XIV

HISTORICAL LANGUAGE AND HISTORICAL REALITY

Metaphysics fragmentary, irresponsible, and half-awake, and unconscious that she is metaphysical, spoils two good things when she injects herself into a natural science.

William James, *The Principles of Psychology*

I intend by the end of this paper to have dissolved a number of problems in the philosophy of history, by showing their structure to be one they share with a very wide class of philosophical problems which themselves are due to confusing two ways in which language is related to the world. This leads to condensing causal and semantical information into single formulations, and the problem disappears when these are distinguished. As elsewhere in philosophy, diagnosis shades into therapy, since the description of the problem is all that is required for its solution. And, again as always in philosophy, the solution to such philosophical problems comes from solving the problem of philosophy itself. So I shall reach the problems which animate this paper only by progressively reducing the scale of analyses that otherwise are meant to reveal structures which always are the same. The philosophy of history is just philosophy writ small.

I

There is a form of intellectual controversy, exhibited throughout the nineteenth century and into our own, which is less accessible because of a radically different order than certain controversies it appears to resemble, namely those which sprang up dramatically between science and religion in this era. Those latter controversies developed chiefly because it was at first supposed that religion was in possession of factual truths which entailed answers incompatible with those offered by science, to just the same factual

questions: the age of the universe, the mutability of species, the community of men and beasts or, for the matter, the historicity of sacred writ itself. On the basis of criteria supposed appropriate to the resolution of scientific controversies as such, the factual claims of religion were one by one infirmed, and it seemed then a reasonable projection that more or less the same would happen in any future such collisions. This left certain options open for religionists. They could, like adherents of any infirmed theory, simply give them up like good scientists are supposed to do. Or they could attempt to shun refutation by regarding religious statements as mere mythic paraphrases of recoverable literal scientific statements which were in fact true. Or religion could constitute itself a specialized science, concerned with an area of reality the "other" sciences did not touch upon, purging itself of any statements which then could conflict with those of the "other" sciences. Or finally, it could radically redefine its own scope and office by foreswearing any claim at all to factuality, so that questions of truth or falsity simply no longer would apply, and controversies between it and any discipline to which such questions did apply would be as inconceivable as a truth-contest between chemistry and opera. The Wittgensteinian suggestion that it is not the purpose of religious language to state facts may be seen as a late response to a dilemma which is then resolved by assigning religious utterance to one language game and physics to another. Were this a suitable disposition of the matter (I believe it not to be), religionists might be grateful (as it is the mark of religionists always to be) for the suffering undergone, for though in the light of it the dilemma need never have arisen, still, had it not done so, religion might never have arrived at a proper consciousness of its own deep character. So the recent history of religion recapitulates its own favorite episodes of trial and purified renascence.

The superficially parallel controversies I wish to anatomize at the outset are between science and philosophy, again on what seems at first the common assumption that philosophy is offering factual descriptions which collide with those of science: as though there is no difference to be drawn between philosophy and science so far

as concerns the enterprise of furnishing factual descriptions of the world. On the other hand, and in contrast with the case of religion, these controversies appear to be structured by a curious dialectic. It is not a dialectic of the progressive sort, leading to higher syntheses, but a static, circular, oscillating dialectic, in which opposed positions rotate alternately and tediously into domination over one other. These are controversies which do not appear open to settlement by Scientific Method, since it is exactly, as we shall see, Scientific Method which is in issue: Even if the duelers decide to first duel over the location of the dueling grounds, they must find *some* place to settle the preambular dispute, and it is the regressive character of the dialectic I want to describe that one cannot begin the fight without presupposing a victory which is hollow.

Let us consider, for illustrative purposes, the grand controversy still being ritually enacted in a major part of the world as the substance of philosophy, between Idealism and (Scientific) Materialism. I shall paint the antagonists with the lurid textbook colors through which they perceive one another. *Grosso modo*, then, Idealism shall be the theory that the entirety of reality depends upon thought, and that there can be no intelligible thought of a thought-independent reality. One way of glossing "depends" here is Kant's. Kant claimed that just those concepts required in order for reality to present itself as intelligible are furnished by the shaping apriori action of the understanding, so that the world as we know it comes under structures we ourselves supply. At least *aller Erscheinungen*, characterized by Kant as *blosse Vorstellungen* so present themselves. *Dinge an sich*, which Kant superstitiously retained in his ontology, do not present themselves, and so do not in this sense "depend" on thought. It was this surviving realism which Hegel smartly excised, not as false but (appealing to a criterion of meaningfulness only a century later to become explicit) as meaningless, leaving reality in its entirety dependent (in Kant's sense) upon thought, there being only one reality, whose structure is now the structure of understanding. As an influential critic put it, it was Hegel's theory that "The real world is only the external, phenomenal form of the Idea," and hence the precise inverse of the true theory (his)

that ideas are the *internal* form of the real world: "The external world as reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought." In a deep sense, this remains more a paraphrase than a rebuttal of the thesis it was meant to overturn (". . . turn right side up again"), for when we superadd the dialectic to the concept of materialism, we find, since dialectic was meant exactly to characterize the processes of intellect—*die wissenschaftliche Anwendung der in der Natur des Denkens liegende Gesetzmässigkeit*—that the laws to which reality confirms are psychological. And the resultant mentalization of matter hardly could be more in the Hegelian spirit. The hurt reply to this would be that at least it is not being claimed that reality is *dependent* on thought, and it is to the further glossing of this that I now turn.

Intellectual history is a tale of vulgarization. When a man claims that reality is dependent upon mind, one can interpret this, and men in fact did interpret it as a causal proposition, madly to the effect that the world in some dark way is extruded by *res cogitans*. Against this startling but almost immediately dubious theory, Marx's riposte seems an almost Johnsonian reflex of common sense responding to an extravagantly false violation of itself. Brains need not secrete thought, as Cabanis proposed, nor excrete them, as Vogt suggested in a crass metaphor. But something like what appears to be factual evidence appears available in support of the claim that, taken as a causal proposition, the truth indeed is the inverse of Hegel's view. The world is considerably older than the earliest brained creatures, and whatever in fact may be the connection between brains and thoughts, it is likely that thinking creatures are creatures with brains; and since these evolved in a world which once was without them, how could *they* have *caused* that world? But secondly, there seems again considerable evidence that what thoughts we have are capable of explanation with reference to things which take place outside those thoughts and often outside the person who has them. Marx, for example, who was less a materialist than a realist, supposed one might plausibly explain the general way men think in terms of their class location and relationship to the springs of production: that their mode of reading the world is

an interiorization—a coming to consciousness—of the material circumstances of the class to which one belongs. And though not an epiphenomenalist, since he supposed that class-consciousness (as opposed to consciousness of one's class) might enforce the class structure, he supposed that the circumstances, which explained the existence of classes, were "material," and antedated any "coming to consciousness." There is, in brief, a wide class of quite reasonable theories and a body of confirmed fact which appear massively to disconfirm Idealism. But of course they do so only by first transforming Idealism into a science, characterized through its laughably hopeless attempt to contribute to our understanding of the world. Idealism has, at this level, nothing to say. It first must transform its rival into a philosophy. Let us then sketch its reply.

The theories advanced against The Idealist are causal theories, one and all. Each applies a scheme, the scheme of causality, which hardly can be derived from reality since it enters into the definition of reality as we know it. The causal concept is part of what determines the structure of intelligibility for a world which science, under such a scheme, may then go on to describe. But it can hardly call in question what it presupposes as a condition of its own coherence. Idealism is a theory about (among other things) causality. The causality it means to understand is just the sort of causality exemplified in all the theories marshalled in refutation of it as though it were in fact just another causal theory! As a causal theory, it might indeed be wrong. But that is not what it is, and Materialism may engage with it only if it has a rival theory of causality to offer, and takes then its responsibilities as a philosophy seriously. It is concerned with what its shallow rival all the time employs, and the Idealist thus wins against the latter not by descending to the latter's level but by demonstrating that no war between them is possible since there is a level for it to descend to. Only, then, if Idealism is a science or Materialism a philosophy can there be an issue between them to be joined. In the former case, Idealism is false, but in the latter case Materialism cannot refute what it mistook as its rival as though the matter were a scientific one.

It will be instructive, before attempting to generalize beyond this, to consider, with equal crudeness, two further seeming controversies which have much the same dynamisms. Then we can turn to history itself.

A. Empiricism as we construe it today is a theory to the effect that the total set of meaningful descriptive predicates either are elements of a base vocabulary consisting exclusively of sense-predicates, or are resoluble via avenues of definition or reduction to definientia composed exclusively of elements in the base vocabulary. This is a considerably chastened transform of a once robust theory to the effect that *things* either are or are composed of ideas (= Kant's *blosse Vorstellungen*). Even in Hume, we begin with a psychological theory, in which ideas are atomic or molecular, and where the intra-atomic forces (the psychological counterpart of gravitational force in particle mechanics) turn out to be analogous to those semantical forces which hold words together as *texts*; and we end with a theory of reality in which *things* are swarms of ideas. So empiricism has vacillated as between a prescriptive theory of meaning and a descriptive theory of the world. I know a philosopher who lost all interest in sense-data when it began to dawn that things are not *literally* constructed out of sense-data in a way rival to and more fundamental than the way we believe chairs, say, literally to be constructed out of molecules or splinters. Now as a scientific theory, empiricism appears to run counter to certain scientific facts; e.g., that sensations are caused by things; e.g., pains by pins, impinging the body's sensory peripheries. How can *things* be then *made* of what they may be invoked instead to explain? The transforming, immediate reply (see Berkeley, Price, and Merleau-Ponty) is that all the causal laws employed in such causal explanations themselves rest upon the evidence of the senses: laws relating things to sensations may be formulated as laws relating sensations with sensations. So, even the science of physiological perception finds itself lodged in the superstructure of a system whose base it pretends to call in question. To then say that the elements in the base may be explained merely turns the circle through another revolution, and the rotation of the controversy is endless and

comical. But of course the vicious dialectic evaporates when empiricism recognizes that it is not a theory of reality but instead a theory of meaning.

B. There is a singular influential theory of language acquisition abroad, according to which the discrepancy between language input and output as linguistic competence must be compensated for by assigning to each learner an innate linguistic structure, a *virtual* language, upon which each actual language is based. Suppose we superadd to this theory some speculative remarks of linguistic visionaries like Whorf or Nietzsche, according to which the structure of the world we live in is a reflection or projection of a grammar, so that permutations in grammar would entail permutations of reality, and every manual of grammar is a transvestite treatise of metaphysics. Combining this with the theory of innate grammar means, of course, that at the deepest level, we all live in the same reality, since we share a common deep grammar. Well, a man might argue that it is difficult to see how that structure of reality should be one with the structure of language, since different languages might have evolved, that is, deeply different languages. Perhaps Martians, for example, have a different deep grammar than that which palimpsestically bleeds through all of ours. This, to be sure, would mean an alternative reality for Martians, since it would imply a different spontaneous metaphysics. This would now make it not merely a serious question of how communication with Martians then would be logically possible. It also raises the question of whether an alternative reality itself is an intelligible concept. For are we not, after all, describing such possibilities in—our language? And so the very notion of alternatives is something the structure of our language makes intelligible? And hence is internal to our grammar? And hence "our reality" which must then just *be* reality since no external alternative to it can intelligibly be framed? So that our language is a kind of fatality, dashing any hope that by changing our grammar we might create a better reality, one more suited, as Nietzsche hoped, to human fulfillment? In any case, we cannot speak of the limits of our lan-

guage save through our language, and so presuppose the structures we want to speak of as limited and relative?

I have not aimed at precision in sketching these controversies, but their structure ought to begin by now to emerge into perspicuity, and so ought the dynamisms through which they are generated. I believe in part at least each such controversy—in contrast either with philosophical controversies or with scientific ones—arises when one side is philosophical and the other scientific, and the former is disguised as inadequate science or the latter disguised as incompetent philosophy. Then, appearing to be addressing themselves to a common problem, the antagonists circle interminably about an illusory fixed center. The controversies of this order may be dissolved only by defining exactly the boundaries between philosophy and science. Because mutual self-redefinition appears to be involved, the disputes in a sense resemble those between religion and science. But whereas I am uncertain what interest could attach to religious propositions unless they *could* in principle conflict with those of science, since religion one would hope, must pretend to tell us truths about the world (ourselves included), I am convinced that philosophy *never* has truths to tell about the world, and so cannot conflict in principle with science or, for what it may be worth, with religion either. I want now dogmatically to state where I believe the boundaries are to be drawn.

II

The incommensurabilities between scientific and philosophical propositions reflect the incommensurability of two distinct relations in which language stands to the world. In one relationship, language stands to reality merely in the part-whole relationship: it is amongst the things the world contains, and is merely a further element in the order of reality. In its other relationship, language stands in an external relationship to reality in its entirety, itself included when taken as included in the inventory of reality. It is external primarily when we construe it in its capacity to *represent* the world, and hence in its capacity to sustain what I have else-

where termed *semantical values*, for example "true" and "false." Anything which is representational in this sense I shall construe as language, e.g., pictures, maps, concepts, ideas, these also sustaining this double relationship with the world. I should suppose that there is nothing in the world unsusceptible to true representation *modulo* some convention of representational adequacy, and this, of course, is true of language itself when taken in its intraworldly location: thus descriptive linguistics. So in a way it is imaginable that there should be an ideal representation of reality which would be complete, a perfect mapping of description onto the world, the entire complex, language again included, recoverably projected onto language as a representation: the sort of thing dreamt of by Borges. But then there stands between language so construed and reality so construed, a metaphorical space which is part neither of language nor reality, the two separated, as it were, by what the continental philosopher would designate as *un rien*. So the interspace between language and the world would (. . . *ce n'est que rien*) not itself appear in the map. Satisfaction of the sorts of corresponential connections which include such concepts as truth, denotation, instantiation, exemplification, since the latter hold between reality and what is mapped onto it, are never part of the map. It is for such reasons that the *Tractatus*, which primarily is addressed (as I would argue that any philosophical work is) to just these connections, has no room in the language it characterizes for the propositions of the *Tractatus*. This is its magnificent insight. Its major failing is to suppose there is some special way language and reality each must be—respectively composed of atomic propositions and co-structural atomic facts—in order that there should be mapping at all, and its assimilation of the vehicles of description to what is after all only a conspicuous kind of representational vehicle, namely pictures. But let us pursue our more general diagnosis.

I shall suppose that science may be thought of as at least an attempt at describing the world, in adding to the map, as it were, or in rectifying or even, in scientific revolution, replacing the map, whatever may be the special strategies worked out for achieving these ends. Were philosophy like science, it too would be making

maps of reality. It is not that, however, for *its* province is the interspace between language and reality, and so to the content of our representation of reality it contributes nothing. Science and philosophy then are at right angles, and intersect but cannot possibly conflict, since they lie in logically distinct planes.

The duplex relationship between language and the world, and especially in those cases where language itself in its intraworldly relationship is its subject in the extraworldly relationship of description, is exceedingly treacherous, as the entire history of philosophy confirms. For in describing language as part of the world, and as standing in such dubiously worldly relationships to other parts, we are almost irresistibly inclined to think of all the relations between language and reality as though they were of the sorts which relate any part of reality to another: say through the causal relationship. But then those terms which have reference to the extra-worldly connections—words like "truth," or "existence," or "representation," or "reality" itself—become remarkably puzzling when they are treated as though they were ordinary or even special descriptive concepts: we look for something they describe, or treat them, so to speak, as mere noises. One response to this is to naturalize these terms, forcing them to do merely descriptive work, e.g., as the Pragmatists attempt to collapse the concept of truth onto the concept of success. Or to treat these words as they are ordinarily used, e.g., describing the uses in ordinary language of such words as "true," these descriptions then coming to form part of that map of reality which describes the way parts of language are *used* in the world. The latter enterprise then comes into conflict with those theories of truth which treat it as having reference to the relationship between language and the world, e.g., as in correspondence theories: which is why the famous quarrel between Strawson and Austin seems at once so futile and so inconclusive, since one was addressing himself to a description of "true" in one plane and the other to an analysis of the relationship it stands for in another plane. Indeed, that controversy is of a piece with those we have attempted to characterize thus far in this essay, which arise from the attempt to naturalize a semantical concept, or semanticize

a natural one. Whenever this happens it is reflected in consciousness by a stale dialectical comedy which can only be ended by unmasking one of the unwittingly disguised controversialists.

We may illustrate this through the causal theory of perception, in which both sorts of relationships are involved, since our percepts are at once considered, under that theory, as within and without the world. It is because of this that standstills of the sort exemplified under (I) are naturally generated. The causal theory arises primarily for representationalist theories of perception—where one's perceptual connection to reality is mediated by an intervening entity, a percept (or *Idée*) which then resembles or represents that reality. This supposes, in "veridical" perception, that there is an object *o* which my percept, as it were, refers to and correctly represents (Descartes and Russell at various points suppose that it *resembles o*, but this is to be attributed to a further instance of domination by a picture theory of representation). Failure of representation then defines hallucination as inadequacy of representation then defines illusion, but what seems obviously true is that at this level, percepts have been construed on a model seemingly more suitable to *sentences*—a representational theory of language is not at all odd—and veridical perception thus is analyzed along logical lines suggested by a correspondence theory of truth. But it is characteristic of philosophical theories of perception that they are shaped on linguistic models: semanticization of perception is not endemic to the representational theory of perception. Now when one semanticizes in this manner, it automatically follows that veridicality is something *externally* conferred upon percepts, which themselves then are neutral as to whether they are veridical or not again like sentences. *Causality* is introduced to eliminate a class of cases in which a man *m* enjoys veridical perception without having knowledge. Thus, suppose I am having a set of perceptions which indeed veridically represent the world, but it is mere coincidence that they do; e.g., I am caused to have these percepts by factors having nothing to do with that in the world which makes my percepts veridical, or which *satisfies* what we might term the veridicality-conditions of my percepts. I might be dreaming or drugged,

and the content of my experience even so might be indistinguishable from what it would have been had I instead been staring reality in the face. So one adds to the notion of veridicality this: a man *m* has a veridical perception of an object *o* if (i) *o* satisfies the veridicality conditions of the percept *p* and (ii) *m* is caused by *o* to have *p*. Causality closes, or hopes to close, an epistemic gap in the analysis of perceptual knowledge. It is no concern of ours at this point whether it succeeds or what other gaps if any the analysis of perceptual knowledge opens up. The point is that percepts have been made to stand in two interestingly distinct relations to reality, one causal and the other semantical. It is worth stressing that the object *o* also becomes doubly related: as the cause and the subject of *p*.

It is through the *causal* connection that perception appears to come under the scope of science, specifically the physiological explanations of how we are caused to have the perceptions we have. And from this vantage point, there is no logical room for skepticism, unless the general skepticism to which causation itself is subject to, in as much as perception and its causes, since equally under causal laws, are indifferently in the same level of reality: causality is intra-worldly. It is through the *semantical* relationship that skepticism enters, for our percepts do not bear their veridicality on their faces, and we may logically undergo all the same experiences whether there is a world for these to denote, and whether we get it right or not. To be sure, causality was meant to help us out of this difficulty, but percepts do not wear, either, their causal credentials on their faces: nothing about a percept, any more indeed than anything about anything, logically guarantees its own causal history or even that it has a causal history. So if we think about representation, there is a problem of the external world, though if we think about causality there is none since by virtue of causality we are, as it were, already within reality which is defined by the causal order. Science is concerned with causality, philosophy with representation. That is why philosophical questions are unintelligible to science and scientific answers irrelevant to philosophy. If we attempt to collapse one relation onto the other, there either is

no problem or there is no solution. And these remarks may be extended to cover all of the controversies which have concerned us, which arise in connection with things which stand, as language does, internal to a world it is also external to through the properties of representation.

It is, to conclude these protracted introductory remarks, chiefly because it is more natural to describe than to think about description, that philosophy came, in the nineteenth century and in our own, to become increasingly a problem for itself. For what did it describe? Since domain after domain of reality became the province of this or that science, it began to seem that philosophy must describe nothing: which meant, in one part of Europe, that it must be meaningless, since meaningfulness was defined in terms of descriptivity, and, in another part of Europe, that there must *be* nothing and philosophy describes it. Finally, it was thought that the problem was generated by descriptivity itself, and that there was more to language than description. But this of course was an unwitting attempt to transform philosophy into a science, concerned with the description of language in its intraworldly location, viz., as a set of gestures (speech acts) and responses. But this final move left the problem of distinguishing philosophy from descriptive linguistics, which had already claimed this territory. But if my sketchy analyses have merit, the space between language and the world is the habitat of philosophy, and this can never be part of the domain of science since it always is itself external to science when the latter is construed as representational of the world. Philosophy is the study of those semantical forces which bond language to reality and enable the former to express truths. It is, to borrow Frege's marvelous characterization of logic, the *science of truth*.

III

It is, I believe, a contribution to historical understanding to show how so many of the deepest conflicts which constitute intellectual history may be traced to simple confusions I have sought to sketch: confusions in which, because two sorts of relations have been inadequately distinguished, philosophy or science bled into one an-

other. This would be a fine example of the way in which a non-historical discipline, analytical philosophy, might help history, in this case, intellectual history, in achieving its descriptive and explanatory ends. But my announced aim here is with the understanding of *history* itself as a descriptive and explanatory enterprise, and it is my hope that the distinctions I have labored toward will seriously contribute to this. For whatever is true of language as such must of course be true of historical language.

By "historical language" I shall have primarily in mind an open class of sentences which purport when asserted to describe events which have taken place anterior to their utterance or inscription. Though my main concern remains with the relations in which such sentences stand to reality, in this case *historical* reality, a few schematic remarks on historical sentences will prove useful.

A. I shall make here no distinction between historical sentences and historical beliefs, between those sentences publicly displayed and those voiced or inscribed within the soul. This is weakly justifiable in that the sincere assertion of the sentence s by a man m presupposes that m believes that s; and the latter in turn presupposes a higher order disposition on m's part to assert, in a suitably loose sense of the term, the sentence s. By "suitable looseness," I mean one can assert the belief that there is a chair in the room by sitting in it, not merely by such stilted locution as "Here is a chair." It is strongly justifiable through the fact that beliefs are sententially qualified, which is to say that there is no belief which is not the belief *that* something is the case, and what one believes to be the case is mapped with sentences. To believe an historical sentence is to believe that to have happened anterior to the belief which satisfies the sentence believed to be true.

B. Not being in the perfect or a past tense does not as such disqualify a sentence as an historical one, so long as the sentence in question, whatever its tense, entails as one of its truth conditions a sentence in the past tense. Thus "Johnson *is* ex-president" entails "Johnson *was* president." "George Sand will publish her third novel tomorrow" entails that George has written at least two other novels. "Notre Dame du Port is being restored" entails a

sentence to the effect that anterior to its utterance, Notre Dame du Port sustained deterioration. And so on. Were we to unfold these grammatically simple propositions into distinct clauses, employing the refractive mechanisms of logical form, we would find some sentence about the past whose falsehood would confer falsehood upon the whole. So though in the present tense and referring to entities which exist at the time the assertions are made—to Kennedy's vice-president, to the authoress of *Francois le Champi*, to the dominating Romanesque structure of Clermont-Ferrand—each of these sentences entails as a condition for its truth some incontrovertibly historical sentence. We may then disregard surface syntax as any criterion for historical language, and look instead to semantics.

C. Satisfaction of a truth condition by at least one event anterior to its utterance or inscription may be counted a primary rule of meaning for the historical sentence. As such, of course, this rule does not discriminate between true and false historical sentences, nor should we expect that it should. The distinction between history and fiction is inscrutable from the perspective of logical form, much in the way in which there is no determining from the descriptions of a set of possible but not compossible worlds, which, if any of them, is satisfied by the actual world. One could not tell by reading alone that the *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* was not fabricated by Gibbon's creative imagination, and that the saga of the Hobbits was not simply a well-written chronicle of real events. The Emperor Caracalla is not especially more credible than Aragorn the King. But one particular feature of historical sentences must be noted: namely, that the *time* of their utterance is one of the conditions for their truth, this being a matter of logic and not merely of pragmatics. "George Sand wrote *La Mare au Diable*" would be false, though somewhere in time George Sand indeed wrote *La Mare au Diable*, if the former were uttered in the wrong temporal relationship to the latter: in 1001 A.D., for example. Since the time of an historical sentence is a factor which counts towards its truth, historical sentences must be located in the same time scale as the events they describe. This certainly distinguishes historical language from other sorts, inasmuch as though

any utterance has a time, the latter is a truth-condition only for historical sentences. So it is irrelevant for other sorts of language whose temporality does not penetrate its meaning. Non-historical language, thus, may be semantically timeless.

D. It is accordingly analytical to the concept of historical language that historical sentences be *in* history, be in definite historical relations to the events they describe, if they are *true*. It follows from this that historical sentences are external to history if they are true, since externality has characterized the relationship between language and the world when the former is meant to describe the latter, and hence whenever questions of truth-and-falsity (in contrast with "use") arise. The connections between time and truth entail that historical sentences are at once within and without the reality they describe—what I shall speak of as historical reality—and that this double relationship between historical sentences and reality may be deduced, as it were, from the rules of meaning of historical sentences as such. With so complicated a semantics, it is inevitable that these relationships should have become confused. It is exactly this confusion, as I shall show, that generates those problems in the philosophy of history I want to resolve. Perhaps it generates philosophy of history as such, since it is just such confusions as these which after all give rise to the pseudoproblems of philosophy, if I may be permitted an abusive of an earlier analytical generation.

E. It is possible to construe the temporal information implied through the logical structure of historical sentences merely as a complex bit of referential apparatus. Thus *s* as an historical sentence uses itself as a reference point to indicate the temporal relationship between itself and the event to which it refers. So we may exclude, for the moment, as it is in general appropriate to do, questions of reference from questions of meaning, and concentrate upon everything other than its temporal relationship to the sentence which describes it which is required of an event in order that it satisfy the truth-conditions of the latter. I write: "George Sand wrote *La Mare au Diable*." In the world a redoubtable, sometimes transvestite lady consumes a period of time, perhaps in Nohant,

scribbling. These scribblings sum to a novel, *La Mare au Diable*. By whatever sartorial mystery words are fitted to the world, I have produced a bit of historical truth, thanks to a resolute *berrichon* novelist bent on literary fortune. My producing this truth need not be the same as having achieved a bit of historical *knowledge*, but our problems for the present do not lie there. What is crucial is that the temporal *deixis* we have put to one side does not, so to speak, penetrate the events it points to, and so the temporal order as between my sentence and the event which satisfies it is insofar irrelevant to the former's truth: let us instead say: bit of truth *sur court*. And the latter may, by deliberate suppression of temporal reference, be counted insofar as timeless. To be sure, there may be temporal information of a sort which belongs to meaning rather than to reference, and hence which is satisfied by some temporal features of the event itself, e.g., that the feat took three years. But this would be time *in*, not time *of* the event relative to the sentence it makes true. When I restore the referential factor I have found it convenient here to bracket, I do not, as it were, give further historical information: at best I communicate that the information is historical. Thus I do not give you an extra bit of truth in telling you what I have told you is true. So that it is "historical" in this eviscerated, referential sense, is no part of the event in question. Its being historical only is a complicated way of expressing one of the ways in which it is related to its description, and indeed, we may say as much of "historical" so far as it applies to sentences in our own usage: "historical" is more or less a semantical predicate, like "true."

F. We may thus dehistoricize historical language by simple suppression of the relevant portion of the referential apparatus, as in the paragraph above: 'George Sand' (timelessly) denotes George Sand; *'La Mare au Diable'* (timelessly) denotes *La Mare au Diable*; 'writes' (timelessly) denotes a relationship between the former and the latter, so that "writes (George Sand, *La Mare au Diable*)" timelessly describes an event at Nohant, though writing takes time and books do not exist *before* they are written. The time at which this sentence is satisfied relative to the time at which the sentence

uttered is irrelevant to its truth, and only becomes relevant when we rehistoricize. Relative, however, to the fact that their relationship to the sentences we describe them with are not part of the events described, we may guardedly characterize these as "timeless." This is not portentously to record some interesting, even astonishing metaphysical property of historical reality. It is relative to language and then only to one element of the referential liaison between language and reality, that events are timeless: nothing follows regarding the Eternity of the Past. All that follows is that the pastness of the past is not some essential feature of the past. So we could in principle give a complete description of the past—a *true* description—which would be enriched not at all by saying that what we had just described was past. All that would be added would be information about the temporal relation between sentences and referenda.

