Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Asian History

Ottoman-Russian Relations

Adrian Brisku

Subject: Diplomatic/International, Political Online Publication Date: Apr 2019
DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190277727.013.288

Summary and Keywords

Four-centuries-long encounters between the Ottoman Empire and the Grand Duchy of Muscovy/Russian Empire point to complex relations that have been triggered and defined mostly by territorial, trade disputes, and wars, and maintained by diplomatic rivalry and occasional military alliances. Starting as friendly encounters during Sultan Bayezid II reign at the beginning of the 16th century, these relations, essentially and persistently asymmetrical, reveal an initial and long Ottoman dominance over the Muscovy/Russian side; one that lasted from the early 16th to the late 18th century—whereby the two sides shared no direct borders, traded and did not fight each other until the late 17th century—followed by a late 18th-century and mid-19th-century Russian ascendency. This ascendency was achieved largely thanks to the military reform that Tsar/Emperor Peter the Great undertook, namely, the establishment of a standing and professional army and consequentially due to the many wars that Russia won throughout the 19th century; the decisive ones being those fought during the reign of Empress Catherine the Great. The mid-19th century and the early 20th century—which witnessed the implosion of the Russian Empire due to the Bolshevik Revolution and the break-up of the Ottoman Empire by Britain and France—was a long period that saw few and brief military alliances, contested trade relations and yet continued wars. It was ultimately marred by an Ottoman drive to counterbalance Russia’s dominance, while the latter sought to preserve it, by involving other European powers (British and French)—the most crucial moment being the British, French, and Ottoman armies defeating the Russian one in the Crimean War (1853–1856)—transforming their bilateral interactions into multilateral but unsustainable relations.

Keywords: Russian Empire, Ottoman Empire, balance of power, Third Rome, wars, trade, the Eastern Question, philhellenism, the Concert of Europe, Pan-Slavism, Pan-Islamism, the Soviet Union, Turkey

Friendly Encounters

The instigator of Ottoman Muscovy–Russian relations was Sultan Bayezid II (r. 1481–1512) at the onset of the 16th century.[1] Starting as friendly and infrequent encounters, these relations would nonetheless be predicated upon power asymmetries, ideological/religious ambitions, and differences that would incrementally grow into frictions, rivalry, and conflict.[2]

When such relations began, the Ottoman Empire was reaching its zenith in terms of military and political power on the European continent and beyond. Its dominance was sealed with Sultan Mehmet II the Conqueror's (r. 1444–1446; r. 1451–1481) capturing of Constantinople (Istanbul) in 1453, thus delivering a final blow to the Byzantine Empire and putting under his possessions the empire's vassal territories in the Balkans—threatening in turn Italian city states—as well as the Black Sea area, including the Crimean khanate (1478). Despite creating further rupture in an already divided Christendom, Sultan Mehmet II saw his rule and state as a continuation of the Roman Empire—to the point of naming himself "Caesar" of Rome (*Qayser-i Rûm*)—on the basis that he who controlled Constantinople, the seat of the Roman Empire since 330 CE and had the legitimate right to rule the Byzantine Empire.[3] In fact, his newly installed Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople–New Rome, Gennadius II (1454–1464) recognized him in such terms.[4] The sultan also laid claim to this title on the grounds that he carried Byzantine imperial blood in his veins from the second ruler of the Osman sultanate Orhan Gazi's (r. 1324–1362) marriage to a Byzantine princess.[5]

The Muscovy rulers contemporaneous to Sultan Mehmet II, Vasily II (r. 1425–1462) and especially Ivan III (r.1462–1505), recognized this Ottoman superiority through their attempts to achieve equal status between the two states and their insistence on establishing relations based on the notion of brotherhood.[6] Yet the Grand Duchy's views of and claims on the Byzantine Empire, which was important for the Duchy's legitimacy and "state-building" process, were as ambitious as those of the Ottomans.

Thus, despite sharing similar Orthodox Christian doctrine and rituals with the Byzantines, Grand Duke Vasily II considered the Byzantine Empire as a rival power to the Grand Duchy's ambition for southward expansion. This became evident when he declined to join forces with other Christian powers in defense of Constantinople; even more so when the head of the Muscovy/Russian Church, Metropolitan Isidor, attended the Ferrara-Florence Church meeting of 1438–1439—gathered to unite the forces of Christendom against the Ottoman threat to the Byzantine Empire—and had agreed that the Grand Duchy would join these forces. Vasily II's reaction to the Metropolitan's action was to arrest him and discard the idea of a union between the Orthodox and Catholic Churches because it would have entailed, for the Russian Church, accepting the Roman Church's primacy. Hence, while a few Muscovites sought to help the Byzantines, the Russian Church's position was that the fall of Constantinople was God's punishment of those Greeks who had sought a union with the Roman Church and the Pope.[7] In fact, Vasily's successor, Ivan III—known in the Russian historiography as the "gatherer of the Rus' lands," pursuant of

a westward expansion of the Duchy at the expense of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania—cooperated with the Ottoman Empire and its vassal, the Crimean khanate.[8]

It was Ivan III and his successor son, Grand Duke Vasily III (r. 1505–1533), who, like Sultan Mehmet, made a dual claim of Byzantine heritage to their state. The first claim was that of sharing the same blood lineage; in 1472 Ivan III married the niece of the last Byzantine emperor, Constantine XI (r. 1449–1453), Sophia Paleologue; their son being Vasily III. The second claim, which differed from the Ottomans'—articulated as the "Third Rome" by Russian monk Philotheus (Filofey) to Vasily III in 1520—was that Muscovy was the sole and true successor of Constantinople. As Filofey put it, "the two Romes have fallen and the third exists and there will not be a fourth."[9] However, it was Vasily's successor, Ivan IV (the Terrible/Fearsome), who in 1547, like Mehmet the Conquer, gave himself the title of Tsar (Caesar) and renamed his Grand Duchy the Tsardom of Russia, ruling it as such until 1584.

