EDMUND HUSSERL
COLLECTED WORKS

VOLUME III

VOLUME I Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy
THIRD BOOK: Phenomenology and the Foundations of the Sciences

VOLUME II Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy
FIRST BOOK: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology

VOLUME III Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy
SECOND BOOK: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution

TRANSLATIONS
PREPARED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF
THE HUSSERL-ARCHIVES (LEUVEN)

EDMUND HUSSERL

IDEAS PERTAINING TO A PURE PHENOMENOLOGY AND TO A PHENOMENOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY

SECOND BOOK
STUDIES IN THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF CONSTITUTION

TRANSLATED BY
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KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS
DORDRECHT / BOSTON / LONDON

ISBN 0–7923–0713–5 (paperback)

Published by Kluwer Academic Publishers,
P.O. Box 17, 3300 AA Dordrecht, The Netherlands.

Kluwer Academic Publishers incorporates
the publishing programmes of
D. Reidel, Martinus Nijhoff, Dr W. Junk and MTP Press.

Sold and distributed in the U.S.A. and Canada
by Kluwer Academic Publishers,
101 Philip Drive, Norwell, MA 02061, U.S.A.

In all other countries, sold and distributed
by Kluwer Academic Publishers Group,
P.O. Box 322, 3300 AH Dordrecht, The Netherlands.

05-0200-250 ts
Second printing 1993, Third printing 1996, Fourth printing 1998, Fifth printing 2000

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Printed in the Netherlands

CONTENTS

TRANSLATORS' INTRODUCTION XI
FOREWORD XVII

SECOND BOOK
STUDIES IN THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF CONSTITUTION

Section One
The Constitution of Material Nature

CHAPTER ONE: THE IDEA OF NATURE IN GENERAL
§ 1. Preliminary delineation of the concepts of nature and experience. (Exclusion of meaning predicates) 3
§ 2. The natural-scientific attitude as a theoretical attitude 4
§ 3. Analysis of the theoretical attitude, of the theoretical interest . . 5
§ 4. Theoretical acts and "pre-giving" intentional lived experiences . 6
§ 5. Spontaneity and passivity; actuality and inactuality of consciousness 13
§ 6. The distinction between the transition into the theoretical attitude and the transition into reflection 15
§ 7. Objectivating and non-Objectivating acts and their correlates . . 17
§ 8. The sense-objects as primal constitutive objects 19
§ 9. Categorial and aesthetic ("sensuous") synthesis 19
§ 10. Things, spatial phantoms, and the data of sensation 23
§ 11. Nature as sphere of mere things 27

CHAPTER TWO: THE ONTIC SENSE-STRATA OF THE THING OF INTUITION AS SUCH
§ 12. Material and animal nature . . . 30
§ 13. The significance of extension for the structure of "things" in general and of material things in particular . . . 32
§ 14. The significance of extension for the structure of animalia . . . 35
§ 15. The essence of materiality (substance) . . . 36
a) Phenomenological analysis of the givenness of the thing as a way toward determining the essence, "material thing." . . . 37
b) Mobility and alterability as constituents of the material thing; the thing-schema . . . 39
c) Exhibition of the materiality of the thing by way of its dependence on circumstances . . . 44
d) The schema as real determinateness of the material thing . . 46
e) More precise determination, redetermination, and cancellation of the thing-experience . . . 48
§ 16. The constitution of the properties of the thing in multiple relations of dependency . . . 49
§ 17. Materiality and substantiality . . . 58

CHAPTER THREE: THE AESTHETA IN THEIR RELATION TO THE AESTHETIC BODY
§ 18. The subjectively conditioned factors of the constitution of the thing; the constitution of the Objective material thing . . . 60
a) The intuitive qualities of the material thing in their dependencies on the experiencing subject-Body . . . 60
b) The significance of *normal* perceptual conditions for the constitution of the intuited thing and the significance of abnormalities . . . 63
c) The significance of psychophysical conditionality for the various levels of constitution . . . 70
d) The physicalistic thing . . . 80
e) Possibility of the constitution of an "Objective nature" on the solipsistic level . . . 82
f) Transition from solipsistic to intersubjective experience . . . 83
g) More precise characterization of the physicalistic thing . . . 89
h) The possibility of the constitution of an "Objective nature" at the level of intersubjective experience . . . 94

Section Two
The Constitution of Animal Nature

INTRODUCTION
§ 19. Transition to the consideration of the soul as a natural Object . 96
§ 20. The sense of the ordinary talk about the "psychic" . . . 97
§ 21. The concept of "I as man" . . . 99

CHAPTER ONE: THE PURE EGO
§ 22. The pure Ego as Ego-pole . . . 103
§ 23. The possibility of grasping the pure Ego (the Ego-pole) . . . 107
§ 24. "Mutability" of the pure Ego . . . 110
§ 25. Polarity of acts: Ego and Object . . . 111
§ 26. Alert and dull consciousness . . . 114
§ 27. "I as man" as part of the content of the environment of the pure Ego . . . 115
§ 28. The real Ego constituted as transcendent Object; the pure Ego as given in immanence . . . 117
§ 29. Constitution of unities within the sphere of immanence. Persistent opinions as sedimentations in the pure Ego . . . 118

CHAPTER TWO: PSYCHIC REALITY
§ 30. The real psychic subject . . . 128
§ 31. The formal-universal concept of reality . . . 133
§ 32. Fundamental differences between material and psychic reality . 134
§ 33. More precise determination of the concept of reality . . . 144
§ 34. Necessity of the distinction between the naturalistic and the personalistic attitudes . . . 147

CHAPTER THREE: THE CONSTITUTION OF PSYCHIC REALITY THROUGH THE BODY
§ 35. Transition to the study of the constitution of "man as nature" 151
§ 36. Constitution of the Body as bearer of localized sensations (sensings) . . . 152
§ 37. Differences between the visual and tactual realms . . . 155
§ 38. The Body as organ of the will and as seat of free movement . . 159
§ 39. Significance of the Body for the constitution of higher Objectivities . . . 160
§ 40. More precision concerning the localization of the sensings and concerning the non-thingly properties of the Body . . . 161
§ 41. Constitution of the Body as material thing in contrast to other material things . . . 165
a) The Body as center of orientation . . . 165
b) Peculiarity of the manifolds of appearance of the Body . . . 167
b) The Body as integral part of the causal nexus . . . 167
§ 42. Character of the Body as constituted solipsistically . . . 168

CHAPTER FOUR: THE CONSTITUTION OF PSYCHIC REALITY IN EMPATHY
§ 43. Givenness of other animalia . . . 170
§ 44. Primal presence and appresence . . . 170
§ 45. Animalia as primally present Corporeal bodies with appresented interiority . . . 171
§ 46. Significance of empathy for the constitution of the reality "I as man." . . . 175
§ 47. Empathy and the constitution of nature . . . 178

Section Three
The Constitution of the Spiritual World

§ 48. Introduction 181

CHAPTER ONE: OPPOSITION BETWEEN THE NATURALISTIC AND PERSONALISTIC WORLDS

§ 49. The personalistic attitude versus the naturalistic 183
a) Introjection of the soul as presupposition even for the naturalistic attitude 184
b) Localization of the psychic 187
c) Temporalization of the psychic. (Immanent time and space-time) 188
d) Reflection on method 189
e) The naturalistic attitude and the natural attitude 190
§ 50. The person as center of a surrounding world 194
§ 51. The person in personal associations 200
§ 52. Subjective manifolds of appearance and Objective things 211
§ 53. The relationship between the consideration of nature and the consideration of the spirit 219

CHAPTER TWO: MOTIVATION AS THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF THE SPIRITUAL WORLD

§ 54. The Ego in the *inspectio sui* 223
§ 55. The spiritual Ego in its comportment toward the surrounding world 226
§ 56. Motivation as the fundamental lawfulness of spiritual life . . . 231
a) Motivation of reason 231
b) Association as motivation 233
c) Association and experiential motivation 235
d) Motivation in its noetic and noematic aspects 238
e) Empathy toward other persons as an understanding of their motivations 239
f) Natural causality and motivation 241
g) Relations between subjects and things from the viewpoint of causality and of motivation 243
h) Body and spirit as comprehensive unity: "spiritualized" Objects 248
§ 57. Pure Ego and personal Ego as Object of reflexive self-apperception 259
§ 58. The constitution of the personal Ego prior to reflection 263
§ 59. The Ego as subject of faculties 266
§ 60. The person as subject of acts of reason, as "free Ego" 269
a) The "I can" as practical possibility, as neutrality modification of practical acts, and as original consciousness of abilities 270

b) The "I can" motivated in the person's knowledge of himself. Self-apperception and self-understanding 277
c) The influence of others and the freedom of the person . . . 281
d) General type and individual type in understanding persons . 282
§ 61. The spiritual Ego and its underlying basis 288

CHAPTER THREE: THE ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY OF THE SPIRITUAL WORLD OVER THE NATURALISTIC

§ 62. The interlocking of the personalistic attitude and the naturalistic attitude 294
§ 63. Psychophysical parallelism and interaction 302
§ 64. Relativity of nature, absoluteness of spirit 311

Supplements

SUPPLEMENT I: Attempt at a step-wise description of constitution 319
SUPPLEMENT II: The Ego as pole and the Ego of habitualities . . 324
SUPPLEMENT III: The localization of the ear noises in the ear . . . 324
SUPPLEMENT IV: Sketch of an introduction to "The constitution of the spiritual world." 325
SUPPLEMENT V: The pregivennesses of the spirit in spiritual life . 328
SUPPLEMENT VI: *Inspectio sui* ("I do" and "I have") 329
SUPPLEMENT VII: The Ego and its "over-and-against." 330
SUPPLEMENT VIII: On the unity of "Body" and "spirit" 333
SUPPLEMENT IX: Spiritual products 333
SUPPLEMENT X: Personal Ego and surrounding world (333)—The levels of the constitution of Objective reality (336)—Pure Ego and personal Ego (337) 333
SUPPLEMENT XI: The human being apprehended in an inductive-natural way and the free person 340
SUPPLEMENT XII: Supplements to Section Three 344

I. THE PERSON—THE SPIRIT AND ITS PSYCHIC BASIS
§ 1. The distinction between primal sensibility and *intellectus agens* 344
§ 2. Sensibility as the psychic basis of the spirit 346
Excursus: impression and reproduction 348
§ 3. Development of the Ego—Ego-action and Ego-affection 349

II. SUBJECTIVITY AS SOUL AND AS SPIRIT IN THE ATTITUDE OF THE NATURAL SCIENCES AND IN THE ATTITUDE OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES
§ 1. The reality of the soul and of the human being 351

§ 2. Psychophysical causality and the causal nexus of things 354
§ 3. Possibility of the insertion of the soul into nature . . . 355
§ 4. The human being as spiritual subject 357
§ 5. Empathy as spiritual (not naturalistic) relation between subjects 358
§ 6. Spiritual Ego and psychological Ego.—Constitution of the Ego as self-apperception 358
§ 7. Subjects considered as nature and as spirit 362
§ 8. Distinction between a psychological and a psychophysical analysis 366
§ 9. Stream of consciousness, lived experience, and intentional correlates as nexuses of psychic life 369
§ 10. The spiritual considered psychologically and the question of its "explanation."—Two concepts of nature 369
§ 11. The human sciences posit subjectivity as absolute.—"Inner" and "outer" experience 374
§ 12. Nature in the human-scientific attitude.—The human-scientific and the phenomenological attitude 377

SUPPLEMENT XIII: "Personal subjectivity" as theoretical theme . . 382

SUPPLEMENT XIV: Human-scientific attitude—Natural science incorporated into the human-scientific attitude.—Mere nature as surrounding world (389)—The various types of intuitive causality (390)—Abstract-scientific investigations (391)—Natural science within human science (392)—The concept of Objectivity (398) . 386

EPILOGUE 405

INDEX 433

TRANSLATORS' INTRODUCTION

As is made plain in the critical apparatus and editorial matter appended to the original German publication of Husserl's *Ideas II*,[1] this is a text with a history. It underwent revision after revision, spanning almost 20 years in one of the most fertile periods of the philosopher's life. The book owes its form to the work of many hands, and its unity is one that has been imposed on it. Yet there is nothing here that cannot be traced back to Husserl himself. Indeed, the final "clean copy" for publication, prepared by an assistant, was completely reviewed by the master three times and emended by him in detail on each occasion. Nevertheless, in the end the work was in fact not submitted for publication, and after Husserl's pen last touched the manuscript in 1928 it was set aside until posthumously edited and published by the Husserl-Archives in 1952.

The story of the composition of *Ideas II* begins with the "pencil manuscript" of 1912. This is the ultimate textual source for both *Ideas II* and *Ideas III*.[2] It has been preserved as a folio of 84 sheets in very dense shorthand of the Gabelsberger system, written mostly with a pencil. It was composed by Husserl "in one stroke" immediately after the completion of

[1] Edmund Husserl: *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch: Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution.* Edited by Marly Biemel. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952 (*Husserliana* IV).

[2] Edmund Husserl: *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Drittes Buch: Die Phänomenologie und die Fundamente der Wissenschaften.* Edited by Marly Biemel. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952 (*Husserliana* V). English translation by Ted E. Klein and William E. Pohl: *Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy. Third Book: Phenomenology and the foundations of the sciences.* The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980 (*Edmund Husserl: Collected Works*, Vol. I).

the first Book of the *Ideas.*[1] The manuscript is divided into two parts, corresponding perfectly to the plan for the second Book as announced in the first. Eventually, however, the first part (the constitutive analyses) was greatly expanded and became a volume on its own, *Ideas II,* while the second part (studies in scientific theory), became, without further revision, the text of *Ideas III,* also published posthumously.

In 1915, Husserl elaborated and re-wrote, again in shorthand, the first half of the pencil manuscript, approximately doubling it in size. This folio bears a title page with the inscription "Ideas II" and includes the remark, "My revision and basis for Miss Stein." The first page mentions that the writings stem from lecture courses of 1913 and 1915 (dealing with the problem of constitution). In fact, the editor of the published version indicates that already a conglomeration of diverse writings can be seen in this folio, as it contains studies from various contexts, some dating back as early as 1908.

In 1916, Edith Stein, as Husserl's assistant, completed her first redaction of the manuscript. For the most part this consisted merely of transcribing into longhand the folio of 1915 and parts of the pencil manuscript. She transcribed the entire second half of the latter, and this became the text of *Ideas III.*

The first redaction by Stein and the texts on which it was based relate only to the first and second sections of *Ideas II.* Section three, on the constitution of the world of spirit, has its source in the so-called "H-folio." This is a manuscript in Husserl's longhand, dating from 1913. In addition, the textual sources of other parts of *Ideas II,* especially the second half of the middle section, go back to numerous manuscripts written by Husserl during the war years, up to the beginning of 1917.

In 1918, Stein completed her second redaction. This time her

[1] Edmund Husserl: *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie.* Edited by Walter Biemel. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950 (*Husserliana* III). English translation by F. Kersten: *Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy. First Book: General introduction to a pure phenomenology.* The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982 (*Edmund Husserl: Collected Works,* Vol. II).

work involved much more than merely transcribing. By incorporating into the text writings from the H-folio and others from the war years, the main text of *Ideas II* began to take its present form.

In 1923, Ludwig Landgrebe became the assistant of Husserl and worked for more than a year on preparing the text of *Ideas II* for publication. Landgrebe's main source was to be the second redaction by Stein, but in the meantime Husserl had revised the third section and had inserted numerous annotations and other writings. These had to be incorporated into the text, and, in addition, Husserl desired that many manuscripts from the H-folio be included, ones that Stein had not used. In order to preserve as much as possible a unity of exposition, Landgrebe appended many of these writings as supplements to the main text. In 1925 Landgrebe completed a "clean copy," typewritten and ready for publication.

Husserl, however, continued to revise the manuscript. Three series of annotations in shorthand can be distinguished, the last dating from 1928. These annotations were transcribed after Husserl's death by Stephan Strasser, working at the newly-established Husserl-Archives in Leuven. They were incorporated by the editor of the present volume, Marly Biemel, into the published version. Where possible the annotations were interpolated directly into the text. Critical remarks and allusions to new circles of problems were assigned to footnotes. The remaining annotations were presented in the supplements.

The division of the text into three sections and into 64 paragraphs derives from the "clean copy," only slightly altering the organization found already in the second elaboration by Stein. The division of the sections into chapters and the chapter headings themselves were based on the Landgrebe draft: for the first section, the chapter divisions and headings were indicated by Husserl explicitly. As regards the second section, Husserl marked the divisions but only listed the key words for the headings. For the last section, Husserl was more vague as to the chapters, and their titles were supplied by the editor. Likewise, the title of the book as a whole is attributable to her.

*

The volume now in the reader's hands is for all intents and purposes a complete *Husserliana* edition in English. It contains everything available to the German scholar except for the text-critical apparatus which provides variant readings. In addition, the present volume includes the Epilogue to the *Ideas*. This text was composed to serve as a preface to the English translation of the first Book and was published as such in 1931. A slightly altered German version actually made it to print the year before, in Volume 11 of Husserl's *Jahrbuch*. It was later appended as an actual Epilogue to the *Ideas*, that is, the last text of the third Book. The translation included here is of this published German version. It was considered too important to be omitted from the "Collected Works."

The Epilogue differs considerably in style from the other writings presented herein. It is written in very polished German, employs a broad vocabulary in highly idiomatic language, and represents Husserl at his most literary. Standing in sharpest contrast are the manuscripts included in the supplements, which are sometimes rather inchoate and often quite cryptic. The main text occupies something of a mean between these extremes, in terms of style. It uses a restricted vocabulary, and this not only as regards technical terms; it repeats many stereotypical phrases; and the text is not without its grammatical peculiarities and ambiguities. Our translation could not help but reflect these three different styles of the respective parts of the book, and we ask the reader's indulgence for this unevenness.

We have observed, for the most part, what can now be considered as established conventions in rendering Husserl into English. We are proposing, however, one innovation. German has two terms for what in English is designated by the single word, "body." The distinction made in German is that between *Körper*, inanimate physical matter, and *Leib*, the animated flesh of an animal or human being. Both these terms would ordinarily be best rendered simply as "body" in English, the context determining the proper sense. But Husserl often plays on the distinction between the two, and so some sort of device was called for to make these passages intelligible. We are proposing, then, to translate *Leib* as "Body" (with a capital) and *Körper* as "body," and the same applies to the derivative

words, "bodily," "corporeal," etc. *Leibkörper* thus becomes "Corporeal body." This stratagem was chosen as the most simple and as having a precedent in the analogous (a limited analogy, of course) distinction between *Objekt* ("Object") and *Gegenstand* ("object"). Just as, for Husserl, *Gegenstand* is the more general term, encompassing anything at all that can be intended in any way, a sensation, for example, and *Objekte* are only certain kinds of *Gegenstände*, intersubjective ones, so *Körper* is more general: i.e., every Object is an object, but not vice versa, and in the same manner every Body is a body.

The reader should also be advised that *Geisteswissenschaft* is being rendered here as "human science," "*geisteswissenschaftlich*" as "human-scientific," etc. Thereby, unfortunately, the connection with the word *Geist* ("spirit") is lost. Where we have thought it necessary to make the connection explicit we have resorted to a parenthetical phrase or hendiadys.

Our translation was carried out under the direction of the Husserl-Archives at Leuven, and we wish to acknowledge especially the invaluable assistance provided by Ullrich Melle of the Archives staff. We consulted him on various passages that had become for us *lites inter doctores*, and we always found his resolutions to stem from a profound grasp of Husserl and of the German and English languages. There is no doubt that our translation could have benefitted from his critique of it in its entirety. Needless to say, we are alone responsible for defects.

We were also assisted by having available published translations of *Ideas II* in French[1] and Italian,[2] and they more than once provided suggestions concerning the sense of a passage. Naturally, it was our linguistic intuition of the original German that was always our final recourse.

We believe there can be no question that *Ideas II* is an important work and will repay a close reading. It is a book that exercised an influence, even before it was published, on two of

[1] Edmund Husserl: *Idées directrices pour une phénoménologie et une philosophie phénoménologique pures. Livre second: Recherches phénoménologiques pour la constitution*. Trans. Eliane Escoubas. Paris: PUF, 1982.

[2] Edmund Husserl: *Idee per una fenomenologia pura e per una filosofia fenomenologica. Libro secondo: Ricerche fenomenologiche sopra la costituzione*. Trans. Enrico Filippini. Torino: Giulio Einaudi, 1965.

the greatest phenomenologists of all, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. Husserl sent Heidegger a copy of the manuscript early in 1925 (doubtlessly the draft prepared by Landgrebe) when Heidegger was lecturing at Marburg and was occupied precisely with the distinction between the naturalistic and personalistic attitude. As for Merleau-Ponty, he studied the manuscript after Husserl's death at the Archives in Leuven, and many precursors of themes in Merleau-Ponty's own work are visible in this text. Merleau-Ponty was a very reserved man, but one of us can remember clearly a conversation with him in which he, with sudden animation, spoke so rapturously of the second *Ideas* and described his study of it as "*une expérience presque voluptueuse.*" Our hope is that this translation may contribute to a rekindling somewhere of the same enthusiasm for the book.

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FOREWORD

Ideas II presents some concrete examples of constitutive analysis. In doing so, it executes at least one phase of the sort of phenomenological philosophy introduced, methodologically and systematically, in Book I. At the same time, it supplements the overall picture of phenomenology portrayed, somewhat lopsidedly, in Book I.

Ideas I emphasized (perhaps even exaggerated) the absolute character of pure consciousness to such an extent that phenomenology might readily be misinterpreted as an abstract idealism that eschewed all concern with the real world of human life. The method of attempting to doubt the existence of the world in order to arrive at pure consciousness as a "residue," and the fantasy of a possible "destruction of the world" which would leave the essence of pure consciousness untouched, had their legitimate rhetorical purpose. But they set a one-sided tone needing a supplementation and a balance that Book II begins to provide.

Further, the selected examples of introductory analyses of constitution of Book I focussed upon the most elementary instances of the constitution of perceptual objects. In the process, the character of the experienceable world might seem to have shrunk to features identifiable as visual spatial configurations alone. The world of the natural attitude, preserved as modified referent of a complex of noematic sense within the reduction, might seem to have been attenuated to mere, theoretically conceived, nature; and mere nature, to spatial phantoms alone.

Book II sets the record straight in some important respects. The world of the natural attitude ("the real world") is seen to be more comprehensive than what is accessible to any purely

theoretical attitude. The legitimate theoretical version of the natural attitude is seen to be more comprehensive than its naturalistic limitations. Nature as object of the theoretical version of the natural attitude is seen to be much more intricate than the sample analyses of Book I could indicate. And the correlation of transcendental consciousness with the transcendent world is displayed more concretely than was possible in the introductory context of Book I.

The specific context within which Husserl presents these analyses of constitution is that of the philosophy of science. Husserl refers to this context of problems also as "metaphysical." The full sense of the juxtaposition of those two terms here needs to be worked out by carefully thinking through the problems addressed by means of constitutive analyses. But from the start, it is clear that the phenomenological approach to the philosophy of science requires a replacement of the inherited metaphysics of naturalism, to supplement the epistemological refutation of naturalism introduced in Book I. A newly fashioned approach to the manifest being of "the real world" is required also in order to provide a basis of clarification for the domain of the human sciences [*Geisteswissenschaften*] as well as the grounds for an intuitively adequate understanding of nature as the domain of the natural sciences.

In the course of the analyses, by attempting a step by step approach to the constitution of the world as nature (even in a generously broadened sense), Husserl shows concretely that the observer of nature can not encompass his or her own psychic and spiritual life (nor those of necessarily participating others) within the categories that do very well to portray intuited nature apprehended as merely material (substantial-causal) in character. The argument is intricate. And it proceeds by devoting careful attention to the subtle interplay among observation, categorization, and general theoretical attitudes of apprehension.

Husserl presents the results as having been made possible by the pedagogical and liberating functions of the phenomenological reduction. Once we have emancipated ourselves from the previously unnoticed theoretical blinders of the naturalistic version of the natural theoretical attitude, we learn of the power

of attitudes to disclose what they can and to cover over all else. But we learn also of our own power, not only to shift back and forth between the personalistic and the naturalistic theoretical attitudes (and between practice-oriented, value-oriented, and theory-oriented attitudes) but to do so in full consciousness of our own involvement in such shifts and in their consequences.

Husserl the rigorous theorist sticks close to the themes at hand. But Husserl the person has a keen sense of the fuller human, cultural, significance of the issues with which he is grappling. He writes, in a letter to Albrecht dated August 2, 1917, "Duty demands that I bring to completion and to publication my labors of many years, especially since they provide the scientific foundations for a reconciliation between the naturalistic world-view that dominated the epoch just expired and the teleological world-view. But the teleological world-view is the definitively true one."[1]

John Scanlon
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[1] Karl Schuhmann, *Husserl-Chronik: Denk- und Lebensweg Edmund Husserls*. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1977, pp. 212-213.

SECOND BOOK
STUDIES IN THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF CONSTITUTION

Section One: The Constitution of Material Nature

Chapter One

THE IDEA OF NATURE IN GENERAL

§ 1. Preliminary delineation of the concepts of nature and experience (Exclusion of meaning-predicates)

We begin our new discussions with *nature*—specifically, with nature as the *object of natural science.* Nature, one would say first of all, is the total spatio-temporal "universe," the total domain of possible experience: thus we are accustomed to take the expressions "natural science" and "experiential science" as synonyms. [1]

The universe, the world-totality, includes, of course, everything "worldly" but not everything in the full sense, not every individual object whatever. Hence the question arises: precisely how are nature and the perception of nature, the experience of nature, to be determined? We said at the outset that *nature is the field of transcendent—specifically, spatio-temporal—realities.* But the concept of real spatio-temporal objectivity, as will soon appear, is insufficient. It will immediately be evident that not all predicates which are, in truth, to be ascribed to spatio-temporal realities, and are actually so ascribed by us, do for all that belong to the essence of the nature-Object which is the correlate of the idea of natural science. Our consideration, however, is supposed to aim at nature in the sense of that correlation. Now, it is in no way the character of this science to restrict itself arbitrarily in the choice of its Objects or in the choice of the predicates referring to its Objects. Rather, what underlies natural science is always an *idea of the essence of nature,* if only an implicit one. Correlatively, the consciousness which functions as natural-scientific experience, and thus also as [2]

the thinking pertaining to natural-scientific experience, has its essential phenomenological unity, and *this* consciousness has its essential correlate in nature. A ruling "apperception" determines in advance what is or is not a natural-scientific Object, hence what is or is not nature in the natural-scientific sense. The task is to bring that to clarity. In which respect it is evident from the outset that *all* the predicates we ascribe to things under the headings of pleasantness, beauty, utility, practical suitability, or perfection remain completely out of consideration (values, goods, ends, instruments, means, etc.). These do not at all concern the natural scientist; they do not belong to nature in his sense.

§ 2. The natural-scientific attitude as a theoretical attitude

That will be understood if we examine more closely the character of the attitude of the subject who intuits and thinks in the natural-scientific way. Through the phenomenological description of that attitude, we will learn that what is termed "nature" is precisely the intentional correlate of experience as carried out in this attitude. Our approach at first will be as follows: *the thematic attitude of the natural scientist's experience of nature* and experiential research is the *doxic-theoretic*. Over against it are other attitudes: namely, the valuing (in the broadest sense, valuing the beautiful and the good) and the practical attitude. This talk about attitudes obviously refers back to the respective subject, and accordingly we speak of the theoretical or the cognitive subject, of the valuing and the practical subject.

Nature is there for the theoretical subject; it belongs to his [3] correlative sphere. Of course, that does not mean simply that nature is already completely determined considered as the correlate of a possible theoretical, cognitive, subject. Nature is an object of possible knowledge, but it does not exhaust the total realm of such objects. *Nature, as mere nature, contains no values, no works of art,* etc., though these are indeed objects of possible knowledge and science. But at first our consideration will be general.

§ 3. Analysis of the theoretical attitude, of the theoretical interest

The theoretical attitude: what does that mean? It is not determined merely through the conscious lived experiences we designate as doxic (Objectifying), as representing, judging, thinking acts (whereby we now always want to have in view non-neutralized[1] acts), for doxic lived experiences also occur in the valuing and practical attitude. On the contrary, what is characteristic of it lies in the manner in which such lived experiences are *performed* or *carried out* in the function of knowledge. In general it happens not only that the focus of the subject passes through the lived experiences to that which is represented, perceived, remembered, thought about; rather, the subject lives in these acts and does so in a phenomenologically eminent way. It is one thing to see, i.e., to live through at all, to experience, to have something in the perceptual field, and it is another thing altogether to perform attentively an act of seeing in the specific sense, to "live" in the seeing in a pre-eminent way, to take an active part oneself in a "believing" and a judging, as an Ego in the specific sence, to perform an act of judging as a cogito, to be directed with an active focus to what is objective, to be directed in a specifically *intentional* way. Again, it is one thing to be conscious at all that the sky is blue, and it is another thing to live in the performance of the judgment (that the sky is now blue) in an attentive, explicitly grasping, specifically intentional way. Doxic lived experiences in this attitude, in this manner of explicit performance (I think, I perform an act in the specific sense, I posit the subject and [4] thereupon posit the predicate, etc.) we term theoretical acts. In

[1] On the concept of neutralization, *cf. Ideen I,* pp. 264 ff. [Trans: I.e., Edmund Husserl: *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie.* Edited by Karl Schuhmann. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976 (*Husserliana* III/1). English translation by F. Kersten: *Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy. First book: General introduction to a pure phenomenology.* The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982 (*Edmund Husserl: Collected Works,* Vol. II). References to this work will cite the *Husserliana* pagination, indicated in the margins of the *Collected Works* edition.]

them, not only is an object simply there for the Ego, but rather the Ego is, as Ego, thereupon directed *attentively* (and then comes thinking, active positing), and thus it is at once directed to the object *in a grasping way:* as "theoretical," it is, in an actual sense, Objectifying.[1]

§ 4. Theoretical acts and "pre-giving" intentional lived experiences

Let us suppose that the subject (always understood here as the ego belonging inseparably to every cogito, as pure subject) is the theoretical subject in the aforementioned sense, something it is only intermittently. It would thus be "Objectifying" in the specific sense of the term, grasping and positing as a being (in the validity-mode of the doxic intention of Being) an objectivity of the respective sense and furthermore determining it in explicative syntheses, perhaps in predicative-judgmental ones. But then the objectivity in question is already consciously constituted *prior* to these theoretical acts, through certain intentional lived experiences, but yet by no means through all of those which can be distinguished in the pure subject as related to this objectivity. In other words, to say that they are related to it does not mean that the focus of the specific intention, ruling in all theoretical acts, goes right through them, as it were; rather, it goes through only those lived experiences which are sense-giving or determining for the theoretically grasped object as such. The remaining lived experiences, e.g. feeling-experiences, lived experiences of this or that special kind, are indeed lived; as intentional lived experiences they also are constituting; they constitute new *objective strata* for the object in question, but ones in relation to which the subject is not in the theoretical attitude, and thus they do not constitute the respective theoretically meant and judgmentally determined object as such (or help determine this object in a theoretical function). It is only by means of a *shift* of the theoretical regard, a change of theoretical interest, that they emerge out of the phase of *pre*-theoretical constitution into the theoretical; the new strata of sense enter into the framework of theoretical sense, and a new object, i.e., one intended in a new and more proper sense, is the Object of the grasping and theoretical determination in new theoretical acts. The total intention of consciousness is therewith an essentially changed one, and the acts responsible for the giving of *other* meanings have also experienced a phenomenological modification. To what extent this is a necessary state of affairs is evident from the fact that *even the theoretical acts,* by means of which the pure subject relates to a given Object delimited by a constitutive sense (e.g., an Object of nature), no matter how they occur as subjectivating, attributing, collecting, relativizing, and other acts, *at once also exercise a constituting function. "Categorial"* objectivities thus are constituted (in a quite definite sense: objectivities of thought), which, however, for their part, first become *theoretical Objects* precisely when the theoretical subject intentionally focuses on these new objectivities (i.e., above all, on states of affairs, collections, etc.) and so performs new acts which grasp them in their being and determine them theoretically; thus these acts are subject-acts, predicate-acts, etc., of a higher level.

With reference to these acts of a higher level—always initiated by shifts of focus of the specific intending and which could be called a special kind of "reflection"[1]—the categorial objectivities constituted in the precedent theoretical acts are *pre-givennesses.* (A state of affairs which holds analogously in other cases, ones in which feeling-acts function as pre-constitution.) If a shift of focus takes place, then the pre-giving acts—in our case, the categorial—have already run their course in the modality of their original performance. They are now no longer active steps of the spontaneous intending and [6]

[1] *Cf.* p. 10.

[1] "Reflection" is taken here in an enlarged sense and includes not only the grasping of acts but also every "turning back," i.e., every turning away from the natural attitude's directedness toward the Object. Included would also be, for example, the turning to the noemata, the manifold of which brings into appearance the one identical thing.

theoretical determining, of subject-positing and predicate-positing, of step-wise collecting, etc. They are alive only in an other, essentially modified, form as the "still" having in consciousness of what has been constituted and the retaining of it (this also takes place already in the progressive development of the categorial acts with regard to those that occur earlier in the chain) and, furthermore, precisely as the reflecting of an intentional ray upon its synthetic "results."

These complex relationships really need to be heeded and understood. At the same time, one must make clear to oneself that it belongs to the peculiar character of the theoretical attitude and its theoretical acts (the performance of which makes the subject the theoretical subject) that, in them, objects which for the first time *will become* theoretical are *already, in a certain manner, laid out there in advance.* Thus objects are already constituted pre-theoretically; it is only that they are not appropriated theoretically and are not Objects intended in the pre-eminent sense, and much less are they Objects of theoretically determining acts.

As can be seen from what has been said, *"pre-given" Objects can themselves "spring" originally out of theoretical acts,* and so in this regard they can already be theoretical Objects. This can happen in various ways: first of all in the manner in which such theoretical Objects have been constituted just now originally in "properly" (i.e., spontaneously) performed theoretical acts and, subsequently, in the manner in which the theoretical subject directs its grasping intentional regard toward what has been constituted. That becomes possible in this way: the different spontaneous stages of the act are retained in consciousness after their execution and specifically in the modified form of *passive* states, and finally, at the end of the whole process of thought, consciousness stands as a unified state, which, in analogy with simple representation, can function as a pre-giving consciousness and can take up a new theoretical direction of focus on the Object it is conscious of as a unity.

But obviously there are also other cases possible. Thus, for example, a state of affairs constituted earlier in spontaneous and articulated thinking can "emerge again" in the form of a memory that *suddenly occurs.* It does so through the medium of [7]

a reproductive modification of the ensuing final result of the earlier thinking, and this modification functions now as pre-giving consciousness for the acts of the new theoretical attitude. Again, this holds also for theoretical "sudden ideas" in which *new*—i.e., not merely presentified once more as memories—states of affairs surge up as certainties, possibilities, or probabilities and function as the "stimulus" for the thinking related to them. Obviously the pre-givennesses of no matter which acts of a theoretical attitude (in other words, the categorial acts performed in the original spontaneity of thinking) cannot always refer back to theoretical acts whence they spring. *Thus we arrive in each case at pre-given objectivities which do not spring from theoretical acts* but are constituted in intentional lived experiences imparting to them nothing of logico-categorial formations.

We have invariably been speaking here about pre-givennesses of theoretical acts. But the same holds with respect to other spontaneous acts and their pre-givennesses; thus here the discussion requires supplementation. As possibilities running parallel to the theoretical attitude, there are the axiological and practical attitudes. In this respect, analogous results are to be established. Valuing acts (taken in the widest possible sense as any kind of act of pleasing or displeasing, as acts performed by every kind of position-taking in the affective sphere and every act performed in the unity of one affective consciousness in syntheses essentially proper to it) can relate to pre-given objectivities, and their intentionality proves itself immediately thereby as constitutive for objectivities of a higher level, analogues of the categorial objectivities of the logical sphere. We have thus to do with a class of objectivities constituted as spontaneous products, as polythetic formations of the polythetically unified acts (joined in the unity of one constitutive act) which produce them. These are not simply objectivities founded in general and in *this* sense objectivities of a higher level, but they are precisely objectivities originally constituted as spontaneous products and which only as such come to possible originary givenness. [8]

Let us clarify this with an example. We had earlier drawn a contrast between just being conscious, by way of seeing, of the

blue sky and the theoretical performance of this act.[1] But we are no longer performing the seeing in this eminent sense when we, seeing the radiant blue sky, live in the rapture of it. If we do that, then we are not in the theoretical or cognitive attitude but in the affective. On the other hand, though we have adopted the theoretical attitude, the pleasure may very well be present still, as, for example, in the observing physicist who is directing himself to the radiant blue sky, but then we are not living in the pleasure. There is an essential phenomenological modification of the pleasure, and of the seeing and judging, according as we pass over from the one attitude to the other. *This characteristic change of attitude belongs, as an ideal possibility, to all acts,* and accompanying it is always the corresponding phenomenological modification. That is, all acts which are not already theoretical from the outset allow of being converted into such acts by means of a change in attitude. We can look at a picture "with delight." Then we are living in the performance of aesthetic pleasure, in the pleasure attitude, which is precisely one of "delight." Then again, we can judge the picture, with the eyes of the art critic or art historian, as "beautiful." Now we are living in the performance of the theoretical or judgmental attitude and no longer in the appreciating or pleasure-taking. If by "valuing" or "appreciating" we understand an act of feeling and precisely one *in which we live,* then it is not a theoretical act. But if we understand these terms, as so often happens by equivocation, as an evaluation in the form of a judgment, possibly even predicating about value, then we would be expressing a theoretical act and not an act of feeling. In that case, in the judging in terms of value, such as it emerges out of the attitude of a purely delighting abandon or surrender, the work of art is objective in quite a different manner. It is intuited, however not only with sense intuition (we are not [9] living in the performance of perception) but with *axiological intuition.* In the active abandon of the "being-occupied-with-it-in-aesthetic-pleasure," in the aesthetic enjoyment, understood as act, the Object is, as we said, the Object of the delight. On

[1] *Cf.* p. 6.

the other hand, in aesthetic judging and appraising, it is no longer an Object in mere delighting abandon but is an object in the special doxothetic sense: the intuited is given with the character of aesthetic enjoyableness, which is its proper attribute (which constitutes its "what"). This is a new "theoretical" Objectivity and, specifically, a characteristic Objectivity of a higher level. Living *in simple sense intuition,* the one on the lowest level, and performing it theoretically, we have theoretically grasped *a mere thing* in the most straightforward manner. When we pass over to the aesthetic grasping and judging of value, we then have more than a mere thing, we have the thing with the "what" character (with the expressed predicate) of the value; we have a value-thing. This value-Object, which, in its objective sense, likewise includes the "what" character of the value, is the correlate of the theoretical grasping of value. Thus it is an Object of a higher level. We observe that the universal-original judgment of value or, generally speaking, each *consciousness which originally constitutes a value-Object as such,* necessarily has in itself a *component* belonging to the *sphere of feelings.* The most original constitution of value is performed in feelings as that pre-theoretical (in a broad sense) delighting abandon on the part of the feeling Ego-subject for which I used the term "value-reception" already several decades ago in my lectures. The term is meant to indicate, in the sphere of feelings, an analogon of per-ception, one which, in the doxic sphere, signifies the Ego's original (self-grasping) being in the presence of the object itself. Thus in the sphere of feelings what is meant by this talk of delighting is precisely that feeling in which the Ego lives with the consciousness of being in the presence of the Object "itself" in the manner of feelings. Just as there is, however, a sort of representing from afar, an empty representational intending which is not a being in the presence of the object, so there is a feeling which relates to the object emptily; and as the former is fulfilled in intuitive representing, so is the empty feeling fulfilled by way of the delighting. On each side [10] there are intentions which strive in parallel: a representing (cognitive, tending toward knowledge) striving versus an evaluating one which tends toward expectations, toward the delighting enjoyment. The similarity here is what is supposed to

be expressed in the parallel terms "per-ception/value-reception."[1] "Value-feeling" remains the more general term for value-consciousness, and, as feeling, it lies in every mode of such consciousness, the non-originary included.

It is also to be noticed here that even in a consciousness which is receptive of values (converted doxically, is intuitive of values), there can be "inadequate" intuition: that is, an anticipatory one, endowed, accordingly, with emptily anticipating horizons of feeling, just as is the case with outer perception. In a glance, I take in the beauty of an old Gothic building, something I only grasp fully in sustained value-reception, and that provides, with the corresponding doxic conversion, a fuller value-intuition. The fleeting glance can finally be anticipating quite emptily, pre-grasping the beauty, as it were, following certain indications, but without actually grasping anything at all. Furthermore, this feeling-anticipation already suffices for a doxic turn and predication. Everywhere this is the same, even in the sphere of willing. Actively willing, living in the attitude of willing, can be distinguished from positing and judging, in the theoretical attitude, that which is willed as practically demanded, required, etc. We can live in willful self-resolve or else in the activity of actually carrying out that resolve. Then, what is presupposed are certain representing acts, perhaps thinking acts of various levels, and valuing acts. But these acts, all of them, are not ones performed in the eminent sense of the word. The true and proper performance lies in the willing and the doing. The attitude changes and becomes theoretical if we look at the resolution and the action, etc., in a way that grasps them theoretically and, possibly, if we form a judgment on the basis of this theoretically intuiting or representing behavior.

What is in question here, in fact, are the universal *essential properties* which belong to all acts built up on a foundation. The subject that lives through can first live altogether in the performance of an act; then, in an equivalent expression, the Ego is, *in an eminent sense, directed* toward the objectively given, is abandoned to what is objective. Thereby what is [11]

[1] [*Wahrnehmen/Wertnehmen:* lit., "truth-taking/value-taking;" the former is the ordinary German word for "perception," the latter is a coinage.—Trans.]

objective is always characterized in consciousness in various ways depending on the basic character of the act: *object of judgment, object of valuing, object of will.* To this state of affairs, however, there belongs apriori the "possibility" of an alteration in the subject's attitude, by virtue of which it *can always pass into the theoretical attitude*—unless it was already theoretical from the start—in which, therefore, what is objective *becomes a theoretical object,* an object, that is, of an *actively performed positing of being* in which the Ego lives and grasps what is objective, seizes and posits it as a being.

§ 5. Spontaneity and passivity; actuality and inactuality of consciousness

This faculty, this *I-can* of the subject, can always be made thematic and, in its own appropriate way, envisaged. Thus what was "pre-theoretically" conscious and objective comes "properly" to consciousness in its own objectivity in the subsequent "unveiling" reflective theoretical grasp. It is also to be noted here that, by the manifold interweaving of theoretical and other acts, essential phenomenological distinctions arise which can be seen more easily than they can be clearly marked off. Above all, it is with regard to them that we speak of the *theoretical, axiological, and practical attitudes,* thereby indicating also that "to have intentional lived experiences in the nexus of consciousness" and "to perform by oneself acts as spontaneities" do not yet mean taking up an attitude *directed to their objects* and do not mean, more specifically, being in the theoretical attitude or being focused on values or on acts in general, on the practical in no matter how broad a sense. We are in such an attitude only when we live in the acts in question in a privileged sense: that is, are directed to their objects in a privileged way. Distinctions of two kinds intersect here. 1) First, the distinction *between the act performed quite spontaneously* (with many-leveled acts, there would be articulated steps) over against the consciousness in which the objectivity that must be constituted through this act *is "passively" there in consciousness in a confused state.* Every spontaneous act, *after* being performed, necessarily passes over [12]

into a confused state; the spontaneity, or if you will, the activity, to speak of it more properly, passes into a passivity, although of such a kind that—as has already been said—it *refers back* to the originally spontaneous and articulated performance. This reference back is characterized as such by the *I-can* or the faculty, which evidently belongs to it, to "reactivate" this state, i.e., to convert it into the production, which comes to consciousness as a "repetition," of that producing out of which it previously came forth and in which it "again" finally, as the same state, comes forth, and it lets come forth, in itself, the *same* result as the same final sense with the same validity. As we saw, however, such a state can in a similar manner become present to consciousness without having arisen in this way, *as a secondary passivity,* out of a spontaneity which has *just now* run its course. 2) If we remain now in the sphere of *spontaneous* performances of acts, then, according to the previous clarification, different spontaneities, which overlap each other, can arise with different phenomenological *dignity:* on the one hand, as the so-to-say *dominating* spontaneity, the one in which we prefer to live, and on the other hand, as the *supporting* or collateral spontaneity, the one which remains in the background, the one, therefore, in which we do not prefer to live (acts characterized as *acts of "interest,"* regardless of their further specific intentional properties). For instance, we receive some joyful tiding and live in the joy. It is a theoretical act when we perform the acts of thought in which the tiding itself is constituted for us; but this act serves only as a foundation for the act of feeling in which, by preference, we are living. Within the joy, we are "intentionally" (with feeling intentions) turned toward the joy-Object as such in the mode of affective "interest." Here the act of turning to the joy has the higher dignity; it is the *principal act.* But the reverse is also possible: that is, there can take place a change of attitude, from the one of joy to the theoretical. Then we are living in theoretical consciousness (we are "theoretically interested"), and the theoretical act gives the "main thing." We can still take joy in it, but the joy remains in the background, and that is how it is in all theoretical research. There we embrace the theoretical attitude, even if at the same time there may also be performed spontaneous and lively [13]

turnings that yield joy, as e.g., a lively feeling for the beauty of the appearances which occur in physical-optical research. In the back of one's mind a decision might thereby be made to show the beautiful phenomena to a friend, though we are still not in the practical attitude but instead stay continuously with the "theme" of the theoretical attitude (in brief, the *theoretical theme*). Again, it can be reversed, and then the practical attitude is what we are in, and we remain in it, staying continuously with the *"practical theme"* while some appearance which is close to our former theoretical concerns incidentally raises our interest. But it does not, for all that, become a theoretical theme for us; it remains in a supporting role within the context of the praxis—unless we do in fact exchange the practical attitude for the theoretical, let the practical theme go in order to assume the theoretical. Perhaps this incomplete description will suffice to give the reader a clear enough notion of the phenomenological distinctions that I here have in mind.

Now, in such thematic interweavings, *new objectivities are thus always being constituted,* possibly with constitutive strata which are ever higher according to whether they arise out of theoretical, evaluating, or practical acts and which have a thematic significance whose sense is different, *depending on the attitude.* Specifically, through a transition to the theoretical attitude, they can again and again become theoretical themes. They then become *objective in a special sense:* they are grasped and become subjects of predicates which determine them theoretically, etc.

Naturally, in a corresponding way, we encounter *in the extra-thematic sphere, in the sphere of passivity,* various objectivities which consciously (hence by means of the intentionality, be it ever so "confused," in which they are conscious) *refer back* to such connections.

§ 6. The distinction between the transition into the theoretical attitude and the transition into reflection [14]

We need to pay close attention to the distinction between the transition into the theoretical attitude, which is what we have

been focusing on, and the transition, which any act, in principle, admits of—namely, the transition to an immanent perception directed at the act or to an immanent retention once that act has fleetingly passed by. This, too, is a theoretical attitude; perception, like retention, is a general Objectivation, and in the so-called *immanent reflection on the act* we live in that Objectivation, performing it. Hence we are dwelling in the *theoretical* attitude. But *this* theoretical attitude is a *different one*; it is much more remarkable and belongs, in principle, to all acts. In aesthetic pleasure we are conscious of something as aestheticallly pleasing, as beautiful. Let our point of departure be the fact that we live in the aesthetic pleasure, thus that we are pleasurably surrendered to the appearing Object. We can then *reflect on the pleasure* which occurs, as when we declare, "I take pleasure in it." The judgment in this case is indeed a judgment about my act of pleasure. But it is something quite different to direct one's *regard to the object* and its beauty.

I intuit the beauty in the object, though, to be sure, not by way of the straightforward sensory perception which gives color or shape. Yet it is *in the object itself that I find the beauty*. Here "the beautiful" means *anything but a predicate of reflection,* as, e.g., if I say, "It is pleasing to me." The "pleasant," the "enjoyable," the "sad," and all similar predicates of objects are, as to their Objective sense, *not relation-predicates referring to the acts*. They arise through the change in attitude we have described; the acts in question are thereby presupposed with it. I continue to be pleased, I still feel joy or sadness, etc., but instead of simply being joyful or sad—i.e., carrying out these acts of feeling—I bring them into another mode by means of the change in attitude. They are still lived experiences, but I do not live in them in the eminent sense. I look to the Object and find in it, in my changed, at present theoretical, attitude, the correlates of these acts of [15] feeling, namely: an Objective stratum superposed on the stratum of the sensuous predicates, the stratum, that is, of the "enjoyable," of an Object that is objectively "sad," of the "beautiful," the "ugly," etc. In the theoretical attitude of *reflection,* however, I cannot find Objective predicates but only ones relative to consciousness.[1]

It is clear now that all *talk about objects,* their predicates, properties, relations, or the states of affairs pertaining to them, such as their laws, *refers back to theoretical acts* in which objects are (or can be) given, perceived or in some other way envisaged, theoretically explained, thought, etc. If we attribute objectivities to all intentional lived experiences, including affective lived experiences, objectivities toward which these lived experiences take a position in the mode of feelings, i.e., objects under the headings of value-objects, practical objects, etc., then we do so obviously *with reference to the fact that in principle belonging to the essence of each act are possibilities of various theoretical directions of focus,* in which such objects are graspable as so-to-say *implicitly* contained already in the feeling-attitude, and among these objects are the ones belonging properly to every basic kind of act, e.g., the values belonging to the valuing, etc.[2]

§ 7. Objectivating and non-Objectivating acts and their correlates

To this we immediately join a further distinction. *Every basic kind of act is characterized by its own basic kind of "act-quality."* Thus the objectivating acts are characterized by the quality of the *doxa*, of "believing" in its various modifications; [16]

[1] Yet it would still be necessary to articulate the fact and the reason why such predicates of feeling are indeed, in a special sense, merely subjective and refer to valuing subjects and consequently to these subjects' acts in which they are constituted for them but not for everyone.

[2] It must be added here immediately, however, that the term "predicates of feeling" has been referring to determining predicates of objects but precisely only such as are constituted in feelings in the way indicated. To that extent they are called objective predicates and even, in a general sense, Objective ones. On the other hand, they are also called, quite legitimately and in a proper sense, "subjective," as being predicates which in their very sense refer back to valuing subjects and their evaluating acts. This is in opposition to the merely natural, purely objective predicates, which in their own proper sense do not intimate anything of the subject and the subject's acts.

the basic kind of act that in a broad sense we designate as *valuing*, precisely by the quality of the *act of valuing*, etc. Theoretical acts are the ones that are properly or explicitly *Objectivating*; to have Objects in the proper sense, or to have objects, the characteristic grasping and *positing attitude* of the theoretical subject is required. *Every non-Objectivating act* allows objectivities to be drawn *from itself by means of a shift*, a change in attitude. Essentially, therefore, every act is implicitly *Objectivating at the same time*. By essence, it is not only built, as a higher level, upon Objectivating acts but is also Objectivating itself according to what it adds as something new. Thus it becomes possible to immerse oneself in this Objectivation, and in that way not only the object of the underlying Objectivation but also the newly Objectivated in the new stratum of feelings comes to theoretical givenness.[1] If the pleasure is founded on a simple Objectivating perception, then I am able to grasp theoretically not only the perceived but also what has been newly Objectivated by means of the pleasure. For instance, I can grasp beauty as a theoretical predicate of the perceived, as has been worked out above. Now there are obviously two possibilities here: 1) Either an act is from the outset *only* Objectivating (if that is at all possible), or if it does indeed have a stratum of a different quality, even though essentially interwoven with a new Objectivation, we are leaving it out of play and are not living in it, and so we are then grasping *mere things* and merely logical characters of things. The characters of the object corresponding to the new acts or to the new qualities are either, from the outset, not there whatsoever (again, if that is at all possible), or they remain *out of action*, out of consideration. In either case, *there would then be no beautiful or ugly*, no enjoyable or disagreeable, no useful or good, no things to use, no cups, spoons, forks, etc. All such terms already include, in [17] conformity with their sense, predicates derived from non-Objectivating acts. 2) *Or*, we move about in the domain of the new, founded, qualities. *We draw into the sphere of theoretical interest*, into the compass of the theoretical attitude, the predicates correlative to these acts, too. And then we have not just mere things but precisely values, goods, etc.

[1] On this point, *cf.* the treatment in Book I, pp. 81 ff., 237 ff., 283 ff.

§ 8. The sense-objects as primal constitutive objects

Obviously, in all these forms of the constitution of objects we are led back to objects which no longer refer to pre-given objects of the kind that originally arose from whatever sort of theoretical, valuing, or practical spontaneities. In other words, if we pursue the intentional structure of no matter which given objects and also the *retrospective indications* of which we are conscious in the form of *secondary receptivities*, and if we produce spontaneities which bring the objectivities at stake here into a fully authentic originary givenness, then we come back, perhaps by means of a series of steps, *to founding objectivities*, noemata, which no longer contain anything of such retrospective indications and which are originally grasped or graspable *in the most direct theses* and refer back to no antecedent theses contributing to the constitutive content of the object, theses which only have to be reactivated. The objects phenomenologically characterized by this property—the *primal objects*, as it were, ones to which all possible objects, in conformity with their phenomenological constitution, refer back—are the *sense-objects*.

The characterization we have presented so far, however, is by no means full and perfect. Matters are, in fact, more difficult than at first appears. Connected with this is the fact that the concept of a "*sense-thing*" *is not univocal*, just as, correlatively, the concept of representation in the pregnant sense is not—I mean *sensuous* representation (*sensuous* perception, *sensuous* remembering, etc.). [18]

§ 9. Categorial and aesthetic ("sensuous") synthesis

Let our point of departure be the distinction between *categorial* (formal and, in a certain sense, analytic) synthesis and *aesthetic* (sensuous) synthesis. We know that *objects, no matter*

how constituted (objects of any region whatever, objects of any species and genus) can be *substrates for certain categorial syntheses* and can, as constitutive *elements,* enter into the *"categorial" formations of objects of a higher level.* To the latter belong collectives, disjunctives, and states of affairs of every kind, such as the relations between any A and any B or relations of attribution, that A is a, and the like. We find such formations in the doxic sphere where doxic theses are built one upon the other, subject-positings functioning as foundations for predicate-positings, etc., and also in the sphere of feeling and will where positings by the will are performed on the basis of other positings of the will (end and means), etc.[1] Thereby we touch upon unities of conduct of feeling and will, as well as upon formations which are essentially part of them, in which states of affairs come to explicit, although not to intuitive, givenness, and so do, in general, logical formations which are all, in accordance with their essence, states of affairs or possible parts or moments of states of affairs.

Now it is possible that objects are not only constituted *categorially*[2] by means of a plurality of theses, thus that these theses are in their constitutive operation categorially *united*; it is also possible that a *plurality of theses* may contribute to the *constitution* of objects *in another way as well.* The originary constitution *of one object* is obviously always carried out by means of *one* thetic consciousness, and what *functions as "matter" for the unitary thesis* and furnishes the *objective "content,"* [19] the objective *sense,* can, for its part, *refer back to a plurality of theses.* But the unity of the object need not in every case presuppose a *categorial* synthesis and in that way include it in its sense. Thus every *straightforward thing-perception* (that is, a consciousness giving the present existence of a thing in an originary manner) leads us intentionally back; it demands of us *separate considerations, special traversings, and transitions to series of perceptions* which are indeed encompassed by the unity

[1] *Cf. Ideen I,* p. 293.

[2] By "categorial" we understand here not merely the formal-logical but also the formal of all regions of objects in the sense of the theory of categories drafted in the first chapter of *Ideen I.*

of a continuous thesis but obviously in such a way that the many single theses are not at all united in the form of a categorial synthesis. What confers unity on *these* single theses is a synthesis of a totally different kind; we suggest calling it the *aesthetic* synthesis. If we seek to delimit both of these in their peculiarity, one against the other, then we find, as a first distinguishing feature, that the *categorial* synthesis is, *as* a synthesis, a spontaneous act, whereas the *sensuous synthesis, on the contrary, is not.* The synthetic connection is itself, in the first case, a spontaneous doing and performing, a veritable activity; in the second case it is not. The objective sense of a pure sense-object (a pure something) is a synthesis of *elements,* ones which are not for their part products of an aesthetic synthesis. They are the ultimate sensuous features.[1]

To characterize the aesthetic synthesis it can be mentioned besides that the single apprehension of a thing—or of its properly essential parts and sides—contains in itself partial meanings in the form of "secondary passivities"[2] which as such are determinative of sense and motivate the further course of perception. It is thus that in the apprehension of the form of a thing from one side continuous courses of apprehendings of the other sides of the same form are intentionally included.

These indications, of course, are not sufficient for an exhaustive description of the aesthetic synthesis; for that, a special [20] investigation on a large scale would be required. Here it need only be emphasized that the function of the aesthetic synthesis should be pursued in *several different strata.* When we consider a thing we necessarily consider it in some *respect* or other; that is, we are thereby focused on a "feature" which comes especially into our grasp as a distinct moment of the pure aesthetic sense. In the example cited, that was the form. Furthermore, we can limit ourselves to purely visual grasping and then within

[1] Regarding the aesthetic synthesis: must one not introduce a fundamental distinction between 1) synthesis as connection or binding in the proper sense, terms that imply a synthesis of what is *separated,* and 2) continuous synthesis as continuous fusion? Every aesthetic synthesis of the first kind leads to ultimate elements. The thing as a product of an aesthetic connection is constructed out of sensuous features which for their part stem from a continuous synthesis.

[2] On the concept of "secondary passivity," *cf.* p. 14.

that region find synthetically unified partial meanings. But it is not thereby necessary that these partial meanings always have the form of "secondary passivity," thus that they refer back in themselves to acts which bring into prominence something that had already been apprehended *for itself*. So, in the apprehension of a unitary surface are potentially included acts which would bring to experience the individual partial surfaces, although these were not previously given there as separate. Something analogous can be shown for every "sphere of sense."

Another function of the aesthetic synthesis is to unify with one another the objectivities that are constituted in the various single spheres of sense: e.g., the visual stratum of a thing with the tactile.

