

By the same author (forthcoming)

RETHINKING IRISH HISTORY *(with Patrick O'Mahony)*

Inventing Europe

Idea, Identity, Reality

Gerard Delanty

*Senior Lecturer in Sociology
University of Liverpool*

palgrave
macmillan

© Gerard Delanty 1995

All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission.

No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1P 9HE.

Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.

First published 1995 by
MACMILLAN PRESS LTD
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 2XS
and London
Companies and representatives
throughout the world

ISBN 0-333-62202-2 hardback
ISBN 0-333-62203-0 paperback

A catalogue record for this book is available
from the British Library.

Transferred to digital printing 2002

Typeset by Tek Art, Croydon, Surrey

Printed & bound by Antony Rowe Ltd, Eastbourne

Contents

<i>Preface</i>	vii
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	xi
1. The Ambivalence of Europe: A Theoretical Introduction	1
2. The Origins of the Idea of Europe	16
3. The Westernisation of Europe	30
4. The Limits of Europe: The Shifting Frontier	48
5. Europe in the Age of Modernity	65
6. Europe in the Mirror of the Orient	84
7. The Crisis of European Identity	100
8. Europe as a Cold War Construction	115
9. Europe after the Cold War	130
10. Conclusion: Towards Post-National Citizenship	156
<i>Bibliography</i>	164
<i>Index</i>	183

1 The Ambivalence of Europe: A Theoretical Introduction

This book is about how every age reinvented the idea of Europe in the mirror of its own identity. I shall bring 'Europe' into focus as a cultural construction and argue that it cannot be regarded as a self-evident entity: it is an idea as much as a reality. Europe, I shall be arguing, is a contested concept and it was in adversity that it became a self-conscious idea. As the central and organising metaphor of a complex civilisation, the European idea expresses our culture's struggle with its contradictions and conflicts.

Much discussed in recent times is the question of 'European unity', yet little thought is actually given to the meaning of the term Europe and its relationship to problems in contemporary political identity. The discourse of Europe is ambivalent in that it is not always about unity and inclusion, but is also about exclusion and the construction of difference based on norms of exclusion. It embodies a great complex of ideas and ideals. Take unity for instance. For many Europeans unity is a cherished goal only so long as it is unattainable; or, indeed, as a strategy to enhance social exclusion or to strengthen the power of the centre over the periphery. Lying at the core of the idea of Europe is a fundamental ambivalence about the normative horizons of collective identity in the modern polity. This ambivalence is apparent in an unresolved tension between two models of collective identity: an exclusivist and formal notion of the polity, on the one side, and on the other, one based more on participation and solidarity. My concern in this book is to dispel the mystique of Europe in order to assess the extent to which the European idea can in fact be the basis of a collective identity unencumbered by the narrow normative horizons of national identity and the chauvinism of the 'Fortress Europe' project. The question of whether a multi-cultural society can evolve a collective identity that is not based on ethno-culturalism is as important as matters pertaining to economic and political integration. The limits and possibility of the European idea as a basis of collective identity is what this book is about. My tentative answer is that the idea of Europe can be the normative basis of collective identity only if it is focused on a new notion of citizenship.

My theme is that of Europe as an idea that has forever been in a process of invention and reinvention as determined by the pressure of new collec-

tive identities. What I wish to deconstruct is the Platonic-like vision of an immutable European ideal, the notion that the idea of Europe has always been linked to the pursuit of the values of freedom, democracy and autonomy. That there is such a thing as, what Karl Jaspers (1947) once called, a 'European spirit' or – as other writers earlier in the twentieth century such as T. S. Eliot (1946), Edmund Husserl and Paul Valery believed – the unity of an essentially European tradition is a pervasive assumption underlying contemporary visions of Europe. While not all will agree with T. S. Eliot (1978, p. 160), when he wrote in 1947, 'that a new unity can only grow on the old roots: the Christian faith, and the classical languages which Europeans inherit in common', there appears to be widespread consensus today that the cultural foundation of Europe is deeply rooted in Latin Christendom, humanist values and liberal democracy (Kundera, 1984). I hope to be able to show that these beliefs are ungrounded, or at best mystifying, and that if the idea of Europe is to be used as a normative concept, it is necessary to subject it to critical reflection. It is not possible to see European history as the progressive embodiment of a great unifying idea since ideas are themselves products of history. No coherent idea runs through European history from the earliest times to the present and the historical frontiers of Europe have themselves shifted several times. Yet something can be discerned in the great flux of history and it is not the unity of history but adversity: the European idea has been more the product of conflict than of consensus.

With respect to the notion of 'European unity' I shall be arguing that the critical and self-examining traditions in European culture have in fact rarely appealed to the idea of unity as their normative standpoint – the exception here being anti-fascist resistance. The idea of Europe has been more connected to the state tradition and elite cultures than with the politics of civil society. What is therefore important is that it be disengaged from the state tradition if it is to be used as a normative idea and a basis for rational collective identities in the modern polity. Without a social dimension the European idea will fall into the hands of the nationalists and bureaucrats. I am not then appealing to some kind of abstract cultural essence, an 'autonomy of the spirit' (Finkelkraut, 1985) or what Jan Patočka (1983, p. 23), following in the footsteps of Husserl, calls 'a concern with the soul around which the project of the life of Europe is crystallised' with its roots in Platonic metaphysics. Nor do I find adequate the view, expressed by President Vaclav Havel of the Czech Republic in a speech to the European Parliament in Strasbourg in 1994, that Europe needs 'a spiritual or moral dimension' which would be capable of articulating an identity and the recreation of charisma. Though broadly agreeing with Havel's plea for a non-technocratic European identity, I wish to take issue with those who regard the normative basis of collec-

tive identity as residing in the contents of culture or the project of modernity as the unfolding of the great promises of the Enlightenment, a notion that has been formulated by Gorbachev (1987, pp. 197/8): 'Europe "from the Atlantic to the Urals" is a cultural historical entity united by the common heritage of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, of the great philosophical and social teachings of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.'

To speak of Europe as an 'invention' is to stress the ways in which it has been constructed in a historical process; it is to emphasise that Europe is less the subject of history than its product and what we call Europe is, in fact, a historically fabricated reality of ever-changing forms and dynamics. Most of Europe is only retrospectively European and has been invented in the image of a distorted modernity. Moreover, the history of Europe is the history not only of its unifying ideas, but also of its divisions and frontiers, both internal and external. Since the idea of Europe is not a mysterious substance floating above the real world of society and history, I shall attempt to show how it is interpolated in concrete configurations of power and their geo-political complexes.