IV

Historical language is external to historical reality, but in no different way than any language is, to which a referential function is attached. Referenda are not penetrated by the expressions which single them out for indication, and so are "there," independent of and unaffected by the fact that they are referred to: and this is so even if the *structure* of objects should itself in some way be assignable to language. That is, there may be a deep truth to the Whorfian-Nietzschian theory that grammar determines the way the world is going to be for those who use it, without this in any way changing the logical fact that reference will remain an external relationship between bits of language and bits of reality, even if the *kinds* of bits referred to may vary from grammar to grammar. Reference makes realists of us all. *Historical* reference then is simply reference in a certain temporal direction relative to the referring expression itself: but that the referendum should be in this respect *past* does not make it *more* independent of and *less* unaffected by language, than were it instead to have been contemporary with the referring expression which falls causelessly upon it. In a way we can say that historical sentences are true before

(= logically prior) they are historically true, in the sense that all the truth-conditions of a description have to be satisfied before the question of the temporal relationship between these and the description arises. Thus the sentence "Vercingetorix kissed Marie Antoinette" is false, and so stands in *no* temporal relationship to any event. Historical sentences have two ways of being false, as it were, but the temporally relevant way is available only when the sentence in question is ahistorically true. This may be a clue as to why singular propositions in the future tense may, as Aristotle proposed, be reckoned neither true nor false. "Thereness" is what characterizes reality when situated at the yonder extreme of a referential line—which always is a kind of *deixis*—the hither extreme of which descends from a vehicle of meaning. So "thereness" is a para-semantical predicate of reality (well, "reality" itself is a para-semantical concept), predicated as it were of anything insofar as the latter is the target of a description. But no further characterization of the latter is implied. In this sense of being *there*, no distinction may be drawn between past and present, whose only difference *here* is a difference in temporal relationship in which they stand relative to a timed description.

"History professors do not love history because it comes to pass, but only because it is something that *has* come to pass." So thinks Dr. Abel Cornelius, himself a history professor, in Thomas Mann's marvelous story *Disorder and Early Sorrow*. Cornelius specializes in the times of Phillip II, and when his own times, which are those (evidently not unlike our own, in which social values are cracking) after World War I, he turns for security and mental relief to a past he can merely study, away from a present he can hardly live. He senses, of course, that history is *being* made, that he and his children and his servants are being carried into unknown relationships by ungovernable forces: and that the world he once was comfortable enough in is *never going to be the same*. Before this cataclysm, perhaps, his present was very like the past he takes such pleasure from, where the basis of that pleasure now is that it *is* past and is never going to be different. One's only task then is to find out what happened then, and one is spared the ag-

ony of being part of what, of course, in the living of it—the Counter-reformation—must have been as wild and precarious and unstructured as Cornelius' own times (which he of course knows too). One has the task, it goes without saying, also of finding out what is happening in the present and not merely living through what is happening: Cornelius tries to understand. He is inside and outside his own times at once, as student and as participant. Logically, of course, and this is the point which concerns me, as student one is outside, even if as person one is also inside present events, and one is no more "external," in this respect, to the times of Phillip II than one's own. It is only that he is excluded from also being inside the events his professional calling consists in knowing as much about as he can. He has, for instance, no children living *then*, about whom he has to worry. There is little doubt of course that Abel Cornelius would prefer, as a counterexistentialist, to live in the present as though it were the past, and to stand *only* in the external relationship of scholar to *his* times, which is the Cartesian posture of a knower set over and against a logically external world. This posture is available, but not exclusively available: because he is a father and a German and a professor, the external world is what he is *in*. His children who live without especially thinking about their times, are utterly inside the reality from which he is cognitively alienated while being, through exigencies and distractions, also alienated as cognizor.

Certain philosophers, indeed certain great philosophers (James and Nietzsche, for example), have felt a certain conflict between the existential relationship in which we stand to life (we *live* it), and the *thereness* which attaches to any event, past or present, in virtue of the truth-relationship. They have taken "thereness" to be some absolute trait of reality in something like the way people have supposed truth must be an absolute property of true sentences. They could not, however, accept thereness, implying fixedness and unalterability, as a trait of reality which was conspicuously plastic and alterable, available for us to give it what shape *we* will, subject only to the most contingent constraints.

They resolved the conflict in a way which makes the difference

between philosophers and historians: by attacking that theory of truth—the correspondence theory—which appeared to them to entail properties of reality repugnant to *their* experience of the world. And they invented a new theory of truth, one more consonant with their vision of the possibilities of life.

Now the Correspondence Theory of Truth, though it has had its important errors and perhaps lacks an adequate formulation even now, is intuitively correct in stating the *sort* of relation we want to hold between language and reality when the former describes the latter successfully; and it implies no characterization of reality beyond whatever characterization is given by the descriptions which are true. Their *being* true is not a further bit of description, in virtue of which the reality described has a special property in addition to those it is described as having. And so, when something satisfies the truth-conditions of a sentence, there is not some further thing it needs to do to make the sentence true: being true is not a further truth-condition of the true sentence. So James and Nietzsche, as well as lesser pragmatists and greater fascists, confused a parasemantical characterization of reality for a metaphysical description of reality's deepest trait. The latter they felt not only inconsistent with the world as they perceived it, but essentially dangerous in the respect that it induced a sense of fatalism and hence a sense that there was no way in which we might change the world (ourselves included, as part of the world), but could only externally record what was already given and—there. At once pernicious and wrong, they felt they could only revolutionize life by revolutionizing the truth-concept. So truth had more and more to refer to successful revolutionizing of reality itself—truth was what worked—and the old external relationship between language and reality was impugned: language, like everything else, had to be part of reality, and those parts of language to which truth and falsity traditionally attach—declarative sentences—were recast as instruments for the transformation and organization of experience: true if successful in their utilitarian role, false if failures. This analysis worked best with sentences whose truth-status is at any rate moot, namely those supposed to express laws or theories, which

now became part of the scientist's battery of instruments he is charged to design for the generation of predictions and the smoothing out of experience. It worked less well for singular propositions, or at least seemed decreasingly intuitive as the degree of specificity of the sentences to be analyzed increased, and simply parted company with intuition altogether when "Christopher Columbus discovered America" proved to be a sentence about future experience in the archives, with 'Christopher Columbus' itself taking on the status of a theoretical term. In general, sentences about the past became sentences about the future. Proper names, which if anything would have seemed paradigmatically to play a referential function, were theoreticized generally; and indeed the distinction we generally countenance between past, present, and future, were reconstituted, so far as they were discriminable at all, as under the pressure of a radically empiricism they had to be, into different compartments for *present* and *future* experiences.

Incongruity with intuition is not an automatically fatal objection against a philosophical analysis, although it would be difficult to choose between the pragmatist's intuition of a plastic present and the plain man's intuition about a fixed past. If, in order to be honest to the former, we must radicalize the truth-concept with the consequence that we cannot any longer be honest to the latter, it is not plain that this is a price we *must* pay. It was after all a late criticism of the pragmatic theories that they had untoward consequences for sentences purportedly about the past, and while we may admire the pragmatists for accepting and even endorsing these consequences, since after all it would not do to have a correspondence theory of truth for the past and a pragmatistical one for the present and future, it might have been a better wisdom to reflect on the question of whether, really, the correspondence theory of truth had such extraordinary metaphysical and human implication that it needed rejection in favor of a theory which demanded so wholesale a redesign of language, truth, and reality. (Of course it is not in the psychology of philosophy to resist so grandiose an opportunity.) But I do not think we need merely pit intuition against intuition to perceive what must be the major objections against the

pragmatic theories in general. I can only afford to mention them here.

The instrumentalist truth-theories were early members of a class of theories, the latest members of which have been contributed by (late) Wittgenstein and by Austin, in which sentences are appreciated as playing roles in the conduct of life, and hence as being part of the fabric of human existence. Each of these presupposes a theory of meaning which essentially is a theory of *use*, sentences having different meanings as they have different uses. Thus if a sentence is used for the anticipation of experience, *that* is its meaning. If it is used to convey encouragement or despair, *that* is its meaning. To ask what is its meaning is to ask for what it is used. And mastering language is something like mastering some craft, in learning to handle the tools of the trade, using the right tool for the right job, etc. Instrumentalist truth theories thus presupposed more or less instrumentalist theories of meaning. And one thing which counts heavily in support of such theories is that sentences do in fact *have* uses, even the uses ascribed to them by philosophers. There is little doubt that sentences about the past are used for the organization of archival materials. There is little doubt that moral propositions are used to commend things or to modify behavior in a certain direction. There is little doubt again that we use the unit sentence "True." to express agreement with some other sentence presupposed reasonably contiguous in the conversational atmosphere. And so on. But there, I believe, the matter ends.

For one thing, what we lose in thinking of sentences as instruments is any sense of their structure; and with loss of structure goes loss of explaining two sorts of things: first, those inferences which are licensed by features of sentences which are simply blurred when the latter are taken as whole, and secondly, the obviously crucial way in which we understand sentences by understanding the relationship of their parts. Were the above story of linguistic mastery to be believed, mastering language would be like mastering a ritual, using just the right sentence in just the right way. But in fact, as we now have been told, to master language is to be master of a potential infinitude of sentences, including sentences

never heard or used before. Indeed, these theories tend to treat sentences as though they were *terms*, with the finitude of vocabulary acquisition that this implies and the inductive manner in which we learn to use words. Semantical theory from Frege through early Wittgenstein to Davidson sees a deep connection between meaning and truth; and while sentences may in addition have uses and social and practical employments of the greatest and most interesting variety, instrumentalist theories of meaning lose connection with what impress me as the most fundamental facts about language. As we might say by means of an expression and a concept brought to consciousness by Fregian semantical analysis: instrumentalism renders everything *opaque*. We lose those transparencies which open language up to substitution and quantification, and by losing the grammatical structures lose, as well, any possibility of understanding how language works. Of course, the connection between meaning and truth does not commit us to any special theory of truth, and the issue of the correspondence theory has to be settled anew. Davidson, for example, rejects it, though mainly by treating sentences, in the Fregian manner, as names of truth-values, which I do not believe the correspondence theory at all entails. Whatever the case, since any theory of truth is going to connect with sentential structure, and since this is exactly what is lost on pragmatic theories of truth, it is difficult to see that the connection between meaning and truth can at all be the way pragmaticists proposed. However finally we are to appreciate the relationship of satisfaction which holds between the truth-conditions (the meaning) of a sentence and their satisfiers, the relation in question will be of a *kind* which leaves language external to its satisfiers (even in the case when one bit of language satisfies another, as when it is language about which we speak). And so we may retain our intuitions about present or past, and suppose that if the correspondence theory of truth may be exemplified indifferently by true sentences about the past and by true sentences about the present, the differences between the alleged fixedness of the one and the fluidity of the other cannot be explained with reference to the Correspondence Theory of Truth. We do not have, conversely to Doctor

Cornelius, to live in the past as though it were the present—we do not have to *live* the past—in order to preserve our sense of being in the world. He tried to be completely external, as the pragmatists thought to be completely internal, to a world in which we, like our language, stand in both relations at once.

Historical sentences are partially token reflexive, in that they are simultaneously used and mentioned—used to describe an event which is *past*, relative to the time of the sentence, which thus is mentioned as a point of temporal orientation. This analysis works best for *true* sentences, inasmuch as then there really is an event earlier in time than the sentence which also truly describes it. If the sentence is false, as we saw, there is then no event relative to which the describing sentence may stand in any temporal relation, and this is markedly so when reference fails rather than predication. For example, "The Battle of Waterloo took place in Ohio," succeeds in referring to a battle which actually occurred, although it is badly mislocated (unless the sentence is arch, like saying the Battle of Waterloo was won on the playing fields of Eton); but "The Battle of Baffinland . . ." fails to refer however we complete the sentence, and either is degenerately false or the question of truth-or-falsity cannot arise. Failure of reference in this sense is always the case for singular propositions in the future tense, at least according to that famous conjecture of Aristotle's: and so, either these are always false or neither false nor true, if he is right. We may, perhaps, if we acquiesce in the intuitions regarding time, truth, deliberation, and action which were bruised by the argument of his opponent in *De Interpretatione*, work out an analysis in which we can speak of sentences about future sea-battles or whatever as *retroactively* true or false, viz., at or after the time at which the appointed sea-battle occurs or fails to do so, via a complex proposition referring to a battle, a prediction, and itself in various temporal relations. But this would be to allow semantic analysis to be contaminated by metaphysical biases of various orders, which would be inconsistent in the light of our criticisms of pragmatism. Let us merely say that future sentences too are token reflexive, and point in the temporal direction relative to their utterance of the event

they mean to describe. Then, if for deep reasons there be nothing to point to and the sentences are accordingly false degenerately, we may retain the temporal direction of the *deixis* in our analysis, and keep our account of timed descriptive utterance consistent. Our concern is not to say whether future, or any, sentences are true, but the relationship in which they must stand to the world if they are so; and this depends upon no conceptually important character of the world itself.

In its concern to describe the events to which it refers, history—because it aims at truth—may be spoken of as history-as-science. History-as-science presupposes no special philosophy of history, apart from whatever philosophy is presupposed by the concept of truth itself, viz., a specification of the relationship between sentences and what satisfies them. Apart from complexities introduced by temporal reference, historical sentences stand to historical reality the way any true description stands to any reality it may be true of. To be sure, as we construe this relationship differently, we may get perhaps a different philosophy; but this will be less a philosophy of history than a philosophy of *truth*, and a consistent analysis will have to be worked out for history and for the rest of science, as we saw happen under the pressures exerted by the pragmatic theories of truth. *Historical* instrumentalism is simply a specialization of instrumentalism at large, somewhat less intuitive perhaps, but nothing greatly turns, as we saw, on that. There are, of course, special problems of historical knowledge and of historical investigation: our access to the realities we want to describe, hence want to describe *correctly*, is complicated by their relative pastness. So there may be some special philosophy of historical inquiry. Still, the strategies for successful inquiry here will be of a piece with successful strategies for dealing with unobservables generally; and while these are very interesting certainly, they are less so, I believe, and have anyway been more often and elegantly discussed than the questions which arise when we think of history-as-science as *part* of historical reality. Thus far we have thought of history-as-science as part of history by dint of the role it plays in the referential apparatus vis à vis the events it describes.

But this makes possible the occurrence of exceedingly complex events, in which beliefs and descriptions about the past are components, in which, as we might say, men's consciousness of events becomes part of an event other men later endeavor to be conscious of. When men's representations of reality become part of the reality other men seek to represent, we begin to encounter features peculiar in a way to history. So it is to history as *internal* to history that I now turn: to history-as-reality, as I shall term it, in contrast with history-as-science, though of course it is always the same thing which is at once, because internal and external to the world, history-as-science and history-as-reality.

V

Let us begin with a topical matter. In recent times a certain tension has arisen within the educational conscience of those charged to teach courses in general education who themselves have been trained as specialists. To be sure, this conflict—or contradiction, as the Marxists would say—has a certain economic basis, for the activity of teaching general courses is antithetical to the kind of activity, namely specialized research, which brings academic advancement and glory. But let us attempt to appreciate the tension less crassly.

The courses, of which the Contemporary Civilization course at Columbia is the paradigm and perhaps the ancestor, were largely designed in the twilight of a dilute Hegelian historicism, in which it was believed that the understanding of x consisted in knowing the history of x. So we understand our institutions and practices by perceiving their emergence from the Dark Ages. It was anyway believed salubrious to think that things have histories: that morality, for example, should be seen to have an actual genealogy was believed by Nietzsche to be a morally liberating disclosure. So the student would be led back to his sources, with the hopeful result that his perspective would be put in perspective. Even the perspective itself has a history. To realize that there are other ways of seeing the world is to wonder if *this* itself is not just one of the ways of seeing the world. The student is immersed in a dissolving

relativism which sucks itself into its own dissolution, and emerges, hopefully, a *free spirit*. The students of the 1950's, during which confidence in these courses peaked, were bred to be relativists. One element, perhaps, in the increasing distaste for these courses was the desire on their teachers' part to combat this easy relativism by furnishing some bits of truth. After all, they did not want the historical truths which gave rise to these relativisms to be swept away by the relativisms they gave rise to. We now begin dimly to discern as the co-ordinates of these tensions, the two relations in which historical language stands to historical reality. We can render its presence more distinct by another consideration.

Think of those figures whose thought not only is the source of modern relativisms, but which enters into the fabric of modern life and must accordingly be studied in those courses which reflect this thought in their very structure: their thought *is* (part of) the structure and substance of these studies. I refer, of course, to people like Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, or Freud: those deep but easily sloganized intelligences. How different, indeed, their thought often is from the sloganized shadows they cast across the present. Anyone who has studied closely the conceptual struggles Marx had with the concept of class or Freud with the concept of sex or Nietzsche with the concept of power, will appreciate the immense distances between what they actually said or believed they were saying, and what men smaller and sillier than they believed them to have said. And one may generalize upon this decay: the historically real x must deviate in some, perhaps in some very considerable measure from the historically apparent x. Now among the teachers of those courses were those whose professional lives consisted in scrupulous specialized study of the thought of Marx, Freud, Hegel, Nietzsche, and the like. How, consonantly with the obligations which define not only scholarship but pedagogic responsibility can these serious individuals do anything less than set straight the record and transmit, as they see it, the *truth* about Freud, Nietzsche, etc.? But the truth takes time to tell, especially when the correspondent realities are such complex architectures of thought and perspectivity. And on each topic to be covered—and there are so many and time is so

short!—there is a special truth to tell. The constraints entailed by the *Beruf der Wissenschaft* atomize history into an archipelago of islands of truth, each one fascinating and capable of indefinite exploration: *whole lifetimes* would be too short to explore fully some of the major islands in the chain!

The difficulty with this altogether commendable attitude is that it, in fact, is the Nietzsche (Freud, Marx, etc.) men have believed to have said what better information reveals them not really to have said, or to have said with such qualification as to be altogether different from the view their global reputation rests upon, who have exercised the real influence upon contemporary civilization. The real Nietzsche, perhaps, had no influence at all: or influenced those whose names are writ in water. It is, to borrow Sartre's impressive distinction, Nietzsche *pour autrui* who is part of our history. Nietzsche *en soi* is just a part, if indeed an interesting part, of the past. But it is Nietzsche *pour autrui* which vanishes when the past is seen as so many specialized islets of truth. So just to the degree that we resolve to be true to Nietzsche *en soi* are we going to be false to him *pour autrui*, and hence false to contemporary civilization, which is after all a composte of *beliefs* about the past, whether true or false. And the point is perfectly general, after all: it is not what the Commune was, but what it has come to mean to radical and conservative alike which determines the political complexion of the present. And what we lose in treating historical reality from the viewpoint of scholarship—of history-as-science—are the forces which relate events to other events, these being imposed through the beliefs and attitudes of later men. It is these beliefs and attitudes which make us what we are, so far as we are part of historical reality. And nothing else can be expected when historical reality is composed in relevant part of the *representations* of historical reality on the part of men who live their lives in terms of these. Only in the special case are these representations necessarily correct, when the *pour autrui* of the past coincides with the past *en soi*. As we saw, indeed, in connection with historical sentences, an historical belief can stand as such though false.

This holds for all ages which have had a sense of history at all.

Whole eras, after all, go under to be replaced by new ones when one set of representations of the past surrender before another. Consider, for example, the Middle Ages from the perspective of the Enlightenment and from the subsequent perspective of Romanticism: the *pour-autrui* of the Middle Ages was exactly a function of the differences between the Enlightenment and Romanticism. But to point out, as good scholars repelled by falsehood, how off the mark these periods have been relative to the *en soi* of medieval times, is in a way to forfeit a proper understanding of the Enlightenment and Romanticism *from within:* for these ages were in part constituted by their reading of the past to be "the Enlightenment-reading-of-the-past." If anything, it would have been believed the true reading of the past as it actually was. It would be largely taken by those who held it to have been, in fact, history-as-science. And indeed, we treat them as historians-as-scientists when we raise the question of the truth or falsity of their representations. We can, and as scientists and scholars we ought, to reject the false beliefs, the myths and superstitions of ages past. From the point of view of truth-and-falsity, we are all contemporaries. But their representations enjoy another life, whether true or false, in the respect that they are part of what those who held them were, and hence are part of historical reality. But of course, to treat representations as part of reality is not to be interested any longer in questions of truth and falsity. Representations, historical or any other kind, are within and without reality at once. And with the periods of the past, we can in a way accept this with equanimity. But it is not less the case with *our* representations than with any. Except that, with these, we feel a certain tension if we are scholars; we want to purge from our representations those which are false or inaccurate, and replace them with true and accurate ones. But it is the false or dim ones which, unfortunately, define our period from within, which form part of our reality. So in a way, we cannot change our representation without changing our reality at the same time. Speaking dramatically, to change our beliefs about history is in whatever small a degree a revolution of historical reality. So the scholars who were discontent with false-

hood were transforming rather than recording the historical reality of the present, and so bore a set of responsibilities distinct from those which define mere scholarship. In setting forth to understand the past they, bit by bit, were changing the present. How disconcerting when our stance outside reality puts us immediately within reality. We find, once more, that paradoxicality which has infected historical language from the beginning! Well, before pursuing it any further here, let us attempt first to unravel certain of the problems in the history of philosophy which it was the announced aim of this essay to achieve. These are all due to the crossing of externality with internality, a hard thing to avoid in connection with representations. There will be time after that, and perhaps some basis, for drawing a moral for historians.

VI

A. *Relativism.* Logically there is no need that there be any historical reality which corresponds *en soi* to a given historical *pour autrui* in any given representation of the past. Suppose the Romans really accepted the account of their origins in the *Aeniad,* and believed themselves descended from noble Trojan refugees. Having an epic past is often a part of having a self-image of grandeur and esteem—often, but not always—and one may appreciate the subtle transvaluations of values which remove us from antiquity when one appreciates the importance of humble origins in *our* mythologies of success and self regard, and the suspiciousness which automatically attaches to those who inherited, who did not have to earn, what they possess. This would be a posture as mysterious to the Romans as Christianity. Now I have at the moment no idea of whether the recounted adventures of Aeneus have any historical weight at all; whether, in short, the book is more than fiction. But I am prepared to learn, from some archeologist inspired by Schliemannian visions, that to each Virgilian episode there is an objective correlate in historical reality—a correlate but no more. The historical Dido may have been a Carthaginian slut who rented rooms to the shrewd mercenary from Dalmatia. The point is that whether their beliefs were false or inflated or accurate and true,

we identify what the past was for the Romans by identifying their beliefs about the past. The past *for them* was what it was, whatever history-as-science may ultimately say about their representations.

There is a striking, famous argument of Russell's that the world, for all we can tell from the present, could have come abruptly into existence a bare five minutes ago. We would have exploded into existence with all the beliefs about the past we in fact hold, including our beliefs about the age of the world, but all of these would be as false as the latter. So, logically speaking, we could live in the perspective of a past which really had no substance. That they are false is after all an external fact about these beliefs; their truth or falsity is not part of their content, so there would be no way of knowing from the beliefs themselves whether they were true or false. And since the existence of the beliefs is consistent with either, the truncated historical expanse of the world playfully proposed by Russell indeed is a logical possibility. It is not, however, a belief we can hold *internally,* that our historical beliefs are false. For to have a belief is to believe the belief in question to be a true one. That is to say, though the believer may deduce from the concept of belief that his beliefs may all be false, he cannot pragmatically, in fact, believe regarding his beliefs that they *are* false: for the moment one believes them false, one does not really believe the things in question. Or if one has them, one does not really believe them false: one is telling oneself semantical tales. This pragmatic incapacity does not entail, of course, of any of our beliefs, that they are true, but only that *we,* since they are *our* beliefs, cannot regard their being false as other than an abstract possibility. In brief, the *past for us* must be regarded as the past *tout court* by us. To believe that Aeneus courted Dido, is not just to know what Virgil says about Dido and Aeneus; it is to hold what he said as true, correspondent to an episode of dalliance in history-as-reality.

The bearing of this on the position known as historical relativism is the following. It was the theory of relativists that history is just a set of pasts-for-x; as though the *en soi* of the past were its *pour autrui*. Questions of truth-or-falsity do not really arise for pasts-

for-*x*. Pasts-for-*x* are, after all, just parts of historical reality. The past-for-the-Romans was an objective feature of Roman life, as much so as Roman architecture and Roman sewage, and in just the way in which the past-for-us is part of contemporary American reality. But of course to describe the-past-for-us is not automatically to describe any further piece of historical reality, unless we believe the past-for-us to be, as indeed we do, a true representation of the past *en soi*. If all there were for historians to do were to report the past-for-them, they would simply be recording their beliefs about the past. And they could be right or wrong, accurate or inaccurate, in reporting what their beliefs were, without the question ever arising of whether these beliefs were true unless there were another dimension to the past than the past-for-us. If there were only the past-for-us, then indeed, assuming the sort of authority philosophers sometimes suppose they have in reporting what their beliefs are, each man would be, in the protagorian phrase of a noted American relativist, his own historian. The only errors he would be subject to would be faults of introspective scanning. But if we really believed that the past were only the past-for-us, we would *have* no past-for-us: for the past-for-us just consists in our beliefs about the past, and these beliefs like any must be held true by we who hold them. Relativism may then *be* true. But neither we nor any relativist who is also a scientific historian can believe it to be, not so long as either of us holds any beliefs about the past at all.

To hold an historical belief is to hold that there is (was) some bit of history-as-reality it describes, external to the belief in question. And this is so even though the beliefs themselves, in our case as in that of the Romans, compose a portion of historical reality. Historical beliefs are thus internal and external to historical reality, and it was the curious muddle of relativism to have denied the latter by having discovered the former. "Right you are if you think you are," which is the title of a play of Pirandello, condenses unfairly the relativist attitude, but I have been trying to emphasize that just when we think we are right only because we happen to think we are so, at that moment can we no longer think we are right.

There is, perhaps, a bit more to the matter than just this. The relativists also noted that it is possible, considered as part of historical reality, to explain *how* beliefs came to be held, as naturally perhaps, as one explains how certain cities were built. Forgetting that their descriptions of these beliefs were themselves either true or false, it seemed to them that as part of historical reality, matters of truth or falsity were as inappropriate to raise for beliefs as for sewage systems, as though historical beliefs were only some more historical reality. This brings us to our next confusion.

B. *Historicism*. Relativism is but one of a class of philosophical and para-philosophical movements in recent intellectual history which were generated by a naturalistic attitude toward language and toward thought, where the latter is appreciated in linguistic or at least in representationalistic terms. Departing from the incontrovertible insight that language is a natural phenomenon in the interesting and relevant respect that its representational properties are subject to causal explanation—the major insight of psycho-analytical theory is that the *content* of our thoughts require and receive explanations in terms of our sexual histories—naturalisms then go on either to overlook or deny the external relations between representations and reality in virtue of which we may speak of representations as true or false. At least shallow naturalisms do this. *Deep* naturalisms, to which a genuine philosophical interest is attached, attempt to give naturalistic accounts of such semantical notions as truth and falsity, in such terms as, for example, the pragmatically favored concepts of success and failure. Whether deep or shallow, in any case, whatever naturalisms say about language must automatically apply to the naturalisms themselves as special ways of *representing* language and reality. And here certain dilemmas begin to arise as symptoms of something having gone wrong.

There is a kind of stale game one can play. One asks if Naturalism is true. The Naturalist translates this out to mean: is this theory successful, does it *work*. One then repeats the question on a new level, viz., is it true that it works? The Naturalist then translates this into the question of whether the naturalistic theory of truth works. He says it does, or we say it doesn't. The question

is whether either of us is right, and whether our being so can again be put into the idiom of working or not working; and like a drawn chessgame, this discussion is an endless oscillation. When the continental philosopher says all language is metaphorical, *we* slyly ask if *that* is another bit of metaphor; and if he says yes, we say: then your claim is false, because if it is literally true, this contrasts with metaphoricity, and paradoxes open like bottomless abysses! *This* is the sort of dilemma I have in mind. For relativism the question arises as to whether *it* is relative. Historicism, which insists upon the fact that all theories are historical phenomena becomes by its own criterion just another historical phenomenon. The sociology of knowledge becomes itself just another social perspective, economic determinism itself economically determined and a reflection of the class locations of its sponsors, and so on. Each of these theories, and this is true of Naturalisms as a class, must fall under its own strictures if it is to be general and true.

Now insofar as a given naturalism does fall under its own strictures, it immediately inherits all those limitations it as a theory imposes upon those theories which fall under it. But if it fails to fall under its own strictures, it immediately loses generality, constituting in itself an exception to all the limitations it wants to say are inherent in theories as a class: each such theory holds itself in hostage. So whether each declares itself an exception to itself, the way Mannheim appears to have done with the sociology of knowledge, or else heroically applies to itself, by a scientific extension of the rule of law, whatever limitations it holds are true of theories as such, naturalisms collapse comically into logically limited statements.

The dumb oscillations and proto-paradoxes may be blocked, I believe, by distinguishing the respects in which theories are within reality from those respects in which they are outside it. And indeed, the questions which concern the explanation of theories as natural phenomena are altogether independent of those questions which concern the truth or falsity of theories; and this is perfectly general for representations of every sort. Historicism, as indeed all these theories, provides us with remarkable insights into the

provenance of human representations. And we may retain these insights even if the theory which provides them *itself* has causal origins and a definite historical location.