Finally, we have to indicate the syntheses which produce the relation between the moments of the "thing-appearance," through which the apprehending ray passes, and the correlative "perceptual circumstances" (for instance, the positioning of the eyes in seeing, of arms, hands, and fingers in touching, etc.) which, in the natural attitude, occupied as it is with the Object of the perception, are not grasped or properly co-intended.[1]

Thereby the thing presents itself persistently as something which is such-and-such, even if no concepts, no judgments in the predicative sense, are mediating. We always pay attention to "features," no matter which, and while we are considering the thing from the viewpoint of one "feature," at the same time it stands intentionally there as endowed with others. In part, they are determined features already present in the perceptual field, [21] though un-grasped; we need only bring to bear on them our grasping regard in order to fulfill the intentions or else to transform them into intentions which, in a determinate or indeterminate manner, do indeed grasp, although they do not present intuitively. This is something that is obviously valid concerning what remains unseen in the thing. In part, these are indeterminate features. In that case, horizons and possibly rays

[1] That the aesthetic synthesis—as aesthetic-causal—is operative as well in the higher strata of the constitution of a thing (the only ones Kant has in mind when he speaks of synthesis) will be shown as soon as we have progressed that far in our study of thing-constitution (*cf.* pp. 44 ff.).

of intention which have a determined direction are reactivated; in the form of non-activated "confusions" they contributed to the sense of the apprehension. But, as has already been mentioned, the analysis does not *need* to be a reactivation. To be sure, one can always say that no analysis could bring out anything that was not latently already implicated in a certain way in an implicit synthesis and that we can only bring parts *out* where we have, with a change of apprehension, intended them *in*, even if only in the form of confused co-intentionalities. Thus our apprehension of a thing is constantly shifting; it appropriates moments of the apprehension into the framework of the unitary style prescribed by thing-consciousness. Hence successive explication transforms the confused co-apprehendings, perhaps into a thematic thesis, a theoretical grasp, with which are generally coupled more precise determinations and, in unity with the kinesthetic processes, more precise intuitive presentations. Yet in so far as such changes of apprehension are possible in advance in accord with the essence of thing-apprehension (and such possibilities are not empty ones but are, instead, motivated), we have at hand "implicit" partial apprehendings which, however, were not really [*reell*] portrayed in the original apprehension.

§ 10. Things, spatial phantoms, and the data of sensation

The objects which served us up to now as representatives of sense objects were real things, such as they are given in "sensory perception" prior to all thinking (all operation of synthetic-categorial acts). They are not spontaneous products (not products in the proper sense, something which presupposes genuine activity, an operation), but still they are "synthetic" unities of components (ones like these do not necessarily have to be synthetically connected). The unity of the visual sense-thing does not necessarily require connection with the unity of the tactual sense-thing. And that is not all. Already in the constitution [22] of a sensed spatial something as such, even if it be only a pure visual spatial phantom (a form fulfilled purely by color, not only without relation to the tactual and the other data of

the other senses, but also without any relation to the moments of "materiality" and thereby to any real-causal determinations), we have a formation of a hidden, analytically exhibitable, constitutive synthesis; it is indeed an "appearance" which refers back to the kinesthetic "circumstances" to which it appertains. We are always led back further analytically and arrive finally at sense-objects in a different sense, ones which lie at the ground (constitutively understood) of all spatial objects[1] and, consequently, of all thing-objects of material reality, too, and which lead us back again to certain ultimate syntheses, but to syntheses which precede *every* thesis. Let us consider, as the most convenient example, a tone played on a violin. It can be apprehended as a real violin-tone and hence as a real occurrence in space. It then remains the same no matter whether I move away from it or approach it, or whether the door of the adjacent room, in which it is being played, is open or closed. By abstracting from material reality, I can still be left with a tonal spatial phantom, appearing with a determinate orientation, proceeding from a certain position in space, resounding through the space, etc. Finally, the spatial apprehension can also be suspended, and then it becomes a mere "sense datum" instead of a spatially sounding tone. In place of that consciousness of the tone which, out there in space, remains unchanged regardless of whether it moves closer or further away, the tone now appears, in the shifting of the focus onto the sense datum, as something which is changing continuously.

It is to be understood that such a tonal datum could be constituted without there being carried out any spatial apprehension at all, an apprehension which, in our example, was only abstractly put aside or, to correct this misleading expression, was suspended but is still, in the changed mode, a lived experience, the lived experience, to be precise, which pre-gives the spatial tone. We should mention, however, that this is not a necessary pre-givenness. A tone would be thinkable which dispensed with every spatial apprehension. Here, with the pure

[1] An example of a spatial object that is not a "thing" is the just-mentioned "phantom."

datum of sensation, we encounter a pregivenness which yet precedes the constitution of the object as object. [23]

We can describe this by juxtaposing two possible cases: the first possibility consists in this, that in the background of consciousness a tone may sound which is indeed apprehended as an object but is not grasped; the Ego is turned toward something else. In the case of the second possibility, talk about a sounding tone denotes a state of sensation which in relation to the Ego does indeed function as a stimulus but which does not possess the property of an object-consciousness, in which a sounding tone comes to consciousness as an object. A genetic example might serve here to make this clear. A conscious subject that had never yet "perceived" a tone, thus had never yet grasped a tone as an object for itself—to such a subject no *object*-tone could impose itself as object. Once this grasp is accomplished (the original object-consciousness), it can lead to object-apprehendings without an intentional advertence, whether in the form of a remembrance of similar tones or in the form of a background consciousness of a newly sounding tone (it is this latter case that we have been using). Obviously not every advertence to a tone can refer back genetically to an advertence toward a constituted object-tone; there must be a tonal sensation which is neither an apprehension of objects nor a grasping of objects. There must be an original constitution of the object-tone which, as a pre-giving consciousness, is prior; in the most proper sense it is not actually *pre-giving* but is a consciousness which apprehends precisely already in terms of objects. If we leave aside the genetic considerations (which for all that do not have to be empirical-psychological), then two phenomenologically possible cases distinguish themselves: first, precisely the one of a merely objective apprehension which is an Objectifying consciousness but is a modified one in relation to the consciousness which gains distinction as advertence and grasp, and, secondly, the case of a state of sensation which is still not an apprehension in terms of objects. Mere apprehension [*AUF-fassung*] shows itself here, consequently, to be an intentional derivation from grasping [*ER-fassung*] somewhat analogous to the way reproductive remembering is a derivation from perception.

An object is constituted originally through spontaneity. The [24]
spontaneity of the lowest level is the one of *grasping*. Grasping, however, can be a kind of reactivating; to wit, a reactivating of a modified grasping which brings to the regard of the grasping Ego something that is already present to consciousness as an object.

Or, it can be a more original act, constituting the object in a most original way.

Thus we see that all Objectivation of spatial things ultimately leads back to sensation. With all objectivities, we are led back from the categorial objectivities to the sensuous. As such are to be considered, on the one hand, sensuous objectivities which in a certain sense are αἰσθητά ἴδια, i.e., ones containing only representatives of a *single* sense sphere and doing so specifically in such a way that they contain no implicit distinct apprehensions and so do not refer back intentionally to hidden theses which could be made explicitly distinct by reactivation.

An example is the tone already apprehended as spatial, insofar as it is correct, as we in fact believe, that there is to be ascribed to such objectivities no intentional references back to perceptual circumstances, ones which would be brought to fulfillment through proper intentions.

But from such objects we are led, ultimately, to sense data constituted in the most primitive way, constituted as unities in original time-consciousness.

All primitive objects, be they objects of sensation or unities already constituted as things in a sphere of sense (even if they are not real objects in the full sense) are originally given as *objects* through mere single-rayed "reception." In a broader sense, those thing-objects constituted through the participation of several sense spheres are also received, but they still need, in order to be properly given, as results from what we have already worked out, articulated processes, chains of receptions. We can also say that the former objects were merely accepted; the latter, at once received and accepted—received, insofar as they contain intentional components that refer to non-active acceptings as implicit constituents.

§ 11. Nature as sphere of mere things

Let us now go back again to the idea of nature as the correlate of modern natural science, the radical phenomenological delineation of which has been the aim of our investigation hitherto. It is clear that, in this sense, "nature" is a sphere of "mere things," a sphere of objectivities which distinguishes itself, by means of a demarcation traced out apriori in the essence of constituting consciousness, from all other spheres of objects that may be treated theoretically. We can and we could already easily say that natural science knows no value-predicates and no practical predicates. Concepts such as the valuable, the beautiful, the amiable, the attractive, the perfect, the good, the useful, act, work, etc., as well as, similarly, concepts like state, church, right, religion, and other concepts, that is, objectivities to whose constitution valuing or practical acts have essentially contributed—all these have no place in natural science, they are not concepts pertaining to nature. But it must be understood from within, from phenomenological sources, that this abstraction from predicates belonging to the spheres of value and practice is not a matter of an arbitrary abstraction, left to one's own discretion, for, as such, it would in fact produce no radically self-enclosed idea of a scientific domain and thus also no idea of a science self-contained apriori. Yet we do gain such an apriori closed idea of nature—as the idea of a world of mere things—provided we become purely theoretical subjects, subjects of a purely theoretical interest, and then proceed purely to satisfy that interest. This is to be understood, however, in the sense previously described. Thereby we are performing a sort of "reduction." We are putting in brackets, as it were, all our feeling-intentions and all the apperceptions deriving from the intentionality of the feelings by virtue of which there constantly appear to us, prior to all thinking, spatio-temporal objectivities in immediate "intuitability," charged with certain characters of value and practice—characters that altogether transcend the stratum of the mere thing. Thus, in this "pure" or purified theoretical attitude, we no longer experience houses, tables, streets, or works of art; instead, we experience merely material things. Of those value- [25]

charged things, we experience only their stratum of spatio-temporal materiality; and similarly, of men and human societies, only that stratum of this psychic "nature" which is bound to the spatio-temporal "Bodies." [26]

There is still a certain restriction to be made here, however. It would not be correct to say that the correlate of mere nature is a purely "Objectivating Ego-subject" that in no way performs any valuing. To be sure, it is a subject that is *indifferent* to its Object, indifferent to the actuality constituted in appearances; that is, this subject does not value such being for its own sake and thus has no practical interest in the transformations such being might undergo and so no interest in fashioning them, etc. *On the other hand, this subject does value the knowledge of appearing being* and the determination of that being by means of logical judgments, theory, science. Thus it values the "It is so," the "How is it?" Furthermore, it does attach value to matters of practice, too; it is indeed interested in transformations, and this subject will produce them in practice by means of experiments. But it does not do so for their own sake but produces them only in order to make visible thereby the connections which might advance the knowledge of appearing being. The correlate of nature is thus not a subject that in no way strives, wills, or evaluates. That is unthinkable. Knowledge of nature abstracts only from all other values besides the *cognitive values:* "I want nothing other than to experience nature more richly by means of 'theoretical experience' and to know, in a theoretical knowledge on the basis of experience, just what that which appears is, what nature is."

Every pure theory, every purely scientific attitude, arises from a theoretical interest in an objectivity, or a class of objectivities, that can be constituted originally. With respect to natural science, this objectivity to be constituted originally is nature, the real unity of all natural objectivities. The term "natural objectivity" thereby denotes a class of objects which, as regards their coexisting exemplars, join together, by essential necessity, to form a really connected unity, whereby at the same time it is characteristic of these objects that a valuing consciousness, as "constituting," has contributed nothing to their essential composition, that is, to the content of their sense. The acts of

valuing performed by the subject that is experiencing nature, the subject pursuing natural science—performed by this subject as such—are not constitutive of the Objects with which it has to do, and that is precisely why it can be said with justice that there are no value-Objects or the like within its compass. But one point must be noted in this regard. The acts of valuing and of willing—feeling, willing, deciding, acting—are not excluded [27] from the sphere of things that matter here; on the contrary, they thoroughly belong to that sphere, even if they do not present themselves as carriers of value-predicates or of other analogous ones. We bear with us the whole of consciousness as an object, but we allow ourselves to "constitute objects" only through the doxic Objectivating consciousness and not through the valuing one. The sphere of things experienceable by us in this way is what should now determine for us the sphere of natural science. From then on we remain purely in the natural-scientific attitude, and it is thereby clear to us that in doing so we are performing a sort of disengaging, *a sort of* ἐποχή. In ordinary life, we have nothing whatever to do with nature-Objects. What we take as things are pictures, statues, gardens, houses, tables, clothes, tools, etc. These are all value-Objects of various kinds, use-Objects, practical Objects. They are not Objects which can be found in natural science.

Chapter Two

THE ONTIC SENSE-STRATA OF THE THING OF INTUITION AS SUCH

§ 12. Material and animal nature

We are directing our attention to the totality of "real" things, to the entire world of things, the "universe," nature, which, in its forms of space and time, encompasses all factual realities but also includes, obviously on essential grounds, all apriori possible realities as well.

Already at first glance what is striking here is the essentially grounded difference between nature in a more strict sense, the lowest and first sense, i.e., *material nature*, and nature in a second, broadened sense, i.e., things that have a soul, in the genuine sense of "living," *animal nature*. Everything that we take as existing in the ordinary sense (thus in a naturalistic attitude), including therefore, sensations, representations, feelings, and psychic acts and states of every kind, belongs precisely in this attitude to living nature; these are "real" acts or states, ontologically characterized precisely in that they are activities or states of animals or humans and as such are part of the [28] spatio-temporal world. Consequently, they are subject to the determinations which befall "every individual objectivity whatever."

Every thingly being is temporally extended; it has its duration, and with its duration it is fit within Objective time in a strict manner. Thus with its duration it has a fixed place in the one world-time, which is a universal form of existence for all thinghood. Everything else that a thing "is," according to every other essential determination which belongs to it, it is that in its duration, with the more precise determination of its "when."

We distinguish therefore appropriately between *temporal determination* (the duration of a thing) and *real feature*, which, as such, fills the duration, spreads itself over the duration. Precisely thereby it is apriori necessary that every feature of a thing, throughout its duration, either changes in a continuous manner as regards its content or else does not change at all, and in the former case single discrete leaps are admissable. If the temporal filling of its duration changes either continuously or by leaps, then the thing "alters;" if that is not the case, then the thing remains unaltered.[1]

Furthermore, every thingly being has its place in world-space, relative to every other thingly being and alterable in principle. The thing is moveable in space, in virtue of the corporeal extension which belongs to it by essence and is exclusively proper to it, and which can constantly alter its location in space. These propositions can be understood so universally that they hold in fact and apriori for *every thingly being whatever*.

Now, however, a distinction arises, precisely with respect to corporeal extension, between *material thinghood* and thinghood in the sense of *animal nature*. It was not without reason that Descartes designated *extensio* as the *essential attribute of the material thing*, which, therefore, is also called, simply, corporeal—over against psychic or spiritual being, which, in its spirituality as such, has no *extensio* but, rather, essentially excludes it. In fact, what, above all, must be brought to insight is that *extensio*, rightly understood, distinguishes nature in the first sense from nature in the second sense, although the fully comprehensive essential attribute of material being is not mere extension but is, instead, materiality, so far as this latter in itself requires temporal as well as spatial extension. But what matters [29]

[1] It should be discussed expressly whether the duration of a thing has to be filled by thingly determinations without a hiatus or whether it is possible for things to disappear and then come into existence anew—with the same determinations or with ones that have altered in that segment of the duration. This would mean that one and the same thing could have several separate durations, and the question would be whether such a thing, extending over two separate durations, could be distinguished from two things existing one after the other. But for our present context the consideration of these questions is not required unconditionally.

most here is to know the distinctive manner in which everything else that belongs to a material thing is yet related apriori (that always means essentially) to its extension. Spiritual nature, understood as animal nature, is a complex composed of a lower stratum of material nature, whose essential feature is *extensio,* and an inseparable upper stratum which is of a fundamentally different essence and which, above all, excludes extension. Thus even if the comprehensive essential feature of the material thing is materiality, yet it is at once understandable how extension can be taken as the essential distinguishing feature differentiating the material from the psychic or spiritual.

§ 13. The significance of extension for the structure of "things" in general and of material things in particular

What is now of utmost importance is to make clear the singular manner in which *everything that a thing is in other respects* and by essence *is related to the extension which necessarily belongs to it,* and, furthermore, how, quite differently, the psychical determinations belonging to animal realities acquire, *by means of the foundedness of the psychic in the material,* the spatial determination which also is necessary to them. By the term spatial (better: corporeal) extension of a thing we understand the *spatial corporeality* pertaining to its concrete essential content exactly the way it belongs to this content in full determinateness. Accordingly, it is not only that every alteration in magnitude, with a conservation of the same spatial form, implies an alteration of extension, and that the same is true for every alteration of the form with a conservation of the magnitude and for every deformation in whatever sense, but also every alteration of position is an alteration of the extension. [30]

Extension is thus not a mere piece of space, although it coincides with such at every temporal point of the duration of the thing. It follows from its essence that neither space itself nor any one whatever of its pieces can move; space itself can never have a *hole,* i.e., a place empty of spatiality and somehow only afterwards filled up by a supplement. It is absolutely "fixed;" its parts are not "extensions" in the sense we have delimited,

not "bodies"—for instance, absolutely fixed bodies in the sense of physics.

Now I am saying that this determination as alterable (spatial extension or corporeality) has a fully proper place amidst the constitutive properties of a material thing. There belongs to the essence of extension the ideal possibility of *fragmentation.* It is then evident that every fragmentation of the extension fragments the thing itself—i.e., splits it into pieces, each of which once again has the full thingly character, that of material thingness. Conversely, every partition of the thing into things, every fragmentation, as such, of the thing, also fragments the extension of the thing. In other words, the thing is not only extended in the sense that it is in general endowed, amidst its other determinations, with a determination called corporeal extension. Rather, as regards whatever it is contentwise, both as a whole and in its particulars, and as regards, specifically, whatever it is in itself (according to its full time-filling essence, according to its proper features), the thing is extended, is something that fills corporeal space. There is a distinction in principle between the corporeal extension-determinations of a thing, magnitude, form, figure and the like (ideally speaking: the geometrical determinations), and its real qualities, i.e., the modes pertaining to them in the current circumstances—better: in the current phases of time.

Every corporeal quality of a thing "fills the spatial body;" the thing spreads itself out in the quality; in every one the thing fills its corporeality (its extension), and the same is true, at the same point in time, for all real qualities. And, naturally, what holds for the totality holds for every piece. In particular, each thing is different, each may have its different spatial extension and fill it qualitatively in a very different manner. The manner of the filling of the body, the qualification of the body, the filling of space[1] (if we would still use this not quite correct, though customary, phrase) may be different, according to the [31]

[1] Filling of space has two senses. Qualification of a *body* produces the concept of the corporeal quality, the "secondary" quality. The body itself as a determination ("quality") of the thing is not a part of space but instead "fills" space itself together with the secondary qualities that fill and qualify it.

kind of features and according as we take into consideration enduring qualities or merely real states (in the alteration of which, identical qualities manifest themselves): but the universal type is always and necessarily the same. It must be said of every kind of quality that it may have its own special ways of filling spatial corporeality, covering it, extending itself over it. Yet it is necessarily a quality that fills. The thing knows no other extensive determinations besides pure corporeality (the primary quality) and the modifying sensuous qualities, the "qualifying" secondary qualities. The momentary coloration of a thing (i.e., its momentary optical state out of the possible multiplicity of optical states in which the unity of the identical optical properties of the thing manifests itself while changing) covers the entire outer surface of the corporeal thing in a determined way. Obviously, it is in quite a different manner that warmth fills the warm body or that the property of odor fills what smells. It is in a still different manner as regards weight and similar real determinations. Weight has its extension, to the degree that every fragmentation of a thing, no matter how thorough, fragments the very weight of the thing as well. The thing may, in the alteration of the circumstances of its existence, take on and then lose again *some or other* of the filling properties. Without corporeal extension no weight is there whatsoever. Yet, to be sure, never can extension be there by itself; its special position is not that of one real property amidst others. The thing is what it is in its real properties, but each one, taken separately, is not necessary in the same sense. Each is a ray of the thing's being. But corporeal extension is not a ray of real being in that same sense; it is not in the same way (properly speaking, "in no way") a real property. Rather, it is an essential form of all real properties. That is why an empty corporeal space is, *realiter*, nothing; it exists only to the degree that a thing, with its thingly properties, is extended therein. Better: body *is a real* determination, but it is a fundamental [32] determination (an essential foundation) and form for all other determinations.

In this sense, extension is thus the essential characteristic of materiality, although it is—indeed, precisely because it is, in a wholly different manner—a "real property;" it is the *essential*

attribute, provided the term is used in this way. It expresses the characteristic essential form of existence for material or physical being (the essential form for all real determinations in which thingly existence is explicated), and, therefore, for the mere physical thing, although not for the full thing altogether, since to the essence of thingly being as a whole there also belongs temporality. Men and animals have their position in space and move in space as sheer physical things. It will be said that it is obvious that they do so "by virtue of" their corporeal Bodies. It would be bizarre, however, to say that only the man's Body moved but not the man, that the man's Body walked down the street, drove in a car, dwelled in the country or town, but not the man. Thus it appears from the first that in this respect too there are differences among the properties of the Body. One could say that the Body has properties such as weight, size, etc. which we attribute to others and to ourselves as well, though we do so in full awareness that they *properly* belong only to the material Body. It is obviously only insofar as I have a Body that I have size and weight. If I attribute to myself a *locus*, then it is the locus of my Body, too. But do we not sense from the outset a certain difference, by virtue of which locality belongs to me somewhat more essentially? But let us consider this matter systematically.

§ 14. The significance of extension for the structure of animalia

The objects of nature in the second, enlarged, sense are, taken in full concretion, animal realities, characterized as Bodies with a soul. They are founded realities, which presuppose in themselves, as their lower stratum, material realities, so-called material Bodies. Furthermore, they have, and this is what is new about them, besides their specifically material determinations, still new systems of properties, the psychic ones, in regard to [33] which we leave it open whether or not a distinction into two, properly speaking, should be made under this heading: a sensuous (aesthetic) stratum and a properly psychic one. In experience, these new properties we speak of are given as

belonging to the Body in question, and it is precisely because of them that it is called Body or organism, i.e., an *"organ" for a soul* or for a spirit. On the other hand, we have to say that these properties are precisely not material properties, and that means that by essence they have no extension, that they are not given in the way in which all properties are given which fill Bodily extension. But whether properties are extended or not, hence whether the objects which have these properties are material or not—these are not accidental matters but essential ones. People and animals *have* material Bodies, and to that degree they have spatiality and materiality. According to what is specifically human and animal, that is, according to what is psychic, they *are*, however, not material, and, consequently, taken *also as concrete totalities*, they are *not material* realities in the proper sense. Material things are open to fragmentation, something which accompanies the extension that belongs to their essence. But men and animals cannot be fragmented. Men and animals are *spatially localized*; and even what is psychic about them, at least in virtue of its essential foundedness in the Bodily, partakes of the spatial order. We will even say that much of what is included under the broad—and, at first, unclarified—heading of the psychic has something like spread (although not extension in space). In principle, however, *nothing* on this side is *extended in the proper sense*, in the specific sense of the extension we described.

§ 15. The essence of materiality (substance)

Before we investigate further the distinctions, open to greater clarification, between localization and extension, and so before we explore the mode of connection in general between material Body and that which gives animality fullness, i.e., the psychic, we want first of all to consider somewhat more closely the respective terms of the connection.

The physical or material thing is *res extensa*. We have already exposed the sense of its "essential attribute," *extensio*. Well, now, what makes up the concept of this *res*, what is meant by [34] extended *reality*, by *reality at all*? One also speaks of extended

substance. But just what, we now ask, is meant by this substantiality, considered in its fullest possible universality?

The material thing fits under the *logical* category, *pure and simple individuum* ("absolute" object). To it are referred the logical (formal-ontological) modifications: individual property (here, the quality of being a thing), state, process, relation, complexion, etc. In every domain of being we find analogous variations, and so the goal of phenomenological clarity requires us to go back to the individuum as the primordial objectivity. It is from it that all logical modifications acquire their sense-determination.

a) Phenomenological analysis of the givenness of the thing as a way toward determining the essence, "material thing"

If we would touch on the thing itself, then it is required of us, assuming we wanted to grasp the essence of the thing and determine it conceptually, that we not be content with vague locutions and traditional philosophical preconceptions but instead draw from the very source of clear givenness. Thus we have to go back, as exemplary, to the consciousness in which things are given to us originarily and so perfectly that we can be lacking nothing for grasping the universal essential form which prescribes the apriori rule for such objects. To bring things in this way to exemplary givenness calls not simply for a mere perception or for a distinct phantasizing of oneself into an act of perception. That is not sufficient at all. It is not enough to see this table and to cast on it a perceiving regard, or even to take together several perceptions of the table and, in addition, perceptions of other things. Rather, it is necessary to *"follow up"* the perceptually meant in a perceiving and experiencing, be it actually experiencing or just phantasizing. The task is to presentify to oneself (if need be, by free fiction) series of perceptions connecting up together in a continuous way, in which the perceived object is one and the same and thereby shows, in the progression of the perceptions, in an ever more perfect way, what lies in it, what belongs to its essence.[1]

[1] *Cf.* pp. 96 f.

In the noema of the act of perception, i.e., in the perceived, [35] taken precisely as characterized phenomenologically, as it is therein an intentional Object, there is included a determinate directive for all further experiences of the object in question. The table is indeed now given in the perceiving act, but it is given each time in a determinate way. Perception has its *perceptual sense*, its meant, just as it is meant, and lying in that sense are directives, unfulfilled anticipatory and retrospective indications, which we only have to follow up. The table-appearance is a table appearing from the front side with a front-side color, front-side shape, etc. It belongs to the sense of this meant that the meant shape or meant color points on to ever new appearances of the form or of the color in a determinate progression, by means of which not only does what has already actually appeared achieve a better appearance, but the sides which did not appear (though they are indeed sides which were co-meant in a more or less indeterminate way) attain a givenness which does exhibit them. All the different *directions of determination* which lie in the meant thing as such are thereby traced out in advance, and that holds for each of the possible motivated courses of perception belonging to it, to which I can give myself over in freely forming phantasy, and to which I must give myself over—at least if I want to bring to clarity the sense of the modes of determinateness in question and, therewith, the full content of the essence of the thing. It is only if one interrogates the thing-noema itself, the so-to-say thing-meaning, by bringing it to a givenness which unfolds itself in all directions, and, further, only if one lets the answer come from it itself in the actual carrying out of its directives, only then does one actually gain the essential components of thingness and the necessary essential interweavings, without which what is meant by a thing at all cannot be thought.

This method, supposing we wanted to pursue it *in extenso*, would result in very many foundational constatations with respect to the essence of the thing. We shall have to content ourselves with a few especially remarkable ones.

b) Mobility and alterability as constituents of the material thing; the thing-schema [36]

To begin, we can easily convince ourselves of the fact that the possibilities of motion and rest, of qualitative change and qualitative permanence, are based in principle on the essence of the material thing in general. A thing can, e.g., be unmoved and unchanged *de facto*, but it would be countersensical to claim that it is unmovable and unchangeable in principle. On the other hand, it *can* be absolutely unchanged; in intuition we can grasp, by means of fitting examples, the idea of a thing which is *unchanged* in all respects (even if only as an ideal limit-case). If we take this idea as our point of departure and hold fast to the thing in itself, disregarding the nexus in which it is a thing, then it strikes us that we would henceforth have at our disposal no means at all for distinguishing the essence of the *thing* from the essence of an empty *phantom*, and that by which the thing exceeds the phantom would then not be given to us in actual, exhibiting, givenness in the sense we have specified. For example, it is a mere phantom that faces us when we learn, in a stereoscope, to bring fitting organizations into corporeal fusion. We are then seeing a *spatial body*, regarding which meaningful questions can be raised about its form, its color, and even about its smoothness, roughness, and other, similarly classified, determinations, questions which can therefore be answered in conformity with the truth, by saying, perhaps, this is a red, rough pyramid. On the other hand, what appears can be given in such a way that questions of whether it is heavy or light, elastic, magnetic, etc. do not make any sense, or, better, do not find any support within the perceptual sense. What we are seeing is precisely not a material thing. The entire class of material determinations is missing from the sense-content of the apperception we performed in the example above. It is not just that they are undetermined and left open, as is indeed the case in every perception of a thing, where, by virtue of the components of indeterminateness in the apprehension, much is left open. For example, concerning the determinate color of the invisible backside, already somehow apperceived as red, is it completely, uniformly, red, or does it contain stains and streaks? Or again,

concerning the form of the thing, apprehended only as somehow consistent, what is it really like where it passes into invisibility? Or, is the body solid or soft, metallic or nonmetallic, etc? It is rather the case that, without detriment to the otherwise indeterminate elements which still remain open, *essential groups of features are not represented in the apprehension at all,* namely, those *of materiality as we have specified it.* This is [37] the way in which we also see a rainbow, the blue sky, the sun, etc. We therefore draw the conclusion that a fulfilled spatial body (a qualified body), fulfilled through the extended qualitative filling, is not yet so much as a thing, a thing in the usual sense as *material-real.* It is equally clear that every sensuous thing, in its givenness, requires as a basic piece of its essence (hence, forever, irremovably) this kind of fulfilled spatial body. Thus it is always necessarily given as a fulfilled spatial extension, but it is still given as more. We say that a *sensuous schema* belongs to the essence of a thing, and we understand by that this groundwork, this corporeal ("spatial") shape, along with the filling which extends over it. The thing which appears at rest and unchanged qualitatively "shows" us no more than its schema or, rather, than the apparent, whereas it is nevertheless *apprehended* at the same time as something material. But in this respect is does not "show" itself, it does not properly come to view, to originary givenness. If the whole stratum of materiality were stricken from the apperception, it would change nothing as regards what is "properly" given. In fact, that is thinkable. In original experience, perception, "body" is unthinkable without sensuous qualification; the phantom, however, is originally given, and thereby thinkable as well, without the components of materiality, whereas these latter for their part are unable to stand alone (unilateral detachment). If we take into consideration the different alterations, the extensive (change of place, deformation) and the qualitative, then we again observe the same thing: what comes to *actual perceptio* for us in the perception of thingly alterations and, specifically, of alterations in the proper content of the appearing thing, are only continuous courses of sensuous schemata, or, as we can also say, *the sensuous schema of the thing undergoes continuous alteration.* But once again it is clear that nothing is given here which could not

also be given as pure "phantom." Phantoms, too, (in the sense specified of pure spatial givenness without the stratum of any apprehension of materiality) can move, deform themselves, and change qualitatively in color, brightness, sound, etc. Again, [38] therefore, materiality can, from the outset, be co-apprehended and yet not co-given.

It should now be emphasized at once that the concept of schema (the concept of phantom) is by no means restricted merely to a single sense-sphere. A perceived thing also has its *tactual schema,* which comes to light in tactual grasping. In general, *there are precisely as many strata there to be distinguished in the full schema as there are to be found classes of sensuous data* which are spread over the spatial extension (appearing as something identical) of the thing. Yet the schema does not become multiple on account of this manifold filling. The sensuous qualities fill the one, absolutely identical, spatial corporeality and do so on several strata which, because of this identity and because of their essential inseparability from extension, cannot, in principle, disperse into further *distinct* schemata.

Let us consider this still a little more closely: let there be given one and the same body, the form of which is one and the extension of which is one, but which presents itself in a two-fold way, as a corporeality that is both seen and touched. The body is colorful; that is, it is colored in all its parts and in its total extension, either in a uniform way or with different colors for the different parts of its extension (its surface). Nevertheless, the body is colorful only in its "optical appearance." In "tactual space," in the tactually appearing (tactually given) corporeality, no color is given.[1] On the other hand, smoothness is given tactually; just as brightness is visually. Wetness cannot be seen—only touched. It can at best be "co-seen," just as the apprehension of silky tactuality co-presentifies a dull lustre. Roughness can be touched and "seen" as well; and so can a

[1] To be sure, the expressions "visual space" and "tactual space" are quite problematic, however common they might be. *The* space, the one space, presents itself and appears both visually and tactually. The question is how we are to understand the identity and to what extent we can speak of strata here.

ribbed surface. There is an exact analogy between the mode or form of the visual filling of corporeality and the tactual; i.e., each has the form of a lived experience of transition within a continuous apprehension; the form is the same. Likewise, for the thing-structure itself, for the pure spatial corporeality, there exists, it seems, this analogy in complexion-form, despite the different mode of sensuous givenness. [39]

Here, however, we want to speak not of analogy but of identity. How does one arrive at a positing of identity? It is *the same Objective property* which announces itself in the brightness and in the smoothness. In any case, I take the body as the same. The body has but one structure, one extension, or, better: the thing of perception has but one spatial corporeality (spatial structure). In addition, the thing has its color, its brightness (grasped in seeing), its smoothness (grasped tactually), etc. Furthermore, now it sounds, radiates warmth or coldness, etc.

The body's motion, too, can be grasped by means of several different senses, as a change in place of thingly spatial corporeality.

Impact and pressure cannot properly be seen; one can only see what results from them as regards space and form. Nor is it by pure and simple touch that pressure, pull, and resistance are to be perceived. One has to "exert the muscles," "brace oneself against," etc. But I do grasp visually all sorts of occurrences when one body presses on another: e.g., I see that a body having an impact on another is pushing it aside, that the motion of a body, owing to an impact, is accelerating or decelerating accordingly, etc. I grasp something similar, even if it is not so easy, by means of touch and the muscle sense. A distinction arises here between geometrical and mechanical movements, and the mechanical is not judgeable exclusively by one sense. Moreover, we find a parallelism between sensuous qualities and extensional events: warmth and coldness *occur together with expansion and contraction in a regulated way*. Everywhere, apprehension includes in itself, by the mediation of a "sense," empty horizons of "possible perceptions;" thus I can, at any given time, enter into a system of possible and, if I follow them up, actual, perceptual nexuses. We can say that the spatial body is a synthetic unity of a manifold of strata of "sensuous

appearances" of different senses. Each stratum is in itself homogeneous, pertaining to one sense; it is a matter of one apperceptive perception or a perceptual manifold which homogeneously runs its course and continues. Every perception (and series of perceptions) of that kind has its complements of parallel apperceptions of other strata, which constitute a *"co-givenness"* (not an actual givenness) making possible a subsequent fulfilling in actual perception. The given optical fulfillment of the visual schema refers to the tactual side of the schema and perhaps to the determined fulfillment of it. "Associatively," the one recalls the other. Experience teaches me to recognize new fulfillments, which are apprehended not as newly arisen but as having been there already and as continuing to belong to it. This is already the case for a single stratum by itself. I see the front side of the schema, and much remains indeterminate in the back. But a back side it certainly does have. In a like manner, the body also has a tactual side (or stratum); it is just that it is still undetermined. The body is a unity of experience, and it lies in the sense of this unity to be an index for a manifold of possible experiences in which the body can come to givenness in ever new ways. Therewith, we have first taken the body as independent of all causal conditioning, i.e., merely as a unity which presents itself visually or tactually, through multiplicities of sensations, as endowed with an inner content of characteristic features. Some of the examples chosen (the apperception of the mechanical qualities) have, however, already gone beyond this restriction. [40]

But, in what we have said, it is also implied that under the presupposition referred to (namely, that we take the thing outside of the nexuses in which it is a thing) we do not find, as we carry out experiences, any possibility for deciding, in a way that exhibits, whether the experienced material thing is actual or whether we are subject to a mere illusion and are experiencing a mere phantom. To appeal to the existing coordination of different senses would come down to a misunderstanding of our problem. The thing-positing (the doxa) which lies in perception is obviously motivated by what is at present actually given, hence by the apparent schema, and it is also obvious that a schema which appears under more aspects must have more

motivating power. Yet were the materiality of the thing not to be given actually and properly from elsewhere (genetically speaking: if in similar cases the content of determination of what is specifically material had never been given to us), then indeed there would be there nothing in reference to which the intuition of the schema could have a motivating function. [41]

c) Exhibition of the materiality of the thing by way of its dependence on circumstances

It is now the time to repair a deficiency, i.e., to take up the presupposition we have been allowing. Up to now we have taken the thing in isolation. But it is in relation to "circumstances" that the thing is what it is. If we juxtapose the change of a phantom and the change of a thing, then we see clearly that these two are not the same and that they are not to be distinguished from each other by means of sheer content, which, under the title, materiality, in the one case would belong and in the other would be lacking. It is obvious that changes in a thing can occur while the sensuous schema does not change at all, and conversely, the thing can remain unchanged while the schema changes. An example of the latter obtains if the same unchanged thing is perceived under a changing daylight or under a chromatic illumination which is in the process of changing, etc.

Reality in the proper sense, here called "materiality," does not lie in the mere sensuous schema and could not be attributed to the perceived, if something like a relation to "circumstances" did not apply to the perceived and had no sense for it; rather, it lies precisely in this relation and in the corresponding mode of apprehension. In a changing illumination, hence in relation to something else that is illuminating, the thing looks constantly different and does so not in just any way but in a determinate way. Here there are evidently functional connections which relate the schematic modifications of the one aspect to those of the other aspects. It pertains to the sense of the apprehension of a thing as thing (but not of a mere phantom) that such schemata, ones which run their course in determined series of modifications, and which, in a determinate way, now change

and now do not, are experienced as intimations of one and the same thing. But such is how we experience them insofar as they run their course as "dependent" on the "real circumstances" which pertain to them. Thus in our example we experience one and the same thing with respect to its optical properties, which maintain their unity and determinateness throughout the change of illumination produced by the corresponding sources of the light. Insofar as the schemata are fulfilled by color, this unity permeates them. What is constituted therewith is the "Objective" color, the one had by the *thing* no matter whether it is in sunlight or in dim daylight or in the darkness of a cupboard, and this is the case for any of the lighting conditions, to which belong, thereby, in a functional way, quite definite schemata, including the complete filling of a visual schema. [42]

So long as the circumstances remain unchanged, the schema remains unchanged as well. A continuous change of the circumstances entails continuous alteration of the schema; and, likewise, continuous non-change, invariability in the behavior of the appearances which are functioning as circumstances, entails, in the same span of time, continuous non-change of the schema dependent on them.

In this way, absence of change is the limit-case of change; it conforms to the rule decreeing that to similar circumstances belong similar functional dependencies. Let us take another example. A steel spring, once struck, executes certain oscillations and runs through certain successions of states of relative change of place and deformation: the spring has the real property of "elasticity." As soon as a certain impetus is given, there occurs a corresponding deviation from the state of rest and a certain corresponding mode of oscillation. As soon as a certain other impetus acts, there occurs a corresponding other change in the spring, though one of a similar intuitive type. Failing any impetus, other circumstances can yet undergo a change and work in a way that is similar to the action of an impetus. If the circumstances (all the ones that are "circumstances" precisely with respect to elasticity) remain unchanged throughout, then the spring remains in a state of non-change. Under similar circumstances, similar consequences: so with similar changes of circumstances, similar modes of oscillation.

The general rule, to which absence of change conforms as the limit-case of change, does not, as such, come to consciousness; here it expresses a form intrinsic to the apperception of the real property. The apperception of the real property includes this articulation in circumstances and includes the functionally dependent changes of the schemata in such a way that there is this dependency in any given case, and it is not merely something abstract, either. On the other hand, however, thing and property are grasped in an Objectifying way, but schema [43] and circumstances (taken likewise as schematic) are not.

It is precisely in this way that every "Objective," "real" property of the phenomenal thing is constituted. What is real of the thing itself is as multiple as it has, in this sense, real properties, ones which are, throughout, unities with respect to manifolds of schematic regulations in relation to corresponding circumstances.

d) The schema as real determinateness of the material thing

By virtue of this realizing apprehension (i.e., as constitutive of the real thing as substrate of real properties), the current schema acquires the character of a real determinateness of a particular sense. Over against the real unitary property, in our example the unchanged Objective color, there stands the momentary real *state,* which corresponds to the "circumstances" and which changes according to rules. The state coincides with the schema; yet it is not a mere schema (the thing is indeed not a mere phantom). Corresponding to the changed apprehension is a changed correlate. That is to say, in the thing-apprehension the schema is not perceived as an extension filled merely sensuously but is perceived precisely as primal manifestation or "documentation" (originary manifestation) of a real property and, precisely thereby, as a state of the real substance at the point in time involved. The property itself comes to actually filling—i.e., originary—givenness only if an originary unfolding is achieved by the functional series in which the dependencies on the corresponding circumstances (i.e., the *causal* dependencies) come to originary givenness. In this case, the causalities are not merely supposed but are *"seen," "perceived."* It is thereby obvious that the direction of the regard in the intentional grasp of the real property and the one in the intentional grasp of the causal dependency of its current states on the respective circumstances (which themselves then attain to an objectifying grasp) are different ones, although in both cases the regard, in a certain way, traverses the schema or, rather, traverses the corresponding stratum of its fullness. Even if it is the one same state of the concrete situation, pre-given for these various graspings, yet there is again a change in the direction of [44] the regard on the thing itself as the identical substrate of this or that self-manifesting property or as the substrate of the states currently related to these or those circumstances. There are as many directions of unity prefigured in the causal apprehension of the schema (i.e., directions for possible series of perceptions in functional relation to series of perceptible circumstances) as there is multiplicity in the way in which the reality-thing, the unitary material *"substance,"*[1] is determinable according to *properties* corresponding to the apprehended sense itself. And the thing has these properties (*real,* substantial properties) in actuality if the fulfilling experience exhibits them originarily in the thingly states (or relational modes) dependent on the circumstances. Moreover, the thing-apprehension, such as it is established already with every individual perception and series of perceptions, bears in itself different modes of determinateness and indeterminateness. To be sure, the perceived enters consciousness as what is real of the given states but only as what is more or less determined. Yet the manner in which the indeterminateness can be determined more precisely is predelineated by the formal essence of thing-apprehension as such and, for the rest, by the particularity of the particular apprehension then current, i.e., precisely by that which the thing-apprehension leaves open in this particularity.

[1] Substance signifies here nothing more than the material thing as such, considered to the extent that it is the identical something of real properties, that which actualizes itself temporally in regulated manifolds of states in regulated dependency on concomitant circumstances.

e) More precise determination, redetermination, and cancellation of the thing-experience

It pertains further to the universal essence of thing-apprehension that, in the progression of the experiences in which the current thing is primordially manifest in a more and more rich manner, there also arise ever richer directions of determination, and in them ever new empty points of determinability can establish themselves. Apriori only in the progression of ongoing experiences which are primordially manifesting can it be exhibited what the current thing is. Hereby (according to what we have already indicated previously) there continually stand side by side, as possibilities in principle: 1) the possibility of thoroughly concordant experiences, ones which do nothing except determine more precisely; 2) the possibility of partly concordant, partly discordant, experiences: i.e., experiences which go to determine the *same* thing but in new and different ways; 3) the possibility, finally, of irreconcilable discrepancies, by means of which is exhibited the non-being of the thing which was experienced in erstwhile concordance or the non-being of the thing which was determined as "new and different" in its particulars. But if the thing *is*, then it is as the identical real something of its real properties, and these are, so-to-say, mere rays of its unitary being. It is as such an identity that the thing is posited, in a motivated way, by every experience, be it ever so imperfect and leaving so much still open, and the legitimating power of the motivation grows along with the richness of the primordial manifestations which show up in the progression of the experience. The thing is constant in that it comports itself in such and such a way under the circumstances which pertain to it: *reality* (or, what is here the same, *substantiality*) *and causality belong together inseparably*. Real properties are *eo ipso* causal ones. To know a thing therefore means to know from experience how it behaves under pressure and impact, in being bent and being broken, when heated and when cooled, etc., i.e., to know its behavior in the nexus of its causalities: which states does the thing actually attain and how does it remain the same throughout these states. [45]

To pursue these nexuses and to determine the real properties

in scientific thinking, on the basis of progressive experience, that is the task of physics (in a broad sense), which, led in this way from the most immediate unities in the hierarchical sequence of experiences and of what is primordially manifest in these experiences, goes on to ever higher unities.

§ 16. The constitution of the properties of the thing in multiple relations of dependency

A *unity*, as we have seen, traverses all changes of state with reference to the real circumstances, both the actual and the possible, in such a way that, as far as the apprehension is concerned, every change of state, pertaining either to the same property as unchanged or to properties which have changed either continuously or intermittently, takes place or can take place as univocal in the given real nexus. The thing as the unity of its properties can, therefore, in the alteration of any of its states or modes of comportment, change "itself" or remain unchanged. Every real property is, as real, changeable. Hence, the unities of primordial manifestations, in their temporal continuity, are apprehended, in their dependence on unities of circumstances, as phases of a unity of duration which persists in them. Iron melts and changes its state of aggregation, which, for its part, obviously has the character of a real property in our sense. While a material body is moving towards one of the poles of the earth, its weight changes continuously, etc. Considered more precisely, the formation of unity as the formation of an identity in the stream of temporal change is nothing specifically proper to a thing. To the essence of each unity, including each non-substantial unity as mere unity of duration, pertain, apriori, possibilities that the very duration is endowed with a temporal fullness which is either the same throughout or, abstraction made from isolated leaps, is changing continuously. And to this there belongs everywhere the consciousness of unity, which, in such temporal continuities, is consciousness of the identical as something individual and which, if possible, intentionally grasps the identical which endures there and changes. For example, the tone, the pure datum of sensation, which is [46]

indeed not something substantially real, changes "itself" with respect to its intensity, yet in doing so it remains unchanged as regards pitch, etc. Now it must be noted that the constitution of real properties can also be accomplished at higher levels, meaning, therefore, that hierarchical formations are possible, according to which still higher unities, in turn, make themselves manifest in unities of primordial manifestation and, if need be, are determined therefrom by means of the thinking grounded in experience. And this is valid universally.

Previously we had arrived at the principle of the co-ordination of whatever is given schematically, namely that in the apperception of the real what is formally determinate is: similar circumstances—similar consequences. But this principle requires a certain modification of the sense which was first accorded to it up to now—where the circumstances were schematic givens and so were the consequences.

There is no problem if we are only dealing with properties of the lowest level and are experiencing the real as an enduring unity of one and the same *unchanged* property.

But in the essence of any thing (as we grasp it in the essence of experience, thus in ideally possible experience) there lies the [47] ideal possibility of its (the real's) changing. E.g., the spring is elastic. Under similar schematic circumstances we experience (or, ideally speaking, can experience) how there occur similar schematic series of change or of permanence: the same modes of oscillation invariably occur under impacts of the same vector and the same force, passing gradually into the limit-case in which the impact is O and henceforth the oscillation is O.

The impact can be so strong, however, that the "limit of elasticity" is exceeded. Then the spring breaks and falls apart in a heap of disconnected pieces. No longer do we have there the unity of one real thing with the one elastic quality. Or, to take another example, the spring is made red hot and thereby loses its elasticity; or at least the elasticity is changed, insofar as it does still remain.

These are *property-changes*, and the changed property once again obeys, with respect to its schemata, the formal rule: under similar circumstances, similar consequences. But now the factual functional connection, the coordination between the schemata and the circumstances, is, despite a sameness in form, different. And should the piece of steel be heated until it melts, the elasticity would quite vanish. It is a changed thing, whether it preserves its properties, though they have altered, or whether it loses properties and acquires new ones of a different type, perhaps exhibiting changes also in the properties of the type which still subsists after the loss of the former properties, etc.

Thus we not only have *unity in the changes of properties* and in the individual changing property, as, in general, we have unity in series of changes, but *a new unity traverses the property-changes;* that is to say, the thing is of such a kind that, under wholly determined changes of the real circumstances, it changes precisely its real properties in a determined way. The series of changes of the real properties, in their dependence on the changes of the real circumstances, once again manifest a unity. For all property-changes we have corresponding changes in the circumstances. In all its modes of behavior the thing is dependent on circumstances, and it is in relation to circumstances that the thing is what it is. And in these modes of [48] behavior there lies a *unity*, as a unitary property, insofar as there occurs such a relation to circumstances that the thing is seized in *states* which are dependent on the states of the circumstances in such a way that motivated changes of circumstances are possible with which go hand in hand regulated changes of the states of the thing. And this happens precisely in such a way that similar series of changes of circumstances of one and the same kind induce "again and again," within the respective span of the duration of the thing, similar series of changes of state of a corresponding kind. "Again and again:" i.e., again and again I can bring the thing, which has its identical unchanged optical character, under different illuminations and series of illuminations. Again and again I can strike the thing, which is elastic and which has its unchanged elastic character, in different ways, etc.

Thus I have a segment in the duration of the thing, in which the thing has precisely the unity of a real, and unchanged, property. If the spring is made red hot, then a new segment of thingly being begins; now it is inelastic and once more has a corresponding, though new, property "in place of" elasticity.

The same holds if the thing has lost its chromatic coloring by becoming completely faded.

In this way the duration of the being of the thing, with respect to any property, disperses itself into segments. But the overriding unity of the thing is still there; each first-degree property is changeable, yet the changes of the properties are again subject to rules of dependence in regard to circumstances.

Dependencies and constitutions of properties of a first degree distinguish themselves everywhere from those of a higher degree, and the formation of unity of higher degree is once more a formation of real properties, since, precisely in the nexus of experience, the changes of property of the lower degree are not unmotivated but, for their part, again present themselves as dependencies on real circumstances. Iron does not, of its own accord, become red hot and change thereby certain complexes of its real circumstances given in experience; instead this happens under real circumstances, ones which can themselves be experienced and which can be known, and originally experienced, in their correspondence to rules. In the duration of a thing ever new properties or changes of a property emerge, and at times they are discontinuous as far as appearances are concerned; yet a unity of reality traverses the totality of changes, a unity of thoroughly regulated relations to real circumstances, a unity of such a kind that each change which already belongs on the level of reality is itself once more causally regulated. [49]

The intuitable thing is not apprehended just in the full rigor of this idea of reality, although this idea, as one can see, is already contained in the very formation of unity given in the apprehension of it without further ado. It was the new science of nature which first grasped this idea of a strict identity in the absolutely determined and unequivocal dependencies of causality (an idea that has to be set off from any empirical apprehension) and which developed the demands implied in this idea, demands which determine essentially the course of the scientific research into nature. Connected to this is the fact that natural science, in strict universality, seizes on the principle already contained in the original apprehension of the thing, namely, under similar circumstances, similar consequences, precisely as

the correlate of the strict idea of the thing (the real). Likewise, it holds to the principle: no change without cause, no alteration without an identical thing altering. Accordingly, therefore, a miracle, in the form of a metamorphosis of a thing into a second thing, is, in truth, out of the question. All there can be, in the best of cases, is a leap (perhaps proving to be only apparently discrete) from main groups of properties into others, but even this would only be in relation to circumstances and according to fixed causal laws.[1] Yet these are certainly not matters of apriori necessity. It is indeed quite thinkable apriori that a thing would change of its own accord, that it would transform itself as to its real properties. Let us look a little more closely. Would it be thinkable, for instance, that a thing lose its elasticity of its own accord, that a coloration fade on its own, that water dry up by itself?

In the apprehension of a thing—e.g. of a thing as colored, elastic, etc.—there lies precisely that apprehension of property of which we spoke, with its relation to circumstances. Included therein is the ideal possibility that, related to certain circumstances, the property remains unchanged. Certain properties can change, without it having any influence on the thing at all. This then means that much can be occurring in the surrounding world while the given thing (insofar as we have it in intuition) manifests no change whatsoever. These circumstances are not ones with a real influence; they do not belong to the causal nexus which is constitutive for the reality of the thing according to any at all of its aspects. Once again, it may be that certain dependencies subsist, that certain changes of circumstances have consequences with regard to the thing, i.e., the corresponding changes of state unfold in the thing in such a way that one and the same unchanged real property announces itself. And if the same series of circumstances unfold, the same series of states [50]

[1] Certainly no special discussion is needed concerning the formation of a complex of real properties of such a kind that through a casual relation to complex circumstances unitary characters of a thing come to the fore in experience, characters which, meanwhile, in a more precise causal analysis, are dissolved into partial properties.

unfold as well, and thereby the property remains unchanged. A special case is the one in which there takes place in the causal circumstances a lapse of non-change (unchanged duration) instead of a process of change; "nothing is changing." Causally, then, nothing can change, if it is a case of the consequences depending simply on such circumstances.

Yet the naïve understanding believes that *a thing could change on its own*. Every apprehension of a thing takes place in the midst of a co-apprehension of circumstances as conditioning. But the thing never achieves a perfect givenness. And as to the assertions we make about the thing, by no means do they follow from what is actually given at that time. For, what the apprehension of a thing requires, concerning the thing in general and according to its concrete content, is not exhibited, and the assertion is not governed merely by what is exhibited, by the fulfilling givenness. That is, perception is not an experience which provides a full report about the thing. What arises for reflection thereby is that we have to distinguish, regarding a thing, between external and internal circumstances, between externally caused and internally caused changes, processes, etc.

Consideration must be taken of the fact that what natural science claims about a thing, namely that it is *constructed out of molecules and atoms*, is already predelineated as a possibility in the intuited thing, at any rate in the way in which a thing is possible as a thing-aggregate with causal connections.

The theme of division is one of foremost importance; I refer to [51] the apprehension of a thing as a thing-system, its construction out of molecules, etc., where it is precisely this constructing that is the problem. The idea of a real totality of real pieces, which pieces, for their part, again function as things—how is that to be grasped apriori? Which apriori possibilities do in fact exist here? What about the apriori possibility of the "continuous" filling of space, and precisely as a real filling; and so what about the possibility of an apprehension of the totality of natural Objects as one continuous thing and the possibility of a multiplicity of natural Objects which are spatially separated, but each is, in itself, continuous? And, consequently, what about the possibility of an apprehension of a continuous thing as a

continuum of things? In the ideal division of one continuous thing, can each part be grasped as a continuous unity of things? What constitutes the unity of such a real continuum? Or is the real fragmentation required apriori, according to which each thing by necessity is really simple in itself or is composed out of real pieces which are simple? And in such a way that what is really simple indeed fills space continuously but does so in such a manner that the ideal geometrical division does not, and cannot, lead to a division in the real? What would bonding or composition mean in that case? Here everything seems to be easier than it is under the aspect of continuity. What distinguishes physical from chemical division? One could speak in this way: a thing is in itself really [*reell*] composed if it is an aggregate of things which stand in certain relations of reciprocal action and, to be precise, in such a way that, over against external causalities, they exhibit a unity of lawful relations and have a total state which leads back to the elements' singular states, ones ruled by laws, and which does so, in general, in such wise that the "totality" behaves *formaliter* like a thing, with reference to certain encompassing classes of "circumstances." But then, in other appropriate circumstances, the totality does "break down" into its parts, ones which can again be for themselves just as they are in the totality. On the other hand, there is no need for a totality to contain its parts as separate, which would be evident in the apprehension of continuity as well, though under certain circumstances there does result a thing-plurality of separate things which previously, in the "totality," did not exist for themselves (Chemistry). A process initiated by means of an external causal action, at first directly [52] exerting itself on one "molecule," propagates itself in the aggregate by virtue of the real-causal connections there. And thus all sorts of things are still occurring in the aggregate after all the external processes have ceased exercising their power. To be sure, the external circumstances are still there, and they still are circumstances. But such as they now are, and perhaps they have not changed at all, they are irrelevant with regard to the changes in the interior of the thing. Yet here, too, nothing occurs "of its own acccord." Whatever occurs does so as a consequence of prior external processes and by virtue of the full

lawfulness of causality, which holds sway throughout both the external and the internal.[1]

Nevertheless, can one really say it is *excluded* that a thing *change of its own accord, "transform"* itself by itself regarding its properties, and on its own *"disappear"* from the world? And all this obviously on the basis of the essence of thing-apperception. Whatever can be seen and found in scientific experience is already prescribed by universal thing-experience. Only what remains open *idealiter* can exhibit itself in the course of experience and in more precise determinations. *Idealiter*, a disappearing of things, a self-modification that has no grounds, could be possible, and yet we would have a right to reject it. Indeed the course of actual experience can raise a protest against such claims as: that is excluded by the character of natural-scientific experience, countless apparent transformations have been sufficiently explained, etc.

The preceding suffices for an understanding of the *universal type of the constitutive* thing-construction in the sphere of intuition, in its remarkable stratification which, as can be seen after all, is only a sort of continuation of an other, though analogous, stratification, one in which the *sensuous schema*, the lowest level of the formation of unity now considered by us, is already constituted, for its part, as a unity. [53]

Appendix

It will be observed that in our analyses we have limited ourselves to a determinate type of material thinghood: namely, that of the *solid body*. This restriction is not an arbitrary one; on the contrary it can be shown that here is where we have to

[1] In this connection is also to be considered the problem of inertia and of uniform motion. Then are these somehow equivalent: qualitative unchange and uniform qualitative change, and, accordingly, rest and uniform motion? What sort of lawfulness is that, the one of inertia? It does not say that uniform motion and qualitative change are without cause, but it does say that once they have begun (even if the cause "disappears," which is possible) they continue (or that the motion or change, which was non-uniform as long as there was a cause, is transformed into a uniform one): a law of the change of effects.

see the foundation of the constitution of material nature. Solid bodies are constituted as things with a rigid spatial figure which, in movement, is transported. There can be things in a medium which also is thingly, like frogs in water, which, as lake or stream or pond, is a thing and bears things in itself.[1] All the things of the original "world" are, hence, in the medium of air, which, however, for the most part is not noticed and which is first grasped as a medium by means of voluntary and vigorous movements of the hand, etc., or by means of some other body's rapid motion making one feel the "breeze." A medium can be "thicker" or "thinner" and so allow motion more grudgingly or more easily. The resistance can be so slight that it becomes unnoticeable. Media can be transparent and visible, or transparent and invisible, or, finally, even non-transparent.

While the solid body which was given as first is constituted as something identical throughout motion and rest, in qualitative change and permanence, as something which is identifiable as being for itself in relation to the normal case of kinematic and qualitative permanence, and is constituted from the start, by means of the sense of sight and touch, in two strata which are relatively closed and which offer the qualitatively filled Gestalt "completely"—on the other hand, with the media, things are quite different. They, too, are constituted for us as bodies (fluid or gaseous ones) in the sense of material things, but they present themselves as a filling of space or as filled spatialities which contain in themselves or can contain, as moveable therein against greater or lesser resistance, material things of the first and originally constituted kind, viz., solid bodies. Media are not constituted as bodies having a fixed shape but, instead, only have shape when another body is there either serving as a "container" or exercising in some different way an influence which can determine a shape for them.

If we take into consideration the possibility of a fluid body, then we have to say that such a thing *cannot be perceived originally* but can only be acquired by means of indirect processes of experiencing and thinking. But it is important here

[1] On the concept of a medium, *cf.* also p. 65.

to follow up the sequence of the levels of constitution and to do so by beginning with the things which are given primordially and which exhibit themselves primordially, and these are the solid bodies.

Transparent solid bodies themselves already represent a deviation from the normal case of original constitution. E.g., in a certain orientation, a flat, colorless, glass plate, large enough to fill the entire visual field, is not visible. It has no surface colors, and it presents no visual aspect whatsoever. But with changes in the orientation, "edges" emerge, by virtue of its relation to other bodies, and thereby visual appearances emerge as well, which, yet, do not deliver up the total Object as a visual schema, because brightness (which can even conceal the color of non-transparent bodies), reflections, and images of the things seen through it stand in the way. Thus it is touch which gives [54] these bodies as normal bodies, though to "normal" constitution there belongs precisely a parallel givenness for sight and touch.

