CHAPTER 9

Enemies at the gate: The Moabit Klostersturm *and the* Kulturkampf*: Germany**

Manuel Borutta

> Gentlemen, anyone who believes in our day and age that he must carry his religion around with him, anyone who feels obliged to wear a particular dress, who swears grotesque vows, who bands together in herds, and who, when all is said and done, swears unconditional loyalty to Rome, the bitterest enemy of our young German and Prussian glory – such people can have no place in our state. That is why I say: away with them as fast as possible. (Enthusiastic cheers).[1]

During the Prussian Landtag debate of 7 May 1875 on the prohibition of religious orders and congregations, the National Liberal deputy Georg Jung lent expression to a central feature of the *Kulturkampf*:[2] the symbolic exclusion of Catholicism from the hegemonial version of national culture. This process had been underway since the end of the eighteenth century. To enlightened Protestant North Germans, Catholicism appeared exotic and alien.[3] In the nineteenth century, the 'orientalist'[4] image of a static, historyless Catholic world served as a foil to the construction of a modern identity that was secular but confessionally coloured. While the decisive protagonists of the *Kulturkampf*, the liberals, saw Protestantism – which for

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[1] *Preußischer Landtag. Haus der Abgeordneten 1875. Stenographische Berichte*, vol. III, 1768.

[2] The most influential early public use of the term *Kulturkampf* was that of the pathologist Rudolf Virchow, co-founder of the left-liberal *Deutsche Fortschrittspartei*; see *Preußischer Landtag. Haus der Abgeordneten 1872/3. Stenographische Berichte*, I, 631. Earlier uses by other authors are discussed in Adalbert Wahl, *Vom Bismarck der 70er Jahre* (Tübingen, 1920), 6–7; Claudia Lepp, *Protestantisch-liberaler Aufbruch in die Moderne. Der deutsche Protestantenverein in der Zeit der Reichsgründung und des Kulturkampfes* (Gütersloh, 1996), 328.

[3] Hans-Wolf Jäger, 'Der reisende Enzyklopäd und seine Kritiker. Friedrich Nicolais "Beschreibung einer Reise durch Deutschland und die Schweiz im Jahre 1781"', *Jahrbuch der deutschen Schillergesellschaft* 26 (1982), 104–24.

[4] Borrowing the paradigm developed by Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York, 1995), we may characterise German anti-Catholicism as an intra-occidental orientalism.

most was their own confessional affiliation – as compatible with modernity, they perceived Catholicism as 'modernity's other'.[5]

At first glance, this perceived dichotomy appears to be borne out by the inner development of both confessions. Whereas Protestantism was characterised by the hegemony of a liberal interest that pressed for the 'breakthrough into modernity',[6] the ultramontanisation of Catholicism entailed the marginalisation and even in some cases secession of pro-modern forces.[7] In the *Syllabus errorum* of 1864, the papacy itself defined Catholicism as the antithesis of modernity. Although it would be wrong to claim that the majority of Protestants were liberal, or that Catholicism was monolithically ultramontane, the two religions seemed to have positioned themselves in pro- and anti-modern camps – even before the onset of the *Kulturkampf*.

If we turn to the level of practices and institutions it becomes clear, however, that the *Kulturkampf* was not a conflict between tradition and modernity. Despite the anti-modernity of its programme, Catholicism developed an extraordinary dynamism after 1850.[8] The centralisation of the church apparatus, the disciplining of the clergy, the invention of confessional traditions, symbols and rituals, the revival of religious practices and the formation of an extensive, ramified, finely woven institutional and communicative network all suggest that Catholicism was embarked on a religious path to modernity.[9]

In Prussia, the focal point of the *Kulturkampf* in the German Empire,[10] Catholic revival was facilitated by the constitution of 1850, which conceded far-reaching autonomy to the recognised confessions. By contrast with the Protestant churches, the Catholics proved adept at exploiting to the full

[5] Manuel Borutta, 'Das Andere der Moderne. Geschlecht, Sexualität und Krankheit in antikatholischen Diskursen Deutschlands und Italiens (1850–1900)', in Werner Rammert (ed.), *Kollektive Identitäten und kulturelle Innovationen. Ethnologische, soziologische und historische Studien* (Leipzig, 2001), 59–75.

[6] Gangolf Hübinger, *Kulturprotestantismus und Politik. Zum Verhältnis von Liberalismus und Protestantismus im wilhelminischen Deutschland* (Tübingen, 1994); Lepp, *Aufbruch*.

[7] Otto Weiss, 'Der Ultramontanismus. Grundlagen – Vorgeschichte – Struktur', *Zeitschrift für bayerische Landesgeschichte* 41 (1978), 821–77; Christoph Weber, 'Ultramontanismus als katholischer Fundamentalismus', in Wilfried Loth (ed.), *Deutscher Katholizismus im Umbruch zur Moderne* (Stuttgart, 1991), 20–45.

[8] Jonathan Sperber, *Popular Catholicism in Nineteenth-Century Germany* (Princeton, 1984).

[9] Irmtraud Götz von Olenhusen, *Klerus und abweichendes Verhalten. Zur Sozialgeschichte katholischer Priester im 19. Jahrhundert: Die Erzdiözese Freiburg* (Göttingen, 1994); Norbert Busch, *Katholische Frömmigkeit und Moderne. Die Sozial- und Mentalitätsgeschichte des Herz-Jesu-Kultes in Deutschland zwischen Kulturkampf und Erstem Weltkrieg* (Gütersloh, 1997).

[10] For a comparative discussion of the culture wars in Baden, Bavaria, Prussia and the Empire: Ellen L. Evans, *The Cross and the Ballot: Catholic Political Parties in Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Belgium and The Netherlands, 1785–1985* (Boston, 1999), 93–122.

the opportunities created by the new system.[11] Among the beneficiaries were the Catholic orders: the number of monks and nuns rose from 713 in 1855 to 5,877 in 1867 to 8,795 in 1872/3.[12] A significant novelty of this era was the foundation of new Catholic congregations in Protestant areas. As a consequence of mass migrations, the nineteenth century saw the emergence of modern diasporal regions in which alien forms of faith were confronted with each other for the first time, so that confessional identity and difference acquired a new significance.[13]

The potential for conflict was heightened by the fact that processes of confessionalisation[14] and of de- and re-Christianisation did not unfold in linear or synchronised fashion.[15] At the time of the Catholic revival, Protestantism saw a decline in formal religious observance.[16] Although the numerical relationship between the confessions remained stable in Prussia during the 1860s (almost 61 per cent Protestants to 37.4 per cent Catholics), and the position of the Protestants improved somewhat in 1866, due to the Prussian annexations,[17] Protestants nevertheless perceived the florescence of the confessional rival as a threat. The expansion of Catholic congregations seemed to betoken an attempt to 'overcome' Prussia, to 'de-Protestantise' it. The evangelising missionary tours of Jesuits and Redemptorists were compared with military campaigns, the foundation of congregations with the conquest of new bastions.[18] Even the less politically oriented orders that concerned themselves with pastoral duties and the care of the sick became

[11] Ernst R. Huber and Wolfgang Huber, *Staat und Kirche im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. Dokumente zur Geschichte des deutschen Staatskirchenrechts*, 4 vols. (Berlin, 1973–88), II, 34–8; Jonathan Sperber, 'Competing Counterrevolutions: Prussian State and Catholic Church in Westphalia during the 1850s', *Central European History* 19 (1986), 45–62; Simon Hyde, 'Roman Catholicism and the Prussian State in the Early 1850s', *Central European History* 24 (1991), 95–121.

[12] Ronald J. Ross, *The Failure of Bismarck's Kulturkampf. Catholicism and State Power in Imperial Germany, 1871–1887* (Washington D.C., 1998), 76.

[13] Helmut Walser Smith, *German Nationalism and Religious Conflict. Culture, Politics and Ideology 1870–1914* (Princeton, 1995), 93–6.

[14] Christel Köhle-Hezinger, *Evangelisch – katholisch. Untersuchungen zu konfessionellem Vorurteil und Konflikt im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Tübingen, 1976), 94–7; Tobias Dietrich, 'Konfessionelle Gegnerschaft im Dorf (1800–1950)', in Olaf Blaschke (ed.), *Konfessionen im Konflikt. Deutschland zwischen 1800–1970: ein zweites konfessionelles Zeitalter* (Göttingen, 2002), 181–213.

[15] Hartmut Lehmann (ed.), *Säkularisierung, Dechristianisierung, Rechristianisierung im neuzeitlichen Europa: Bilanz und Perspektiven der Forschung* (Göttingen, 1997); Hugh McLeod, *Secularisation in Western Europe, 1848–1914* (New York, 2000).

[16] Lucian Hölscher, 'Einleitung', in Lucian Hölscher (ed.), *Datenatlas zur religiösen Geographie im protestantischen Deutschland. Von der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts bis zum Zweiten Weltkrieg*, 4 vols. (Berlin, 2001), I, 1–20.

[17] Gerhard Besier, *Religion, Nation, Kultur. Die Geschichte der christlichen Kirchen in den gesellschaftlichen Umbrüchen des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Neukirchen-Vluyn, 1992), 63.