History-as-science, indeed, requires that its representations of history be *in* history in this sense, and that they have causes. It does so largely because it pretends to offer us knowledge of the past. Now it is plain that something more is required than that a representation should be *true* in order for the latter to be considered knowledge. It is not knowledge unless an explanation is available as to how it comes to be the case that we *have* a given representation of reality, and if it should prove to be the case that our having a given representation has nothing to do with what makes the representation true, it is wrong to describe us as having knowledge. Indeed, to believe myself in the possession of knowledge is to believe, in effect, that whatever it is, *of* which it is knowledge enters into the explanation of my possession of it. We may see this simply in the case of perceptual knowledge. If I believe on the basis of perceiving rain that it *is* raining, it would be natural to explain my having this belief with reference to whatever it is that makes my belief a true one, in this case the rainfall itself. As we move to more complicated cases, the chains of evidence may be longer and more tenuous, but the two connections between representation and the world are required if the former is to be considered knowledge of the latter: the representation must be ultimately explained by whatever it is of which it is true. So it is knowledge only to the degree that it is within the world under one connection and without the world under the other.

The application of these necessarily schematic remarks to history is plain. If an historian believes that Louis XVI's attempted escape to Varrenne was a failure, he presumably holds this is a reasoned belief, and so has evidence he believes could not be explained unless the belief itself were a true one, and hence that whatever makes the belief a true one—in this case an event consisting in the apprehension of a royal, fleeing family at Varrenne on June 22, 1791, doomed by revolutionary forces—itself enters into the explanation of his believing it. Our evidence for the past

are so many bits of the present whose character and existence are directly related to those parts of the past which make our statements, based on this evidence, true. Or at least this is what we are required to believe insofar as we engage at all in the practices of history-as-science. Hence we are required, as it were, to believe that historical beliefs are within history if they are without it. Whether or not this higher order belief, which amounts to the belief that our lower order beliefs amount to *knowledge*, is itself a true one, is a matter for technical epistemology to determine.

Now what relativisms, historicisms, and like doxastic determinisms mean to insist upon is that there are further causal factors which color and limit our beliefs about the past or about whatever, and that these are perhaps inexpungible. It is, however, wholly consistent with our beliefs constituting genuine knowledge that they should be colored and limited in these ways, and moreover it is possible that historical statements *about* these beliefs should be colored and limited by the circumstances, historical and other, of those who make them without this disqualifying these statements as knowledge. Even science has a history, and all manner of adventitious circumstances enter into the explanation of why one concept rather than another should be used at a given historical period. But on the other hand, we are faced with a certain set of quite special problems, as always, when the representations we offer as true are themselves about the representations of others: when the beliefs of others are what *our* beliefs are about. This brings me to my next set of puzzles.

C. *Verstehen*. At one point we identified a class of sentences which, though descriptively applied to objects which are present relative to the time of their assertion, nevertheless presuppose as true some sentence about the past. So if the historical condition entailed by the meaning rules for such sentences fails, then the sentence in question is false. We can imagine, thus, two indiscernible objects relative to properties presently observable: two vases, say, which correspond molecule for molecule. Indeed, let one of them be a molecular copy of the other, ingeniously produced by an object-simulator capable of exact reproduction at any chosen level of fine-

grainedness. To the right, then, is a priceless Ming bowl, to the left its porcelain counterpart, like it in all manifest respects. Nevertheless, the latter is not a Ming bowl if "Ming" carries the implications of authenticity and provenance. "Ming bowl" applied to the righthand object, is a true, and to the left hand object a false, description, though the objects are in perfect molecular isomorphism. Parity of structures, which is a symmetrical relationship of course, undetermines the critical distinction between "fine Ming bowl" and "replication of fine Ming bowl." What is interesting about the example is that the world might contain objects indiscernible from all now properly called Ming artifacts and *no* real Ming artifacts, and no one could tell by exhaustive examination of these objects that this were so. And indeed, the possibility may be generalized to cover all entities whatever: chateaux, vintage wines, dowagers, anything which might otherwise be described by historical sentences as I have characterized them. In fact, we can imagine as the extreme possibility the entire world consisting of objects, exactly like the objects it in fact is believed to consist in, but such that almost every historical sentence is false. This would be a world in which things had causal histories wildly different from what we believe them to have had. Or no causal histories at all if the world, as Russell proposed in that celebrated conjecture, were to have come abruptly into existence a brute five minutes ago. Nobody could tell the difference.

Of course it would make a difference to us. We lose a certain interest in an object if, though in every possible respect it is like a Ming bowl, it happens not to be one, but "only" a reproduction. A woman exactly like my wife, say a woman read off my wife by a flawless molecule matcher, would still only be a curious sort of doll, and in any case would not be my *wife*: I married one of them and not the other, even though there is no palpable difference between the two. Counting objects the same if they satisfy the same descriptions, the world might be made up of all the same objects under non-historical descriptions, but different objects under historical descriptions, though none of *these* differences could strike even the educated eye. For my purposes, however, it is only nec-

essary to note the degree to which our beliefs about the past penetrate the language we use even to describe objects contemporary with those descriptions, the "present world" so called. Russell's conjecture is incompatible with any ordinary historical statement applied to the present world, so if we believed for a mad instant that his conjecture were true, all historical statements would go false and whole sectors of language would be put out of play. And in that event objects, however otherwise unaltered, would lose for us all the interest they have on the basis of the customary historical beliefs. And this is so whether the beliefs are true or false.

Consider in this respect certain stones on the Aventine, which once were makeweights for the public scales in an ancient Roman market place. As such they were part of the complex of commercial life in Rome, saturated with *Zuhandenheit*: things merchants would lay hands on when parcelling out foodstuffs to housewives. As the empire waned and Christianity rose, churches often and naturally rose up where marketplaces had been, and those very stones, having long since lost their *Zuhandenheit* but felt, perhaps to have *some* reason for existence, found their way into odd corners of the churches, as at Santa Susanna. They did not thus become *mere* stones, and their proximity to churches suggested to the naively susceptible mind of the time a meaning: they were there as some sort of sacred object—relics, perhaps. In time they were believed to have figured in the lapidation of saints! Those stones are there today, their function in the present being due to their bearing historical meanings which mere specimens for the petrologist blankly lack. What I mean to stress is that the self-identical stones have come under different and non-overlapping descriptions for differing sets of people who, though they shared these stones, lived in *different worlds*. Employing the same logical licence which permits us to ponder Russell's conjecture, we might suppose two worlds in which the objects under all but historical descriptions were indiscriminable, but in which all the historical beliefs of those who lived amongst these objects differ. In fact this would require that they have different sets of causal beliefs as well, since a large and important subset of historical statements are those in which a causal

presupposition holds: as a certain depression is correctly described as a footprint only on the assumption that it was *caused by* a footstep. Not all historical beliefs are so innocuous as those which focus on religious relics, and our survival often depends upon our having the right, or at least not the wrong causal beliefs. But our concerns are logical rather than practical, and this enables us to suppose a difference in worlds as one which does not so much require a difference in objects but in the beliefs about these objects. It is in this sense that we live in a different world from they who believed a given set of stones were created by the Gods of Measures and Balances, and in a different world again from those who believe their presence to be due to their erstwhile martyrizing impact on early Christians. To enter another world, as I am now using this expression, would be to see the same objects under different descriptions and against the background of differing sets of historical and causal beliefs. It is here that the much criticized concept of *Verstehen* becomes suddenly apt.

The central idea of *Verstehen* is one which hardly will be contested save by the most unreconstructed behaviorist. It is that some reference to the *beliefs* of agents is required in the explanation, hence the understanding of their actions. This is perhaps dramatized in those cases in which the behavior in question strikes us as wayward. It would impress a Roman merchant as insane were he to perceive a man actually worshipping what he casually weighs potatoes against, as it would impress a medieval Christian from the Aventine as sacrilegious to see a *saintly object* thrown crassly onto the weighing pan by the merchant—like starting a fire with a piece of the true cross! We defeat the predication of insanity in the one case and of blasphemy in the other by reference to differing and in this instance non-overlapping beliefs, though to be sure, there always is the possibility that the petrolator is a weird sort of fetishist and the merchant is showing contempt for superstition, these being descriptions of actions which again require reference to the precise content of these personages' beliefs. But deviant behavior, as I say, only dramatizes what always is the case: namely, that it is with reference to their beliefs that we in part understand and

explain differences or similarities in behavior by human agents generally. It is with reference to their beliefs that their *worlds* differ, even when their world contains, under some suitably neutral description like "stone," the same or even all the same objects. To be sure, it is less the postulation of explicative beliefs in the understanding of behavior which identifies *Verstehen* than what has been taken as their peculiar view of how one discovers what the beliefs are—namely by dint of an act of empathic intuition: a literal, vicarious occupation, as it were, of the interior of Other Minds. This has been criticized as pernicious or gratuitous or impossible, but there are philosophical rather than merely methodological problems which arise in connection with it which our distinctions help us, I believe, to appreciate.

There is a certain asymmetry between the way in which we attempt to explain the actions of others, and the way in which we attempt to explain our own. With others we indeed invoke their beliefs as a means to the rationalization of their conduct. In our own case we make reference instead to the *world*. The Roman merchant understands the otherwise weird behavior of the Christian by seeing that if he *indeed* believes the make-weight to be a sacred object, then, though the belief itself is *false*, the behavior in question makes sense in the light of it, reasoning here being largely abductive. In his own case, however, his behavior is to be explained, not with reference to his beliefs but with reference to *what the stones in fact are*: plain and simple makeweights. For our beliefs are in a curious way, perfectly transparent, in the sense that it is the world rather than our beliefs about it that we think of when others think of our beliefs. It is this that is epitomized in the philosophical commonplace that to believe that *s* is to believe that *s* is true. Indeed, when our beliefs become opaque to ourselves, it is virtually as though they were our beliefs no longer; it is virtually as though we stand to ourselves in the relation in which we stand to another. So to occupy, as it were, the interior of another would, by dint of this transparency, not be to have the interior of another as something of which we would be conscious or aware: what we instead would be aware of would be the world as

the Other lives it. And we would, in case we achieved the required identification, no longer see it as the world of the other but as the world *tout court*: it would be our world, and the beliefs we sought to empathize with would be our beliefs. But for just the reasons laid down, when they are *our* beliefs. they are not revealed to us as beliefs at all. To put it with a certain dash of paradox, we do not occupy our *own* interiors. We live, rather, naively in the world. So were *Verstehen* to succeed, it would fail, for instead of exchanging, as it were, one psyche for another, one would instead exchange one world for another. And the problem of understanding the Other would remain.

We can put this another way. The beliefs of others are part of the reality we have to deal with when we explain their conduct in the world. We can speak of *their* world meaning only their beliefs about the world. We cannot in the same sense speak of "our world." For us, our world is: *the world*. The reason for the distinction is plain. Their world is defined by their beliefs. And to stigmatize them as *theirs* is ipso facto to refuse to endorse them: hence to regard them as false. Our beliefs, because we regard them as true, are not thought of as *our* beliefs. And any attempt to refer to our beliefs is immediately transmitted—to not *our* but—to *the world*. What is curious is that in our own case, the distance between ourselves and the world which the concept of truth requires is automatically closed in our own perception of our situation, because we do not think of the representation of the world, to which truth properly attached, but to *what* is represented, namely the world. In our own case we think of ourselves as within the world when in fact we are external to it, namely in the respect that we believe our representations true.

It is possible for men to live, as witness the merchant and the monk, in quite different worlds or to live differently in the same world. It is the mark of a world that it can be lived, and from this somewhat vitalistic criterion, one world is as valid as another. This is the Principle of the Relativity of Worlds. One thinks of worlds as doxastic environments in which, by mechanisms analogous to those of evolution, men have learned to survive. But we

do not take this Darwinistic view of our own doxastic atmosphere. It indeed is one we can live. But it is also true. We are by means of it within and without the world at once.

By this criterion, too, "our past" is just: the past. We speak of "the past for them" not in the sense of their having different and special histories, but rather in the sense that their beliefs about the past are their own. There is no "past for us" but just the past, and to see ourselves as having a past is just to take the posture of history-as-science. *Verstehen* is, after all, understanding, not knowledge. Knowledge entails the truth of what is known, whereas understanding entails nothing so far as concerns truth or falsity of what is understood. Understanding, however it is achieved, gives us entry into the world of another in the sense that it opens up the beliefs of others when these define that world. But to understand the world of another is not to understand the world, unless those beliefs are also *our* beliefs, at which point they become transparent. Among the things in the world are the ways in which others live it. And abstractly, our own form of life is also in the world that way. But because it *is* our world, we spontaneously hold it true. And this is what the Principle of the Relativity of Worlds overlooks.

VII

In the *Analytical Philosophy of History,* I argued that the definitive description of the past is not to be given, not because there are and always will be lacunae in our evidence—which is banal and contingent—but because earlier events will continue to receive differing descriptions through the relations in which they stand to events later in time than themselves. In effect, so far as the future is open, the past is so as well; and insofar as we cannot tell what events will someday be seen as connected with the past, the past is always going to be differently described. In this paper, a connected point has been aimed at, this time concerning the present. For since so many descriptions of present objects and current happenings presuppose, sometimes as part of their meaning, sometimes through what are taken to be sound causal theories, other

descriptions of the past, if the latter are doubtful in any way, so are the former. There are no doubt descriptions of the present which are compatible with *any* account of the past whatever: descriptions in an historically or temporally neutral idiom. But for the rest, I think, it may be said that to the degree that our past is in doubt, our present—the way we live in the world—is no less in question. And indeed, our very actions inherit these margins of incertitude, for what we do can only have the meanings we suppose it to have if it is located in a history we believe *real*. If our beliefs in that history are shattered, our actions lose their point and, in dramatic cases, our lives their purpose. The present is cleared of indeterminacy only when history has had its say; but then, as we have seen, history never completely has its say. So life is open to constant re-interpretation and assessment.

It nevertheless remains the ideal of history-as-science to eradicate the discrepancies between historical reality and history-for-us. To the degree that it succeeds, we live no differently in history than we do outside history: we live in the light of historical truth. It is, of course, not altogether plain that truth is to be preferred to illusion, nor certain that it will make us free. It is only that we have no choice in the matter once we achieve historical consciousness, for we cannot will falsehood or inconsistency. Obviously, we will live differently in the present as our beliefs about the past are modified, e.g., to take a current issue, whether ours is a past of conflict or consensus. It may not be a better or more felicitous present, but it is not as though we have a choice. For when the past is in doubt, a question mark blurs the present, and, since we cannot will falsehood, our lives persist unclearly until history-as-science has had its say. The present is clear just when the relevant past is known.

XV

NARRATION AND KNOWLEDGE

If Rawdon Crawley had been then and there present, instead of being at the club nervously drinking claret, the pair might have gone down on their knees before the old spinster, avowed all, and have been forgiven in a twinkling. But that good chance was denied to the young couple, doubtless in order that this story might be written. . . .

William Makepeace Thackeray, *Vanity Fair*, chap. 16

This article seeks to identify certain structures which define, as it were, part of the phenomenology of historical consciousness and hence of historical existence, understood as existing in the consciousness that one is in history. Consciousness so structured contrasts of course with the sort of animal consciousness under which, in Nietzsche's phrase, one "exists blindly between the walls of past and future." That to which such consciousness is blind is, precisely, those walls. Hence it is blind to the fact that the present is present, and hence to the fact that one's consciousness exemplifies animal consciousness. But more than this contrast is required to cast historical consciousness into relief, for all that animal consciousness contrasts with is a consciousness of temporality; and the *historical* present is more than a moment one is conscious of as simultaneous with one's consciousness of it. To recognize the present as historical is to perceive both it and one's consciousness of it as something the meaning of which will only be given in the future, and in historical retrospection. For it is recognized as having the structure of what will be a past historical moment, namely as one the meaning of which is available to historians, but not necessarily to those to whom it was present, that meaning having been concealed from them for whatever reason it is that the future is hidden. But their future is part of the historian's past and historical consciousness is a matter of structuring our present in terms of our future and their past. There is an entire vocabulary, the

language of narrative as we might call it, the rules of whose meaning presupposes internalization of this structure—a structure to which even those with a temporal consciousness may be blind if they are like those happy women described by George Eliot as lacking, like happy nations, a past. To exist historically is to perceive the events one lives through as part of a story later to be told.

There is an analogy between the acquisition of historical consciousness and the acquisition of that structure of perception Sartre speaks of in analyzing the dawning of consciousness of others for whom one exists as an object. For the knowledge that there are other consciousnesses transforms the way a person structures the world, inasmuch as there is a difference to be marked between this and the simple consciousness that there are differences between the objects of consciousness and one's self. Indeed, Sartre argues that one has no true conception of oneself as a self until one has the concept of other selves, for when that comes one abruptly perceives oneself as having, so to speak, an inside and an outside. The analogy is not casually drawn, because historical consciousness too sees events as having an inside and an outside, and marks a difference between the consciousness of living through events, and a consciousness of those events as seen from the outside, by historians for whom they are to be located in narrative structures. There is, in brief, an analogy between other minds and other times which is richer than the analogy between knowing about the past and knowing about external objects. But it would take me far afield to do more for now than to point the analogy out. Let me therefore address myself to historical knowledge as such, as a way of bringing to logical awareness some special features of the language of narrative.

I

Historians may be minimally characterized as seeking to make, and successful when they establish as true, statements about the past; and historical knowledge, on this minimal view, is had when one knows that *s*, and *s* is about the past. Perhaps "*s* is about the past"

may be taken to mean just that *s* is in the past tense, and that whatever satisfies the truth-conditions of *s* is earlier in time than *s*'s assertion. It is philosophically attractive to suppose that this relationship between the time of assertion and the time of satisfaction is the sole information conveyed by the tense, for this allows an analysis of a sentence taken as exemplifying a piece of historical knowledge roughly as follows: there is a tenseless content, viz., "Marivaux presents *Arlequin poli par l'amour* on October 17, 1722," and then an indication that the event so characterized is earlier in time than the sentence which so characterizes it, tense itself marking only the temporal relation between whatever it is which satisfies the tenseless portion of the historical statement, and the making of the statement itself. Then, this analysis continues, the other grammatical tenses merely mark the other temporal relationships in which we may stand to the identical event. The detensed *content*-sentence may be said to express *what the historian knows* when the sentence expresses historical knowledge, and its being *historical* is but a matter of the right temporal relationship between what he knows and the time at which he knows it. Nothing then marks the difference, once we subtract for time, between what the historian knows and what someone else in a different temporal relationship to the event in question knows. Thus Luigi Ricoboni knew, on October 23, 1722, that Marivaux was presenting *Arlequin poli par l'amour*. But his was not historical knowledge at all. A parallel analysis could be given of grammatical persons, I should think. Suppose there is a time at which Marivaux knows that Ricoboni is looking for a good French playwright. Then he knows about Ricoboni what Ricoboni knows about himself—*what* they know is the same in both cases—but the personal pronouns each uses indicates the different relationships in which either stands to the identical facts which satisfy the depersonalized content invariant to "He is looking for a good French playwright" and "I am looking for a good French playwright." Then pronouns, on this analysis, no more penetrate the content of what is known than tenses penetrate it on the analysis of temporal language just sketched, since tenses, like pronouns, are mere modes of reference.

True, the referential factors thus extruded from the content of such sentences may make a difference, indeed a stupendous difference, so far as cognitive access to this allegedly invariant content may be concerned. Thus Ricoboni knew (let us say with the vulgar) by direct introspection what Marivaux (to protract the familiar thesis) could make out only by evidence and inference and *come* to know. And similarly, Marivaux was not required to consult the theatrical archives to know, on October 17, 1722, that *Arlequin poli par l'amour* was receiving its initial presentation at the *Comédie Italienne*. The first-person pronoun and the present tense mark reputedly privileged positions, cognitively speaking, and though the content known is invariant, the contrast between privileged and nonprivileged positions with respect to it may even, on verificationist criteria, determine differences in the meaning of the content sentence *cum* tense, or *cum* pronoun. That there is a difference in meaning, whether it is to be explained on verificationist terms or not, will readily be allowed. In fact I distrust the verificationist intuition here: St. Augustine tells us that he smiled when an infant and stole pears when a youth. But he remembers the latter while his claim to know the former is a matter of analogical inference and reliance on the fond testimony of Monica. And this difference would require sentences in the past tense to be more ambiguous than grammar would suggest: so I shall suppose it sufficient to our purposes to explain tenses provisionally as modes of temporal reference, and in any case what matters for my analysis is only the suggestion that the sort of temporal information is supposed deleted from the content of knowledge, so that, once more, *what* is known is invariant to our temporal relationship to it.

It must have been some such distinction which Descartes would have cited in support of a famous condescending remark of his regarding historians. What credit does it do the latter if, by arduous archival industry they arrive at a cognition concerning, say, what happened in the last year of the Roman Republic, if these would be facts available as a matter of course to Cicero's servant girl?[1] All that distinguishes the scholar from her lies in the techniques that he but not she must acquire in order to overcome ob-

stacles he but not she faces in arriving at a piece of knowledge which is the same in either instance. A similar snobbism raises a similar question for the anthropologist who has to arrive through special techniques at knowledge which Hottentots have as a matter of course, simply in consequence of the privilege of growing up as Hottentots. But my concern is with history, and the issue Descartes forces is whether in fact historians, in knowing about the past, come to know at most and at best what would be known by non-historians who happened to be in position to witness the events in question? Or is there something, knowledge of which is *uniquely* available to the historian and which cannot have been observed by witnesses? And if there is, might there not then be some cognitive content available to him but not to contemporaries to the events in question, so that the cognitive privileges, as it were, are distributed differently than the commonplace epistemology allows?

I wish to claim that the historian knows things about the very events the servant girl knew about but that she could not have known what the historian knows because she stood in the wrong temporal relationship to those events to have been enabled to know. The historian, for example, knows that these events were taking place in the *last years* of the Roman Republic, and that these *were* the *last* years could be known, if knowledge implies truth, only when the Republic had come to an end. This would be knowledge of those events as redescribed with reference to events in the serving girl's future, but in the historian's past. There are doubtless descriptions of those events under which it would be true to say that the historian and the servant girl know the same thing. And no doubt it was because he spontaneously supposed that this was the case with all descriptions of those or any events that Descartes made his jibe. But there are, I believe, crucial descriptions which lack this easy symmetry, and these are descriptions which have, as truth-conditions, and hence as part of their meaning, events which occur later than the events primarily referred to. Thus in accepting Queen Christina's invitation, Descartes was setting forth to meet his death. This is a redescription of an event which was presumably hidden from the man of whom it is true, and it may be argued that it was

not true of that man at that time, but became true only when the last truth-condition was met, some time after the acceptance. In *Analytical Philosophy of History*, I designate those sentences which employ such descriptions *narrative* sentences. It is distinctive of them that the content of the knowledge they express contains temporal information which cannot be assimilated simply to the apparatus of tense. Accordingly the analysis of narrative sentences into a content always in principle available, together with a tense, will not serve. To be sure, if H is a narrative description of an event *e*, there will always be some predicate true of *e*, call it G, under which *e* can be observed by its contemporaries. So "*e* is H" may be thought analyzable into "*e* is G" plus some tense. In fact, however, if we subtract "*e* was G" from "*e* was H" there will be a residue which cannot be so analyzed, and this residual information belongs to the language of historical consciousness, and constitutes the idiom in which narratives, historical narratives included, are framed. It is also an idiom which yields descriptions of events for which the historical mode of cognition is the only mode. Of course it may have made no impact upon Descartes that there after all is this mode of cognition, a prejudice upon which was based a famous critique of Cartesianism by Vico. But my concerns, being logical, have less to do with what makes this mode of description humanly important, than what are the conceptual differences between it and the mode of description congenial to the Cartesian mentality.

II

It is by no means exclusively through narrative sentences that we describe events and objects with reference to other events and objects which stand in various temporal relationships to them. There are in fact any number of predicates in the language which are true of a given object only on the presupposition that it has a certain causal history. Hence such a predicate is true of such an object only if a certain earlier event occurred. Something is truly a scar, for instance, only if caused by a wound; a document only if caused by the events it records; a relic only if once part of a saint

or martyr; a Rembrandt only if painted in fact by Rembrandt, etc.—and each of these predicates is false of these respective objects if the historical presupposition is false. Thus the dictionary encapsulates a kind of encyclopedia, in that it is part of the very meaning of certain terms in it that certain explanations are true; and we internalize a body of causal laws as we acquire our language. Now of course it is always possible that objects may exactly resemble a scar, a document, a relic, or a Rembrandt—or for the matter a ruin—and nevertheless not be one, just because the causal assumptions are false. Nor can there be any set of monadic predicates true of objects and which entail that the object *must* have the required causal history—if only because any term entailing a causal ascription is relational, and no relational predicate can be monadically defined. It is this which opens space up for the radical causal skepticism dramatized in Russell's celebrated proposal that, for all that one can tell from the most minute examination of the present world, it might be but five minutes old. Such a world, exactly congruent, observationally, with our own, would contain thus objects indiscernible from counterparts in ours, yet in fact contain no ruins, relics, documents, etc.—contain not even names of individuals believed older than five minutes on Kripke's causal theory of names—and indeed, for all that observations under monadic predicates may reveal, that world might be our very world.

How deeply the causal encyclopedia penetrates our vocabulary is difficult to say: whether it is analytical to something's being bread that it have been baked; to something's being a child that it have been born; to something's being a tree that it have grown from a seed. That it penetrates it to a considerable distance, however, is shown by the fact that if Russell's conjecture were instead true, a lot of our language would go instantly false. Any predicate of which this is the case I shall designate a *past-referring predicate*. In addition to these, there are a number of *future-referring predicates*, but it will be important to mark out two classes of these.

There are, to begin with, certain predicates which apply to present objects and events on the assumption that, because of them, certain future objects will exist or certain future events occur. Indeed, many

things are described as they are described only because it is believed, and often on very reasonable grounds, that they themselves will stand in certain causal relations with what is to come. Someone may be said, for instance, to have terminal cancer, which means that it will inevitably cause his death. Nevertheless, this description is not retroactively false when the man is killed in an automobile accident or takes his own life. Nor is it false that I made a promise even if, in fact, I do not perform the action my having made the promise would explain were I to have performed it because I made the promise. Nor is it false that those were rose-seeds I planted if, in fact, the heavens break and the earth is flooded forty days and nothing now grows in the ground. The world will still contain promises, rose-seeds, and terminally ill persons even if it were to end five minutes *from* now, to rotate Russell's proposal in the direction of the future. It is just because the future in fact is taken as uncertain and even unknowable that it is difficult to generate an interesting skepticism about the future. I mean that all the laws may break down in such a way that the future proves radically different from the present. But unlike the claim that the laws already have broken down and the present is radically different from the past, this theory leaves our language quite intact: we still can describe the present with respect ot the future, though a very different future, or for the matter no future at all, should take place.

Now this enables me to identify the other class of future-referring predicates, namely those which, though applied to present objects, do so only on the assumption that a future event occurs, and which will be retrospectively *false* of those objects if the future required by the meaning-rules of these predicates fails to materialize. She will still have been my fiancée though she marry someone else, but it will be false that she was my future wife if we do not marry. I may refer to my favorite candidate as our next president, and though she may indeed be that, it will have been false that she was that if she in fact fails to win the election. I shall call such predicates, which are true of objects and events at a given time only if certain objects and events occur at a time future to

them and failing which they are retrospectively false, *narrative predicates*. When we apply them to present objects, we are making a *special* claim on the future, different indeed from that made by the use of non-narrative future-referring predicates. Narrative predicates can be retroactively applied to things and events by historians, simply because historians know and contemporaries to those things and events do not know, that the required last truth-conditions for them are met. With the other future-referring predicates, no difference between historical and nonhistorical language is available—not unless we *augment* the descriptions in question with narrative predicates, and not only describe someone as terminally ill but ill with the disease which will kill him; not only as having made a promise, but having made the promise he will keep; not only as having planted rose-seeds, but as having planted the roses which will make him famous, and so on. To imagine a language is to imagine a form of life, Wittgenstein has told us. We can imagine a form of life subtended by a language in which future-referring but not narrative predicates occur. In that form of life people have a temporal sense, certainly, and can make predictions. They can perform inductions and have a natural science. But they will not have what I want to call a narrative sense, and it would be difficult to suppose there are storytellers among them. There cannot be because, in order that stories be told, things and events must be perceived and described only as they can be described historically, which is to say: from the perspective that events which are future to them but past to the historians, afford. The historian not only has knowledge they lack: it is knowledge they cannot have because the determinate parts of the future are logically concealed.