§ 17. Materiality and substantiality

In our considerations we have purposely allowed the universal of thinghood, i.e., "reality," to come to the fore with more strength versus what belongs to materiality as such as the specific character of extensive reality. This universal—for which, surely, "reality" would be the best term—is called *substance*. (Unfortunately, all these philosophical expressions are laden with equivocation and lack any clarification in depth.). On the contrary, we have here obtained, out of intuition, a firm essential content, whose fundamental meaning is evident. In order to distinguish these genuine "realities" from the common, widest sense of the word, where *every* individual (or temporal) being would be included, we will speak of *substantial reality*; and this is precisely what is to be understood from now on whenever we speak simply of substantiality or substance or thing. Accordingly, extensive substance is to count for us only as a particular type of substance. We have already spoken above of the role of extension (corporeality). From that,

it is clear that determinations such as site, figure, etc., as pertaining to extension, are not substantial properties. Instead, they are causal properties through and through. As to their mode of givenness, they are not unities of primordial manifestation; *rather, they belong already to the schema.* This does not prevent these, too, i.e., the figure and site of a thing, from being dependent on circumstances, as regards change and permanence, or from being experienceable in this causal dependency. Related to this, the specific determinations of extension become primordial manifestations of the real properties characteristic of a thing, on which, for their part, the properties which primordially manifest themselves in the fullness of the schema are functionally dependent. In this way we experience, in the thing, solidity and fluidity, elasticity, etc. E.g., to react to an impact by way of vibrations, and, according to the circumstances, by way of vibrations of a certain kind and frequency, is a primordial manifestation of elasticity and, in fact, of a definite and particular elasticity, that, say, of a watch spring. These then are substantial properties as are the others; they belong to the material thing, which is extended in space with them as with all its substantial properties and which has its spatial form and its [55] site, these latter for their part not being material properties.

Chapter Three

THE AESTHETA IN THEIR RELATION TO THE AESTHETIC BODY[1]

§ 18. The subjectively conditioned factors of the constitution of the thing; the constitution of the Objective material thing[2]

Our entire analysis has been moving in a determinate narrow frame, the limits of which we must fix. The real unity, which was constituted for us in levels, has nevertheless, with all these levels, not reached the ultimate one, the level on which the Objective material thing is actually constituted. What it is that we have described is the thing constituted in the continuous-unitary manifold of the sense intuitions of an experiencing Ego or in the manifold of "sense-things" of various levels: multiplicities of schematic unities, of real states and real unities on various levels. It is the *thing for the solitary subject,* the subject thought of ideally as isolated, except that this subject in a certain sense remains forgotten to itself and equally forgotten by the one who is doing the analysis.

a) The intuitive qualities of the material thing in their dependencies on the experiencing subject-Body

Nevertheless, this self-forgetfulness is hardly appropriate for the restoration of the full givenness of a thing, a givenness in

[1] Aestheta refers here, as it does in the previous chapter, to material things as such in their aesthetic structure.

[2] Concerning this paragraph, see also the third chapter of Section Two.

which the thing exhibits its actual reality. We need only consider how a thing exhibits itself as such, according to its essence, in order to recognize that such an apprehension must contain, at the very outset, components which refer back to the subject, specifically the human (or, better: animal) subject in a fixed sense.

The qualities of material things as aestheta, such as they [56] present themselves to me intuitively, prove to be dependent on my qualities, *the make-up of the experiencing subject,* and to be related to *my Body and my "normal sensibility."*

The Body is, in the first place, the *medium of all perception;* it is the *organ of perception* and is *necessarily* involved in all perception.[1] In seeing, the eyes are directed upon the seen and run over its edges, surfaces, etc. When it touches objects, the hand slides over them. Moving myself, I bring my ear closer in order to hear. Perceptual apprehension presupposes sensation-contents, which play their necessary role for the constitution of the schemata and, so, for the constitution of the appearances of the real things themselves. *To the possibility of experience there pertains, however, the spontaneity of the courses* of presenting acts of sensation, which are accompanied by series of kinesthetic sensations and are dependent on them as motivated: *given with the localization of the kinesthetic series in the relevant moving member of the Body is the fact that in all perception and perceptual exhibition (experience) the Body is involved as freely moved sense organ, as freely moved totality of sense organs,* and hence there is also given the fact that, on this original foundation, all that is thingly-real in the surrounding world of the Ego has its relation to the Body.

Furthermore, obviously connected with this is the distinction the Body acquires as the bearer of the zero point of orientation, the bearer of the here and the now, out of which the pure Ego intuits space and the whole world of the senses. Thus each thing that appears has *eo ipso* an orienting relation to the Body, and this refers not only to what actually appears but to each thing that is supposed to be able to appear. If I am imagining a

[1] On this point, *cf.* also pp. 135 ff.

centaur I cannot help but imagine it as in a certain orientation and in a particular relation to my sense organs: it is "to the right" of me; it is "approaching" me or "moving away;" it is "revolving," turning toward or away from "me"—from me, i.e., from my Body, from my eye, which is directed at it. In phantasy, I do look at the centaur; i.e., my eye, freely moved, [57] goes back and forth, accommodating itself in this or that way, and the visual "appearances," the schemata, succeed one another in motivated "appropriate" order, whereby they produce the consciousness of an experience of an existing centaur-object viewed in various ways.

Besides its distinction as a center of orientation, the Body, in virtue of the constitutive role of the sensations, is of *significance for the construction of the spatial world.* In all constitution of spatial thinghood, two kinds of sensations, with totally different constituting functions, are involved, and necessarily so, if representations of the spatial are to be possible. The first kind are the sensations which *constitute,* by means of the apprehensions allotted to them, corresponding *features of the thing* as such by way of adumbration. For example, the sensation-colors with their sensation-expansions: it is in the apprehension of these that the corporeal colorations appear together with the corporeal extension of these colorations. Likewise, in the tactual sphere, thingly roughness appears in the apprehension of the roughness-sensations, and corporeal warmth appears in relation to the sensation of warmth, etc.

The second kind are the "sensations" which do not undergo such apprehensions but which, on the other hand, are necessarily involved in all those apprehensions of the sensations of the first kind, insofar as, in a certain way, they *motivate* those apprehensions and thereby themselves undergo an apprehension of a completely different type, an apprehension which thus belongs correlatively to every constituting apprehension. In all constitution and on all levels, we have, by necessity, "circumstances," related one to the other, and "that which is dependent on" all the circumstances: everywhere, we find the "if-then" or the "because-therefore." Those sensations which undergo extensional apprehension (leading to the extended features of the thing) are motivated as regards the courses they

take either actually or possibly and are apperceptively *related to motivating series, to systems, of kinesthetic sensations,* which freely unfold in the nexus of their familiar order in such a way that if a free unfolding of one series of this system occurs (e.g., [58] any movement of the eyes or fingers), then from the interwoven manifold as motive, the corresponding series must unfold as motivated. In this way, from the ordered system of sensations in eye movement, in head movement freely moved, etc., there unfold such and such series in vision. That is, while this is happening, there unfold, *in motivated order,* "images" of the thing that was perceptually apprehended to begin the eye movement and, likewise, the visual sensations pertaining to the thing in each case. An apprehension of a thing as situated at such a distance, as oriented in such a way, as having such a color, etc., is unthinkable, as can be seen, without these sorts of relations of motivation. In the essence of the apprehension itself there resides the possibility of letting the perception disperse into *"possible"* series of perceptions, all of which are of the following type: *if* the eye turns in a certain way, *then* so does the "image;" if it turns differently in some definite fashion, then so does the image alter differently, in correspondence. We constantly find here this two-fold articulation: kinesthetic sensations on the one side, the motivating; and the sensations of features on the other, the motivated. The like holds, obviously, for touch and, similarly, everywhere. Perception is without exception a *unitary accomplishment* which arises essentially out of the playing together of two *correlatively related functions.* At the same time, it follows that *functions of spontaneity* belong to every perception. The processes of the kinesthetic sensations are *free processes* here, and this freedom in the consciousness of their unfolding is an essential part of the constitution of spatiality.

b) The significance of *normal* perceptual conditions for the constitution of the intuited thing and the significance of abnormalities (change of the Body, change in the thing)

Now the processes of perception, in virtue of which one and the same external world is present to me, do not always exhibit the same style; instead, there are distinctions which make

themselves noticeable. At first, the same unchanged Objects appear, according to the changing circumstances, now this way, now in another way. The same unchanged form has a *changing appearance,* according to its position in relation to my Body; [59] the form appears in *changing aspects,* which *present "it itself" more or less "advantageously."* If we disregard this and instead consider real properties, then we find that one and the same Object, maintaining one identical form, does have different color appearances (the form as filled), according to its position relative to an illuminating body; furthermore, the color appearances are different when it stands under different illuminating bodies, but all this happens in an ordered fashion, one which may be determined more precisely in regard to appearances. At the same time, certain conditions prove to be the *"normal"* ones: seeing in sunlight, on a clear day, without the influence of other bodies which might affect the color-appearance. The "optimum" which is thereby attained then counts as the *color itself,* in opposition, for example, to the red light of the sunset which "outshines" all proper colors. All other color properties are *"aspects of,"* "appearances of," this pre-eminent color-appearance (which latter is called "appearance" only in an *other* sense: namely, with respect to a higher level, the physicalistic thing, still to be discussed). Yet it is inherent in the thing that its normal color keeps changing, precisely in dependence on whatever illuminating bodies are involved, whether the day is one of clear light or is hazy, etc., and it is only with the return of the normal circumstances that the normal color re-appears. "In itself" there belongs to a body a color as being in itself, and this color is grasped in seeing, but it ever appears differently, and the aspect it presents depends thoroughly on the Objective circumstances, and it can be distinguished there either more or less easily (with the limit case of complete invisibility). And the degree of visibility affects the form, too.

It should also be examined whether from the very start all Objective circumstances are apperceived *as causal,* as emanating from things. Certain circumstances exhibit periodic changes—e.g., the relations of night and day—and correspondingly the things which otherwise are experienced as unchanged, for instance things given as unchanged for the sense of touch,

undergo periodic changes in the unfolding of their visual characters. With regard to the visual mode of givenness, which brings out the color characteristics as well as the form characteristics that become visible along with them, a privilege attaches to *clear daylight,* such that there not only does the form [60] become visible in a particularly favorable way up to its finer details, but also in this light such global characteristics are visible through which properties of other sense spheres are co-announced at the same time, properties given in the nexus of these experiences as not affected by the change of color (e.g., the material attributes, which are disclosed when the surface structure become visible). Therefore in the series of possible appearances a certain givenness of the thing is privileged in that with it is given, *of the thing as a whole, what is relatively the best,* and this acquires the character of what is *especially intended:* it is the predominating focus of the "interest," what the *experience is tending toward, terminates in,* is fulfilled in; and the other modes of givenness become intentionally related to this "optimal" one.

Included *in the normal experience,* in which the world is *originally* constituted as world, *"the way it is,"* are still other *conditions of normal experience*: e.g., seeing in air—which counts as immediate seeing, seeing without any mediating things—touching by immediate contact, etc. If I interpose a foreign *medium*[1] between my eye and the things seen, then all things undergo a change in appearance; more precisely, all phantom-unities undergo a change. It will be said: the same thing is seen, but through different media. The thing has no dependency on such changes; it remains the same. Only the "mode of appearance" of the thing (in this case, the appearance of the phantom) depends on whether this or that medium is mediating between the eye and the thing. Transparent glass is indeed a medium that can be seen through, but it changes the images of things in different ways according to its different curvatures, and, if it is colored, it transmits its color to them—all that belongs in the realm of experience. Finally, if I

[1] *Cf.* above, p. 57.

put on colored lenses, then everything looks changed in color. If I knew nothing of this medium, then for me all things would be colored. Insofar as I have experiential knowledge of it, this judgment does not arise. The givenness of sense-things counts, [61] with regard to the color, as *seemingly* given, and semblance again means a mode of givenness which could possibly also occur in this way within the system of normal givenness, under the appropriate circumstances, and which would induce an *Objectively false* apprehension where there are motives prompting a mixup, something those circumstances are very likely to bring about. *The "false" lies in the contradiction with the normal system of experience.* (The change of appearance is a uniform one for all the things, recognizable as a uniform change according to type.)

The case is the same if we take, instead of an interposition of a medium between organ and thing, an *abnormal change of an organ itself.* If I am touching something with a blister on my finger, or if my hand has been abraded, then all the tactual properties of the thing are given differently. If I cross my eyes, or if I cross my fingers, then I have two "things of sight" or two "things of touch," though I maintain that only one actual thing is present. This belongs to the general question of the constitution of a thingly unity as an *apperceptive unity of a manifold of different levels* which themselves are already apperceived as unities of multiplicities. The apperception acquired in relation to usual perceptual conditions obtains a new apperceptive stratum by taking into consideration the new "experience" of the dispersion of the one thing of sight into a pair and of the fusion of the pair in the form of a continuous overlapping and convergence in the regular return to the former perceptual conditions. The doubled things of sight are indeed completely analogous with the other things of sight, but only *the latter* have the additional meaning of "things;" and the lived experience has the meaning of a *lived experience of perception only as related to a certain "position of the two eyes,"* the *homologous* one or one from the system of normal eye positions. If a *heterology* now occurs, then I indeed have analogous images, but they *mean* things only in *contradiction* to all normal motivations. The images now once again obtain the apprehension, "actual thing," precisely through the constitutive nexus, i.e., the *motivation which puts them in a concordant relation to the system of motivated perceptual manifolds.* If I take my eyes [62] out of a normal position into a disparate *crossed position,* then two semblant images arise; "semblant images:" i.e., images which would, each for itself, present "the thing" only if I lent them normal motivations.

A further important consideration deals with other groups of abnormalities. If I ingest santonin, then the whole world "seems" to change; e.g., it "alters" its color. The "alteration" is a "seeming." Afterwards, as is the case with every change of colored lighting, etc., I once again have a world which matches the normal: everything is then concordant and changes or does not change, moves or is at rest, as usual, and it displays the same systems of aspects as before.

But here it must be observed that rest and motion, change and permanence, get their sense by means of the constitution of thinghood as reality, in which such occurrences, especially the limit cases of rest and permanence, play an essential role.

Therefore the global coloring of all seen things can easily "change," for example when a body emits rays of light which "cast their shine" over all things. There is more to the constitution of the "change of things according to color" than just a change of the filled schemata with respect to color: *change of things is, from the very outset, constituted as causal change* in relation to causal circumstances, as, for example, each advent of an illuminating body. I can apprehend the change without seeing such an illuminating body, but in that case the causal circumstance is, in an indeterminate way, co-apperceived. These causal circumstances, however, are of the order of things. *The relativity of the spatial things with reference to other ones determines the sense of the change in things. But the psychophysical conditionalities do not belong here in the least.* This must be kept in mind. It goes without saying, however, that my Body is indeed involved in the causal nexuses: if it is apprehended *as a thing in space,* it is certainly not apprehended as mere schema [63] but instead as the point of intersection of real causalities in the real (exclusively spatio-thingly) nexus. Belonging to this sphere is, for example, the fact that a stroke of my hand (considered

purely as the striking of a corporeal thing, i.e., excluding the lived experience of the "I strike") acts exactly the same as a stroke of any other material thing, and, similarly, the fall of my Corporeal body is like any other fall, etc.[1]

Now concerning the intake of santonin, this too is therefore, abstracting from all "concomitant psychic facts," a *material process,* one which could very well, if required by the constitution of the world of experience, or by the further elaboration of the constitution of the experience of this world in the course of new experiences, enter into a real relation with the optical change of the rest of the material world. In itself it is thus thinkable that I would find experiential motives for seeing a general change in the color of the entire visible world and for regarding the change, in this apprehension, as a real-causal consequence of the material process of ingesting santonin (with its Bodily-material consequences). It would be a normal perception just like any other. As long as, and whenever, I experience the change of all visible colors as an optical change of the *things,* I must assume a causal relation between whatever causing thinghoods there might be; it is *only* in the *causal* nexus that a change is precisely a change of a *thing.* As soon as experiential motives arise in opposition, then there must necessarily take place a *transformation in the apprehension,* in virtue of which the "change" that is seen loses the sense of a change and forthwith acquires the *character of "seeming."* A semblant change is a schematic transformation apprehended as a change under normal conditions, thus in relation to experiences constitutive of causality. But now it is given in a way which cancels the causal apprehension. The causal apprehension is suggested by the given schematic transformation: it is as if it would present a change, but this is, under the given circumstances, excluded. The intake of santonin is not, with respect to the [64] general "change in color," a process which is or which could be apprehended as a cause. The shift in color of all seen things is

[1] To be sure, it still remains to be discussed to what extent the solitary subject has the possibility of apprehending his Body as a material body like any other. *Cf.* pp. 165 ff.

such that there is not even an incentive to regard it at all as a real change of the illumination (e.g., in the manner of a light source emitting colored rays). It is therefore that it presents itself as a semblant change; everything looks "as though" there were a new source of light shining, or "as if," in some other way, real causes were there effecting a general optical change (even if these causes were undetermined, unknown). But such causes may not now be presupposed; they are, given the total experiential situation, excluded.

We have to ask: what can, *on the basis of a transformation in the sense-thing, totally cancel the apperception of real change* in this way, in opposition to the cases in which such an apperception, already accomplished, merely undergoes a modification (by the fact that a different causal nexus is substituted for the one that had been supposed, that is, the assumed cause abandoned but another cause accepted)? The answer is a modification in the sphere of *psychophysical "causality"* or, rather, *"conditionality,"* to say it better. (For a *causa* in the proper sense is precisely a *real* cause. The subjective, however, is, in opposition to reality, an irreality. Reality and irreality belong together essentially in the form of reality and subjectivity, which on the one hand mutually exclude one another and on the other hand, as is said, essentially require one another). Besides the relations of the real to the real, which belong to the essence of everything real as spatial, temporal, and causal relations, there also belong to this essence relations of psychophysical conditionality in possible experience. Things are "experienced," are "intuitively given" to the subject, necessarily as unities of a spatio-temporal-causal nexus, and necessarily pertaining to this nexus is a pre-eminent thing, "my Body," as the place where, and always by essential necessity, a system of subjective conditionality is interwoven with this system of causality and indeed in such a way that in the transition from the *natural attitude* (the regard directed in experience to nature and life) to the *subjective attitude* (the regard directed to the subject and to moments of the subjective sphere), real existence, and manifold [65] real changes as well, are given as in conditional connection with subjective being, with a state of being in the subjective sphere. Something thingly is experienced (perceptually apperceived, to

give privilege to the originary experience) in such a way that, through a mere shift of focus, there emerge relations of dependency of the apperceived state of the thing on the sphere of sensation and on the rest of the subjective sphere. Here we have the *primordial state of psychophysical conditionality* (under this heading are included *all conditional* relations which run back and forth between thingly and subjective being). To every psychophysical conditionality there necessarily appertains *somatological causality,* which immediately always concerns the relations of the irreal, of an event in the subjective sphere, with something real, the Body: then mediately the relations with an external real thing which is in a real, hence causal, connection with the Body.

c) The significance of psychophysical conditionality for the various levels of constitution

The real world is originally constituted in levels, in such a way that the manifold of sense-things (the manifold of the full schemata) is erected as substratum in the unity of the spatial form. The sense-things are thereby constituted in the subjective way of "orientation" and are constituted for us (whether or not this is a matter of necessity is a special problem) such that a distinctive sense-thing, the "Body," is given as the constant bearer of the center of orientation. The *realizing* is then completed in such a way that the sense-things become states of real things; the system of *real qualities* is constituted, a system of regulated reciprocal relations of the sense-things under the heading, *causality.*

It is the constitution of the *substratum* which bestows on all things in experience, i.e., insofar as they are, in their momentary states, *sense-things,* the most original psychophysical conditionality. The sense-things are what they are as unities "in" a manifold of perceptions and kinesthetic constellations of subjectivity, and they are thereby always in consciousness as *motivating with regard to the corresponding aspects* as motivated. Only in this nexus are the aspects *aspects of sense-things.* There is involved here essentially a *possible change of attitude* by means of which the sense-thing, in its givenness, is made conditionally [66]

dependent on Corporeality, on my opening my eyes to look, on my eye movements, on my running my hands, hands moved by subjectivity, over things in order to feel them, etc. This total system of conditionality, which connects sense-things and subjective occurrences in a regulated way, is what underlies the higher stratum of apperception and then becomes the psychophysical conditionality between, on the one side, my Body and its causal interweavings in extra-Bodily nature, and, on the other side, the subjective courses of sensation, courses of changing aspects, etc. To this *primordial state* of psychophysical conditionalities, *new* conditionalities are then added, ones which already presuppose their constitution, i.e., ones arising from *abnormalities of the Body.*

In the system of normal—"orthoaesthetic"—appearances, which coalesce into the unity of one concordant experience, occasionally breaks occur. All things suddenly appear changed, the Body as well. The system of the orthoaesthetic appearances of the same thing falls apart in groups, and discordant appearances can arise by groups. If we limit ourselves to these groups, in which the thing already appears *for itself* as concordantly identical, then, with the transition from the earlier nexuses in the same group to the new ones, the thing presents itself as "suddenly changed," whereas it is given as unchanged in the other groups. By itself each partial system, as a perceptual system, has equal rights. Thus we get discordance, and at first it means nothing to say summarily that perceptions of the one sense could be "rectified" by those of the other senses. Supplemented perhaps, insofar as they all contribute constitutively to the givenness of the thing. The appearing thing thus refers back to all of them and leaves open much, as momentary appearance, in the various sense spheres, which can be determined more precisely, hence supplemented, by means of new perceptions and by recourse to perceptions of a sense sphere which was not involved but to which we were referred indeterminately. [67]

To begin, let us take the case in which *only one sense* is impaired, one sense organ happens into an abnormal state, while the other senses continue to function normally. The impaired sense being excluded, we have a world-apprehension

that is concordant throughout, and up to the moment of the impairment, we have the same for that sense too.

The sense organ in question can be experienced by the other, normally functioning, ones, and so can the particular thingly causal circumstances to which it is subject. I see, for example, how my hand is burnt, or I see that my hand is swollen, etc. Moreover, *abnormal sensations within the field of sensation of the organ in question* will arise, thus ones issuing from the side of aesthesiological Corporeality. The changed data of the field of touch are indeed still apperceived according to appearances but precisely as anomalies, versus the concordant appearances of normally functioning sensibility, in which the same things are given in relation to the equally concordant and normally appearing parts of the Body and in relation to the whole Body. The change of the sense organ in question conditions, in this relation, a group of anomalous givennesses of the thing. Thereby I experience: it is the same thing which is given—in a modified way by the injured hand, in a normal way by the sound. Concordance is not cancelled altogether; something not unlike is appearing, just "colored" differently for the hand which seems to be such and such, i.e., which is given by the other senses as such and such. In short, for sense organs changed in a certain way all things appear in a corresponding way, and this modified givenness refers back to the normal. Within the domain of the subjective perceptual conditions as well, there thus results an *"optimum"* of appearance (which may—with the healing of the originally injured organ or by the use of artificial aids—only appear subsequently in opposition to the former "normal" perception).

The constitution of nature by the subject *must* of course be accomplished in such a way that *at first* is constituted *normally* precisely a nature with a Body, within an open horizon of possible experience of further properties of things and of the Body. The normal constitution is the one which constitutes the *first reality* of the world and of the Body, the reality which has to be constituted to make possible thereby the constitution of apperceptive transformations precisely *as* transformations, as incorporating *"anomalous"* experiential circumstances, taking into account the reality of higher strata as the new relations of dependence. [68]

The system of causality into which the Body is interwoven in normal apperception is of such a kind that the Body, throughout all the changes it undergoes, still remains within the compass *of an identity of type*. The changes of the Body, as a system of perceptual organs, are *free* movements of this Body, and the organs can, without compulsion, return again to the same base position. They do not thereby change in a way that would modify the type of the sensibility; they can always accomplish the same thing and always in the same way: namely, for the constitution of outer experiences. (Likewise, there is a normal praxis of voluntary getting hold of, and working upon, the sensible world.) "Sensibility" here refers to what is Objective: in a normal way I have to be able to grasp rest precisely as rest, non-change as non-change, and therein all senses must accord.

Anomalies emerge when real-causal changes of the Body first disturb the normal function of individual organs as perceptual organs. E.g., the finger is burnt, and this change of the physical Body (of the finger as material) has the psychophysical consequence that the touched body in its thingly content as touched appears to be endowed with quite different properties than before, and this applies to every body touched by this finger. In our example—the injury of a hand—the possibility of thing-constitution is preserved. But we have two hands, and the entire surface of the Body serves as a touch surface, and the Body itself as a system of touch organs. All these furnish *the* touch properties, only in different degrees of perfection and also, I might say, with different "colorings." At least the two hands can take each other's place and give essentially similar "images." But in any case the same thing-property is constituted versus the differences in the tactile images. [69]

But what if the sense of touch were completely impaired or underwent a *total* pathological change? Then again, what if both eyes were diseased and yielded images changed in an essential way, images in which things would appear as changed, with changed sense qualities? With the other organs, of course, I do not see and I have no grasp of colors, the specifically visual qualities.

Yet the identity of the thing endures—in the sense of touch—

and, furthermore, so does the relation of the visual "images" to this same thing. The coordination of the senses, even if in a changed way, remains preserved (otherwise I would, e.g., have colored spots in the field of sensation but no appearances of things). It is still the same thing which I touch and which I see. The fact that the spatial forms have not changed and that the haziness is a mere subjective modification of the appearances, similar to a normal seeing, but without the proper accommodation, is due to the sense of touch and to the earlier stretches of visual perception, prior to the pathological change. It is not that the sense of touch as such has a priority. But there belongs to the thing its *optimal* constitutive content, to which all other data intentionally refer back; and if the sense of sight from the very outset yielded only hazy contours, while the sense of touch provided sharp and more subtle differentiations, then the seen form would indeed "coincide" with the touched, but the form as touched would acquire a priority. To speak more accurately: the thing itself does not have two forms which are superimposed but instead *one* form (and likewise one surface) which can be both touched and seen. Ideally, every sense can yield the same data and do so equally well, but *de facto* one sense often provides more than another, and a good pair of spectacles can transform my chronic and accustomed blurry vision into one so good that the sense of sight achieves a priority.

To be sure, color is not a quality that is given as the same by means of several senses in different modes of appearance. If the normal lighting circumstances (daylight, etc.) are absent, or if I am completely blind, then for me it becomes night. I do not see anything, all I have in my visual field is darkness. The same is true if I shut my eyes or cover them. It will be said that the [70] objects still have their color, but I do not see them. I do not have them in sight, but they do not cease to be, and I can indeed perceive them by touch. By means of the sense of touch, I am always in the world perceptually, I am able to find my way around in it, and I can grasp and get to know whatever I want. But I can also see (visually, the world is not continually given; that is rather a privilege of the sense of touch), and it is the same things which have color, even if I do not exactly see them, for, unless I am hindered, I can easily go there until I see, or

perhaps just raise my eyelids, turn my head, focus my gaze, etc. In this, the sense of touch always plays its part, as it is indeed obviously privileged amongst the contributors to the constitution of a thing.

It has become night, all things retain their color, but it is permanently night, light is now no more—could such a consciousness arise for me, as solipsistic subject, if I became blind, for instance by being struck on the eyes? Or is this the consciousness that is more likely to be motivated: there is day and night as before, but I do not see any longer? It depends on the apperception of the respective Objective and subjective perceptual circumstances as such. In any case one fact remains: I still have eyes, which touching tells me, but I do not see with them any more. For normal persons, things are not constituted as things by building them out of seen things and touched things. There is but *one and the same* thing, along with its properties, some of which are predominately or exclusively (as, e.g., colors and their distinctions) grasped by vision, others by touch. The thing is not split apart by the two groups of appearances; on the contrary, it is constituted in unitary apperception. The visualness does not offer any property-complexes which could be taken away, *as if the thing itself had in itself a visual element* as something it could gain or lose. It makes no sense to assign to each sense its property-complexes as separate components of the thing any more than it makes sense to claim that the "primary" properties are somehow *doubled* when grasped by the different senses. But the color, which does indeed present itself as something of the thing itself, as constitutive property, is given perceptually precisely only in seeing. It is unthinkable that it would appear, as color, by means of touch. To be a mirroring surface, to shine, these also [71] are visible properties. But to *brightness* as seen property corresponds *smoothness* as touched, and are these not, in the thing itself, one and the same? Thus color could have a parallel in the sphere of tactile appearances, could have exactly parallel series of distinctions, corresponding to parallel series of changes under similar circumstances. In that case the same would obtain here as occurs with the primary properties. We would then say, "What appears in a certain way only to the sense of vision

would appear, in a parallel way, to the sense of touch as well, in the way appropriate to touch." But as a matter of fact, this does not obtain for the constitutive appearances of sense-things (including perception-things). Color is seen and nothing but seen, and yet it belongs to the *thing;* it should hence be thinkable that any sense which in general lets *the thing* appear originarily would also do so for *every property* of this thing. The color is the color of *the* spatial form, just as the smoothness is the smoothness of the spatial form; the color is precisely there where the smoothness is. One could thus declare it to be an ideal requirement for each and every sense: insofar as it claims to give the thing in the original, there must exist an ideal possibility of series of appearances of this sense, in which *every* constitutive property of the thing would come to originary givenness.

On the other hand, we need to consider whether, where this ideally possible correction by means of the other senses does not exist, the apperception is possible: things "lose their color." It is said, indeed with a certain justification, "The color changes along with the illumination and disappears when night comes." Color disappears in twilight, passes into "colorlessness," but then it is not only the color of the things that disappears, but the things too become more and more indistinct until finally they are no longer visible at all. Obviously, we must hereby distinguish *sensation-color* (in a generalized sense), which flows over into blackness, and the thing's own color, which actually disappears for us.

As long as the thing "is constituted for me," as long as the possibility (the faculty) remains open to me of experiencing the properties of a thing and specifically of experiencing colors under the experiential circumstances which belong to the content of the constitutive apperception, then I legitimately judge that things are colored and do so determined by motives which either lie in the apperception of the thing itself or lie mediately [72] in the apperceived nexuses which are attached to other experienced things. In that case I do not for the moment need to see the color of the thing or to see anything at all. (What is essential is that the Body is co-experienced as functioning in the perception. That the things, in their "what," work causally, in perception, on the Body and its affected organs, and that the sensation, etc., is tied up with them in psychophysical conditionality—all this also belongs here constitutively, hence quite obviously. Yet anomalies occur.) Anomalies as such can therefore occur only in this form, namely that the normal world remains constitutively preserved, i.e., experienced, by the rest of the perceptual organs, the ones which, functioning reciprocally for each other as such organs, continue to give us experiences in the normal way. On the other hand, the abnormal organ and the causation which has altered it also belong, by virtue of these other senses, to the normally given world. But the abnormal organ loses, together with its normal form, its normal psychophysical conditionality, and a new one is substituted. All things perceived by such an organ appear in other aspects, not the normal ones. The "injured" or diseased organ, in its functioning in perception, occasions changed appearances of things. Or, rather, the things are not such as they then seem; they appear perhaps as changed things would normally appear, but this is *mere semblance.* It is a regular psychophysical-conditional consequence of the disease of the organ. Thus what does the world gain thanks to such experiences? The material world remains an experienced world. It presents itself as it is, if the Corporeality is normal; but if the Corporeality is abnormal, then it is given in anomalous appearances (yet these are normal sense-things or, more clearly expressed, phantoms). Hence this is the case if the experiencing subject, within the persistent system of normal, or what is the same, continuous, world-constituting experiences, discovers an abnormal part of the Body and thereby encounters its "unfitness," "uselessness," or reduced usefulness, for "rightful" experiential functions, or if the subject experiences therein its own anomalous type of psychophysical conditionalities. There can then also be the experience of the "return to health," of the abnormality as temporary (as is the case when [73] one is struck sharply), etc. If the function of the organ is disturbed, or if it has, on its own, changed abnormally, let us say "pathologically," without the subject's knowing anything about it, then the subject will obviously experience, in the "experience by means of this organ," changed thinghoods, provided the new sense data can be apprehended as phenomenal

sense-things, wholly analogous to normally motivated ones, and are in fact apprehended accordingly. The healthy sense organs in that case present contradictory "reports." The senses conflict with one another, but this conflict can be resolved in view of the fact that precisely afterwards an organ must be rejected as abnormal. All the other senses together furnish a world progressing harmoniously, whereas the rejected sense, the one which does not concord with the course of the earlier experience, demands a general and unmotivated world-change, something avoided in the case of the reports of the rest of the senses, if they have normal validity. Obviously, the conflict can remain completely unresolved, because it is possible that no experiential preference goes to one side (N.B.: as long as we take the experiencing subject as solipsistic).

It is a matter of experience, already for the solipsistic subject too, that eating also has effects on the Body and specifically of a kind as to influence the sensibility of the senses and the perceptual function of the parts of the Body. E.g., santonin has effects just like spectacles with yellow lenses do, and its other effects are to provoke paralyses, make the Body partially or totally anesthetic, etc.

The only thing important is that I *have experience* of these effects, that, in perceiving, I know at once that my Body is in an abnormal state, and that then in a corresponding one, to be determined further in the course of experience, there occur, as consequences of the abnormal modification of the Body, changed modes of sensation or the loss of certain groups of sensation, and thereby also changed modes of givenness of things. The inclusion of the abnormalities therefore enlarges the original system of psychophysical conditionalities which, along with the normal constitution, is detectable through a mere change of attitude. There is *the one normally constituted world as the true world,* as "norm" of truth, and there are *multiple semblances,* deviations of the modes of givenness, which find [74] their "explanation" in the experience of the psychophysical conditionality. Thereby we see that anomalies cannot contribute anything toward the constitution of things, and neither can psychophysical conditionalities. What they do contribute is only the rule of my subjectivity, which precisely resides in this, that

things for subjects are experienceable things and that conditioned rules of the series of sensations are conjoined with Corporeal-thingly causalities.

The result of this is that perceptual activities, considered purely as relations of physical causality (the purely physical aspect of touching, smelling, seeing, etc.) are not *just any* causal relations between the Body and the things to be perceived; what we have here are, rather, *causalities of a typical kind.* The Body, as a thing like any other, admits, still beyond these, an infinity of causalities, namely every kind of causalities whatsoever which belong at all to things with such physical qualities. If, hence, the typical is transgressed, the *psychophysical* consequences which deviate from the typical remain possible. But the typical here is the conjunction of regulated groups of sensation, apprehensible and actually apprehended as normal appearances of things, though of such a kind that they interrupt the harmonious experience of nature. There also remains open, however, the possibility of such a change of the relevant parts of the Body that no sensations whatsoever occur or only ones which can no longer be apprehended as appearances of things. All such groups of appearances and sensations stand out as ruptures from the system of "orthoaesthetic" perceptions in which one and the same reality is experienced harmoniously. The Body is said to be functioning throughout orthoaesthetically or "normally" as long as the psychophysically dependent perceptions or appearances are orthoaesthetic. For a solipsistic subject to speak of a pathological, abnormally functioning, Corporeality only makes sense if this subject has its system of orthoaesthetic experiences and has thereby, continuously over against itself, the one spatio-temporal-causal nature. This again presupposes that its Body is constituted in systems of orthoaesthetic perceptions: thus the Body cannot be pathological throughout but must be "normal" at least to this extent, that some of its [75] organs are functioning normally, by virtue of which the pathological organs and parts can be given as they Objectively actually are.

Hand in hand with the changes of the Body which condition modifications in the appearances of things go other modifications which pertain to the subject according to its psychic life.

Also dependent on Bodies are the *reproductions* and therewith the apperceptions. The reproductions stand within the associative nexus of subjectivity. The apperceptions are determined through them, and that is again significant for the things which stand over and against the subject. It depends on the Body *and on what is proper to the psyche, what it is that, as world,* stands over and against the subject. Even abstracting from reproductive elements which enter into the apperception of a thing, the psychic gains significance for the givenness of the external world, in virtue of the relations of dependence which exist between the Bodily and the psychic. The use of stimulants, as well as corporeal diseases, affect the occurrence of sensations, sensuous feelings, tendencies, etc. Conversely, a psychic state such as cheerfulness or sadness exercises an influence on Bodily processes. And thanks to these connections, the *appearing external world shows itself as relative not only to the Body but also to the psychophysical subject as a whole.* Hence a distinction is made here between the identical *thing itself* and its subjectively conditioned *modes of appearance,* i.e., its subjectively conditioned features which persist in relation to me, my Body, and my soul.

In the sphere of intuition, there stands out from the series of multiplicities of appearances the "optimal givenness" in which the thing comes to the fore along with the properties that "befit it itself." Yet even this givenness is givenness under certain Objective and subjective circumstances, though it is still "the same" thing which under these or under other circumstances presents itself in a more or less "favorable" way.

d) The physicalistic thing

The Objectification accomplished in these *relativisms of experience* within the experiential nexus posits the thing as the identical substrate of identical properties. Of course, the thing [76] appears differently depending on whether or not I press the eye (double images), whether or not I take santonin, etc. But for consciousness it is the same, and the alteration of the coloring does not count as an alteration, or, rather, a change, of the property which is announced by the color, which is given in it.

And this holds universally. The thing is what it is in its thingly nexus and "in reference" to the experiencing subject, but it is still the same in all changes of state and of appearance it undergoes as a consequence of the altering circumstances. And as the same thing it has a stock of "lasting" properties. This reminds us of the formal logic which treats of objects in general and formulates conditions of possibility for any objectivity whatsoever to be able to count as identical, i.e. as maintaining its identity harmoniously throughout. Every object is what it is; in other words, it has its own proper qualities, properties, in which it displays its identical being, and with these properties, which are its permanent ones and which belong to its identity, it enters into relations, etc.

If the thing is (and concordance in the positing of being within the nexus of experience is an original ground of reason for the assertion, "It is"), then it must be determinable in a way which determines what is non-relative from among the relativities and, on the other hand, determines it out of that which contains all grounds of right, out of the data of experience, thus out of the sensuous relativities. Of course, experience does not exclude the possibility that it be annulled by future experience or even that the real not be at all, though it had been given in a concordant way. But now there are rightful grounds for positing being and consequently for the possibility and necessity of positing the goal of logico-mathematical determination.

As we work these matters out, notice should be taken of the different role given to the geometrical determinations of a thing versus the "sensuous qualities;" this comes to be expressed, at the beginning of the modern age, in the distinction between the *primary and secondary qualities.* In the constitution of a thing, which is accomplished for the solitary subject with reference to a relative constancy of Corporeality, we must first of all distinguish as a lower level:

1) The thing itself (as it itself is) with its constitutive features as they themselves are, versus the different modes of givenness, more perfect or less perfect as the case may be. The features [77] which pertain to the thing "itself" are then the "optimal" ones. This applies to all features, to the geometrical as well as to the sensuous qualities.

2) Now once the "sense-thing" is itself constituted, and so is, founded with it, the real-causal thing at the level of genuine experience, sense experience, then a new constitution of a higher level results in regard to the relativity of this "thing" with respect to the Corporeality constituted in a similar fashion. It is this relativity which demands the constitution of a *physicalistic thing* manifesting itself in the intuitively given thing. But in this relativity the geometrical determinations and the specifically "sensuous qualities" play quite different roles (both taken, in their own constitutive sphere, as "themselves," as optimal). The geometrical determinations pertain to the physicalistic Object itself; what is geometrical belongs to physicalistic nature in itself. But this is not true of the sensuous qualities, which thoroughly belong in the sphere of the appearances of nature. Hence it must be shown presently that and why, particularly for this relativism, they and they alone come into consideration.[1]

e) Possibility of the constitution of an "Objective nature" on the solipsistic level

We have pursued the constitution of material nature through various strata and have seen that already for the "solipsistic" subject—the subject in isolation—there exist motives for the distinction between an "appearing" thing, whose qualitative content is relative to my subjectivity, and the "Objective" thing, which remains what it is even if changes occur in my subjectivity and, dependent on it, in the "appearances" of the thing. Thereby we have to understand under the heading "true" or "Objective" thing still something double:

1) the thing as it presents itself to me under "*normal*" *conditions,* in opposition to all other thing-like unities which, constituted under "abnormal" conditions, are degraded to "mere semblance."

2) the identical content of qualities which, *abstraction made from all relativity,* can be worked out and fixed logico-mathematically: i.e., the physicalistic thing. Once this is known

[78]

[1] For a more precise treatment of the physicalistic thing, see below, pp. 89 ff.

and once we have, in addition, Objective knowledge of the psychophysical character of experiencing subjects, as well as of the existing conditionalities between thing and subject, then from that it can be determined Objectively how the thing in question must be intuitively characterized for the respective subjectivity—the normal or the abnormal.[1]

The question now, however, is whether or not the motives for the necessary distinction between the subjectively conditioned thing and the Objective thing, motives which do present themselves in solipsistic experience, are sufficient or have to be there at all. As long as we take cases in which changes of the external world, feigned for us by an abnormal perceptual organ, are shown up as "semblances" by the testimony of the other organs, to that extent the distinction between "seeming" and what actually is is always given, even if it may remain undecided in particular cases *what* is semblant and *what* is actual. But if we assume for once that a subject would always have only normal perceptions and would never undergo a modification of any of its organs, or on the other hand would undergo a modification, but one that allowed for no possibility of correction (loss of the entire field of touch, or mental diseases which alter the entire typical character of perception), then the motives of the distinction between "semblance" and "actuality," assumed up to now, would be eliminated, and the level of "Objective nature" could not be attained by such a subject. But the danger, that under the assumed conditions the constitution of Objective nature could not be attained, is removed as soon as we lift the abstraction we have maintained up to now and take into account the conditions under which constitution takes place *de facto*: namely, that the experiencing subject is, in truth, *not a solipsistic subject* but is instead one among many.

f) Transition from solipsistic to intersubjective experience

[79]

Let us consider a little more closely the possibility of a *solipsistic world,* something we have assumed up to now. I

[1] Thus are determined, as will later be shown in full, the tasks of physics, psychophysics, and psychology.

(everybody should substitute here his own "I") would experience a world, and it would be exactly the same as the one I actually do experience; everything would be the same, with the only exception that in my field of experience there would be no Bodies I could apprehend as Bodies of *other* psychic subjects. If this apperceptive domain is lacking, then it neither determines my apprehensions of things, and insofar as it does usually determine these apprehensions in my actual experience, then its influence would be absent from my world-image as now modified. Moreover, I now have the same manifolds of sensation; and the "same" real things, with the same properties, appear to me and, if everything is in harmony, exhibit themselves as "actually being," or otherwise, if discrepancies of a known kind occur as exceptional, the things show themselves as being "different" or as not being at all. Seemingly, nothing essential has changed; seemingly, only a fragment of my world of experience is missing, the world of animalia, as well as the group of causalities precisely involved with it in a world-nexus. Let us then imagine, however, that at a point of time within the time co-constituted along with the solipsistic world, suddenly in my domain of experience Bodies show up, things understandable as, and understood as, human Bodies. Now all of a sudden and for the first time human beings are there for me, with whom I can come to an understanding. And I come to an understanding with them about the things which are there for us in common in this new segment of time. Something very remarkable now comes out: extensive complexes of assertions about things, which *I* made in earlier periods of time on the ground of earlier experiences, experiences which were perfectly concordant throughout, are *not corroborated* by my current companions, and this not because these experiences are simply lacking to them (after all, one does not need to have seen everything others have seen, and vice versa) but because they thoroughly conflict[1] [80] with what the others experience in experiences, we may suppose,

[1] Of course, this conflict should not be considered total. For a basic store of *communal* experiences is presupposed in order for mutual understanding to take place at all.

that necessarily are harmonious and that go on being progressively confirmed. Then what about the actuality exhibited in the first period of time? And what about myself, the empirical subject of this actuality? The answer is clear. As I communicate to my companions my earlier lived experiences and they become aware of how much these conflict with their world, constituted intersubjectively and continuously exhibited by means of a harmonious exchange of experiences, then I become for them an interesting *pathological* Object, and they call my actuality, so beautifully manifest to me, the hallucination of someone who up to this point in time has been mentally ill. One may imagine perfection in the exhibition of my solipsistic world and raise that perfection to any height, still the described state of affairs as an apriori one, the ideal possibility of which is beyond question, would not change at all.

Light must now be shed on a certain problem: the relation to a multiplicity of people who have dealings with one another — how does that enter into the apprehension of a thing and come to be constitutive for the apprehension of a thing as "Objective and actual"? This "how" is at first very puzzling, because when we carry out an apprehension of a thing we do not, it *seems*, always co-posit a number of fellow men and, specifically, co-posit them as ones who are to be, as it were, invoked. One might also wonder if we are not entangled here in a circle, for surely the apprehension of one's fellow man presupposes the apprehension of the Body and consequently also presupposes thing-apprehension. There is only one way to solve this problem, the way prescribed for us by phenomenology. We must interrogate the thing-apprehension itself, there where it is an experience of an "Objectively actual" thing, and we must interrogate the experience which is not yet exhibiting, but is in want of exhibition, as to what, inherent in it, is in need of exhibition, what components of unfulfilled intentions it harbors. (In this regard it must be observed that we have in fact described the constitution of the thing incompletely by investigating only the manifolds of sensation, the adumbrations, schemata, and, in general, visual things in all their levels. We must overcome in a [81] decisive point the Ego's self-forgetfulness we touched upon previously.) Each thing of my experience belongs to my "envi-

ronment," and that means first of all that *my Body* is part of it precisely as Body. It is not that we have here a matter of essential necessity in any sense. That is precisely what our solipsistic thought-experiment has taught us. Strictly speaking, the *solus ipse* is unaware of the *Objective Body* in the full and proper sense,[1] even if the *solus ipse* might possess the *phenomenon* of its Body and the corresponding system of experiential manifolds and know them in just as perfect a way as the social man. In other words, the *solus ipse* does not truly merit its name. The abstraction we carried out, for justifiable theoretical reasons, does not yield the isolated *man*, the isolated human person. This abstraction does obviously not consist in our arranging for a mass murder of the people and animals of our surrounding world, sparing one human subject alone. For in that case the remaining subject, though one and unique, would still be a human subject, i.e., still an intersubjective object, still apprehending and positing himself as such. But, on the contrary, the subject we constructed knows nothing of a human environment, knows nothing of the reality or even just the real possibility of "other" Bodies, understood in the sense of an apprehension of the human, and thus knows nothing of his own Body as understandable by others. This subject does not know that others can gaze upon the same world, one that simply appears differently to different subjects, such that the appearances are always relative to "their" Bodies, etc. It is clear that *the apprehension of the Body plays a special role for the intersubjectivity* in which all objects are apprehended "Objectively" as things in the one *Objective* time and one *Objective* space of the one Objective world. (In every case the exhibition of any apprehended Objectivity whatsoever requires a relation to the apprehension of a multiplicity of subjects sharing a mutual understanding.) The thing which is constituted for the individual subject in regulated manifolds of harmonious experiences and which, as one for sense intuition, stands continuously [82] over and against the Ego in the course of perception, obtains in

[1] On this point, *cf.* the segments on the constitution of the Body, pp. 165 ff.

that way the character of a merely subjective "appearance" of the "Objectively real" thing. Each of the subjects who are intersubjectively related in mutual understanding in regard to the same world and, within that, in regard to the same things, has his own perceptions of them, i.e., his own perceptual appearances, and in them he finds a unity in the appearances, which itself is only an appearance in a higher sense, with predicates of appearance that may not, without any further ado, count as predicates of the appearing "true thing."

Thus we come here, in considering mutual understanding, to the same distinction we already demonstrated as possible on the solipsistic level. The "true thing" is then the Object that maintains its identity within the manifolds of appearances belonging to a multiplicity of subjects, and specifically, again, it is the *intuited* Object, related to a community of normal subjects, or, abstraction made from this relativity, it is the *physicalistic* thing, determined logico-mathematically. This physicalistic thing is obviously the same, whether it is constituted solipsistically or intersubjectively. For logical Objectivity is *eo ipso* Objectivity in the intersubjective sense as well. What a cognizing subject comes to know in logical Objectivity (hence in such a way that this presents no index of a dependency of its truth-content upon the subject or upon anything subjective) can be similarly known by any cognizing subject as long as he fulfills the conditions *any* subject must satisfy to know such Objects. That is, he must experience the things and the *very same things,* and he must, if he is also to know this identity, stand in a relation of empathy to the other cognizing subjects, and for that he must have Corporeality and belong to the same world, etc.

It pertains to *perception's very sense,* as well as to that of *experience* in general, that things come to presence there which are to be determined in themselves and distinguished from all other things. And it pertains to the sense of experiential *judgment* to make a claim to Objective validity. If a thing is determined in itself and distinct from every other, then it has to allow for judgmental, therefore predicative, determination in such a way that its distinctiveness as regards all other things stands out.

The thing given in perception and experience is, in accordance with perception's very sense, something *spatio-temporal* from the first, having form and duration and also having a position [83] in space and time. So we have to distinguish between the *appearing* form and the *form itself,* between the appearing spatial magnitude, the appearing location, and the magnitude and location themselves. Everything that we experience of the thing, even the form, has reference to the experiencing subject. All these appear in changing aspects, in the change of which the things are present as sensibly changed also. In addition, the space between things and the form of this space appear under different aspects according to the subjective circumstances. Always and necessarily, however, the one and the same space "appears" as the form of all possible things, a form that cannot be multiplied or altered. Every subject has his "space of orientation," his "here" and his possible "there," this "there" being determined according to the directional system of right-left, above-below, front-back. But the basic form of all identification of the intersubjective givennesses of a sensuous content is of such a kind that they necessarily belong to one and the same *system of location,* whose Objectivity is manifest in that every "here" is identifiable with every relative "there" as regards every new "here" resulting from the subject's "moving on" and so also as regards every "here" from the viewpoint of another subject. This is an ideal necessity and constitutes an Objective system of location, one that does not allow of being grasped by the vision of the eyes but only by the understanding; that is, it is "visible," in a higher kind of intuition, founded on change of location and on empathy. In this way is solved the problem of the "form of intuition" and of spatial intuition. It is not a matter of the senses, although in another respect it is. The primary intuitive space is sensuously given though this is not yet space itself. Objective space is not sensuous, although it is still intuited on a higher level, and it comes to givenness by means of an identification within a change of orientation, but exclusively one the subject itself carries out freely. Oriented space (and along with it, *eo ipso* Objective space) and all appearing spatial forms already admit of idealization; they are to be grasped in geometrical purity and determined "exactly."

The *Objective form* is Objective as ordered within *Objective space.* Everything *else* about a thing that is Objective (detached [84] from all relativisms) is so through a connection with what is fundamentally Objective, viz., space, time, motion. Real properties manifest themselves as real substantial-causal unities in the motion and deformation of the spatial form. These are the *mechanical properties* which express the causal-lawful dependencies of the spatial determinations of bodies. The thing is always *form* in a *situation.* The form is, however, in every situation a *qualified* one. Qualities are what fills, they extend over the surface and through the corporeality of the form. *Qualifications,* however, extend from the things into empty space: *rays of light, radiations of heat,* etc. That means that thingly qualities condition qualities and qualitative changes in other things and indeed do so in such a way that the effect is a constant function of the situation: to every change of situation there corresponds a change of effect. In virtue of such a subordination to spatial relations which may be determined with exactitude, even the sense qualities become amenable to exact determination. Thus we come to an understanding of the physicalistic world-view or world-structure, i.e., to an understanding of the method of physics as a method which pursues the sense of an intersubjectively-Objectively (i.e., non-relative and thereby at once intersubjective) determinable sensible world.

g) More precise characterization of the physicalistic thing

"Physicalistic nature," to which we have now advanced, presents itself in the following way in accord with our expositions: *the thing itself in itself* consists of a continuously or discretely filled space in states of motion, states which are called energy forms. That which fills space lends itself to certain groups of differential equations and corresponds to certain fundamental laws of physics. But there are no sense qualities here. And that means there are no qualities here whatever. For the quality of what fills space *is* sense quality. But, now, filled space without quality, how is that thinkable?

To attribute actuality to appearing things with their sense qualities in themselves is out of the question, as the natural

scientists quite rightly say. For the sense qualities change [85] according to the kind and the disposition of the sense organs; they are dependent on the sense organs and, more generally, dependent on the Body and the total condition of the experiencing subject. And it turns out that the true physical facts which correspond to the qualitative distinctions of red and green, warm and cold, are *produced* without qualitative transition as mere quantitative distinctions of one and the same domain, for example, temperature, waves in the ether, etc.

Shall we say that God sees the things as they are in themselves while we see them through our sense organs, which are a kind of distorting eyeglasses? That things are filled space with absolute quality and it is only that we know nothing of it? But should the things which appear to us as they appear to us be the same as the things which appear to God as they appear to God, then a unity of mutual understanding would have to be possible between God and us, just as, between different men, only through mutual understanding is there the possibility of *knowing* that the things seen by the one are *the same* as those seen by the other. But how would the identification be thinkable if not in the sense that the supposed absolute spirit sees the things precisely also through sensuous appearances, which, likewise, have to be exchangeable in an understanding that is reciprocal—or, at least, unilateral—as is the case with the appearances we share among us men? And if not in that case, then God would be blind to colors, etc., and men blind to his qualities. Is there any sense, however, to arguing about which are the true qualities? The new qualities would again be secondary and would be eliminated once more by physics, which has to be the same for all, if the things are the same. Obviously, the absolute spirit would also have to have a Body for there to be mutual understanding, and thus the dependency on sense organs would have to be there as well. The result is that we must understand the *sense of the distinction between secondary and primary qualities* correctly and that we are permitted to understand the non-Objectivity of the former only in the sense that in no way do they escape the relativity of appearances, not even in the way we easily overlook insofar as we spontaneously think of ourselves as normally sensing in a

world of beings of normal sensibility. A main feature of the relativity consists in the dependence upon the subject. To be sure, an important distinction is to be found here: subjects who [86] in general share a *common* world of things, to which they actually relate, hence to which they can relate through appearances, as is required by thingly being, can in principle be relatively "blind" as regards color, sound, etc., i.e., as regards individual senses which provide their own particular sorts of sense qualities. The senses can also be completely different, provided they make possible a common understanding and constitute a common nature as an appearing one. But in principle subjects cannot be blind as regards *all* the senses and consequently at once blind to space, to motion, to energy. Otherwise there would be no world of things there for them; in any case it would not be the same as ours, precisely *the* spatial world, *the* world of nature.

Nature is an intersubjective reality and a reality not just for me and my companions of the moment but for us and for everyone who can have dealings with us and can come to a mutual understanding with us about things and about other people. There is always the possibility that new spirits enter into this nexus; but they must do so by means of their Bodies, which are represented through possible appearances in our consciousness and through corresponding ones in theirs.

The thing is a rule of possible appearances. That means that the thing is a reality as a unity of a manifold of appearances connected according to rules. Moreover, this unity is an intersubjective one. It is a unity of states; the thing has its real properties, and to each moment there corresponds an active state (for the properties express faculties; they are causal properties, related to an "if-then"). Whereas, however, for the *former* consideration, supported by *direct experience,* the *state* is identical with the space that is filled with sensuous qualities (schema), a space which can be an intersubjective unity only as related to a totality of normal "like-sensing" subjects, on the other hand the real possibility and actuality of *subjects endowed with different sense faculties* and the knowledge of the *dependence,* present in each individual, of the sense qualities on physiological processes lead to a consideration of this depen-

dence precisely *as a new dimension of relativities* and lead to the [87] construction, in *thought,* of the purely physicalistic thing. Then to the same Objective-physicalistic state of the thing pertain multiple "filled spaces" related to various sense faculties and individual sense aberrations. The physicalistic thing is *intersubjectively* common in that it has validity for all individuals who stand in possible communion with us. The *Objective determination* determines the thing through that which belongs to it and must belong to it if it is going to be able to appear to me or to anyone else in communion with me and if it is going to be able to count as the same for every member of the communicating society—even for me throughout all possible modifications of my sensibility. The determinations of space and time are common, as is common a lawfulness which, in virtue of its concepts related to the "physicalistic thing," is a unitary rule for all the appearances, of the intersubjective community, which constitute the same thing and which must constitute it in rational mutual understanding. It is only from the appearances (and the intersubjective nexus) that we can draw the sense of what a thing is in "Objective actuality," i.e., in the actuality which appears, and which appears to all communicating subjects, and which is identifiable by means of intersubjective identification.

The Objectively real is not in my "space," or in anyone else's, as "phenomenon" ("phenomenal space") but exists in *Objective space,* which is a formal *unity* of identification in the midst of the changing qualities. Whereas it holds for my space-phenomena that they can only be given with sensuous qualities, it holds for Objective space that it cannot be given with sensuous qualities but can appear only within subjective spaces that have sensuous qualities. This is valid for the *solus ipse* as well and for the space already being constituted therein as Objective, though still not as intersubjective. (Thus the intersubjective thing is the "Objective" spatial form with "Objective" qualities, the physicalistic ones.) *Pure space* (the purely Objective spatial form) arises out of my appearing space *not through abstraction* but *through an Objectification* which takes as "appearance" any sensuously appearing spatial form endowed with sensuous qualities and posits it in manifolds of [88]

appearances which do not belong to an individual consciousness but to a societal consciousness as a total group of possible appearances that is constructed out of individual groups. Each subject has the totality of space and has particular spatial forms, but in intersubjectivity these are appearances.

In principle, the thing is given and is to be given only through appearances, whose appearing content can vary with the subjects. This content (the appearing thing just as it appears, as red, as warm, etc.) is what it is as appearance to an actual subject or to a possible subject in actual connection with the former. We find ourselves led back to a multiplicity of actual subjects and, in connection with them, still possible subjects who intuit a thing, accomplish an experience, etc., in which, as correlate, something appearing as such comes to consciousness in a varying mode with moments of appearance such as red, warm, sweet, round, etc. These subjects stand in a relationship of empathy and, in spite of the variation in the givennesses of appearances, can intersubjectively assure themselves of the identity of what appears therein.

Thus in principle the thing is something intersubjectively identical yet is such that it has no sensuous-intuitive content whatsoever that could be given as identical intersubjectively. Instead, it is only an empty identical something as a correlate of the identification possible according to experiential-logical rules and grounded through them, the identification of what appears in the changing "appearances" with their various contents, the identification carried out by the subjects that stand in the intersubjective nexus along with their corresponding acts appropriate to appearance and to experiential-logical thinking. In physics as the mere natural study of the intersubjective-Objective thing existing "in itself," the thing is Objectively determined as an empty something, determined through the intersubjectively constituted forms of space and time and through the "primary qualities" related to space and time. All secondary qualities, indeed precisely *everything* that can be given intuitively, including all *intuitive spatial and temporal forms* which are quite unthinkable without secondary filling, all differences in orientation, etc.—these do not belong there.

h) The possibility of the constitution of an "Objective nature" at the level of intersubjective experience

[89]

Let us now examine analogously, for the intersubjective level of experience as we have done for the solipsistic, which conditions have to be fulfilled so that the constitution of an "Objective" nature can arise, and indeed must arise. We began with relationships as they are present *de facto:* we found that individual differences stand out from a fundamental set of common experiences and lead to the distinction between determinations which belong to the thing "itself" versus ones that are merely subjectively conditioned. Now other conditions, as well, are to be constructed apriori. We can imagine a human world in which there would be no illness, in which there would occur no illusions, hallucinations, or the like. We can furthermore assume that all the persons who have commerce with one another apprehend the world completely alike (abstraction made from the always necessary differences in orientation). In that case would the things with their secondary qualities simply count as the ultimate Objectivity? Or would it be recognized that this state of affairs is contingent and not necessary? It is to be noted in this regard that the constitution of the *sensible world* is obviously to be distinguished from the constitution of the *"true" world,* the world for the *scientific* subject, whose activity is a *spontaneous* "free" thinking and, in general, researching. That is to say: if we live passively, in the manner of animals, "in the world" and in commerce with others who are like us, who are as "normal" as we are, then a world of experience is constituted common to us all. Now, we are, however, *free intelligent beings.* Even if we encounter no abnormalities, we can still perform *gratuitous operations* on our Bodies or on others', and then *"anomalies"* do appear. We pursue, in thought, the causal nexuses and form for ourselves the "physicalistic world-image."