Such competing claims, though, did not spark tensions between the two sides because in these early years Ottoman sultans clearly had the upper hand vis-à-vis Russian Grand Dukes. For instance, following Sultan Bayezid II's friendly overture, Sultan Selim I (r. 1511–1522) sent his first Ottoman ambassador, Kamal Feodorit, to Moscow to establish such relations with Grand Duke Vasily III. From the Ottoman perspective, such relations could be friendly but unequal because sultans did not accept the principles of equality and reciprocity with other states. In fact, they expected other rulers to become their vassals and tributaries. Yet upon Muscovite insistence, ambassador Feodorit had to accept and add the term of "brotherhood" to describe their relationship.[10] Furthermore, while there was no contemporary Ottoman account describing Muscovy/Tsardom's political organization, on the Russian side stories such as that by Ivan Peresvetov, "Tale of Sultan Mohamet" (*Skazanie o Magmete Saltane*) (1547), elevated Sultan Mehmed II the Conquer to the ideal ruler, whose impressive authoritarian, centralized, military, quasi-police state, based on the use of terror, had defeated the weak Byzantine emperor Constantine XI.[11] Fascinated by the Ottoman Empire, the Russian side was also intimidated by its political and military superiority. When, for instance, Sultan Suleiman "the Magnificent" (r. 1520–1566) captured the fortress of Belgrade in 1521—seen by many contemporaries as the main defense line of Christendom and the "gateway to Hungary"—Muscovite envoys, together with Venetian and Ragusa envoys, were "the first to congratulate him."[12]

For most of the 16th century, which included the reigns of some of the most conspicuous rulers in the respective Ottoman and Russian imperial historiographies, Suleiman "the Magnificent" and Ivan IV, the two states kept these relations friendly. This was also because neither side saw each other as real enemies. Tsar Ivan IV was preoccupied with his multiple war fronts to his Tsardom's west against Livonian knights, Poland, Sweden, and Lithuania, even though, to the south, it was harassed by the Ottoman vassal, the Crimean khanate—humiliatingly for the tsars, they had to pay a tribute of 25,000 rubles, thus indirectly giving money the Ottomans. Meanwhile, for Sultan Suleiman, his empire's

real enemies remained the Habsburg emperor Charles V and King Ferdinand as well as the Roman Popes, who supported and financed anti-Ottoman campaigns.

This absence of military confrontation allowed for trade between the two sides. Ottoman sultans had grown an insatiable appetite for Russian fur—they used it for themselves as well as for gifts to their vassals—with Sultan Suleiman appointing an Ottoman Greek merchant, Michael Cantacuzenus, as his “imperial” agent to buy furs in Muscovy. On the one hand, Ottoman (Istanbul) merchants generally sold items such as woolen cloth, Bursa silk textiles as well as precious stones to the Muscovy/Russian market.[13] Russian merchants, on the other hand, traded in the Ottoman realm. But unlike Venetian merchants, for instance, who operated from Istanbul—a sign of better and higher status—Russian merchants traded from the Sea of Azov, which was often a dangerous area due to attacks from Crimean Tatars. The Sea of Azov, together with the Kaffa fortress and Crimean ports, were under Ottoman control.

That these states did not see each other as real enemies did not, however, preclude friction or conflict. Following his military successes and advances in the Mediterranean, the Balkans and Central Europe as well as his ongoing wars with the Persian Empire, Sultan Suleiman had sought to turn Istanbul into an international market for spices. This entailed undercutting his greatest rival to the east, the Persian Empire, as well as the Portuguese dominance in the Indian Ocean—both engaged in the international spice and silk trade—by seeking to open trade routes in Central Asia. Commercial interests combined with requests by Uzbek and Turkestan khanates to open new pilgrimage routes after a recently converted Persia to the Shia branch of Islam blocked their paths—Suleiman styled himself as the “Caliph of all the Muslims in the world,” hence becoming their protector—and made for a slight shift in the Ottoman attitudes vis-à-vis the Tsardom.[14] Tsar Ivan IV’s eastward expansion, too, capturing the Kazan khanate (1552) and the Astrakhan khanate (1556), establishing fortresses along the Terek river (close to Ottoman border lines)—and also driven by the ambition of controlling the slave trade there and the profitable trade routes with the Persian Empire—put the two sides onto a collision course and hence to their first conflict.[15]

Up to this point, the Ottomans had not seriously considered threatening the growth of the Russian power to the north of Black Sea steppe. This was partly because they thought that their vassal Crimean khanate’s strong cavalry would continue to check it. Around this time, however, Sultan Suleiman planned to send an expedition to the lower Volga, i.e., the Astrakhan khanate, and even construct a canal between the Volga and Don rivers. Suleiman proved unable to pursue this strategy, and so the plan was taken up by his successor Sultan Selim II (r. 1566–1574), who sanctioned a military expedition in the summer of 1569. The expedition failed and there was no military engagement between the two states. Nevertheless, the failed expedition had an effect. For, while the Russian side had sought to test the Ottoman reaction to its annexation of the khanates—Ivan IV, upon Selim II’s accession to power in 1566, sent his envoy to Istanbul to seek peace and friendship while expressing his determination to keep Kazan and Astrakhan—the fact was that Ivan IV ultimately agreed, in a letter in April 1571, to Selim’s demands that he

abandon Astrakhan and the fortress on the Terek river, allowed pilgrimage, and continued to pay tribute to the Crimean khanate for the sake of good relations.[16]

Until the mid-17th century, the Russian side particularly seemed keen to avoid conflict with the Ottomans. Having challenged the European balance of power, the Ottoman Empire ultimately had become part of it—following Sultan Suleiman's anti-Habsburg alliance with the French king Francis I in 1536—whereas the Tsardom remained still at the edges of this balance of power, pushing against Lithuania and Poland. Yet where Russia could not balance out the Ottoman Empire in military strength and diplomatic status—Russia sent twice as more envoys to Istanbul than their counterparts to Moscow and crucially the Ottomans chose to do most of their Russian dealings via the Crimean khanate—it tried to compensate in diplomatic ritual. Indeed, Russian envoys reaching Istanbul often engaged in disputes and committed sporadic violations of the Ottoman ambassadorial ceremony to emphasize their tsar's status vis-à-vis that of the sultans.[17]

Adversarial Relations

During the second half of the 17th century, both sides were geopolitically much more aware of each other. Their relations would increasingly become more politically and militarily adversarial, engaging each other in several war theatres: from the northern steppe of the Black Sea to the Ottoman vassal principalities of Moldova and Wallachia. Diplomatic and trade relations also increased as a result of these wars.

Ottoman awareness of Russia's rising military power came about as its own military power followed a renewed ambition for a westward expansion—in light of the great territorial expansion into three continents during Sultan Suleyman's reign, an expansion that continued during most of the Köprülü period (*c*. 1656–1703)—came decisively under check by the Habsburgs during a second failed Ottoman attempt, in 1683, to take Vienna. Prominent Köprülü Ottoman grand viziers had been pursuing a multi-frontal aggressive military strategy: against the Habsburgs in 1664; the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1672; and crucially against Russia. The latter, thus, precipitated their first direct war in 1676, whereby the Ottomans had sought to deal with the rise of Russia's power by aiming to establish a buffer Cossack state against it as well as against Poland.[18]

The Russian side, too, under the reigns of Tsar Alexei (r. 1645–1676) and Tsar Feodor III (r.1676–1682)—despite convulsive internal revolts particularly during Alexei's reign—were in a process of further expansion westward, and continued a multi-frontal strategy against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth—reaching the 1667 Treaty of Andrusovo that gave it control of areas of Smolensk and the east of River Dnieper, including Kiev—and against Sweden as well as against the Ottoman Empire. In their first war, though, neither side won. Settled in the Treaty of Bakhchisarai (1681), the two sides agreed on a twenty-year truce and on demarcating their first direct territorial border whereby Russia controlled the right bank of River Dnieper whereas the Ottoman Empire the left one.[19]