Defining Europe is then fraught with problems, for Europe is a protean idea and not something self-evident. It is erroneous to regard Europe as merely a region for the simple reason that it means different things to different people in different contexts. Europe does not exist any more naturally than do nations. It is like most of our political vocabulary, constituted by history and, at the same time, constitutive of that very history. European identity did not exist prior to its definition and codification. It is a doubtful construct anyway given the apparent irresolvable conflict of national cultures and oppositional collective identities. Unifying myths of integration should be viewed with scepticism unless they unambivalently accommodate diversity. In the present context what I wish to emphasise is that the idea of Europe was constructed with strategic goals in mind and the 'reality' that it designates is also used strategically. The sociological concept of a 'discourse' can help to explain this: Europe cannot be reduced to an idea, an identity or a reality since it itself is a structuring force. What is real is the discourse in which ideas and identities are formed and historical realities constituted.

In contextualising the idea of Europe, I intend to demonstrate that the idea of Europe is a historical projection, a universalising idea under the perpetual threat of fragmentation from forces within European society; it is essentially the unifying theme in a cultural framework of values as opposed to a mere political norm or the name for a geo-political region. It can be seen as the emblem and central organising metaphor of a complex civilisation. But Europe is more than a region and polity, it is also an idea and an identity. In the following chapters I shall outline the historical process in which the idea

of Europe was constituted as a cultural frame of reference for the formation of identities and new geo-political realities. My aim is to trace the process through which Europe became first a cultural idea and then a self-conscious political identity. The linchpin of my critique is that in this transformation, and in the cultural shifts accompanying it, the idea of Europe always remained tied to ethno-cultural values which have had a reifying effect on collective identities. It will also become apparent that the idea of Europe failed to become a cohesive collective identity, for instead of a European identity configurations of national identities formed. Most discussions on the European idea fail to distinguish between the idea of Europe and European identity as a form of consciousness. The idea of Europe existed long before people actually began to identify with it and to see themselves as Europeans. What we need to know more about is exactly how Europe became established as a reality for knowledge – a cultural idea – and how it subsequently lent itself to power.

Since the distinction between Europe as an idea, identity and reality is crucial to my argument, some further preliminary conceptual clarification is required. It may be helpful to conceptualise this with the help of the metaphor of the football game: the ball is Europe, the players the identity projects and the pitch the geo-political reality on which the game, in this instance the discourse, is played. This analogy also underlines my contention that the idea of Europe is never totally controlled by any of the players in the field; it occupies the cultural-symbolic space which is competed for by collective identities. The European idea is quite simply a political football. But, to take the metaphor further, it is not without its referees, for the social reproduction of reality also involves a normative dimension; that is, it can be linked to a moral dimension which has the power of critical self-reflection.

Though I am principally concerned with Europe as an idea, it is important to see clearly the three levels of analysis that are involved in the theory of the 'invention of Europe'. As an idea Europe is a kind of regulative idea for identity-building processes. The idea of Europe is a cultural model of society, a focus for collective identities. Castoriadis (1987) has written about the function of the 'imaginary' in the constitution of society. 'Social imaginary significations' are part of every society and in particular, in the present context, the 'central imaginary'. The point at issue is the manner in which a society imagines itself in time and space with reference to a cultural model. This is not unlike what Anderson (1984) has called an 'imaginary community' to describe the national ideal. The idea of Europe should, however, be seen as an even higher degree of abstraction than the national ideal. Following Durkheim, I believe it can be seen as a collective or social representation encompassing within it a heterogeneity of cultural forms (Moscovici, 1981,

1984). Social representations are not merely reproductions of reality, they are also prescriptive and serve as regulative ideas for the formation of collective identities.

However, when cultural ideas become part of political-identity building processes they can become ideologies. By ideology I mean an all-embracing and comprehensive system of thought, a programme for the future, and a political doctrine for the mobilisation of the masses. 'When a particular definition of reality comes attached to a concrete power interest, it may be called an ideology' (Berger and Luckmann, 1984, p. 141). Identities become pathological once they take on the character of a dominant ideology and the individual can no longer choose his or her identity. When this happens identities become life-lies: identities stabilise as objective forms of consciousness. In other words identities become vehicles for the reproduction of dominant ideologies. National identity, sexism, sectarianism and racism are examples of regressive forms of identification with authority: identities become reified and anchored in the state, gender, church and colour. Identities can also take on a pathological form when they are constructed against a category of otherness (Fabian, 1983; Gilman, 1985). Instead of identity being defined by a sense of belongingness and solidarity arising out of shared life-worlds, it becomes focused on opposition to an Other: the 'We' is defined not by reference to a framework of shared experiences, common goals and a collective horizon, but by the negation of the Other. Identification takes place through the imposition of otherness in the formation of a binary typology of 'Us' and 'Them'. The purity and stability of the 'We' is guaranteed first in the naming, then in the demonisation and, finally, in the cleansing of otherness. This is frequently what the pursuit of community really is about: the imposition of otherness in the assertion 'we are different from them'. The defining characteristic of the group is not what its members have in common but in what separates them from other groups. By this I do not mean to suggest that difference is somehow bad. Identities are always relational and what matters is not the representation of the Other as such but the actual nature of the difference that is constructed. The issue then is one of diversity or division: self-identity by the recognition of otherness or by the negation of otherness; solidarity or exclusion. When the Other is recognised as such, difference is positive, but when the Other is represented as a threatening stranger, difference is negative. This dichotomy between Self and Other has been pivotal in the making of European identity (Keen, 1986; Hall, 1992; Harle, 1990; Larrain, 1994; Neumann and Welsh, 1991; Neumann, 1992; Said, 1979; Young, 1990).

The concept of identity must be further differentiated into the levels at which identity is possible. It is important to distinguish between personal

and collective identities. While a collective European identity existed (at least as part of elite culture) in some form since the sixteenth century, European identity as part of personal identities did not exist until the late nineteenth century though it had gradually evolved since the Enlightenment. In this period the idea of Europe became reflected in the personal life histories of individuals as well as movements.

