QUESTION 22

The Subject of the Passions of the Soul

After this we have to consider the passions of the soul, first in general (questions 22-25) and then in particular (questions 26-48).

In the general treatment, there are four things to consider about the passions: first, their subject (question 22); second, the differences among them (question 23); third, their relation to one another (question 24); and, fourth, their badness and goodness (question 25).

On the first topic there are three questions: (1) Are there passions in the soul? (2) Does a passion exist in the appetitive part of the soul rather than in the apprehensive part? (3) Does a passion exist in the sentient appetite rather than in the intellective appetite, which is called the will?

Article 1

Are there passions in the soul?

It seems that there are no passions in the soul (*nulla passio sit in anima*):

Objection 1: To be acted upon (*pati*) is proper to matter. But as was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 75, a. 5), the soul is not composed of matter and form. Therefore, there are no passions in the soul.

Objection 2: As *Physics* 3 says, a passion is a movement. But as is proved in *De Anima* 1, the soul does not undergo movement (*anima non movetur*). Therefore, there are no passions in the soul.

Objection 3: A passion is a path toward corruption, since, as *Topics* says, "Every passion, when made stronger, takes away from the substance (*abiicit a substantia*)." But the soul is incorruptible. Therefore, there are no passions in the soul.

But contrary to this: In Romans 7:5 the Apostle says, "When we were in the flesh, the passions of the sins which were by the law were working in our members." But sins properly speaking exist in the soul. Therefore, the passions, which are here said to belong to the sins, likewise exist in the soul.

I respond: There are three ways in which something is said to be acted upon (*pati dicitur tripliciter*).

In one way, 'to be acted upon' is used generally, insofar as every instance of receiving something is an instance of being acted upon, even if nothing is taken away from the thing in question; in this sense the air is said to be acted upon when it is illuminated. However, properly speaking, this is to be *perfected* rather than *acted upon*.

In a second sense, something is said to be acted upon, properly speaking, when one thing is received along with the loss of something else. But there are two ways in which this happens:

(a) Sometimes what is taken away is not agreeable to the thing. For instance, when an animal's body is healed, it is said to be acted upon, since it receives health while losing sickness.

(b) Sometimes the reverse happens. For instance, getting sick is said to be an instance of being acted upon, since infirmity is received while health is lost. And this is the most proper sense of 'passion' or 'to be acted upon' (*hic est propriissimus modus passionis*). For 'to be acted upon' is taken from the fact that something is drawn toward the agent, and that which withdraws from what is agreeable to it seems especially to be drawn toward something else. Similarly, *De Generatione et Corruptione* 1 says that when what is more noble is generated from what is less noble there is a generation absolutely speaking (*generatio simpliciter*), but when what is less noble is generated from what is more noble there is, conversely, a generation in a certain respect (*generatio secundum quid*).

These are the three ways in which passions can exist in the soul. For in the sense of just receiving, sensing and intellective understanding are a certain sort of being acted upon (*sentire et intelligere est quoddam pati*). On the other hand, a passion with a loss occurs only through a bodily change (*secundum*

transmutationem coporalem), and so a passion properly speaking belongs to the soul only *per accidens*—viz., insofar as the composite is acted upon. But even here there is a difference, since the sort of change in question has the character of a passion more properly when it is a change for the worse than when it is a change for the better. Hence, sadness (*tristitia*) is more properly a passion than joy (*laetitia*) is.

Reply to objection 1: Insofar as being acted upon comes with a loss and a change, it is proper to matter and so is found only in things composed of matter and form. But insofar as being acted upon implies just the reception of something, it does not have to belong just to matter, but is instead able to belong to whatever is in potentiality.

Now even though the soul is not composed of matter and form, it nonetheless does have some potentiality, and accordingly it is suited for receiving and being acted upon. This is the sense in which, as *De Anima* 3 says, to understand intellectively is to be acted upon (*intelligere pati est*).

Reply to objection 2: Even if being acted upon and undergoing movement do not belong to the soul *per se*, they do belong to it *per accidens*, as *De Anima* 1 points out.

Reply to objection 3: This argument goes through with respect to passions that are accompanied by a change for the worse. This sort of passion belongs to the soul only *per accidens*, whereas it belongs *per se* to the composite, which is indeed corruptible.

Article 2

Are the passions in the apprehensive part of the soul more than in the appetitive part?

It seems that the passions are in the apprehensive part of the soul more than in the appetitive part:

Objection 1: As *Metaphysics* 2 says, what is first in a genus seems to be the greatest of the things belonging to that genus and to be a cause of the others. But the passions are in the apprehensive part before being in the appetitive part; for the appetitive part is not acted upon except when the apprehensive part has previously been acted upon (*non patitur pars appetitiva nisi passione praecedente in parte apprehensiva*). Therefore, the passions exist more in the apprehensive part than in the appetitive part.

Objection 2: What is more active seems to be less passive, since acting is opposed to being acted upon (*actio passioni opponitur*). But the appetitive part is more active than the apprehensive part. Therefore, it seems that the passions exist more in the apprehensive part.

Objection 3: Just as the sentient appetite is a power in a corporeal organ, so too is the sentient apprehensive power. But the passions of the soul come to exist, properly speaking, through a bodily change (*secundum transmutationem corporalem*). Therefore, it is not the case that they exist in the sentient appetitive part more than in the sentient apprehensive part.

But contrary to this: In *De Civitate Dei* 9 Augustine says, "The movements of our mind—πάθη in the Greek—are such that some, like Cicero, call them perturbations (*perturbationes*), and some call them affections (*affectiones*) or affects (*affectus*), while others call them—more clearly, as in the Greek—passions (*passiones*)." From this it is clear that the passions of the soul are the same as affections. But affections clearly belong to the appetitive part and not to the apprehensive part. Therefore, the passions are likewise in the appetitive part rather than in the apprehensive part.

I respond: As has already been explained (a. 1), the name 'passion' implies that the thing being acted upon (*patiens*) is drawn toward something that belongs to the agent.

Now the soul is drawn toward a thing through its appetitive power rather than through its apprehensive power. For it is through its appetitive power that the soul is ordered toward the things themselves insofar as they exist in themselves (*ad ispsas res prout in seipsis sunt*). Hence, in *Metaphysics 6* the Philosopher says that "the good and the bad"—i.e., the objects of the appetitive

power—"exist in the things themselves."

By contrast, the apprehensive power is not drawn to things insofar as they exist in themselves; rather, it has cognition of a thing in accord with the thing's intention (*secundum intentionem rei*), which it has or receives within itself in its own mode. Hence, in the same place the Philosopher says that "the true and the false"—which pertain to cognition—"exist in the mind and not in the things."

Hence, it is clear that the character of a passion is found in the appetitive part more than in the apprehensive part.

Reply to objection 1: What pertains to perfection behaves in a way contrary to what pertains to defectiveness (*e contrario se habet in his quae pertinent ad perfectionem et in his quae pertinent ad defectum*).

In the case of what pertains to perfection, intensity is associated with an approach toward a single first principle (*attenditur per accessum ad unum primum principium*), so that the closer something is to that principle, the more intense it is. For instance, the intensity of light is associated with its approach toward something that is maximally bright, so that the closer it gets to that thing, the brighter it is.

By contrast, in what pertains to defectiveness, intensity is associated not with an approach toward some highest thing, but instead with a movement away from the perfect, since this is what the character of privation and defectiveness consists in. And so the less remote a defect is from the first thing, the less intense it is; and, for this reason, at the beginning a defect is always small, and then later, as it proceeds further, it becomes greater (*postea procedendo magis multiplicatur*).

Now the passions have to do with defectiveness, since a passion belongs to something insofar as it is in potentiality. Hence, in things that are close to the first perfect thing, viz., God, there is hardly anything of the character of potentiality and passion, whereas in the other things that come after them, there is more potentiality and passion. And so it is likewise the case that there is less of the character of a passion in that prior power of the soul, viz., the apprehensive power.

Reply to objection 2: The appetitive power is said to be more active because it is more of a source (*principium*) for the exterior act. It has this feature from the very fact in virtue of which it is more passive, viz., that it has an ordering toward a thing insofar as that thing exists in itself. For it is through the exterior act that we arrive at the attainment of things.

Reply to objection 3: As was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 78, a. 3), there are two ways in which an organ of the soul can be changed:

(a) *by a spiritual change* (*transmutatione spirituali*), insofar as it receives the intention of a thing (*recipit intentionem rei*). This sort of change exists *per se* in the act of the sentient apprehensive power; for instance, the eye is changed by the visible thing not in such a way that it becomes colored, but in such a way that it receives the intention of color.

(b) *by a separate natural change in the organ*, insofar as the organ is changed with respect to its natural condition—e.g., becoming hot or cold or being changed in some similar way. This sort of change is related *per accidens* to the act of the sentient apprehensive power—as, for instance, when the eye is fatigued by an intent gaze or weakened by the intensity of a visible thing. However, a change of this sort is ordered *per se* toward an act of the sentient appetite. This is why a natural change in an organ is posited materially in the definition of movements of the appetitive part—as, for instance, when it is said that anger is the heating of the blood around the heart.

Hence, it is clear that the character of a passion is found more in the act of sentient appetitive power than in the act of the sentient apprehensive power, even though both are acts of a corporeal organ.

Article 3

Are the passions in the sentient appetite more than in the intellective appetite?

It seems that the passions are not in the sentient appetite rather than in the intellective appetite:

Objection 1: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 2, Dionysius says that Hierotheus "was taught by a more divine inspiration, not only learning divine things, but also undergoing them (*non solum discens sed etiam patiens divina*)." But the undergoing of divine things (*passio divinorum*) cannot belong to the sentient appetite, the object of which is the sensible good. Therefore, the passions exist in the intellective appetite as well as in the sentient appetite.

Objection 2: The more powerful the agent (*activum*) is, the stronger the passion. But the intellective appetite's object, viz., the good in general (*bonum universale*), is a more powerful agent than the sentient appetite's object, viz., a particular good. Therefore, the character of being a passion is found more in the intellective appetite than in the sentient appetite.

Objection 3: Joy and love are said to be passions. But they are found in the intellective appetite and not just in the sentient appetite; otherwise, they would not be attributed in the Scriptures to God and the angels. Therefore, it is not the case that the passions exist more in the sentient appetite than in the intellective appetite.

But contrary to this: In *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2 Damascene, in describing the animal passions, says, "A passion is a movement of the sentient appetitive power upon one's imagining something good or bad." And in another place: "A passion is a movement of the non-rational soul upon one's receiving an indication of something good or bad."

I respond: As has already been explained (a. 1), a passion properly speaking exists when there is a bodily change (*ubi est transmutatio corporalis*). Such a change is found in the acts of the sentient soul—and not only a *spiritual* change, as in the case of sentient apprehension, but a *natural* change as well. By contrast, in the case of an act of the intellective appetite no bodily change is required, because this sort of appetite is not a power of any organ.

Hence, it is clear that the character of a passion is found more properly in an act of the sentient appetite than in an act of the intellective appetite, and this is likewise clear from the definitions cited from Damascene.

Reply to objection 1: Here what is called an "undergoing of divine things" is (a) an affection directed toward divine things and (b) a union with those things through a love that occurs without a bodily change.

Reply to objection 2: The magnitude of a passion depends not only on the agent's power but also on the patient's susceptibility (*sed etiam ex passibilitate patientis*), since things that are highly susceptible (*bene passibilia*) are acted upon strongly even by puny agents (*etiam a parvis activis*). Therefore, even if the intellective appetite's object is more active than the sentient appetite's object, the sentient appetite is nonetheless more passive.

Reply to objection 3: When 'love', 'joy', and other names of this sort are attributed to God or the angels—or to men with respect to their intellective appetite—they signify a simple act of willing along with a likeness of the effect, but without any passion. Hence, in *De Civitate Dei* 9 Augustine says, "The holy angels punish without anger and give help without compassionate sadness. And yet—because of a certain likeness in the works and not because of the weakness of having affections—the names of those passions are by a custom of human speech applied to the angels as well."

QUESTION 23

The Differences among the Passions

Next we have to consider the differences the passions have from one another. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Are the passions that exist in the concupiscible power diverse from the ones that exist in the irascible power? (2) Is the contrariety among the passions of the irascible power based on the contrariety between the good and the bad? (3) Is there any passion that does not have a contrary? (4) Are there any passions within the same power that differ in species and are not contrary to one another?

Article 1

Do the same passions exist in the irascible and concupiscible powers?

It seems that the same passions exist in the irascible and concupiscible powers:

Objection 1: In *Ethics* 2 the Philosopher says that the passions of the soul are "the ones that joy (*gaudium*) and sadness (*tristitia*) follow upon." But joy and sadness exist in the concupiscible power. Therefore, all the passions exist in the concupiscible power. Therefore, the passions that exist in the irascible power are not different from the ones that exist in the concupiscible power.

Objection 2: Jerome's Gloss on Matthew 13:33 ("The kingdom of heaven is like leaven .....") says, "In the power of reason we have prudence, in the irascible power we have hatred for the vices, and in the concupiscible power we have desire for the virtues." But as *Topics* 2 says, hatred (*odium*) exists in the concupiscible power, as does love (*amor*), which it is its contrary. Therefore, the same passions exist in the concupiscible and irascible powers.

Objection 3: Passions, as well as actions, differ in species from one another according to their objects. But the objects of the passions of the irascible power are the same as the objects of the passions of the concupiscible power. Therefore, the same passions belong to the irascible and concupiscible powers.

But contrary to this: The acts of diverse powers, e.g., seeing and hearing, are diverse in species. But as was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 81, a. 2), the irascible and the concupiscible are two powers that divide the sentient appetite. Therefore, since, as was explained above (q. 22, a. 3), the passions are movements of the sentient appetite, it follows that the passions that exist in the irascible power differ in species from the passions that exist in the concupiscible power.

I respond: The passions that exist in the irascible power and the passions that exist in the concupiscible power differ from one another in species. For since, as was explained in the First Part (q. 77, a. 3), diverse powers have diverse objects, it is necessary for the passions of diverse powers to be directed toward diverse objects. Hence, *a fortiori*, the passions of the diverse powers differ in species, since a greater difference in the objects is required for a diversity of species among powers than for a diversity of species among the passions or actions of those powers. For just as, among natural things, a diversity of genus follows upon a diversity in the potentiality of the matter, whereas a diversity of *species* follows upon a diversity of form in the same matter, so too, among the acts of the soul, acts belonging to diverse powers are diverse not only in species but also in genus, whereas the acts or passions that are directed toward diverse specific objects that fall under the common object of a single power differ as species of the same genus.

Therefore, in order to discern which passions exist in the irascible power and which exist in the concupiscible power, one must take the object of each of these powers. Now in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 81, a. 2) it was explained that the object of the concupiscible power is the sensible good or the sensible bad taken absolutely (*bonum vel malum sensibile simpliciter acceptum*), i.e., the pleasurable (*delectabile*) or the painful (*dolorosum*). However, because it is necessary for the soul to suffer sometimes from

difficulties and opposition in attaining a good of this sort or in avoiding something bad, and to the extent that attaining the good or avoiding the bad is in some sense elevated beyond the animal's easily exercised power (*quodammodo elevatum supra facilem potestatem animalis*), it follows that the object of the irascible power is the good or the bad insofar as it has the character of being arduous or difficult (*secundum quod habet rationem ardui vel difficilis*).

Therefore, if a passion is directed toward the good or the bad absolutely speaking—e.g., joy (*gaudium*), sadness (*tristitia*), love (*amor*), hatred (*odium*)—then it belongs to the concupiscible power. By contrast, if a passion is directed toward the good or the bad under the notion *arduous*, i.e., insofar as it is attainable or avoidable with some difficulty—e.g., daring (*audacia*), fear (*timor*), hope (*spes*), etc.—then it belongs to the irascible power.

Reply to objection 1: As was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 81, a. 2), the irascible power was given to animals in order that the obstacles might be removed by which the concupiscible power is prevented from tending toward its object—either because of the difficulty involved in attaining a good or because of the difficulty involved in overcoming an evil. And this is why the irascible passions are all terminated in the concupiscible passions. Accordingly, joy and sadness, which exist in the concupiscible power, follow upon even those passions that exist in the irascible power.

Reply to objection 2: Jerome attributes the hatred of the vices to the irascible power not because of the character of hatred, which properly belongs to the concupiscible power, but rather because of the pugnacity (*propter impugnationem*) that belongs to the irascible power.

Reply to objection 3: It is the good insofar as it is pleasurable (*bonum inquantum est delectabile*) that moves the concupiscible power. But if a good is such that there is a difficulty involved in attaining it, then by that very fact the good in question has something that is contrary to the concupiscible power. And so it was necessary for there to be another power that would tend toward that good; and the same line of reasoning applies to bad things. The power in question is the irascible power. Hence, it is because of this that the passions of the concupiscible power differ in species from the passions of the irascible power.

Article 2

Is the contrariety among the passions of the irascible power based only on the contrariety between the good and the bad?

It seems that the contrariety among the passions of the irascible power (*contrarietas passionum irascibilis*) is based only on the contrariety between the good and the bad:

Objection 1: As has been explained (a. 1), the passions of the irascible power are ordered toward the passions of the concupiscible power. But the passions of the concupiscible power are not contrary to one another except according to the contrariety between the good and the bad, in the way that love is contrary to hatred and joy to sadness. Therefore, the passions of the irascible appetite are likewise not contrary to one another except according to the contrariety between the good and the bad.

Objection 2: The passions differ from one another according to their objects in the same way that movements differ from one another according to their termini. But as is clear from *Physics* 5, there is no contrariety among movements other than that based on the contrariety among their termini. But the object of an appetite is either the good or the bad. Therefore, there cannot be a contrariety among the passions in any appetitive power except one based on the contrariety between the good and the bad.

Objection 3: As Avicenna says in *De Naturalibus* 6, "Every passion of the soul involves approach and withdrawal (*omnis passio animae attenditur secundum accessum et recessum*)." But approach is caused by the character of the good, whereas withdrawal is caused by the character of the bad, since just

as the good "is what all things desire," as *Ethics* 1 puts it, so too the bad is what all things seek to avoid. Therefore, there cannot be a contrariety among the passions of the soul that is not based on the contrariety between the good and the bad.

But contrary to this: As is clear from *Ethics* 3, fear and daring are contrary to one another. But fear and daring do not differ with respect to the good and the bad, since both of them are directed at things that are bad. Therefore, not every contrariety among the passions of the irascible power is based on the contrariety between the good and the bad.

I respond: As *Physics* 3 says, a passion is a certain sort of movement. Hence, one has to interpret the contrariety among the passions in accord with the contrariety among movements or changes.

Now as *Physics* 5 says, there are two sorts of contrariety among changes or movements:

(a) The first has to do with *approach toward and withdrawal from the same terminus* (*secundum accessum et recessum ab eodem termino*). This sort of contrariety belongs properly to changes (*mutationes*), i.e., to (a) generation, which is a change toward *esse*, and (b) corruption, which is a change away from *esse*.

(b) The second has to do *with a contrariety among the termini*. This sort of contrariety properly belongs to movements (*motus*)—in the way that whitewashing (*dealbatio*), which is a movement from blackness to whiteness, is contrary to blackening (*denigratio*), which is a movement from whiteness to blackness.

So, then, two sorts of contrariety are found among the passions of the soul—(a) one involving a contrariety among their objects, viz., the good and the bad, and (b) the other involving approach toward and withdrawal from the same terminus.

Now among the passions of the concupiscible power one finds only the first sort of contrariety, viz., contrariety among the objects, whereas among the passions of the irascible power one finds both sorts of contrariety. The reason for this is that, as was explained above (a. 1), the object of the concupiscible power is the sensible good or the sensible bad absolutely speaking. Now the good as good cannot be a *terminus from which* (*terminus ut a quo*), but can only be a *terminus toward which* (*solum ut ad quem*), since nothing withdraws from the good insofar as it is good, but instead all things desire it. Similarly, nothing desires the bad insofar as it is bad, but instead all things withdraw from it; because of this, the bad has only the character of a *terminus from which* and not the character of a *terminus toward which*.

So, then, every passion of the concupiscible power that has to do with the good—viz., *love* (*amor*), *desire* (*desiderium*), and *joy* (*gaudium*)—tends toward the good itself, whereas every passion of the concupiscible power that has to do with the bad—viz., *hatred* (*odium*), *withdrawal* (*fuga*), and *sadness* (*tristitia*)—tends away from the bad itself. Hence, among the passions of the concupiscible power there cannot be any contrariety based on approach toward and withdrawal from the same object.

By contrast, as was explained above (a. 1), the object of the irascible power is not the sensible good or bad absolutely speaking, but rather the sensible good or bad as characterized by difficulty or arduousness (*sub ratione difficultatis vel arduitatis*). Now the arduous or difficult good has (a) the character of being tended toward insofar as it is good, and this pertains to the passion of *hope* (*spes*), and (b) the character of being withdrawn from insofar as it is arduous or difficult, and this pertains to the passion of *despair* (*desperatio*). Similarly, the arduous bad has (a) the character of being avoided insofar as it is bad, and this pertains to the passion of fear (*timor*), and it also has (b) the character of being tended toward as something arduous in order thereby to escape from being subjected to the bad, and it is *daring* (*audacia*) that tends toward it in this way. Thus, among the passions of the irascible power one finds (a) a contrariety according to the good and the bad, as in the case of the contrariety between hope and fear, and again (b) a contrariety according to approach toward and withdrawal from the same terminus, as in the case of the contrariety between daring and fear.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: The replies to the objections are clear from what has been said.

Article 3

Does every passion of the soul have a contrary?

It seems that every passion of the soul has a contrary (*habeat aliquid contrarium*):

Objection 1: As was explained above (a. 1), every passion of the soul exists either in the irascible power or in the concupiscible power. But both sorts of passions have contrariety in their own way. Therefore, every passion of the soul has a contrary.

Objection 2: Every passion of the soul has either the good or the bad as its object, and these are in general the objects of the appetitive part of the soul. But a passion whose object is the bad is contrary to a passion whose object is the good. Therefore, every passion has a contrary.

Objection 3: As has been explained (a. 2), every passion of the soul involves either approach or withdrawal. But for every approach there is a contrary withdrawal (*cuilibet accessui contrariatur recessus*), and vice versa. Therefore, every passion of the soul has a contrary.

But contrary to this: Anger is a passion of the soul. But as is clear from *Ethics* 4, no passion is posited as the contrary of anger. Therefore, not every passion of the soul has a contrary.

I respond: It is peculiar to the passion of anger that it cannot have a contrary based either on approach and withdrawal or on the good and the bad.

For anger is caused by a difficult evil that is already occurring and in the presence of which the appetite must either (a) succumb, in which case it does not go beyond the limits of sadness, which is a concupiscible passion, or else (b) experience a movement toward attacking the hurtful evil, and this pertains to anger. However, the appetite cannot experience a movement toward withdrawal, since the evil is already assumed to be present or past. And so there is no passion that is contrary to the movement of anger according to a contrariety between approach and withdrawal.

Again, there is likewise no passion that is contrary to the movement of anger according to a contrariety between the good and the bad. For what is contrary to an already occurring evil is an already acquired good, which no longer has the character of an arduous or difficult good. Nor does any other movement remain after the good is acquired—except for the appetite's resting in the acquired good, and this pertains to joy, which is a concupiscible passion.

Hence, the movement of anger cannot have any contrary movement of the soul. Rather, the only thing contrary to it is a cessation of movement. As the Philosopher says in the *Rhetoric*, "Calming down is opposed to getting angry, but it is opposed to it not as its contrary, but instead as its negation or privation."

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: The replies to the objections are clear from what has been said.

Article 4

Is it possible for passions that differ in species and are not contrary to one another to exist in the same power?

It seems that it is impossible for passions that differ in species and are not opposed to one another to exist in the same power:

Objection 1: The passions of the soul differ according to their objects. But the objects of the passions of the soul are the good and the bad, and it is according to the difference between them that the passions have contrariety. Therefore, no passions that belong to the same power and are not contrary to

one another differ from one another in species.

Objection 2: A difference in species is a difference in form. But as *Metaphysics* 10 says, "Every difference in form is a difference in accord with some sort of contrariety." Therefore, passions that belong to the same power and are not contraries do not differ in species.

Objection 3: Since every passion of the soul involves approach toward or withdrawal from the good or the bad, it seems necessary for every difference among the passions of the soul to be based either (a) on the difference between the good and the bad or (b) on the difference between approach and withdrawal or (c) on a greater or lesser approach or withdrawal. But as has been explained (a. 2), the first two sorts of differences make for a contrariety among the passions of the soul. On the other hand, the third sort of difference does not make for diverse species, since if it did, then there would be infinitely many species of passions of the soul. Therefore, it is impossible for passions belonging to the same power of the soul to differ in species and yet not be contraries.

But contrary to this: Love and joy differ in species and exist in the concupiscible power. And yet they are not contrary to one another in a way that prevents the one from being a cause of the other. Therefore, there are passions of the soul belonging to the same power that differ in species and yet are not contraries.

I respond: The passions differ in accord with the agents (*activa*) that are the objects of the passions of the soul. And there are two possible ways to think of the differences among the agents: (a) with respect to the species or natures of the agents themselves, and (b) with respect to their diverse active powers.

The diversity of agents or movers with respect to the power of effecting movement can be applied to the passions in accord with a likeness to natural agents. For everything that effects movement either draws the patient toward itself in some way or repels it away from itself. When it draws it toward itself, it effects three things in it. First, the agent gives the patient an inclination or aptitude to tend toward it, as when a lightweight body located in a high place (*quod est sursum*) gives to a generated body a lightweightness through which it has an inclination toward or aptitude for being in a high place. Second, if the generated body is located outside its proper place, the agent gives it movement toward that place (*dat ei moveri ad locum*). Third, the agent gives it rest when it arrives at that place, since something comes to rest in a place in virtue of the same cause by which it is moved to that place. And one should think along similar lines of a repelling cause (*de causa repulsionis*).

Now in the movements of the appetitive part of the soul, the good has, as it were, the power to attract, whereas the bad has the power to repel.

Thus, first of all, the good causes in the appetitive power a certain inclination toward, or aptitude for, or connaturality with the good (*causat quandam inclinationem seu aptitudinem seu connaturalitatem ad bonum*). This pertains to the passion of love (*amor*); and corresponding to it, as its contrary on the side of the bad, is hatred (*odium*).

Second, if the good has not yet been attained, it gives the appetitive power a movement toward acquiring the good that is loved, and this pertains to the passion of desire (*desiderium*) or sentient desire (*concupiscentia*). And contrary to this, on the part of the bad, is withdrawal (*fuga*) or aversion (*abominatio*).

Third, when the good has been attained, it gives the appetite a certain sort of rest (*quaedam quietatio*) in the good that has been attained, and this pertains to pleasure (*delectatio*) or joy (*gaudium*). And the opposite of this on the part of the bad is pain (*dolor*) or sadness (*tristitia*).

Now in the case of the passions of the irascible power, what is presupposed is an aptitude for or inclination toward pursuing the good and withdrawing from the bad on the part of the concupiscible power, which has to do with the good and the bad absolutely speaking.

With respect to a good that has not yet been attained, there is hope (*spes*) and despair (*desperatio*). With respect to something bad that has not yet occurred, there is fear (*timor*) and daring (*audacia*). With

respect to a good that has already been attained, there is no passion in the irascible power, since, as was explained above (a. 3), such a good no longer has the character of something arduous. However, the passion of anger (*ira*) follows upon something bad that has already occurred.

So, then, it is clear that in the concupiscible power there are three groups of passions, viz., (a) love and hatred, (b) desire and withdrawal, and (c) joy and sadness. Similarly, in the irascible power there are three groups, viz., (a) hope and despair, (b) fear and daring, and (c) anger, which has no passion opposed to it. Therefore, the passions that differ in species number eleven in all—six in the concupiscible power and five in the irascible power. All the passions of the soul are contained under these.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: This makes clear the responses to the objections.

QUESTION 24

Goodness and Badness in the Passions of the Soul

Next we have to consider goodness and badness in the passions of the soul. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Can moral goodness and moral badness be found in the passions of the soul? (2) Is every passion of the soul morally bad? (3) Does every passion add to or diminish an act's goodness or badness? (4) Is any passion good or bad by its species?

Article 1

Is any passion morally good or morally bad?

It seems that no passion is either morally good or morally bad:

Objection 1: Moral goodness and badness are proper to man, since, as Ambrose says in *Super Lucam*, "Morals are properly called 'human'." But the passions are not proper to men; instead, they are shared in common with other animals as well. Therefore, no passion of the soul is either morally good or morally bad.

Objection 2: As Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, "Man's goodness or badness has to do with being in accord with reason or being against reason (*secundum rationem vel praeter rationem*)." But as was explained above (q. 22, a. 3), the passions of the soul exist in the sentient appetite and not in reason. Therefore, they are not relevant to a man's goodness or badness, i.e., to the moral good.

Objection 3: In *Ethics* 2 the Philosopher says, "We are neither praised nor blamed for passions." But it is because of what is morally good and morally bad that we are praised or blamed. Therefore, the passions are not morally good or morally bad.

But contrary to this: In *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine, speaking about the passions, says, "They are bad if the love is bad, and they are good if the love is good."

I respond: The passions of the soul can be thought of in two ways: (a) in their own right (*secundum se*) and (b) insofar as they are subject to the rule of reason and will (*secundum quod subiacent imperio rationis et voluntatis*).

Thus, if they are thought of in their own right, viz., insofar as they are certain movements of a non-rational appetite, then in this sense they do not have moral goodness or badness—which, as was explained above (q. 18, a. 5), depends on reason.

However, if they are thought of insofar as they are subject to the rule of reason and will, then in this sense they do have moral goodness and badness. For the sentient appetite is closer to reason and will themselves than are the exterior members of the body, and yet the movements and acts of the exterior members are morally good or bad insofar as they are voluntary. Hence, *a fortiori*, the passions themselves, insofar as they are voluntary, can be called morally good or morally bad. And they are called voluntary either because they are commanded by the will or because they are not prohibited by the will.

Reply to objection 1: The passions, considered in their own right, are common to men and other animals. However, insofar as they are governed by reason, they are proper to men.

Reply to objection 2: As *Ethics* 1 says, even the lower appetitive powers are called rational to the extent that they "participate in some way in reason."

Reply to objection 3: The Philosopher is claiming that we are not praised or blamed for the passions considered absolutely. But he does not deny that the passions can be made praiseworthy or blameworthy to the extent that they are regulated by reason (*secundum quod a ratione ordinantur*). Thus he adds, "For it is not the one who becomes fearful or angry who is praised or blamed; rather, it is the one who becomes fearful or angry in a certain way"—viz., in a way that is in accord with reason or beyond the limits of reason (*secundum rationem vel praeter rationem*).

Article 2

Is every passion of the soul morally bad?

It seems that every passion of the soul is morally bad:

Objection 1: In *De Civitate Dei* 9 Augustine says, "Some call the passions of the soul sicknesses or disturbances of the soul (*morbos vel perturbationes animae*)." But every sickness or disturbance of the soul is something morally bad. Therefore, every passion of the soul is morally bad.

Objection 2: Damascene says, "An operation is a movement in accord with nature (*secundum naturam*), whereas a passion is a movement beyond the limits of nature (*praeter naturam*)." But that which is against nature in the movements of the soul has the character of a sin and a moral evil. This is why he says elsewhere that the devil "turned away from what is in accord with nature and turned toward what is against nature." Therefore, passions of this sort are morally bad.

Objection 3: Everything that leads one toward sin has the character of badness. But passions of the sort in question lead one toward sin; hence, in Romans 7:5 the passions are called "the passions of the sins." Therefore, it seems that the passions are morally bad.

But contrary to this: In *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine says, "Upright love has all the upright affections. For they fear to sin, they desire to persevere, they sorrow in their sins, they rejoice in their good works."

I respond: On this question there was a disagreement (*diversa fuit sententia*) between the Stoics and the Peripatetics. For the Stoics claimed that all the passions are bad, whereas the Peripatetics claimed that moderated passions are good (*dixerunt passiones moderatas esse bonas*). Even though this difference does, to be sure, sound like a big one, there is in reality either no difference at all or a small one, once one takes into consideration what the two sides mean.

For the Stoics did not distinguish between the sensory power and the intellect and, as a result, they did not distinguish between the sentient appetite and the intellective appetite. Hence, they did not distinguish the passions of the soul from the movements of the will in keeping with the fact that the passions of the soul exist in the sentient appetite, whereas the simple movements of the will exist in the intellective appetite. Instead, they called every reasonable movement (*omnem rationabilem motum*) of the appetitive part 'an act of will', whereas they called any movement that went beyond the limits of reason 'a passion'. And so, following their opinion, in *De Tusculanis Quaestionibus* 3 Tully calls all the passions "sicknesses of the soul." From there he argues, "Those who are sick are not healthy, and those who are not healthy are foolish." And this is why we call the foolish 'unhealthy'.

By contrast, the Peripatetics call all the movements of the sentient appetite 'passions'. Hence, they deem them good when they are moderated by reason and bad when they fall outside of reason's moderation. From this it is clear that, in the same book, Tully, in arguing against the position of the Peripatetics, who approved of moderating the passions (*qui approbabant mediocritatem passionum*), was wrong to say, "Every evil, even a moderate one (*mediocre*), should be avoided; for just as in the case of the body, one is not healthy even if he is only moderately sick, so too this sort of moderation in the sicknesses or passions of the soul is not healthy." For the passions are not called 'sicknesses' or 'disturbances' except when they lack reason's moderating influence (*nisi cum carent moderatione rationis*).

Reply to objection 1: The reply to the first objection is clear from what has been said.

Reply to objection 2: In every passion of the soul something is either added to or subtracted from the heart's natural movement in the sense that the heart is moved either more intensely or less intensely by contraction and dilation (*intensius vel remissius movetur secundum systolen aut diastolen*); and accordingly the movement has the character of a passion. However, a passion need not always depart

from the order of natural reason.

Reply to objection 3: Insofar as the passions of the soul lie outside the order of reason, they incline one toward sin; however, they pertain to virtue insofar as they are ordered by reason.

Article 3

Does a passion always diminish a moral act's goodness?

It seems that a passion always diminishes a moral act's goodness:

Objection 1: Everything that impedes reason's judgment, which the moral act's goodness depends on, thereby diminishes the moral act's goodness. But every passion impedes reason's judgment; for in *Bellum Catilinarium* Sallust says, "All men who take counsel about doubtful matters should be free of hatred, anger, friendship, and pity (*ab odio, ira, amicitia atque misericordia vacuos esse decet*)." Therefore, every passion diminishes a moral act's goodness.

Objection 2: A man's act is better to the extent that it is more similar to God; hence, in Ephesians 5:1 the Apostle says, "Be imitators of God, as most dear children." But God and the holy angels "punish without anger and give help without compassionate sadness," as Augustine puts it in *De Civitate Dei* 9. Therefore, it is better to do good works of this sort in the absence of a passion of the soul than in the presence of a passion.

Objection 3: Just as moral badness involves a relation to reason, so too does moral goodness. But moral badness is diminished by passion, since one who sins out of passion (*ex passione*) sins to a lesser degree than one who sins purposefully (*ex industria*). Therefore, one who does something good in the absence of a passion does a greater good than one who does it in the presence of a passion.

But contrary to this: In *De Civitate Dei* 9 Augustine says that the passion of pity (*misericordia*) "is subject to reason when pity is shown in such a way that justice is preserved, as when help is given to someone who is poor, or when a penitent is forgiven." But nothing that is subject to reason diminishes moral goodness. Therefore, a passion of the soul does not diminish the goodness of a moral act (*non diminuit bonum moris*).

I respond: Just as the Stoics claimed that every passion of the soul is bad, so too they claimed as a result that every passion of the soul diminishes an act's goodness, since every good is either totally destroyed or made less good by being mixed with evil.

To be sure, this is true if by 'passions of the soul' we mean only disordered movements of the sentient appetite that are disturbances or sicknesses (*aegritudines*). However, if by 'passions' we simply mean all the movements of the sentient appetite, then it is part of the perfection of the human good that these passions should themselves be moderated by reason. For since a man's good lies in reason as its root, this sort of good will be more perfect to the extent that it is able to flow into more of the things that belong to a man. Hence, no one doubts that it is part of the perfection of the moral good that the acts of the exterior members should be directed by the rule of reason. Hence, since, as was explained above (q. 17, a. 7), the sentient appetite is able to obey reason, it is part of the perfection of the moral or human good that the passions of the soul should likewise be regulated by reason.

Therefore, just as it is better that a man should both will the good and do it by an exterior act, so too it is part of the perfection of the moral good that a man should be moved not only by his will but also by his sentient appetite—this according to Psalm 85:3 ("My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God"), where by 'heart' we understand the intellective appetite and by 'flesh' we understand the sentient appetite.

Reply to objection 1: There are two possible ways for the passions of the soul to be related to the judgment of reason.

One way is *antecedently*. In this way, since they cloud reason's judgment, which the moral act's goodness depends on, they diminish the act's goodness. For instance, it is more praiseworthy for someone do an act of charity because of reason's judgment than to do it solely out of the passion of pity (*misericordia*).

The second way is *consequently*. And this happens in two ways:

(a) *by way of redundancy*—specifically, because when the higher part of the soul is intensely moved toward something, the lower part likewise conforms to its movement. And in such a case the passion that consequently exists in the sentient appetite is a *sign* of the intensity of the will's act.

(b) *by way of choice*—specifically, when a man chooses by reason's judgment to be affected by some passion, in order that he might act more promptly because of the sentient appetite's cooperation. And in this way a passion of the soul *adds to* the action's goodness.

Reply to objection 2: There is no sentient appetite in God or the angels; neither do they have corporeal members. And so in them goodness does not involve the ordering of the passions or of corporeal acts, as it does in our case.

Reply to objection 3: A passion that tends toward evil and is antecedent to reason's judgment diminishes the sin, but a passion that is consequent in one of the ways explained above either *adds to* the sin or is a *sign* of the sin's being added to (*auget peccatum vel significat augmentum eius*).

Article 4

Is any passion of the soul morally good or bad by its species?

It seems that no passion of the soul is morally good or bad by its species:

Objection 1: Moral goodness and badness involve reason. But the passions exist in the sentient appetite, and so whatever has to do with reason is accidental to them. Therefore, since nothing that is *per accidens* is relevant to a thing's species, it seems that no passion is good or bad by its species.

Objection 2: Acts and passions have their species from their object. Therefore, if some passion were good or bad by its species, it would have to be the case that passions whose object is the good—e.g., love, desire, and joy—are good by their species, and passions whose object is the bad—e.g., hatred, fear, and sadness—are bad by their species. But this is clearly false. Therefore, it is not the case that any passion is good or bad by its species.

Objection 3: There is no species of passion that is not found in other animals. But moral goodness is found only in man. Therefore, no passion of the soul is good or bad by its species.

But contrary to this: In *De Civitate Dei* 9 Augustine says, "Pity (*misericordia*) belongs to virtue." Again, in *Ethics* 2 the Philosopher says that shame (*verecundia*) is a praiseworthy passion. Therefore, some passions are good or bad by their species.

I respond: It seems that one should repeat in the case of the passions what has been explained for the case of acts (q. 18, aa. 5-6), viz., that the species of an act or a passion can be thought of in two ways:

(a) insofar as it belongs to a *natural* genus (*in genere naturae*), and in this sense moral goodness and badness are irrelevant to the species of an act or a passion; and

(b) insofar as it belongs to a *moral* genus (*ad genus moris*), given that it participates in the voluntary and in the judgment of reason. And in this sense moral goodness and badness can belong to a species of passion to the extent that it takes as its object something that is of itself consonant with reason or at variance with reason (*de se conveniens rationi vel dissonum a ratione*)—as is clear in the case of shame (*verecundia*), which is a fear of what is base (*timor turpis*), and in the case of envy (*invidia*), which is sadness at the good of another (*tristitia de bono alterius*). For it is in this way that they are

relevant to the species of the exterior act.

Reply to objection 1: This argument goes through for the case of the passions insofar as they belong to a natural species, viz., insofar as the sentient appetite is thought of in its own right. But insofar as the sentient appetite obeys reason, the goodness or badness of reason exists in the passions *per se* and not *per accidens*.

Reply to objection 2: The passions that tend toward a good are good if it is a genuine good, and so are the passions that withdraw from a genuine evil. Conversely, passions that withdraw from a good and approach an evil are bad.

Reply to objection 3: In brute animals the sentient appetite does not obey reason. And yet insofar as brute animals are led by a certain natural estimative power that is subject to a higher reason, viz., God's reason, there is in them a certain likeness of moral goodness with respect to the passions of the soul.

QUESTION 25

The Ordering of the Passions with respect to One Another

Next we have to consider the ordering of the passions with respect to one another. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) How are the passions of the irascible power ordered with respect to the passions of the concupiscible power? (2) How are the passions of the concupiscible power ordered with respect to one another? (3) How are the passions of the irascible power ordered with respect to one another? (4) What are the four principal passions?

Article 1

Are the passions of the irascible power prior to the passions of the concupiscible power?

It seems that the passions of the irascible power are prior to the passions of the concupiscible power:

Objection 1: The order of the passions follows the order of their objects. But the object of the irascible power is the arduous good, which seems to be higher than all the other goods (*supremum inter alia bona*). Therefore, the passions of the irascible power seem to be prior to (*praeesse*) the passions of the concupiscible power.

Objection 2: What effects movement is prior to what is moved. But the irascible power is related to the concupiscible power in the way that what effects movement is related to what is moved; for as was explained above (q. 23, a. 1), the irascible power is given to animals in order to remove obstacles by which the concupiscible power is prevented from enjoying its object, and, as *Physics* 8 says, "that which removes an obstacle has the character of something that effects movement." Therefore, the passions of the irascible power are prior to the passions of the concupiscible power.

Objection 3: Joy (*gaudium*) and sadness (*tristitia*) are passions of the concupiscible power. But joy and sadness follow upon the passions of the irascible power; for in *Ethics* 4 the Philosopher says, "Punishing someone (*punitio*) puts to rest the force of anger, producing pleasure (*delectatio*) in the place of sadness." Therefore, the passions of the concupiscible power are posterior to the passions of the irascible power.

But contrary to this: The passions of the concupiscible power are directed toward the good in an unrestricted sense (*respiciunt bonum absolutum*), whereas the passions of the irascible power are directed toward the good in a restricted sense (*respiciunt bonum contractum*), viz., the arduous good. Therefore, since the good in an unrestricted sense is prior to the good in a restricted sense, it seems that the passions of the concupiscible power are prior to the passions of the irascible power.

I respond: The passions of the concupiscible power are related to more things than are the passions of the irascible power. For among the passions of the concupiscible power there is (a) something, viz., desire, that has to do with movement and (b) something, viz., joy and sadness, that has to do with rest. But among the passions of the irascible power there is only something that has to do with movement and nothing that has to do with rest. The reason for this is that a good in which something is at rest no longer has the character of being difficult or arduous—which is the object of the irascible power.

Now since being at rest is the end of a movement (*quies est finis motus*), it is prior in intention and posterior in execution. Therefore, if the passions of the irascible power are compared to those passions of the concupiscible power that signify *resting in the good*, then the passions of the irascible power are clearly prior in the order of execution to passions of this sort that belong to the concupiscible power, in the way that hope (*spes*) is prior to joy (*gaudium*) and is thus a cause of joy—this according to the Apostle in Romans 12:12 ("Rejoicing in hope" (*spe gaudentes*)). On the other hand, a passion of the concupiscible power that signifies *resting in the bad*, e.g., sadness (*tristitia*), stands midway between two

passions of the irascible power. For sadness follows upon fear (*timor*), since it is caused when the evil that was feared has occurred; and it precedes the movement of anger, since when someone is aroused to retribution by a preceding sadness (*ex tristitia praecedente aliquis insurgit in vindictam*), this pertains to the movement of anger. And because paying back evils is apprehended as a good, an angry individual rejoices when he has accomplished this. And so it is clear that every passion of the irascible power is terminated in a passion of the concupiscible power that pertains to rest, viz., either joy or sadness.

However, if the passions of the irascible power are compared to the passions of the concupiscible power that imply movement, then the passions of the concupiscible part are clearly prior, because the passions of the irascible power add something to the passions of the concupiscible power, in the same way that the object of the irascible power adds arduousness or difficulty to the object of the concupiscible power. For instance, hope (*spes*) adds to desire (*desiderium*) a certain effort and elevation of the mind in order to attain an arduous good. Similarly, fear (*timor*) adds to withdrawal (*fuga*) or aversion (*abominatio*) a certain sinking of the mind because of the difficulty involved in the relevant evil (*addat quandam depressionem animi propter difficultatem mali*).

So, then, the passions of the irascible part stand between those passions of the concupiscible power that signify a movement with respect to the good or the bad (*important motum in bonum vel in motum*) and those passions of the concupiscible power that signify resting in the good or the bad. And in this way it is clear that the passions of the irascible power both (a) take their beginning from the passions of the concupiscible power and (b) are terminated in the passions of the concupiscible power.

Reply to objection 1: This argument would go through if something opposed to arduousness were part of the object of the concupiscible power in the way that being arduous belongs to the nature of the object of the irascible power. But since the object of the concupiscible power is the good absolutely speaking, it is naturally prior to the object of the irascible power in the way that what is general is prior to what is more specific (*sicut commune proprio*).

Reply to objection 2: Something that removes an obstacle is a mover *per accidens* and not *per se*. But here we are talking about the *per se* ordering of the passions.

Moreover, the irascible power removes what prevents the concupiscible power from resting in its own object. Hence, from this all that follows is that the passions of the irascible power precede those passions of the concupiscible power that have to do with rest.

Reply to objection 3: The third objection has to do with these same passions of the concupiscible power.

Article 2

Is love the first among the passions of the concupiscible power?

It seems that love (*amor*) is not the first among the passions of the concupiscible power:

Objection 1: The concupiscible power is named from sentient desire (*concupiscentia*), which is the same passion as desire (*desiderium*). But as *De Anima* 2 says, a thing is named from what is most important. Therefore, sentient desire is more important than love.

Objection 2: Love implies a certain union, since, as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, it is "a unitive and consolidating force" (*vis unitiva et concretiva*). But sentient desire or desire (*concupiscentia vel desiderium*) is a movement toward union with a thing that is longed for or desired (*ad unionem rei concupitae vel desideratae*). Therefore, sentient desire is prior to love.

Objection 3: A cause is prior to its effect. But pleasure (*delectatio*) is sometimes a cause of love; for as *Ethics* 8 says, some individuals love for the sake of pleasure. Therefore, pleasure is prior to love. Therefore, love is not the first among the passions of the concupiscible power.

But contrary to this: In *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine says that all the passions are caused by love, since "love (*amor*) that longs to have what is loved is avid desire (*cupiditas*), and love that has what is loved and enjoys it is unrestrained delight (*laetitia*)." Therefore, love is the first among the passions of the concupiscible power.

I respond: The objects of the concupiscible power are the good and the bad. But the good is prior to the bad, since the bad is a privation of the good. Hence, all the passions whose object is the good are naturally prior to the passions whose object is the bad. More specifically, each such passion is prior to its opposite; for the reason why the opposed evil is being rejected is that the good is being sought.

Now the good has the character of an end, which is prior in *its being intended* but posterior in *its being attained* (*est prior in intentione sed est posterior in consecutione*). Therefore, the ordering of the passions of the concupiscible power can be thought of either (a) in accord with good's being intended or (b) in accord with the good's being attained.

As regards its being attained, what is prior is what first comes to exist in that which tends toward the end. But it is clear that everything that tends toward an end has, first of all, a readiness for or proportion to the end (*primo habet aptitudinem seu proportionem ad finem*); for nothing tends toward an end that is disproportionate to it. Second, it is moved toward the end. Third, it comes to rest in the end after the end has been attained.

Now the appetite's very readiness for or proportion to the good is *love* (*amor*), which is nothing other than being pleased with the good (*quid nihil aliud est quam complacentia boni*). On the other hand, the movement toward the good is *desire* or *sentient desire* (*desiderium vel concupiscentia*), whereas rest in the good is *joy* or *pleasure* (*gaudium vel delectatio*). And so in accord with this ordering, love precedes desire and desire precedes pleasure.

By contrast, in the order of the good's being intended, the reverse holds. For intended pleasure causes desire and love, since pleasure is the enjoyment of the good (*fruitio boni*), and, as was explained above (q. 11, a. 3), it is in some sense the end, just as the good itself is.

Reply to objection 1: A thing is named in accord with what is known to us, since, according to the Philosopher, spoken words are signs of acts of understanding (*voces sunt signa intellectuum*). And in most cases we know a cause through its effect. Now when a thing that is loved is itself possessed, the effect of love is pleasure, whereas when it is not possessed, the effect of love is desire or sentient desire. But as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 9, "Love is felt more strongly when a lack [of the good] produces it." Hence, among all the passions of the concupiscible power, the one that is most felt is sentient desire (*concupiscentia*). And it because of this that the concupiscible power (*concupiscibilis*) is named from it.

Reply to objection 2: There are two types of union between the lover and the loved.

One type is a *real union*, viz., the conjoining of the lover to the thing itself. And this type of union involves joy or pleasure, which follows upon desire.

The second is an *affective union*, which has to do with the readiness or proportion—namely, in the sense that something already participates in some way in another by the fact that it has a readiness for and inclination toward that other. And it is in this sense that love implies a union. And this is the union that precedes the movement of desire.

Reply to objection 3: Pleasure is a cause of love in the sense that it is prior to love in intention.

Article 3

Is hope the first among the passions of the irascible power?

It seems that hope (*spes*) is not the first among the passions of the irascible power.:

Objection 1: The irascible power (*irascibilis*) is named from anger (*ira*). Therefore, since a thing

is named from what is most important, it seems that anger is more important than and prior to hope.

Objection 2: The object of the irascible power is what is arduous. But it seems to be more arduous for someone to try to overcome a contrary evil that either (a) threatens him as something future, and this pertains to daring (*audacia*), or that (b) is already upon him as something present, and this pertains to anger (*ira*), than to try to simply acquire some good. Similarly, it seems to be more arduous for someone to try to conquer a present evil than a future evil. Therefore, anger seems to be a more important passion than daring, and daring seems to be a more important passion than hope. And so hope does not seem to be prior.

Objection 3: In a movement toward an end, withdrawing from a terminus is prior to approaching a terminus. But fear (*timor*) and despair (*desperatio*) imply a withdrawal from something, whereas daring (*audacia*) and hope (*spes*) imply an approach toward something. Therefore, fear and despair precede hope and daring.

But contrary to this: Something is prior to the extent that it is closer to what is first. But hope is closer to love, which is the first among the passions. Therefore, hope is first among all the passions of the irascible appetite.

I respond: As has already been explained (a. 1), all the passions of the irascible power imply a movement with respect to something. Now there are two ways in which a movement with respect to something in the irascible power can be caused:

(a) solely by the readiness for or proportion to the end, and this pertains to either love or hatred;

(b) by the presence of the good or the bad itself, and this pertains to either sadness or joy. To be sure, as has been explained (q. 23, a. 4), no passion in the irascible power is caused by the presence of the good, but the passion of anger is caused by the presence of the bad.

Therefore, since, along the path of generation or attainment (*in via generationis seu consecutionis*), the proportion to or readiness for the end precedes the attainment of the end, it follows that among all the passions of the irascible power *anger* (*ira*) is the last in the order of generation. Among the other passions of the irascible power that imply a movement that follows upon love or hatred for the good or the bad, the passions whose object is the good, viz., *hope* (*spes*) and *despair* (*desperatio*), are naturally prior to the passions whose object is the bad, viz., *daring* (*audacia*) and *fear* (*timor*). However, this is so in such a way that *hope* is prior to *despair*, since hope is a movement toward the good as a good that is attractive by its nature, and so hope is a *per se* movement toward the good, whereas despair is a withdrawal from the good—a withdrawal that (a) belongs to the good not insofar as it is good, but insofar as it is something else, and hence a withdrawal that (b) is, as it were, *per accidens*. And by the same line of reasoning, since fear is a withdrawal from evil, it is prior to daring.

Now the claim that hope and despair are naturally prior to fear and daring is clear from the fact that just as a desire for the good (*appetitus boni*) is the reason why the bad is avoided, so too hope and despair are the reason for fear and daring. For daring follows upon the hope for victory and fear follows upon despairing of victory. On the other hand, anger follows upon daring, since, according to what Avicenna says in *De Naturalibus* 6, no one who desires vindication becomes angry unless he dares to vindicate himself.

So, then, it is clear that hope is the first among all the passions of the irascible power. And if we want to know the ordering of all the passions along the way of generation, the first to occur are *love* and *hatred*; second, *desire* and *withdrawal*; third, *hope* and *despair*; fourth, *fear* and *daring*; fifth, *anger*; and sixth, and last, *joy* and *sadness*, which, as *Ethics* 2 says, follow upon all the passions. Yet, as can be inferred from has been said, this is so in such a way that love is prior to hatred, desire is prior to withdrawal, hope is prior to despair, fear is prior to daring, and joy is prior to sadness.

Reply to objection 1: Since anger is caused by other passions in the way that an effect is caused by causes that precede it, it follows that the irascible power is named from anger as something more manifest.

Reply to objection 2: It is not the arduousness that is a reason for approaching or desiring something, but rather its goodness. And so hope, which is aimed more directly at the good, is prior, even though daring, or even anger, is sometimes directed at something that is more arduous.

Reply to objection 3: The appetite is moved *per se* and primarily toward the good as its proper object, and its withdrawing from the bad is caused by this. For a movement of the appetitive part of the soul is likened not to a natural movement but to the tendency of a nature (*proportionatur non motui naturali sed intentioni naturae*), which tends toward the end prior to tending toward the removal of a contrary, something that is sought after only for the sake of attaining the end.

Article 4

Are the four principal passions joy and sadness, hope and fear?

It seems not to be the case that the four principal passions are joy (*gaudium*) and sadness (*tristitia*), hope (*spes*) and fear (*timor*) :

Objection 1: In *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine does not mention hope, but puts avid desire (*cupiditas*) in its place.

Objection 2: There are two orderings among the passions of the soul, viz., the order of intention and the order of attainment or generation. Therefore, either (a) the principal passions are taken from the order of intention, in which case only *joy* and *sadness*, which are ending passions (*passiones finales*) will be principal passions, or (b) the principal passions are taken from the order of attainment or generation, in which case *love* will be the principal passion. Therefore, there is no way in which one should claim that the four principal passions are these four: joy and sadness, hope and fear.

Objection 3: Just as daring is caused by hope, so fear is caused by despair. Therefore, either (a) hope and despair should be posited as the principal passions in the sense of being causes, or (b) hope and daring should be posited as the principal passions in the sense of being close to one another.

But contrary to this: In *De Consolatione* Boethius, in enumerating the four principal passions, says, "Banish joys, banish fear. Away with hope, let pain (*dolor*) be not near."

I respond: The four passions in question are commonly said to be the principal passions.

Two of them, viz., *joy* and *sadness*, are called principal passions because they are, absolutely speaking, culminating and final (*completivae et finales*) with respect to all the passions and so, as *Ethics* 2 says, they follow upon all the passions.

On the other hand, *fear* and *hope* are principal passions not in the sense that they are culminating absolutely speaking, but rather in the sense that they are culminating in the genus *appetitive movement toward something*. For with respect to the good, the movement begins in *love* (*amor*), continues in *desire* (*desiderium*), and terminates in *hope* (*spes*), whereas with respect to the bad, the movement begins in *hatred* (*odium*), continues in *withdrawal* (*fuga*), and terminates in *fear* (*timor*).