[18] Johannes. B. Kißling, *Geschichte des Kulturkampfes im Deutschen Reiche*, 3 vols. (Freiburg, 1911–16), I, 301–2.

suspect. In a 'firmament of bourgeois values' whose fixed stars were reason, categorical imperative, freedom, intimacy, heterosexuality, publicity and work, there was little room for faith, casuistry, vows, the confession of sins, celibacy, monastic seclusion and contemplation.[19] In the *Kulturkampf*, two distinct cosmologies separated by the portals of the cloister confronted each other as antagonists.

We turn now to an exemplary encounter of this kind. As early as August 1869, there were attacks on a Catholic orphanage run by Dominicans and Franciscans in Berlin-Moabit. It was under the shock effect of this event and of its parliamentary aftermath that Catholics founded the Centre Party in 1870.[20] The 'Moabiter Klostersturm' is thus rightly regarded as marking the onset of the *Kulturkampf* in the German Empire. An analysis of the episode is fruitful for several reasons. Like the *Kulturkampf*, it resulted from the clash of a plurality of partly contradictory and partly mutually reinforcing tendencies in nineteenth-century life: industrialisation, de- and re-Christianisation, confessionalisation, the rise of bourgeois society, capitalism and democracy. To a certain extent it prefigured the course and conclusion of the *Kulturkampf* itself. It demonstrates in miniature that the *Kulturkampf* was more than a political conflict between state and church or a struggle to install a monopoly over ideology[21] – it was a confrontation between worlds of collective imagination that embraced the sphere of everyday practices.[22] Since the storm on the cloisters took place before the foundation of the German Empire, it has the additional advantage that it permits us to disaggregate, as it were, the socio-confessional dimension of the conflict from the ideological and political impact of war and unification, and thereby to assess their relative importance. By focusing on the 'culture war' before the *Kulturkampf*, we also avoid the pitfalls of a teleological perspective that would see the *Kulturkampf* as the inevitable consequence of secularisation[23] or of confessionalisation.[24] By contrast, the aim of this chapter is to examine the *Kulturkampf* as a multi-dimensional conflict between two competing cultural imperialisms – one of them modernist

[19] Manfred Hettling and Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann (eds.), *Der bürgerliche Wertehimmel. Innenansichten des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Göttingen, 2000).

[20] George Windell, *The Catholics and German Unity, 1866–1871* (Minneapolis, 1954), 239.

[21] Dieter Langewiesche, *Liberalismus in Deutschland* (Frankfurt, 1988), 181.

[22] David Blackbourn, *Marpingen. Apparitions of the Virgin Mary in Bismarckian Germany* (Oxford, 1993).

[23] For a critique of secularisation theory, see Jonathan Sperber, 'Kirchengeschichte or the Social and Cultural History of Religion?', *Neue Politische Literatur* 43 (1998), 13–35.

[24] Olaf Blaschke, 'Das 19. Jahrhundert: Ein Zweites Konfessionelles Zeitalter?', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 26 (2000), 38–75, 58.

and liberal,[25] the other anti-modern and ultramontane.[26] It was a conflict that would end with the lasting subordination of Catholicism to the liberal-Protestant hegemonial culture of the German Empire. The consequences would be imprinted not only on the behaviour of Catholics and non-Catholics, but also on political culture and academic life.

MISSION IMPOSSIBLE – THE RETURN OF THE DOMINICANS TO A CATHOLIC DIASPORA CITY

When the Dominican Pater Ceslaus, Alfred Count de Robiano, a grandson of the famous convert Friedrich Leopold Count Stolberg, arrived in Berlin in March 1866, he was enthusiastic: 'A flourishing associational life, artisans' clubs, eight or nine Vincentian conferences, hospitals, Catholic schools, new chapels, all this has taken root and prospered; and behind it there stand eager determined Catholics of every rank and status whose relations with each other remind one vividly of the first Christians.'[27] The key figure behind this revival was the missionary vicar and church councillor Eduard Müller. Since his arrival in 1852, this Silesian, known as a 'second Boniface' and the 'apostle of Berlin' had revitalised traditional rituals, built up a local Catholic press and associational network and even facilitated the foundation of female religious communities.[28] Despite the concern and criticism of leading Protestants, these developments were tacitly tolerated by the Prussian authorities and even directly supported by Queen Augusta of Prussia.[29] Nevertheless, the limited pastoral capacities of diasporal Berlin were completely overstrained. In 1862, a total of 33,580 Catholics were served by eleven priests. Thanks to inward migration from Silesia, Posen and West Prussia, the number of Catholics in the expanding industrial metropolis had risen disproportionately: from 7,736 (1821) to 20,000 (1849) and 56,171 (1868).[30] In view of this unsatisfactory state of affairs, Robiano, acting on

[25] Páll Björnsson, 'Making the New Man. Liberal Politics and Associational Life in Leipzig, 1845–1871' (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Rochester, N.Y., 1999).

[26] Olaf Blaschke, 'Die Kolonialisierung der Laienwelt. Priester als Milieumanager und die Kanäle klerikaler Kuratel', in Olaf Blaschke and Frank-Michael Kuhlemann (eds.), *Religion im Kaiserreich. Milieus – Mentalitäten – Krisen* (Gütersloh, 1996), 93–135.

[27] Cited in Hieronymus Wilms, *Alfred Graf Robiano P. Ceslaus, der Erneuerer des Dominikanerordens in Deutschland* (Düsseldorf, 1957), 179.

[28] Ernst Thrasolt, *Eduard Müller. Der Berliner Missionsvikar* (Berlin, 1953); Michael Höhle, *Die Gründung des Bistums Berlin 1930* (Paderborn, 1996), 36–7.

[29] Meinolf Lohrum, *Die Wiederanfänge des Dominikanerordens in Deutschland nach der Säkularisation, 1856–1875* (Mainz, 1971), 138–9, 144, 156.

[30] Leo Jablonski, *Geschichte des fürstbischöflichen Delegaturbezirkes Brandenburg und Pommern*, 2 vols. (Breslau, 1929), I, 207–18.

the initiative of Müller and the director of the Catholic Division in the Kultusministerium, Adalbert Krätzig, suggested to the head of his order that a mission-house for the Boniface Society (Bonifatiusverein)[31] be established in Berlin: 'There could not be a more advantageous moment [than the present] for advancing into Berlin . . . Silesia has more religious vocations than it can use. These young people are looking everywhere in order to dedicate themselves to the religious life. Here we would be at the point of entry.'[32]

Since the Dominicans had only returned to Germany in 1860 – their convents had been closed down at the beginning of the nineteenth century – there were reservations within the order about speedy expansion, especially in the city of Berlin, the capital of Prussia. When the head of the Düsseldorf Dominican community learned of Robiano's plans, he demanded the latter's immediate return: 'The idea is fine, seductive, and flattering to our fancy, but there will be a high price to pay, as we shall learn to our detriment. At the present moment there can be no doubt about this.'[33] Despite similar reservations, the general of the order approved the foundation of a community in Berlin. After Robiano – a Belgian citizen – had returned to Berlin to perform pastoral duties among the Italian-speaking wounded of the Austrian army, he was awarded Prussian citizenship on the recommendation of the queen and offered a post at the garrison hospital.[34] In Moabit, an industrial working-class quarter in the north of Berlin, he saw an ideal domain for the work of the Dominicans. When the St Hedwig's Women's Association offered him the chief administrative post at the orphanage, Robiano leaped at the chance. Under the cover of working with orphans, he assured the head of his order, one could build up as large a community as one wished without fearing the effects on public opinion. The Women's Association shared this view: with work of this kind, they argued, the Dominican order could count on the neutrality of the Protestant public and the benevolence of the government; astonishment and curiosity would be set aside.[35]

It was within this legal grey zone that the Dominicans began their mission. Two Franciscans were recruited from Aachen to educate the orphans. By summer 1869, two further Dominicans had joined them. At first, there was hardly any demand for their pastoral services. The monks lamented

[31] On the significance of the Boniface tradition for the ultramontane diasporal mission in Germany, see Siegfried Weichlein, 'Der Apostel der Deutschen. Die konfessionspolitische Konstruktion des Bonifatius im 19. Jahrhundert', in Blaschke, *Konfessionen*, 155–79.

[32] Cited in Wilms, *Robiano*, 180. [33] Lohrum, *Wiederanfänge*, 142.

[34] Ibid., 137. [35] Ibid., 145–55.

the indifferent attitude of the Moabit Catholics in questions of faith, their infrequent attendance at mass and confession, and the many confessionally mixed marriages in which the children were educated as Protestants. Since Robiano planned to retrieve his 'lost sheep', they hit upon the idea of establishing a parish office of their own. Since the Dominicans lacked corporate status and were thus not entitled to acquire property, they purchased the neighbouring property through the Women's Association. There, they built a chapel that was opened on 4 August 1869 with a celebratory sermon by Eduard Müller.[36]

On the following day, a detailed report of the ceremony appeared in the pro-governmental newspaper *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*. The report emphasised the presence of 'senior state officials, officers and citizens', and mentioned the head of the Catholic Division of the Kultusministerium, *Ministerialdirektor* Krätzig – himself a Catholic – by name.[37] Many newspapers erroneously assumed that church councillor Müller was a 'councillor in the Catholic Department of the ministry of Church Affairs'.[38] Although the conservative *Kultusminister*, Heinrich von Mühler, an opponent of the separation of church and state, denied that his ministry had played any part in the event,[39] he was suspected thereafter of promoting Catholicism. Mühler and his conciliatory church policy now came under increasing pressure from the Liberals.

