

## CHAPTER II

### ECONOMICS AND PHILOSOPHY

One wonders how appropriate is an investigation that reaches directly for the essence and leaves all the inessential behind as just excess baggage. Such investigation pretends to be something it is not. It claims to be scientific, yet it takes the most essential thing – the distinction between what is essential and what is peripheral – for granted and beyond investigating. It does not strive for the essential through a complex process of regressing and progressing which would at once cleave reality into the essential and the peripheral and substantiate such cleaving. Instead, it leaps over phenomenal appearances without ever investigating them and in so doing seeks to know both the essence and how to reach it. The directness of ‘essential’ thought skips the essential. Its chase after the essential ends in hunting down a thing without its essence, a mere abstraction or triviality.

Before an individual ever reads a textbook of political economy and learns about the scientifically formulated laws of economic phenomena, he *already* lives in an economic reality and understands it in his own way. Perhaps our investigation should then start by questioning the untutored individual? What promise might his answers hold, though? He might answer the question ‘What is economics?’ in words expressing his idea of it or regurgitating the answers of others. His answers will be mere echoes of those read or heard elsewhere. Similarly, his idea of economics will hardly be an original one, since its content will not measure up to reality. He who lives closest to economic reality and experiences it all his life does not necessarily have a correct idea of economics, i.e. of what he lives in. Important for the authenticity of our further reasoning is not how people answer the question about economics but rather what economics *is* to them, prior to any questioning and any contemplation. One always has a certain understanding of reality that precedes explication. Itself an elementary layer of consciousness, this pre-theoretical understanding is the basis for the *possibility* of the culture and the cultivation through which one ascends from a preliminary understanding to a conceptual cognition of reality. The belief that reality in its phenomenal appearance is a peripheral and negligible issue for philosophical cognition and for man leads to a fundamental error: ignoring the

phenomenal appearance amounts to closing the door to the cognition of reality.

To investigate how economics exists for man is also to seek the most fundamental mode of this reality's givenness. Before economics becomes a topic for scientific considerations, explanations and interpretations, it already exists for man in a particular manifestation.

#### METAPHYSICS OF EVERYDAY LIFE

##### *Care*<sup>1</sup>

The primary and elementary mode in which economics exists for man is care. Man does not take care but care takes care of man. One is not careworn or carefree; rather, care *is* both in the careworn and in the carefree. Man may free himself of care but cannot set care aside. 'In life man belongs to care,' Herder has said. What then is care? To start with, care is not a psychological state or a negative frame of mind which would alternate with a different, positive one. Care is the subjectively transposed reality of man as an objective subject. Man is always already enmeshed in situations and relationships through his existence which is one of activity – though it may manifest itself as absolute passivity and abstention. Care is the entanglement of the individual in a network of relationships that confront him as the practical-utilitarian world. Therefore, objective relationships manifest themselves to the individual – in his 'praxis' rather than in his intuiting – as a world of procuring, of means, ends, projects, obstacles and successes. Care is the pure activity of the social individual in isolation. Reality cannot primarily and immediately manifest itself to this involved subject as a set of objective laws to which he is subjected; on the contrary, it appears as activity and interference, as a world which only the active involvement of the individual sets in motion and gives sense to. This world is *formed* through the involvement of the individual. Far from being merely a set of ideas, it is above all a certain kind of praxis in its most varied modifications.

Care is not the everyday consciousness of the struggling individual, one that he would shed during leisure. Care is the practical involvement of the individual in a tangle of social relations conceived from the position of his personal, individual, subjective involvement. These relations are not objectivised: they are not the subject-matter of science or of objective investigation, but are rather the sphere of individual involvement. Therefore the subject cannot intuit them as objective laws of processes and of