And so the enumeration of these four passions is usually taken in accord with the differences *present* and *future*. For a movement has to do with the future, whereas rest is in something present. Therefore, (a) with respect to a present good there is *joy*; (b) with respect to a present evil there is *sadness*; (c) with respect to a future good there is *hope*; and (d) with respect to a future evil there is *fear*.

Now all the other passions that have to do with a good or an evil that is present or future are traced back to these four as their culmination. Hence, some writers call the four passions in question 'principal passions' because they are general. And, to be sure, this is true as long as 'hope' and 'fear' designate any appetitive movement that tends in general toward something that is to be desired or avoided.

Reply to objection 1: Augustine posits desire (*desiderium*) or avid desire (*cupiditas*) in the place of hope because they seem to pertain to the same thing, viz., a future good.

Reply to objection 2: The passions in question are called the principal passions in accord with the order of intention and completion. And even though fear and hope are not the last passions absolutely speaking, they are nonetheless last in the genus *passions tending toward another as something future*.

The only possible counterexample is anger (*ira*). But anger cannot be posited as a principal passion, since it is a certain effect of daring, which, as will be explained in a moment, cannot be a principal passion.

Reply to objection 3: Despair implies a withdrawal from the good that is, as it were, *per accidens*, and daring implies an approach toward the bad that is likewise *per accidens*. And so these passions cannot be principal passions, since what is *per accidens* cannot be called 'principal'. And this is why anger, which follows upon daring, cannot be called a principal passion, either.

QUESTION 26

Love

Next we have to consider the passions of the soul individually, first the passions of the concupiscible power (questions 26-39) and, second, the passions of the irascible power (questions 40-48).

The first consideration will have three parts. For, first, we will consider love (*amor*) and hatred (*odium*) (questions 26-29); second, sentient desire (*concupiscentia*) and withdrawal (*fuga*) (question 30); and, third, pleasure (*delectatio*) and pain or sadness (*dolor vel tristitia*) (questions 31-39).

As regards love, there are three things to consider: first, love itself (question 26); second, the causes of love (question 27); and third, the effects of love (question 28).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Does love exist in the concupiscible power? (2) Is love a passion? (3) Is love (*amor*) the same as elective love (*dilectio*)? (4) Is love appropriately divided into love of friendship (*amor amicitiae*) and love of concupiscence (*amor concupiscentiae*)?

Article 1

Does love exist in the concupiscible power?

It seems that love does not exist in the concupiscible power:

Objection 1: Wisdom 8:2 says, "Her,"—viz., Wisdom—"have I loved, and I have sought her out from my youth." But since the concupiscible power is part of the sentient appetite, it cannot tend toward Wisdom, which is not comprehended by the sensory power. Therefore, love does not exist in the concupiscible power.

Objection 2: Love seems to be identical with every passion; for in *De Civitate Dei* 14, Augustine says, "Love that longs to have what is loved is avid desire (*cupiditas*), while love that has and enjoys what is loved is delight (*laetitia*); love that flees from what is contrary to what is loved is fear (*timor*); and love that feels what is contrary to what is loved is sadness (*tristitia*)." But not every passion exists in the concupiscible power; instead, fear, which has just been enumerated here, exists in the irascible power. Therefore, one should not claim without qualification that love exists in the concupiscible power.

Objection 3: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius posits a certain sort of "natural" love. But natural love seems rather to pertain to the natural powers, which belong to the vegetative part of the soul. Therefore, love does not unqualifiedly exist in the concupiscible power.

But contrary to this: In *Topics* 2 the Philosopher says, "Love exists in the concupiscible power."

I respond: Love is something that involves the appetite (*amor est aliquid ad appetitum pertinens*), since the good is the object of both of them. Hence, the distinction among the types of love follows the distinction among the types of appetite.

For instance, there is a certain type of appetite that follows another's apprehension and not the apprehension of the very thing that has the appetite; and an appetite of this sort is called a *natural appetite*. For as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 103, a. 1), natural things have an appetite for what is appropriate for them according to their nature, and yet they have this appetite not because of their own apprehension, but because of the apprehension of the One who establishes their nature.

There is another type of appetite that follows the apprehension of the very thing that has the appetite, but it follows that apprehension *by necessity* and not by a free judgment (*ex necessitate, non ex iudicio libero*). This is the type of appetite that exists in *brute animals*, and yet in men this type of appetite has some participation in freedom to the extent that it obeys reason.

On the other hand, there is another type of appetite that follows the apprehension of the one who has the appetite in accord with free choice (*secundum liberum arbitrium*). And this type of appetite is a *rational* or *intellective appetite*, which is called the will.

Now in each of these types of appetite, what is called 'love' is the principle of the movement that tends toward the end that is loved. In a natural appetite, the principle of this sort of movement is the connaturality between the thing that has the appetite and the thing toward which it tends; and this is called *natural love*. For instance, the very connaturality of a heavy body with a place at the center is due to gravity, and it can be called 'natural love'. Similarly, the bond (*coaptatio*) between the sentient appetite or the will and some good—i.e., its being pleased with the good (*ipsa complacentia boni*)—is called 'sentient love' or 'intellective (or rational) love'.

Thus, in the same way that intellective love exists in the intellective appetite, sentient love exists in the sentient appetite. And this sentient love belongs to the concupiscible power, since 'love' is predicated with respect to the good absolutely speaking and not with respect to the arduous good, which is the object of the irascible power.

Reply to objection 1: This passage is talking about intellective or rational love.

Reply to objection 2: It not by its essence but because of what it causes (*non essentialiter sed causaliter*) that love is said to be fear, joy, desire, and sadness.

Reply to objection 3: Natural love exists not only in the powers of the vegetative soul but in all the powers of the soul, as well as in all the parts of the body and, in general, in all things. For as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, "The beautiful and the good are lovable to everything," since each entity has a connaturality with what is appropriate to it, given its nature.

Article 2

Is love a passion?

It seems that love is not a passion:

Objection 1: No virtue (*virtus*) is a passion. But as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, every type of love is "a certain sort of virtue." Therefore, love is not a passion.

Objection 2: According to Augustine in *De Trinitate*, love is a certain sort of union or connection (*unio quaedam vel nexus*). But a union or connection is not a passion; instead, it is a relation. Therefore, love is not a passion.

Objection 3: In *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2 Damascene says that a passion is "a certain sort of movement." But 'love' implies not a movement of the appetite, which is desire (*desiderium*), but a principle of such a movement. Therefore, love is not a passion.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 7 the Philosopher says, "Love is a passion."

I respond: A passion is an agent's effect within the patient. But a natural agent brings about two types of effect in the patient. For, first of all, it gives a form and, second, it gives the movement that follows upon that form. For instance, that which generates a body gives the body (a) heaviness (*gravitas*) and (b) the movement that follows upon heaviness. And it is the heaviness itself, which is a principle of the movement toward the place that is connatural to the body because of its heaviness, that can in a certain sense be called a *natural love*.

So, too, the desirable thing itself (*ipsum appetibile*) gives to the appetite, first of all, a certain bond with it (*dat quandam coaptationem ad ipsum*), which is the appetite's being pleased with the desirable thing (*complacentia appetibilis*), and from this there follows a movement toward the desirable thing. For as *Ethics* 3 says, "The appetitive movement goes in a circle." The desirable thing moves the appetite and fashions itself in some way in the appetite's tendency (*faciens se quodammodo in eius intentione*), and the appetite tends toward attaining the desirable thing in reality, so that the movement ends where it began (*ut sit ibi finis motus ubi fuit principium*).

Thus, the first change effected in the appetite by the desirable thing is called *love*, which is nothing

other than the appetite's being pleased with the desirable thing; and from its being pleased there follows a movement toward the desirable thing, and this movement is *desire*; and, finally, there is rest, i.e., *joy*.

So, then, since love consists in a certain change in the appetite effected by the desirable thing, it is clear that (a) love is a passion, properly speaking, insofar as it exists in the concupiscible power, and that (b) love is a passion, in a general and extended sense, insofar as it exists in the will.

Reply to objection 1: Since 'virtue' signifies a principle of movement or of action, Dionysius is calling love 'a virtue' insofar as it is the principle of an appetitive movement.

Reply to objection 2: Union is relevant to love insofar as, through its being pleased (*per complacentiam*), the loving appetite is related to what it loves in the way it is related to itself or to something that belongs to it. And so it is clear that love is not the very relation of union; rather, the union follows upon the love. Hence, Dionysius says that love is "a unitive power," and in *Politics* 2 the Philosopher says that the union is the work of love (*unio est opus amoris*).

Reply to objection 3: Even though 'love' does not name the movement of an appetite that is tending toward a desirable thing, it nonetheless does name the movement of the appetite through which the appetite is changed by the desirable thing in order that the desirable thing might be pleasing to it.

Article 3

Is love (*amor*) the same as elective love (*dilectio*)?

It seems that love (*amor*) is the same as elective love (*dilectio*):

Objection 1: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says that love and elective love are related in the same way that "*four* and *two times two* are, and *rectilinear figure* and *figure having straight lines* are." But these signify the same thing. Therefore, 'love' (*amor*) and 'elective love' (*dilectio*) signify the same thing.

Objection 2: Appetitive movements differ from one another because of their objects. But the object of elective love is the same as the object of love. Therefore, they are the same.

Objection 3: If elective love and love differ in anything, they seem to differ in the fact that "'elective love' (*dilectio*) is used in the case of good things and 'love' (*amor*) is used in the case of bad things, according to some," as Augustine reports in *De Civitate Dei* 14. But they do not differ in this; for as Augustine points out in the same place, in Sacred Scripture both terms are used in the case of good things and in the case of bad things. Therefore, love and elective love do not differ from one another—and Augustine himself concludes in the same place that "It is not one thing to say 'love' (*amor*) and something else to say 'elective love' (*dilectio*)."

But contrary to this: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, "It has seemed to some of the saints that the name 'love' (*amor*) is more divine than the name 'elective love' (*dilectio*).

I respond: There are four names that in one way or another point to the same thing (*ad idem quodammodo pertinentia*): 'love' (*amor*), 'elective love' (*dilectio*), 'charity' (*caritas*), and 'friendship' (*amicitia*). They differ from one another as follows:

Friendship (*amicitia*), according to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 7, is a sort of habit, whereas love (*amor*) and elective love (*dilectio*) are signified in the manner of an act or a passion, and charity (*caritas*) can be taken in either of these two ways. However, the acts are signified differently by these last three names. For *love* is common to the three of them, since every act of elective love or act of charity is an act of love, but not vice versa.

More specifically, 'elective love' adds to 'love' a previous act of choosing, just as the name itself suggests (*dilectio/electio*). Hence, elective love exists only in the will and not in the concupiscible power, and it exists only in a rational nature.

On the other hand, 'charity' (*caritas*) adds to love a certain perfection of love (*addit supra amorem perfectionem quandam amoris*), insofar as that which is loved is thought of as having great worth (*id quod amatur magni pretii aestimatur*), as the name itself (*carus/caritas*) suggests.

Reply to objection 1: Dionysius is talking about love and elective love insofar as they exist in the intellective appetite, since in that case love and elective love are the same thing.

Reply to objection 2: The object of love (*amor*) is more general than the object of elective love (*dilectio*), since, as has been explained, love extends to more things than elective love does.

Reply to objection 3: Love and elective love are not differentiated by the differences *good* and *bad*, but are instead differentiated in the way that has been explained.

And yet in the intellective part of the soul, love and elective love are the same thing. And it is in this sense that Augustine is talking about love (*de amore*) in the passage in question. That is why he adds a little later, "An upright act of will is a good act of love, and a perverse act of will is a bad act of love."

Yet those who assigned the differences *good* and *bad* had a plausible reason for doing so (*habuerunt occasionem*), because the love that is a passion of the concupiscible power inclines many individuals toward what is bad.

Reply to the argument for the contrary: Some have claimed that even in the case of the will itself, the name 'love' (*amor*) is more divine than the name 'elective love' (*dilectio*). The reason is that 'love' implies a certain passivity (*passio*), mainly because love exists in the sentient appetite, whereas elective love (*dilectio*) presupposes the judgment of reason. But a man is better able to tend toward God through love (*per amorem*), having been attracted passively in a certain way by God Himself, than he is able to be led to this by his own reason—which, as has been explained, is what is involved in the nature of elective love. And in this sense love (*amor*) is more divine than elective love (*dilectio*).

Article 4

Is love appropriately divided into love of friendship and love of concupiscence?

It seems that love is not appropriately divided into love of friendship (*amor amicitiae*) and love of concupiscence (*amor concupiscentiae*):

Objection 1: Love (*amor*) is a passion, whereas friendship (*amicitiae*) is a habit, as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 8. But a habit cannot be a partition dividing a passion (*pars divisa passionis*). Therefore, love is not appropriately divided into love of concupiscence and love of friendship.

Objection 2: Nothing is divided by what is enumerated on the same level with it; for instance, *man* is not enumerated on the same level with *animal*. But *concupiscence* is enumerated on the same level with *love* as another passion that is distinct from love. Therefore, *love* is not divided by *concupiscence*.

Objection 3: According to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 8, there are three types of friendship: (a) friendship of utility, (b) friendship of pleasure, and (c) noble friendship (*amicitia utilis, delectabilis et honesta*). But friendship of utility and friendship of pleasure both involve concupiscence. Therefore, *concupiscence* should not be used to divide *friendship*.

But contrary to this: Some things we are said to love because we desire them; for instance, as *Topics* 2 points out, "someone is said to love wine because of the sweetness he desires in it." But as *Ethics* 8 says, we do not have friendship with wine or other things of that sort. Therefore, love of concupiscence is one thing and love of friendship is something else.

I respond: As the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 2, "To love is to will a good for someone." Therefore, the movement of love tends toward two things: (a) the good which one wills for someone, either for himself or for another (*in bonum quod quis vult alcui, vel sibi vel alii*); and (b) the one he wills the good for (*illud cui vult bonum*). Thus, *love of concupiscence* is had with respect to that good which

someone wills for another, and *love of friendship* is had with respect to the one that someone wills a good for. Hence, this distinction is a distinction between what is prior and what is posterior. For what is loved by a love of friendship is loved absolutely speaking and *per se*, whereas what is loved by a love of concupiscence is not loved absolutely speaking and in its own right (*secundum se*), but is instead loved for the sake of another.

For just as a being absolutely speaking (*ens simpliciter*) is that which has *esse*, whereas a being in a certain respect (*ens secundum quid*) is something that exists in another, so too *good*, which is convertible with *being*, is such that what is good absolutely speaking is that which itself has goodness, whereas what is good in a certain respect (*bonum secundum quid*) is that which is the good of another. As a result, a love by which something is loved in order that there be some good for it is loved absolutely speaking, whereas a love by which something is loved in order that it be the good of another is loved in a certain respect.

Reply to objection 1: *Love* is divided not by *friendship* and *concupiscence*, but by *love of friendship* and *love of concupiscence*. For the one who is properly called a friend is he for whom we will some good, whereas we are said to desire (*concupiscere*) what we will for ourselves.

Reply to objection 2: This makes clear the reply to the second objection.

Reply to objection 3: In friendship of utility and friendship of pleasure, someone wills some good for his friend, and to that extent the nature of friendship is preserved in these cases. However, since the good in question is directed further toward pleasure or usefulness for oneself, it follows that to the extent that friendship of utility or friendship of pleasure is drawn closer to the love of concupiscence, it falls short of the nature of genuine friendship.

QUESTION 27

The Causes of Love

Next we have to consider the causes of love. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Is the good the only cause of love? (2) Is cognition a cause of love? (3) Is likeness a cause of love? (4) Are any other passions of the soul causes of love?

Article 1

Is the good the only cause of love?

It seems that the good is not the only cause of love:

Objection 1: The good is a cause of love only because it is loved. But it happens that the bad is loved as well—this according to Psalm 10:6 ("He who loves iniquity hates his own soul"). Otherwise, every instance of love would be good. Therefore, the good is not the only cause of love.

Objection 2: In *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, "We love those who acknowledge their own bad deeds." Therefore, it seems that the bad is a cause of love.

Objection 3: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says that not only the good, but also "the beautiful is lovable to all things."

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 8 Augustine says, "Surely, nothing is loved except the good." Therefore, only the good is a cause of love.

I respond: As was explained above (q. 26, a. 1), love belongs to the appetitive power, which is a passive power (*vis passiva*). Hence, its object is related to it as a cause of its movement or act. Therefore, the object of love must be a cause, properly speaking, of the love. But the proper object of love is the good, since, as has been explained (q. 26, aa. 1-2), love implies the lover's connaturality with, or his being pleased with, what is loved (*amor importat quandam connaturalitatem vel complacentiam amantis ad amatum*). But the good for each thing is what is connatural to it and proportioned to it. Hence, it follows that the good is a proper cause of love.

Reply to objection 1: The bad is never loved except under some notion of goodness—more specifically, insofar as it is good in some respect and is apprehended as good absolutely speaking (*inquantum est secundum quid bonum et apprehenditur ut simpliciter bonum*). So an instance of love is bad insofar as it tends toward something that is not a genuine good absolutely speaking. And a man "loves iniquity" in the sense that through iniquity he acquires some good, e.g., pleasure or money or something else of this sort.

Reply to objection 2: Those who "acknowledge their own bad deeds" are loved not because of the bad deeds, but because they acknowledge the bad deeds. For acknowledging one's own bad deeds has the character of something good, insofar as it does away with dissimulation or pretense (*inquantum excludit fictionem seu simulationem*).

Reply to objection 3: The beautiful is the same as the good and differs from it only in concept (*sola ratione*). For since the good is what all things desire, it is part of the notion of the good that the appetite comes to rest in it, whereas it is part of the notion of the beautiful that the appetite comes to rest in seeing it or knowing it. Hence, the senses that are principally directed toward the beautiful are those that are especially cognitive, viz., seeing and hearing at the service of reason. For we talk of beautiful sights and beautiful sounds. By contrast, in the case of the sensible objects of the other senses, we do not use the name 'beauty'. For instance, we do not call tastes and odors 'beautiful'.

So it is clear that *beautiful* adds to *good* a certain ordering toward the cognitive power, so that the good is that which pleases the appetite absolutely speaking, whereas the beautiful is such that the apprehension of it is itself pleasing.

Article 2

Is cognition a cause of love?

It seems that cognition is not a cause of love:

Objection 1: The fact that something is sought after stems from love. But some things that are sought after are unknown, e.g., the sciences. For since, in the case of the sciences, "having them is the same as knowing them," as Augustine says in *83 Quaestiones*, it follows that if they were known, they would be had and would not be sought after. Therefore, cognition is not a cause of love.

Objection 2: Something's being loved without being known seems to be the same sort of thing as something's being loved more than it is known. But some things are loved more than they are known—e.g., God, who in this life can be loved in Himself but cannot be known in Himself. Therefore, cognition is not a cause of love.

Objection 3: If cognition were a cause of love, then love could not exist where there is no cognition. But love exists in all things, as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, whereas cognition does not exist in all things. Therefore, cognition is not a cause of love.

But contrary to this: In *De Trinitate* 10 Augustine says, "No one can love anything that is unknown."

I respond: As has been explained (a. 1), the good is a cause of love in the manner of an object. But the good is not the object of an appetite except insofar as it is apprehended. And so love requires some sort of apprehension of the good that is loved. Because of this, the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 9 that the corporeal act of seeing is a principle of sentient love. And, similarly, the spiritual contemplation of beauty or goodness is a principle of spiritual love.

So, then, cognition is a cause of love for the same reason that the good is, viz., that the good cannot be loved unless there is a cognition of it.

Reply to objection 1: Someone who seeks after scientific knowledge is not altogether ignorant of it, but has some cognition of it beforehand, either in general, or in some of its effects, or through hearing it praised, as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 10. So what is the same as having scientific knowledge is not having *some* cognition of scientific knowledge, but rather having a *perfect* cognition of scientific knowledge.

Reply to objection 2: Something is required for perfection in the case of cognition that is not required for perfection in the case of love. For cognition involves reason, the role of which is to separate things that are conjoined in reality and to bring together, by comparing one to another, things that are diverse. And so for perfection in the case of cognition it is required that a man know individually whatever exists in a thing, e.g., its parts, powers, and properties. By contrast, love exists in the appetitive power, which is directed toward a thing as it exists in itself. Hence, for perfection in the case of love it is sufficient that a thing be loved insofar as it is apprehended in itself. Thus, the reason why it is possible for a thing to be loved more than it is known is that it can be loved perfectly even if it is not known perfectly.

This is especially clear in the case of the sciences, which some individuals love because of the summary cognition they have of them; for instance, they know that rhetoric is a science through which a man can give persuasive arguments, and they love this feature in rhetoric. And something similar should be said about loving God.

Reply to objection 3: Even natural love, which exists in all things, is caused by some sort of cognition—not, to be sure, by a cognition that exists in the natural things themselves, but rather, as was explained above (q. 26, a.1), by a cognition that exists in the One who institutes their nature.

Article 3

Is likeness a cause of love?

It seems that likeness (*similitudo*) is not a cause of love:

Objection 1: The same thing is not a cause of opposites. But likeness is a cause of hatred; for Proverbs 13:10 says, "Among the proud there are always contentions," and in *Ethics* 8 the Philosopher says, "Potters quarrel with each other." Therefore, likeness is not a cause of love.

Objection 2: In *Confessiones* 4 Augustine says, "One loves in another what he does not want to be; for instance, a man loves an actor and yet does not want to be an actor." But this would not be so if likeness were a proper cause of love; for in that case a man would love in another what he himself has or wants to have. Therefore, likeness is not a cause of love.

Objection 3: Each man loves what he himself needs, even if he does not have it; for instance, a sick man loves health and a poor man loves riches. But insofar as he both lacks and needs these things, he is unlike them. Therefore, it is not only likeness but also unlikeness that is a cause of love.

Objection 4: In *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, "We love those who give us money and health, and, similarly, everyone loves those who retain their friendship for the dead." But not everyone is like that. Therefore, likeness is not a cause of love.

But contrary to this: Ecclesiasticus 13:19 says, "Every animal loves its like."

I respond: Likeness is, properly speaking, a cause of love. But notice that there are two ways in which a likeness among things can be thought of: (a) insofar as both have the same feature in actuality, in the way that two individuals that have whiteness are said to be like one another; and (b) insofar as the one has in potentiality and by some sort of inclination what the other one has in actuality, as when we say that a heavy body located outside its proper place is like a heavy body that is located in its proper place—or even insofar as a potentiality bears a likeness to the corresponding actuality, since the actuality in some sense exists within the potentiality itself.

The first type of likeness is a cause of the love of friendship or benevolence (*causat amorem amicitiae seu benevolentiae*). For from the fact that two individuals are like one another and have, as it were, one form, they are in some sense united in that form (*sunt quodammodo unum in forma illa*), in the way that two men are united in the species *human nature* and in the way that two white individuals are united in whiteness. And so the affections of the one tend toward the other as toward something that is one with himself, and he wills the good for the other just as he wills it for himself.

By contrast, the second type of likeness is a cause of the love of concupiscence, or a cause of a friendship of utility or of pleasure (*causat amorem concupiscentiae vel amicitiam utilis seu delectabilis*). For each thing that exists in potentiality has as such a desire for its own actuality, and, if it is something with sentience and cognition, then it delights in attaining that actuality.

Now it was explained above (q. 26, a. 4) that in a love of concupiscence the lover properly loves himself, since he wills the good that he desires. But each individual loves himself more than he loves another, since he is united with himself in his substance, whereas he is united to the other in a likeness of the same form. And so if he himself is impeded from attaining the good that he loves by the fact that there is someone else who is like him by participation in a form, then that individual becomes hateful to him, not insofar as he is like him, but insofar as the other poses an obstacle to his own good. And the reason why "potters quarrel with one another" is that each one poses an obstacle to the other's own profit; and the reason why "among the proud there are contentions" is that each keeps the other from attaining the excellence that he desires for himself (*se invicem impediunt in propria excellentia quam concupiscunt*).

Reply to objection 1: This makes clear the reply to the first objection.

Reply to objection 2: Even in the fact that someone loves in another what he does not love in

himself one finds the character of a likeness by proportionality. For the individual is related to what he loves in himself in the same way that the other individual is related to what is loved in him. For instance, if a good singer loves a good writer, there is a likeness of proportion insofar as each of them has what is appropriate for him in accord with his own art.

Reply to objection 3: As has been explained, someone who loves what he needs bears a likeness to what he loves in the way that potentiality bears a likeness to actuality.

Reply to objection 4: In accord with this same sort of likeness that potentiality bears to actuality, someone who is not generous (*non liberalis*) loves someone who is generous insofar as he expects from him what he desires. And the same line of reasoning holds for the case of an individual who perseveres in his friendship toward someone who does not persevere in friendship toward him. In both cases, there seems to be a friendship of utility.

An alternative reply is that even though not all men have virtues of the relevant sort by a perfect habit, they nonetheless have certain seeds of reason in accord with which someone who lacks virtue loves a virtuous individual insofar as the latter conforms to his own natural reason.

Article 4

Can any of the other passions be a cause of love?

It seems that some of the other passions can be a cause of love:

Objection 1: In *Ethics* 8 the Philosopher says that some individuals are loved for the sake of pleasure. But pleasure (*delectatio*) is a passion. Therefore, there is some other passion that is a cause of love.

Objection 2: Desire (*desiderium*) is a passion. But we love some individuals out of a desire for what we expect from them, as is obvious in every friendship that exists for the sake of utility. Therefore, there is some other passion that is a cause of love.

Objection 3: In *De Trinitate* 10 Augustine says, "If someone has no hope of getting a thing, he either loves it tepidly or does not love it at all, even though he sees how beautiful it is." Therefore, hope is likewise a cause of love.

But contrary to this: As Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 14, all the other affections of the soul are caused by love.

I respond: There is no other passion of the soul that does not presuppose some instance of love. The reason for this that every other passion of the soul involves either a movement toward something or resting in something. But every movement toward something or instance of resting in something proceeds from some sort of connaturality or bond (*ex aliqua connaturalitate vel coaptationem procedit*), and this belongs to the nature of love. Hence, it is impossible for any other passion of the soul to be a cause in general of every instance of love.

However, it does happen that some other passion is a cause of some instance of love, just as one good is likewise a cause of another good.

Reply to objection 1: When someone loves something for the sake of pleasure, the love is, to be sure, caused by pleasure, but that pleasure is, once again, caused by another previous instance of love. For no one takes pleasure except in a thing that is in some way loved.

Reply to objection 2: The desire for a thing always presupposes love for that thing. But the desire for a thing can be a cause of another thing's being loved. For instance, someone who desires money loves for this reason the one from whom he receives money.

Reply to objection 3: Hope causes and increases love, both (a) by reason of pleasure, since hope is a cause of pleasure, and (b) by reason of desire, since hope fortifies desire, since we do not desire as intensely what we do not hope for. And yet the hope is itself a hope for some good that is loved.

QUESTION 28

The Effects of Love

Next we have to consider the effects of love. And on this topic there are six questions: (1) Is union (*unio*) an effect of love? (2) Is mutual indwelling (*mutua inhaesio*) an effect of love? (3) Is ecstacy (*extasis*) an effect of love? (4) Is jealousy (*zelus*) an effect of love? (5) Is love a passion that is hurtful (*passio lasesiva*) to the lover? (6) Is love a cause of everything that a lover does?

Article 1

Is union an effect of love?

It seems that union (*unio*) is not an effect of love:

Objection 1: Absence is incompatible with union. But love is compatible with absence; for in Galatians 4:18 the Apostle says, "Always emulate the good in one who is good" (speaking of himself, as a Gloss says), "and not only when I am present among you." Therefore, union is not an effect of love.

Objection 2: Union exists either (a) through the *essence*, in the way that form is united with matter, and an accident with its subject, and a part either with its whole or with another part to constitute a whole, or (b) through a *likeness* of either genus or species or accident. But love does not cause a union of essence; otherwise, love would never be had with respect to things that are divided by their essence. And love does not cause the sort of union that exists through likeness; instead, it itself is caused by such a union, as has been explained (q. 27, a. 3). Therefore, union is not an effect of love.

Objection 3: The sensory power in acting (*in actu*) becomes in actuality (*in actu*) the thing sensed, and the intellect in acting becomes in actuality the thing understood. But the one who is exercising an act of love (*amans in actu*) does not become in actuality the thing loved. Therefore, union is more an effect of cognition than it is of love.

But contrary to this: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says that every instance of love is "a unitive power."

I respond: A lover has two sorts of union with what is loved:

(a) The one is a *real union* (*secundum rem*), viz., when the thing loved is now present to the lover.

(b) The other is an *affective union* (*secundum affectum*), and this union has to be thought of as proceeding from a previous apprehension, since an appetitive movement follows upon an apprehension.

Now since there are two types of love, viz., love of concupiscence and love of friendship, both proceed from an apprehension of the unity of the thing loved with the lover. For when someone loves something in the sense of desiring it (*quasi concupiscens illud*), he apprehends it as relevant to his own well-being (*quasi pertinens ad suum bene esse*). Similarly, when he loves someone with a love of friendship, he wills the good for him in the same way that he wills the good for himself; hence, he apprehends him as another self (*apprehendit eum ut alterum se*) insofar as he wills the good for him in the same way that he wills the good for himself. Thus it is that a friend is said to be another self (*amicus dicitur esse alter ipse*), and in *Confessiones* 4 Augustine says, "Someone fittingly called his friend half of his soul."

Therefore, love brings about the first type of union as an *efficient* cause (*effective*), since it effects a movement toward desiring and seeking the presence of the thing that is loved as something that is fitting for and relevant to oneself. However, it brings about the second type as a *formal* cause (*formaliter*), since love itself is just this sort of union or connection. Hence, in *De Trinitate* 8 Augustine says that love is like "a life that connects, or seeks to connect, two things, viz., the lover and what is loved." When he says 'connects', this refers to the *affective* union (*refertur ad unionem affectus*), without which there is no love, whereas when he says 'seeks to connect', this has to do with the *real* union.

Reply to objection 1: This objection goes through for the case of a real union. *Pleasure* requires real union as its cause, whereas *desire* exists in the real absence of what is loved, and *love* exists both in

the absence of what is loved and in its presence.

Reply to objection 2: There are three ways in which an instance of union may be related to love:

(a) An instance of union may be a *cause of love*. This is a *substantial union* in the case of the love by which someone loves himself, while, as has been explained (q. 27, a. 3), it is a *union of likeness* in the case of the love by which someone loves other things.

(b) An instance of union may be *essentially the love itself*, and this is union by a *bond of affection* (*secundum adaptationem affectus*). This sort of union is assimilated to a *substantial union* in a case in which the lover is related to what is loved either in a love of friendship with respect to himself or in a love of concupiscence with respect to something of his own.

(c) An instance of union may be an *effect of love*. This is a *real union* that the lover seeks after with respect to what is loved. And this sort of union is appropriate for love (*est secundum convenientiam amoris*). For as the Philosopher reports in *Politics* 2, "Aristophanes claimed that lovers would desire to be united by the two becoming one," but since "this would result in one or both of them being destroyed," they seek a union that is appropriate and fitting, viz., to live together and converse together and to be joined in other such ways.

Reply to objection 3: Cognition is perfected by the fact that the thing known is united to the knower by a *likeness*. By contrast, as has been explained, love brings it about that *the very thing* that is loved is united in some way to the lover. This is why love is more unitive than cognition is.

Article 2

Is love a cause of mutual indwelling in the sense that the lover exists in what is loved and vice versa?

It seems that love is not a cause of mutual indwelling (*mutua inhaesio*) in the sense that the lover exists in what is loved, and vice versa:

Objection 1: What exists in another is contained in that other. But the same thing cannot be both the container and the contained. Therefore, love cannot be a cause of mutual indwelling in the sense that what is loved exists in the lover, and vice versa.

Objection 2: Nothing can penetrate into the interior of any whole except through some sort of division. But to divide what is joined in reality pertains to reason and not to the appetite, in which love exists. Therefore, mutual indwelling is not an effect of love.

Objection 3: If through love the lover exists in what is loved and vice versa, then it will follow that what is loved is united to the lover in the same way that the lover is united to what is loved. But as has been explained (a. 1), the union itself is the love. Therefore, it follows that the lover is always loved by what is loved, which is clearly false. Therefore, it is not the case that mutual indwelling is an effect of love.

But contrary to this: 1 John 4:16 says, "He who abides in charity abides in God, and God in him." But charity (*caritas*) is the love of God (*amor Dei*). Therefore, for the same reason, every instance of love brings it about that what is loved exists in the lover, and vice versa.

I respond: This effect of mutual indwelling can be thought of both (a) with respect to the apprehensive power and (b) with respect to the appetitive power:

As regards the *apprehensive power*, what is loved is said to exist in the lover insofar as what is loved lingers in the lover's apprehension—this according to Philippians 1:7 ("..... because I have you in my heart"). On the other hand, the lover is said to exist by apprehension in what is loved insofar as the lover is not content with a superficial apprehension of what is loved, but instead tries to discover everything that belongs intrinsically to what is loved and so to enter into its depths (*ad interiora eius ingeditur*)—just as 1 Corinthians 2:10 says of the Holy Spirit, who is the Love of God, that He "searches

all things, even the deep things of God."

As regards the *appetitive power*, what is loved is said to exist in the lover insofar as its exists in his affections through his being pleased, so that either (a) he takes pleasure in it or in its good aspects when it is present or (b) in its absence he tends toward (i) what is loved itself through a love of concupiscence or (ii) toward the goods that he wills through a love of friendship for the one who is loved—not because of any extrinsic cause, as when someone desires something for the sake of something else or when someone wills a good for another for the sake of something else, but because he is pleased with the one he loves in a way that is interiorly rooted. This is why love is called 'intimate' and why one uses the expression 'the bowels of charity'. Conversely, the lover exists in what is loved in one way through the love of concupiscence and in a different way through the love of friendship. For the love of concupiscence does not come to rest in any extrinsic or superficial attainment of or enjoyment of what is loved, but instead seeks to possess it perfectly—reaching its insides, as it were (*quasi ad intima illius perveniens*). By contrast, in the love of friendship the lover exists in what is loved in the sense of treating his friend's goods or evils as his own, and his friend's will as his own, so that he himself seems to undergo the good and the bad in his friend, as it were, and to be affected by them. Because of this, according to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 9 and *Rhetoric* 2, it is proper for friends "to will the same things and to sorrow over and rejoice in the same things." And so to the extent that he thinks of what belongs to his friend as his own, the lover seems to exist in the one who is loved and becomes, as it were, the same as the one who is loved. Conversely, to the extent that he wills and acts for the sake of his friend as for his own sake, thinking of his friend as if he were identical with himself, the one who is loved exists within the lover.

There is also a *third way* in which mutual indwelling can be thought of in the love of friendship, by way of reciprocation, insofar as the friends mutually love one another and will and do good things for one another.

Reply to objection 1: What is loved is contained in the lover in the sense that it is impressed in his affections through his being pleased. Conversely, the lover is contained in what is loved in the sense that the lover pursues in some way that which is innermost (*intima*) in what is loved. For nothing prohibits a thing's being both container and contained in different senses, just as a genus is contained within its species and vice versa.

Reply to objection 2: Reason's apprehension precedes love's affection. And so, as is clear from what has been said, as reason investigates what is loved, love's affection enters into it.

Reply to objection 3: This argument goes through for the third mode of indwelling, which is not found in every instance of love.

Article 3

Is ecstacy an effect of love?

It seems that ecstacy is not an effect of love:

Objection 1: Ecstasy seems to imply a sort of loss of self (*extasis quandam alienationem importare videtur*). But love does not always bring about loss of self, since lovers sometimes have self-mastery (*amantes interdum sui compotes*). Therefore, love does not bring about ecstasy.

Objection 2: A lover desires to be united to what is loved. Therefore, he draws the lover toward himself instead of entering into what is loved by going outside of himself (*quam etiam pergat in amatum extra se exiens*).

Objection 3: As has been explained (a. 1), love unites the lover to what is loved. Therefore, if the lover moves outside of himself in order to enter into what is loved, it follows that a lover always loves what is loved more than he loves himself. But this is clearly false. Therefore, it is not the case that

ecstacy is an effect of love.

But contrary to this: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, "God's love brings about ecstacy, and God Himself undergoes ecstacy because of love." Therefore, since, as is explained in the same place, every instance of love is a sort of participated likeness in God's love, it seems that every instance of love is a cause of ecstacy.

I respond: Someone is said to undergo ecstacy when he is put outside himself. This happens both (a) with respect to the apprehensive power and (b) with respect to the appetitive power.

As regards the *apprehensive power*, someone is said to be put outside himself when he is put outside of the sort of cognition that is proper to him, either because (a) he is elevated to a higher sort of cognition—as a man, when he is elevated to comprehend things that lie beyond the senses and beyond reason, is said to undergo ecstacy in the sense of being put outside of the apprehension connatural to reason and the sensory power—or because (b) he sinks down to a lower level, as someone is said to undergo ecstacy when he falls into furiousness or mindlessness (*cum aliquis in furiam vel amentiam cadit*).

On the other hand, as regards the *appetitive part of the soul*, someone is said to undergo ecstacy when his desire for something carries him into the other and he in some sense goes outside himself.

As has been explained (a. 1), love effects the first type of ecstacy *as a disposing cause* (*dispositive*), viz., by bringing it about that one thinks about what is loved, where such intense thinking about this one thing draws his thoughts away from other things.

On the other hand, love effects the second type of ecstacy *directly* (*directe*). The love of friendship effects it absolutely speaking, whereas the love of concupiscence effects it in a certain respect and not absolutely speaking. For in the case of the love of concupiscence, the lover is carried outside of himself in the sense that, not content to rejoice over the good that he has, he seeks to enjoy something outside of himself. But because he seeks to have that extrinsic good for himself, he does not go out of himself absolutely speaking; rather, this sort of affection ends up within himself after all. By contrast, in the case of the love of friendship, one's affection goes outside himself absolutely speaking, since he wills the good for his friend and, for the sake of the friend himself, exercises care for him and provides for him (*operatur quasi gerens curam et providentiam ipsius propter ipsum amicum*).

Reply to objection 1: This argument goes through for the first type of ecstasy.

Reply to objection 2: This argument goes through for the case of the love of concupiscence, which, as has been explained, does not bring about ecstacy absolutely speaking.

Reply to objection 3: To the extent that a lover goes outside of himself, he wills and does good things for his friend. However, he does not will his friend's good more than his own. Hence, it does not follow that he loves another more than he loves himself.

Article 4

Is jealousy an effect of love?

It seems that jealousy or zeal (*zelus*) is not an effect of love:

Objection 1: Jealousy is principle of contention; hence, 1 Corinthians 3:3 says, "There is among you jealousy and contention ....." But contention is incompatible with love. Therefore, jealousy is not an effect of love.

Objection 2: The object of love is the good, which communicates itself. But jealousy is incompatible with such communication, since it seems to be part of jealousy that an individual does not tolerate sharing what is loved (*non patiatur consortium in amato*). For instance, husbands are said to be jealous of their wives, because they do not want them to have familiarity with others (*quas nolunt habere communes cum ceteris*). Therefore, jealousy is not an effect of love.

Objection 3: Jealousy does not exist without hatred, just as it does not exist without love; for Psalm 72:3 says, "I was jealous of the wicked (*zelavi super inquos*)." Therefore, jealousy should not be called an effect of love more than an effect of hatred.

But contrary to this: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, "God is called a jealous lover (*zelotes*) because of the great love He has for the things that exist."

I respond: Jealousy (*zelus*), however it is understood, proceeds from love's intensity. For it is clear that the more intensely a power tends toward something, the more forcefully it repels anything that is contrary or counteractive. Therefore, since, as Augustine says in *83 Quaestiones*, "Love is a certain movement toward what is loved," an intense love seeks to exclude everything that counteracts it.

Now this occurs in one way in the case of the love of concupiscence and in a different way in the case of the love of friendship.

For in the case of a love of concupiscence that intensely desires something, one moves against anything that counteracts the attainment or restful enjoyment of what is loved (*illud quod repugnat consecutioni vel fruitioni quietae eius quod amatur*). And it is in this sense that husbands are jealous of their wives, lest the exclusiveness (*singularitas*) that they seek in a wife should be impeded by her familiarity with others. Similarly, someone who seeks excellence is moved against those who seem to excel, as if they were impeding his own excellence. This is the *jealousy of envy* (*zelus invidiae*) that is spoken of in Psalm 36:1 ("Do not emulate evildoers or be jealous of those who work iniquity").

By contrast, the love of friendship seeks the friend's good, and so when it is intense, it makes a man move against everything that counteracts his friend's good. Accordingly, someone is said to be jealous or zealous on his friend's behalf (*aliquis dicitur zelare pro amico*) when he is eager to repel anything said or done against his friend's good. And, in the same way, someone is likewise said to be jealous or zealous on God's behalf (*zelare pro Deo*) when he tries to repel, as much as he can, what is contrary to God's honor or will—this according to 3 Kings 19:14 ("With zeal I have been jealous on behalf of the Lord of hosts"). And a Gloss on John 2:17 ("Zeal for your house consumes me") says, "He is consumed with a good jealousy who seeks to remedy whatever evil he sees; but if he is unable to remedy it, then he bears it and laments it."

Reply to objection 1: The Apostle is here talking about the zeal of envy, which is a cause of contending not against what is loved, but on behalf of what is loved and against obstacles to it.

Reply to objection 2: A good is loved to the extent that it is communicable to the lover. Hence, everything that impedes the perfection of this communicability becomes odious. And this is the way in which jealousy is caused by loving the good.

Now because of a shortage of goodness (*ex defectu bonitatis*) it happens that certain scarce goods (*quaedam parva bona*) cannot be fully possessed by many at the same time. And the jealousy of envy is caused by loving goods of this sort. By contrast, the jealousy of envy is not, properly speaking, caused by loving goods that can be fully possessed by many. For instance, no one envies another's cognition of a truth that can be fully possessed by many, though he may perhaps envy another's excellence with respect to the cognition of this truth.

Reply to objection 3: The very fact that someone hates the things that counteract what is loved stems from love. Hence, jealously is properly posited as an effect of love rather than of hatred.

Article 5

Is love a harmful passion?

It seems that love is a harmful passion (*passio laesiva*):

Objection 1: 'Languor' signifies a sort of harm on the part of the one who is languishing (*languor significat laesionem quandam languentis*). But love causes languor; for Song of Songs 2:5 says, "Sustain

me with flowers, surround me with apples, because I am languishing with love." Therefore, love is a harmful passion.

Objection 2: Melting is a sort of dissolution (*liquefactio est quaedam resolutio*). But love causes melting; for Song of Songs 5:6 says, "My soul melted as my beloved spoke." Therefore, love causes dissolution. Therefore, it is corruptive and harmful.

Objection 3: 'Fervor' (*fervor*) signifies a certain excess of heat, and this excess is corruptive. But fervor is caused by love; for in *De Caelestis Hiearchibus*, chap. 7, Dionysius lists "hot," "sharp," and "highly fervent" among the properties that belong to the Seraphim's love. And Song of Songs 8:6 says of love that "its splendors are the splendors of fire and flames." Therefore, love is a harmful and corruptive passion.

But contrary to this: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, "Each thing loves itself in a way that holds it together," i.e., in a way that conserves it (*singula seipsa amant contentive, idest conservative*). Therefore, love is not a harmful passion, but is instead a passion that conserves and perfects.

I respond: As was explained above (q. 26, aa. 1-2 and q. 27, a. 1), 'love' signifies a certain bond (*coaptatio*) between the appetitive power and some good. But nothing is bonded with anything fitting for it by the fact that it is harmed; rather, if it is possible, the thing is advantageous to it and makes it better. By contrast, it is harmed and made worse by the very fact that it is united to something that is not fitting for it. Therefore, love for a fitting good perfects the lover and makes him better (*est perfectivus et meliorativus amantis*), whereas love for a good that is not fitting for the lover is harmful to the lover and makes him worse (*est laesivus et deteriorativus amantis*). Hence, a man is perfected and made better especially by love for God, whereas he is harmed and made worse by a love for sin—this according to Hosea 9:10 ("They became abominable, just like the things they loved").

To be sure, what has just been said about love applies to what is *formal* in it, i.e., what belongs to the appetite. By contrast, with respect to what is *material* in the passion of love, viz., the corporeal change, it happens that love might be harmful because of the excessiveness of the change—in the same way that this happens in the case of a sensory power and in the case of every act of a power of the soul that is exercised through a change in a corporeal organ.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: To the objections one should reply that four proximate effects can be attributed to love, viz., melting (*liquefactio*), enjoyment (*fruitio*), languor (*languor*), and fervor (*fervor*).

Among these the first is *melting*, which is opposed to freezing (*congelatio*). For things that are frozen are compressed within themselves, so that they cannot easily allow themselves to be entered into by another (*ut not possint de facili subintrationem alterius pati*). But it is part of love that the appetite is adapted to the reception of the good that is loved insofar as what is loved exists in the lover—in the way that has already been explained above (a. 2). Hence, the freezing or hardening of the heart (*congelatio vel duritia cordis*) is a disposition incompatible with love. By contrast, 'melting' implies a certain softening of the heart by which the heart shows itself ready to be entered into by what is loved.

Therefore, if what is loved is present and possessed, then what is effected is *pleasure* or *enjoyment*. On the other hand, if what is loved is absent, then two passions result, viz., (a) *sadness* over the absence, and this is signified by '*languor*' (this is why, in *De Tusculanis Quaestionibus* 3, Tully mainly uses the word 'sickness' for this sadness), and (b) *intense desire* to attain what is loved, and this is signified by '*fervor*'.

These are, to be sure, the effects of love understood formally, i.e., in accord with the relation of the appetitive power to its object. However, in the case of the passion of love there are some effects, proportionate to these, that result from changes in the organ.

Article 6

Does a lover do everything out of love?

It seems that a lover does not do everything out of love:

Objection 1: As was explained above (q. 26, a. 2), love is a passion. But a man does not do everything he does out of passion; rather, as *Ethics* 6 explains, certain things he does by choice and others he does out of ignorance. Therefore, it is not the case that a man does everything he does out of love.

Objection 2: As is clear from *De Anima* 3, the appetite is a principle of movement and action in all animals. Therefore, if someone does everything he does out of love, then the other passions of the appetitive part of the soul will be superfluous.

Objection 3: Nothing is caused simultaneously by contrary causes. But some things are done out of hatred. Therefore, not all things are done out of love.

But contrary to this: In *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, Dionysius says, "It is because of the love of the good that each agent does everything."

I respond: As has been explained (q. 1, a. 2), every agent acts for the sake of some end. But the end is the good that each thing desires and loves. Hence, it is clear that every agent, whatever it might be, does every action out of some sort of love.

Reply to objection 1: This objection goes through for the case of the love that is a passion in the sentient appetite. But we are now talking about love taken in general, insofar as it includes under itself intellective love, rational love, animal love, and natural love. For this is how Dionysius is talking about love in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4.

Reply to objection 2: As has already been explained (q. 27, a. 4), desire, sadness, and pleasure are all caused by love, and as a result all the other passions are caused by love as well. Hence, every action that proceeds from any passion whatsoever also proceeds from love as a first cause. Hence, the other passions, which are proximate causes, are not superfluous.

Reply to objection 3: As will be explained below (q. 29, a. 2), hatred is also caused by love.

QUESTION 29

Hatred

Next we have to consider hatred. And on this topic there are six questions: (1) Is the cause and object of hatred the bad? (2) Is hatred caused by love? (3) Is hatred stronger than love? (4) Can someone hate himself? (5) Can someone have hatred for the truth? (6) Can something be hated in general (*in universali*)?

Article 1

Is the cause and object of hatred the bad?

It seems that the bad is not the object and cause of hatred:

Objection 1: Everything that exists, insofar as it exists, is good. Therefore, if the object of hatred is the bad, it follows that no entity is hated (*nulla res odio habeatur*), but that only the defectiveness of an entity is hated. But this is clearly false.

Objection 2: It is praiseworthy to hate what is bad; thus, in praise of certain individuals 2 Maccabees 3:1 says that "the laws were very well kept, because of the piety of Onias the high priest, and their minds hated what was bad." Therefore, if nothing is hated except what is bad, then it follows that every instance of hatred is praiseworthy. But this is clearly false.

Objection 3: The same thing is not simultaneously both good and bad. But the same thing is odious to some and lovable to others. Therefore, there is hatred not only of what is bad, but also of what is good.

But contrary to this: Hatred is contrary to love. But as has been explained (q. 26, a. 1 and q. 27, a. 1), the object of love is the good. Therefore, the object of hatred is the bad.

I respond: Since a natural appetite (*appetitus naturalis*) flows from an apprehension, even though this apprehension is not conjoined to it [in the same substance], the explanation for the inclination of an animal appetite, which, as was explained above (q. 26, a. 1), follows upon a conjoined apprehension, seems to be the same as that for the inclination of a natural appetite.

Now in the case of a natural appetite it is manifestly obvious that just as each thing has a natural consonance with or aptitude for, i.e., a natural love for, what is fitting for it, so too it has a natural dissonance from, i.e., a natural hatred for, what is repugnant to it and corruptive of it. So, then, in the case of an animal appetite, as well as in the case of an intellective appetite, love is likewise an appetite for what is apprehended as fitting, whereas hatred is likewise the appetite's dissonance from what is apprehended as repugnant and harmful.

Now just as everything that is fitting, insofar as it is fitting, has the character of being good, so too everything repugnant, insofar as it is repugnant, has character of being bad. And so just as the good is the object of love, so too the bad is the object of hatred.

Reply to objection 1: A being, insofar as it is a being, has the character of being fitting rather than the character of being repugnant, since all things share being in common. But a being, insofar as it is *this* determinate being, has the character of being repugnant to some other determinate being. It is in this way that one being is odious to another and is bad. Even if it is not odious in itself, it is nonetheless odious in relation to something else.

Reply to objection 2: Just as something that is not genuinely good is apprehended as good, so too something that is not genuinely bad is apprehended as bad. Hence, it sometimes happens that hatred for the bad is not good or that love for the good is not good.

Reply to objection 3: The reason why it happens, in the case of a natural appetite, that the same thing is lovable to some and odious to others is that one and the same thing is fitting by its nature for the one thing and repugnant by its nature to the other; for instance, heat is fitting for fire and repugnant to

water.

The reason why this happens in the case of an appetite that belongs to the soul (*secundum appetitum animalem*) is that one and the same thing is apprehended by one individual as good (*sub ratione boni*) and by another individual as bad (*sub ratione mali*).

Article 2

Is love a cause of hatred?

It seems that love is not a cause of hatred:

Objection 1: As the *Categories* puts it, "Things that are divided by opposites are naturally simultaneous with one another." But since love and hatred are contraries, they are divided by opposites. Therefore, they are naturally simultaneous with one another. Therefore, it is not the case that love is a cause of hatred.

Objection 2: One of two contraries is not a cause of the other. But love and hatred are contraries. Therefore, love is not a cause of hatred.

Objection 3: What is posterior is not a cause of what is prior. But it seems that hatred is prior to love; for hatred implies withdrawing from the bad (*recessus a malo*), whereas love implies drawing nearer to the good (*accessus ad bonum*). Therefore, love is not a cause of hatred.

But contrary to this: In *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine says that all the affections are caused by love. Therefore, even hatred, since it is a certain affection of the soul, is caused by love.

I respond: As has been explained (a. 1), love consists in a certain fit between the lover and what is loved, whereas hatred consists in a certain repugnance or dissonance. Now in every case one has to consider what is fitting prior to considering what is repugnant; for one thing is repugnant to another by virtue of the fact that it corrupts or impedes what is fitting. Hence, it is necessary that (a) love is prior to hatred and that (b) nothing is hated except in virtue of the fact that it is contrary to something fitting that is loved. Accordingly, every instance of hatred is caused by love.

Reply to objection 1: Among things that are divided by opposites, some are naturally simultaneous both *in reality* (*secundum rem*) and *in concept* (*secundum rationem*), e.g., two species of animal or two species of color. Some are simultaneous in concept, but the one is prior in reality to the other and a cause of it; this is clear in the case of the species of number, shape, and movement. On the other hand, some are simultaneous neither in reality nor in concept, e.g., substance and accident, given that (a) a substance is a cause in reality of its accident, and (b) 'being' is attributed to a substance conceptually prior to its being attributed to its accident, since it is attributed to the accident only insofar as the accident exists in the substance.

Now love and hatred are, to be sure, naturally simultaneous in concept, but not in reality. Hence, there is nothing to prevent love from being a cause of hatred.

Reply to objection 2: Love and hatred are contraries when they are taken with respect to the same thing. But when they are taken with respect to contraries, then they are not themselves contrary but result from one another. For the fact that something is loved is of the same nature as the fact that its contrary is hated. And so the love of one thing is a cause of its contrary being hated.

Reply to objection 3: As regards *execution*, withdrawing from the one terminus is prior to coming closer to the other terminus. But as regards *intention*, the converse holds; for one withdraws from the one terminus *in order to* draw nearer to the other terminus.

Now an appetitive movement has to do with intention rather than with execution. And so love is prior to hatred, since both of them are appetitive movements.

Article 3

Is hatred stronger than love?

It seems that hatred is stronger than love:

Objection 1: In *83 Quaestiones* Augustine says, "There is no one who does not flee from pain (*dolor*) more than he desires pleasure (*voluptas*)." But to flee from pain pertains to hatred, while the desire for pleasure pertains to love. Therefore, hatred is stronger than love.

Objection 2: The weaker is conquered by the stronger. But love is conquered by hatred, viz., when love is converted into hatred. Therefore, hatred is stronger than love.

Objection 3: The soul's affections are made manifest by their effects. But a man persists more strongly in repelling what is odious than in pursuing what is loved—in the same way that, as Augustine notes in *83 Quaestiones*, even beasts abstain from delectable things because of the whip. Therefore, hatred is stronger than love.

But contrary to this: The good is stronger than the bad, since "the bad acts only in the power of the good," as Dionysius puts it in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4. But hatred and love differ in accord with the difference between the good and the bad. Therefore, love is stronger than hatred.

I respond: It is impossible for an effect to be stronger than its cause. But as was explained above (a. 2), every instance of hatred proceeds from some instance of love as its cause. Hence, it is impossible for hatred to be stronger, absolutely speaking, than love.

But, further, it is necessary for love to be stronger, absolutely speaking, than hatred. For something moves toward an end more strongly than it does toward a means to that end. But a withdrawal from the bad is ordered toward attaining the good as its end. Hence, absolutely speaking, the soul's movement with respect to the good is stronger than its movement with respect to the bad.

Yet sometimes hatred seems stronger than love, and this for two reasons:

First of all, hatred is felt more than love is (*odium est magis sensibile quam amor*). For since the sensory power's perception involves a certain change, by the fact that something has already been changed, it is not sensed in the same way as when it is in the very process of being changed (*quando est in ipso immutari*). Hence, even though the heat of a chronic fever (*calor febris hecticae*) might be greater, it is not felt as much as the heat of an acute fever, since the heat of the chronic fever has by now become, as it were, habitual and natural. It is also because of this that love is felt more in the absence of what is loved; as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 9, "Love is not felt as much when need does not bring it forth." And it is likewise because of this that the repugnance of what is hated is perceived in a more sensible way than the fittingness of what is loved.

Second, the hatred is not being compared to the love that corresponds to it. For corresponding to the diversity of goods there is a diversity of greater and lesser among the instances of love, and the opposite instances of hatred are proportioned to them. Hence, a hatred that corresponds to a greater love effects a greater movement than does a lesser love.

Reply to objection 1: This makes clear the reply to the first objection. For the love of pleasure is not as great as the love of conserving oneself, which the avoidance of pain corresponds to. And so pain is avoided to a greater degree than pleasure is loved.