Much of what is being called 'European' is in fact reconstructed, and in many cases thinly disguised, nineteenth century imperialist ideas (Nederveen Pieterse, 1991). One could even go so far as to argue that there is a similarity between present-day experiments with European identity and late nineteenth century attempts at consciousness-raising by means of a social imperialism and jingoistic nationalism. In both cases the result is the same: the postulates of political discourse are withdrawn from critique and scrutiny by being reified into official cultures. Oppositional currents, sub-cultures and regional and social movements are alienated in the appeal to a meta-community: 'For a part of the public the abstract symbols presented by the various administrative agencies may become a stereo-typed substitute for rigorous thought about their own and others' social needs' (Edelman, 1964, p. 62). The idea of Europe was mostly derived from 'above' and not from 'below' in concrete forms of life and political struggles. It has principally been the ideology of intellectuals and the political class. As such it has tended to be a counter-revolutionary ideology of the elites, those groups who claim to be the representatives of society. It is in their language that the idea of Europe has been codified. Intellectuals generally play a leading role in the shaping and codification of collective identities (Giesen, 1993).

Today, more than ever before, the discourse of Europe is taking on a strongly ideological character. In this transformation Europe becomes part of a hegemonical cultural discourse. Elevated to the status of a consensus, the idea of Europe, by virtue of its own resonance, functions as a hegemon which operates to produce an induced consensus – which is less a compliance with power than acquiescence and helplessness – with which a system of power can be mobilised. By a 'hegemon' I mean, following Gramsci (1971), the manifold ways in which consciousness is structured in the soliciting of consent. In the battle of ideas, a single system of thought becomes hegemonic. The rule of the hegemon is rule by a form of consent that does not question its own presuppositions. A world is created which is experienced as objective; it is something that is given, taken for granted, unalterable and self-evident. As a hegemon Europe is a self-enclosure, a coherent subject-matter, a system of thought. It is not something that can easily be chosen or rejected, for it itself structures the field of choices and the epistemological framework in which it is articulated. Thinking, reading and writing about Europe are the

intellectual modalities of power through which Europe is constituted as a strategic reality and a subject of knowledge. Europe thus exists as a sub-text which sets the terms for the construction of a field of representations. As a philosophy of history, the idea of Europe serves as a meta-norm of legitimation for the pursuit of a strategy of power. It serves as a substitute for the complexity of modern society, which is characterised by differentiation and abstractness (Luhmann, 1982; Zijderveld, 1972). One of the tasks of a critical theory of Europe is to demonstrate that cultural and political diversity and the heterogeneity of social milieus lie beneath the dominant ideology. The task of the sociologist is to inquire into the process by which realities are constructed out of ideas and to demystify the power of symbolic names; to disentangle the complex web of interconnections by which identities become linked to relations of power. It must also be recognised that the dominant ideology, the hegemon, is never entirely a monolith but is fraught with tensions and contradictions, for where there is consensus there is conflict. The dominant ideas are never controlled by any single ruling elite and can be used to subvert power. So the European idea is not just only a hegemonic idea; it should be seen as a totalising idea that collapses at the point of becoming hegemonic.

Europe is more than an idea and identity; it is also a geo-political reality. One of the central characteristics of Europe as a geo-political entity is the process in which the core penetrated into the periphery to produce a powerful system of control and dependency. It was colonialism and conquest that unified Europe and not peace and solidarity. Every model of Europe ever devised always generated an anti-model. Europe has tended to be a divisive phenomenon; it is not inherently connected with peace and unity. It has been a fact of European history that every attempt made to unite the continent occurred after a period of major division. This presupposes a theory of the historical regions of Europe. It will suffice here to remark that Europe is not a natural geo-political framework but is composed of a core and a number of borderlands which are all closely related to the eastern frontier. To a very significant extent, much of the 'unity' of Europe has been formed in relation to the eastern frontier and it has been possible only by violent homogenisation. Unlike the western frontier, which has been a frontier of expansion, the eastern one has been a frontier of defence and has played a central role in the formation of European identity.

There is another aspect to the discourse of Europe which bears on the present context. The idea of Europe shares with the idea of the nation, or national identity, the characteristic of obscurantism. Though the idea of Europe rarely evokes the same degree of irrational reverence and deification that the ideal of the national community can demand, it is also ultimately based on

an obscurantist interpretation of community: a fantasy homeland that goes hand in hand with a retrospective invention of history as well as a moralisation of geography. Underlying this are unifying narratives of origin and destiny. The difference is that in the case of the idea of Europe it is the mystique of civilisation that is cultivated and reinforced by myths of high culture. Europe can be viewed as a discursive strategy which is articulated by shifting signifiers in relational contexts. In other words, what must be analysed are the reference points of the European idea rather than its cultural content. This is because there is no real tradition of Europeanism in the sense that we can speak of a tradition of statehood or nationalism. Today such an 'invented tradition' is clearly in the process of invention with the proliferation of a paraphernalia of emblems and slogans of the new official culture. It must not be forgotten that the nation-state is also not the unified and autonomous entity it is often portrayed to be, but is characterised by the same divisions with which Europe is often equated.

Taking Gellner's (1983) argument that nationalism came into being to serve society in the process of industrialisation with a culturally uniform mode of communication, it could be argued that the idea of Europe is today fulfilling this role. The new politics of Europeanism is very much a product of the media and is exhibited in life styles – food, advertising, tourism, satellite TV – and technocratic ideologies and not in the emotionalism of nationalism. The idea of Europe quite simply does not have the same emotional attachment of the nation. To take an example from history. After the Risorgimento, when Italy was united in 1861 (without the knowledge of most Italians) one of its architects, Massimo d'Azeglio, in a famous phrase, said 'we have made Italy, now we have to make Italians' (Hobsbawm, 1991b, p. 44). The situation is not very different today: Europe has been united, but those elusive citizens, the Europeans, have yet to be invented.

The idea of Europe has all too often been erroneously seen as a cosmopolitan ideal of unity and an alternative to the chauvinism of the nation-state. My thesis, in contrast, is that it must be viewed in the global context of world-views and the nation-state, far from being its enemy, is in fact the condition of its possibility. The European idea has in fact reinforced rather than undermined the ideology of nationality. As Karl Mannheim (1979) argued, many cultural ideas which embody utopian impulses do not always transcend the society with which they are ostensibly in conflict but become ideologies.