phenomena; from the perspective of his subjectivity, he sees them as a world *related* to the subject, having meaning for this subject, and created by the subject. Since care is the entanglement of the individual in social relations seen from the perspective of the involved subject, it also amounts to a trans-subjective world seen by that subject. Care is the world in the subject. The individual is not only that which he considers himself or the world to be: he is also a part of the situations in which he plays an objective trans-individual role of which he may be quite unaware. In his subjectivity, man as care is outside himself, aiming at something else, transcending his subjectivity. Yet man is subjectivity not only in being outside himself and in transcending himself through it. Man's transcendence means that through his activity he is trans-subjective and trans-individual. His life-long care (*cura*) contains both the earthly element, directed at the material, and the element aspiring upward, to the divine;<sup>1a</sup> 'care' is ambiguous, and the question arises: Why this ambiguity? Is it a product and an artifact of Christian theological thought for which the ordeal of this world marks the only sure path to God? Is theology a mystified anthropology, or is anthropology a secularized theology? Theology can be secularized only because theological topics are in reality mystified problems of anthropology. Man's spanning of the earthly and the divine elements is a consequence of the dual nature of human praxis, which in its subjectively mystified form appears as the duality of 'care'.

The subject is determined by a system of objective relations, but acts as a concerned individual whose activity *forms* a network of relations. Care is:

- (1) the entanglement of the social individual in a system of social relations on basis of his involvement and his utilitarian praxis;
- (2) the activity of this individual which in the elementary form appears as caring and procuring;
- (3) the subject of activity (of procuring and caring) which appears as lack of differentiation and anonymity.

Procuring is the phenomenal aspect of abstract labor. Labor has been divided up and depersonalized to the extent that in all its spheres — material, administrative, and intellectual — it appears as mere procuring and manipulation. To observe that the place occupied in German classical philosophy by the category of labor has been taken over in the twentieth century by mere procuring, and to view this metamorphosis as a process of decadence represented by the shift from Hegel's objective idealism to Heidegger's subjective idealism, is to highlight a certain *phenomenal* aspect of the historical process. The substitution of 'procuring' for labor does not

reflect the qualities of a particular philosopher's thought or of philosophy as such; rather, it expresses in a certain way changes in the objective reality itself. The shift from 'labor' to 'procuring' reflects in a mystified fashion the process of intensified fetishization of human relations, a fetishization through which the human world reveals itself to the everyday consciousness (as fixed in a philosophical ideology) as a *ready-made* world of devices, implements and relations, a stage for the individual's social movement, for his initiative, employment, ubiquity, sweat, in one word — as procuring. The individual moves about in a *ready-made system of devices and implements*, procures them as they in turn procure him, and has long ago 'lost' any awareness of this world being a product of man. Procuring permeates his *entire* life. Work has been fragmented into a thousand independent operations, each of them with its *own* operator and executor, be it a production or a white-collar job. The manipulator faces not the work but an abstractly disintegrated segment of it which does not provide an overview of the work as a whole. The manipulator perceives the whole as a *ready-made* thing; of its genesis there exist only details, and these are in and of themselves irrational.

Procuring is praxis in its *phenomenally alienated form* which does not point to the *genesis* of the human world (the world of people and of human culture, of a culture that humanizes nature) but rather expresses the praxis of everyday manipulation, with man employed in a system of *ready-made* 'things', i.e., implements. In this system of implements, man himself becomes an object of manipulation. The praxis of manipulation (procuring) transforms people into manipulators and into objects of manipulation.

Procuring is manipulation (of things and of people). Its motions repeat daily, they have long ago become a habit and are performed mechanically. The reified character of praxis expressed in the term 'procuring' signifies that manipulation is not a matter of creating a work but of a man who, consumed by procuring, 'does not think' about the work. Procuring is man's practical behavior in a world that is ready-made and given; it amounts to attending and manipulating implements in a world, but in no way to the *process of forming* a human world. The philosophy that had offered a description of the world of care and procuring met with extraordinary acclaim because this particular world is the universal surface level of twentieth century reality. This world does not appear to man as the reality that *he* would have *formed* but as a ready-made and impenetrable world in which manipulation appears as involvement and activity. An individual manipulates the telephone, the automobile or the electric switch as

something ordinary and unquestioned. It takes a break-down for him to discover that he lives in a world of *functioning* implements which constitute a mutually interlocking and interconnected system. A break-down indicates that 'implements' exist not in the singular but in the plural: that the telephone receiver is useless without the mouthpiece, the mouthpiece without the wiring, the wiring without electric current, current without the power station, the power station without coal (raw material) and machinery. A hammer or a sickle are not implements (apparatuses). Breaking a hammer is a perfectly transparent matter with which a single person can deal. A hammer is not an implement but a tool: it points not to a whole system of implements conditioning its own functioning but to the smallest circle of producers. In the patriarchal world of the plane, the hammer and the saw it is impossible to capture the problems of implements and apparatuses created by the modern industrial world of the twentieth century.<sup>2</sup>

