogy as a way of thinking and not just a rhetorical device, a strategy that might grant Tolstoj status as an honorary cognitive linguist well before the formal development of such a field. As I noted earlier, many of the novel's analogies originate with the characters themselves in their speech or interior monologues. These character-generated analogies are not, however, evenly distributed, which leads to the conclusion that characters have different levels of awareness of metaphorical analogy and are differentiated from one another in part by their ability to appreciate the power of analogical thought. If we accept Emerson's claim that "Tolstoyan characters are too much like us; [t]hey are trying to get through the day" (2003: 112) and Gustafson's proposal that "the character and reader know in the same way [, and] the process of reading [Tolstoj], therefore, must resemble the process of knowing" (1986: 277), then *how* the characters speak and think becomes significant for how we read and what we learn from reading.

The two characters that make the most use – by far – of analogy are, not surprisingly, Levin and Anna.¹⁴ Levin demonstrates an appreciation for metaphorical analogy early in the novel and cultivates analogical thinking, as opposed to rational (*razumnyj*) or logical thought, throughout. I will not argue this point thoroughly here, but will illustrate it by the following three examples:

(7) The narrator describes Levin's feelings and thoughts after Kitty has refused to marry him, and Levin understands his reaction through an explicit analogy with past experiences: "Ещё в первое время по возвращении из Москвы, когда Левин каждый раз вздрагивал и краснел, вспоминая позор отказа, он говорил себе: *Так же краснел и вздрагивал я, считая все погибшим, когда получил единицу за физику и остался на втором курсе; так же считал себя погибшим после того, как испортил порученное*

мне дело сестры. И что ж? – теперь, когда прошли года, я вспоминаю и удивляюсь, как это могло огорчать меня. То же будет и с этим позором. Пройдёт время, и я буду к этому равнодушен.” (II, xii)

(7) “During the first days of his return from Moscow, when Levin used to start and grow red in the face every time he remembered the disgrace of Kitty’s refusal, he had said to himself: *In exactly the same way I went red in the face and started and thought that everything was at an end when I did not pass my exam in physics and had to stay for another year at the university; and also in the same way I thought that all was over when I made a mess of my sister’s affairs that I was supposed to look after.* And what happened? Now that several years have passed, I recall it all and I can’t help being surprised at having taken it so much to heart. The same is going to happen with this grief. Time will pass and I shall regard this, too, with indifference.”

(8) Levin is lying in a field at night and looking at the clouds: “Как всё прелестно в эту прелестную ночь! И когда успела образоваться эта раковина? Недавно я смотрел на небо, и не нём ничего не было – только две белые полосы. Да, *вот так–то незаметно изменились и мои взгляды на жизнь.*” (III, xii)

(8) “How lovely everything is on this lovely night! And when did this shell have time to form? A short while ago I looked at the sky and there was nothing there, only two white stripes. Yes, *exactly in the same way my views on life have imperceptibly changed.*”

(9) In the last chapter of the book, Levin thinks to himself about his “new feeling”: “Это новое чувство не изменило меня, не осчастливило, не просветило вдруг, как я мечтал, – *так же как и чувство к сыну.* Никакого сюрприза тоже не было. А вера – не вера – я не знаю, что это такое, – но чувство это так же незаметно вошло страданиями и твердо засело в душе.” (VIII, xix)

(9) “This new feeling has not changed me, has not made me happy and enlightened me all of a sudden as I had dreamed it would – *just the same as with my feeling for my son.* There was no surprise about it either. But whether it is faith or not – I don’t know what it is – but that feeling has entered just as

imperceptibly into my soul through suffering and has lodged itself there firmly.”

The point is not that Levin always analogizes correctly (he obviously errs in example seven), but that he relies on analogical linkages or “seeing-as” as his primary way of learning, knowing, and understanding, and this special kind of thinking comes to be opposed, by Levin himself and readers of the novel, to the sort of abstract, rational thought exemplified by Karenin and other characters. I will add, at the risk of somewhat overstating the case, that Levin’s receptivity to analogical thought ultimately proves to be his salvation: example nine is from the penultimate paragraph of the novel, and the experiential analogy reinforces Levin’s new-found feelings of optimism and happiness.