Reply to objection 2: Hatred never conquers love except because of a greater love to which the hatred corresponds. For instance, a man loves himself more than he loves his friend, and because of this he hates even his friend if his friend opposes him.

Reply to objection 3: The reason why a thing acts more intensely to repel what is odious is that hatred is felt to a greater degree.

Article 4

Can someone hate himself?

It seems that someone can hate himself (*aliquis possit seipsum odio habere*):

Objection 1: Psalm 10:6 says, "He who loves iniquity hates his own soul." But there are many who love iniquity. Therefore, there are many who hate themselves.

Objection 2: We hate someone when we will what is bad for him and do what is bad to him. But sometimes someone wills what is bad for himself and does what is bad to himself, e.g., those who kill themselves. Therefore, there are some who hate themselves.

Objection 3: In *De Consolatione Philosophiae* 2 Boethius says, "Avarice makes men odious." From this one can conclude that every man hates an avaricious man. But some men are avaricious. Therefore, those men hate themselves.

But contrary to this: In Ephesians 5:29 the Apostle says, "No one ever hated his own flesh."

I respond: It is impossible for anyone, speaking *per se*, to hate himself. For each thing naturally desires the good, and no one can desire anything except as a good (*nisi sub ratione boni*). For as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, "To love someone is to will the good for him." Hence, it is necessary for someone to love himself, and it is impossible for anyone, speaking *per se*, to hate himself.

Yet it is possible for someone to hate himself *per accidens*, and this in two ways.

First, on the part of *the good* that someone wills for himself. For it sometimes happens that what is desired as good in a certain respect (*secundum quid bonum*) is bad absolutely speaking (*simpliciter malum*) and, accordingly, someone *per accidens* wills what is bad for himself—which is what it is to hate oneself.

Second, on the part of *the man himself*, for whom he wills the good. For each thing is most especially that which exists more principally within itself; hence, the city-state is said to do what the king does, as if the king were the whole city-state. Therefore, it is clear that a man is especially the man's mind. But it happens that some men think themselves to be especially that which corresponds to their corporeal and sentient nature. Hence, they love themselves in a way that corresponds to what they take themselves to be, but they hate what they truly are when they will what is contrary to reason.

And it is in these two ways that "he who loves iniquity" hates not only "his own soul," but even his very self.

Reply to objection 1: This makes clear the reply to the first objection.

Reply to objection 2: No one wills what is bad for himself and does what is bad to himself except insofar as he apprehends it as a good. For even those who kill themselves apprehend dying itself as a good insofar as it terminates some sorrow or pain.

Reply to objection 3: An avaricious man hates an accident of himself, but he does not for this reason hate himself—just as a sick man hates his own sickness in virtue of the very fact that he loves himself.

An alternative reply is that avarice makes men odious to others, but it does not make a man odious to himself. To the contrary, it is caused by a disordered love of oneself, in the sense that someone wills more temporal goods for himself than he should.

Article 5

Can someone hate the truth?

It seems that no one can hate the truth (*aliquis non possit habere odio veritatem*):

Objection 1: *Good* and *being* and *true* are convertible with one another. But no one is able to hate the good. Therefore, it is likewise the case that no one is able to hate the truth.

Objection 2: As it says at the beginning of the *Metaphysics*, "All men by nature desire to know." But scientific knowledge is only of the truth. Therefore, the truth is naturally desired and naturally loved. But what exists in someone naturally exists in him always. Therefore, no one is able to hate the truth.

Objection 3: In *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, "Men naturally love those who are not deceptive (*homines amant non fictos*)." But this is only for the sake of the truth. Therefore, a man naturally loves the truth. Therefore, he is not able to hate it.

But contrary to this: In Galatians 4:16 the Apostle says, "Have I become an enemy to you by telling you the truth?"

I respond: *Good* and *true* and *being* are the same in reality but differ in concept. For *good*, but not *being* or *true*, has the character of being desirable, since the good is "what all things desire." And so the good under the concept *good* cannot be hated, either in general or in particular.

Now, to be sure, *being* in general and *true* in general cannot be hated, since dissonance (*dissonantia*) is a cause of hatred and fittingness (*convenientia*) a cause of love, and *being* and *true* are common to all things. However, there is nothing to prevent some being in particular or some truth in particular from being hated insofar as it has the character of being contrary and repugnant. For contrariety and repugnance are not at odds with (*non adversatur*) the notions *being* and *true* in the way that they are at odds with the notion *good*.

There are three ways in which some particular truth can be repugnant or contrary to a good that is loved:

(a) First, insofar as the truth exists by causality and by origin in the things themselves. And a man sometimes hates a truth in this sense when he wishes something that is true not to be true.

(b) Second, insofar as a truth that impedes a man's pursuit of what he loves enters into his cognition. For instance, some men might wish not to know the truth of the Faith in order that they might sin freely. Job 21:14 says in the person of such individuals, "We do not want the knowledge of Your ways."

(c) Third, a particular truth is hated as something repugnant insofar as it exists in the mind of another. For instance, when someone wants to lie hidden in some sin, he hates it that someone might learn the truth about his sin. Accordingly, in *Confessiones* 10 Augustine says that men "love the truth that enlightens and hate the truth that reproves."

Reply to objection 1: This makes clear the reply to the first objection.

Reply to objection 2: To know the truth is something lovable in its own right (*secundum se*); this is why Augustine says that they "love the truth that enlightens." But cognition of the truth can be odious *per accidens* insofar as it keeps one from something he desires.

Reply to objection 3: From the fact that those who are not deceptive are loved it follows that a man loves in its own right the truth that non-deceptive men make manifest.

Article 6

Can there be hatred of something in general?

It seems that there cannot be hatred of something in general (*odium non possit esse alicuius in universali*):

Objection 1: Hatred is a passion of the sentient appetite, which is moved by sentient apprehension. But the sensory power cannot apprehend a universal (*non potest apprehendere universale*). Therefore, there cannot be hatred of something in general (*in universale*).

Objection 2: Hatred is caused by dissonance, which is repugnant to commonality (*quae communitate repugnat*). But commonality is part of the notion *universal*. Therefore, there cannot be hatred of something in general.

Objection 3: The object of hatred is the bad. But as *Metaphysics* 4 says, the bad "exists in things and not in the mind." Therefore, since a universal exists only in the mind (*cum universale sit solum in mente*), which abstracts the universal from the particular, it seems that there cannot be hatred of something in general (*in universali*).

But contrary to this: In *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, "Anger is always directed toward singulars, whereas hatred is also directed to things in general (*ad genera*); for everyone hates a thief and a backbiter (*furem odit et calumniatorem unusquisque*)."

I respond: There are two possible ways of talking about a universal: (a) talking about it insofar as it is the subject of an intention of universality (*secundum quod subest intentioni universalitatis*); and (b) talking about the nature that such an intention is attributed to. For it is one thing to consider *man* as a universal, and it is another thing to consider a man insofar as he is a man (*alia est consideratio hominis universalis et alia hominis in eo quod homo*).

Thus, if a universal is taken in the first way, then no power of the sentient part—neither an apprehensive power nor an appetitive power—can be directed toward a universal (*non ferri potest in universale*). For a universal is fashioned by abstraction from the material individual in which every sentient power is rooted.

Nonetheless, it is possible for sentient powers—both the apprehensive power and the appetitive power—to be directed toward something in general (*ferri potest in aliquid universaliter*). For instance, we say that the object of the visual power is color in general (*color secundum genus*), not because the visual power has a cognition of the universal *color*, but because the fact that a color is susceptible to cognition by the visual power belongs to a color not insofar as it is *this* color, but insofar as it is a color absolutely speaking.

So, then, it is likewise the case that the hatred that belongs to the sentient part of the soul can be directed toward something in general (*potest respicere aliquid in universali*). For it is by its common nature, and not just by the fact that it is a particular, that something is an adversary of an animal—in the way that a wolf is an adversary of a sheep. Hence, a sheep hates wolves in general (*ovis odit lupum generaliter*). By contrast, anger is always caused by something particular, since it is caused by a harmful act and acts are particulars. This is why the Philosopher says that anger is always directed toward something singular, whereas hatred can be directed toward something in general.

However, insofar as hatred exists in the intellective part of the soul, it can exist with respect to a universal in both ways, since it follows upon the intellect's universal apprehension,.

Reply to objection 1: The sensory power does not apprehend a universal insofar as it is a universal, but it does apprehend something to which universality accedes through abstraction.

Reply to objection 2: What is common to *all* things cannot be a reason for hatred. But nothing prevents a thing from being common to *many* things and yet being dissonant with respect to others; and so it is odious to those other things.

Reply to objection 3: This argument goes through in the case of a universal insofar as it is the subject of an intention of universality. For in this sense it is not susceptible to either sentient apprehension or sentient appetite (*sic non cadit sub apprehensione vel appetitu sensitivo*).

QUESTION 30

Concupiscence

Next we have to consider concupiscence or sentient desire (*concupiscentia*). And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Does concupiscence exist just in the sentient appetite? (2) Is concupiscence a specific passion? (3) Is it the case that some instances of concupiscence are natural and others are non-natural? (4) Is concupiscence infinite or unlimited (*infinita*)?

Article 1

Does concupiscence or sentient desire exist just in the sentient appetite?

It seems that concupiscence or sentient desire (*concupiscentia*) does not exist just in the sentient appetite:

Objection 1: As Wisdom 6:21 ("Concupiscence for wisdom (*concupiscentia sapientiae*) leads to the everlasting kingdom") puts it, there is a certain concupiscence directed toward wisdom. But the sentient appetite cannot be directed toward wisdom. Therefore, concupiscence does not exist just in the sentient appetite.

Objection 2: The desire for God's commandments (*desiderium mandatorum Dei*) does not exist in the sentient appetite; in fact, in Romans 7:18 the Apostle says, "There dwells not in me, i.e., in my flesh, that which is good." But the desire for God's commandments falls under concupiscence—this according to Psalm 118:20 ("My soul has had concupiscence (*concupivit*) to desire (*desiderare*) Your justifications"). Therefore, concupiscence does not exist just in the sentient appetite.

Objection 3: Every power is such that its proper good is an object of concupiscence for it (*cuilibet potentiae est concupiscibile proprium bonum*). Therefore, concupiscence exists in every power of the soul and not just in the sentient appetite.

But contrary to this: Damascene says, "The non-rational that is obedient to and persuadable by reason is divided into *concupiscence* and *anger*. This is the non-rational part of the soul, passive and appetitive." Therefore, concupiscence exists in the sentient appetite.

I respond: As the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 1, "Concupiscence is a desire for what is pleasurable (*appetitus delectabilis*)." Now as will be explained below (q. 31, aa. 3-4), there are two kinds of pleasure (*delectatio*), (a) one kind that is found in an intelligible good, i.e., a good of reason, and (b) another kind that is found in what is good according to the sensory power. The first kind of pleasure seems to belong only to the soul, whereas the second kind belongs to the soul and the body, since the sensory power is a power in a corporeal organ. Hence, what is good according to the sensory power is a good of the whole composite (*bonum totius coniuncti*). Now it seems to be the desire for this kind of pleasure that is *concupiscence*, since, as the name 'con-cupiscence' suggests, it pertains to both the soul and the body together. Hence, concupiscence, properly speaking, exists in the sentient appetite and in the concupiscible power, which takes its name from concupiscence.

Reply to objection 1: The desire (*appetitus*) for wisdom, or for other spiritual goods, is sometimes called 'concupiscence' either (a) because of a certain likeness or (b) because of the intensity of the desire which belongs to the higher part of the soul and from which there is an overflow into the lower appetite, so that (i) even the lower appetite itself simultaneously tends in its own way toward a spiritual good by following the higher appetite and so that (ii) even the body itself serves spiritual goods, just as Psalm 83:3 says ("My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God").

Reply to objection 2: Properly speaking, 'desire' (*desiderium*) can pertain not only to the lower appetite but also to the higher appetite. For 'desire' (*desiderium*) does not imply any union [of soul and body] in longing for something (*non importat aliquam consociationem in cupiendo*), but instead implies a simple movement toward the thing that is desired (*simplicem motum in rem desideratum*).

Reply to objection 3: Each power of the soul is such that it desires its proper good by a *natural* appetite that does not follow upon an apprehension.

By contrast, desiring the good by means of an appetite belonging to a soul (*appetitu animali*), which does follow upon an apprehension, pertains solely to an appetitive power. And to desire something as a good pleasurable to the senses—which is, properly speaking, what it is to have concupiscence (*quod proprie est concupiscere*)—pertains to the concupiscible power.

Article 2

Is concupiscence a specific passion of the concupiscible power?

It seems that concupiscence is not a specific passion of the concupiscible power:

Objection 1: The passions are distinguished from one another by their objects. But the object of the concupiscible power is what is pleasurable to the senses; and, according to the Philosopher in *Rhetoric* 1, this is likewise the object of concupiscence. Therefore, concupiscence is not a specific passion in the concupiscible power.

Objection 2: In *83 Quaestiones* Augustine says, "Avid desire (*cupiditas*) is the love of transient things, and so it is not distinct as such from love." But all the specific passions are distinct from one another. Therefore, concupiscence is not a specific passion in the concupiscible power.

Objection 3: As was explained above (q. 23, a. 4), each passion of the concupiscible power is such that some specific passion in the concupiscible power is opposed to it. But there is no specific passion in the concupiscible power that is opposed to concupiscence. For Damascene says, "An expected good gives rise to concupiscence, whereas a present good gives rise to joy; similarly, an expected evil gives rise to fear, whereas a present evil gives rise to sadness." From this it seems that just as sadness is opposed to joy, so fear is opposed to concupiscence. But fear exists in the irascible power and not in the concupiscible power. Therefore, it is not the case that concupiscence is a specific passion in the concupiscible power.

But contrary to this: Concupiscence is caused by love and tends toward pleasure, and these are passions of the concupiscible power. And so concupiscence is distinct as a specific passion from the other passions of the concupiscible power.

I respond: As has been explained (q. 23, a. 1), the object of the concupiscible power is, generally speaking, the good that is pleasurable to the senses. Hence, it is by reference to the differences dividing this object that the diverse passions of the concupiscible power are distinguished from one another.

Now diversity in an object can result either (a) from the nature of the object itself or (b) from a diversity in its power to act. A diversity of active objects that stems from the nature of the thing makes for a *material* difference among the passions, whereas a diversity that stems from the power to act makes for a *formal* difference among the passions in accord with which the passions differ from one another in species.

However, the kind of power to effect movement that belongs to the end or good itself when it is *present* in reality is different from its power to effect movement when it is *absent*. For insofar as it is present, it brings about [the appetite's] coming to rest in it (*facit in seipso quiescere*), whereas insofar as it is absent, it brings about movement toward itself. Hence, what is pleasurable to the senses is a cause of *love* insofar as the appetite adapts and conforms to it in a certain way, whereas it is a cause of *concupiscence* insofar as, when absent, it draws the appetite to itself, and it is a cause of *pleasure* insofar as, when present, it brings the appetite to rest in it. So, then, concupiscence is a passion that *differs in species* both from love and from pleasure.

On the other hand, it is having concupiscence for *this* or *that* pleasurable thing that makes for

numerically diverse instances of concupiscence.

Reply to objection 1: The pleasurable good is not, absolutely speaking, the object of concupiscence; instead, it is the pleasurable good *as something absent* (*sub ratione absentis*), in the same way that the object of memory is the sensible thing *as past*. For particular conditions of this sort make for diverse species among the passions or likewise among those powers of the sentient part of the soul that are directed toward particulars.

Reply to objection 2: This predication is based on the cause [of avid desire] and not on its essence (*illa praedicatio est per causam, non per essentiam*). For avid desire (*cupiditas*) is not love *per se*, but is instead an effect of love.

An alternative reply is that Augustine is here taking 'avid desire' (*cupiditas*) broadly for any appetitive movement that can be directed toward a future good. On this reading it includes both love and hope within itself.

Reply to objection 3: The passion that is directly opposed to concupiscence—i.e., the passion that has the same relation to the bad that concupiscence has to the good—is unnamed. But because, like fear, it is directed toward an absent evil, fear is sometimes put in its place, just as hope* is sometimes put in the place of avid* desire* (*cupiditas*). For small goods or evils are, as it were, left out of account, and so hope and fear, which are directed toward the arduous good and the arduous bad, are posited for every movement of the appetite that is directed toward a future good or evil.

Article 3

Are some instances of concupiscence natural and others non-natural?

It seems not to be the case that some instances of concupiscence are natural and others are non-natural:

Objection 1: As has been explained (a. 1), concupiscence belongs to an appetite belonging to a soul. But *natural appetite* is divided off against *appetite belonging to a soul*. Therefore, no instance of concupiscence is natural.

Objection 2: Material diversity does not make for a diversity of species, but only makes for a diversity in number; and this sort of diversity does not fall under an art. But if some instances of concupiscence were natural and some non-natural, then they would differ only in a way that corresponds to diverse desirable things, which would make for a material difference and only a numerical diversity. Therefore, instances of concupiscence should not be divided into the natural and the non-natural.

Objection 3: As is clear from *Physics* 2, *reason* is divided off against *nature*. Therefore, if some non-natural instance of concupiscence existed in a man, it would have to be rational. But this cannot be the case; for since concupiscence is a passion, it belongs to the sentient appetite and not to the will, which is reason's appetite. Therefore, it is not the case that any instances of concupiscence are non-natural.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 3 and *Rhetoric* 1 the Philosopher claims that some instances of concupiscence are natural and some are non-natural.

I respond: As has been explained (a. 1), concupiscence is a desire for the pleasurable good. Now there are two ways in which something is pleasurable:

(a) In the first way, something is pleasurable because it is fitting for the nature of an animal; examples are food, drink and other things of this sort. Concupiscence for what is pleasurable in this sense is called *natural*.

(b) In the second way, something is pleasurable because it is fitting for an animal on the basis of apprehension, as when someone apprehends something as good and fitting and as a result takes pleasure

in it. And concupiscence for what is pleasurable in this sense is called *non-natural*, and it is often called 'avid desire' (*cupiditas*) instead of 'concupiscence' (*concupiscentia*).

The former, or natural, instances of concupiscence are common to both men and the other animals, because they involve something that is fitting and pleasurable for both by nature. And all men agree in these; that is why in *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher calls them "common and necessary."

By contrast, the latter instances of concupiscence are peculiar to men, to whom it is proper to regard something that goes beyond what nature requires as good and fitting. Hence, in *Rhetoric* 1 the Philosopher says that the former instances of concupiscence are "non-rational" (*irrationales*), whereas the latter instances are "accompanied by reason" (*cum ratione*). And because different individuals think in different ways, in *Ethics* 3 the latter instances are also called "proper and apposite," i.e., beyond the natural (*supra naturales*).

Reply to objection 1: The same thing that is desired by a natural appetite can be desired by an appetite belonging to a soul when that thing is apprehended. This is the sense in which there can be natural concupiscence with respect to food and drink and other things of this sort that are desired naturally.

Reply to objection 2: The distinction between natural concupiscence and non-natural concupiscence is not just a material distinction, but it is also in some sense formal, insofar as it proceeds from the distinction among the active objects.

Now the object of an appetite is an apprehended good. Hence, a distinction among acts of apprehending corresponds to the distinction among active objects. More specifically, (a) something is apprehended as fitting by an absolute apprehension, and natural concupiscence—which the Philosopher calls "non-rational" in the *Rhetoric*—is caused by this sort of apprehension; and (b) something is apprehended with deliberation, and non-natural concupiscence—which is thereby said to be "accompanied by reason" in the *Rhetoric*—is caused by this sort of apprehension.

Reply to objection 3: As was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 78, a. 4 and q. 83, a. 3), in a man there exists not only universal reason, which belongs to the intellective part of the soul, but also particular reason, which belongs to the sentient part. Accordingly, concupiscence that is accompanied by reason can also belong to the sentient appetite. Furthermore, the sentient appetite can also be moved by universal reason through the mediation of the particular imagination.

Article 4

Is concupiscence infinite or unlimited?

It seems that concupiscence is not infinite or unlimited (*infinita*):

Objection 1: The object of concupiscence is the good, which has the character of an end. But as *Metaphysics* 2 says, when one posits something infinite, he rules out an end. Therefore, concupiscence cannot be infinite.

Objection 2: Concupiscence is directed toward a fitting good, since it arises from love. But since what is unlimited is not proportionate to anything (*sit improportionatum*), it cannot be fitting. Therefore, concupiscence cannot be unlimited.

Objection 3: It is impossible to traverse infinitely many things (*infinita non est transire*), and so among such things it is impossible to reach a last one (*non est pervenire ad ultimum*). But in someone who has concupiscence pleasure is effected by his attaining the last thing. Therefore, if concupiscence were infinite, it would follow that pleasure is never effected.

But contrary to this: In *Politics* 1 the Philosopher says, "Since concupiscence is unlimited, men desire infinitely many things (*in infinitum concupiscentia existente homines infinita desiderant*)."

I respond: As was explained above (a. 3), there are two sorts of concupiscence, the one natural and the other non-natural.

Thus, natural concupiscence cannot be actually unlimited. For natural concupiscence has to do with what nature requires, but nature always intends something finite and fixed (*finitum and certum*). Hence, a man never has concupiscence for an unlimited amount of food or an unlimited amount of drink (*numquam homo concupiscit infinitum cibum vel infinitum potum*). However, just as it is possible for there to be in nature a potential infinity via succession, so too this sort of concupiscence can be infinite via succession—so that, namely, having acquired food, or any other thing that nature requires, a man desires food again in place of the other food; for when corporeal goods of this sort arrive, they do not last forever, but run out. Hence, in John 4:13 our Lord said to the Samaritan woman, "Whoever drinks this water will thirst again."

By contrast, non-natural concupiscence is altogether unlimited. For as has been explained (a. 3), non-natural concupiscence follows reason, and it belongs to reason to proceed *ad infinitum*. Hence, someone who has concupiscence for riches can desire to be rich but not to any fixed limit; instead, he can desire simply that he should be as rich as possible.

Moreover, according to the Philosopher in *Politics* 1, there is another possible explanation for why some instances of concupiscence are finite and some unlimited. For concupiscence directed toward an end is always unlimited, since an end, such as health, is desired *per se*; and so greater health is desired to a greater degree, and so on *ad infinitum*—just as, if white expands sight *per se* (*album per se disgregat*), then a brighter white expands sight to a greater degree. By contrast, concupiscence that is directed toward the means to an end is not unlimited; instead, the means to an end is desired to the degree that it is suitable for the end. Hence, those who have riches as their end have concupiscence for riches *ad infinitum*, whereas those who desires riches for the necessities of life desire limited riches that are sufficient for the necessities of life, as the Philosopher says in the same place. And the same line of reasoning holds for concupiscence with respect to any other things as well.

Reply to objection 1: Everything that is the object of concupiscence (*omne quod concupiscitur*) is taken as something finite, either because it is finite in reality insofar as it is once actually desired, or because it is finite insofar as it falls under apprehension. For it cannot be apprehended as infinite (*sub ratione infiniti*), since, as *Physics* 3 puts it, "The infinite is such that however much one takes of its quantity, it is always possible to take something besides that."

Reply to objection 2: In a certain sense reason has infinite power, insofar as it is able to consider something *ad infinitum*, as is clear in the case of the addition of numbers and of lines. Hence, the infinite taken in a certain way is proportionate to reason. For even the universal, which reason apprehends, is in a sense infinite, insofar as it contains infinitely many singulars in potentiality.

Reply to objection 3: In order for someone to have pleasure, it is not required that he acquire everything that he desires; rather, what is required is that he take pleasure in each desired thing that he acquires.

QUESTION 31

Pleasure in Itself

Next we have to consider pleasure or delight (*delectatio*) (questions 31-34) and sadness or pain (*tristitia*) (questions 35-39).

As regards pleasure, there are four things to be considered: first, pleasure itself in its own right (question 31); second, the causes of pleasure (question 32); third, the effects of pleasure (question 33); and, fourth, the goodness and badness of pleasure.

On the first topic there are eight questions: (1) Is pleasure a passion? (2) Does pleasure exist in time? (3) Does pleasure differ from joy (*gaudium*)? (4) Does pleasure exist in the intellective appetite? (5) How do the pleasures of the higher appetite compare with the pleasures of the lower appetite? (6) How do sentient pleasures compare with one another? (7) Is any pleasure non-natural? (8) Can one pleasure be contrary to another pleasure?

Article 1

Is pleasure a passion?

It seems that pleasure (*delectatio*) is not a passion:

Objection 1: In *De Fide* 2 Damascene distinguishes an operation from a passion, saying that "an operation is a movement in accord with nature, whereas a passion is a movement contrary to nature." But as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 7 and 10, pleasure is an operation. Therefore, pleasure is not a passion.

Objection 2: As *Physics* 3 says, "To undergo a passion is to be moved (*pati est moveri*)." But pleasure consists not in being moved but in having been moved (*non in moveri sed in motum esse*), since pleasure is caused by a good that has already been acquired. Therefore, pleasure is not a passion.

Objection 3: Pleasure consists in a certain perfection on the part of the one taking pleasure, since, as *Ethics* 10 says, pleasure "brings an operation to perfection (*perficit operationem*)." But as *Physics* 7 and *De Anima* 2 explain, to be perfected is different from undergoing a passion or being altered (*perfici non est pati vel alterari*). Therefore, pleasure is not a passion.

But contrary to this: In *De Civitate Dei* 9 and 14 Augustine posits pleasure, i.e., joy (*gaudium*) or gladness (*laetitia*), among the passions of the soul.

I respond: As was explained above (q. 22, a. 3), a movement of the sentient appetite is properly called a 'passion'. And every affection that proceeds from sentient apprehension is a movement of the sentient appetite. But this feature must belong to pleasure. For as the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 1, "Pleasure is a movement of the soul, and the soul's establishment, all at once and sensibly, into an existent nature (*delectatio est quidam motus animae et constitutio simul tota et sensibilis in naturam existentem*)."

To understand this claim, notice that just as it happens among natural things that some of them attain their natural perfections, so too this happens among animals. And even though their *being moved toward* their perfection does not occur all at once, their *attainment of* their natural perfection does occur all at once (*est totum simul*). However, the difference between animals and other natural things is that when other natural things are established into what is fitting for them, they do not sense this, whereas animals do sense it (*hoc non sentiunt sed animalia hoc sentiunt*). And the sensing of it is a cause of a certain movement of the soul in the sentient appetite, and it is this movement that is the pleasure.

Thus, when one says that pleasure is "a movement of the soul," pleasure is being placed in a *genus*. And when one says that pleasure is "the soul's establishment into an existent nature"—i.e., into that which exists in the thing's nature—what is being posited is the *cause* of pleasure, viz., the presence of a connatural good. On the other hand, when the establishment is said to occur "all at once," this shows that

'establishment' should be taken not as 'being established' but rather as 'having been established'—the terminus, as it were, of a movement. For pleasure is not an instance of generation, as Plato claimed, but consists rather in something's having been effected, as *Ethics* 7 says. And when one says 'sensibly', this excludes the perfections of things that do not have sentience and in which there is no such thing as pleasure (*excluduntur perfectiones rerum insensibilium in quibus non est delectatio*).

So, then, it is clear that since pleasure is a movement in the animal appetite that follows upon sensory apprehension, it is a passion of the soul.

Reply to objection 1: As *De Anima* 2 proves, an unimpeded connatural operation is a secondary perfection. And so when a thing is established in a proper and unimpeded connatural operation, what follows is pleasure, which, as has been explained, consists in its having been perfected. So, then, when one claims that pleasure is an operation, this predication is based on the cause [of pleasure] and not on its essence (*non est praedicatio per essentiam sed per causam*).

Reply to objection 2: In the case of an animal, there are two sorts of movement that can be considered: (a) the one has to do with the *intending* of an end, and this belongs to the appetite; (b) the other has to do with *execution*, and this pertains to the exterior operation.

Thus, even though, in someone who has attained the good in which he takes pleasure, the movement of execution by which the appetitive part tends toward the end has ceased, nonetheless, what does not cease is that movement of the appetitive part by which (a) it previously desired the unpossessed good and by which (b) it afterwards takes pleasure in the possessed good. For even though pleasure is the appetite's resting in a certain sense, given the presence of the good which gives pleasure and satisfies the appetite, nonetheless, what remains is the change effected in the appetite by the desirable good (*immutatio appetitus a appetibili*); and it is by reason of this change that pleasure is a certain movement.

Reply to objection 3: As was explained above (q. 23, a. 1 and 4), even though the name 'passion' is more appropriate in the case of passions that are corruptive and tend toward what is bad—e.g., sicknesses in the body, and sadness and fear in the soul—nonetheless, there are also some passions that are ordered toward the good. And it is in this sense that pleasure is called a 'passion'.

Article 2

Does pleasure exist in time?

It seems that pleasure exists in time:

Objection 1: As the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 1, pleasure is a certain movement. But every movement exists in time. Therefore, pleasure exists in time.

Objection 2: A thing is called 'long-lasting' or 'lingering' in relation to time (*secundum tempus*). But some pleasures are called 'lingering'. Therefore, pleasure exists in time.

Objection 3: The passions of the soul belong to a single genus. But some passions of the soul exist in time. Therefore, so does pleasure.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 10 the Philosopher says, "It will not take time for one to receive pleasure (*secundum nullum tempus accipiet quis delectationem*)."

I respond: There are two ways in which a thing can exist in time: (a) in its own right (*secundum se*) and (b) through another (*per aliud*) and, as it were, *per accidens*.

For since time is the numbering of successive entities, the things that are said to exist in time in their own right are those whose nature is succession or something that pertains to succession, e.g., movement, rest, speaking, and other things of this sort.

By contrast, the things that are said to exist in time because of another (*secundum aliud*) and not *per se* are those whose nature is not any sort of succession and yet which are such that they are subject to

some sort of succession. For instance, being a man does not by its nature (*de sui ratione*) involve succession, since it is not a movement but is instead the terminus of a movement or change, viz., the man's being generated; however, because human *esse* is subject to changeable causes, being a man exists in time.

Therefore, one should reply that pleasure in its own right does not exist in time, since pleasure is taken in an already acquired good which is, as it were, the terminus of a movement. However, if that acquired good is subject to change, then the pleasure will exist *per accidens* in time. On the other hand, if the good in question is altogether unchangeable, then the pleasure will not exist either *per se* or *per accidens* in time.

Reply to objection 1: As *De Anima* 3 says, 'movement' has two senses (*motus dupliciter dicitur*):

In one sense, a movement is the act of what is imperfect—more specifically, of what exists in potentiality—insofar as it is imperfect; and a movement taken in this sense is successive and exists in time.

The second sort of movement is the act of what is perfect, i.e., of what exists in actuality, e.g., understanding, sensing, willing, etc.—and, likewise, taking pleasure. And a movement in this sense is not successive and does not exist *per se* in time.

Reply to objection 2: Pleasure is said to be long-lasting or lingering insofar as it exists *per accidens* in time.

Reply to objection 3: The other passions do not have as their object an already acquired good, in the way that pleasure does. Hence, they have more of the character of an imperfect movement than pleasure does. As a result, it is more fitting for pleasure not to exist in time.

Article 3

Is joy altogether the same thing as pleasure?

It seems that joy (*gaudium*) is altogether the same thing as pleasure (*delectatio*):

Objection 1: The passions of the soul differ with respect to their objects. But the object of joy is the same as the object of pleasure, viz., a good that has been acquired. Therefore, joy is altogether the same as pleasure.

Objection 2: A single movement does not terminate in two endpoints. But the movement that terminates in joy is the same as the movement that terminates in pleasure, and that movement is concupiscence. Therefore, pleasure and joy are altogether the same thing.

Objection 3: If joy differs from pleasure, then it seems that, by parity of reasoning, 'gladness' (*laetitia*), 'exultation' or 'excitement' (*exultatio*), and 'delight' or 'enjoyment' (*iucunditas*) signify something different from pleasure, and so they will all be different passions. But this seems false. Therefore, it is not the case that joy differs from pleasure.

But contrary to this: In the case of brute animals we do not use the name 'joy'. But we do in their case use the name 'pleasure'. Therefore, it is not the case that joy and pleasure are the same thing.

I respond: As Avicenna says in his *Liber de Anima*, joy is a certain species of pleasure. For notice that, as was explained above (q. 30, a. 3), some instances of concupiscence are natural, whereas some are non-natural and follow upon reason. (Or, as Damascene and Gregory of Nyssa put it, some are "corporeal" and some "belong to the soul" (*sunt animales*)—which amounts to the same thing.) For we take pleasure both (a) in those things that we naturally desire, once we acquire them, and also (b) in those things that we desire because of reason. However, the name 'joy' has a place only in the pleasure that follows upon reason. This is why we do not attribute joy to brute animals, but instead attribute to them only the name 'pleasure'.

Now everything that we desire according to nature we can also desire with the pleasure of reason, but not vice versa. Hence, all the things with respect to which there is pleasure are such that there can also be joy with respect to them in individuals who have reason. However, there is not always joy with respect to all of them. For sometimes one feels some bodily pleasure (*aliquis sentit aliquam delectationem secundum corpus*) and yet does not rejoice in this according to reason. Because of this, it is clear that 'pleasure' applies to more things than (*est in plus quam*) 'joy' does.

Reply to objection 1: Since the object of an animal appetite is an apprehended good, the diversity of apprehensions is in some way relevant to a diversity of objects. And so pleasures belonging to the soul that are also joys are distinguished from corporeal pleasures, which are only called 'pleasures', in a way that corresponds to what was said above (q. 30, a. 3) about the kinds of concupiscence.

Reply to objection 2: A similar difference is likewise found in the case of concupiscence, so that 'pleasure' corresponds to 'sentient desire' or 'concupiscence' (*concupiscentia*) and 'joy' corresponds to 'desire' (*desiderium*), which seems to pertain to the 'soul's concupiscence' (*ad concupiscentiam animalem*). And corresponding to the difference in the types of movement there is also a difference in types of rest.

Reply to objection 3: The other names relevant to pleasure are imposed because of pleasure's effect. For instance, *laetitia* ('gladness') is imposed because of the widening (*dilitatio*) of the heart, as if one were saying *latitia* ('width'). *Exultatio* ('exultation' or 'excitement') is imposed because of those exterior signs of interior pleasure that become apparent externally to the extent that the interior joy breaks out into the open. *Iucunditas* ('delight' or 'enjoyment') is imposed because of the special signs of, or effects of, gladness. And yet all these names seem to pertain to joy; for we use them only in the case of rational natures.

Article 4

Does pleasure exist in the intellective appetite?

It seems that pleasure does not exist in the intellective appetite:

Objection 1: In *Rhetoric* 1 Aristotle says, "Pleasure is a felt movement (*motus quidam sensibilis*)." But there is no felt movement in the intellective part of the soul. Therefore, pleasure does not exist in the intellective part.

Objection 2: Pleasure is a passion. But every passion exists in the sentient appetite. Therefore, pleasure exists only in the sentient appetite.

Objection 3: Pleasure is common to us and brute animals. Therefore, it exists only in that part of the soul that is common to us and brute animals.

But contrary to this: Psalm 36:4 says, "Take pleasure in the Lord (*delectare in domino*)." But only the intellective appetite, and not the sentient appetite, can reach out to God. Therefore, pleasure can exist in the intellective appetite.

I respond: As has been explained (a. 3), some instances of pleasure follow upon reason's apprehension. However, it is not only the sentient appetite but also the intellective appetite, called the 'will', that is moved at reason's apprehension by means of an application to something particular. Accordingly, in the intellective appetite, or will, there is pleasure that is called 'joy', though not corporeal pleasure.

Now the relation between the types of pleasure in the two appetites is that the sentient appetite's pleasure is accompanied by some corporeal change, whereas the intellective appetite's pleasure is nothing other than a simple movement of the will. And this is why, in *De Civitate Dei* 14, Augustine says, "Avid desire (*cupiditas*) and gladness (*laetitia*) are nothing other than an act of will in agreement

with what we wish for (*voluntas in eorum consensione quae volumus*)."

Reply to objection 1: In this definition of the Philosopher's, 'felt' is being used generally for any sort of apprehension. For in *Ethics* 10 the Philosopher says, "There is pleasure with respect to every sensory power, and, similarly, with respect to the intellect and speculative inquiry."

A possible alternative reply is that the Philosopher is here defining pleasure for the case of the sentient appetite.

Reply to objection 2: Pleasure has the character of a passion, properly speaking, insofar as it occurs with some corporeal change. And it does not exist in this way in the intellective appetite. Rather, in the intellective appetite it exists as a simple movement; for this is also the way it exists in God and in the angels. Hence, in *Ethics* 7 the Philosopher says, "God rejoices by a single simple operation." And at the end of *De Caelesti Hierarchia* Dionysius says, "The angels are not susceptible to our passive pleasure, but instead they rejoice along with God with a gladness of incorruption."

Reply to objection 3: In us there is not only the sort of pleasure that we share with brute animals, but also the sort of pleasure that we share with the angels. Hence, in the same place Dionysius says, "Holy men often participate in the pleasures of the angels." And so in us pleasure exists not only in the sentient appetite, which we share with brute animals, but also in the intellective appetite, which we share with the angels.

Article 5

Are corporeal and sensible pleasures greater than intelligible spiritual pleasures?

It seems that corporeal and sensible pleasures are greater than intelligible spiritual pleasures:

Objection 1: According to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 10, everyone pursues certain pleasures. But more people pursue sensible pleasures than intelligible spiritual pleasures. Therefore, corporeal pleasures are greater.

Objection 2: The magnitude of a cause is known by its effect. But corporeal pleasures have more powerful effects, since, as *Ethics* 10 says, "They alter bodies and in some they cause insanity." Therefore, corporeal pleasures are more powerful.

Objection 3: It is necessary to temper and curb corporeal pleasures because of their strength. But it is unnecessary to curb spiritual pleasures. Therefore, corporeal pleasures are greater.

But contrary to this: Psalm 118:103 says, "How sweet are Your words to my palate, more than honey to my mouth." And in *Ethics* 10 the Philosopher says, "The greatest pleasure is that which stems from the operation of wisdom."

I respond: As has already been explained (a. 1), pleasure stems from one's being joined to something fitting that is sensed or known. Now in the works of the soul, principally the sentient and intellective works, one has to take into account that since they do not pass into an exterior matter, they are acts or perfections of the one who is operating, viz., by understanding, by sensing, by willing, etc. For the actions that pass into exterior matter are instead the actions and the perfections of the matter that is changed, since a movement is an act of the thing moved that comes from the thing that effects the movement (*motus est actus mobilis a movente*). So, then, the aforementioned actions of the sentient and intellective soul are themselves a certain good belonging to the one who operates, and they are also known through the sensory power or the intellect. Hence, pleasure arises from the actions themselves and not just from their objects.

Therefore, if intelligible pleasures are compared to sensible pleasures insofar as we take pleasure *in the actions themselves*, viz., in the sensory power's cognition and in the intellect's cognition, then there is no doubt that intelligible pleasures are much greater than sensible pleasures. For a man takes much more

pleasure in knowing something by having an intellective understanding of it than he does in knowing something by sensing it. For intellectual cognition is more perfect and even better known, since the intellect reflects on its own act more than the sensory power does. Intellective cognition is also loved to a greater degree, since, just as Augustine claims in *De Civitate Dei*, there is no one who would not wish to be without corporeal vision rather than to be without intellectual vision, in the way in which beasts and simpletons are without intellectual vision.

On the other hand, if intelligible spiritual pleasures are compared to sensible corporeal pleasures *in their own right and simply speaking*, then the spiritual pleasures are greater. This is clear from the three things that are required for pleasure, viz., (a) the good that is conjoined, (b) that to which it is conjoined, and (c) the conjoining itself:

(a) For a spiritual good is itself greater than a corporeal good, and it is loved to a greater degree. An indication of this is that men abstain from even the greatest corporeal pleasures (*etiam a maximis corporalibus voluptatibus abstinent*) in order not to lose honor, which is an intelligible good.

(b) Similarly, the intellective part of the soul is itself much more noble and more capable of cognition (*magis cognoscitiva*) than the sentient part.

(c) Again, the conjoining of the two is more intimate, more perfect, and more stable (*firma*). It is more intimate because the sensory power stops at a thing's exterior accidents, whereas the intellect penetrates through to a thing's essence; for the intellect's object is what a thing is (*quod quid est*). It is more perfect because a movement, which is an imperfect act, accompanies the conjoining of the sensory power to what is sensed, and for this reason sensible pleasures do not occur all at once, but instead something passes away in them while something else waits to be consummated, as is obvious in the case of the pleasures of food and sex. By contrast, intelligible things exist without movement, and for this reason pleasures of this sort occur all at once. Again, the conjoining is more firm because corporeal pleasures are corruptible and quickly pass away, whereas spiritual goods are incorruptible.

However, *as things appear to us* (*quoad nos*), corporeal pleasures are stronger (*magis vehementes*), and this for three reasons. First, sensible things are more known to us than intelligible things are. Second, since sensible pleasures are passions belonging to the sentient appetite, they are accompanied by some corporeal change; this does not happen in the case of spiritual pleasures, except in virtue of a sort of overflow from the higher appetite into the lower appetite. Third, corporeal pleasures are desired as a sort of remedy (*ut medicinae quaedam*) for corporeal defects or problems that result in sadness; hence, when corporeal pleasures supersede such sadness, they are felt more keenly and, as a result, they are welcomed to a greater degree than are spiritual pleasures. For, as will be explained below (q. 35, a. 5), spiritual pleasures do not have any contrary forms of sadness.

Reply to objection 1: The reasons why the majority pursues corporeal pleasures are that (a) sensible things are known to a greater degree and to a greater number of people, and also that (b) men need these pleasures as remedies for many pains and sorrows, and that (c) since the majority of men cannot attain to spiritual pleasures, which are proper to the virtuous, they consequently fall back into corporeal pleasures (*declinent ad corporales*).

Reply to objection 2: Corporeal change is caused more by corporeal pleasures because they are passions of the sentient appetite.

Reply to objection 3: Corporeal pleasures accord with the sentient part of the soul, which is regulated by reason, and this is why they need to be tempered and curbed by reason. By contrast, spiritual pleasures accord with the mind, which is itself the rule, and so they are sober and moderate in their own right.

Article 6

Are the pleasures associated with touch greater than the pleasures associated with the other senses?

It seems that the pleasures associated with touch (*declectationes secundum tactum*) are not greater than the pleasures associated with the other senses (*delectationes secundum alios sensus*):

Objection 1: The greatest pleasure seems be a pleasure which is such that if it is excluded, all joy ceases. But such is the pleasure associated with sight; for Tobit 5:12 says, "What sort of joy shall be to me, who sit in darkness and see not the light of heaven?" Therefore, the pleasure that stems from sight is the greatest among sensible pleasures.

Objection 2: As the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 1, "Each thing is such that what is pleasurable to it is what it loves." But among all the senses, sight is loved the most. Therefore, the pleasure associated with sight is the greatest.

Objection 3: Sight is especially the beginning of the friendship of pleasure. But pleasure is the cause of such friendship. Therefore, pleasure seems to be especially associated with sight.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says that the greatest pleasures are associated with touch.

I respond: As has already been explained (q. 27, a. 4), each thing, insofar as it is loved, becomes pleasurable. Now as the beginning of the *Metaphysics* points out, the sensory powers are loved for two reasons, viz., for the sake of *cognition* and because of their *usefulness*. Hence, it is in both these ways that there can be pleasure associated with the sensory power.

However, since it is proper to man to apprehend cognition itself as a certain good, it follows that the first pleasures of the senses, viz., those associated with cognition, are proper to men, whereas to the extent that the pleasures of the senses are loved for their usefulness, they are common to all animals. Therefore, if we are speaking of the sensory pleasure that exists by reason of *cognition*, then it is clear that there is greater pleasure associated with *sight* than with any other sense.

However, if we are speaking of the sensory pleasure that exists by reason of *usefulness*, then the greatest pleasure is associated with *touch*. For the usefulness of sensible things has to do with their being ordered toward the conservation of animal nature. But it is the sensible objects of touch that are related more closely to this sort of usefulness, since touch has cognition of the things that an animal consists of, viz., hot and cold and other things of this sort. Accordingly, the pleasures associated with touch are greater in the sense of being more proximate to the end. Moreover, because of this, the other animals, which do not have sensible pleasure except by reason of its usefulness, do not take pleasure in the other senses except in relation to the sensible objects of touch. For as *Ethics* 3 puts it, "Dogs take pleasure not in smelling hares, but in eating them; and the lion takes pleasure not in the sound made by an ox, but in devouring the ox."

Therefore, given that the pleasure of touch is the greatest in relation to usefulness and that the pleasure of sight is the greatest in relation to cognition, if someone wants to compare the two of them, he will find that to the extent that he remains within the confines of sensible pleasure, the pleasure of touch is greater, absolutely speaking, than the pleasure of sight. For, clearly, it is what is natural in any given thing that is the most powerful, and the pleasures of touch are the ones toward which natural concupiscence—e.g., the desire for food, sexual desire, etc.—is ordered. On the other hand, if we consider the pleasures of sight insofar as sight serves the intellect, then in this sense the pleasures of sight will be more powerful, for the same reason that intelligible pleasures are more powerful than sensible pleasures.

Reply to objection 1: As was explained above (a. 3), 'joy' signifies pleasure that *belongs to the soul* (*animalem delectationem*) and this pertains especially to sight. But *natural* pleasure pertains

especially to touch.

Reply to objection 2: As is shown in the same place, sight is especially loved for the sake of cognition, since it shows us many of the differences among things.

Reply to objection 3: Pleasure is a cause of carnal love in one way, and sight is a cause of it in another way. For pleasure—and especially the pleasure associated with touch—is a cause of the friendship of pleasure in the manner of an end, whereas sight is a cause in the sense of being the beginning of movement, insofar as it is through seeing what is lovable that one receives an impression of the likeness of the thing, and this entices one to love it and desire its pleasure.

Article 7

Are any pleasures non-natural?

It seems that no pleasure is non-natural (*innaturalis*):

Objection 1: Pleasure in the affections of the soul is like rest in the case of bodies. But a body's natural appetite comes to rest only in its natural place. Therefore, an animal appetite's rest, i.e., pleasure, can exist only in something natural. Therefore, no pleasure is non-natural.

Objection 2: What is contrary to nature is violent. But as *Metaphysics* 5 says, everything violent produces sadness. Therefore, nothing that is contrary to nature can be pleasurable.

Objection 3: As is clear from the Philosopher's definition cited above (a. 1), establishment into one's proper nature is, when it is sensed, a cause of pleasure. But establishment into its proper nature is natural to each thing, since a natural movement is a movement toward a natural terminus. Therefore, every pleasure is natural.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 7 the Philosopher says that some pleasures "are sicknesses and contrary to nature."

I respond: As *Physics* 2 says, 'natural' means what is in accord with nature. Now in the case of a man, 'natural' can be taken in two senses:

(a) In one sense, insofar as the intellect and reason are most principally man's nature, since it is by reason that man is constituted in his species. And in this sense, what can be called man's 'natural' pleasures are those that lie in what is fitting for a man with respect to reason, in the way in which it is natural to a man to take pleasure in the contemplation of truth and in acts of virtue.

(b), 'Nature' can be taken in a second sense in the case of a man insofar as it is divided off from 'reason', so that what is natural is that which is common to men and other things and, especially, that which is not obedient to reason. Accordingly, things that pertain to the conservation of the body, either (a) in the individual, such as food, drink, sleep, etc., or (b) in the species, such as sexual intercourse, are said to be naturally pleasurable to a man.

Now with respect to both sorts of pleasures, it happens that some are non-natural absolutely speaking but natural in a certain respect. For it is possible for some principles that are natural to the species to be corrupted in a given individual, and in such a case what is contrary to the nature of the species becomes natural *per accidens* to *this* individual, in the way that it is natural to *this* heated water that it give warmth. So, then, it is possible for what is contrary to man's nature—either with respect to reason or what respect to the conservation of the body—to become connatural to *this* man because of some corruption of nature that exists in him. This corruption can be either (a) on the part of the body, due either (i) to sickness, as when bitter things seem sweet, and vice versa, to those who are feverish, or (ii) to some bad persistent condition (*propter malam complexionem*), as when someone takes pleasure in eating dirt or coal, etc., or even (b) on the part of the soul, as when out of custom some men take pleasure in eating men, or in having sex with beasts or with males, or other practices of this sort that are not in

accord with human nature.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: The replies to the objections are clear from what has been said.

Article 8

Is one pleasure contrary to another?

It seems that it is not the case that one pleasure is contrary to another:

Objection 1: The passions of the soul receive their species and their oppositions from their objects. But the object of pleasure is the good. Therefore, since it is not the case that one good is contrary to another, but instead, as the *Categories* says, "the good is contrary to the bad, and the bad to the bad," it seems that it is not the case that one pleasure is contrary to another.

Objection 2: As *Metaphysics* 10 proves, it is a single thing that is contrary to a single thing. But sadness is contrary to pleasure. Therefore, it is not the case that one pleasure is contrary to another.

Objection 3: If one pleasure is contrary to another, this is only because of an opposition among the things in which one takes pleasure. But this difference is a material difference, whereas, according to *Metaphysics* 10, contrariety is a difference in form. Therefore, there is no contrariety between one pleasure and another.

But contrary to this: According to the Philosopher, contraries are things that impede one another and exist in the same genus. But as *Ethics* 10 says, there are pleasures that impede one another. Therefore, some pleasures are contrary to one another.

I respond: As was explained above (a. 1), pleasure in the affections of the soul is like rest in the case of bodies. Now two instances of rest are called 'contrary' when they exist in contrary termini, in the way that "a rest that exists above is contrary to a rest that exists below," as *Physics* 5 puts it. Hence, in the case of the affections of the soul, it is possible for two pleasures to be contrary to one another.

Reply to objection 1: In this passage from the Philosopher 'good' and 'bad' should be interpreted as 'virtues' and 'vices'. For two vices may be contrary to one another, whereas it is not the case that one virtue is contrary to another.

Now in other cases, there is nothing to prevent two goods from being contrary to one another, in the way that hot and cold, one of which is good for fire and the other of which is good for water, are opposed to one another. And it is in this way that one pleasure can be contrary to another. But this cannot happen in the case of the good of virtue, since the good of virtue exists only because of agreement with some single thing, viz., reason.

Reply to objection 2: Pleasure is related to the affections of the soul in the way that natural rest is related to bodies, since it exists in something fitting and, as it were, natural. By contrast, sadness is like a violent rest, since what is painful is repugnant to the animal appetite in the way that a place of violent rest is repugnant to a natural appetite. But as *Physics* 5 explains, the natural rest of a body is opposed both by the violent rest of the same body and by the natural rest of another body. Hence, a pleasure is opposed both by a pleasure and by sadness.

Reply to objection 3: Since the things in which we take pleasure are the objects of pleasure, they make for not only a material difference but also a formal difference, as long as there are diverse types of pleasurableness. For as is clear from what was said above (q. 23, a. 1 and 4, and q. 30, a. 2), the diverse characters of the objects make for diverse species of acts or of passions.

QUESTION 32

The Causes of Pleasure

Next we have to consider the causes of pleasure. And on this topic there are eight questions: (1) Is action or operation (*operatio*) a proper cause of pleasure? (2) Is movement a cause of pleasure? (3) Are hope and memory causes of pleasure? (4) Is sadness a cause of pleasure? (5) Are the actions of others a cause of pleasure for us? (6) Is doing good for someone else a cause of pleasure? (7) Is likeness a cause of pleasure? (8) Is wonder (*admiratio*) a cause of pleasure?

Article 1

Is operation a cause of pleasure?

It seems that action or operation (*operatio*) is not a proper and primary cause of pleasure:

Objection 1: As the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 1, "Taking pleasure consists in the sensory power's undergoing something." For as has been explained (q. 31, a. 1), cognition is required for pleasure. But the objects of operations are knowable prior to the operations themselves. Therefore, operation is not a proper cause of pleasure.

Objection 2: Pleasure consists especially in an acquired end, since the end is what is principally desired. But it is not always the case that an operation is the end; instead, sometimes the end is the very thing that is done through the operation (*ipsum operatum*). Therefore, it is not the case that operation is a proper and *per se* cause of pleasure.

Objection 3: Leisure and rest (*otium et requies*) bespeak the cessation of an operation. But as *Rhetoric* 1 points out, they are desirable things. Therefore, it is not the case that operation is a proper cause of pleasure.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 7 and 10 the Philosopher says, "Pleasure is an unimpeded connatural operation (*operatio connaturalis non impedita*)."

I respond: As was explained above (q. 31, a. 1), two things are required for pleasure, viz., (a) the acquisition of a fitting good and (b) the cognition of this acquisition. Now each of these consists in a certain operation, since actual cognition is an operation and, similarly, we acquire a fitting good by some operation. In addition, the operation itself is a certain fitting good. Hence, it must be the case that every pleasure follows upon an operation.

Reply to objection 1: The objects of the operations are themselves pleasurable only insofar as they are joined to us either (a) through cognition alone, as when we take pleasure in thinking about or looking at certain things, or (b) in some other way along with cognition, as when one takes pleasure in knowing that he possesses some good, such as riches or honor, etc., that is pleasurable only if it is apprehended as possessed. For as the Philosopher says in *Politics* 2, "To think of something as one's own is a great pleasure that proceeds from the natural love one has for himself." For having things of this sort is nothing other than making use of them or being able to make use of them, and this occurs through an operation. Hence, it is clear that every pleasure is traced back to an operation that is a cause of it.

Reply to objection 2: Even in cases in which the things done through the operations—and not the operations—are the end, the things done are themselves pleasurable insofar as they are possessed or made, and this goes back to some operation or act of using.

Reply to objection 3: Operations are pleasurable to the extent that they are proportioned to and connatural to the one who operates. Now since human power is finite, an operation is proportioned to it by some measure. Hence, if the operation exceeds that measure, then it will no longer be proportionate or pleasurable, but will instead be laborious and tedious (*laboriosa et attaediens*). Accordingly, leisure and play and other things involving relaxation are enjoyable to the extent that they remove the sadness that stems from work.

Article 2

Is movement a cause of pleasure?

It seems that movement or change (*motus*) is not a cause of pleasure:

Objection 1: As was explained above (q. 31, a. 1), it is a good that is presently possessed that is a cause of pleasure; hence, in *Ethics* 7 the Philosopher says that pleasure is not like generation, but is instead like the operation of a thing that already exists. But what is moving toward something does not yet possess it; rather, it is in a certain sense on the path of generation with respect to it, since, as *Physics* 8 says, generation and corruption are adjoined to every movement. Therefore, movement is not a cause of pleasure.

Objection 2: Movement is mainly a cause of laboriousness and weariness in operations (*in operibus*). But by the fact that operations are laborious and wearying, they are painful (*afflictivae*) rather than pleasurable. Therefore, movement is not a cause of pleasure.

Objection 3: 'Movement' or 'change' implies a certain newness that is opposed to custom (*opponitur consuetudine*). But as the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 1, "What is customary is pleasurable to us." Therefore, movement is not a cause of pleasure.

But contrary to this: In *Confessiones* 8 Augustine says, "What does this mean, Lord my God—though You are everlasting joy to Yourself and some things around You rejoice in You always, this local portion of things rejoices in alternating ebbs and flows, offenses and reconciliations?" From this one may infer that men rejoice and take pleasure in certain sorts of changes (*in quibusdam alternationibus*). And so movement or change seems to be a cause of pleasure.

I respond: Three things are required for pleasure, two of which are involved in the pleasurable conjoining, and the third of which is the cognition of this conjoining. And as the Philosopher explains in *Ethics* 7 and *Rhetoric* 1, it is in accord with these three things that movement or change becomes pleasurable.