Procuring as abstract human labor in its phenomenal form creates an equally abstract world of utility in which everything is transformed into a utilitarian instrument. In this world, things have no independent meaning and no objective being; they acquire meaning only insofar as they are manipulable. In practical manipulation (i.e. in procuring) things and people *are* implements, objects of manipulation, and acquire a meaning only in a system of general manipulability. The world discloses itself to the concerned individual as a system of meanings all of which point to all others, and the system as a whole points back to the subject for whom things have these meanings. This reflects, first, the complexity of modern civilization in which particularity has been transcended and its place taken by absolute universality. Second, behind the phenomenal form of the world of meanings (which when absolutized and separated from objective objectivity leads to idealism) there transpire the contours of the world of man's objective praxis and of its artifacts. In this world of meanings, the objective material praxis forms not only the meanings of things as the sense of things, but also the human senses which negotiate man's access to the objective meaning of things. The objective—practical and the sensory—practical world has dissolved in the perspective of care and has been transformed into a world of meanings outlined by human subjectivity. This is a *static* world in which manipulation, procuring and utilitarian calculation represent the movement of the concerned individual in a ready-made and fixed reality whose genesis is obscured. The *bond* of the individual with social reality is expressed and realized through care; but this reality discloses itself to concerned

consciousness as a reified world of manipulation and procuring. Procuring as the universal reified image of human praxis is not *the process of producing and forming* an objective—practical human world, but is rather the manipulation of ready-made implements as of the total of civilization's resources and requirements. The world of human praxis is objective-human reality in its genesis, production and reproduction, whereas the world of procuring is one of ready-made implements and their manipulation. Since both the worker and the capitalist live in this twentieth century world of procuring, the philosophy of *this* world might appear to be more universal than the philosophy of human praxis. This fictitious universality results from its being a philosophy of *mystified* praxis, of praxis not as a human, transforming activity, but as the manipulation of things and people. Man as care is not merely 'thrown' into the world that is already there as a ready-made reality; rather, he moves about in this world — itself a creation of man — as in a complex of instruments he knows how to manipulate even without knowing their functioning and the truth of their being. In the process of procuring, man as care manipulates the telephone, the TV set, the elevator, the car and the subway, oblivious of the reality of technology and of the sense of these instruments.

Man as care is involved in social relations and *at the same time* has a certain relationship with nature and develops a certain idea of nature. Recognizing the human world as one of *utility* reveals an important truth: that this is a *social* world, in which nature appears as humanized nature, i.e. as the object and material base for industry. Nature is the laboratory and raw-material base for procuring, and man's relationship with it resembles that of a conqueror's relationship, a creator to his material. This, however, is only one of all *possible* relations, and the image of nature based on it exhausts neither the truth of nature nor the truth of man. 'Nature is sometimes reduced to being a workshop and to providing raw material for man's productive activity. This really is how nature appears to man — the producer. But the entirety of nature and its significance cannot be reduced to this role only. Reducing the relationship between man and nature to that of a producer and his raw material would infinitely impoverish human life. Such a reduction would indicate that the esthetic aspects of human life and of man's relation with the world have been uprooted — and more: the loss of nature as something created neither by man nor by anyone else, as something eternal and uncreated, would be coupled with the loss of the awareness that man is a part of a greater whole: compared with it, man becomes aware both of his smallness and of his greatness.'<sup>3</sup>