The truce, however, was not kept by Russia. Tsar Peter I, “the Great” (r. 1682–1725)—proclaimed Emperor of All Russia in 1721—confident in Russia’s strength, joined a 1686 anti-Ottoman war coalition with Habsburg Austria, Venice and Poland-Lithuania to fight the Ottomans unsuccessfully in his Crimean campaigns of 1687 and 1689, but successfully in his Azov campaigns of 1695 and 1696. In capturing the Azov fortress, building a naval station in Taganrog in 1699, and in sailing his incipient fleet of fourteen ships from the station to the straits of Kerch—controlled by the Ottomans—to demand a free sail to Istanbul for his envoy Yemelyan Ukraintsev, Peter I began to challenge the sultan’s exclusive dominance of the Black Sea and its adjacent areas.[20] On this latter point, the Ottomans had warned Ukraintsev that Sultan Mustafa II (r. 1695–1703) would never tolerate foreign ships sailing upon the waters of the Black Sea.[21]

Aside from these war campaigns and efforts, Peter I injected a new kind of pressure into these emerging adversarial relations. He began to demand from Sultan Mustafa II protection rights for Ottoman Christian Orthodox subjects. One of his envoys requested in 1692, through the Crimean khanate, the return of the Holy Places to the Greeks, having been in the hands of French Catholics—a request that would become the pretext of the Crimean War in 1853–1856. The tsar also began to forge closer relations with Balkan Orthodox Christians (Montenegrins, Serbs, and Moldovans). The ensuing Treaty of Constantinople (1700), which concluded their 14-year war, confirmed an emerging Russian ascendency in military terms. The Treaty allowed Russia to keep Azov and confirmed the ending of the tributary payment to the Crimean khanate. Markedly, Russia made gains in diplomatic terms, too—compelling Sultan Mustafa II to accept the tsar’s resident diplomatic mission in Istanbul—putting his Tsardom on a similar footing with the Habsburg Empire, England, Venetia, and Holland; states which for a long time had their permanent embassies there.

Despite these diplomatic and military gains—Peter I had also begun the process of transforming his army by introducing superior European military techniques—the Ottomans, according to Russia’s first permanent ambassador in Istanbul Peter Tolstoi, still underestimated Russia’s military skill.[22] Ottoman historians point out that Ottoman diplomats of the period did not understand that this modernization was primarily aimed at fighting wars against them.[23]

It was true that the Ottoman army returned to victory against Peter’s army in the River Pruth campaigns between 1710 and 1711, which were fought in the territory of the Ottoman principality of Moldova. The ensuing Treaty of Adrianople (1713) forced Peter I to abandon his fleet as well as the possession of Azov and Taganrog. But the Treaty of Belgrade (1739), ending their fourth military encounter in the 1735 and 1739 wars—triggered by the Crimean raids on the Cossack Hetmanate (1649–1754) and their incursions into the Caucasus—restored Russia’s confidence when it regained control of Azov and incrementally resumed its challenge to the Ottoman military supremacy in the Black Sea area.

As war campaigns increased, relations—during the reigns of Empress Anna Ioannovna (r. 1730–1740) and particularly during that of Catherine “the Great” (r. 1762–1796)—became more direct and continuous in diplomatic terms. At the societal level, Muscovite and Petersburgian elites, in their numerous publications, became fascinated with the sultan’s realm, depicting it as an Oriental entity: exotic, passive and non-European empire.[24]

It was during the reign of Catherine “the Great,” though, that tables definitely turned in Russia’s favor, whereby the Russian state—keen to increase its grain exports to the European market through the Bosporus Strait controlled by the Ottomans—became more assertive and confrontational militarily and ideologically. The wars that made this possible were those fought and won between 1786 and 1774, with Catherine’s army occupying the principalities of Moldova and Walachia, and Crimean khanate, and with her navy forces’ victory over the Ottoman fleet at the Battle of *Chesme* in 1770. The Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji—the Ottoman side saw it as the “most humiliating treaty Ottomans had yet signed”—which was concluded in July 1774, forced Sultan Abdulhamid I (r. 1774–1789) to give up on the Ottoman exclusive dominance of the Black Sea, and on the control of adjacent territories north coast of the Black Sea and the Crimean khanate.[25] Azov was given “in perpetuity,” and crucially Russia was allowed to navigate some of its merchant vessels through the Bosporus Strait.[26] To put salt into the wound, Empress Catherine marked Russia’s ascendency southwards with her 1787 journey in the “New Russia,” an area that included her earlier conquests: Kiev, Poltava, and more recent ones, most notably the Crimean khanate—territories that would be part of Russia’s civilizing mission of entailing russification and drawing a distinction between Orthodox and non-Orthodox population.[27]

Aside from these territorial changes, both sides taking part in the Treaty accepted—though this was to be hotly contested in the 19th century—that Russia would have protection rights over the sultan’s Orthodox subjects whereas the sultan would have protection rights over his co-religionist in the Tsardom. Russia swiftly made use of it in its foreign policy towards them. Indeed, Catherine’s earlier discussions with French philosopher Voltaire on re-establishing Byzantium and installing a Russian ruler crystallized as “Greek Project” during the early 1780s.[28] The latter entailed support for the rights of Ottoman Greek subjects—in the early 19th century, especially in the context of the Greek Uprising (1821–1830), the love for the ancient Greek culture, and the support for a Greek state, articulated as *Philhellenism*, became fashionable also among affluent English, French, and German societies—as well as pursuing a strong commercial policy (grain trade), and securing Catherine’s newly acquired Black Sea ports. This Russian multi-frontal pressure and subsequent Ottoman weak response—which would call the attention of other European powers—set the stage for what in European historiography came to be referred as the 19th-century “Eastern Question.”[29] The Ottomans sought to overturn the Kuchuk Kainarji’s losses by starting the wars of 1787 and 1792 against Catherine’s army. However, the latter won decisively, forcing Sultan Selim III (r. 1789–1807) to sign the Treaty of Iasi (1792) that reconfirmed Kuchuk Kainarji’s provisions and made River Dniester their new border.