For *on the part of us who take pleasure*, change (*transmutatio*) becomes pleasurable to us because our nature is changeable. For this reason, what is now fitting for us will not be fitting for us later on; for instance, getting warm in front of a fire is fitting for a man in the winter, but not in the summer.

Next, *on the part of the pleasurable good that is conjoined to us*, change is again pleasurable. For the continued action of any agent adds to the effect; for instance, the longer someone stays near a fire, the warmer and drier he becomes. But a 'natural condition' (*naturalis habitudo*) consists in a measure. And so when the continued presence of a pleasurable thing exceeds the measure of one's natural condition, then the thing's removal becomes pleasurable.

Next, *on the part of the cognition itself*, by reason of the fact that a man desires to have a complete and perfect cognition of a thing. Therefore, since some things cannot be apprehended all at once (*tota simul*), change is more pleasing in the case of these things, so that one part passes away and another part succeeds it, and in this way the whole thing comes to be sensed. Hence, in *Confessiones* 4 Augustine says, "You do not want the syllable to stay; instead, you want it to fly away so that others might come and you might hear the whole thing. And so whenever any one thing is made up of many but they do not all exist together at the same time, all of them, if they can all be sensed, are more pleasing than they are one by one."

Therefore, if an entity is such that (a) its nature is unchangeable, and (b) its natural condition cannot be exceeded by a continuation of the pleasurable thing, and (c) it can intuit the pleasurable thing as a whole all at once, then change will not be pleasurable to it. And the closer a given pleasure comes to being like this, the more capable it is of being prolonged.

Reply to objection 1: Even if what is moving does not yet possess perfectly what it is moving toward, it nonetheless is already beginning to have something of what it is moving toward—and,

accordingly, the movement is itself pleasurable to a certain degree (*habet aliquid delectationis*). Yet it falls short of being a perfect pleasure, since the most perfect pleasures exist in unchangeable things.

Also, as was just explained, a movement or change also becomes pleasurable to the extent that because of it a thing that was previously unfitting either becomes fitting or ceases to exist.

Reply to objection 2: Movement leads to laboriousness and weariness to the extent that the natural condition is exceeded. But movement in this sense is not pleasurable; instead, it is pleasurable to the extent that it removes contraries of the natural condition.

Reply to objection 3: What is customary becomes pleasurable to the extent that it becomes natural. For custom is, as it were, a second nature (*altera natura*). Now movement or change is not pleasurable because it departs from custom; instead, it is pleasurable to the extent that it impedes the sort of corruption of the natural condition that could come from the prolongation of an operation. And so custom and the movement are both pleasurable by the same cause, viz., connaturality.

Article 3

Are hope and memory causes of pleasure?

It seems that hope and memory are not causes of pleasure:

Objection 1: As Damascene says, pleasure has to do with a good that is present. But memory and hope have to do with what is absent; for memory is about the past, whereas hope is about the future. Therefore, memory and hope are not causes of pleasure.

Objection 2: It is not the case that the same thing is a cause of contrary things. But hope is a cause of affliction, since Proverbs 13:12 says, "Hope deferred afflicts the soul." Therefore, hope is not a cause of pleasure.

Objection 3: Just as hope agrees with pleasure in having to do with the good, so too do concupiscence and love. Therefore, hope should not be designated as a cause of pleasure any more than concupiscence or love are.

But contrary to this: Romans 12:12 says, "..... rejoicing in hope." And Psalm 76:4 says, "I remembered God and was delighted."

I respond: Pleasure is caused by the presence of a fitting good insofar as that good is sensed or perceived in some way or other. Now there are two ways in which something is present to us: (a) *by cognition*, viz., insofar as what is known exists in the knower by means of a likeness of it; and (b) *in reality*, viz., insofar as the one thing is joined in reality to the other, either in actuality or in potentiality, in accord with some mode of conjoining.

And since (a) a conjoining in reality is greater than a conjoining by means of a likeness, which is the sort of conjoining that belongs to cognition, and since likewise (b) the conjoining of a real thing is greater in actuality than in potentiality, it follows that the greatest pleasure is that which comes through the sensory power, and this requires the presence of the sensible thing.

However, in second place is the pleasure that belongs to hope, in which the pleasurable conjoining exists not only with respect to apprehension, but also with respect to one's ability or power to acquire the good that gives pleasure.

And third place is occupied by the pleasure that belongs to memory, in which there is only a conjoining of apprehension.

Reply to objection 1: Hope and memory have to do with things which are absent absolutely speaking but which are present in a certain respect, viz., either through apprehension alone or through apprehension and ability, at least estimated ability.

Reply to objection 2: Nothing prevents the same thing from being, in different respects, a cause of contraries. So, then, insofar as it involves a present judgment about a future good, hope is a cause of

pleasure, whereas insofar as the thing's presence is lacking, hope is a cause of affliction.

Reply to objection 3: Love and concupiscence are also causes of pleasure. For everything that is loved is pleasurable to the lover, because love is a sort of union or connaturality between the lover and what is loved. Similarly, everything for which there is concupiscence is pleasurable to the one who desires it, since concupiscence is mainly a desire for pleasure.

However, to the extent that hope involves a sort of certitude about the presence of a pleasurable good—something that neither love nor concupiscence involves—it is hope that is posited as a cause of pleasure more than love and concupiscence are. Similarly, hope is posited as a cause of pleasure more than memory is, because memory is of something that has already passed away.

Article 4

Is sadness a cause of pleasure?

It seems that sadness or pain (*tristitia*) is not a cause of pleasure:

Objection 1: A contrary is not a cause of its contrary. But sadness is contrary to pleasure. Therefore, it is not a cause of pleasure.

Objection 2: Contraries are the effects of contraries. But remembered pleasurable things are a cause of pleasure. Therefore, remembered sad things are a cause of pain and not of pleasure.

Objection 3: Sadness is related to pleasure as hatred is related to love. But as was explained above (q. 29, a. 2), hatred is not a cause of love, but instead vice versa. Therefore, sadness is not a cause of pleasure.

But contrary to this: Psalm 41:4 says, "Tears have been to me my bread, day and night." But 'bread' here means pleasurable refreshment. Therefore, tears, which arise from sadness, can be pleasurable.

I respond: Sadness can be thought of in two ways: (a) insofar as it exists *in actuality* and (b) insofar as it exists *in memory*. And in both of these ways sadness can be a cause of pleasure.

Sadness that exists in actuality is a cause of pleasure insofar as it effects a memory of something beloved at the absence of which one is saddened and yet in the mere apprehension of which one takes pleasure.

On the other hand, the memory of sadness becomes a cause of pleasure in light of the later escape from sadness. For not possessing something bad is taken as a good (*accipitur in ratione boni*), and insofar as a man apprehends himself to have escaped from sadness and pain, the stuff of joy grows for him. Hence, in *De Civitate Dei* 22 Augustine says, "Often, while joyful, we remember sad things and, while healthy, we remember pains but without the pain, and because of this we become even more joyful and thankful." And in *Confessiones* 8 he says, "The more danger there was in the battle, the more joy there will be in the victory."

Reply to objection 1: A contrary is sometimes a *per accidens* cause of its contrary, in the way that, as *Physics* 8 points out, what is cold sometimes gives warmth. And, similarly, sadness is a *per accidens* cause of pleasure insofar as it effects the apprehension of something pleasurable.

Reply to objection 2: Remembered sad things are a cause of joy not insofar as they are sad and contrary to pleasurable things, but rather insofar as a man is now free of them.

Reply to objection 3: Hatred can likewise be a *per accidens* cause of love; for some individuals love one another because they agree in their hatred of one and the same thing.

Article 5

Are the actions of others a cause of pleasure for us?

It seems that the operations or actions (*actiones*) of others are not a cause of pleasure for us:

Objection 1: It is a conjoined good of one's own that is a cause of pleasure. But the operations of others are not conjoined to us. Therefore, they are not a cause of pleasure for us.

Objection 2: An operation is a good that belong's to the one who operates. Therefore, if the operations of others were a cause of pleasure for us, then by parity of reasoning all the other goods that belong to others would be a cause of pleasure for us. But this is clearly false.

Objection 3: An operation is pleasurable insofar as it proceeds from a habit that exists within us (*procedit ex habitu nobis innato*); this is why *Ethics* 3 says, "We must take as a sign of a generated habit the pleasure that is effected in its act." But the operations of others do not proceed from habits that exist in us, though they do in some cases proceed from habits that exist in those who are operating. Therefore, the operations of others are pleasurable not to us, but to the very individuals who are operating.

But contrary to this: 2 John, verse 4, says, "I rejoiced greatly to find some of your children walking in the truth."

I respond: As has already been explained (a. 1), two things are required for pleasure, viz., (a) the acquisition of a good for oneself (*consecutio proprii boni*) and (b) the cognition of this acquired good that belongs to one.

Therefore, there are three ways in which someone else's operation can be a cause of pleasure:

In the first way, insofar as *we acquire some good* through someone's operation. On this score, the operations of those who do some good for us are pleasurable to us, since it is pleasurable to be treated well by another (*bene pati ab alio est delectabile*).

In the second way, insofar as through the operations of others *some cognition of or judgment about our own good* is effected in us. The reason why men take pleasure in being praised or honored by others is that they thereby receive the assessment (*aestimatio*) that some good exists within themselves. And since this sort of assessment is more forcefully generated by the testimony of good and wise individuals, men take more pleasure in being praised and honored by such individuals. Moreover, since someone who flatters gives the appearance of praising (*quia adulator est apparens laudator*), flattery is also pleasurable to some individuals. And since love is directed toward something good, and since admiration is directed toward something great, it is pleasurable to be loved by others and to be held in admiration by them. For a man thereby gets an assessment of the goodness or greatness which belongs to him and which someone else takes pleasure in.

In the third way, insofar as the operations of others, if they are good, *are themselves thought of as our own good* because of the force of love, which makes one think of his friend as identical with himself. Moreover, because of hatred, which makes one think of someone else's good as contrary to his own good, an enemy's bad action becomes pleasurable; this is why 1 Corinthians 13:6 says that charity "does not rejoice over iniquity, but rejoices with the truth."

Reply to objection 1: Someone else's action can be joined to me either through its *effect*, as in the first way above; or through *apprehension*, as in the second way; or through *affection*, as in the third way.

Reply to objection 2: This argument goes through with respect to the third way above, but not with respect to the first two ways.

Reply to objection 3: Even if the actions of others do not proceed from habits that exist within me, they nonetheless either (a) cause something pleasurable in me, or else (b) they give me an assessment or apprehension of my own habits, or else (c) they proceed from a habit that belongs to someone who is united with me through love.

Article 6

Is doing good for another a cause of pleasure?

It seems that doing good for another (*benefacere alteri*) is not a cause of pleasure:

Objection 1: As was explained above (q. 31, a. 1), pleasure is caused by the acquisition of one's own good (*ex consecutione proprii boni*). But doing good is more akin to expending one's own good than to acquiring it (*non pertinet ad consecutionem proprii boni, sed magis ad emissionem*). Therefore, doing good seems to be a cause of sadness rather than of pleasure.

Objection 2: In *Ethics* 4 the Philosopher says, "A lack of generosity (*illiberalitas*) is more natural to men than is prodigality." But doing good for others belongs to prodigality, whereas refraining from doing good belongs to a lack of generosity. Therefore, since, as *Ethics* 7 and 10 say, a natural operation is pleasurable to an individual, it seems that doing good for others is not a cause of pleasure.

Objection 3: Contrary effects proceed from contrary causes. But doing certain bad things to others (*quaedam quae pertinent ad malefacere*) is naturally pleasurable to a man—for instance, as the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 1, winning against another (*vincere*), disproving another (*redarguere*), rebuking another (*increpare*), and even, in the case of angry men, punishing another (*punire*). Therefore, doing good is a cause of sadness rather than a cause of pleasure.

But contrary to this: In *Politics* 2 the Philosopher says, "It is very pleasurable to give gifts or assistance to friends or strangers."

I respond: There are three ways in which doing good for another can itself be a cause of pleasure:

In the first way, in relation to the *effect*, which is a good established in the other. On this score, to the extent that we think of the other's good as our own good because of a union of love, we take pleasure in the good that we do for others, especially our friends, in the same way that we take pleasure in our own good.

In the second way, in relation to the *end*, as when someone, by doing good for another, hopes to gain some good for himself, either from God or from man. But hope is a cause of pleasure.

In the third way, in relation to the *principle*. And on this score, there are three principles in relation to which doing good for another can be a cause of pleasure:

One of them is the *ability to do good* (*facultas benefaciendi*), and on this score doing good for another becomes pleasurable to the extent that it effects for a man some idea of the abundant good which exists within him and which it is possible to share with others. And so men take pleasure in their children and in their own works as something by which they share their own good.

A second principle is *an inclining habit* in accord with which it becomes connatural to someone to do good. Hence, generous individuals give to others with pleasure.

The third principle is *the motive*—as, for instance, when someone is moved by an individual he loves toward doing good for someone. For all the things that we do or undergo for the sake of a friend are pleasurable, since love is the main cause of pleasure.

Reply to objection 1: Insofar as the expending points toward one's own good, it is pleasurable. But insofar as it empties one of one's own good, it can sadden one, as when it is immoderate.

Reply to objection 2: Prodigality is immoderate expending, which is contrary to nature. And this is why prodigality is said to be contrary to nature.

Reply to objection 3: To win against another, to disprove another, and to punish another are pleasurable not insofar as they are bad for the other, but insofar as they pertain to a man's own good, which he loves more than he hates what is bad for the other.

For instance, to win against another is naturally pleasurable insofar as it gives a man an assessment of his own excellence. And because of this, all games which involve competition (*omnes ludi in quibus est concertatio*) and in which there can be victory are especially pleasurable. And, in general, so are all competitions, insofar as they involve the hope for victory.

Now there are two ways in which disproving or rebuking another can be pleasurable. In one way, insofar as it gives a man some idea of his own wisdom and excellence (*facit homini imaginationem propriae sapientiae et excellentiae*). And to rebuke or to reproach another belongs to those who are wise and greater in a second way, insofar as someone, by rebuking and reproaching another, does something good for the other—and this, as has been explained, is pleasurable.

Now for someone who is angry it is pleasurable to inflict punishment, insofar as this seems to remove the apparent threat (*removere apparentem minorationem*) that seems to come from a previous wound. For when someone is wounded by another, it thereby appears to him that he is threatened, and so he seeks to be liberated from this threat by wounding in return (*per retributionem laesionis*).

And so it is clear that doing good for another can be pleasurable *per se*, whereas doing something bad to another is pleasurable only insofar as it seems to belong to one's own good.

Article 7

Is likeness a cause of pleasure?

It seems that likeness is not a cause of pleasure:

Objection 1: 'To rule' (*principari*) and 'to preside over' (*praeesse*) imply a certain dissimilarity. But as *Rhetoric* 1 says, "It is naturally pleasurable to rule and to preside." Therefore, it is dissimilarity, rather than likeness, that is a cause of pleasure.

Objection 2: Nothing is more unlike pleasure than sadness. But as *Ethics* 7 says, it is those who suffer from sadness who especially pursue pleasures. Therefore, it is dissimilarity, rather than likeness, that is a cause of pleasure.

Objection 3: Those who are sated with certain types of pleasurable things (*repleti aliquibus delectabilibus*) do not take pleasure in them, but instead are disgusted by them (*fastidiunt ea*)—as is clear in the case of those who are sated with food. Therefore, it is not the case that likeness is a cause of pleasure.

But contrary to this: As was explained above (q. 27, a. 3), likeness is a cause of love. But love is a cause of pleasure. Therefore, likeness is a cause of pleasure.

I respond: Likeness is a kind of unity; hence, what is similar to someone is pleasurable insofar as it is united with him, in the same way that, as was explained above (q. 27, a. 3), what is similar is lovable. And if what is similar adds to and does not corrupt the individual's own good, then it is pleasurable absolutely speaking, e.g., one man with respect to another, and one youth with respect to another.

By contrast, if it corrupts the individual's own good, then it becomes disdainful or painful *per accidens*—not insofar as it is united with the individual, but insofar as it corrupts something that is more united with him (*inquantum corrumpit id quod est magis unum*). Now there are two ways in which what is similar corrupts an individual's own good:

In one way, by corrupting the measure of his own good by a sort of excess. For the good, especially a corporeal good like health, consists in a certain balance (*in quadam commensuratione consistit*). Because of this, an overabundance of food or of any corporeal pleasure becomes loathesome.

In a second way, through a direct opposition to the individual's own good, in the way that potters dislike other potters—not insofar as they are potters, but insofar as, because of the others, they lose either their superiority or their money (*amittunt excellentiam propriam sive proprium lucrum*), which they desire as goods of their own.

Reply to objection 1: Since a leader and his subject share something in common (*est communicatio principantis ad subiectum*), there is some likeness in such a case—yet it is a likeness with respect to a certain excellence, given that ruling and presiding pertain to the excellence of one's own good. For to rule and to preside belong to the wise and to one's betters (*sapientum et meliorum est*

principari et praeesse). Hence, this gives a man some idea of his own proper goodness.

An alternative reply is that by the fact that a man rules and presides, he does good for others, and this is pleasurable.

Reply to objection 2: Even if what the sad man takes pleasure in is not similar to sadness, it is nonetheless similar to the sad man. For sadness is contrary to the proper good of the one who is sad. And so those who are sad desire pleasure in order that it might contribute to their own good, insofar as it is medicine against its contrary (*inquantum est medicativa contrarii*). This is the reason why corporeal pleasures, which certain sorts of sadness are contrary to, are desired more than intellectual pleasures, which, as will be explained below (q. 35, a. 5), do not have contrary forms of sadness (*non habet contrarietatem tristitiae*).

From this it likewise follows that all animals naturally desire pleasure because an animal is always laboring through its sensory power and movement. This is also why youths especially desire pleasure, because of the many changes that occur within them while they are still growing (*dum sunt in statu augmenti*). Again, those who are melancholic strongly desire pleasures in order to expel sadness, since, as *Ethics* 7 puts it, "Their body is corroded, as it were, by a base humor."

Reply to objection 3: Corporeal goods consist in a certain measure, and so an excess of similar things corrupts one's own good. And thus such an excess becomes distasteful and saddening, insofar as it is contrary to a man's own good.

Article 8

Is wonder a cause of pleasure?

It seems that wonder (*admiratio*) is not a cause of pleasure:

Objection 1: As Damascene says, someone who wonders is ignorant of nature. But it is scientific knowledge (*scientia*) rather than ignorance that is pleasurable. Therefore, wonder is not a source of pleasure.

Objection 2: As the beginning of the *Metaphysics* says, wonder is the beginning of wisdom—a path, as it were, to inquiring into the truth. But as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 10, "It is more pleasurable to contemplate what is already known than to inquire into what is unknown." For the latter involves difficulty and obstacles, whereas the former does not, and, as *Ethics* 7 says, pleasure is caused by an unimpeded operation. Therefore, wonder is not a cause of pleasure, but instead impedes it.

Objection 3: Each individual takes pleasure in what he is used to; hence, the operations of habits acquired by custom are pleasurable. But as Augustine says in his commentary on the Gospel of John, what is customary is not an object of wonder (*consueta non sunt admirabilia*). Therefore, wonder is opposed to a cause of pleasure.

But contrary to this: In *Rhetoric* 1 the Philosopher says that wonder is a cause of pleasure.

I respond: As was said above (q. 23, a. 4 and q. 31, a. 1), it is pleasurable to acquire what is desired. And so the more the desire for something that is loved grows, the more the pleasure over its acquisition grows. And there is even an increase in pleasure in the very increase in the desire, since hope is likewise effected with respect to the thing that is loved. For as was explained above (a. 3), the desire is itself pleasurable because of hope.

Now wonder is a certain sort of desire to know, and it arises in a man from the fact that he sees an effect without knowing its cause, or from the fact that the cause of such an effect exceeds his cognition or ability. And so wonder is a cause of pleasure insofar as there is adjoined to it the hope of acquiring cognition of what one desires to know.

Because of this, all things that give rise to wonder (*mirabilia*) are pleasurable, as are things that are rare and all representations of things—even of those things that are not pleasurable in themselves. For

the soul rejoices in connecting one thing with another, since, as the Philosopher says in his *Poetics*, connecting one thing to another is the proper and natural act of reason.

For this reason, moreover, "being freed from great dangers is more pleasurable because it gives rise to wonder," as *Rhetoric* 1 puts it.

Reply to objection 1: Wonder is pleasurable not because it involves ignorance, but rather because it involves a desire to learn the cause and because someone who wonders learns something new, viz., that he did not know that anything was quite like this.

Reply to objection 2: Pleasure involves two things, viz., (a) coming to rest in a good and (b) perceiving this rest.

Thus, as regards the first of these, since it is more perfect to contemplate a known truth than to inquire into what is unknown, acts of contemplation with respect to known things are, speaking *per se*, more pleasurable than are acts of inquiry into unknown things.

Still, as regards the second point, it happens *per accidens* that acts of inquiry are sometimes more pleasurable because they proceed from a more intense desire (*ex maiori desiderio procedunt*), given that desire is excited to a higher degree by the perception of ignorance. Hence, a man takes pleasure especially in those things that he discovers or learns for the first time (*de novo*).

Reply to objection 3: What is customary is pleasurable to do because it is, as it were, connatural. Yet what is rare can be pleasurable either (a) by reason of *cognition*, since knowledge of such things is desired because they give rise to wonder (*inquantum sunt mira*), or (b) by reason of *operation*, since, as *Ethics* 10 says, "the mind is more inclined by desire to operate intensely in new matters." For a more perfect operation is a cause of a more perfect pleasure.

QUESTION 33

The Effects of Pleasure

Next we have to consider the effects of pleasure. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Does pleasure widen (*dilatare*) an individual? (2) Is pleasure a cause of a thirst or desire for pleasure? (3) Does pleasure impede the use of reason? (4) Does pleasure bring an operation to perfection?

Article 1

Is being widened an effect of pleasure?

It seems that being widened (*dilatatio*) is not an effect of pleasure:

Objection 1: According to the Apostle in 2 Corinthians 6:11 ("..... our heart is widened (*dilatatum est*)"), being widened seems to have more to do with love. Hence, Psalm 118:96 says of the precept of charity, "Your commandment is exceedingly wide." But pleasure is a passion distinct from love. Therefore, being widened is not an effect of pleasure.

Objection 2: By the fact that something is widened, it becomes more capacious for receiving things. But receiving has to do with desire, which is directed at a thing that is not yet possessed. Therefore, being widened seems relevant to desire rather than to pleasure.

Objection 3: Squeezing or holding on tightly to something (*constrictio*) is opposed to widening it (*dilatio*). But it is holding on tightly to something that seems relevant to pleasure. For we hold on tightly to what we strongly want to keep, and this is the sort of appetitive affection that is directed toward something that gives pleasure. Therefore, being widened is irrelevant to pleasure.

But contrary to this: To express joy, Isaiah 60:5 says, "You will see and abound, and your heart will wonder and be widened (*dilatabitur cor tuum*)." Moreover, pleasure itself (*ipsa delectatio*) takes its name from '*dilatatio*' (being widened), in the same way that, as was explained above (q. 31, a. 3), '*laetitia*' (gladness) does.

I respond: Width (*latitudo*) is a dimension of corporeal magnitude, and so in the case of the affections of the soul it is predicated only metaphorically (*non nisi secundum metaphoram dicitur*). Now being widened is, as it were, a movement with respect to width, and it belongs to pleasure with respect to the two things that are required for pleasure:

One of them has to do with the *apprehensive* power, which apprehends the conjoining of some fitting good. Now by this apprehension a man apprehends that he has acquired a certain perfection, i.e., a 'spiritual' magnitude, and the man's mind is accordingly said to be made larger or to be widened by the pleasure (*animus hominis dicitur per delectationem magnificari seu dilatari*).

The other has to do with the *appetitive* power, which assents to the pleasurable thing and comes to rest in it by in some sense surrendering itself to it in order to grasp it interiorly. And so a man's affections are widened by pleasure in the sense that they give themselves over, as it were, to containing interiorly the thing that gives pleasure.

Reply to objection 1: In the case of things that are predicated metaphorically, nothing prevents the same thing from being attributed to diverse things in accord with diverse likenesses. Accordingly, being widened pertains to *love* by reason of a certain extension, in the sense that the lover's affections are extended to others, in order that he might care about not just what belongs to him but what belongs to others as well. By contrast, being widened pertains to *pleasure* because something is widened in itself in the sense of being rendered more capacious.

Reply to objection 2: Desire receives some amplification from imagining the desired thing, but much more amplification it received from the presence of a thing that is already giving pleasure. For the mind offers itself to a greater degree to a thing that is already giving pleasure than to a desired thing that is not yet possessed, since pleasure is a goal of desire.

Reply to objection 3: Someone who is taking pleasure does, to be sure, hold on tightly to the thing

that gives pleasure as long as he adheres to it strongly, but his heart grows larger in order that he might enjoy the pleasurable thing completely.

Article 2

Is pleasure a cause of a desire for pleasure itself?

It seems that pleasure is not a cause of a desire for pleasure itself (*non causet desiderium sui ipsius*):

Objection 1: Every movement ceases when it arrives at rest. But as was explained above (q. 25, a. 2), pleasure is a sort of rest associated with the movement of desire (*quasi quaedam quies motus desiderii*). Therefore, the movement of desire ceases when it arrives at pleasure. Therefore, pleasure is not a cause of desire.

Objection 2: An opposite is not a cause of its opposite. But as regards its object, pleasure is in a certain sense opposed to desire, since desire is directed toward a good that is not possessed, whereas pleasure is directed at a good that is already possessed. Therefore, pleasure is not a cause of a desire for pleasure itself.

Objection 3: A distaste for something is opposed to a desire for it. But pleasure is very often a cause of distaste. Therefore, it does not effect a desire for pleasure.

But contrary to this: In John 4:13 our Lord says, "Whoever drinks of this water will thirst again," where, according to Augustine, 'water' signifies corporeal pleasure.

I respond: Pleasure can be thought of in two ways: insofar as it exists *in actuality*, and insofar as it exists *in memory*. Likewise, thirst or desire can be understood in two ways: *properly*, insofar as it implies an appetite for a thing that is not possessed, and *generally*, insofar as it implies [just] the exclusion of anything distasteful (*secundum quod importat exclusionem fastidii*).

Thus, insofar as it exists *in actuality*, pleasure is not, speaking *per se*, a cause of a thirst or desire for pleasure itself. Instead, it is only *per accidens* a cause of a thirst or desire for pleasure, as long as 'thirst' or 'desire' is being predicated of an appetite for a thing that is not possessed. For pleasure is an appetitive affection with respect to a thing that is present.

However, it is possible for a thing that is present not to be possessed perfectly. This can happen either on the side of *the thing that is possessed* or on the side of *the one who possesses it*:

On the side of *the thing that is possessed*, because the thing that is possessed does not exist all at once and so is received successively, and because while someone takes pleasure in what he does possess, he desires to enjoy what still remains. For instance, as Augustine says in *Confessiones* 4, someone who hears the first part of a verse and takes pleasure in it desires to hear the other part of the verse. And in this sense almost all corporeal pleasures are a cause of a thirst for themselves, up to the point of their being consummated. For pleasures of this sort follow a certain movement, as is clear in the case of the pleasures of food.

On the side of *the one who possesses it*, as when one possesses a thing that exists as a whole within him (*habet aliquam rem in se perfectam existentem*), but does not at once possess it completely and instead acquires it little by little. For instance, in this world we take pleasure when we perceive imperfectly something of the knowledge of God, and the pleasure itself excites a thirst or desire for perfect knowledge—this according to a possible interpretation of Ecclesiasticus 24:29 ("They who drink of me will still thirst").

By contrast, if by 'thirst' or 'desire' one means just an intense affection without distaste, then it is spiritual pleasures that especially effect a thirst or desire for pleasure itself. For since increased, or even prolonged, corporeal pleasures overwhelm the natural condition (*faciunt superexcrescentiam naturalis habitudinis*), they become distasteful (*efficiuntur fastidiosae*), as is clear in the case of the pleasures of

food. Because of this, when someone has already reached a completeness in corporeal pleasures, he finds them distasteful and sometimes desires other pleasures instead. By contrast, spiritual pleasures do not produce an overload in the natural condition, but instead perfect nature. Hence, when consummation is reached in the case of these pleasures, then they are more pleasurable—except perhaps *per accidens*, insofar as the contemplative operation has adjoined to it certain operations of the corporeal powers, which are wearied by persistent operation. And it is in this way that one can understand Ecclesiasticus 24:29 ("They who drink of me will still thirst.") For even of the angels, who know God perfectly and take pleasure in Him, 1 Peter 1:12 says, "They desire to look at Him."

On the other hand, if pleasure is thought of insofar as it exists *in memory* and not in actuality, then it is *per se* apt to be a cause of a thirst and desire for pleasure itself, viz., when the man returns to the disposition in which what has now passed was pleasurable to him. However, if he has departed from that disposition, then the memory of pleasure is a cause of aversion in him and not of pleasure, as in the case of the memory of food for one who is now full.

Reply to objection 1: When the pleasure is complete (*perfecta*), it then has rest in the full sense (*habet omnimodam quietem*), and the movement of desire toward what is not possessed ceases. But when pleasure is had incompletely (*imperfecte*), then the movement of desire toward what is not possessed does not cease altogether.

Reply to objection 2: What is had incompletely is had in one respect and not had in another respect. And so both desire and pleasure can exist simultaneously with respect to it.

Reply to objection 3: As has been explained, pleasures are a cause of aversion (*fastidium*) in one way and of desire in another way.

Article 3

Does pleasure impede the use of reason?

It seems that pleasure does not impede the use of reason:

Objection 1: Rest confers what is especially needed for the use of reason; hence, *Physics* 7 says, "When we sit and rest, the soul becomes knowledgeable and prudent," and Wisdom 8:16 says, "Going into my house, I will repose with her," i.e. with wisdom. But pleasure is a kind of rest. Therefore, it does not impede the use of reason, but instead assists it.

Objection 2: Things that do not exist in the same thing do not impede one another, even if they are contraries. But pleasure exists in the appetitive part of the soul, whereas the use of reason exists in the apprehensive part. Therefore, pleasure does not impede the use of reason.

Objection 3: What is impeded by another seems to be changed by it in some way. But the use of the apprehensive power affects pleasure instead of being affected by it, since it is a cause of pleasure. Therefore, pleasure does not impede the use of reason.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 7 the Philosopher says, "Pleasure corrupts the judgment of prudence."

I respond: As *Ethics* 10 says, "Proper pleasures add to operations, whereas extraneous pleasures impede them." Thus, there is a certain pleasure which is had by the act of reason, as when someone takes pleasure in contemplating or in reasoning. This sort of pleasure does not impede the use of reason but instead assists it; for we do more attentively that which we take pleasure in, and attention aids an operation.

By contrast, there are three reasons why corporeal pleasures impede the use of reason:

First, because of *distraction*. For as has already been explained, we pay close attention to what we take pleasure in, and when attention is strongly fixed on a given thing, it is weakened with respect to other things or totally withdrawn from them. Accordingly, if a corporeal pleasure is great, then either it

will totally impede the use of reason by attracting the soul's attention to itself, or else it will impede it to a great degree.

Second, because of *opposition*. For certain pleasures, especially excessive ones, are contrary to the order of reason. And on this score the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 6 that "corporeal pleasures corrupt the judgment of prudence, though not speculative judgments, e.g., that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles." (However, pleasure impedes both sorts of judgment in the first way mentioned above.)

Third, because of a sort of *shackling* (*secundum quandam ligationem*), viz., insofar as what follows upon pleasure is a certain corporeal change—even greater than in the case of the other passions, since the appetite is affixed more strongly to a present thing than to an absent thing. Corporeal disturbances of this sort impede the use of reason, as is clear in the case of drunkards, whose use of reason is shackled or impeded (*ligatum vel impeditum*).

Reply to objection 1: Corporeal pleasure does, to be sure, involve the appetite's coming to rest in the pleasurable thing, and this rest is sometimes contrary to reason. And on the part of the body, pleasure always involves a change. In both of these respects, pleasure impedes the use of reason.

Reply to objection 2: The appetitive and apprehensive parts of the soul are, to be sure, diverse parts, but they are parts of a single soul. And so when the soul's attention is strongly applied to the act of one of these parts, a contrary act by the other part is impeded.

Reply to objection 3: The use of reason requires the appropriate use of the imagination and other sentient powers, which employ a corporeal organ. And so the use of reason is impeded by a corporeal change when the acts of the imaginative power and of the other sentient powers are impeded.

Article 4

Does pleasure perfect an operation?

It seems that pleasure does not perfect an action or operation (*non perficiat operationem*):

Objection 1: Every human operation depends on the use of reason. But as has been explained (a. 3), pleasure impedes the use of reason. Therefore, pleasure weakens and does not perfect a human operation.

Objection 2: Nothing perfects either itself or its own cause. But as *Ethics* 7 and 10 explain, pleasure is an operation, and this has to be understood either with respect to its essence or with respect to its cause. Therefore, pleasure does not perfect an operation.

Objection 3: If pleasure perfects an operation, then it perfects it either as an end or as a form or as an agent. But not as an end, since operations are not sought for the sake of pleasure; instead, as was explained above (q. 4, a. 2), it is just the opposite. Nor, again, in the manner of an efficient cause, since it is instead the operation that is an efficient cause of the pleasure. Nor, again, as a form, since, according to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 10, pleasure does not perfect an operation as a sort of habit. Therefore, pleasure does not perfect an operation.

But contrary to this: *Ethics* 10 says that pleasure perfects an operation.

I respond: There are two ways in which pleasure perfects an operation.

In the first way, in the manner of an *end*—not, to be sure, in the sense in which an end is *that for the sake of which* something exists, but rather in the sense in which every good that is *added by way of completion* can be called an end (*omne bonum completive superveniens potest dici finis*). Accordingly, in *Ethics* 10 the Philosopher says, "Pleasure perfects an operation as a sort of supervening end," viz., in the sense that over and beyond the good which is the operation itself, there supervenes another good which is the pleasure and which involves the appetite's coming to rest in the previously mentioned good (*quae importat quietationem appetitus in bono praesupposito*).

In the second way, on the side of the *agent cause*—not *directly*, to be sure, since in *Ethics* 10 the

Philosopher says that "pleasure perfects an operation not in the way that a physician perfects a healthy man, but in the way that health perfects him," but instead *indirectly*, viz., insofar as an agent who takes pleasure in his action pays closer attention to that action and carries it out more diligently. Accordingly, *Ethics* 10 says, "Pleasures augment their own operations and impede extraneous operations."

Reply to objection 1: It is not all pleasures that impede the act of reason, but rather corporeal pleasures, which do not follow upon an act of reason, but instead follow upon an act of the concupiscible part that is augmented by pleasure. By contrast, pleasure that follows upon an act of reason strengthens the use of reason.

Reply to objection 2: As *Physics* 2 says, it is possible for two things to cause one another in such a way that the first is an efficient cause of the second and the second is a final cause of the first. And in this way, as has been explained, an operation is a cause of pleasure as an efficient cause, whereas the pleasure perfects the operation in the manner of an end.

Reply to objection 3: The reply to the third objection is clear from what has been said.

QUESTION 34

The Goodness and Badness of Pleasures

Next we have to consider the goodness and badness of pleasures. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Is every pleasure bad? (2) Given that not every pleasure is bad, is every pleasure good? (3) Is there some pleasure that is the best thing? (4) Is pleasure a measure or rule according to which goodness or badness is judged in morals?

Article 1

Is every pleasure bad?

It seems that every pleasure is bad:

Objection 1: Anything that corrupts prudence and impedes the use of reason seems to be bad in its own right (*secundum se*), since, as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, a man's good is "to exist in accord with reason." But pleasure corrupts prudence and impedes reason, and the greater the pleasure, the more it does this. Hence, as *Ethics* 7 says, "in the midst of sexual pleasures," which are the greatest pleasures, "it is impossible to have an intellective understanding of anything." And in *Super Matthaeum* Jerome says, "The presence of the Holy Spirit will not be granted at the time that conjugal acts are being performed, even if they involve an apparent prophet who is fulfilling the duty of generating." Therefore, pleasure is bad in its own right. Therefore, every pleasure is bad.

Objection 2: If there is anything that a virtuous man avoids and that a man deficient in virtue pursues, then that thing seems to be bad in its own right. For as *Ethics* 10 says, "The virtuous man is, as it were, the measure and standard (*mensura et regula*) of human acts." And in 1 Corinthians 2:15 the Apostle says, "The spiritual man is the judge of all things." But children and beasts, in whom there is no virtue, pursue pleasures, whereas the temperate man avoids them. Therefore, pleasures are bad in their own right and should be avoided.

Objection 3: As *Ethics* 2 says, virtue and craft (*virtus et ars*) are directed toward what is both difficult and good. But no craft is ordered toward pleasure. Therefore, pleasure is not something good.

But contrary to this: Psalm 36:4 says, "Take pleasure in the Lord." Therefore, since a divine authority does not induce us toward anything bad, it seems that not every pleasure is bad.

I respond: As *Ethics* 10 explains, some have claimed that all pleasures are bad. The reason seems to have been that they were directing their attention only to sentient and corporeal pleasures, which are the most obvious ones; for in other matters as well, as the *De Anima* reports, the ancient philosophers did not distinguish intelligible things from sensible things, or the intellect from the sensory power. Now they thought that corporeal pleasures should all be called bad in order that in this way men, who are prone toward immoderate pleasures, might arrive at the mean of virtue by withdrawing themselves from pleasures.

But this way of thinking was not plausible (*non conveniens*). For since no one can live without any sentient and corporeal pleasure, if those who teach that all pleasures are bad are discovered submitting to some pleasures, then men will be more inclined toward pleasures by the example of their deeds, whereas the teaching of their words will be ignored. For in the case of human actions and passions, in which experience holds sway for the most part, example is more effective than words (*magis movent exempla quam verba*).

Thus, one should reply that some pleasures are good and some are bad. For (a) pleasure is the appetitive power's coming to rest in a good that is loved, and (b) it follows upon some operation. Hence, there are two possible explanations [for the goodness or badness of a pleasure]:

One is on the side of *the good* in which the one who comes to rest takes pleasure. For as was explained above (q. 18, a. 5) in moral matters, 'good' and 'bad' are predicated in accord with what agrees

or disagrees with reason, in the same way that among natural things something is called 'natural' because it agrees with nature and 'unnatural' because it disagrees with nature. Therefore, just as among natural things there is both (a) 'natural rest', viz., a coming to rest in what agrees with nature, e.g., when something heavy comes to rest down below, and also (b) 'unnatural rest', viz., a coming to rest in what is opposed to nature, as when a heavy body comes to rest up above, so too in moral matters there is (a) good pleasure, insofar as a higher or lower appetite comes to rest in what agrees with reason, and (b) bad pleasure, insofar as an appetite comes to rest in what disagrees with reason and with the law of God.

The other possible explanation is taken from the side of *the operations*, some of which are good and some bad. Now the pleasures that are joined to the operations have more affinity to those operations than do the sentient desires (*concupiscentiae*) that precede them in time. Hence, since the desires for good operations are themselves good and the desires for bad operations are themselves bad, *a fortiori* the pleasures that belong to the good operations are good, and the pleasures that belong to the bad operations are bad.

Reply to objection 1: As was explained above (q. 33, a. 3), it is not the pleasures derived from an act of reason that impede reason and corrupt prudence; instead, it is extraneous pleasures such as corporeal pleasures. And, as was explained above (*ibid.*), these pleasures impede the use of reason either (a) because of the opposition of the appetite, which comes to rest in what is opposed to reason and because of which the pleasure is bad, or (b) because of the shackling of reason, as in the case of conjugal intercourse which, even though it agrees with reason, nonetheless impedes the use of reason because of the corporeal change that accompanies it.

However, conjugal intercourse does not for this reason acquire moral badness, just as sleep does not acquire moral badness if it is undertaken in accord with reason; for even reason itself dictates that the use of reason should sometimes be interrupted (*et ipsa ratio hoc habet ut quandoque rationis usus intercipiatur*). Still, we claim that even if this sort of shackling of reason by the pleasure of sexual intercourse is not morally bad—for it is neither a mortal sin nor a venial sin—it nonetheless stems from an instance of moral badness, viz., from the sin of the first parent. For as is clear from what was said in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 98, a. 2), this shackling of reason did not occur in the state of innocence.

Reply to objection 2: A temperate man does not avoid all pleasures, but avoids immoderate pleasures and those that do not agree with reason.

Now the fact that children and beasts pursue pleasures does not show that pleasures are always bad. For the natural appetite that exists in children and beasts comes from God, and this appetite is moved toward what is appropriate for them.

Reply to objection 3: As will be explained below (q. 57, a. 3), a craft is aimed not at every sort of good, but at exterior things that are able to be made. By contrast, it is prudence and virtue, rather than craft, that has to do with actions and passions. Still, as *Ethics* 7 points out, some crafts, viz., "the arts of the cook and the perfumer," do indeed produce pleasure.

Article 2

Is every pleasure good?

It seems that every pleasure is good:

Objection 1: As was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 5, a. 6), the good is divided into three: the upright, the useful, and the pleasant. But everything upright is good, and the same holds for everything useful. Therefore, every pleasure is likewise good.

Objection 2: As *Ethics* 1 says, what is good *per se* is such that it is not sought for the sake of anything else. But pleasure is not sought for the sake of anything else; for it seems ridiculous to ask

someone why he wants to have pleasure (*quare vult delectari*). Therefore, pleasure is good *per se*. But what is predicated *per se* of something is predicated of it universally. Therefore, every pleasure is good.

Objection 3: What is desired by all seems to be good *per se*; for as *Ethics* 1 says, "The good is what all things desire." But all, even children and beasts, desire some sort of pleasure. Therefore, pleasure is good in its own right (*secundum se*). Therefore, every pleasure is good.

But contrary to this: Proverbs 2:14 says, "They are glad when they have done evil, and they rejoice in the most wicked things."

I respond: Just as some Stoics claimed that all pleasures are bad, so the Epicureans claimed that pleasure is good in its own right (*secundum se*) and that, consequently, all pleasures are good. They seem to have been misled because they did not draw a distinction between what is good absolutely speaking (*bonum simpliciter*) and what is good as far as *this* individual is concerned (*bonum quoad hunc*). To be sure, what is good absolutely speaking is good in its own right. However, there are two ways in which it happens that what is not good in its own right is good for *this* individual:

In one way, because it is appropriate for him, given the condition in which he now finds himself (*secundum dispositionem in qua nunc est*), where this condition is not a natural one. For instance, it is sometimes good for a leper to eat certain poisonous things that are not agreeable to a human constitution absolutely speaking.

In a second way, because what is not appropriate is thought to be appropriate.

Since pleasure is the appetite's coming to rest in a good, if what the appetite rests in is good absolutely speaking, then there will be pleasure absolutely speaking and that pleasure will be good absolutely speaking. By contrast, if what the appetite rests in is good as far as *this* individual is concerned but not good absolutely speaking, then there is pleasure with respect to this individual but not pleasure absolutely speaking (*nec delectatio est simpliciter sed huic*), and the pleasure will not be good absolutely speaking, but will instead be good in a certain respect or an apparent good (*nec simpliciter est bona sed bona secundum quid vel apparens bona*).

Reply to objection 1: The upright and the useful accord with reason, and so there is nothing upright or useful that is not good. By contrast, the pleasant accords with appetite, which sometimes tends toward what does not accord with reason. And so not everything pleasant is good in the sense of having moral goodness, which involves reason.

Reply to objection 2: The reason that pleasure is not sought for the sake of anything else is that it is a coming to rest in the end. But it is possible for ends to be good or bad, even though nothing is an end except insofar as it is good as far as some individual is concerned. And the same thing holds for pleasure as well.

Reply to objection 3: All have a desire for pleasure in the same way that all have a desire for the good, since pleasure is the appetite's coming to rest in the good. But just as it happens that not every good that is desired is *per se* and genuinely good, so, too, not every pleasure is *per se* and genuinely good.

Article 3

Is any pleasure the best thing?

It seems that no pleasure is the best thing:

Objection 1: No instance of generation is the best thing, since generation cannot be an ultimate end. But pleasure follows upon an instance of generation, since, as was explained above (q. 31, a. 1), something takes pleasure from the fact that it is established into its own nature. Therefore, no pleasure can be the best thing.

Objection 2: The best thing is such that it cannot be made better by anything that is added to it. But pleasure is made better by something added to it; for pleasure is better when accompanied by virtue than when not accompanied by virtue (*est melior delectatatio cum virtute quam sine virtute*). Therefore, pleasure is not the best thing.

Objection 3: The best thing is such that it is good in all respects (*universaliter bonum*), in the same way that it is good *per se*; for what is such-and-such *per se* is prior to and more important than what is such-and-such *per accidens*. But as has been explained (a. 2), pleasure is not good in every respect. Therefore, pleasure is not the best thing.

But contrary to this: Beatitude is the best thing, since it is the goal of human life. But beatitude does not exist without pleasure; for Psalm 15:11 says, "With Your countenance You will fill me with gladness; at Your right hand are pleasures even to the end."

I respond: Plato did not, like the Stoics, claim that all pleasures are bad; nor did he, like the Epicureans, claim that all pleasures are good. Instead, he claimed that some pleasures are good and that some are bad, but in such a way that no pleasure is the highest good or the best thing (*nulla sit summum bonum vel optimum*).

However, as far as one can tell from his arguments, he is mistaken on two points:

First, since he saw that sensible and corporeal pleasures consist in a certain movement and generation, as is clear in the case of filling up with food and other such pleasures, he thought that *all* pleasures follow upon generation and movement. Hence, since generation and movement are incomplete acts (*actus imperfecti*), it would follow that pleasure does not have the character of an ultimate perfection.

However, this seems obviously false in the case of intellectual pleasures. For as was explained above (q. 31, a. 8), one takes pleasure not only in generating scientific knowledge, e.g., while he is learning or wondering, but also in contemplating in accord with the knowledge that has already been acquired.

Second, he claimed that the best thing is that which is the highest good absolutely speaking and, more specifically, that which is, as it were, the abstract and unparticipated Good itself, in the sense that God Himself is the highest good.

However, we are now talking about the best of *human* things. And in the case of each thing, the best is its ultimate end. But as was explained above (q. 1, a. 8 and q. 2, a. 7), there are two senses of 'end', viz., (a) the thing itself and (b) possessing that thing; for instance, the avaricious man's end is either (a) money or (b) possessing money. Accordingly, a man's ultimate end can be said to be either (a) God Himself, who is the highest good absolutely speaking or (b) the act of enjoying God, which involves taking a certain sort of pleasure in the ultimate end. And in this sense there is a pleasure belonging to a man that can be called the best thing among human goods.

Reply to objection 1: Not every pleasure follows upon an instance of generation; instead, as has been explained, some pleasures follow upon completed operations (*consequuntur operationes perfectas*). And so nothing prevents some particular pleasure from being the best thing, even if not every pleasure is the best thing.

Reply to objection 2: This argument goes through in the case of the thing which is the best absolutely speaking and through participation in which all things are good. Hence, this thing is such that it is not made better by any addition.

However, among other goods it is true in general that every good is made better by the addition of something else—although one could claim that, as *Ethics* 6 says, pleasure is not something extraneous to the operation of a virtue.

Reply to objection 3: Pleasure has its status as the best thing not from the fact that it is pleasure, but from the fact that it is a perfect coming to rest in the best thing. Hence, it need not be the case that every pleasure is the best or even that every pleasure is good. In the same way, some instance of

scientific knowledge, but not every instance of scientific knowledge, is the best (*sicut aliqua scientia est optima, non tamen omnis*).

Article 4

Is pleasure the measure or rule of moral goodness and badness?

It seems that pleasure is not the measure or rule of moral goodness and badness:

Objection 1: As *Metaphysics* 10 says, "All things are measured by what is first in their genus." But pleasure is not the first thing in the genus of morals, but is instead preceded by love and desire. Therefore, pleasure is not the measure of goodness and badness in morals.

Objection 2: The measure and rule has to be uniform, and so, as *Metaphysics* 10 says, it is the movement that is maximally uniform that is the measure and rule of all movements. But pleasure varies and takes on many forms (*delectatio est varia et multiformis*), since some pleasures are good and some are bad. Therefore, pleasure is not the measure and rule of morals.

Objection 3: One makes a more certain judgment about an effect on the basis of its cause, than vice versa. But the goodness and badness of actions is a cause of the goodness and badness of pleasures, since, as *Ethics* 10 says, "Good pleasures are those that follow upon good actions, whereas bad pleasures are those that follow upon bad actions." Therefore, pleasures are not the rule and measure of goodness and badness in morals.

But contrary to this: In commenting on Psalm 7:10 ("God is the searcher of hearts and minds"), Augustine says, "The end of care and of deliberation (*finis curae et cogitationis*) is the pleasure that each one tries to reach." And in *Ethics* 7 the Philosopher says, "Pleasure is the architectonic end"—read: the principal end—"which we look to when we say of each thing that this one is bad absolutely speaking, whereas that one is good absolutely speaking."

I respond: As was explained above (q. 20, a. 1), moral goodness or badness lies principally in the will. Now whether an act of will is good or bad is known mainly from the end, and what is taken to be the end is what the will comes to rest in. But it is pleasure that is the will's—or any appetite's—resting in the good. And so a man is judged to be good or bad mainly according to the sort of pleasure that belongs to the human will; for a good and virtuous man is one who rejoices in the works of virtue, whereas a bad man is one who rejoices in bad works.

However, the pleasures of the sentient appetite are not a measure of moral goodness or badness; for instance, food is generally pleasurable to both good and bad men in accord with the sentient appetite. But the will of good men takes pleasure in such things according to their agreement with reason—something that the will of bad men does not care about.

Reply to objection 1: Love and desire are prior to pleasure in the order of generation (*in via generationis*). But pleasure is prior in relation to the notion of the end (*prior secundum rationem finis*). And in the case of actions the end has the character of a principle which is such that it is especially on the basis of it, as a rule or measure, that the judgment [regarding goodness or badness] is made.

Reply to objection 2: Every pleasure is uniform in the sense that it is a resting in some good, and it is on this score that it can be a rule or measure. For someone is good whose will rests in a genuine good, whereas someone is bad whose will rests in something bad.

Reply to objection 3: Since, as was explained above (q. 33, a. 4), pleasure perfects an action in the manner of an end, there cannot be a perfectly good action unless pleasure is also present in the good. For the goodness of a thing depends on its end, and so the goodness of the pleasure is in some sense a cause of the goodness in the action.

QUESTION 35

Pain or Sadness in Itself

Next we have to consider pain (*dolor*) and sadness or sorrow (*tristitia*). And on this topic we have to consider, first, sadness or pain in itself (question 35); second, its cause (question 36); third, its effects (question 37); fourth, the remedies for it (question 38); and, fifth, its goodness or badness (question 39).

On the first topic there are eight questions: (1) Is pain (*dolor*) a passion of the soul? (2) Is sadness or sorrow (*tristitia*) the same as pain (*dolor*)? (3) Is sadness or pain contrary to pleasure? (4) Is every instance of sadness opposed to every instance of pleasure? (5) Is there any sort of sadness opposed to the pleasure of contemplation? (6) Is sadness to be avoided more than pleasure is to be desired? (7) Is exterior pain greater than interior pain? (8) What are the species of sadness?

Article 1

Is pain a passion of the soul?

It seems that pain (*dolor*) is not a passion of the soul:

Objection 1: No passion of the soul exists in the body. But pain can exist in the body; for in *De Vera Religione* Augustine says, "The pain that is said to belong to the body is a sudden corruption of the health of a thing that the soul has subjected to corruption by using it badly." Therefore, pain is not a passion of the soul.

Objection 2: Every passion of the soul has to do with the appetitive power. But pain has to do more with the apprehensive power than with the appetitive power; for in *De Natura Boni* Augustine says, "The sensory power effects pain in the body when it resists a more powerful body." Therefore, pain is not a passion of the soul.

Objection 3: Every passion involves an animal appetite. But pain pertains more to a *natural* appetite than to an *animal* appetite; for in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 8 Augustine says, "If nothing good had remained in the nature, there would be not be any pain involved in losing a good through punishment." Therefore, pain is not a passion of the soul.

But contrary to this: In *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine claims that pain is among the passions of the soul, citing this passage from Virgil: "Through [these seeds] they fear and desire, they rejoice and sorrow (*hinc metuunt, cupiunt, gaudentque dolentque*)."

I respond: Just as two things are required for pleasure, viz., (a) the conjoining of something good [to the appetite] and (b) the perception of this conjoining, so also two things are required for pain, viz., (a) the conjoining of something bad (which is bad because it deprives one of some good), and (b) the perception of this conjoining.

Now if what is conjoined does not have the character of being good or bad for what it is conjoined to, then it cannot be a cause of pleasure or pain. From this it is clear that the object of pleasure or of pain is something taken *as good* or *as bad* (*aliquid sub ratione boni vel mali*). But the good and the bad are, as such, the objects of appetite. Hence, it is clear that pleasure and pain have to do with appetite.

Now every appetitive movement or inclination that follows upon an apprehension involves either an *intellective* appetite or a *sentient* appetite. For as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 103, aa. 1 and 3), a *natural* appetite's inclination does not follow upon an apprehension on the part of the very thing that has the appetite. Therefore, since pleasure and pain presuppose a sensory power or some sort of apprehension within the same subject, it is clear that pain, like pleasure, exists in either an intellective appetite or a sentient appetite. But as was explained above (q. 22, aa. 1 and 3), every movement of the sentient appetite is called a passion—and especially those movements that bespeak a defect.

Hence, insofar as it exists in the sentient appetite, pain called a passion of the soul with complete propriety (*propriissime*), just as bodily maladies are properly called passions of the body. Hence, in *De*

Civitate Dei 14 Augustine specifically calls pain a sort of sickness (*dolorem specialiter aegritudinem nominat*).

Reply to objection 1: Pain is said to belong to the body because the *cause* of pain exists in the body—for instance, when we suffer some injury to the body. But the *movement* of pain always exists in the soul, since, as Augustine says, "The body cannot be in pain without the soul's being in pain" (*corpus non potest dolere nisi dolente anima*).

Reply to objection 2: Pain is said to belong to the sensory power not because pain is an act of a sentient power, but because the sensory power is required for bodily pain, in the same way that it is required for bodily pleasure.

Reply to objection 3: Pain at the loss of a good shows the goodness of the nature not because the pain is an act of a natural appetite, but because the nature desires something as a good, and when it is sensed that this thing is being removed, the passion of pain follows in the sentient appetite.

Article 2

Is sadness or sorrow the same as pain?

It seems that sadness or sorrow (*tristitia*) is not the same as pain (*dolor*):

Objection 1: In *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine says, "Pain (*dolor*) is in bodies." But sadness (*tristitia*) is in the soul instead. Therefore, sadness is not pain.

Objection 2: Pain (*dolor*) exists only with respect to a present evil. But sadness (*tristitia*) can exist with respect to a past evil or a future evil; for instance, repentance (*poenitentia*) is sadness about the past, and anxiety (*anxietas*) is sadness about the future. Therefore, sadness is altogether different from pain.

Objection 3: Pain (*dolor*) seems to follow upon the sense of touch alone. But sadness (*tristitia*) can follow upon any of the senses. Therefore, sadness is not pain, but instead exists in more cases.

But contrary to this: In Romans 9:2 the Apostle says, "I have great sadness and continuous pain in my heart"—where he is using 'sadness' and 'pain' for the same thing.

I respond: There are two sorts of apprehensions by which pleasure and pain can be caused, viz., (a) an apprehension on the part of the *exterior* sensory power and (b) an *interior* apprehension on the part of either the intellect or the imagination.