When we contemplate the vast range of books, monographs and political manifestos that all bear the word Europe in their titles, it is difficult to deny that there is an element of mystification in the idea of Europe. It projects the language of the life-world and political struggles onto the macro-dimension

of a community of states by the invention of a mega-community. The result is not genuine internationalism but a socio-technical framework for the exploitation of scarce resources and the pursuit of unrestrained economic growth. We find that the idea of Europe is becoming the driving force of strategies of macro-political and economic engineering, and, above all, the substitution of a new goal, closely linked to the neo-liberal political programme, for the traditional social democratic programme. It is a unifying theme which links the macro-level of economic and global frameworks to the cultural reproduction of the life-world and enhances the steering-capacity of the former. The most important task for Europe today is the articulation of a new idea of Europe which would be capable of providing an orientation for a post-national European identity. Rather than being the leitmotif for 'disorganised capitalism' (Lash and Urry, 1987) the European idea should, if it is to be anything, be the basis of a new politics of cultural pluralism.

At this point I should like to clarify a theoretical presupposition implicit in what I have been arguing. Essential to a sociological theory of the evolution of modern political culture is a vision of the structures underlying shifts in collective identity and their regulative ideas. By structures I mean, essentially, the state, economy, culture and society. When we survey the history of the European idea it can be seen how it was always articulated in terms of the first three. Europeanism generally signified some notion of political unity, be it that of the Holy Leagues and alliances of Christendom, the Concert of Europe or the European Union. This state-centred model was in modern times closely linked to the pursuit of economic interests. It is also connected with militarism in the sense of Europe as a security agenda. Europe has also been seen as a product of culture: be it that of scientific-technological culture, bourgeois high culture, or the present-day attempts to invent a European official culture. Europeanism has rarely been associated with the politics of society in the sense of 'civil society' or the 'public sphere' understood as a domain distinct from that of the state. If Europeanism is to have any sense at all, this is the model that it should be based upon and not one that uses collective identities as props for macro-institution-building. The discourses with which the idea of Europe has been connected – Christendom, civilisation, the West, imperialism, racism, fascism, modernity – are ones that are based on matters that have little to do with the real experiences of life. The official and codified version of European culture has nothing to say to the silent Europe of minorities. Not surprisingly the charisma and enchantment that it lacks is filled by nationalist and racist ideology and the new politics of materialism. So exactly where the space for identity formation is to be created is a crucial question for the future. It is certain, however, that it is not to be found in the sphere of the state and its administrative and ideo-

logical apparatus. Of relevance here, and which I think will seriously challenge the possibility of a European identity, is the fact that in recent times post-national identity is increasingly focused more on collectively mediated goals than on totalising visions of unity. Post-national Europeans do not see themselves as bearers of the whole, be it the totality of the nation or Europe, but as citizens whose identity is formed by their interests. If this is so, then a European identity, unless it is to be a contradiction in terms, could only be formed on the basis of intractable disunity and the democratic pluralism that this entails.

An important theoretical problem concerning the idea of Europe is its relationship to the claims of European culture to universal validity. In other words what is the normative status of the idea of Europe? A book on the idea of Europe cannot escape this thorny philosophical issue. It must be said at the outset that while I have heavily drawn on Foucault's (1980a; 1980b) notion of discourse and Said's (1979) concept of cultural construction, I hope to avoid some of the well-known theoretical pitfalls of their works. My approach is also inspired by the sociology of Max Weber who attempted to provide a theory of 'Occidental rationalism' (Schluchter, 1981). Rather than circumventing the issue of universality by means of cultural relativism, I shall attempt to present a working hypothesis of a concept of universality that does not open itself to the Eurocentric fallacy. The idea of Europe, I have argued, is essentially a cultural value as opposed to a concrete form of identity. As a cultural value it is not in itself a normative postulate. Values are not the same as norms. The latter are closer to ethical principles and can claim to be universalisable in the sense that we can expect them to be of binding force (Habermas, 1984, p. 89). Values, in contrast, are particularistic, they do not carry the same claims to universal validity that we attach to norms. The problem that this presents for the idea of Europe is not whether universal ethical principles exist, but whether they are embodied in European culture.

The equation of the idea of Europe with political identity-building projects has resulted in a distorted idea of Europe. This is because the idea of Europe, since it became an institutionalised discourse in early modern Europe, served as a kind of legitimation for the politics of the secular and territorial state. Now, legitimation presupposes a normative standpoint by means of which power becomes legitimate authority. In usurping the place held by Christendom, the idea of Europe came to acquire the aura of a normative standard of civilisation, but this ultimately was a reification of ethical postulates. The concept of a universal Church was thus preserved in its heir, Europe, which espoused a secular ideology of progress and a philosophy of history. As the geo-political name for a civilisation, Europe also signified its cultural value spheres. This, as I shall argue in the following chapters, was

possible because of the tension between the two functions of the idea of Europe: as a geo-political name and as a cultural framework. As a result of the enduring conflict between West and East, Christendom and Islam, Europe failed to devise a geo-political framework capable of uniting European civilisation with a common set of values. Ever since the Muslim expansion of the eighth century, much of Europe lay under non-European rule. After the Fall of Constantinople in 1453 as much as one quarter of European territory lay under Muslim rule and after the advance of the Red Army in 1945 one third of Europe lay under the Russians, who have traditionally been perceived as non-European. Europe, as a civilisation, perpetually under threat from outside forces, particularly on its eastern frontier, evolved a cultural ethos which tended to attribute to its own structures of consciousness a universalistic dimension. With the opening of the western frontier after 1492 and its subsequent path to world mastery, the idea of Europe increasingly signified a universal culture and European modernity was supposed to be the agent of universality. With the exception of China, the only cultures that ever challenged this were eventually either defeated or assimilated.

It is a mistake, as Ernst Troeltsch (1977) argued, to conflate universal structures of consciousness with any one particular culture. This is the essence of Eurocentricism as an ethno-cultural project. Whether or not universalistic structures of consciousness have been more institutionalised in western European culture – which clearly transcends Europe as a geo-political region – than in non-European cultures is not the issue. Habermas (1984, p. 180) has cogently argued this point:

The universalist position does not have to deny the pluralism and the incompatibility of historical versions of 'civilized humanity', but it regards this multiplicity of forms of life as limited to cultural contents, and it asserts that every culture must share certain formal properties of the modern understanding of the world, if it is at all to attain a certain degree of 'consciousness awareness' or 'sublimation'. Thus the universalist assumption refers to a few necessary structural properties of modern life forms as such.