In any case, we see that on the one hand there exists already on the solipsistic level the *possibility of advancing to the constitution of the "Objective" (physicalistic) thing.* On the other hand, there does not exist, even on the intersubjective level, the

unconditioned *necessity* to reach that far. But there is—abstracting from the circumstance that *de facto* constitution is accomplished intersubjectively—a distinction in principle between these two possible ways of constructing an "Objective nature." The solipsistic subject could indeed have over against itself an Objective nature, however this subject could *not apprehend itself as a member of nature,* could not apperceive itself as psychophysical subject, as animal, the way this does happen on the intersubjective level of experience.[1] Obviously, this can become evident only if the constitution of animal nature is examined. As has indeed been shown in general by the exhibition of the relations of dependency between experienced nature and experiencing subject, the study of subjectivity is unconditionally required for a full clarification of the sense and structure of physical nature.

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[1] *Cf.* pp. 165 ff.

Section Two: The Constitution of Animal Nature

INTRODUCTION

§ 19. Transition to the consideration of the soul as a natural Object

Let us now proceed to investigate the essence of the soul, the human or animal soul, as it is, in its connection with the material Body, an Object of natural-scientific research. Here also, as is required by a rigorous phenomenological method, we want to keep to what originary experience teaches us. We leave aside all vague experiential lore and all unclarified interpretations of what is given as psychic; these may have arisen from experience, but in themselves they are confused, whether they can be corrected or instead prove to be inappropriate and full of contradiction. We renounce all erudition, in a lower or higher sense, from which we are, rather, led back as from a mediate cognitive function precisely to these original experiences. Consequently, we also keep our distance from all convictions prevailing in the science of psychology, without, however, disputing their rights. What we are seeking does not lie in the *consequences* of theoretical, mediate thinking but in its *beginnings*; we are looking for its most original presuppositions. No theory can [91] overthrow the meaning of the soul prescribed to us by the perfect intuition of the psychical. This meaning lays down an absolutely binding rule for all theoretical research. Any deviation from it results in absurdity. This is indeed intelligible on absolutely universal grounds. Legitimate theory cannot accomplish anything other than the predicative determination, in mediate thinking, of that which was first posited by originary presenting intuition (in our case, experience) in a straightforward way as a being and thereby as a being of determinate

"content" or sense. There what the "analysis of origin" has drawn from originary intuition as the originary sense of the object cannot be annulled by any theory. It is the norm which must be presupposed and to which all possible theoretical cognition is rationally bound. Hereby is designated a universal rule for the fundamental clarification of all regional concepts—thus all concepts which delimit the domain of objects of a regional ontology (and therewith of all special and empirical disciplines of the regional sphere in question)—just as of the concept of the soul. Hence the task is "to draw out of experience" the authentic concept of the psychic. But obviously here, as elsewhere in phenomenology, this does not mean to engage straightforwardly in actual experiences, i.e., to proceed empirically, as if the empirical thesis, which binds itself to contingent facts, would be pertinent. The task is rather to examine, *in eidetic intuition, the essence of the experienced in general and as such,* precisely as it is made explicit[1] in any experience, whether carried out actually or imaginatively (by means of a fictional transfer of oneself into a possible experience) in order then to grasp intuitively, in the unfolding of the intentions essentially involved in such an experience, the sense of the experienced as such—the sense of the relevant class of regional objectivities—and to express this sense in rigorous analysis and description.

§ 20. The sense of the ordinary talk about the "psychic"

Let us begin our analyses. It is in connection with what is material that the psychic is given to us. Among material things there are certain ones, or from an eidetic standpoint there are [92] certain ones apriori possible, which are soulless, "merely" material. On the other hand, there also are certain ones which have the rank of "Bodies" and as such display a connection with a new stratum of being, the psychic stratum, as it is called here. What is included under this heading? What experience

[1] *Cf.* p. 38.

first discloses to us here is a *stream, with no beginning or end, of "lived experiences,"* of which manifold types are well known to us from inner perception, "introspection," in which each of us grasps his "own" lived experiences in their originality. And when these are no longer originary and "actual," we can still grasp them intuitively in inner remembrance, inner free phantasy, inner imaginary representation. Similar lived experiences are further given, with more or less clear intuitiveness, in the form of an interpreting grasp of others' psychic lives as present actualities.

As the image, *stream of lived experience* (or stream of consciousness), already indicates, the lived experiences, i.e., the sensations, perceptions, rememberings, feelings, affects, etc., *are not given to us in experience as annexes, lacking internal connection, of material Bodies,* as if they were unified with one another only through the common phenomenal link to the Body. Instead, *they are one by means of their very essence;* they are bound and interwoven together, they flow into one another in layers and are possible only in this unity of a stream. Nothing can be torn away from this stream; nothing can be separated off as, so to say, a thing for itself.

But in a certain way this unitary stream contains in itself still further unities, and is interwoven with unities, which can equally be grasped in intuition, given the appropriate viewpoint, and which must no less be taken into consideration if we wish to bring clarity to the phenomenologically original field of the psychic. To this field refer indeed the *Ego concepts*, to be grasped in a different sense, as well as the proper concept of the soul, which of course in no way coincides with the concept of lived experience and stream of lived experience. For us the first question to be raised here concerns *the unity of the pure (transcendental) Ego* and then that of the *real psychic Ego,* hence of the empirical subject affiliated with the soul, whereby the soul *is constituted as a reality bound together with Bodily reality or interwoven in it.* The Body will here require special study, and so will the question of whether its essential determinations are only those of a peculiar material thing or whether it is the bearer of a new, extra-material, constitutive stratum which is to be designated as a psychic stratum in the pregnant [93]

sense. Under the heading, "empirical Ego," which still needs clarification, we find furthermore also the unity "I as man," hence the Ego which not only ascribes to itself its lived experiences as its psychic states and likewise ascribes to itself its cognitions, its properties of character, and similar permanent qualities manifest in its lived experiences, but which also designates its Bodily qualities as its "own" and thereby assigns them to the sphere of the Ego.

§ 21. The concept of "I as man"

Let us immediately proceed from this last Ego-concept, the ordinary one, which is especially rich in content. Everyone grasps, in "self-perception," precisely himself, and likewise, in the experiential knowledge of another, precisely this other. When anyone uses the *first person,* he speaks *of his acts and states* in the form, "I perceive, I judge, I feel, I will." Similarly, with the expression, "I am of such a kind," one speaks of his personal qualities, of his innate or acquired traits of character, abilities, and of his transient and only relatively permanent dispositions. Likewise for others. We say that so-and-so is a man of character, virtuous, cheerful or melancholic; we say that he has a choleric temperament, is in love, etc. However, in saying that he dances, is a gymnast, eats, writes letters, etc., one is at the same time saying that he has psychophysical capacities, is a good dancer, a mediocre gymnast, etc. Similarly, someone will say that *he* has been beaten, stabbed, or burnt when it is his Body that has undergone the corresponding actions, when *it*, as we also say, has been beaten, stabbed or burnt. We say of someone that he is dirty when it is his finger that is covered with dirt. Furthermore we also say *he* is anemic or full-blooded, *he* is weak in the heart or sick in the stomach, etc. Hence in the normal saying of "I" (or in the normal use of personal pronouns in general), the expression "I" encompasses the "whole" man, Body and soul. It can therefore very well be said: I *am* not my Body, but I *have* my Body; I *am* not a soul, but I *have* a soul. [94]

Now, if it is correct that the unity of man encompasses these

two components not as two realities externally linked with one another but instead as most intimately interwoven and in a certain way mutually penetrating (as is in fact established), then one can understand that states and properties of either of these components count as ones of the whole, of the "I as man" itself.

On the other hand, it is easy to see *that the psychic has a priority* and *that it is what determines the concept of the Ego essentially*. When the soul departs, then what remains is dead matter, a sheer material thing, which no longer possesses in itself anything of the I as man. The Body, on the contrary, cannot depart. Even the ghost necessarily has its ghostly Body. To be sure, this Body is not an actual material thing—the appearing materiality is an illusion—but thereby so is the affiliated soul and thus the entire ghost.

Considered more closely, we have here various possibilities. Either this Body is given *perceptually* to us as a material reality, without any consciousness of an illusion, and in that case what we are seeing is not a "ghost" but a real man. Or, on the other hand, if there is consciousness of an illusion with respect to materiality, then we will also give up the man as an illusion, though we still do not speak of a ghost. I say "as an illusion," because experience teaches us that real spirituality is connected up with material Bodies only and not somehow with mere subjective or intersubjective spatial phantoms (pure spatial schemata). And according to experience the material Body and the soul necessarily belong together in the idea of an actual man. But this necessity is only an empirical one. In itself the case would be thinkable (and an actual ghost would result) that [95] a psychic being would appear and be actual while lacking a *material* Body, a normal thing of nature as underlying the psychic determinations. But this still does not imply that a Body in every sense is lacking or could be lacking. We have indeed recognized that the specifically material determinations are founded in those that are included under the heading "pure schema" and are at the same time unilaterally separable from them. A ghost is characterized by the fact that its Body is a pure "spatial phantom" with no material properties at all, which, instead, insofar as they do somehow co-appear, are consciously

stricken out and are characterized as unrealities.[1] In itself, then, it would be thinkable that ghosts appear not only to one subject but also intersubjectively—i.e., manifest themselves as consistent in an intersubjective experience on the basis of mere phantom Bodies, possibly even purely visual ones. If thereby the apriori (although entirely empty) possibility of actual ghosts is granted, then the immediate consequence is that a psychic subject without a material Body is indeed thinkable, i.e., as a ghost instead of a natural animal being, but in no way without a Body of some kind. For a psychic being to be, to have *Objective* existence, the *conditions of possibility of intersubjective givenness* must be fulfilled. Such an intersubjective experienceability, however, is thinkable only through "empathy," which for its part presupposes an intersubjectively experienceable Body that can be understood by the one who just enacted the empathy as the Body of the corresponding psychic being. Moreover, this Body, in its givenness, requires a comprehension of the psychic and can then be exhibited in further experience. It is purely as a consequence of this that there arises a priority of the psychic or, if you will, of the spiritual over against the Body, namely due to the fact that the Body will not withstand [96] separation. In order to be experienceable Objectively, the spirit must be animating an Objective Body (though apriori precisely not just a material Body), whereas, conversely, the Objective experienceability of a spatial phantom or of a material thing requires no animation. Thus if we consider more closely what the *anima* and animation are and also what is presupposed for the possibility of an Objective knowledge of them, we are struck by the fact that no mere simple connection and perhaps no

[1] To distinguish between a ghost and the real incarnation of a subjectivity with its Ego, it is not altogether correct to refer back simply to the phantom. And no consideration has been taken of the fundamentally essential role of the *vocalization* of one's own self-produced voice, related to one's own, originally given kinestheses of the vocal muscles. This was also missing in the original sketch of the theory of empathy, which had to be presented first. It seems, from my observation, that in the child the self-produced voice, and then, analogously, the heard voice, serves as the first bridge for the Objectification of the Ego or for the formation of the "*alter*," i.e., before the child already has or can have a sensory analogy between his visual Body and that of the "other" and, afortiori, before he can acknowledge to the other a tactual Body and a Body incarnating the will.

absolutely simultaneous connection can exist here, and in fact there is none. The Body is not only in general a thing but is indeed expression of the spirit and *is at once organ of the spirit*. And before we engage ourselves here in deeper expositions, we already recognize that everything properly "subjective" and Ego-like lies on the side of the spirit (this side comes to expression in the Body), whereas the Body is called "Ego-like" only in virtue of this animation, and its states and qualities are only thereby called "my" qualities, subjective, of the Ego. It is the special quality of the animation which accounts for the fact that what is Bodily and ultimately *everything* Bodily from no matter what point of view can assume psychic significance, therefore even where at the outset it is not phenomenally the bearer of a soul.

Now, since, in the unity of the total apperception, "man," the psychic, which is attributed to the Body "in empathy," is apprehended as really united with this Body, then it is understandable that the Bodily events are apprehended as properly belonging to this human subject, i.e., are apprehended as "mine."

The situation is somewhat different as regards extra-Bodily things which through their relation to man have likewise assumed Ego-meanings, e.g., words, goods, aesthetic values, Objects to be used, etc. They have indeed a "meaning," but they have no soul, no meaning which points to a psychic subject really connected to them, connected into a single founded reality. This is expressed by the fact that they are indeed called my work, my dress, my possession, my darling, etc., but their properties are not likewise called mine and are instead at most apprehended as indications, reflections of my properties. All this would still require closer scrutiny and deeper foundation. In our further analyses, these same issues will come up often.[1] [97]

The Ego-concept we have discussed up to now, Ego, the man, leads us back, according to all that has preceded, to a purely psychic Ego. In this respect, however, we have to draw still further distinctions.

[1] *Cf.* pp. 248 ff.

Chapter One

THE PURE EGO

§ 22. The pure Ego as Ego-pole

Let us think of a self-perception as accomplished, but this time in such a way that we abstract from the Body. What we find then is ourselves as the spiritual Ego related to the stream of lived experiences—"spiritual" here is used in a mere general sense, referring to the Ego that has its place precisely not in Corporeality; e.g., I "think" (*cogito*), i.e., I perceive, I represent in whatever mode, I judge, I feel, I will, etc., and I find myself thereby as that which is one and the same in the changing of these lived experiences, as "subject" of the acts and states. (This subject has absolute individuation as the Ego of the current *cogitatio*, which is itself absolutely individual in itself.) Here, however, we can draw various lines and do so at first in such a way that we arrive at the Ego as *pure Ego*, precisely the one we spoke of at such length in Book One. With this aim in view, we limit ourselves therefore to intentional lived experiences which "we" have in each case "accomplished" and throughout which we, or, let us say more clearly, I, the Ego that in each case "thinks," have directed the ray of the Ego onto what is objective in the act. We now focus on the Ego in which the "I think" reigns, and purely as what reigns therein, hence on the Ego given in absolute indubitability as the *"sum cogitans."* As what is absolutely given, or what can be brought to givenness in the apriori possible view of fixating reflection, it is by no means whatsoever something mysterious or mystical. I take myself as the pure Ego insofar as I take myself purely as that which, in perception, is directed to the perceived, in knowing to the known, in phantasizing to the phantasized, in logical thinking

to the thought, in valuing to the valued, in willing to the willed. In the accomplishment of each act there lies a ray of directed- [98]
ness I cannot describe otherwise than by saying it takes its point of departure in the "Ego," which evidently thereby remains undivided and numerically identical while it lives in these manifold acts, spontaneously takes an active part in them, and by means of ever new rays goes through these acts toward what is objective in their sense. To speak more precisely, the pure Ego is further related to Objects in very different modes, according to the type of the act accomplished. In a certain sense, in its directedness to one same thing the Ego is ever a free Ego; on the other hand, the image of "directing oneself to" the appearance can only be used imperfectly. Of course, in a certain general sense, the Ego directs itself in every case to the Object, but in a more particular sense at times an Ego-ray, launched from the pure Ego, goes out toward the Object, and, as it were, counter-rays issue from the Object and come back to the Ego. This is how it is that in desire I find myself attracted by the desired Object; I am directed to it, but in such a way that I reach out toward it, without, however, attaining it in mere desire. In love I find myself inclined to the beloved, attracted by the one I love, perhaps wholly surrendered to and lost in the beloved. In hate, on the contrary, I am indeed equally directed to the hated; however, in this case it is a matter of repulsion. Accordingly, I behave either by following up the attraction or repulsion, yielding to it, or by resisting it; at times I am in my act of behavior "moved," at times unmoved; at times I am one who actively moves "himself;" at times one who does not move at all. Thus I am, e.g., "sunk" in passive mourning, in a dumb, motionless sadness, in a pure passivity. Or, I am filled by a passionate sadness, as an "e-motion," though still passive; or again I am moved while holding myself occupied in a controlled sadness, etc. Versus this, in activity, I am "into" the thing in a pratical way; in the *"fiat"* I am first of all engaged in setting the scene; the action which now unfolds is constituted as having happened according to my will, as happening *through* my agency as a freely willing being; I am constantly there as bringing about the strived for, as aiming in will. And every phase of the aiming itself is such that in it the pure willing

subject "attains" the willed as such. The pure Ego not only lives in singular acts as accomplishing, as active, and as passive. Free and yet attracted by the Object, it goes forth from act to act, and it experiences excitations from the Objects constituted [99]
in the "background;" without immediately giving in to them, it allows them to intensify, to knock at the door of consciousness; and then it surrenders, perhaps even "completely," turning from the one Object to the other. In doing so, in the change of its acts, it accomplishes particular turns and freely builds up for itself these or those many-layered act-unities. Thus, as theoretical subject in the unity of a thematic nexus, it holds sway by relating and connecting, by positing subjects and predicates, by presupposing and drawing conclusions. Within the unity of a theoretical interest it carries on the theme; occasionally, however, it lets itself be diverted and then picks up again the thematic thread, etc. Thus we find in fact, by studying the manifold acts in which the pure Ego lives, all sorts of structures, ones which are to be described in each realm of acts, structures which concern the proper modes of subject participation and of the ways of the correlative Object participation and in this latter respect the ways in which the Object comes to meet the pure subject related to it, for example by attracting the subject or by repelling, by eliciting or by hindering, by stimulating or by "determining" in some other way.

The pure Ego exercises its pure "functions" in the acts of the multiformed cogito, discrete ones or ones connected by this cogito, and to that extent we could call the acts themselves, by transferring over the sense of the word, functions. On the one hand, we must definitely here distinguish the pure Ego from the acts themselves, as that which functions in them and which, through them, relates to Objects; on the other hand, this distinction can only be an abstract one. It is abstract to the extent that the Ego cannot be thought of as something separated from these lived experiences, from its "life," just as, conversely, the lived experiences are not thinkable except as the medium of the life of the Ego. In this connection it is important to notice that the pure Ego is not only an accomplishing one, such as we up to now have considered it exclusively: that is, in acts in the specific sense, those of the form, "cogito." Just as

the cogito of the moment sinks down into inactuality, in a certain sense the pure Ego also sinks down into inactuality. It withdraws from the act in question, it is no longer in this act as an accomplishing Ego, and perhaps it is not carrying out any act at all. But in that case it is not something separate from all lived experience, as if now the consciousness that is not [100] accomplishing any act and the pure Ego would be without any connection between themselves. Rather, the distinction between actuality and inactuality points to a distinction in the essential structure of intentional lived experiences and consequently at once to a distinction, inseparable from them, in the "how," in the manner in which the Ego has lived experiences. The Ego can never disappear, it is always present in its acts but in different ways, depending: if they are or if they become acts *in actu*, then the Ego steps forth, as it were, in them; it comes to the light of day, it exercises an active living function, it directs itself, in an active ray, toward what is objective. But if it is, so to say, a latent Ego, then it does not cast an active regard onto something; it does not actively experience or have an effect on, or undergo, anything. Of course, there can be no question here of arbitrary possibilities of sudden coming into existence and stepping forth out of nowhere in the accomplishment of an act; instead it is a matter of a phenomenological alteration of the pure Ego-relatedness that is always extant. To be sure, something new arises thereby, a changed phenomenon, which here could be called an active self-directing of the Ego, e.g., casting a glance of focused notice onto something, etc., but in such a way that already in the former phenomenon, in the one of latency, an Ego-structure is extant. This Ego-structure precisely allows us and requires us to say that the Ego in the stage of the specifically "unconscious," of latency, is not a nothing or the empty potentiality of the alteration of the phenomena into ones of Ego-actuality but instead is a moment of their structure. Thus the images of the stepping forth of the Ego, of the being actively directed onto something, and of the stepping back or sinking back into latency have a real [*reell*] meaning. We know all this, however, in reflection, in which we grasp in retrospection precisely not only individual background lived experiences but also whole stretches of the stream of consciousness which

would lack all Ego-activity. In spite of all the obscurity and all the confusion which adheres to the proper character of such stretches, we can grasp insightfully the most general essential properties which have been indicated.

But we still have to add more to the characterization of the pure Ego. In addition, it is necessary to clarify more precisely the points we have already made. We can at once attach ourselves to the possibility of "reflection" we used just now.

§ 23. The possibility of grasping the pure Ego (the Ego-pole) [101]

It pertains in general to the essence of every cogito that a new cogito of the kind called by us "Ego-reflection" is in principle possible, one that grasps, on the basis of the earlier cogito (which itself is thereby phenomenlogically altered), the pure subject of that earlier cogito. It consequently pertains, as we can also say (since the same obviously applies to this reflective cogito as well) to the essence of the pure Ego that it be able to grasp itself as what it is and in the way it functions, and thus make itself into an object. Therefore it is in no way correct to assert that the pure Ego is a subject that can never become an Object, as long as we do not limit the concept of Object at the very outset and in particular do not limit it to "natural" Objects, to mundane "real" Objects, for if we do, the assertion would indeed hold in a good and valid sense. Now it is certainly very significant that the pure Ego occupies a completely isolated position as opposed to all that is real and in general to all other things which can be designated as "being." We can in fact say: everything that is objective, in the broadest sense of the word, is thinkable only as correlate of a possible consciousness or, more precisely, as correlate of a possible "I think" and consequently as referable to a pure Ego. This holds for the pure Ego itself as well. The pure Ego can be posited as an object by the pure Ego which is identically one with it.

The essence of the pure Ego thereby includes the possibility of an originary self-grasp, a "self-perception," and in that case also the possibility of the corresponding modifications of self-grasp-

ing: i.e., self-remembrance, self-phantasy, etc. The essence of self-remembrance obviously includes the fact that the pure Ego, remembering itself, is conscious of itself as bygone, and the fact that, on the other hand, a shift of focus is possible in virtue of which the pure Ego can grasp itself as the pure Ego of the act of remembering and consequently as self-perceived actual presence, and, similarly, the fact that it grasps itself as something temporally enduring from the past now to the actual flowing now of the present.

Obviously, something similar, but with the corresponding modifications, holds for the other parallel acts. It is to be noted that everywhere the distinction must certainly be made between the objectified and the "originally" not objectified pure Ego, e.g., between the perceived and the perceiving pure Ego. But no matter how much a phenomenological transformation is [102] expressed hereby with regard to the cogito—which at one time is the unreflected, original cogito, the cogito of the originally accomplishing pure Ego, and at other times is a reflected cogito, hence an essentially transformed, intentional Object or medium of a new act, by means of which the accomplishing Ego grasps the accomplishing of the earlier act—yet it is evident, in virtue of further reflections at a higher level, *that this and the other pure Ego are in truth one and the same.* It is just that at one time it is given, at other times not given; or, in a higher reflection, in the one case it is straightforwardly given, in the other it is given through a further mediating stage. Similarly, the original cogito itself and the reflectively grasped cogito are one and the same and can be grasped mediately, in a reflection on a higher level, as indubitably absolutely the same. In the transition from the original act to the reflection on it, the whole lived experience is certainly changed; the earlier cogito is certainly no longer, in the reflection, really [*reell*] present, i.e., present as it was lived unreflectively. But the reflection does not grasp and does not posit as being that which, in the present lived experience is a real [*reell*] constituent as a modification of the cogito. What it posits (as is grasped with evidence precisely by a reflection on a higher level) is the identical, which at one time is given objectively, at another time not. Now, afortiori, the pure Ego is indeed something which comes to be grasped in the cogito in

question, but not somehow as a real [*reell*] moment of it. When the Ego is objective or again not objective, what changes phenomenologically is not the Ego itself, which we grasp and have given in reflection as absolutely identical, but the lived experience.

It is to be noted, furthermore, that the unities we are considering here throughout, as, e.g., the identical cogito, are precisely themselves already unities constituted in consciousness as unities of a duration in which they change in this or that way. In other words, they are constituted in a more profound, correspondingly manifold "consciousness" taken in another sense, in which all that we have up to now called "consciousness" or "lived experience" does not occur really [*reell*] but only as a unity of the "immanent time" which is that of its constitution. We have deliberately left out of consideration in our treatise this most profound element, immanent time and all the unities of lived experience which partake of it, including every consciousness that constitutes a cogito, and our investigation has remained completely *within* immanent temporality. [103] And to this sphere there belongs also the identical pure Ego. Its identity is an identity throughout this immanent time. I am and I was the same, I who endure and "hold sway" in this or that conscious act, although, on the other hand, I am no real [*reell*] moment of it in the manner of a constituent. No real [*reell*] moment—that is especially to be considered. *Each and every cogito, along with all its constituents, arises or vanishes in the flux of lived experiences. But the pure subject does not arise or vanish,* although in its own way it does "step forth" and once again "step back." It enters into action and then again retires from action. What it is, and what it in itself is and does in general, is grasped by us, or, rather, is grapsed by it itself in the self-perception which is one of its own actions, such a one that grounds the absolute indubitability of the grasp of being. In fact, the pure Ego is indeed nothing other than what Descartes, in his marvelous *Meditations,* grasped with the insight of genius and established as such once and for all, the being of which it is not possible to doubt and which in any doubt would itself necessarily be found again as the subject of the doubt. If there were a sense to saying that this Ego is subject to generation

and perishing, then we would precisely have to establish this possibility in pure givenness; we would have to be able to grasp, in pure intuition, the essential possibility of generation and perishing. But as soon as we set out to do so, the absurdity of it becomes plain. The pure Ego itself of such intuition, namely the regarding, focusing Ego, on the one hand would be living in the continuity of this regarding as what is identical in the corresponding duration, and yet it would have to find at once, precisely in this duration, a time-span in which it itself was not and a beginning point in which it first of all entered into being. We would have the absurdity that the absolutely existing Ego, in the duration of its being, would encounter itself as not being, whereas it is evident that the only way that it is possible for the pure Ego not to encounter itself is for it not to reflect on itself.

Thus, instead of *generatio* and *corruptio,* to the pure Ego there pertains only the essential property that it has its stepping forth and its receding, that it begins to function and hold sway actively and that it ceases to do so. The phrases "it steps forth" and "acts in the specific sense of the cogito become an event in [104] the stream of consciousness" mean the same, since the essence of such acts consists precisely in their being intentional lived experiences "carried out" by the pure Ego.

§ 24. "Mutability" of the pure Ego

We can discern with evidence the sense in which the pure Ego changes in the changing of its acts. It is changeable in its practices, in its activities and passivities, in its being attracted and being repulsed, etc. But these changes do not change it itself. On the contrary, in itself the pure Ego is immutable. It is not the kind of identical something that would first have to manifest and prove itself as identical by means of properties remaining permanent throughout manifold states as these are determined by the changing circumstances. Therefore it is not to be confused with the Ego as the real person, with the real subject of the real human being. It has no innate or acquired traits of character, no capacities, no dispositions, etc. It is not

changeably related, in real properties and states, to changing real circumstances, and thus it is not given in appearance with reference to appearing circumstances. In order to know what a human being is or what I myself am as a human personality, I have to enter into the infinity of experience in which I come to know myself under ever new aspects, according to ever new properties, and in an ever more perfect way. Only this experience can exhibit (or perhaps repudiate) what I am and even that I am. In principle it is always possible that I, this person, am not at all; similarly, it is possible that my material Body, or some other material thing, is not, in spite of its givenness in experience; it could turn out, in future experience, not to be. On the other hand, in order to know that the pure Ego is and what it is, no ever so great accumulation of self-experiences can profit me more than the single experience of one sole and simple cogito. It would be countersensical to claim that I, the pure Ego, actually am not or am something altogether different from the Ego functioning in this cogito. Everything which "appears," everything which, in whatever way, presents and manifests itself can also not be; I can be deceived by these things. The Ego, however, does not appear, does not present itself merely from a side, does not manifest itself merely according to discrete [105] determinations, aspects, and moments, which, moreover, for their part merely appear. Instead, the pure Ego is given in absolute selfhood and in a unity which does not present itself by way of adumbrations; it can be grasped adequately in the reflexive shift of focus that goes back to it as a center of functioning. As pure Ego it does not harbor any hidden inner richness; it is absolutely simple and it lies there absolutely clear. All richness lies in the cogito and in the mode of the function which can be adequately grasped therein.

§ 25. Polarity of acts: Ego and Object

Insofar as every cogito calls for a cogitatum and insofar as this latter is related to the pure Ego in the accomplishment of an act, we find a remarkable polarity in every act: *on the one side, the Ego-pole; on the other, the Object as counter-pole.* Each

an identity, but one of a radically different kind and provenance.

The Ego is the identical subject functioning in all acts of the same stream of consciousness; it is the center whence all conscious life emits rays and receives them; it is the center of all affects and actions, of all attention, grasping, relating, and connecting, of all theoretical, valuing, and practical position-taking, of all enjoyment and distress, of all hope and fear, of all doing and suffering, etc. In other words, all the multi-formed particularities of intentional relatedness to Objects, which here are called acts, have their necessary *terminus a quo,* the Ego-point, from which they irradiate. Often, if not always, we find here, properly spoken, two-fold radiations, running ahead and running back: from the center outward, through the acts toward their Objects, and again returning rays, coming from the Objects back toward the center in manifold changing phenomenological characters. Thus in theoretically interested experience there is the working toward the Object, appropriating it, penetrating into it; but there is also here constantly the being incited by the Object, being captivated, thrilled, determined. The coincidence of all acts in the numerically identical Ego-center lies on the noetic side.

The structure of the acts which radiate out from the Ego-Center, or, the Ego itself, is a form which has an analogon in the centralizing of all sense-phenomena in reference to the Body. In absolute consciousness there is always a "field" of [106] intentionality, and the spiritual "focus" of the attention "directs" itself now onto this, now onto that. The question is whether these images have an original meaning and are expressing a primordial analogy. That is to say, does there lie in the act of attention, abstraction made from the spatial, whence the image is derived, something like a directing that emanates from a point? Certainly there is a multiplicity of interconnected lived experiences and of intentional givennesses, and consequently a "field," to which changing attentional modifications are joined. Each attention-series is, as a series, something like a ray, and in each series "the same thing" is intentionally grasped. It is a series grasping one and the same thing ever more richly and more perfectly, analogously to the way in which I, by coming

closer to an Object, hence in the corresponding series of orientations, gain an ever more rich knowledge of the Object and grasp it always better and more fully. Thus the metaphor: I bring the matter (even if it is non-spatial) closer to me. If we abstract from this analogy, then what is given is a progressive series in which the grasp of an Object approaches the ideal, and this takes place in each process of an attentive grasp of an Object. And all these rays emanate in lived experience from the one single point of departure, the identical Ego.[1]

If we now turn our focus to a unity of a wholly different kind, that of the Object (we are assuming that this Object is not itself a subject), then it also refers us back to manifolds acts, and in a determinate sense it gives them their unity, though in a totally different sense than occurs in the relation of the act to the centralizing subject.

First of all not just any act, and certainly not all acts, are [107] unified in the relation to the Object but precisely only those acts which, even if in different ways, are "conscious of" the same Object. If we say of these acts that they also are "directed" to their Object, then it means (to the extent that what we have in mind is not rather the *Ego* directing itself in these acts to the Object) something fundamentally different instead. This can be seen in the fundamentally different manner of the "coincidence" of the acts in relation to the same Object, which here, without prejudice to the unity of coincidence binding all acts, actual or potential, in the Ego-center, does not concern the

[1] A more precise clarification of the analogy we formed would require proper systematic considerations. Here we can only point in their direction. If we take the field of thing-objects which appear to the senses, and which are given in an orientation, then the coincidence with the "Ego-orientation" becomes understandable: the processes of adaptation (my movements) pertain to the constitution of the thing, and, parallel with them, I always grasp more of the thing. And this grasping is originally a process of paying attention. Thus here there seems to be a way of grasping the centrality of the Ego as an analogon of the parallel orientation and of what is intertwined with it. Now, however, spiritual objectivities are intertwined with the sensuous; e.g., thoughts are intertwined with verbal signs that are apprehended in a certain orientation. The attention passes right through the verbal signs. Or, if I look at sense data, then they are presentative of Objective things, hence they are already intertwined with an orientation. A question for further consideration would be how far one could progress along this path.

noetic but, rather, the noematic "side" of the acts, a coincidence of what, in the acts (through the Ego) is "meant as such." For the rest, Ego, act, and object belong together by essence; in idea they are inseparable.

§ 26. Alert and dull consciousness

The pure Ego, as we said above, steps forth and then steps back again. That is, the essence of consciousness in the unity of the flux is of such a kind that the pure Ego cannot illuminate everything in it but, instead, shines its light on individual acts, and *only* on individual acts. For it pertains irrevocably to the essence of consciousness that every act have its horizon of obscurity, that every act-performance, in the shift of the Ego onto new lines of cogitation (action) sink down into obscurity. As soon as the focus of the Ego is withdrawn from it, it changes and is received into the vague horizon. There is nothing in the essence of consciousness, however, that would require, in some necessary fashion, that in it an active cogito must be being accomplished. Our "alert consciousness" can be interrupted for a period by a sleepy, completely dull one, in which there is no distinction to be made between an active field of focus and an obscure background. Everything then is background, everything obscurity. Waking from dull sleep, we can bend backward the reflexive gaze and grasp what has just past by in its dullness and Egolessness, in its loss of the active Ego, the one which grasps, thinks, undergoes while awake, etc. There is room to doubt whether we should say that in the place of this actively accomplishing Ego what we have here is a dull one as an other Ego-mode, or whether such a mode always exists as a mode surrounding the active Ego (corresponding to the obscure background). For it is difficult to send rays of reflection into the realm of obscurities and gain certitude in this sphere of givens. [108]
That which comes into our grasp as pure Ego in absolute clarity and indubitability is not a matter of this postulated mode. Hence if we take the pure Ego as we have it before us in this full clarity, then we are certain at all events of this, that it can step forth and can also not step forth. Thereby nothing prevents us

from thinking that what is familiar to us as an interruption of alert consciousness would be extended to infinity. No essential necessity interdicts us from thinking that a consciousness might be dull throughout. On the other hand, however, it still includes, as does any consciousness whatsoever, the unconditional essential possibility that it can become an *alert* consciousness, that an active focus of the Ego may establish itself at any given place in it in the form of a cogito inserting itself into it or, rather, springing forth from it, and that this occurrence can then be repeated, etc. Or, to speak like Leibniz, that the monad can pass from the stage of evolution into the one of involution and become, in higher acts, self-conscious "spirit." The Ego which becomes active here is not something introduced from the outside or added on, not something which comes into being for the first time at the moment of active stepping forth, only to vanish again into nothingness. *The pure Ego must be able to accompany all my representations.* This Kantian proposition makes good sense if we include here under representations all obscure consciousness. In principle the pure Ego can enter into any unaccomplished (in a determinate sense: unconscious, un-alert) intentional lived experience, it can bring the light of alert consciousness to those lived experiences that have receded into the background and are no longer being performed; but the Ego *holds sway* only in the performance, in the cogitations proper. Yet it can cast its gaze into precisely everything that can receive this ray of Ego-function. It can look into everything intentionally constituted in the flux of consciousness, it can grasp it, take a position regarding it, etc.

§ 27. "I as man" as part of the content of the environment of the pure Ego

Connected with this is still something else. *In virtue of the polarity belonging to the essence of the cogito, the alert Ego is intentionally related to what is objective in the accomplished cogitations.* They are its objects and indeed precisely as the very noematic objects (either posited or quasi-posited, as the case may be) of these cogitations. This holds potentially, however, [109]

for the objects of the unaccomplished noeses dormant in the background and which, as it were, make up the field of the Ego's freedom. Their objects form the field of the spiritual regard, the Ego's field of activity. But if we look into the matter more closely, then what comes into consideration for this field of regard are not only the objects of the dormant noeses (it is for the Ego as alert that they first become ob-jects in the proper sense) but also the objects of the *possible* noeses to which the motivations of consciousness belonging to the content of consciousness lead over. If we proceed from actually experienced real objects, then it is not only the environing things, the ones actually constituted as background, the ones actually appearing or the ones only presentified, that are mine, but what is mine, what is the pure Ego's, is the whole "world," the surrounding world, the whole world with all it contains that is still unknown to me but is experienceable by me: i.e., things, fellow men, animals, and including that man whom I also designate as I, as Ego, namely I, the man called so and so and characterized as such and such. I as a man am a part of the content of the real surrounding world of the pure Ego, which, as the center of all intentionality, also accomplishes that intentionality by which is constituted precisely I, the man, and I, the person.

Primordially and most basically, each thing I experience is constituted for me, precisely through what is lived in the experience, as a thing in the spatio-temporal world; and as undetermined as this positing is, and no matter how infinite the manifolds it leaves open, still it leaves them open in accordance with the sense of this apperception. What is grasped in the course of continuous experience presents itself as fulfillment of already extant motivations which are enriched and limited only within the unity of that sense. And what holds for the constitution of any thing whatever, also holds apriori, corresponding to the ontic structure of the thing-nexuses which coalesce into the unity of the universe, for the constitution precisely of this universe. The latter is constituted necessarily, as a closer consideration shows, in such a way that, notwithstanding the circumstance that the pure Ego is the center of all intentionality whatsoever, the empirical Ego in the form, I as man, functions as the phenomenal-real central member for the constitution, in [110]

appearances, of the entire spatio-temporal world. In all experience of spatio-temporal Objectivity, the co-appearance of the experiencing man is presupposed, and so is, to be sure, the apperceptive relation to his actual or possible companions (men or animals).

The pure Ego is, to emphasize it expressly, numerically one and unique with respect to "its" stream of consciousness. If it posits in its cogito, in its experiences, a man, and in him a human personality, then it posits implicitly, as pertaining to him, a pure Ego with its stream of consciousness. That is to say, the intentional lived experiences it posits in the empathizing presentification require, for their part, a pure Ego as subject of the function, even if the pure Ego may, in the apperception of man, become the core-content of an encompassing apperception. In principle, the empathized pure Ego (and, along with it, the empirical as well) is an "other;" consequently if I posit many human beings then I also posit many pure Egos, separate in principle, and that many streams of consciousness. There are the same number of pure Egos as there are real Egos, while at the same time these real Egos are constituted in the pure streams of consciousness, are posited by the pure Egos or are positable in motivated possibilities. Every real Ego belongs, as does the entire real world, to the "environment," to the "field of vision," of my—and every—pure Ego, as is shown with apriori necessity by a closer study of the intentional constitution of the Objective (intersubjective) world. And so, as has been said, every pure Ego that accomplishes the apperception, "I, the human being," has the human Ego, the person, as an Object in its environment. On the other hand, the pure Ego encounters itself again as pure Ego in the human being and in the person, insofar as these objects are posited with an apprehension-sense according to which the real Ego includes the pure Ego as its apperceptive nuclear content.

§ 28. The real Ego constituted as transcendent Object; the pure Ego as given in immanence

Moreover, *real Egos, as well as realities in general, are mere*

intentional unities. Whereas the pure Egos must be drawn, originarily and in absolute selfhood, out of the originary givenness of each cogito in which they function and consequently are, just like the data of pure consciousness itself in the sphere of immanent phenomenological time, *incapable of and in no need of constitution through "manifolds,"* the converse holds for real Egos and for all realities. These latter are constituted unities not only in relation to a pure Ego and a stream of consciousness with its manifolds of appearances but also in relation to an intersubjective consciousness, that is, in relation to an open manifold of pure Egos separated from one another like monads or in relation to an open manifold of their streams of consciousness which, by reciprocal empathy, are unified into a nexus which constitutes intersubjective objectivities. [111]

§ 29. Constitution of unities within the sphere of immanence. Persistent opinions as sedimentations in the pure Ego

All data of consciousness, levels of consciousness, and noetic forms which "can be accompanied" by the identical Ego of an actual or possible "I think" belong to a monad. Now within the absolute stream of consciousness of a monad, certain formations of unity occur, but ones which are thoroughly different from the intentional unity of the real Ego and its properties.[1] To those formations belong unities such as the persistent "opinions" of one and the same subject. They can, in a certain sense, be called "habitual," though there is no question here of a *habitus* as what has become customary, the way the empirical subject might acquire real dispositions which would then be called customary. The *habitus* that we are concerned with pertains not to the empirical, but to the pure, Ego. The identity of the pure Ego does not only reside in the fact that I (*sc.* the

[1] If we say that these unities too are constituted, since they are objectivities of a higher level, built upon more primitive ones, still that does not mean they are constituted the way transcendent Objects are. Concerning the constitution of lived experiences, *cf.* above, pp. 108 f. and also Supplement II, pp. 324 f.

pure Ego), with regard to each and every cogito, can grasp myself as the identical Ego of the cogito; rather, I am even therein and apriori the same Ego, insofar as I, in taking a position, necessarily exercise consistency in a determinate sense: each "new" position-taking institutes a persistent "opinion" or a thema (a thema of experience, of judgment, of enjoyment, of will, etc.) so that, from now on, as often as I grasp myself as the same as I used to be or as the same as I now am and earlier was, I also retain my themata, assume them as active themata, just as I had posited them previously. And that means that themata are posited originally, either on their own or from motives (absence of motives taken as the null-point of motivation), and on the basis of the same motives I, the Ego that takes a position, cannot behave differently. My thesis, my position-taking, my deciding from motives (the null-point included) is something I have a stake in. As long as I am the one I am, then the position-taking cannot but "persist," and I cannot but persist in it; I can carry out a change only if the motives become different. As long as and as far as I am an actually rational Ego that takes a position on the basis of insight, I can decide only one way, the rational way, and in that case my decision is identical with the one that would be made by any rational subject whatsoever that shared the same insight. Or, if an other cannot have the same motives, he can at least understand mine and can, in a rationally insightful way, approve of my decision. I can (allowing, once again, the specific case of reason to be universalized) become "unfaithful" to myself in my position-taking, can become "inconsistent," only in this, that I have become precisely an other inasmuch as I have succumbed to other motivations. In truth, however, I am not unfaithful to myself, I am constantly the same, though in a changing stream of lived experience, in which new motives are often constituted. [112]

Thus here I see a law of essence of the pure Ego. As this identical, numerically one, Ego, it itself belongs to "its own" stream of lived experience, which is constituted as a unity of endless immanent time. The one pure Ego is constituted as a unity in relation to this unity of the stream, and that means that it can, in the course it takes, discover itself as identical. It can

therefore, in retrospective remembering, look back on earlier cogitations and become conscious of itself as the subject of these [113] remembered cogitations. Already herein there lies a kind of consistency in the Ego. For a "steadfast and persistent" Ego could not be constituted if a steadfast and persistent stream of lived experience were not constituted, thus if the originarily constituted unities of lived experience were not assumable once more, were not capable of emerging anew in re-remembering, and did not appear in the assuming of their being-quality (as being in immanent time), and if there were no possibility of bringing clarity to the obscure, of exploiting, according to its immanent reality, what maintains itself consistently, and, therefore, if there were no possibility of having recourse to rational consistency. At all events, this too is certainly an essential law of the identity of the same Ego and consequently is co-given in the cognition of the identity, namely the law that I can retain an inner active position-taking and acknowledge and assume it as mine in repeated acts. Hence this also is a law: each "opinion" is an instauration which remains a possession of the subject as long as motivations do not arise which require the position-taking to be "varied" and the former opinion abandoned or require, with respect to its components, a partial abandonment, and with respect to the whole, a variation. As long as there are no motives for striking it out, each opinion of one and the same Ego remains necessarily within the chain of rememorations.

We still need to examine more closely how the persistence of "the" lived experience is to be understood. I have a lasting conviction, or I "nurse a grudge." At different times I do have different lived experiences of the grudge (or of the judgment), yet it is only "the" grudge coming again to givenness; it is a lasting grudge (or a lasting conviction). The judgment of determinate content *as lived experience* lasts a while (immanent duration) and then is irretrievably gone. A new lived experience of the same content can subsequently emerge—but not the same lived experience. It may emerge in such a way, however, that I have the consciousness that it is only the former conviction returning again, the former conviction which had been carried out earlier and is now again being carried out, but it is the one lasting conviction, the one I call mine. The various

enduring lived experiences, belonging to spans of duration which are discrete within phenomenological time, have a relation to one another and constitute something that lasts and endures (the conviction, the grudge), which once, at such and [114] such a point in time, and from these or those motives, originated. From then on it has been a lasting property of the Ego, existing also in those intervals of phenomenological duration in which it was not being constituted as a lived experience. The same applies to the unity of a decision, a desire, an enthusiasm, a love, a hate, etc.[1]

For a more precise clarification of these formations of unity, the distinctions between noesis and noema must be introduced. If I now execute a judgment "originarily," e.g., in describing a landscape, and subsequently once again execute "the same" judgment in originary description, then the judgment is, in the logical sense, the same. This holds equally if I execute, with insight, a mathematical judgment at various different times. Nevertheless, the unity of the conviction we have been speaking of is not like that; we therefore have here two different things. If I "acquire anew" an old conviction, while executing the appropriate judgment, then the acquired conviction (a "lasting acquisition") "remains" with me as long as I can assume it "again," can bring it again to givenness for me (in a new execution). I may also abandon the conviction, now rejecting the reasons for it, etc. Then again, I can turn back to "the same" conviction, but in truth the conviction had not been persistent throughout. Instead, I have two convictions, the second of which restores the first after it has broken down. The relations obtaining here can be studied already in the simple case of straightforward perception. I experience something, I perceive. The perception extends itself originarily over a duration (immanently speaking). I then have an objectivity which appears, is intended, is appearing in a certain aspect, under the given circumstances, with such and such an objective content, and is apprehended, as motivated, in this or that way. This is then made explicit in a determinate manner and perhaps

[1] Such unities can also be constituted intersubjectively, but in the present context this can be disregarded.

grasped conceptually and asserted. I have originarily "my judgment" about it. In remembering, we look back once again on these matters that once were. Perhaps what was is taken as enduring. From the outset it had a future horizon in the [115] perception, over which it extends as enduring, and it is apprehended as an enduring being at rest or as a periodical movement which endures by recurring (e.g., the turning of a mill wheel). The matter is now there not merely in general as past (and perhaps as enduring) but as *remembered.* I can remember it as often as I like, and in these new memories what is past and remembered stands over and against me as the same again and again. Thereby I can at the same time have memories of the earlier memories, and a unity persists with regard to the chain of lived experiences of memory: the unity of the same thing remembered as such, the same memory. What is it here that is preserved as lasting? In each memory, I have the same aspect of that which was, the same "previous perception" with the same meant as such, with the same previous appearance and thesis of being. The memory-"content" is the same. Thereby the unity is not intended in such a way that it allows for differentiation with respect to the clarity or unclarity of the given. It is the correlate of the memory's positing, the "memory thesis," that which was, but in the mode of memory, in which it presents itself to me as identical in repeated possible memories. In repeated memories, this unity reaches coincidence; it stands out as something Objective. If I relate this unity in memory to the phenomenological time in which all individual lived experiences of memory are integrated, in which they exist as a multiplicity, as a succession of lived experiences, fulfilling spans of time, then this unity extends itself in time and permeates time in a characteristic manner. There is a first lived experience in which "the" memory is established, and throughout the time-spans in which it is absent it remains as something, as one and the same in the subsequent actual and possible lived experiences of memory. If I now take it up, then it is in itself motivated, and at each place in time the repetition of this memory would be something motivated. The memory "persists" the whole time, as long as motives do not arise which annul it and thereby invalidate the original memory. The cancelling crosses out every future

remembering of this content and every past memory back through to the originary perception (which is preserved in each [116] memory as motivating). The content of the memory as matter for the memory thesis in that case remains indeed as something identical, but the thesis is no longer there.

The unity we are discussing here is not a mere abstraction, an idea, but a concrete unity of lived experience. The idea of memory A is not "the" memory A, which I might possess as a unity that is constantly valid (even if for all that it is not yet Objectively valid). The same applies here just as in the case of "the" predicative conviction, which is my lasting sustained conviction, my possession, and which I can grasp in repeated acts, and in acts repeatable as often as I like, as the one and the same conviction, as the one that I constantly have. I arrive at the conviction on the basis of a deliberation and through certain motives; here it is instaurated as my lasting conviction. Later, I return to it as to a familiar conviction of mine; a memory arises, clearly or unclearly, the motives, the reasons for the judgment, perhaps completely obscure; my old conviction, established I no longer know when, has its reasons, and perhaps I am seeking them, which is not the same as seeking new reasons for it. It is not a question here of the conviction's content, everywhere identical, as an ideal unity, but of the content as identical *for the subject,* as proper to the subject, as acquired by him in earlier acts, and which does not pass away along with the acts but instead belongs to the enduring subject as something which remains lastingly his. The conviction remains the same if the testimony remains the same. It is a judgment; more precisely, it is judgment-material with a concomitant thesis and related to certain reasons. In the course of time, however, the reasons can change. Possibly new reasons become attached; or, by repetition, reinforcement can increase: "For a long time I have had the conviction, and in the course of time it has always been reinforced and confirmed..." The relation to the motives of the judgment can thereby be very unclear, and so can the relation to the various cases of renewal and reinforcement of the conviction. Yet it is clear that the unity constituted here is not the unity of the *lived experience* of the one who is judging, but it is the unity of "the" judgment,

which persists for the judging subject who grasps it as the same in relation to various cases of remembering again and renewing again—as something proper to this subject, but precisely only [117] as something re-assumed and re-grasped. The *thesis of belief* must here once more (as is the case with the memory of something perceived) be "taken up;" otherwise it would mean that it *was* my conviction but is not any longer. Hence these unities, which we are calling convictions, have their *duration*; they can cease to be and then perhaps be instaurated anew. If I acquire a conviction and if I represent to myself thereby a future in which I would come back to this conviction, then I am representing myself immediately as "taking up" or "taking part in" the conviction and not merely as remembering again the lived experience of it. In order to relinquish the old conviction, annulling reasons are needed. To be sure, one will ask what is included in this "are needed." What we have here is no empirical-psychological factum; instead it is indeed a matter of pure consciousness prior to the constitution of the real psychic subject. The earlier conviction (experience, etc.) remains valid for me, and this says nothing other than that I "assume" it; by reproducing it, I participate in the belief. It is not an approving or an affirming of the kind that occurs in a question, a doubt, or a simple presumption. And yet I have to do something like give approval, insofar as we can indeed distinguish the two strata: the memory connected with the earlier subject, the earlier belief, conviction, experience, etc., with the present subject not taking part in them. And, on the other hand, the same things, but now with participation, whereby, to be sure, the participation is not a proper separate step, not an affirmation in the proper sense, but instead, in a homogenous unity of the memory, the remembered is there for me and the quality of the present positing enters into the remembered. The same applies to acts of every class, to lived experiences qualified in all sorts of ways.

Nevertheless, in all these cases memory seems to play its role and everywhere in the same way. In the case of *lasting memory,* that S was p, memory plays a double role. This lasting memory is constituted in distinct experiential acts, at the head of which stands the act of the earlier perception as primordial instauration. At the least, I see in a chain of such acts that the memory is actually one. (The *unity of "experience"* is almost the same: I see now that A is, and thereby the experience is "instaurated." From then on it is my experiential possession, my experience, [118] that A was at this particular point in time.)

If now, for example, we have the unity of a lasting *mathematical* conviction, then what institutes the unity is not a perception as an act that posits a temporally fixed being. To be sure, every act is an "impression," is itself a being in inner time, is something constituted in the consciousness that constitutes time originally. We can reflect on each act and in so doing turn it into an object of an act of immanent "perception." Prior to this perception (to which belongs the form of the cogito), we have the "inner consciousness" which lacks this form, and to this consciousness there corresponds, as ideal possibility, the inner reproduction in which the earlier act again comes to consciousness in a reproductive way and consequently can become the object of a reflective memory. Hence given therewith is the possibility of reflecting, in the reproduction, on the earlier having-perceived, even if it was not one in the proper sense, thus on the having-originarily-lived-through as having-had-an-impression.

Therefore in the case of a mathematical conviction, the originating act is the relevant judging (in inner consciousness it is an act constituted originarily, as an impression, and is of such and such a duration in immanent time). It is judgment-material along with a positing of being. This material contains nothing of temporality. A non-temporal state of affairs is posited as being. In repeated emergence of the judgment we may have chains of reproductions of the original judgment-impression. The regard can be focused on them and can penetrate into them. In that case I have possibilities for memories of various levels. I recall my earlier memory; I now have a reproduction of a second level and can focus on it; in that case I have a memory of a memory. Or my regard can penetrate into it; I focus on the state of affairs which was intended in the reproduced reproduction, on the earlier judgment. The same occurs in each case in which I look back, in a reproductively repeated series of acts, on the noematic content of the original act. (It should be noted

here that it is one thing to conceive, and indeed originarily, the mathematical conviction in several temporally distinct acts, and [119] it is another thing to come back to the old conviction. And I can simultaneously conceive the conviction anew and be conscious of the fact that I had already once, or perhaps more than once, formed it.) The lasting conviction is persistent and remains one and the same, extending itself throughout, not in reference to a new conception that may arise, but in reference to the mere assumption of the old one, already instituted and accepted again as valid.

Hence this is valid for all acts, and, in addition, in the acts of perception we find this peculiarity that in them there takes place the following doubling: 1) they are themselves perceptions, they constitute a temporal being and in this regard are originarily giving; 2) as acts of inner consciousness they are impressions, in inner consciousness they are originarily given. Inner consciousness is, for them, originarily giving. Consequently, in them a *double memory* occurs:

1) The memory of what was in *transcendent time*;
2) the memory of what was given in *immanent time,* the memory of the earlier perception and of that which was perceived in it as such, or the reproduction of the earlier perception and of its perceptual theme.

In all cases, the constitution of the unity of the lasting theme relates to this second memory. That which is posited by an act of the cogito, the theme, is, with reference to repeated reproductions and repositings, which extend "throughout" the chain of reproductions, of the original theme reproduced in them, something lasting, at least as long as the reproduction is precisely not merely just any reproduction but is a "repositing" or, better, an actual taking part in the positing, an assumption of what was posited "earlier."

All the unities we have discussed are unities in reference to a pure Ego, whose stream of consciousness they belong to and as whose "possessions" they are constituted. And the stream of consciousness, as a totality, builds itself up as a phenomenal unity. All my lived experiences, the successive and the coexisting, on which I focus, have the unity of a flux of time. That

which belongs immanently to a flux of time possesses a perceivable, adequately graspable, unity. The unity of immanence is the unity of a constant flux, in the nexus of which all [120] immanent duration and change are constituted. All unities of duration which are built up in the continuous flux of immanent time merge into the unity of the monadic stream of consciousness which is constantly becoming and changing, together with the concomitant pure Ego. Thereby, this pure Ego is established by means of a cogito determined in any way whatsoever. It extends itself therein onto the total sphere of what is, in the sense of ideal possibility, absolutely immanently experienceable by it, rememberable, expectable, and indeed even phantasizable, according to all temporal modes. If, for example, I yield to the phantasy that I undertook a trip to Mars and had there lived experiences similar to Gulliver's, then these fictional lived experiences of consciousness would belong to me, though as empty phantasies. The fictional world is a correlate of a fictional Ego, which, however, is phantasized as *the same* as my actual Ego. Consequently, the idea, not only of the actual world posited by me but also of each and every possible and phantasizable world, as a world for this pure Ego, has, precisely through the relation to the actual pure Ego, fixed bounds.