In care, the individual is always already in the future and turns the present into a means or a tool for the realization of projects. Care as the individual's practical involvement favors the future in a certain way, and turns it into the basic time dimension, in whose light he grasps and 'realizes' the present. The individual appraises the present and the past by the practical projects he lives for, by his plans, hopes, fears, expectations and goals. Since care is anticipation, it invalidates the present and fastens onto the future which has *not yet* happened. Man's time dimension, and his being as a being in time, are disclosed in care as a fetishised future and fetishised temporality: because it is ahead of the present, care considers the present not as the authentic existence, as 'closeness to being', but rather as a flight.<sup>4</sup> Care does not reveal the authentic character of human time. In and of itself, the future does not overcome romanticism or alienation. In a certain way it even amounts to an alienated escape from alienation, i.e. to fictitiously overcoming it. 'To live in the future', 'to anticipate' in a sense denies life: the individual as care lives not his present but his future, and since he neglects that which is and anticipates that which is not, his life occurs in nothingness, i.e. in inauthenticity, while he himself staggers between blind 'resoluteness' and resigned 'waiting'. Montaigne knew this form of alienation well.<sup>5</sup>

### *The Everyday and History*

Every mode of human existence or being-in-the-world has its everyday. The Middle Ages had its everyday which was segmented among different classes, estates and corporations. Though the everyday of the serf differed from those of the monk, the wandering knight or the feudal lord, they all shared a common denomination, one single basis determining the tempo, rhythm, and organization of life — the feudal society. Industry and capitalism introduced not only new tools of production, new classes and political institutions but also a new manner of the everyday, one essentially different from that of previous epochs.

What is the everyday? The everyday is not privacy, as opposed to public life. Nor is it so-called profane life as opposed to an exalted official world: both the scribe and the emperor live in the everyday. Entire generations, millions of people have lived and still live the everyday of their lives as though it were a *natural* atmosphere, and they never pause to question its sense. What is the sense of questioning the sense of the everyday? Might such questioning perhaps suggest an approach that would expose the essence of the everyday? At what point does the everyday become problematic and

what sense does this uncover? The everyday is above all the *organizing* of people's individual lives into every day: the replicability of their life functions is fixed in the replicability of every day, in the time schedule for every day. The everyday is the organizing of time and the rhythm which govern the unfolding of individual life histories. The everyday has its experience and wisdom, its sophistication, its forecasting. It has its replicability but also its special occasions, its routine but also its festivity. The everyday is thus not meant as a contrast to the unusual, the festive, the special, or to History: hypostatizing the everyday as a routine over History, as the exceptional, is itself the *result* of a certain mystification.

In the everyday, the activity and way of life are *transformed* into an instinctive, subconscious, unconscious and unreflected *mechanism* of acting and living: things, people, movements, tasks, environment, the world — they are not perceived in their originality and authenticity, they are not tested and discovered but they *simply are there*, and are accepted as inventory, as components of a *known* world. The everyday appears as the night of indifference, of the mechanical and the instinctive, i.e. as the world of familiarity. At the same time, the everyday is a world whose dimensions and potentialities an individual can control and calculate with his abilities and resources. In the everyday, everything is 'at hand' and an individual can realize his intentions. This is *why* it is a world of confidence, familiarity, and routine actions. Death, sickness, births, successes and failures are all accountable events of everyday life. In the everyday, the individual develops relations on basis of *his own* experience, *his own* possibilities, *his own* activity, and therefore considers the everyday reality to be his own world. Beyond the limits of this world of confidence, familiarity, immediate experience and replicability which the individual can count on and control, there begins another world, the very opposite to the everyday. The collision of these two worlds reveals the truth of each of them. The everyday becomes problematic and reveals itself as the everyday when it is disrupted. It is not disrupted by unexpected events or by negative phenomena: the exceptional and the festive on the level of the everyday are an integral part of it. Inasmuch as the everyday represents the organizing of millions of people's lives into a regular and replicable rhythm of work, action and life, it is disrupted only when millions of people are jolted out of this rhythm. War disrupts the everyday. It forcefully drags millions of people out of their environment, tears them away from their work, drives them out of their familiar world. Although war 'lives' on the horizon, in the memory and in the experience of everyday living, it is beyond the everyday.



War is History. In the collision of war (of History) with the everyday, the latter is overpowered: for millions, the customary rhythm of life is over. This collision of the everyday and History (war), in which one (particular) everyday has been disrupted and no other habitual, mechanical and instinctive rhythm of acting and living has yet been established, reveals both the character of the everyday and that of History, and their relationship.