It is important that these minimal conditions be separated from the idea of Europe. To suppose that the idea of Europe is itself a universal normative standard would be to relate it to a kind of 'cultural violence' (Galtung, 1990). By this I mean the violence that is contained in a cultural world-view which claims to be in possession of a single universal truth. Pertinent to this issue is the thesis, developed in Chapter 5, that European culture was never adequately secularised and that consequently the idea of the universal survived as a cultural absolute, an 'essentialism', in the Europe of the territorial and secular nation-states. To invoke Europe often involves the illusion that there

is a privileged 'We' who are the subject of history and a corresponding belief in the universality of western norms. Europe becomes a mirror for the interpretation of the world and European modernity is seen as the culmination of history and the apotheosis of civilisation. The most common form in which this exists today is an highly ambivalent 'anti-racism' which, in appealing to some allegedly self-evident set of abstract rights, is selectively deployed as an pretext for western triumphalism and does not recognise that there is a profound 'antinomy between universalism as regards human beings and universalism as regards human beings' "cultures" (Castoriadis, 1992).

The thesis I should like to propose, then, is that it is important that the idea of Europe be separated from universal ethical validity claims disguised as an essentialist ethno-culturalism. The idea of Europe, ostensibly a geo-political concept, is a cultural model, a cultural construct, and as such cannot claim universal validity. It is an unreflective category of cultural reproduction. While it can be connected to the moral dimension of society, it itself is not a moral concept. Moreover, in so far as battles for legitimation crystallise in the idea of Europe, the effect can only be one of distortion, a reification of the moral space. The idea of Europe then inevitably becomes a basis of division and a strategy for the construction of difference. The politicisation of the idea of Europe in fact amounts to a definition of Europe not as what its peoples have in common but in what separates them from the non-European world, and, indeed, very often amongst themselves. It is this definition of Europe, which inevitably results from its political hijacking, that should be avoided.

At this point the notion of universality must be further clarified. Universality does not mean uniformity and the intolerance that this necessarily implies, but can refer to plurality and difference. As I have already argued, difference is not in itself bad so long as it is not a question of the negation of otherness. Universality can refer to a notion of otherness than includes rather than alienates the Other. It is for this reason important that what I would call the 'project of autonomy' be disengaged from the dominant social representations that have until now prevailed and be more firmly connected to normatively grounded ideas. A model of citizenship based on participation and solidarity is crucial in this respect. I shall be arguing that the notion of European post-national citizenship is a more important ideal than that of 'European unity' and could offer a more normatively based reference point for a European identity.

The idea of Europe is not, then, without ambivalence. It is Janus-faced: on the one hand, an exclusivist notion of Europe has prevailed; yet, on the other the idea of Europe does appear to occupy the normative space for a universalist project of autonomy. By deconstructing the myth of the unity of

European culture, I hope to be able to open up a critical perspective for a theory of citizenship which no longer appeals to atavistic myths and cultural chauvinism. So what needs to be clarified is the moral universalism that is implicitly connected to the idea of Europe. There is enough within European history with which the idea of Europe can be associated, such as a strong tradition of civil society and anti-authoritarianism. It must, however, be recognised that even these enlightened traditions are not specifically European but transcend the specificity of cultural traditions.

The structure and argument of the book reflect this critique of the universalist claims of European culture. It is written in the spirit of a radical intervention into the debate on a European identity and the attempt to fashion an artificial identity out of what should perhaps be best left as a cultural idea. The unifying theme in the book is the deconstruction of the 'Eurocentric fallacy', the implicit association of the idea of Europe with universally valid norms and the myth of unity. The crux of the problem is the relation of Europe as a cultural idea to concrete forms of collective identity-building and its structuring in the geo-political framework which we call Europe. What is also at stake is the relationship of cultural identity to political identity: the historical process whereby Europe was constituted as a cultural idea and transformed into a political identity. Above all the failure of this identity to constitute a collective identity capable of challenging national identities is my theme.

I can now state a central hypothesis. A theory of the invention of Europe seeks to explain how the idea of Europe becomes attached to processes of collective identity formation, which reinforce the dominance of the centre over the periphery. By a 'European identity' I mean essentially, by definition, a collective identity that is focused on the idea of Europe, but which can also be the basis of personal identity. I shall attempt to outline the historical constitution of the discourse of Europe in the following chapters by reference to these three levels of analysis: Europe as an idea, identity and as a reality. The variables in this are language, religion, consciousness of history, nationality, the frontier, material and aesthetic culture, and law/citizenship. The structures to which these are linked are the economy, the state, culture and society. From a normative-critical point of view, I shall be arguing for a restructuring and re-imagining of the European idea, which should be located on the level of society, so that we can speak of a 'Social Europe' as opposed to a state-centred Europe and link it to citizenship as a normative basis of collective identity. Very schematically, I shall link the idea of Europe to five discourses which can be seen as its 'crystallisations': the discourse of Christendom, the Enlightenment discourse of civilisation, the late nineteenth and early twentieth century discourse of culture, the Cold War

discourse after 1945 and the contemporary conflict between the discourses of Fortress Europe and that of a Social or Citizens' Europe.

I begin, in Chapter 2, by tracing the genesis and emergence of the idea of Europe in classical antiquity and its gradual transformation in the course of the Middle Ages from a geographical notion – originally linked to the idea of the Hellenic Occident – into a cultural idea, but one which, nevertheless, was subordinated to the idea of Christendom. With the consolidation of the idea of Europe – which I place at the late fifteenth century – I seek in Chapter 3 to relate this new cultural model to the emerging forms of European identity and their burgeoning geo-political realities. My aim is to assess at exactly what stage European identity became focused on the idea of Europe as opposed to Christendom. Chapter 4 deals with the enclosure of the idea of Europe in western Europe. Its central argument is that the division between Europe and the Orient was reflected in an internal division within Europe and that the eastern frontier – closed after the fall of Constantinople in 1453 – was the determining factor in the shaping of the idea of Europe as the 'West'. It was not until the opening of the western frontier following the reconquest of Spain and the colonisation of the Americas after 1492 that the broader and more hegemonic notion of the 'West' provided the basis for European identity. Chapter 5 looks at the consolidation of the western system of nation-states and the formation of a political concept of the idea of Europe as a debased normative standard in the Concert of Europe. A central concern in this chapter, as well as in Chapter 6, is an attempt to explain the manner in which the idea of Europe came to rest on a universalistic notion of *civilisation*, constructed in opposition to the Orient and the conquest of nature, while the idea of the nation became more focused on the particularistic concept of national *culture*. In Chapter 6 I argue that European identity is very closely linked with racial myths of civilisational superiority and the construction of otherness within an adversarial system of world-views. Chapter 7 proceeds with an argument about the collapse of the idea of Europe: the rise of the idea of *Mitteleuropa*, as a competitor, the conditions of total war and the rise of fascism, which also competed for the idea of Europe. Chapter 8 considers the rebuilding of the idea of Europe as part of post-war reconstruction and its institutionalisation as a pseudo-norm in the European Union. In this context the crucial issue is the wider scenario of the Cold War. Chapter 9 is addressed to the implication of the collapse of the Cold War consensus for the idea of Europe. Its basic thesis is that the idea of Europe has become part of a new state-seeking nationalism that has crystallised in 'Fortress Europe' and far from being a successor to the nation-state, Europe, in fact, is a function of it.