No other character is as receptive to analogical thought as Levin is – with the possible exception of Anna. Anna’s analogies are decidedly less intellectual than Levin’s, as this example demonstrates:

(10) Vronskij asks if Anna is unhappy: “– Я несчастлива? – сказала она, приближаясь к нему и с восторженной улыбкой любви глядя на него, – я – как голодный человек, которому дали есть. Может быть, ему холодно, и платье у него разорвано, и стыдно ему, но он не несчастлив.” (II, xxiii)

(10) “‘Me unhappy?’ she said, drawing near to him and gazing at him with a rapturous smile of love. ‘I am like a hungry man who has been given food. He may be cold, his clothes may be tattered, he may feel ashamed, but he is not unhappy.’”

Almost all of Anna’s analogies reference a small set of key symbolic motifs in the novel: hunger, binding (tearing, a taut string about to snap), judging and stoning, falling, dreaming, heaviness, and deception. They are all, also unlike Levin’s, self-absorbed and emotionally raw.

While Anna clearly has the capacity, even the inclination, to achieve insight through analogy, she is not in a position to use it to reach a state of provisional wisdom, as Levin does. Indeed, as the novel progresses, Anna psychologically fragments, a theme well documented in the text given her association with knives (cutting and tearing) and with the references to her “doubling” that begin in part IV of the novel and increase thereafter. Analogy profiles the unity

and harmony of different forms of experience, which is the lesson learned by Levin, and Anna's fragmentation moves her in exactly the opposite direction: she bifurcates, cutting and tearing things, relationships, and herself apart. If analogy teaches wisdom through linkage, then Anna comes to represent the severing of linkage, a fragmentation of forms of experience iconized in her palindromic name (An-na) and her two identically named lovers (Aleksej Karenin and Aleksej Vronskij). Although I will not prove the point here, Tolstoj also explicitly associates Anna's fragmentation and ultimately her suicide with abstract reasoning (*razum*), the non-analogical and non-metaphorical way of thinking that Levin rejects.

Orwin has written that in *Anna Karenina* Tolstoj shows that human beings are sentient, not rational, creatures (2003: 103), and I would add that he develops this argument, at least in part, by opposing analogical thought (Levin) to reason (ultimately Anna as well as other characters). As Hester has stated about understanding via analogy: "Seeing-as is an irreducible accomplishment in which the imagination aids perception or reading. It is categorically impossible to reduce seeing-as to a set of rules or criteria" (cited in Zwicky 2003: 92). If we were to rephrase this in Havelian terms, we might say that Levin decides in favor of *understanding* while Anna comes to embrace logical *explanation* by reason, and these developments lead to his (provisional) salvation and her death.

Much more could be said about Tolstoj's use of metaphorical analogy and its function in the novel. I would include here: a more detailed account of the relation between analogy and other key rhetorical strategies (visual motifs and feeling simulation); metaphorical analogy as the nexus of the novel's extensive network of images; analogy and defamiliarization; and the implications of Tolstoj's systematic privileging of analogical thought over reason for a reconsideration of his so-called "monologism" (see Sloane 2001 and Emerson 2003). On the whole, it can be said that Tolstoj's specific use of analogy is consistent with the general architecture of the novel in which linkages and mappings play a central role, and a more complete exploration of that connection ought to prove valuable.

For the purposes of this paper, however, this sketch of the role played by metaphorical analogy in *Anna Karenina* has been intended as an illustration of the more moderate statement of the value of CP that attempts to conform to the three standards introduced above. A cognitive account of metaphor that profiles the dynamics of experiential mapping has allowed us to continue a reconsideration of Tolstoj as a writer of metonymic realism and to highlight his systematic and coherent use of analogy in the novel, a strategy that was shown to be consistent with other well-discussed aspects of Tolstoj's style and message. In carrying out this analysis, I have made a deliberate attempt to contextualize my discussion within the literary-critical conversation that has developed around the novel and to indicate what a focus on metaphorical analogy concretely contributes to this dialogue. Finally, I have tried to let the cognitive disappear in the poetic: while a conceptual approach to metaphor underlies much of my discussion, it is the ground, not the figure, in the analysis.

6 Conclusion

Is it possible to *understand* literariness by trying to *explain* it? Literature itself is not primarily concerned with *explaining*, but with *understanding*, and *Anna Karenina* is one of finest examples of this in a novel. Can we reach a sense of literariness through an analytic method (or “way of thinking” about literature that is itself more oriented toward *explaining*, or, if we try to do so, do we risk depriving literature of its literariness, just as the modern world deprives Havel's cows of their cow-ness?