Chapter Two

PSYCHIC REALITY

§ 30. The real psychic subject

We distinguish, ever faithful to what is given intuitively, between the pure or transcendental Ego and the *real psychic subject,* the psyche or soul, the identical psychic being which, connected in a real way with the respective human or animal Body, makes up the substantial-real double being: the animal, man or brute. We will only later be able to consider to what extent soul and psychic subject are to be distinguished, for example in this way, that the psychic subject is inherent in the soul but is not simply to be identified with it. Provisionally, we are not taking this distinction into account. By emphasizing the substantial reality of the soul, we mean that the soul is, in a sense similar to that of the material Body-thing, a substantial-real unity, versus the pure Ego, which, according to our exposition, is not such a unity. The task is now to seek for greater clarity than has been achieved hitherto. The psychic [121] Ego, or the soul, is a unity quite different from the pure Ego, though in principle similarly related to a monadic nexus of consciousness. We come to know what is essential in it if we proceed from the psychological Ego-idea, from speaking about human or, in general, animal subjects and go on to clarify, in conformity with our method, the sense of such talk by means of a return to actually exhibiting experience. By doing so, it becomes evident that what is meant by this psychic Ego, e.g., the human (but excluding all Corporeality), is not the monadic flux belonging to this Body experientially, nor is it something that occurs as a real [*reell*] moment of this flux, but rather is a unity indeed essentially related to the flux, though in a certain

sense transcending it. The subject is now a substrate of properties (personal properties in a determinate, very broad sense), analogous to the way a material thing is a substrate of thingly-real properties. Just as not everything a material thing has, e.g., its extension or its schema, is a real property in the specific sense, so it is the same as regards the psychic subject. It is related to the lived experiences of consciousness in such a way that it has them, lives them, and lives in them; however, these lived experiences are not its properties but merely its modes of comportment, its mere "psychic states." The subject also "has" his Body, and, as it is said, his psychic lived experiences are "bound" to the Body. Yet it is clear that the psychic subject is not primarily related to his Corporeal body as a material thing and is only mediately related to the lived experiences connected up to it, but, rather, the reverse: the psychic subject has a material thing as his Body *because* it is animated, i.e., because he has psychic lived experiences which, in the sense of the apperception of the human, are one with the Body in a singularly intimate way. The analogy between the psychic unity and the unity of the material thing extends so far that we can say there exists a full analogy, according to form, between material properties, manifested in the changing physical behavior of the thing, and psychic properties, manifested in corresponding lived experiences as psychic modes of behavior. Psychic properties therefore are "unities of manifestation." Among the psychic properties, in the sense being elaborated here, are [122] included every personal property, the intellectual character of the man and the totality of his intellectual dispositions, his affective character, his practical character, every one of his spiritual capacities and aptitudes, his mathematical talent, his logical acumen, his magnanimity, amiability, self-abnegation, etc. In addition, his senses and the dispositions of sense behavior which are properly his own, which are characteristic of him, his phantasy disposition, and so on, are psychic properties. Every psychic property, in accordance with the sense just exemplified, has a relation to determined groups of actual and possible lived experiences. These groups belong together and relate to the psychic property in the same way that every material property is related to the actual and possible schematic

"appearances" in which it manifests itself or would manifest itself. In both cases, consequently, the way is predelineated in which the respective properties would come to an intuitive givenness of their essence and being, i.e., to an actually exhibiting intuition and experience. Simply to look at a thing, i.e., to bring to givenness its extension and the concomitant sensuous fullness (thus the momentary schema of it) is not yet the same as having actually experienced the thing as a material thing. One needs to follow exactly the nexus predelineated in the present thing-apprehension, in which a schematic multiplicity unfolds in a unity-consciousness in which the property in question is not merely manifest but is primordially manifest by way of a constant fulfillment of the apprehending intentions. The psychic properties in like manner refer back to multiplicities of psychic experience, to lived experiences which correspond to them and belong to them and which, in the apprehension, are connected in one consciousness of unity. These lived experiences, in the way they run their course, flow into one another, and are connected, manifest the relevant character-properties, and they do not merely manifest them in a vague manner but do so in a fulfilling manner, and in an originary way they primordially manifest them, or, in other words, bring them to an experience that exhibits them. In both cases, the material and the psychic, there is a certain fixed regulation in the relation between properties and an infinity of actual and possible states, something we learn about obviously only in reflection upon the foundation of the experiential nexus which constitutes both the properties and the states inseparably, whereas, unreflectively [123] living in the relevant experiential consciousness (or putting ourselves into such a consciousness by means of phantasy) we get sight of the relevant lasting property *in* the unfolding of states, and we experience the property in the full sense and with the appropriate form of evidence in the unfolding of a primordially manifesting series of states. In each case, the unities are ones of multiple levels. In the psychic sphere, we find groups of dispositions as properties of an inferior level and, built on them, though not in the manner of mere "summation" but instead in that of a "constitution," we find unities of property of a higher level as ones which consequently manifest themselves, as unitary, in the properties of the inferior level and in their experiential changes. This is how, to borrow an example from the sphere of sense, the unitary, variable property, "visual acuity" manifests itself in the visual faculty which alters according to circumstances. Thereby, just as is the case with the thing itself, so the soul itself is nothing more than the unity of its properties; in its states it "behaves" in such and such a way, in its properties it "is," and each of its properties is a sheer ray of its being. This can also be expressed as follows: the soul is the unity of the "spiritual faculties;" these are built upon the inferior ones of sense (and they have once again, amongst themselves, levels), and the soul is nothing more than that. When the old psychology was a *theory of faculties*, then it was, as a *theory of the soul*, precisely what it purely and simply could be and had to be. If it failed, its failure was not due to its being an alleged "false faculty-psychology" but was due to its breaking down methodologically; i.e., it did not develop the method predelineated to it as a theory of the soul, as a doctrine of faculties rightly understood. It failed, speaking generally, especially in that it neglected, or took too lightly, the systematic study of the psychic states, hence, at bottom, the "states of consciousness," whereas these, in fact, as the material for the primordial manifestation of everything psychic, should have called for the most radical study.[1]

The *main point sustaining the analogy* must yet be expressly [124] noted. The modes of behavior, as real modes in the material sphere, refer back to "real circumstances," and it is only in the reciprocal play between modes of behavior and circumstances of behavior that the substantial-real property manifests itself primordially in the framework of originarily giving experience. The same holds for the soul as the real something primordially manifesting itself in the lived experiences of a monadic nexus (lived experiences which obviously have thereby undergone a

[1] For our present purposes it does not have to be shown how it failed in another respect too, i.e., insofar as it did not realize that a distinction has to be made between psychology as a natural science and psychology as a human science. Inclined, as it was in general, toward the human sciences, it did not grasp the tasks and methods of a natural science of the soul. (For modern psychology the situation is exactly the reverse.)

corresponding apperception). The soul (or the psychic subject) behaves as it does under the pertinent circumstances and in a regulated way. Here, as everywhere in analogous cases, this is not merely an Objective fact but is included in the experiential apprehensions; hence it can be drawn from them phenomenologically. In the modes of behavior apprehended in reference to the circumstances which pertain phenomenally, the psychic property in question manifests itself or primordially manifests itself in originary experience. Here, too, the apprehension of the psychic lived experiences, as modes of behavior of something real, is a phenomenologically peculiar one. The rule of the belonging together is, in phenomenological thinking, a secondary recognition, since the type of the experience is already given. For only from the essence of the type of experience, and not inductively-empirically, can one gain knowledge of the regulation constitutive for that type of unity of reality.

If we now look back on the *pure Ego*, then, in *comparison with the psychic,* it is to be noted that as regards the pure Ego too, insofar as it is active in its acts, passive in them, etc., it is said then to "behave" in them in such and such a way. In addition, as regards the pure Ego too, and in a broader or stricter sense, one speaks of states (as occurs, e.g., when one opposes states as passivities to activities). But it is clear that this concept of modes of behavior and of states is totally different than the one which applies to the sphere of reality, where all modes of behavior or states are, in conformity with the constituting apprehension, causally related to "circumstances." This is a radical distinction in sense, for causality and substantiality are by no means extrinsic annexes but point instead to fundamental types of apperception. According to the case, the [125] grasping regard can be directed differently, onto the state, onto the causal dependence, etc., and all the acts which take form thereby we call acts of real experience.

Finally, it must be said that just as, with the material thing, nothing of what is distinguishable in the schema of the moment escapes regulation from the point of view of reality, so likewise nothing escapes in the sphere of lived experience. At least, the empirical apprehension of the soul is such that eventually everything apprehendable as real state in the relevant sphere is

actually apprehended by it that way. Thereby it is a matter for the experience which determines more precisely to construct the series of experiences in which the property, perhaps only vaguely postulated, would manifest itself primordially. The term *experience* is ordinarily employed in the limited sense of experience of the real (briefly, in the sense of "real experience"). Thus what is designated thereby is the self-giving (and, at bottom, originarily giving) act, in which a reality is given as mere substrate of real properties primordially manifested in real states and in causal relation to circumstances.

According to our considerations, *two types of real experience* rightfully stand side by side: *"external" experience,* physical experience, as experience of material things, and *psychic experience*, as experience of psychic realities. *Each of these experiences is foundational for corresponding experiential sciences:* the one for the sciences of material nature and the other for psychology as science of the soul.

§ 31. The formal-universal concept of reality

The analogies that we have established between matter and soul, and that no doubt could be pursued further, are grounded in a commonality of ontological form, which, in our analyses, came markedly to the fore and through which is determined out of originary sources a formal-universal, and obviously extremely important, concept of reality, namely, *substantial reality.* Accordingly, if we speak in one breath of material and of [126] psychic *reality,* then the common word expresses a common sense or a common form in the two different concepts. On the level of formal universality the concepts *real substance* (concretely understood as a thing in a very broad sense), *real property, real state* (real behavior) and *real causality* are concepts which belong together essentially. I say *real causalities* because with the states we are referred back to real circumstances in the form of the dependence of one real *on another real.* Realities are what they are only in reference to other actual and possible realities in the interweavings of substantial "causality." These dependencies are *dependencies of change* (of which

unchange is a mere limit-case and plays, furthermore, as a mode of change in a broad sense, the same role that every other mode plays) and specifically are dependencies of the change of the real, in *its* properties, on the change of other real things in *their* properties. In the relation between real properties and modes of behavior these dependencies imply functional dependencies, in the exchange of the corresponding multiplicities on both sides, on possible modes of behavior in such a way that a thorough reciprocal regulation takes place as to change and unchange, according to everything these realities *are* as well as according to everything they have.

§ 32. Fundamental differences between material and psychic reality [1]

The question now arises concerning the extent to which one can speak of reality, in the sense we have indicated, in the same way as regards material and as regards psychic nature. As to *causality*, it is a constitutive idea for material nature, for the idea of the physical thing. That is, all "inner" features of the thing as a lasting being, a duration, are themselves persistent, and each such feature expresses a persistent behavior (a persistent lawfulness in behavior) in the causal nexus of change.

But now, what about the reality of the soul? It, too, is a [127] persistent being versus changing circumstances, but a more precise examination is required to know what kind of "circumstances" these are and what kind of "persisting" this is. The soul is the bearer of a psychic life together with the subjective possessions of that life, and as such it is a unity extending through time (the same time in which the Body endures). It "acts" upon *physis*, and it undergoes actions coming from there. It exhibits an identity in that, on the whole, it "behaves" in a regulated way in its reactions under given physical circumstances, e.g., it senses and perceives in such and such a manner, etc. Owing to these regulated modes of behavior, *psychophysical*

[1] *Cf.* also § 3 of Supplement XII, pp. 355 ff.

properties [1] are attributed to it. These, however, are not the same kind of persistent properties as the thingly ones. To make this clearer, we have to recall how thingly properties are constituted and how the psychic are. The thing is constituted as a unity of schemata or, more precisely, as a unity of a causal necessity within the nexus of dependencies which present themselves in manifolds of schemata. The soul, on the other hand, does not allow of schematization. To speak with more precision, the manifold, which, for what is material, functions as state, is of the type: schema (sensuously fulfilled corporeal extension).

The schema is itself already a unity of manifestation. More precisely, it is a unity in the manifolds of adumbrations. The pure spatial schema is the mere corporeal form (the extension without sensuous filling) which is necessarily given, in empirical intuition, merely from one side and ever and again only from one side. In originary primordial manifestation the form is presented in a multiplicity of originarily given sides, in a manifold of aspects, which we can grasp, at any time, with the appropriate shift of focus (which, as a turning of the spiritual regard away from the normal attitude occupied with the thing itself, is directed upon the form, i.e., upon aspects of the thing, its modes of appearance, its appearing sides). The aspect of the moment is necessarily related to the zero-point of orientation, to the absolute "here," and to the concomitant system of the [128] depth dimension (fore-back), and of the breadth and height dimensions (right-left, above-below). Thereby indeed a universal form is designated in which all that appears as spatial-thingly and, in the first place, all extension of it, must be given. We note also that the aspects themselves are already constituted unities and that they, corresponding to the essence of their apperceptive constitution, harbor unities in various directions and on different levels, in a certain sense implicitly co-constituting them. These unities still precede the appearing corporeal form and in relation to them are likewise designated as aspects. If we hold fast to the visual sphere pure and simple and to the

[1] For a fuller treatment of the "psychic properties" mentioned on pp. 129 f. but left out of consideration here, i.e., the so-called character-properties, ones that are not psychophysical, *cf.* below pp. 147 ff.

constitutive unities existing in it alone, then to each position of the eyes (to indicate it in an Objective expression), the body and head remaining fixed, corresponds a new aspect of the thing seen and especially of its extension. And the same applies to each change of the position of the head which affects the phenomenal orientation (in particular, the one concerning "distances"). Each of these aspects and the unfolding of the continuously changing aspects are thereby phenomenologically related to corresponding "circumstances" and are shown (as becomes evident in new reflective directions of the grasping "spiritual regard") to be related to concomitant complexes of kinetic sensations. And this concomitance itself is something constituted by consciousness and is graspable in reflection. The originary or, in every case, fully intuitive consciousness of the identity of the form within the continuous change of its modes of givenness, which we are calling here its aspects, essentially presupposes the continuous unfolding, played out in the background of attention, of the concomitant kinesthetic sensation-complexes or of the corresponding transitional phenomena ("kinetic phenomena") of the sensation-complexes which, for example, are different according to whether, Objectively spoken, the eyes move from their position at the start to this or that other position. Thereby, in the consciousness of the concomitance and in an apperceptively regulated way, the aspects (in a certain sense, the appearances) related to these circumstances of appearance change, and during this unfolding we see, in the normal attitude, "in" these aspects (without their becoming objects) continuously the one and the same thing or, in terms of [129] our foregoing abstractive consideration, *the one and the same form*.

It is now clear, however, that the apperceptive constitution of the aspects is of such a kind that aspects of a higher level, in suitably distinguished continua of their transformations, are constituted as "unities," with regard to which the aspects in the preceding sense function as "manifolds." E.g., to designate it once again with an Objective expression, if we, at will, move merely our eyes while the rest of the perceptual circumstances remain fixed (fixed position of the body, of the head, etc.) then not only the form but also the appearance of the form are given

to us as one and the same aspect. We can be in such an attitude that we are focused not on the thing but on the "thing from the side," or we can be focused on the side, on the mode of appearance of the thing, and, without paying attention to the changing movement of the eyes and the corresponding modifications of appearance, we see the "appearance" as one and the same. The like occurs if we, keeping all other circumstances fixed, desire to intuit the object merely phenomenally as "receding" or as "coming close," in which case we care only for the change in the depth-order, whereas it is a matter of indifference to us whether, in an Objective respect, owing to corresponding apperceptive distinctions, we are conscious that it is the object that is receding from us or that it is we who are moving away from it.

Again, we have an aspect of a higher level if we both move the eyes—and thereby allow the dimensions of height and breadth to alter—and at the same time allow a receding into the depth. And there always remain transformations of the aspect-unity constituted here, which make evident the phenomenal difference as regards the form itself. The form is still always given in "one" sheer mode of appearance, alongside which others are possible; it can turn, gradually rotate, etc.

Of course, intertwined with all this are still other modifications, ones constitutive of formations of unity. For example, those that find their Objective expression (so to say) in the "change of the accommodation." For if we again fix all the other circumstances of the appearance and allow only the accommodation to change, then "the" appearance, determined as a phase within the continuum of the distinctions previously indicated, has its changing modes of givenness. There are [130] obviously great tasks here awaiting the phenomenological analysis of the thing. All "strata" of the constitution of the thing would need to be examined; what has been indicated here for the visual layer would have to be pursued, in systematic completeness and precision, not only for that layer itself but also for all other layers and all constitutive directions in which unities distinguish themselves over and against manifolds and are constituted in them in terms of appearance. If we go back step by step from the present unities to the manifolds constituting

them, and from these (insofar as they themselves are again unities of manifolds) to the manifolds constituting them in turn, then in all cases we arrive finally at the data of the lowest level, the sensory data of sensation in immanent time, the sensory "representatives" for the "apprehensions" of the lowest level.

Thus we see that the expression "adumbration" is equivocal. It can be said of every aspect that the thing is adumbrated in it. At bottom, however, it is the manifold data of sensation that are called adumbrations, for they are the most primitive materials in which thingly determinations are "adumbrated."

Though at the outset we attached our considerations only to the form (the *extensio*) of the material thing, still what we said already had a universal significance. What has been worked out obviously applies to the concretely full schema, or to it according to all its components that can be abstracted out, thus also to the sensuous qualities which "manifest" and "fill" the form. These qualities are constituted as unities in parallel with the form and utterly inseparable from it: e.g., the body-colors, the body-coloration that belongs in a unitary fashion to the body, to the appearing extension, including the total coloration belonging unitarily, as "the surface coloration," to the surface of the body. Moreover, this total coloration, in accord with the essence of extension, is "divided" among all the distinguishable parts of the surface so that to each fragmentation of the extension corresponds a fragmentation of the coloring, or, speaking universally, to each fragmentation of the schema correspond parts that have the full character of a schema. The coloration and, thus, in general, the filling "sensuous quality" are adumbrated in their own way exactly parallel to the visual [131] extension. What they "are" is primordially manifest perceptually exclusively in determinate, essentially concomitant, continua of adumbrations, so that, e.g., "coloring" without extension is unthinkable, just as is extension without coloring. If corporeal extension or coloring is to appear visually, then that is possible apriori only in manifolds of adumbration, in aspects of a concomitant sort, and it is only possible if extension and coloring are adumbrated in parallel to each other. They cannot appear without each other.

This *primordial manifestation through adumbrations* is, however, despite all the formal mutuality common to all constitution of "transcendent" unities in manifolds, something in principle quite different than the *manifestation of real properties through states,* as we have already expounded earlier. On the level of the schema, there can be no question of substantial reality and causality. Whereas we then stand, with respect to material states, in the sphere of transcendence, this manifestation of the unity of the soul, of the psychological Ego, leads us, it would seem, immediately into the sphere of immanence. Psychic states are, abstraction made from higher apprehension, no longer transcendent unities but instead are nothing else than the immanently perceivable lived experiences of the immanent flux of lived experience, of that flux in which all "transcendent" being is manifest, ultimately through primordial manifestation.

Hence, opposed to one another are the immanently given psychic state and, constituted as transcendent unities, the momentary states, the manifestations of persistent real properties, the identical of which is the thing. In the progression from the perceptual to the higher constitution of the thing, the intuitive thing—as has been dealt with earlier—displays, in its optimal givenness, its relativity to normal subjectivity. The identity of the thing then requires, if it is to be not only *intersubjective-normal* but *"thing in itself"* as correlate of *any rational subject* (any logical subject), a thing-determination of logical form, which is an index of nexuses of sense experience or, better, an index of thing-qualities of the lower level, given in sense intuition. This higher thing-constitution assigns to the [132] thing a persistent being, a stock of persistent mathematical properties, in such a way, however, that the universal structure of things, the form of reality-causality, remains preserved. The states, too, are mathematized and become indexes of sensuous states. The mathematical causality-in-itself is an index of the manifold of sensuous causalities. If we, on the contrary, take the soul and borrow (as Kant did) the idea of *substance* from the mathematical thing, then we must undoubtedly say there is no soul-substance: the soul has no "in itself" the way "nature" has, nor does it have a mathematical nature as has the

thing of physics, nor a nature like that of the thing of intuition (since it is not a schematized unity). And as far as causality is concerned, we have to say that if we call *causality* that functional or lawful relation of dependence which is the correlate of the constitution of persistent properties of a persistent real something of the type, nature, then *as regards the soul we cannot speak of causality at all.* Not every lawfully regulated functionality in the factual sphere is causality. The flux of psychic life has its unity in itself, and if the "soul," concomitant to a Body, stands toward this thingly Body in a functional connection of reciprocal dependence, then the soul surely has its lasting psychic properties, which are expressions for certain regulated *dependencies of the psychic on the Bodily.* It is a being that is conditionally related to Bodily circumstances, to circumstances in physical nature. And, similarly, the soul is characterized by the fact that psychic events, in regulated fashion, have consequences in physical nature. On the other hand, the Body itself, too, is characterized by this psychophysical nexus and its regulation. But *neither Body nor soul* thereby acquire "nature-properties" in the sense of logico-mathematical nature.

Further, the material thing *can*, as a possibility in principle, be completely unchanged, i.e., unchanged with respect to its properties and unchanged with respect to its states as well. In that case, the schematic manifold fills the duration with continuously unchanged sameness. The psychic "thing," however, in principle cannot remain unchanged; least of all can it abide in an unchanged psychic state. By essential necessity, psychic life is a flux; obviously, therefore, it lacks everything analogous to a spatial form as a form making unchange possible for existing realities. Along with the necessity of the changing of the states, what is then given as regards the soul is the *necessity of the above-mentioned change of psychic properties* through a new formation of dispositions. Every lived experience leaves behind itself a wake of dispositions and creates something new as regards psychic reality. Hence this reality itself is something constantly changing. This is not to say that it would not similarly, together with all other souls, lend itself to a form of constancy, just as the material thing does in the spatial form. [133]

This *form of psychic existence,* which belongs to the psychic essence and its constitution just like the spatial form in the parallel case, consists in the form of the *social community,* founded on the (proper and still to be exposed) form of Corporeality (which means much more than materiality), as a community of existence unified by means of the bond of reciprocal understanding. Moreover, it has to be noted in this connection that what belongs to the *full* psychic unity as manifold (in analogy with the schema of the material thing) is the current *total state of consciousness,* whereas the singular, abstracted out, lived experiences are, in this respect, "states" of the soul in its fullness only insofar as they fit within the total consciousness and are, in their total nexus, transitional points for particular avenues of manifestation.

We have still to emphasize a difference: the material thing as *res extensa* is fragmentable in principle, corresponding to the extension with which it coincides throughout, and it can break down into real parts. In relation to such possibilities of breaking down into extended parts, it is evident that in this or that place and in this or that piece the thing has these or those qualities, and elsewhere it has others. The soul, on the other hand, has no places, no pieces. It is absolutely not a fragmentable unity, understood in the genuine and strict sense of *a* soul in which souls, as parts, would be distinguishable and, furthermore, separable into pieces. This does not exclude the possibility that the *psychic Ego,* manifested in the continuity of the nexus of consciousness, might transform, either in a rapid gradual transition or all of a sudden, some of its dispositions, even entire groups and their nexuses, its whole "character," and so become *"a totally different"* Ego. Of course, one can ask whether the continuity in reality could be broken by itself, just as, in the parallel domain, the possibility can be considered as to whether in the continuity of the schematic changes the thing could transform itself suddenly into an *other* thing. As we know, science holds fast to the idea of a reality persisting throughout, even in such cases (which actually present themselves in the experience of a lower level). Science refers the transformation of reality to unknown and still to be sought *causal circumstances,* but in doing so grasps it as *semblant* transformation, to the [134]

extent that a unity of a higher level manifests itself in what at first counts as the real itself; and all real qualities of the lower level, with all its discontinuities, are then reduced to relative states of that unity.

Notwithstanding the undoubtedly essential unfragmentability (connected to the essential unfragmentability of the flux of consciousness into a plurality of monadic nexuses) there exists, on the other hand, a certain *partition* of the soul, namely, a distinction between *strata in the soul,* corresponding to strata of consciousness. Higher levels can be missing, and then the stratification of the soul is quite different, as occurs, for example, in the case of the soul which is constantly sleeping and in which no cogito is accomplished. Another example is the soul of the brute animal, in which the stratum of theoretical thought in the pregnant sense is lacking, etc. Phenomenology convinces us that the ancient doctrines of the "parts of the soul" and the kinds of the soul actually contain meaningful problems and, what is more, phenomenological problems, insofar as here in intuition essential possibilities can be examined.

At all events, the most important stratification is indicated by the distinction between the *soul* and the *psychic subject,* the latter understood as a reality, but a reality nested in the soul. Without the soul, it is unable to stand alone; and yet again, it is a unity which in a certain sense encompasses the soul and which is at the same time so prominent that it dominates the general way of speaking about human and animal subjects. At present, [135] however, we have not yet come so far that we can approach the difficult problems the psychic Ego entails. For the moment, we leave their delineation somewhat indeterminate and tarry with the soul in its generality.

We have not yet considered closely its *dependence on "circumstances."* In this regard as well, there arises a certain stratification, in accordance with which we can distinguish: 1) the psychophysical (or, better, physiopsychic) side, 2) the idiopsychic side, and 3) the intersubjective relations of dependence of psychic reality. As to the first, it is well known that the psyche depends on the Body and thereby on physical nature and its many relationships. First of all, this dependency exists throughout with regard to the totality of sensations (including the

sensuous sensations of feeling and instinct) and further also with regard to their concomitant *reproductions,* and thereby the *whole life of consciousness is already affected by this dependency,* since sensations and reproductions of sensations (phantasms) play their role everywhere. It does not have to be discussed here how far the dependency extends with regard to the manifold phenomena of consciousness, over and beyond this mediation; at any rate, with regard to the life of the oul there exist "physiological" dependencies that are very far-reaching, indeed in a certain way penetrating all conscious processes. Corresponding to them, there is a physiopsychic side to psychic reality. Obviously, nothing else is meant by this than that the apprehension constituting psychic reality assigns *to it* real properties which find their "circumstances" in the Body and in the Bodily causalities.

As to the second, consciousness presents itself (if we at first let speak the apprehension already there rather than outside theories that would interpret it away) as, so-to-say, *dependent on itself.* Within one and the same soul, *the present stock of lived experiences, as a totality, is dependent on earlier stocks of lived experiences.* Or again, if, under given inner circumstances, that is, within the present total state of consciousness, a change [136] supervenes in the form of a newly emerging state, then that too depends on what had been an *earlier* state of the same soul. But this dependency is certainly not simply the one mentioned as regards the first case, for even where a sensation occurs as an "effect of external stimulation," the mode of its "acceptance into consciousness" is co-determined by this new regulation. The earlier lived experiences did not vanish without a trace; each one has its after-effect. To the essence of the soul pertains a continuous new formation or re-formation of disposnvictions, of orientatiar titles: association, habit, memory, and also motivated change in sense, motivated change of convictions, of orientations of feeling (dispositions toward taking positions as regards feelings or toward the corresponding abstentions), and of orientations of will, which certainly, in accord with the sense of the apprehension, are not reducible to mere association. Thus the soul has complexes of dispositions and, thereby, real qualities, which manifest themselves in it as having originated

from it itself out of its own influence rather than out of a relation to something external. It is clear that this type of dependency is still less to be considered an analogon of physical causality than is the conditionality through external circumstances. We can not yettain, that even the states of the soul whichs certain, that even the states of the soul which are so named by us (and the soul encompasses indeed the whole course of lived experiences) are dependent from both points of view: i.e., either merely through the sensuous substrate or as a totality.

§ 33. More precise determination of the concept of reality

After our expositions of the differences between material nature and what is psychic, the idea of reality consequently needs a more exact delimitation. Both material nature and the psychic are included under the formal idea, "unity of lasting properties in relation to pertinent circumstances." But a differentiation must be made as to the special kind of "properties" and "circumstances." The "circumstances," as we saw, can be either outer or inner or again partly the one, partly the other. Inner circumstances obviously are not states of something real itself in the given span of time to which the consideration relates. Rather, we take the total state, hence the real as it is in a [137] given point of time, and inquire into that on which it, as real state, depends. And now something remarkable shows itself, namely the fact that *material things* are conditioned exclusively from the outside and are not conditioned by their own past; they are *history-less realities*. This results from the fact (and at the same time it clearly determines the sense of our exposition) that the possibility of material identity throughout all the sequences of changes is inherent in the essence of material reality and is so in such a way that thereby no augmentation or fragmentation of materiality takes place (both of which indeed equally belong as ideal possibility to the essence of such a reality). Similarly, in this essence inheres the ideal possibility that the material thing might come back in cyclical processes to

identically the same external circumstances under which it had already stood, even if something like that in any given case be most improbable. But material reality is so constituted that in such a cyclical return it would have to have identically the same total state. On the other hand, it pertains to the essence of *psychic reality* that as a matter of principle it *cannot* return to the same total state: psychic realities have precisely a *history*. Two temporally contiguous cycles of external circumstances would affect the same soul in similar fashions, but within the soul itself the psychic unfolding of states could not be the same. for the earlier state functionally determines the following one.

Hence it appears, speaking in principle and formally, that realities are to be divided into mere natural realities, supernatural realities (not of nature, having no natural sides, no natural determinations), and mixed realities, ones which, like the soul, have a natural side and an idiopsychic side. The second possibility is for us an empty possibility, and it is problematic whether it can be demonstrated at all. Such realities cannot be in the "Objective" spatio-temporal world.

Accordingly, we have, on the one hand, a set of lasting properties which are, as to their "in itself," determinable logico-mathematically and, on the other hand, "properties" of [138] a completely different kind, unities which, by their very essence, are involved in a constantly flowing reformation and development, and in principle admit of no mathematization.

If we take the essence of the material thing as our point of orientation for the concepts "nature" and "reality," then we have to say accordingly that these concepts do not appertain to the psychic as such. But through its connection with the corporeal, the psychic is *linked to nature and "existence" in a second sense,* existence in space, existence in space-time. And thus it also has, we can say, a quasi-nature and a quasi-causality, to the extent that we broaden precisely the concepts nature, or substance and causality, and designate everything existing, related to conditional circumstances of existence and standing under laws of existence, as substance (thingly, real existence) and designate as a causal property every property constituted here as conditionally determined. The above-men-

tioned "link" to the Corporeal body, however, procures for this "quasi-nature" an insertion into the nexus of nature in the strict sense. I grasp the "human being" as a concrete unity in "outer experience." In this apperception there is a system of experiential indications by virtue of which an Ego-life with partially determined content and with a horizon of indeterminateness, of unknownness, is given as one with the Body and is "there" *bound* with it. And it resides in the character of this apperception that from the start relations of dependence between the psychic and the Bodily are apprehended in consciousness and enter into the thematic focus by means of the corresponding attention. The Bodily itself is again given as interwoven in the causal nexus of physical nature. Here the human being is a *human being in nature* and is in nature only because, first and foremost, the Body is a material thing in spatial nature. Psychic reality is constituted as reality only through psychophysical dependencies. It has its unity in itself, but here it is considered as a unity in a nexus. To be sure, in a psychophysical consideration I observe one single sensation, one perception, one nexus of memory, etc. But these are moments of the subjective stream of consciousness and are states of the "soul," which, as unity, is a seat of causalities (in an enlarged [139] sense). It is in just this way that I isolate the individual physical state, e.g., of the optic nerve, and follow it up to the process in the brain. But it is precisely a brain process; the nerve is an organ in the nervous system, and the nervous system is that of a Body closed on itself, which, as Body, is a *bearer* of relations of psychophysical dependence. All this inheres in the essence of the dominant, sense-determining, apperception. The unity of the soul is a *real* unity in that, *as unity of psychic life, it is joined with the Body* as unity of the Bodily stream of being, which for its part is a member of nature.

The result of the consideration which was to enlighten us on the sense of what is meant in speaking of the "soul" and "psychic nature" leads us back accordingly to the point of departure of our entire discussion: what we have to oppose to material nature as a second kind of reality is not the "soul" but the *concrete unity* of Body and soul, the human (or animal) subject.

§ 34. Necessity of the distinction between the naturalistic and the personalistic attitudes

Before we can enter into a more precise treatment of the constitution of this reality, we must, in order to dispel obvious objections, insert a brief remark. In relation to the psychic Ego, taken as the unity that we have thought as constituted by physiopsychic[1] and idiopsychic dependencies, the following difficulties arise:

That which is given to us, as human subject, one with the human Body, in immediate experiential apprehension, is the human person, who has his spiritual individuality, his intellectual and practical abilities and skills, his character, his sensibility. This Ego is certainly apprehended as dependent on its Body and thereby on the rest of physical nature, and likewise it is [140] apprehended as dependent on its own past. But one thing is striking: *the apprehension* in which *the human being* is given to us *in the human Body*, the apprehension in which the human being is given as a person who lives, acts, and undergoes, and of whom we are conscious as a *real* person who behaves under the circumstances of his personal life now in this way and now in that way, *seems to contain a surplus* which does not present itself as a mere complex of constitutive moments of apprehension of the type we have described.

Let us consider: the human subject, e.g. I myself, a person, live in the world and find myself dependent on it. I find myself in an environment of things. The things there are dependent on each other, and I on them. From this we take account of the fact that my Body stands precisely within a thingly nexus and that certain of its material changes have, in a determinate fashion, psychophysical correlates. This state of affairs enters into the apprehension insofar as I *can* at any time say meaningfully: my hand has been struck by a stick and *that is why* I sense

[1] As the following considerations will show, the physiopsychic dependencies are not sufficient for the constitution of the psychic subject and its properties, as we grasped them at the outset (pp. 129 f.) On the contrary, the concept of "external circumstances" has to be extended to the Objects that motivate the behavior of the subject.

a contact, pressure, light pain. On the other hand, however, it is remarkable that I find myself determined by things in so many ways without such psychophysical dependencies seeming to play a role, i.e., in the apprehension itself. Among the things of my environment, that one there *steers my regard* onto itself; its special form *"strikes me."* I choose the fabric *for the sake of* its beautiful color or its smoothness. The noise in the street "irritates" me; it makes me close the window. In short, in my theoretical, emotional, and practical behavior—in my theoretical experience and thinking, in my position-taking as to pleasure, enjoyment, hoping, wishing, desiring, wanting—*I feel myself conditioned by the matter in question,* though this obviously does not mean psychophysically conditioned. Just as in my own case, so I apprehend everyone else as directly dependent, in such relations, on the matters in the same way (though by no means psychophysically conditioned). If I know the person, then I know, on the whole, how he will behave. For this realizing apprehension, the psychophysical relations do not play, obviously, any actual essential role, even if they may be included in this apprehension of the man. Even the idiopsychic apprehensions, although they are co-functioning, cannot emerge as constitutive for such realization. I apprehend myself as dependent in my behavior, in my acts, on the things themselves, on their beautiful color, on their special form, on their pleasant or dangerous properties. I do not *therein* apprehend myself as dependent on my Body or on my history. The same applies in an even more striking way to the dependencies in which persons know themselves as dependent on others, and not merely on individual persons but on communities of persons, social institutions, the state, morals, the law, the church, etc. The apprehension of the man as a real personality is determined throughout by such dependencies. A man is what he is as *a being who maintains himself* in his commerce with the things of his thingly, and with the persons of his personal, surrounding world and who, in doing so, *maintains his individuality throughout.* And furthermore, he maintains himself over against the *powers of the Objective spirit,* which, like legal institutions, morals, and religious prescriptions, stand over against him precisely as Objectivities. In these relations a man now finds himself bound [141]

and constricted, now unbound and free; also, he feels himself now receptive, now creatively active. But in any event, he finds himself really related to his thingly and spiritual surrounding worlds. How a man behaves there is not a matter of mere chance; someone who knows him can predict his behavior. His reality as a person consists precisely in having real properties (as personal properties) which possess relations, under rules, to this surrounding world. On the one hand now it is certainly clear that in the apprehension of the subject, with respect to all states of acts, the physiopsychic and idiopsychic dependency is somehow assumed, but that, on the other hand, in all specifically personal contexts in which the personality manifests its *personal* properties, they, properly speaking, play no role. What is remarkable thereby is that we say the *psychic Ego* and the *personal Ego* are, in their underlying basis, *the same.* The whole consciousness of the personal Ego, together with all its acts and the rest of its psychic basis, is precisely nothing other than the psychic Ego's consciousness. We are even inclined to say that it is *the same* Ego. And yet the same state of consciousness is standing *under two totally different apperceptions.* In the one case the system of real circumstances provides the *"surrounding world,"* in the other case, it is provided by the mere *Body* and the elapsed nexus of consciousness. [142]

A puzzling situation indeed. One who is wont to think in the way of natural science will immediately say here that "in Objective truth" the individuality in the nexus of individualities dissolves into a nexus of Bodies in physical nature, with which is linked a system of psychic correlates to which idiopsychic regulations belong (to the extent that these latter cannot just be reduced to psychophysical regulations). Thereby, in a way to be explained by "natural science" (physical and psychological), it happens that, in the psychic unities, Ego-subjects are constituted and therewith acquire representations of other people and of a surrounding world in the widest sense and work out modes of representation in which they see themselves as directly related to this surrounding world.

The question will be whether this answer suffices. At any event, if we, in the way indicated, let the psychic Ego be constituted by physiopsychic and idiopsychic components of

apprehension alone, we are still not making a decision in favor of this answer. To describe faithfully we must instead recognize here *two* modes of apprehension (not only as facts given in experience but also in phenomenological ideation) as essentially different modes of apprehension still to be clarified by a proper penetrating analysis.

In what follows we remain at first in the attitude in which we think of the psychic Ego as constituted exclusively through its dependencies; we are powerless against the fact that the personal Ego, which functions so-to-say as the ruler of the soul, is co-present; but it is now for us dissolved, according to all its acts and states, into the psychic. We are and we remain in the attitude in which material nature is precisely actually there. The Bodies are actually there, and, psychophysically one with them, so are the psychic data that belong, as correlates, to the central physiological processes, and causally interwoven with these data [143] are dispositional after-effects of the earlier lived experiences of the same soul.

Later, we will examine extensively each of the attitudes, or apprehensions, in their mutual relations and in their significance for the constitution of different worlds and sciences. Terminologically, we distinguish *psychological apprehension* and experience from *human-scientific* (personal) *apprehension* and experience. The Ego that is apprehended "psychologically" is the psychic Ego; the one apprehended in the way of the human sciences, the spiritual sciences, is the personal Ego or the spiritual individuum. Psychological experience fits within natural-scientific experience in a broad sense, i.e., within the science of physical nature and of the Bodily-psychic nature founded in the physical. Parallel with this, talk about man can have two meanings: man in the sense of *nature* (as Object of zoology and natural-scientific anthropology) and man as *spiritually real* and as member of the spiritual world (as Object of the human sciences).

Chapter Three

THE CONSTITUTION OF PSYCHIC REALITY THROUGH THE BODY

§ 35. Transition to the study of the constitution of "man as nature"

Now, the theme of the following considerations is to be the constitution of the *natural reality, man* (or animal being), i.e., the constitution of man as he presents himself to a naturalistic point of view: as material body upon which are constructed new strata of being, the Bodily-psychic. It is possible that in this constitutive consideration much will have to be included that subsequent investigation will show as belonging to the personal or spiritual Ego. It will be possible to provide the ultimate distinction between "man as nature" and "man as spirit," as well as the establishment of their reciprocal relations, only when both these Objectivities have been subject to constitutive study.

If we now look for a point of departure for our constitutive [144] analysis, then we must take into account what came to light for us as regards the constitution of material nature, namely, that it, with its entire intuitive content, is related to animal subjects. Hence when we approach the constitution of the natural Object, "man," we may not already presuppose his Body as a fully constituted material thing but instead must at first pursue what is already constituted prior to, or correlative with, material nature, as regards the psychophysical subject. And here, as before, let us first try to see how far we can advance in a solipsistic consideration.

§ 36. Constitution of the Body as bearer of localized sensations (sensings)

We have seen that in all experience of spatio-thingly Objects, *the Body* "is involved"[1] as the perceptual organ of the experiencing subject, and now we must investigate the constitution of this Corporeality. We can thereby choose immediately the special case in which the spatially experienced body, perceived by means of the Body, is the Corporeal body itself. For this too is perceived from the outside, although within certain limits, preventing it from being considered, without qualification, as a thing like any other in a thingly nexus. Thus there are parts of this body which can indeed be perceived by touch but cannot be seen.[2] At first, however, we may disregard these and begin instead with parts that we can both touch and see. I can look at them and feel them, just like other things, and in this respect the appearances have entirely the same nexus as do other appearances of things. But now there is a distinction between the *visual* appearances and the *tactual* regarding, e.g., a hand. Touching my left hand, I have touch-appearances, that is to say, I do not just sense, but I perceive and have appearances of a soft, smooth hand, with such a form. The indicational sensations of movement and the representational sensations of touch, which [145] are Objectified as features of the thing, "left hand," belong in fact to my right hand. But when I touch the left hand I also find in it, too, series of touch-sensations, which are *"localized"* in it, though these are not constitutive of properties (such as roughness or smoothness of the hand, of this physical thing). If I speak of the *physical* thing, "left hand," then I am abstracting from these sensations (a ball of lead has nothing like them and likewise for every "merely" physical thing, every thing that is not my Body). If I do include them, then it is not that the physical thing is now richer, but instead *it becomes Body, it senses*. "Touch"-sensations belong to every appearing Objective spatial position on the touched hand, when it is touched precisely at those places. The hand that is touching, which for its part again appears as a thing, likewise has its touch-

[1] *Cf.* pp. 60 ff. and pp. 134 ff.

[2] As to the constitution of the Body as a thing, *cf.* pp. 165 ff.

sensations at the place on its corporeal surface where it touches (or is touched by the other). Similarly, if the hand is pinched, pressed, pushed, stung, etc., touched by external bodies or touching them, then it has its sensations of contact, of being stung, of pain, etc. And if this happens by means of some other part of one's Body, then the sensation is *doubled* in the two parts of the Body, since each is then precisely for the other an external thing that is touching and acting upon it, and each is at the same time Body. All the sensations thus produced have their *localization*, i.e., they are distinguished by means of their place on the appearing Corporeality, and they belong phenomenally to it. Hence the Body is originally constituted in a double way: first, it is a physical thing, *matter*; it has its extension, in which are included its real properties, its color, smoothness, hardness, warmth, and whatever other material qualities of that kind there are. Secondly, I find on it, and I *sense* "on" it and "in" it: warmth on the back of the hand, coldness in the feet, sensations of touch in the fingertips. I sense, extended over larger Bodily areas, the pressure and pull of my clothes. Moving my fingers, I have motion sensations, whereby a sensation in an ever changing way extends itself over and traverses the surface of the fingers, but within this sensation-complex there is at the same time a content having its localization in the interior of the digital space. My hand is lying on the table. I experience the [146] table as something solid, cold, and smooth. Moving my hand over the table, I get an experience of it and its thingly determinations. At the same time, I can at any moment pay attention to my hand and find on it touch-sensations, sensations of smoothness and coldness, etc. In the interior of the hand, running parallel to the experienced movement, I find motion-sensations, etc. Lifting a thing, I experience its weight, but at the same time I have weight-sensations localized in my Body. And thus, my Body's entering into physical relations (by striking, pressing, pushing, etc.) with other material things provides in general not only the experience of physical occurrences, related to the Body and to things, but also the experience of specifically Bodily occurrences of the type we call *sensings*. Such occurrences are missing in "merely" material things.

The localized sensations are not properties of the Body *as* a

physical thing, but on the other hand, they *are* properties of the thing, Body, and indeed they are effect-properties. They arise *when* the Body is touched, pressed, stung, etc., and they arise there *where* it is touched and at the time *when* it is touched: only under certain circumstances do they still endure after the touching takes place. Touching refers here to a physical event. Even two lifeless things can touch one another, but the touching of the Body provides sensations on it or in it.

We must now give heed to the following: in order to bring to perception here the tactual thing, paperweight, I touch it, with my fingers, for example. I then experience tactually the smooth surface of the glass and the delicate crystal edges. But if I attend to the hand and finger, then they have touch sensations which still linger when the hand is withdrawn. Likewise, my finger and hand have kinesthetic sensations, and precisely the same sensations which function as indicational or presentational with respect to the thing, paperweight, function as touch-*effects* of the paperweight on the hand and as sensings produced in it. In the case of the hand lying on the table, the same sensation of pressure is apprehended at one time as perception of the table's surface (of a small part of it, properly speaking) and at another time produces, with a "different direction of attention," in the actualization of an other stratum of apprehension, sensations of [147] digital pressure. In the same way are related the coldness of the surface of a thing and the sensation of cold in the finger. In the case of one hand touching the other, it is again the same, only more complicated, for we have then two sensations, and each is apprehendable or experienceable in a double way.

Necessarily bound to the tactual perception of the table (this perceptual apprehension) is a perception of the Body, along with its concomitant sensation of touch. This nexus is a necessary connection between two possible apprehensions: pertaining correlatively to that, however, is a connection between two thinghoods that are being constituted. It is shown empirically by the possibility of a representation of the world in those blind from birth that everything can come into play in the extra-visual sphere and that here the apperceptions have to be ordered in such a way that these correlations can be constituted.

§ 37. Differences between the visual and tactual realms

We find now a striking difference between the sphere of the visual and that of the tactual. In the tactual realm we have the *external Object,* tactually constituted, and a second Object, the *Body,* likewise tactually constituted, e.g., the touching finger, and, in addition, there are fingers touching fingers. So here we have that double apprehension: the same touch-sensation is apprehended as a feature of the "external" Object and is apprehended as a sensation of the Body as Object. And in the case in which a part of the Body becomes equally an external Object of an other part, we have the double sensation (each part has its own sensations) and the double apprehension as feature of the one or of the other Bodily part as a physical object. But in the case of an *Object constituted purely visually* we have *nothing* comparable. To be sure, sometimes it is said that the eye is, as it were, in touch with the Object by casting its glance over it. But we immediately sense the difference. An eye does not appear to one's own vision, and it is not the case that the colors which would appear visually on the eye as localized sensations (and indeed visually localized corresponding to the various parts of its visual appearance) would be the same as those attributed to the object in the apprehension of the seen external thing and [148] Objectified in it as features. And similarly, we do not have a kind of extended occularity such that, by moving, one eye could rub past the other and produce the phenomenon of double sensation. Neither can we see the seen thing as gliding over the seeing eye, continually in contact with it, as we can, in the case of a real organ of touch, e.g., the palm of the hand, glide over the object or have the object slip past the hand. I do not see myself, my Body, the way I touch myself. What I call the seen Body is not something seeing which is seen, the way my Body as touched Body is something touching which is touched.[1] A visual appearance of an object that sees, i.e., one in which the sensation of light could be intuited just as it is in it—that is

[1] Obviously, it cannot be said that I see my eye in the mirror, for my eye, that which sees *qua* seeing, I do not perceive. I see something, of which I judge indirectly, by way of "empathy," that it is identical with my eye as a thing (the one constituted by touch, for example) in the same way that I see the eye of an other.

denied us. Thus what we are denied is an analogon to the touch sensation, which is actually grasped along with the touching hand. The role of the visual sensations in the correlative constitution of the Body and external things is thus different from that of the sensations of touch. All that we can say here is that if no eye is open there are no visual appearances, etc. If, ultimately, the eye as organ and, along with it, the visual sensations are in fact attributed to the Body, then that happens indirectly by means of the properly localized sensations.

Actually, the eye, *too*, is a field of localization but *only for touch sensations,* and, like every organ "freely moved" by the subject, it is a field of localized muscle sensations. It is an Object of touch for the hand; it belongs originally to the merely touched, and not seen, Objects. "Originally" is not used here in a temporal-causal sense; it has to do with a primal group of Objects constituted directly in intuition. The eye can be touched, and it itself provides touch and kinetic sensations; that is why it is necessarily apperceived as belonging to the Body. All this is said from the standpoint of straightforward empirical intuition. The relation of the seen color of the thing to the seeing eye, the eye "with which" we see, the "being directed" of the open eye onto the seen thing, the reference back to this [149] direction of the eye which is part of having visual appearances, and, furthermore, growing out of this, the relation of the color sensations to the eye—all that will not be confused with the givenness of these sensations in the manner of localized "sensings."

The same applies to *hearing*. The ear is "involved," but the sensed tone is not localized in the ear. (I would not even say that the case of the "buzzing" in the ears and similar tones subjectively sensed in the ear are exceptions. They are in the ear just as tones of a violin are outside in space, but, for all that, they do not yet have the proper character of sensings and the localization proper to them.[1]) It would be an important task to thoroughly examine in this regard the groups of sensations of the various senses. However important that would be for a completely elaborated theory of the phenomenological constitution of material thinghood, on the one hand, and of the Body, on the other hand, for us now the broad distinctions will suffice. To make ourselves sure of them, we must be perfectly clear on the fact that *localization of sensings* is in fact something *in principle different from the extension of all material determinations of a thing*. The sensings do indeed spread out in space, cover, in their way, spatial surfaces, run through them, etc. But this *spreading out* and spreading into are precisely something that differs essentially from *extension* in the sense of all the determinations that characterize the *res extensa*. The sensing which spreads over the surface of the hand and extends into it is not a real quality of a thing (speaking always within the frame of intuitions and their givenness) such as, for example, the roughness of the hand, its color, etc. These real properties of a thing are constituted through a sensuous schema and manifolds of adumbrations. To speak in a similar way of sensings would be quite absurd. If I turn my hand, bring it closer or take it away, then, for one, the unchanged color of the hand is given to me as constantly different. Yet the color itself presents itself, and the color constituted first (that of the sensuous schema) manifests a real optical property of the hand. Roughness, too, [150] presents itself and does so tactually in manifolds of touch sensations which constantly flow into one another and to each of which a spreading-out belongs. The touch-sensings, however, the sensations which, constantly varying, lie on the surface of the touching finger, are, such as they are lying there spread out over the surface, nothing given through adumbration and schematization. They have nothing at all to do with the sensuous schema. The touch-sensing is not a *state* of the material thing, hand, but is precisely the *hand itself,* which for us is more than a material thing, and the way in which it is mine entails that I, the "subject of the Body," can say that what belongs to the material thing is its, not mine. All sensings pertain to my soul; everything extended to the material thing. *On* this surface of the hand I sense the sensations of touch, etc. And it is precisely thereby that this surface manifests itself immediately as my Body. One can add here as well: if I convince myself that a perceived thing does not exist, that I am subject to an illusion, then, along with the thing, everything extended in its

[1] *Cf.* Supplement III, p. 324.

extension is stricken out too. But the sensings do not disappear. Only what is *real* vanishes from being.

Connected to the privilege of the localization of the touch sensations are differences in the complexion of the visual-tactual apprehensions. Each thing that we see is touchable and, as such, points to an immediate relation to the Body, though it does not do so in virtue of its visibility. *A subject whose only sense was the sense of vision could not at all have an appearing Body;* in the play of kinesthetic motivations (which he could not apprehend Bodily) this subject would have appearances of things, he would see real things. It cannot be said that this subject who only sees sees his Body, for its specific distinctive feature as Body would be lacking him, and even the free movement of this "Body," which goes hand in hand with the freedom of the kinesthetic processes, would not make it a Body. In that case, it would only be as if the Ego, in unity with this freedom in the kinesthetic, could immediately and freely move the material *thing, Body.*

The Body as such can be constituted originarily only in tactuality and in everything that is localized with the sensations of touch: for example, warmth, coldness, pain, etc. Furthermore, the kinetic sensations play an important role. I see how [151
my hand moves, and without it touching anything while moving, I sense kinetic sensations, though as one with sensations of tension and sensations of touch, and I localize them in the moving hand. And the same holds for all the members of the Body. If, while moving, I do touch something, then the touch sensation immediately acquires localization in the touching surface of the hand. At bottom, it is owing only to their constant interlacing with these primarily localized sensations that the kinetic sensations receive localization. But because there obtains here no parallelism which is exactly stratified as there is between temperature sensations and touch sensations, so the kinesthetic sensations do not spread out in a stratified way over the appearing extension, and they receive only a rather indeterminate localization. Yet this is indeed not without significance; it makes the unity between the Body and the freely moveable thing more intimate.

Obviously, the Body is also to be seen just like any other thing, but it becomes a *Body* only by incorporating tactile

sensations, pain sensations, etc.—in short, by the localization of the sensations as sensations. In that case the visual Body also participates in the localization, because it coincides with the tactual Body, just as other things (or phantoms) coincide, ones which are constituted both visually and tactually, and thus there arises the idea of a sensing thing which "has" and which can have, under certain circumstances, certain sensations (sensations of touch, pressure, warmth, coldness, pain, etc.) and, in particular, have them as localized in itself primarily and properly. This is then a precondition for the existence of all sensations (and appearances) whatsoever, the visual and acoustic included, though these do not have a primary localization in the Body.

§ 38. The Body as organ of the will and as seat of free movement

The distinctive feature of the Body as a field of localization is the presupposition for its further distinctive features setting it off from all material things. In particular, it is the precondition for the fact that it, already taken as Body (namely, as the thing that has a stratum of localized sensations) is an *organ of the will,* [152]
the *one and only Object* which, for the will of my pure Ego, is *moveable immediately and spontaneously* and is a means for producing a mediate spontaneous movement in other things, in, e.g., things struck by my immediately spontaneously moved hand, grasped by it, lifted, etc. *Sheer material things are only moveable mechanically and only partake of spontaneous movement in a mediate way.* Only Bodies are immediately spontaneously ("freely") moveable, and they are so, specifically, by means of the free Ego and its will which belong to them. It is in virtue of these free acts that, as we saw earlier, there can be constituted for this Ego, in manifold series of perceptions, an Object-world, a world of spatial-corporeal things (the Body as thing included). The subject, constituted as counter-member of material nature, is (as far as we have seen up to now) an Ego, to which a Body belongs as field of localization of its sensations. The Ego has the "faculty" (the "I can") to freely move this

Body—i.e., the organ in which it is articulated—and to perceive an external world by means of it.

§ 39. Significance of the Body for the constitution of higher Objectivities

Now, besides this, the Body is involved in all other "conscious functions," and that has its various sources. Not only the sensations which exercise a constitutive function as regards the constitution of sense-things, appearing spatial Objects, not only these sensations have a localization given in immediate intuition along with the relation to a Body grounded therein, but that is also true of *sensations belonging to totally different groups,* e.g., the "sensuous" feelings, the sensations of pleasure and pain, the sense of well-being that permeates and fills the whole Body, the general malaise of "corporeal indisposition," etc. Thus here belong groups of *sensations which, for the acts of valuing,* i.e., for intentional lived experiences in the sphere of feeling, or *for the constitution of values* as their intentional correlates, *play a role, as matter, analogous to that played by the primary sensations for what is intentionally lived in the sphere of experience,* or for the constitution of Objects as spatial things. Moreover, all [153] kinds of sensations, difficult to analyze and discuss, belong here as well, ones that form the material substrate for the life of desire and will, sensations of energetic tension and relaxation, sensations of inner restraint, paralysis, liberation, etc. All these groups of sensations, as *sensings,* have an immediate Bodily localization. Thus, for every human being, they *belong, in a way that is immediately intuitable, to the Body as to his particular Body,* i.e., as a subjective objectivity distinguished from the Body as a mere material thing by means of this whole stratum of localized sensations. *The intentional functions, however, are bound to this stratum;* the matter receives a spiritual forming, just as, discussed above, the primary sensations undergo *apprehension,* are taken up in perceptions, upon which, then, perceptual judgments are built, etc. Hence in this way *a human being's total consciousness is in a certain sense, by means of its hyletic substrate, bound to the Body,* though, to be sure, the intentional

lived experiences themselves are *no longer* directly and properly *localized;* they no longer form a stratum on the Body. Perception, as the touching apprehension of form, does not have its seat in the touching finger in which the touch sensation is localized; thinking is not actually localized intuitively in the head, the way the impressions of tension are, etc. That we very often speak as if it were so is no proof that we actually apprehend it that way in intuition. The co-intertwined contents of sensation have a localization which is actually intuitively given, but the intentionalities do not, and only metaphorically are they said to be related to the Body or to be in the Body.

§ 40. More precision concerning the localization of the sensings and concerning the non-thingly properties of the Body

Now, if all that belongs to the matter is Bodily localized or is, by means of localization, related to the Body and is constitutive, therewith, for the Body in the Objectivity proper to it, then we need to ask how this constitution is to be understood and *what it is that institutes unity here.* The physical Body is, of course, a [154] constituted unity, and only to it does the stratum of the sensings belong. How is the content of the sensation connected to what is constituted, and how does the Body, which is equally a material thing, have in itself and on itself the contents of sensation? It is certainly not in the way in which the sensation-content, tone quality, and the sensation-content, intensity, have an essential unity, nor is it the way in which the sensation-content, color, is unified with the moment of spread (we do not mean here spatial extension, talk of which makes no sense with regard to sensation-contents). Here we have on the one side not sensation-contents but constituted real unities instead, and is it really the case that we have mere sensation-contents on the other side? Let us reflect. If an object moves mechanically over the surface of my skin, touching it, then I obviously have a succession of sensings ordered in a determinate way. If it always moves in the same way, with the same pressure, touching the same parts of the Body at the same pace, then the result is

obviously always the same. All this is "obvious," it is there in the apprehension; precisely under such circumstances this Corporeal body behaves in such a way that it is not to be stimulated in just any way but is stimulatable in a definite way under definite circumstances, and such that all effects of stimulation have their system, and to the system of thingly bodies appearing in it there correspond distinctions as to place, whereby, however, to each such place pertains a definite, dependent on the type of the stimulation-effect, further dimension of possible distinctions. To the place in the extension corresponds a place-moment in the sensation, and to the degrees of stimulation and kinds of stimulation correspond definite moments which render the sensation concrete and modifiable according to more or less known ways. Thus there lies in the sensations an order which "coincides" with the appearing extension; but that is already implicit in the apprehension from the outset, in such a way that the stimulation-effects do not appear as something alien and as just an effect, but rather as something *pertaining* to the appearing Corporeal body and to the extensive order, and as something ordered in a *coincident* order. In each Bodily sensation, the mere sensation is not grasped, but it is apprehended as belonging to a system of possible functional consequences which corresponds exactly to the extensive order, consequences that the material real must undergo in consistent parallels with [155] possible material effects. We must also note that the fields of sensation in question here are always completely filled, and each new stimulation does not provoke a sensation as if for the first time, but rather, it provokes in the sensation-field a corresponding change in the sensation. Hence the field undergoes an apprehension as something changeable in manifold ways and as dependent on extension in the type of its changeableness. The field receives localization, and in the field each new change receives localization as a consequence of the particular stimulating circumstances. The new stratum the thing has received by means of the localization of the field acquires, with respect to the constancy of the field, the character of a kind of real property. The Body, we can say, always has states of sensation, and which particular ones it has depends on the concomitant system of real circumstances under which it senses. Under the

real circumstances of the "sting" in this or that part of the Body, there emerges in the sensation field (as a field of states) the state of sensation, "sting-sensation." Under the real circumstances we call entrance into a hot room, a change occurs in the total localized field with respect to its total stratum of warmth sensation in the sense of rising temperature, etc. The sensitiveness of the Body thus is constituted throughout as a "conditional" or psychophysical property. And that enters into the apprehension of the Body, as it is perceived "externally." To the apprehension of Corporeality as such belongs not only the apprehension of a thing but also the *co*-apprehension of the sensation fields, and indeed these are given as belonging, in the mode of localization, to the appearing Corporeal body. "Belonging:" phenomenologically, this term expresses relations of the phenomenal "if-then": if my hand is touched or struck, then I sense it. We do not here have the hand as physical body and, connected with it, an extra-physical consequence. From the very outset it is apperceptively characterized as a hand *with* its field of sensation, with its constantly co-apprehended state of sensation which changes in consequence of the external actions on it, i.e., as a *physical-aesthesiological unity*. In the abstract, I can separate the physical and aesthesiological strata but can do [156] so precisely only in the abstract. In the concrete perception, the Body is there as a new sort of unity of apprehension. It is constituted as an Objectivity in its own right, which fits under the formal-universal concept of reality, as a thing that preserves its identical properties over against changing external circumstances. The relations of dependency under which it stands toward external nature are thereby, however, other than the ones material things have amongst themselves. (It has already been mentioned, and it will be discussed with more precision in what follows, that the Body, in addition, as a material thing like all others, is fit within the nexus of reality in a more strict sense, namely, the one of causal regulation.)

It pertains in general to the intuition of something real to leave open, in this intuition's apprehension, further real dependencies which do not yet belong to the content of the executed apprehension in a determinate way (although they may be determinate in their specific nature). The real can therefore be

related, in new apprehensions and in extensions of old ones, to new circumstances as something dependent on them, whereby real properties of the same real object are constituted. The sense of the expanded apprehension then prescribes the type which the course of experience has to bear out and determine more precisely. With this more precise determination the apprehension itself then necessarily takes on fuller form.

