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Charles University

Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies

(BA Module + Erasmus students)

Daniele De Santis, Ph. D.

**Husserl on the “Lived-Body” in *Ideas… III***

**• The constitution of human being as a “psycho-physical” unity**

**🡪** The constitution of the lived-body (*Leib*) as a bearer of “localized sensations”

- We begin with parts of the body, which we can both “touch” and “see”: I can look at them and feel them

“But now there is a distinction between the *visual* appearances and the *tactual* regarding, e.g., a hand. Touching my left hand, I have touch-appearances, that is to say, I do not just sense, but I have appearances of a soft, smooth hand, with such a form. The indicational sensations of movement and the representational sensations of touch, which are objectified in the thing ‘left hand’, belong in fact to my right hand. But when I touch the left hand I also find in it, too, series of touch-sensations, which are *localized* in it”

“If I speak of the physical thing ‘left hand’, then I am abstracting from these sensations (…). If I do include them, then it is not that the physical thing is now richer, but instead it becomes a *lived-body*, it *senses*”

“Touch-sensations belong to every appearing objective spatial position on the touched hand, when it is touched precisely at those places. The hand that is touching (…) likewise has its touch-sensations at the place on its corporeal sphere when it touches (or is touched by the other) (152-153)

*Localized Sensation as Constitutive of the LB*

**LEIB**

(**A) Matter or Physical Thing**

(It has extension and all its real properties)

+

**(B) Localized Sensations**

(I sense *on* it, *in* it…)

[🡪 Double sensation phenomenon: the body can touch itself, and each part is for the other an external thing, and each is at the same time “body”]

“Such occurrences are missing in ‘merely’ material things”

- *The double function of “sensations”*: “the same sensations that function which function as indicational or representational with respect to the thing, paperweight, function as touch-*effects* of the paperweight on the hand and as sensings produced in it. In the case of the hand lying on the table, the same sensation of pressure is apprehended at one and the same time as perception of the table’s surface (…) and at another time produces (…) sensations of digital pressure” (154)

🡪 The peculiarity of touching vis-à-vis visual experience

**Tactile experience:**

(1) Two objects: the external object and the body as a second object

(2) They are both tactually constituted (double apprehension): the same system of sensations is experienced as a feature of the external object and of the body itself

(3) Double-sensation phenomenon: a part of the body as object for the body itself

**Purely visually constituted object:** We have nothing comparable

- Accordingly, the role of the visual sensations in the constitution of the LB is quite different

🡪 The localization of sensations is in principle something different from the *extension* of a material thing

- In the first place, it is different *descriptively*: “The sensing which spreads over the surface of the hand and extends into it is not a real quality of a thing (…) such as, for example, the roughness of the hand, its color, etc.”

- Secondly, because all sensing belongs to my soul (*zu meiner Seele*)

🡪 The necessity of the tactile sensations for the constitution of the LB

“Each thing that we see is touchable, and, as such, points to an immediate relation to the body, though it does not do so in virtue of its visibility. *A subject whose only sense was the sense of vision could not at all have an appearing body*. (…) It cannot be said that this subject who only sees sees its body, for its specific distinctive feature as a body would be lacking him or her”

“The body as such can be constituted originarily only in tactuality and in everything that is localized with the sensations of touch: for example, warmth, coldness, pain, etc.”

“Obviously, the body is to be seen just like any other thing, but it comes a lived body only by incorporating tactile sensations, pain sensations, etc., in short: by the localizations of sensations as sensations” (158-159)

**• Localized sensations as the condition for a further “constitutive” layer**

🡪 Localized sensations as “pre-conditions” for the constitution of the as a “organ of the will”

- LB as the only object that my ego can move *directly* and *immediately* and *spontaneously*

- And through which a mediate movement of other things can be produced

**LEIB**

(**A) Matter or Physical Thing**

(It has extension and all its real properties)

+

**(B) Localized Sensations**

(I sense *on* it, *in* it…)

+

**(C) Motivated/Motivating**

**Sensations** *Body as organ of*

*the will*

**• Sensations in general as pre-conditions for the constitution of higher objectualities**

🡪 *Sensuous feelings*: pleasure and pain, the sense of well-being that permeates the whole body and the general malaise of corporeal indisposition

Sensuous feelings 🡨🡪 Values

“Thus here belong groups of sensations which, for the acts of valuing (…) *play a role, as matter, analogous to that played by the primary sensations for what is intentionally lived in the sphere of experience*” (160)

**LEIB**

(**A) Matter or Physical Thing**

(It has extension and all its real properties)

+

**(B) Localized Sensations**

(I sense *on* it, *in* it…)

+

**(C) Motivated/Motivating**

**Sensations** *Body as organ of*

+ *the will*

Values **(D) Sensuous Feelings**