Now interior apprehension extends to more things than does exterior apprehension, since whatever falls under exterior apprehension falls under interior apprehension, but not vice versa. Thus, as was explained above, only the sort of pleasure that is caused by interior apprehension is called 'joy' (*gaudium*). And, similarly, only the sort of pain (*dolor*) that is caused by interior apprehension is called 'sadness' or 'sorrow' (*tristitia*). And just as the sort of pleasure that is caused by exterior apprehension is called 'pleasure' but not 'joy', so, too, the sort of pain that is caused by exterior apprehension is called 'pain' but not 'sadness' or 'sorrow'. So, then, sadness or sorrow (*tristitia*) is a species of pain (*dolor*), in the same way that joy (*gaudium*) is a species of pleasure (*delectatio*).

Reply to objection 1: In the place cited here, Augustine is talking about the use of the word, since 'pain' (*dolor*) is used more in the case of bodily pains, which are more known to us, than in the case of spiritual pains.

Reply to objection 2: The exterior sensory power perceives only what is present, whereas the interior cognitive power can perceive what is present, past, or future. And so sadness or sorrow can exist with respect to the present, the past, or the future, whereas bodily pain, which follows upon apprehension by the exterior sensory power, can exist only with respect to something present.

Reply to objection 3: The sensible objects of touch are painful not only to the extent that they are

disproportionate to the apprehensive power, but also to the extent that they are opposed to the nature. By contrast, the sensible objects of the other senses can be disproportionate to the apprehensive power, but they are not opposed to the nature except in relation to the sensible objects of touch.

Hence, only man, who is the animal that is complete with respect to cognition (*animal perfectum in cognitione*), takes pleasure in a sensible object of the other senses in its own right, whereas the other animals, as *Ethics* 3 explains, take pleasure in such an object only insofar as it is related to the sensible objects of touch. And so pain, insofar as it is contrary to natural pleasure, is not attributed to the sensible objects of the other senses; instead, what is attributed to them is sadness, which is opposed to joy that belongs to the soul (*quae contrariatur gaudio animali*).

So, then, if 'pain' is used for bodily pain, which is the more common usage, then pain is divided off from sadness as its opposite, in accord with the distinction between interior apprehension and exterior apprehension—even though, as regards their objects, pleasure extends to more things than does bodily pain.

On the other hand, if 'pain' is taken in a general sense (*communiter*), then, as has been explained, *pain* is the genus for *sadness*.

Article 3

Is sadness or pain contrary to pleasure?

It seems that sadness or pain is not contrary to pleasure:

Objection 1: One of two contraries cannot be a cause of the other. But sadness can be a cause of pleasure; for Matthew 5:5 says, "Bless are they who mourn, for they shall be comforted (*consolabuntur*)." Therefore, they are not contraries.

Objection 2: One of two contraries does not denominate the other. But in some individuals pain or sadness is itself pleasurable. For instance, in *Confessiones* 3 Augustine says, "In the case of stage plays (*in spectaculis*), pain often gives pleasure." And in *Confessiones* 4 he says, "Crying is a bitter thing, and yet sometimes it gives pleasure." Therefore, pain is not contrary to pleasure.

Objection 3: One of two contraries is not the matter of the other, since contraries cannot exist together at the same time. But pain can be the matter of pleasure. For instance, in *De Poenitentia* Augustine says, "A penitent is always sorrowful (*doleat*), and he rejoices over his sorrow (*de dolore gaudeat*)." And in *Ethics* 9 the Philosopher says, conversely, that "a bad man feels pain at what he has taken pleasure in." Therefore, pleasure and pain are not contraries.

But contrary to this: In *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine says, "Gladness (*laetitia*) is an act of will consenting to what we will, whereas sadness is an act of will dissenting from what we will the opposite of." But consenting and dissenting are contraries. Therefore, gladness and sadness are contraries.

I respond: As the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* 10, contrariety is a difference with respect to form. But the form or species of a passion or movement is taken from its object or terminus. Hence, since the objects of pleasure and of sadness or pain are contraries, viz., a present good and a present evil, it follows that pain and pleasure are contraries.

Reply to objection 1: Nothing prevents one contrary from being a *per accidens* cause of the other. And it is in this sense that sadness can be a cause of pleasure:

In one way, insofar as sadness about the absence of a thing or about the presence of its contrary leads to more forceful seeking after what one takes pleasure in (*tristitia vehementius quaerit id in quo delectetur*); for instance, someone who is thirsty more forcefully seeks after drink as a remedy for the sadness that he is suffering from.

In a second way, insofar as because of his great desire for some pleasure, an individual does not shy

away from undergoing sadness (*non recusat aliquis tristitias perferre*), in order that he might attain that pleasure.

It is in both of these ways that present mourning (*luctus praesens*) leads one toward the comfort (*ad consolationem*) of the future life. For by the very fact that a man mourns over his sins or over the postponement of glory (*luget pro peccatis vel pro dilatione gloriae*), he merits eternal comfort. Similarly, one likewise merits this comfort by the fact that in order to attain it, he does not shy away from undergoing hardships and difficulties for its sake (*labores et angustias propter ipsam sustinere*).

Reply to objection 2: Pain can itself be pleasurable *per accidens*, viz., insofar it has wonder adjoined to it (*admirationem adiunctam*), as in the case of stage plays, or insofar as it causes a memory of a thing that is loved and makes one perceive his love for that whose absence he grieves over. Hence, since this love is pleasurable, the pain and everything else that follows upon the love are likewise pleasurable to the extent that the love is felt in them. And it is likewise for this reason that the pain felt in the case of stage plays can be pleasurable to the extent that some sort of conceptualized love (*amor conceptus*) is felt for those who are portrayed in the plays.

Reply to objection 3: The will and reason reflect upon their own acts insofar as acts of will and act of reason are themselves understood as good or bad (*inquantum ipsi actus voluntatis et rationis accipiuntur sub ratione boni et mali*). And it is in this sense that sadness is able—*per accidens* and not *per se*—to be the matter for pleasure, or vice versa, viz., insofar as both are understood as good or bad.

Article 4

Is every instance of sadness contrary to every instance of pleasure?

It seems that every instance of sadness is contrary to every instance of pleasure (*omnis tristitia omni delectationi contrarietur*):

Objection 1: Just as whiteness and blackness are contrary species of color, so pleasure and pain are contrary species of the passions of the soul. But whiteness and blackness are universally opposed to one another. Therefore, pleasure and pain are, too.

Objection 2: Remedies (*medicinae*) are effected through contraries. But as is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 7, every instance of pleasure is a remedy for every instance of sadness. Therefore, every instance of pleasure is contrary to every instance of sadness.

Objection 3: Contraries are such that they impede one another. But as is clear from what is said in *Ethics* 10, every instance of sadness impedes every instance of pleasure. Therefore, every instance of sadness is contrary to every instance of pleasure.

But contrary to this: Contraries do not have the same cause. But the same habit is the source of someone's rejoicing over one thing and being sad about its opposite; for instance, it is out of charity that it is possible to "rejoice with those who rejoice and weep with those who weep," as Romans 12:15 puts it. Therefore, it is not the case that every instance of sadness is contrary to every instance of pleasure.

I respond: As *Metaphysics* 10 says, contrariety is a difference with respect to form. But form is both generic and specific. Hence, some things happen to be contrary with respect to the forms of their genera (*secundum formam generis*), e.g., *virtue* and *vice*, and some things are contrary with respect to the forms of their species (*secundum formam speciei*), e.g., *justice* and *injustice*. Note, moreover, that certain things, e.g., substances and qualities, are specified by *absolute* forms, whereas other things are specified *in relation to something outside themselves* (*per comparationem ad aliquid extra*), in the way that passions and movements receive their species from their termini or their objects.

Thus, in the case of things whose species are thought of in accord with *absolute* forms, it can happen that the species contained under contrary genera are not contrary to one another with respect to

the notion of their species (*non esse contrarias secundum rationem specie*), and yet they do not happen to have any affinity to or agreement with one another. For instance, *intemperance* and *justice*, which fall under contrary genera, viz., *virtue* and *vice*, are not contrary to one another with respect to the notions of their proper species, and yet they do not have any affinity to or agreement with one another.

By contrast, in those things whose species are taken in accord with *a relation to something extrinsic*, it can happen that the species of contrary genera are not only not contrary to one another, but also have some sort of agreement with and affinity to one another. For to be related in the same way to contraries induces contrariety, in the way that moving toward whiteness and moving toward blackness have the character of contrariety, whereas to be related in contrary ways to contraries has the character of likeness, as in the case of receding from whiteness and moving toward blackness. This is especially evident in the case of contradiction, which is the source of opposition (*principium oppositionis*), since opposition consists in the same thing's being affirmed and denied (*in affirmatione et negatione eiusdem consistit oppositio*), e.g., *white and non-white*. But there is agreement and likeness in affirming the one opposite and denying the other, as in the case of *black and non-white*.

Now since sadness and pleasure are passions, they are specified by their objects. And, to be sure, they have contrariety with respect to their genera (*secundum genus*), since the one has to do with *pursuing* and the other with *avoiding*—which, as *Ethics* 6 says, stand to one another in the case of the passions as affirmation and negation stand to one another in the case of reason. And so sadness and pleasure with respect to the same thing have opposition to one another with respect to their species. However, sadness and pleasure with respect to diverse things, where those diverse things are disparate but not opposites, do not have opposition to one another with respect to the notions of their species, but are likewise disparate, e.g., being saddened at a friend's death and taking pleasure in contemplation. But if the diverse things in question are contraries, then pleasure and sadness not only do not have contrariety with respect to the notions of their species, but even have agreement and affinity, e.g., rejoicing over something good and being saddened at something bad.

Reply to objection 1: Whiteness and blackness do not have their species from a relation to anything exterior to them, in the way that pleasure and sadness do. Hence, the argument is not the same in the two cases.

Reply to objection 2: As is clear from *Metaphysics* 8, the genus is taken from the matter. Now in the case of accidents, the subject takes the place of the matter; and it has been explained that pleasure and sadness are contraries with respect to their genera. So in every instance of sadness there is a disposition of the subject that is contrary to the disposition that exists in every instance of pleasure. For in each instance of pleasure the appetite is disposed toward accepting what it has, whereas in every instance of sadness the appetite is disposed toward fleeing from what it has.

Reply to objection 3: From this the reply to the third objection is clear.

An alternative reply is that even if not every instance of sadness is contrary to every instance of pleasure with respect to its species, it is nonetheless the case that they are contrary with respect to their effects. For the nature of an animal is comforted by the one, but troubled by the other.

Article 5

Is there a sadness that is contrary to the pleasure of contemplation?

It seems that there is a sadness that is contrary to the pleasure of contemplation (*delectationi contemplationis sit aliqua tristitia*):

Objection 1: In 2 Corinthians 7:10 the Apostle says, "The sadness that is in accord with God works penance steadfast unto salvation." But to look to God pertains to higher reason, one role of which,

according to Augustine in *De Trinitate* 12, is to devote itself to contemplation. Therefore, there is a sadness opposed to the pleasure of contemplation.

Objection 2: Contraries are the effects of contraries. Therefore, if one contrary, when contemplated, is a cause of pleasure, then the other will be a cause of sadness. And so there will be a sadness that is contrary to the pleasure of contemplation.

Objection 3: Just as the object of pleasure is the good, so the object of sadness is the bad. But contemplation can have the character of something bad; for in *Metaphysics* 12 the Philosopher says, "There are some things that it is wrong to meditate on." Therefore, there can be a sadness that is contrary to the pleasure of contemplation.

Objection 4: As *Ethics* 7 and 10 say, any operation is a cause of pleasure insofar as it is not impeded. But there are many ways in which the operation of contemplation can be impeded, so that it either does not exist at all or else exists with difficulty. Therefore, in contemplation there can be a sadness that is contrary to the pleasure.

Objection 5: The affliction of the flesh is a cause of sadness. But Ecclesiastes 12:6 says, "Frequent meditation is an affliction of the flesh." Therefore, contemplation involves a sadness that is contrary to pleasure.

But contrary to this: Wisdom 8:16 says, "Her"—i.e., wisdom's—"conversation has no bitterness nor her company any tediousness, but gladness and joy." But wisdom's conversation and company come through contemplation. Therefore, there is no sadness that is contrary to the pleasure of contemplation.

I respond: There are two ways to understand the pleasure of contemplation:

First, in such a way that the act of contemplating is a *cause* of the pleasure and *not its object*. And in this sense the pleasure is directed not toward the contemplation itself but toward the thing that is being contemplated. Now it is possible to contemplate something disagreeable and sorrowful (*aliquid nocivum et contristans*), just as it is possible to contemplate something agreeable and pleasurable. Hence, if the pleasure of contemplation is understood in this sense, then there is nothing to prevent there being a sadness that is contrary to the pleasure of contemplation.

There is a second way in which the pleasure of contemplation can be thought of, viz., in the sense that the act of contemplation is *an object and a cause* of the pleasure—as, for instance, when someone takes pleasure in the very fact that he is engaged in contemplating. And in that case, as Gregory of Nyssa says, "There is no sadness opposed to the pleasure that follows upon contemplation (*ei delectatione quae est secundum contemplationem*). And the Philosopher says the same thing in *Topics* 1 and *Ethics* 10.

However, this has to be understood as speaking *per se*. The reason for this is that an instance of sadness is *per se* contrary to an instance of pleasure that is directed toward a contrary object; for instance, sadness directed toward the cold is contrary to pleasure directed toward heat. However, the object of contemplation has nothing contrary to it. For the notions of contraries (*contrariorum rationes*) are not, insofar as they are apprehended, themselves contraries; instead, the one contrary is a means for understanding the other (*unum contrarium est ratio cognoscendi aliud*). Hence, speaking *per se*, there cannot be any sort of sadness that is contrary to the pleasure that exists in contemplating. But neither does this pleasure have any sort of sadness adjoined to it, as do corporeal pleasures, which are, as it were, remedies for certain troubles; for instance, someone takes pleasure in drink because he is troubled by thirst, but when his thirst has been completely driven away, the pleasure of drinking also ceases. For the pleasure of contemplation is not caused by the fact that some trouble is being driven off, but is instead caused by the fact that contemplation is pleasurable in its own right; for as has been explained (q. 31, a. 1), the act of contemplating does not involve generation, but is a certain complete operation.

However, sadness is mixed in *per accidens* with the pleasure of apprehension—and this in two ways: first, on the part of the organ and, second, because of impediments to apprehension. On the part of the organ, sadness or pain is mixed in with the apprehension either directly in the apprehensive powers of the sentient part, which have a corporeal organ, or because of a sensible thing that is contrary to the

normal condition of the organ, e.g., the taste of something bitter or the smell of something fetid, or because of the prolongation of an agreeable sensible object which, as was explained above (q. 33, a. 2), overwhelms the natural condition and is such that a sensible apprehension that was at first pleasurable becomes wearisome. However, these two considerations do not play a role directly in the case of the mind's act of contemplating, since the mind does not have a corporeal organ. This is why the passage cited above claims that the mind's contemplation has no "bitterness or tediousness."

Still, because in its act of contemplating the mind makes use of the sentient apprehensive powers, in whose acts weariness occurs, it follows that some affliction or pain is mixed in indirectly with contemplation. However, sadness is not contrary to the pleasure of contemplation in either of the two ways in which it is adjoined *per accidens* with contemplation. For the sadness that derives from an impediment to contemplation is not contrary to the pleasure of contemplation, but instead has an affinity or agreement with it, as is clear from what was said above (a. 4). And the sadness or affliction that derives from bodily weariness does not belong to the same genus and is thus altogether disparate.

And so it is clear that there is no sadness that is contrary to the pleasure that comes from contemplation itself, and there is no sadness adjoined to that pleasure except *per accidens*.

Reply to objection 1: The "sadness that is in accord with God" is not directed toward the mind's contemplation itself, but is instead directed toward something that the mind contemplates, viz., sin, which the mind considers to be contrary to God's love.

Reply to objection 2: Insofar as things that are contraries in nature exist in the mind, they do not have contrariety. For it is not the case that the notions of contraries are themselves contraries; instead, the one contrary is a means for understanding the other. It is for this reason that one and the same science deals with the relevant contraries (*est una scientia contrariorum*).

Reply to objection 3: In its own right (*secundum se*), contemplation never has the character of something bad, since contemplation is nothing other than the consideration of what is true, and this is the intellect's good. Instead, contemplation has the character of something bad only *per accidens*, viz., either because the contemplation of what is more vile impedes the contemplation of what is better, or because the appetite is attached in a disordered way to the thing that is contemplated.

Reply to objection 4: As has been explained, the sort of sadness that is directed toward an impediment to contemplation is not contrary to the pleasure of contemplation, but instead has an affinity to it.

Reply to objection 5: As has been explained, the "affliction of the flesh" is related *per accidens* and indirectly to the mind's act of contemplating.

Article 6

Is sadness to be avoided more than pleasure is to be desired?

It seems that sadness is to be avoided more than pleasure is to be desired (*magis sit fugienda tristitia quam delectatio appetenda*) :

Objection 1: In *83 Quaestiones* Augustine says, "There is no one who does not avoid pain more than he desires pleasure." But what everyone generally agrees to seems to be natural. Therefore, it is natural and fitting that sadness be avoided more than pleasure is desired.

Objection 2: The action of a contrary contributes to the velocity and intensity of a movement; for instance, as the Philosopher says in *Meteorlogia*, "Hot water freezes more quickly and more solidly." But an aversion to sadness (*fuga tristitiae*) arises from the saddened individual's contrariety, whereas the desire for pleasure does not arise from anything contrary but instead proceeds from the object's being agreeable to the individual who takes pleasure in it. Therefore, the aversion to sadness is greater than the

desire for pleasure.

Objection 3: The more someone fights a stronger passion in accord with reason, the more praiseworthy and virtuous he is, since, as *Ethics* 2 says, virtue has to do with what is difficult and good. But the courageous individual, who resists the movement by which pain is avoided, is more virtuous than the temperate individual, who resists the movement by which pleasure is desired; for in *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, "It is the courageous and the just who are most highly honored." Therefore, the movement by which pain is avoided is more forceful than the movement by which pleasure is desired.

But contrary to this: As is clear from Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, the good is stronger than the bad. But pleasure is desirable because of the good, which is its object, whereas the aversion to sadness is because of the bad. Therefore, the desire for pleasure is stronger than the aversion to sadness.

I respond: Speaking *per se*, the desire for pleasure is stronger than the aversion to pain (*appetitus delectationis est fortior quam fuga tristitiae*).

The reason for this is that the cause of pleasure is an agreeable good, whereas the cause of pain or sadness is some bad thing that is repugnant. But it is possible for a good to be agreeable without any sort of disagreeableness (*conveniens absque omni dissonantia*), whereas there cannot be anything that is totally bad and repugnant without any sort of agreeableness. Hence, it is possible for an instance of pleasure to be complete and perfect (*integra et perfecta*), but an instance of sadness is always partial. Hence, naturally speaking, the desire for pleasure is greater than the aversion to pain.

A second reason is that the good, which is the object of pleasure, is desired for its own sake (*propter seipsum*), whereas the bad, which is the object of sadness, is to be avoided because it is the privation of a good. But what is such-and-such in its own right (*per se*) is stronger than what is such-and-such through because of another (*per aliud*). A clear indication of this is found in natural movements. For every natural movement is more intense at the end, when it is approaching the terminus that befits its nature than at the beginning, when it moving away from the terminus that does not befit its nature; it is as if a nature tends toward what befits it more than it flees from what is repugnant to it. Hence, speaking *per se*, the inclination of an appetitive power tends toward pleasure more strongly than it flees from sadness.

However, it is possible *per accidens* for someone to flee from sadness more intensely than he desires pleasure. There are three ways in which this happens.

First, on the part of *the apprehension*. For as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 10, "Love is felt more strongly when a lack [of the good] produces it." But from the lack of the thing loved comes sadness, which proceeds from the loss of some good that is loved or from the incursion of some contrary evil. Pleasure, by contrast, does not involve a lack of the thing that is loved, but instead comes to rest in that thing once it is possessed. Therefore, since love is a cause of pleasure and of sadness, the greater the aversion to sadness, the more strongly the love is felt in the face of what is contrary to the love.

Second, on the part of the *cause* that saddens one or inflicts pain, when this cause is repugnant to a good that is loved to more than is the good in which we are taking pleasure. For instance, we love the body's natural condition (*consistentiam corporis naturalem*) more than the pleasure of food. And so out of fear of the pain that comes from blows or other things of this sort, we forsake the pleasure of food or of other such things.

Third, on the part of the *effect*, viz., insofar as the sadness impedes not only a single instance of pleasure, but all of them.

Reply to objection 1: What Augustine says, viz., that pain is avoided more than pleasure is desired, is true *per accidens* and not *per se*. This is clear from what he adds: "For we see that even the most savage animals are deterred from the greatest pleasures by their fear of pain," where the pain is opposed to life, which is loved above all else.

Reply to objection 2: A movement that is from within differs from a movement that is from

without. For as was explained above for the case of a natural movement, a movement that is from within tends toward what is agreeable instead of receding from a contrary. By contrast, a movement that is from without is intensified by the contrariety itself, since each thing tries in its own way to resist its contrary, in the same way that it strives to conserve itself. Hence, a violent movement is intensified at the beginning, and becomes less intense at the end (*motus violentus intenditur in principio et remittitur in fine*).

Now a movement of the appetitive part of the soul is from within, since it moves from the soul to the things. And so, speaking *per se*, pleasure is desired more than sadness is avoided. But the movement of sentience (*motus sensitivae partis*) is from without and is, as it were, from the things to the soul. Hence, what is contrary to a greater degree is sensed to a greater degree. And so, *per accidens*, insofar as the sensory power is required for pleasure and sadness, sadness is avoided more than pleasure is desired.

Reply to objection 3: It is not just any sort of pain or sadness that a courageous individual is praised for not being overcome by in accord with reason. Rather, he is praised because he is not overcome by pain or sadness that involves the danger of death. This sort of sadness is fled from more intensely than the pleasures of food or sex, which are the objects of temperance, are desired, just as life is loved more intensely than food or sexual intercourse are. By contrast, as is clear from *Ethics* 3, the temperate individual is praised for not pursuing the pleasures of touch rather than for not fleeing from the contrary sorts of sadness.

Article 7

Is exterior pain greater than the interior pain of the heart?

It seems that exterior pain is greater than the interior pain of the heart:

Objection 1: Exterior pain is caused by a cause which attacks the good condition of the body that life consists in (*ex causa repugnante bonae consistentiae corporis in quo est vita*), whereas interior pain is caused by an act of imagining evil. Therefore, since life is loved more than an imagined good is, it seems that, given what has already been said, exterior pain is greater than interior pain.

Objection 2: A real thing moves one more than a likeness of a thing. But exterior pain comes from the real conjoining of some contrary [to the appetite], whereas interior pain comes from the apprehended likeness of a contrary. Therefore, exterior pain is greater than interior pain.

Objection 3: A cause is known from its effect. But exterior pain has more forceful effects; for a man dies because of exterior pains rather than because of interior pains. Therefore, exterior pain is greater than, and is fled from more intensely than, interior pain.

But contrary to this: Ecclesiasticus 25:17 says, "The sadness of the heart is all wounds, and the wickedness of a woman is all evils." Therefore, just as the wickedness of a woman surpasses all wickedness—which is what is meant here—so, too, the sadness of the heart exceeds all exterior wounds.

I respond: Interior and exterior pain agree in one respect and differ in two respects. They agree in that each, as was explained above (a. 1), is a movement of the appetitive power, whereas they differ in the two things that are required for pain and pleasure, viz., the *cause*, which is a conjoined good or a conjoined evil, and the *apprehension*.

For the *cause* of exterior pain is a conjoined evil that attacks the body, whereas the cause of interior pain is a conjoined evil that attacks the appetite. Also, exterior pain follows upon the sensory power's apprehension—and especially the sense of touch—whereas interior pain follows upon an interior apprehension by the imagination or even by reason. Therefore, if the cause of interior pain is compared with the cause of exterior pain, the one belongs *per se* to the appetite, to which both sorts of pain belong, whereas the other belongs to the appetite through something else (*per aliud*). For a pain is interior by the

fact something is attacking the appetite itself, whereas a pain is exterior from the fact that something is attacking the appetite because it is attacking the body. But it is always the case that what is such-and-such *per se* is prior to what is such-and-such through another (*per aliud*). Hence, on this score interior pain surpasses exterior pain (*dolor interior praeeminet dolori exteriori*).

The same thing holds on the part of the *apprehension*. For apprehension by reason and the imagination is higher than (*altior quam*) apprehension by the sense of touch. Hence, speaking absolutely and *per se*, interior pain surpasses (*potior est quam*) exterior pain. An indication of this is that an individual voluntarily undergoes exterior pain in order to avoid interior pain. And to the extent that exterior pain does not attack the interior appetite, it becomes in some sense pleasurable and agreeable by an interior joy.

However, sometimes exterior pain exists along with interior pain, and in such a case the pain is increased. For not only is interior pain greater than exterior pain, but it is also more general, since whatever is repugnant to the body can be repugnant to the interior appetite, and whatever is apprehended by the sensory power can be apprehended by the imagination and reason—but not vice versa. And the reason why the passage cited above explicitly says, "The sadness of the heart is all wounds" is that even the pain of exterior wounds is included under the interior sadness of the heart.

Reply to objection 1: Interior pain can also be directed at what is contrary to life. And so the comparison of interior pain with exterior pain should be made not according to the different evils that are the cause of the pain, but according to the different relations of this cause of pain to the appetite.

Reply to objection 2: Interior pain does not proceed from the likeness of an apprehended thing as its cause; for a man is saddened interiorly not by the apprehended likeness itself, but by the thing that it is a likeness of. This thing is apprehended more perfectly to the extent that the likeness is more immaterial and more abstract. And so, speaking *per se*, interior pain is greater insofar as it is directed toward a greater evil; for an evil is better known by an interior apprehension.

Reply to objection 3: Corporeal changes are caused to a greater extent by exterior pain, both because (a) the cause of exterior pain is a corrupting thing that is conjoined to the body (*corrumpens coniunctum corporaliter*), and this is a requirement for apprehension by the sense of touch; and also because (b) the exterior sensory power is more corporeal than the interior sensory power is, just as the sentient appetite is more corporeal than the intellective appetite is—and because of this, as was explained above (q. 22, a. 3 and q. 31, a. 5), the body is changed to a greater degree by a movement of the sentient appetite. And, similarly, the body is changed to a greater degree by an exterior pain than by an interior pain.

Article 8

Is Damascene's division of sadness into four species correct?

It seems that Damascene incorrectly identifies the four species of sadness as listlessness (*acedia*), distress (*acthos*) (or anxiety (*anxietas*), according to Gregory of Nyssa), pity (*misericordia*), and envy (*invidia*):

Objection 1: Sadness is opposed to pleasure. But no species are assigned to pleasure. Therefore, neither should species be assigned to sadness.

Objection 2: Repentance is a certain species of sadness. And, as the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 2, so are indignation (*nemesis*) and jealousy (*zelus*). But they are not included among the aforementioned species. Therefore, the division noted above is insufficient.

Objection 3: Every division should be made by means of opposites. But the aforementioned species are not opposed to one another. For according to Gregory, "Listlessness is sadness that cuts off

speech, anxiety is sadness that weighs one down, envy is sadness about goods that belong to others, and pity is sadness about evils that belong to others." But it is possible for someone to be sad about both another's goods and another's evils, and at the same time both to be weighed down interiorly and to lose his voice exteriorly. Therefore, the aforementioned division is incorrect.

But contrary to this is the authority of the two of them, viz., Gregory of Nyssa and Damascene.

I respond: It belongs to the notion of a species (*ad rationem speciei*) to be had by an addition to the genus. Now there are two ways in which something can be added to a genus:

In one way, what is added pertains to the genus *per se* and is virtually contained within it, in the way that *rational* is added to *animal*. And as is clear from the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 7 and 8, this sort of addition effects genuine species of a given genus (*facit veras species alicuius generis*).

On the other hand, something may be added to a genus as something extraneous to its notion, in the way that *white*, or something of this sort, is added to *animal*. And this sort of addition does not effect genuine species of the genus in the sense in which we commonly speak of a genus and its various species. Nonetheless, once in a while something is said to be a species of a given genus because it contains something extraneous to which the notion of the genus is applied, as when *glowing coal* and *flame* are said to be species of *fire* because of the way the nature of fire is applied to some outside matter (*ad materiam alienam*). And by a similar way of speaking, astronomy (*astrologia*) and the science of perspective (*perspectiva*) are called species of mathematics, insofar as mathematical principles are being applied to natural matter. It is in this way that the species of sadness are being identified here through the application of sadness to something extraneous.

Now this extraneous thing can be taken either from the side of the *cause*, i.e., the *object*, or from the side of the *effect*.

The proper *object* of sadness is (a) something bad that is (b) one's own (*proprium malum*).

Hence, an extraneous object of sadness can be taken from *just one* of these (*secundum alterum tantum*), viz., in the sense that it is *something bad that is not one's own*, and in that case there is *pity* (*misericordia*), which is sadness about an evil that belongs to someone else insofar as it is nonetheless counted as one's own evil.

Or the object can be extraneous with respect to *both* of them, viz., in the sense that the object of sadness is neither one's own nor anything bad, but is instead *the good of another*, and in that case there is *envy*.

Now the proper *effect* of sadness consists in (a) a certain aversion (b) on the part of the appetite (*in quadam fuga appetitus*).

Hence, what is extraneous with respect to the effect of sadness can be taken from *just one* of these, viz., in the sense that the aversion is removed, and in that case there is *anxiety*, which weighs the soul down in such a way that there does not appear to be any escape—this is why it is also called by another name, viz., *emotional constriction* (*angustia*).

If, on the other hand, this heaviness proceeds in such a way that it immobilizes the exterior members from their work, then this pertains to *listlessness* (*acedia*), so that the effect will be extraneous in both respects, since neither is there an aversion nor does the effect exist in the appetite. And the reason why listlessness is specifically said to cut off speech is that among all the exterior movements, it is the voice that most expresses one's interior conceptions and affections, not only among men, but, as *Politics* 1 says, among the other animals as well.

Reply to objection 1: Pleasure is caused by the good, which has [just] one sense. And so not as many species of pleasure are specified as are species of sadness, which is caused by evil; for as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, evil "occurs in many ways" (*multifariam contingit*).

Reply to objection 2: Repentance concerns one's own evil, which is the proper object of sadness. Hence, it is not relevant to the species that concern us here. On the other hand, as will become clear below (*ST* 2-2, q.36, a. 2), indignation and jealousy are contained under envy.

Reply to objection 3: The division in question here is taken not from the opposition of the species but instead, as has been explained, from the diversity of the extraneous things that the nature of sadness is drawn to.

QUESTION 36

The Causes of Sadness or Pain

Next we have to consider the causes of sadness or pain (*tristitia*). And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Is the cause of pain (*dolor*) a lost good or instead a conjoined evil? (2) Is concupiscence a cause of pain? (3) Is a desire for oneness (*appetitus unitatis*) a cause of pain? (4) Is a power that cannot be resisted a cause of pain?

Article 1

Is it a lost good that is a cause of pain rather than a conjoined evil?

It seems that it is a lost good (*bonum amissum*) that is a cause of pain (*dolor*) rather than a conjoined evil (*malum coniunctum*):

Objection 1: In *De Octo Quaestionibus Dulcitii* Augustine says that there is pain over the loss of temporal goods. Therefore, by the same line of reasoning, every pain occurs because of the loss of some good.

Objection 2: It was explained above (q. 35, a. 4) that an instance of pain that is contrary to an instance of pleasure is directed toward the the same thing that the pleasure is directed toward. But as was explained above (q. 23, a. 4 and q. 35, a.3), pleasure has to do with a good. Therefore, pain has to do mainly with the loss of a good.

Objection 3: According to Augustine in *De Civitate Dei* 14, love is a cause of sadness, just as it is a cause of the other affections of the soul. But the object of love is a good. Therefore, pain or sadness has more to do with a lost good than with a conjoined evil.

But contrary to this: In *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2 Damascene says, "An anticipated evil is a cause of fear (*timorem constituit*), whereas a present evil is a cause of sadness."

I respond: If privations had the same status (*hoc modo se haberent*) in the soul's apprehensions that they have among the things themselves, then this question, it seems, would be of no importance. For as was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 14, a. 10 and q. 48, a. 3), evil or badness (*malum*) is the privation of a good, and in the world of reality (*in rerum natura*) a privation is nothing other than a lack of the opposed disposition. And so, accordingly, being saddened over a lost good would be the same as being saddened over a possessed evil.

However, sadness is a movement of the appetite that follows upon an apprehension. And within apprehension a privation itself has the nature of a sort of entity and is thus called a 'being of reason' (*ens rationis*). And so since evil is a privation, it behaves in the manner of a contrary. Therefore, as regards the appetitive movement, it makes a difference whether this movement has to do mainly with a conjoined evil or a lost good.

Since the movement of an animal appetite has the same status among the works of the soul that a natural movement has among natural things, the truth can be ascertained by considering natural movements. For if we think about the notions *moving toward* (*accessus*) and *receding from* (*recessus*) in the case of natural movements, *moving toward* has to do *per se* with what is agreeable to the nature in question, whereas *receding from* has to do *per se* with what is contrary to the nature; for instance, a heavy body *per se* recedes from a higher place, whereas it naturally moves toward a lower place. But if we take the cause of these two movements, viz., heaviness (*gravitas*), the heaviness itself first inclines a thing toward a place below prior to withdrawing it from the place above from which it recedes as it tends downward.

So, then, since among the appetitive movements sadness is a sort of aversion or receding (*se habeat per modum fugae vel recessus*), whereas pleasure is a sort of pursuit or moving toward (*per modum prosecutionis vel accessus*), it follows that just as pleasure has to do in the first place with an acquired good as its object, so sadness has to do with a conjoined evil. But the cause of pleasure and of sadness,

viz., love, has to do with the good prior to having to do with the bad. So, then, in the sense in which a passion's object is its cause, the cause of sadness or pain is more properly a conjoined evil than a lost good.

Reply to objection 1: The loss of a good is itself apprehended as something bad (*sub ratione mali*), just as the loss of something bad is apprehended as a good (*sub ratione boni*). And this is why Augustine says that pain stems from the loss of temporal goods.

Reply to objection 2: An instance of pleasure and an instance of pain contrary to it have to do with the same thing but under contrary notions. For instance, if the pleasure is directed toward some good, then the sadness is directed toward the absence of that same good. Now as is clear from *Metaphysics* 10, one of two contraries includes the privation of the other. And so it is that the sadness that is directed toward a contrary is in some sense directed toward the same thing under a contrary notion.

Reply to objection 3: When many movements stem from a single cause, only the first of the movements, and not all of them, must have to do principally with what the cause has to do with principally. Each of the other movements has to do principally with what is appropriate for it, given its own nature.

Article 2

Is concupiscence a cause of pain or sadness?

It seems that concupiscence or sentient desire (*concupiscentia*) is not a cause of pain or sadness:

Objection 1: As has been explained (a. 1), sadness *per se* has to do with what is bad. But concupiscence is a certain movement of the appetite toward what is good, and a movement that is directed toward one of two contraries is not a cause of a movement that has to do with the other contrary. Therefore, concupiscence is not a cause of pain.

Objection 2: According to Damascene, pain has to with the present, whereas concupiscence has to do with the future. Therefore, concupiscence is not a cause of pain.

Objection 3: That which is *per se* pleasurable is not a cause of pain. But as the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 1, concupiscence is pleasurable in its own right (*secundum seipsam*). Therefore, concupiscence is not a cause of pain or sadness.

But contrary to this: In *Enchiridion* Augustine says, "When ignorance of things that have to be done and a desire (*concupiscentia*) for harmful things find their way in, error and pain are added as attendants." But ignorance is a cause of error. Therefore, concupiscence is a cause of pain.

I respond: Sadness is a certain movement of the animal appetite. But as has been explained (a. 1), an appetitive movement bears a likeness to the movement of a natural appetite, for which two sorts of causes can be assigned: one in the manner of an *end*, and the other as *the source of the beginning* of the movement (*alia sicut unde est principium motus*). For instance, the cause, in the sense of the *end*, of the downward movement of a heavy body is a place down below (*locus deorsum*), whereas the beginning of the movement (*principium motus*) is the natural inclination that comes from heaviness (*ex gravitate*).

Now the cause, in the manner of an *end*, of an appetitive movement is the movement's object. And in this sense, as was explained above (a. 1), the cause of pain or sadness is a conjoined evil.

On the other hand, the cause, in the sense of *the source of the beginning* of such a movement, is the interior inclination of the appetite, which is first of all inclined toward a good and, as a result, is inclined toward rejecting the contrary evil (*ad repudiandum malum contrarium*). And so the first principle of this sort of appetitive movement is love, which is the appetite's first inclination toward attaining the good, whereas the second principle is hatred, which is the appetite's first inclination toward avoiding what is

bad. But since concupiscence or desire (*concupiscentia vel cupiditas*) is the first effect of love, which, as was explained above (q. 32, a. 6), we especially delight in, Augustine often substitutes 'concupiscence' (*concupiscentia*) or 'avid desire' (*cupiditas*) for 'love' (*amor*)—as was likewise explained above (q. 30, a. 2). And this is the sense in which he claims that concupiscence is a universal cause of pain.

However, even when thought of according to its proper notion, concupiscence itself is sometimes a cause of pain. For everything that keeps a movement from reaching its terminus is contrary to that movement. But what is contrary to the appetite's movement is a cause of sadness (*contristans*). And so, as a result, concupiscence becomes a cause of sadness insofar as we are saddened by the postponement of a desired good or by its being completely cancelled (*de retardatione boni concupiti vel totali ablatione*). However, concupiscence cannot be a *universal* cause of pain, since we sorrow more over the removal of present goods (*de subtractione bonorum praesentium*), in which we are already taking pleasure, than over the future goods that we have concupiscence for (*quae concupiscimus*).

Reply to objection 1: As has been explained, the appetite's inclination toward attaining what is good is a cause of the appetite's inclination toward avoiding what is bad. And this is why appetitive movements that have to do with the good are posited as a cause of appetitive movements that have to do with what is bad.

Reply to objection 2: Even if what is desired is future in reality, it is nonetheless present in a certain sense insofar as it is hoped for.

An alternative reply is that even if the desired good is itself future, nonetheless, what causes pain is an obstacle that is posed in the present.

Reply to objection 3: Concupiscence is pleasurable as long as hope remains for acquiring what one has concupiscence for. But if the hope is removed by an obstacle that is posed, then the concupiscence is a cause of pain.

Article 3

Is a desire for oneness a cause of pain?

It seems that a desire for oneness (*appetitus unitatis*) is not a cause of pain:

Objection 1: In *Ethics* 10 the Philosopher says, "This opinion," which posited that being filled up (*repletio*) is a cause of pleasure and being cut off (*incisio*) is a cause of sadness, "seems to have been formed on the basis of the pleasures and pains associated with food." But not every instance of pleasure or of sadness is of this sort. Therefore, a desire for oneness is not a universal cause of pain—given that being filled up has to do with oneness, whereas being cut off induces a multitude.

Objection 2: Any sort of separation is opposed to oneness. Therefore, if pain were caused by a desire for oneness, then no sort of separation would be pleasurable. But this is clearly false in the case of the separation of what is superfluous.

Objection 3: The reason why we desire to be conjoined to something good is the same reason why we desire to be separated from something bad. But just as being conjoined pertains to oneness, since oneness is a certain sort of union, so separation is contrary to oneness. Therefore, a desire for oneness should not be posited as a cause of pain more than a desire for separation is.

But contrary to this: In *De Libero Arbitrio* 3 Augustine says, "From the pain that beasts feel, it is quite evident how much their souls, in ruling and animating their bodies, desire oneness. For what is pain other than a sort of reluctant sensing of division or corruption?"

I respond: In the same way that having concupiscence or desire for the good is a cause of pain, so also love, or a desire for oneness, should be posited as a cause of pain. For the good of each thing consists in a certain sort of oneness, viz., insofar as each thing has united within itself the things that its

completeness (*perfectio*) consists in; this is why the Platonists claimed that the One is a principle in the same way that the Good is. Hence, each thing naturally desires oneness in the same way that it desires goodness. And because of this, just as love in the sense of a desire for the good is a cause of pain, so love in the sense of a desire for oneness is a cause of pain.

Reply to objection 1: It is not just any sort of union that brings the nature of the good to perfection, but only that sort of union that the entity's complete *esse* depends on (*sed solum illa unio a qua dependet esse perfectum rei*).

And, for this same reason, it is not, as some have thought, just any sort of desire for oneness that is a cause of pain or sadness. In the cited passage the Philosopher rules out their opinion by appealing to the fact that some instances of being filled up are not pleasurable, in the way that those who are filled up with food do not take pleasure in consuming food. For this sort of being filled up—or oneness—would be repugnant to complete *esse* rather than constitutive of it (*magis repugnaret ad perfectum esse quam ipsum constitueret*). Hence, pain is caused not by the desire for just any sort of oneness, but rather by the desire for the sort of oneness that the nature's perfection (*perfectio naturae*) consists in.

Reply to objection 2: Separation can be pleasurable either insofar as what is removed is contrary to the thing's perfection, or insofar as the separation has some sort of union adjoined to it—as, for instance, the union of a sensible object with the sensory power.

Reply to objection 3: The separation from things that are harmful or corrupting is desired insofar as such things destroy the right sort of oneness. Hence, the desire for a separation of this sort is not a first cause of pain, but is instead a desire for oneness.

Article 4

Should a greater power be posited as a cause of pain?

It seems that a greater power (*potestas maior*) should not be posited as a cause of pain:

Objection 1: What is within an agent's power is no longer present but future. But pain has to do with a present evil. Therefore, a greater power is not a cause of pain.

Objection 2: Inflicted harm is a cause of pain. But harm can be inflicted even by a lesser power. Therefore, a greater power should not be posited as a cause of pain.

Objection 3: The causes of appetitive movements are the soul's interior inclinations. But a greater power is something exterior. Therefore, it should not be posited as a cause of pain.

But contrary to this: In *De Natura Boni* Augustine says, "The will resisting a greater power causes pain in the mind; the sensory power resisting a more powerful body causes pain in the body."

I respond: As was explained above (a. 1), a conjoined evil is a cause of pain or sadness in the manner of an object. Therefore, whatever causes the evil to be conjoined should be posited as a cause of pain or sadness. Now it is clearly contrary to the appetite's inclination for it to adhere in the present to what is bad. But what is contrary to a thing's inclination never reaches it except through the action of something more powerful. And this is why Augustine claims that a greater power is a cause of pain.

However, note that if a greater power is strong enough to change a contrary inclination into a proper inclination, then there will no longer be any repugnance or violence—as when a stronger agent, by corrupting a heavy body, removes from it the inclination by which it tends downward, at which point being borne upwards is natural to it and not violent. So, then, if some greater power is strong enough to remove the will's inclination or the sentient appetite's inclination, then pain or sadness does not follow from this. Instead, pain or sadness follows only when the appetite's inclination to the contrary remains. And this is why Augustine says that it is "the will *resisting* a greater power" that causes pain. For if it were not resisting, but if it instead ceded by consenting, then pleasure, and not pain, would follow.

Reply to objection 1: A greater power is a cause of pain not insofar as it is an agent in potentiality, but insofar as it is actually acting, viz., while it is effecting the conjoining of the corruptive evil.

Reply to objection 2: Nothing prevents a power that is not greater absolutely speaking from being greater with respect to something. And in this sense it is able to inflict harm. But if it were not greater in any way at all, then it would not in any way be able to inflict harm and hence could not be a cause of pain.

Reply to objection 3: Exterior agents can be a cause of appetitive movements insofar as they cause the presence of the object. And it is in this sense that a greater power is posited as a cause of pain.

QUESTION 37

The Effects of Pain or Sadness

Next we have to consider the effects of pain or sadness (*de effectibus doloris vel tristitiae*). And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Does pain remove the ability to learn something new? (2) Is the mind's being weighed down (*aggravatio animi*) an effect of sadness or pain? (3) Does sadness or pain weaken every operation? (4) Does sadness harm the body more than the other passions of the soul do?

Article 1

Does pain remove the ability to learn something new?

It seems that pain does not remove the ability to learn something new (*non auferat facultatem addiscendi*):

Objection 1: Isaiah 26:9 says, "When you issue your judgments on the earth, the inhabitants of the world will all learn justice." And further on (26:16): "In the tribulation of murmuring (*in tribulatione murmuris*) your teaching was with them." But pain or sadness follows in the hearts of men from God's judgments and from tribulation. Therefore, pain or sadness does not remove, but instead strengthens, the ability to learn something new.

Objection 2: Isaiah 28:9 says, "Whom shall He teach knowledge to? And whom shall He make to understand what is heard? Those who are weaned from milk, who are drawn away from the breast," i.e., from pleasures. But it is pain and sadness that especially take away pleasure. For as *Ethics* 7 explains, sadness impedes all pleasure; and Ecclesiasticus 11:29 says, "The affliction of an hour makes one oblivious to the greatest delights." Therefore, pain does not remove, but instead confers, the ability to learn something new.

Objection 3: As was explained above (q. 35, a. 7), interior sadness surpasses exterior pain. But a man is able to learn something new at the same time that he is sad. Therefore, *a fortiori*, he can learn something new at the same time that he is in bodily pain.

But contrary to this: In *Soliloquia* 1 Augustine says, "..... though I was tormented with a very sharp toothache in those days, so that I was able to turn over in my mind only those things that I had already securely learned, and I was altogether prevented from learning anything that required the full attention of my mind."

I respond: Since all the powers of the soul are rooted in the one essence of the soul, it must be the case that when the soul's attention (*intentio animae*) is strongly drawn to the operation of one power, it is drawn back from the operation of another; for a single soul can only have one act of attention (*una intentio*). Because of this, if something draws all the mind's attention, or a large part of it, to itself, then that is incompatible with something else's needing close attention (*magnam attentionem*).

Now it is clear that sensible pain draws the soul's attention to itself to the highest degree, since, as is likewise apparent in the case of natural things, each thing naturally tends with full inclination (*tota intentione*) toward repelling what is contrary to it. Similarly, it is also clear that to learn something new (*addiscendum aliquid de novo*) requires study and effort along with close attention (*cum magna intentione*); this is clear from what Proverbs 2:4-5 says: "If you seek wisdom as if it were money, and dig for her as for a treasure, then you will understand the teaching." And so if the pain is intense, it keeps a man from being able to learn anything new. Moreover, pain can be intensified to such a degree that, at the instant of the pain, a man cannot even think about what he previously knew. However, on this point there is a diversity in accord with the different degrees of love that a man has for learning or thinking. The greater this love is, the more he keeps his mind's attention from being completely turned toward the pain.

Reply to objection 1: A moderate sadness that keeps the mind from wandering can contribute to the undertaking of learning—especially the learning of those things through which a man hopes he can be

freed from the sadness. And it is in this sense that in the "tribulation of murmuring" men are more receptive to God's teaching (*homines doctrinam Dei magis recipit*).

Reply to objection 2: Insofar as they the draw the soul's attention to themselves, both pleasure and pain impede reason's inquiry. Hence, *Ethics* 7 says, "In the midst of sexual pleasure, it is impossible to have an intellective understanding of anything."

Yet pain draws the soul's attention to itself more than pleasure does. We likewise see in the case of natural things, too, that a natural body's action is intensified against a contrary; for instance, heated water is acted upon more intensely by the cold, so that it freezes more solidly. Therefore, if the pain or the sadness is moderate, then it can contribute *per accidens* to learning something new insofar as it removes an excess of pleasure. But *per se* it impedes learning, and if it is intensified, it totally removes it.

Reply to objection 3: Exterior pain occurs because of some bodily damage, and so it has a greater corporeal change adjoined to it than does interior pain—even though interior pain is nonetheless greater because of the formal element in pain, which comes from the soul (*secundum illud quod est formale in dolore, quod est ex parte animae*). And so bodily pain is more of an obstacle to contemplation, which requires absolute quiet (*omnimodam quietem*), than is interior pain. And yet even interior pain, if it is intensified to a great degree, draws the mind's attention in such a way that the man cannot learn anything new. Hence, because of sadness Gregory himself interrupted his commentary on Ezechiel.

Article 2

Is the mind's being weighed down an effect of sadness?

It seems that the mind's being weighed down (*aggravatio animi*) is not an effect of sadness:

Objection 1: In 2 Corinthians 7:11 the Apostle says, "Behold, this very fact that you were made sorrowful in accord with God—what great solicitude it works in you, what readiness for defense and indignation ....." But solicitude and indignation have to do with the mind's being lifted up, which is the opposite of its being weighed down (*sollicitudo et indignatio ad quandam erectionem animi, quae aggravatione opponitur*). Therefore, the mind's being weighed down is not an effect of sadness.

Objection 2: Sadness is opposed to pleasure. But being widened is an effect of pleasure (q. 33, a. 1), and it is being constricted—not being weighed down—that is opposed to being widened. Therefore, being weighed down should not be posited as an effect of sadness.

Objection 3: As is clear from what the Apostle says in 2 Corinthians 2:7 ("Lest perhaps one who is of this sort should be absorbed by abundant sorrow"), it belongs to sadness to absorb. But what is weighed down is not absorbed; instead, it is pressed down under something heavy, whereas what is absorbed comes to be included within what absorbs it. Therefore, being weighed down should not be posited as an effect of sadness.

But contrary to this: Gregory of Nyssa and Damascene both posit a sadness that weighs one down.

I respond: The effects of the passions of the soul are sometimes named metaphorically because of a likeness to sensible bodies, given that the movements of an animal appetite are similar to the inclinations of a natural appetite. It is in this way that intense heat (*fervor*) is attributed to love, being widened (*dilatatio*) is attributed to pleasure, and being weighed down is attributed to sadness. For a man is said to be weighed down because he is impeded from his proper movement by something heavy.

Now it is clear from what said above (q. 36, a. 1) that sadness has to do with a present evil, and this evil is such that by the very fact that it is opposed to the will's movement, it weighs down the mind insofar as it keeps it from enjoying what it wants.

Now even if the mind is weighed down to the extent that at present it does not possess what it

wants, still, if the force of the evil that makes one sad is not great enough to take away the hope of escape, then there remains a movement to repel the harmful thing that makes one sad. On the other hand, if the force of the bad thing grows to such an extent that it excludes the hope of escape, then the tormented man's interior movement will be impeded absolutely speaking, so that it is unable to turn this way or that. And sometimes even the exterior movement of the body is impeded, so that the man remains stupefied within himself.

Reply to objection 1: This 'lifting up' of the mind has its source in the sadness that is "in accord with God," and this because of the hope, which is adjoined to it, for the remission of sins.

Reply to objection 2: As regards the appetitive movement, 'being constricted' and 'being weighed down' amount to the same thing. For from the fact that the mind is weighed down, so that it cannot proceed freely to exterior things, it withdraws into itself, as if constricted within itself.

Reply to objection 3: Sadness is said to absorb a man when the power of the evil that makes him sad affects the soul in such a way as to cut off all hope of escape. And so it is likewise in the same way that sadness weighs a man down and absorbs him.

For in the case of what is said metaphorically, certain claims follow which seem to be opposed to one another when they are taken in their proper senses.

Article 3

Does sadness impede every operation?

It seems that sadness does not impede every operation:

Objection 1: Solicitude is caused by sadness, as is clear from the passage adduced above from the Apostle (2 Corinthians 7:11). But solicitude helps one to operate well; hence, in 2 Timothy 2:15 the Apostle says, "Be solicitous to present yourself as a workman without disgrace." Therefore, sadness does not impede an operation, but instead helps one to operate well.

Objection 2: As *Ethics* 7 says, in many men sadness is cause of concupiscence. But concupiscence makes for a more intense operation. Therefore, so does sadness.

Objection 3: Just as those who are rejoicing have certain proper operations, so too certain operations belong to those who are sad, e.g., to lament. But each thing is strengthened by what agrees with it. Therefore, there are some operations that are improved, and not impeded, because of sadness.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 10 the Philosopher says that "pleasure perfects an operation," but that, on the contrary, "sadness impedes it."

I respond: As has already been explained (a. 2), sometimes sadness does not weigh the mind down or absorb it to such an extent that it prevents every interior and exterior movement; instead, certain movements are in some cases caused by sadness itself. So, then, there are two ways in which an operation can be related to sadness:

In one way, as that which the sadness is directed toward (*id de quo est tristitia*). And on this score sadness impedes every operation, since what we do with sadness is such that we never do it as well as what we do with pleasure or without sadness. The reason for this is that the will is the cause of a human operation, and so when it is an operation with respect to which one is saddened, the action has to be weakened.

In the second way, an operation is related to the sadness as to its source and cause. And in this way such an operation has to be strengthened by the sadness, in the sense that the more someone is saddened by a given thing, the harder he tries to expel the sadness—as long as the hope of expelling it remains, since otherwise there would be no movement or operation caused by the sadness.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: This makes clear the replies to the objections.

Article 4

Is it sadness that inflicts the most harm on the body?

It seems that it is not sadness that inflicts the most harm on the body:

Objection 1: Sadness has spiritual *esse* in the soul. But things that have only spiritual *esse* do not cause corporeal change, as is clear in the case of the intentions of the colors which exist in the air and by which bodies are not colored. Therefore, sadness does not do harm to any corporeal thing.

Objection 2: If sadness does harm to some bodily thing, then this happens only insofar as it has some bodily change adjoined to it. But as was explained above (q. 22, aa. 1 and 3), a bodily change is found in every passion of the soul. Therefore, sadness does not harm the body more than the other passions of the soul do.

Objection 3: In *Ethics* 7 the Philosopher says, "Anger and concupiscence drive some men mad," and this seems to be the greatest harm, since reason is the most excellent thing that exists in a man. In addition, despair (*desperatio*) seems to be more harmful than sadness, since it is a cause of sadness. Therefore, sadness does not harm the body more than other passions of the soul do.

But contrary to this: Proverbs 17:22 says, "A joyful mind makes age flourish, a sorrowful spirit dries up the bones." And Proverbs 25:20 says, "As a moth harms a garment, and a worm harms wood, so a man's sadness harms the heart." And Ecclesiasticus 38:19 says, "Out of sadness death comes speedily."

I respond: Of all the passions of the soul, it is sadness that most harms the body. The reason for this is that sadness, unlike the other passions of the soul, is opposed to human life because of the very species of its movement and not just because of its measure or quantity. For human life consists in a certain motion (*humana vita consistit in quadam motione*) that is diffused from the heart into the other members of the body, and this motion belongs to human nature in a determinate measure. Therefore, if this motion exceeds the appropriate measure, it will be opposed to human life in the measure of its quantity, but not in the likeness of its species. On the other hand, if the course of the motion is impeded, then that will be opposed to human life in its species.

Now notice that in the case of all the passions of the soul, the bodily change that is the material element in the passions is conformed and proportioned to the appetite's movement, which is the formal element, in the same way that matter is proportioned to form in all things. Therefore, those passions of the soul that involve a movement of the appetite toward pursuing something—e.g., love, joy, desire, etc.—are not opposed to the vital movement because of their species, but they can be opposed to it because of their quantity. And so they help the nature of the body because of their species, but can harm it because of their excess. By contrast, the passions that involve an appetitive movement with aversion or a sort of retraction are opposed to the vital motion not only because of their quantity but also because of the species of their movement, and so they are harmful absolutely speaking. Among these are fear, despair, and, above all, sadness, which weighs down the mind because of a present evil, the impression of which is stronger than is that of a future evil.

Reply to objection 1: Since the soul by its nature moves the body, the soul's spiritual movement is naturally a cause of bodily change. Nor is there a similarity to spiritual intentions, since the latter do not have the natural role of moving other bodies that are not apt to be moved by the soul.