For Russian–Ottoman relations, Kuchuk Kainarji was crucial in diplomatic terms, too. Russia's diplomatic status in Istanbul moved from being a third rank (resident) to second (plenipotentiary)—with the understanding that in reality the Ottomans would begin to respect it as a first-rank power—and that it could have consulates anywhere in the Ottoman territory. The same thing could not be said about the Ottomans, however. Already seeing their military standing as a first-rank state slipping away—Sultan Selim III was poised, unsuccessfully, to build a modern army—diplomatically, too, Selim III's opening of permanent embassies abroad, the first being in London in 1793, was experienced by Ottoman diplomats as "humiliating."[30] Consequently, given the asymmetric rivalry that had accompanied their diplomatic relations, Russia's late-18th-century rise and the Ottoman relative decline came to be articulated as tense interactions, with "tsarist diplomats [trying] to add ceremonial gains to battlefield victories, [whereas] their Ottoman counterparts sought symbolic compensations for the lost battles."[31]

Between the Kuchuk Kainarji and Iasi treaties, the two states also signed the Treaty of Commerce (1783). The latter, in addition to reconfirming Russian merchants' shipping rights on the Black Sea, allowed Russia to join the capitulatory system of trade privileges in the Ottoman international trade that other European states—most notably France—had for many decades. These treaties created a "forced rapprochement between the Ottomans and Russians," whereby Ottoman Greeks and other Balkan merchants—displacing the once dominant French merchants—benefited by expanding their activities in the Adriatic Sea and the Black Sea, and using their connections in the Habsburg and Russian Empires.[32] These trade relations, nevertheless, would become another source of tension between the two states from the late 18th century onward. Already at the onset of the 19th century, Russian diplomats in Istanbul complained about irregularities in Ottoman implementation of trade agreements, whereas Ottoman officials criticized Russia's "protégé system," which allowed Ottoman Greeks to abuse the use of Russian flags as a means to avoid Ottoman regulations and obligations, hence putting the Ottoman state at a disadvantageous position in terms of transportation of commodities vis-à-vis Russia.[33]

Cooperation, Confrontation, Deterioration

While both empires began the 19th century on a note of political and military cooperation, Russia continued to exert its dominance over the Ottoman Empire for most of the "long nineteenth century," so much so that the Ottomans had to seek the support and the mediation of other European powers. But as these empires met completely transformative destinies at beginning of the 20th century—with the Russian Empire imploding and emerging as Soviet Russia, and the Ottoman Empire being broken up and succeeding as the Republic of Turkey—both of these successor states began to see their relations in friendly or "brotherly" terms again, perhaps as they had initially done at the turn of the 16th century.

Certainly, following the accession to the throne of Tsar Paul I (r. 1796–1801) and subsequently of his son Tsar Alexander I (r. 1801–1825), until 1806 Russian and Ottoman relations were on a better footing than they had been during Catherine's reign. A major reason for this change was the impact of the French Revolution and the wars it ushered in on the European continent, as well as against the Ottoman Empire. With regard to the latter, Napoleon Bonaparte occupied the Ottoman provinces of Egypt (1798) and Syria (1801), thus ending the Franco-Ottoman alliance established in the 16th century. But in so doing Napoleon brought together Selim III and Emperor Paul I into a brief alliance against his army in the Ionian and Adriatic Seas. Napoleon's initial goal there had been to take over the former Venetian possessions—seven islands on the Ionian Sea—as was agreed to with Habsburg Austria at the Treaty Campo Formio (1797). Yet, keen to snatch the islands away from France, Sultan Selim III allowed Russian military fleet to pass through Bosporus to join their Ottoman counterparts near these islands. And they did so, leading the two empires to ratify a convention in the summer of 1800 that turned these islands into the independent Septinsular Republic, which came under the Ottoman suzerainty but militarily protected by both.[34] Relations also improved because Paul and Alexander did not pursue Catherine's "Greek project."

This cooperation, however, came to an end because of the war between 1806 and 1812, triggered by a dispute over the status of the principalities of Moldova and Walachia and their dishonoring of their trade agreements. The Treaty of Bucharest (1812), concluding the war—Russia was keen to end it because Napoleon's *Grande Armée* was heading toward Moscow—nonetheless obliged Sultan Mahmud II (r. 1809–1839) to cede to Russia more territories (Bessarabia), give it shipping rights on the Danube, some western Georgian regions in the Caucasus, as well as forcing it to accept Serbia's autonomy. Curiously though, this Treaty, together with that of Adrianople (1829)—which concluded their 1828–1829 war, with Russia annexing more territories from the principality of Moldova and western Georgia from the Ottoman Empire in addition to getting the right of navigations in Bosporus to all commercial vessels—would be the last ones that the two empires negotiated and concluded bilaterally. The ensuing treaties would be drawn up with other European powers' mediations and interventions, which the sultans mostly welcomed, whereas the tsars did not.

Indeed, Tsar Alexander I wanted to maintain only bilateral relations without other powers intervention or mediation with the Ottoman Empire partly because of what he considered to be religious and civilizational differences between the two. After the defeat of Napoleonic France and the establishment of the Concert of Europe—a monarchial and antirevolutionary order for the European continent—at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, as well as his Christian-solidarity inspired Holy Alliance (1815), Tsar Alexander I resisted British calls for the Ottoman Empire to join the Concert of Europe on these grounds. In fact, in light of the Greek struggle for independence, also known as the Greek Uprising, that started in 1821, he could have gone to war against the Ottoman Empire by making use of his grandmother's policy of protecting Ottoman Orthodox subjects, or his Christian solidarity principle of his Holy Alliance platform. But did not use these justifications because he fundamentally was in favor of maintaining the principle of monarchical order

—given that the Ottoman Empire was a monarchical state—upon which the Concert of Europe held together.[35] Ultimately, but under his successor Tsar Nicholas I (r. 1825–1855), Russia, together with Britain and France, intervened militarily in the Greek Struggle, leading to the creation of the Hellenic Republic (1830), as well as setting in motion, "the Eastern Question," which was the process of intervening and managing the decline of the Ottoman Empire—which later included other powers such as Prussia (imperial Germany) and the Habsburg Empire. In economic terms, the two empires became "rivals," both exporting wheat to Europe and, with the Russian port of Odessa, competing against those in the Danubian principalities which, after the Treaty of Adrianople, were allowed to sell grain to other markets besides Istanbul.[36]

For his part, Sultan Mahmud II sought to overcome his Empire's decline by embarking on a series of reforms—often compared to Peter "the Great," but for him the guiding example was Selim III—establishing a modern army, setting up new institutions, and pursuing centralization policies (military campaigns against rebellious provinces). But as many historians have pointed out, this would not suffice and "sultan and the empire [became] second-class player[s], waiting to be rescued by their imperial protectors: Russia, Britain and France."[37] In the mid-1820s, in fact—in the context of the Greek Uprising—Sultan Mahmud II sought to improve relations with Russia by embarking on a policy of reconciliation. This policy became more pertinent during the first Ottoman–Egyptian war of 1831, which pitted Mahmud II's modern army against that of Mehmet Ali of Egypt, whereby the former's weak performance brought in Russia's fleet to defend Istanbul. Mahmud's approach sparked discussions among Istanbulians, who, seeing the sultan's modern army inability to defend the city, considered whether it would be better that Istanbul came under the control of their "brother in religion," i.e., Mehmet Ali of Egypt, or Russia.[38] The sultan's controversial reconciliation policy coincided with Tsar Nicholas I's approach—after the Treaty of Adrianople (1829)—of pursing a "weak neighbor strategy" toward the Ottoman Empire.[39] This meant that Russia would seek to control the Golden Horn of Istanbul without undermining Ottoman territorial integrity. This meeting of interests led to an eight-year period of military alliance between the two, confirmed with the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi (1833). The Treaty concluded that Sultan Mahmud II forfeited the Ottoman "ancient rule" of barring foreign military vessels from crossing the Strait in exchange for Russia's military support.

