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Kommentar:

In the focus of Husserl's thought especially in the last phase of his life and also in the center of interest of later thinkers, who belong to the phenomenological movement in its larger sense is the problem of the common-sense world, the world of daily life or "Lebenswelt" as Husserl calls it. In contradistinction to the universe as constructed and elaborated by science, especially the modern physical sciences, the common-sense world is that world in which we always find ourselves, in which we live, with which we have a certain familiarity. The things which it comprises present themselves in our daily experience and it is with these things as they appear in immediate experience and previously too and independently of scientific knowledge that we deal in our daily lives. For Alfred Schutz also the common-sense world or as Husserl calls it, the Lebenswelt was the central problem and was in the focus of his philosophical endeavours. For him the problem arose from his pre-occupation with the foundation problems of social sciences.

It is to Husserl's conceptions that Schutz referred and from which he started. But because of the motives which led Schutz to raise the problem of the Lebenswelt he gave to Husserl's interpretation a new turn, interpreting the Lebenswelt as a social reality.

According to Husserl the world of daily life, both the natural and the social cultural world is taken for granted. We never doubt its existence, to be sure doubt may arise and does arise and is resolved in the course of our experience; it may happen and it does happen that ~~they~~^{things} prove to be different from that what they appeared to be at first. But these doubts and these corrections always concern details within the world. The world itself never becomes doubtful to us in our natural attitude, that is to say in that attitude which dominates all our life, both

theoretical and practical. This natural world is the ground and the ^{scene} terrain ~~for~~ all our activities and as such a ground, terrain, background or horizon it is taken for granted. Differently expressed: ^{the} belief in the existence of the world of our daily life is never questioned. This belief is most of the time unformulated. In this unformulated fashion it pervades and permeates all our activities. This world whose existence we take for granted is at the same time taken as an intersubjective world. Not only do we find in this world our fellowmen, but we also take it for granted that they are confronted with the same world as we are. The intersubjective Lebenswelt is the same for all of us. And we take it also for granted that they take the world for granted in substantially the same way in which we do it. Therefore we can act and work together with others not only in a world common to all of us but we can also work together with others in the different forms of cooperation. We can orient our actions with regard to theirs, and we may expect them to do the same.

Husserl called attention to the typification of our experience of the world of daily life and of the things encountered within this world. In the ~~great~~ majority of cases we do not perceive singular objects in the sense of uniqueness. Rather we perceive mountains, streets, animals, fellow beings and so on. That is: ~~what~~ we encounter ~~of~~ things and beings of a certain type, we experience them in the light and in the sense of a certain typicality. Such typification is a general fact of consciousness and leads to a very important problem of general phenomenology. Schutz however called attention that such typification varies from society to society, it also varies for one individual on several occasions of his life. I perceive an animal and I can perceive it once as a quadrupede an other time as a dog, a third time as a dog of a special ^{sort} nature. In each case I

have typified the thing which I have perceived in a different way. More important however is the typification which varies from society to society and which even within one and the same society varies at different moments of his history. ^{This} It becomes especially apparent with respect to cultural objects, like instruments, tools, books and so on, objects which refer to certain human activities and needs, ~~and which are~~ also typified. A stranger who is not familiar with the highly industrialized society which is ours would certainly perceive the things and the instruments in a light different from the one in which we perceive them. In addition to specification at large, there is the problem of this ~~special or~~ particular specification which prevails at a certain time. And Schutz concerned himself mainly with the second problem, with that of special typification. The special typification betrays the social origin of the world in which we find ourselves. We are at in this world, because we have grown into it. And we have grown into it during a process which might be called a process of education. We have grown into the world under the guidance of parents, teachers and our elders. And our intercourse with our contemporaries has also contributed to our growing into that world and ~~towards~~ accepting the special typification which prevails in that world. Growing into the world we have acquired a certain language, and language is the vehicle as well as the medium of expression of the mentioned typification. Language fixes the typifications, it fixes those things and aspects of things and those events which stand out for typification in contradistinction to ^{features} other which ^{may} almost pass unnoticed. Along with language ^{and the} ~~as a~~ typifications embodied ⁱⁿ with language we have also acquired in the course of our life ~~rules or principles of selection for typification.~~ We have acquired recipes, that is rules and modes of conduct which permit us to obtain typical results