In this way, even the Body is apprehended not only as dependent with respect to the primary stratum of sensation, its properly localized one, but also with respect to the fields of sensation and groups of sensation that pertain to it mediately and are not properly localized, thus, e.g., with respect to the field of vision. How the visual field of sensation is filled, which motivations can occur therein, and consequently what in the visual field can be experienced by the subject, and in which modes of appearance it must be exhibited, this all depends on certain qualities of the Body, especially on those of the eye, and, furthermore, on the eye's Bodily connections, especially its connections with the central nervous system, and even more particularly it depends on this system itself and, on the other hand, on the concomitant external stimulations. Along with that, hence, are constituted new real properties of the Body, which, thereby, is obviously involved as already constituted [157] from elsewhere. So the capacity to be stimulated in general becomes a universal title for a class of real properties which have quite another source than the properly extensive (and therewith material) properties of the thing and which in fact pertain to a quite different dimension. For through this stratum, through this new group of real properties which display themselves as real insofar as they are constituted through a relation to real circumstances within the real, the material Body is intertwined with the soul. What can be apprehended as localized stratum of the Body as well as what can be apprehended as dependent on the Body (in the full sense of Body, including this stratum already) and on the "sense organs," all this forms, under the heading of the matter of consciousness, an underlying basis of consciousness and undergoes its realizing apprehension in unity with this consciousness as soul and psychic Ego. To say that this Ego, or the soul, "has" a Body does not merely mean

that there exists a physical-material thing which would, through its material processes, present real preconditions for "conscious events" or even, conversely, that in its processes there occur dependencies on conscious events within a "stream of consciousness." Causality belongs, if the word is to retain its pregnant sense, to reality, and conscious events participate in reality only as psychic states or as states of a psychic Ego. Soul and psychic Ego "have" a Body; there exists a material thing, of a certain nature, which is not merely a material thing but is a Body, i.e., a material thing which, as localization field for sensations and for stirrings of feelings, as complex of sense organs, and as phenomenal partner and counter-part of all perceptions of things (along with whatever else could be said about it, based on the above), makes up a fundamental component of the real givenness of the soul and the Ego.

§ 41. Constitution of the Body as material thing in contrast to other material things[1]

We have seen how, correlative to the material world, a subject of Bodily-psychic faculties (sense faculties, faculties of free [158] movement, of apperception, etc.) is constituted, whereby the Body comes to light, at one and the same time, as Body and as material thing. In this regard, however, we made the restriction that the Body emerges as a thing of a particular type, so that one cannot, without qualification, assign it to nature as a part just like any other part. This is what we must discuss somewhat more precisely.

a) The Body as center of orientation

If we consider the characteristic way in which the Body presents itself and do the same for things, then we find the following situation: each Ego has its own domain of perceptual things and necessarily perceives the things in a certain orientation. The things appear and do so from this or that side, and in

[1] *Cf.* pp. 152 f.

this mode of appearing is included irrevocably a relation to a here and its basic directions. All spatial being necessarily appears in such a way that it appears either nearer or farther, above or below, right or left. This holds with regard to all points of the appearing corporeality, which then have their differences in relation to one another as regards this nearness, this above and below, etc., among which there are hereby peculiar qualities of appearance, stratified like dimensions. The Body then has, for its particular Ego, the unique distinction of bearing in itself the *zero point* of all these orientations. One of its spatial points, even if not an actually seen one, is always characterized in the mode of the ultimate central here: that is, a here which has no other here outside of itself, in relation to which it would be a "there." It is thus that all things of the surrounding world possess an orientation to the Body, just as, accordingly, all expressions of orientation imply this relation. The "far" is far from me, from my Body; the "to the right" refers back to the right side of my Body, e.g., to my right hand. In virtue of its faculty of free mobility, the subject can now induce the flow of the system of its appearances and, along with that, the orientations. These changes do not have the significance of changes of the things of the environment themselves, and specifically, they do not signify a movement of the things. The Body of the subject "alters its position" in space; the things appearing in the environment are constantly oriented thereby; all appearances of things preserve their fixed system according to form. The form of intuition, the lawful character [159]
of the adumbrations, and, therewith, the form of the order of orientation around a center, all this is necessarily preserved. But whereas the subject is always, at every now, in the center, in the here, whence it sees the things and penetrates into the world by vision, on the other hand the Objective place, the spatial position, of the Ego, or of its Body, is a changing one.

Nevertheless, at the present stage of our investigation we are not at all so advanced that we could assign to the Ego such an "Objective place." Provisionally, we must say: I have all things over and against me; they are all "there"—with the exception of one and only one, namely the Body, which is always "here."

b) Peculiarity of the manifolds of appearance of the Body

Other peculiar properties of the Body are conjoined with its distinctive character as we have described it. Whereas, with regard to all other things, I have the freedom to change at will my position in relation to them and thereby at the same time vary at will the manifolds of appearance in which they come to givenness for me, on the other hand I do not have the possibility of distancing myself from my Body, or my Body from me, and accordingly the manifolds of appearance of the Body are restricted in a definite way: certain of my corporeal parts can be seen by me only in a peculiar perspectival foreshortening, and others (e.g., the head) are altogether invisible to me. The same Body which serves me as means for all my perception obstructs me in the perception of it itself and is a remarkably imperfectly constituted thing.

c) The Body as integral part of the causal nexus

If, despite all this, we apprehend the Body as a real thing, it is because we find it integrated into the causal nexus of material nature. We spoke of the peculiarity the Body has (as Body) of being moved "spontaneously" or "freely" by the will of the Ego. Besides these free kinesthetic processes, others emerge which, instead of being "done by," are characterized as being "done to," i.e., as passive processes in which spontaneity plays no part. In that case, we have at the same time an experiencing of the mechanical process of the movement of the Body and a [160]
givenness of this process with the "psychic" character of enduring something—not as if it were something painful or repugnant but simply in the sense that "my hand is moved, my foot is struck, pushed," etc. Similarly, I experience the mechanical movement of the Body as the movement of a material thing like any other thing even in the case of spontaneity, and I find it characterized at the same time as a spontaneous movement in the sense, "I move my hand," etc.

Thus movements of my Body are apprehended as mechanical processes like those of external things, and the Body itself is apprehended as a thing which affects others and upon which the

others have effects. All the cases mentioned earlier of conditional relations between things and the Body also admit of changes in apprehension, thanks to which the processes in question appear as merely physical ones. If a heavy body is resting on my hand (or perhaps the one hand on the other) then I have, abstracting from the resultant sensation of pressure or pain, the physical phenomenon of one body pressing on another, perhaps deforming it by its pressure. If I cut my finger with a knife, then a physical body is split by the driving into it of a wedge, the fluid contained in it trickles out, etc. Likewise, the physical thing, "my Body," is heated or cooled through contact with hot or cold bodies; it can become electrically charged through contact with an electric current; it assumes different colors under changing illumination; and one can elicit noises from it by striking it. The last two cases, however, are different from the earlier ones where there was a psychophysical process that could be split apart abstractively into a physical process and its "psychical" consequence (or vice versa). But the physical process, "red illumination of my hand," is not followed by the sensation of red in the same way that the sensation of warmth follows the heating of my hand, and the physical process to which the sensation of the color is linked—red light rays striking my eyes—is not given to me at all. The "turning point," which lies in the Body, the point of the transformation from causal to conditional process, is hidden from me.

§ 42. Character of the Body as constituted solipsistically [161]

If we now try, in a short summary, to characterize the way a Body is constituted for the solipsistic subject, then we find that:

1) viewed from "within"—in the "inner attitude"—it appears as a freely moving organ (or system of such organs) by means of which the subject experiences the external world. Furthermore, the Body appears as a bearer of sensations, and, thanks to their intertwining with the rest of psychic life in its totality, it appears as forming, with the soul, a concrete unity.

2) Approached from the outside—in the "outer attitude"—

it presents itself as a reality *sui generis*. That is: on the one hand, as a material thing of special modes of appearance, a thing "inserted" between the rest of the material world and the "subjective" sphere (the subject together with what was just mentioned in 1), as a center around which the rest of the spatial world is arranged, and as being in causal relationship with the real external world. On the other hand, the Body appears here at the same time as a "turning point" where the causal relations are transformed into conditional relations between the external world and the Bodily-psychic subject. And in virtue of that, the Body appears as pertaining integrally to this subject and its properties, both the specifically Corporeal and the psychic ones bound up with them. That which is constituted in the outer attitude is there co-present together with what is constituted in the inner attitude.

In solipsistic experience, however, we do not attain the givenness of our self as a spatial thing like all others (a givenness which certainly is manifest in our factual experience) nor that of the natural Object, "man" (animal being), which we came to know as correlate of the "naturalistic attitude," a material thing upon which the higher strata of what is specifically animal are built and into which they are, in a certain way, inserted, "introjected." In order to attain that, a different path has to be followed; one must go beyond his own subjectivity and turn to the animalia encountered in the external world.

Chapter Four [162]

THE CONSTITUTION OF PSYCHIC REALITY IN EMPATHY

§ 43. Givenness of other animalia

In experience, in the sphere of original constitution, what is originally given is a multiplicity of things in space and time, in manifolds of appearances, but also originally given are ζῶα, including men ("rational" living beings), not as amalgamations of what is given separately, but as two-fold unities, unities which allow two strata to be distinguished therein, unities of things and subjects, along with the subjects' psychic life. Given *eo ipso* with the act of apperceiving something as human is also the possibility of mutual relations, communication, between man and man. Then also the identity of nature for all men and animals. Given furthermore are the more simple and more complex social connections, friendships, marriages, unions; these are connections instituted between men (on the lowest level, already between animals).

If we unfold what lies in the unitary act of apperceiving a man, as we have described it, then we have at the lowest level the material Corporeal body, which, as a material thing like all others, has its position in space and is given to me in manifold appearances, variable at will, and in constantly changing orientations: it is perceived originally.

§ 44. Primal presence and appresence

If we give the name *original perception* to the lived experience in which a subject has the perceived object given in original

presence, then that means the object is there "actually," "in the original," and is not merely "co-presented." Hence there is a fundamental difference between *primal presence* and *appresence*. The latter refers back to the former. It is to be noted that primal presence of an object does not mean primal presence of all its inner determinations or proper attributes; some are enough, as with all physical things. Yet there exists for the Ego the [163] possibility of bringing the object, in continuous original perceptions, to primal presence as regards each of the properties which belong to it, whereby in this perceptual continuum there is a constant consciousness of the object itself in primal presence.

In that case, perceptual objects (thus, individual objects, objects that have a temporal presence and a temporal duration) break down into:

1) objects which can be primally present not just to one subject, but, if they are primally present to one, can be given identically as primally present *idealiter* to all other subjects (as soon as these are constituted). The totality of objects that can be given as primally present and that make up a domain of common primal presence for all communicating subjects is *nature in the first and original sense*. It is spatial-temporal-material nature: the one space, the one time, the one world of things for all: the one that can be given as primally present to all.

2) what is subjective over against the Objective. And the subjective is the individual-unique, the temporal, the total content of original presence which can be given to only one subject in primal presence. Each subject belongs here itself along with all its acts, states, noematic correlates, and, furthermore, with the Corporeality and the properties, or faculties, constituted in it in the inner attitude.

§ 45. Animalia as primally present Corporeal bodies with appresented interiority

We now have to note, however, that what is experienceable in the original sense, being which can be primally present, is not all of being, is not even all experienceable being. There are realities

that cannot be given to several subjects in primal presence, namely, *animalia,* for subjectivities are included in them. They are Objectivities of a particular kind, given originally in such a way that they presuppose primal presences, whereas they themselves cannot be given in primal presence. Human beings as components of the external world are originally given insofar as they are apprehended as unities of corporeal Bodies and souls. The Bodies which are externally standing over against me are experienced by me in primal presence just like other things, [164] whereas the interiority of the psychic is experienced in appresence.

In my physical surrounding world I encounter Bodies, i.e., material things of the same type as the material thing constituted in solipsistic experience, "my Body," and I apprehend them as Bodies, that is, I feel by empathy that in them there is an Ego-subject, along with everything that pertains to it and with the particular content demanded from case to case. Transferred over to the other Bodies thereby is first of all that "localization" I accomplish in various sense-fields (field of touch, warmth, coldness, smell, taste, pain, sensuous pleasure) and sense-regions (sensations of movement), and then in a similar way there is a transfer of my indirect localization of spiritual activities.

In conformity with the experienced localization, there then also takes place a continual coordination of the physical and the psychical, and rightly so. For the dependencies, accompanying the localization, of what is localized, i.e., dependencies upon the physical substrata, give rise, where similar dependencies occur, to an accomplishment of a coordination: e.g., localization of psychic processes in the brain, in the frontal lobes, etc. To be sure, this is not an experienced localization, which would be a proper apperception. My hand and other parts of my Body are appearing ones, and they appear as really connected with sense data. But the lobes of my brain do not appear to me. The functional coordination between the hand and the hand's field of touch is such that whenever I experience contact (as a physical process) with the hand, "contact sensations" emerge in my field of touch, or, in case it is someone else's hand making contact with something, sensations are co-given to me in the

mode of appresence. But my frontal lobe is not the bearer of a field of touch and is for me not at all something appearing. And even as regards the other's brain, I cannot "intuit" in immediate appresence the psychic processes which pertain to it.

But the Body as physical Object is subject to physical influences to which psychic "consequences" are linked without my knowing precisely how they are connected. And finally I arrive at the brain, its structures and the physical processes occurring therein which are in correspondence with the psychical processes, a correspondence that includes in itself functional [165] alterations and dependencies. If a process in the brain alters, then there occurs an alteration of the corresponding set of lived experiences, the set of psychical events, and perhaps the converse also holds. In the case of the hand, at first I find only that contact conditions the alteration of the field of touch in a corresponding way. But subsequently I discover a determinate structure of the hand, sensory nerves, and finally the corpuscles of touch and the physical processes there, and I will say naturally that the field of touch "pertains" especially to these nerve-ends. But I cannot "see" that this is the case, and, should I excise these nerve ends, I will not be able to feel that it is the case either. Hence this is originally an empirical coordination which belongs to appearances, and then it is an empirical coordination that belongs to what has been worked out theoretically.

What requires a closer examination is the system of appresentations, which, on the one hand, in the case of the solipsistic subject, has its original basis in original connections of regular co-existence in such a way that the connected members and series of members in their *co-presence* are not just there together but refer to one another. And, on the other hand, this system develops as a system of ordered indications only by means of continuous experience of other people, who are already constituted by empathy. In the case of the solipsistic subject we have the distinctive field of touch in co-presence with the appearing Bodily surface and, in union with that, the field of warmth; in second place we have the indeterminate localization of the common feelings (the spiritual ones as well) and, further, the localization of the interior of the Body, mediated by the

localization of the field of touch. For example, I "feel my heart." When I press the surface of the Body "around the heart," I discover, so to say, this "heart sensation," and it may become stronger and somewhat modified. It does not itself belong to the touched surface, but it is connected with it. Likewise, if I not only simply contact the surface of my Body but press on it more strongly, press into the flesh, i.e., with my touching finger "feel through" to my bones or inner organs (just as, similarly, with other bodies I feel through to their inner parts), then particular new sensations, which are attributed to the relevant felt-through Bodily parts, join to the general sensations of pressure and touch. Besides, solipsistically there [166] belongs to every position of my eyes an "image"-aspect of the seen object and thus an image of the oriented environment. But also in the case of touching an object, there belongs to every position of my hand and finger a corresponding touch-aspect of the object, just as, on the other side, there is a touch-sensation in the finger, etc., and obviously there is visually a certain image of my touching hand and its touching movements. All this is given to me myself as belonging together in co-presence and is then transferred over in empathy: the other's touching hand, which I see, appresents to me his solipsistic view of this hand and then also everything that must belong to it in presentified co-presence.

Yet to the appearance of the other person there also belongs, in addition to what has been mentioned, the interiority of psychic acts. In this connection it should be noted that the point of departure is here, too, a transferred co-presence: to the seen Body there belongs a psychic life, just as there does to my Body. If, however, a point of departure for understanding the other's psychic life is given, then various appresented indications, in themselves undetermined, work together. What is then understood is psychic being, which is co-given to the spectator along with Bodily movements in co-presence, and indeed as conforming to rules, movements which now for their part frequently become new signs, that is, for the psychic lived experiences which were indicated or surmised earlier and as well in cases where these were not indicated in another fashion. Gradually, in this way, a system of indications is formed, and there is finally

in actuality an analogy between this system of signs "expressing" psychic events, both the active and passive, and the system of signs of language for the expression of thoughts, abstracting from the fact that language itself, as actually spoken, also belongs to the former system. Precisely from here one could embark upon a systematic study of the "expression" of psychic life (and this has in fact already been attempted) and elaborate, as it were, the grammar of this expression. Since here this manifold expression appresents psychic *existence* in Corporeality, thus there is constituted with all that an objectivity which is precisely double and unitary: the man—without "introjection."

§ 46. Significance of empathy for the constitution of the reality "I as man" [167]

Therefore, under the title "the other man," we have a Body, and we have this Body in union with sensorial fields and, as it were, psychic fields, i.e., in union with a subject of acts. This appurtenance or conjunction obviously exists also for *me myself*. Parts of these appurtenances were certainly given to me originarily as regards myself (and could only be given as regards myself); the rest is then empirical extension, transfer in thinking based on experience. But now it would not occur to me at all in the attitude of "self-experience" to take all that is psychic in me, my Ego, my acts, my appearances as well, with their sense data, etc. and seriously place, i.e., "introject," all this into my Body. It is also out of the question that in solipsistic self-experience I encounter all that is subjective about me, along with my perceptually given Body, as a reality, i.e., in the form of a *perception*, although my Body has such a multifarious unity with what is subjective. It is only with empathy and the constant orientation of empirical reflection onto the psychic life which is appresented along with the other's Body and which is continually taken Objectively, together with the Body, that the closed unity, man, is constituted, and I transfer this unity subsequently to myself.

Concerning the experience of others, every person, in virtue

of his Body, stands within a spatial nexus, among things, and to each Body for itself there pertains the person's entire psychic life, grasped in empathy in a determinate way, so that therefore if the Body moves and occupies ever new places, the soul, too, as it were, co-moves. The soul is indeed ever one with the Body.

Moves "as it were:" "If something is bound to something else that moves, then it is co-moved by that movement, and, likewise, the whole formed by those two moves."[1] This applies, however, only if the connection is that of a physical whole. But the soul is nowhere, and its connection with the Body is founded only on functional nexuses: the Body is "organ" of the subject, and all appearances are related to Corporeality, [168] through the connections the sensations have with the Body, etc. The "being-somewhere" of a person certainly has a valid meaning, but it is one thing "to be regularly integrated with something else and thereby localized," and it is another thing "to be in space on one's own." In order to establish a mutual relationship between myself and an other, in order to communicate something to him, a Bodily relation, a Bodily connection by means of physical occurrences, must be instituted. I have to go over and speak to him. Thus space plays a major role here and so does time, but this role must always be understood according to its sense and its function. The legitimate "naturalization" of consciousness consists in the fact that Body and soul form a genuine experiential unity and that, in virtue of this unity, the psychic obtains its position in space and time. It is as localized and temporalized in this way that the other subjects are there for us. To the compass of that which is appresented with the seen Body pertain also the systems of appearances in which an external world is given to these subjects. Because we grasp them in empathy as analogons of ourselves, their place is given to us as a "here," in opposition to which everything else is "there." But with this analogizing, which does not result in anything new over against the Ego, we have at the same time the other Body as "there" and as identified with the Body-as-here phenomenon. I then have Objective movement in space,

[1] Aristotle, *De anima*, A 3.

the other Body is moved just like any body whatsoever, and, in union with it, the man "himself" with his psychic life moves. So I have an Objective reality as the conjunction of two sides, i.e., the man as inserted into Objective space, into the Objective world. I then posit with this reality an analogon of my Ego and of my surrounding world, thus a second Ego with its "subjectivities," its sense data, changing appearances, and things appearing therein. The things posited by others are also mine: in empathy I participate in the other's positing. E.g., I identify the thing I have over and against me in the mode of appearance α with the thing posited by the other in the mode of appearance β. To this belongs the possibility of substitution by means of trading places. Each person has, at the same place in space, "the same" appearances of the same things—if, as we might suppose, all have the same sensibility. And on this account, even [169] the "view" of a thing is Objectified. Each person has, from the same place in space and with the same lighting, the same view of, for example, a landscape. But never can the other, at exactly the same time as me (in the originary content of lived experience attributed to him) have the exact same appearance as I have. My appearances belong to me, his to him. Only in the manner of appresence can I have, co-given with his Body, his appearances and his "here," to which they are related. But from that "here" I can then consider even my own Body as a natural Object, i.e., from that "here" my Body is "there," just as the other's Body is "there" from my "here." is there at a point in Objective space, and I consider it like any other thing that is identical not only for me but for every other, and I represent it, the Body, in just the way that it is given to any person who encounters a man as one with it. I place myself at the standpoint of the other, any other whatever, and I acknowledge that each encounters every other as the natural being, man, and that I then have to identify myself with the man seen from the standpoint of external intuition. Man as Object is thus a transcendent external Object, an Object of an external intuition; that is, we have here an experience of two strata: interwoven with external primally presenting perception is appresenting (or introjecting into the exterior) empathy, in an apperception, specifically, which *realizes* the entire psychic life and psychic

being in a certain sort of unity of appearance, namely that of an identity of manifold appearances and states localized therein, which are united in the form of dispositions.

§ 47. Empathy and the constitution of nature

Empathy then leads, as we saw earlier, to the constitution of the intersubjective Objectivity of the thing and consequently also that of man, since now the physical Body is a natural-scientific Object. The natural-scientific Object is the x of "mathematical" qualities, toward the substruction of which causal analysis and the thinking based on it impel. The things that are seen, actually experienced, as well as the actually experienced causalities prove to be, as to their intuitive qualities, subjectively conditioned. Consequently, man acquires, as a [170] natural-scientific Object, a particular structure. The physical Body is a mathematical ("theoretical") substruction which refers back to "merely subjective" appearances (originally these are called "things"). The higher stratum is subjectivity, localized in the substructed mathematical spatial bodies, the soul with its conscious lived experiences, but also what is intentionally meant in them, including the Objects of original experience as they are experienced by this subject. The Objects of my experience, just as I experience them, are now incorporated in me, the man, as "appearances" belonging to me and as being in the mode of "appearances." If I posit, in my experiential research, a thing as Objectively actual, then I am thereby also positing, for every posited subject, existing unities of appearance, i.e., unities of validity which are indices for rules of lived experiences of perception and of possible perception that are intentionally related to these "appearances." All these "phenomenal" things are what they are only as noematic correlates of the perceptual lived experiences of the man in question. They are merely "subjective," they have a "merely subjective truth" (merely subjective "being"). In the apprehension of nature, physical nature is posited absolutely, and so is the aesthesiological, just as are, likewise, all lived experiences. Furthermore, the things that are experienced by the subject in question, and that have

their true correlates in the mathematical world, are posited as unities of appearance. They are not posited as mere noemata but as relative existences, and the truths pertaining to them have their relative and subjective truth. They exist relatively: that is, only if the subject (the man) exists and actually has the kind of Body that corresponds and actually has the concomitant psychic life in the concomitant relation to the thing itself "existing in itself" (the physicalistic thing).

There are as many such subjective worlds as there are human individuals in "nature," which is for them the corresponding truth in itself. The strata of the constitution of nature which have been exhibited teach us how this apprehension is to be evaluated: at the lowest level there is constituted, in the manner previously described, the intuitive material world and, correlative to that, the experiencing subject, one that has Body and soul but is not yet the real unity "man," is not yet an Object in [171] nature. Then there are constituted the other subjects, apperceived as analogons of oneself and, at the same time, as natural Objects; nature is constituted as intersubjectively common and as determinable Objectively (exactly), and oneself as subject is constituted as member of this "Objective nature." The relativity of the things of experience in relation to individual men is thus incontrovertible, and it is also beyond doubt that the positing, accomplished in empathy, of an intersubjective world in the form of natural science allows that which is intersubjectively posited to be determined "theoretically" in such a way that the content of the determination becomes independent of the individual subjects, i.e., in such a way that this content consists exclusively of determinations *any* subject can acquire, out of what is given to him in appearances, by means of the methodological procedure of natural science and with a sense that is identically the same for every subject involved in natural-scientific research. And the determination is such that each subject can refer the determinations back to himself, to his appearances in their dependency on him as subject. Hence it is doubtlessly correct to say that the experienced things, with their sensuous-intuitive experiential properties and experiential dependencies, exist relatively only. They are dependent on one another for the content of their being, and they are co-

dependent on the Bodies, and on the souls, of those who experience them. And in all this there is documented an "Objective" nature which is determinable as the intersubjective that belongs to all subjective existences (unities of appearance), as what "appears" there in a higher sense. As such, and according to this sense, it can also be seen as an index of the intersubjective regulation of the unities of appearance in relation to their subjects. This whole apprehension presupposes, however, that which can never be transformed into an "index:" the *absolute subject* with its lived experiences, its intentionally meant, its acts of reason, etc., the subject *for* which is constituted the totality of nature, physical as well as animal. Nature is a unity of appearance posited by subjects and to be posited by them, to be posited, specifically, in acts of reason. But these absolutely presupposed subjects are not subjects as nature, men, for the latter are themselves intersubjective Objectivities. The Bodies are the identical x's as indices of lawful regulations of [172] Bodily appearances of subjects in the nexus of the whole of physical nature. The souls bound with these Objectively determinate x's, in substantial-real unity with them, are also Objectively determinable: they are unities which are dependent on the natural Objects, "physical Bodies," and which are bound to them in an Objectively real way as realities in space and time.

The analysis of nature in our consideration of nature thus proves to be in need of supplementation. It harbors presuppositions and consequently points beyond to another realm of being and of research, i.e., the field of subjectivity, which no longer is nature.

Section Three: The Constitution of the Spiritual World

§ 48. Introduction[1]

The following investigations are dedicated to the clarification of a group of interconnected distinctions in metaphysics and scientific theory, all of which have their source in the difficult distinction between *soul* and *spirit*, which, thus, is the fundamental one in this entire group. On it obviously are dependent the oppositions between *nature* and the *world of the spirit*, between the natural sciences and the human sciences, the sciences of the spirit, between a natural-scientific theory of the soul on the one hand and theory of the person (theory of the Ego, Egology) as well as the theory of society (theory of community) on the other hand. Our entire world-view is determined, essentially and fundamentally, by the clarity of these distinctions. To them corresponds within phenomenology vast domains of research. Already decades ago, reactions asserted themselves against the naturalistic interpretation, self-evident in the age of natural science, of the human sciences as mere descriptive natural sciences. In the first rank Dilthey has here earned for himself everlasting merit. It was he who for the first time recognized the essential distinction here and first [173] reached a lively awareness of the fact that modern psychology, being a natural science of the psychic, is incapable of providing for the concrete human sciences the scientific foundation they require according to their specific essence. What is needed is a new "psychology" of an essentially different type, a universal science of the spirit that is neither "psychophysical" nor natural-scientific. Dilthey, a man gifted with the intuition of genius, though not a man of rigorous scientific theorizing, saw, to be sure, the problems leading to the goal and the directions of the work to be done, but he did not penetrate through to the decisive formulations of the problems and to the methodologically certain solutions, no matter how great was the progress he

[1] For another draft of the introduction, see Supplement IV, pp. 325 ff.

made here especially in the years of his wise old age. The power of his thought is demonstrated by the fact that Hermann Ebbinghaus's elegant critique, one which, however, undermined only the inadequate scientific elaboration of the ideas of Dilthey, could not, in spite of the universal approval of the natural scientists, arrest the course of development of those ideas. Ever new significant investigations joined up with Dilthey's research. Windelband, Rickert, Simmel, Münsterberg, and others tried their utmost to do justice, from new sides, to the opposition in question. Yet following them we do not penetrate to the actually decisive clarifications and rigorously scientific conceptions and foundations. Only a *radical* investigation, directed to the phenomenological sources of the constitution of the ideas of nature, Body, and soul, and of the various ideas of Ego and person can here deliver decisive elucidations and at the same time further the rights of the valid motives of all such investigations.

CHAPTER ONE

OPPOSITION BETWEEN THE NATURALISTIC AND PERSONALISTIC WORLDS

§ 49. The personalistic attitude versus the naturalistic

We link our considerations to what has been established in carrying out the pure phenomenological analyses of the preceding sections. In those sections our investigations were related to the naturalistic attitude. It was in that attitude that we carried out our analyses. It is easy to understand, however, that all the investigations will assume the character of pure phenomenology simply by our performing, in the appropriate way, the phenomenological reductions. As long as we live in the naturalistic attitude, it itself is not given in our field of research; what is grasped there is only what is experienced in it, what is thought in it, etc. But if we carry out phenomenological reflection and the phenomenological reduction, make the attitude itself thematic, relate to it what is investigated in it, and lastly carry out an eidetic reduction and purification of all transcending apperceptions, then all our investigations are transformed into purely phenomenological ones. As subject of the naturalistic attitude we have then the pure Ego. To be sure, we will at first find ourselves in reflection as empirical Ego; we perform the reflection at first precisely as a new naturalistic attitude, which thus, in the phenomenological reduction, belongs in brackets. The ultimate subject, the phenomenological one, which can never be bracketed and is the very subject doing all eidetic phenomenological research, is the pure Ego. For the rest, all that has been "put out of play" remains for us, here as elsewhere, preserved in the bracketing-modification: i.e., the whole world of the naturalistic attitude, "nature" in the broadest sense of the term. [174]

As we know, it pertains to the essence of this nature—which consequently emerges here as the *pure sense* of the acts that make up the natural attitude, as their constitutive correlate—that a thorough grounding is accomplished as the positing of nature in the first sense, that of physical nature, in which everything else that is called nature has the source of its sense, as something founded therein. Thus were built on one another, with respect to the *constituting basic characters of the apprehension:* the experience of the physical as foundational and, resting on it and enveloping it, the experience of the Body, which is constitutive of man and animal; based on the latter, as constitutive stratum, is the experience of the soul. The total system of naturalistic experiences encompasses the whole of nature as the total domain of the natural sciences in the stricter and in the broader sense. Belonging here, therefore, is psychology, too, as [175] the natural science of the psychic being of animalia (humans and animals) which thus fits within anthropology and so within general zoology as natural sciences. Psychic being includes the psychic *Ego-subject,* the *Ego-subject as nature.* We recall, however, that there are difficulties and objections related to this Ego, namely ones regarding a distinction which obtrudes but which yet does not impose itself as it should, i.e., a distinction between this Ego and the *Ego as person* or as *member of a social world.* It is this distinction we want to investigate, and specifically by research in constitutive phenomenology.

a) Introjection of the soul as presupposition even for the naturalistic attitude

Let us begin with the *soul.* For natural science, it is nothing *per se*; it is merely a stratum of real occurrences in the Body. In material nature—obviously this is the Objectively true nature, with respect to which appearing nature (the thing-world with "secondary" qualities), appearing to me and to everyone else, is precisely mere appearance—there occur, as we all agree, within the naturalistic attitude, certain pre-eminent things, ones distinguished by means of a stratum of real qualities that are not specifically physical, not "material" or "extensive;" I refer, of course, to the properties of stimulatability or sensitivity. These

new properties are constituted in the form of *"localization"* and are, in conformity with their sense, dependent on physical Corporeality and, through that, dependent on physical nature in general. The higher stratum, the specifically *psychic,* is likewise experienced in a way which is, to this extent, similar to the experience of the aesthesiological, that is, *precisely as a stratum of the Body as thing,* insofar as this stratum, too, is, in a certain manner, "localized." The soul animates or be-souls the Body, and the animated Body is a natural Object within the unity of the spatio-temporal world.

I see a playing cat and I regard it now as something of nature, just as is done in zoology. I see it as a physical organism but also as a sensing and animated Body, i.e., I see it precisely as a cat. I "see" it in the general sense ordinarily meant when [176] speaking of seeing. A stone is seen in any at all of its perceptual appearances, in which, strictly, only very little "of it" is presented in "actual," "proper," perception. If, on account of the one-sidedness and other multifarious imperfections, we were not to allow this seeing to count as a "seeing," as a "perceiving," then talk about seeing would lose its essential sense forthwith. There is indeed no seeing of a physical thing that would not be "imperfect" in this manner. Perception of something physical, in conformity with its essence, includes indeterminations—but includes them as determinable. In its own way, the cat also is seen, and, in the seeing, its existence as this animal, cat, is experienced. This experience has the kind of imperfections corresponding to the fundamental character of experience of animals. But, as always, the cat is present there in the flesh—specifically, as a physical thing with sensing surfaces, sense organs, etc. The stratum of sensation is not there as something beside the physical thing; what is there is a Body, a Body which has physical and aesthesiological qualities as one. Likewise, the Body is also experienced as Body of a soul, and the word "soul" indicates again a founded stratum of qualities, and of course one that is still higher. The soul is not there as extended over the Body in the manner of being "localized" in the proper sense; it does not offer itself as something like a complex of "psychic fields"—thought in analogy with sense fields—which would come, immediately or mediately, to phe-

nomenal coincidence with the extensional components of the Body, or which would come to a determinate correspondence with them, either point for point or part for part. In spite of that, the psychic is, in experience, one — that is, *realiter* one — with the Body; to that extent it is something at the Body or in it, lacking only distinguishable separate location. One could employ the expression, misleading to be sure, of *introjection;* it would then express precisely this state of affairs. In the Objective world, in the Objective world-space, there appears here and now this Objectively real cat; it is something physical and moves physically just like other things, except that beyond the merely physical qualities it constantly has aesthesiological and psychic ones. The excess of reality beyond the mere physical thing is not something that can be separated off by itself, not something juxtaposed, but something *in* the physical thing; thus it moves "along with" the thing and acquires its spatial determination by its being in something which is itself spatial.

As we can direct our analyzing regard onto other properties, [177] so we can also turn to these psychic ones; they then stand out as a "stratum," as a really inseparable annex, of the physical Body as a thing (which for its part would be thinkable without such strata, though, of course, only with the corresponding transformation, which is termed decomposition of the organism, organic death). All these are not arbitrary inventions but are pure unfoldings of what lies in the very *sense* of the naturalistic apprehension, "animal-real," an apprehension which is determinate apriori for the sense of all zoological judgments and cognitions, insofar as they indeed originally draw the meaning-content of their concepts from such an apprehension. That which is included apriori in the sense of zoological experience, in the sense content of this essential type of experience, "makes possible" zoological science in precisely that sense, just as the content (with its eidetic laws) enclosed in the essential type "physical experience" makes possible the science of physical nature. If we think the one or the other type of experience as cancelled out, then the concomitant experiential concepts, judgments, and sciences vanish *eo ipso.*

b) Localization of the psychic

Still the following is striking here. Every stratum is a constituted unity. We can consider, in conformity with its essence, the "matter" of the constitution and abstract from the ("forming") realizing apprehension. We can direct our regard onto the sensation-material and leave aside what is contributed by the apprehension as the Body's sensing. Similarly, we can direct the regard to the unity of the stream of lived experience and leave aside the apprehension in which the stream exists as the lived state of an animal-thing that has lived experiences. We can then also find, in the manifold currently presenting itself, unities that are henceforth no longer unities of nature. In particular, it is to be seen that with such a change of attitude, with such a separation from the physical Body of what previously had been apprehended as psychic, all integration into the Objective world, into the world-space and world-time, gets lost. The soul is in the Body and is there where the Body presently happens to be. What also is there are such and such groups of *states* of consciousness, such and such representations, stirrings of [178] thought, judgments, etc. As acts and states of, e.g., this cat, which has, by means of its Body, its position in Objective space, everything that is really one with the cat has position, even though it may have *per se* nothing to do with extension. Just as consciousness loses the apperceptive apprehension as psychic state, as stratum in the Body, and just as it is purely posited as itself in the phenomenological (even if not at the same time an eidetic) reduction, so it loses its empirical insertion in Objective space. Which can also be expressed in this way: consciousness in itself, for example this individual *cogitatio* in its nexus, is thinkable without a nature, and the apperception of nature itself can be posited in itself as "That there!"; however, it is thinkable that it, or more precisely that the positing of nature implicit in it, may not be able to be demonstrated at all, that there is no nature at all. Then, in that case, there is also no Objective space, and consciousness is not positable as something of nature (as state of an animal); it is absolutely non-spatial.

c) Temporalization of the psychic. (Immanent time and space-time)

The same holds for time. Pure consciousness is a genuine temporal field, a field of "phenomenological" time. This must not be confused with "Objective" time, which is constituted, along with nature, by consciousness. It is through the psychic apprehension that the conscious lived experiences obtain the sense of psychophysical states and consequently their insertion into Objective time, the form of Objective nature; to localization corresponds temporalization. Since phenomenological time, immanent in the stream of consciousness, is a uni-dimensional "constant" manifold of properties that are exactly analogous to the properties of the time which *presents* itself ("appears") in the lived experiences of the perception of something physical and "corresponds" to the latter point for point, and since in this appearing time in the ultimate Objectivation the "absolute" world-time manifests itself, so the temporalization of the time of consciousness is an especially deep one, insofar as the latter perfectly coincides, in a certain way, with absolute time. The coincidence is even more perfect than is the case with the localization of the field of touch, for that lacks three-dimensionality, precisely what would be needed for an equal perfection in the coincidence with the appearing Objective extension of the [179] Body; thus what is lacking is the regulated coincidence of three dimensional constancy with three dimensional constancy. As regards time there is now transferred to consciousness the Objective physicalistic time-measurement and time-determination which belongs exclusively to the material world. The states of consciousness then have, in conformity with the constitutive sense of the coincidence of their time with the time of physical nature, a time that is measurable through primordial manifestation by the use of instruments. This is a confirmation which certainly must be interpreted precisely in the sense prescribed by this state of affairs, and one would be subject to a psychological falsity if one did not make this sense perfectly clear. It is not our task here to carry out this explication completely.

d) Reflection on method

In these considerations we have been exercising the right of *phenomenological reduction,* and the redeeming quality of this doubtlessly valid fundamental method of the most original determination of sense is that it frees us from the sense-restrictions of the natural attitude and of every relative attitude. Natural man, and especially the researcher into nature, is not aware of these restrictions; he does not see that to all his results adheres a determinate index, one which manifests their merely relative sense. He does not realize that the natural attitude is not the only possible one, that it allows for shifts of focus whereby there emerges the absolute, nature-constituting, consciousness, in relation to which, in virtue of the essential correlation between the constituting and the constituted, all nature must be relative. What is *educational* in the phenomenological reduction, however, is also this: it henceforth makes us in general sensitive toward grasping other attitudes, whose rank is equal to that of the natural attitude (or, as we can now say more clearly, the nature-attitude) and which therefore, just like the latter, constitute only relative and restricted correlates of being and sense. The new correlates thus refer back similarly to absolute consciousness in the phenomenological sense. They require, for their full clarification, a return to the originary and full nexus of the essence of this absolute consciousness. By [180] means of the reduction to this nexus, we are capable at any time of putting in their correct relation, and of exploiting absolutely, the givennesses of the various attitudes (or the fundamentally different modes of apperception pertaining to them).

It is such a *new attitude* that we are now intent on; in a certain sense it is very natural, but it is *not a nature-attitude.* "Not a nature-attitude:" that means that what is experienced in it *is not nature in the sense of all the natural sciences* but is, so to say, something *contrary to nature.* Obviously, the quite exceptional difficulty here lies not only in grasping this opposition but in understanding it from within, though not by actually adopting the attitudes. For if we abstract from the attitude, surely artificial, toward pure consciousness, toward this residuum of the various reductions, then we constantly slip, quite

effortlessly, from one attitude into another, from the naturalistic into the *personalistic,* and as to the respective sciences, from the natural sciences into the *human sciences*. The difficulties lie in the reflection and in the phenomenological understanding of the transformation of apprehension and experience and in the understanding of the correlates constituted by them. Only in the framework of phenomenology, through the relation of the ontological distinctions of the constituted objects to the correlative essential nexuses of the corresponding constituting manifolds, is it possible to preserve these distinctions without confusion, in absolutely certain distinctness, free from all misunderstandings which have their source in the involuntary changes in attitude, ones which, from want of pure reflection, pass unnoticed. By means of a return to absolute consciousness and to the totality of nexuses of essence to be pursued in it, it is first possible to understand the meaningful relativities of the relevant objectivities of the one and the other attitude together with their reciprocal essential relations.

e) The naturalistic attitude and the natural attitude

Let us now proceed with the investigation.

What it means to speak of a *human being and a human soul as* [181] *nature* (the human may suffice for us as a representative of animality in general) we hold as firmly established. It then presents no difficulties to say that the human soul has, among other psychic states, so-to-say I-states, occurrences of the type, *cogito*. They, like the psychic in general, are, in naturalistic experience, added on to or "inserted into" the physically appearing Body and are localized and temporalized with it in the familiar manner. They belong within the constellation of real (substantial-causal) nature. This concerns also the empirical Ego that lives in these states. That man there sees and hears, and on the basis of his perceptions he executes such and such judgments, such and such evaluations and acts of will, in their multi-formed vicissitudes. That an "I think" emerges "in" him, in the man there, is a fact of nature, founded in the Body and in Bodily occurrences, determined by the substantial-causal nexus of nature, which is precisely not mere physical nature,

whereas, of course, the physical is founding and co-determining for all the rest of nature. The man there succumbs to a dreamless sleep or faints; that has certain physical reasons. The "I think" disappears from the stream of his psychic occurrences. In the course of these lived experiences, which are his natural states and which, as such, have a real relation to determining real circumstances, dispositions, qualities of character, cognitions, etc. manifest themselves and are, for their part, natural-real "properties," to be investigated "natural-scientifically, inductively," in analogy with physical properties.

Pertaining to the psychic states are also the acts in which the man has a consciousness of himself and of his fellows and of the rest of the surrounding real actuality, sees them in front of himself, takes cognizance of them, is related to them in a more or less lofty way of thinking, and perhaps is also related to them in the modes of affectivity and will. Here belong, e.g., the acts in which he pursues physical natural science, psychology, history, etc., or again, works as a man active in the practical life, utilizes the things of *his environment,* transforming them according to his purposes, and evaluates them from aesthetic, ethical, and utilitarian points of view. Here also are the acts in which he [182] places himself in a communicative relation toward his fellow men, speaks with them, writes them, reads about them in the papers, associates with them in communal activities, makes promises to them, etc. A countless number of remarkable relations between the subject and his "surrounding world" also have a place here, all of them grounded in the fact that the man *"knows"* about himself and his fellows and about a surrounding world common to them all. This surrounding world is comprised not of mere things but of use-Objects (clothes, utensils, guns, tools), works of art, literary products, instruments for religious and judicial activities (seals, official ornaments, coronation insignia, ecclesiastical symbols, etc.). And it is comprised not only of individual persons, but the persons are instead members of communities, members of personal unities of a higher order, which, as totalities, have their own lives, preserve themselves by lasting through time despite the joining or leaving of individuals, have their qualities as communities, their moral and juridical regulations, their modes of functioning

in collaboration with other communities and with individual persons, their dependencies on circumstances, their regulated changes and their own way of developing or maintaining themselves invariant over time, according to the determining circumstances. The members of the community, of marriage and of the family, of the social class, of the union, of the borough, of the state, of the church, etc., "know" themselves as their members, consciously realize that they are dependent on them, and perhaps consciously react back on them.

As soon as we presentify to ourselves in a lively way any of these personal relations and, as it were, immerse ourselves in the life of the person as bearer of these relations, and as soon as we then, in reflection, peer at their modes of givenness through the phenomenological magnifying glass, we notice that we are thereby in an attitude that is essentially different as opposed to the naturalistic attitude which was ours previously. In the latter, the totality of "Objective" physical nature was, or is, there for us, founding, scattered therein, Bodies, sensitivenesses, and psychic lives. All men and animals we consider in this attitude are, if we pursue theoretical interests, anthropological or, more generally, zoological Objects. We could also say physio-psychic [183] Objects, whereby the inversion of the usual "psychophysical" indicates quite appropriately the order of the founding. What has been said concerns all our fellow men as well as ourselves, to the extent that we consider ourselves theoretically precisely in this attitude: we then are animated Bodies, Objects of nature, themes of the relevant natural sciences. But it is quite otherwise as regards the *personalistic attitude,* the attitude we are always in when we live with one another, talk to one another, shake hands with one another in greeting, or are related to one another in love and aversion, in disposition and action, in discourse and discussion. Likewise we are in this attitude when we consider the things surrounding us precisely as our surroundings and not as "Objective" nature, the way it is for natural science. We thus have to do here with an entirely natural and not an artificial attitude, which would have to be achieved and preserved only by special means. In the natural life of the Ego we do not always—indeed not even predominately—consider the world in a naturalistic way, as if we were

doing physics and zoology, as if our theoretical and extra-theoretical interest would have to be directed inevitably to the psychic only as founded in the Body, as really dependent on the Body, as intertwined with it in a real-causal way. That is not always the case even for the zoologist and naturalistic psychologist; it is only that such a one has assumed the rigid habit, the restrictions of which he normally can no longer break through, that as soon as he takes up a *scientific* attitude at all, he does so inevitably in the form of the naturalistic attitude (or, equivalently, in an attitude directed to "Objective" reality). He wears the blinders of habit. As a researcher all he sees is "nature." As a person, however, he lives like any other person and "knows" that he is always the subject of his *surrounding world.* To live as a person is to posit oneself as a person, to find oneself in, and to bring oneself into, conscious relations with a "surrounding world."

Upon closer scrutiny, it will even appear that there are not here two attitudes with equal rights and of the same order, or two perfectly equal apperceptions which at once penetrate one another, but that the naturalistic attitude is in fact subordinated to the personalistic, and that the former only acquires by means of an abstraction or, rather, by means of a kind of self-forgetfulness of the personal Ego, a certain autonomy— [184] whereby it proceeds illegitimately to absolutize its world, i.e., nature.

Let us try to gain some clarity here.

We had previously first introduced the person and his personal modes of behavior as component parts of *nature* as human. In fact, naturalistically considered, all consciousness, and, in general, all lived experience, is founded Bodily, and hence, in addition, so is the total content of that which, in the persons, intentionally constitutes the world and all its properties. The person sees things round and about himself, and all the thing-apprehensions and thing-positings with their contents of noetic matter and form are psychical (physio-psychic). Likewise, the person evaluates the thing, apprehends it as beautiful or useful, as a garment or as a drinking cup, etc., and as such the thing is perceptually present to him. The apperceptions which

refer back to the spheres of affect and will and everything that belongs to them, the sensuous feelings and drives, the modes of evaluating and practical consciousness related to things, all this pertains phenomenally, in the consideration of nature, to man as animated Body. The same holds with respect to all social acts. Sociality in its entirety is of interest to the psychologist and, more generally, to the natural scientist, but is so only as the sum total of physical bodies with concomitant psychic foundations, whereby are also produced, in the mediate way prescribed by such foundations, interhuman causalities. The inter-physical causal relations also render possible, by means of the provoked excitations distributed among individual Bodies and by means of the aesthesiological-psychic occurrences immediately connected to them in a functional way, the real emergence of psychic lived experiences of "mutual understanding" and, as a further consequence, the emergence of the lived experiences of *social consciousness*. All these are here thus particular facts of nature, not different than other facts of perception and cognition which occur in unity with the Body and as having such a content that the concomitant Ego has a consciousness of these or those things as oriented to it in such and such a way and as appearing to it with such and such sensuous qualities. Hence all the facts concerning the person appear in this naturalistic way of consideration precisely as facts of nature and, as such, require a natural-scientific treatment. [185] Obviously this ultimately leads into the domains of physical nature and therefore is a psycho-physical treatment in the correct original sense. The personal psychic data only form a *part* of the psychic data and of the data of nature in general. From the standpoint of nature, everything personal is subordinate.

§ 50. The person as center of a surrounding world

On the other hand, if we now examine more closely the essence of personal subjectivity, bring it to intuitive givenness, and wholly immerse ourselves in it, then, as has been indicated already, it will be manifest of itself that the attitude in which we

live in the personal world, as subjects in the world of subjects, is in fact essentially different from the naturalistic attitude and that therefore in fact an apperceptive shift is needed first, in order to thematize the personal naturally. Let us therefore seek out the phenomena of the person and try to describe them.

As person, I am what I am (and each other person is what he is) as *subject of a surrounding world.* The concepts of Ego and surrounding world are related to one another inseparably. Thereby to each person belongs his surrounding world, while at the same time a plurality of persons in communication with one another has a common surrounding world. The surrounding world is the world that is perceived *by the person* in his acts, is remembered, grasped in thought, surmised or revealed as such and such; it is the world of which this personal Ego is conscious, the world which is there for it, to which it relates in this or that way, e.g. by way of thematically experiencing and theorizing as regards the appearing things or by way of feeling, evaluating, acting, shaping technically, etc. And the personal Ego "relates" to this world in acts upon which it can reflect, as is the case, for example, when it takes notice of itself as personal Ego, just as any other person can reflect on these same acts, even if in a correspondingly modified way (reflection in empathy), when the other grasps these acts as acts of the person in question, for instance whenever the other speaks, with clear understanding, of that person precisely as a person. And a person is precisely a person who represents, feels, evaluates, strives, and acts and who, in every such personal act, stands in [186] relation to something, to objects in his *surrounding world.*

Thus the actual surrounding world of any person whatsoever is not physical reality pure and simple and without qualification, but instead it is the surrounding world only to the extent he "knows" of it, insofar as he grasps it by apperception and positing or is conscious of it in the horizon of his existence as co-given and offered to his grasp—clearly or unclearly, determinately or indeterminately—precisely in accordance with the way it happens to be posited by consciousness. If the person knows nothing of the discoveries of physics, then the world with the sense-content of physics does not belong to his actual

surrounding world. (Obviously, the same holds for the sphere of psychological being as regards the discoveries of psychology.) Speaking quite universally, the surrounding world is not a world "in itself" but is rather a world "for me," precisely the surrounding world of *its* Ego-subject, a world experienced by the subject or grasped consciously in some other way and posited by the subject in his intentional lived experiences with the sense-content of the moment. As such, the surrounding world is in a certain way always in the process of becoming, constantly producing itself by means of transformations of sense and ever new formations of sense along with the concomitant positings and annullings.

To begin with, the world is, in its *core,* a world appearing to the senses and characterized as "on hand," a world given in straightforward empirical intuitions and perhaps grasped actively. The Ego then finds itself related to this empirical world in new acts, e.g., in acts of valuing or in acts of pleasure and displeasure. In these acts, the object is brought to consciousness as valuable, pleasant, beautiful, etc., and indeed this happens in various ways, e.g., in original givenness. In that case, there is built, upon the substratum of mere intuitive representing, an evaluating which, if we presuppose it, plays, in the immediacy of its lively motivation, the role of a value-"perception" (in our terms, a value-reception) in which the value character itself is given in original intuition. When I hear the tone of a violin, the pleasantness and beauty are given originarily if the tone moves my feelings originally and in a lively manner, and the beauty as such is given originally precisely within the medium of this pleasure, and similarly is given the mediate value of the violin as producing such a tone, insofar as we see it itself being played and grasp intuitively the causal relation which is founding here. [187] Likewise, the beauty of the violin's external structure, its elegant form, is given immediately and originally, whereby the particularities and connections motivating the pleasure come actually to the fore in the unity of the constituting intuition and exercise their motivating power. The consciousness of value, however, can also arise in the mode of non-originary pleasure and in the mode of the evaluation of the pleasurable as such without the feelings being moved "originally" and in a lively way; that

would be the analogon, in the sphere of feelings, of obscure representations as opposed to the clear. For example, if at a first glance, I find the violin "beautiful" and a "work of art," the pleasure is then incomplete, if the beauty itself is present at all. I can see the violin and find it to be beautiful, without my feelings being aroused in any "genuine" way.

The same holds for the objects of desiring and practical acts. The experienced objects, as objects of this empirical sense, excite my desire or perhaps fill needs in relation to certain circumstances constituted in consciousness, e.g., in relation to the need for food which makes itself felt very frequently. Afterwards, the objects become apprehendable as in the service of the satisfaction of such needs according to this or that property, and in that case they offer themselves to the apprehension as a means for nutrition, or as use-Objects of various sorts: heating material, choppers, hammers, etc. For instance, I see coal as heating material; I recognize it and recognize it as useful and as used for heating, as appropriate for and as destined to produce warmth. I see that something is burning or is glowing; I approach it and heat radiates out from it. I also know that from experience, and now the object is "hot" even if I do not feel any degree of warmth. To be hot is an Objective property, manifesting itself in act in the sensation of warmth and in the apprehensions of the heat radiating out from the object. The object suffuses heat, and as its Objective property it is perhaps one unchanging, ever the same, heat, whereas I, in approaching and stepping back, have dissimilar sensations of it. Experience teaches me, further, that an object itself starts to glow by being rubbed or by being ignited by a body that is itself already burning or glowing. This object is "combustible" material (at first without any practical bearing). [188] Henceforth I can use it as fuel; it has value for me as a possible source of heat. That is, it has value for me with reference to the fact that with it I can produce the heating of a room and thereby pleasant sensations of warmth for myself and others. I apprehend it from this point of view: I "can use it for that," it is *useful* to me for that. Others also apprehend it in the same way, and it acquires an intersubjective use-value and in a social context is appreciated and is valuable as serving such and such a purpose, as useful to man, etc. That is how it is first

"looked upon" in its immediacy: subsequently it is further seen as a "commodity" sold for that purpose, etc.

All these are founded Objects, which, in apprehension, have been constituted for the Ego, in the way described, by means of founded acts, and again, they are constituted in either an originarily giving consciousness by means of such acts or in a consciousness which is not giving in that way, in acts which are fully developed or authentic, or in unauthentic acts.

If, however, these sorts of founded acts are accomplished at all, in whatever mode, then the relevant objects, endowed with value characteristics, desirable and practical ones, are again for the Ego objects of its surrounding world, and it can relate to them in new personal acts. It evaluates them as to the degree of their being good or bad, appropriate or counter-productive. The Ego transforms them, and they then become its "products," its "fabrications," and as such they enter once more into its surrounding world. For instance, they are given the value of works; at the same time they may be recognized as beautiful, and perhaps they serve as work-tools for new productions, which then, for their part, function in position-takings and found new strata of apprehension, new Objectivations, etc. Consequently, the subject is always carrying out multi-layered acts of every possible kind, out of which can arise, by means of the appropriate shifts, ever new Objectivations of ever higher levels. Living in these acts, the subject has the objects constituted at present precisely as its "objects," which will then determine its further behavior and which the subject will thereby recognize as determining itself.

It is evident what foundational new sense there is to the relation between man as personal subject and the objects of his surrounding world versus the natural relation between the [189] naturally understood man (as psychophysical reality) and other realities. "Stimuli" are said to be emitted especially by the physical Objects of nature, and the sensitive nerves are said to be stimulated by physical excitations. Perhaps then even the soul will be said to be stimulated: the excitations propagated in the nervous system terminate in a final excitation within the central nervous system, which excitation then for its part functions as "stimulus" for the soul and brings about its

reaction, the sensation. But if we place ourselves on the terrain of the intentional relation between subject and Object, the relation between person and surrounding world, then the concept of stimulus acquires a fundamentally new sense. Instead of the causal relation between things and men as natural realities, there is substituted the *relation of motivation* between persons and things, and these things are not the things of nature, existing in themselves—i.e., the things of exact natural science with the determinations claimed there to be the only Objectively true ones—but are the experienced, thought, or in some other way intended and posited things as such, intentional objects of personal consciousness. Thus it is from the things which, in terms of the consciousness of the personal Ego, are "meant" as actually existing that "stimuli" arise. Phenomenologically, the unities of things (the noematic unities) are points of departure for more or less "strong" tendencies. Already as conscious but not yet grasped (hovering in the background of consciousness), they draw the subject to themselves, and if the "stimulating power" is sufficient, the Ego "follows" the stimulus, "gives in" and turns in that direction. Then the Ego exercises on these things explicating, conceiving, theoretically judging, evaluating, and practical activities. They now engage its interest in their being and their attributes, in their beauty, agreeableness, and usefulness; they stimulate its desire to delight in them, play with them, use them as a means, transform them according to its purposes, etc. They then function in ever new strata as stimuli for its being active (and also, not to neglect the negative, for its being passive). Besides, the subject of the motivation can at one time yield to the stimuli and at another time resist them. All these are phenomenological relations which can be found and described only in the purely intentional sphere. In a very broad sense, we can also denote the personal or motivational attitude [190] as the *practical* attitude: that is, what we have here always is the active or passive Ego and indeed in the proper intrinsic sense.

§ 51. The person in personal associations[1]

The subject finds consciously in his surrounding world not only things, however, but also other subjects. He sees them as persons who are engaged in their own surrounding world, determined by their objects, and ever determinable anew. In this attitude, it never occurs to him to "insert" the spirit into the Body, i.e., to consider the spirit as something in the Body, as something founded in it, as something belonging, with the Body, to a reality; thus it never occurs to him to carry out the corresponding real apperception (the natural one). If it were carried out, then humans would themselves be posited as things. And in that case the spirit as person, coordinated with our person as a member of a personal association, is not given its rights. For here the spirit is functioning only as a psychic being in the sense of a natural consideration, as something causally dependent on the Body, upon which it seems to be grafted.

To treat humans and animals "as mere things" has, to be sure, various senses, a juridical and moral sense and, on the other hand, a scientific sense. But both have something in common. From a moral-practical standpoint, I am treating a human being as a mere thing if I do not take him as a person related to the moral, as a member of a moral association of persons in which the world of morals is constituted. Likewise, I am not treating a human being as a subject of rights if I do not take him as a member of a community founded on law, to which we both belong, but instead view him as mere matter, as without rights just like a mere thing. Again, analogously, I treat a human *theoretically* as a thing if I do not insert him in the association of persons with reference to which we are subjects of a common surrounding world but instead take him as a mere annex of natural Objects which are mere things and consequently take him as a mere thing himself. Now, within certain limits, this is legitimate, and it becomes an injustice only if we do not acknowledge at all that the naturizing of persons and souls can allow us to recognize only certain relations of [191] dependency of Objective existence and continuity which obtain

[1] *Cf.* pp. 301 f. and the footnote there.

precisely between the natural world of things and the personal world of spirits, insofar as both belong to the unity of the Objective spatio-temporal world of realities. Further, it is an injustice if we do not acknowledge that nevertheless spirits make possible and require still an other and more significant mode of research precisely in this respect, that they have, as Ego-subjects, a being properly their own, that, as such, they are required for all matters and all research into these matters as the subjective counter-parts, and that they thus, in their intentional life, relate to the world in the form of their surrounding world. He who sees everywhere only nature, nature in the sense of, and, as it were, through the eyes of, natural science, is precisely blind to the spiritual sphere, the special domain of the human sciences. Such a one does not see persons and does not see the Objects which depend for their sense on personal accomplishments, i.e., Objects of "culture." Properly speaking, he sees no person at all, even though he has to do with persons in his attitude as a naturalistic psychologist. But this needs a more thoroughly grounded exposition.

In the *comprehensive experience of the existence of the other,* we thus understand him, without further ado, as a personal subject and thereby as related to Objectivities, ones to which we too are related: the earth and sky, the fields and the woods, the room in which "we" dwell communally, the picture we see, etc. We are in a relation to a common surrounding world—we are in a personal association: these belong together. We could not be persons for others if a common surrounding world did not stand there for us in a community, in an intentional linkage of our lives. Correlatively spoken, the one is constituted essentially with the other. Each Ego can, for himself and for the others, become a person in the normal sense, a person in a personal association, only if comprehension brings about the relation to a common surrounding world.