This alliance worried some Ottoman officials as well as Britain and France, the latter two being apprehensive that Russia would threaten their trade routes and colonies. Russian Foreign Minister Count Karl von Nesselrode downplayed French misgivings about this treaty in a letter to the French government in 1833, suggesting that it "was purely defensive . . . conducted between two independent powers . . . the Turkish Government will henceforth find a guarantee of stability and if need be, means of defense calculated to ensure its preservation."[40] However, following the second Ottoman–Egyptian war in 1839, Britain, France, Austria, and Prussia pressured Russia to share its interests on the Ottoman affairs. This led to the signing of the London Straight Convention (1841), which restored the Ottoman "ancient rule."[41]

This meant that, in the newly gained ground of influencing Ottoman external, and increasingly internal, affairs, Russia could not have exclusive bilateral relations with the Ottoman Empire. Britain—in light of its 1830s rivalry with Russia—became invested in the Ottoman affairs, turning, in fact, into a de facto guarantor of the empire's territorial integrity after 1841 and a supporter of its *Tanzimat* reforms. The Ottomans' siding with Britain led to a deterioration of the Russian–Ottoman relations. This deterioration was reflected in Russian public discourse—informed by the emergence of scholarly inquiry of the Ottoman Orient, *Osmanistika*—that blamed Ottoman dependency on the West and on its Westernizing reforms for the disappearance of authenticity of "Old Turkey," the weakening Ottoman state, and emergence of a "rootless and superficial" society.[42] It was reflected in their political relations, too, particularly on the eve of the Crimean War (1853–1856)—the *casus belli* being the dispute between the Greek Orthodox Church and French Catholics over the possession of the Holy Places' keys, with Sultan Abdulmejid I (r. 1839–1861) handing them over to the French—which pitted together the Ottoman Empire, Britain, and France against Russia. Tsar Nicholas I famously described the Ottoman Empire as "the sick man of Europe," whereas his ambassador in London, on the eve of war, told his British counterpart that "[Russian policy] consists of deeds, not of words. Russia is strong, Turkey is weak—that is the preamble of all our treaties."[43]

But Russia was defeated and—this was just when Tsar Alexander II (r. 1855–1881) got the reigns of the empire—this humiliating rout further deteriorated their relations, especially after the ensuing Treaty of Paris (1856) with its "Black Sea clauses" that forbade Russia from keeping its navy in the Black Sea. Meanwhile, the Ottoman Empire was admitted in the Concert of Europe, which—provided that it carried out reforms required more directly by its European allies—offered guarantees to its territorial integrity. These relations remained highly antagonistic, particularly from the Russian side, which saw to reverse its losses—as it did in the coming years by getting rid of the "Black Sea clauses" in the Convention of London (1871)—but more importantly, to reinstate its status as a great power. Russia saw its moment of comeback with the Russo-Ottoman war of 1877 and 1878, using also Pan-Slavism—the idea of a grand union of Slavonic people under its leadership—to liberate the Orthodox brethren: Serbs, Montenegrins, and Bulgarians (a brutal communal violence in 1876, served as one of the sparking rods for the war) from the Ottoman "yoke." Prior to this, the newly enthroned Sultan Abdulhamid II (r. 1876–1909)—who had accepted and then swiftly suspended a constitutional order for his realm—blamed Tsar Alexander II's Pan-Slavism for inciting religious fanaticism, threatening, in turn, to do the same with his co-religionists in Russia.[44] His reaction and use of the idea of defending the rights of co-religionists in Russia and beyond came to be articulated as Pan-Islamism informed his foreign policy, which nonetheless in the ensuing decades would turn toward isolationism vis-à-vis the other powers in Europe.[45]

This war ended with the Russian victory. But their bilateral Treaty of San Stefano (March, 1878), by which the sultan agreed to grant independence to Serbia, Romania, and Montenegro, as well as autonomy to Bulgaria, was rejected by the other great powers—one of the discords being the size of Bulgaria's territory. Its replacement, reached at the Congress of Berlin (July 1878), which also recognized Russia's annexation of the

northeast Ottoman territories of Kars, Ardahan, and Batumi showed that not only the Ottoman Empire's, but also Russia's, standing as a first-ranking power had not been restored. Despite these wars, *Tanzimat* reformers such as Grand Vizier Fuad Pasha still appreciated Russia's military strength. In an 1869 letter to Sultan Abdulmejid I's successor, Sultan Abdulaziz (r. 1861–1876), Grand Vizier Fuad Pasha envisaged a reformed empire that had "money like England, Enlightenment like France and troops like Russia"—the end of the 19th century showed that, in terms of trade, their relations became important; it was Ottoman non-Muslim merchants though that dominated Ottoman international trade.[46] Russia, like other European powers—following some of the stipulation of the Congress of Berlin and the establishment of the Public Debt Administration (1881) set to manage Ottoman debt—also profited from Ottoman revenues that the administration collected from the Ottoman economy.[47]

The onset of the 20th century saw a further deterioration of their relations. Existing and new tensions—such as Russia's pressure for autonomy of the Ottoman Armenian provinces and the incitement of Kurdish tribes to revolt from 1910 onward—put them at the opposite sides in the First World War.[48] Russia allied with Britain and France in the Triple Entente, whereas the Ottoman Empire joined Imperial Germany and Austro-Hungary in the Central Powers. This was also because, following a period of political and diplomatic isolationism pursued by Sultan Abdulhamid II and with the coming to power of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) after the 1908 Young Turk Revolution that restored the constitutional order suspended by the sultan—the CUP sought to come out of this isolation, as well as restore and strengthen the empire. In fact, however, the CUP, and Talat Pasha in particular, pitched the idea of an Ottoman-Russian alliance to Russian foreign minister, Sergey Sazonov, in May 1914; earlier in March it founded and funded a Turkish-Russian Committee jointly with Russians to support closer ties and such things as student exchanges. Yet CUP did not manage to come to an agreement with Russia; one that they had begun negotiating in the early 1913. In this negotiations Russia demanded autonomy for Ottoman Armenian provinces backed by military intervention. Failing to agree, the Ottomans decided to enter a defensive alliance with Imperial Germany in February 1914, though they kept the door open to an alliance until May 1914.[49]