by typical means. We have acquired typical modes of conduct, in typical situations and this holds from the most trivial to the most consequential situations. If for instance we are riding on a train we have to display a certain typical behavior, namely that which is expected from a railroad passenger. Or more correctly that of which we know that it is expected from such a passenger. *To consider a more less trivial case* As another extreme, *if we want* to engage upon a career *or a* vocation, we know that we have to follow certain typical process of action in order to reach our goal. Two special features are worth mentioning as far as these recipes, typical modes of conduct and behavior are concerned. In the first place they are socially approved. Such approval ~~does~~ *merely* not necessarily mean ~~that they are~~ *their being* sanctioned by a formal law or by some other formal institution. Social approval can rather mean and does in the great majority of cases mean, that silently and without ever being formulated, the mentioned rules, recipes are followed in the society in which we live. The other feature concerns the justification for these rules. They are justified, because they yield results. The pragmatic motif is the one which dominates our life in the social reality, our life in the common sense world. Because these rules of conduct yield desired results they are followed and they can not become questionable unless the results fail to materialize. As far as the social approval in the form of implicit acceptance is concerned it is merely the result of the social derivation of all the mentioned acquisitions, language, typification as expressed in language, the rules of conduct and the rules of behavior. All these acquisitions together constitute what Alfred Schütz called "the stock of knowledge at hand". The "stock of knowledge at hand" is ~~then~~ a sedimentation of my whole history comprising both what was handed down to me by my parents, teachers and those with whom I associ-

and my own personal acquisitions. It must, however, be pointed out that only a very small part of the "stock of knowledge at hand" originated in my own personal experience. The bulk of that "stock of knowledge at hand" was socially derived, was communicated to me in the mentioned way, to express it perhaps better, was passed on to me and accepted by me, I grew into it. And even my own personal experiences, which come to be inserted into the stock of knowledge at hand, are inserted into the socially derived knowledge they find their ^{place} ~~way~~ within the socially communicated and derived knowledge and only to the extent to which they find this a place within that socially derived knowledge are of some value to me. Even if in some detail I find it convenient to deviate from the accepted ^{rules} ~~place~~ on account of my personal experience, such deviation, as a deviation from the commonly accepted rules refers back to those rules as their background. This stock of knowledge at hand forms a frame of reference and orientation for my coming to terms with the things, with the beings, which I encounter. It forms the frame of reference and orientation in the world of daily experience. This stock of knowledge at hand is also taken for granted as unquestioned, but it may become questionable if the occasion arises, that is, if I am confronted with a situation, in which the recipes, the rules and norms of conduct do not longer help me.

As mentioned before I take it for granted that "fellow human beings exist and that they are beings like myself. This implies, that I take it for granted that they have a stock of knowledge at hand as I have it and it furthermore implies that their stock of knowledge at hand is substantially the same as mine. This assumption derives from the social origin of my stock of knowledge at hand as well as theirs. Both,

my fellowman and I have been born into the same world and have grown into it. However, if we speak of their knowledge at hand, being substantially the same as mine a certain qualification is called for. This knowledge at hand in question admits of degrees of clarity, distinction, precision and explicitness. Not only then do I know different things, than those which are known by a certain of my fellowman, but I may know the same things differently than he does. I am an expert in a very small field in which I have acquired genuine experience and first-hand knowledge, and I am a layman in most other fields. I know that there are experts in those fields in which I am a layman and I know that if the situation presents itself I have to resort to the advice and opinion of the expert, in consulting a lawyer, a doctor, an architect and so on. In other words the stock of knowledge at hand is in a certain way socially distributed. That social distribution or rather the knowledge about that social distribution also belongs to my stock of knowledge at hand.