Eduard Müller's address evoked an even stronger response. The mission vicar had described Moabit as a symbol not only of 'hedonism [and] the pursuit of material success' but also of 'a modern, steam-powered industry' which knows and pursues only earthly objectives. In order to 'slay the savage giant of unbelief', a ' "new Rome" was to be established here, "in Jerusalem" '.[40] The liberal press countered this philippic against the Zeitgeist with praise for the hard-working 'North German population', whose 'education and civilised outlook' found expression precisely in the 'indifference of a creative and industrious unbelief vis-à-vis the fairy-tale of idle prayer and contemplation'.[41] Müller himself invoked this dichotomous portrayal of the capitalist and the Catholic ways of life in the *Märkisches Kirchenblatt*.[42] A binary opposition that emerged from the polemical denunciations and self-justifications of liberals and ultramontanes during the

[36] Ibid., 155–65. In correspondence with the building authorities, this new ecclesiastical building was declared an extension of the orphanage. See Kurt Wernicke, 'Der "Moabiter Klostersturm"', *Berlinische Monatsschrift* 3 (1994), 6–14, 7.

[37] *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, 5 August 1869. [38] *Berliner St. Bonifacius-Kalender* (1883), 31.

[39] *National-Zeitung*, 28 August 1869. [40] *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, 5 August 1869.

[41] *Volks-Zeitung*, 11 August 1869. [42] *Märkisches Kirchenblatt*, 28 August 1869.

Kulturkampf became by the turn of the century a core element of the confessionalist paradigm and one of the axioms of secularisation theory.[43] But the Müller speech was also interpreted within the context of a confessionalism that legitimated itself in historical terms. With the onset of the 'second age of confessionalisation' as one historian has called it,[44] the Reformation, the Counter-Reformation and the Thirty Years War became virtual battlefields for a confessional struggle over national history that was only resolved in favour of the Protestants with the foundation of a small-German empire.[45] Against this background, the appearance of a Dominican establishment in the 'metropolis of Protestantism' could be seen as the sign of a second Counter-Reformation. The liberal press was thus unsettled by the 'confidence in victory' with which 'the Romelings anticipate the eventual return of the Protestant city to the Roman yoke'.[46] Whereas Müller was cited as stating that the supportive attitude of the authorities revealed a 'Prussian trait' in the tradition of Frederick the Great,[47] the liberal newspaper celebrated the revolt against Luther's rival Johannes Tetzel – a 'degenerate [*entarteten*] Dominican' and an 'envoy of the Roman Church' – as the 'greatest and most moral act of the German people'.[48] Müller was astonished at the impact of his address. That the press had taken note of it at all was somewhat suspicious and suggested that an intrigue was afoot.[49] Notwithstanding Müller's later denial of certain passages and the publication of a supposedly 'authentic' version of the address,[50] the Moabit foundation – and with it all Catholic orders and monasteries – was henceforth at the centre of public attention.

CONVENT STORIES – THE UBRYK AFFAIR AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF CIVIL SOCIETY

The opening of the Dominican chapel happened to coincide with a European cloister scandal.[51] Only a week before, the liberal press had reported on a 'dreadful crime' that had allegedly taken place in Cracow. The local convent of the Carmelites had been searched by the authorities after an

[43] Martin Baumeister, *Parität und katholische Inferiorität. Untersuchungen zur Stellung des Katholizismus im Deutschen Kaiserreich* (Paderborn, 1987), 101–5.
[44] Blaschke, 'Das 19. Jahrhundert'. [45] Smith, *Nationalism*, 27–33, 61–68.
[46] *Vossische Zeitung*, 6 August 1869. [47] *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, 5 August 1869.
[48] *National-Zeitung*, 8 August 1869. [49] *Berliner Bonifacius-Kalender* (1871), 89.
[50] *Märkisches Kirchenblatt*, 21 August 1869.
[51] Michael B. Gross, 'The Strange Case of the Nun in the Dungeon, or German Liberalism as a Convent Atrocity Story', *German Studies Review* 23/1 (2000), 69–84. On European reactions to the Ubryk affair, see *National-Zeitung*, 10 August 1869 (Belgium) und *Il Libero Pensiero*, 5, 12 and 19 August 1869 (Italy).

anonymous denunciation to the effect that a nun had been held 'buried alive' for twenty-one years within its walls. Despite efforts by the nuns to thwart the search, 'a dark pestilential hole that served as a latrine' was found to contain 'a naked, barbarised, half-insane female', 'a fearful creature such as even Dante in the fullness of his imaginative powers could not draw'.[52] Asked why she had been imprisoned, the woman replied 'I broke my vow of chastity, but these ones here [indicating the nuns] are not pure either, they are not angels either.' She described the father confessor as a 'beast'.[53] A judicial inquiry revealed that the woman in question was Barbara Ubryk, born in Warsaw in 1817. She had been accepted into the Cracow convent at the age of twenty-two. Since 1848, she had shown 'symptoms of a mental illness' that was described by a doctor as 'erotomania'.[54] When she had run amok, become violent and torn her clothes, she had been locked into a cell. In order to prevent her from presenting herself naked at the window and accosting passers-by, her window had been partially bricked in.[55]

The liberal press transformed the case into a 'typical' cloister story. A once-pretty girl had gone into the convent because her parents had forbidden her to marry a young student. In order to return to her beloved, she had attempted to escape in 1848 and, when this failed, had gone mad from despair. Attempts by the family to contact her had been forbidden by the nuns. After her confinement, it was claimed, Barbara Ubryk had also suffered physical mistreatment.[56]

The Ubryk affair focused public attention on a phenomenon that until then had gone largely unremarked: namely, the feminisation of religion, by which Catholicism was especially affected. The profession of nun was chosen by ever more women in the nineteenth century as a form of life beyond the bourgeois institutions of marriage and family.[57] In Prussia, the number of Catholic women's communities rose from 125 (1853) to 736 (1869), to 851 (1874).[58] The number of the members rose from 559 (1855) to 2,883 (1861) and 8,011 (1872/3).[59] In choosing to live the life of a nun, a woman withdrew herself not only from the male-controlled spheres of family and marriage, but also from her ascribed tasks of reproduction and education.

[52] *National-Zeitung*, 27 July 1869. [53] *Volks-Zeitung*, 27 July 1869.
[54] Ibid., 1 August 1869. [55] *Germania*, 31 May 1871.
[56] *National-Zeitung*, 31 July 1869; *Vossische Zeitung*, 31 July 1869; *Volks-Zeitung*, 5 August 1869.
[57] Irmtraud Götz von Olenhusen (ed.), *Frauen unter dem Patriarchat der Kirchen. Katholikinnen und Protestantinnen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart 1995); Irmtraud Götz von Olenhusen (ed.), *Wunderbare Erscheinungen. Frauen und katholische Frömmigkeit im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Paderborn, 1995).
[58] Ross, *Failure*, 76–7.
[59] Relinde Meiwes, *'Arbeiterinnen des Herrn'. Katholische Frauenkongregationen im 19. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt, 2000), 77.

This alternative female mode of life came in for sharp criticism in the 'cloister novel', a widely used medium of culture war that represented the nun as the helpless victim of her sex and of a male-dominated institution which exploited her economically and sexually. The career of a nun culminated in mindlessness, emotional coldness, or even in sexual perversion and madness. The protagonist could only be 'rescued' by a representative of the patriarchal order, or by death. By constructing a linkage between the conventual life, deviant sexuality and religious madness, the cloister novel made a significant contribution to a moral and epistemological critique of Catholicism that had been formulated by enlightened critics of religion and had acquired a certain institutional authority with the formation of the scientific disciplines in the nineteenth century.[60]

As 'proof that the Cracow convent scandal is nothing new', the liberal press cited numerous titles in this genre.[61] Classics from the eras of the Enlightenment and pre-March were reissued in new editions. But there was also a flood of new products on the market, to the point where one newspaper editor had to bar 'cloister-story-writers' categorically from his editorial department.[62] Commenting on the facile sensationalism of such stories, the satirical journal *Kladderadatsch* recommended that one could always wall up another nun if real news were in short supply.[63] The production of such literature was driven in part by commercial interests, and its entertainment value should not be underestimated. Nevertheless, the intentions behind it were serious enough. Various scholarly devices, such as a citation apparatus and lists of primary and secondary sources, were employed to persuade the reader of the veracity of the narrative.[64]

This fiction was rendered more plausible by daily horror reports from the convents of Europe: the suicides of pregnant nuns, underground passages between male and female convents, the grisly discovery of the skeletons of walled-up nuns in Prague, Lvov, Spain, Posen, West Prussia and Upper Lusatia – the more remote the location, the more horrific the acts seemed to be.[65] The Dominican establishment in Düsseldorf was also shaken by a scandal that became known throughout Europe.[66] After one Father had been forced to leave, following the discovery of a sexual liaison, the convent was surrounded by police on 6 August 1869, after an accusation concerning offences with underage girls. Despite a police man-hunt, the suspected Father was able to escape.[67]

[60] Borutta, 'Das Andere der Moderne', 64–8.
[61] *Kladderadatsch*, 15 August 1869.
[62] *Märkisches Kirchenblatt*, 16 October 1869.
[63] *Kladderadatsch*, 8 August 1869.
[64] Borutta, 'Das Andere der Moderne', 65–8.
[65] *Volks-Zeitung*, 6 August 1869.
[66] *Il Libero Pensiero*, 2 September 1869; Lohrum, *Wiederanfänge*, 205.
[67] Lohrum, *Wiederanfänge*, 71–2, 215.