The Ottoman and Russian armies fought their First World War battles—starting from late 1914—in the Caucasus and in Persia where massacres between Christians (Greek, Armenian, and Assyrians) and Muslims took place. Yet one of the most tragic events of the time was what came to be known at the Armenian genocide—a term largely disputed by Turkish historians—in which the CUP-led Ottoman government and army, from April 1915, perpetrated a policy of systematic killings, forced labor, and deportations of Ottoman-Armenian, intellectuals, soldiers, and civilians (the figure is also disputed, varying between 800,000 and 1,800,000 victims).[50] Amidst the fighting and horrors of the war, the Ottoman side had not been aware that the Russian Empire had signed a secret Constantinople Agreement (1915) with Britain and France. The agreement stipulated that, in the event of an Entente victory, Russia would control Istanbul, the Straits, and northeastern Anatolia (thus the Ottoman Armenian provinces and Trabzon) in return for its consent to British and French control of the other parts of the empire. Britain and

France materialized this in the Sykes-Picot-Sazanov Agreement (1916), which divided among them the Ottoman Arab provinces.[51]

The fighting between the Ottoman Empire and Russia ended with the latter's withdrawal from the war after the November 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, though the Russian office corps maintained its presence in Anatolia. Naming what remained of the former empire the Soviet Russia, the Bolsheviks, who took control of it but would have to fight with its Red Army a civil war against the anti-Bolshevik White Army until 1922, broke out the news of the Constantinople Agreement to the Ottomans and the rest of the world. And this fact, together with the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (March 1918) signed between the Central Powers, including the Ottomans—which confirmed Russia's withdrawal from war—and to the Ottomans' satisfaction who saw their 1878 lost territories in the Caucasus returned to them, seemed to have brought the interactions between the two sides to some repair.

However, what would bring them—the Soviet Russians under the leadership of Vladimir I Lenin on the one hand, the Ottoman/Turkish National Forces under the command of Mustafa Kemal on the other hand—closer, after the First World War, was their traumatic sidelining to the edges of a shattered European balance of power dominated by Britain and France.[52] A Bolshevik Soviet Russia—fighting a civil war against forces of the "old regime"—felt isolated ideologically and threatened by "antagonistic" and "imperialistic" powers in Europe. Meanwhile, Mustafa Kemal's resistance movement—fighting its "war of liberation" in 1919 against partition from Britain, France, and Italy, and their "proxies" Greece and Armenia—felt not only isolated but existentially threatened by them for its very survival. Significantly, the preamble to the Treaty of Moscow, signed in March 1921, summed up their shared sentiment of a common enemy, namely, seeking "Turkish-Russian solidarity in the struggle against imperialism."[53]

Undoubtedly, this Treaty opened a new chapter in the relations between a transformed Russia and an Empire that, in October 1923, would become the Republic of Turkey whereby the two parties agreed to solve what had become their centuries-old sources of contention: the status of Istanbul and the Straits, the question of control of the Black Sea, and the delineation of boundaries and territorial claims in Eastern Anatolia. With Tsarist Russia since Empress Catherine "the Great" having pressured the Ottoman Empire, in this Treaty Soviet Russia pledged to respect Ottoman/Turkish sovereignty, including that over Istanbul, and to resolve their other contentious issues in a future conference together with the other littoral countries.[54] The ensuing Treaty of Neutrality and Non-Aggression in 1925 was a further confirmation of this new chapter of maintaining friendly relations with each other, no longer as the Russian and Ottoman empires, but respectively as the Soviet Russia/Soviet Union/the Russian Federation and the Republic of Turkey.[55]

Discussion of the Literature

Historical English-language scholarship on Ottoman–Russian relations remains remarkably underwhelming. The few available contributions, such as B. H. Sumners's *Peter the Great and the Ottoman Empire* (1965), Michael A. Reynolds's *Shattering Empires: The Collapse of the Ottoman and Russian Empires, 1908–1918* (2011), William E. D. Allen and Paul Muratoff's *Caucasian Battlefields* (2011), and Victor Taki's *Tsar and the Sultan: Russian Encounters with the Ottoman Empire* (2016), focus on particular time frames and themes (war and diplomacy), which nonetheless do not provide exhaustive, comprehensive accounts on these 400-year-long relations. Moreover, except for Reynolds' work, these contributions (for lack of access to Ottoman sources or knowledge of the Ottoman language) only offer a "Russian" perspective.

The paucity of historical scholarship in English is not necessarily compensated by contributions from the respective Russian and Turkish scholarship. Of these, Russian scholarship stands out in terms of quantity. In this light, some of the most defining surveys of the Russian–Ottoman wars and the Russian foreign policy perspective on the "Eastern Question" have been written from the second half of the 19th century with a Russian imperial *state-school* historiographical tradition.[56] Similar themes of inquiry have been pursued during the Soviet and the post-Soviet[57] periods. Regarding Turkish scholarship—for there is not Ottoman scholarship on this—only few contributions emerge in the 1960s that place particular attention to the Russo–Ottoman War of 1877–1878.[58] An early 1990s symposium held in Turkey, titled "Five Hundred Year of Turkish-Russian Relations," published in the late 1990s as an edited volume, attempted to make up for the lack of such literature by analyzing 500 years of Ottoman–Russian and Turkish–Russian political and economic relations.[59] This was followed by an account of Ottoman–Russian relations during "the long 19th-century" by Akdes Nimet Kurat in his *Türkiye ve Rusya* (2011).

Since the early 1990s a sub-field of inquiry in comparative history of the empires has generated important literature that sheds further light on these relations. Contributions vary from edited volumes—with some of them adopting *entangled histories* perspective—to monographs, which examine particular phenomena or espouse to a *conceptual history* approach—with most of them focusing on these empires' 19th-century political and societal experiences.[60]

Primary Sources

One of most important Russian sources on Russian–Ottoman relations is the Inventory of Fond 89 at the Russian State Archives for Ancient Manuscripts. This Fond contains materials on 16th- and 17th-century relations.[61] In addition, an excellent source on commercial relations, and more specifically on Tsarist policy in the wider Ottoman world from the early 19th century, is held at Moscow's Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian

Empire. Ottoman sources on these relations are to be found at the Ottoman Prime Ministerial Archives, Süleymanyie Library, and Topkapi Palace Library and Achieves.

Digital Material and References

Guide to sources on Russian history and historiography.

Other collections relevant to Russian history.

Ottoman Empire Archives, *Hazine*.

Ottoman History Podcast.

Oxford Islamic Studies Online.

Oxford University Podcasts/Russia.

Russian-Ottoman Relations 1600–1914 Online.