Theorists of CP explicitly deny that they seek to trivialize literature and literariness in this way. In the introduction to his book, Stockwell states that a trivial application of CP “would be simply to take some of the insights from cognitive psychology and cognitive linguistics, and treat literature as just another piece of data” (2002: 5). This approach would be trivial because it would avoid the question of literary value, and it would make what literary criticism does seem irrelevant or wrong-headed – this would be cognitive linguistics, but not cognitive poetics (Stockwell 2002: 6).

Despite these and similar claims, most CP analyses that have been carried out since its programmatic inception are more linguistics than poetics: they are studies in which cognition is the figure, not the ground. As such, they are not without value, but they do not usually address literariness and do not represent adequate literary-critical analyses.

The evidence to support the strong version of the CP hypothesis – as a “way of thinking” about literature that has “radically reevaluated” literary studies – does not exist. However, as my revised version of the hypothesis suggests, it is certainly possible to make use of CP as an effective tool in literary analysis that contributes to an appreciation of literariness. We still need, as Gross suggests, to incorporate the insights of CP into literary analysis without denying other forms of literary criticism their due.¹⁵

Notes

1 This article could be read as an updating of Gross (1997) that takes into account the decade or so following Turner (1996) by addressing Stockwell (2002) and its companion volume, Gavins & Steen (2005).

2 Stockwell claims that CP is not a framework as much as it is a “way of thinking” about literature (2002: 6), which would be a quite reasonable statement if practitioners of CP, including Stockwell himself in the very same book, took it to heart. In practical application to textual analysis, however, this distinction seems difficult to make.

3 There is a line of cognitive-science research that attempts to empirically define literariness. See, for example, Miall and Kuiken (1998).

4 The citation is to be read as “volume 1, paragraph 220.”

5 Peirce defines the difference between efficient and final causation in gestalt terms: “Efficient causation is that kind of causation whereby the parts compose the whole; final causation is that kind whereby the whole calls out its parts” (1931: 1:220).

6 The distinction between *explaining* and *understanding* is not an either-or choice. In these essays, however, the emphasis falls on the side of the former.

7 Even thorough treatments of the novel’s style and structure fail to recognize metaphorical analogy as a coherent motif and to draw the necessary implications from it. See, for example, Fikhenbaum (1982), which looks at specific symbolic details in the novel and discusses their allegorical interpretations, and also Schultze (1982).

8 References to the novel are given by part (I) and chapter (v) and are keyed to Tolstoj (1936). Translations are taken from Tolstoj (1961) and have been slightly modified where necessary. Analogies are italicized.

9 This information is based on my database of examples of analogy in the novel. While the average number of analogies per chapter seems low, we need to keep in mind that chapters in the novel are notoriously short (usually only three or four pages in length).

10 About 60 instances of the *kak budto* and *kak by* analogies (from approximately 200 total instances) might not be considered metaphorical. A discussion of this falls outside of the scope of this paper.

11 Analogies, and other related devices, cluster in nearly all of the thematically key chapters. The examples given here do not exhaust the list.

12 There are about 150 *kak budto* phrases in *Anna Karenina* and about 100 instances of *kak by*. Based on informal testing with native speakers of Russian, it is clear that these phrases have different conceptual effects: the former seems to present a more thoughtful evaluative commentary with a necessarily stronger viewpoint component while the latter provides an impressionistic qualification of a scene (it is used as a hedging device: something may have been true, but the observer is not quite certain). Both introduce an evaluative judgement into the text that implies the existence of an observer, but they do so in different ways.

13 This discussion illustrates the distinction that Booth proposed, without mentioning Tolstoj, between the "telling" and "showing" modes of narration (Booth 1961: 3ff) and represents an extension of Schultze's treatment of narrative strategies in the novel (Schultze 1982: chapter V). Note also Silbajoris, who argues that, in all of Tolstoj's works, he "uses language to convey something beyond words, the way a metaphor does" (1990: 165).

14 Levin engages in analogical speech or thought over thirty times and Anna just under thirty times. Other characters who make use of analogy include: Stiva (eleven times), Vronskij (eight times), and Karenin, Dolly, and Kitty (five times each).

15 I am grateful to participants in a graduate course on metaphor theory that I occasionally teach at UW-Madison and, most especially, to Kat Scollins, who provided comments on a draft of this paper. My thanks also go to my colleagues at UW-Madison, especially Sabine Gross and Max Statkiewicz, for their contributions to an interdisciplinary discussion of metaphor.