In the light of such revelations, the Ubryk affair did not appear as an exception, but rather as the rule.[68] If the authorities failed to pursue the allegations, then they were accused of complicity with the clergy. If investigations ended with an acquittal, then this was simply passed over in silence, as in the Ubryk case,[69] or simply interpreted as evidence of the clergy's skill in covering its tracks. The efforts of the Catholic press to counter this sort of reporting[70] could not prevent the orders and the cloisters from becoming the privileged objects of collective fantasies of violence and sexual licence. They no longer appeared as the useless, risible relics of a bygone era, but rather as the germ cells of an evil that had to be defeated in the interest of the progress of civilisation. Even the educational work of the cloister came under hostile scrutiny.[71]

In Cracow, the Ubryk affair triggered several days of rioting against the foundations of the Carmelites, the Jesuits and the Franciscans; only after military intervention could the rioting be stopped.[72] On 31 July 1869, the German Journalists' Congress in Vienna urged the Austrian government to close down all convents, to expel the Jesuits and to suspend the Concordat with Rome. The Prussian legislature was also urged to do its duty, on the grounds that the re-establishment of convents constituted a disturbance of the religious peace. The monk and his way of life belonged to a 'long-past' era, which was 'no longer intelligible to us'. Vows and the conventual life stood in opposition to 'the spirit of our time, the spirit of freedom and industriousness' and were dedicated solely to the propagation of ultramontanism and the extension of papal dominion.[73]

COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE – ANTI-CATHOLIC MEDIA AND THE MOABIT *KLOSTERSTURM*

The link was immediately made between Berlin Catholicism and the latest scandals.[74] The Ubryk affair was disseminated via every medium of the urban public sphere: theatres and organ grinders helped to propagate street ballads. The 'most shameless poems and ditties' encouraged spectacular displays of anti-Catholicism. When an 'insolent boy' in the house of a freemason began to sing 'smutty songs against the cloister' and to hawk cheap copies of 'the most shameless narrative coupled with an indecent image of the Nun of Cracow', the result was a spontaneous anti-Catholic

[68] *Volks-Zeitung*, 30 July 1869. [69] *Märkisches Kirchenblatt*, 27 November 1869.
[70] Ibid., 2 October 1869. [71] Lohrum, *Wiederanfänge*, 189–90.
[72] *National Zeitung*, 26 and 27 July 1869; *Vossische Zeitung*, 27, 29 and 30 July 1869.
[73] Cited in *Berliner St. Bonifacius-Kalender* (1883), 33. [74] *Märkisches Kirchenblatt*, 14 August 1869.

Figure 5 Procession of Austrian monks on their way to Moabit, from the satirical journal *Kladderadatsch*, 15 August 1869.

performance.[75] Local liberal associations conjured up the danger of a return of the Inquisition through the Moabit Dominicans.[76] Rumours of incarcerated boys, forced baptisms, the odour of corpses and subterranean passages from the Dominicans to the Ursulines spread like a bush-fire across the city.[77] Collective fantasies were aroused by popular verses and caricatures. Under the title 'A Country Outing from Austria', the satirical journal *Kladderadatsch* of 15 August 1869 depicted a procession of Austrian monks to Moabit, armed with inquisitional instruments of torture and alcohol, one of them cavorting, another in intimate embrace with a nun, who carries the mortar to be used for her own incarceration (figure 5).[78] The *Berliner Wespen*, another illustrated satirical paper, visualised a 'future vision of Berlin' with the caption 'Anno Dominicano', which depicted shameless monks with helpless women, nuns flagellating and prostituting themselves, forced conversions, pogroms against Jews and the public burning of heretics (figure 6).

[75] *Berliner St. Bonifacius-Kalender* (1871), 86. [76] Ibid., 83–4.
[77] *Berliner Wespen*, 15 August 1869. [78] *Kladderadatsch*, 15 August 1869.

Verlag von B. Brigl in Berlin, Krausenstraße 41. — Druck von R. Gensch & Elsner in Berlin, Kommandantenstraße 7.

Figure 6 A 'vision of Berlin's future' from the satirical paper *Berliner Wespen*, 15 August 1869.

To this was added the 'bad dream of a Dominican in Moabit', who is seen cowering under the hefty blows of a Moabit worker.[79]

The interest of the Berliners had been aroused. Inquisitive spectators besieged the cloister day and night. After false press reports that the cloister had been stormed by a crowd, the numbers swelled even further.[80] A Catholic teacher who lived in the house of the Dominicans complained: 'The massive profusion of often very distorted newspaper reports on the Moabit church attract hundreds of people . . . They all want to know about the underground passages, the nuns, the secrets of the convent . . . We estimate the number of spectators last Sunday at between ten and twelve thousand.' The crowd did not confine itself to voyeurism: 'The excesses of the uninvited guests, these underage disciples of Gambrinus have unfortunately become so bad, what with their profane speech, their indecent behaviour, with burning cigars and hats worn in the church, that it was thought necessary to close not only the church, but also the other entrances of the building to the public after the services.'[81]

The most serious tumult occurred on 16 August 1869. Crowds had converged on the Moabiter Festwiese, a favoured destination for weekend excursions, in order to observe a high-wire cyclist whose performance had been widely advertised in the district. At the same time, the liberal Berliner Arbeiterverein had announced a meeting on the question of the church and religion.[82] When the 'aerial velocipedist' failed to show up, there was a call to storm the cloister. 'There was much cursing of the monks, and in the matter of a moment the entire crowd had poured across the Turmstraße towards the cloister building'.[83] 'Horrific masses of people' – between 3,000 and 10,000 – surged 'in never-ending legions armed with cudgels, poles and other equipment' towards the Dominican establishment. The constable succeeded in holding back the crowd until dusk. 'But now', a police commissioner recalled, 'the mood became ever more dangerous. First the street lanterns were smashed with cobble stones and broken off at the base, fences were torn down to gain new material, and together with the other officers, I

[79] *Berliner Wespen*, 15 August 1869. In 1869 the liberal satirical journals of Berlin published seventeen caricatures on the convent question. This total exceeds the number of representations satirising the dogma of infallibility (eleven). Friedhelm Jürgensmeier, *Die katholische Kirche im Spiegel der Karikatur der deutschen satirischen Tendenzzeitschriften von 1848 bis 1900* (Trier, 1969), 261–2.

[80] P. Augustinus Keller, 'Gründung von Düßeldorf und von Berlin, Geschichte Berlins und Gründung des Collegium Albertinum, Trans Cedron in Venlo, Marienspalter (bis 1880)', Ms., in Archiv Konvent St. Paulus, Berlin, 20; *Märkisches Kirchenblatt*, 14 August 1869.

[81] *Volks-Zeitung*, 17 August 1869. Gambrinus refers to a legendary Flemish king who is alleged to have been the inventor of beer and is known as the patron of brewers. I am grateful to Christopher Clark for bringing this to my attention.

[82] *Vossische Zeitung*, 18 August 1869.

[83] Keller, *Gründung*, 20–1.

was subjected to a veritable hail of stones, poles and pieces of wood.'[84] Disguised in secular clothes, the Patres fled with the orphans. After a withdrawal by the police, the crowd tore the fence down, forced its way into the courtyard, demolished windows and doors and could only be pushed back by a mounted policeman.[85] The seventeen persons who were arrested – workers, craftsmen's apprentices and a pupil from the *Gymnasium*[86] – stated that they had been looking for the fugitive Father from Düsseldorf.

When a crowd of hundreds gathered before the cloister once again on the following evening, the police reacted with brutal efficiency to the first thrown stones. There were twenty-four arrests and seven individuals were admitted with wounds to the Charité hospital.[87] Since the siege did not let up over the following days, the police continued to guard the cloister for several months. The Dominicans nonetheless remained the target of symbolic attacks. In the Berlin Panoptikum, a mid-nineteenth-century counterpart to Madame Tussaud's, a suite of wax figures was displayed that served as proxies for those who wished to abuse the Fathers. Moreover, there was no halt to intrusions into the church by 'strangers, mostly Protestants', who came to look about the church and to observe people taking confession. Youths gathered in front of the cloister in the evening to make 'rough music' (*Katzenmusik*).[88] The re-activation of this popular form of protest, which had traditionally been directed against women accused of transgressing sexual taboos,[89] is a reminder of how central the association with sexual deviancy remained to the critique of the conventual life.