The world of my daily life which is social reality is however primarily not a field of observation, but rather the scene of action. Normally I do not contemplate things in the world, normally I ^{am} neither an observer, ~~not to speak of~~ ^{still less!} theoretician. I pursue certain goals and purposes, I am an actor. But if I am an actor, that means that I occupy a certain place in the social world. I have not grown into that world at large, but I have grown into it, so to speak from a certain corner. I was born by parents, who belong to a certain subgroup within society. I have a certain profession, I pursue certain goals and interests. That I do so is the result of my past. In other words, as Schutz called it, I have a certain biographical situation, I have a place within society and from the vantagepoint of that place I perceive the social world,

from the vantagepoint of that biographical ^{situation} society, I pursue my goals and purposes. My biographical situation is then the sedimentation of my whole past; it is the outcome of my having become what I am and who I am. It is clear, that the biographical situation is never definitively ~~defined~~ ^{established}. As I continue to live so my biographical situation develops. This biographical situation is given to me and to me alone, I do not share it with anybody. In my biographical situation originate my because-motives, which Schutz distinguishes sharply from in-order-to motives. It is my biographical situation which explains why I pursue certain goals, why I have conceived for myself this life-plan rather than a different one. But as an actor I hardly know of these because-motives since I am living in my actions, pursuing my goals. Only if I turn back and refer the goals which I am pursuing to my past do I become aware of my because-motives, but ~~that~~ then I am no longer an actor, I have transformed myself into an observer. of myself. In contradistinction to the because-motives my in-order-to- motives are always given to me in my acting. In fact it is towards a state of affairs to be brought about by my action, that I orient my behavior. It is to that goal that I subordinate the means which I apply. And hence the in-order-to motive is given to me as the centralizing factor of my behavior.

Whatever goals and objectives I pursue have an hierarchical order and they originate in my biographical situation. The latter is also the origin of my system of relevance, both permanent and transient, that is shifting along with the purpose at hand. The system of relevances which prevails at any given moment depends upon the goals which I pursue. My actions as well as my projects are oriented towards my goals and purposes. They are organized with respect to my systems of relevances. In my acting as well as in my planning I am guided by my

stock of knowledge at hand, faulty and deficient as it might be, it may happen that I misjudge circumstances, act without knowing the circumstances completely. I may fail to allow for future developments which I ~~might~~^{could} have foreseen. But whatever criticism or rather self-criticism I might formulate later with respect to my acting, it has always been guided and directed by my knowledge at hand. My actions thus have a certain meaning to me. They have that meaning with regard to my purpose at hand to the goals more or less ultimate which I pursue, to a system of purposes and in the light of my stock of knowledge at hand. We thus arrive at the notion of the meaning which an action or plan of action has for the actor himself. We arrive already here at the notion of Max Weber's "subjektiver Sinn". To this notion we shall have to return later, but it is worthwhile noting that it arises already in the context of the single actor planning and pursuing his plans.

Again I take it for granted that my fellowmen have places in the social world as I have a place in the social world. Each one of them has a unique biographic situation given to him and to him alone as this is the case with respect to myself. And yet we all live in the same world. IT IS TAKEN FOR GRANTED, that my fellowman see the same things which I see, but they see them differently, that is ^{on} different perspectives. While I see a thing from here, that is ^{from} the place where I find myself now, the other sees the same thing from his standpoint, different from mine. The purposes and systems of relevance of my fellowmen must by necessity differ from mine, since ^{his} ~~both~~ purposes and systems of relevances have originated in a ^{his} biographical situation which ^{can never} ~~is for~~ ~~be the same for different people~~ ~~no human being ever the same~~. Two idealizations, as Schutz calls them, come here into play. The first is the reciprocity of perspectives: I know, that I can exchange my place with a fellowman, that I can ~~say~~ see

things from the point of view from which he sees them now and that he can place himself at my point of observation. In that respect we can speak of an interchangeability of standpoints. Still more important perhaps is the other idealization, which leads us to the congruency of different systems of relevancy. We take it for granted that ^{the} ~~all~~ differences between my system of relevance and that of my fellowmen ^{can be rendered conformable.} ~~make~~ both systems ~~congruent~~. That is to say, we can eliminate certain differences as irrelevant and can typify that which is common to us. And so we can interlock our behavior, interlock our conduct as this will be seen in the sequence. → The social aspect of the common-sense world has been brought out thus far without any specific reference ^{to} ~~of~~ social inter-action in the proper sense. We have merely considered the behavior of an actor, acting alone. We have not yet taken into consideration the multiple relationships with human human beings, ~~which belong essentially to our social life.~~