Russia history before the eighteenth century.

Russian State Library.

Slavic and Eurasian Studies, digital collections and databases.

The National Library of Russia.

Turkish & Ottoman Studies Research Guide.

Further Reading

Berger, Stefan, and Alexai Miller. Eds. *Nationalizing Empires*. Budapest: The Central European University Press, 2016.

Burbank, Jane, and Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010.

Brisku, Adrian, *Political Reform in the Ottoman and Russian Empires*. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017.

Crews, Robert D., *For Prophet and Tsar: Islam and Empire in Russia and Central Asia*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006.

Frary, Lucien J., and Mara Kozelsky, Eds. *Russian-Ottoman Borderlands*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014.

Layton, Susan, *Russian Literature and Empire: Conquest of the Caucasus from Pushkin to Tolstoy*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Leonhard, Jörn, and Ulrike von Hirschhause. Eds. *Comparing Empires: Encounters and Transfers in the Long Nineteenth Century*. Gottingen, Germany: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2012.

Lieven, Dominic, *Russian Empire and its Rivals*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000.

Neumann, Iver B., and Einar Wigen, *The Steppe Tradition in the International Relations: Russians, Turks and European State Building, 4000 BCE–2018 CE*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2018.

Reynolds, Michael A., *Shattering Empires: The Collapse of the Ottoman and Russian Empires, 1908–1918*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

Rieber, Alfred J., *The Struggle for the Eurasian Borderlands: From the Rise of Early Modern Empires to the End of the First World War*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2014.

Robarts, Andrew, *Migration and Disease in the Black Sea Region: Ottoman and Russian Relations in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries*. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018.

Smiley, Will, *From Slaves to Prisoners of War: The Ottoman Empire, Russia and International Law*. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 2018.

Notes:

(1.) Daniel Goffman, “Negotiating with the Renaissance State: The Ottoman Empire and the New Diplomacy.” In *The Early Modern Ottomans: Remapping the Empire*. Edited by Daniel Goffman and Virginia H. Aksan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 61–74.

(2.) Halil Inalcik, “Osmanli-Rus Iliskeleri, 1492–1700.” *Türk-Rus Iliskileri Iliskilerinde 500 Yil (1491–1992)* (Ankara, Turkey: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1999), 22–29.

(3.) Roger Crowley, *Constantinople: The Last Great Siege, 1453* (London: Faber and Faber, 2005).

(4.) “Gennadius II Scholarios I, the Patriarch of Constantinople.” *Encyclopedia Britannica*.

(5.) John J. Norwich, *Byzantium: The Decline and Fall* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995).

(6.) Victor Taki, *Tsar and Sultan: Russian Encounters with the Ottoman Empire* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2016), 22; see also “Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Moskovkogo gosudarstva s Krymom, nogaimi i Turtsieiu.” *Sbornik Imperatoskogo Russkogo Istoricheskogo Obshchstva* 95 (1895): 100.

(7.) Iver B. Neumann, *Russia and the Idea of Europe: A Study in Identity and International Relations* (London and New York: Routledge 1996), 46.

(8.) Brian Davies, *Warfare, State, Society in the Black Sea Steppe* (London: Routledge, 2007).

(9.) Dimitri Strémooukhoff, "Moscow the Third Rome: Sources of the Doctrine," *Speculum* 28, no. 1 (1953): 84–101.

(10.) Taki, *Tsar and Sultan*, 22.

(11.) Alan Wood, *The Romanov Empire 1613–1917* (London: Hodder Arnold, 2007), 56.

(12.) Andre Clot, *Suleiman the Magnificent* (London: Saqi, 2005), 39.

(13.) Edhem Eldem, "Capitulations and Western Trade." In *The Later Ottoman Empire, 1603–1839*. Edited by Suraiya N. Faroqhi (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 283–335; 302.

(14.) Halil Inalcik, "The Ottoman State: Economy, Society, 1300–1600." In *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*. Edited by Halil Inalcik and Donald Quataert (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 9–410; 232.

(15.) Carl M. Korteperter, "The Ottoman Imperial Policy and the Economy of the Black Sea Region in the Sixteenth Century." *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 86, no. 2 (1966): 86–113; 109.

(16.) Akdes Kurat, "'The Turkish Expedition to Astrakhan' in 1569 and the Problem of Don-Volga Canal," *The Slavonic Review* 40 (1961): 10–23.

(17.) Taki, *Tsar and Sultan*, 5–25.

(18.) Christoph K. Neumann, "Political and Diplomatic Developments." In *The Later Ottoman Empire, 1603–1839* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 44–64; 51.

(19.) Alexandre Mikaberidze, ed. *Conflict and Conquest in the Islamic World: A Historical Encyclopedia* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio, 2011), 180–182.

(20.) Benedict H. Sumner, *Peter the Great and the Ottoman Empire* (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1965), 31.

(21.) Korteperter, "The Ottoman Imperial Policy," 105.

(22.) Sumner, *Peter the Great and the Ottoman Empire*, 7; Ilber Ortayli, "XVIII. Yüzyil Türk-Rus." In *Türk-Rus Iliskileri Iliskilerinde 500 Yil (1491-1992)* (Ankara, Turkey: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1999), 128. .

(23.) Haluk F. Gürsel, *Tarih Boyuca Türk-Rus Iliskileri* (Ankara, Turkey: Ak Yayinlari, 1968), 56.

(24.) Taki, *Tsar and Sultan*, 12.

(25.) Virginia H. Aksan, “War and Peace.” In *The Later Ottoman Empire, 1603–1839*. Edited by Suraiya N. Faroqhi (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 81–117; 103; Virginia H. Aksan, “The One-eyed Fighting the Blind: Mobilization, Supply, Command in the Russian-Turkish War of 1768–1774.” *The International History Review* 15, no. 2 (1993): 221–238.

(26.) Majid Khaduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam* (Clark, NJ: Lawbook Exchange, 2006), 286.

(27.) Virginia H. Aksan, “Locating the Ottomans among the Early Modern Empires,” *Journal of Early Modern History* 3, no. 2 (1999), 103–134.

(28.) Simon Dixon, *Catherine the Great* (London: Profile Books, 2010), 206.

(29.) Dominic Lieven, *Russian Empire and its Rivals* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), 142.

(30.) Mehmet A. Yalçinkaya, *The First Permanent Ottoman Embassy in Europe: The Embassy of Yusuf Agah Efendi to London, 1793–1797* (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2010); Aksan, “War and Peace,” 108.

(31.) Taki, *Tsar and Sultan*, 19.

(32.) Eldem, “Capitulations and Western Trade,” 323.

(33.) Theophilus C. Prousis, “Risky Business: Russian Trade in the Ottoman Empire in the Early Nineteenth Century,” *Mediterranean Historical Review* 20, no. 2 (2005), 201–226; 202–204.