References

- Adler, H. & S. Gross 2002. 'Adjusting the Frame: Comments on Cognitivism and Literature,' in: *Poetics Today* 23/2, 195-220.
- Booth, W. 1961. *The Rhetoric of Fiction*. Chicago.
- Danaher, D. 2003. 'A Cognitive Approach to Metaphor in Prose: Truth and Falseness in Leo Tolstoy's "The Death of Ivan Il'ich",' in: *Poetics Today* 24/3, 439-469.
- Dirven, R. 1993. 'Metonymy and Metaphor: Different Mental Strategies of Conceptualisation,' in: *Leuvense Bijdragen* 82, 1-28.
- Edmundson, M. 2004. *Why Read?*. New York.
- Eikhenbaum, B. 1982. *Tolstoj in the Seventies*. Ann Arbor.
- Emerson, C. 2003. 'Tolstoy versus Dostoevsky and Bakhtin's Ethics of the Classroom,' in: Knapp & Mandelker 2003: 104-115.
- Gavins, J. & G. Steen (eds.). 2003. *Cognitive Poetics in Practice*. London.
- Gibbs, R. 2002. 'Identifying and Appreciating Poetic Metaphor,' in: *Journal of Literary Semantics* 31, 101-112.
- Gross, S. 1997. 'Cognitive Readings; or, The Disappearance of Literature in Mind,' in: *Poetics Today* 18/2, 271-297.
- Gustafson, R. 1986. *Leo Tolstoj: Resident and Stranger*. Princeton.
- Havel, V. 1990. 'Križe identity [1982],' in: *O lidskou identitu*, 349-351. Praha.
- Jackson, R.L. 1993. *Dialogues with Dostoevsky*. Stanford.
- Knapp, L. & A. Mandelker. 2003. *Approaches to Teaching Tolstoj's "Anna Karenina"*. New York.
- Lakoff, G. 2004. *Don't Think of an Elephant!*. White River Junction.
- Lakoff, G. & M. Turner. 1989. *More than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor*. Chicago.
- Mandelker, A. 1993. *Framing "Anna Karenina"*. Columbus.
- Miall, D. & D. Kuiken. 1998. 'The Form of Reading: Empirical Studies of Literariness,' in: *Poetics* 25, 327-341.

COGNITIVE POETICS AND LITERARINESS

- Morson, G.S. 1978. 'The Reader As Voyeur: Tolstoi and the Poetics of Didactic Fiction,' in: *Canadian-American Slavic Studies* 12/4, 465-480.
- Oatley, K. 1992. *Best-Laid Schemes: The Psychology of Emotions*. New York.
- Orwin, D. 2003. 'Tolstoy's Anti-philosophy Philosophy in Anna Karenina,' in: Knapp & Mandelker 2003: 95-103.
- Peirce, C.S. 1931. *The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*. Eds. C. Hartshorne & P. Weiss. Cambridge.
- Schultze, S. 1982. *The Structure of "Anna Karenina"*. Ann Arbor.
- Semino, E. & J. Culpeper (eds.). 2002. *Cognitive Stylistics: Language and Cognition in Text Analysis*. Amsterdam.
- Silbajoris, R. 1990. *Tolstoy's Aesthetics and His Art*. Columbus.
- Sloane, D. 2001. 'Rehabilitating Bakhtin's Tolstoy: The Politics of the Utterance,' in: *Tolstoy Studies Journal* 13, 59-77.
- Stenbock-Fermor, E. 1975. *The Architecture of "Anna Karenina"*. Lisse.
- Stockwell, P. 2002. *Cognitive Poetics: An Introduction*. London.
- Tolstoj, L.N. 1961. *Anna Karenina*. Trans. D. Magarshack. New York.
- Tolstoj, L.N. 1936. *Polnoe sobranie sočinenij*. Moskva.
- Trollope, A. 1986. *The Warden*. New York.
- Tsur, R. 1992. *Toward a Theory of Cognitive Poetics*. Amsterdam.
- Turner, C.J.G. 1993. *Anna Karenina Companion*. Waterloo.
- Turner, M. 1996. *The Literary Mind: The Origins of Language and Thought*. New York.
- Turner, M. 1991. *Reading Minds: The Study of English in the Age of Cognitive Science*. Princeton.
- Zwicky, J. 2003. *Wisdom & Metaphor*. Kentville.