Reply to objection 2: The other passions involve bodily changes that are conformed in their species to the vital motion, but, as has been explained above, sadness involves a change that is contrary to the vital motion.

Reply to objection 3: The use of reason is impeded by less weighty causes (*ex leviori causa*) than those that life is corrupted by; for we see many sicknesses that undermine the use of reason and yet do not take away life.

Still, fear and anger do inflict bodily harm by being mixed in with sadness, and this because of the absence of what is desired.

Moreover, sadness itself takes away reason, as is clear in the case of those men who because of pain fall into melancholy or mania.

QUESTION 38

The Remedies for Pain or Sadness

Next we have to consider the remedies for pain or sadness. And on this topic there are five questions: (1) Is pain or sadness lessened by every instance of pleasure? (2) Is pain or sadness lessened by weeping? (3) Is pain or sadness lessened by the compassion of friends? (4) Is pain or sadness lessened by contemplating the truth? (5) Is pain or sadness lessened by sleeping and bathing?

Article 1

Is pain or sadness lessened by every instance of pleasure?

It seems not to be the case that every instance of pleasure lessens every instance of pain or sadness:

Objection 1: Pleasure lessens sadness only insofar as it is contrary to it; for as *Ethics* 2 says, "Medicines are made from contraries." But as was explained above (q. 35, a. 4), not every instance of pleasure is contrary to every instance of sadness. Therefore, it is not the case that every instance of pleasure lessens every instance of sadness.

Objection 2: What causes sadness does not lessen sadness. But some instances of pleasure cause sadness, since, as *Ethics* 9 says, "A bad man is saddened because he has taken pleasure (*quoniam delectatus est*)." Therefore, it is not the case that every instance of pleasure lessens sadness.

Objection 3: In *Confessiones* 4 Augustine says that he left his homeland, where he had been accustomed to sharing his life with his friend who was now dead, because his eyes would seek his friend less where he was not accustomed to seeing him. From this one can infer that what our dead or absent friends have shared with us becomes onerous to us when we grieve over their death or their absence. But what they especially shared with us were our pleasures. Therefore, those very pleasures become onerous to us when we are grieving. Therefore, it is not the case that every instance of pleasure lessens every instance of sadness.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 7 the Philosopher says, "Pleasure expels sadness—whether it is a contrary pleasure or just any pleasure at all, if it is strong."

I respond: As is clear from what has already been said (q. 23, a. 4), pleasure is the appetite's coming to rest in an agreeable good (*quies appetitus in bono convenienti*), whereas sadness has its source in what opposes the appetite. Hence, pleasure is related to pain among the appetitive movements in the same way that, among bodies, rest is related to fatigue (*fatigatio*), which proceeds from a non-natural change. For sadness itself implies a sort of fatigue or sickness on the part of the appetitive power. Therefore, just as any sort of rest on the part of a body affords a remedy against any sort of fatigue, no matter what sort of non-natural cause it stems from, so any instance of pleasure affords a remedy to lessen any instance of sadness, no matter what it stems from.

Reply to objection 1: Even if it is not the case that every instance of pleasure is opposed by its species to every instance of pain, nonetheless, as was explained above (q. 35, a. 4), it is opposed to it by its genus. And so as far as the subject's condition is concerned (*ex parte dispositionis subiecti*), any instance of sadness can be lessened by any instance of pleasure.

Reply to objection 2: The pleasures of bad men cause them sadness in the future and not in the present, viz., insofar as the bad men repent of the evils that have given them joy (*poenitent de malis de quibus laetitiam habuerunt*). And this sort of sadness is relieved by contrary pleasures.

Reply to objection 3: When there are two causes that give inclinations toward contrary movements, each impedes the other, but the cause that finally wins out is the one that is stronger and more long-lasting.

Now in someone who is grieving over what he used to take pleasure in together with his dead or absent friend, there are two causes moving him in opposite directions. For when he thinks about his

friend's death or absence, this inclines him toward sorrow (*inclinat ad dolorem*), whereas his present good inclines him toward pleasure. Hence, each is diminished by the other. And yet since his present perceptions move him more strongly than do his memories of the past, and since his love for himself remains for a longer time than does his love for the other, in the end it is the pleasure that expels the sadness. Hence, a few lines later in the same place Augustine adds that his sorrow gave way to his former pleasures.

Article 2

Does weeping lessen sadness?

It seems that weeping (*fletus*) does not lessen (*non mitigat*) sadness:

Objection 1: No effect diminishes (*minuit*) its cause. But weeping or sighing (*fletus vel gemitus*) is an effect of sadness. Therefore, it does not diminish sadness.

Objection 2: Just as weeping or sighing is an effect of sadness, so laughing is an effect of rejoicing. But laughing does not diminish rejoicing. Therefore, weeping does not lessen sadness.

Objection 3: The bad thing that saddens us is represented in the weeping. But imagining a thing that saddens us increases our sadness, just as imagining a thing that delights us increases our rejoicing. Therefore, it seems that weeping does not lessen sadness.

But contrary to this: In *Confessiones* 5 Augustine says that when he was grieving over the death of his friend, it was only in his sighs and tears that he found a little peace.

I respond: Tears and sighs naturally lessen sadness, and this in two ways:

First, because every harmful thing afflicts us all the more when it is closed up inside (*interius clausum*), since the soul's attention keeps growing with respect to it. But when it is diffused to the outside, then the soul's attention is in a certain sense dispersed toward exterior things, and so the interior pain is diminished. Because of this, when men who are in distress (*in tristitiis*) manifest their sadness by weeping or sighing, or even by talking (*fletu aut gemitu vel etiam verbo*), their sadness is lessened.

Second, because it is always the case that an operation that is appropriate for a man, given the condition he is in, is pleasurable to him. But weeping and sighing are operations appropriate for someone who is sad or in pain. And so they become pleasurable to him. Therefore, since, as has been explained (a. 1), every instance of pleasure in some way lessens sadness or pain, it follows that sadness is lessened by lamenting and sighing.

Reply to objection 1: The relation of a cause to its effect is itself contrary to the relation of what causes sadness to the one who is saddened. For every effect is agreeable to its cause and, as a result, pleases it, whereas a thing that causes sadness is contrary to the one who is sad. And so the effect of sadness bears to the one who is sad a relation that is contrary to the relation that the thing that causes sadness bears to the one who is sad. And because of this, sadness is lessened by an effect of sadness, by reason of the contrariety just explained.

Reply to objection 2: The relation that an effect bears to its cause is similar to the relation that someone who takes pleasure bears to that which gives pleasure, since there is agreeableness in both cases. But everything augments what is similar to itself. And this is why rejoicing is augmented by laughter and by the other effects of rejoicing—unless perhaps *per accidens*, because of its excessiveness, [the laughter lessens the rejoicing].

Reply to objection 3: Imagining the thing that effects the sadness, taken in its own right (*quantum est de se*), is apt to increase the sadness, but a certain pleasure arises from the very fact that a man imagines that which effects what is agreeable to him, given his condition. And for the same reason, as Tully points out in *De Tusculanis Quaestionibus* 3, if one bursts out laughing in a situation in which he

should be mourning, then he is saddened by the very fact that he is doing something inappropriate.

Article 3

Does the pain of a compassionate friend lessen sadness?

It seems that the pain of a compassionate friend does not lessen sadness:

Objection 1: It is contraries that are the effects of contraries. But as Augustine says in *Confessiones* 8, "When one rejoices with many others, each one has a more exuberant joy, since they are kindled and inflamed one by the other." Therefore, by parity of reasoning, when many are sad together, then it seems that there is more sadness.

Objection 2: As Augustine points out in *Confessiones* 4, friendship requires that each one give back to his friend in kind. But a friend who suffers with another (*amicus condolens*) grieves over the sadness of his sorrowful friend. Therefore, the friend who is already suffering his own evil is such that the compassionate friend's sorrow for him is itself a cause of his suffering another's evil. And so, since his pain is doubled, sadness seems to increase.

Objection 3: Every evil that belongs to a friend makes one sad in the same way that one's own evil does, since "a friend is another self" (*amicus est alter ipse*). But pain is something bad. Therefore, the pain of a compassionate friend augments the pain of the friend with whom he is suffering.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 9 the Philosopher says that in sorrows a friend who suffers with someone consoles him.

I respond: A friend who suffers with someone in his sorrows naturally consoles him (*naturaliter amicus condolens in tristitiis est consolativus*). In *Ethics* 9 the Philosopher touches on two reasons for this:

The first is that since sadness weighs down the mind, it has the character of a burden that the one who is weighed down tries to have lightened. Therefore, when someone sees others saddened by his own sadness, he imagines that others are bearing that burden with him, trying, as it were, to make the burden lighter for him. And so he bears a lighter burden of sadness, as likewise happens in cases where one is carrying corporeal burdens.

The second, and better, reason is that by the fact that his friends are saddened for him, he sees that he is loved by them—and, as was explained above (q. 32, a. 5), this is pleasurable. Hence, since, as was explained above (a. 1), every instance of pleasure lessens sadness, it follows that a friend who suffers along with another lessens sadness.

Reply to objection 1: Friendship is shown in both respects, i.e., both in the fact that one rejoices with his rejoicing friend, and also in the fact that he suffers with his suffering friend. And each is rendered pleasurable by reason of the cause.

Reply to objection 2: The friend's suffering itself makes one sad in its own right. But when one considers the cause of the pain, viz., love, he takes pleasure to a greater degree.

Reply to objection 3: This makes clear the reply to the third objection.

Article 4

Does contemplating the truth lessen pain?

It seems that contemplating the truth does not lessen pain (*contemplatio veritatis non mitiget dolorem*):

Objection 1: Ecclesiastes 1:18 says, "He who adds knowledge also adds pain." But knowledge has to do with contemplating the truth. Therefore, it is not the case that contemplating the truth lessens pain.

Objection 2: Contemplating the truth belongs to the speculative intellect. But as *De Anima* 3 says, "The speculative intellect does not effect movement." Therefore, since joy and pain are certain movements of the soul, it seems that contemplating the truth does nothing to lessen pain.

Objection 3: The remedy for a disease has to be applied where the disease is. But the contemplation of truth exists in the intellect. Therefore, it does not lessen pain, which exists in the sensory power.

But contrary to this: In *Soliloquia* 1 Augustine says, "It seemed to me that if the splendor of truth had opened itself to our minds, then either I would not have felt that pain, or at least I would not have endured it for nothing."

I respond: As was explained above (q. 3, a. 5), the greatest pleasure consists in contemplating the truth. But as was also explained above (a. 1), every pleasure lessens pain. And so contemplating the truth lessens sadness or pain; and the more perfectly someone is a lover of wisdom, the more it does so.

Moreover, it is because of the contemplation of God and of future beatitude that men rejoice in the midst of tribulations—this according to James 1:2 ("My brethren, count it all joy when you encounter various trials"). What's more, joy of this sort is found even in the midst of bodily tortures; for instance, when the martyr Tiburtius was walking barefoot on the burning coals, he said, "It seems to me that I am walking on roses in the name of Jesus Christ."

Reply to objection 1: He who adds knowledge adds pain either because of the difficulty and failures involved in finding the truth (*propter difficultatem et defectum inveniendae veritatis*), or because through knowledge a man comes to recognize many things that are contrary to his will. And so on the side of the things known, knowledge causes pain, whereas on the part of the act of contemplating the truth, it causes pleasure.

Reply to objection 2: The speculative intellect does not move the mind through the thing that is being thought of (*ex parte rei speculatae*), but it does move the mind through the act of speculating itself, which is a certain human good and naturally pleasurable.

Reply to objection 3: There is an overflow in the powers of the soul from the higher ones to the lower ones. Accordingly, the pleasure of contemplating, which is in the higher part, overflows to lessen even that pain that exists in the sensory power.

Article 5

Do sleeping and bathing lessen sadness?

It seems that sleeping and bathing (*somnus et balneum*) do not lessen sadness:

Objection 1: Sadness exists in the soul. But sleeping and bathing have to do with the body. Therefore, they do nothing to lessen sadness.

Objection 2: It seems that the same effect cannot be caused by contrary causes. But since causes of the sort in question are corporeal, they are opposed to the contemplation of the truth, which, as has been explained (a. 4), causes the lessening of sadness. Therefore, sadness is not lessened by causes of the sort in question.

Objection 3: Insofar as sadness and pain have to do with the body, they consist in a certain change within the heart. But remedies of the sort in question seem to have to do with the exterior senses and exterior bodily members rather than with the interior condition of the heart. Therefore, sadness is not lessened by remedies of this sort.

But contrary to this: In *Confessiones* 9 Augustine says, "I had heard that the name 'bath' (*balneum*; Greek: *βαλανεῖον*) comes from the fact that a bath drives anxiety from the mind." And further on he says: "I slept, and woke up again, and found that my pain was more than a little lessened." And he quotes the words from the hymn of Ambrose, which says, "Sleep restores the tired limbs to labor, refreshes the weary mind, and banishes anxious sorrows."

I respond: As was explained above (q. 37, a. 4), in its species sadness is opposed to the body's vital motion. And so the things that restore corporeal nature to the normal state of its vital motion are opposed to sadness and lessen it. Moreover, by the fact remedies of the sort in question bring the nature back to its normal condition, they are a cause of pleasure; for, as was explained above (q. 31, a. 3), this is something that gives pleasure. Hence, since every instance of pleasure lessens sadness, sadness is lessened by corporeal remedies of this sort.

Reply to objection 1: Insofar as it is felt, the normal condition of the body is itself such that it causes pleasure and, as a result, lessens sadness.

Reply to objection 2: As was explained above (q. 31, a. 8), one pleasure impedes another, and yet every instance of pleasure lessens sadness. Hence, it is not problematic for sadness to be lessened by causes that impede one another.

Reply to objection 3: As the book *De Causa Motus Animalium* explains, every good bodily disposition overflows in a certain way to the heart, which is the beginning and the end of corporeal motions.

QUESTION 39

The Goodness and Badness of Sadness or Pain

Next we have to consider the remedies for pain or sadness. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Is every instance of sadness bad? (2) Can sadness be an upright good (*bonum honestum*)? (3) Can sadness be a useful good (*bonum utile*)? (4) Is bodily pain the greatest evil?

Article 1

Is every instance of sadness bad?

It seems that every instance of sadness is bad:

Objection 1: Gregory of Nyssa says, "Every instance of sadness is bad by its very nature (*sui ipsius natura*)." But what is bad by its nature is always and everywhere bad. Therefore, every instance of sadness is bad.

Objection 2: What all men, including virtuous men, avoid is bad. But all men, including virtuous men, avoid sadness; for as *Ethics* 7 says, "Even if a prudent man does not intend to take pleasure, he nonetheless does intend not to be saddened." Therefore, sadness is bad.

Objection 3: Just as a bad corporeal thing is an object and cause of corporeal pain, so a bad spiritual thing is an object and cause of spiritual sadness. But every corporeal pain is bad for the body. Therefore, every instance of spiritual sadness is bad for the soul.

But contrary to this: Being sad about what is bad is opposed to taking pleasure in what is bad (*tristitia de malo contrariatur delectationi de malo*). But taking pleasure in what is bad is itself bad; hence, in denouncing certain people Proverbs 2:14 says, "They rejoiced over having done evil." Therefore, being sad about what is evil is itself good.

I respond: There are two ways in which something can be said to be good or bad:

In one way, it can be said to be good or bad absolutely speaking and in its own right (*simpliciter et secundum se*). And in this sense every instance of sadness is something bad. For the very fact that a man's appetite is troubled by a present evil (*anxiari de malo praesenti*) has the character of badness, since the appetite is thereby prevented from coming to rest in the good.

In the second way, a thing is said to be good or bad given some assumption about something else (*ex suppositione alterius*). For instance, as *Ethics* 9 points out, shame is said to be good on the assumption that some disgraceful deed has been committed. So, then, assuming the presence of something sad or painful, it is good (*ad bonitatem pertinet*) that someone should be saddened or pained by this present evil. For one could not fail to be saddened or pained unless either because he is insensitive (*non sentiret*) or because he does not regard the thing in question as repugnant—and each of these is manifestly bad. And so it is good that, given the presence of something bad, sadness or pain should follow. This is a point Augustine makes in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 8: "It is a good thing for him to be saddened over the good he has lost. For if nothing good had remained in his nature, then there would have been no pain over the good that was lost in his punishment."

However, since moral discourse is about singular cases, which are what actions (*operationes*) have to do with, what is good on an assumption ought to be judged good, in the same way that, as *Ethics* 3 says and as was established above (q. 6, a. 6), what is voluntary on an assumption is judged to be voluntary.

Reply to objection 1: Gregory of Nyssa is speaking of sadness from the side of the bad thing that causes sadness (*ex parte mali tristantis*) and not from the side of the one who perceives and repudiates that bad thing. It is likewise true from this perspective that everyone flees from sadness insofar as they flee from what is bad; however, they do not flee from perceiving and repudiating what is bad.

And one should reply in the same way about corporeal pain. For it attests to a good nature that one

should sense and reject what is bad for the body.

Reply to objection 2 and objection 3: From this the replies to the second and third objections are clear.

Article 2

Does sadness have the character of an upright good?

It seems that sadness does not have the character of an upright good (*non habeat rationem boni honesti*):

Objection 1: What leads one to Hell (*ad inferos*) is opposed to what is upright. But as Augustine says in *Super Genesim ad Litteram* 12, "Jacob seems to have been afraid of being so troubled by his great sadness that he would go to the Hell of sinners and not to the rest of the blessed." Therefore, sadness does not have the character of an upright good.

Objection 2: An upright good has the character of being praiseworthy and meritorious. But sadness lessens praise and merit; for in 2 Corinthians 9:7 the Apostle says, "Each one, as he has determined in his own heart, not out of sadness or necessity ....." Therefore, sadness is not an upright good.

Objection 3: As Augustine says in *De Civitate Dei* 14, "Sadness is has to do with what happens to us against our will." But not to will what happens at present is to have an act of will that is opposed to the plan of God, whose providence is such that everything which happens is subject to it. Therefore, since, as was explained above (q. 19, a. 9), the human will's being conformed to God's will is part of the will's uprightness (*cum conformitas humanae voluntatis ad divinam pertineat ad rectitudinem voluntatis*), it seems that sadness is contrary to uprightness of will. And so it does not have the character of an upright good.

But contrary to this: Whatever merits eternal life has the character of being upright. But sadness is one of these things, as is clear from what Matthew 5:5 says: "Blessed are they who mourn, for they shall be consoled." Therefore, sadness is an upright good.

I respond: Given the sense in which sadness is a good, it can be an upright good. For as has been explained (a. 1), sadness is a good because of the *recognition* and the *rejection* of what is bad.

In the case of bodily pain, these two things point to the goodness of nature, which is the source of (a) the sensory power's act of sensing and of (b) the nature's shrinking back from the hurtful thing that causes the pain.

On the other hand, in the case of interior sadness, the recognition of what is bad is sometimes the result of an upright judgment on the part of reason (*cognitio mali quandoque quidem est per rectum iudicium rationis*), and the rejection of what is bad is the result of a well-disposed will that detests what is bad (*recusatio mali est per voluntatem bene dispositam detestantem malum*). But every upright good proceeds from these two sources, viz., from uprightness on the part of reason and on the part of the will (*ex rectitudine rationis et voluntatis*).

Hence, it is clear that sadness can have the character of an upright good.

Reply to objection 1: All the passions of the soul should be regulated by the rule of reason, which is the root of the upright good. Immoderate sadness goes beyond this rule and so recedes from the character of the upright good, and it is this sort of sadness that Augustine is talking about.

Reply to objection 2: Just as sadness about what is bad proceeds from an upright will and reason that detests what is bad, so sadness about what is good proceeds from a perverse will and reason that detest the good. And so this latter sort of sadness obstructs the praise or merit that belongs to an upright good, as in the case of someone who gives alms with sadness.

Reply to objection 3: There are some things that happen in the present, e.g., sins, that are done not in accord with God's will, but instead with God's permission (*non fiunt Deo volente sed Deo permittente*). Hence, a will that is opposed to sin either within itself or in another is not in disagreement with God's will.

On the other hand, evils of punishment (*mala poenalia*) occur in the present even in accord with God's will. However, as was explained above (q. 19, a. 10), uprightness of will requires not that a man will such things in their own right, but only that he not work against the order of God's justice.

Article 3

Can sadness be a useful good?

It seems that sadness cannot be a useful good:

Objection 1: Ecclesiasticus 30:25 says, "Sadness kills many, and there is no usefulness in it."

Objection 2: Choice has to do with what is useful for some end. But sadness is not the sort of thing that can be chosen (*tristitia non est eligibilis*); at the very least, as *Topics* 3 points out, "a thing without sadness should be chosen over the same thing with sadness." Therefore, sadness is not a useful good.

Objection 3: As *De Coelo* 2 says, "Every entity exists for the sake of its own operation." But as *Ethics* 10 says, "Sadness impedes an operation." Therefore, sadness does not have the character of a useful good.

But contrary to this: A wise man seeks only what is useful. But Ecclesiastes 7:5 says, "The heart of wise men is where sadness abides, and the heart of fools is where mirth abides." Therefore, sadness is useful.

I respond: There are two appetitive movements that arise in the face of a present evil:

There is one movement by which the appetite is opposed to the present evil. And on this score sadness does not have any usefulness, since what is present is unable not to be present.

The second movement rises up in the appetite to flee from or repel the evil that is causing the sadness. And on this score, sadness has usefulness if it is directed at something that should be fled from. For there are two reasons why something should be fled from:

First, because of its very self (*propter seipsum*), in light of its opposition to the good. Sin is of this sort. And so sadness about sin is useful in order that a man might flee from sin; as the Apostle puts it in 2 Corinthians 7:9: "I rejoice not because you have been saddened, but because you have been saddened unto repentance."

The second reason for which something should be fled from is not that it is bad in its own right (*non quia sit secundum se malum*), but that it is an occasion of something bad when a man adheres to it excessively out of love for it, or also when he thereby falls into something bad. Temporal goods are clearly of this sort. Accordingly, sadness about temporal goods can be useful in the way described in Ecclesiastes 7:3: "It is better to go to the house of mourning than to the house of feasting, for in the former we are reminded of the end of all men."

Now the reason why sadness about all the things that should be fled from is useful in that one's reasons for fleeing are doubled. For (a) the bad thing itself should be fled from in its own right, whereas (b) everyone flees from sadness itself in its own right—just as, similarly, everyone (a) desires the good and (b) desires to take pleasure in the good. Therefore, just as taking pleasure in the good makes one seek the good more eagerly, so, too, being sad about what is bad makes one flee from what is bad more resolutely (*vehementius*).

Reply to objection 1: This passage is talking about immoderate sadness, which absorbs the mind.

For as was explained above (q. 37, a. 2), sadness of this sort immobilizes the mind and makes it difficult for one to avoid what is bad.

Reply to objection 2: Just as everything that can be chosen becomes less choiceworthy because of sadness, so everything that should be fled from becomes, because of sadness, even more such that it should be fled from. And it is in this respect that sadness is useful.

Reply to objection 3: Sadness about an action impedes the action, but sadness about the cessation of an action makes one operate more eagerly.

Article 4

Is sadness the greatest evil?

It seems that sadness is the greatest evil:

Objection 1: As *Ethics* 8 says, "The worst is opposed to the best." But there is an instance of pleasure that is the best, viz., that which belongs to happiness (*felicitas*). Therefore, some instance of sadness is the greatest evil.

Objection 2: Beatitude is man's highest good, since it is man's ultimate end. But as was explained above, beatitude consists in (a) a man's having whatever he wills and in (b) his willing nothing bad. Therefore, man's greatest good is the fulfillment of his will. But as is clear from Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* 14, sadness consists in something's happening against one's will. Therefore, sadness is man's greatest evil.

Objection 3: Augustine argues as follows in *Soliloquia*: "We are composed of two parts, viz., a soul and a body, and the body is the lower part (*pars deterior*). Now the highest good is the best thing that belongs to the better part (*melioris partis optimum*), whereas the greatest evil is the worst thing that belongs to the lower part (*pessimum deterioris*). But the best thing in the mind is wisdom, and the worst thing in the body is pain. Therefore man's greatest good is to be wise, whereas his greatest evil is to suffer pain."

But contrary to this: As was established in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 48, a. 6), sin (*culpa*) is a greater evil than is punishment (*poena*). But sadness or pain has to do with the punishment for sin, in the same way that the enjoyment of mutable things is a sinful evil. For in *De Vera Religione* Augustine says, "What is the pain that is attributed to the soul, other than the soul's being deprived of the mutable things that it used to enjoy or had hoped it would be able to enjoy? And this is the totality of all that is called evil, i.e., sin and the punishment for sin." Therefore, it is not sadness or pain that is man's greatest evil.

I respond: It is impossible that any instance of sadness or pain should be man's greatest evil. For every instance of sadness or pain is directed either (a) toward something that is truly bad or (b) toward something that is apparently bad but truly good.

Now pain or sadness that is directed at something that is truly bad cannot be the greatest evil, since there is something worse than it, viz., either not to judge as bad what truly is bad, or not to reject it.

On the other hand, sadness or pain that is directed toward something apparently bad but truly good cannot be the greatest evil, since it would be worse to be altogether separated off from the true good (*peius esset omnino alienari a vero bono*).

Hence, it is impossible for any instance of sadness or pain to be man's greatest evil.

Reply to objection 1: There are two goods common to both pleasure and sadness, viz., (a) true judgment about what is good and bad and (b) an proper ordering on the part of the will by which it approves of what is good and rejects what is bad (*ordo debitus voluntatis approbantis bonum et recusantis malum*). And so it is clear that there is some good in an instance of pain or sadness which is such that if it is removed, then the pain or sadness can be made worse. But it is not the case that in every

pleasure there is some evil which is such that if it were removed, the pleasure would be made better. Hence, it is possible for some instance of pleasure to be man's highest good, in the way explained above (q. 34, a. 3), but it is impossible for an instance of sadness to be man's greatest evil.

Reply to objection 2: The very fact that the will opposes what is bad is a certain good. Because of this, sadness or pain cannot be the greatest evil, since it has some good mixed in with it.

Reply to objection 3: What harms the better part is worse that what harms the worse part. Now as Augustine explains in *Enchiridion,* something is called 'bad' because it is harmful. Hence, what is bad for the soul is a greater evil than what is bad for the body. Hence, the argument that Augustine adduces here—not in his own voice but in that of someone else (*non ex suo sensu sed ex sensu alterius*)—is not efficacious.

QUESTION 40

Hope and Despair

Next we have to consider the passions of the irascible part of the soul: first, hope (*spes*) and despair (*desperatio*) (question 40); second, fear (*timor*) and daring (*audacia*) (questions 41-45); and, third, anger (*ira*) (questions 46-48).

On the first topic there are eight questions: (1) Is hope the same thing as desire (*desiderium*) or avid desire (*cupiditas*)? (2) Does hope exist in the apprehensive power or in the appetitive power? (3) Does hope exist in brute animals? (4) Is despair contrary to hope? (5) Is experience a cause of hope? (6) Does hope abound in the young and the inebriated? (7) What is the relation of hope to love (*ordo spei ad amorem*)? (8) Is hope conducive to an operation?

Article 1

Is hope the same thing as desire or avid desire?

It seems that hope (*spes*) is the same thing as desire (*desiderium*) or avid desire (*cupiditas*):

Objection 1: Hope is posited as one of the four principal passions. But as is clear from *De Civitate Dei* 14, in enumerating the four principal passions, Augustine puts avid desire (*cupiditas*) in the place of hope. Therefore, hope is the same as avid desire or desire.

Objection 2: The passions differ from one another because of their objects (*secundum obiecta*). But the object of hope is the same as the object of avid desire or desire, viz., a future good. Therefore, hope is the same thing as avid desire or desire.

Objection 3: If someone replies that hope adds to desire the possibility of attaining the future good, then against this: What is related to the object *per accidens* does not alter the passion's species. But *possible* is related *per accidens* to *future good*, which is the object of avid desire (or desire) and of hope. Therefore, hope is a passion that does not differ in species from desire or avid desire.

But contrary to this: Diverse passions that differ in species belong to diverse powers. But hope exists in the irascible part of the soul, whereas desire and avid desire exist in the concupiscible part. Therefore, hope differs in species from desire or avid desire.

I respond: The species of a passion is taken from its object. Now with respect to the object of hope there are four conditions to attend to:

The first is that the object be something *good*, since, properly speaking, hope exists only with respect to some good. And hope thereby differs from *fear* (*timor*), which has to do with what is bad.

The second condition is that the object be *future*, since there is no such thing as hope with respect to what is present and already possessed. And hope thereby differs from joy (*gaudium*), which has to do with a present good.

Third, it is required that the object be something *arduous* that is attainable with *difficulty*, since no one is said to hope for something insignificant (*minimum*) that is immediately within his power to have. And hope thereby differs from *desire* or *avid desire*, which has to do with a future good simply speaking (*de bono futuro absolute*) and so belongs to the concupiscible part of the soul, whereas hope belongs to the irascible part.

Fourth, it is required that this arduous object be *possible to attain*, since no one hopes for what cannot be attained in any way at all. And on this score hope differs from *despair*.

So, then, it is clear that hope differs from desire in the way that the passions of the irascible part differ from the passions of the concupiscible part. Because of this, hope presupposes desire in the way, explained above (q. 25, a. 1), that all the passions of the irascible part presuppose passions of the concupiscible part.

Reply to objection 1: Augustine puts avid desire in place of hope because (a) both of them have to

do with a future good, and because (b) a good that is not arduous is, as it were, counted as nothing, with the result that avid desire seems mainly to tend toward an arduous good—which is what hope also tends toward.

Reply to objection 2: As has been explained, the object of hope is not a future good absolutely speaking, but a future good along with the arduousness and difficulty involved in attaining it.

Reply to objection 3: The object of hope adds to the object of desire not only possibility but also arduousness, and it is the latter that makes hope belong to a different power, viz., the irascible power, which, as was explained in the First Part (*ST* 1, q. 81, a. 2), has to do with the arduous.

Moreover, *possible* and *impossible* are not related altogether *per accidens* to the object of the appetitive power. For the appetite is a principle of movement, and nothing is moved toward a thing except under the notion *possible* (*nihil movetur ad aliquid nisi sub ratione possibilis*), since no one moves toward what he judges to be impossible to attain. And because of this, hope differs from despair in accord with the [specific] differences *possible* and *impossible*.

Article 2

Does hope belong to the cognitive power?

It seems that hope belongs to the cognitive power (*spes pertineat ad vim cognitivam*):

Objection 1: Hope seems to be a certain sort of looking for (*expectatio quaedam*); for in Romans 8:25 the Apostle says, "If we hope for what we do not see, then we look for it with patience." But looking for (*expectatio*) seems to belong to the cognitive power, the role which is to 'look forward' (*ex-spectare*). Therefore, hope belongs to the cognitive power.

Objection 2: Hope seems to be the same thing as confidence (*fiducia*); hence, we call those who have hope 'confident', as if we were using 'hoping' and 'confident' for the same thing. But confidence, like faith, seems to belong to the cognitive power. Therefore, hope does, too.

Objection 3: Certitude is a property of the cognitive power. But certitude is attributed to hope. Therefore, hope belongs to the cognitive power.

But contrary to this: As has been explained (a. 1), hope is directed toward a good. But the good is as such the object of the appetitive power and not of the cognitive power. Therefore, hope belongs to the appetitive power and not to the cognitive power.

I respond: Since hope implies the appetite's being extended in a certain way toward a good (*extensionem quandam appetitus in bonum*), it manifestly belongs to the appetitive power, since movement toward a thing properly belongs to the appetite. By contrast, the cognitive power's action is completed not by the knower's moving toward the things, but rather by the fact that the things known come to exist in the knower.

However, because the cognitive power moves the appetite by presenting the appetite's object to it, diverse movements occur in the appetitive power in a way that corresponds to diverse conceptions of the apprehended object. For instance, one sort of movement follows in the appetite from the apprehension of a thing as good (*ex apprehensione boni*) and another sort of movement from the apprehension of a thing as bad (*ex apprehensione mali*); and, similarly, one sort of movement follows from an apprehension of a thing as present or as future, or as good or bad simply speaking or as arduous, or as possible or as impossible (*ex apprehensione praesentis et futuri, absoluti et ardui, possibilis et impossibilis*). Accordingly, hope is a movement of the appetitive power that follows upon the apprehension of something as a good which is future and arduous and possible to attain. That is, hope is the appetite's being extended toward an object of this sort.

Reply to objection 1: Since hope has to do with a good that is possible, there are two ways in

which the movement of hope arises in a man, corresponding to the two ways in which something is possible for a man, viz., (a) by his own power and (b) by someone else's power.

Thus, someone is said only to 'hope for'—and not to 'look for'—what he hopes to attain by his own power. On the other hand, he is properly said to 'look for' what he hopes for through the assistance of someone else's power, so that he is said to 'look for something' (*exspectare*) in the sense of looking for it from another (*ex alieno spectare*), viz., insofar as the prior apprehension (*vis apprehensiva praecedens*) has to do not only with the good he intends to attain, but also that by whose power he hopes to attain it—this according to Ecclesiasticus 51:10 ("I looked for the help of men"). Thus, the movement of hope is sometimes called a 'looking for' because of the cognitive power's prior assessment (*propter inspectionem virtutis cognitivae praecedentem*).

Reply to objection 2: A man believes that he will attain whatever he desires and judges to be possible for him to attain; and from this sort of faith in his prior cognitive movement, the appetitive movement that follows is called 'confidence'. For an appetitive movement is named on the basis of the prior cognitive movement, in the way that an effect is named from a better known cause. For the apprehensive power knows its own act better than it knows the appetite's act.

Reply to objection 3: Certitude is attributed not only to a sentient appetite's movement but also to a natural appetite's movement. For instance, one says that a rock will certainly tend downward, and this is so because of the infallibility that one has in light of the certitude of the cognition that precedes a sentient appetite's movement, or even a natural appetite's movement.

Article 3

Does hope exist in brute animals?

It seems that hope does not exist in brute animals:

Objection 1: As Damascene says, hope has to do with a future good. But having cognition of the future is something that does not belong to brute animals, which have only sentient cognition; for sentient cognition does not have to do with future things. Therefore, hope does not exist in brute animals.

Objection 2: The object of hope is a good that is possible to attain. But *possible* and *impossible* are differences that apply to *true* and *false*, which exist only in the mind, as the Philosopher points out in *Metaphysics* 6. Therefore, hope does not exist in brute animals, which do not have minds (*in quibus non est mens*).

Objection 3: In *Super Genesim ad Litteram* Augustine says, "Animals are moved by what is seen" (*animalia moventur visis*). But hope does not have to do with what is seen; for as Romans 8:24 says, "What someone sees—does he hope for that?" Therefore, hope does not exist in brute animals.

But contrary to this: Hope is a passion of the irascible part of the soul. But the irascible part exists in brute animals. Therefore, so does hope.

I respond: The interior passions of the animals can be discerned from their exterior movements. It is apparent from those movements that hope exists in brute animals. For instance, if a dog sees a rabbit or a hawk sees a bird too far off in the distance (*nimis distantem*), then it does not move toward it—as if having no hope of being able to catch it. But if it sees it close by, then it does move—as if acting on the hope of catching it.

For as was explained above (q. 35, a. 1), the sentient appetite of brute animals, as well as the natural appetite of non-sentient things, follow upon some intellect's apprehension—as does an intellective nature's appetite, which is called a 'will'. The difference is that the will is moved by the apprehension of an intellect that is conjoined to it, whereas the movement of a natural appetite follows upon the apprehension of an intellect which is separate from it and which institutes its nature; and the

same holds for the sentient appetite of brute animals, which act by a certain natural instinct. Hence, in the works of brute animals and of other natural things, the process is similar to that involved in the works of a craft (*in operibus artis*). And it is in this sense that hope and despair exist in brute animals.

Reply to objection 1: Even though brute animals have no cognition of the future, an animal is nonetheless moved by natural instinct toward something in the future as if it did foresee the future. For an instinct of this sort is instilled in brute animals by God's intellect, which foresees future things.

Reply to objection 2: The object of hope is not possible in the sense in which *possible* is a difference of [the genus] *true*, since what is possible in this sense follows upon the relation of a predicate to a subject. Instead, the object of hope is possible in the sense in which *possible* is predicated relative to a given power (*dicitur secundum aliquam potentiam*). For this is the way *possible* is divided in *Metaphysics* 5, viz., into the two senses of *possible* just explained.

Reply to objection 3: Even if what is future does not fall under the visual power, still, on the basis of what an animal sees in the present, its appetite is moved to either pursue or avoid something future.

Article 4

Is despair contrary to hope?

It seems that despair is not contrary to hope (*desperatio non sit contraria spei*):

Objection 1: As *Metaphysics* 10 says, "For a single thing there is a single contrary." But fear is contrary to hope. Therefore, it is not the case that despair is contrary to it.

Objection 2: Contraries, it seems, have to do with the same thing. But hope and despair do not have to do with the same thing. For hope has to do with the good, whereas despair exists because of something bad that impedes the attainment of the good. Therefore, hope is not contrary to despair.

Objection 3: It is a movement that is contrary to a movement, whereas rest is opposed to movement as its privation. But despair seems to imply immobility rather than movement. Therefore, it is not contrary to hope, which implies a movement that involves being extended toward the good that is hoped for.

But contrary to this: *De-speratio* (despair or desperation) is so called because it is contrary to *spes* (hope).

I respond: As was explained above (q. 23, a. 2), there are two sorts of contrariety involved in changes (*in mutationibus invenitur duplex contrarietas*):

One sort has to do with *being directed toward contrary termini* (*secundum accessum ad contrarios terminos*), and this sort of contrariety is found only in the passions of the concupiscible part of the soul, in the way that *love* and *hatred* are contraries.

The second sort has to do with *approaching toward and withdrawing from the same terminus* (*per accessum et per recessum respectu eiusdem termini*), and this sort of contrariety is found among the passions of the irascible part, in the way explained above (q. 23, a. 2).

Now the object of hope, which is an arduous good, has the character of something attractive, as long as it is thought of as being possible to attain; and so hope, which implies a movement of *approaching toward*, tends toward this object. By contrast, insofar as something has the character of being impossible to attain, it has the character of being repellent, since, as *Ethics* 3 explains, "When they come up against something impossible, men leave off." And so it is this object that despair has to do with. Hence, despair implies a movement of *withdrawing from*. And because of this, despair is contrary to hope in the way that withdrawing from something is contrary to approaching toward it.

Reply to objection 1: Fear is contrary to hope by a contrariety in the *objects*, viz., between *good* and *bad*, since this sort of contrariety is found among the passions of the irascible part insofar as they

flow from the passions of the concupiscible part. By contrast, despair is contrary to hope only by a contrariety between *approaching toward* and *withdrawing from*.

Reply to objection 2: Despair does not have to do with the bad as bad (*sub ratione mali*), although it sometimes has to with the bad *per accidens*, insofar as what is bad makes something impossible to attain (*inquantum facit impossibilitatem adipiscendi*). However, despair can also have its source solely in the abundance of what is good.

Reply to objection 3: Despair implies not just a privation of hope, but also a certain withdrawal from the desired thing by reason of the fact that the thing is judged to be impossible to attain. Hence, despair presupposes desire, just as hope does, since we have neither despair nor hope with respect to what does not fall under our desire. And likewise, because of this, both despair and hope have to do with a good that falls under desire.

Article 5

Is experience a cause of hope?

It seems that experience is not a cause of hope:

Objection 1: Experience belongs to the cognitive power; hence, in *Ethics* 2 the Philosopher says, "Intellectual virtue requires experience and time." But as has been explained (a. 2), hope exists not in the cognitive power, but in the appetitive power. Therefore, experience is not a cause of hope.

Objection 2: In *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, "Old men find it difficult to have hope, because of their experience." From this it appears that experience is a cause of a lack of hope. But it is not the case that the same thing is a cause of opposites. Therefore, experience is not a cause of hope.

Objection 3: In *De Caelo* 2 the Philosopher says, "To say something about everything and not to leave anything out is sometimes a sign of foolishness." But the fact that a man attempts everything seems to involve a great deal of hope, while foolishness stems from inexperience. Therefore, it seems to be inexperience, rather than experience, that is a cause of hope.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says, "There are some who are of good hope because they have been victorious many times and over many." But this pertains to experience. Therefore, experience is a cause of hope.

I respond: As has been explained (a. 1), the object of hope is a future and arduous good that is possible to attain. Therefore, something can be a cause of hope either (a) because it makes something possible for a man or (b) because it makes him judge that something is possible.

In the first way, what causes hope is anything that increases a man's power—wealth, fortitude, and, among other things, experience as well. For through experience a man acquires the ability to do something with ease, and hope follows from this. Hence, in *De Re Militari* Vegetius says, "No one fears doing what he is confident that he has learned well."

In the second way, what causes hope is anything that makes someone judge that something is possible for him. And in this sense learning, along with any sort of persuasion, can be a cause of hope. And experience can be a cause of hope in this sense, too, viz., insofar as through experience a man comes to judge that something is possible for him which he had previously thought impossible.

However, in this same way experience can also be a cause of a lack of hope. For just as through experience a man can come to judge that something is possible for him which he had previously thought impossible, so too, conversely, through experience a man can come to judge that something is not possible for him which he had previously thought possible.

So, then, there are two ways in which experience is a cause of hope and one way in which it is a cause of a lack of hope. Because of this, we can say that it is more a cause of hope.

Reply to objection 1: Experience in action (*in operabilibus*) is a cause not only of knowledge but also of a certain habit, because of the action's becoming customary (*propter consuetudinem*), and this makes the operation easier.

On the other hand, intellectual virtue itself likewise gives one the power to do things with ease, since it demonstrates that certain things are possible. And in this way it is a cause of hope.

Reply to objection 2: In the case of old men, there is a lack of hope because of experience insofar as experience causes them to judge that something is impossible (*inquantum experientia facit existimationem impossibilis*). Hence, in the same place the Philosopher adds that many things have turned out badly for them (*eis multa evenerunt in deterius*).

Reply to objection 3: Foolishness and inexperience can be a cause of hope *per accidens*, as it were, viz., by setting aside the knowledge through which one judges truly that something is not possible. Hence, inexperience is a cause of hope in the same way that experience is a cause of a lack of hope.

Article 6

Are youthfulness and inebriation causes of hope?

It seems that youthfulness (*iuventus*) and inebriation (*ebrietas*) are not causes of hope:

Objection 1: Hope implies a sort of certitude and firmness; hence, Hebrews 6:19 compares hope to an anchor. But the young and the inebriated lack firmness, since they have minds that are easily changed. Therefore, youthfulness and inebriation are not causes of hope.

Objection 2: As was explained above (a. 5), anything that increases one's power is in a special way a cause of hope. But youthfulness and inebriation have a sort of weakness adjoined to them. Therefore, they are not causes of hope.

Objection 3: As was just explained (a. 5), experience is a cause of hope. But young people lack experience. Therefore, youthfulness is not a cause of hope.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says, "The inebriated are very hopeful" (*bene sperantes*). And in *Rhetoric* 2 he says, "The young are full of hope (*bonae spei*)."

I respond: As the Philosopher explains in *Rhetoric* 2, there are three reasons why youthfulness is a cause of hope. And these three reasons can be thought of as corresponding to the three conditions of a good that is the object of hope, viz., as has been explained (a. 1), that it is *future*, that it is *arduous*, and that it is *possible*.

For young people have a long future ahead of them and little by way of a past (*multum habent de futuro et parum de praeterito*). And so since memory has to do with the past and hope with the future, they have little memory but live mostly in hope.

Again, because of their impassioned nature (*propter caliditatem naturae*), young people have high spirits, and so their hearts are bigger. But having a big heart makes one tend toward arduous tasks. And so young people are spirited and full of hope.

Similarly, those who have not suffered rejection and have not experienced obstacles in their undertakings are quick to believe that things are possible for them (*de facili reputant aliquid sibi possibile*). And so they are full of hope.

Two of these conditions are likewise present in the inebriated because of wine, viz., (a) an impassioned nature and high spiritedness and, again, (b) a failure to take into account dangers and weaknesses. And for the same reason all foolish people (*omnes stulti*), failing to make use of deliberation, attempt everything and are full of hope.

Reply to objection 1: Even though in the young and in the inebriated there is no firmness as a

matter of fact, they nonetheless have firmness in their own judgment; for they think that they will surely get what they hope for.

Reply to objection 2: Similarly, the young and the inebriated have weakness as a matter of fact, but in their own judgment they have power, since they do not recognize their own defects.

Reply to objection 3: As has been explained (a. 5), it is not only experience, but also inexperience, that is a cause of hope.

Article 7

Is hope a cause of love?

It seems that hope is not a cause of love:

Objection 1: According to Augustine in *De Civitate Dei* 14, the first among the affections of the soul is love. But hope is a certain affection of the soul. Therefore, love precedes hope. Therefore, hope is not a cause of love.

Objection 2: Desire precedes hope. But as has been explained (q. 25, a. 2), desire is caused by love. Therefore, hope likewise follows upon love. Therefore, it is not a cause of it.

Objection 3: As was explained above (q. 32, a. 3), hope is a cause of pleasure. But pleasure exists only with respect to a good that is loved. Therefore, love precedes hope.

But contrary to this: A Gloss on Matthew 1:2 ("Abraham begot Isaac, and Isaac begot Jacob") says, "That is, faith begot hope, and hope begot charity." But charity is love. Therefore, love is caused by hope.

I respond: There are two possible things that hope has to do with. For hope has to do with its object, the *good that is hoped for*. But since (a) the good that is hoped for is an arduous good that is possible and (b) it sometimes happens that what is arduous is possible for us through others and not through ourselves, hope also has to do with *what makes something possible for us*.

Therefore, insofar as hope has to do with the *good that is hoped for*, hope is caused by love, since there is hope only with respect to a good that is desired and loved.

On the other hand, insofar as hope has to do with *what makes something possible for us*, love is caused by hope and not vice versa. For from the fact that there is someone through whom we hope that it will be possible for certain goods to come to us, we are moved toward him as toward our good, and so we begin to love him. By contrast, it is not the case that we hope in someone by virtue of the fact that we love him—except *per accidens*, viz., insofar as we believe that we are be loved by him in return. Hence, being loved by someone makes us hope in him, whereas our love for him is caused by the hope we have in him.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: The replies to the objection are clear from what has been said.

Article 8

Does hope facilitate action?

It seems that hope does not facilitate action (*spes non adiuvat operationem*), but instead impedes it:

Objection 1: It belongs to hope to be carefree. But being carefree gives rise to negligence, which impedes an operation. Therefore, hope impedes action.

Objection 2: As was explained above (q. 37, a. 3), sadness impedes action. But hope is sometimes

a cause of sadness; for Proverbs 13:12 says, "Hope that is deferred afflicts the soul." Therefore, hope impedes action.

Objection 3: As has been explained (a. 4), despair is contrary to hope. But despair, especially in matters of warfare, facilitates action; for 2 Kings 2:26 says, "Despair is very dangerous." Therefore, hope brings about the contrary effect, viz., it impedes action.

But contrary to this: 1 Corinthians 9:10 says, "He who plows should plow in hope of obtaining fruit." And the same line of reasoning holds for all other actions.

I respond: Hope is such that it *per se* facilitates action by intensifying it. It does this in two respects:

First, by reason of its *object*, which is a good that is arduous and possible. For the judgment that the good in question is arduous stimulates one's attentiveness, whereas the judgment that it is possible does not slow down one's effort. Hence, it follows that a man operates intensely because of hope.

Second, by reason of its *effect*. For as was explained above (q. 32, a. 3), hope is a cause of pleasure, which, as was likewise explained above (q. 33, a. 4), facilitates action.

Hence, hope facilitates action.

Reply to objection 1: Hope has to do with attaining what is good, whereas carefreeness has to do with avoiding what is bad. Hence, carefreeness seems opposed to fear rather than relevant to hope.

Reply to objection 2: Hope is *per se* a cause of pleasure, but, as was explained above (q. 32, a. 3), its causing sadness is *per accidens*.

Reply to objection 3: Despair becomes very dangerous in war because of a certain sort of hope that is adjoined to it. For those who despair of fleeing are weakened with respect to fleeing, but they hope to avenge their own death. And so they fight more fiercely because of this hope, and they thus become extremely dangerous to their enemies.

QUESTION 41

Fear in Itself

Next we have to consider, first, fear (*timor*) (questions 41-44) and, second, daring (*audacia*) (question 45).

As for fear, there are four things to consider: first, fear itself (question 41); second, the object of fear (question 42); third, the causes of fear (question 43); and, fourth, the effects of fear (question 44).

On the first topic there are four questions: (1) Is fear a passion of the soul? (2) Is fear a specific passion (*passio specialis*)? (3) Is there such a thing as natural fear? (4) What are the species of fear?

Article 1

Is fear a passion of the soul?

It seems that fear (*timor*) is not a passion of the soul:

Objection 1: In *De Fide Orthodoxa* 3 Damascene says, "Fear is a virtue (*virtus*) that involves *sustole*—that is, being drawn inward (*contractio*)—"and that desires the essence" (*desiderativa essentiae*). But as is proved in *Ethics* 2, no virtue is a passion. Therefore, fear is not a passion.

Objection 2: Every passion is an effect that has its source in the presence of an agent. But as Damascene points out in *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2, fear has to do with something that is future and not with anything present. Therefore, fear is not a passion.

Objection 3: Every passion of the soul is a movement of the sentient appetite that follows upon an apprehension by the sensory power. But the sensory power apprehends the present and not the future. Therefore, since fear has to do with a future evil, it seems that it is not a passion of the soul.

But contrary to this: In *De Civitate Dei* 14 Augustine numbers fear among the other passions of the soul.

I respond: With the exception of sadness (*post tristitiam*), fear has more of the character of a passion than any of the other movements of the soul.

For as was explained above (q. 22, a. 1), the first thing relevant to the character of a passion is that a passion is the *movement of a passive power*, i.e., a movement to which its object is related in the manner of an active mover, so that a passion is the effect of an agent. And in this sense even acts of sensing and of intellective understanding are called passions or instances of being acted upon (*etiam sentire and intelligere dicuntur pati*). Second, what is more properly called a passion is a *movement of an appetitive power*. And what is even more properly called a passion is a movement which (a) belongs to an appetitive power having a corporeal organ and which (b) occurs along with some *corporeal change*. And, beyond that, what are most properly of all called passions are those movements that imply *some sort of harm*.

Now it is clear that since fear has to do with what is bad, it belongs to an *appetitive* power; for it is appetitive powers that have to do *per se* with the good and the bad. Moreover, fear belongs to the *sentient* appetite, since it occurs along with a certain change, viz., "being drawn inward" (*cum contractione*), as Damascene puts it. And it also implies a certain relation to what is bad, insofar as what is bad in some sense gains a victory over something good. Hence, the character of being a passion belongs to fear in the truest sense (*verissime*).

Still, fear comes after sadness, which has to do with a present evil; for fear has to do with a future evil, and a future evil does not effect movement in the same way that a present evil does.

Reply to objection 1: 'Virtue' (*virtus*) names a principle of action, and so insofar as an appetitive power's interior movements are principles of exterior actions, they are called 'virtues'. By contrast, the Philosopher is denying that a passion is the sort of virtue that is a habit.

Reply to objection 2: Just as a passion in the case of a natural body has its source in the corporeal

presence of an agent, so, too, a passion in the case of the soul has its source in the 'soul-like' presence of an agent without a corporeal or real presence (*ex animali praesentia agentis absque praesentia corporali vel reali*), viz., insofar as the bad thing that is future in reality is present through the soul's apprehension (*inquantum malum quod est futurum realiter est praesens secundum apprehensionem animae*).

Reply to objection 3: The sensory power does not apprehend the future, but on the basis of what it apprehends as present, an animal is moved by natural instinct to hope for a future good or to fear a future evil.

Article 2

Is fear a specific passion or a generic passion?

It seems that fear is not a specific passion (*timor non sit specialis passio*):

Objection 1: In *83 Quaestiones* Augustine says, "He whom fear does not distress is such that desire does not harass him, and sickness [read: sadness] does not wound him, and gesticulating and empty joy do not toss him around." From this it seems that if fear is removed, then all the other passions are removed as well. Therefore, fear is a generic passion and not a specific passion (*non passio est specialis sed generalis*).

Objection 2: In *Ethics* 4 the Philosopher says, "Approaching and withdrawing (*prosecutio et fuga*) are related in the appetite in the same way that affirming and denying are related in the intellect." But negation is not a species in the intellect, as neither is affirmation, but is instead something common to many things. Therefore, neither is withdrawal a species in the appetite. But fear is nothing other than a certain sort of withdrawal from what is bad. Therefore, fear is not a specific passion.

Objection 3: If fear were a specific passion, then it would exist principally in the irascible part of the soul. But fear also exists in the concupiscible part. For in *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, "Fear is a certain sort of sadness," and Damascene says, "Fear is a virtue of desire" (*virtus desiderativa*), and, as was explained above (q. 23, a. 4), sadness and desire exist in the concupiscible part. Therefore, fear is not a specific passion, since it belongs to diverse powers.

But contrary to this: As is clear from Damascene in *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2, fear is divided off on the same level with the other passions of the soul (*condividitur aliis passionibus animae*).

I respond: The passions of the soul take their species from their objects. Hence, a specific passion has an object that is specific. But fear has a specific object, just as hope does. For just as the object of hope is something good that is future, arduous, and possible to attain, so the object of fear is something bad that is future, difficult, and cannot be resisted (*cui resisti non potest*). Hence, fear is a specific passion of the soul.

Reply to objection 1: All the passions of the soul are derived from a single source, viz., love, in which they have a connection to one another. And it is by reason of this connection—and not because fear is a generic passion—that if fear is removed, then the other passions of the soul are removed as well.

Reply to objection 2: Not every instance of an appetite's withdrawing is an instance of fear; instead, as has been explained, fear is withdrawal from a specific object. And so even though withdrawal is something generic, fear is nonetheless a specific passion.

Reply to objection 3: There is no sense in which fear exists in the concupiscible part of the soul, since it has to do not with something bad simply speaking, but with something bad that is accompanied by some difficulty or arduousness that makes it almost impossible to resist (*sed cum difficultate vel arduitate ut ei resisti vix possit*).

However, because, as was explained above (q. 25, a. 1), the passions of the irascible part have their source in the passions of the concupiscible part and are terminated in them, what belongs to the

concupiscible part is attributed to fear. For fear is said to be sadness insofar as the object of fear would produce sadness if it were present; hence, in the same place the Philosopher says that fear proceeds "from imagining a future evil that is corruptive and produces sadness." Similarly, Damascene attributes desire to fear, since just as hope arises from the desire for something good (*a desiderio boni*), so fear arises from an aversion to something bad (*ex fuga mali*). For as is clear from what was said above (q. 25, a. 2 and q. 29, a. 2 and q. 36, a. 2), the aversion to something bad arises from the desire for something good.

Article 3

Is there such a thing as natural fear?

It seems that there is such a thing as natural fear (*timor aliquis sit naturalis*):

Objection 1: In *De Fide Orthodoxa* 3 Damascene says, "There is a sort of natural fear by which the soul is unwilling to be separated from the body."

Objection 2: As has been explained (a. 2), fear arises from love. But as Dionysius explains in *De Divinis Nominibus* 4, there is such a thing as natural love. Therefore, there is likewise such a thing as natural fear.

Objection 3: As was explained above (q. 40, a. 4), fear is opposed to hope. But there is such a thing as a hope that belongs to nature, as is clear from what Romans 4:18 says of Abraham, viz., that "against hope"—the hope of nature—"he believed in hope"—the hope of grace. Therefore, there is likewise such a thing as natural fear.