The open demonstration of this alternative way of life was perceived as a provocation. It was said in the 'salons of Berlin officialdom' that the publicly visible clothing of the Dominicans bestowed upon the 'metropolis of Protestantism' the appearance of a Catholic city.[90] When it became known that the Fathers intended to participate in a Corpus Christi procession, there were efforts to prevent it.[91] In the immediate aftermath of the attack, the general of the Dominicans had forbidden the brothers to wear the habit of the order when leaving the cloister. They should never again wear their habit publicly in Berlin.[92] In other words, even before the onset of the *Kulturkampf* proper, one important liberal objective, namely the exclusion of religious symbols from public space, had been achieved – at

[84] Report by Police Commissioner Lück to P. Robiano, Archiv Konvent St. Paulus, Berlin.
[85] Keller, *Gründung*, 23. [86] *Volks-Zeitung*, 18 August 1869.
[87] Kurt Wernicke, 'Der "Moabiter Klostersturm"', *Berlinische Monatsschrift* 3 (1994), 6–14, 10.
[88] Keller, *Gründung*, 25–30.
[89] Jonathan Sperber, *Rhineland Radicals: The Democratic Movement and the Revolution of 1848–1849* (Princeton, 1991), 86–7.
[90] *Berliner St. Bonifacius-Kalender* (1871), 83–4.
[91] Keller, *Gründung*, 29–30. [92] Lohrum, *Wiederanfänge*, 176–9.

least partially. But this was not enough to allay confessional passions. In spite of everything, Father Keller recalled, 'people recognised us as Moabit monks and often threatened us in all kinds of ways. Sometimes we were told: you too will soon be hanging from the lantern; sometimes stones were thrown at us. Protestant girls coming out of their schools stood and spat before us.'[93]

While contemporaries had no difficulties explaining such acts of symbolic violence, the *Klostersturm* itself, with its extensive physical violence, posed a more serious challenge to their hermeneutic capabilities. A range of different interpretations was offered. Representing the authorities, the Berlin magistracy ascribed the events to the mentality of the Berlin population, which responded with instinctive rage to any form of religious compulsion.[94] The liberal press also depicted the events as a spontaneous act of the rabble, which – disappointed by the non-appearance of the high-wire cyclist – had taken out its frustration on the cloister.[95] One newspaper distanced itself from the violence, but spoke sympathetically of the 'distaste of the Protestant population of working Berlin for the establishment of places dedicated solely to contemplative inactivity'.[96] For Eduard Müller, this had obviously been a traumatic experience, and he responded to it with ever more complex and encompassing interpretations. The ring-leaders, as he saw it, were 'grey-bearded', 'finely-dressed gentlemen', who had roused and even paid the crowd in the taverns and had given 'the sign' to attack the cloister.[97] Although the ultramontane camp was slow to respond in kind to the pictorial offensive of the liberals and produced only a very meagre flow of caricatures of their own,[98] they did nonetheless have a clear image of the enemy. If the leading opponents of cloisters were finely dressed, then this merely manifested the social dimension of the culture war – poor Catholics here, rich elites there. Beardedness and the frequenting of taverns stood for liberal views, bourgeois sociability and a norm of masculinity that was diametrically opposed to the Tridentine priestly ideal.[99] Surprisingly, the rage of the mission vicar was not directed against the confessional rival. By contrast with the Dominicans, Müller stressed the solidarity of local Protestants with the beleaguered Catholics. In his view the tumult had been the work above all of 'foreigners', freemasons and Jews. Although we should not assume that Müller's extreme antisemitism[100] was typical of Catholics in general, it points nonetheless to a more general tendency. In the context of the late nineteenth-century revival of conspiracy theories,

[93] Keller, *Gründung*, 28. [94] *National-Zeitung*, 24 August 1869.
[95] *Vossische Zeitung*, 18 August 1869. [96] *Volks-Zeitung*, 19 August 1869.
[97] *Märkisches Kirchenblatt*, 21 August 1869; Keller, *Gründung*, 19–21.
[98] Jürgensmeier, *Kirche*, 56–7. [99] Götz von Olenhusen, *Klerus*, 181–206.
[100] *Märkisches Kirchenblatt*, 21 August 1869; *Berliner St. Bonifacius-Kalender* (1871), (1883), passim.

both sides engaged in the partly dialogical, partly reciprocal construction of an invisible, all-powerful, international and hostile other.[101]

The sources do not permit us to determine the extent to which the *Klostersturm* was planned in advance.[102] However, there was nothing coincidental or spontaneous about the selection of the Moabit cloister as a target. Perhaps the most differentiated contemporary account stems from an outsider, Pater Rouard de Card, the French prior of the cloister. For Rouard, it was the 'publicity surrounding the consecration of the chapel, the scandal of Düsseldorf, and above all the agitation which had prompted the tumult'.[103] The attack was the result of a process of emotional escalation against an antagonist seen as embodying deviant political, confessional, sexual and moral values. It had been brought about by a European scandal, an ultramontane provocation, a political intrigue, a publicity campaign, and the collective adoption of anti-Catholic stereotypes in popular media and ritual (rumour, humour, songs, rough music). It we conceptualise it in terms of a topographical model of power, the impulse for the attack did not come from above (from the state), but from the midst of society (from the liberals), while the physical violence came from below (from workers). Although the boundaries between personal religiosity and secular morality were fluid,[104] what was at stake for the cloister-stormers was above all the definition of a good and proper life. Their motivations were moral rather than politico-confessional in nature.

DEMOCRATIC DISCIPLINE – THE 'SUBJECTIVATION'[105] OF POLITICAL CATHOLICISM

After the attack on the cloister, the conflict acquired an official politico-legal dimension. On 24 August 1869, the police president informed the

[101] Helmut Walser Smith, 'The Learned and Popular Discourse of Anti-Semitism in the Catholic Milieu of the Kaiserreich', *Central European History* 27 (1994), 315–28; Olaf Blaschke, *Katholizismus und Antisemitismus im Deutschen Kaiserreich* (Göttingen, 1997); Michael B. Gross, 'Anti-Catholicism, Liberalism and German National Identity, 1848–1880' (Ph.D. dissertation, Brown University, Providence, R. I., 1997); Róisín Healy, 'The Jesuit as Enemy: Anti-Jesuitism and the Protestant Bourgeoisie of Imperial Germany, 1890–1917' (Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University, Washington D.C., 1999); Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann, *Die Politik der Geselligkeit. Freimaurerlogen in der deutschen Bürgergesellschaft, 1840–1918* (Göttingen, 2000).

[102] Keller, *Gründung*, 28.

[103] Cited in Lohrum, *Wiederanfänge*, 170; on Rouard, see ibid., 73, note 136.

[104] Hölscher, 'Einleitung', 6.

[105] This neologism is used by Judith Butler, *The Psychic Life of Power. Theories in Subjection* (Stanford, 1997), 83, drawing on Foucault, to denote 'both the becoming of the subject and the process of subjection – one inhabits the figure of autonomy only by becoming subjected to a power, a subjection which implies a radical dependency'. This was the situation in which German Catholicism found itself when it – in response to a political threat – constituted itself as a political subject in the form of the Centre Party, but thereby subjected itself to the liberal discourse.

Dominicans that, in view of the hostile atmosphere, the safety of the institution and its personnel could no longer be guaranteed. Invoking a royal decree of 1810 that had defined the cloisters as state properties subject to confiscation,[106] he questioned the settlement rights of the order, initiated a parliamentary investigation and urged the Dominicans to leave the city.[107] The Dominicans assumed there would be further attacks. The prior wrote to the general of the order:

> We know that people close to the King are doing everything they can in order to bring about the closure of our church. We also know that the Kultusminister and the Minister of the Interior . . . are in fear of the challenges levelled at them on our account in the chambers of parliament. At the same time we receive the most unsettling letters informing us that our house will be set on fire, that our church will be blown up and so on. After what we have seen of the tone here in the first days, nothing is impossible. And yet the police talk of wanting to abandon us. But the church councillor, Müller, has already offered to see to the formation of a guard troop recruited from Catholics to protect the cloister.[108]

On 29 August 1869, the Liberal Berliner Arbeiterverein, which had been established in 1852 by Hermann Schulze-Delitzsch, co-founder of the Nationalverein and of the German Progressive Party, convened a popular meeting. Speaking before an audience of 2,000, the head of the local joiners' association, Waldow, described the convents as 'breeding grounds for superstition, idiocy, stupidity and crime. Unless a concerted campaign were mounted against them, the reputation of German civilisation would be no more than a wisp of grey fog over a trodden-down German Fatherland fertilised with blood.' The aim was 'to struggle for a free, united, happy Fatherland, and to move forward with the whole society (Deafening cheers)'. When the legal executor for the property of the Moabit cloister and later co-founder of the Centre Faction, Friedrich von Kehler, pointed out that the monks led blameless lives and that one could see 'no evidence of idleness within, that four Fathers were responsible for raising, teaching and caring for 41 orphans', tumults broke out on the floor and the speaker was obliged to leave the platform. After the Catholics had left the hall, the meeting passed a resolution, calling for the dissolution of monasteries in Prussia, which closely resembled that of the German Journalists' Congress.[109]