Finally, in Chapter 10, by way of a conclusion I argue that it is important that the ethno-cultural idea of Europe be separated from normative consid-

erations such as the issue of citizenship. Political and legal conceptions should not be made out of unreflective cultural identities. When such unreconstructed cultural ideas are translated into institutional practices by political identity projects, the polymorphous nature of reality will ensure their divisive application. The only way out of this would be to replace the largely unreflective idea of Europe based on self-identity through negation and exclusion with one based on autonomy and participation. Only by means of a commitment to a post-national European citizenship can the idea of Europe be divested of its cultural ambivalence. Since a collective European identity cannot be built on language, religion or nationality without major divisions and conflicts emerging, citizenship may be a possible option. Given the obsolescence of the Cold War idea of Europe, there is now a greater need than ever before for a new definition of Europeanism that does not exclude the stranger. A collective identity based on citizenship could be a starting point for such a reappraisal of the European idea. I am suggesting then that the politics of Europeanism should be seen as an incomplete project in which there can be both regression and a potential for social learning.

10 Conclusion: Towards Post-National Citizenship

The aim of this book has not been to demonstrate that the idea of Europe is an idea with negative implications. I do not wish to suggest that it should be abandoned as a cultural concept. It is in many senses a collective concept for unclear ideas, not all of which should be rejected. The general thrust of the argument has been that there are many 'Europes' and that the one that has become predominant today is very much one of exclusion and not inclusion. I have stressed the importance of looking at the idea of Europe from a global point of view. The idea of Europe that I have attempted to deconstruct is one that is focused on the notion of unity and one for which modernisation is the model. After surveying the idea of Europe through the centuries it is not difficult to conclude that there is little new in the world that is emerging today: the Europe of our time is not one that has relinquished the age-old pursuit of enemies. The 'little' Europe of the Cold War era is over and so are the illusions and luxuries it afforded. It is no longer exclusively a question of West versus East but of North versus South. A new and greater Europe is being born in what is becoming a major confrontation between Europe and the rest of the world amidst the rise of a racist malaise of xenophobic nationalism. White bourgeois nationalism has found new outlets in populist political rhetoric.

On a positive note, however, it must be recognised that, since the old Europe developed within the context of the Cold War the restrictions it imposed are now absent: high military spending is now no longer necessary and there is no reason why the new Europe cannot devote itself to new goals determined by social and environmental demands (Freeman et al, 1991). The discourse of Europe can be seen as the space in which new demands can be articulated. So simple-minded opposition to Europe can also be undemocratic. As Alain Touraine argues: 'European construction offers us the chance to live simultaneously at various levels of political and social organization; if we don't use it, we will be torn between universalism and particularism or close ourselves into a desperado nationalism' (Touraine, 1994 p. 22).

I have also attempted to demonstrate that the ideal of European unity has not, in fact, been an alternative to the nation-state, either in theory or in practice. To briefly restate one of the central theses of this book, when the idea of Europe became differentiated from the Christian world-view after the Renaissance it became closely associated with the emerging ideal of the

nation-state and ever since, aside from a number of anomalous utopian ideas, the dominant understanding of the idea of Europe has been that of a Europe of nation-states. Europe is not, then, an alternative to nationalism but a confirmation of the hegemony of the nation-state. In fact Europe is a function of the nation-state, which has also fostered the nationalism of the region. As a strategy of discourse it is a protean notion by which the ugly aspects of the nation-state can be rejected while its basic ideology is retained. To suppose that the Europe of the European unity refers to a cosmopolitan ideal beyond the particularism of the nation-state is, quite simply, an act of delusion. As a concrete entity Europe is meaningless without the nation-state. In fact the movement towards European unity has possibly led to a strengthening of the nation-state since there has been a transfer of major mechanisms of economic and political integration to the EU onto which the burden of legitimation has been shifted. Europe emerged out of the disunity among nation-states, but ultimately reinforced them. I have tried to demonstrate that, even for conservative-populist opposition to the ideal of Europe the issue is not, strictly speaking, Europe. It is rather that Europe, as a discursive strategy, is the focus for articulating a variety of political standpoints which are increasingly tending to coalesce in opposition to immigrants. In the discourse of Europe mutually opposed groups can find in the single entity a focal point for the pursuit of their projects. The very concept of a European union makes little sense if something is not going to be excluded.

What I hope to have demonstrated is that an unreflected idea of Europe is a dangerous idea. The idea of Europe embodies prejudices that lie deep in the history of Europe. The ideas that have given Europe its identity, the ideals of the Christian humanist West and liberal democracy, have failed to unite Europe; at least we are less likely to believe in such ideas as the civilising power of European modernity. The idea of Europe cannot be disengaged from the atrocities committed in its name. Walter Benjamin (1973, p. 258) wrote under conditions which are real for many people today: 'There is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of barbarism.' There is a direct continuity in the idea of Europe from the crusading genocides of medieval Christendom to the systematic extermination of other civilisations by European imperialism to the gas chambers of the Nazis and the pogroms of ethnic cleansing of the new nationalisms in the post-Cold War period. European history does not lead from culture to civilisation, from diversity to unity; these are the terms of an old debate which we can no longer accept. In the wake of the ending of the Cold War we are witnessing today the reconstruction of borderlands, some new, some old. The frontier zones of the old empires dissolved after the First World War are now making a violent return in the form of ethnic nationalism. The almost fifty years of peace that Western

Europe has enjoyed since the end of the Second World War – when war was effectively transported to the Third World – are now over with the reappearance of the old fissures. History, in short, has returned today in the formation of a new dichotomy of Self and Other. It is in the shadow of the two world wars that many of the conflicts in the Balkans and Transcaucasia have been fought. The developments in European history in the present decade have turned Europeans in upon themselves and have led to the reappropriation of the past. But it is a past with which Europeans have not come to terms. Just as Europe took over the world-view of Christendom in the early modern period, it has also taken over the culture of nineteenth century imperialism, and European fascism has been rehabilitated today in various strategies of 'cleansing', be it ethnic or ideological. The lesson is clear: Europe must be judged by its failures as much as by its lofty ideals.