But contrary to this: What is natural is found generally among all things, animate and inanimate. But fear is not found among inanimate things. Therefore, there is no such thing as natural fear.

I respond: A movement is called 'natural' because nature inclines a thing toward it. But there are two ways in which this happens:

In one way, the whole of the movement is completed by the nature without any operation on the part of an apprehensive power, in the way that moving upwards (*moveri sursum*) is fire's natural movement, and in the way that growth (*augeri*) is a natural movement belonging to plants and animals.

In a second way, what is called 'natural' is a movement that the thing's nature inclines it toward, even if the movement is completed only through an apprehension—in the way that, as was explained above (q. 10, a. 1 and q. 17, a. 9), the movement of the cognitive and appetitive powers is traced back to the nature as its first principle. And in this sense, even the acts of an apprehensive power, e.g., understanding, sensing, and remembering, along with an animal's appetitive movements as well, are sometimes called 'natural'. This is the sense in which an instance of fear can be called 'natural'.

And this natural fear is distinguished from non-natural fear by the diversity of their objects. For as the Philosopher explains in *Rhetoric* 2, there is a sort of fear that has to do with a corruptive evil that a nature shies away from because of its natural desire to exist (*refugit propter naturale desiderium essendi*); and it is this sort of fear that is called 'natural'. Again, there is a sort of fear that produces sadness and that is repugnant not to the nature but to the appetite's desire, and this sort of fear is called 'non-natural'. In the same way, love, concupiscence, and pleasure were likewise divided into *natural* and *non-natural* above (q. 26, a. 1 and q. 30, a. 3 and q. 31, a. 7).

However, notice that certain passions of the soul, e.g., love, desire, and hope, are sometimes called 'natural' in the first sense of 'natural', whereas the others cannot be called natural in that sense. This is because *love* and *hatred* and *desire* and *aversion* imply a certain inclination toward pursuing what is good and avoiding what is bad, and this sort of inclination belongs to a natural appetite as well. And so a certain natural love and desire (or hope) can in some sense be attributed even to natural things that lack cognition. By contrast, the other passions of the soul imply certain movements for which a natural

inclination is in no way sufficient. This is so either because (a) sensation and cognition are part of the nature of these passions, in the sense, explained above (q. 31, a. 1 and q. 35, a. 1), in which apprehension is required by the nature of pleasure and pain, so that things which lack cognition cannot be said to take pleasure or to be saddened; or because (b) movements of the sort in question are contrary to the character of a natural inclination; for instance, despair withdraws from a good because of some difficulty, and fear withdraws from fighting against a contrary evil, even though there is a natural inclination toward doing this. And so passions of this sort are in no sense attributed to inanimate things.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: The replies to the objections are clear from what has been said.

Article 4

Does Damascene correctly assign the species of fear?

It seems that Damascene incorrectly assigns six species of fear, viz., sluggishness (*segnities*), shamefacedness or embarrassment (*erubescentia*), shame (*verecundia*), wonder (*admiratio*), amazement (*stupor*), and agony (*agonia*):

Objection 1: As the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 2, "Fear has to do with something bad that produces sadness (*de malo contristativo*)." Therefore, the species of fear ought to correspond to the species of sadness. But as was explained above (q. 35, a. 8), there are four species of sadness. Therefore, there should be just four species of fear corresponding to them.

Objection 2: Whatever consists in an act of ours is subject to our power. But as has been explained (a. 2), fear has to do with something bad that exceeds our power. Therefore, sluggishness, shamefacedness, and shame, which involve our action, should not be posited as species of fear.

Objection 3: As has been explained (aa. 1-2), fear has to do with the future. But as Gregory of Nyssa explains, "Shame (*verecundia*) has to do with a base act that has already been committed." Therefore, shame is not a species of fear.

Objection 4: Fear has to do only with what is bad. But wonder (*admiratio*) and amazement (*stupor*) have to do with what is great and unusual, regardless of whether it is good or bad. Therefore, wonder and amazement are not species of fear.

Objection 5: As it says at the beginning of the *Metaphysics*, philosophers are moved by wonder to inquire into the truth. But fear moves one to put off inquiry instead of moving one toward inquiry. Therefore, wonder (*admiratio*) is not a species of fear.

But contrary to this: The authority of Damascene and Gregory of Nyssa suffices for the contrary.

I respond: As has been explained (a. 2), fear has to do with something bad that is future and that exceeds the power of the one who has the fear, with the result that it cannot be resisted.

Now just as a man's good can be thought of either (a) as involving his own operation or (b) as involving exterior things, so too in the case of what is bad for him.

As for an operation that belongs to the man himself, there are two sorts of evil that can be feared:

The first sort of evil is work that weighs heavily on his nature (*labor gravans naturam*). And this is the cause of *sluggishness* or *dilatoriness* (*segnities*), viz., when someone shies away from acting because of his fear of too much work (*propter timorem excedentis laboris*).

The second sort of evil is disgrace that damages his reputation (*turpitudo laedens opinionem*). And so if disgrace is feared in an act about to be committed, then there is *shamefacedness* (*erubescentia*), whereas if the fear has to do with a disgraceful act that has already been committed, then it is *shame* (*verecundia*).

On the other hand, there are three ways in which what is bad in exterior things can exceed a man's

power to resist:

First, by reason of its magnitude (*ratione magnitudinis*), viz., when someone thinks about a great evil, the unfolding of which he is unable to take in (*magnum malum cuius exitum considerare non sufficit*). And this is *wonder* (*admiratio*).

Second, by reason of its unfamiliarity (*ratione dissuetudinis*), viz., because some evil that we are not used to thinking about is encountered, and so it is a great evil in our estimation. And then there is *amazement* (*stupor*), which is caused by imagining something unusual (*ex insolita imaginatione*).

Third, by reason of its unexpectedness (*ratione improvisionis*), viz., since it cannot be provided for ahead of time (*provideri non potest*)—in the way that future misfortunes are feared (*sicut futura infortunia timentur*). And this sort of fear is called '*agony*' (*agonia*).

Reply to objection 1: The species of sadness that were posited above (q. 35, a. 8) are taken not from the diversity of their objects, but from their effects and from certain special characteristics. And so those species of sadness do not have to correspond to these species of fear, which are taken from a proper division of the object of fear.

Reply to objection 2: Insofar as it is now being done, an operation is subject to the agent's power (*subditur potestati operantis*). But something that exceeds the agent's power, and because of which the agent shies away from the action, can be thought of with respect to the action. Accordingly, sluggishness, shamefacedness, and shame are posited as species of fear.

Reply to objection 3: Future insults or reproaches can be feared because of a past act. Accordingly, shame is a species of fear.

Reply to objection 4: Not every instance of wonder and amazement is a species of fear, but rather wonder that has to do with a great evil and amazement that has to do with an unfamiliar evil.

An alternative reply is that just as sluggishness shies away from the work of an exterior operation, so wonder and amazement shy away from the difficulty of thinking about great and unfamiliar things, regardless of whether they are good or bad, so that wonder and amazement are related to an act of the intellect in the same way that sluggishness is related to an exterior act.

Reply to objection 5: Someone who has wonder shies away at present from passing judgment about the thing he wonders about, fearing a mistake; but he will inquire into it in the future. The one who is amazed fears both to judge in the present and to inquire in the future. Hence, wonder is a source of philosophizing, whereas amazement is an impediment to philosophical thinking.

QUESTION 42

The Objects of Fear

Next we have to consider the objects of fear. And on this topic there are six questions: (1) Is the object of fear something good or something bad? (2) Are evils of nature (*malum naturae*) an object of fear? (3) Is there fear of evils of sin (*malum culpae*)? (4) Can fear itself be feared? (5) Are things that happen suddenly (*repentina*) feared to a greater degree? (6) Are things for which there is no remedy feared to a greater degree?

Article 1

Is the object of fear something good or something bad?

It seems that the object of fear is something good (*bonum sit obiectum timoris*):

Objection 1: In *83 Quaestiones* Augustine says, "We fear nothing except (a) losing what we love and have acquired or (b) not acquiring what we love and hope for." But what we love is something good. Therefore, fear has something good as its proper object.

Objection 2: In *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, "Power, and someone's being over another (*super alium ipsum esse*), is something to be feared (*est terribile*)." But something of this sort is a good. Therefore, it is something good that is the object of fear.

Objection 3: There cannot be anything bad in God. But we are commanded to fear God—this according to Psalm 33:10 ("Fear the Lord, all you His holy ones"). Therefore, there is also fear of what is good.

But contrary to this: In *De Fide Orthodoxa* 2 Damascene says, "Fear has to do with a future evil."

I respond: Fear is a certain movement of the appetitive power. Now as *Ethics* 6 explains, what belongs to the appetitive power is to approach and to withdraw (*prosecutio et fuga*); approaching has to with what is good, whereas withdrawing has to do with what is bad. Thus, every movement of an appetitive power that implies an approach toward something has for its object what is good, whereas every movement that implies a withdrawal from something has for its object what is bad. Hence, since fear implies a withdrawal, in the first instance and *per se* it has as its proper object what is bad.

Now fear can also have to do with what is good insofar as what is good bears a relation to what is bad. And there are two ways in which this can be the case:

In one way, insofar as some good is being stripped away by the bad thing in question (*inquantum per malum privatur bonum*). Now something is bad by the very fact that it strips away a good. Hence, when someone withdraws from what is bad because it is bad, it follows that he is withdrawing from it because it strips away a good that he is approaching out of his love for it. And this is the sense in which Augustine claims that there is no reason for fear other than that one might lose a good that is loved.

In the second way, something good is related to what is bad as its cause, viz., in the sense that something good is by its power able to inflict some harm on a good that is loved. And so, in the same way in which it was explained above (q. 40, a. 7) that hope has to do with two things, viz., (a) the good thing toward which one is tending and (b) that through which he hopes to acquire the desired good, so, too, fear has to do with two things, viz., (a) the evil that one is shying away from and (b) the good thing that is able by its power to inflict that evil. This is the sense in which God is feared by a man insofar as He is able to inflict either spiritual or corporeal punishments. This is also the sense in which a man's power is feared, especially when it is harmful or unjust, since such a man is ready to inflict harm. And this is also the sense in which "someone's being over another" (*super alium esse*) is feared, i.e., being subject to another (*inniti alii*) in such a way that it is within the other's power to inflict harm on us; for instance, someone who is privy to a crime is feared because he might reveal the crime.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: The replies to the objections are clear from what has been said.

Article 2

Is there fear of evils of nature?

It seems that there is no fear of evils of nature (*timor non sit de malo naturae*):

Objection 1: In *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, "Fear makes us deliberate (*timor facit consiliativos*)." But as *Ethics* 3 says, we do not deliberate about things that come from nature. Therefore, there is no fear of evils of nature.

Objection 2: Natural failings (*defectus naturales*) such as death and other things of this sort threaten men at all times. Therefore, if there were fear of such evils, then a man would always have to be in fear.

Objection 3: Nature does not effect movement toward contraries. But evils of nature have their source in nature. Therefore, the fact that someone might shy away from such evils through fear does not have its source in nature. Therefore, natural fear is not fear of evils of nature, and yet it is this sort of evil that seems pertinent to natural fear.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says, "The most fearful of all things is death," and death is an evil of nature.

I respond: As the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 2, fear comes from "imagining a future evil that is corruptive and causes sadness." Now just as an evil that causes sadness is one that is contrary to the *will*, so a corruptive evil is one that is contrary to *nature*. And this is what an 'evil of nature' is. Hence, there can be such a thing as fear of an evil of nature.

But notice than an evil of nature sometimes comes from a natural cause, and in such a case it is called an evil of nature not only because it strips away a good of nature, but also because it is an effect of nature, e.g., natural death and other failings of this sort. Sometimes, however, an evil of nature comes from a non-natural cause, e.g., a death that is violently inflicted by an assailant. And in both of these senses, an evil of nature is in some way feared and in some way not feared. For since, as the Philosopher puts it, fear comes from "imagining a future evil," anything that eliminates the imagining of a future evil removes fear as well.

Now there are two ways in which it can happen that an evil does not appear to be future:

In one way, from the fact that it is remote and distant, since because of the distance we imagine that it is not going to happen (*propter distantiam imaginamur ut non futurum*). And so either we do not fear the evil in question, or else we fear it very little. For as the Philosopher explains in *Rhetoric* 2, "Things that are a long way off are not feared; for instance, all men know that they will die, but because death is not imminent, they do not trouble themselves about it."

In a second way, some evil that is future is judged as not future, and this because of an inevitability that makes one judge it to be present. Thus, in *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, "Those who are already being executed are not afraid," since they see the inevitability of their imminent death ..... "but in order for someone to be afraid, there must be some hope of surviving."

So, then, an evil of nature is not feared when it is not apprehended as future. However, if an evil of nature that is corruptive is apprehended as imminent and yet accompanied by some hope of escape, then it will be feared.

Reply to objection 1: As has been explained, sometimes an evil of nature does not have its source in nature.

However, insofar as such an evil does have its source in nature, it might nonetheless be capable of

being deferred even if it cannot be totally avoided. And given this sort of hope, there can be deliberation with respect to avoiding it.

Reply to objection 2: Even if an evil of nature is always threatening, it is nonetheless not always close by. And so it is not always being feared.

Reply to objection 3: Death and other failures of nature come from nature in general, and yet a particular nature fights against them as much as it can. And so because of the inclination of a particular nature, there is pain and sadness with respect to evils of this sort when they are present, and there is fear if they are imminent in the future.

Article 3

Is there fear of evils of sin?

It seems that there can be fear of evils of sin:

Objection 1: In his commentary on 1 John 4:18 Augustine says, "It is with a chaste fear that a man fears separation from God." But nothing except sin separates us from God—this according to Isaiah 59:2 ("Your sins have divided you and your God"). Therefore, there can be fear of evils of sin.

Objection 2: In *De Tusculanis Quaestionibus* 4 Tully says, "The things that we fear when they are future are the things by which we are saddened when they are present." But it is possible for someone to grieve over or to be saddened by an evil of sin. Therefore, it is likewise possible for someone to fear an evil of sin.

Objection 3: Hope is opposed to fear. But as is clear from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 9, one can hope for the good of virtue. And in Galatians 5:10 the Apostle says, "I am confident of you in the Lord, that you will not be of another mind." Therefore, it is possible for there to be fear of evils of sin.

Objection 4: As was explained above (q. 41, a. 4), shame (*verecundia*) is a species of fear. But shame has to do with an unseemly deed, i.e., an evil of sin. Therefore, so does fear.

But contrary to this: In *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, "Not all evils are feared, e.g., that someone will be unjust or tardy."

I respond: As was explained above (q. 40, a. 1 and q. 41, a. 2), just as the object of hope is something good that is future, arduous, and such that one can attain to it, so fear has to do with something bad that is future, arduous, and such that it cannot easily be avoided. From this one can infer that what is completely subject to our own power and will does not have the character of something to be feared (*non habet rationem terribilis*); instead, what is to be feared is only that which has an extrinsic cause.

Now an evil of sin has its proper cause the human will, and so, properly speaking, it does not have the character of something to be feared.

However, since the human will can be inclined toward sinning by something exterior, if that thing which inclines it toward sinning has a great power to incline it, then in this sense there can be fear of an evil of sin, insofar as that evil comes from an exterior cause—as, for instance, when someone fears spending time in the company of bad men, lest he be induced by them to sin. But, properly speaking, in such a situation it is the seduction that the man fears more than the sin in its proper character, i.e., insofar as it is voluntary. For insofar as it is voluntary, it does not have the character of being such that it is feared.

Reply to objection 1: Separation from God is a certain punishment that follows upon sin, and every punishment is in some sense from an exterior cause.

Reply to objection 2: There is one thing that sadness and fear agree in, viz., that both have to do with what is bad, whereas there are two things that they disagree in. First, sadness has to do with a present evil, whereas fear has to do with a future evil. Second, since sadness exists in the concupiscible

part of the soul, it has to do with evil simply speaking and so can be directed toward any sort of evil whatsoever, whether great or small. By contrast, since fear exists in the irascible part, it has to do with an evil that involves arduousness and difficulty. However, arduousness and difficulty are ruled out to the extent that something is subject to the will. And so it is not the case that everything we are saddened by when it is present is such that we fear it when it is future. Rather, we fear just some of those evils, viz., the ones that are arduous.

Reply to objection 3: Hope has to do with something good that one can attain to. But someone can attain to the good thing either by himself or through another, and so there can be hope with respect to an act of virtue that is within our power. By contrast, fear has to do with something bad that is not subject to our power, and so it is always the case that an evil that we fear has its source in an extrinsic cause. By contrast, a good that is hoped for can have its source either in an intrinsic cause or in an extrinsic cause.

Reply to objection 4: As was explained above (q. 41, a. 4), shame is fear not with respect to the sinful act itself, but rather with respect to the disgrace or ignominy that follows upon the sinful act. And this disgrace or ignominy comes from an extrinsic cause.

Article 4

Can fear be feared?

It seems that fear cannot be feared:

Objection 1: Everything that is feared is guarded from being lost by fearing; for instance, someone who fears losing his health guards it by fearing. Therefore, if fear were feared, then a man would guard himself from fearing by fearing. But this seems absurd.

Objection 2: Fearing is a certain sort of withdrawing (*quaedam fuga*). But nothing withdraws from itself. Therefore, fear does not fear fearing.

Objection 3: Fear has to do with the future. But someone who fears already has fear. Therefore, he cannot fear the fear.

But contrary to this: A man can love his own love and be pained by his own pain. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, he can likewise fear his own fear (*potest timere timorem*).

I respond: As has been explained (a. 3), whatever has the character of something to be feared has its source in an extrinsic cause and does not have its source in our own will.

Now fear has its source partly in an extrinsic cause, and it is partly subject to our will. It has its source in an extrinsic cause insofar as it is a passion that follows upon imagining some imminent evil. Accordingly, someone can fear fear, i.e., he can fear that there might be an imminent necessity for fearing due to the onslaught of some overwhelming evil.

Now this fear is subject to the will insofar as the lower appetite obeys reason, and so a man can repel the fear. In this respect, fear cannot be feared, just as Augustine claims in *83 Quaestiones*. But because someone could use the arguments adduced by Augustine in order to show that fear cannot in any way at all be feared, it is necessary to reply to those arguments.

Reply to objection 1: Not every instance of fear is a single fear, but instead there are diverse instances of fear corresponding to the diverse things that are feared. Therefore, there is nothing to prevent its being the case that by one instance of fear someone saves himself from another instance of fear, and in this sense by fearing he guards himself against that later instance of fear.

Reply to objection 2: Since the instance of fear by which the imminent evil is feared is different from the instance of fear by which that very fear of the imminent evil is feared, it does not follow that the same thing withdraws from itself or that the same withdrawal is a withdrawal from itself.

Reply to objection 3: Because of the diversity among the instances of fear that has already been explained, a man can fear a future instance of fear by means of a present instance of fear.

Article 5

Are unfamiliar and sudden things more to be feared?

It seems not to be the case that unfamiliar and sudden things are more to be feared (*insolita et repentina non sint magis terribilia*):

Objection 1: Just has hope has to do with something good, so fear has to do with something bad. But experience makes for an increase of hope in the case of good things. Therefore, it also makes for an increase of fear in the case of bad things.

Objection 2: In *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, "It is those who are quiet and astute, and not those who are prone to sharp anger (*illi qui acutae irae sunt*), who are more to be feared." But it is clear that those who are prone to sharp anger have movements that are more sudden. Therefore, what is sudden is less to be feared.

Objection 3: Things that are sudden are less able to be thought about. But some things are such that the more they are considered, the more they are feared; hence, in *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says, "Some men appear to be courageous because of ignorance; for if they discover that things are different from what they suspected, they run away." Therefore, sudden things are less feared.

But contrary to this: In *Confessiones* 2, Augustine says, "Fear shudders at what is unfamiliar and sudden and stands opposed to things that are loved, and it takes precautions to secure those things."

I respond: As was explained above (a. 3), the object of fear is an imminent evil that cannot be easily repelled. This occurs because of two elements: (a) the magnitude of the evil and (b) the weakness of the one who is fearful. Something's being unfamiliar and sudden contributes to both of these elements.

First, it makes the imminent evil seem greater. For all corporeal things, both good ones and bad ones, appear less daunting (*minora apparent*) the more they are thought about. And so just as pain with respect to a present evil is lessened when it lasts for a long time, as is clear from Tully in *De Tusculanis Quaestionibus* 3, so, too, the fear of a future evil is diminished by one's thinking about it ahead of time.

Second, something's being unfamiliar and sudden contributes to the weakness of the one who is fearful insofar as it eliminates the remedies which a man can prepare ahead of time in order to repel future evils; such remedies cannot exist when the evil occurs unexpectedly.

Reply to objection 1: The object of hope is something good that one can attain to. And so whatever increases a man's power is apt to increase his hope and, for the same reason, to diminish his fear, since fear has to do with something bad that cannot easily be resisted. Therefore, since experience makes a man more able to operate, it diminishes his fear in the same way that it increases his hope.

Reply to objection 2: Those who are sharply angry do not hide their anger, and so the harms they inflict are not so sudden that they cannot be foreseen. By contrast, quiet and astute men hide their anger, and so the harm that they threaten cannot be foreseen, but instead comes unexpectedly. And this is why the Philosopher says that it is the latter who are more to be feared.

Reply to objection 3: Speaking *per se*, corporeal goods or evils appear greater at the beginning. The reason for this is that each thing appears greater when its contrary is placed right next to it. Hence, when someone suddenly passes from poverty to wealth, he overestimates his wealth because of his previous poverty (*propter paupertatem praeexistentem divitias magis aestimat*), and, conversely, the rich have a greater fear of poverty immediately upon falling into it.

However, it can happen by some accident that the magnitude of a given evil is hidden, e.g., when

enemies cleverly conceal themselves. And in such a case it is true that the evil becomes more fearful upon careful consideration.

Article 6

Are evils for which there is no remedy more to be feared?

It seems not to be the case that evils for which there is no remedy are more to be feared (*ea quae non habent remedium non sint magis timenda*):

Objection 1: As was explained above (a. 3), it is required for fear that some hope of escape should remain (*quod remaneat aliqua spes salutis*). But in the case of evils for which there is no remedy, no hope of escape remains. Therefore, such evils are in no way to be feared.

Objection 2: No remedy can be applied to the evil of death, since, in accord with nature, no return is possible from death to life. Yet, as the Philosopher points out in *Rhetoric* 2, it is not death that is most to be feared. Therefore, it is not the case that evils for which there is no remedy are more to be feared.

Objection 3: In *Ethics* 1 the Philosopher says, "A good that lasts longer is no greater than one that lasts for a single day, and a good that is everlasting is no greater than one that is not everlasting." But evils for which there is no remedy do not seem to differ from other evils except because they are long-lasting or everlasting. Therefore, they are not for that reason worse, or more to be feared.

But contrary to this: In *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, "The fearsome things that are most to be feared are those which, if they have gone wrong, cannot be corrected ..... or those which we cannot help, or cannot easily help."

I respond: The object of fear is something bad, and so anything that contributes to an increase in the badness likewise contributes to an increase in the fear. Now as is clear from what was said above (q. 18, a. 3), badness is increased not only because of the species of the bad thing itself, but also because of its circumstances. And, of all the circumstances, being long-lasting, or even everlasting, seems to contribute most to an increase of badness. For things that exist in time are in some sense measured by temporal duration, and so if enduring something for such-and-such a length of time is bad, then the same thing endured for twice that length of time is thought of as twice as bad. And according to this line of reasoning, to endure the same thing for an infinitely long time (*pati idem in infinito tempore*), i.e., to endure it forever, in some sense makes for an infinite increase in the evil (*habet quodammodo infinitum augmentum*). But evils which are such that once they arrive, they cannot be remedied, or cannot be easily remedied, are taken to be everlasting or long-lasting. And so they are to be feared most of all.

Reply to objection 1: There are two sorts of remedies for an evil:

One, by the future evil's been prevented from arriving at all. And if this sort of remedy is excluded, then hope is removed and, as a result, so is fear. Hence, we are not here talking about this sort of remedy.

The other sort of remedy for evil is one by which an evil that is already present is removed. And this is the sort of remedy that we are talking about here.

Reply to objection 2: Even if death is an evil without remedy (*irremediabile malum*), nonetheless, as was explained above (a.2), because it is not immediately threatening, it is not feared.

Reply to objection 3: In this passage the Philosopher is talking about something that is good taken in its own right (*de per se bono*), i.e., good by its species. In this sense of 'good', a thing becomes a greater good because of the nature of goodness itself and not by virtue of being long-lasting or everlasting.

QUESTION 43

The Causes of Fear

Next we have to consider the causes of fear. And on this topic there are two questions: (1) Is love a cause of fear? (2) Is weakness (*defectus*) a cause of fear?

Article 1

Is love a cause of fear?

It seems that love (*amor*) is not a cause of fear:

Objection 1: That which 'introduces' (*introducit*) a thing is a cause of it. But as Augustine says in his commentary on 1 John 4:18, "Fear introduces (*introducit*) the love of charity." Therefore, fear is a cause of love, and not vice versa.

Objection 2: In *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, "The men who are feared the most are those from whom we expect bad things to threaten us." But by the fact that we expect something bad from someone, we are prompted to hate him rather than to love him (*magis provocamur ad odium eius quam ad amorem*). Therefore, fear is caused by hatred rather than by love.

Objection 3: It was explained above (q. 42, a. 3) that what comes from within ourselves does not have the character of something to be feared. But it is especially the case that what comes from love proceeds from the depth of our heart (*ex intimo cordis*). Therefore, fear is not caused by love.

But contrary to this: In *83 Quaestiones* Augustine says, "Without doubt, there is no cause of fear except (a) losing what we love and have acquired or (b) not acquiring what we love and hope for." Therefore, every instance of fear is caused by the fact that we love something. Therefore, love is a cause of fear.

I respond: The objects of the passions are related to the passions in the way that forms are related to natural things or artifacts, since the passions of the soul take their species from their objects, in the same way that the things just mentioned take their species from their forms. Therefore, just as anything that is a cause of a form is a cause of the thing constituted by that form, so, too, anything that is in any way a cause of the object of a passion is a cause of that passion.

Now something can be a cause of the object of a passion either in the manner of an *efficient cause* or in the manner of a *material disposition*. For instance, the object of pleasure is something good that is apprehended and fitting and conjoined [to the appetite] (*bonum apparens conveniens coniunctum*), where (a) its *efficient* cause includes anything that brings about the conjoining or that brings it about that the good thing in question is fitting or good or apprehended (*illud quod facit coniunctionem vel quod facit convenientiam vel bonitatem vel apparentiam huiusmodi boni*), while (b) its cause in the manner of a *material disposition* is a habit, or any sort of disposition, in accord with which the good that is conjoined to him becomes fitting for someone or is apprehended by him (*habitus vel quaecumque dispositio secundam quam fit alicui conveniens aut apparens illud bonum quod est ei coniunctum*).

So, then, in the case under discussion, the object of fear is something judged to be evil and in the near future and such that it cannot easily be resisted (*obiectum timoris est aestimatum malum futurum propinquum cui resisti de facili non potest*). And so whatever is able to inflict such an evil is an *efficient* cause of the object of fear and thus of the fear itself. On the other hand, that by which someone is so disposed that something is an evil of the sort in question for him is a cause of fear and of its object in the manner of a *material disposition*. And it is in this latter sense that love is a cause of fear. For from the fact that someone loves a certain good, it follows that it is bad for him to be deprived of that good and, as a result, it follows that he fears being deprived of it as something bad.

Reply to objection 1: As was explained above (q. 42, a. 1), fear has to do in the first place and *per se* with something bad which one is with withdrawing from and which is opposed to a certain good

that is loved. And so fear arises *per se* from love.

However, in a secondary sense, fear has to do with the source of the relevant sort of evil (*secundario vero respicit ad id per quod provenit tale malum*). And so sometimes fear induces love *per accidens*, viz., insofar as a man who fears being punished by God keeps God's commandments, and so begins to hope; and as was explained above (q. 40, a. 7), hope introduces love.

Reply to objection 2: Someone from whom bad things are expected is, to be sure, at first hated (*primo quidem odio habetur*). However, after good things begin to be hoped for from him, then he begins to be loved.

Still, the good that the feared evil is contrary to was loved from the beginning.

Reply to objection 3: This argument goes through with respect to anything that is a cause of a fearsome evil in the manner of an *efficient* cause. But as has been explained, love is a cause of fear in the manner of a *material disposition*.

Article 2

Is weakness a cause of fear?

It seems that weakness is not a cause of fear (*defectus non sit causa timoris*):

Objection 1: Those who have power are feared most of all. But weakness is opposed to power. Therefore, weakness is not a cause of fear.

Objection 2: Those who are already being executed are in an especially weakened state (*illi qui iam decapitantur maxime sunt in defectu*). But as *Rhetoric* 2 points out, such men do not have fear. Therefore, weakness is not a cause of fear.

Objection 3: To contend with a rival has its source in courage and not in weakness (*decertare ex fortitudine provenit, non ex defectu*). But as *Rhetoric* 2 says, "Those who are contending have a fear of those who are fighting for the same things." Therefore, weakness is not a cause of fear.

But contrary to this: Contraries are causes of contraries. But as *Rhetoric* 2 says, "Fear is eliminated by wealth, and strength, and a multitude of friends, and power." Therefore, fear is caused by a weakness in such things.

I respond: As was explained above (a. 1), one can identify two sorts of causes of fear, (a) one in the manner of a *material disposition* on the part of the one who has the fear, and (b) the other in the manner of an *efficient cause* on the part of what is feared:

(a) Thus, as regards the first of these, weakness is, speaking *per se*, a cause of fear, since it happens that, because of some weakness in one's capacities (*ex aliquo defectu virtutis*), one is unable to easily repel an imminent evil. However, what is required in order to cause fear is a weakness of a certain measure. For a weakness that causes fear of a future evil is a lesser weakness than that which follows upon a present evil, with respect to which there is sadness. And the weakness would be still greater if one's perception of the evil, or one's love for the good whose contrary is feared, were totally eliminated (*si totaliter sensus mali auferretur vel amor boni cuius contrarium timetur*).

(b) On the other hand, as regards the second sort of cause of fear, it is power and strength that are, speaking *per se*, causes of fear. For by virtue of the fact that something apprehended as harmful is powerful, it happens that its effect cannot be repelled.

However, it is possible *per accidens* for a weakness on this side to be a cause of fear, viz., insofar as it happens that, because of some weakness on his part, someone wills to inflict a harm, e.g., to redress an injustice, either because he has previously been harmed by the other or because he fears being harmed by him (*puta propter iniustitiam, vel quia ante laesus fuit vel quia timet laedi*).

Reply to objection 1: This argument goes through for a cause of fear that is an *efficient* cause of

the fear.

Reply to objection 2: Those who are already being executed are suffering from a present evil. And so their weakness exceeds the measure involved in fear (*iste defectus excedit mensuram timoris*).

Reply to objection 3: Those who are contending are fearful not because of the power by which they are able to contest with their rival, but because of a weakness in their power, the result of which is that they are not confident that they will be victorious.

QUESTION 44

The Effects of Fear

Next we have to consider the effects of fear. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Does fear make one to be drawn inward (*facit contractionem*)? (2) Does fear make one deliberative (*faciat consiliativos*)? (3) Does fear make one quiver (*faciat tremorem*)? (4) Does fear impede an operation (*impediat operationem*)?

Article 1

Does fear make one to be drawn inward?

It seems that fear does not make one to be drawn inward (*non faciat contractionem*):

Objection 1: When one is drawn inward (*contractione facta*), heat and animal spirits are drawn back toward the interior parts of the body (*ad interiora revocantur*). But when heat and the spirits are increased within, the heart is enlarged for boldly doing something aggressive (*ad audacter aliquid aggrediendum*), as in clear in case of those who are angry. But this is contrary to what happens in the case of fear. Therefore, fear does not make one to be drawn inward.

Objection 2: When heat and the spirits are increased within by a man's being drawn inward, what follows is that he bursts out loudly (*in vocem prorumpat*), as is clear in the case of those who are in pain (*ut patet in dolentibus*). But those who are afraid do not emit sounds; instead, they are rendered speechless. Therefore, fear does not make one to be drawn inward.

Objection 3: As was explained above (q. 41, a. 4), shame (*verecundia*) is a species of fear. But as Tully points out in *De Tusculanis Quaestionibus* 4 and as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 6, those who are ashamed blush (*rubescent*). And redness in the face attests not to being drawn inward, but to the opposite. Therefore, it is not an effect of fear that one is drawn inward.

But contrary to this: In *De Fide Orthodoxa* 3 Damascene says, "Fear is a virtue (*virtus*) that involves *sustole*," i.e., being drawn inward (*idest secundum contractionem*).

I respond: As was explained above (q. 28, a. 5), in the case of the passions of the soul, the movement of the appetitive power is itself like a form, whereas the bodily change is like matter, and the one is proportioned to the other. Hence, the bodily change follows as a likeness to the appetitive movement and in keeping with the character of that movement (*secundum similitudinem et rationem appetitivi motus*).

Now as regards the soul's appetitive movement, fear implies being drawn inward in a certain way (*importat certam contractionem*). The reason for this is that, as was explained above (q. 41, a. 2), fear has its source in the imagining of some imminent evil that can be difficult to repel. But, as was explained above (q. 43, a. 2), the fact that something can be difficult to repel finds its source in the weakness of one's power. And to the extent that a power is weaker, it extends to fewer things. In this sense, an instance of being drawn inward follows from the very act of imagining that causes the fear. In the same way, we see in the case of those who are dying that their nature is drawn back toward the inside because of the weakness of their power. And we likewise see, in the case of cities, that when the citizens are afraid, they withdraw from the outer parts of the city and retreat as far as possible into the interior parts.

And by a likeness to this drawing inward that belongs to the soul's appetite, there is also in the case of fear, on the part of the body, a drawing of heat and spirits inward toward the interior parts of the body.

Reply to objection 1: As the Philosopher says in *De Problematibus*, even if, in those who are afraid, the spirits are drawn from the exterior parts of the body to the interior parts, the movement of the spirits is nonetheless not the same in those who are angry and those who are afraid.

For in the case of those who are angry, because of the heat and subtlety of the spirits that has its source in the desire for retribution, the interior movement of the spirts is from the lower parts of the body

to the upper parts and so the spirits and heat gather around the heart. And the result of this is that those who are angry are rendered quick to attack and daring.

By contrast, in the case of those who are afraid, because of a coldness that thickens them (*propter frigiditatem ingrossantem*), the spirits move from the higher parts of the body to the lower parts, where this coldness results from imagining one's lack of power. And so the heat and spirits do not multiply around the heart, but instead withdraw from the heart. And because of this, those who are afraid are not quick to attack, but instead withdraw.

Reply to objection 2: It is natural for any being that is in pain, whether human or animal, to use whatever assistance he can to repel the harmful thing that is present and inflicting the pain. Hence, we see that animals in pain strike back with their jaws or their horns. Now the greatest assistance for everything in animals is heat and animal spirits. And so in an instance of pain, the nature conserves the heat and the animal spirits internally, in order to use them to repel what is harmful. This is why in *De Problematibus* the Philosopher says that when the heat and the spirits are increased inwardly, they have to be expressed vocally. And because of this, those who are in pain can scarcely keep themselves from crying out.

By contrast, as has been explained, in those who are afraid there is a movement of the interior heat and spirits away from the heart toward the lower parts of the body. And so fear counteracts the formation of sounds, which are effected by the emission of spirits toward the higher parts through the mouth. And it is because of this that fear renders people speechless. And this is also why fear makes one quiver, as the Philosopher points out in *De Problematibus*.

Reply to objection 3: The danger of death is not only contrary to the soul's desire but also contrary to the nature. Because of this, in the case of this sort of fear, there is a drawing inward not only on the part of the appetite, but also on the part of the body's nature. For an animal that draws heat toward the interior parts of the body because it is imagining death is disposed in the same way that it is when death is naturally imminent. And this is why, as *Ethics* 4 says, "Those who are fearing death turn pale."

By contrast, the evil that is feared by shame is opposed only to the soul's desire and not to the nature. And so there is, to be sure, a turning inward by the soul's appetite, but not by the body's nature. Instead, the soul—drawn into itself, as it were—gives free rein to the movement of heat and of the spirits. Hence, they are diffused to the exterior parts of the body. And this is why those who are ashamed blush.

Article 2

Does fear make one deliberative?

It seems that fear does not make one deliberative (*non faciat consiliativos*):

Objection 1: The same thing does not both make one deliberative and impede deliberation. But fear impedes deliberation, since every passion disturbs the quiet that is required for the good use of reason. Therefore, fear does not make one deliberative.

Objection 2: Deliberation is an act of reason by which it thinks and deliberates about future matters. But certain instances of fear "drive away thought and displace reason," as Tully puts it in *De Tusculanis Quaestionibus* 4. Therefore, fear does not make one deliberative, but instead impedes deliberation.

Objection 3: Just as deliberation is used for avoiding evils, so, too, it is used for pursuing goods. But just as fear has to do with evils to be avoided, so, too, hope has to do with goods to be pursued. Therefore, fear does not make one deliberative more than hope does.

But contrary to this: As the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 2, "Fear makes one deliberative (*timor*

consiliativos facit)."

I respond: There are two senses in which someone can be called 'deliberative':

The first is in virtue of one's willing to, i.e., taking care to, deliberate (*voluntate seu sollicitudine consiliandi*). And this is the sense in which fear makes one deliberative. For as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 3, "We deliberate about big matters with respect to which we distrust ourselves, as it were." For as has already been explained (q. 42, a. 2), the things that strike fear into us are not just bad simply speaking, but have a certain magnitude, both because they are apprehended as things that can be repelled only with difficulty, and also because they are apprehended as being close by. Hence, it is especially in the presence of fear that men seek to deliberate.

In a second way, someone is called deliberative because he has the ability to deliberate well. And in this sense, neither fear nor any other passion makes one deliberative. For when a man is affected by a passion, things seem to him either greater or smaller than they are in reality (*secundum rei veritatem*); for instance, to a lover, the things that he loves seem better, and to one who fears, the things that he fears seem more fearsome. And so due to this lack of rectitude in judging, each passion as such (*quantum est de se*) impedes the ability to deliberate well.

Reply to objection 1: This makes clear the reply to the first objection.

Reply to objection 2: The stronger a given passion is, the more the man affected by it is impeded. And so when his fear is strong (*fortis*), a man wills to deliberate, but he is so perturbed in his thoughts that he cannot succeed in his deliberation (*consilium adinvenire non potest*). On the other hand, if his fear is a weak one (*parvus timor*) that makes him take care to deliberate, then it does not disturb reason very much and can even contribute to his ability to deliberate well—this by reason of the care that results from the fear.

Reply to objection 3: Hope, too, makes one deliberative, since, as the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 2, "No one deliberates about matters with respect to which he despairs"—in the same way that, as *Ethics* 3 points out, no one deliberates about what is impossible.

However, fear makes one more deliberative than hope does. For hope has to do with what is good to the extent that we are able to attain it, whereas fear has to do with what is bad insofar as it can hardly be repelled; and so fear deals with the nature of the difficult to a greater degree than hope does. But as has been explained, we deliberate about difficult matters, especially those with respect to which we do not trust ourselves.

Article 3

Is quivering an effect of fear?

It seems that quivering or trembling (*tremor*) is not an effect of fear:

Objection 1: Quivering has its source in coldness; for instance, we see that those who are very cold quiver. But fear does not seem to cause coldness; instead, it seems to cause a dry heat (*calorem dissicantem*), an indication of which is that those are afraid get thirsty—especially in the case of the greatest fears, as is clear with those who are being led off to death. Therefore, fear does not cause quivering.

Objection 2: The emission of excrement has its source in heat; hence, medicines that serve as laxatives are, for the most part, hot. But such emissions of excrement happen frequently in the presence of fear. Therefore, fear seems to cause heat. And so it does not cause quivering.

Objection 3: When fear occurs, heat is withdrawn from the exterior parts of the body to the interior parts. Therefore, if it were because of this sort of withdrawal that a man quivers in his exterior parts, then it seems that quivering should be caused by fear in all the exterior members. But this does not

seem to be the case. Therefore, the body's quivering is not an effect of fear.

But contrary to this: In *De Tusculanis Quaestionibus* 4 Tully says, "Terror is followed by quivering, pallor, and the chattering of the teeth."

I respond: As was explained above (a. 1), in the case of fear there is a certain drawing inward from the exterior parts of the body to the interior parts, and so the exterior parts remain cold. And because of this they are affected by quivering, which is caused by a weakness in the power that controls the members (*causatur ex debilitate virtutis continentis membra*). And this sort of weakness is especially brought about by a lack of heat, which, as *De Anima* 2 explains, is the instrument by which the soul effects movement.

Reply to objection 1: When heat is withdrawn from the exterior parts of the body into the interior parts, the interior heat increases, and especially with respect to the lower parts, i.e., with respect to the nutritive power. And so, since moisture is consumed, thirst follows and also sometimes the loosening of the bowels, along with the emission of urine and sometimes even of semen.

An alternative reply is that, as the Philosopher claims in *De Problematibus*, bodily emissions of the sort in question occur because of contractions in the abdomen and testicles.

Reply to objection 2: This makes clear the reply to the second objection.

Reply to objection 3: Since, in the presence of fear, heat leaves the heart and goes from the higher parts of the body to the lower parts, what mainly quivers in those who are afraid are the heart and those members that have some connection to the chest, where the heart is. Hence, those who are afraid have quivering especially in the voice, because of the closeness of the windpipe to the heart. The lower lip also quivers, along with the whole of the lower jaw, because of their connection to the heart, and from this follows the chattering of the teeth. And for the same reason, the arms and hands quiver.

Another, additional, reply is that the members that quiver are the ones that are more mobile. This is why the knees also quiver in those who are afraid—this according to Isaiah 35:3 ("Strengthen feeble hands, and firm up trembling knees").

Article 4

Does fear impede an operation?

It seems that fear impedes an operation (*impedit operationem*):

Objection 1: An operation is impeded most of all by a disturbance in reason, which directs one's work. But as has been explained (a. 2), fear disturbs reason. Therefore, fear impedes an operation.

Objection 2: Those who do something in the presence of fear fail more easily in their acting. For instance, if someone is walking on top of a log positioned in a high place, it is easy for him to fall because of his fear, whereas, because of a lack of fear, he would not fall if he walked on the same log positioned in a low place. Therefore, fear impedes an operation.

Objection 3: Laziness (*pigritia*), or sluggishness (*segnities*), is a species of fear. But laziness impedes an operation. Therefore, so does fear.

But contrary to this: In Philippians 2:12 the Apostle says, "Work out your salvation with fear and trembling." But he would not have said this if fear impeded a good operation. Therefore, fear does not impede a good operation.

I respond: A man's exterior operation is caused, to be sure, by the soul as a first mover, but also by the bodily members as instruments. Now it is possible for an operation to be impeded both (a) because of a defect in the instrument or (b) because of a defect in the principal mover.

Thus, as far as the corporeal instruments are concerned, fear, taken in itself (*quantum est de se*), is always apt to impede an exterior operation due to the lack of heat that occurs in the exterior members

because of fear.

However, as far as the soul is concerned, if the fear is moderate and does not disturb reason too much, then it contributes to operating well, insofar as it causes a certain carefulness and makes the man deliberate and act more attentively.

On the other hand, if the fear increases so much that it disturbs reason, then it impedes the operation even on the part of the soul. But in passage quoted above, the Apostle is not talking about this sort of fear.

Reply to objection 1: This makes clear the reply to the first objection.

Reply to objection 2: Those who fall off a log positioned in a high place are suffering from a disturbance in the imagination because of their fear of an imagined fall.

Reply to objection 3: Everyone who is afraid withdraws from what he fears, and so, since laziness (*pigritia*) is the fear of an operation itself insofar as that operation is laborious, it impedes an operation because it holds the will back from it.

By contrast, fear of other things aids an operation to the extent that it inclines the will to do those things by which the man escapes what he fears.

QUESTION 45

Daring

Next we have to consider daring or audacity (*audacia*). And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Is daring contrary to fear? (2) How is daring related to hope? (3) What are the causes of daring? (4) What are its effects?

Article 1

Is daring contrary to fear?

It seems that daring (*audacia*) is not contrary to fear (*timor*):

Objection 1: In *83 Quaestiones* Augustine says, "Daring is a vice." But vice is contrary to virtue. Therefore, since fear is not a virtue, it seems that daring is not contrary to fear.

Objection 2: A single thing has a single contrary. But hope is contrary to fear. Therefore, daring is not contrary to fear.

Objection 3: Each passion excludes its opposed passion. But what is excluded by fear is carefreeness (*securitas*); for in *Confessiones* 2 Augustine says, "Fear guards against carefreeness." Therefore, carefreeness is contrary to fear. Therefore, it is not the case that daring is contrary to fear.

But contrary to this: In *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, "Daring is contrary to fear."

I respond: As *Metaphysics* 10 says, it is part of the nature of contraries that "they are maximally distant from one another." But what is maximally distant from fear is daring. For fear withdraws from a future harm because of the harm's victory over the one who fears it, whereas daring attacks the imminent danger for the sake of winning a victory over the danger itself. Hence, daring is clearly contrary to fear.

Reply to objection 1: 'Anger' (*ira*) and 'daring' (*audacia*)—and the names of all the passions—can be taken in two senses:

In one sense, insofar as they imply simply (*absolute*) the sentient appetite's movement with respect to some good or bad object. And it is in this sense that they are the names of *passions*.

In a second sense, insofar as they imply, along with this movement, a departure from the order of reason; and in this sense they are the names of *vices*. This is the sense in which Augustine is talking about daring, whereas we ourselves are at present talking about daring in the first sense.

Reply to objection 2: There is no more than one contrary for a single thing in the same respect (*secundum idem*). But nothing prevents a single thing from having more than one contrary in different respects. And thus it was explained above (q. 23, a. 2 and q. 40, a. 4) that the passions of the irascible part of the soul have two contraries, one in accord with the opposition between *good* and *bad*, and the other in accord with the opposition between *approaching toward* and *withdrawing from*. And it is in this latter way that daring is opposed to fear, and that despair is opposed to hope.

Reply to objection 3: 'Carefreeness' (*securitas*) does not signify anything contrary to fear, but instead signifies only the exclusion of fear. For it is someone unafraid who is said to be carefree. Hence, carefreeness is opposed to fear as its *privation*, whereas daring is opposed to it as its *contrary*. And just as the contrary includes the privation within itself, so daring includes carefreeness within itself.

Article 2

Does daring follow upon hope?

It seems that daring does not follow upon hope (*non consequatur spem*):

Objection 1: As *Ethics* 3 says, daring has to do with what is bad and fearsome. But as was

explained above (q. 40, a. 1), hope has to do with what is good. Therefore, they have diverse objects and do not belong to a single ordering. Therefore, daring does not follow upon hope.

Objection 2: Just as daring is contrary to fear, so despair is contrary to hope. But fear does not follow upon despair; to the contrary, as the Philosopher explains in *Rhetoric* 2, despair excludes fear. Therefore, daring does not follow upon hope.

Objection 3: Daring intends a certain good, viz., victory. But it is hope that tends toward an arduous good. Therefore, daring is the same thing as hope. Therefore, it does not follow upon hope.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 3 the Philosopher says, "Those who are full of hope are daring" (*illi qui bonae spei sunt audaces*). Therefore, daring seems to follow upon hope.

I respond: As has already been explained many times (q. 22, a. 2, *et alia*), the passions of the soul belong to the appetitive power.

Now every movement of the appetitive power is traced back to either *approach* or *withdrawal*. And a thing's approach or withdrawal is either *per se* or *per accidens*. More specifically, approach is *per se* toward something good, whereas withdrawal is *per se* away from something bad; but there can be, *per accidens*, (a) an approach toward something bad, for the sake of some adjoined good, and (b) a withdrawal from something good, because of some adjoined evil.

Now what is such-and-such *per accidens* follows upon what is such-and-such *per se*. And so approaching something bad follows upon approaching something good, just as withdrawing from something good follows upon withdrawing from something bad.

Now these four movements belong to four passions: for approaching toward what is good belongs to *hope*, withdrawing from what is bad belongs to *fear*, pursuing (*insecutio*) what is fearsomely bad belongs to *daring*, and withdrawing from what is good belongs to *despair*. Hence, it follows that daring follows upon hope; for because one hopes to overcome something that is fearsome and imminent, one pursues it with daring (*audacter insequitur ipsum*). On the other hand, despair follows upon fear; for one despairs because he fears the difficulty involved with a hoped for good.

Reply to objection 1: This argument would go through if *good* and *bad* were objects that did not have an ordering with respect to one another. But since what is bad has a certain ordering to what is good—for what is bad is posterior to what is good in the way that a privation is posterior to its corresponding disposition—daring, which pursues what is bad, comes after hope, which pursues what is good.

Reply to objection 2: Even if *good* is, simply speaking, prior to *bad*, nevertheless, withdrawal is appropriate with respect to what is bad prior to being appropriate with respect to what is good—just as approach (*insecutio*) is appropriate with respect to what is good prior to being appropriate with respect to what is bad. And so just as hope is prior to daring, so, too, fear is prior to despair. And just as despair does not always follow from fear, but only when the fear is more intense, so, too, daring does not always follow from hope, but only when the hope is strong.

Reply to objection 3: Even if daring has to do with something bad which, in the judgment of the one who is daring, the good of victory is connected to, nonetheless, daring is directed toward something bad, whereas hope is directed toward the connected good thing. Similarly, despair has to do directly with what is good, which it withdraws from, whereas fear has to do with the connected bad thing.

Hence, properly speaking, daring is not a *part* of hope but is instead an *effect* of hope, just as despair is an effect of fear and not a part of it. Also, this is the reason why daring cannot be one of the principal passions (cf. q. 25, a. 4).

Article 3

Is some defect a cause of daring?

It seems that some defect is a cause of daring:

Objection 1: In *De Problematibus* the Philosopher says, "Lovers of wine are strong and daring." But the defect of being inebriated follows from wine. Therefore, daring is caused by a defect.

Objection 2: In *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosophers says, "It is those who lack experience with dangers who are daring." But the lack of experience is a certain defect. Therefore, daring is caused by a defect.

Objection 3: Those who suffer injustices (*iniusta passi*) are usually daring, "just like beasts who have been beaten," as *Ethics* 3 puts it. But to suffer an injustice is a sort of defect. Therefore, daring is caused by some defect.

But contrary to this: In *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says that the cause of daring "is the presence in the imagination of the hope that the means of safety are near at hand and that what needs to be feared either does not exist or is far off." But any relevant defect involves either the exclusion of the means of safety or the proximity of what needs to be feared. Therefore, nothing that involves a defect is a cause of daring.

I respond: As was explained above (aa. 1-2), daring follows upon hope and is contrary to fear, and so anything that is apt to cause hope or to remove fear is a cause of daring. However, since, given that they are passions, fear, hope, and daring consist in (a) a movement of the appetite and (b) a bodily change, there are two possible ways to think about a cause of daring, regardless of whether it involves evoking hope or removing fear: (a) on the part of the appetitive movement and (b) on the part of the bodily change.

As regards the appetitive movement that follows upon an apprehension, the hope that causes daring is evoked by whatever makes us judge that it is possible to attain victory, either (a) by our own power, e.g., by our bodily strength, or experience with dangers, or a lot of money, or other such things, or (b) by the power of others, e.g., by a large number of friends or other helpers, and especially if a man is confident of God's help. Hence, as the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 2, "Those who have a good relationship with the divine are daring."

On the other hand, again as regards the appetitive movement, fear is removed by excluding whatever is both fearsome and close by (*per remotionem terribilium approprinquantium*), e.g., by a man's having no enemies, or by his having harmed no one, or by his not seeing that a danger is approaching. For dangers seem imminent most of all to those who have done harm to others.

As regards the bodily change, daring is caused—via hope's being evoked and fear's being excluded—by whatever builds up heat around the heart. Hence, in *De Partibus Animalium* the Philosopher says, "Those who have a quantitatively small heart are daring, and animals that have a quantitatively large heart are timid, because natural heat cannot heat up a large heart to the extent that it can a small one, just as a fire cannot burn a large house to the extent that it can a small one." And in *De Problematibus* he says, "Those whose lungs contain a lot of blood are daring, because of the heating of the heart that follows from this." And in the same place he says, "Lovers of wine are more daring because of the wine's heat." Hence, it was explained above (q. 40, a. 6) that inebriation gives one good hope, since heat in the heart repels fear and causes hope by extending and enlarging the heart.

Reply to objection 1: Inebriation causes daring not insofar as it is a defect, but insofar as it makes the heart larger and also insofar it makes a man judge that he is great in some way (*inquantum etiam facit aestimationem cuiusdam magnitudinis*).

Reply to objection 2: Those who lack experience with dangers are daring not because of their defect, but rather *per accidens*, viz., insofar as, because of their inexperience, they do not recognize their own weakness or the presence of dangers. And so daring follows because the causes of fear have been

excluded.

Reply to objection 3: As the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 2, "Those who suffer injustice are rendered more daring, because they believe that God gives assistance to those who suffer injustice."

And so it is clear that no defect causes daring except *per accidens*, viz., insofar as the defect has some excellence connected with it—regardless of whether it is a genuine excellence or something thought to be an excellence, and regardless of whether it is an excellence on one's own part or on the part of someone else.

Article 4

Are those who are daring more eager at the beginning than in the midst of the dangers themselves?

It seems not to be the case that those who are daring are more eager at the beginning than in the midst of the dangers themselves (*non sint promptiores in principio quam in ipsis periculis*):

Objection 1: As is clear from what was said above (q. 44, a. 3), quivering is cased by fear, which is contrary to daring. But as the Philosopher points out in *De Problematibus*, those who are daring sometimes quiver at the beginning. Therefore, they are not more eager at the beginning than when they are in the midst of the dangers themselves.

Objection 2: A passion is increased by increasing its object; for instance, a good is lovable, and the more good it is, the more lovable it is. But the object of daring is what is arduous. Therefore, if the arduousness is increased, then the daring is increased. But a danger becomes more arduous and difficult when it is actually present. Therefore, daring should increase at that time as well.

Objection 3: Anger is provoked by wounds that have been inflicted. But anger causes daring; for in *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, "Anger emboldens one." Therefore, once men are in the midst of the dangers themselves and are struck, it seems that they are rendered more daring.

But contrary to this: *Ethics* 3 says, "The daring hasten along and are willing before the dangers, but in the midst of them they draw back."

I respond: Since daring is a certain movement of the sentient appetite, it follows upon an apprehension by the sentient power. Now the sentient power does not collate and inquire into a thing's singular circumstances, but instead makes a quick judgment (*non est collativa nec inquisitiva singulorum quae circumstant rem, sed subitum habet iudicium*).

Now it sometimes happens that, because of the quick apprehension, not everything that will pose a difficulty in a given situation can be recognized, and so a movement of daring rises up to meet the danger. Hence, when the men in question experience the danger itself, they sense that there is more difficulty than they had estimated. And so they draw back.

Reason, however, takes into account all the things that pose difficulties in a given situation. And so courageous men, who go out to meet dangers in accord with the judgment of reason (*ex iudicio rationis*), seem at the beginning to be relaxed, since they meet the dangers with due deliberation and not passively. And when they find themselves in the midst of the dangers themselves, they do not experience anything unexpected. And so they continue on steadfastly. Or, again, this is because they meet dangers for the sake of the good of virtue, and they persevere in willing this good, no matter how great the dangers are.

By contrast, as has been explained, those who are daring act solely on the basis of a judgment that makes for hope and excludes fear.