(34.) Katherine E. Fleming, *The Muslim Bonaparte: Diplomacy and Orientalism in Ali Pasha’s Greece* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Legacy Library, 1999), 102.

(35.) Adrian Brisku, “The Holy Alliance and the Laws of Religion and Humanity.” In *Paradoxes of Peace in the Nineteenth Century Europe*. Edited by Thomas Hippler and Milos Vec (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 2015), 153–169; 167; Adrian Brisku, “‘Politics of Change and Stability’ in Ottoman and Russian Empires, 1815–1914.” In *Europe 1815–1914: Creating Community and Ordering the World*. Edited by Martti Koskenniemi and Bo Strath (Helsinki, Finland: Unigrafia Oy, 2014), 44–58; 48.

(36.) Donald Quataert, “Part IV: The Age of Reforms, 1812–1914.” In *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*. Edited by Halil Inalcik and Donald Quataert (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 759–946; 825; Candan Badem, *The Ottoman Crimean War, 1853–1856* (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2010), 63.

(37.) Adrian Brisku, *Political Reform in the Ottoman and Russian Empires* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017), 63; Aksan, “War and Peace,” 104–105.

(38.) Christine M. Philliou, *Biography of an Empire: Governing Ottomans in an Age of Revolution* (Berkley: University of California Press, 2011), 107.

(39.) Taki, *Tsar and Sultan*, 159.

(40.) Frank E. Bailey, *British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement: A Study in Anglo-Turkish Relations, 1826–1853* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1942), 54.

(41.) Philliou, *Biography of an Empire*, 102.

(42.) Taki, *Tsar and Sultan*, 165.

(43.) Mustafa Aksakal, "Europeanisation, Islamization, and the New Imperialism." In *Paradoxes of Peace in the Nineteenth Century Europe*. Edited by Thomas Hippler and Milos Vec (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 2015), 250–257; 254.

(44.) Selim Deringil, *Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876–1909* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1998), 46.

(45.) Dwight E. Lee, "The Origins of Pan-Islamism," *American Historical Review* 47, no. 2 (1942), 278–287; Kemal Karpat, *Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith and Community in the Late Ottoman State* (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 2001), 280–282.

(46.) Egin D. Akarli, *Belgelerle Tanzimat-Osmanli Sadrazamlaridan Ali ve Fuad Pasalarin Siyasi Vasyietnameleri* (Istanbul, Turkey: Bogazini Unversitesi Yayinlari, 1978), 2; Donald Quataert, "Part IV: The Age of Reforms," 833–839.

(47.) Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*. 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1966).

(48.) Michael A. Reynolds, *Shattering Empires: The Clash and Collapse of Ottoman and Russian Empires, 1908–1918* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

(49.) Carter V. Findley, *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity: A History, 1789–2007* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010).

(50.) Ronald G. Suny, *"They Can Live in the Desert but Nowhere Else": A History of the Armenian Genocide* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015), xiv–xx; Ahsan I. Butt, *Secession and Security: Explaining State Strategy Against Separatists* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2017), 128.

(51.) Findley, *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity*, 218.

(52.) Samuel J. Hirst, "Antiwesternism on the European Periphery: The Meaning of the Soviet-Turkish Convergence in the 1930s," *Slavic Review* 7, no. 21 (Spring, 2013): 32–53.

(53.) Roderic H. Davison, *Essays in Ottoman-Turkish History, 1774–1923* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990), 219.

(54.) Moskovskii dogovor mezhdi Rosskiei i Turciei.

(55.) Erel Tellal, “Sovyetler ile Iliskiler.” In *Türk dis Politikasi*, Vol. I. Edited by Oran Baskin, 6th ed. (Istanbul, Turkey: Iletisim Yayinlari, 2002), 174.

(56.) A. N. Petrov, *Voina Rossii s Turtsiei i pol’skimi konfederatami*, 5 vols. (St. Petersburg: Veimar, 1866–1874); A. N. Petrov, *Vtoraia turetskaia voina v tsarstvovanie Ekateriny vtoroi* (St. Petersburg: Golike, 1880); A. N. Petrov, *Voina Rosii s Turtsiei, 1806–1812*, 3 vols. (St. Petersburg: Voennaia tipografiia, 1885–1887); A. N. Petrov, *Voina Rossii s Turtsiei, Dunaiskaia kampaniia, 1853–1854* (St. Petersburg: Voennaia tipografiia, 1890); V. I. Ulianitskii, *Dardanelly, Bosfor, i Chernoie more v XVIII v*. (Moscow: Gatsuk, 1883); S. A. Zhigarev, *Russkaia politika v vostchnom voprose. Istoriko-iuridicheskie ocherki*, 2 vols. (Moscow: Universitetskaia tipografiia, 1896); S. M. Gorianov, *Bosfor i Dardanelly. Issledovanie voprosa o prolivkakh po peripieske khraniashcheisia v Gosudarstvennom i Sankt-Peterburgskom glavnykh arkhivakh* (St. Petersburg: Skorokhodov, 1907).

(57.) T. K. Krylova, “Rusko-turetskie otnosheniya vo vremiya severnoi voiny,” in *Istorichskie Zapiski* (1941); N. A. Smyrnov, *Rossiya i Turtsiya v XVI i XVII vv*, 2 vols. (Moscow, 1946); E. P. Kudriavtseva, *Russkie na Bosfore: Rossiskie posol’tsvo v Kostandiopole v pervoi polovine XIX v*. (Moscow, 2011).

(58.) Y. T. Kurat, “1877–78 Osmanli-Rus harbibnim sebepleri,” (Ankara, Turkey, 1962); T. Y. Öztuna, *Resimlerle 93 Harbi. 1877–78 Türk-Rus Savasi* (Ankara, Turkey, 1969)

(59.) *Türk-Rus Iliskileri Iliskilerinde 500 Yil (1491–1992)* (Ankara, Turkey: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1999).

(60.) Karen Barkey, and Mark von Hagen. Eds. *After Empire: Multi-Ethnic Societies and Nation-building* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1977); Alexei Miller, and Alfred. J. Rieber. Eds. *Imperial Rule* (Budapest, Hungary: CEU Press, 2004); Jörn Leonhard, and Ulrike von Hirschhause. Eds. *Comparing Empires: Encounters and Transfers in the Long Nineteenth Century* (Göttingen, Germany: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2012); Adrian Brisku, *Political Reform in the Ottoman and Russian Empires* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017); Will Smiley, *From Slaves to Prisoners of War: The Ottoman Empire, Russia and International Law* (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 2018); Andrew Robarts, *Migration and Disease in the Black Sea Region: Ottoman and Russian Relations in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018).

(61.) Available online.

Adrian Brisku

School of International Relations & Diplomacy, Anglo-American University in Prague