Folk wisdom has it that one will even get used to the scaffold. That is, even in the most extraordinary, least natural and least human of environments, people develop a *rhythm* of life. Concentration camps had their everyday, and indeed even the person on death row has his. Two kinds of replicability and substitution operate in the everyday. Every day of the everyday can be substituted for another corresponding day, the everyday makes this Thursday indistinguishable from last Thursday or from last year's Thursday. It merges with other Thursdays and it would be preserved, i.e. it would differ and emerge in memory, only if there were something special and exceptional to it. At the same time, any subject of a given everyday can be substituted for any other subject: subjects of the everyday are interchangeable. They are best described and branded with a number and a stamp.

The clash of the everyday with History results in an upheaval. History (war) disrupts the everyday, but the everyday overpowers History – for *everything* has its everyday. In this clash, the separation of the everyday from history, a separation which is the starting and permanent vantage point of everyday consciousness, *proves* in practice to be a mystification. The everyday and history interpenetrate. Intertwined, their supposed or apparent character changes: the everyday no longer is that for which routine consciousness takes it, in the same way as History is not that as what it appears to routine consciousness. Naïve consciousness considers the everyday to be a natural atmosphere or a familiar reality, whereas History appears as a transcendental reality occurring behind its back and bursting into the everyday in form of a catastrophe into which an individual is thrown as 'fatally' as cattle are driven to the slaughterhouse. The *cleavage* of life between the everyday and History exists for this consciousness as fate. While the everyday appears as confidence, familiarity, proximity, as 'home', History appears as the derailment, the disruption of the everyday, as the exceptional and the strange. This cleavage simultaneously splits reality into the *historicity* of History and the *ahistoricity* of the everyday. History changes, the everyday remains. The everyday is the pedestal and the raw material of History. It supports and nourishes History but is itself devoid of history and outside of history. What are the circumstances of the everyday

which transform it into the 'religion of the workaday', of acquiring the form of eternal and immutable conditions of human life? How did the everyday which is a product of history and a reservoir of historicity end up *severed* from History and considered the antinomy of history, i.e. of change and of events? The everyday is a *phenomenal* world which *reveals* reality in a certain way even as it *conceals* it.<sup>6</sup>

In a certain way, the everyday *reveals* the truth about reality, for reality outside the everyday would amount to transcendental non-reality, i.e. to a formation without power or effectiveness: but in a way it also conceals it. Reality is contained in the everyday not immediately and in its totality but mediately and only in some aspects. An analysis of the everyday allows for reality to be grasped and described only to a *certain extent*. Beyond the limits of its 'potentialities' it falsifies reality. In this sense one grasps the everyday from reality, rather than vice versa.<sup>7</sup>

The method of the 'philosophy of care' is at once mystifying and demystifying in that it presents the everyday in a *particular* reality as though it were the everyday as such. It does not distinguish between the everyday and the 'religion' of the workaday, i.e. the alienated everyday. This method takes the everyday to be inauthentic historicity, and the transition to authenticity to be a rejection of the everyday.

If the everyday is the *phenomenal* 'layer' of reality, then the *reified* everyday is overcome not in a leap from the everyday to authenticity but in practically abolishing both the fetishism of the everyday and that of History, that is, in practically destroying reified reality both in its phenomenal appearance and in its real essence. We have demonstrated that radically separating the everyday from variability and historicity on the one hand leads to a *mystification of history* which then appears as the Emperor on horseback and as History, and on the other hand leads to *emptying the everyday*, to banality and to the 'religion of the workaday'. Divorced from history, the everyday becomes emptied to the point of being absurdly immutable. Divorced from the everyday, history turns into an absurdly *powerless* giant which bursts into the everyday as a catastrophe but which nevertheless cannot change it, i.e. cannot eliminate its banality or fill it with content. The plebeian naturalism of the nineteenth century believed that the importance of historical events lies not in how and why they developed but in how they influenced the 'masses'. But a mere projection of 'grand history' into the lives of ordinary people does not eliminate the idealistic view of history. It even strengthens it in a sense. From the point of view of official heroes, only the so-called exalted world, the world of grand deeds

and of historical events which overshadow the emptiness of everyday life, rightfully belongs into history. Conversely, the naturalist concept negates this exalted world and focuses on a scatter of daily events, on mere records and documentary snapshots of ordinary life. This approach, however, deprives the everyday of its historical dimension as much as the idealistic approach does. The everyday is taken as eternal, in principle immutable, and thus compatible with any epoch in history.