Reply to objection 1: Quivering also occurs in those who are daring, because of the withdrawal of heat from the exterior parts of the body to the interior parts—just as likewise occurs in those who are afraid. But in the case of those who are daring, the heat withdraws to the heart, whereas in those who are

afraid, it withdraws to the lower parts.

Reply to objection 2: The object of love is the good simply speaking, and a good that is simply speaking increased increases the love. But the object of daring is composed of what is good and what is bad, and the movement of daring toward what is bad presupposes a movement of hope toward what is good. Therefore, if so much arduousness is added to a danger that the danger exceeds the hope, then the movement of daring will not follow, but will instead be diminished.

However, if there is in fact a movement of daring, then the greater the danger is, the greater the daring is judged to be.

Reply to objection 3: As will be explained below (q. 46, a. 1), anger is not caused by a wound unless some sort of hope is presupposed. And if the danger were so great that it exceeded the hope of victory, anger would not follow. But it is true that if the anger does follow, then the daring will be increased.

QUESTION 46

Anger in Itself

Next we have to consider anger (*ira*). And we will consider, first, anger in its own right (question 46); second, the causes that effect anger, along with the remedy for anger (question 47); and, third, the effects of anger (question 48).

On the first topic there are eight questions: (1) Is anger a specific passion? (2) Is the object of anger something good or something bad? (3) Does anger exist in the concupiscible part of the soul? (4) Does anger involve reason (*utrum ira sit cum ratione*)? (5) Is anger more natural than concupiscence? (6) Is anger more grievous than hatred? (7) Is anger directed only toward those with respect to whom there is justice? (8) What are the species of anger?

Article 1

Is anger a specific passion?

It seems that anger is not a specific passion (*ira non sit passio specialis*):

Objection 1: The irascible power (*potentia irascibilis*) derives its name from anger (*ira*). But there are many passions that belong to this power, and not just a single passion. Therefore, anger is not a single specific passion.

Objection 2: As is clear to anyone who goes through the passions one by one, there is a contrary for each specific passion. But as was explained above (q. 23, a. 3), there is no contrary for anger. Therefore, anger is not a specific passion.

Objection 3: One specific passion does not include another. But anger includes several passions, since, as is clear from the Philosopher in *Rhetoric* 2, it involves sadness and pleasure and hope (*est cum tristitia et cum delectatione et cum spe*). Therefore, anger is not a specific passion.

But contrary to this: Damascene posits anger as a specific passion. And so does Tully in *De Tusculanis Quaestionibus* 4.

I respond: There are two senses in which something is called 'generic' (*generale*):

(a) In the *first* sense, by *predication*, in the way that *animal* is generic with respect to all animals.

(b) In a *second* sense, by *causality*, in the way that, according to Dionysius in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, the sun is a generic or general cause (*causa generalis*) of all the things that are generated here below (*in his inferioribus*). For just as a genus, in a way similar to matter, contains many specific differences in potentiality (*genus continet multas differentias potestate secundum similitudinem materiae*), so an agent cause contains many effects that correspond to its active power.

(c) Now an effect can be produced by the concurrence of diverse causes, and since every cause remains in its effect in some way, one can also claim, in a *third* sense, that an effect produced by several causes coming together has a sort of generality in the sense that it *contains several causes* that are in some way actualized (*quodammodo in actu*).

Therefore, in the *first* sense, anger is not a generic passion, but, as was explained above (q. 23, a. 4), is instead divided off at the same level from the other passions (*condivisa aliis passionibus*).

Similarly, it is not a generic passion in the *second* sense, either. For it is not a cause of other passions. Rather, given this sense, it is *love* that can be called a generic passion, as is clear from Augustine in *De Civitate Dei* 14. For as was explained above (q. 27, a. 4), love is the primary root (*prima radix*) of all the passions.

However, in the *third* sense anger can be called a generic passion, given that it is caused by the concurrence of several passions. For the movement of anger rises up only because some sort of sadness has been inflicted and only insofar as the desire for retribution is present, along with the hope of exacting it. For as the Philosopher explains in *Rhetoric* 2, "Someone who is angry hopes to inflict punishment,

since he desires the retribution that is possible for him" (*appetit vindictam ut sibi possibilem*). Hence, as Avicenna points out in his *Liber de Anima*, if it is a person of very exalted status (*persona multum excellens*) who has inflicted the harm, then only sadness follows, and not anger.

Reply to objection 1: The irascible power derives its name from anger not because every movement of this power is an instance of anger, but rather because (a) all the movements of this power are terminated in anger, and because (b) anger is the most manifest of all the movements of this power.

Reply to objection 2: Since anger is caused by contrary passions, viz., by *hope*, which is directed toward something good, and by *sadness*, which is directed toward something bad, it includes contrariety within itself and so does not have a contrary outside itself—just as, within the mixed colors, one finds only the contrariety that belongs to the simple colors by which the mixed colors are caused.

Reply to objection 3: Anger includes several passions not in the way that a genus includes its species, but rather in the sense of containment that applies to causes and effects (*secundum continentiam causae et effectus*).

Article 2

Is the object of anger something bad?

It seems that the object of anger is something bad:

Objection 1: Gregory of Nyssa says that anger is "the sword-bearer of avid desire or concupiscence" (*armigera concupiscentiae*), viz., insofar as it attacks whatever impedes one's desire. But every impediment has the character of something bad. Therefore, anger is directed toward something bad as its object.

Objection 2: Anger and hatred agree in their effect, since each has the effect is of inflicting harm on another. But as was explained above (q. 29, a. 1), hatred is directed toward something bad as its object. Therefore, so is anger.

Objection 3: Anger is caused by sadness; hence, in *Ethics* 7 the Philosopher says, "Anger acts with sadness." But the object of sadness is something bad. Therefore, so is the object of anger.

But contrary to this:

1. In *Confessiones* 2 Augustine says, "Anger desires retribution." But a desire for retribution is a desire for something good, since retribution is a part of justice. Therefore, the object of anger is something good.

2. Anger always involves hope, and so, as the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 2, anger is a cause of pleasure. But the object of hope and pleasure is something good. Therefore, so is the object of anger.

I respond: The movement of an appetitive power follows upon an act of an apprehensive power. But there are two ways in which an apprehensive power apprehends something: (a) in the manner of something *simple* (*per modum incomplexi*), as when we understand what a *man* is; and (b) in the manner of something *complex* (*per modum complexi*), as when we understand *whiteness* to exist in a *man*. Hence, it is in both of these ways that an appetitive power can tend toward something good or toward something bad:

(a) *in the manner of something simple and incomplex*, as when the appetite simply pursues or adheres to something good or withdraws from something bad. Movements of this sort are *desire* and *hope*, *pleasure* and *sadness*, and others of this type.

(b) *in the manner of something complex*, as when the appetite is directed toward a good thing (or a bad thing) which exists in another or which is being done to another, either by tending toward this [object] or by withdrawing from it. This is manifestly obvious in the case of love and hatred. For instance, we love someone insofar as we want something good to exist in him, whereas we hate him

insofar as we want something bad to exist in him. And the same thing holds for anger. For whoever gets angry seeks to exact retribution from someone (*quaerit vindicari de aliquo*). And so the movement of anger tends toward two things, viz., (a) toward the *retribution* itself, which it desires and hopes for as something good, and hence takes pleasure in, and also (b) toward the *one against whom it seeks retribution* as against someone who is opposed to him and harmful, and this involves the character of something bad.

However, there are two noteworthy differences between anger, on the one hand, and hatred and love. The first is that anger is always directed toward two objects, whereas love and hatred are sometimes directed toward just one object, as when someone is said to love or to hate wine or something of this sort. The second is that each of the objects that love is directed toward is something good, since the lover wills something good for someone, insofar as that individual is agreeable to him (*vult amans bonum alicui tanquam sibi convenienti*). On the other hand, each of the objects that hatred is directed toward has the character of something bad, since one who hates wills something bad for someone, insofar as that individual is disagreeable to him. By contrast, anger has one object with the character of something good, viz., the retribution that it desires, and another object with the character of something bad, viz., the noxious man whom it wants to exact retribution from. And so anger is a passion that is in some sense composed of contrary passions.

Reply to objection 1 and objection 2 and objection 3: This makes clear the replies to the objections.

Article 3

Does anger exist in the concupiscible part of the soul?

It seems that anger exists in the concupiscible part of the soul (*ira sit in concupiscibili*):

Objection 1: In *De Tusculanis Quaestionibus* 4 Tully says that anger is a sort of desire (*libido quaedam*). But desire exists in the concupiscible part. Therefore, so does anger.

Objection 2: In *Regula* Augustine says, "Anger grows into hatred." And in *De Tusculanis Quaestionibus* 4 Tully says, "Hatred is inveterate anger." But like love, hatred exists in the concupiscible part. Therefore, anger exists in the concupiscible part.

Objection 3: Damascene and Gregory of Nyssa claim that anger is composed of sadness and desire. But both of these exist in the concupiscible part. Therefore, anger exists in the concupiscible part.

But contrary to this: The concupiscible power is distinct from the irascible power. Therefore, if anger existed in the concupiscible power, then the irascible power would not derive its name from it.

I respond: As was explained above (q. 23, a. 1), the passions of the irascible part differ from the passions of the concupiscible part in that the objects of the passions of the concupiscible part are something good or something bad simply speaking (*bonum et malum absolute*), whereas the objects of the passions of the irascible part are something good or something bad along with a certain loftiness or arduousness (*bonum et malum cum quadam elevatione vel arduitate*).

Now it has been explained (a. 2) that anger is directed toward two objects, viz., (a) the retribution that it desires and (b) the individual against whom it seeks retribution. And anger requires a certain arduousness in both, since the movement of anger arises only if there is a certain degree of magnitude in both objects (*non insurgit motus irae nisi aliqua magnitudine circa utrum existente*). For as the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 2, "We judge to be of little worth anything that amounts to nothing or almost nothing." Hence, it is clear that anger exists in the irascible part and not in the concupiscible part.

Reply to objection 1: Tully is using the name 'desire' (*libido*) to designate an appetite (*appetitus*)

for any sort of future good, with no distinction between arduous goods and non-arduous goods. Accordingly, he places *anger* under *desire* insofar as anger is a desire for retribution. But 'desire' (*libido*) in this sense is common to both the irascible part and the concupiscible part.

Reply to objection 2: Anger is said to grow into hatred not because numerically the same passion that was at first anger becomes hatred later on through a sort of aging process (*per qunadam inveterationem*), but because of a certain sort of causality. For when anger lasts for a long time, it causes hatred.

Reply to objection 3: Anger is said to be composed of sadness and desire, not in the sense of being composed of *parts*, but in the sense of being composed of *causes*. Now it has already been explained above (q. 25, a. 2) that the passions of the concupiscible part are causes of the passions of the irascible part.

Article 4

Does anger involve an act of reason?

It seems that anger does not involve an act of reason (*ira non sit cum ratione*):

Objection 1: Since anger is a passion, it exists in the sentient appetite. But the sentient appetite follows the apprehension of the sentient part of the soul and not of reason. Therefore, anger does not involve an act of reason.

Objection 2: Brute animals lack reason. And yet anger is found in them. Therefore, anger does not involve an act of reason.

Objection 3: Inebriation constricts reason (*inebrietas ligat rationem*). But it is conducive to anger (*adiuvat ad iram*). Therefore, anger does not involve an act of reason.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 7 the Philosopher says, "In some sense anger follows upon an act of reason."

I respond: As was explained above (a. 2), anger is a desire for retribution (*appetitus vindictae*). But this implies an act of collating the punishment to be inflicted with the harm that has been done to one (*collationem poenae infligendae ad nocumentum sibi illatum*); hence, in *Ethics* 7 the Philosopher says, "Inferring (*syllogizans*) that it is necessary to fight back against such an individual, he immediately gets angry." But collating and inferring are acts of reason (*conferre et syllogizare est rationis*). And so anger in some sense involves an act of reason.

Reply to objection 1: There are two ways in which an appetitive power can involve an act of reason (*potest esse cum ratione*):

In one way, when reason *gives a command* (*cum ratione praecipiente*), and it is in this way that an act of willing involves an act of reason (*sic voluntas est cum ratione*); this is why the will is called a 'rational appetite'.

In the second way, when reason *makes something known* (*cum ratione denuniante*), and it is in this way that anger involves an act of reason. Hence, in *De Problematibus* the Philosopher says, "Anger involves an act of reason not in the sense that reason commands the anger, but in the sense that it makes manifest an injury." For the sentient appetite obeys reason by the mediation of the will and not directly.

Reply to objection 2: As was explained above (q. 40, a. 3), brute animals have a natural instinct which is instilled in them by God's reason and through which they have interior and exterior movements similar to the movements of reason.

Reply to objection 3: As *Ethics* 7 says, "Anger listens to reason in a certain sense," viz., insofar as reason makes it known (*nuntiat*) that one has been injured, "but it does not listen perfectly," since it does not observe the rule of reason in measuring out the retribution (*in rependendo vindictam*). Therefore,

anger requires an act of reason and adds an impediment to reason. Hence, in *De Problematibus* the Philosopher says that (a) those who are greatly inebriated, in the sense that they have nothing of reason's judgment, do not get angry, but that (b) when they are just a little inebriated, in the sense of having reason's judgment, though an impaired judgment, they do get angry (*irascatur tamquam habentes iudicium rationis sed impeditum*).

Article 5

Is anger more natural than concupiscence?

It seems that anger is not more natural than concupiscence or avid desire (*ira non sit naturalior quam concupiscentia*):

Objection 1: It is proper to man to be an animal that is gentle by nature. But as the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 2, "Gentleness is opposed to anger." Therefore, anger is not more natural than concupiscence, but seems to be altogether contrary to a man's nature.

Objection 2: *Reason* is divided off against *nature*. For we do not say that things that act in accord with reason act 'in accord with nature'. But as *Ethics* 7 says, "Anger involves an act of reason, but concupiscence does not involve an act of reason." Therefore, concupiscence is more natural than anger.

Objection 3: Anger is a desire for retribution, whereas concupiscence is, more than anything, a desire for things that are pleasurable to the sense of touch, viz., food and sex. But these pleasures are more natural to a man than retribution is. Therefore, concupiscence is more natural than anger.

But contrary to this: In *Ethics* 7 the Philosopher says, "Anger is more natural than concupiscence."

I respond: As is clear from *Physics* 2, the 'natural' is what is caused by nature. Hence, whether a passion is more or less natural can be perceived only on the basis of its cause. Now as was explained above (q. 36, a. 2), the cause of a passion can be thought of in two ways: (a) on the part of the *object*, and (b) on the part of the *subject*.

Thus, if the causes of anger and concupiscence are considered on the part of the *object*, then in this sense concupiscence—and especially concupiscence with regard to food and sex—is more natural than anger, since food and sex are more natural than retribution is.

On the other hand, if the cause of anger is considered on the part of the *subject*, then there is one sense in which anger is more natural and another sense in which concupiscence is more natural.

For a man's nature can be thought of either (a) in relation to the nature of the genus or (b) in relation to the nature of the species or (c) in relation to the temperament peculiar to an individual (*secundum complexionem propriam individui*).

Thus, if one thinks of the nature of the *genus*, i.e., the nature of this man insofar as he is an *animal*, then concupiscence is more natural than anger, since it is from the common nature itself that a man has a certain inclination toward desiring those things that conserve life either in the species or in the individual.

On the other hand, if we think of a man's nature on the part of the *species*, viz., insofar as the man is *rational*, then anger is more natural to a man than concupiscence is, since anger involves reason more than concupiscence does. Hence, in *Ethics* 4 the Philosopher says, "It is more human to punish," which pertains to anger, "than to be gentle." For each thing naturally rises up against what is contrary to it and harmful.

Again, if one considers the nature of *this* individual in accord with his *peculiar temperament*, then anger is more natural than concupiscence, since anger follows upon the natural disposition to get angry, which is part of one's temperament, more readily than concupiscence or any other passion follows upon

its corresponding natural disposition. For a man is disposed toward getting angry insofar as he has a choleric temperament, where, among the humors, yellow bile (*cholera*) is the one that moves most quickly, since it is similar to fire. And so someone who is disposed by his natural temperament toward anger gets angry more readily (*magis in promptu*) than someone who is disposed toward concupiscence experiences a desire (*quam de eo qui est dispositus ad concupiscendum quod concupiscat*). This is why, in *Ethics* 7 the Philosopher says that anger is more easily handed down from parents to children than is concupiscence.

Reply to objection 1: In the case of a man, one can consider both the body's natural condition, which is temperate, and reason itself.

On the part of the natural condition, a man does not by his species naturally have an excess of anger or of any other passion because of the temperament that belongs to his condition. By contrast, the other animals, insofar as they fall short of this sort of condition in the direction of a disposition to some extreme condition, are thereby naturally disposed toward the excess of some passion, in the way that a lion is disposed toward daring, a dog toward anger, a rabbit toward fear, etc.

On the part of reason, it is natural to a man both to get angry and to be gentle. For (a) reason in some sense causes anger, insofar as it makes known (*nuntiat*) the cause of anger, and (b) reason in some sense sedates anger, insofar as someone who is angry "does not pay complete attention to reason's command." This was explained above (a. 4).

Reply to objection 2: Reason itself is part of human nature. Hence, from the very fact that anger involves an act of reason it follows that it is in some sense natural to a man.

Reply to objection 3: This argument goes through with respect to anger and concupiscence on the part of the object.

Article 6

Is anger more grave than hatred?

It seems that anger is more grave than hatred (*ira sit gravior quam odium*):

Objection 1: Proverbs 27:4 says, "Anger has no mercy; nor does fury (*furor*) when it erupts." But hatred is sometimes accompanied by mercy. Therefore, anger is more grave than hatred.

Objection 2: Suffering an evil and grieving over the evil (*de malo dolere*) is something more than simply suffering an evil. But for someone who hates another it is enough that the one whom he hates should suffer evil, whereas for someone who is angry this is not sufficient; rather, as the Philosopher points out in *Rhetoric* 2, he wants the other to recognize the evil and to grieve over it. Therefore, anger is more grave than hatred.

Objection 3: The greater the number of things that come together in order to constitute something, the more stable that thing seems to be; for instance, a habit that is caused by many acts is more permanent. But as was explained above (a. 1), anger, but not hatred, is caused by the concurrence of several passions. Therefore, anger is more stable and more grave than hatred.

But contrary to this: In *Regula* Augustine says that hatred is like "a beam," whereas anger is like "a mote" (cf. Matthew 7:3).

I respond: The species of a passion, along with its concept (*species passionis et ratio ipsius*), is taken from its object.

Now the object of anger is the same *in subject* (*idem subiecto*) as the object of hatred; for just as the one who hates desires something bad for the one whom he hates, so someone who is angry desires something bad for the one whom he is angry with.

However, these objects are not the same *conceptually*. Instead, the one who hates desires what is

bad for his enemy insofar as it is something bad, whereas the one who is angry desires what is bad for the one he is angry with, not insofar as it is something bad, but insofar as it has the character of something good; for he thinks of it as something that is just, insofar as it effects retribution.

Hence, it was likewise explained above (a. 2) that hatred has to do with the application of what is bad to what is bad, whereas anger has to do with the application of what is good to what is bad.

Now it is clear that to desire something bad under the concept *just* has less of the character of badness than simply to will something bad for someone. For to will something bad for someone under the concept *just* can even be in accord with the virtue of justice if it is tempered by a precept of reason, whereas the only way that anger falls short is in not obeying the precept of reason when it exacts retribution.

Hence, it is clear that hatred is much worse and much more grave than anger.

Reply to objection 1: There are two possible things to consider in the case of anger and hatred, viz., *what* is desired and the *intensity* of the desire.

As regards *what* is desired, anger has more mercy than hatred does. For since hatred desires what is bad in its own right (*malum secundum se*) for another, there is no measure of badness that satisfies it. For as the Philosopher points out in *Politics* 1, things that are desired in their own right are desired without measure, in the way that an avaricious man desires wealth. Thus, Ecclesiasticus 12:16 says, "If an enemy finds the opportunity, he will not be satisfied with blood." By contrast, anger desires something bad only under the concept *just retribution*. Thus, when the bad thing that has been inflicted exceeds the measure of justice in the judgment of the one who is angry, at that point he has mercy. Hence, in *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, "Someone who is angry will have mercy if many bad things happen, whereas someone who hates will not have mercy on any account."

As regards the *intensity* of the desire, anger tends to exclude mercy more than hatred does, since the movement of anger is more impetuous because of the inflammation of the yellow bile. Hence, Proverbs adds right afterwards, "Who can bear the force of a spirit roused to violence?"

Reply to objection 2: As has been explained, one who is angry desires what is bad for someone insofar as it has the character of just retribution. Now retribution is effected by inflicting a punishment. But it is part of the nature of punishment that it is contrary to the will of the one being punished, that it is painful, and that it is inflicted because of some fault. And so one who is angry desires that the individual on whom he inflicts this harm should perceive it, grieve over it, and recognize that it comes to him because of a harm inflicted on the one who is angry. By contrast, someone who hates another cares nothing about this, since he desires what is bad for the other insofar as it is bad.

Moreover, it is not true that what someone grieves over is worse; for as the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 2, "Even though injustice and imprudence are bad,"—still, because they are voluntary—"they do not grieve those in whom they exist."

Reply to objection 3: What is caused by a number of causes is more stable when the causes are of the same type (*quando causae accipiuntur unius rationis*); however, it is possible for a single cause to dominate over many others.

Now hatred stems from a more permanent cause than does anger. For anger has its source in a sort of mental commotion (*ex aliqua commotione animi*) due to an inflicted injury, whereas hatred proceeds from a disposition on a man's part to think of what he hates as something opposed to and harmful to himself. And so just as a passion passes away more quickly than a disposition or habit does, so anger passes away more quickly than hatred does. (Even though hatred is likewise a passion, it proceeds from this sort of disposition.) This is why in *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, "Hatred is more incurable than anger is."

Article 7

Is anger directed only toward individuals with respect to whom there is justice?

It seems that anger is not directed only toward individuals with respect to whom there is justice (*solum sit ad illos ad quos est iustitia*):

Objection 1: There is no human justice with respect to non-rational things. Yet sometimes a man is angry with non-rational things—as, e.g., when, out of anger, a writer throws his pen or a rider strikes his horse. Therefore, anger is not directed only toward those with respect to whom there is justice.

Objection 2: As *Ethics* 5 says, "There is no such thing as justice with respect to oneself or with respect to what belongs to onself." But sometimes a man gets angry with himself, in the way that a penitent gets angry with himself because of his sin; hence, Psalm 4:5 says, "Be angry, and do not sin." Therefore, anger is not directed only toward those with respect to whom there is justice.

Objection 3: There can be justice and injustice with respect to a whole genus or with respect to a whole community—as, for instance, when a city does harm to someone (*cum civitas aliquem laesit*). But as the Philosopher points out in *Rhetoric* 2, anger is directed only toward singular individuals and not toward any genus. Therefore, anger is not, properly speaking, directed toward those with respect to whom there is justice and injustice.

But contrary to this is what the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 2.

I respond: As was explained above (a. 6), anger desires something bad insofar as it has the character of just retribution. And so anger is directed at those with respect to whom there is justice and injustice. For to exact retribution is something that pertains to justice, whereas to inflict harm is something that pertains to injustice. Hence, both on the part of its cause, which is an injury inflicted by another, and on the part of the retribution that is desired by the one who is angry, it is clear that anger pertains to the very same individuals with respect to whom there is justice and injustice (*ad eosdem pertinet ira ad quos iustitia et iniustitia*).

Reply to objection 1: As was explained above (a. 4), even though anger involves an act of reason, it can nonetheless exist in brute animals, which lack reason, to the extent that, by natural instinct, they are moved through their imagination toward something similar to the works of reason.

So, then, since in a man there is both reason and imagination, there are two ways in which the movement of anger can arise in a man:

(a) In one way, *with the imagination alone making the injury known* (*ex sola imaginatione nuntiante laesionem*). And in such a case a movement of anger arises even with respect to non-rational and non-living things—similar to the movement that exists in animals with respect to any sort of harm whatsoever.

(b) In the second way, *with reason making the injury known*. And in such a case, as the Philosopher puts it in *Rhetoric* 2, "there cannot in any way be anger with respect to non-sentient things or with respect to the dead." This is both because (a) they do not experience pain (*non dolent*), which is especially what those who are angry want for those with whom they are angry, and also because (b) there is no such thing as retribution with respect to them, since they are not the sort of things that inflict injury (*cum eorum non sit inuriam facere*).

Reply to objection 2: As the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 5, "There is a sort of metaphorical justice and injustice that a man has with respect to himself," viz., insofar as reason governs the irascible and concupiscible parts of the soul. Accordingly, a man can likewise be said to exact retribution from himself and, as a result, to be angry with himself. However, no one can be angry with himself properly speaking and *per se*.

Reply to objection 3: In *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher assigns as a difference between hatred and anger that hatred can be directed toward a genus, in the way that we hate the whole genus of thieves,

whereas anger is directed only toward something singular. The reason for this is that hatred is caused by judging a quality of a given thing to be disagreeable to our disposition, and this can be either in general or in particular. By contrast, anger is caused by someone's injuring us through his act.

Now all acts are singulars, and so anger always has to do with something singular. And when a city as a whole wrongs us (*cum tota civitas nos laeserit*), then the whole city is being counted as a singular thing.

Article 8

Does Damascene correctly enumerate the species of anger?

It seems that Damascene incorrectly enumerates the three species of anger as wrath (*fel*), bitterness or rancor (*mania*), and fury or rage (*furor*):

Objection 1: The species of a genus are not differentiated by any accidents. But the three things in question are differentiated by accidents. For the beginning of the movement of anger is called *wrath* (*fel*), whereas persistent anger (*ira permanens*) is called *bitterness* or *rancor* (*mania*), and *fury* or *rage* (*furor*) is anger waiting for the time of retribution. Therefore, these are not three different species of anger.

Objection 2: In *De Tusculanis Quaestionibus* 4 Tully says, "Nascent anger (*excandescentia*) is called '*thumosis*' in Greek, and is the kind of anger that now flares up and now subsides." But according to Damascene, *thumosis* is the same as fury (*furor*). Therefore, fury subsides with time and does not seek an opportunity for retribution.

Objection 3: In *Moralia* 21 Gregory posits three levels of anger, viz., "silent anger, anger with an utterance, and anger with an expressed phrase" (*iram sine voce et iram cum voce et iram cum verbo expresso*)—in accord with these three sayings of our Lord at Matthew 5:22: "Whoever is angry with his brother ....," where He touches on silent anger; and afterwards He adds, "Whoever says to his brother, 'Raca'..... ," where He touches on anger with an utterance, but not yet formulated with a full phrase; and afterwards He says, "Whoever says to his brother, 'You fool' ..... ," where the utterance is expressed with a complete phrase. Therefore, since Damascene does not say anything about utterance, his division of anger is inadequate.

But contrary to this is the authority of Damascene and of Gregory of Nyssa.

I respond: The three species of anger posited by Damascene, and also by Gregory of Nyssa, are taken from things that augment anger in some way. This happens in three ways:

(a) because of the ease of the movement itself, and he calls this sort of anger *wrath* (*fel*), because it erupts quickly;

(b) because of a sadness that causes the anger and remains for a long time in the memory, and this feature belongs to *bitterness* or *rancor* (*mania*), which is called *mania* because it remains (*a manendo*);

(c) because of what the one who is angry desires, viz., retribution, and this has to do with *fury* or *rage* (*furor*), which does not die down until it metes out the punishment.

Hence, in *Ethics* 4 the Philosopher calls some angry individuals 'sharp-tempered' (*acuti*) because they are quick to anger; others 'bitter' (*amari*) because they retain their anger for a long time; and others 'obstinate' (*difficiles*) because they never rest until they mete out punishment.

Reply to objection 1: Not all the features through which anger is in some way brought to completion are related to anger entirely *per accidens*. And so nothing prevents the species of anger from being assigned on the basis of such things.

Reply to objection 2: Nascent anger (*excandescentia*), which Tully posits, seems to be more relevant to the first species of anger, which is constituted (*perficitur*) by the quickness of the anger, than

it is to fury. But there is nothing to prevent the Greek '*thumosis*', which corresponds to the Latin '*furor*', from implying both things, viz., being quick to anger and being firm in the intention to punish.

Reply to objection 3: The grades of anger referred to here are distinct from one another as effects of anger, but they are not diverse ways of augmenting the movement of anger itself (*non autem secundum diversam perfectionem ipsius motus irae*).

QUESTION 47

The Causes of Anger, and its Remedies

Next we have to consider the efficient causes of anger, and its remedies. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Is the moving cause (*motivum*) of anger always something done to the one who gets angry? (2) Is the only moving cause of anger contempt or disdain (*parvipensio vel despectio*)? (3) What is the cause of anger on the part of the one who gets angry? (4) What is the cause of anger on the part of the one whom one gets angry with?

Article 1

Is it always because of something done to himself that someone gets angry?

It seems that it is not always because of something done to himself that someone gets angry:

Objection 1: A man cannot by sinning do anything to God; for Job 35:6 says, "If your iniquities multiply, what will you be doing to Him?" But God is said to get angry with men because of their sins—this according to Psalm 105:40 ("The Lord was exceedingly angry with His people"). Therefore, it is not always the case that someone gets angry because of something done to himself.

Objection 2: Anger is a desire for retribution. But someone desires to exact retribution even for things that are done to others. Therefore, it is not always the case that the moving cause of anger is something done to ourselves.

Objection 3: As the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 2, men get angry mainly with those "who look down upon (*despiciunt*) what they themselves are especially interested in; for instance, men who are interested in philosophy get angry with those who look down upon philosophy," and the same thing holds for other cases. But to look down upon philosophy is not to harm the individual himself who is interested in it. Therefore, it is not always the case that we get angry because of what has been done to ourselves.

Objection 4: As Chrysostom points out, one who remains silent in the face of an individual who is insulting him (*tacet contra contumeliantem*) provokes that man to anger. But in remaining silent, he is not doing anything to him. Therefore, it is not always the case that someone's anger is provoked by something that has been done to him.

But contrary to this: In *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, "Anger always comes from what has been done to oneself. By contrast, animosity (*inimicitia*) comes without anything having been done to oneself, since we hate anyone whom we think to be of a certain sort."

I respond: As was explained above (q. 46, a. 6), anger is a desire to harm another under the concept *just retribution*. Now retribution has a place only where there has been a previous injury. Nor is it the case that every injury provokes one to retribution; instead, it is only an injury that involves the one who desires retribution (*sed illa sola quae ad eum pertinet qui appetit vindictam*). For just as each thing naturally desires what is good for itself (*proprium bonum*), so, too, each thing naturally repels what is bad for itself (*proprium malum*).

Now an injury done by one individual pertains to another individual only if the former has done something that is in some sense against the latter. Hence, it follows that the moving cause of someone's anger is always something done to himself.

Reply to objection 1: In the case of God, 'anger' is predicated not as a passion of the mind, but rather as a judgment of justice insofar as He wills to exact retribution for sin. For in sinning, the sinner cannot as an efficient cause do any harm to God, and yet on his own part he acts against God in two ways: (a) insofar as he shows disdain for God in His commands, and (b) insofar as he harms someone, either himself or another—something that pertains to God insofar as the one to whom the harm is done is included under God's providence and protection.

Reply to objection 2: We get angry with those who harm others and seek retribution against them to the extent that those who are harmed belong to us in some sense, either by some sort of kinship, or by friendship, or at least by the nature that we share in common with them (*saltem per communionem naturae*).

Reply to objection 3: What we are especially interested in is such that we think of it as our good. And so when that thing is looked down upon, we regard ourselves as likewise looked down upon and judge that we ourselves have been harmed.

Reply to objection 4: Someone who remains silent provokes an injurious individual to anger when it appears that he is remaining silent out of contempt (*ex contemptu*) and is, as it were, treating the other's anger as of little account (*quasi parvipendat alterius iram*). For this very treating of it as of little account is itself an act.

Article 2

Is disdain or contempt the only moving cause of anger?

It seems that disdain or contempt (*parvipensio vel despectio*) is not the only moving cause of anger:

Objection 1: Damascene says, "It is when we have suffered an injury, or think ourselves to have suffered an injury, that we get angry." But a man can suffer an injury even in the absence of contempt or disdain. Therefore, disdain is not the only moving cause of anger.

Objection 2: To desire honor is the same thing as being saddened by disdain. But brute animals do not desire honor. Therefore, they are not saddened by disdain. And yet, as the Philosopher points out in *Ethics* 3, "Anger is provoked in them because they are wounded." Therefore, disdain does not seem to be the only moving cause of anger.

Objection 3: In *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher posits many other causes of anger, e.g., "our being forgotten about by others, having others rejoice in our misfortunes, having others make bad things known to us, being prevented by others from fulfilling our own will (*oblivionem, et exultationem in infortuniis, denuntiationem malorum, impedimentum consequendae propriae voluntatis*)." Therefore, it is not only disdain that provokes anger.

But contrary to this: In *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says that anger is "a desire, accompanied by sadness, to punish someone because of apparent disdain shown in an unseemly fashion."

I respond: All the other causes of anger are traced back to disdain (*parvipensio*). For as *Rhetoric* 2 explains, there are three species of disdain (*tres species parvipensionis*), viz., (a) contempt (*despectio*), (b) obstructionism (*eperasmus*), i.e., preventing someone from doing what he wills (*impedimentum voluntatis implendae*), and (c) verbal abuse or insults (*contumeliatio*), and all the moving causes of anger are traced back to these three.

There are two possible ways to explain this:

The first explanation is that anger desires harm for another insofar as this harm has the character of just retribution, and so it seeks retribution to the extent that this seems just. Now just retribution is effected only in response to something that has been done unjustly, and so what provokes someone to anger always falls under the concept *unjust*. Hence, in *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, "If men think that those who have done harm are suffering justly, then they do not get angry, since anger is not directed against what is just."

Now there are three ways in which harm can be inflicted, viz., out of *ignorance*, out of *passion*, and by *choice*. An individual does something unjust especially when he inflicts the harm *by choice* or *purposefully* or *out of fixed malice* (*ex electione vel industria vel ex certa malitia*), as *Ethics* 5 says. And so we get the most angry with those whom we think to have harmed us on purpose. For if we think that it

was through ignorance or passion that someone inflicted harm on us, then either we do not get angry with him or we get much less angry, since doing something out of ignorance or out of passion diminishes the act's character as an injury (*diminuit rationem iniuriae*) and in some sense gives rise to mercy and forbearance (*est quodammodo provocativum misericordiae et veniae*). By contrast, those who inflict harm on purpose seem to be sinning out of contempt, and so we get the most angry with them. Hence, in *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, "We either do not get angry at all, or we get less angry, with those who have done something out of anger; for they do not seem to have acted in order to show disdain (*propter parvipensionem*)."

The second explanation is that disdain is opposed to a man's excellence, since, as *Rhetoric* 2 says, "Men disdain what they believe to have no worth." Now it is some sort of excellence that we seek from all our goods. And so every instance of harm inflicted on us is such that to the extent that it detracts from our excellence, it seems to involve disdain.

Reply to objection 1: If someone suffers harm from any cause other than contempt, that cause diminishes the harm's character as an injury. Instead, it is only contempt or disdain that strengthens the character of anger. And so contempt or disdain is a *per se* cause of someone's getting angry.

Reply to objection 2: Even though a brute animal does not desire honor under the concept *honor*, it nonetheless has a natural desire for a certain sort of excellence, and it gets angry with whatever detracts from that excellence.

Reply to objection 3: All the causes in question are traced back to some sort of disdain. For forgetting about someone (*oblivio*) is an obvious sign of disdain, since we fix more firmly in memory what we regard as important (*ea enim quae magna aestimamus magis memoriae infigimus*). Similarly, it is because of a certain sort of disdain that someone does not fear saddening an individual by making sad things known to him. Again, someone who shows signs of merriment at the misfortune of another seems to care very little about what is good or bad for him. Similarly, someone who prevents another from executing his plans, but not because of any advantage that thereby comes his way, seems not to care very much about his friend. And so all such things provoke anger insofar as they are signs of contempt.

Article 3

Is an individual's excellence a cause of his getting angry more easily?

It seems that an individual's excellence is not a cause of his getting angry more easily:

Objection 1: In *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, "There are some people who get angry especially when they are saddened, e.g., the sick, the needy, and those who do not have what they desire." But all these things seem to involve defects. Therefore, defectiveness make one more prone toward anger than excellence does.

Objection 2: In the same place the Philosopher says, "There are some who get angry especially when there can be some suspicion that what they are looked down upon for does not exist in them or exists very weakly in them; by contrast, when they think that they excel in what they are looked down upon for, then they do not care." But the suspicion spoken of here arises from some defect. Therefore, it is defectiveness, rather than any sort of excellence, that causes someone to get angry.

Objection 3: What involves excellence makes men especially agreeable and full of hope. But in *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, "Men are not angry when they are playing, making jokes, taking part in a feast, completing their work, partaking in non-shameful pleasures, or when they are full of hope." Therefore, excellence is not a cause of anger.

But contrary to this: In the same book the Philosopher says that men become indignant because of their excellence.

I respond: There are two ways to understand the cause of anger in the one who is angry:

(a) In one way, as *a disposition toward the moving cause of anger* (*secundum habitudinem ad motivum irae*). And in this sense *excellence* is a cause of someone's getting angry easily. For as has been explained (a. 3), the moving cause of anger is unjust disdain. Now it is clear that the more excellent someone is, the more unjust it is to disdain him in the matter in which he excels. And so those who have some sort of excellence are especially angered if they are disdained—e.g., if a rich man is disdained in matters that involve money, or a rhetorician in matters that involve speaking, and so on for other such cases.

(b) In a second way, the cause of anger in the one who is angry can be thought of as *a disposition that is left over in him by the sort of moving cause in question* (*ex parte dispositionis quae in eo relinquitur ex tali motivo*). Now it is clear that nothing moves one to anger except harm that saddens him. But what involves *defectiveness* is especially saddening, since men are who are subject to defects are more easily harmed. And the reason why men who are sick or who suffer from other defects get angry more easily is that they are saddened more easily.

Reply to objection 1: This makes clear the reply to the first objection.

Reply to objection 2: Someone who is despised in a matter in which he clearly excels to a high degree does not think of himself as suffering any diminution, and so he is not saddened and on this score is less angry. However, from the other side, to the extent that he is despised less deservedly, he has more of a reason for getting angry—unless, perhaps, he thinks of himself as being envied or scorned not out of disdain, but out of ignorance or some other cause of this sort.

Reply to objection 3: All the things in question impede anger to the extent that they impede sadness. However, from the other side, these things are apt to provoke anger to the extent that they make a man less fit to be despised.

Article 4

Is an individual's defectiveness a cause of his being such that we more easily get angry with him?

It seems that an individual's defectiveness is not a cause of his being such that we more easily get angry with him (*defectus alicuius non sit causa ut contra ipsum facilius irascamur*):

Objection 1: In *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, "We are not angry with those who confess and repent and humble themselves; instead, we are gentle with them. Hence, even dogs do not bite those who sit back down." But this involves lowliness and defectiveness. Therefore, someone's lowliness (*parvitas*) is a cause of our being less angry with him.

Objection 2: There is no greater defect than death. But anger ceases with respect to the dead. Therefore, someone's defectiveness is not a cause that provokes anger against him.

Objection 3: No one judges that someone is lowly by reason of the fact that he is his friend. But if our friends harm us or do not help us, then we suffer more; hence, Psalm 54:13 says, "If my enemy had reviled me, I at least would have been able to bear it." Therefore, someone's defectiveness is not a cause of our more easily getting angry with him.

But contrary to this: In *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, "The rich man gets angry with the poor man if the poor man despises him, and the prince gets angry with his subject."

I respond: As was explained above (aa. 2-3), unseemly contempt (*indigna despectio*) is what above all provokes anger. Therefore, the defectiveness or lowliness of the one with whom we are angry makes for an increase of anger insofar as it increases the unseemliness of the contempt (*inquantum auget indignam despectionem*). For just as the more prestigious someone is (*quanto aliquis est maior*), the more unseemly it is to look down upon him, so the more lowly someone is, the more unseemly it is for

him to look down upon anyone. And so nobles get angry if they are looked down upon by peasants, and the wise get angry if they are looked down upon by the foolish, and masters get angry if they are looked down upon by their servants.

On the other hand, if lowliness or defectiveness diminishes the unseemliness of the contempt, then this sort of lowliness diminishes anger and does not increase it. And in this sense those individuals diminish anger who repent of the injuries they have inflicted and confess that they have acted badly and humble themselves and seek forgiveness—this according to Proverbs 15:1: "A gentle response breaks anger," viz., insofar as such men seem not to look down upon, but instead to think more highly of, those before whom they humble themselves.

Reply to objection 1: This makes clear the reply to the first objection.

Reply to objection 2: There are two reasons why anger ceases with respect to the dead. One is that they cannot grieve or perceive, which is what those who are angry especially seek in those with whom they are angry. The second reason is that they already seem to have arrived at the worst of all evils. Hence, anger likewise ceases with respect to those who have been gravely harmed, insofar as the evil that belongs to them exceeds the measure of just retribution.

Reply to objection 3: The disdain that comes from one's friends seems to be more unseemly. And so the reason why we get more angry with them if they disdain us—by harming us or by not helping us—is similar to the reason why we get more angry with those who are more lowly than we are.

QUESTION 48

The Effects of Anger

Next we have to consider the effects of anger. And on this topic there are four questions: (1) Is anger a cause of pleasure? (2) Is it especially anger that is a cause of fervor or violent heat (*fervor*) in the heart? (3) Does anger especially impede the use of reason? (4) Is anger a cause of speechlessness (*taciturnitas*)?

Article 1

Is anger a cause of pleasure?

It seems that anger is not a cause of pleasure:

Objection 1: Sadness excludes pleasure. But anger is always accompanied by sadness, since, as *Ethics* 7 says, "Everyone who does something because of anger does it while he is saddened." Therefore, anger is not a cause of pleasure.

Objection 2: In *Ethics* 4 the Philosopher says, "The act of punishing (*punitio*) quiets the force of anger, bringing about pleasure in the place of sadness." From this one can infer that it is through the act of punishing that pleasure comes to the one who is angry. But the act of punishing eliminates the anger (*punitio excludit iram*). Therefore, when the pleasure arrives, the anger is gone. Therefore, the anger is not an effect that is conjoined to the pleasure.

Objection 3: No effect impedes its own cause, since it shares its form with its cause (*sit suae causae conformis*). But as *Rhetoric* 2 says, pleasure eliminates anger. Therefore, pleasure is not an effect of anger.

But contrary to this: In the same book the Philosopher adduces the proverb that anger "grows much sweeter than honey spreading through the hearts of men."

I respond: As the Philosopher points out in *Ethics* 7, instances of pleasure—especially sensible and bodily pleasure—are a sort of medicine against sadness, and so the greater the sadness or anxiety for which the pleasure is offered as a remedy, the greater the degree to which the pleasure is perceived. For instance, it is clear that when someone is thirsty, drinking becomes more pleasurable for him.

Now it is clear from what has been said above (q. 47, aa. 1 and 3) that the movement of anger arises from a saddening injury that has been inflicted, and that the remedy for this sadness is applied by exacting retribution (*cui tristitiae remedium adhibetur per vindictam*). And so pleasure follows upon the presence of the retribution; and the greater the sadness was, the greater the pleasure is. Therefore, if the retribution is present *in reality*, then there is a complete pleasure (*perfecta delectatio*) that totally eliminates the sadness and thereby quiets the movement of anger.

However, there are two ways in which the retribution is present to the one who is angry *before* it is present in reality:

In one way, through *hope*. For as was explained above (q. 46, a. 1), no one gets angry unless he hopes for retribution.

In a second way, through *continuous thought* (*secundum continuam cogitationem*). For anyone who has a desire takes pleasure in lingering over the thought of what he desires; this is also why images from dreams are pleasurable. And so when someone who is angry keeps mulling over retribution in his mind (*multum in animo suo cogitet de vindicta*), he takes pleasure from this. Yet this pleasure is not the complete pleasure that eliminates sadness and thereby eliminates anger.

Reply to objection 1: Someone who is angry is not saddened by the same thing that he rejoices over. Rather, he is saddened by the injury that has been inflicted, whereas he takes pleasure in the retribution that he is thinking about and hoping for. Hence, the sadness is related to the anger as its source, while the pleasure is related to it as its effect or terminus.

Reply to objection 2: This objection goes through for the pleasure that is caused by the real presence of retribution, which totally eliminates the anger.

Reply to objection 3: Antecedent pleasures keep sadness from following and, as a result, they impede anger. But pleasure with respect to retribution follows upon anger.

Article 2

Is fervor an effect especially of anger?

It seems that fervor or violent heat (*fervor*) is not an effect especially of anger:

Objection 1: As was explained above (q. 28, a. 5), fervor pertains to love. But as was also explained above (q. 27, a. 4), love is the source and cause of all the passions. Therefore, since a cause is more powerful than its effect, it does not seem that it is especially anger that is a cause of fervor.

Objection 2: Things that in their own right (*de se*) excite fervor grow stronger by persisting through time (*per temporis assiduitatem magis augentur*); for instance, love grows stronger when it lasts for a long time (*sicut amor diuturnitate convalescit*). But anger becomes weaker through the course of time; for in *Rhetoric* 2 the Philosopher says, "Time quiets anger." Therefore, anger is not properly speaking a cause of fervor.

Objection 3: When fervor is added to fervor, it increases the fervor. But as the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 2, "When a greater anger is added to anger, it makes the former anger become gentle." Therefore, anger is not a cause of fervor.

But contrary to this: Damascene says, "Anger is the fervor of the blood which surrounds the heart and which results from the evaporation of the bile" (*ex evaporatione fellis fiens*).

I respond: As has been explained (q. 44, a. 1), the bodily changes involved in the passions of the soul are proportioned to the appetite's movement. Now it is clear that every desire, even a natural desire, tends more strongly toward what is contrary to itself if a contrary is present. Hence, we see that heated water freezes more solidly, since the cold acts more strongly, as it were, on what is hot.

Now anger's appetitive movement is caused by an inflicted injury, which serves as a sort of contrary that is present. And so the appetite tends very forcefully (*potissime tendit*) toward repelling the injury through a desire for retribution, and it is from this desire that the great vehemence and impetuosity (*vehementia et impetuositas*) of anger's movement follows. And since anger's movement does not have the mode of a withdrawal (*non est per retractionis*), which is what cold is proportioned to, but instead has the mode of an incursion (*est per modum insecutionis*), which is what heat is proportioned to, the result is that anger's movement is a cause of a certain fervor in the blood and spirits that surround the heart, which is itself an instrument of the passions of the soul. And from this it follows that because of the great disturbance of the heart that occurs in the case of anger, certain indications become especially apparent in the exterior members of those who get angry. For as Gregory says in *Moralia* 5, "The heart palpitates, inflamed with the stings of its own anger; the body quivers; the tongue stammers; the face becomes fiery; the eyes grow fierce; and an acquaintance becomes hardly recognizable. His mouth forms a sound, but his understanding does not know what he is saying."

Reply to objection 1: As Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 10, "Love itself is not felt in this way except when some need brings it forth." And so when, because of an inflicted injury, a man suffers the loss of some excellence that he loves, his love is felt more keenly (*magis sentitur amor*). And so his heart becomes hotter (*ferventius*) in order to remove this obstacle to the thing he loves, with the result that the love's fervor itself grows because of the anger and is felt more keenly.

However, the fervor that follows upon the heat pertains to love in one way and to anger in another way.

For the fervor of love is accompanied by a sort of sweetness and gentleness, since it is directed at a good thing that is loved. And so it is similar to the heat that belongs to the air and to blood. It is because of this that (a) sanguine individuals are more beloved and that (b) the liver, in which there is a sort of generation of blood, is said to "push one toward love" (*cogit amare iecur*).

By contrast, the fervor of anger is accompanied by a bitterness aimed at destruction (*ad consumendum*), since it tends toward punishing what is contrary to it. Hence, this sort of fervor is like the heat of fire and of yellow bile (*assimilatur calori ignis et cholorae*). This is why Damascene says that anger "proceeds from the evaporation of the bile and is called 'bilious'" (*fellea nominatur*).

Reply to objection 2: Anything whose cause diminishes over time is necessarily weakened by time. Now it is clear that memory diminishes over time; for things that are very old (*antiqua*) easily slip out of memory. But anger is caused by the memory of an inflicted injury. And so the cause of anger diminishes little by little over time, up to the point of being completely eliminated.

Also, an injury seems greater when it is first perceived, and one's estimation of it diminishes little by little as one recedes more and more from the present feeling of the injury.

Something similar occurs with love as well, if the cause of love remains solely in the memory. Hence, in *Ethics* 8 the Philosopher says, "If a friend's absence lasts for a long time, then it seems to make one forgetful of the friendship."

By contrast, in the friend's presence the cause of friendship is always increasing over time, and so the friendship grows. And something similar holds for anger, if its cause is continually increased.

Yet the very fact that anger is quickly consumed attests to its vehement fervor. For just as a large fire is quickly extinguished once its matter is consumed, so, too, because of its own vehemence, anger quickly dies out.

Reply to objection 3: Every power that is divided into many parts is diminished. And so when an individual is angry with someone and then gets angry with someone else, by this very fact his anger with respect to the first individual diminishes—and especially if his anger is greater with respect to the second individual. For the injury that excited the anger against the first individual will seem like little or nothing in comparison to the second injury, which is judged to be greater.

Article 3

Does anger impede reason?

It seems that anger does not impede reason:

Objection 1: What involves an act of reason seems not to be an impediment to reason. But as *Ethics* 7 says, "Anger involves an act of reason." Therefore, anger does not impede reason.

Objection 2: The more reason is impeded, the more its manifestation is diminished. But in *Ethics* 7 the Philosopher says, "An angry man does not hide himself, but is manifest" (*iracundus non est insidiator sed manifestus*). Therefore, anger does not seem to impede the use of reason in the way that, according to *Ethics* 7, concupiscence, which hides itself (*sicut concupiscentia quae est insidiosa*), does impede the use of reason.

Objection 3: Reason's judgment is rendered more evident when a contrary is present, since contraries shine forth to a greater degree when they are juxtaposed with one another. But this sort of juxtaposition makes anger grow as well; for as the Philosopher says in *Rhetoric* 2, "Men get more angry if there are preexisting contraries—as in the case of someone who has been honored in the past, if he is now being dishonored," and so on for the others. Therefore, it is in virtue of the same thing that (a) anger grows and that (b) reason's judgment is assisted. Therefore, it is not the case that anger impedes reason.

But contrary to this: In *Moralia* 5 Gregory says, "Anger takes away the light of understanding,

since it confuses the mind by agitating it."

I respond: Even though the mind, or reason, does not use a bodily organ in its own proper act, nonetheless, since it needs various sentient powers for its acts, and since the acts of those powers are impeded when the body is agitated (*corpore perturbato*), bodily disturbances must likewise impede the use of reason, as is clear in the case of those who are inebriated or dreaming.

Now as has been explained (a. 2), what anger especially does is to cause a bodily disturbance around the heart in such a way that this disturbance also flows into the exterior members. Hence, of all the passions anger most manifestly impedes the use of reason—this according to Psalm 30:10 ("My eye is troubled with anger").

Reply to objection 1: The source of anger (*principium irae*) lies in reason as regards the appetitive movement, which is what is *formal* in anger.

However, the passion of anger prevents reason from perfecting its judgment by not, as it were, listening to reason completely (*perfectum iudicium rationis praeoccupat quasi non perfecte audiens rationem*), and this because of the commotion caused by the rapidly moving heat, which is what is *material* in anger. And on this score, anger impedes reason.

Reply to objection 2: The angry man is said to be "manifest" (*manifestus*) not because it is manifest to him (*manifestum sibi*) what he should do, but because he acts openly (*manifeste operatur*) and without seeking concealment. This happens in part because reason is impeded, with the result that it is unable to discern what should be kept hidden and what should be made manifest, and also unable to devise ways of hiding. But it also happens in part because the heart is expanded, and this has to do with the magnanimity that anger produces. Hence, in *Ethics* 4 the Philosopher says of the magnanimous man that "he is manifest about what he loves and hates, and he speaks and operates openly."

By contrast, concupiscence is said to be hidden and insidious because, in most cases, the pleasurable things that are desired involve shamefulness and softness (*habent turpitudinem quandam et mollitiem*), and in such matters a man wants to remain hidden. However, in matters that involve virility and excellence, e.g., exacting retribution, a man seeks to be out in the open (*quaerit homo manifestus esse*).

Reply to objection 3: As has been explained, the movement of anger begins with an act of reason, and so the juxtaposition of the one contrary with the other both aids the judgment of reason and increases anger in the same respect. For when someone has honor or riches and afterwards incurs the loss of one of them, then that loss appears greater, both because of the close proximity of the contraries and because it was unexpected. And so the loss causes greater sadness, in the same way that great goods that come along unexpectedly cause greater pleasure. And as a result of this increase in the sadness that precedes the anger, there is an increase as well in the anger that follows.

Article 4

Does anger cause speechlessness?

It seems that anger does not cause speechlessness (*ira non causet taciturnitatem*):

Objection 1: Speechlessness is opposed to speech. But as anger increases, one arrives at the point of speaking, as is clear from the degrees of anger that our Lord designates in Matthew 5:22 when He says, "Whoever is angry with his brother ..... and whoever says to his brother, 'Raca' ..... and whoever says to his brother, 'You fool'." Therefore, anger is not a cause of speechlessness.

Objection 2: When reason's watchfulness decreases, it happens that a man erupts into inordinate speech (*prorumpat ad verba inordinata*); hence, Proverbs 25:28 says, "Like a city that is open and not surrounded by walls, so is a man who cannot restrain his spirit in speaking." But as has been explained

(a. 3), it is anger especially that impedes reason's judgment. Therefore, it is anger especially that makes someone issue forth into inordinate speech.

Objection 3: Matthew 12:34 says, "The mouth speaks from the abundance of the heart." But as has been explained (a. 2), it is especially through anger that the heart is agitated. Therefore, anger is especially a cause of speaking. Therefore, it is not a cause of speechlessness.

But contrary to this: In *Moralia* 5 Gregory says, "Anger that is closed up through silence rages more strongly within the mind."

I respond: As has already been explained (a. 3 and q. 46, a. 4), anger both (a) involves an act of reason and (b) impedes reason. And on both scores, it can cause speechlessness.

On the part of the act of reason, when reason's judgment is vigorous enough that even if it does not restrain the affections from a disordered desire for retribution, it at least restrains the tongue from inordinate speech. Hence, in *Moralia* 5 Gregory says, "Sometimes anger in an agitated mind imposes silence as if by a judgment."

On the part of the impediment to reason, the disturbance of anger, as has been explained (a. 2), reaches all the way to the exterior members, and especially to those members in which the heart's vestiges shine forth more expressively, e.g., in the eyes and in the face and in the tongue. Hence, as was quoted above, "The tongue stammers; the face becomes fiery; the eyes grow fierce." Therefore, the disturbance of anger can be so great that the tongue is altogether prevented from exercising speech. And then what follows is speechlessness.

Reply to objection 1: The increase in anger sometimes reaches the point that reason is prevented from restricting the tongue. But at other times the anger proceeds further, to the point of preventing the movement of the tongue and of the other exterior members.

Reply to objection 2: This makes clear the reply to the second objection.

Reply to objection 3: The heart's agitation can sometimes abound to the point that the heart's inordinate movement prevents the movement of the exterior members. And in such a case it causes speechlessness, immobility in the exterior members, and sometimes even death.

However, if the agitation is not this great, then the mouth's speaking is what follows from the abundance of the heart's agitation.