By the time the next mass meeting took place on 12 September 1869, the Catholics had mobilised their numerous members in artisans' and masters' associations and now enjoyed a majority. When they elected a member

[106] Huber and Huber, *Staat*, I, 58. [107] Lohrum, *Wiederanfänge*, 172.
[108] Cited in ibid., 173. [109] *National-Zeitung*, 30 August 1869.

of the Bonifatiusverein as chairman, there were further tumults and the meeting had to be closed, even before it had been possible to discuss the planned petition to the Prussian parliament calling for the dissolution of cloisters.[110] The impossible had happened: in Berlin, the bastion of the Liberals,[111] the 'Catholic party – for we must now describe the supporters of Church Councillor Müller as a party in their own right' had succeeded in sabotaging a mass meeting.[112] This was all the more disturbing to the Liberals for the fact that they did not perceive the Catholics as autonomous subjects, but rather as mere instruments operating under the remote control of ultramontane leaders. Word soon got around of Müller's servants (*Knechte*).[113] The 'influence' of the clergy on the ill-educated, helpless and easily aroused and seduced Catholic masses became one of the standard Liberal arguments against the introduction of a democratic franchise.[114]

In the matter of the cloister, they chose to follow legal procedures and sent eleven petitions calling for the dissolution of the cloisters to the Prussian Chamber of Deputies. Since most of the 826 establishments known to the Ministry of Church Affairs did not possess rights of corporation, there was debate within the Petitions Committee over whether these were 'private' associations, or monastic establishments requiring state approval. Whereas the government favoured the former view, the majority of the committee, led by the Liberal jurist Rudolf von Gneist, one of the architects of the later *Kulturkampf* legislation, saw these institutions as 'organised corporations' controlled from abroad and bound by oaths to their superiors. The 'public' purpose of the Jesuit Order and of other denominations, they argued, was the struggle against Protestantism. On 17 December 1869, the committee recommended that the government make the fullest use of prosecutions, the right to withhold concessions and powers of supervision. All private educational institutions, orphanages and hospitals were to be either prohibited or watched.[115]

[110] Ibid., 13 September 1869.

[111] Toni Offermann, 'Preußischer Liberalismus zwischen Revolution und Reichsgründung im regionalen Vergleich. Berliner und Kölner Fortschrittsliberalismus in der Konfliktzeit', in Dieter Langewiesche (ed.), *Liberalismus im 19. Jahrhundert. Deutschland im europäischen Vergleich* (Göttingen, 1988), 109–35.

[112] *Vossische Zeitung*, 14 September 1869.

[113] *Märkisches Kirchenblatt*, 9 October 1869.

[114] Margaret L. Anderson, *Practicing Democracy. Elections and Political Culture in Imperial Germany* (Princeton, 2000), 69–151.

[115] 'Fünfter Bericht der Kommission für Petitionen, betreffend die Aufhebung der Klöster in Preußen', in *Preußischer Landtag. Haus der Abgeordneten. 1869/70. Stenographische Berichte. Anlagen*, II, 990–1007. On these juridical aspects, see Erwin Gatz, *Kirche und Krankenpflege im 19. Jahrhundert. Katholische Bewegung und karitativer Aufbruch in dem preussischen Provinzen Rheinland und Westfalen* (Munich, 1971), 44, 575–8.

The Catholics responded swiftly with eighty counter-petitions pleading for the preservation of their corporations. The Liberals had reason to fear further damage to their standing in parliament, but Bismarck, whose policy was focused at this time on national conciliation, came to their aid. On 2 February 1870, in a session of the Ministerial Council, the Prussian minister-president had invoked Frederick the Great's principle of religious toleration and had warned against undermining the trust of Prussian Catholics. Members of a repressed church, he observed, could easily be fanaticised.[116] The Prussian administration should avoid any scandals that might jeopardise the attachment of the predominantly Catholic German south to the North German Confederation. On 8 and 9 February 1870, in sessions of the Prussian Chamber of Deputies, Bismarck's allies, the Free Conservatives, urged the house – in the name of national unity and of confessional peace – to abstain from a discussion of the report from the Petitions Committee. Despite protests from Catholic deputies, the National Liberal president of the parliament, Max von Forckenbeck, scheduled the report so late in the proceedings that it could no longer be dealt with. The Catholics were thus prevented from picking up the liberal Protestant gauntlet; indeed they were effectively 'silenced'.[117]

It was against the background of this experience, of intensified anti-Catholicism in general and of the successful Catholic mobilisations in Baden and Bavaria, that the Centre Party constituted itself in December 1870.[118] Already in 1869, Eduard Müller had called for the reactivation of the Catholic electors' movement and the parliamentary fraction formed in 1852 in response to the decrees of the Prussian minister of church affairs, Karl von Raumer.[119] The establishment of an independent political formation, Müller argued, provided the key to understanding how 'otherwise insignificant parties could come to great influence, whereas the Ultramontanes always drew the short straw despite all their superiority in other respects . . . Our subordinate position [*Helotenstellung*] can be ascribed to this failure to achieve independence in all municipal and state elections.'[120] In Müller's view, the relationship between Liberals and Catholics was essentially colonial in character. By contrast, Catholic politicians, many of whom were well-to-do burghers or nobleman, tended to see themselves as

[116] Karl Bachem, *Vorgeschichte, Geschichte und Politik der deutschen Zentrumspartei*, 9 vols. (Cologne, 1927–32), III, 41.

[117] *Preußischer Landtag. Haus der Abgeordneten 1869/70. Stenographische Berichte*, 2009, 2010, 2039, 2010.

[118] Bachem, *Vorgeschichte*, III, 43–7. On political Catholicism in Baden and Bavaria, see Evans, *Cross*, 95–108.

[119] Bachem, *Vorgeschichte*, II, 96–111.

[120] *Märkisches Kirchenblatt*, 27 November 1869.

autonomous subjects and emphatically not as subalterns. They wanted to give the party a *political* character. In the context of contemporary political assumptions, this meant a *non*-confessional character. They thus adopted the title 'Verfassungspartei' ('Constitutional Party') as the subsidiary name for the party. By contrast with the Netherlands, Switzerland, Baden and Austria, political Catholicism in Prussia and in the German Empire chose not to characterise itself as 'Catholic' or 'Christian'.[121] On a symbolic level, it thus anticipated the separation of public and private, of politics and religion that the Liberals held so dear. The political representatives of the Catholics were already integrated in the ideological universe of the Liberals. In this sense, it was neither paradoxical nor opportunistic that the Centre Party figured in the *Kulturkampf* as the advocate of liberal basic rights. As a party within the Empire, however, it continued to be marked with the 'stigma' of confessionalism.[122]

INTENTIONS, LIMITS AND EFFECTS – THE *KULTURKAMPF* AS A FAILURE?

On 18 June 1880, Karl Strosser, a German-Conservative member of the Prussian Landtag described the storming of the Moabit cloister and its parliamentary afterlife as the 'egg from which the *Kulturkampf* later developed'.[123] This local episode did indeed prefigure in miniature many of the key features of the later national conflict: Protestant fears of re-Catholicisation, the competition between ultramontane and enlightened-liberal missionary and educational programmes, the ambivalent – sometimes transconfessional, sometimes anti-Catholic – attitude of the state, an aggressive anti-Catholicism among Liberals and Protestants, the exclusion of specific forms of religiosity from public space and the mobilisation, politicisation and ghettoisation of the Catholics.

Nevertheless, the outbreak of the *Kulturkampf* in Prussia as a state-driven enterprise would not have been possible without the foundation of the Empire. In this sense, the Prussian experience was quite distinct from that in Bavaria and Baden. The relative weights of the Christian confessions in the Empire (61.6 per cent Protestants to 36.7 per cent Catholics) and the conflicting orientations of the hegemonial tendencies within them

[121] Kißling, *Geschichte*, III, 336; Margaret L. Anderson, *Windthorst. A Political Biography* (Oxford, 1981), 133–9; Evans, *Cross*, 109–10.

[122] Margaret L. Anderson, 'Interdenominationalism, Clericalism, Pluralism: The *Zentrumsstreit* and the Dilemma of Catholicism in Imperial Germany', *Central European History* 21 (1988), 350–78.

[123] *Preußischer Landtag. Haus der Abgeordneten 1879/80. Stenographische Berichte*, III, 2181.