When we survey the scene of destruction in Eastern Europe and the violent return of history that the end of the Cold War has unleashed, it is difficult not to conclude that Europe as a programmatic ideal has been a failure. The dismemberment of Bosnia under the most violent of conditions is the ultimate expression of the failure of Europe as a multi-cultural polity. Bosnia posed a fundamental question about the identity of Europe. This was the question of whether or not Muslims and Christians, both Orthodox and Roman, can live together in a single multi-ethnic state. Europe's answer was no. This decision was the completion of the process begun with the reconquest of Spain. The division of Bosnia gives expression in an extreme form to the failure of Europe and crystallises the war psychosis that has been the basis of European identity for centuries. In particular the tragedy of Sarajevo encapsulates the failure of Europe as a multi-cultural civilisation. Sarajevo had been the home of four religions – Roman Catholics, Orthodox Christians, Muslims and Jews (there had been a large Jewish population since the fifteenth century, when they had been expelled from most parts of Europe) had lived there for centuries – and was renowned for its tolerance and cosmopolitanism. Moreover, it is hardly necessary to add that the failure of the European Union to act in concert to save Bosnia from its horrible fate by the dark forces of Christendom is yet another serious demonstration of the failure of Europeanism to link itself with a notion of collective responsibility and solidarity. The tendency in the European Union, with its monopoly on the idea of Europe, was to define Bosnia as non-European and thereby justify non-action (Ali and Lifschulz, 1993). Muslim Bosnians believed they were being judged by many Europeans as Muslims. One cannot help speculating about the consequences of a Muslim attack on a Christian enclave in the periphery of Europe. Many western pundits spoke of the undesirability of a Muslim state in Europe. But it must also be said that the inability of the

European Union and the United Nations to intervene in the war in Bosnia also disillusioned many Europeans with their international agencies and European identity was severely shaken.

Is there anything in the discourse of Europe that provides a point of departure for a politics of collective responsibility? Is it possible to speak of 'learning processes' in history? (Eder, 1985; Wehler, 1988). Can anything be rescued from the idea of Europe? I should like to bring this essay to a conclusion with a brief excursus on this issue.

The thesis I wish to advocate is that unless the idea of Europe can be linked to multi-culturalism and post-national citizenship, it is best regarded with scepticism as a political notion. Europe must be judged by how it treats its minorities as well as its attitude to the non-European world, and not merely by the chauvinistic norms of the nation-state. With the break-up of traditional political identities, there is a need today for an alternative collective identity that is not based on the counter-factualism that is inherent in national identity. I remain doubtful that the idea of Europe can achieve this but I do not wish to preclude the possibility that it can provide a space for overcoming resurgent nationalism and new populist kinds of racism. In order to achieve this it is, I believe, crucial to separate the ethno-cultural idea of Europe from citizenship. This distinction hangs on the difference between universalisable norms and cultural values, which are relativistic. Citizenship is a normative concept while Europe is a cultural idea. Citizenship should not be any more conflated with the idea of an 'essentialist' Europe than with the principle of nationality. I hope to have demonstrated in this book that Europe's claim to universally valid norms is at best highly contentious if not downright false. The idea of Europe is essentially a cultural idea based on a geo-political entity and its politicisation as a political system inevitably results in a distorted and regressive adversarial value system. The only way out of this dilemma is to break the connection between the idea of Europe and the ethno-culturalism that it has until now been based upon.

The idea of Europe, in contrast to the idea of the nation, is not yet a monolithic notion with regressive tendencies, but is characterised by tensions and contradictions which can be exploited for a new politics of autonomy. If the idea of Europe can be aligned with the progressive forces in European history it may be of emancipatory interest. Of particular relevance in this is the secular and pluralist traditions of European cities and the earlier traditions of citizenship associated with them. The ideal of citizenship is very much bound up with the ideal of the autonomy of the city resisting the tyranny of centralised power (Benevolo, 1993). It is possible that a revival of the memory of the diversified tradition of civil societies could offer an ideal strong enough to combat the tribalism of the new nationalism and the existing norms

of European identity. This is not an unlikely prospect since the more the nation-state is undermined, the more the city will come to the fore (Castells, 1994). While there has been considerable discussion of the new nationalism of the regions, little attention is being given to the potentiality of the city as a source of cultural renewal.

One of the most important issues raised by the question of European unity and the conflicts in south-east Europe is that of citizenship. The problem for the twenty-first century is exactly how we are to conceive of citizenship. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the predominant idea of citizenship has been linked to the nation-state. Citizenship was seen in terms of the relationship of the individual to a territorial entity, the modern state. Citizenship thus came to be enshrined in the constitutions of the liberal democracies and monarchies. This view of citizenship has given rise to the belief that constitutional and civil rights can only be guaranteed within the limits of the nation-state. The crucial question for the future is whether it is possible to create a post-national kind of citizenship (Andrews, 1991; Habermas, 1992; Meehan 1993a, 1993b; Vogel, 1991; Welsh, 1993). Society has always existed as a legal and moral order, but since this has always been tied to the nation-state, at least in modern times, the undermining of the sovereignty of the nation-state by European unity results in a legitimisation crisis unless new principles of legitimisation can be found which substitute the old idea of society as a moral and legal order with a notion of universal community based on citizenship.

If we look more closely at the old idea of citizenship as it emerged during the French Revolution, it can be seen that the revolutionary understanding of citizenship was closely linked to ideas of radical democracy and popular sovereignty. The idea of self-determination lay at the core of the early conceptions of citizenship. The individual was conceived first and foremost as a citizen of a democratic polity rather than as a subject of a monarch or church. But with the transformation of citizenship into nationality, the original and radical idea of popular sovereignty was lost. This loss of sovereignty was connected to the idea of negative liberty: the idea that liberty consists in freedom from coercion. Citizenship circumscribes a public sphere in which the autonomy of the individual is guaranteed from the arbitrary intrusion of the state. This is what is widely regarded as a civil liberty or civil rights and forms part of a broader notion of human rights. But the idea of citizenship also includes an active component, a political or public liberty. This is related to the sphere of public discourse and the principle of free association: the citizen as a political actor. We can also distinguish a third liberty, the right to welfare. This involves the idea that the role of the state is to serve society and to be the basis of the social welfare state. This is to follow T. H. Marshall's (1992) well-

known classification of citizenship into three types, the civil, the political and the social. According to Marshall the three kinds of citizenship became differentiated from each other from the twelfth century onwards and it is possible to associate each with a specific century: civil rights with the eighteenth century, political with the nineteenth and social with the twentieth.