The *common* surrounding world acquires communal characteristics of a new sense and at a higher level by means of acts of personal mutual determination which arise on the basis of mutual comprehension. This results in possibilities not only for a parallel and mutually understood comportment to objects as the ones of the community's surrounding world but also for a [192]

joint-unitary comportment of persons to such objects, a comportment in which they participate communally as members of a whole that binds them together. Persons apprehend themselves comprehensively not only in the certainly first and fundamental way, namely that the one understands, as Body, the Corporeality of the other belonging to his surrounding world and its spiritual sense, thereby interpreting the facial expressions, gestures, and spoken words as intimations of personal life, but also in such a way that they "determine one another" and are active not just as individuals but communally, i.e., as personally united.

Just as, in accordance with our previous elaboration, mere physical things "motivate," i.e., stimulate the subject of experience as appearing things, as experienced actuality, and are the "occasion" of his behavior (phenomenally this is an immediate experiential relation between a worldly Object as object of experience and a subject of that experience), so do human beings exercise on one another, in a similar general sense, "immediate" personal effects that can be intuited. They have "motivating power" for each other. But they do not have effects in the mere way of the things of physical experience, in the mere form of stimuli, although occasionally they also do (e.g., I see an insufferable man and keep out of his way just as I would avoid a repulsive thing). But there is still *another* form in which persons influence persons: in their spiritual activity they *direct* themselves toward *one another* (the Ego toward the other and vice versa), they perform acts with the intention of being understood by the other and of determining the other, in his understanding grasp of these acts (insofar as they are externalized in this intention), to certain personal modes of behavior. On the other side, it is possible that the one who is determined in such a way yields willingly to this influence or that he, being unwilling, refuses it, and in turn, by the fact that he not only acts accordingly but also makes it be known that he is willing or unwilling by communicating it, he determines reactions again in the one that was determining him. In this way *relations of mutual understanding* are formed: speaking elicits response; the theoretical, valuing, or practical appeal, addressed by the one to the other, elicits, as it were, a response coming back, assent [193]

(agreement) or refusal (disagreement) and perhaps a counterproposal, etc. In these relations of mutual understanding, there is produced a conscious *mutual relation* of persons and at the same time a unitary relation of them to a common surrounding world. Furthermore, this might be not merely a physical and animal (or personal) surrounding world but also an ideal one, e.g., the "world" of mathematics. The surrounding world of the moment encompasses indeed the totality of "Objectivities"—the ideal as well—which "confront" the person (each of the persons communicating with the others) as the same Objectivities in terms of consciousness and upon which he reacts in his intentional modes of behavior.

The surrounding world constituted in experiencing others, in mutual understanding and *mutual agreement,* is designated as the *communicative* one. It is, by essence, relative to persons, who find themselves in it and find it as what is over and against them. That applies to it, therefore, as well as to the "egoistic surrounding world" of the person thought as solitary, i.e., it applies to the person who, in his relatedness to the surrounding world is thought abstractively in such a way that he enjoys no relations of understanding with other persons (no social bond). Each person has, ideally speaking, within his communicative surrounding world his egoistic one insofar as he can "abstract" from all relations of mutual understanding and from the apperception founded therein, or, rather, insofar as he can think them as separated. In this sense there exists, therefore, "one-sided separability" of the one surrounding world in relation to the other, and the egoistic surrounding world forms an essential nucleus for the communicative one in such a way that if the former is ever to be separated off, the processes of abstraction needed for it have to come from the latter.

If, by abstracting them out, we think of a sheer solitary subject and therefore also of his purely egoistic surrounding world, then the latter gains afterwards, when the abstraction is lifted and relations of mutual understanding emerge, new intentional strata, and thereby is constituted the association of persons and the communicative world relative to this association, *its* surrounding world, which is not only surrounding, external, but embraces the association itself. It is to be noted [194]

here that just as persons may already belong to an egoistic surrounding world, so persons living outside of communication (persons outside the relevant social association) may belong to a communicative surrounding world. The persons who belong to the social association are given to each other as *"companions,"* not as *opposed objects but as counter-subjects* who live "with" one another, who converse and are related to one another, actually or potentially, in acts of love and counter-love, of hate and counter-hate, of confidence and reciprocated confidence, etc.

The acts of mutual relation in society are, according to the above presentation, especially pre-eminent amid the acts of one-sided empathetic understanding of the life of the other Ego. It is not sufficient that the others are understood as persons and that the one who understands comports himself unilaterally toward the others in such and such a way and takes his direction from them; mutuality of understanding would not be needed for that. But this is precisely what is at stake here. Sociality is constituted by *specifically social, communicative acts,* acts in which the Ego turns to others and in which the Ego is conscious of these others as ones toward which it is turning, and ones which, furthermore, understand this turning, perhaps adjust their behavior to it and reciprocate by turning toward that Ego in acts of agreement or disagreement, etc. It is these acts, between persons who already "know" each other, which foster a higher unity of consciousness and which include in this unity the surrounding world of things as the surrounding world common to the persons who take a position in regard to it. And even the physical world has a social character in this apperceptive inclusion; it is a world that has a spiritual significance.

Up to now we have taken the concept of surrounding world very *narrowly,* as the world of what confronts a personal Ego (i.e., an Ego within a communicative association), a world that encompasses all objectivities and that is constituted for the Ego *through its "experiences,"* through its experiences of things and its axiological and practical experiences (into which therefore axiological and practical apprehensions also enter). This surrounding world is, as was said earlier, (pp. 194 f.) a world that constantly changes in the course of active experience, in the

subject's actively occupying himself in natural experience, in theoretical thinking, in valuing, willing, creating, and in forming ever new Objects, etc. [195]

For each personal individual, however, there is constituted *one surrounding world with an open horizon* encompassing the Objectivities which *could* subsequently present themselves, or which, under given circumstances *would* present themselves, in connection with the course of his active constitution of surrounding Objects (things, objects of value, etc.). The experiences actively performed motivate possibilities for new experiences; the objects for the subject are experienced by it as ones which have their existence, their ontological orders, and their dependencies, all of which can be investigated. The subjects communicating with one another belong mutually, for one another, to the surrounding world which is relative to the Ego that at any given time is outwardly circumspecting and is constituting *its* surrounding world. And this Ego itself belongs to its own surrounding world in virtue of self-consciousness and in virtue of the possibility of all sorts of self-directed comportment; the subject is *"subject-Object."* On the other hand, it is a *sole and unique* world that is constituted in the intersubjective association, a world in which there are levels. The subjects in communication with one another constitute personal unities of a higher level, the sum total of which, extending as far as actual and possible personal ties do, makes up the world of *social subjectivities.* To be distinguished from this world of social subjectivities is the world correlative to it and inseparable from it, the world *for* these subjectivities, the *world of social Objectivities,* as one might say.

Therefore *various concept-formations are required here.* We distinguished above, first of all, a *subject and its surrounding world.* We then had to distinguish in addition an *association of persons and its surrounding world.* But the subject, as Objectivatable and as Objectivated for itself, is included at the same time in the surrounding world. Thus the former distinction is not sufficient, however necessary it may be. For a circle of friends, for a union, its "external world" is all the rest of the world, thus the remaining spirits, spiritual communities, and the physical things, as well as the cultural Objects, the sciences, and [196]

the arts insofar as they are precisely objects of its interests and concerns, etc. Included in the surrounding world of such a circle, or, in general, of a social subjectivity (an association of subjects, constituted through communication), is, once again, this very subjectivity itself insofar as it too can become an Object for itself, when the association relates back to itself, just as each individual subject in it can also become an Object. Consequently it is useful to distinguish, in the case of the individual subject as well as in the case of an association of subjects (as a social subjectivity), between *surrounding world in the full sense* and surrounding world in the sense of *external world,* which latter then excludes the Objectivated subject.

Now, however, the task is to gather up into unity all the social Objectivities (with the limit case of the ideally possible isolated individual) that are in communication with one another. It should be noted here that the *idea of communication* obviously extends from the single personal subject *even to the social* associations of subjects, which, for their part, present personal unities of a higher level. All such unities, as far as their communication extends, a communication produced factually or one yet to be produced in accord with their own indeterminate open horizon, do not constitute merely a *collection* of social subjectivities, but instead they coalesce into a social subjectivity inwardly organized to a greater or lesser degree, which has its common opposite pole in a surrounding world, or an external world, i.e., in a world which is *for* it. If the surrounding world is one that no longer contains subjects (thus no subjects standing in a practically possible domain of still to be produced communication: e.g., the possible people on Mars, subjects whose actuality, like that of these latter, remains open) but only mere Objects, then these Objects are nevertheless still Objects for the associated persons and for higher personal unities, Objects which can be encountered as such by any subjectivity of this kind in *its* surrounding world, and which every "companion" could find in his own. This *possibility,* as hypothetically ideal potentiality, is an essential component of the sense of the surrounding world. At the same time, there is constituted the idea of a world as *world of spirit* in the form of a sum total of social subjects of lower or higher levels (and we [197]

include here the isolated person as zero limit-case of social subjectivity) which are in communication with each other, actually or in part actually in part potentially, together with the sum total of the social Objectivities pertaining to it. For every subject that in this way is a member of a social association as a totality, there is constituted one and the same world of spirit, although from the "standpoint" of this or that subject it is apprehended and posited with a corresponding (hence different from subject to subject) apprehended sense. An associated plurality of subjects, of individual spirits and spiritual communities, related to a world of things, a world of "Objects," i.e., an actuality which is not spirit but which is actuality *for* the spirit, is nevertheless, on the other hand, precisely as actuality for the spirit, always spiritualized, *spiritually significant,* bearing in itself spiritual sense and ever receptive to new sense of that kind.[1]

This world of things is, at its lowest level, intersubjective material nature as common field of actual and possible experience of individual spirits, solitary ones and ones in a community of experience. All individual Bodies have their place on this level. And the sensuous feelings and drives arrange themselves under sense experience. At a higher level this nature is considered as a field of theoretical, axiological, and practical actions, activities of spirits on various social levels. Nature becomes the domain of the natural sciences, the field of aesthetic evaluations or of actual and possible practical work, work which, for its part, can have scientific, aesthetic, ethical, or other aims. These aims are set by the individual or social subjectivity (social on whatever level). It is this subjectivity that also orders the ways and means to the ends, in which case, the ends and the ways and means, products of individual and social evaluation, can in turn be substrata, can elicit new spiritual reactions, can determine new settings of goals, etc. Apperceptions of various levels arise, whereby it should especially be noticed that the objects present at any moment can be apperceived *as* objects of possible or probable evaluations and settings of ends and means.

[1] On the following passage, *cf.* Supplement V, p. 328.

If we look more closely, then we find that we still need to [198] distinguish:

1) The *surrounding world* or *external world of the communal spirit*. This is the world of intersubjectively constituted objectivities, i.e., spirits, spiritual communities, spiritualized states of affairs and mere natural factualities, objectivities each subject belonging to the community can bring to givenness in his own way and from his own standpoint. And each subject can at the same time recognize, in virtue of mutual understanding, that what is given to him and what is given to his companions is one and the same.

2) *The merely subjective sphere of the solitary subject*. This subject has an environment which, in its original mode, is *merely* his own, which therefore can be *given originarily to no other subject*. In the communicative society, each member sees what I see and hears what I hear, or at least he *can* do so. We experience the same things and events, we experience the animals and people there facing us, and we see in them the same inner life, etc. Yet each has appearances which are exclusively his own, and each has lived experiences which are exclusively his own. Only he experiences these in their very flesh, utterly originarily. In a certain way, I also experience (and there is a self-givenness here) the other's lived experiences; i.e., to the extent that the empathy (*comprehensio*) accomplished as one with the originary experience of the Body is indeed a kind of presentification, one that nevertheless serves to ground the character of *co*-existence in the flesh. To that extent, what we have here is thus experience, perception. But this co-existence ("*appresence*" in the previously fixed sense[1]) does not, in principle, allow itself to be transformed into immediate originary existence (primal presence). It is characteristic of empathy that it refers to an originary Body-spirit-consciousness but one I cannot myself accomplish originarily, I who am not the other and who only function, in regard to him, as a comprehending analogon.

As a consequence, we come up against a distinction in idea, which is obviously significant from the point of view of constitutive genesis as well, i.e., the distinction between the "idea" [199]

1) of *pre-social subjectivity*, of the subjectivity which does not yet presuppose empathy. This subjectivity knows only: a) *inner experience*, which is absolutely originary and contains no elements of presentification; it is thoroughly a grasping in the flesh, without any co-grasping, even in the form of "horizons," and b) *external experience*, which throughout is only experience of such co-positing ("*apprehensio*" or "appresentation"), but which can be converted in transitions to experiences which do give in the flesh.

2) and that of *social subjectivity*, of the world of the communal spirit. Here we have experience of other subjects as well as of their inner life, an experience in which their character and their properties come to givenness for us, an experience of other subjects as well as of their inner life, an experience of forms of community, community affairs, Objects of the spirit. Everywhere in this kind of experience, a moment of presentification through empathy is involved which can never be converted into immediate presentation. Also pertaining to this world of social subjects are the subjects, as objects, and, in addition, the acts (lived experiences) of those subjects, their appearances, etc. But these are given in originary *perceptio* (presentation) only for the subjects that they belong to. They are given in *purely* originary *perceptio*, but only as "immanent" data and not as components of the intersubjective world with intersubjective time and intersubjective realization: i.e., not as belonging to spatial Corporeality and thereby to the spatiality of nature. Nevertheless, what is Objective (i.e., intersubjective) separates into two groups according to the mode of givenness:

1) that which the personal subject (the member of the communicative world) can experience immediately and *originarily in terms of his own content* even if a form of inclusion, or form of reality, to put it better, still pertains to him and which belongs to his intersubjective Objectivity. Here also is the place for all lived experiences of the subject and even the subject for himself, as "inwardly" perceptible and as really apperceived object, as subject-Object.

2) that which the personal subject experiences, to be sure, but experiences *only mediately*, insofar as the subject experiences a

[1] *Cf.* pp. 170 f. (§ 44).

co-presence on the basis of what is actually perceptively experienced or what may be perceived in the course of experience, a co-presence that is not perceptible itself and which cannot be converted into the subject's perceptions, i.e., in terms of his own content of being. I can have a "direct" experience of myself, and it is *only my intersubjective form of reality* that I cannot, in principle, experience. For that I need the mediation of empathy. I can experience others, but only through empathy. Their own content can be experienced only by themselves in originary *perceptio*. Likewise, my lived experiences are given to me directly, i.e., the lived experiences in their own content. But others' lived experiences can be experienced by me only mediately, in empathy. And not even each of my lived experiences, as components of the "world" (of the Objective spatio-temporal sphere of reality) is experienceable directly, for the form of reality (that of intersubjective Objectivity) is not an immanent form. [200]

Addendum

Social objectivities are given to us in "social experience." What is this social experience? I can "understand" what a marriage is insofar as I can, in full clarity, put myself into a marriage by empathy, if I have myself entered the married state, have lived it through, and can now grasp its essence. (This would be "perception.") What is thus "given" I can represent intuitively modified, I can produce intuitive variation-forms of marriage and consequently can grasp various essential differentiations of "marriage," and in that way, I have, e.g., material for comparative evaluations. Another example: friendship. I stand toward others in relations of friendship. The friendship may not be an "ideal" one; however, I can modify the intuitive representation, which requires me to be able to intuitively bring to validity modes of motivation that are not in any given case the effective ones or the predominating and regularly effective ones, and, in order to do that, I have to, e.g., eliminate these or those egoistic motivations or represent them as eliminated and then examine the modifications essential to the ideal social

structure. In the same way I can clarify for myself the essence of a union. I begin, for example, with a union of students in which I participated in a lively way and of which I played an inner and active role as a member. Similarly for a borough. I gain the fullest understanding as an actively participating citizen, by living through all the civil activities which pertain to the life of the borough, by coming to know the constitution of the borough, and this not only in words, i.e., in that I have read the borough's statutes and read about the customs and mores belonging to this area or have been instructed by others' stories, but rather in that I make clear to myself the "sense" of all that and make intuitive to myself the laws in their application to praxis and according to their function for the regulation of that praxis and consequently bring their "essence" to full clarity. If I cannot do it exhaustively, then it suffices, if need be, that I employ examples.

§ 52. Subjective manifolds of appearance and Objective things [201]

Belonging to the second class of Objects is the entire infinity of *appearances* of things, of the things of intersubjectively constituted physical nature. This nature appears to everyone, but, as has already been mentioned, it appears to each in a different way as a matter of principle. Each has his appearances of things; at most, by exchanging the subjective circumstances of the experiencing, the one can have appearances comparable to those the other had previously. But it would never be possible for different subjects to have the same appearances at the same temporal point of intersubjective ("Objective") time. To the extent that the one subject is part of the surrounding world of the other, then, to be sure, the store of actual appearances of the one is part of the surrounding world of the other as well. But only to that extent. Such is the case with *every* manifold of constituting phenomena in which is constituted, for each subject, an identical reality—constituted as identical, as intersubjective Object of a communal world, owing to the mutual understandings that unify it and that make possible acts of intersubjective identification (moreover, the mutual under-

standings may be actual or potential). Thus here belong all the sensuous schemata, adumbrations, and sensuous matter that we discussed when we treated the constitution of a thing. They are *specifically "subjective."*

One could here continue along this line and say that the same would apply obviously and afortiori as regards the apperceptive character of the apprehension and, finally, as regards the whole stream of consciousness. Meanwhile we must not overlook the essential distinction. In the stream of subjective lived experiences the subject manifests himself as a real person, and the lived experiences are at the same time his states. On the other hand, the subject does not manifest himself in the sensory schemata, in the subjective appearances of things; instead, what is manifested there are the things of his surrounding world. The appearances, of course, are not states of the things themselves, for in fact it is in appearances that states of things first manifest themselves. That the appearances are not states of the subject is clear from the fact that they are transcendent with regard to his actual states, his lived experiences. This is, for us, nothing new; it shows precisely the fundamental difference in the way the real [202] subject is constituted and the way real Objects are constituted. This holds as much for the personal subject as for the psychic, which will be perfectly clear once we have determined the relationship between the two.

If we turn back to what we established above (pp. 159 f.) concerning the subject and the Object-world given him, then we see that the person's surrounding world of things, presently intuited or intuitable, coincides with the world as it appeared to the solipsistic subject. I.e., we have here things appearing in manifolds of adumbrations, spatially arranging themselves around a central "here."

Other subjects, who stand there confronting me and who I am able to apprehend as such in understanding them, can have given the same things with the same determinations; but their actual manifolds of appearance are, as a matter of principle, not the same. Each of them has his "here," and that is, in the selfsame phenomenal now, different from mine. Every subject has his phenomenal Body and his subjective Bodily movements. Every subject can indeed make the same places in intersubjectively identifiable space (the common surrounding space) his here, the same places *I*, in succession, have just now made my here. But for each point of time intersubjectively grasped as identical, my here and the other's here are separate.

We have still to demonstrate that it is justified to speak here of "intersubjective space" and "intersubjective time." We have seen previously that what is psychic undergoes temporalization and localization and thereby becomes nature in an enlarged sense. But *even as spirit*, apprehending and positing myself and others precisely not as nature, *I find myself and others in the spatial and temporal world.*

I am now, was previously, and will be later. Others are contemporary, in the same time (indeed in Objective time); their acts and my acts have temporal position in relation to each other as being contemporaneous or earlier or later, and this time is the same as the time of our surrounding world.

The same applies with respect to space. Everything is related to the here which is my here. I, the person, am in space at this place. Others are over there, where their Bodies are. They go for [203] a walk, they pay a visit, etc., whereby indeed their spirits, along with their Bodies, change their place in space, in the space of the one Objective surrounding world. The local positions are measured and determined just like any other spatial position. And as for temporal positions, they are measured by means of clocks and chronometers of every kind, instruments that do have a significance in terms of natural science. And all such measurements refer back to certain spatial measurements to be carried out in physical nature, in connection with periodic spatial occurrences in the physical world.

Consequently it does seem that there is no essential distinction between the natural-scientific conception of the spiritual and the conception of it in the human sciences.

The response to this is that every person as such (essentially) has his surrounding world, first of all his subjective world of appearances and then, by means of a relation to a nexus of persons, at the same time a relation to the common Objective surrounding world, in reference to which the subjective surrounding world is mere appearance. To each personal Ego is given a physical surrounding world with its definite orientation,

and each personal Ego has his center, whence he perceives things; he has his Body as the central thing, around which, insofar as it encloses the center, all other things appearing to it are arranged and present themselves as oriented. Thereby, the world, along with the Body, is given as over and against the Ego, as the environment of the Ego, and is given every moment in a mode of appearance relative specifically to this Ego. "I am here," which does not mean I am an Object of nature.

I, a man taken as an Object of nature, am a Corporeal body, and this is—considered egoistically-subjectively—the Object of my environment in the "here," and it is, considered Objectively, in the place of Objective space which presents itself in the subjective "here." Furthermore, this Body is actually, first and foremost, an Object of my environment and, secondly, in view of everything it is in "Objective truth," a thing in Objective nature (in natural science). This Objective Corporeal body is not yet the human being but is still only the bearer of an aesthesiological and Corporeal-psychic ontological stratum; and this totality is then an Object of the *common* surrounding world *for* all subjects related to it in their pursuit of natural science. Every [204] other man is grasped as nature in a still more direct way in the attitude of natural science adopted by me and all subjects doing research on nature, in which attitude nature belongs to my spiritual environment—but, for all that, I am still here not in the attitude of the sciences proper to the spirit (the personal attitude), for I precisely do not thereby have the person and his surrounding world in my thematic sphere. In this attitude the other man is constituted as a founded being, one that owes its spatiality and temporality to the Body as founding.

But if I am in the attitude of the human sciences, the sciences devoted to the spirit, in which the other spirit is thematically posited as spirit and not as founded in the physical Body (not as founding reality of the total reality, man in natural history, man as zoological being), then this Corporeal body, like everything which is not spirit, belongs to the surrounding world of things; it is a thing, one that has spiritual significance, that serves as *expression,* organ, etc., for a spiritual being, for a person and his spiritual activity. Although the spirit is not apprehended here as nature, nevertheless it still is assigned to a Body and thereby to

an Objective part of space. The space of the environing world, together with the things belonging to it, is always Objectifiable as natural-scientific space, as the space of natural-scientific nature. The essence of this state of affairs does indeed include the possibility of the nature-attitude and the natural-scientific attitude as well as the possibility of research into nature. In this way, therefore, the spirit, too, which is naturalizable in the determinate way that has been indicated, has "its" place assigned to it, its distance from other things of the environment, etc. The spirit, the human being as a member of the personal human world, does not have a place the way things do (nor in the secondary sense in which a Body founded in thinghood and a man founded in natural history have a place). Yet it does have a place; that is, it stands constantly in a functional relationship to a Body, which for its part has its place in the environing world and in the scientific determination of this latter as a physicalistic world, perhaps one determinable by the instruments of physics.

The same holds from a *temporal* point of view. Different persons have their different subjective time, insofar as isolated subjects (so long as no empathy has been accomplished thematically, and a personal association, in which the person as such [205] is constituted, has not yet been produced thematically) for their part have their temporality in the course of their consciousness. Every stepping forth of the pure Ego has its position in this time, and every act of the Ego has its temporal extension in it. But all constituted unities have their time as well, and it pertains to the essence of the constitution of unities of appearance that they are constituted temporally in such a way that the constituted egoistic-transcendent time (essentially) stands in relation to the time of the constituting lived experiences and at once in such a way that relations of simultaneity, of before, and of after, run back and forth in a determinate fashion. The thing of appearances constituted primally, a unity of sense intuition, is there, with regard to its duration, as simultaneous with the continuity of perception and its noetic duration.

This carries over to all unities constituted intersubjectively to this extent that, apriori, Objective time and subjective time (my immanent time and my space-time) are a single order of time. In

the subjective space-times, as "appearances," Objective time presents itself in a certain way and "appears," provided appearance is, in this regard, valid appearance. This temporalization and localization of the spirit differ essentially from those of "introjection." (See pp. 200 f.)

Hence in a now which, as intersubjective presence, is *identical* for the different subjects who mutually understand one another, these subjects cannot have the same "here" (the same intersubjective spatial presence) nor the same appearances. The index of this phenomenological state of affairs is the impenetrability of the different contemporaneous Bodies as such. Two Bodies can be Objectively bound into one thing, can "grow together" into one, but the concrescence into one thing does not create a Body filling the same temporal duration, does not create a here, a space with phenomenal orientation, and an identity of the appearances of things with respect to the world of things surrounding both subjects. The appearances two subjects have cannot fuse together into identical appearances as do the optical appearances provided by one's two eyes. Therefore different subjects have phenomenal Objectivities that in phenomenal intersubjective time are distinct of necessity and in principle are not even of the same essential content. The same things can, of course, actually appear to them, but the appearances, the things "in their fleeting mode of appearance," in their subjective qualities of standing in relief, of being oriented, of presenting just these colors, etc., are different. It is only that there exist relations of interchangeability, whereby the same thing, a moment ago given to me in a certain mode of appearance, can also, with the lapse of intersubjective time, be given *subsequently* to the other as well (in totally the same mode), and the reverse. To be sure, in another respect interchangeability is essentially excluded; the central here, to which the modes of appearance are related and which confers individuation on their concrete essential contents in the respective now, is not interchangeable, nor are the individual phenomena, nor, in general, is anything subjective interchangeable in its individuality. Thus, for example, even the "I move" is proper to me, this Ego, and as such can never be "comprehended in empathy" by another Ego. What can be comprehended by that Ego is not my Ego but precisely his Ego, not mine but his subjectivities in lived experiences, in "subjective" modes of appearance, etc.

Different subjects describe the objects of their surrounding world on the basis of their own respective appearances. To the extent that the subjects standing in possible communication have in fact the same groups of appearances (i.e., actual or, as motivated, possible appearances in perception) even if not actually the same appearances themselves, in such a way that with the simple exchange of their positions in space the appearances of the one subject would have to become the same appearances of the other, to that extent the appearing things would also be the same for the different subjects and would be described by them in the same way. We already know that a certain sameness in the totality of the manifolds of appearance is a condition for the possibility of mutual understanding and that consequently differences are possible in certain directions only. Such differences come to the fore in the exchange of descriptions; on the basis of the intersubjective harmony of experience discordance stands out, and only in that way can it be manifest.

Thence proceed the guidelines for the possible and familiar [207] distinctions between "*normal*" human persons versus the *abnormal*. This normality is related to a multiplicity of persons in a communicating association, persons who, on the whole, in conformity with a predominating regularity, agree with one another in their experiences and consequently in their assertions about experience, versus other persons of the same association who make deviant assertions about the surrounding world in some of their descriptions and who thus are apprehended in the comprehension of the former as persons who experience the same things in another way, a way not empirically realizable, by the one who understands them, in the framework of the motivation then current. Furthermore, from here proceed the guidelines for the constitution of *physicalistic* thing-Objectivity in intersubjective research into nature. The Objectivity which is intuitively constituted for individual subjects and which comes to expression in their descriptive statements, as well as the Objectivity constituted as correlate of a community of persons

who mutually assess each other as normal, itself now has the status of mere "appearance" of a "true" Objectivity. And the common nature given in intuitive experience has the status of mere "appearance" of a nature in itself, unintuitable by essence, of a nature that can indeed be determined intersubjectively in theory but cannot be experienced directly. Hence this nature is not, strictly speaking, describable, and no concepts of immediate experience can go to determine it. In Cartesian terms: we distinguish between nature as given in imagination and nature in pure intellection, and in doing so we abstract from the fact that since Kant this nature attained in natural-scientific theory is itself, in turn, ordinarily taken as appearance of an unknowable, problematic, metaphysical "in itself." (But all these modes of expression harbor very dangerous anticipations which ought not, at the outset, be taken for granted.) Every consensus of the subjects of a community with respect to the predicates describing the appearance of Objects which appear either to an individual or interindividually now counts as accidental factum, versus their consensus with respect to all Objective (physicalistic) determinations produced in rational thought of experience, which counts as necessary. There belongs here, furthermore, the fact that, by means of these Objective theoretical cognitions of nature, all actual and possible differences and agreements of subjects as to their phenomena (their immediately experienced contents in regard to things) are "explainable," hence themselves cognizable as necessary, by taking into consideration their Bodily and psychic organization, which is itself open to Objective research.

So again, happily, we have landed in natural science, first of all in physics and then in natural science in general. The differences in "world pictures," i.e., in empirically intuited worlds of things, which come to the fore within intersubjective consensus and which, despite their discrepancies as to content, nevertheless manifest themselves in intersubjective understanding as experiences of *the* world, of the one and the same world, together with the impossibility, which results, of arriving on the basis of actual experience at unconditionally valid judgments about this world, necessitate theoretical research in the form of natural science. Natural science brings to cognition "Objective"

nature, which henceforth belongs for its part to the surrounding world of the communal spirit.

§ 53. The relationship between the consideration of nature and the consideration of the spirit

The time has come to recollect. For we sense an uncomfortable difficulty here, a certain tension between the nature which stood at the beginning and the nature which has now arisen for us out of the context of the community. Our point of departure was the naturalistic (natural-scientific) attitude, in which nature comes to givenness and to theoretical cognition as physical, Bodily, and psychic nature. This naturalistically considered world is of course not *the* world. Rather, given prior is the world as the everyday world, and within this arise man's theoretical interest and the sciences related to the world, among which is natural science under the ideal of truths in themselves. This pregiven world is investigated first with respect to *nature*. Then animalia have their turn, human beings before all others. And this is precisely the first task: to investigate them as Ego-subjects. We are led back to their life. This is—as individual factical life, like the person himself—inductively determinable, in terms of its place in the spatial world, only in a psychophysical fashion. In any case, we have here a series of psychophysical investigations. [209] And that is precisely not everything. What we have here is the one "Objective" world, with the one space and the one time, in which "everything" is ordered—persons as well, who, in union with their Bodies, lead their personal lives. To engage in considerations in this attitude, to reflect, to give an account of the world, means to accomplish in advance precisely the theoretical positing of "nature," and anything given acquires, by being approached in this way, insertion into nature. E.g., the person is *eo ipso* apprehended as a being of nature, as something annexed to a Body.

We then delved into the essence of personal being as being of persons and for persons. We carried out a segment of actual personal life or we phantasized ourselves into such a segment in a full and lively way, and we also, by empathy, entered into the

personal life of an other. And then, in a few steps, we described the correlation between personal subject and personal surrounding world. We observed how persons established personal relationships, how personal associations were constituted as particular objectivities of a higher level, how a spiritual world arose as a world of intersubjective community, and how a special world for each personal subject stood out against this, that is, how each subject encounters, as his own, endless manifolds of appearances and thus, in general, endless objectivities belonging exclusively to him alone. Hence each subject finds himself, or, with the appropriate focus, at any time can find himself, as *subject,* i.e., as *bearer of a merely subjective world* which, for reasons of principle, cannot be the same for any other subject, or rather, he finds himself as bearer of a subjective mode of appearance of *the* world or as bearer of an *appearance* of the world, in which precisely the selfsame world does actually appear. And in this contrast, with regard to the relation between appearance and appearing Objectivity, we again encountered nature and natural science: nature now as an Objectivity constituted in the context of the personal world, that is, harmoniously experienced in communal experience as being identically the same, experienced as such by all rational members of the community, the actual ones or those who may possibly still enter in. This understanding of nature is to be worked out on a higher level in activities of empirical science, in predicative products known as truth and science. It seems that here we got into a vicious circle. For, when, at the beginning, we posited nature straightforwardly, in the way done by every natural scientist and by everyone else sharing the naturalistic attitude, and when we took human beings as realities, ones that have a *plus* above and beyond their physical Corporeality, then persons turned out to be subordinated natural Objects, component parts of nature. On the other hand, when we inquired into the essence of the person, then nature presented itself as something constituted in an intersubjective association of persons, hence presupposing it.

How are we to find our way here? I said above that consideration in depth of the person and his surrounding world would by itself bring us into a new attitude, one differing

essentially from the naturalistic attitude, e.g., that of the natural scientist. Let us try to clarify for ourselves the opposition between these attitudes.

A change in attitude means nothing else but a thematic transition from one direction of apprehension to another, to which correspond, correlatively, different objectivities. We are dealing here with radical changes of such a kind, with transitions to apprehensions of fundamentally different phenomenological types. Hence our question is whether the distinctions in apprehension and, accordingly, in "experience" are here of such a kind that, corresponding to them, the noemata and their noematic objectivities (the experienced "as such") differ fundamentally. That is, whether, with regard to the interrelations between possible empirical demonstration and the empirical knowledge based on it, the objects on the two different sides belong to fundamentally different "regions." Is it really a matter of two different worlds, "nature" on the one side, the world of the spirit on the other, separated by cardinal ontological distinctions? This does not have to mean, and should not mean, that these two worlds have nothing to do with each other, that there are no essential relations between the sense of the one and the sense of the other. We know indeed of other cardinal distinctions between "worlds" which nevertheless are mediated by relations of sense and of essence. We could refer to the relation between the world of ideas and the world of experience, or to the relation of the "world" of pure, phenomenologically reduced consciousness to the world of transcendent unities constituted in it, or to the relation between the world of things as appearances (the world of the "secondary" qualities of things) and the world of physicalistic things. All such distinctions are connected to cardinal distinctions in "attitude," to fundamentally different types of apprehension and experience, and the correlative objectivities, no matter how fundamentally different they might be, are nevertheless mediated by relations of sense, which already comes out in the designations: things as appearances are precisely appearances of the things of physics, pure consciousness is constitutive of such and such constituted unities, etc.

As for the attitude whose correlate is nature (the world of

realities in Objective space-time, the world whose causality rules the changes occurring therein), we have studied it sufficiently at depth and need only now remind ourselves of it. At the lowest level, what is to be experienced here is material (physical) nature, and founded on it is the experience of Bodily and psychic being. The aesthesiological and the psychic are an "annex"[1] of the physical Body, localized in it in a broad sense and obtaining by means of it Objective spatial position and insertion into the time of nature. In this way, therefore, we may apprehend every man as "nature," positing in his Body psychic properties, psychophysically dependent ones. And we can do the same as regards ourselves, if that is what we want, although it would involve remarkable difficulties. What kind of difficulties these are will become clear by itself as we now pass over to the personalistic attitude and personalistic experience.

[1] Annex means regulated coexistence, and what regulates the change is "causality," an inductive causality.

CHAPTER TWO

MOTIVATION AS THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF THE SPIRITUAL WORLD

§ 54. The Ego in the *inspectio sui*[1]

In this attitude I take myself simply as I ordinarily take [212] myself when I say "I" and as the I in any kind of "I think" (I am convinced, I doubt, I hold to be possible, I love, I enjoy, I want, etc.). It is absolutely out of the question that I am here intending or encountering myself and my cogito as something in the Body, as founded in it, and as a localized annex of it. It is rather the reverse: the Body is *my* Body, and it is mine in the first place as my "over and against," my *ob-ject*, just as the house is my object, something I see or can see, something I touch or can touch, etc. These things are "mine," but not as component pieces of the Ego; hence they are given to me through manifold harmonious synthetic perceptions, which I as subject carry out, and what I do not perceive of them is "co-given" to me precisely through those perceptions: possible perceptions are motivated by actual perceptions in a regular fashion. To be sure, I find the stratum of sensation to be localized in the Body, including therefore physical pleasure and physical pain; but that only shows that this stratum does not belong to the realm of what properly pertains to the Ego. Just as the Body in general is over and against the Ego, so is everything *"not-I"* which makes it an object, and only in the mode of the "over and against" does it appertain to the Ego, precisely as existing object of the Ego's experiences. Each

[1] *Cf.* Supplement VI, pp. 329 f. On this § and the following, see also §§ 4-11 of Section One.

thingly objectivity of my experience partakes of the Ego in this way, and to that extent each has a subjective character as experienced by the Ego and consequently as existing for it in the manner of a goal of its attention, a substrate of its theoretical, affective, and practical acts, etc.

Furthermore, the Ego can, of course, also reflect on its experiences, on its focusings, on its acts of evaluating or willing, and then these too become objects and stand over and against it. But the difference is obvious: these are not alien to the Ego but are indeed of the Ego; they are *operations (acts), states of the Ego itself.* They do not merely appertain to the Ego in the manner of what is experienced and what is thought; they are not mere identity-correlates of that which is Ego-like and subjective primarily and originally.

To be sure, the Body has it special virtues compared with other things, and as a result it is "subjective" in a pre-eminent sense, i.e., as bearer of fields of sense, as organ of free [213] movements, and so as organ of the will, as bearer of the center and as seat of the fundamental directions of spatial orientation. But all these are *Ego-like by the grace of what is originally Ego-like.* Just as Objects are Objects *for* the Ego, are its worldly surroundings, in virtue of its apprehendings, positings in experience, etc. (i.e., as unities given therein in the mode, "existing"), so also this Body is *my* Body, and indeed mine in the palpable special sense, because I already am and in a certain sense bestow on it its special virtues. E.g., the center of orientation belongs to the noematic content of my perception of the thingly Body as such, and in experiential positing it belongs to the Body as an intuitively constituted Objectivity; thus it belongs to a level of appearances that already is a constituted appearance. Consequently the special status of the Body is by grace of the Ego (or of Ego-like originary intuition), which obviously does not mean by the haphazard arbitrariness of the Ego.[1]

Therefore we find, as *the originally and specifically subjective, the Ego in the proper sense,* the Ego of "freedom," the attending, considering, comparing, distinguishing, judging, valuing, attracted, repulsed, inclined, disinclined, desiring, and willing Ego: the Ego that in any sense is *"active"* and *takes a position.* This, however, is only one side. Opposed to the active Ego stands the *passive,* and the Ego is always passive at the same time whenever it is active, in the sense of being affected as well as being receptive, which of course does not exclude the possibility of its being sheer passivity. To be sure, the very sense of the expression, "receptivity," *includes a lowest level of activity* even if not the genuine freedom of active position-taking. The "passive" Ego (in a second sense) is then also subjective in the original sense as *the Ego of "tendencies,"* the Ego that experiences stimulation from things and appearances, is attracted, and simply yields to the attractive force. In addition, the *"states"* of the Ego are subjective as well, states of mourning, of cheerfulness, of passive desire, and of renouncing as a state. "Being touched" as originating in a tiding is [214] something subjective whose source is the Object; to "react" against, to revolt against, or to pull oneself together is something subjective whose source is the subject.

From the properly subjective (the Ego itself and its comportment—both the active as well as the passive) we must now distinguish, on the one hand, the objective, that *over and against* which the Ego comports itself actively or passively, and, on the other hand, the *material substratum of "stuff"* upon which this comportment is built. For in any life of consciousness whatsoever the stratum of position-taking, of acts in general, is built upon substrata. Here we rejoin what we said earlier (§§ 4-10). The Objects of the surrounding world, over and against which the Ego is active in its position-taking, and by which it is motivated, are, all of them, originally constituted in acts of this Ego. Goods, works, use-objects, etc. refer back to valuing and practical acts, in which the "mere things" acquired this new ontological stratum. When we abstract from these ontological strata, we are led back to "nature" as the domain of mere things and then back further to the syntheses of various levels in which the Ego is active as constituting nature. Running backwards through the strata of the constitution of the thing, we arrive finally at the data of sensation as the ultimate, primitive, primal objects, no longer constituted by any kind of

[1] *Cf.* Supplement VII, pp. 330 ff.

Ego-activity whatsoever but, in the most pregnant sense of the term, *pregivennesses* for all of the Ego's operations. They are "subjective," but they are *not states or acts of the Ego;* rather, they are *what is had by the Ego*, the Ego's first *"subjective possession."* We saw earlier, however, that everything constituted in the spontaneous acts of the Ego becomes, as constituted, a "possession" of the Ego and a pregivenness for new acts of the Ego. For example, the "sense-things" of various levels become pregivenness for the relevant higher syntheses; and so do the fully constituted intuitive Objects of nature for theoretical-scientific activity, for valuing and practical behavior, etc.

Therefore we need to distinguish:

1) subjective being as being and comportment of the Ego: the subject and its acts, or states; activities and passivities, and

[215]

2) subjective being as *being for the subject:* what the Ego *has,* consisting of the material of sensation and the totality of Objects constituted for the subject in the course of its genesis. Here belong also the properly human Ego, which appears as a part of nature, but also already the solipsistically constituted *Bodily-psychic unity* presupposed for that, and also even the somatic Corporeality insofar as it is constituted in the inner attitude, although it, like the sensation material, has a special appurtenance to the Ego and is not "over and against" the Ego in the same manner as the constituted external world and its appearances. Thus what remains of that which is given in the inner attitude is only the *subject of the intentionality*, the subject of the acts, *as what is subjective in the original and proper sense.*

§ 55. The spiritual Ego in its comportment toward the surrounding world

This Ego of intentionality is related in the cogito to its surrounding world and especially to its real surrounding world, e.g., to the things and the people it experiences. This relation is

not immediately a *real relation but an intentional relation* to something real. Therefore there is a distinction between:

1) the *intentional relation:* I have the Object given. I have it given as appearing in this or that way, and with the required direction of focus I have the appearance of the Object given. I have the appearance, but I may be focusing my attention on the Object; or else I can attend to the appearance itself.

2) the *real relation:* the Object T stands in a real-causal relationship to me, to me as a human being, thus first of all to that Body which is called mine, etc. The real relation collapses if the thing does not exist; the intentional relation, however, remains. That each time the Object does exist a real relation runs "parallel" to the intentional relation, namely that in such a case waves are propagated in space from the Object (the real actuality), strike my sense organs, etc., and that my experience is connected to these processes, all this is a psychophysical fact. But nothing of the kind holds for the intentional relation itself, which suffers nothing through the non-actuality of the Object but, at most, is modified through its consciousness of the non-actuality. [216]

If we now consider the comportment of the subject towards its *surrounding world, as the world posited by it,* which includes not merely realities but also, for example, ghosts, and if we take the subject at first again as the one and only subject, as solipsistic, then we find a plethora of relations between the posited Objects and the *"spiritual" subject,* as we are now calling the subject of intentionality, relations which, in the sense indicated, are relations between what is posited as reality and the positing Ego, which are not real relations, however, but *subject-Object relations.* Here belong relations of *subjective-Objective "causality,"* a causality which is not real causality but which has a fully proper sense: namely, the sense of *motivational causality.* Objects experienced in the surrounding world are at one time attended to, at another time not; and if they are, they exercise a greater or lesser "stimulation." They "arouse" an interest and, in virtue of this interest, a tendency to turn towards them. This tendency then freely unfolds in the turning, or else it unfolds only after counter-tendencies weaken or are

overcome, etc. All this is played out *between the Ego and the intentional Object*. The Object exercises stimulation, perhaps by virtue of its pleasing appearance. The "same" Object can be given to me in an unpleasing mode of appearance, and then I experience a stimulus to change my position appropriately, to move my eyes, etc. Presently, a pleasing appearance is given once again, and the telos of the movement has been reached. Here, once more, movements of the body and of the eyes do not enter into the picture as real processes of nature, but instead a domain of possibilities of free movement is most properly present to me, and an "I do" succeeds the *"I can"* according to the reigning stimuli and tendencies. Correlatively, the end of the process has the character of a goal. The Object stimulates me in virtue of its *experienced properties* and not its physicalistic ones, of which I need know nothing, and if I am acquainted with them, in truth that did not have to be. This Object stimulates me (within the intentionality of experience or of an [217] indirect experiential knowledge in virtue of properties ascribed to it correlatively) to eat it. It is one of the goods belonging to the class, nutrients. I reach for it so I can eat it. This is a new kind of subject-Object "effect." The Object has value qualities and is "experienced" as having them, is apperceived as a value-Object. I am occupied with it, it stimulates me to occupy myself with it; I observe it, observe how it behaves as such an Object, how these new properties, which are not properties of nature, show themselves, are determined more precisely, etc. Yet I am not only a subject that values but also one that wants, and I prove to be such and not just a subject of value-experiences and a subject of the thinking which judges in this regard, etc. For I can also creatively transform these objects as well as actually use them for the ends they are designed to serve, etc. In this way, too, they exhibit their existence as nature on a certain, very low, intuitive level. In the opposite case, they are nothing, they no longer determine or motivate me in this relation. Perhaps, however, the illusory Objects as such, the cancelled noemata, affect me in their own way, just as previously, in a different way, the noemata affected me in their proto-doxic ontological character.

We have here the *behavior of reacting to something*, by which

stimuli are experienced and by which there is motivation in a determinate sense. I experience the stimulus of the beautiful, and I am motivated to turn to it, to pay attention to it, to take pleasure in regarding it. Something reminds me of something else that is similar, and the similarity prods me to compare and distinguish them. Something seen very obscurely determines me to get up and approach. The room's stale air (which I experience as such) stimulates me to open the window. In each case, we have here an *"undergoing of something,"* a being *passively* determined by something, and an *active reaction to it*, a transition into action. And this action has a *goal*. Here belong all forming and transforming of physical Objects but also every "I move" (I move my hand, my foot, etc.) and similarly every "I strike," I push, I pull, I offer resistance to a thing, etc. To be sure, the occurrence of the *mechanical* movement of my hand and its mechanical effect on the "struck" ball is a physical-real process. Likewise, the Object, "this man," "this animal," [218] partakes of this event in virtue of his "soul," and his "I move my hand, I move my foot" is a process that is psychophysically intertwined, a process that is to be explained in a real-causal manner within the nexus of psychophysical reality. *Here*, however, we are not concerned with this real psychophysical process but with the intentional relation. I, the subject, move my hand, and what this is in the subjective mode of consideration excludes all recourse to brain processes, nerve processes, etc., and the same holds for the "I hit the stone." The Bodily member, the hand, *appearing* to consciousness in this or that way, is as such a substrate of the "I move," is an Object for the subject and is, as it were, a *theme* of his freedom, of his free action; in the act of striking it is the means "by which" the thing, likewise intentionally given to me, can become and does become the "theme" of the striking (of the "I strike").

Obviously, therefore, the cogito essentially pertains to the intentional relation between the subject and the thematic Object, the cogito, that is, which defines the thematic Object (Object for me, for this Ego) or the thematic relation. It is therein, in the cogito, that the Object appears, is perceived, remembered, emptily represented, conceptually thought, etc. The thesis of being (that of experience, of thinking, etc.) can be

erroneous — the thing does not exist — and in that case it will be said in my subsequent critical judgment, or in someone else's, that in actuality I did not strike, dance, or jump. But the evidence (the evident lived experience) of the "I undergo" or "I do," of the "I move," is not affected thereby, is not annulled. (One can say that even the "I strike" or the "I dance" is a cogito, but such a one as to co-include in itself a thesis of transcendence, and in this mixed form it harbors in itself the *ego sum* as well.) The world is *my surrounding world.* That is to say, it is not the physicalistic world but the thematic world of my, and our, intentional life (including what is given to consciousness as extra-thematic, co-affecting, and accessible to my thematic positings: my thematic horizon).

This surrounding world is perhaps, or it harbors in itself, my *theoretical surrounding world.* More clearly put, this surrounding world can present to me, the actual subject (not me, the man), all sorts of theoretical themes, and I can even become a [21
practitioner of natural science by theoretically investigating the nexuses of reality. In setting after the real or in elaborating real actuality, I arrive at "true nature," which manifests itself in the given things of the surrounding world as appearances of it. Here also belongs the fact that I can make myself and my psychic life into Objects, can pursue the Bodily-psychic nexuses, and can investigate myself, the man, as a reality amid realities. In that case, however, natural science and true being according to natural science are a determination pertaining to my surrounding world and one that itself occurs within its broad circumference.

The surrounding world can then be for me the *theme of the technique of natural science* or, in general, the theme of *practical formations* in relation to valuations and settings of goals. In that case, I am pursuing technique, art, etc. I can thereby posit values and accept values; and on that basis I can see and find derived values and mediate values. I can regard goals as final goals, can deliberate about them in hypothetical-practical consciousness, can choose and then take them in actual praxis, and can order to these goals possible means. Yet I can also judge about values and in the end raise ultimate questions concerning values and goals and in that way pursue the *theory of values*, the theory of *rational praxis,* the theory of *reason.*

That is an overview of the field of proper Egological facts. The Ego is always a *subject of intentionalities,* and that means that a noema and a noematic Object are immanently constituted ("apperception"); consciousness of an Object is produced. In particular, an Object posited as existing, which is present to consciousness in its "how," enters into an "intentional" relation with the subject in a new sense: the subject *comports itself* toward the Object, and the Object *stimulates* or *motivates* the subject. The subject is subject of an undergoing or of a being-active, is passive or active in relation to the Objects present to it noematically, and correlatively we have *"effects" on the subject* emanating *from the Objects.* The Object "intrudes on the subject" and exercises stimulation on it (theoretical, aesthetic, practical stimulation). The Object, as it were, wants to be an Object of advertence, it knocks at the door of consciousness taken in a specific sense (namely, in the sense of advertence), it attracts, and the subject is summoned until finally the Object is noticed. Or else it attracts on the practical level; it, as it were, wants to be taken up, it is an invitation to pleasure, etc. There are countless relations of this kind and innumerable noematic strata which the Object assumes with these advertences and which are built upon the original noema, or in the case of things, on the pure thing-noema. [220]

§ 56. Motivation as the fundamental lawfulness of spiritual life

Thus we see that when we speak of the *spiritual or personal Ego*, that is to be understood as the subject of intentionality, and we see that *motivation is the lawfulness of the life of the spirit.* Just what motivation is still requires, of course, closer investigation.

a) Motivation of reason

Let us first of all fix our sight on the way perceptions and the like, for example, motivate judgments, the way judgments are justified and verified in experience, thus how the attribution of a

predicate is confirmed by the concordant experience of it, how being in contradiction with experience motivates a cancelling negation, or how a judgment is motivated by another judgment in drawing a conclusion, but also how, in quite a different way, judgments are motivated by affects and affects by judgments, how surmises or questions are motivated, how feelings, desirings, willings are motivated, and so on. In short, the issue is the motivation of position-takings by position-takings (for which certain "absolute motivations" are always presupposed: something pleases me in itself, "for its own sake," etc., it being of no consequence whether or not reason reigns within these motivations).

Nor should reason be excluded here, insofar as there exists precisely the pre-eminent case of the motivation of reason, motivations within the framework of evidence, which, if they are reigning in purity, produce constitutive unities of consciousness of a higher level along with correlates of the region "true being" in the broadest sense. Here belongs especially every [221] instance of logical grounding. So we have to distinguish: 1) motivations of effective acts by effective acts in the sphere that stands under norms of reason. Here the distinction is that between the motivation of the Ego and the motivation of the acts. 2) Motivations of other kinds.

Motivation can exist here in the most authentic sense, whereby it is *the Ego that is the motivated: I* confer my thesis onto the conclusion because I judged such and such in the premises, because I have given my thesis to the premises. The same occurs in the sphere of valuing; there is a valuing that I do for having valued something else, and there is a derived willing as a deciding for having decided something else. In each case here I am accomplishing a cogito and am determined in doing so by the fact that I have accomplished another cogito. Obviously, the thesis of the conclusion is related thereby to the thesis of the premises. These are Ego-theses, yet on the other hand they are not themselves the Ego, and so we also have as motivation a particular relationship among the theses. But the theses as theses have their "material," and that produces lines of dependencies as well: the full assertions and, correlatively, the full lived experiences have a "connection of motivation."

One can speak of *motivations of pure reason in a two-fold sense:* it can refer to mere relations and connections of requirement between *"acts" properly* so called. The subject here is the "active" one; in a certain sense the subject is always "doing something" here, even in purely logical thinking. Reason can then be called pure reason if, and insofar as, it is motivated with insight and is thoroughly so motivated. Yet this condition does not have to be met. Even invalid conclusions belong under the heading of motivation of reason. Their "material" is perhaps a sediment of previous acts of reason, but one which now comes forth in a confused unity and in that state maintains the thesis. Reason is a "relative" one here. He who lets himself be drawn by inclinations and drives (which are blind since they do not emanate from the sense of the matters currently functioning as stimuli, i.e., they do not have their source in this sense) is driven irrationally. But if I take something to be true or take a demand to be a moral one, thus having a source in the corresponding values, and if I freely pursue the reputed truth or the reputed moral good, then I am being reasonable—yet only relatively so, for I may indeed be mistaken there. I am projecting a theory in [222] relative rationality insofar as I fulfill the intentions predelineated to me by my presuppositions. But I may have overlooked the fact that of one of my presuppositions was wrong. Perhaps I am following a blind tendency here. I believed I could remember that the proposition was demonstrated; the tendency is not completely blind insofar as the memory has its reason. Finally we reach in this way the fundamental questions of ethics in the widest sense, which has as its object the rational behavior of the subject.

The doctrine of the affects in Spinoza and Hobbes deals, by and large, with immanent motivations.

b) Association as motivation

Furthermore, the entire realm of *associations* and *habits* fits in here. They are relations established between an earlier and later segment of consciousness within one Ego-consciousness. But motivation occurs in the "present" consciousness, namely in

the unity of the conscious stream, characterized as time-consciousness (originary consciousness) in act. Here it is not a matter of a motivation of position-takings by other position-takings (active theses by active theses) but of lived experiences of any sort whatsoever. These are, specifically, either "sediments" of earlier acts and accomplishments of reason, or ones which emerge, in "analogy" with the former, as apperceptive unities without actually being formed out of acts of reason, or else they are completely a-rational: sensibility, what imposes itself, the pre-given, the driven in the sphere of passivity. What is specific therein is motivated in the obscure background and has its "psychic *grounds,*"[1] *about which it can be asked: how did I get there*, what brought me to it? That questions like these can be raised characterizes all motivation in general. The "motives" are often deeply buried but can be brought to light by "psychoanalysis." A thought "reminds" me of other thoughts and calls back into memory a past lived experience, etc. In some cases it can be perceived. In most cases, however, the motivation is indeed actually present in consciousness, but it does not [22
stand out; it is unnoticed or unnoticeable ("unconscious").

The contrast between associative motivations and motivations in the pregnant sense of Ego-motivation (motivation of reason), which we are dealing with here, can be brought into relief in the following way: What is meant by the universal fact of "passive motivation"? Once a connection is formed in a stream of consciousness, there then exists in this stream the tendency for a newly emerging connection, similar to a portion of the earlier one, to continue in the direction of the similarity and to strive to complete itself in a total nexus similar to the previous total nexus. We thus put the question: how is it that this is known? Now, when I reflect on an earlier connection and then on a second one, related to the first in the way indicated, I expect the initial part to be followed by a similar part, in rational motivation, and I then actually find it. Here for us who question and expect and who establish the fact of association, something new emerges: the existence of the similar part

[1] Here in the "Ego-less" sphere we speak of the Ego that is motivated. Is the Ego then the stream itself?

demands the existence of a similar part complementing it. This is a *law of motivation*; it concerns the *existential positings*. The demand is an "original" one, a demand of reason. Hence there are rational motivations for existential positings as well as for judgments and for taking up positions of belief in general (formal-logical position-takings belong here too).[1] Likewise there are rational motivations for position-taking as regards feeling and will.

Obviously, belief, and any position-taking, is an event in the stream of consciousness and therefore is subject to the first law, that of "habit." Having once believed M, with this sense and in a certain mode of representation, there then exists the associative tendency to believe M again in a new case. If I ask whether A is and proceed to affirm that A is, then in a new case there may be joined "by habit" to the question whether A′ is (thought as similar to A with respect to its matter) the affirmation that it *is*. [224] This is no different: if I have once apprehended a content of sensation and have posited it objectively as A, then I may again, on another occasion, apprehend and posit as A′ a similar content of sensation (along with its concomitant similar relations and circumstances). And in that case we again have in the stream forms of processes. It is clear, however, that I must not confuse the occurrence of habit with the occurrence of motivation in the sphere of position-taking, which, of course, is alone called motivation in ordinary language.

To be sure, the one and the other kind of motivation intertwine, the "causality" in the deep grounds of association and apperception and the "causality" of reason, the passive and the active or free. The free one is purely and completely free where passivity plays a role only for the delivering of the primal material which no longer contains any implicit theses.

c) Association and experiential motivation

We have been speaking of unnoticed, "hidden" motivations,

[1] This would be the place to consider the correlative existential motivations in what is constituted: for example, the "under similar objective relations (in nature) the similar is to be expected," etc.

which are to be found in habit, in the events of the stream of consciousness. In inner consciousness, every lived experience is itself doxically "characterized as existing." But a great difficulty lies here. Is it actually characterized as existing, or is there only, by essence, the possibility of a reflection which in the process of objectification necessarily confers on the lived experience this ontological character? And even that is not yet clear enough. *Reflection* on a lived experience is originally a positing consciousness. But is the *lived experience* itself something given or constituted in a positing consciousness? If that were the case, then could we not always go back a step in reflection, and would we not then fall into an infinite regress?

For now, however, we can put this aside. By all means, there are hidden motivations. Even without our performing acts of belief, they enter into motivations. Examples of it are provided by the realm of *experience*, the infinite field of motivations included in every outer perception, in memory, and (modified, however) in every phantasizing of a thing. Apprehensions of things and of thingly nexuses are "webs of motivation:" they are built through and through from intentional rays, which, with their sense-content and their filled content, refer back and forth, and they let themselves be explicated in that the accomplishing subject can enter into these nexuses. I have the unitary intentionality in which a thing is given to me in one stroke. Then from every way of running through it, there results a series of continuous acts unfolding in the first-posited sense and in a harmonious sense conforming to every further givenness. That is to say, everything here is "motivated," including every new positing and every phase of the unitary total positing as well as every new partial positing which may perhaps come to the foreground but does not have to. And this applies, in like manner, to every new content; what is motivated is precisely the positing *with* its content, its quality, and its matter, though each one of them supervenes here in a different way. In every moment, I have a "divisible" matter and a unitary quality extending over the matter, hence there are also elements of motivation and webs of motivation in co-existence, unities of "mutual belongingness" to "one affair." On the other hand, "the similar motivates the similar under similar circumstances."

Better: the givenness of the similar (in positing consciousness) motivates the givenness of what is similar.

Now, how are they both connected? On the one hand, in the unity of a lived experience, or perhaps in the unity of a nexus of lived experiences, I have, under the heading of "motivations," "intentional" connections, tendencies which run back and forth, which are fulfilled or remain open. They come to the fore and they sustain themselves, and here, too, we have motivations of reason: existence motivates co-existence, etc. It is so everywhere that a "unity of consciousness" is related to a transcendent unity of an object within a grasping of something given. (One could also ask whether there is not also, in the mere unity of the stream of consciousness, a unity in which every part motivates the contiguous one.)