The everyday appears as the anonymity and tyranny of the impersonal power which dictates every individual's behavior, thoughts, taste and even his protest against banality. The anonymity of the everyday, expressed in the subject of this anonymity, that is in *the someone/no-one*, has its counterpart in the anonymity of historical actors described as 'history makers'. Historical events consequently appear as the work of no-one and thus of all, as the result of anonymity shared both by the everyday and by History.

What does one mean by saying that the first and foremost subject of the individual is anonymity, that man understands himself and the world above all on basis of care and of procuring, on basis of the world of manipulation in which he is submerged? What does one mean by saying that 'Man *ist* das, was man *betreibt*'? What does it mean, that an individual is first immersed in the anonymity and facelessness of the someone/no-one which acts *in him*, thinks *in him*, protests *within him* on *his* behalf and on behalf of the *I*? Through his very existence, man is not only a social being which is already enmeshed in a network of social relations. He is also *acting, thinking* and *feeling* as a social *subject* even before he is or indeed could be aware of this reality. Routine consciousness (the 'religion') of the everyday takes human existence for a manipulable object and treats and interprets it accordingly. Since man identifies with his environment, with what is at hand, what he manipulates and what is optically closest to him, his own existence and understanding of it turn into something distant and unfamiliar. Familiarity is an obstacle to knowledge. Man can figure out his immediate world of procuring and manipulation but cannot 'figure out' himself because he disappears in and merges with the manipulable world. The mystifying-demystifying 'philosophy of care' describes and postulates this reality but cannot explain it. Why does man first of all *disappear* in the 'external' world and interprets himself from it? Man is primordially what his world is. This derivative existence determines his consciousness and prescribes the way in which he is to interpret his own existence. The subject of an individual is first of all a *derivative* subject, both in terms of false individuality (the false

I) and false collectivity (the fetishised we). The materialist thesis which states that man is an ensemble of social conditions but neglects to mention who is the *subject* of these 'conditions'<sup>8</sup> leaves it to the 'interpretation' to fill in the blank either with a real or with a mystical subject, with the mystified I or the mystified we. Both transform the real individual into a tool and a mask.

The subject-object relationship in human existence is not identical with the relationship of the internal and the external, or with that of the isolated pre- or non-social subject and the social entity. The subject is already constitutively per[redacted] objectification of human praxis. An individual might be submerged in objectivity, in the world of manipulation and procuring, so completely that his subject disappears in it and objectivity itself stands out as the real, though mystified, subject. Man might disappear in the 'external' world because his is the existence of an objective subject which exists only by producing a subjective-objective historical world. Modern philosophy discovered the great truth that man is not born into conditions 'proper' but is always 'thrown'<sup>9</sup> into a world. He has to check *for himself* its authenticity or inauthenticity: in struggle, 'practical life', in the process of his own life history, in the course of appropriating and changing, of producing and reproducing reality.

In the course of the practical-spiritual evolution of the individual and of mankind, the undifferentiated and omnipotent rule of anonymity eventually collapses. In the course of ontogenesis and phylogenesis, its undifferentiated character diversifies into human and general human features on the one hand, the appropriation of which transforms an individual into a human individual, and into particular, non-human, historically transient features on the other hand, of which an individual has to free himself, if he is to work his way toward authenticity. In this sense, man's evolution progresses as a practical process of *separating* the human and the non-human, the authentic and the inauthentic.