III

There are, of course, many things an historian may know about a past time which those living at that time did not in fact know, but such ignorances are not distinctively historical because the information then lacking could have been had, since all the facts were in place, so to speak, and the formulation of what the historian

knows does not involve what would have been narrative predicates had individuals at the time possessed it. "It is hard for us to remember," writes the medievalist R. W. Southern, "how little the men of the tenth century knew of what was going on around them":

> If a man wanted to study mathematics or logic he might have to wait for a chance encounter which sent him to a distant corner of Europe to do so: and, in most cases, it is probable that the chance never came. We know of men with an ardent desire for a life of strict monastic observance, who wandered from one end of Europe to the other without apparently being able to find a community of sufficient austerity, though it would be easy now to name half a dozen famous places where all they sought was to be found.[1]

What is easy now would have been difficult then, but even so what the historian possesses is tenth-century knowledge. We may grant that a lot would have been different in the tenth century if this extra bit of tenth-century knowledge were possessed in the tenth century, and there is a measure of tragedy in the fact that it was lacking then.

Indeed tragedy—or comedy for the matter—is often generated by the fact that agents lack a piece of knowledge the *author* of a tragedy or a comedy will disclose to the audience, whose feelings are engaged by the realization that they know something the character does not know. It is this cognitive asymmetry which almost by itself renders the character helpless in their eyes, since the assumption is that the character would have acted differently had he or she known what we know, where what we know in fact was available then, without any claim on the character's future. We know, and Othello does not, that Iago is really an evil character. If Othello knew what we and Iago know, that the latter had stolen the fateful handkerchief, he could not, unless mad, interpret Desdemona's pleading on behalf of Cassio as he does. And if Desdemona knew what was Othello's state of mind at the time, she would realize that her pleading would be misread. What is tragic is the fact that terrible things happen which would have been avoided if persons in the action only knew what *could* have been known but

which *was* not. Spectators nevertheless do not have any special kind of knowledge relative to the action: as before, all the facts are in place, and the knowledge is available at the time.

Still, the audience does not know, any more than the characters do, how it is all going to come out: they do not unless, as it were, they are informed by the author who gives them knowledge they are not entitled to have, of something future to the events they are witnessing or reading about. As when the author of Beowulf tells us what will happen, perhaps because he believes the suspense would otherwise be intolerable: we know, as Grendel does not, that the mighty Beowulf is waiting for him in the meadhall. If he knew that he might have had second thoughts about seeking his "gluttonous meal." But the author tells something only he can know from a vantage point we are not strictly speaking entitled to since it presupposes a cognitive position from a point future to the action, that "It was not to be; he was no longer to feast on the flesh of mankind/after that night." *This* marks an ignorance which could not have been rectified at the time. We assume that if W. C. Fields knew what we know, that the figure he believes to be a woman to whom he is paying court under the bedsheets is in fact a goat, the knowledge would make a difference unless, contrary to the belief that renders the scene comic, he is some kind of sexual freak and does not care. Comedy and tragedy arise from the fact that we believe the relevant knowledge would make a difference to the characters' futures. But if Grendel knew what readers of Beowulf know at lines 734–36, it would make no difference to his future: for *his future is what he knows*. And his helplessness is not, as it were, due to ignorance, simply because his future would already be closed if he knew it. His would be a radical impotency, since nothing could be done. It is, then, not simply that by the time the knowledge is had it is too late to do anything about matters: if, per impossible, the knowledge were available earlier, nothing could have been done either. And to suppose the future could be known before it comes to be the present dislocates us entirely from our own history since there is nothing we could do to alter it. The future gets to be like the past is now supposed to be, something not even God can alter

and regarding which, in Aristotle's words, deliberation is pointless. The cognitive openness of the future is required if we are to believe that the shape of the future is in any way a matter of what we choose to do.

These are routine metaphysical assumptions which fall out, as it were, from our routine concepts about time, action, and knowledge. But there is another and, for me, a deeper point to be made. Not merely is it the case that what I have called historical knowledge—twentieth-century knowledge of the tenth century, say, which is not just tenth-century knowledge—is knowledge which was unavailable in principle in the tenth century. It is that narrative description would be false if the knowledge of the future were available at the time to which it is future. For, as I suggested in the case of Grendel, if he had that knowledge, it could not have made a difference: *whatever* he did, his death in the meadhall would occur, which then means that his death was destined, *whatever* he did. This immediately dissolves any connection between what he did and that death. The ties between present and future which license narrative redescription would be logically dissolved and each event becomes immediately independent of each other event. And the logical structure of the narrative becomes immediately invalid. We would have, instead, at best a recitation of events in the form of a chronicle of totally independent occurrences. And this, if true, means that the logical structure of the narrative entails that the knowledge of the future is logically ruled out at the time it is future. *The very structure of the narrative* entails the openness of the future, for only then can it in any way depend upon the present. Let us examine in the light of these strong claims, then, the differences between narrative and chronicle.

IV

It will be convenient to imagine a chronicle and a narrative (a "history proper") which are extensionally equivalent in the sense of mentioning all and only the same events. These we will for simplicity suppose a temporally ordered set ⟨*e*-1 . . . *e*-n⟩. That all and only the same events are referred to by chronicle C and

narrative N is useful because it then makes the difference turn on the mode in which these are referred to, rather than the references themselves. Beyond that, there is a temporal asymmetry to mark, chiefly that the chronicler is supposed to insert the entries into C roughly at the time of occurrence of the events referred to, to which he accordingly may be supposed (roughly) a contemporary. (This is not strictly necessary; one may chronicle past events. But in point of structure, chronicles pretend to no knowledge not really available to contemporaries of the events designated.) Thus if *d* is a description of *e*, *d* enters C at the same time or nearly the same time as *e* itself occurs. So the chronicle C is as it were a temporally ordered set of descriptions ⟨*d*-1 . . . *d*-n⟩ and such that whatever event *e*-i itself a member of the set ⟨*e*-1 . . . *e*-n⟩, which satisfies the truth-conditions of *d*-i, does so never later than the inscription of *d*-i in C. So if *d*-i describes *e*-i, and *e*-j occurs later than *e*-i, *d*-i cannot refer to *e*-j. No such restrictions hold for the narrator, save of course that the last reference in N takes place not earlier than the last event referred to. The narrator has then the option of describing events with reference to other events later than themselves, a privilege cognitively forbidden the chronicler. This makes a considerable difference in the language available to each. Thus in the narrative N, *e*-1 and *e*-n are respectively the beginning and the end—modes of description unavailable to the chronicler, if "beginning" presupposes an end, and "end" presupposes that nothing relevantly takes place afterwards, and these accordingly are descriptions which make claims on the future. The discrepancy in available vocabulary is more than this, however: the chronicler cannot make use of such terms as *climax*, *crisis*, *turning-point*; he cannot use language like *anticipates*; he cannot mention first and last things (the "winter's heaviest snowfall" is an allowable description only if it occurs on the last day of winter, a description which incidentally does not make a claim on the future.) A chronicle has the structure finally of a list, and though it is possible to find a degenerate set of descriptions which do make reference to events which occur later than a given event, viz., "*e*-i occurred before *e*-j" uttered after the occurrence of *e*-j—and hence still yields some-

thing little distinguishable from a list, we would want a narrative to make interreferential connections of the sort we find in *stories*.

And this brings us to questions of the inclusion of a description, which requires no more justification in the case of a chronicle than that the event happened. But more than this is needed in a narrative, namely that we include mention of an earlier event because we believe that the later event would not have happened as it did had the earlier event not happened as *it* did. The structure implied may be genuinely ramified, as we allow plots and subplots, but in the end, I think if we can show that *e*-j would have occurred whether *e*-i had occurred or not, then we insofar have no justification for referring to *e*-i. Rather, such a reference is a narrative irrelevance, a mention to which Wittgenstein's well-known characterization applies: a wheel that turns though nothing turns with it, is not part of the machine. So whatever is included in a narrative is a wheel, the turning of which we want to understand, or is there because it turns another wheel. Thus we read a narrative with the expectation that each thing mentioned is *going to be important*: which is an attitude conceptually ruled out when we believe ourselves to be reading a chronicle. (It is an attitude exploited by narrators who put in false clues and dead ends, to thwart the narrative imagination: probably the best place to study the structure of narrative is the mystery novel, where narration is a duel fought between writer and reader.) Briefly, then, though the same events may be referred to in a chronicle as in a narrative, these compose merely a temporally ordered set so far as chronicle description tells us, but a *history* so far as the narrative tells us, simply because each later event is in place because some earlier event is in place; and though I cannot here offer a good philosophical analysis of what this "because" amounts to, it gives us enough, I think, to make the argument I wanted. It is that if there is knowledge of the future, what is known is true, and nothing then can make it false. So, to revert to our example, if Grendel knows he is to die in the meadhall, nothing he now does can make any difference: for he will die whatever he now does. But that means that the fact that he is to die is in place, whatever earlier event is in place, and the explan-

atory connection between earlier and later events presupposed by the narrative structure is dissolved. The future is set, and nothing earlier can then make any difference. *Each* wheel turns without turning any other wheel, and a system of independently turning wheels is not a machine at all. In effect, if the future is knowable, in the sense that sentences in the future tense are known *now*, each event becomes independent of each event and we are back, in description, to the structure of the chronicle: a list of occurrences. Hence the structure of the narrative presupposes the openness of the future, cognitively speaking, and, if I may conclude this discussion with a speculation, fatalism is incompatible with determinism if we mean by "fatalism" *logical* determinism, namely, that if any sentence is ever true it is always true, so that it was true yesterday that I would be writing on logical determinism today.

This entails then the really interesting cognitive asymmetries which go with narrative structures, namely that the narrator has to know things his characters, who may be chroniclers to the same events, do not know: he knows how things came out. There is nothing superhuman about this knowledge, and it may seem as though since he possesses it at the end, it should be possible to possess it beforehand. But my claim is that if the knowledge of the narrator were made available to the characters, the structure of narration would be destroyed. The knowledge available to him is *logically outside* the order of events he describes.

V

I want now to spell out some of the philosophical consequences of having these two cognitive perspectives collide, the perspective of the agent and the perspective of the narrator who knows how to describe the former's action in the light of later events.

The reason an event is mentioned in a narrative is typically distinct from the reason the event happened: different, in brief, from its *historical* explanation. This is so obvious it would hardly bear mention were it not for the practice of some of the great philosophers of history to use the one sort of reason in place of the other, projecting onto the fabric of history the structures which belong

instead to its narrative representation, and taking as the deep reason for the occurrence of an event the reason for which it would be included in a final narrative in which its description has a place: in what Vico speaks of as an Ideal Eternal History. And this would be analogous to giving the reasons for which a painter includes a representation of a certain tree in a landscape he is painting as an explanation of why the *tree is out there* to begin with. Yet I am certain that something like this subtle transfer from representation to reality is what Hegel surreptitiously and no doubt unconsciously effected when he writes that "The sole thought which philosophy brings to the treatment of history is the simple concept of *Reason:* that Reason is the Law of the world and that therefore, in world history, things have come about rationally."[1] For the structure of history, as Hegel perceives it, is virtually the structure of a narrative text, as though what holds history together is what holds *an historical text* together: as though the criteria which justify inclusion of the description of an event in a text is what makes the occurrence of that event finally comprehensible.

Let us consider for a moment a rather typical narrative redescription. In 1722, the Italian Theater in Paris presented a play by Marivaux called *Arlequin poli par l'amour*. It was a very great success, but no one would have realized what is nevertheless true, that Marivaux with this charming if innocuous drama "in effect destroyed, or laid the foundation for destroying the very being" of *commedia del arte*.[2] The circumstances under which it was produced are roughly these: there was a demand in Paris for what the audience of the time believed was Italian comedy, a form of entertainment driven out of France under the late dour regime of Louis XIV. The regent, the Duc d'Orléans, summoned the remarkable company of Luigi Ricoboni back to Paris, but the comedy they saw was not quite what the Parisian audience thought it had been demanding, and soon the company was playing to empty houses. Ricoboni sought for French playwrights to provide a vehicle more to the new taste than anyone had realized was going to be necessary, and had the luck to find Marivaux, whose play clearly saved the company's fortunes, but with the consequences narra-

tively expressed above. What the French really wanted was Harlequin, and he became central in a suite of plays, the traditional personage of Pantalone, Graziane and the others meanwhile becoming vestigial. With their disappearance, the structures of improvisation, which was indeed the essence of this art, merely disappeared, giving way to pre-written dialogue. By 1729, when Ricoboni returned to Italy, the "handwriting was on the wall." The French mode was introduced into Italy, and in very short order the institutional complex in which audiences and actors were trained to expect certain things from one another was altered beyond restitution. The outward form of the comedy perdured for a time, but in a few years any effort to perform in the original manner became self-conscious archaism.

This was not something anyone at all intended. The responsible figures in the Regency merely wanted to revive a form of spectacle they had no way of knowing would be dated; Ricoboni wanted only to save his theater; Marivaux, presumably, to gain fame and fortune. In any case, the difference is clearly evident between those factors which enter into an explanation of this play's presentation, and the factors which explain its importance for the subsequent history of the theater. It is with reference to the latter that its inclusion in a narrative history of Italian theater is justified. My claim is that the philosophies of history I have in mind substitute the latter sort of explanation for the former, where its role in a narrative becomes the explanation of its occurrence. We may observe this, for instance, in Vico, for whom the explanation of events through the insidious force of Providence has precisely to do with their importance in the evolution of certain later events, this evolution being, in his philosophy, the "reason" for the former. True, had Marivaux intended the dissolution of Italian comedy, *that* might have been his reason for writing *Arlequin poli par l'amour*, in which case it would not have been the later event as such, but the intention of it by Marivaux, which enters into the explanation of his writing this particular play. But nothing remotely like this is implied by Vico's theory. This calls for comment.

Whatever may have been Marivaux's intentions, the truth of

the narrative sentence is established without reference to them: the action derives its relevant description from events subsequent to their occurrence, whether these were meant or not to happen by that agent. The sheer irrelevance of intentions to many narrative descriptions could abort any proposed skepticism based upon an alleged inscrutability of the intentions of past agents. But Vico really required reference to human intentions in his historical explanations, and so do all philosophies of history which pretend to interpret history as *irony*, where men not only make their history and in ways they never intended: but where what they bring about rather is *counter* to their intentions. Vico for one, and Hegel and Marx for others, suppose history globally to exhibit irony in this sense. Providence, on Vico's view, exploits the "designs of men" to create forms of social order which at once contravene these designs and which could only have arisen, given human nature, if men did not intend them. Thus "ferocity, arrogance, and ambition" are institutionally transformed into the virtues of "soldiers, merchants, and rulers," according to the *Scienza Nuova*, so that "of the three great vices which could certainly destroy mankind on the face of the earth, legislation makes civil happiness." Such reversals, which are legion in dialectical theories, though they necessarily make reference to the intentions of agents, cannot themselves coincide with the intentions which cause them. They cannot because a *dialectical* narrative sentence refers to events which are explained by intentions they also subvert: and no one can rationally intend the contrary of what he intends.

It would immediately follow from the truth of such philosophies of history that men could not know their futures, since it is necessary through the concept of intention itself that this future be hidden, contravening intentions it requires in order to happen as it does. Such theories presuppose attribution of rationality to agents: that they seek to maximize their utilities as they perceive them. But it is inconsistent with this that they should pursue what "providence" requires, this being precisely incompatible with the utilities so perceived. A stronger argument is needed to show that the future must be absolutely hidden: all this shows (at best) is that it

must be hidden from those who make it—it could be known perhaps to the philosopher of history himself, who, like the historian (unless a chronicler), must stand logically outside the narrative of the events he describes. But I have offered what I hope is the stronger argument, that knowledge of the future is incompatible with the very structures of narration, an incompatibility which is of course dissolved when the required knowledge is available, as it is to the historian, when the events it is knowledge of are in his past though in the future of those events he narratively redescribes in the light of it. Hence the philosophy of history, as an effort to perceive the narration of events in the light of a knowledge of the philosopher of history's own future, is an incoherent enterprise.

VI

I spoke earlier of a powerful literary device, the psychology of which it would be fascinating to speculate upon, where the author of a narrative discloses a piece of knowledge to a spectator or a reader which he also conceals from his characters. That knowledge is of course in principle available to the characters, and there would be little point in concealing it from them if it would make no difference to their conduct and feelings were they to possess it. The tragedy or comedy they live out is then often due to the cognitive darkness in which they are placed. Knowledge of the future, which of course is in the nature of the case concealed from them, *cannot* make any difference, if my argument is correct that knowledge entails truth, and what is true cannot then be altered. So its being true cannot depend upon any freedom available to them. Yet surely, it may be argued, there is a piece of knowledge one might think is available to them though it is of their future, namely the knowledge the writer has of the end to which he is driving them, and the question before us is why cannot Oedipus know in principle what Sophocles knows, viz., how it is all to come out? Something like this question arises in connection with the philosophy of history which exploits, as Vico's does, a concept of providence, where in effect the principle of narrative inclusion is also the principle of historical explanation, where things happen so that other later

things can happen, things men cannot intentionally bring about but which it would be to their advantage were they able to. This view of providential history animates, I think, the book of Genesis. At Genesis 45, Joseph explains to his brothers, "I am your brother Joseph whom you sold into Egypt. Now do not be distressed or take it amiss that you sold me into slavery here; it was God who sent me ahead of you to save men's lives." So the meaning of all the paternal grief—the pit and the ensanguined coat, the hem clutched by the wife of Potyphar (and who knows how far back to go?), the duping of Esau, the sacrifice of Isaac, the funding of the covenant, the alienation of Ishmael—is revealed at last: so that the men of Egypt should have what to eat in the lean years that no one could have known of. And so in general events have a significance, or some of them do, which it is the hope of the prophet to eke out, just as we match wits with the narrator whose tale we read seeking to identify which are going to be the portentous events. Now the *author* knows the future, which is not inconsistent with his writing a structured narrative: and is my claim that these cannot go coherently together consistent with the fact that men write novels?

The question, I think, exactly presupposes the collision between two cognitive modes of the sort I am seeking to identify. Strictly speaking, the author, though he may in the old-fashioned play or novel know his character's futures, those are not *his* futures, and it does not constitute truly knowledge which belongs in the timescale in which his characters live, to which he has, in fact, no real connection at all. I no more live in the same time as the time of the characters in a book than I exist in the same space as that of the figures in a painting: the rape of the Sabine women does not transpire in the space of the gallery, and I have no temporal connection with the death of Anna Karenina. That is the cognitive and metaphysical difference between historical and fictional narratives: the historian's statements are in history, and belong in the same temporal order as the events which make them true. And this is not the case with fiction, a fact we can especially appreciate in cases in which the author does live in the same time as his characters

do, and where their futures and his future are the same. I am thinking of the *roman fleuve* of Anthony Powell, the last volume of which narrates events the author could not have known about when he began his work. The novel indeed was begun in the early 1950s, but Widmerpool meets his death in the last volume through an involvement with figures from the counter-culture of the 1960s and Powell could hardly have known about that when he designed the character of Widmerpool. So the novel has a kind of improvisory quality, and with regard to the historical events themselves, the author is more in the position of a chronicler than a narrator, and the writer shares the ignorance of his characters as to their exact futures, those being equally hidden from him and them. Of course there are other and even major differences between historical and fictional narratives it is no part of my task to bring out here. In terms of our concerns, the author is logically external to the events he narrates in the respect that there is no way in which he can intervene in their actions.

As for the doctrine of providence itself, it is of course a possibility that God writes history in the medium of human actions, but being Eternal it is difficult to suppose there is any temporal relationship between whatever knowledge He has and ours: He knows our future, perhaps, but it is not His future, as He has none. As for intervention by Him into history, it is, of course, a widely accepted miracle that constitutes the advent of the Christian epic—that the word become flesh, the eternal temporal, and the divine human at a crucial moment in which two orders, only one of them temporal, intersect. I have little to say about this miracle, or any, save that miracles entail the overcoming of certain contradictions, and the inconsistency between future knowledge and narration may exactly be what is allegedly overcome in the advent of Christ.

These are deep, dark matters, but for us, I think, the words of Dante in the tenth Canto of the *Inferno*, spoken through the mouth of Cavalcante, hold:

> tutta morta
> fia nostra conoszenza da quel punto
> che del futuro fia chiusa la porta.

The door of the future *is* closed, and knowledge of it is a dead option, and this is what makes narration possible and all that narration presupposes: the openness of the future, the inalterability of the past, the possibility of effective action.

DANTO'S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY IN RETROSPECTIVE

FRANK ANKERSMIT

This is a book which fulfills its author's dictum about the historical past: its full significance will only appear in the future

—Alan Donagan

INTRODUCTION

Danto's *Analytical Philosophy of History* was published in 1965 at a time when philosophers of history were still mainly interested in the issue of historical explanation. Against this background the book was nothing less than a paradigm shift. For with his book, Danto placed the notion *of historicity* on the agenda of philosophy of history. He wanted to make clear that there is a radical and inexpungible asymmetry between the past and the present and that we can make sense of what historians are doing only if we recognize this asymmetry and are fully aware of all its far-reaching implications. This was a new idea—and in fact, it still is. I will argue here, that even now, in 2006, philosophers of history have never properly grasped the true meaning and scope of Danto's insights.

Philosophers of history always praised *Analytical Philosophy of History* for its interest in the problem of historical narrative. We need only recall Danto's treatment of the so-called narrative sentences to recognize that this is one of the book's great merits. Nevertheless, other authors, like William Walsh, William Dray, and Morton White, addressed the issue of narrativity before Danto did, so we cannot claim that he discovered narrative. What Danto did discover is that narrative is more than merely an alternative model of historical explanation that is closer to the practice of history than Hempel's infamous CLM (covering-law

Epigraph. Alan Donagan, review of *Analytical Philosophy of History*, by Arthur C. Danto, *History and Theory* 6 (1967): 430–435.

model). That is, he demonstrated the extent to which the logic of narrative determines both our relationship to the past and the past's "historicity." Historicity is a dimension of narrative that nobody had ever noticed before and that is as revolutionary now as it was forty years ago, if only because analytical philosophers of language have never taken narrative seriously—which is arguably the most baffling blind spot in all their subtle and penetrating analyses of the secrets of language. Danto thus made clear that (historical) narrative also requires a complete revision of the analytical philosophy of language, which is why the philosophy of history matters to the philosophy of language. He achieved all this by insisting that language may express historicity and the radical asymmetries of past and present. This is what makes him unique among philosophers of both history and language.

Danto himself was quite explicit about the nature of his enterprise, as becomes clear in the first lines of his book:

> It is sometimes said that the task of philosophy is not to think or talk about the world, but rather to analyze the ways in which the world is thought and talked of. . . . The philosophical analysis of our ways of thinking and talking about the world becomes, in the end, a general description of the world as we are obliged to conceive of it, given that we think and talk as we do. Analysis, in short, yields a descriptive metaphysic when systematically executed.[1]

The term *descriptive metaphysic* in this quotation is a reference to P. F. Strawson's notion of "descriptive metaphysics," to which he assigned the task of a quasi-Kantian analysis of how the structure of language determines the most basic framework of our conception of the world.[2] Therefore, in order to understand Danto's goal when writing *Analytical Philosophy of History*, we might say that the book was a counterpart to Strawson's *Individuals*, insofar as it aimed to be a "descriptive metaphysics" of the past implied in the kind of language we use for speaking about the past.

Seeing the book in this light, we can only be amazed by how poorly the book's true message has been understood by philosophers of history (and of language), which is what I will discuss in this essay. I will

examine the "effective history" (to use Gadamer's terminology) of the book and investigate how philosophers of history have reacted to it. My essay will make clear that Anglo-Saxon philosophers of history were, on the whole, still too much under the spell of the explanation paradigm and of Collingwoodian intentionalism to be truly open to Danto's revolutionary insights. In Germany, however, the situation was different. More specifically, only Hans Michael Baumgartner fully appreciated the book's significance and even elaborated on Danto's insights to a point substantially beyond Danto's own claims.[1] Likewise, Baumgartner's study was never given the attention it deserved, so in a sense, we still are in 1965 when Danto published his book on philosophy of history.

Hence the epigraph to this essay.

DONAGAN AND OLAFSON

Soon after its publication, Alan Donagan wrote a review of Danto's book for *History and Theory*, the principal journal in the field of philosophy of history both then and now. The paradox of this unusually brief, five-page review is that it laboriously praised Danto's achievements but was remarkably unwilling to focus and expound on these achievements. The main part of the review is devoted to the issue of historical explanation, which is where Donagan considers Danto's views to be "disappointing."[2] Donagan's points of departure here are the following three propositions:

1. Historians sometimes explain events.
2. Every explanation must include at least one general law.
3. Historians' explanations do not include general laws.

Since the first proposition will be doubted only by scientistic diehards and the second and third are incompatible with each other, a compromise must be worked out between the second and third propositions. Danto's own proposal for a workable compromise is that the second proposition is false as it stands and has to be adapted. The first step in this adaptation is recognizing that events are never explained as such but always are presented by means of a description.

Danto then argues that the historian's most difficult problem is finding a (re)description of the event to be explained that can reach a compromise or *juste milieu* between two opposing efforts. The first effort is to keep the (re)description as close as possible to the unique event to be explained, whereas the other effort is to move away from the unique event to the level of generality at which empirical laws prevail. Danto's own (well-known and often cited) example may clarify his intentions here. Suppose we had to explain why in the 1960s the Monegasques displayed an American flag next to the Monacan flag on their national day. The reason obviously had a lot to do with the fact that Prince Rainier of Monaco was married to Grace Kelly, by birth an American citizen. But there are no reliable empirical laws that pertain to displaying both a Monacan and an American flag on Monaco's national day and that might support an explanation of the event in question. So the event must be redescribed in a more general way, for example, as "on this national festival day the citizens of this monarchy are honoring their prince's wife" (i.e., by displaying American flags). There likely is a reliable empirical law that might explain the event under this description; for example, "If national festival days are celebrated in monarchies, then citizens will honor their prince's wife appropriately." This more general (re)description of the unique event, under which a unique event can be governed by a general law, is what Danto refers to as the event's *explanatum*.[3] In this way it makes sense to say that explaining a past event is essentially a search for the right *explanatum* under which it can be explained.[4]

Although the logic of Danto's argument is impeccable, Donagan is not satisfied with it:

> Danto's example leaves open the question why the Monégasques have chosen to honor Princess Grace in the way they have done. Did she particularly request it? Have they had a supply of flags left over from the wedding for which they wanted to find use? Or was it something else?

Ironically, Donagan's own formulation here suggests how his objections would best be answered from Danto's point of view. When trying to answer Donagan's admittedly reasonable questions, historians might

investigate whether these flags were displayed on the specific request of Princess Grace or whether they were left over from the wedding. If it is the first reason, we would rely on the law that citizens honor their monarchs in the way requested by them. Or if it is the second reason, we might appeal to the general law that citizens honor their monarchs by using the national symbols easily accessible to them. Therefore, Donagan did himself a disservice by indicating how his criticism of Danto could most effectively be refuted from the perspective of Danto's own argument.[1] With enemies like Donagan, one does not need friends.

Typical of the neglect of Danto's book is that it was hardly ever discussed again seriously in *History and Theory* after Donagan's 1965 review. True, the journal occasionally referred to Danto's book, most often to Danto's claim (mentioned earlier) that historical events are not explained as such, but always through a description of them. Apparently this insight found its way into the minds of contemporary philosophers of history. But the articles published in *History and Theory* never satisfactorily discussed the book's more challenging claims. No less striking is that the issue in 1998 that *History and Theory* devoted to Danto dealt almost exclusively with his philosophy of art and not with his philosophy of history.[2] Moreover, although *History and Theory* did review Danto's *The Transfiguration of the Commonplace*,[3] his principal work on the philosophy of art, the journal did not review the republication of his *Analytical Philosophy of History* (under the title *Narration and Knowledge*[4] and containing three new chapters).[5] Accordingly, if a journal on the philosophy of history, like *History and Theory*, presents Danto as being mainly a philosopher of art, its readers might infer that his philosophy of history is merely a spin-off from his philosophy of art. It is undoubtedly true that a "light" variant of Hegelianism[6] links Danto's philosophy of art and his philosophy of history most closely, but we should not interpret this to mean that his philosophy of art should take precedence over his philosophy of history. On the contrary, we could argue that Danto is more sensitive to the historical aspects of art than to the aesthetic aspects of historical writing. But again it is true that since the 1980s, Danto discussed art and not history in his vast and still expanding philosophical oeuvre.