Schutz distinguishes what he calls the face-to-face relationship between consociates from other social relationships. In that face-to-face relationship the consociates partake in one another's life, be it only for a brief moment and in a rather superficial way as for instance in the conversation between passengers on the train. But what characterizes the face-to-face relationship according to Schutz is the immediacy with which I grasp the other's thought and conversely he grasps mine. In the face-to-face relationship the self of my consociates reveals itself to me though only partially and fragmentarily. But it is a relationship in which we share a given situation, time and space, a relationship, in which our biographical situations intertwine or as Schutz used to express it: Be it only for a brief period of time we live together, and we grow older together.

In all other relationships I deal with a certain typification. I have to typify the behavior of my fellowman, his motives, his attitudes and all this in various degrees of anonymity or intimacy. Let us again examine two extreme cases: I may think of my absent friend to whom I write a letter and submit to him a proposal. Typifying what I know of his attitudes, his interests, his goals and purposes I can expect him and do expect him to react to this proposal in a certain way. Another example is that, quite oftenly quoted by Schutz, of my putting a letter in a mailbox. Doing so I expect that people whom I never met and in all likelihood will never meet will behave in a certain way, called handling the mail, with the result that my letter will arrive at its destination, will be read by the addressee, whom perhaps I also never met and perhaps will never meet, and the result will be, that in due time I'll receive the book or other commodity which I ordered. In this behavior of mine I rely then on others conducting themselves in a typical way in a typical situation. In all my social interaction I have to typify the fellowmen with whom I am dealing; I do that in expecting them to behave in a typical way under typical circumstances. But in doing so I have to typify myself so as to tune in my own typical behavior ^{with} what I expect theirs to be in a typical situation. I have for instance to conduct myself in a train in such a way of which I assume that the typical railroademployee expects a typical passenger to behave. Such typification permits me to interact with other people under social conditions. It permits me to understand the other in social interaction. And this is of extreme importance when the attainment of my goals I have to depend upon the cooperation of others. Such typification ^{is} ~~max~~ facilitated ^{by} ~~wherever~~ ^{there} they are socially accepted norms and standards, whether legalized or not, for instance

certain rules of handling certain situations, certain recipes universally accepted to come to terms with certain conditions. I might pursue quite different interests than those which my fellowman pursues, so that my action or project has a different meaning to me from the one it has to him. Yet to come to terms with him either to obtain his cooperation or in the case of conflict to bring about a kind of compromise I must know what the project in question means to him. I come to know this by imputing to my fellowmen typical goals, interests, motives, a typical attitude, even a personality type. I have to conceive a typical image of a man in a certain type of position who pursues those and those typical interests and I have to refer the project in question to the typical behavior of a man of that type. Only so can I come to know what the project means to him and only in this way can I interlock my behavior and my courses of action with his. I have to impute to him a knowledge of what the project means to me. In all social interrelations of the kind considered the reciprocity prevails. Here we arrive at the subjective interpretation of meaning which we encountered already in the context of the lonely actor. It is to be pointed out as Schutz has, that subjective interpretation of meaning is neither a particularity of Max Weber's sociology, nor a specifically scientific device but rather the practice of social life in the common-sense world. With his interpretation Schutz has given a complete phenomenological clarification of that notion of subjective interpretation of meaning. It should by now be clear that this ^{does not} mean ^{any} ~~neither~~ introspection, ~~for who is the one who introspects himself?~~ Nor has it anything to do with my identifying myself with my partner, which becomes especially clear when I have to pursue interests opposed to his and when my negotiations with him have as their objective a compromise between conflicting interests. ^{EMog for} ~~Not for~~

whom do I give up ^{my interests} mine, but in order to come to terms with him I must understand what the ^{subjective} project ^{is} means to him and this understanding I can only accomplish if I refer the project to the type of man with whom I have to deal.

