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Charles University

Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies

(BA Module + Erasmus students)

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**E. Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations***

• **General Introduction**

“Any object in general points to a *structure, within the transcendental ego, that is governed by a rule*. (…) the object indicated forthwith a universal rule governing *possible* other consciousnesses of it as identical—possible, as exemplifying essentially pre-delineated types” (53-54)

🡪 *The Task of a Transcendental Theory*:

“Thus arise, first of all, as separate, many different transcendental theories: a theory of perception and the other types of intuition, a theory of intending objects as symbolized, a theory of judgment, a theory of volition, and so forth. They become united, however, in view of the more comprehensive synthetic complexes; they belong together functionally, and thus make up the *formal* universal constitutional theory of *any object whatsoever*” (51-52)

(Subjectivity) 🡨 **SENSE** 🡪 (Such and Such a) Category of Being

 (Phenomenology) 🡨**SENSE** 🡪 Ontologies

 (Many A Priori Sciences)

• **Some Examples (from *Ideas… III*)**

“In our phenomenological-kinetic method we have ascertained the fundamental distinction among merely material thing (*materiellem Ding*), lived-body (*Leib*), and psyche (*Seele*), or psychic Ego, which dominates all apprehension of the world, and we have studied it at the same time with respect to its phenomenological original sources. (…) it is thus certain from the beginning that such basically essential differentiations of objectualities that arise out of basically essential ones in the constitutive apprehension (*konstituierenden Auffassung*) must be decisive for the separation (*Sonderung*) of scientific areas and for the sense (*Sinn*) of their problematic” (1)

🡪 *Material Perception -- Material Thing -- Material Science of Nature*

“First of all, we have material things. However intimately, according to our analyses, the constitution of these things may be interwoven with the constitution of the other categories of reality, what gives them unity is a particular type and nexus of constitutive acts. The original presenting act is the *material perception (thing-perception)*, body-perception. With this, a basic sort of perception is designated, fully delimitated from every other sort of perception. *We intentionally do not say ‘external perception’, since the perception of lived-bodies, which makes up a new basic type, could also be and would have to be so named* (my emphasis)” (1)

🡪 *Apprehension of Lived-Body -- Lived-Body -- Somatology*

“A *second fundamental sort of apprehension*, one that constitutes its object as object of the second level, is the *apprehension of lived-body*. It is a new fundamental sort considering the basically different way in which the uppermost stratum of the lived-body’s objectuality, the specific stratum of lived-body, is constituted in contrast with everything that concerns the material of the lived-body. With this there cohere as correlates (a priori, naturally) the designated essential differences between material determinations of lived-body and the specifically lived-bodily ones. To this stratum belong the really uniform *sense fields* that change according to real circumstances belonging to them in their states of sensation” (4-5)

• **The “lived-body” in the *Cartesian Meditations***

🡪 *My Lived-Body as a Field of Sensations and Organ*

“Among the bodies (*Körpern*) belonging to this nature and included in my peculiar ownness, I then find my *lived-body* as uniquely singled out, namely, as the only one of them that is not just a body but precisely a lived-body: the sole object (…) to which I ascribe *fields of sensation* (…); the only object *in* which I *rule and govern immediately*. (…) Touching kinesthetically, I perceive ‘with’ my hands; seeing kinesthetically, I perceive also ‘with’ my eyes; and so forth (…). Meanwhile, the *kinesthesia* pertaining to the organs flow in the mode ‘I am doing’, and are subject to my ‘I can’; furthermore, by calling these kinesthesia into play, I can push, thrust, and so forth, and can thereby *act with my lived-body (leiblich)* immediately and then mediately” (97)

Lived-Body

(Fields of Sensations)

 Presenting Sensations Kinesthetic Sensations

🡪 *The Original Spatiality of the Lived-Body*

“As reflexively related to itself, my lived-body (*Leib*) has the central ‘here’ as its mode of givenness; every other body (*Körper*) (…) has the mode ‘there’. The orientation ‘there’ can be freely changed by virtue of my kinesthesia. (…) Now, the fact that my lived-body can be (and is) apprehended as a natural body (*Körper*) existing and movable in space like any other is manifestly connected with the possibility expressed in the words: by free modifications of my kinesthesia, particularly those of locomotion, I can change my position in such a manner that I convert any *there* into a *here,* i.e., I could occupy any spatial locus with my lived-body. This implies that, perceiving from there, I should see the same physical things, only in correspondingly different modes of appearance, such as pertain to my being there. It implies, then, that not only the systems of appearance that pertain to my current perceiving ‘from here’, but other quite determinate systems, corresponding to the change of position that puts me ‘there’, belong constitutively to each physical thing. And the same in the case of every other ‘there’” (116-117)

- “I am *here* with my lived-body (*leiblich*), the center of a *primordial* *world* (*Umwelt*) oriented around me. Consequently my entire primordial ownness, proper to me as a monad, has the content of the *here*—not the content varying with come ‘I can and do’, which might set in, and belonging to some *there* or other; accordingly, not the content belonging to that definite *there* (119)