There is one notable exception to this relative neglect of Danto's philosophy of history in *History and Theory*:[7] the essay on Danto (and

Morton White) by the California philosopher Frederick Olafson which the journal published in 1970.[1] At the outset Olafson covers much the same ground as Donagan does. He also questions Danto's notion of the *explanatum*, but whereas Donagan asks Danto a question that the question itself already answers, Olafson more sensibly points out that the *explanatum* moves us away from the unique event to be explained and that this has its problems as well:

> The question I wish to raise about this is simply whether there are any limits to this movement away from the preliminary descriptions of historical events under which they may not be instances of general laws, in search for descriptions under which they are. No such limits are set by Danto. . . . As the level of generality at which historical events are described rises, there will be more and more features of those events that cannot be accounted for by reference to the general concepts and laws that the historian uses.[2]

Olafson is contending here that Danto's *explanatum* is a workable notion only if there is a well-confirmed general law according to which it can be formulated. And then we are back to the old problem that no such well-confirmed general laws are available to historians. Moreover, the whole strategy forces us to move away from the specificity that is always demanded from a satisfactory historical account of the past.

I expect that from his present perspective, Danto would be willing to grant to Olafson this point, as he himself already abandoned a long time ago the CLM that he still hesitantly embraced in *Analytical Philosophy of History*. For example, in an essay written about ten years ago, Danto amusingly compared the CLM to the Sybil of Cumae as described by Eliot in *The Waste Land*: "When asked what she really wanted, the Sybil responded that she only wanted to die."[3]

Next Olafson moves on to a different and more important issue, his criticism of Danto for his lack of interest in authorial intention. According to Olafson, historical explanation is mainly the explanation of human action, and in the end, no such explanation can convince us that does not, somehow and at some time, refer to the historical agent's intentions.[4] This is the kind of argument we should expect from a disciple

of Collingwood. In this context, I should point out that Danto mentions Collingwood only once (and only in passing) in his *Analytical Philosophy of History*. Furthermore, I do not know of any influential Anglo-Saxon contemporary philosopher of history who is less interested in and less inspired by Collingwood than Danto is. So Olafson's criticism draws our attention to an aspect of Danto's philosophy of history that we cannot afford to ignore.

Olafson combines his criticism of Danto's *explanatum* with his own intentionalism by saying that the former does not recognize that an acceptable explanation of a human agent's action should, minimally, be stated in terms "which are known to the agent or logically derivable from the descriptions he gives of his own actions."[1] In this way, for Olafson, the agent's intentions function as a decisive check on "this movement away from the preliminary descriptions of historical events under which they may not be instances of general laws" and toward "descriptions under which they are" (in Olafson's earlier words). Danto's *explanatum* does not respect this check—thus Olafson's criticism—since it does not automatically rule out explanations of human behavior that rely on "concepts drawn from neuro-physiology or some other branch of behavioral science"[2] and that would be unintelligible to those human agents whose actions are explained. Again, an adherent of intentionalist hermeneutics is likely to criticize Danto's position along such lines.

At this stage in my exposition of Olafson's and Danto's disagreement, I should emphasize that it has a dimension that is much deeper than what I just stated. That is, what divides Olafson and Danto goes far beyond the dispute between, on the one hand, an adherent of intentionalist hermeneutics and, on the other, someone holding with the CLMists that the language of historical explanation need not necessarily be limited to the language at the disposal of the historical agent himself or herself. This is where the difference between Olafson and Danto more or less accidentally originated.

Although we may say all kinds of ugly things about the CLM—and these things have been said (by Danto as well many others since the 1970s). Surely, we should never forget these ugly things. But the CLM ideology has one redeeming feature: it openly welcomes the possibility of historical explanations that are not accessible or even intelligible to the

historical agents themselves whose actions are explained. For instance, in agreement with the CLM's requirements, an economic law discovered only in the twentieth century may be used to explain an economic development that took place in antiquity or the Middle Ages.

The paradox, then, is the following: The CLM ideology has always (rightly) been attacked for its complete lack of historical sense, because of its assumption that human nature and the laws of psychology and of human social behavior have always and everywhere been the same and will always remain so.[1] For this reason, the CLM ideology has always be an easy target for hermeneuticists and intentionalists. But by allowing for an unbridgeable gap between a historical explanation that is acceptable to us and is intelligible to the historical agents themselves, the CLM ideology also has left room for a far more profound historical sense than would ever be possible in intentionalist hermeneutics. The gap between the self-understanding of somebody living in the Middle Ages and a modern scientist living in the twenty-first century was, so to speak, the hollow in which this dramatic historical sense could originate and prosper. This is what the philosophy of history lost when it moved in the 1970s from the CLM ideology to hermeneutics and intentionalism. Moreover, I would not hesitate to state that the psychologist parochialism of intentionalism is far more detrimental to a proper understanding of history and historical writing than is the scientific parochialism of the CLM ideology.

This is what really is at stake in the debate between Olafson (and the hermeneuticists) and Danto. Because Danto approached history and historical writing from the perspective of the philosophy of science of the 1950s and the 1960s and because he was one of the very few Anglo-Saxon philosophers of history to address the problem of history unburdened by Collingwood's legacy, he was in a position to shed the obvious shortcomings of the CLM ideology while retaining an openness to the past's strangeness that would be unthinkable for theorists in the hermeneuticist and intentionalist tradition. Olafson was right when discerning in *Analytical Philosophy of History* the objectionable remnants of what is rightly condemned in the CLM ideology. But he was wrong to remain blind to how Danto pulled this ideology into a direction diametrically opposed to what was always considered to have been this ideology's main sin (i.e., its lack of historical sense).

We now should ask ourselves why and in what way Danto succeeded in separating what is good from what is bad in the CLM ideology.

Let us start with why. We should begin by observing that in one of the chapters added to the later version, *Narration and Knowledge*, Danto pointed out the similarities between the intentionalist issue and the so-called other-mind problem.[1] This other-mind problem was widely discussed by analytical philosophers of language in the 1950s and the 1960s. The question was whether one could have access to the mind(s) of other people. The obvious answer is, of course, that this is not possible in all circumstances, as people may never reveal their true intentions, their real beliefs, and the like. Nevertheless, ordinary language philosophers were, on the whole, critical of the obvious answer. They argued with Gilbert Ryle's *The Concept of Mind* and Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* that the human mind is not like a "ghost in the machine" and is not an inaccessible forum that we can observe only "from the outside" and never "from the inside." Or in regard to a more recent defense of the same view, they asserted along with Donald Davidson in his *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation* that the publicly observable phenomena of the world we all share function as a kind of reliable bridge between what happens in my mind and what happens in yours. In fact, there is no "other-mind problem," and we can infer the beliefs and intentions of others on the basis of their actions, of what the world is like and of our own experiences with both others and the world. To put it more crudely, there is only a "public" and no "private" world.

In the first place, although the arguments of these ordinary language philosophers were quite different from those proposed by Collingwood and Olafson, they all concluded that there was no real problem with obtaining access to the minds of others. The profound irony in all this is worth noting. Whereas the ordinary language philosophers used mainly scientistic assumptions, the Collingwoodians reached many of the same conclusions as they did based on the assumption of an unbridgeable gap between *Erklären* (science) and *Verstehen* (humanities). In the world of philosophy, alliances sometimes may surprise us as much as those in the crude world of politics. In the second place, there is an obvious structural similarity between the other-mind problem and the problem of getting access to other historical periods. In both cases the problem

is whether we can move outside or beyond our own world into that of others, of either other people living now or those who lived in another historical period.

Danto rejects both Collingwood's (and Olafson's) view and that of ordinary language philosophers about the other-mind problem. His main argument (as formally developed in the last chapter of *The Transfiguration of the Commonplace*) is that we must distinguish a *representation* from a *true description* of the world. True description gives us direct access to the world, and indeed, here the strictly public and the strictly private cannot be distinguished. In principle, everything is accessible to everybody. But representation is different, and we should not forget that Danto did not hesitate to describe the human being as an *ens representans*![1] Instead, representation stands here for the totality of the beliefs that we hold to be true.

Note that we can never objectify our own representation of the world, that we can never move outside the totality of what we hold to be true, as trying to do so would just add another item to this totality. This is different for others, however, as they may ascribe to me the totality of beliefs I hold to be true. Others may therefore succeed where I cannot succeed, namely, in ascribing a certain representation of the world to me.[2] The surprising implication is that there is indeed an other-mind problem, but one different from what Collingwood, Olafson, and the ordinary language philosophers had in mind. They worried about whether we can move from our own mind to that of others (and then concluded that there was, in the end, no real problem here). Danto, however, begins from the other end, from the outside, as it were, and observes that we always enclose others (and other historical periods) in their representations of the world. We can never avoid doing so. But at the same time, this is also something that they can never do themselves, as they are never aware of their own representations of the world. So what gives us access to others (and to other historical periods)—that is, our representations of them—at the same time distances us from them, for these representations have no counterpart in how they experience(d) their lives and the world.

Isn't this the same situation that the CLM presented? On the one hand, a CLM explanation may give us a perfect scientific explanation of

human behavior, but on the other hand, its scientific validity separates us from the agent whose action is explained, since the explanation is formulated in a language inaccessible to him or her. In this way, Danto's view of the representation of other periods is the same as how the CLM relates us to the past (or to the actions of others). The paradox is that the CLM is far more effective in suggesting the past's radical strangeness than is any argument we might expect from hermeneuticists, intentionalists, or ordinary language philosophers. We lose our openness to the past with Collingwood, Olafson, and the others and can retain it only if we accept the CLM, or, rather, how Danto translated the CLM into a theory of historical representation. One more item to add to the list of surprising alliances in the world of philosophy!

Let us turn next to the second question, how Danto differentiated in his own philosophy of history the good and the bad in the CLM ideology. This brings us to a discussion of his so-called narrative sentences and his project verbs and, of course, to what Olafson says about them. The "project verbs" illustrate what Danto had in mind with his Strawsonian idea of a "descriptive metaphysics" focusing on how the language we use (co)determines the most general "metaphysical" properties of our world and, more specifically, of the past. Project verbs refer to verbs like "planting roses," "building a ship," and "writing a book." Of interest to Danto is our use of these verbs to describe the actions of people in an indefinite future. Suppose that somebody is planting rose seeds in the soil behind her house. We could properly describe her actions—her "project," according to Danto—as "planting roses," even though because of a drought these seeds never actually grow into roses. A similar story could be told about someone writing a book. That is, there may be an asymmetry between our description of what this person is doing right now and the results of her action. We say that she is planting roses, but "history" may show that she was not planting roses, since the seeds died in the soil. A potential tension, or asymmetry, arises between the language we happen to use and the actual history. The fascinating conclusion is that this is how history may be created, for we use a kind of language (i.e., the language of project verbs) that may be contradicted by what history actually is or, rather, will be. If we didn't have these project verbs, with their implicit reference to the future,

language would always correspond to what actually happens, and "history" would never be manifested.[1]

Next, Danto often speaks of "temporal wholes" when discussing the logical features of the project verbs,[2] and the notion immediately makes sense. Doesn't the temporal interval between planting the seeds and the growth of the roses constitute a "temporal whole"? It therefore seems natural to associate the historical dimension of the project verbs with these temporal wholes. Indeed, this is how Danto's argument is often read and interpreted. But now we discover what is wrong with this interpretation. History does not enter the scene with these temporal wholes as such, but only with the potential discrepancy between the expectations about the future suggested by the temporal wholes and what actually happened in the past. History is created when language has led us astray, so to speak. In this way we can properly speak of the essential or inherent "negativity" that we should attribute to historical reality.

We can understand all this if we recall the notion of the "unintended consequences of intentional human action," which was so important to Hegel's philosophy of history.[3] A famous example is Francesco Guicciardini who, as an adviser to Pope Clement VII, urged him to join an alliance against Emperor Charles V. The ultimate result of this policy was the sack of Rome in 1527, and for the rest of his life Guicciardini grieved about the disastrous consequences of what had initially seemed to him a rational and recommendable policy. In this sense we may say that the brute and terrible force of history was brought home to Guicciardini, and he turned to historical writing in order to understand how this discrepancy between his intentions and their unforeseen and unintended consequences could be explained historically. Unintended consequences provoked Guicciardini's historical awareness. More generally, the origins of Western historical consciousness in the sixteenth century is linked to a new awareness to this dimension of the unintended consequences of intentional human action.[4] Danto's project verbs thus give us what we might describe as "the microlevel" of this mechanism.

Let us return to Danto's debate with Olafson. As we might expect, Olafson has no problem with project verbs. The agent's actions as described by the project verbs and the temporal wholes in which they should be situated never go beyond the limits of what can still be reduced

to the intentionalist framework. Rather, these actions follow from the agent's intentions and can be understood (by him or her) accordingly. Slightly more surprising is that Olafson also agrees with the notion of unintended consequences, as it always constituted for all variants of intentionalist hermeneutics a problem that they never could resolve. This shouldn't surprise us. Obviously, however we look at the matter, we can never explain *unintended* consequences by appealing to the historical agent's *intentions*. But Olafson sees no problem with the somewhat rash argument that we can recognize unintended consequences only if we begin with knowledge of the agent's intentions.[1] This observation is correct, but even if we accept Olafson's argument, he still has no guide to identify what caused those results of the agent's actions that differed from his intentions. The intentionalist therefore may at most establish that these unintended consequences do exist, since there is a difference between what the agent intended and what eventually happened, but he will never be able to explain them. Instead, they must remain to him an unfathomable mystery.

Nevertheless, we should grant to Olafson that the project verbs will never take us very far from the historical agent himself and his intentions and thus safely enclose us in the intentionalist's logical space. As Danto proposed, the project verbs "have something to do with the agent's intentions and his understanding of what he was about; and these are not altered by some subsequent failure due to the agent's ignorance."[2] Consider now Danto's so-called narrative sentences, whose formal definition is as follows: "The class of descriptions I am concerned with refer to two distinct and time-separated events E-1 and E-2. They describe the earliest of the events referred to."[3] One of Danto's (many) examples is the statement that "the author of the *Principia* is born in Woolethorpe." Note that on Christmas Day 1642 we might have said, "Isaac Newton is born in Woolethorpe" but not "the author of the *Principia* is born in Woolethorpe," since that statement could be made only after 1687. Or as Danto puts it elsewhere, if there existed such a thing as the Ideal Chronicle mentioning literally everything taking place at a certain time in the universe, it could not possibly contain for Christmas Day 1642 the statement "The author of the *Principia* is born at Woolethorpe," since nobody could know at that time that Newton would write that book.

Olafson is eager to point out the difference between project verbs and narrative sentences. The difference is that narrative sentences sever the ties to authorial intention, since the event E-2 referred to in the narrative sentence is typically not related to intentions existing at the time of E-1. Olafson also does not take the heroic position of claiming that narrative sentences are an illegitimate component of the historian's rhetoric. Indeed, actual historical texts are full of narrative sentences, and historians do not seem to care much about these sentences' lack of respect for the intentionalist's sensitivities. So Olafson realizes that he will somehow have to defuse the threat of these narrative sentences in order to rescue his intentionalist's way of thinking.

Olafson uses two arguments to do this. In a book published in 1978 he proposed a very complicated and contorted argument to the effect that narrative sentences are not interesting from a logical point of view, since they can always be dissolved into one statement about event E-1 and another one about event E-2.[1] Although this is true, it does not invalidate Danto's claims for the narrative sentence. Rather, Danto is interested in narrative sentences (in agreement with his Strawsonian strategy) because they exemplify how our language may create asymmetries in our relationship to the past, on the one hand, and to the present and the future, on the other. It is this property of narrative sentences that would be eliminated if we translated, with Olafson, narrative sentences into two separate sentences about separate events.[2] Accordingly, Olafson has spirited away with his translation the whole issue that is *sub iudice* here.

Of more interest in our context is how Olafson deals in his 1970 essay with the question that was discussed earlier. He asserts that Danto's advocacy of narrative sentences would legitimate statements like "Martin Luther was a pioneer of religious liberty in the modern world." Clearly, Olafson considers this to be a *reductio ad absurdum*: "While Luther's break with the church was certainly one of the events that were eventually to lead to an acceptance of religious liberty as the only alternative to religious strife, that outcome was wholly alien to Luther's own intention."[3] But as everyone acquainted with historical texts recognizes, there is nothing absurd in this statement about Luther. Some historians will agree with it, and others will not—and both parties will have

more or less good arguments for their views. But no historian will reject the statement out of hand as being at odds with historical practice or with the criteria for what a historian can and cannot meaningfully state. And certainly most historians will consider Luther's own intentions as irrelevant when debating the pros and cons of the statement. Recall, for example, the discussion of the German Sonderweg of some ten to twenty years ago, when some historians contended that Luther's submission to the German princes after the outbreak of the Peasant's War of 1525 helped explain why the Germans were so much more *autoritätssüchtig* than the French or the English. We may not agree with the argument, but it would make no sense to counter it with the correct observation that it was not at all Luther's intention to pave the way for Hitler.

Finally, with the wisdom of hindsight (and here as well!) we may understand Olafson's misgivings about Danto's claims for his narrative sentences. There is something peculiarly oxymoronic about the notion of a narrative sentence. Narratives always consist of sentences, but in being part of a narrative, such sentences also are something else, or something more than just mere sentences. Someone who writes or recites a narrative is not just putting (narrative) *sentences* one after another but instead is writing or reciting a *narrative*, and a narrative is more than just the sum of its sentences.[1] In the end, it is both amazing and disappointing that Danto never asked himself whether the "descriptive metaphysics" implicit in historical language should not require him to focus on narrative instead of only narrative sentences, especially since his own account begged him to do so. For example, Danto writes, "For it to be true that Petrarch opened the Renaissance, it is logically required that the Renaissance take place, though in point of fact the Renaissance might have taken place whether Petrarch opened it or not." No historian in her right mind would ever write such as thing as "the Renaissance taking place" or "the Renaissance was opened by Petrarch (as if it were a kind of exhibition)," because the Renaissance is not an item on the inventory of the world in the way that exhibitions are. This is the kind of thing (I'm deliberately phrasing this in a vague and noncommittal way) we can discuss meaningfully only in *narratives* about the past. As soon as Danto realized the oddity of locutions like "Petrarch opening the Renaissance," he would have moved on almost automatically toward a consideration of narrative as such. Thus it

was only a tiny step from the narrative sentence to just narrative, and it was Louis O. Mink who took this step.

BUNZL AND MINK

Martin Bunzl approaches the relationship between narrative and Danto's narrative sentences from another angle. He begins by pointing out that many historical studies are not narrative at all: "Here I have in mind cross-cultural and cross-temporal studies of the kind exemplified by Natalie Zemon Davis's well-known study of the phenomenon of male–female festive role inversions that spans over three hundred years and at least six cultures."[1]

I could make a number of comments about this statement. First, since Danto discusses narrative only in relationship to his narrative sentences and never in the context of how in a historical narrative a historian may describe some complex development through time, Bunzl's criticism does not really apply to Danto's argument.

Bunzl might now have pointed out that precisely this was a weakness of Danto's argument. He might have argued that Danto failed to clarify how the use of narrative sentences in a historical text could result in what we ordinarily assume a historical narrative to be: an account of a complex development through time. And here we might agree with him. On the other hand, it is not true that "cross-temporal" studies should be nonnarrative, as Bunzl seems to think. As has often been emphasized, there is always a story, or narrative, implicit in "cross-temporal" or "cross-sectional" historical studies (such as Burckhardt's *Die Kultur der Renaissance in Italien* or Huizinga's *The Waning of the Middle Ages*), since these try to show how some historical periods differ from what went before or came after them.[2] We could even contend that this gives cross-temporal or cross-sectional studies a logic that perfectly fits what Danto said about narrative sentences, because cross-temporal or cross-sectional studies describe one period (e.g., the Renaissance or the Middle Ages) with tacit reference to some other period. Hence, if Danto wished to circumvent the criticism (made just now) that he failed to explain how his narrative sentences related to narrative proper, his most promising point of departure would be cross-temporal or cross-sectional studies.

Next, Bunzl considers sentences like "when Socrates died, Xanthippe became a widow."[1] He then argues that from a logical point of view, such a sentence agrees with what Danto claimed about his narrative sentences, for here the reference to one event E-1 (Socrates' death) is coupled with a description of another event E-2 (Xanthippe's being widowed). Nevertheless, there is no time difference here between the event referred to and the one described, since Xanthippe was widowed by Socrates' dying. Both things took place at the same time.

I am not sure what to make of Bunzl's criticism and how it differs from anything that Danto said. Danto might concede that besides his narrative sentences are also the kinds of sentences that Bunzl had in mind and then might add that this in no way compelled him to abandon anything he had claimed for his narrative sentences. Sentences could be categorized as the Danto variants and the Bunzl variants, although we might then have problems like "The conclusion by Louis XIV and Charles II of the secret treaty of Dover in 1670 destroyed the political position of the Dutch Republic" (recall that in 1672 both France and England declared war on the Dutch Republic). Accordingly, we might say both that the event referred to and the one described are simultaneous (the conclusion of the secret treaty was also the destruction of the Dutch Republic's political position, just as Socrates' death made Xanthippe a widow) and that there must be a time sequence here, since the two (the secret treaty caused the destruction of the political position of the Dutch Republic) have a causal relationship. The first reading would give us the Bunzl variant, and the second one, the Danto variant. Perhaps we should try to sort this out, but here we do not need to investigate this problem further, since again, it has no bearing on any claim that Danto made in his book.

Of more general interest is Bunzl's criticism of Danto's habit of projecting on the past itself what is said in terms of narrative sentences: "In the main he defends the full-bodied ontological claim that a change in the set of descriptions of the past generates the 'retro-active re-alignment of the Past.'"[2] This is the idea that the past itself changes with what is said about it. Bunzl is right when he maintains that this move would be indefensible, since historical events will always remain what they are or were, regardless of what historians may wish to say about them later.

Moreover, the ontological claim might upset all of Danto's argument about narrative sentences, about the Ideal Chronicle, and about substantive or speculative philosophies of history. If we stick to the ontological claim, we can no longer be satisfied with Danto's Ideal Chronicle, and we should now think instead of another Ideal Chronicle,* containing not only the sentences of Danto's Ideal Chronicle but also all possible narrative sentences that could (and will) be formulated about the past from any later perspective. Because these narrative sentences describe properties of the past that the ontological claim requires us to attribute to the past itself, they also must be included in the Ideal Chronicle. But this Ideal Chronicle* can be written from one vantage point only, namely, from that of the End of History (which then will automatically coincide with the End of All Historical Writing). This will require us to reject (1) Danto's notion of an Ideal Chronicle to which more and more new sentences are added as history moves on through time; (2) the logical difference between the kinds of statements mentioned in the Ideal Chronicle (as defined by Danto) and narrative sentences; (3) the argument about the essential asymmetry between the past, on the one hand, and the present and the future, on the other; and (4) Danto's argument against substantive or speculative history (insofar as this argument depended on this asymmetry between past and future). Acceptance of the ontological claim would thus pull the carpet from under almost all of Danto's argument, and we may hope, therefore, that Danto's occasional lapses into ontology are, in fact, nothing more than just that.

Let us now look more closely at these substantive or speculative philosophies of history mentioned earlier. It is common knowledge that most, though not all, speculative philosophies of history pretend to be able to predict the future. Think of Marx's prediction that History will end with, and culminate in, a classless society or of Toynbee's judgment that we all will return to Roman Catholicism or be damned. But according to Danto, substantive or speculative philosophies of history are more than mere predictions of what will happen in the future. He characterizes them as *prophecies* and describes the difference as follows:

> The substantive philosophies of history, insofar as I have correctly characterized them, are clearly concerned with what I shall term *prophecy*. A

> prophecy is not merely a statement about the future, for a prediction is a statement about the future. It is a certain kind of statement about the future, and that I shall say, pending a further analysis, that it is an historical statement about the future. The prophet is one who speaks about the future in a manner which is appropriate only to the past, or who speaks of the present in the light of the future treated as a *fait accompli*.[1]

As we know by now, when Danto speaks about our speaking about the past, he demands that we think of his narrative sentences. Hence, he believes that it is characteristic of substantive or speculative philosophies of history (and of prophecies) to describe the present and the future in terms of narrative sentences. Recall that we found in the preceding paragraph that tying an ontological claim to what is expressed by narrative sentences compels us to assume the vantage point of the End of History—and thus the vantage point from which substantive or speculative history is typically written. It then follows that substantive or speculative philosophies of history require an ontological interpretation of what is expressed by narrative sentences, so all that is expressed in and by narrative sentences and narratives should have a counterpart in, or be a reflection of, the past itself.

All this may seem at first to be little more than mere philosophical scholastics. But here is the central dilemma of all of the contemporary philosophy of history. I will demonstrate this using Louis O. Mink's slogan "Stories are not lived but told," which he defended with arguments derived from Danto. But before examining Mink's elaboration of Danto's argument, I will elaborate on my own claim that deciding against or for Mink's slogan is the most fundamental decision I must make as a philosopher of history. Indeed, everything else depends on this. More specifically, rejecting Mink's slogan means that all historical interpretation or representation—or what is expressed by narrative sentences and historical narratives—can be checked empirically against actual historical facts. Those philosophers of history who agree with Mink's slogan contend that there are no algorithms, epistemological or otherwise, that tie the past and historical narrative so closely together. Put differently, the rejection of Mink's slogan gives us the realist conception of the relationship between the past itself and historical narrative, whereas the

embrace of the slogan gives us the nominalist or instrumentalist view of the relationship between the two. In the philosophy of history, everything depends on whether we adopt the realist or the nominalist view of how the historian's language relates to the past.[1]

It was the discussion of substantive or speculative philosophies of history that led us to this dilemma. Mink's argument makes clear why and, more important, why substantive or speculative philosophies of history are not things of the past but are still present in the minds of many, if not most, historians and philosophers of history. This will become clear if we focus on what Mink refers to as "Universal History":

> The idea of Universal History is at least as old as Augustine's *City of God* and was introduced to modern thought in Vico's *Scienza Nuova*. But it was never so powerful or so widely shared as at the end of its active life, the last two decades of the eighteenth century.[2]

Mink then sums up the main characteristics of Universal History:

> First, it was the claim that the ensemble of human events belongs to a single story. . . . Second, the idea of Universal History specifies that there is a single central subject or theme in the unfolding plot of history. . . . Third, it is implied that the events of the historical process are unintelligible when seen only in relation to their immediate circumstances. . . . Finally, Universal History did not deny the great diversity of human events, customs and institutions; but it did regard this variety as the permutations of a single and unchanging set of human capacities and possibilities.[3]

Clearly, Danto's substantive speculative philosophies of history and Mink's Universal History are the same thing.

Mink then makes a stunning and amazing claim for his Universal History, namely, that what inspired the idea of a Universal History is, in fact, as much alive today as it was at the end of the eighteenth century. It is true, Mink concedes, that we all now believe that the many stories that we may discern in the past have many subjects and themes and that each story has its own beginning, middle, and end. So it may seem

that the Idea of Universal History has been discarded upon the midden of the past, along with such refuse such as the legitimacy of kings and the perfectibility of man. Yet, I venture to claim that the concept of Universal *History* has not been abandoned at all, only the concept of universal historiography.[1]

Mink recognizes that we now accept that many stories are, and can be told, about the past. But as he later says, despite this, we still conceive of the past as being an "untold story" itself and that the stories we tell ourselves about the past should approximate them as much and as closely as possible. Most perceptively, Mink relates this fallacy of the past as an untold story to Danto's Ideal Chronicle and what we have learned to associate with that notion. More specifically he relates it to what was referred to earlier as the Ideal Chronicle*—hence, the Ideal Chronicle also contains all the narrative sentences we could formulate about the past. We believe that the Ideal Chronicle* is the linguistic counterpart of the untold story that the past itself is, so "The idea that the past itself is an untold story has retreated from the arena of conscious belief and controversy to habituate itself as a presupposition in that area of our a priori conceptual framework which resists explicit statement and examination."[2]

This is the presupposition shared by most contemporary working historians and philosophers of history. Historians believe that Universal History provides us with an untold story against which we can empirically check all that historians may wish to say about the past. All empiricist and intentionalist[3] philosophers of history (the majority in the philosophy of history, now no less than ever before) also embrace a realist conception of historical narrative, in which all that is said about the past should have an exact and demonstrable counterpart in the past itself. Such beliefs are the remnants of what Gadamer called the "logos philosophy of history," as expressed in traditional speculative philosophies of history assuming "the self-evident correspondence of Logos and Being."[4] But the past is not an untold story; and stories are not lived but told, which are crucial insights that we owe to Danto and Mink and without which no future progress in philosophy of history would be possible. Only these insights

can save us from the tyranny and the perennial temptations of the "logos philosophy of history."