Only in broad outlines and therefore rather incomplete ^{for} have we sketched Schutz' conception of the common-sense world as a social reality. It now remains to compare his conception with Husserl's conception of the lifeworld and to see in which respect Schutz' theories constitute a progress over the results of Husserl. Husserl arrived at the problem of the lifeworld starting from problems connected with the constitution of modern physical science. It is true, that he soon became aware of the fact that the ~~problem~~ task of an adequate description of the lifeworld far surpasses the initial problem from which he started. It is perhaps too much to say that his conception of the lifeworld is arrived at by a procedure of subtraction. Though this appears exaggerated there is yet some point in it. When Husserl describes the lifeworld and the things we encounter in it, he restores the sensual qualities to the ^{things} ~~sense~~, and more important, he removes the mathematical idealizations which have been ^{bestowed} ~~thrown~~ upon the lifeworld by the ^{rise} ~~process~~ ^{development} of science. Husserl's objective is to reconstitute the world of everyday experience, that world which precedes science, that is which on the one hand is given to us previously to its scientific interpretation and which on the other hand forms the basis upon which the "elaboration of the scientific universe proceeds. This explains that ~~as~~ Husserl describes the things in the lifeworld ^{as} ~~there are~~ primarily perceptual things in a narrower sense. The things are characterized in terms of those properties and attributes which are perceptual attributes and properties in the more specific sense like the ^{chromatic} ~~traumatic~~ properties,

tactile properties, *hermitic* properties and so on. To be sure Husserl comes to discuss cultural objects and ~~even~~ to raise the problem of ~~fellows~~ ^{animated and beings and also of fellow men} ~~that is animated and even intellectual beings~~ encountered in the world. But the point is that he arrives at cultural objects and animated organisms as well as fellowmen only subsequently. And this indicates that his starting point was the perceptual world as such. This onesidedness has been partially corrected by Heidegger with his insistence on the notions like *Zuhandenheit* and *Zeug?*. These notions denote objects which have an essential reference to human activity, like a pen which is perceived as something to write with. That is the object is not taken, certainly not to begin with in terms of its merely visual, merely ^{factible/} ~~factual~~ properties but on the contrary it is seen under the perspective ^{of the} use which can be made of it. Heidegger's notion as allowed for in Schutz' description when Schutz refers ~~to~~ cultural objects, to human activities, to human needs, to human makers and to human users. Let it be remarked in passing that by these critical remarks we do not mean to deny that perception or perceptual ~~or perceptual~~ consciousness ^{may} ~~must~~ hold rightly ^{hold} a privileged position within ~~an~~ Husserlian phenomenology. But it is then perhaps necessary to re-define the concept of perception, a problem which can not be pursued here any further. It is furthermore true that in Husserl's description of the common-sense world and even of interpersonal relation the theoretical attitude prevails. ^{me} Along the examples which he chooses to illustrate interpersonal relations, that is social relations characteristically enough the examples of scholars and scientists who compare their findings, confirm and correct one another and come to common results, ~~prevails~~. His emphasis is on the sameness of the things which we encounter, on the identity of the commonsense world

for all of us, ^{rather than} ~~It is not of~~ the interlocking of action with respect to common things, ~~it is things which are taken for all of us as identically the same.~~

Because Schutz emphasizes action rather than perception ~~xxx~~ he is enabled ^{to give} a broader picture, or I should perhaps prefer to say a more concrete picture of the common-sense world. In this sense his theory is more encompassing. Aspects of the common world can then be singled out according to the scientific or philosophical problem under scrutiny. But they are then singled out, ^{context,} ~~out of a broader theory, out of a more concrete presentation of the common-sense world.~~ Because of his emphasis on action Schutz is enabled furthermore to allow for the actor as being involved, as engaged. ~~However in contradistinction to existentialist trends both in Germany and France Schutz has well allowed because of his emphasis on action Schutz is enabled to present the actor as involved as engaged.~~ However in ~~contradistinction~~ ^{by} to existentialistic philosophies both German and French, Schutz allows for the disinterested observer and the social scientist. He has clearly seen that the social scientist becomes a scientist ~~as long and only if he disengages~~ ^{ing} himself from the pursuit of interests and goals in the social world. As long as he is a scientist and in his capacity as a scientist he does not have to pursue any interests, he has no goals to attain, he transforms himself into a mere observer of the social world and the happenings ^{occurring} ~~inter-~~ actions in that world.