(ultramontanism on the one hand and 'cultural Protestantism' on the other) were of course important factors, but it was above all the intersection of these conflicts with the foundation of the nation-state that accounts for the relative severity and vitality of the German *Kulturkampf*. In view of the threatening capacity of Catholicism to mobilise masses for politics and religion, an anti-Catholic consensus had established itself among Liberals and Protestants by the beginning of the Liberal era (1866–78). This consensus provided the basis for the *Kulturkampf* proper. With the Prussian victory over Austria in 1866, anti-Catholicism also acquired a power-political perspective. It was expected that the minority status now imposed upon the Catholics within the new small-German nation-state would facilitate the homogenisation of national culture. Following the territorial unification of 1871, the *Kulturkampf* appeared the logical next step in the nation-building process.[124] Yet the objectives of the exponents of *Kulturkampf* varied; indeed they were in some respects contradictory. Whereas conservative Protestants expected that the completion of a 'Holy Protestant Empire of the German Nation'[125] would also entail a revival of their church and religion, the Liberals looked to the separation of church and state, the exclusion of religion from public space and the dissemination of *Bildung*, that bourgeois-secular *Ersatzreligion* in which mystical-pietist assumptions about the individual blended with the pedagogy of the Protestant Enlightenment.[126] Since the liberals understood the state to be an agent of modernisation, they did not – with the exception of a few left-Liberals – see the application of state coercion as irreconcilable with liberal principles.[127] For Reich Chancellor Bismarck, the chief priorities were the Germanisation of ethnic-confessional minorities and the campaign against federalist-secessionist tendencies in Bavaria, Schleswig-Holstein, Alsace-Lorraine, Hanover, Upper Silesia and Prussian Poland.[128] In the Centre Party, which sometimes cooperated with these groups, he saw the incarnation of anti-national and democratic centrifugal forces.[129]

[124] Langewiesche, *Liberalismus*, 104–5, 180–7; Otto Pflanze, *Bismarck and the Development of Germany*, vol. II: *The Period of Consolidation, 1871–1880* (Princeton, 1990), 180; Smith, *Nationalism*, 19–37; Lepp, *Aufbruch*, 294–333.

[125] Stoecker to Brockhaus, 27 January 1871, cited in Walter Frank, *Hofprediger Adolf Stoecker und die christlich-soziale Bewegung* (Hamburg, 1935), 27–8.

[126] Georg Bollenbeck, *Bildung und Kultur. Glanz und Elend eines deutschen Deutungsmusters* (Frankfurt, 1994), 103–9, 216–21.

[127] David Blackbourn, 'Progress and Piety: Liberalism, Catholicism and the State in Imperial Germany', *History Workshop* 26 (1988), 57–78; Smith, *Nationalism*, 37–41.

[128] Lech Trzeciakowski, *The Kulturkampf in Prussian Poland* (New York, 1990).

[129] Heinrich Bornkamm, 'Die Staatsidee im Kulturkampf', *Historische Zeitschrift* 170 (1950), 41–72; 273–306; Anderson, *Windthorst*, 144–5; Evans, *Cross*, 112–15.

The impulse for an escalation of the conflict came from Rome. The declaration of the dogma of papal infallibility at the Vatican Council of 1870, initially rejected by the majority of German bishops, was seen in Germany not only as a declaration of war on modernity, but also as a challenge to dynasty and nation. Although the comportment of Catholics in the German Wars of Unification had been no less 'national' than that of the Protestants, and although ultramontanisation and national mobilisation were no more mutually exclusive than loyalty to Kaiser and pope, the Catholics were branded with the stigma of national unreliability.[130] The dissolution of the Catholic Department within the Ministry of Church Affairs in 1871 and the replacement of the conservative minister for church affairs Mühler by the liberal Adalbert von Falk in 1872 thus signalled the onset of a confessional homogenisation of the state apparatus.[131]

The legislative phase of the *Kulturkampf* began in 1871 with the 'Pulpit Law'. This made it illegal for priests to 'treat state matters in a manner that threatens the public peace'. The Prussian School Inspection Law of 1872 extended state supervision over schooling. Catholic school inspectors were forced to leave office. Some 1,000 members of orders were obliged to leave the school service. The resistance of the Polish clergy to Germanisation policies thereby lost its institutional basis.[132] The 'Jesuit Law' of 1872 forbade foundations of the Societas Jesu in the Reich, established procedures for the expulsion of foreign Jesuits and imposed limits on the residential rights of their German colleagues.[133] In the following year, this provision was extended to cover the supposedly related orders of the Redemptorists, the Lazarists, Priests of the Holy Spirit and the Sacred Heart of Jesus.[134] The 'May Laws' stipulated that German citizenship was a precondition for the appointment to clerical office; clerical appointments would henceforth depend upon an 'academic pre-training' which was to be acquired in a German institution and to be tested through a state examination, the so-called '*Kulturexamen*'. Bishops were obliged to report all appointments

[130] Barbara Stambolis, 'Nationalisierung trotz Ultramontanisierung oder: "Alles für Deutschland. Deutschland aber für Christus". Mentalitätsleitende Wertorientierung deutscher Katholiken im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert', *Historische Zeitschrift* 269 (1999), 57–97.

[131] Margaret L. Anderson and Kenneth Barkin, 'The Myth of the Puttkamer Purge and the Reality of the Kulturkampf', *Journal of Modern History* 54 (1982), 647–86.

[132] Marjorie Lamberti, *State, Society and the Elementary School in Imperial Germany* (New York, 1989).

[133] Michael B. Gross, 'Kulturkampf and Unification: German Liberalism and the War Against the Jesuits', *Central European History* 30 (1997), 545–66; Róisín Healy, 'Religion and Civil Society: Catholics, Jesuits, and Protestants in Imperial Germany', in Frank Trentmann (ed.), *Paradoxes of Civil Society: New Perspectives on Modern German and British History* (New York, 2000), 244–62.

[134] Otto Weiss, 'Die deutschen Redemptoristen während des deutschen Kulturkampfes (1871–1893)', *Rottenburger Jahrbuch für Kirchengeschichte* 15 (1996), 127–47.

to clerical offices to the local authorities. The 'Expatriation Law' made it possible to expel undesirable clergymen and to nullify their citizenship status. The Civil Registration Laws established the primacy of the state over the chief ceremonial rites of passage (birth, marriage, death). In 1875, under the 'Bread-Basket Law' (*Brotkorbgesetz*) state payments to the church were ended. The Law Concerning Orders and Congregation authorised the dissolution of all foundations on Prussian territory.[135]

The church reacted in confrontational fashion. In 1872, Pius IX called upon German Catholics to resist the 'persecution of the church'. In Mainz, a Verein der deutschen Katholiken was founded to coordinate opposition to state measures. Together with the Centre Party, the episcopate criticised the *Kulturkampf* laws as in breach of the constitution, a point that was later implicitly conceded by the modification (1873) and removal altogether (1875) of the religious articles of the Prussian constitution. The bishops forbade Catholics to implicate themselves in any way in the carrying out of the new laws. In 1875, Pius IX declared the Prussian church legislation to be invalid and threatened all those who participated in its enforcement with excommunication.[136]

The most vigorous state action was directed against the resistance of the clergy in Prussia. In the first four months of 1875 alone, 241 priests, 136 editors and 210 laymen were sentenced to fines or periods of detention, 20 newspapers were confiscated, 74 houses were searched, 103 persons were expelled or interned, and 55 associations or clubs were dissolved.[137] In all, eight bishops were arrested or expelled during the *Kulturkampf* in Prussia – in 1878 only three out of twelve were still in office. The pastoral care of the Catholics suffered. In 1881, a quarter of all Prussian parishes were unoccupied; in the diocese of Trier, more than quarter of the clergy were in exile.[138] Catholics saw this unprecedented repression as a campaign to transform the state by legislative means into a 'tutelary dictatorship'.[139] They reacted with strategies of active and passive resistance that ranged from declarations of solidarity and financial help for dismissed, arrested or fugitive clergy, to petitions, the boycott of national celebrations, participation in forbidden rituals and symbolic or physical violence.[140]

[135] Huber, *Staat*, II, 395–764.

[136] Rudolf Morsey, 'Kulturkampf', in Anton Rauscher (ed.), *Der soziale und politische Katholizismus. Entwicklungslinien in Deutschland 1803–1963* (Munich, 1981), 80–9.

[137] Bachem, *Vorgeschichte*, III, 303–4. On measures against the Catholic press, see Ross, *Failure*, 158–79.

[138] Christoph Weber, *Kirchliche Politik zwischen Rom, Berlin und Trier 1876–1888. Die Beilegung des preußischen Kulturkampfes* (Mainz, 1970), 61.

[139] Kurt Nowak, *Geschichte des Christentums in Deutschland. Religion, Politik und Gesellschaft vom Ende der Aufklärung bis zur Mitte des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Munich, 1995), 155.

[140] Sperber, *Catholicism*, 207–52; Ross, *Failure*, 121–57.