I now turn to Mink's treatment of the narrative sentences, in which he takes Danto's own analysis in a direction that finds its logical conclusion in the argument of Hans Michael Baumgartner, discussed in the next section. Mink begins here by refining Danto's categorization of the kinds of statements that we may make about the past:

1. Contemporary descriptions of events, that is, actual descriptions of events as recorded by observers.
2. Possible contemporary descriptions, that is, those not actually formulated or reported because no one was in a position to observe, or in a mood to record, them.
3. Descriptions possible only after the event because they refer to and thus depend on knowledge about later events; these are Danto's narrative sentences.
4. Descriptions possible only after the event because they depend on subsequently developed techniques of acquiring knowledge; for example, "Richard II died of a coronary embolism."
5. Descriptions possible only after the event because they depend on later conceptual modes of interpretation and analysis; for example, "The unpropertied citizens of Rome constituted the first urban proletariat."[1]

The fourth and fifth types of descriptions are new, compared with Danto's own list.

Of these two new types, the fifth is of more interest here, and I shall conclude my account of Mink with a brief discussion of it and how it relates to historical narrative. In a number of influential essays Mink elaborated on the "conceptual modes of interpretation and analysis," to which he refers in his definition of the fifth type of descriptions of the past. The "conceptual modes" he defines there as the "configurational mode of comprehension" that enables us to detect a certain pattern or structure are a complex and incoherent set of data, such as what a *(hi)story* typically offers to us. For example, think of how this notion of "the Roman citizens as an urban proletariat" would allow us to organize

into one coherent historical narrative all that what we know about Imperial Rome in a new and illuminating way. The notion is the "figure" around, or in terms of, which this organization of knowledge can be achieved, thus the term *configurational comprehension*.

There is one more feature of the configurational comprehension that we should take into account here. These patterns discerned in the past's events require us to see them together in order to eliminate the temporal sequence that kept them apart from one another in the past. As Mink put it, "To comprehend temporal succession means to think of it in both directions at once, and then time is no longer the river which bears us along but the river in aerial view, upstream and downstream seen in a single survey."[2]

Two implications of Mink's account are of particular relevance here. First, this configurational comprehension destroys the temporal order in which life was actually lived in the past itself and exchanges this order for that of the pattern or "figure" that a historical narrative may invite us to find in the past. Here we may discover one more argument in favor of Mink's claim that "stories are not lived but told": stories are to be associated with these patterns or "figures" and not with the past itself.[3] Second, in the preceding paragraph we were moving from (narrative) sentences to stories or narratives themselves, to narratives as such. In this way Mink presented us with a correction of Danto's exclusive focus on sentences that is as welcome as it is valuable.[4]

But it was only the German theorist Hans Michael Baumgartner who correctly grasped all the philosophical implications of this shift from sentence to narrative.

JOCKS, SCHIFFER, AND BAUMGARTNER

Danto's philosophy of history may well have been introduced in Germany by no less a scholar than Jürgen Habermas. In an essay in 1967 he refers to Danto's book,[5] in his *Erkenntnis und Interesse* in 1968 and also in his magnum opus of a much later date, *Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns*.[6] Although Habermas's references to Danto are disappointingly brief and nowhere come close to Danto's main argument, they must have caught the imagination of other German scholars, for whenever

they mention Danto, they rarely fail to mention Habermas's casual remarks about him. As the neo-Marxist that he was at the time, Habermas was looking for the so-called false class-consciousness. In *Erkenntnis und Interesse* he argued that the tensions between self-understanding (the object of intentionalist hermeneutics) and social-scientific truth might provide an answer to the problem. This solution has a certain structural similarity to Danto's opposition between the Ideal Chronicle (self-understanding) and his narrative sentences (historical truth). But I cannot say whether this might explain Habermas's interest in Danto.[1]

Werner Martin Jocks also considers *Analytical Philosophy of History* from a (neo-)Marxist perspective. The point of departure for his exposition is the following passage: "The complete description then presupposes a narrative organization, and the narrative organization is something that *we* do. Not merely that, but the imposition of a narrative organization logically involves us with an inexpungable subjective factor. There is an element of sheer arbitrariness in it."[2]

This undeniably is a very dramatic statement, and it should not surprise us that a (neo-)Marxist would now ask himself to what extent socioeconomic and/or ideological factors guide the historian and, more specifically, how to interpret this dimension of "sheer arbitrariness" in how historians relate to the past that they are investigating.[3] Jocks offers a disappointingly simple answer to this. He cites a passage in which Danto refers to the Marxist thesis of the dialectical conflict between production forces and production relations, and he then asserts that this conflict did not originate in a "subjective representation" (*subjektive Vorstellung*) but in an "analysis of the objective cohesion of historical reality" (*eine Analyse des objektiven Zusammenhangs historischer Realität*).[4] This dogmatic appeal to the Marxist conception of history to solve this problem of the "arbitrariness" that Danto attributed to historical writing will fail to convince non-Marxists, especially since Jocks does not satisfactorily refute Danto's compelling criticism of speculative philosophies of history like Marxism.

Nevertheless, Jocks does have reason to worry about Danto's claim about "this element of sheer arbitrariness" of historical writing. First, we want to hear more about how far this "arbitrariness" actually goes and to what extent it undermines claims made for the rationality of

the discipline of history. Second, we regret that nowhere in his book did Danto deal with why historians might have good reasons for preferring one historical narrative to another regarding part of the past. Once again, we wish here that Danto had not restricted his analysis to narrative sentences and that he had addressed historical narrative as a textual whole, for then he would have had to address the adequacy of historical accounts of the past.

Literary theory is introduced in Werner Schiffer's study of Danto's, Habermas's, Baumgartner's, and Droysen's theories of narrative and historical representation (*Darstellung*).[1] Because much of contemporary literary theory is devoted to an analysis of (fictional) narrative, we welcome this cooperation between literary and historical theory to discover the secrets of historical writing. Hayden White has been an immensely successful and influential pioneer in this cooperation. In his 1973 *Metahistory*, White appealed to the instruments of literary theory (though perhaps not the most obvious ones)[2] in analyzing the historical narratives of nineteenth-century historians and philosophers of history. But I am sorry that Danto and White never discussed each other's work, which is surprising, since both studied history after World War II at Wayne State University and both were deeply influenced by William Bossenbrook, the charismatic professor of history there. White even dedicated a Festschrift to Bossenbrook, to which Danto contributed an essay on the ontological proof of God's existence.[3] This failed encounter of White and Danto is regrettable, too, because both complement each other quite well: White is best on historical narrative, but less so on the relationship between historical texts and historical reality, whereas it is the other way around with Danto. What both these former students of Bossenbrook could have written about historical writing would have been a strong and encompassing philosophy of history.

In any case, Schiffer starts by observing that Danto's focus on narrative sentences prevents him from justifying his major claim that narrative, as narrative, can be explanatory. He relates this to Danto's rejection of the distinction between story and plot: if Danto had embraced the notion of plot as a semantic structure and as a sequence of mere sentences behind or below the story, he would not have been able to avoid

discussing narrative as a textual whole.[1] Schiffer then refers to the narratologist idea of "viewpoint" for many of the same reasons.[2]

But in the remainder of his chapter on Danto, Schiffer acquiesces in Danto's disregard for these narratologist analytical tools and turns to narrative sentences. Although he agrees with the anti-intentionalism of Danto's theory of the narrative sentences, he has some minor problems with Danto's claims. Danto stated that narrative sentences pull together two events, E-1 and E-2, and whereas the first one is described, the second one is only (implicitly) referred to. But consider the following narrative sentence: "The constitution of 1871 made the German emperor into the most powerful man in the world." The (later) situation in which the German emperor is the most powerful man in the world is then *described*, whereas the constitution of 1871 is merely *referred* to. Hence, in narrative sentences, description may indeed precede reference, but it may also be the other way around. Next, Danto always emphasized the retrospectivity of narrative sentences (they look in a new way at what happened in the past). But Schiffer points out that narrative sentences can be both retrospective and "finalist" (Schiffer's term). Think, for example, of the following narrative sentence: "Social democratic organization could be realized without hindrance from the state." Schiffer's remarks here are only useful elaborations of Danto's theory, not a criticism of it.

Hans Michael Baumgartner is the most interesting commentator on Danto's *Analytical Philosophy of History*. Baumgartner (born in 1933) is a very highly regarded German philosopher, the author of many works, and an authority on the history of German idealism. He has written widely on ethics, aesthetics, and the philosophy of religion. Unfortunately, he is not well known in the Anglophone world, and none of his works has been translated into English.

Like most of the commentators on Danto, Baumgartner starts with narrative sentences.[3] He observes that the temporal relationship between the two historical events E-1 and E-2 that are tied together in the narrative can take one of three forms: (1) E-2 may take place later than E-1 but before the historian writes his text; (2) E-2 may take place later than E-1 but at the same time as the historian is writing; or (3) E-2 may take place later than both E-2 and the historian. Next, Baumgartner

points out that the third form is the basis for most of Danto's argument, for example, both for his thesis that we can never give a complete description of a past event, since we do not know the future (or, rather, can never predict future events in their uniqueness), and for his claim of the asymmetry of past and future. This is the "essential retrospectivity of all historical writing" (*die prinzipielle Retrospektivität der Historie*)[1] and why all historical knowledge is organized accordingly.

Baumgartner here still remains within the parameters of Danto's own argument but leaves it when he radicalizes Danto's argument into a *transcendentalist* analysis of historical language. The reason for this radicalization is Baumgartner's claim that Danto contaminated his "descriptive metaphysics of historical existence" with the remnants of a naive historical ontology. That is, Danto still speaks about notions like "the Middle Ages," "the French Revolution," or "the Renaissance"[2] as if they had the same ontological status as proper names like "Caesar" or "Napoleon." As a satisfactory appraisal of historical language, however, (the subjects of) biographies (of Caesar or Napoleon) are wholly misleading.[3] The explanation is that the unity or continuity of persons or individuals like Caesar or Napoleon are warranted by these notions (or "sortal concepts," as philosophers might call them) of "person" or "individual," insofar as these notions denote a category of objects with the same unity and continuity through time, unlike notions like the Middle Ages, the French Revolution, or the Renaissance. These sorts of (typically historical) notions do not *presuppose* unity and continuity (as do the notions of "person" and "individual") but only *create* it.[4] To put it more bluntly: in the beginning there is only chaos and disorder, then historians come along using notions like the Middle Ages—and only then, and only because of their use of these notions, can chaos be exchanged for unity and continuity. Individual human beings, animals, tables, and chairs need no language in order to have unity and continuity because they already possess these properties before a word has been uttered or ever will be uttered. Historical language—into which Danto gave us so many profound insights—is therefore the condition of the possibility of having knowledge of typically historical "things" like the Middle Ages, the French Revolution, and the Renaissance. This is the reason for Baumgartner's thesis that Danto's argument in *Analytical Philosophy of History* still awaits transcendentalization.

Put differently, we could say that Danto left too soon the path that Strawson followed. After his *Individuals*, in which he proposed the notion of "descriptive metaphysics," Strawson went on to write *The Bounds of Sense*,[1] in which he explored the Kantian and transcendentalist implications of what he started to do in his previous book. And this is exactly what Baumgartner wanted to do for history and for how we conceive of the past.

This proposal is not merely a matter of getting things straight from a philosophical point of view. Baumgartner's argument also has implications for the practice of historical writing and for what should guide historical discussion. Historians almost naturally opt for what we could call "the copy theory of historical representation." They believe that they also should "copy" the past as well as they can in the language they use for writing about it. All they say about the past should have an exact counterpart in the past itself, and language should not add anything to this, because that would be a distortion of the past *wie es eigentlich gewesen*. Danto indicated how his narrative sentences would necessarily conflict with the "copy" theory. That is, these narrative sentences would always go beyond the linguistic "copy" or duplication of the past that the Ideal Chronicle might give us. But this search for complete correspondence between the past and historical language will lead historians astray, as it will blind them to the fact that the unity and continuity of historical language are the transcendental conditions for the possibility of historical knowledge. In this way, the pseudopositivism of the copy theory of historical representation may invite historians to write bad history. At the same time, the adherents of the copy theory (like the French *annalistes* of the 1970s) cannot understand why what they are writing actually is bad history.

As Baumgartner demonstrates, however, Danto himself was prevented from developing the transcendentalist implications of his own account because he believed that there cannot be historical change without "subjects of change."[2] Needless to say, this is how we intuitively tend to look at the issue: first there must be Napoleon (as the subject of change existing in the past itself), and next we can give a historical account of his complex path through space and time. The latter is impossible without the former. But as Baumgartner insists, in the case of historical

phenomena like the Middle Ages, there *is* no subject of change that is given to us before the historical narratives in which we may write about such phenomena.[1] These phenomena lead their lives exclusively, so to speak, in historical narratives. Put differently, when tacitly postulating these subjects of change in the past itself for notions like the Middle Ages, Danto had not yet completely freed himself from the seductions of Mink's Universal History, insofar as it requires us to believe that the items discussed in narrative should always and at all times have a counterpart in the "untold story" that the past itself is.

As Baumgartner emphasizes, the exclusively linguistic character of historical phenomena like the Middle Ages should certainly not be interpreted as an extra argument in favor of Danto's subjectivism.[2] Rather, unity and continuity should be seen as the transcendentalist checks on the use of such notions in the writing of history. In the unity and continuity of historical narrative, we can find the transcendentalist standards for measuring the historian's success in explaining the past. Unity and continuity are the product of narrative synthesis (*autonome historische Synthese*)[3] and do not mirror the features of an object existing in the past itself.[4] This, then, is the meaning we should ascribe to Danto's claim that narrative can explain *as narrative* and that we may discern in narrative explanation what differentiates historical writing from the sciences.[5]

CONCLUSION

William Bossenbrook's two former students—Hayden White and Arthur Danto—have been the two most important American philosophers of history in the second half of the preceding century. White's fame as a historian of philosophy is undisputed: his work has been intensively discussed, commented on, and even imitated by his many followers. But we cannot say the same about Danto. Donagan's review in *History and Theory* of *Analytical Philosophy of History* has set the pattern for most of the later reactions to the book: it is brief and full of praise but does not have much understanding for the true meaning and significance of its content.

The German response to the book has generally been fuller than the Anglo-Saxon one, which is not difficult to explain. Most Anglo-Saxon philosophers of history were introduced to the field by Collingwood's

The Idea of History. Surely this book was a remarkable achievement at the time. But no one—turning from German philosophers such as Hegel, Humboldt, Droysen, Dilthey, and Gadamer to Collingwood—can fail to be disappointed by the shallowness of *The Idea of History* and its absence of sensitivity to the real interest in and about the past. Perhaps Collingwood never developed a historical awareness because he was an archaeologist rather than a historian.

We should not be surprised, therefore, that it was not an Anglo-Saxon but a German philosopher—Hans Michael Baumgartner—who went right to the heart of Danto's book. We should regret even more that Baumgartner did not succeed in prompting the discussion that Danto's book deserves, in either Germany or the Anglo-phone intellectual world.

Danto never closely studied Collingwood,[1] which may explain why he, unlike most other Anglo-Saxon philosophers of history, did not remain enclosed in the narrow limits of intentionalism. As we stated earlier, it was paradoxically the legacy of the CLM that guaranteed Danto's openness to what separates past and present. Again, with the well-deserved demise of the CLM in the 1960s, Danto's Anglo-Saxon colleagues lost this openness. Still today, we find in contemporary Anglo-Saxon philosophy of history three directions: (1) Collingwoodian intentionalism, (2) the scientistic interpretation of historical writing that has become popular in the last few years, and (3) the textualism introduced by Hayden White. Each of these three directions can claim successes and shortcomings. But none of them leaves much room for the asymmetries of past and present that are so brilliantly explored in *Analytical Philosophy of History* and that culminated in the last chapter of *The Transfiguration of the Commonplace*.

This is why Danto's *Analytical Philosophy of History* still awaits a discussion that does justice to the range and richness of its insights and why, at this moment, the book is no less new and stimulating than when it was first published some forty years ago. This also is why this republication of Danto's book is most warmly welcomed.

NOTES

PAGE 3

1 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology* (New York; International Publishers, 1947), p. 22. 'As soon as labor is distributed, each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from which he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, a shepherd, or a critical critic, and must remain so if he does not want to lose his means of livelihood; while in communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd, or critic.' Marx's reluctance to speak in any detail about the classless society was consonant, of course, with his general theory that forms of life and consciousness reflect the material conditions of existence ('the production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the language of real life': *ibid.* pp. 13–14)—so how is one to speak of the 'ideas, conceptions, etc.' which *will* exist under a form of material existence which has never yet existed? Moreover, in the classless society, men are at any rate to be liberated from these material causes, and free to control their lives. So one can only say that at that time things will be 'the opposite' of what they are now, so at best a kind of negative characterization is possible. But it is not easy to positively identify what 'not-*A*' is to designate. Cf. Engels, 'The Origins of Family, Private Property, and the State', in Marx and Engels, *Selected Works* (London; Lawrence & Wishart, 1950), II, 219: 'What we can conjecture at present about the regulation of sex relations after the impending effacement of capitalist production is, in the main, of a negative character, limited mostly to what will vanish.'

2 'If all contradictions are once for all disposed of, we shall have arrived at so-called absolute truth—world history will be at an end. And yet it has to continue, although there is nothing left for it to do—hence, a new, insoluble contradiction.' (Friedrich Engels, 'Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy', in Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, II, 330.) To be sure, Engels here is speaking of Hegel, but in fact the same 'contradiction' holds in his own system. In the classless society, or for post-revolutionary history, the Marxist theories of history will not have application. See the following note.

3 History, apparently, in the Marxist view, admits of a theory only so far as human beings are driven by forces over which they have no control. But in the classless society men will be free from historical forces, and hence 'make their own' history, instead of being 'made by it'. Thus 'The whole sphere of conditions of life which environ man, and which have hitherto ruled man, now comes under the dominion and control of man, who for the first time becomes the real, conscious lord of Nature, because he has now become master of his own social organization. . . . Man's own social organization, hitherto confronting him as a necessity imposed by Nature and history, now becomes the result of his own free action. The extraneous objective forces that have hitherto governed history pass under the control of man himself. Only from that time will man himself, more and more consciously, make his own history. . . . It is the ascent of man from the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom.' Friedrich Engels, 'Socialism: Utopian and Scientific' in Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, II, 140–1.

PAGE 4

1 Immanuel Kant, 'Idea of a Universal History from a Cosmopolitical Point of View', tr. by W. Hastie, in Patrick Gardiner (ed.), *Theories of History* (Glencoe; Free Press, 1959), p. 23.

PAGE 7

1 Karl Löwith, *Meaning in History* (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1957), p. 1. Cf. 'What projects customarily referred to as "philosophies of history" have in common is the aim of giving a comprehensive account of the historical process that "makes sense".' Patrick Gardiner, Introduction in *op. cit.* p. 7.

PAGE 8

1 'Here I should like to say: a wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it, is not part of the mechanism [Maschine].' Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, tr. G. E. M. Anscombe (New York; Macmillan, 1953), para. 271.

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1 Löwith, *op. cit.* p. 1. I cannot accept Löwith's *reasons* for saying this, however, which seem rhetorical.

2 The distinction between prediction and prophecy I borrow from Karl Popper. See his 'Prediction and Prophecy in the Social Sciences', in Gardiner, *op. cit.* pp 276 ff. By 'prophecy', Popper means an unconditional

prediction. He allows only conditional predictions (i.e. given condition *C*, then *E*), or predictions derived from these. He argues that historicists not only give unconditional predictions, but give them for systems where it is not legitimate to do so. Unconditional predictions are licit only when derived from conditional ones, and then with respect to 'well-isolated, stationary, and recurrent systems'. Society is 'open', however. This is not quite the sense I am giving to the notion of prophecy, as will appear. Nor do I find historicism quite so illegitimate as Popper does, here and elsewhere in his writings. Cf. especially *The Poverty of Historicism* (Boston; Beacon Press, 1957), ch. II and *passim*. I deal in part with this in ch. XII.

3 E.g. Hitler, who was given to such utterances as 'The war is won', spoken in the early 40's. Hitler's confident descriptions of the present in the light of a future he gave every appearance of having a special insight into must have accounted, in some measure, for the remarkable power he had over people's minds.

4 Donald Williams, 'More on the Ordinariness of History', *Journal of Philosophy*, LII, no. 10, p. 272.

PAGE 13

1 W. H. Walsh, '"Meaning" in History', in Gardiner, *op. cit.* pp. 296 ff.

PAGE 14

1 G. W. F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, tr. J. Sibree (New York; Willey Book Co., 1944), p. 350. 'We find, moreover, in the east of Europe, the great *Sclavonic* nation. . . . These people did, indeed, found kingdoms and sustain spirited conflicts with the various nations that came across their path. Sometimes as an advanced guard—an intermediate nationality—they took part in the struggle between Christian Europe and unchristian Asia. The Poles even liberated beleaguered Vienna from the Turks; and the Sclaves have to some extent been drawn within the sphere of Occidental Reason. Yet this entire body of peoples remains excluded from our consideration, because hitherto it has not appeared as an independent element in the series of phases that Reason has assumed in the World. Whether it will do so hereafter, is a question that does not concern us here; for in History we have to do with the past.' Again: 'We have confined ourselves to the consideration of the progress of the Idea, and have been obliged to forego the pleasure of giving a detailed picture of the prosperity, the periods of glory that have distinguished the career of people, the beauty and grandeur of the character of individuals, and the interest attaching to their fate in weal and woe. Philosophy concerns itself only with the glory of the Idea mirroring itself in the History of the World.' (*Ibid.* p. 457.)

PAGE 15

1 Jacob Burckhardt, *Force and Freedom: Reflections on History*, tr. J. H. Nichols (New York; Pantheon Books, 1943), p. 80.

2 *Ibid.*

PAGE 19

1 Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, tr. by Crawley (New York; The Modern Library, 1934), bk. I, 1. 'Indeed this was the greatest movement yet known in history, not only of the Hellenes, but of a large part of the barbarian world—I had almost said of mankind. For though the events of remote antiquity, and even those that more immediately preceded the war, could not from lapse of time be clearly ascertained, yet the evidences, which an inquiry carried back as far as was practicable leads me to trust, all point to the conclusion that there was nothing on a great scale, either in war or in other matters.' This statement has been radically misinterpreted by Spengler. Thucydides' 'lack of historical feeling', Spengler writes, 'is conclusively demonstrated on the very first page of his book by the astounding statement that before his time (about 400 B.C.) no events of importance had occured in the world!' (Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West*, tr. by C. F. Atkinson: New York; Knopf, 1946, I, 10.) Thucydides says nothing of the sort, but only that on the basis of the best evidence he knew of, nothing as large-scale as the war between Sparta and Athens had occurred. Spengler says that 'what is absolutely hidden from Thucydides is perspective, the power of surveying the history of centuries, that which for us is implicit in the very conception of an historian.' (*Ibid.*) To be sure, what Thucydides lacked was a predecessor as gifted as himself. And his painstaking accuracy, which even Spengler admires, was meant, as we shall see, for 'all time' so that men might always thenceforth be able to *use* his work. 'Someone said: "The dead writers are remote from us because we *know* so much more than they did." Precisely, and they are that which we know.' T. S. Eliot, 'Tradition and Individual Talent', in *Selected Essays: 1917–1932* (New York; Harcourt Brace, 1932), p. 6.

2 Thucydides, bk. I, xxii. 'With reference to the narrative of events, far from permitting myself to derive it from the first source that came to hand, I did not even trust my own impressions, but it rests partly on what I saw myself, partly on what others saw for me, the accuracy of the report being always tried by the most severe and detailed tests possible. My conclusions have cost me some labor from want of coincidence between accounts of the same occurrences by different eye-witnesses, arising sometimes from imperfect memory, sometimes from undue partiality for one side or the other.' The celebrated description of the plague is a fair example of this: 'I shall simply set down its nature, and the symptoms by which it perhaps may be

recognized by the student, if it should ever break out again. This I can the better do, as I had the disease myself, and watched its operation in the case of others.' (Bk. II, xlviii.) This, incidentally, illustrates as well the sort of *use* to which Thucydides felt his work might in general be put. See the following note.

PAGE 20

1 'The absence of romance in my history will, I fear, detract somewhat from its interest; but if it be judged useful by those inquirers who desire an exact knowledge of the past as an aid to the interpretation of the future, which in the course of human things must resemble if it does not reflect it, I shall be content. In fine, I have written my work, not as an essay which is to win the applause of the moment, but as a possession for all time.' (Bk. II, xxii.)

2 τοιαῦτα καὶ παραπλήσια: 'such and such-*like*'. Liddell and Scott, *Greek-English Lexicon* (New York; Harpers, 1848), p. 1110. That is to say, 'resemble or *exactly* resemble'.

3 'His method was inductive. He cited facts and then drew conclusions from them. He believed in cycles of history and he wished to aid the cause of civilization by showing men how, under a given set of circumstances, individuals, and above all communities, had in the past acted rightly or wrongly, in order that in the future the mistakes of the past might be avoided.' G. B. Grundy, *Thucydides and the History of his Age* (London; John Murray, 1911), p. 8.

PAGE 21

1 See note 1, p. 19. Also: 'The Median war, the greatest achievement of past times, yet found a speedy decision in two actions by sea and two by land. . . . Never had so many cities been taken and laid desolate . . . never was there so much banishing and bloodshedding, now in the field of battle, now in the strife of action. Old stories of occurrences handed down by tradition, but scantily confirmed by experience, suddenly ceased to be incredible; there were earthquakes of unparalleled extent and violence. . . .' (Bk. I, xxiii.)

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1 For instance, his initial emphasis upon the great scale of the war may have been by way of advertising the subject of his history as 'greater and more interesting than that of his predecessor, Herodotus'. (Grundy, *op. cit.* p. 3.) Cf. also the individious contrast with the Persian War, cited in n. 1, p. 21.

PAGE 23

1 Richard Taylor, 'Fatalism', *Philosophical Review*, LXXI, 1 (January, 1962), 56–66.

2 And of course if it *did* have its intended use, the future would *not* have resembled the past. By marking the pockets of quicksand where people have been trapped, one expects the future to be empty of victims of at least these pockets.

3 'We can at least conceive of a change in the course of nature; which sufficiently proves that such a change is not absolutely impossible. To form a clear idea of anything is an undeniable argument for its possibility, and is alone a refutation of any pretended demonstration against it.' (David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, bk. I, part III, sect. vi.) Imaginability is Hume's criterion of logical possibility. If the 'opposite' of a state of affairs *S* is imaginable, *S* is not necessary. So we cannot *demonstrate* that there will be no such change. Nor can we appeal to experience, since this quite begs the question. But we have only demonstration and experience as bases for judgement. Hume's criteria are far too confused to untangle here.

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1 The first philosopher to have held this view, or one closely connected to it, seems to have been Peirce. 'It cannot be denied', he writes, 'that acritical inferences may refer to the Past in its capacity as Past; but according to Pragmaticism, the conclusion of a reasoning power must refer to the Future. For its meaning refers to conduct, and since it is a reasoned conclusion must refer to deliberate conduct, which is controllable conduct. But the only controllable conduct is future conduct. . . . Thus, a belief that Columbus discovered America really refers to the Future.' (C. S. Peirce, *Collected Papers*, edited by C. Hartshorne and P. Weiss: Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard University Press, 1934, V, para. 461.) Again: 'The truth of the proposition that Caesar crossed the Rubicon consists in the fact that the further we push our archeological and other studies, the more strongly will that conclusion force itself on our minds forever—or would so if study were to go on forever.' (*Collected Papers*, V, para. 544.)

2 Russell's view was that every meaningful proposition must be either true or false. His celebrated Theory of Descriptions was specifically engineered to handle sentences whose meaning was plainly understood, but which could not readily be assigned a truth-value, for (1) these sentences seemed to require that there actually exist something for their subject-term to refer to but (2) no such thing existed. Rather than manufacture special entities for such sentences as 'The present King of France is bald' to be *about*, he recast them in such a manner as to require no new entities and to enable one to assign the value 'false' to that sentence and its natural contradictory, meanwhile preserving the Principle of Contradiction. In general, all sentences which employ a singular referring expression as a subject term, and which in fact have no referendum, are *false*. See especially B. Russell, *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, 2nd edition (London; Allen and Unwin, 1920), ch. XVI. Few pieces of recent philosophical analysis have been more heatedly discussed, and indeed the entire recent history of Anglo-American philosophy could be written with specific reference to the Theory of Descriptions. The chief critical attack is due to P. F. Strawson, in his 'On Referring', *Mind*, LIX (July, 1950). The subsequent literature is considerable.

3 I distinguish between '*a* doubts that *p*' and '*a* is sceptical with regard to *p*'. The first implies that *a* believes that not-*p*, while the second implies that *a* has no grounds for choosing between *p* and not-*p*, and suspends belief as between them.

PAGE 32

1 Margaret Macdonald, 'Some Distinctive Features of Arguments used in Criticism of the Arts'. Reprinted in M. Weitz (ed.), *Problems in Aesthetics* (New York; Macmillan, 1960), p. 696.

PAGE 33

1 F. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, II, para. 68. The citation by Freud is in 'The Psychopathology of Everyday Life', in *Basic Writings* (New York; Modern Library, 1938), p. 103.