In the present context we have to confine ourselves to Schutz' theory of the social reality. We are not ~~xxx~~ able now to proceed to a theory of the social sciences. This theory has not been developed by him in complete form. He has given most valuable hints and references. But he was well aware that a great number of problems connected with conceptualization had to be solved before a coherent and

consistent theory could be given. There is however one point underlined by him which deserves a special attention.

Social science varies from natural science in one important respect: The natural scientist ~~tries to interpret the facts which how-~~
~~ever~~ have not undergone a previous interpretation. It is he who selects the facts,
(and it is he who interprets them, but his objects whatever they are, observed things or theoretical constructs, do not interpret themselves. In this sense Schutz could say that the constructs of the natural sciences are first order constructs.) ~~Indeed what underlies them is the experience of things and events.~~ The social scientist is however in a different position. He also has to elaborate constructs which he has then to insert into his theory. Let it be mentioned in passing that his constructs are Max Webers Ideal Typen or as Schutz used to call them: puppets which the scientist creates and which he endows with consciousness but which he makes at his discretion. The difference between the social scientist and the natural scientist consists ~~mainly~~ in that, that the natural scientist does not deal with pre-interpreted objects, whereas the social scientist in his very theoretical constructions has to allow for the self-interpretation of his objects. The theory of the social scientist must be such that the interpretation of his objects, men ^{and in the} involved ~~the~~ engaged social action and interaction, who interpret their actions, to whom their actions ^{have} ~~has~~ meaning, are allowed for in the context of the theory. In this sense the constructs of the social scientist have been called by Schutz "second order constructs", second order, because they are based on those constructs which the social actors not being scientists, develop and use in their actual life. These constructs are of course the mentioned typifications, ^{they!} ~~apprehensions.~~ All of them can be comprised under the general heading of subjective interpretation of meaning. The specific construct of the social scientist, the second order

order construct must then be of such a nature as to allow for the first order constructs of the social ~~order~~ actors. In other words: The social scientist elaborates an objective interpretation of meaning, but this objective interpretation of meaning has to leave room for, has even to allow for the subjective interpretation of meaning as this was presented before.

To conclude I refer to Dilthey's endeavour to find a theoretical basis for the historical sciences. It is well known that this problem was of great concern to him, the problem that is of understanding of History and of the possibility of such historical understanding. Dilthey was very well aware that a specific conceptual apparatus had to be invented. Much of his theoretical work was devoted to this problem. It is well known that Dilthey even looked to Husserl's Phenomenology as the possible source for those concepts which would enable him to give an account of understanding in history. My final remark is the suggestion which I put in the form of a question? Has Schutz' theory not solved the problem of Dilthey or at least has it not essentially contributed towards its solution? What would appear most desirable would be a comparative study of Schutz and the pertinent writings of Dilthey. ^{Smith/a/} By this comparative study ^{would not have to be} ~~I do not mean a comparative study~~ ^{understood in a verbal sense!} ~~in the usual way or of the usual form~~, since Dilthey started from and was concerned with History, whereas Schutz' interest centered around the social relations between contemporaries. History did not play a role of first order for Schutz' problems. But the question remains whether Schutz' theory does not provide, so to speak as a by-product a solution of Dilthey's problem. In other words it would be a most important and desirable investigation to find out in which sense and to which extent Schutz ^{conception} of the life world as a social reality and especially his account of subjective interpretation

of meaning if properly generalized would not provide the clue to the problems as raised by Dilthey.