I should like to argue that the dominant understanding of citizenship in modern times has, in fact, been shaped by conceptions of nationality, which in turn have been linked to purely political notions of citizenship. This is an aspect of citizenship that is rarely discussed. The nation-state has been the framework for the institutionalisation of citizenship. This is because the genesis of the notion of citizenship has been closely tied to the idea of freedom, which itself has been very much linked to the principle of nationality. In this transformation the political identity of the individual is shaped less by his or her relation to the state, as an apparatus of power, than to the nation as a moral community. Citizenship, reduced to nationality, thus becomes a means by which the political identity of the individual is shaped in the drawing of borders between nationalities. In this model there is no clear distinction between citizenship and national patriotism: the citizen is transformed into the patriot. This is in direct opposition to the original conception of citizenship that emerged with the French Revolution when citizenship was considered to be opposed to the coercive state. Notwithstanding the contradictions of the revolutionary concept of citizenship, there was not a close identification between citizenship and nationality in the original formulation of citizenship (Sewell, 1988). The constitutions of modern states do not make clear distinctions between citizenship and nationality. The basic criterion in most cases for citizenship is nationality, which in the original revolutionary conception was incidental to citizenship. In the final instance, this is reduced to the privilege of birth – and in some cases, such as in modern Germany, to blood (Brubaker, 1990). In the course of the nineteenth century, as the Old Order adapted itself to the conditions of capitalist modernity, the model of citizenship became a reflection of the property relations of bourgeois society: the citizen was an economic agent based on property ownership within a patriarchal system of power. With the emergence of universal franchise the notion of citizenship was subordinated to democracy. Notions of democracy that reduce, or subordinate, citizenship to a secondary consideration must be rejected for their narrowness: citizenship is not a mere extension of democracy which itself can exist only on the basis of active citizenship. In any case the reduction of citizenship to the principle of nationality was never the sole feature of citizenship throughout history (Heather, 1990; McNeil, 1986).

This narrow concept of citizenship as nationality is becoming increasingly irrelevant to Europe as the twenty-first century approaches. The liberal

constitutional idea of citizenship has become an instrument by which Europe, in the name of democracy and nationality, can close and tighten its borders (Brubaker, 1989). This kind of citizenship is no longer appropriate to the requirements of the late twentieth century. In 1970 the UNHCR estimated that there were 2.5 million refugees, and 8 million in 1980; and by 1992 the number had risen to 18 million refugees world-wide, while Amnesty International estimates that there were 35 million displaced persons. It is not surprising, then, that the Western European states are imposing new restrictions on immigration and that disillusionment with democracy is finding a new voice in racism and xenophobic nationalism. This is also a problem within Greater Europe. For instance, since the collapse of the USSR over twenty-five million Russians have been stranded in non-Russian states without clear rights to citizenship. Citizenship is being disengaged from universal rights and is being subordinated to the particularism of nationality. Citizenship should not be a means by which Europe defines its identity as a white bourgeois nationalism. This is the danger today, that citizenship is being reduced to the national chauvinism of the advanced nations. In this regression, 'Europeans' are consumers, recipients of welfare, tourists.

The connection between national identity and citizenship is growing stronger today in the face of the threat of mass immigration. Instead of being a means for protecting minorities, refugees, asylum seekers, ethnic minorities and stateless persons, it is becoming a means for protecting the majority from the outsider. Citizenship has become a synonym for nationality and a legitimisation of nationalist xenophobia. It has become a means by which minorities can be deprived of their rights rather than being a means of solidarity and a basis of democracy. The effect of most policies of the European Union has been to restrict citizenship by limiting the rights of refugees to enter the member states (Fernhout, 1993). The dominant concept of unity in the EU is an instrumentalist-technocratic one which does not question the nation-state as the basis of citizenship. Its principal failure is that it does not recognise that membership of a state does not mean membership of the national community, which the state is supposed to be based upon.

Post-national citizenship is an alternative to the restrictive notion of nationality. The essence of post-national citizenship is that citizenship is determined neither by birth nor nationality but by residence. Unlike nationality, citizenship should not be embodied in the national culture of the state. Citizenship is international and transcends the particularist assumptions of culture and nationality. It is also more than a mere political-legal principle but involves recognition of social rights. It is crucial to break the connection between citizenship and nationality, both intellectually and constitutionally. The only way Europe can overcome its political ambiguity is in the redefi-

tion of the basic political unit and notions of sovereignty (Tassin, 1992).

European identity remains trapped in a racial myth of origins which has found its expression today in a new nationalism of materialist chauvinism. Immigration laws are the crux of European identity, for these are the instruments Europe uses to restrict democracy and civil rights which are reserved for the privileged. Alongside new laws on immigration, what is also required is a fundamental questioning of the prevailing European forms of identity. European identity and the possibility of a post-national citizenship are very closely linked to the question of immigration laws (Lorenz, 1994, p. 14). So long as citizenship remains linked to nationality, the conviction will remain that citizenship laws exist in order to protect the unity and cohesion of the dominant culture from foreign cultures. The only adequate idea of Europe is one that is connected to anti-racism and stands unequivocally for post-national citizenship.

Post-national citizenship is not to be understood merely as a formal constitutional right. It also embraces a substantive dimension, which empowers citizens with the right to participation in the democratic polity. In this sense it is fundamentally different from national citizenship, which is purely formal. Purely formal notions of citizenship are dangerous since they leave open the possibility for their contents to be filled by populist ideology. Citizenship should be the ultimate basis of legitimation for institution-building, not ambiguous cultural identities. It is important that it be linked to participation in the new political institutions that are being created.

The crucial issue here is the institutionalisation of pluralism. Citizenship does not merely entail a liberalisation of laws on immigration but also pertains to the right to cultural autonomy. This also involves creating the space in which minorities can define themselves rather than having their identity defined for them by the dominant ideology. Post-national citizenship is inextricably linked to cultural pluralism, which recognises the rights of ethnic minorities to their cultural autonomy without being forced to integrate into the dominant culture, which in most cases is the national culture. This involves a rejection of the prevailing ideas of assimilation which have now been widely recognised to be a failure. A post-national identity would therefore involve a commitment to cultural pluralism based on post-national citizenship which would be relevant to Muslims as well as Christians and other world religions, atheists, east and west Europeans, black and white, women as well as men.