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1 See C. I. Lewis, *Mind and the World Order* (New York; Dover, 1956), pp. 148–53. Lewis takes the problem up again in *An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation* (Lasalle, Ill.; Open Court, 1946), pp. 197–200. For a discussion of some of the problems, see Evelyn Masi, 'A note on Lewis's Analysis of the Meaning of Historical Statements', *Journal of Philosophy*, XLVI, 21 (1949), 670–4; and Israel Scheffler, 'Verifiability in History: A Reply to Miss Masi', *Journal of Philosophy*, XLVII, 6 (1950), pp. 158–66. Scheffler makes the important point that Lewis's analysis is concerned with 'intensional meaning' rather than with 'objective reference', but it is not clear to me that Lewis *himself* is aware of the distinction, or that, if he were aware of it, he could readily accommodate it to his analysis. And if we drop 'objective reference', what of 'future'?

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1 *Mind and the World Order*, p. 140.

2 *Ibid.* p. 142.

3 Or, as he later put it, 'translated into'. Cf. *An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation*, ch. VII, *passim*, and especially pp. 182–5.

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1 *Mind and the World Order*, p. 149. Cf. *An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation*, p. 197: 'By depicting the meaning of "Caesar died" as consisting in what would verify it to us in future possible experience, this conception may be charged with translating what is past into something which is exclusively future.'

PAGE 37

1 John Dewey, 'Realism without Monism or Dualism: I. Knowledge Involving the Past', *Journal of Philosophy*, XIX, 12 (1922), 314. This is Dewey's fullest statement of what we can recognize as a general Pragmatist thesis. Critics of Pragmatism such as Blanshard, Lovejoy, and Santayana never fail to stress it as a vulnerable point. For a recent discussion, see Richard Gale, 'Dewey and the Problem of the Alleged Futurity of Yesterday', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, XXII, 4, pp. 501 ff.

2 John Dewey, *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy* (New York; Holt, 1910), pp. 160–1.

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1 *Mind and the World Order*, p. 151.

PAGE 39

1 *Mind and the World Order*, p. 151.

2 *Ibid.* p. 153.

PAGE 40

1 David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, bk. I, part I, sect. iii: 'The ideas of memory are much more lively and strong than those of the imagination, and the former faculty paints its objects in more distinct colours than any which are employed by the latter.' Cf. *op. cit.* part III, sect, v. Hume later employed exactly the same criterion for distinguishing between 'ideas' and 'impressions', in order to answer the question: How can I tell whether I am perceiving an *x* or only just thinking about an *x*? (See his *Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, sect. ii.)

2 R. F. Holland, 'The Empiricist Theory of Memory', *Mind*, LXIII, 252 (1954), 466.

3 Bertrand Russell, *The Analysis of Mind* (London; Allen and Unwin, 1921), p. 162. This is not the sole criterion Russell offers: he also mentions 'amounts of context'. Notice that 'feelings of pastness' are supposed to differentiate between near and remote memories: 'feelings of familiarity' are to differentiate between memories *überhaupt* and imaginings.

Whatever the case, Russell's attempts are dominated by accepting as valid the essential question which Hume was concerned with, viz.: 'It seems that there must be some mark or sign whereby a remembering state of mind can be distinguished from an imagining one. So that one proceeds to ask: What is this mark or sign?' (Holland, *loc. cit.* p. 465.) And this is Lewis's problem as well.

4 Bruce Waters, 'The Past and the Historical Past', *Journal of Philosophy*, LII (1955), 253–64.

5 See for example *An Inquiry into the Forgery of the Etruscan Terracotta Warriors in the Metropolitan Museum of Art*, The Metropolitan Museum of Art Papers, no. 11 (1961).

6 *Mind and the World Order*, p. 150. Cf. *An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation*, p. 200, where a similar recourse to challenge is made.

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1 For example, Bertrand Russell, *partout*.

PAGE 45

1 A. J. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic*, 2nd edition (London; Gollancz, 1946), p. 102.

2 *Ibid.*

3 A. J. Ayer, *The Problem of Knowledge* (Penguin Books, 1956), p. 154.

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1 A. J. Ayer, Preface to the Second Edition, *Language, Truth, and Logic*, p. 119.

PAGE 47

1 A. J. Ayer, *The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge* (London; Macmillan, 1940), pp. 167–8.

PAGE 48

1 Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (London; Kegan Paul, 1922), 6.4311.

PAGE 49

1 Preface to Second Edition, *Language, Truth, and Logic*.

PAGE 51

1 For difficulties in this notion, see John Hospers, *An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis* (New York; Prentice Hall, 1953), p. 442.

PAGE 53

1 A. J. Ayer, *The Problem of Knowledge*, p. 160.

2 *Ibid.*

PAGE 54

1 But we might, for example, have 'spases' as well as tenses in our language. Thus, in learning the conjugation of verbs, students would be required to master 'the right-hand present indicative', 'the left-hand future', and so on. We might then have a difficulty in giving a spatially neutral translation of a language so inflected. In fact, we have devices for giving any information spases might allow, just as languages without tenses (for example, Chinese) are able to give information concerning the temporal direction of a reference. English has, in strict grammatical fact, but two distinct tenses. But I shall later show how a good deal of our vocabulary is temporal, quite apart from tenses.

PAGE 55

1 Ayer, *op. cit.* p. 160.

PAGE 58

1 See A. N. Prior, *Time and Modality* (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1957), p. 9.
2 See ch. VIII.

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1 Ayer, *op. cit.* p. 161.

PAGE 66

1 The fastidious may baulk at the suggestion that there are false memories. If what I claim to remember did not happen, then I simply do not remember it. Hence I do not have a memory of it. According to this view, it is analytic that if *a* remembers *E*, then *E* in fact happened. So it may be. This, however, but transfers the problem; the question being now which of what seem to be memories are so in fact. It is this question the sceptic wishes to say that we cannot answer, and cannot, in particular, answer on the basis of a simple examination of our seeming-memories. But then what alternative have I? I plainly cannot examine what these purport to be memories *of*. At all events, I shall hope that my use of the expression 'false memory' is not misleading.
2 H. H. Price, *Thinking and Experience* (Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 84.

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1 David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, bk. I, part III, sect. 3.
2 Bertrand Russell, *The Analysis of Mind* (London; Allen & Unwin, 1921), pp. 159–60.

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1 That is, when 'knows' takes the name of an individual as its accusative. It is then what I call *existence-entailing*. Comparably, '*a* knows that *p*' is *truth-entailing*, for from it the truth of *p* follows logically.
2 But notice that 'is called such-and-such' is a temporally neutral predicate, e.g. in roughly the same way that 'seems to be such and such' is what one might call *existence-neutral*. It does not commit one in the way in which '*is* such and such' does. '*X* is called a father' is compatible with '*X* is not a father'.
3 Bertrand Russell, *op. cit.* p. 160.
4 'But on the contrary, the notion that the world came into being five minutes ago, complete with a population which 'remembered' a wholly unreal past, is fascinating—but untenable.' R. J. Butler, 'Other Dates', *Mind*, LXVII, no. 269 (1959), p. 16.

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1 The literature on this is considerable. For the best recent discussions, see especially C. G. Hempel, 'The Theoretician's Dilemma' in Feigl, Scriven, and Maxwell (eds.), *Concepts, Theories, and the Mind-Body Problem*, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. II (University of Minnesota Press, 1958); and Israel Scheffler, 'Prospects of a Modest Empiricism', *Review of Metaphysics*, X, nos. 3 and 4 (1958).

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1 With the exception of Peirce, whose views on the philosophy of history have yet to be carefully studied. Thus: 'When I say a reductive inference is not a matter for belief at all, I encounter the difficulty that there are certain inferences which scientifically considered are undoubtedly hypotheses, and yet which practically are perfectly certain. Such, for instance, is the inference that Napoleon Bonaparte really lived at about the beginning of this century, a hypothesis which we adopt for purposes of explaining the concordant testimony of a hundred memoirs, the public records of history, traditions, and numberless monuments and relics. It would surely be downright insanity to entertain a doubt about Napoleon's existence.' Nevertheless, the latter is 'quite aside from the purpose of science. . . . It is extra-scientific'. C. S. Peirce, *Collected Papers*, V, para. 589.
2 Cf. 'Theoretical statements offer an explanation of the facts, but not in terms of more facts.' P. Herbst, 'The Nature of Facts', in A. Flew (ed.), *Essays in Conceptual Analysis* (London; Macmillan, 1956).

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1 It is of course not quite fair to Instrumentalism to regard it as a kind of refuge

to which we may retreat when driven back to sceptical attack. It was originally offered, and is surely currently defensible, as a positive theory in its own right, and not as a kind of fall-out shelter.

2 The suggestion is taken from Richard Taylor, 'The "Justification" of Memories and the Analogy of Vision', *Philosophical Review*, LXV, no. 3 (1956), p. 198.

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1 Butler, 'Other Dates', p. 16.

2 Which is precisely the move that Lewis made. All statements purportedly asserting something of physical objects are to be translated out into sets of conditionals involving actions and experiences.

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1 And this statement would hardly be accepted on even an Instrumentalist criterion, for it serves rather poorly to organize the present very coherently.

PAGE 84

1 Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* (New York; Barnes & Noble, 1949), pp. 149–53 and *passim*.

PAGE 88

1 Charles Beard, 'Written History as an Act of Faith', *The American Historical Review*, XXXIX, 2 (1934), p. 219. Reprinted in Hans Meyerhoff (ed.), *The Philosophy of History in Our Time* (New York; Anchor Books, 1959), p. 140. Page references are to the latter.

2 *Ibid.*

3 Beard seems not to have felt it to be an especially ordinary way of looking at history: 'Although this definition of history may appear, at first glance, distressing to those who have been writing lightly about "the science of history", and "the scientific method" in historical research and construction, it is in fact in accord with the most profound contemporary thought about history . . .' (*ibid.*). This is remarkable both for Beard's notion that his characterization is profound and that history, so characterized, is somehow incompatible with any use of 'scientific method'.

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1 *Ibid.*

2 R. Butler, 'Other Dates', p. 32.

PAGE 92

1 See the brilliant paper of David Pears, 'Time, Truth, and Inference', in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, vol. LVI. Reprinted as ch. XI in A. Flew (ed.), *Essays in Conceptual Analysis*.

2 Cf. A. J. Ayer, *The Problem of Knowledge*, p. 152. Much the same considerations apply, I think, to his *deictic* definition of 'is present'. 'The notion of the present . . . may be defined ostensively . . . as the class of events contemporary with *this*, where *this* is any event that one chooses to indicate at the given moment.'

PAGE 94

1 Charles Beard, 'That Noble Dream', *The American Historical Review*, XLI, 1 (1935), pp. 74–87. Reprinted in Fritz Stern (ed.), *The Varieties of History* (New York; Meridian Books, 1956), p. 323. Page references are to the latter. Note that the word 'objectively' in this context contrasts with 'sees through a medium' and so means, roughly, 'perceives directly'. More particularly, Beard means that one does not have, in science, to *infer* propositions about one's subject-matter on the basis of what one does perceive, for one perceives the subject-matter as such. And with history it is quite otherwise.

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1 I refer here, of course, to the important discussion of 'seeing as' and 'aspect blindness' in L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, II, xi. See also N. R. Hanson, *Patterns of Discovery* (Cambridge University Press, 1958), especially ch. I.

2 Beard, *loc. cit.* p. 324.

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1 Claude Bernard, *Introduction à la Médecine Expérimentale* (Paris; 1865), p. 67. Cited by Pierre Duhem, in Philip Wiener (tr.), *The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory* (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1954), pp. 181–2.

2 Duhem, *op. cit.* p. 182.

3 Beard, *loc. cit.* p. 324.

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1 'Thermodynamics can be reduced to a mechanics that post-dates 1866, but it is not reducible to a mechanics as this science was conceived in 1700. Similarly, a certain part of chemistry is reducible to a post-1925 physical theory, though not to a physical theory of a hundred years ago.' Ernest Nagel, 'The Meaning of Reduction in the Natural Sciences', in R. Stauffer (ed.), *Science and Civilization* (Madison; University of Wisconsin Press, 1949). Reprinted in A. Danto and S. Morgenbesser (eds.), *Philosophy of Science* (New York; Meridian Books, 1960), p. 307.

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1 Beard, *loc. cit.* p. 324

PAGE 101

1 Duhem, *op. cit.* p. 183.
2 The best recent discussion is in C. F. Presley, 'Francis Bacon: His Method and His Influence', *The Australian Journal of Science*, XIX, 4 (1957), pp. 138–42.
3 '. . . The Baconian method of induction . . . if consistently pursued, would have left science where it found it.' A. N. Whitehead, *Process and Reality* (New York; Macmillan, 1929), p. 7.

PAGE 103

1 W. H. Walsh, *An Introduction to Philosophy of History* (London; Hutchinsons' University Library, 1951), p. 103.
2 *Ibid.*
3 *Ibid.* p. 107.
4 *Ibid.*

PAGE 105

1 *Ibid.* p. 106.
2 'Common sense, as a system is laws, is delicately ramified, down to the nicest details of behaviour, as evidenced by the fact that we are so seldom surprised in our everyday doings and witnessings. Neither, of course, are infants often surprised: having *no* general notions, every experience is equivalently random, equally expected and unexpected, the infant being an unconscious master of the Principle of Insufficient Reason.' A. Danto, 'On Explanations in History', *Philosophy of Science*, XXIII, 1 (1956), p. 27.
3 Cf. H. P. Grice and P. F. Strawson, 'In Defense of a Dogma', *Philosophical Review*, LXV, 2 (1956), especially pp. 150 ff.
4 F. H. Bradley, 'The Presuppositions of Critical History', in *Collected Essays by F. H. Bradley*, vol. 1 (Oxford University Press, 1935).

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1 Walsh, *op. cit.* p. 108.

PAGE 112

1 Arthur Danto, 'On Historical Questioning', *Journal of Philosophy*, LI (1954), 89–99.

PAGE 113

1 'Since the history of any period embraces all the actualities involved, and since both documentation and research are partial, it follows that the total actuality is not factually knowable to any historian, however laborious, judicial, or faithful he may be in his procedures. History as it actually was . . .

is not known or knowable, no matter how zealously is pursued "the ideal of the effort for objective truth".' C. Beard, 'That Noble Dream', p. 324.

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1 And I am saying that nothing contrasts with this which is recognizably a piece of historical writing. For an analogous point, see the discussion in Christopher Blake, 'Can History be Objective?', *Mind*, LXIV (1955), 61–78, reprinted in P. Gardiner, *Theories of History*, pp. 329–43. Blake cautions us against using the word 'objective' to apply to accounts we cannot so much as imagine, not because an objective account is immeasurably difficult to produce, but because it is by no means clear what we would mean by 'objective account'. Blake writes, after remarking upon the indeterminacy of usage here, that 'we cannot say with any precision what an objective account of anything would be like' (p. 343). He reminds us that 'before we started to wonder, we did know how to use the word'.

PAGE 116

1 Benedetto Croce, *History—Its Theory and Practice*, tr. D. Ainslee (New York; Russell & Russell, 1960). See especially ch. 1, the bulk of which is reprinted in Gardiner, *op. cit.*

PAGE 117

1 W. H. Walsh, *Introduction to Philosophy of History*, p. 31. He writes, however, 'The point on which I want to insist is that, though it is possible to find these two levels of chronicle and history proper throughout written history —though it is possible to find elements of chronicle in the most sophisticated history, and of history proper in the most primitive chronicle—the historical ideal is always to get away from the stage of chronicle and attain that of history itself' (p. 33). I wish to insist, on the other hand, that there are not two kinds of things, portions of which may be found in every instance of historical narration. It is not even a distinction in kinds of activity such as, say, experimenting and theorizing are in physics.

PAGE 119

1 I mean that in the remarks to follow, I am not to be engaged in a strictly *ad hominem* argument against Walsh's views. I shall be taking Walsh's claims as general claims, and I shall be using them to make general points. Walsh has simply thought out with greater clarity and in greater detail certain notions which are very widely held indeed.

PAGE 120

1 Walsh, *op. cit.* p. 32.
2 *Ibid.* p. 33.

PAGE 122

1 Charles S. Peirce, *Collected Papers*, vol. v, para. 146. See particularly the discussion of abduction in N. R. Hanson, *Patterns of Discovery*, pp. 85 ff. For a comparable approach, based upon the falsificationist thesis of Karl Popper, and with specific application to history, see Joseph Agassi, *Towards an Historiography of Science*, printed as Beiheft 2 of *History and Theory* (1963).

PAGE 123

1 But we could hardly imagine the immense variety with which the Last Supper theme was in fact instantiated, only taking into consideration the series beginning with Castagno and ending with Veronese. This relationship between concept and instance is a critical one, and I shall discuss it at some length in connection with my analysis of historical explanation.

PAGE 124

1 'It is no light matter to write the history of painting in Greece', wrote Mary Hamilton Swindler in her important history of the subject, *Ancient Painting* (New Haven; Yale University Press, 1931), p. 109. To begin with, the great paintings are lost. But 'this is not to say that there is no painting left to use, nor that we can form no adequate idea of it' (p. 110). Again, few antique writings go back beyond the third century, and one of the main works, Pliny's, is marred by the fact 'that often he did not understand the authors from whom he drew'. But we apparently are in a position to show this. Finally, we have, for various reasons, the idea that painting was an essentially subordinate art in Greece, a fact which has inhibited us from correctly estimating the force of some of the data. Despite all these things, a narrative of Greek painting can be written.

2 Walsh, *op. cit.* p. 33.

PAGE 125

1 'In the year 1891, Manet and Seurat were already dead; Pissaro, Monet and Renoir were at their height of powers; Cézanne had opened yet another world. *Sunday at la Grande Jatte* and *Le Dejeuner dans le Bois, La Musique aux Tuileries, Les Dames dans un Jardin*, the ochre farms and tawny hills of Aix were there, on canvas, hung, looked at—to be seen by anybody who would learn to see. But were they seen? . . . . For the age of the Impressionists was also still the age of decorum and pomposity, of mahogany and the basement kitchen, the overstuffed interior and the stucco villa; an age that venerated old, rich, malicious women and the clever banker; when places of public entertainment were large, pilastered and vulgar, and anyone who was neither a sportsman, poor, nor very young, sat down on a stiff-backed chair three times a day eating an endless meal indoors.' Sybelle Bedford, *A Legacy*, III, 1.

2 The analogue in the case of memory is that memories do not decay with *time*, but rather as a function of the number of intervening experiencings increases. This is experimentally demonstrable.

PAGE 126

1 Ibn Khaldun, *An Arab Philosophy of History*, tr. and arranged by Charles Issawi (London; John Murray, 1950), pp. 31–2.

PAGE 128

1 See the discussion in P. F. Strawson, *Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics* (London; Methuen, 1959), pp. 20 ff.

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1 Walsh, *op. cit.* p. 32.

PAGE 131

1 Leopold von Ranke, *Preface to Histories of the Latin and German Nations from 1494–1514*. Tr. by the editor in Fritz Stern (ed.), *The Varieties of History*, pp. 55–60.

2 For example, by Pieter Geyl, *Debates with Historians* (New York; Meridian Books, 1958), ch. 1: 'Ranke *is* to be found in his work.'

3 Or that he meant to understand events in just the same way in which those who lived through them understood them. But then 'to understand Greece *wie es eigentlich gewesen* is not only impossible, but it is not even a valid idea of knowledge', writes J. H. Randall Jr. in *Nature and Historical Experience* (New York; Columbia University Press, 1958, p. 64). Randall gives no argument.

PAGE 140

1 W. H. Walsh, '"Plain" and "Significant" Narratives in History', *Journal of Philosophy*, LVIII (1958), 479–84. This is a reply to a paper of mine, 'Mere Chronicle and History Proper', *Journal of Philosophy*, L (1953), 173–82. This, in turn, is an earlier version of part of the present chapter.

PAGE 143

1 Irwin Lieb (ed.), *Charles S. Peirce's Letters to Lady Welby* (New Haven; Whitlock's, 1953), p. 9. Peirce says this in the midst of discussing his theory of Categories. This is complicated enough, but he is also giving *en passant* an account of the sorts of reasons which must have led Kant to the view that Time is a 'form of the internal sense alone'. From the context it is not clear

whether the sentence is asserted by Peirce or imputed by him to Kant, or whether he supposes that Kant implictly subscribed to it. It appears in a tangled, and inconsistent, discussion, but I am not examining Peirce's views as such, only using his statement as representative of a widely held view. Cf. '[People] . . . have very different pictures of the past and the future. The past is thought of as being "there", fixed, unalterable, indelibly recorded in the annals of time, whether we are able to decipher them or not. The future, on the other hand, is regarded as being not merely largely unknown but largely undecided. . . . Thus the future is thought to be open, whereas the past is closed.' A. J. Ayer, *The Problem of Knowledge* (London; Macmillan, 1956), p. 188.

PAGE 145

1 C. S. Peirce, *loc. cit.* p. 9.

2 I allude, of course, to P. F. Strawson, 'On Referring', *Mind* (1950), reprinted in A. Flew (ed.), *Essays in Conceptual Analysis* (London; Macmillan, 1956). I cannot accept Strawson's *general* thesis—see my 'A Note on Expressions of the Referring Sort', *Mind* (1958). So application of it to references to purported future occasions would have to be independently argued. The entire difficulty arises from the view that the truth or falsity of a sentence *S* is independent of the time at which *S* is uttered. Strawson must argue that sentences as such are never either true or false, only *statements* are; and whether these are true or false is very much a matter of the time at which they are asserted. But if we regard sentences without the appropriate temporal information as incomplete, we may then regard sentences when appropriately completed as true independently of the time of their utterance. But this solves none of the epistemological problems I am to be concerned with.

3 See the elementary discussion of this in A. Heyting, *Intuitionism: An Introduction* (Amsterdam; North Holland Publishing Co., 1956), pp. 1 ff. Heyting would justifiably rule out my 'extension' as 'metaphysical'.

4 C. D. Broad, *The Mind and its Place in Nature* (London; Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1925), p. 252.

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1 *Ibid.*

PAGE 147

1 Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, pp. 301–4 and *passim*.

2 For example, Bertrand Russell, *The Analysis of Matter* (London; Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1927), p. 294. '. . . No event lasts for more than a few seconds at most.' By 'event' Russell means a component of an object

having physical structure. On the other hand, 'Whether to call the Battle of Waterloo an event is a matter of words' (p. 293). But see M. Mandelbaum, *The Problem of Historical Knowledge* (New York; Liveright, 1938), p. 254 and *passim*. Mandelbaum regards the Reformation as an event. I shall later introduce the term 'temporal structure' for very large events.

PAGE 148

1 Galileo Galilei, *Dialogo sopra i due massimi sistemi del mondo*, in *Opere* (Florence; Edi. Naz., 1929–39), VII, 129.

2 I appreciate the fact that it is important for maps to be incomplete. 'For when our map becomes as large and in all other respects the same as the territory mapped—and indeed long before this stage is reached—the purposes of a map are no longer served. There is no such thing as an unabridged map; for abridgment is intrinsic to map making.' (Nelson Goodman, 'The Revision of Philosophy', in Sidney Hook (ed.), *American Philosophers at Work*: New York; Criterion Books, 1956, p. 84.) But of course *this* map is not an exact replica: there is as much difference between an event and its description as there is between Pittsburg and a dot. Moreover, the use to which my 'map' is to be put requires completeness.

3 I do not mean to suggest that these are the *only* problems regarding maps.

PAGE 150

1 Benedetto Croce, *History: Its Theory and Practice*, *passim*.

PAGE 151

1 In her book, *Intention* (Oxford; Basil Blackwell, 1957), G. E. M. Anscombe points out that there are many descriptions of an action, only under some of which is an action intentional. I think this a considerable insight, and I want to acknowledge that my own thoughts here were directly stimulated by Miss Anscombe's book.

PAGE 152

1 Alfred North Whitehead, *Adventures of Ideas* (New York; Macmillan, 1933), p. 246.

PAGE 153

1 See Mandelbaum, *op. cit.* chs. I and IV.

2 Max Black, 'Why Cannot an Effect Precede its Cause?', *Analysis*, XVI (1956), 49–58.

PAGE 155

1 For familiar reasons. By definition, p states a necessary condition for q if $\sim p \supset \sim q$. But this is equivalent to $q \supset p$. And this exactly represents the

claim that q is a sufficient condition for p. In brief, whenever p is a necessary condition for q, q is a sufficient condition for p, and conversely.

2 Though of course the so-called mechanical state of a physical system s determines every other state of s for every value of t—including all temporally earlier states of s.

PAGE 158

1 N. R. Hanson would argue that we don't see the same thing they saw, that even, say, a contemporary historian of science and his wife who is totally uninterested in the history of science would not, parity of retinal images notwithstanding, see the same thing when both view the house. See his *Patterns of Discovery* especially ch. 1.

PAGE 164

1 Of course, if B_i is admitted into the range $B_1 \ldots B_n$ marked out by 'is R-ing', this is doubtless because of some strong evidence that B_i in general leads to R, or that failure to B_i leads to a failure of R. Indeed, if one may speculate on the history of language, it may very well be that project-words get applied to various actions in this way. But once the convention is part of common usage, ascription of B_i does not entail the prediction that R.

PAGE 167

1 This is argued in detail in my 'Mere Chronicle and History Proper', *Journal of Philosophy*, L (1953).

PAGE 168

1 Cecil Woodham-Smith, *The Reason Why* (New York; McGraw-Hill, 1954), p. 167.

2 *Ibid.* It is only necessary to pick a history book at random to find examples of this manner of speaking. Thus: 'At the very moment when it seemed that the Papacy should have concentrated all its forces to resist its enemies, it flung itself into the crisis which is known as the Great Schism, and which for forty years was to rend Western Christiandom in twain.' (Henri Pirenne, *History of Europe*: New York; Anchor Books, 1956, II, 122.) 'A disagreeable incident occurred as Erasmus was leaving English soil in January 1500. . . . Yet this mishap had its great advantage for the world, and for Erasmus too, after all. To it the world owes the *Adagia*; and he the fame, which began with this work.' (J. Huizinga, *Erasmus and the Age of Reformation*: New York; Harper Torchbooks, 1958), pp. 34–5.) 'And yet this business, so distasteful in itself, was of supreme importance in world history. This Church, with its collateral sects grown rigid and cut off from all development, was for another millenium and a half to hold nationalities together against the pressure of the barbarians, even to take the place of

nationalities, for it was stronger than state or culture, and therefore survived them both. In it alone there persisted the essence of Byzantism.' (Jacob Burckhardt, *The Age of Constantine the Great*: New York; Anchor Books, 1954, p. 302.) '[Oresme's] work was a step towards the invention of analytical geometry and towards the introduction into geometry of the idea of motion which Greek geometry had lacked.' (A. C. Crombie, *Augustine to Galileo: The History of Science: A.D. 400–1650*: Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard University Press, 1953, p. 261.) This last example (and they could be multiplied endlessly) is quoted in an important paper by Joseph T. Clark, 'The Philosophy of Science and the History of Science', in Marshall Clagett (ed.), *Critical Problems in the History of Science* (Madison, Wisconsin; The University of Wisconsin Press, 1959), p. 127. All my examples are instances of what Father Clark terms *die von unten bis oben geistesgeschichtliche Methode*, a method particularly susceptible to what he terms 'precursitus' (*loc. cit.* p. 103, and note 2, p. 138). Precursitus (if it be a lapse), and the whole *Methode* characterized by Father Clark, are due to narrative description, a mode of description which goes *von später bis früher*.

3 'Men who never think independently have nevertheless the acuteness to discover everything, after it has once been shown them, in what was said long since, though no one ever saw it there before.' Immanuel Kant, *Prolegomena To any Future Metaphysic*, para. 3.

4 Henri Bergson, *La Pensée et le Mouvant* (Paris; Felix Alcan, 1934), p. 23. This passage is cited by Mandelbaum, *op. cit.* p. 29. I am indebted to Professor Mandelbaum for drawing my attention especially to Bergson's discussion.

PAGE 169

1 Perhaps this sentence, though grammatically one, breaks up into a conjunction which contains a sentence in the future tense as one conjunct. Thus, it asserts: (*a*) Aristarchus did such and such at t-1; (*b*) Copernicus will do such and such at t-2; (*c*) t-1 is earlier than t-2; (*d*) so-and-so resembles such and such. But (*b*) shifts tense after 1543, and this confirms the point I make below.

2 This is perhaps questionable. Consider the case of lying. A man intends S to be a lie, but unbeknownst to himself he utters a true sentence. Shall we say he lied anyway, the intention to lie being enough to make of S a lie? Or shall we say that he *tried* or *meant* to lie, and failed? I would say the latter. And similarly I would say the man tried and failed to predict. But this may be simply legislation on my part.