To the great surprise of its exponents, the *Kulturkampf* merely strengthened the bond between clergy and lay people. It intensified the confessionalisation, ultramontanisation and the politicisation of Catholics, whose infrastructure now began to thicken into a relatively homogeneous milieu.[141] It was above all the Centre Party that profited from these developments: in the Reichstag elections of 1874, they succeeded in capturing 77 per cent of the Catholic votes;[142] in 1878, they achieved electoral parity with the National Liberals; in 1881 and 1884, the Centre was the strongest party.[143] Moreover the Old-Catholic movement, which rejected the doctrine of infallibility, failed to unleash a 'second Reformation'.[144] Despite formal state recognition, it remained confined to a relatively narrow constituency drawn from the educated bourgeois elites.[145] Most middle-class Catholics managed to straddle the gap between the secular liberal-Protestant hegemonial culture and the Catholic subculture.[146]

The campaign against the church was hindered by divergences among the exponents of *Kulturkampf*. Within Protestantism, the limits of the anti-Catholic consensus were soon laid bare: whereas Liberal Protestants campaigned against 'Catholics' of both confessions (a group which, in their view, included orthodox Protestants), conservative Protestants and the Protestant church were gradually alienated by the transconfessional anticlerical aspects of the *Kulturkampf*.[147] The character of the state itself also set limits to the *Kulturkampf*. The German Empire was an authoritarian, but not a totalitarian state. Traditions of respect for law, the need to comply with legal procedures and bureaucratic inertia rendered state coercion ineffective. Neither the judiciary nor the executive was up to the task of meeting the challenge of Catholic resistance. The policing resources required to survey, monitor and prosecute all Catholic offences were simply not available. At local level, especially in Catholic districts, many officials abstained from implementing *Kulturkampf* regulations.[148] Moreover, the personnel and

[141] Olaf Blaschke and Frank-Michael Kuhlemann, 'Religion in Geschichte und Gesellschaft. Sozialhistorische Perspektiven für die vergleichende Erforschung religiöser Mentalitäten und Milieus', in Blaschke and Kuhlemann, *Religion*, 7–56.

[142] Anderson, *Democracy*, 102.

[143] Gerd Hohorst *et al.*, *Sozialgeschichtliches Arbeitsbuch*, vol. II: *Materialien zur Statistik des Kaiserreichs 1870–1914* (Munich, 1978), 173–4.

[144] Ferdinand Gregorovius, *Römische Tagebücher 1852–1889*, ed. Hanno-Walter Kruft and Markus Völkel (Munich, 1991), 271.

[145] Sperber, *Catholicism*, 233–40; Ross, *Failure*, 35–52.

[146] Thomas Mergel, 'Ultramontanism, Liberalism, Moderation: Political Mentalities and Political Behaviour of the German Catholic Bürgertum, 1848–1914', *Central European History* 29 (1996), 151–74: a more detailed treatment of these themes can be found in Thomas Mergel, *Zwischen Klasse und Konfession. Katholisches Bürgertum im Rheinland 1794–1914* (Göttingen, 1994), 253–307.

[147] Ross, *Failure*, 15–34.

[148] Ibid., 95–120.

financial means required to replace Catholic institutions were often lacking. In particular, the female orders that dedicated themselves to caring for the sick had made themselves virtually indispensable. They were exempted from the various legal prohibitions, remained largely shielded from state repression and were indeed able in some places to extend their activities during the *Kulturkampf*.[149]

At the 'macro-level' of church–state relations, the *Kulturkampf* accelerated a process of institutional differentiation that escaped the notice of most contemporaries: while the state laid claim to primacy in the 'masculine' sphere of politics and public life, the church withdrew, at least provisionally, into domains like the care of the sick whose connotation was predominantly female. What resulted was not a separation, but the crystallisation of a complementary-hierarchical co-existence of state and church analogous to the 'gendered spheres' of public life and private domain.[150] Moreover, anti-socialism was a bond that connected state and churches, liberals, conservatives and Catholics. It is no accident that the beginning of the end of the state-driven *Kulturkampf* in 1878/9 coincided with the anti-socialist law. The 'scoundrels without a Fatherland' ('*Vaterlandslose Gesellen*')[151] were replaced by the 'Romelings without a Fatherland' (*Vaterlandslose Römlinge*) as the primary 'enemies of the Reich'.[152]

The official end of the *Kulturkampf* as a state-driven enterprise came with the 'Peace Laws' (1886/7) that largely normalised the relationship between the Prussian state and the Catholic church, but this by no means implied that the societal culture war was over. As a consequence of the confessionalisation that had occurred in the course of the *Kulturkampf*, two mass organisations now appeared – the anti-ultramontane Evangelischer Bund zur Wahrung der deutsch-Protestantischen Interessen (1886) and the anti-socialist and anti-liberal Volksverein für das Katholische Deutschland (1890). It was thanks in part to such organisations that the political culture of Wilhelmine Germany continued to be structured by confessional antagonisms.[153]

[149] Meiwes, *Arbeiterinnen*, 298–301.

[150] Borutta, 'Das Andere der Moderne', 68–70.

[151] Dieter Groh and Peter Brandt, *'Vaterlandslose Gesellen'. Sozialdemokratie und Nation 1860–1990* (Munich, 1992).

[152] *National-Zeitung*, 21 October 1876.

[153] Gangolf Hübinger, 'Confessionalism', in Roger Chickering (ed.), *Imperial Germany. A Historiographical Companion* (London, 1996), 156–84; Gotthard Klein, *Der Volksverein für das katholische Deutschland 1890–1933. Geschichte, Bedeutung, Untergang* (Paderborn, 1996); Armin Müller-Dreier, *Konfession und Politik, Gesellschaft und Kultur des Kaiserreichs. Der Evangelische Bund 1886–1914* (Gütersloh, 1998).

If we measure the *Kulturkampf* against the intentions of its exponents, then there is no doubt that it failed. Despite all Bismarck's best efforts, the Centre did not disappear from the German party landscape, but rather established itself as a crucial power factor. In spite of Protestant and Liberal hopes, there was no homogenisation of national culture in the sense of confessional unity or secularisation; on the contrary, there was a deepening of confessional oppositions. An asymmetrical relationship developed between a Liberal-Protestant hegemonial culture and an ultramontane Catholic subculture. Within the triangular relationship among Liberals, ultramontanes and Catholics, the latter were subject to a twofold process of colonisation. It was the Liberals who dominated public life at national level, to an extent even within the Catholic elites,[154] whereas it was the ultramontanes who controlled the Catholic milieu. The hegemony of these two cultural imperialisms was mutually reinforcing. The long-term consequences would only be overcome in West Germany after the Second World War, and even then only through the emergence of a Christian-Conservative party.[155]

In the social and cultural sciences, the *Kulturkampf* had an even longer afterlife. Sociology 'objectivised' the confessionalist paradigm, transforming it into a scientific premiss.[156] The recruitment and research practices of academic history helped to conceal this epistemological anti-Catholicism under a veneer of objectivity. The foundation of the Empire and the *Kulturkampf* perpetuated the exclusion of Catholic historians from the academic profession[157] and the exclusion of Catholicism from 'history'. Religion in general and Catholicism in particular appeared as mere obstacles on the road to modernity, the *Kulturkampf* merely as a necessary attempt to overcome them. In the 1960s, this paradigm of modernisation, with its cultural-Protestant roots, acquired a Marxist colouring, without however renouncing its anti-Catholic foundations.[158]

The 'hot' phase, in which it was impossible to write the history of the *Kulturkampf* without at the same time waging culture war, now appears

[154] Reformist Catholic intellectuals adopted the supposedly universal, secular-liberal, Protestant-dominated national culture of the early German Empire as a yardstick for their own confession and propagated concepts such as the 'educational deficit' (*Bildungsdefizit*) and the 'intellectual inferiority' (*geistige Inferiorität*) of the Catholics; these were in turn understood by the Protestant public as confirming anti-Catholic prejudices. Cf. Baumeister, *Parität*, 50–94.

[155] Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte*, vol. III: *Von der 'Deutschen Doppelrevolution' bis zum Beginn des Ersten Weltkrieges, 1849–1914* (Munich, 1995), 902.

[156] Baumeister, *Parität*, 95–105.

[157] Wolfgang Weber, *Priester der Clio. Historisch- sozialwissenschaftliche Studien zur Herkunft und Karriere deutscher Historiker und zur Geschichte der Geschichtswissenschaft 1800–1970* (Frankfurt, 1984).

[158] Raymond C. Sun, *Before the Enemy is Within our Walls: Catholic Workers in Cologne, 1885–1912, a Social, Cultural, and Political History* (Boston, 1999), 1–2.

to be over. With the decline of modernisation theories since the 1980s, apparently paradoxical, long-obscured phenomena like the modernity of anti-modern ultramontanism or the anti-Catholic fundamentalism of the Liberals, have become intelligible. Religion is no longer seen as the residue of tradition, but as a powerful historical force within modernity. With this shift in perspectives, there is reason to hope that the 'confessional blindness'[159] of German academic history will at last be overcome. The end of the secularisation paradigm may have been announced, but there is still a tendency to conceptualise religion in the modern era using categories such as privatisation and individualisation and thereby to separate it from the political, the public and the collective. The secularist definition of modernity forged in the culture wars remains influential. Simply to replace the paradigm 'secularisation' with that of 'confessionalisation' therefore brings the danger of amnesia and repression (*Verdrängung*). A more successful way of overcoming the hegemony of secularisation theory in the longer term might well be to begin by taking it seriously as a still-influential self-characterisation of the modern era and to turn – in genealogical fashion – to the historical location of its emergence: the culture wars.

[159] Dieter Langewiesche, 'Nation, Nationalismus, Nationalstaat: Forschungsstand und Forschungsperspektiven', *Neue Politische Literatur* 40 (1995), 216.