We have characterized the everyday as a world with a regular rhythm in which man moves about following mechanical instincts, and with a feeling of familiarity. Reflection over the sense of the everyday leads to the absurd consciousness that there is no sense to it. 'What a bore to put on a shirt in the morning. Then the breeches over it. To crawl into bed at night and out again in the morning. To keep setting one foot in front of the other *with no prospect of it ever changing*. It's very sad. And to think that millions have done it before us and millions will do it again . . .'<sup>10</sup> What is essential, however, is not the consciousness of the absurdity of the everyday, but the

question of when does one come to reflect upon it. One questions the sense of the everyday with its automatism and immutability not because *it itself* would have become a problem. Rather, its problematization reflects a problematization of reality: primordially, one seeks not the sense of the everyday but the sense of reality. The feeling of absurdity is evoked not by reflection about the automatism of the everyday. Rather, reflection about the everyday is a *consequence* of the absurdity that historical reality has forced upon the individual (Danton).

Man *can* be man only if he can perform various life functions automatically. The less these activities impinge upon his consciousness and reflection, the better suited they are and the better service they render. The more complicated man's life, the more numerous are the relations he enters into; and the more functions he performs, the more extensive is the *necessary* sphere of automated human functions, customs, procedures. The process of automating and mechanizing the everyday of human life is an *historical* process. The boundary between the possible and necessary sphere of automation, on the one hand, and the sphere which in the best human interest cannot be automated, on the other hand, is consequently one that shifts in the course of history. With an increasingly complex civilization, man has to subject ever more extensive spheres of his activity to automation, in order to maintain enough space and time for genuine human problems.<sup>11</sup> The impossibility of automating certain life functions can be an obstacle to human life itself.

Inasmuch as the shift from the inauthentic to the authentic is an historical process which is realized both by mankind (a class, a society) and by the individual, an analysis of its concrete forms has to cover *both* of these processes. A forced reduction of one process to the other or their identification will transpire in the sterility and triviality of answers that philosophy might offer to the problems they pose.

The pseudoconcrete of the alienated everyday world is destroyed through *estrangement*, through *existential modification*, and through *revolutionary transformation*. Though this list does have an hierarchical aspect to it, every form of destruction maintains its relative independence, and to that extent cannot be substituted by another form.

The world of everyday familiarity is not a known and a recognized one. In order to *present* it in its reality, it has to be ripped out of fetishised intimacy and exposed in alienated brutality. Experiencing the workaday life naively and uncritically, as though it were the natural human environment,

shares a substantial common trait with philosophical nihilism: in both, a particular historical form of the everyday is considered the natural and immutable basis for all human coexistence. In one instance, the alienation of the everyday is reflected in consciousness as an uncritical attitude, in the other as a feeling of absurdity. To behold the truth of the alienated everyday, one has to maintain a certain distance from it. To do away with its familiarity, one has to 'force' it. What is the kind of society and what is the kind of world whose people have to 'turn into' lice, dogs and apes in order for their real image to be represented adequately? In what 'forced' metaphors and parables must one *present* man and his world, to make people *see* their own faces and *recognize* their own world? One of the main principles of modern art, poetry and drama, of painting and film-making is, we feel, the 'forcing' of the everyday, the destruction of the pseudo-concrete.<sup>12</sup>

*Presenting* the truth about human reality is rightly felt to be something other than this reality itself, and it is therefore insufficient. It is not enough for the truth of reality to be *presented* to man; man has to *perform* this truth. Man wants to *live* in authenticity and to *realize* authenticity. An individual cannot by himself effect a revolutionary change in conditions and eradicate evil. Does this imply that as an individual, man has no immediate relationship to authenticity? Can he live an authentic life in a world that is inauthentic? Can he be free in an unfree world? Does there exist *one single* trans-personal and trans-individual authenticity, or is there a permanent choice, accessible to anyone and to all? In the existential modification, the subject of the individual awakens to his own possibilities and elects them. He changes not *the world*, but *his attitude toward it*. The existential modification is not a revolutionary transformation of the world but *the drama of an individual in the world*. In the existential modification, the individual liberates himself from the inauthentic existence and chooses an authentic one *among others*, by considering the everyday *sub specie mortis*. In that way he invalidates the everyday with all its alienation and rises above it, but at the same time he negates the *sense* of his own activity. Choosing authenticity *sub specie mortis* leads to aristocratic romantic stoicism (under the sign of death I live authentically, on the throne or in chains) or is realized as choosing death. *This* form of existential modification is, however, not the only way, or even the most frequent or the most adequate way for an individual's authentic realization. It, too, is only an historical choice with a quite precise social and class content.