3 Even this wants amplification. Suppose E never happens, so that I cannot stand in any temporal relation to E: I suggest that there must be some implicit time limitation, e.g. at t-1 E is predicted to occur at t-2, so the *full*

prediction is '*E*-at-*t*-2'. If *E* fails to occur at *t*-2, the prediction will be false. But obviously we cannot always make such specifications. I may predict that I will die, but save for special contexts, the date is hidden from me.

PAGE 173

1 See below.
2 Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, p. 223e.

PAGE 183

1 Some historians, of course, appreciate the fact that their temporal distance from an event constitutes an advantage rather than an occupational liability. Thus: 'Il ne faut pas projeter indûment les développements ultérieurs sur la situation précédente, rendre par example Platon "responsable" du skepticisme de la Nouvelle Académie, ni St-Augustin de Jansénius. Mais l'effort même qui me conduit à établir que la Jansénisme est un développement bâtard de l'Augustinisme m'aide puissamment à mieux comprendre ce dernier.' H.-I. Marrou, *De la Connaissance Historique* (Paris; Editions de Seuil, 1959), pp. 46–7.

PAGE 184

1 For plainly it is not a sufficient condition for an action *a* to be free that *a* be intentional.

PAGE 187

1 Gilbert Ryle, *Dilemmas* (Cambridge University Press, 1956), p. 21.
2 Aristotle's opponent is cleverer than Ryle's. 'It makes no difference whether people have or have not actually made the contradictory statements. For it is manifest that the circumstances are not influenced by the fact of an affirmation or denial on the part of anyone. For events will not take place or fail to take place because it was stated that they would or would not take place, nor is this any more the case if the prediction dates back ten thousand years or any other space of time. Wherefore, if through all time the nature of things was so constituted that a prediction about an event was true, then through all time it was necessary that that prediction should find fulfilment.' Aristotle, *On Interpretation*, 18*b*-19*a*, tr. E. M. Edgehill.
3 Denis Diderot, *Jacques le Fataliste* (Paris; Bibliothèque Mondiale, n.d.), p. 19.

PAGE 188

1 *Ibid.* p. 17.

PAGE 189

1 'Yet this view leads to an impossible conclusion; for we see that both deliberation and action are causative with regard to the future, and that, to

speak more generally, in those things which are not continuously actual there is a potentiality in either direction.' Aristotle, *op. cit.* 19*a*.
2 This move is suggested, as is much of my general presentation of the argument thus far, by the interesting discussion in Colin Strang, 'Aristotle and the Sea Battle', *Mind*, LXIX (1960), p. 463. I must emphasize, however, that my argument deviates considerably from Strang's hereafter, and that I attempt rather to reconstruct Aristotle than to defeat his opponent. That is to say, if the opponent is wrong, the problem remains of giving a positive account, which is what I seek to do.

PAGE 190

1 Richard Taylor, 'The Problem of Future Contingencies', *Philosophical Review*, LXVI (1957), p. 3. Taylor gives, in n. 2, a good bibliography of recent discussions on this subject; and part, but only part, of the present analysis is, I think, compatible with Taylor's own excellent account.
2 *On Interpretation*, 18*b*.

PAGE 191

1 *Ibid.*

PAGE 192

1 That is, though neither '*s* will be *F*' nor '*s* will not be *F*' is true or false, the *disjunction* of the two is true. Actually, as I formulate it, it need not be true. Supposing there will be a sea-battle tomorrow, we may say that it will be fatal to the one side, or it will not be. But it need not be fatal nor otherwise if there in fact turns out to be no sea battle. To be sure, 'There will be a sea battle tomorrow or there won't be a sea-battle tomorrow' is perhaps necessarily true (providing they both refer to the *same* tomorrow and that that tomorrow ever comes).

PAGE 193

1 That is, if *S* did take place.
2 That is, if *S* did take place, *S* was either one of *F* or not-*F*.

PAGE 196

1 See the superb discussion in A. N. Prior, *Formal Logic* (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1955), part III, ch. II, sect. 2.

PAGE 197

1 Richard Taylor, *loc. cit.* p. 26.

PAGE 203

1 C. G. Hempel, 'The Function of General Laws in History', *Journal of Philosophy*, XXXIX (1942). Reprinted frequently, but I shall make references

to P. Gardiner (ed.), *Theories of History*. It is fair to say that almost everything since published on the topic has been structured by Hempel's original formulation, whether writers agree with him or not. For a bibliography of post-war literature, see John C. Rule, *Bibliography of Works in the Philosophy of History, 1945–1957*, published as Beiheft 1 of *History and Theory* (1961).

PAGE 204

1 It might seem as though one could hardly take (3) to be common ground and then go ahead and deny (1): for how is one to ascertain that in fact historians' explanations contain no general laws when, if (1) is false, there are no such explanations? (If (3) is true, (1) must be, and so (2) must be false.) Nevertheless, when people assert (3) and deny (1), they have in mind sufficient qualifications to permit this, as will come out in the following discussion.

PAGE 205

1 I speak of Historical Idealists, rather than Historicists, for that word is either too vaguely bestowed or else is too precisely associated with the use given it by Professor Karl Popper, whose views I should wish to quarantine as much as possible, they being rather peculiarly his own.

PAGE 209

1 C. G. Hempel and P. Oppenheim, 'The Logic of Explanation', *Philosophy of Science*, XV (1948). Reprinted in H. Feigl and M. Brodbeck, *Readings in Philosophy of Science* (New York; Appleton, Century & Crofts, 1953).

PAGE 210

1 Hempel, 'The Function of General Laws in History', *loc. cit.* p. 351.
2 See Karl Popper, *The Poverty of Historicism* (Boston; Beacon Press, 1957), p. 144 and *passim*.

PAGE 213

1 Michael Scriven, 'Truisms as Grounds for Historical Explanations', in P. Gardiner (ed.), *Theories of History*; and 'Explanations, Predictions, and Laws', in H. Feigl and G. Maxwell (eds.), *Scientific Explanation, Space, and Time, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, vol. III (Minneapolis; University of Minnesota Press, 1962), pp. 170 ff.
2 Karl Popper, *The Open Society and its Enemies* (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1950), pp. 448 ff. 'If we explain, for example, the first division of Poland in 1772 by pointing out that it could not possibly resist the combined power of Russia, Prussia, and Austria, then we are tacitly using some trivial universal law such as "If of two armies which are about equally well armed and led, one has a tremendous superiority in men, then the

other never wins." . . . Such a law might be described as a law of the sociology of military power; but it is too trivial ever to raise a serious problem for the students of sociology, or to arouse their attention.'
3 Ernest Nagel, *The Structure of Science* (New York; Harcourt Brace & World, 1961), *passim*.
4 William Dray, *Laws and Explanations in History* (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1957), p. 57.

PAGE 214

1 Of course, that an event may be covered by a law, and that a description of an event may be deduced from explanatory premisses containing a general law, may be regarded as distinct theses. They are so treated by Alan Donagan in 'The Popper-Hempel Theory of Historical Explanation', *History and Theory*, IV, 1 (1964). Donagan defends the deductivist account, but rejects the covering law account.
2 Dray, *op. cit.* pp. 66 ff.

PAGE 215

1 See, e.g. William Dray, '"Explaining What" in History', in P. Gardiner (ed.), *Theories of History*.
2 For a rather similar point, see J. Passmore, 'Explanation in Everyday Life, in Science, and in History', *History and Theory*, II (1962), 2.

PAGE 217

1 For if the explanans *Es* could be true simultaneously with the explanandum *Em* being *false*, in what sense would we have explained *Em* with reference to *Es*? Not, of course, that this is enough to establish that an explanation requires a deductive operation, but only that if this is not satisfied, how are we to speak of any kind of explanation at all?
2 Hempel and Oppenheim, 'The Logic of Explanation', *loc. cit.* III, para. 6.

PAGE 224

1 Most notably by Israel Scheffler, 'Explanation, Prediction, and Abstraction', *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, VII (1957), 28. Reprinted in A. Danto and S. Morgenbesser (eds.), *Philosophy of Science*, pp. 274 ff.

PAGE 225

1 See Alan Donagan, *loc. cit.* sect. 7. Donagan, I believe, is not an historicist.

PAGE 228

1 Alan Donagan, 'Explanation in History', *Mind*, LXVI (1957). Reprinted in P. Gardiner (ed.), *Theories of History*. (See p. 430.)

PAGE 229

1 In this regard it is not easy to see how Donagan can, consistently with his assumption that historians explain, go on to affirm the deduction requirement, and at the same time reject the covering law requirement.

PAGE 234

1 Patrick Gardiner, *The Nature of Historical Explanation* (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1952).
2 Ernest Nagel, *The Structure of Science*, pp. 564 ff.

PAGE 235

1 *Ibid.* p. 565.

PAGE 237

1 Bertrand Russell, 'On the Notion of Cause, with Applications to the Free-will Problem', in H. Feigl and M. Brodbeck (eds.), *Readings in Philosophy of Science*.
2 C. G. Hempel, 'The Function of General Laws in History', *loc. cit.* p. 346.

PAGE 239

1 Where, in my own idiom, we proceed from *conceptual* to *documentary* evidence.

PAGE 240

1 C. V. Wedgwood, *The Thirty Years War* (Penguin Books, 1957), p. 167.

PAGE 241

1 G. M. Trevelyan, *England Under the Stuarts* (New York; 1906). Cited in Nagel, *op. cit.* p. 564–5.

PAGE 242

1 See A. Danto, 'On Historical Questioning', *loc. cit.*

PAGE 246

1 Thus you cannot say that Louis XIV died unpopular because he ate poisoned lobster: for *that* only explains why he *died*. Indeed, it would not even enter into an explanation of why he died unpopular.

PAGE 249

1 W. B. Gallie, 'Explanations in History and the Genetic Sciences', reprinted in Gardiner (ed.), *Theories of History*, pp. 386 ff.

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1 J. W. N. Watkins, 'Historical Explanation in the Social Sciences', *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* (1957). Reprinted in P. Gardiner (ed.), *Theories of History*. Page references are to the Gardiner volume. The passage cited is there on p. 505.
2 H.-I. Marrou, *De la Connaissance Historique* (Paris; Editions du Seuil, 1959), p. 177. Strictly speaking the cited sentence is plainly false: experience furnishes examples of masses of organisms other than human individuals. It indeed furnishes us with examples of organisms which have other organisms as parts of themselves. It is a moot point whether it furnishes examples of organisms which have human individuals as parts of themselves. But surely it is only this point that Marrou is concerned with.

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1 *Ibid.*
2 Watkins, *loc. cit.* p. 505.

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1 C. V. Wedgwood, *The Thirty Years War* (Pelican Books, 1957), p. 339.

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1 *Ibid.* pp. 339–40.

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1 *Ibid.*
2 *Ibid.*

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1 Watkins, *loc. cit.* p. 511.

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1 H.-I. Marrou, *op. cit.* p. 177. Cf. pp. 163 ff.
2 Watkins, *loc. cit.* p. 505.
3 The literature on Methodological Individualism is substantial, but much of it fails to make the distinctions I feel are crucial. For background, see Watkins's earlier paper, 'Ideal Types and Historical Explanation', *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* (1952), reprinted in H. Feigl and M. Brodbeck, *Readings in the Philosophy of Science* (New York, 1953). Criticisms may be found in M. Mandelbaum, 'Societal Facts', *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* (1955); L. Goldstein, 'The Inadequacy of the Principle of Methodological Individualism', *Journal of Philosophy* (1956); E. Gellner, 'Holism versus Individualism in History and Sociology,' *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* (1956). The papers of Mandelbaum (which I shall discuss

on p. 270 ff.) and of Gellner are both reprinted in Gardiner, *op. cit.* which also contains a brief note—'Reply to Mr. Watkins'—by Gellner. In addition see the earlier discussions. See F. A. Hayek's two books, *Individualism and the Economic Order* and *The Counter Revolution of Science*, as well as Karl Popper's *The Open Society and its Enemies* and *The Poverty of Historicism*.

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1 Hence Professor Popper is perfectly justified when, in ch. 14 of *The Open Society and its Enemies*, he condemns Psychologism and recommends Methodological Individualism, and Mr Gellner is in logical error when he seeks to rebut Methodological Individualism through arguing against Psychologism, feeling that the two cannot be distinguished. See 'Holism versus Individualism in History and the Social Sciences', in Gardiner, *op. cit.* 501 and n. 9.
2 Page references will be to the Gardiner volume.
3 *Ibid.* p. 479. I do not believe that the adjective 'specific' is to be taken as a rejection of reference to anonymous individuals.
4 *Ibid.* p. 478.
5 *Ibid.* p. 483.

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1 *Ibid.*
2 *Ibid.* p. 486.
3 *Ibid.* p. 488. A philosophical puritan would strenuously object to the notion that facts are able to interact, or that facts can possibly come into conflict. *Things* can interact, things and propositions can come into conflict. But this relaxed use of 'fact' does not intrinsically damage Mandelbaum's argument, and can readily be reconstructed.
4 *Ibid.* p. 481.

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1 *Ibid.* p. 482. Should the 'theoretical possibility', though 'practical impossibility', of such a translation be demonstrated this would 'be significant from the point of view of a general ontology, but would not affect my argument regarding the autonomy of the societal sciences'.

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1 Watkins, 'Historical Explanation in the Social Sciences', p. 509.
2 *Ibid.*

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1 See in particular ch. 11 of his *The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation* (New York; Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961).

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1 'What I regard as the real issue is something like this: social scientists can be rougly and crudely divided into two main groups: those who regard social processes as proceeding, so to speak, under their own steam, according to ther own nature and laws, and dragging the people involved along with them; and those who regard social processes as the complicated outcome of the behavior of human beings.' J. W. N. Watkins, personal letter, dated 11 January 1962.

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1 Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, eds., *Les Oeuvres de Descartes* (Paris: Vrin, 1908), vol. 7, p. 6ff. The passage is cited by Vico himself. See *Opere G.B. Vico* (Bari: Laterza, n.d.), vol. 1, p. 274. The attitude of Descartes toward history is discussed by Isaiah Berlin, *Vico and Herder* (London: Hogarth Press, 1976), p. 36. I am grateful to Professor Berlin for helping me locate this vivid passage.

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1 R. W. Southern, *The Making of the Middle Ages* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), p. 16.

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1 G. W. F. Hegel, *Reason in History*, trans. R. S. Hartman (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1953), p. 11.
2 Allardyce Nicoll, *The World of Harlequin* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 188.

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1 Arthur C. Danto, *Analytical Philosophy of History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), vii; Arthur C. Danto, *Narration and Knowledge* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), xv.
2 "Metaphysics has often been revisionary, and less often descriptive. Descriptive metaphysics is content to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world, revisionary metaphysics is concerned to produce a better structure" (P. F. Strawson, *Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics* [London: Methuen, 1971], 9).

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1 Hans Michael Baumgartner, *Kontinuität und Geschichte: Zur Kritik and Metakritik der historischen Vernunft* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1972).
2 Donagan, review, 432.

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1 Danto proposed the Latin *supinum*-form *explanatum* as a refinement of the better-known *gerundivum* of *explanandum*.
2 Danto, *Analytical Philosophy of History*, 220–232; Danto, *Narration and Knowledge*, 220–232.

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1 Donagan also criticizes Danto for mistakenly attributing to "Croce, Dilthey and Collingwood" the view that historians "explain" the past in the way that scientists do (review, 433, 434). But as any reader of Danto's book will see, Donagan uses here the fact that the English verb *explain* may mean both *Verstehen* and *Erklären*, in order to accuse Danto of being blind to Croce's, Dilthey's, and Collingwood's insistence that historical explanation typically is a matter of Verstehen rather than of Erklären.
2 *Danto and His Critics: Art History, Historiography and After the End of Art* (*History and Theory*, theme issue 37, 1998). Only one essay in this issue—my own—deals with Danto's philosophy of history.
3 Arthur C. Danto, *The Transfiguration of the Commonplace* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981); N. Carroll, "The Transfiguration of the Commonplace; the Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art; the State of the Art," *History and Theory* 29 (1990): 111–125.
4 Danto, *Narration and Knowledge*.
5 We could regard these three new chapters as a kind of "missing link" between *Analytical Philosophy of History* and *The Transfiguration of the Commonplace*.
6 Danto's Hegelianism can best be summarized using Hegel's well-known statement in the "Vorrede" of his Rechtsphilosophie, stating that true philosophical wisdom is always a wisdom after the event: "Wenn die Philosophie ihr Grau in Grau malt, dann ist eine Gestalt des Lebens alt geworden, und mit Grau in Grau lässt sie sich nicht verjüngen, sondern nur erkennen; die Eule der Minerva beginnt erst mit der einbrechenden Dämmerung ihren Flug" (G. W. F. Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts* [Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1956], 17).
7 As with the essay mentioned in note 9, I shall not discuss here my own essay on Danto in *History and Theory* of a few years ago: Frank R. Ankersmit, "Danto and the Tragedy of Human Existence," *History and Theory* 42 (2003): 291–305 (originally written for a conference on Danto's works at Columbia University in 2001).

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1 Frederick A. Olafson, "Narrative History and the Concept of Action," *History and Theory* 19 (1970): 265–289.

2 Ibid., 270.
3 Arthur C. Danto, "The Decline and Fall of Analytical Philosophy of History," in *A New Philosophy of History*, ed. Frank R. Ankersmit and H. Kellner (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 71. The title of this essay makes us wonder whether we should look at it as Danto's recantation of his book on the analytical philosophy of history. It is true that in this essay Danto makes some very harsh comments about philosophy of history in general, characterizing it as a philosophical subdiscipline without any value and interest. The argument in the essay, however, is directed exclusively against the logical-positivist tradition in philosophy of history, and perhaps we can agree with him about this.
4 See Rex Martin for the same criticism: "The really interesting thing about Danto's argument . . . is that it avoids all mention of intentions, or even of situational motivations. The whole analysis is denatured, as it were. We are given simply deeds under a description, redescriptions of these, and the deductive derivation—perhaps at a very high level of generality of one of the redescriptions. But the cost of avoiding reference to 'thoughts' (purpose, situational motivation) in favor of mere redescriptions of deeds is, I think, a heavy one" (*Historical Explanation: Reenactment and Practical Inference* [Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977], 112). As I will argue, this argument demonstrates only the extent to which Collingwood's legacy has misled philosophers of history.

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1 Olafson, *Narrative History*, 272.
2 Ibid., 271.

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1 Don't we all know by heart David Hume's famous statement in his *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*: "It is universally acknowledged that there is a great uniformity among the actions of men, in all nations and ages, and that human nature remains still the same, in its principles and operations"; and don't we all know, as historically educated modern scholars, what faults we nowadays are expected to find in this statement?

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1 Danto, *Narration and Knowledge*, 285.

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1 Arthur C. Danto, *Connections to the World* (New York: Harper & Row, 1989), 249.

2 I must confess that this is, to a certain extent, a popularization of Danto's own far more sophisticated argument. For a formal justification of it, I refer the reader to what Danto wrote in the last chapter of *The Transfiguration of the Commonplace* about intentional contexts and to where the statement "s is true" corresponds to true description and the statement "P believes that s is true," to representation.

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1 Danto, *Analytical Philosophy of History*, 159ff.; Danto, *Narration and Knowledge*, 159ff.
2 For example, Danto, *Analytical Philosophy of History*, 183ff.; Danto, *Narration and Knowledge*, 183ff.
3 "Jener Zusammanhang enthält nämlich dies, dass in der Welgeschichte durch die Handlungen der Menschen noch etwas anderes überhaupt herauskomme, als sie bezwecken und erreichen, als sie unmittelbar wissen und wollen. Sie vollbringen ihr Interesse; aber es wird noch ein Ferneres damit zustande gebracht, das auch innerlich darin liegt, aber das nicht in ihrem Bewusstsein und Absicht lag" (G. W. F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte. Band 1: Die Vernunft in der Geschichte* [Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1970], 88). Reason uses this discrepancy between intention and unintended results for the insidious realization of its own purposes; Hegel speaks here of "the cunning of Reason."
4 For an elaboration of this, see Frank R. Ankersmit, *Sublime Historical Experience* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2005), chap. 8.

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1 "We would not be in a position to point out the unintended consequences of an action unless we had some prior knowledge of the intention of the action itself" (Olafson, *Narrative History*, 277).
2 Olafson, *Narrative History*, 275.
3 Danto, *Analytical Philosophy of History*, 152; Danto, *Narration and Knowledge*, 152.

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1 Frederick A. Olafson, *The Dialectic of Action: A Philosophical Interpretation of History and the Humanities* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 82ff.
2 Paul Ricoeur repeats Olafson's mistake: "Nothing therefore indicates that the something more that a narrative has in relation to a simple enumeration of events is different from the twofold structure of reference in the narrative sentence, thanks to which the meaning or truth of one event is relative to the meaning and truth of another event" (*Time and Narrative*,

vol. 1, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984], 148).
3 Olafson, *Narrative History*, 276.

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1 But what exactly? That's the secret of narrative logic.

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1 Martin Bunzl, *Real History: Reflections on Historical Practice* (London: Routledge, 1997), 32.
2 For this argument, see, for example, Louis O. Mink, "Narrative Form as a Cognitive Instrument," in *Louis Mink: Historical Understanding*, ed. B. Fay, E. O. Golob, and R. T. Vann (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987), 184.

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1 Bunzl, *Real History*, 35–40.
2 Ibid., 43.

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1 Danto, *Analytical Philosophy of History*, 9; Danto, *Narration and Knowledge*, 9. Danto makes clear with this argument that substantive or speculative philosophies of history should not be reduced to the claim to predict the future only, as they also will affect the way we look at the past. More specifically, a substantive or speculative philosophy of history requires us to see the past from the perspective of the future. No such perspective is proposed in "normal" historical writing. H. Fain lost sight of this when he criticized Danto's attack on substantive or speculative philosophy of history with the argument that Hegel avoided, in order to speak about the future except in a very general sense (*Between Philosophy and History* [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970], 225, 226). Fain's observation about Hegel is undoubtedly true, but he forgot that Hegel's substantive philosophy of history also affected the way he spoke about the *past*, which was only what Danto had in mind here.

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1 When thinking about the dilemma, we should begin by considering Nancy Struever's claim, in *The Language of History in the Renaissance* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973), that all historical awareness and all progress in the history of historical writing always were made in the name of the nominalist option.
2 Mink, "Narrative Form," 189.
3 Ibid., 189–191.

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1 Ibid., 194.
2 Ibid.
3 We may specifically think here of D. Carr, *Time, Narrative and History* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), and his attack on Mink's claim that "stories are not lived but told."
4 Hans Georg Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1960), 207.

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1 Louis O. Mink, "Philosophical Analysis and Historical Understanding," in *Louis Mink: Historical Understanding*, ed. B. Fay, E. O. Golob, and R. T. Vann (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987), 139, 140.

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1 Needless to say, this notion of figure calls to mind all that Hayden White said about "figure" and "prefiguration" in *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in the Nineteenth Century* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), and rightly so, if only because White and Mink were colleagues at Wesleyan University and were very much aware of each other's historical thought.
2 Louis O. Mink, "History and Fiction as Modes of Comprehension," in *Louis Mink: Historical Understanding*, ed. B. Fay, E. O. Golob, and R. T. Vann (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987), 57.
3 This does not mean that historical agents themselves may not start to tell stories to themselves about what has happened to them—stories that later sometimes will be taken up and refined by historians. But the fact that historical agents themselves may already have begun to historicize their lives is not an argument against Mink's claims. On the contrary, it shows how deep the claim really goes, that it is truly part of the *condition humaine*. At the level of life itself we already are torn apart by how life is lived, on the one hand, and the stories we tell ourselves about our lives, on the other. Much of the drama of psychoanalysis has its origins here.
4 A similar criticism of Danto was formulated by Ricoeur: "In my opinion, if the question of the relationship between text and sentence is not posed as such, it is due to the excessive emphasis placed upon the quarrel Danto has with the phantom of complete description, and the fact that this phantom is exorcized through the analysis of narrative sentences" (*Time and Narrative*, 149).
5 Jürgen Habermas, *Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970). Danto's book also is mentioned in Karl Acham, *Analytische Geschichtsphilosophie* (Freiburg: Alber, 1974), which introduced a

generation of German theorists into Anglo-Saxon philosophy of history. But Acham's brief remarks on Danto are without interest and are not discussed in this section.
6 Jürgen Habermas, *Erkenntnis und Interesse* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1973), 320, 332; Jürgen Habermas, *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Band 2. Zur Kritik der funktionalistischen Vernunft* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1987), 207.

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1 I certainly owe it to Jurgen that the book is known in the first place in Germany. I have a vivid memory of meeting him in New York. He was teaching at the New School, and he sent me a letter about the book. I invited him up for lunch, with no really clear idea of who he was or how important he was. I asked Charles Parsons, who did know these things, to come along. We had a lively discussion. As we left the Faculty House, he said that by applying analytical pressure to the questions it discussed, the book overcame the difference between analytical philosophy and hermeneutics. I think that was something he respected and aspired to achieve himself. After that, the book was translated into German. He invited me to come to lecture at Starnberg, at the Max Planck Institute, at a time when I was working out some of my first thoughts in the philosophy of art. I feel as though there is between us a very powerful bond of friendship, though we do not often meet.
2 Danto, *Analytical Philosophy of History*, 142; Danto, *Narration and Knowledge*, 142 (italics in original).
3 Nor that Danto's statement has also worried many non-Marxist theorists.
4 Werner M. Jocks, *Analytische Geschichtsphilosophie: Philosophische Begründung der Geschichte oder Rechtfertigung historischer Aussagen?* (Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1980), 235.

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1 Werner Schiffer, *Theorien der Geschichtsschreibung und ihre erzähltheoretische Relevanz: Danto, Habermas, Baumgartner, Droysen* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1980). The organization of this book is surprising: Schiffer begins with Danto, Habermas, and Baumgartner and then ends with a discussion of Droysen, comprising the major part of the book. This organization, however, could be seen as paying a compliment to Danto's thesis that the past's meaning (Droyen) could be discovered only from the perspective of the present (Danto, Habermas, and Baumgartner).
2 White rarely mentions and discusses the best-known contemporary narrative theorists (scholars such as Bal, Barthes, Benveniste, Chatman, Culler, Eco, Genette, Greimas, Riffaterre, and Todorov). See, for

example, the entry "structuralist narratology," in *Routledge Encyclopedia of Narrative Theory*, ed. D. Herman, M. J. Jahn, and M. L. Ryan (London: Routledge, 2005), 571–576.

3 Hayden V. White, ed., *The Uses of History: Essays in Intellectual and Social History: Presented to William J. Bossenbrook* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1968). In the preface White wrote that the Festschrift's main purpose was "to commemorate the career of an inspiring teacher. Bossenbrook's lectures were characterized by an intensity of involvement in intellectual matters, unfailing courtesy and good humor, irony, and a surpassing power to endow ideas with the palpability of perceivable objects" (9).

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1 Schiffer, *Theorien*, 29ff.
2 Ibid., 32.
3 Baumgartner, *Kontinuität und Geschichte*, 278ff.

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1 Ibid., 281.
2 I also am reminded here of what I said about Danto's use of the term "Renaissance" at the end of section 2.
3 "Im Licht dieser Uberlegungen erweist sich die Präokkupation durch das geschichtstheoretische Paradigma der Biographie als irreführend" (Baumgartner, *Kontinuitätt und Geschichte*, 299).
4 This is the thesis I also defended in Frank R. Ankersmit, *Narrative Logic: A Semantic Analysis of the Historian's Language* (Boston: Nijhoff, 1983).

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1 P. F. Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (London: Methuen, 1966).
2 "Eine Erzählung vermag nur dann zu erklären wenn ihr ein einheitliches und kontinuierliches Subjekt zugrunde liegt" (Baumgartner, *Kontinuitätt und Geschichte*, 289).

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1 For a similar, though technically more refined and more detailed, argument, see Ankersmit, *Narrative Logic*, chap. 5.
2 Baumgartner, *Kontinuitätt und Geschichte*, 294.
3 Ibid., 299.
4 We cannot properly say that Napoleon himself is "continuous," although we may well say this of a *historical account* of his life. See Baumgartner, *Kontinuitätt und Geschichte*, 301.

5 A response close to Baumgartner's was presented by the influential Russian philosopher of history Andrej Oleynikov in "The Experience of Time and the Subject of Narration: The Problem of Their Correlation in Phenomenology and in the 'New' Philosophy of History," *Dialogue with Time: Intellectual History Review* 6 (2001): 248–274. This essay is based on the author's "History: Event and Story, a Critical Analysis of Narrativist Philosophy of History" (Ph.D. diss., Moscow University, 1999). Oleynikov emphasized in both this essay and his dissertation that the phenomenological approach to historical writing (Ricoeur and Carr) could never do justice to Danto's claims about the asymmetries of past and future.

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1 As one may infer from Danto's "resounding silence" on Collingwood.

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