On the other hand, we have motivations extending beyond the continuity of the contiguous and inner nexus and, likewise, beyond the continuity of what is given unitarily on the side of the constituted. Here, too, the accomplishing Ego does not have to live in the motivations. The similar reminds me of the similar, and by analogy with what was given with the similar on the one side, I expect something similar on the other side. It is associated with it and "reminds" me of it, though as analogon of something remembered in the usual narrow sense. [226]

Now, however, the question could be raised: is the one kind of motivation actually different from the other? Where I have the lived experience of the unity of co-appurtenance, where motivations run back and forth continually, there the true state of affairs is, one could say, that A refers to B as belonging to it because previously, in analogous cases, A occurred intertwined with B. Hence all thingly apperception and all apperception of unities of the nexus of several things and thingly processes would have their source in associative motivations. We come back to an original togetherness and an original consequence, where there is yet nothing of motivation. But to what extent that would be thinkable, and to what extent the unity of a stream of consciousness could be precisely a unity if it is without any motivation—that is the question.

Furthermore, a distinction needs to be made here. In the unity of the consciousness of a thing, as a consciousness of

co-appurtenance, we have to explicate "conditionalities," a "because-thus" according to various directions: If I turn my eyes in such a way, if I produce a series of optical experiences in a certain way, then I must see such and such, etc. And what I see presents itself as the unity of a thing with these or those parts, and the mode of givenness of one part supports that of the other. If they are to be together Objectively as such and such, and if the one appears in a certain way, then so must the other, in correlation, under the given experiential circumstances. On the other hand, if we take this case: under the previous circumstances, and in the previous nexuses Z, A had occurred, and in the present similar circumstances Z′, A′ is to be expected or has already been given as a consequence, then we also speak here of the "being-co-given" and the being-motivated of A by Z, of the A-positing by the Z-positing. But the being-motivated certainly has a different sense here.

d) Motivation in its noetic and noematic aspects

If we examine the structure of the consciousness that constitutes a thing, then we see that all of nature, with space, time, causality, etc., is completely dissolved into a web of immanent motivations. In the unity of the total lived experience, which comprises consciousness of a thing there and of an Ego here with its Body, we find distinguishable objectivities of many kinds, and we also find functional dependencies which are not dependencies of an actual thing on the actual Body and the actual Ego in the world, which, in short, are not natural-scientific psychic and psychophysical dependencies. But then neither are they dependencies of subjective appearances (as possessed by the subject of lived experience) on real Objectivities that are posited or received as real. We can now consider the noetic lived experiences according to their relations of motivation, relations of nexuses of belonging together, by which occurs a procession from positing to positing, i.e., positing "in consequence of," with this special character. Or, we can consider the thetic correlates, the themata, in their noematic co-appurtenance, whereby again, under this aspect, there occurs the correlative "in consequence of."

We have *static* and *dynamic* co-appurtenances, and the static pass over into dynamic ones in virtue of a change of the lived experiences (and these changes have the character of "subjective" processes of the "I change," perhaps of the "I go through arbitrarily"). But here we touch upon the main difficulty. We do not say that in the unity of the stream of my lived experiences each lived experience is necessary, necessarily conditioned by the lived experiences which precede it and are co-lived. If we say that every lived experience of an act is motivated, that relations of motivation are intertwined in it, this is not to imply that every meaning-intending is one "in consequence of." When I become aware of a thing, the thesis contained in the perception is not always a thesis "in consequence of": e.g., when I see the night sky lit up by a meteor shower or hear quite unexpectedly the crack of a whip. Still, even here a kind of motivation can be exhibited, *included in the form of inner time-consciousness*. This form is something absolutely fixed: the subjective form of the now, of the earlier, etc. I can change nothing of it. Nevertheless, there exists here a unity of co-appurtenance, in virtue of which the judgmental positing "Now this is" conditions the futural positing "Something will be," or again, "Now I have a lived experience" conditions "It was a lived experience previously." Here we have a judgment motivated by another judgment, but prior to the judgment the temporal forms themselves motivate each other. In this sense we [228]
can say that even the pervasive unity of the stream of consciousness is a unity of motivation. In the personal attitude this means that every act of the Ego is subject to the constant apprehension characterizing it as an act "of" the Ego, as "my" lived experience.

e) Empathy toward other persons as an understanding of their motivations

This apprehension as "mine" is obviously also included in cases of empathy. Here it is an other Ego, a certain one I at first do not know, but one I nevertheless do know in terms of universal Ego-being. I know, in general, what "a person," a man, is, and it is a matter for the experience of empathy, in its

unfolding, to instruct me about the man's character, about his knowledge and abilities, etc. This is analogous to the case of the apperception of physical things. In one stroke, I perceive a thing having these visible properties. It is "a" thing. What it is besides, that experience must teach. The extent the perceptual apprehension reaches can be different: I can (in the dark) recognize the thing as a spatial thing, then, under better illumination, it is made more precise as a tree, then as an oak, and finally as the well-known oak that I saw yesterday in a more definite way. Yet there still always remains much that is unknown or imperfectly known. So also in the apprehension of a man very much is already included. From self-experience we know already that implied here is the possibility of a double apprehension: as Object in nature and as person. This holds as well when we consider other subjects. On both sides what is common is the givenness of the fellow-man by means of comprehension, though it functions differently in the two cases. In the first case, what is comprehended is nature; in the other, spirit. In the first case, what is introjectively posited is the other Ego, lived experience, and consciousness, built upon the fundamental apprehension and positing of material nature and apprehended as being functionally dependent on it, as an appendix of it. In the other case, the Ego is posited as person "purely and simply" and posited, consequently, as subject of its personal and thingly surroundings, as related to other persons by means of understanding and mutual understanding, as member of a social nexus to which corresponds a unitary social surrounding world, while at the same time each individual member has his own environment bearing the stamp of his subjectivity. [22

This means that others are apprehended in analogy with one's own Ego as subjects of a surrounding world of persons and things to which they comport themselves in their acts. They are "determined" by this surrounding world, or by the spiritual world that surrounds them and encompasses them, and, in turn, they exercise "determination" on it: they are subject to the laws of motivation.

f) Natural causality and motivation

The "because-so" of motivation has a totally different sense than causality in the sense of nature. No causal research, no matter how far-reaching, can improve the understanding which is ours when we have understood the motivation of a person. The unity of motivation is a nexus founded in the relevant acts themselves, and when we inquire into the "because," into the grounds of a personal behavior, we seek to know nothing but precisely this nexus. The causality of nature in the natural sciences has its correlate in laws of nature, according to which it can be determined without equivocation (at least in the domain of physical nature) what it is that has to follow under univocally determining circumstances. In the sphere of the human sciences, on the contrary, to say that historians, sociologists, or cultural anthropologists "explain" human-scientific facts means that they want to clarify motivations, to make intelligible how the people in question "came to do it," came to behave in such and such a way, which influences they underwent and which ones they themselves exercised, what it was that determined them in and toward the community of action, etc. If the human scientist speaks of "rules" and "laws," to which are subject such modes of behavior or modes of formation of cultural structures, still the "causalities" in question, which find their general expression in the laws, are anything but natural causalities. The historian asks what the members of the society in their communal life represented, thought, valued, desired, etc. How have these people "determined" themselves reciprocally, how have they allowed themselves to be determined by the surrounding world of things, how have they, for their part, shaped the world in turn, etc.?

All spiritual modes of behavior are "causally" linked together through relations of motivation. E.g., I surmise that A is because I know that B, C... are. I hear that a lion has broken loose, and I know a lion is a bloodthirsty animal, and *therefore* I am afraid to go out in the street. The servant meets his master, and because he acknowledges him as master, he greets him with deference. We make a note for ourselves on a memo pad about tomorrow's schedule; the consciousness of the schedule in [230]

connection with the knowledge of our forgetfulness motivates the making of the note. In all these examples, the "motivational because" appears. There is no question here of a judgmental orientation to something real as such. The "because" expresses here anything but a causality of nature (a real causality). I, as subject of the "premises of the action," do not grasp myself in an inductive-real way as the cause of the Ego as subject of the "conclusion of the action." In other words, I who conclude and decide on the basis of these or those motives grasp neither the conclusion as a natural effect of the motives or of the lived experiences of the motives nor myself as subject of a conclusion effected by the Ego as the subject of the motivating lived experiences. It is similar as regards every logical conclusion (it should not be overlooked that the practical conclusion is essentially analogous to the logical one, but they are not the same) and thus everywhere that I give expression in the egological attitude to a motivational situation. If I am able, by means of empathy, to ascertain this situation in an other, then I say *"I understand why* he decided in that way, I understand why he came to that judgment" (in view of what). All these "causalities" are exhibitable quite intuitively, since they are precisely motivations.

Thingly (nature-real, natural) causalities are given intuitively as well. We *see* how the hammer forges the iron, how the drill bores the hole. But the seen causalities are here mere appearances of the "true" natural causalities, just as the thing seen is a mere appearance of the true thing, the physicalistic thing. *The true nature, the physicist's, is a methodologically necessary substruction of thinking* and only as such can it be constituted, *only as "mathematical" does it have its truth.* Versus this, it makes no sense as regards motivation, which is to be grasped originarily-intuitively, to base it, by means of substructions in thought, on something non-intuitive as a mathematical index of an infinite manifold of intuitive appearances, of which the presently given is only one. If I take the spirit, in unity with the Body, as a natural Object, then even the spirit is entwined in natural causality, which itself is given as mere appearance: for the simple reason that one member of the relation of dependency, the physical member, can only be determined as appear- [231]

ance and only by means of substruction. Sensations, sensuous feelings, reproductions, associations, apperceptions, and the whole course of psychic life in general that is grounded there, even as regards its position-takings, are Objectively (naturally-inductively) dependent on the physical Body with its physiological processes and its physiological organization; consequently, they are dependent on real physical nature. But the physiological processes in the sense organs, in the nerve cells and in the ganglia, do not motivate me even if they condition, in my consciousness, psychophysically, the appearance of sense data, apprehensions, and psychic lived experiences. What I do not "know," what does not stand over against me in my lived experiences, in my representing, thinking and acting, as the represented, perceived, remembered, thought, etc., does not "determine" me as a spirit. And what is not intentionally included in my lived experiences, even if unattended or implicit, does not motivate me, not even unconsciously.

g) Relations between subjects and things from the viewpoint of causality and motivation

Now what do we have if we consider subjects as subjects of *intersubjective motivations* and establish that thereby they determine others and are determined by them? Is this not a matter of causality? The first thing to say is that if I do something because I hear that someone else acted in such and such a way, then my action is motivated by my hearing and my knowing, and this is not natural causality. Yet I apprehend myself here as determined by the other man, by the other real Ego. We speak indeed of people as reciprocally "acting" on one another. It is similar to the case of an "abominable" din in the street disturbing me in my work and my finding it precisely abominable, vexatious, etc. In that case my state of mind is conditioned by the hearing of the noise with this determinate acoustic content and this sensuous feeling, etc. We say the din vexes me, *brings about* displeasure in me, just as, on the contrary, the tones of magnificent music bring about joy, admiration, etc. Are these not causal relations? Does anyone doubt that air waves are propagated up to my ear, etc.? On the other hand, however, [232]

we do also say that *since* M and N are, I conclude that S is; my lived experience is related to M and N, to these facts which perhaps are geometrical-ideal, and to which, of course, I can ascribe no action on me.

If we consider the relations more precisely, then we observe (as we have already done previously) that the relations of motivation have various facets. On the one hand, the drawing of a conclusion is noetically motivated by the judging in the premises, the willing by a seeing, hearing, evaluating, etc. On the other hand, it pertains to the essence of these *motivations of acts* that there also exist relations between the *correlates of the acts* and the *acts* on the one side and between the *correlates themselves* on the other side, which also have their "because" and "therefore." These correlates might eventually be characterized as actual, and we might thereby have the protodoxically positing consciousness of actual things and states of affairs. But they enter into these because-relations as these correlates "residing in" consciousness itself, the intuited as intuited, the fictional as fictionalized, the judged as judged, etc. Precisely for that reason it makes no essential difference whether or not the correlates correspond to actualities, whether or not they have in general the "sense" of actualities. I am afraid of the ghost, perhaps it makes me quiver, although I know that what is seen is nothing actual. The dramatic action in the theater moves me deeply, although it is not something real, as I very well know. Whatever changes may manifest themselves in feelings and conscious acts in general, it makes no matter for our question whether I am determined in them by actual things or by the mere phantasy-things of art.

Accordingly it is clear that a fundamental distinction is to be made here, namely:

1. between relations of the real subject to real objects (things, [233] persons, etc.), which are actually real effects, hence real-causal effects. The objects and persons are thereby posited as nature, as real, as dependent on one another for their real existence and for their being what they are.

2. relations between subjects (not posited as causal-real objects) and the intuited, judged, etc., things *"as such,"* i.e., between subjects and noemata-things, which relations necessarily have their reverse side in relations among certain acts of the subjects, acts of intuition, of thinking, etc. And likewise here are relations between subjects and other people and their acts, which are not actually causal relations but relations, produced by empathy, between the acts and motivations of the one subject and those of the other. Thereby, the subject in question, who undergoes the "influences," is motivated by his own lived experiences or only by the correlates of these lived experiences, that is, by the correlates of empathy as such.

Here the subject may, as indeed he normally does (when he does not empathize with imagined subjects and the like), posit the empathized subject, the fellow man and his lived experiences, as actualities and as natural realities, just as he can posit himself as such a reality, and in that case, to be sure, the relation of motivation can be transformed into a real-causal relation, and the motivational "because" into a real "because." The din there, outside, vexes me—the apprehension can be exactly the same as when I am vexed by the popular song haunting me in phantasy. In the case of the first, the correlate is posited as actual; with the latter, not. And when it is posited as actual, I can understand the state of affairs as causal, the transformation of the attitude being scarcely noticeable, although it is an essential change. The real process outside acts causally on me as a reality: the falling of the hammer disturbs the air, the disturbances stimulate my organs of hearing, etc., with the consequence that there is produced in me, as real Ego, the noise.

The same holds by analogy in the case of the intersubjective relations of dependency. To be sure, the other person is given to us in comprehension as related to a Body and as present there, [234] one with the Body. Is this unity not therefore a real, psychophysical unity, a causal unity? But upon closer scrutiny, we do not find, living in the comprehension-consciousness (e.g., when we converse with other persons, when they address themselves to us in speaking and we address them, when we receive instructions from them and carry them out, etc.), a naturalistic unity between Body and soul,[1] any more than the things we see there

[1] Here begins the continuation of the text of Supplement VII, pp. 330-332.

as things of the environment are things of nature. The things surrounding us are what we have over against us in intuition; they have their colors, odors, etc. They are precisely the things that our experience at present shows us, although they are given in it imperfectly, of course. But we only need step up closer, look at them "from all sides," in order to know them "perfectly" (i.e., perfectly for our aims). The qualities of the thing (the "sensuous," "secondary" qualities) which in this way appear ever better are the qualities that are constitutive of the surrounding things; they are the only ones proper to these things, and no extension of experience goes beyond such qualities. Hence according to the naïvely personal and interpersonal experiential apprehension, there are not "physicalistic" things somehow behind the actually intuited things, or non-intuitive ("primary") qualities behind the intuited qualities, which would be mere "signs," mere "subjective appearances" of them. The things of our socially common world, the things of the world of our dialogue and praxis, have precisely those qualities we actually (optimally) see them as having. Everything is here intuited thinghood, and no one apprehends the seeing and hearing of them as real-causal processes, neither his own such processes nor those of an other. Here one looks precisely upon the things, and this looking is an act of the subject but is not a natural-causal relation. The subject is not an Object of natural science; the subject acts, but that is not the theme.

Now, as to the persons we encounter in society, their Bodies are naturally given to us in intuition just like the other Objects of our environment, and consequently so are they as persons, unified with the Bodies. But we do not find there two things, entwined with one another in an external way; Bodies and persons. We find *unitary* human beings, who have dealings with us; and their Bodies participate in the human unity. In their intuitive content—in what is typical of Corporeality in general, and in the many particularities which vary from case to case—ones of facial expression, of gestures, of the spoken "word," of the individual's intonation, etc.—is expressed the spiritual life of persons, their thinking, feeling, desiring, what they do and what they omit to do. And so is also already their individual spiritual character, which, to be sure, comes to [235]

givenness in an ever more perfect way in the unfolding of the states which become understandable to us in their nexus as well. Everything is here of an intuitive character; as are external world and Body, so is the Bodily-spiritual unity of the man there before me.

I hear the other speaking, see his facial expressions, attribute to him such and such conscious lived experiences and acts, and let myself be determined by them in this or that way. The facial expressions are seen facial expressions, and they are immediately bearers of sense indicating the other's consciousness, e.g., his will, which, in empathy, is characterized as the actual will of this person and as a will which addresses me in communication. The will characterized in this way, i.e., the empathetic consciousness of this will and consequently the consciousness that posits in the mode of empathy, then motivates my counter-willing or my submission, etc. There is no question here of a causal relation (as, e.g., between the optically active thing, the "head" of the other, his face, and his face as it appears to me, between his sound production and the stimulation of my ear) and equally no question of any other psychophysical relation. The mien of the other determines me (this is already a kind of motivation) to join to it a sense within the other's consciousness. And the mien is precisely the one I see, and in seeing it, I just as little take it as causally related to my sight, my sensations, appearances, etc., as I do with any other straightforward sense perception. It is not at all that we are just grasping the causality deficiently, superficially. Rather, we are altogether *outside the attitude required for grasping natural causality*. In empathy, consciousness is posited in relation to consciousness, and my will and that of the other are posited in a determinate milieu of consciousness, and in a somewhat modified way here one act motivates the other, as occurs in the individual consciousness. "In a modified way" because at first my will and the empathy of the other's will are in a "because" relation, but in that case so are my will and the other's will itself. This motivation has its necessary presuppositions *as* motivation (not real presuppositions as real conscious states), familiar ones such as "I see the facial expression of the other." To introduce natural causality here would be to abandon the personal attitude. [236]

h) Body and spirit as comprehensive unity: "spiritualized" Objects

The thoroughly intuitive unity presenting itself when we grasp a person *as such* (e.g., when we, as persons, speak to them as persons, or when we hear them speak, or work together with them, or watch their actions) is the unity of the *"expression"* and the *"expressed"* that belongs to the essence of all comprehensive unities.[1] This Body-spirit unity is not the only one of this kind. When I read the "lines and pages" of a book or when I read in the "book" and grasp the words and sentences, then we are dealing with physical matters. The book is a body, the pages are sheets of paper, the lines are black marks and physical imprints at certain spots of these papers, etc. Is that what I grasp when I "see" the book, when I "read" the book, when I "see" that what is written is written, what is said is said? It is obvious that my attitude is here quite different. I do indeed have certain "appearances;" the physical thing and the physical occurrences appearing in it are there in space with a determinate orientation to "my" center of apprehension, hence they are in front of me, to the right or to the left, etc. exactly as if I were, in my experience, focused on the corporeal. But that is precisely what I am not focused on. I see what is thingly about it insofar as it appears to me, but I "live in the sense, comprehending it." And while I do so, the spiritual unity of the sentence and that of the sentence-nexuses are there before me, and these in turn have their character, e.g., the determinate peculiar style impressing itself on me, a style which distinguishes this book, as a literary product, from any other of the same genre.

Now one could say that there is *bound* to what physically [237] appears, as a first Objectivity, a second one which is precisely the sense "animating" the physical. But in this regard I wonder: am I focused on a second Objectivity only externally linked to the first? Is not rather that upon which I am focused a unity that is fused together throughout and not something that just stands there *next to* the physical? It is surely the case that this is not a connection in which the parts are "outside one another," a connection in which each part could also exist for itself in abstraction from the form which binds them.

[1] *Cf.* Supplement VIII, p. 333.

Let us take another example, changed in a fitting way. I have here before me a piece of jewelry, and what interests me exclusively is the beautiful sapphire mounted in it. That is what I consider, that is what I am focused on in an experience oriented towards it. The rest of the piece of jewelry appears but does not fall within the compass of my observing perception. Or, as a natural scientist, I look at an organ that I have to dissect as an organ for itself; the rest of the physical Body, whence I excised it, is something I see but do not observe, and so on. In the case of the attitude directed to the spiritual, do we have the same situation or perhaps an analogous one? Is the spiritual a part connected to the appearing Body in a way similar to the manner in which one physical part is connected with another? Do I pay attention to that part and simply not observe the Bodily? No, it is obvious that the state of affairs as regards the spiritual is totally different.

Certainly I can say that the physical is animated and is so in various, yet related, senses. The word, the sentence, the whole text (the drama, the essay) have their spiritual content, their spiritual "sense." And thereby a nexus of physical nature appears. I can at any time attend to this nexus, I can assume my attitude in such a way that the observing, experiencing, noticing regard (the thematic intention) enters into these appearances and *intends* the appearing spatial existence. Then it is precisely "there." Furthermore, I can again turn back from there into the attitude in which the drama, the essay, or the individual sentences it contains are my Object. But then I have an Object which no longer exists *there* in space, at this place, and such talk makes no sense in that case.

Further, while reflecting and juxtaposing the one Object *as* [238] Object of the one attitude with the other as Object of the other attitude, I can say that the existing book, the existing sheet of paper, have a special sense, they are animated by an intention. The book with its paper pages, its cover, etc. is a thing. To this book there does not append a second thing, the sense; but instead the latter, *in "animating," penetrates* the physical whole in a certain way: namely, insofar as it animates every word,

though, again, not each word taken for itself, but rather the word-nexuses, which are bound together by the sense into meaningful forms, and these later bound into higher formations, etc. The spiritual sense is, by animating the sensuous appearances, *fused* with them in a certain way instead of just being bound with them side by side.

It is clear that this analysis, even if still insufficient, applies in the first place to all works of the spirit, to all works of art and to all things that have a comprehensive spiritual sense, a spiritual significance. Of course it therefore applies, *mutatis mutandis,* to all things of ordinary life within the sphere of culture, the sphere of actual life. A drinking glass, a house, a spoon, theater, temple, etc. mean something. And there is always a difference between seeing something as a thing and seeing it as a useful object, as a theater, temple, etc. Thereby the spiritual sense at one time belongs to a purely *ideal sphere,* and has no relation to existence, and at another time does have such a *relation to existence,* although it is never some sort of real thing in the proper sense, conjoined as a second existence to a physically existing thing. It is a question everywhere of a *fundamental mode of apperception,* a particular experiential attitude, in which what appears (is pregiven) to the senses does not become sense datum, perception, experience, but helps to constitute, in its "psychic fluidum," in the very unity of the different kind of apprehension, an Objectivity of a proper sort.[1] Obviously this apprehension thereby has another "subjective function," another subjective mode than in the case of thematic external experience.

More precisely, we should have said the cases are different. For example, the case of the *use-Object* and the case of sculpture, the literary work, etc. As regards the latter, the [239] written signs are inessential but not so the associated word-sounds, which, for their part, are not posited as memory, as existing, or even as "appearing." As regards the Object of use, certain sensuous determinations of its existence enter into the total apprehension; I look at the form of the spoon, etc., for

[1] The attitude does not itself constitute the spiritual product; the physical-spiritual is already pre-constituted, pre-thematized, pre-given.

that belongs to the essence of a spoon. Here one will say that the perception together with its existential thesis is sheer substratum for the grasping of what is spiritual. But even here it holds that the spiritual is not a second something, is not an appendix, but is precisely animating; and the unity is not a connection of two, but, on the contrary, one and only one is there. Physical being can be grasped for itself (carrying out the existential thesis), by means of a natural attitude, as natural being, as thingly being; and to the extent one *can* assume this attitude, it was "included" therein. But what we have here is not a surplus which would be posited on top of the physical, but rather this is spiritual being which essentially includes the sensuous but which, once again, does not include it as a part, the way one physical thing is part of another. In many cases, we do have a real nature, an existence, as substratum; and in many cases—as already indicated above—the substratum is physically unreal and has no existence. The harmony of the rhythms of a closet drama cannot be posited as a real existence; just as little as the drama is somewhere existing in space is the harmony somewhere. To the ideal spiritual unity belongs the ideal harmony.[1]

Let us now leave the region of these partially real, partially ideal "spiritual Objects," formations of the "Objective spirit," and consider again *spiritual living beings*, those beings animated in a special sense, i.e., human beings (but of course all animals are included). The question above was: is a man a unification of [240] two realities, is that how I see him? If I do, then I am grasping

[1] In this presentation (totally insufficient, by the way) these two must be kept distinct:

1. if I do not accept the idea of a bond here in the manner of an appendix, that can be taken to mean there are not two things, external to one another, which are connected up and which are joined precisely in conformity with the sense of the total apprehension and which, in the movement of the focus from one to the other, would appear as parts on an equal level, and thus would form an external unity of parts of the same level.

2. the sensible acquires, as it were, an inner life in virtue of its being a sensuous substratum given a spiritual sense (which does not at all imply an external connection as in 1.), and as is the case with a literary work (drama), the physical substratum is a manifold of sensuous members which are, as manifold, unitarily animated, so that even taken this way the spiritual sense is not simply *beside* the physical. (*Cf.* also p. 255).

a corporeal existence. But that is not the attitude I am in when I see a man. I see the man, and in seeing him I also see his Body. In a certain way, the apprehension of a man as such goes through the appearance of the body which here is a Body. In a certain sense, the apprehension does not stop at the body, its dart is not aimed at that, but it goes through it. Yet neither does the apprehension aim at the spirit joined to the Body; instead, it aims precisely at the man. And the apprehension of the human, the apprehension of that person there, who dances, laughs when amused, and chatters, or who discusses something with me in science, etc., is not the apprehension of a spirit fastened to a Body. Instead it is the apprehension, accomplished through the medium of an appearance of a body, of something that essentially includes in itself the appearance of a body and that constitutes an Object, of which I can say: it *has* a Corporeality, it has a body which is a physical thing with such and such qualities, and it *has* lived experiences and lived dispositions. And this Object has characteristics both sides possess at once: a way of walking, a way of dancing, a way of speaking, etc. Man, in his movements, in his action, in his speaking and writing, etc., is not a mere connection or linking up of one thing, called a soul, with another thing, the Body. The Body is, as Body, filled with the soul through and through. Each movement of the Body is full of soul, the coming and going, the standing and sitting, the walking and dancing, etc. Likewise, so is every human performance, every human production.[1]

The apprehension of the man is such that, as "sense," it completely penetrates the apprehension of the body. But this should not be understood as if there were any question here of a temporal sequence: first the apprehension of the body and then the man. On the contrary, it is an apprehension which has the apprehension of the body, constituting the Body, as founding substratum for the apprehension of the comprehensive sense. Basically and in the main, this is just the way the word-sound is "Body" for the animating "sense." Furthermore, the imprinted page or the spoken lecture is not a connected duality of [241] word-sound and sense, but, rather, each word has its sense, and

[1] *Cf.* Supplement IX, p. 333.

perhaps parts of words already have the character of a word, as already, in anticipation, sense refers to a new sense and to new words, the way words are joined into word-formations, into sentences, and sentences into nexuses of sentences, which happens because of the fact that animating sense has such a rhythm, such a texture of sense, such a unity, a unity which yet has its support, or, better, its Corporeality, in verbal substrata, so that the whole lecture is through and through a unity of Body and spirit, is, in its articulations, always a unity of Body and spirit, a unity which is a part of a unity of a higher level, so that finally the lecture itself is present as the unity of the highest level.

Exactly the same holds for the unity, man. It is not that the Body is an undifferentiated physical unity, undifferentiated from the standpoint of its "sense," from the standpoint of the spirit. Rather, the physical unity of the Body there, which changes in such and such a way or is at rest, is *articulated* in multiple ways, in ways that are more determinate or less determinate, according to the circumstances. And the articulation is one of *sense,* which means it is not of a kind that is to be found within the physical attitude as if every physical partition, every distinction of physical properties, would receive "significance," i.e., significance as Body, or would receive a sense of its own, its own "spirit." Rather, the apprehension of a thing as a man (and, to be more exact, as a man who speaks, reads, dances, is vexed and rages, defends himself or attacks, etc.) is precisely such as to animate multiple, though distinguishable, moments of the appearing corporeal objectivity and to give to the individual sense a psychic content, and again it is such as to unify the already animated individualities into a higher unity according to the demands present in the sense and finally unify them into the unity of a human being. We have just still to note that only very little of the Bodily actually comes to appearance at any given time and only very little appears in direct animation, whereas very much can be "supposed," co-apprehended, and co-posited in a more or less indeterminate-vague way, and this is co-posited Corporeality and has a co-posited sense. A large part can remain completely undetermined and yet still contain so much determination: a certain Corporeality with a [242]

certain spirituality—a certain one, which, as horizon of experience, is to be determined further by experience.

This apperception of spirit is transferred to one's own Ego, which, in apperceiving other spirits, obviously does not have to be apperceived for itself in this way (as comprehensive unity, as spirit), and if it is not apperceived that way, then it functions as non-Objectivated pure Ego. In my own case, I arrive at the apprehension of man (in the sense of spirit) by way of a comprehension of others, i.e., insofar as I comprehend them as centers not only for the rest of the surrounding world but also for my Body, which is for them an Object of the surrounding world. It is precisely thereby that I comprehend them as apprehending me similar to the way I apprehend them, thus as apprehending me as a social man, as a comprehensive unity of Body and spirit. Therein is rooted an identification between the Ego I encounter in direct inspection (as Ego which has its Body over and against it) and the Ego of the other's representation of me, the Ego the others can understand and posit, one with my Body, as, for him, an "external" representation, in acts which I for my part attribute to him. The comprehensive representation others have, or can have, of me is of service to me as regards the apprehension of myself as a social "man," hence the apprehension of myself totally different from the way I grasp myself in direct inspection. By means of this apprehension, with its complicated structure, *I fit myself into the family of man,* or, rather, I create the constitutive possibility for the unity of this "family." It is only now that I am, in the proper sense, an Ego over against an other and can then say "we." And then for the first time do I become "Ego," and the other precisely an other. "We" are all human beings, similar to each other, capable as such of entering into commerce with each other and establishing human relations. All this is accomplished in the spiritual attitude, without any "naturalizing." But we know already that we can turn *every man as comprehensive unity* into a *unity of nature,* a biological and psychophysical Objectivity, in which pure spirit no longer functions as member of a comprehensive unity, but instead a new phenomenal unity, an Objective thinghood, is constituted. This is transferred to me myself as an Object of nature, in a very mediate way of representation, as one can see. By means of the change of attitude, the spiritual [243]

Ego is transformed in my own case, even if in a more mediate way than in the case of others, into the psychic Ego of the natural-scientific treatment of the soul.

We have here a fundamental analysis *embracing all spiritual Objects, all unities of Body and sense,* hence not only individual humans but also human communities, all cultural formations, all individual and social works, institutions, etc.

Now if we have not been permitted to let the relation between Body and spirit, wherever it occurs, pass as a junction of two things, still nothing prevents us, on the other hand, from ascribing to the Body a Bodily unity and to the sense a sense-unity in such a way that we then acknowledge that the Bodily-spiritual unity we call man, state, or church harbors two-fold unities, namely: Bodily unities as material-corporeal unities (the ultimate in all cases in which corporeal existence enters into the whole of the "spiritualized" Object) and spiritual unities. Consequently a distinction has to be drawn and we have to maintain that the individual man is:

1) unitary Body, i.e., a body which is animated and which bears sense, and

2) unitary spirit. In the case of a state, a people, a union, etc., there is a plurality of Bodies, standing in physical relationships, something required for intercommerce, either direct or indirect. What pertains here has sense. Each Body has its spirit, but they all are bound together by the overarching *communal spirit* which is not something beside them but is an encompassing "sense" or "spirit." This is an Objectivity of a higher level.

In the case of other spiritual Objects, namely the *ideal* ones, such as drama, literature in general, music, and in a certain sense also in the case of every other work of art, the situation is different, so much so that the sensuous Body is not an existing one. (The sensuous Body of a picture is not the picture hanging on the wall. It would not be difficult to elaborate this. But it would take us too far afield.)

At all events, with respect to the unity of the spirit, which makes up the "sense" of the Body, we have to note the following, as regards the individual man: [244]

Empathy into persons is nothing else than precisely that apprehension which *understands the sense,* i.e., which grasps the

Body in its sense and in the unity of the sense it has to bear. To perform an act of empathy means to grasp an *Objective spirit*, to see a human being, to see a crowd of people, etc. Here we do not have an apprehension of the Body as bearer of something psychic in the sense that the Body is posited (experienced) as a physical Object and then something else is added on to it, as if it was apprehended just as something in relation to, or in conjunction with, something else. What we have here rather is precisely an Objectivation of a higher level superposed on that of the other stratum of apprehension in such a way that what is constituted is the unity of an Object, one which in turn (without any kind of binding of parts that would presuppose a prior separation) involves Objective strata of lower and higher levels, distinguishable only after the fact.

The unity given in the apprehension of spiritual being allows for differentiation into Body and sense by means of a change in the apprehending attitude. The human Body is given in perceptual appearance; as the correlate of perception it presents itself as an actuality, and as such it fits within the surrounding actuality of the one who understands and who, in seeing this Body, grasps the human person as a companion. More precisely formulated, he does not posit or grasp in the proper sense (in the sense of an actively performed thesis) the actuality of the Body when he grasps the person expressed therein, no more than we posit, in reading, the written marks on the paper in an active thesis of experience, make it into the "*theme*" of theoretical or even practical position-taking. The written mark "appears," but we "live" in the performance of the sense. Likewise, the Body appears, but what we perform are the acts of comprehension, and what we grasp are the persons and the personal states "expressed" in the appearing content of the Body. As expressed, they appertain only to the appearing Body of my environment; but this *appertaining* signifies here a special relation having anything but the sense of the founded natural unity, man as an animal being, as zoological Object. On the [245] contrary, it precedes the constitution of any such unity.

In comparison with the unities of word-sound and sense brought up earlier, it must be noted that we were dealing there with irreal unities. The unity of Body and spirit, however, is

constituted as a higher unity of two real unities. It requires proper constitutive manifolds, something which obviously is shown in the exhibition of this unity in the consciousness of its explicit givenness.

If a real objectivity of experience is to come to givenness, it is necessary to take together the two real unities of Body and soul and pursue in experience, in a unitary fashion, their relations of dependency on real circumstances and on one another. Instead of paying heed merely to the Body and, again, instead of simply living the understanding and paying heed to the person, we first of all have to take the connection produced between expression and expressed as a *totality* and see how it behaves in concordant experience. We will have to say, of course, that already *prior* to the *turn and grasp* of experience this unity of expression and expressed comes to *consciousness*, as *a unique reality*, in the unfolding of the concomitant perceptual apprehensions and that it is perceptually present as a formation of *two levels*, in such a way that the total formation's dependency on circumstances essentially includes the dependency of the events of the higher level on those of the lower.

In fact, a unity of realizing apperception is constantly a lived experience, on which the regard of the pure Ego can focus and can grasp therein the founded reality as well as its current states and circumstances. It must be noticed, however, that the *unity of expression* is a *presupposition* for the constitution of the founded reality as one which encloses levels, but that it is not already in itself this reality. We could formulate it in this way: it is only by means of expression that the person of the other is there at all for the experiencing subject, and the person must necessarily be there first in order for him to be able to enter, precisely as a level, into a real unity of a higher level and indeed to do so together with that which serves as expression.

In itself it is indeed thinkable that the totality of real relations [246] between Body and spirit would be reducible to the unity of expression. Spiritual being would be expressed in the Bodily to such an extent that the spirit would be graspable; but psychophysical unity would be lacking, and Body and soul would not appear in real connection. Perhaps it will be objected that the bond between expression and expressed is itself already appre-

hendable as real. If the Body has the peculiarity that personal states, as co-posited, are tied in empirical regularity to its general type and especially to certain occurrences in it, e.g., the play of facial features, the spoken word, etc., then these occurrences have precisely real spiritual consequences. Conversely, if certain spiritual states unfold and if, in parallel, certain miens, gestures, etc. appear on the Body, then in that case the spiritual has real consequences in the Body and, accordingly, is experienced as a cause. In the meantime, such statements have only to be pronounced in order to see that this view cannot be sustained. A *parallel bond* of this kind does not create any reality of a higher level. We would have in such a case two realities, each of them having its states and its real properties. Within certain limits there would exist a correspondence, and conclusions could be drawn from the parallel states on the one side to those on the other; the ones could be used as intimations of the others. But not a single new real property would arise, and neither could there be any question of a causality joining Body and spirit, for that presupposes both realities would assume for one another the function of circumstances with respect to their real states. But as we have presupposed the state of affairs here, the cancelling of the one reality would not change anything as regards the other, and the total manifold of its states would be the same.

The truth is, however, that with the appropriate attitude a man stands there confronting us as a *real unity* with real properties, ones we call psychophysical and which presuppose causality in the relations between Body and soul. It is precisely through such a causality that a proper founded unity is made possible. There is in the sense of the natural apperception of a man something like health and sickness in their countless forms, whereby sickness of the Body results in psychic disturbances [247] and, more generally, in various experienceable consequences for the soul. Even inverse causalities are given in experience; e.g., the will, in that it has the Body as the field of its freedom, leaves a wake of Bodily occurrences. Yet it is not necessary to list individually all the forms of psychophysical causality which, even if they are always retracted in subsequent philosophical argumentation, nevertheless command the straightforward

experiential apprehension of animal being. What matters here is that by means of them something enters into the experiential apprehension which is not simply contained in the unity of "expression" and "expressed."[1]

The Body, which we apprehend as expression of spiritual life, is at the same time a part of nature, inserted into the universal nexus of causality, and the spiritual life, which we grasp through the Bodily expression and understand in its nexus of motivation, appears, in virtue of its connection with the Body, to be conditioned itself by natural processes and to be apperceived as something of nature. The unity of Body and spirit is a two-fold one, and, correlatively, a two-fold apprehension (the personalistic and the naturalistic) is included in the unitary apperception of the human.

§ 57. Pure Ego and personal Ego as Object of reflexive self-apperception[2]

If we take the *personal Ego* just as we encountered it in the *inspectio* (thus without regard to its unity with the expressing Body, the Body given to us in empathy), then it does not at first seem to be distinct from the pure Ego. The Body is in that case something I have, hence in the broadest sense something over against me just like everything pregiven, foreign to the Ego, in analogy with the things of my environment. To be sure, the Body has here (as we already saw earlier) a particular subjectivity; it is proper to me in a special sense: it is the *organ* and system of organs of the Ego, the organ of perception, the organ of my effects on the "outside," on the extra-Bodily environment, etc. I myself, however, am the subject of the actual "I live": I undergo and I do, I am affected, I have my own "over and against" and am affected by it, attracted, repulsed, and [248] motivated in various ways. Or, more clearly: *self-perception is a reflection* (self-reflection of the pure Ego) and presupposes according to its essence an *unreflected consciousness*. The unre-

[1] *Cf.* Supplement X, pp. 333 ff.

[2] *Cf.* the § with the same title in Supplement X, pp. 337 ff.

flected life of the Ego in relation to all sorts of pregivennesses, in relation to a surrounding world of things, a world of goods, etc., alien to the Ego, takes on a distinctive form, precisely that of self-reflection or self-perception, which is thus a special mode of the "I live" in the universal nexus of Ego-life. To expound it more precisely, it takes on the form: I perceive that I have perceived this or that and that I still continue to perceive, I perceive that this or that affected me previously, though was unperceived, that it has attracted my attention, that I still remain fixed on it, that something joyful moved me and still does, that I made a decision and stuck to it, etc. By way of such reflections I know about my unreflected Ego-life; they bring structures of it into the focus of my attention.

Reflection can be a protracted and continous unity of reflections. In reflection, I pass from one cogito, which has become a grasped object, to another and again to others; and in so doing the Ego, the subject in each cogito, grasps its identity according to its essence. The manifold activities and passivities of the Ego are given originally as those of one identical Ego; and correlatively, the manifold possessions, that which affects, that which is pregiven, belonging to the immanent or transcendent sphere, is given originally as the possessions of one and the same Ego. All these are descriptions which are pertinent to the pure Ego.

Now, while I move thus in the fields of reflection (in the Objectivated subjectivities), in living, unreflected acts of reflection, I *experience* thereby how I "comport" myself under different subjective circumstances, i.e., in relation to my sphere of current pregivennesses (my surrounding world in a very broad sense). And if I enter into the intertwining of the motivations of my cogito, into the patent and latent intentionalities of motivation, then I experience how I am motivated by them, how I am *wont* to be motivated by them, and what *sort of general character I possess, in terms of experience,* as the motivational subject of these motivating circumstances[1]: i.e., [249]

[1] Here we must distinguish between habits which I have but which I did not have in various periods of my past, possessing others instead. And, on the other hand, the habitual style. But is "habit" the right word here? As Ego, do I not have my position-taking and my way of position-taking not out of mere habit but from freedom and faculties of various kinds?

what sort of *personal subject* I am.[1] I experience all this at first without an accompanying conceptual fixation and without thinking about it (without "reflecting," if the word is taken in quite a different sense, namely, precisely in the sense of the comportment of thinking and asserting). So we distinguish between *pure-Ego-reflection,* i.e., reflection on the pure Ego that belongs essentially to every cogito, and *reflective thematic experience* built on the basis of the accrued experiential apperception, the intentional object of which is this empirical Ego, the Ego of empirical intentionality, as self-experience of the *personal Ego* in relation to the experiential nexuses in which this personal Ego (hence in relation to the acts it carries out under the pertinent motivating circumstances) shows itself according to its *"personal features"* or *properties of character.*

To complete this exposition it should be noted that the inner reflection I am carrying out here does not exclude, but rather includes, the fact that I apprehend myself thereby as a human Ego also in the relations I maintain with others. It is indeed as personal Ego that I comport myself in relation to others as ones who also belong to my surrounding world. But if I keep within the content offered by pure and proper self-perception and limit myself to the self-preservation of my person under the circumstances of my comportment in the surrounding world, then it is clear that I can disregard the stratum of apprehension that arises from the fact that I represent myself at the same time as the same one who is apprehended by others externally through empathy. And finally, even if I eliminate every apperception [250] bearing on others and consequently all the contributions this apperception makes towards the rest of the apperception of the surrounding world and of myself, then obviously what remains

[1] Is this to mean that merely through repeated reflection on the motivations of my affections and actions there arises an experiential apperception of the Ego as an Ego of affection and action? As personal Ego, however, I am a man among other men. What is prior here, the formation of the inductive apperception of the personal style of others or of my own style? And is it merely a question of inductive-associative apperception? The person is the subject of faculties. A person's faculty is not constituted merely as a product of association, and I come to know his formation and growth according to the style of experience properly his own, in which free association always plays a role. Much is still to be clarified here.

is my Ego, which comports itself in a regulated way in my pure (natural, thingly) surrounding world, and a limited personal apperception. In self-intuition in the proper sense (self-perception, self-memory) there enters at the outset nothing of the representation of the way in which I would appear from a there, from an other's point of view.[1]

I, the personal Ego, am something pre-given to myself, after the development of the empirical apperception of the Ego, just as well as the thing is pre-given to me after the thing-apperception has developed. Just as "experience," in the sense of deliberate observation executed according to developed thing-apperception, and in the sense of willfully ordered satisfaction of the interest in things, allows me to come to know the thing better through series of experiences—which leads to observational science—so it is with regard to the empirical Ego. I purposely enter "into the experience" and come to know myself "more clearly," possibly with a purely observational interest. Self-perception as personal self-perception and the nexus of reflective self-experiences "teaches" me that my pure Ego-acts unfold in a regulated way under their subjective [25]

[1] The personal Ego is the human Ego. I experience the comportment of others within the circumstances of their surrounding world, and out of repeated reflection on their similar behavior under similar circumstances an inductive apperception arises. Insofar as I apperceive myself as a human being in a human nexus and thus find occasion enough to observe my own behavior and find it to be regulated (i.e., I find habits, active regularities in my behavior), I come to know myself as a personal "reality." The personal reflection which I exercise in this way is therefore a very mediated one in its intentionality.

Yet many questions still remain.

First, a part of inductive apperception, concerning myself, arises as somatological prior to the experience of others. Here it must be seriously considered how the Ego, in all this, plays its role as a pole and how an enduring ability is constituted (I can move my hand in a certain direction, I can touch things, etc.): my Body as substrate of various Corporeal "faculties." And then multiple habits in my subjective sphere, whether or not others come into consideration for me. Interplay between the observation of others and self-observation, with a continued extension of inductive apperception as a consequence.

With that, however, always and from the very outset there comes into consideration the faculties proper to the Ego and the somatological faculties of the lower stratum. An active faculty is indeed not a habit, not an inductively constituted property, not a mere product of association, if we take the latter in the customary sense. The analysis of the person is therefore very incomplete here.

circumstances. I recognize *eidetically*, or *can* recognize, that according to these regulated processes the "representation," Ego-person, the empirical Ego-apperception, must *necessarily* develop and must incessantly develop further, and that hence, if I reflect on a series of lived experiences, a course of various *cogitationes*, I must encounter myself constituted as personal Ego. The course of the lived experience of pure consciousness is necessarily a process of development in which the pure Ego must assume the apperceptive form of the personal Ego, hence must become the nucleus of all sorts of intentions which would find their demonstration or their fulfillment in series of experiences of the type just mentioned.

§ 58. The constitution of the personal Ego prior to reflection[1]

In reflection I therefore always find myself as a personal Ego. But originally this Ego is constituted in the genesis pervading the flux of lived experiences. The crucial question here is this: is the personal Ego *constituted on the basis* of Ego-reflections, hence completely originally on the basis of pure self-perception and self-experience? We have lawfulnesses, such as those which stand under the heading "association," that belong to the stream of lived experience with its total content, thus likewise to the *cogitationes* emerging therein as well as to the other lived experiences. So the question is whether, merely in virtue of such lawfulnesses, apperception in general can develop and, in particular, those of the personal Ego in its regulated comportment relative to subjective circumstances, in such a way that reflections on *cogitationes* play no privileged role there, or whether precisely the reflections have here a special and altogether *essential constitutive function.* Is it necessary that I, in reflective experience, run through my modes of comportment in order for the personal Ego to be able to come to consciousness as the unity of these modes, or can it already be "conscious" in *pre-givenness,* before it was *given* originally through such series

[1] On this §, *cf.* Supplement XII, pp. 344 ff.

of identifying and realizing experiences, which, as reflections on the *cogitationes*, focus on the comportment in relation to [252] circumstances? But in that case what is it which is organized in the pre-reflective sphere? Surely, "associations" are formed, references back and forth develop, just as they do with the unnoticed sensuous and thingly "backgrounds." Thus a content is already there, and in the subsequent reflection, in the remembering, I can and I must encounter something already formed. This is the presupposition for the "explication," for the "fully conscious" exhibition, of the "if" and "then," and for that identification of the Ego in relation to the pertinent circumstances, in which the Ego is "properly" constituted as personal-real unity. (The question arises as to whether something similar does not take place regarding the constitution of the thing, which I have in fact shown in my *Transcendental Logic*.)

But even abstracting from the associative nexuses, the Ego constituted in reflection refers back to another one. Properly spoken, I am originally not a unity composed of associative and active experience (if experience means the same as it does in the case of the thing). I am the subject of my life, and the subject develops by living; what it primarily experiences is not itself, but instead it constitutes objects of nature, goods, instruments, etc. What it primarily forms and structures as active is not itself but things for work. The Ego does not originally arise out of experience—in the sense of an associative apperception in which are constituted unities of manifolds of a nexus—but out of life (it is what it is not *for* the Ego, but it is itself the Ego).

The Ego can be more and can be other than the Ego as apperceptive unity. It can have *latent* capacities (dispositions) which have not yet appeared, have not yet been apperceptively Objectified, just as a thing has properties that have not yet been drawn into the thing-apperception. We make all these distinctions even in the ordinary, personal way of considering a man and consequently they are there in the human-scientific (e.g., historical) approach, in ordinary experience. No one "knows" himself or has "knowledge" of what he is, without *learning* to know himself. Self-experience, self-apperception, is constantly

expanding. The "learning to know oneself" is one with the development of self-apperception, with the constitution of the "self," and this development is carried out in unity with the development of the subject itself.

But what about a supposed beginning? In the beginning of [253] experience, no constituted "self" is pre-given yet and present as an object. It is completely latent for itself and for others, at least in terms of intuition. Yet the others can already, in empathy, comprehend more of it insofar as the form of subjectivity is experientially predelineated to them as a form constituted in development. The peculiarity of the spiritual subject is that in it there arises the apperception, "Ego," an apperception in which this "subject" is the "object" (even if it is not always the thematic Object). The apperception, "thing," does not arise *in* a thing; only subjects have such apperceptions. Therefore we have to distinguish between the "I that I am" on the subject side and the "I that I am" as Object for myself, an Object which is, in the existing "I am," represented, constituted, and perhaps intended in the specific sense: the me. What is intended here is "the person" constituted for me, the Ego which has consciousness as a self.

Furthermore, must we not say that, in contrast to the waking Ego, the sleeping is complete immersion in Ego-matter, in the *hyle*, is undifferentiated Ego-being, is Ego-sunkenness, whereas the awake Ego opposes itself to the matter and then is affected, acts, undergoes, etc.? The Ego posits the non-Ego and comports itself towards it; the Ego unceasingly constitutes its "over and against," and in this process it is motivated and always motivated anew, and not arbitrarily but as exercising *"self-preservation."* If we disregard a lower level in which "sensuous objectivity" arises as a unity "without acts," then the Ego develops unceasingly, what it does and what it undergoes always having their after-effects. The Ego exercises itself, it habituates itself, it is determined in its later behavior by its earlier behavior, the power of certain motives increases, etc. The Ego "acquires" capacities, posits goals, and, in attaining these goals acquires practical skills. It not only acts, but activities themselves become goals, and likewise so do systems of activities (e.g., I want to be able to play a piece on the piano with ease) and the corresponding skills and faculties.

§ 59. The Ego as subject of faculties

The Ego, as unity, is a system of the *"I can."* In this regard a distinction is to be made between the *physical* "I can" (the Bodily and the one mediated by the Body) and the *spiritual.* I [254]
have power over my Body, I am the one who moves this hand and who can move it, etc. I can play the piano. But this does not last forever. I can forget how, I can fall out of practice. I exercise my Body. In the case of the most common activities, I do not generally lose my skill. But if I have been laid up sick for a long while, then I have to learn how to walk again, though it comes back quickly. However, I can also have a nervous disorder and lose the mastery of my limbs; "I can't do it." In that respect I have become an other.

"I am normal as to the Bodily and the practical"—that is, I have the ability, as a permanent normal substratum, to move my organs in a "natural and free" way as perceptual organs and as practical organs of sensory life. I am spiritually normal in my representing if I can freely carry out my spatial experiences and form my imaginations and can freely run through my memories; this, however, has a typical natural compass and is not unlimited in extent. I have a normal memory, a normal phantasy, and likewise a *normal activity of thinking*: that is, I can draw conclusions, compare, distinguish, connect, count, calculate; also, I can evaluate and weigh values, etc.—all this in the normal way as a "mature man." On the other hand, I do have *my peculiarities*, my way of moving, of doing things, my individual evaluations, my own way of preferring, my temptations, and my power of conquering certain kinds of temptations, against which I am invulnerable. The next person is different, he has different pet motives, other temptations are dangerous for him, he has other spheres in which he exercises his individual powers of action, etc., but within the bounds of the normal, specifically within what is normal for youth, for age, etc. Within this typicality there are, of course, idiosyncratic developments: conscious self-education, inner conversion, transformation through the setting of ethical goals, through exercise, etc.

In this way the spiritual Ego can be apprehended as an

organism, an *organism of faculties* and of the development of these faculties in a normal typical style following the stages of infancy, youth, maturity, old age. The subject "can" do many things and, according to its abilities, is determined to act by means of stimuli, by means of effective motives. The subject is ever and again active according to its faculties and, in turn, constantly transforms them, enriches, strengthens, or weakens them by means of its own action. *A faculty is not an empty* [255]
ability but is a positive potentiality, which may now happen to be actualized but which is always in readiness to pass into activity, into an activity that, as it is lived, refers back to the corresponding subjective ability, the faculty. The motivation, however, is, for consciousness, something open, understandable; the "motivated" decision as such is clear in view of the kind and the power of the motives. Finally, everything refers back, in an understandable manner, to *primal faculties of the subject* and from there to *acquired faculties* having their source in earlier lived actuality.[1]

In original genesis, the personal Ego is constituted not only as a person determined by *drives*, from the very outset and incessantly driven by *original "instincts"* and passively submitting to them, but *also as a higher, autonomous, freely acting* Ego, in particular one guided by *rational motives*, and not one that is merely dragged along and unfree. Habits are necessarily formed, just as much with regard to originally instinctive behavior (in such a way that the power of the force of habit is connected with the instinctive drives) as with regard to free behavior. To yield to a drive establishes the drive to yield: habitually. Likewise, to let oneself be determined by a value-motive and to resist a drive establishes a tendency (a "drive") to let oneself be determined once again by such a value-motive (and perhaps by value-motives in general) and to resist these drives. Here *habit and free motivation intertwine.* Now, if I act freely, then I am

[1] Should we say "original character" is nothing else than this, that there is a determinate motivation in the beginning and that in the development of the Ego every motivation is co-conditioned by the previous ones already carried out *de facto*? But did we not indeed have to speak of a determinate type of motivation and this only with regard to the beginning? But "beginning" should not be understood here only in a temporal sense.

indeed obeying habit too, but I am free insofar as it is the motive, the reason, that I am obeying in a free decision.[1]

But all this has to be kept distinct from the efficacy of the [25] "association" in which the personal empirical subject is constituted. If the personal subject signifies, for the stream of lived experience, a certain rule of development and specifically one for the types of Ego-behavior under subjective circumstances, i.e., if it signifies a certain rule stipulating the way to behave in activities and in passivities, then there corresponds to this rule a certain doxic habit, as it were, a certain familiarity in the present behavior of the Ego, certain tendencies of expectation or possible tendencies of expectation related to the occurrence of the present behavior in the stream of consciousness. Now, this behavior is, in the background consciousness, not an expecting in the proper sense but a *protention* directed toward the future occurrence, a protention which can become an expectation with a shift of the attention of the Ego. But not only that; an objectivity is constituted, precisely the subject of the modes of behavior. The system of such protentions and intertwinings, which could be transformed into an actual "if-then," into actual, hypothetical, and causal motivations, creates a new intentional unity or, correlatively, a new apperception.

Thus on the one side we have tendencies ruling the "I do" and the "I undergo" and powers providing rules for it. On the other side there are tendencies of consciousness which subsequently characterize these acts and the Ego and invest it with an apprehension.

In our entire consideration up to now, we have been speaking of the unity of the Ego that is constituted in the stream of life. In the first place, this is the Ego that develops, is co-formed, and is constituted together with all other apperceptions, above all in unity with the thing-apperceptions that are formed. But

[1] From a phenomenological standpoint, the "habitually" or the "experientially" has its intentional *relation to circumstances*. If these circumstances become real, then the experiential steps forth as something belonging to them, as something expected. An instinctual drive would also have to be related to circumstances, and to that extent we have there an experiential expectation, but this expectation has, in the case of genuine habit, an implicit horizon of similar memories. There still remains a question concerning the expectation of the yielding, with its increasing power and with the growing tendency of the yielding itself.

there is more to it. I am of course not only the subject, the Ego, that can consider a thing in a certain freedom, can freely move the eyes while looking, etc. I am also the subject that is used to being pleased by such and such matters, that habitually desires this or that, goes to eat when the time comes, etc., i.e., the subject of certain feelings and of certain habits of feeling, desire, and will, sometimes passive, as I said, sometimes active. It is clear *that certain strata are constituted there in subjectivity,* [257] insofar as certain groups of Ego-affections, or passive Ego-acts, are organized for themselves in a relative way and coalesce constitutively into an empirical unity. A closer investigation would be needed to bring out these strata.

§ 60. The person as subject of acts of reason, as "free Ego"

Above all, however, it is versus the empirical subject, in its generality and its unity, that the *"person"* is to be delimited *in the specific sense*: the subject of acts which are to be judged from the standpoint of *reason*, the subject that is *"self-responsible,"* the subject that is free or in bondage, unfree (taking "freedom" here in a particular sense, indeed the proper sense). A passive compliancy in the "I move," etc. is a subjective "pro-cedure," and it can be called free only insofar as it "pertains to my freedom," i.e., insofar as it, just like any subjective pro-cedure, can be, by the centralized Ego, reined in or given its freedom again. That is to say, the subject "consents," says "yes" to the invitation of the stimulus precisely as an invitation to yield to it, and gives its *fiat* in practice. With regard to my centralized Ego-acts, I have consciousness of the *I can*. They are indeed activities, and in their entire course we have precisely not a mere lapse of events but, instead, the course they take continuously proceeds out from the Ego as center, and as long as that is the case, there reigns the consciousness, "I do," "I act." On the other hand, if the Ego is, by some affection, "carried off" elsewhere, "captured," then the genuine "I do" is interrupted, and the Ego is checked as active Ego, it is unfree, "moved rather than moving." In the case of freedom, there exists for the future phases which lie within the

immediate horizon, for the future phases of the action in relation to the horizon of unfulfilled practical intentions, the consciousness of the free "I can" and not the mere consciousness that "it will come," "it will happen."

a) The "I can" as logical possibility, as practical possibility and impossibility, as neutrality modification of practical acts, and as original consciousness of abilities (subjective power, faculty, resistance).[1]

[25

Now what does all that mean? What I can do, what is in my power, what I know myself capable of and am conscious of as such, that is what a *practical possibility* is. It is only between practical possibilities that I can "decide," and only a practical possibility can (this is an other, theoretical "can") be a theme of my will. I cannot will anything that I do not have consciously in view, that does not lie in my power, in my competence. "I cannot will anything that..."—here the "can" itself may be meant as practical, viz., insofar as the will itself is able to be an Object of will, and it could only be so to the extent that it is within my "power" (the scope of my power), i.e., to the extent that the performance of the thesis itself is for me something practically possible. *Prior* to the will with its active thesis of the *"fiat"* lies the action as instinctive action, e.g., the involuntary "I move," the involuntary "I reach" for my cigar; I desire it and do it "without any further ado," something which, to be sure, is not easily distinguished from a case of voluntary willing in the narrower sense.

Then just what sort of modification is the "I can," "I have the power to," "I am capable of"?

In experience, the "I can" is distinct from the "I cannot" according to their phenomenological characters. There is a resistanceless doing of things, i.e., a consciousness of an ability that meets no resistance, and there is a doing as an overcoming of resistance, a doing that has its "against which," and a

[1] Lipps (*Psychologie*, 2 ed. p. 24 ff.) presents the first fundamental discussion of these. He points out that the most original concept of possession, of the "I have," arises here: I have my Bodily parts, I have power over them. *Cf.* p. 266 above and also § 3 of Supplement XII, pp. 349 ff.

corresponding consciousness of an ability to overcome the resistance. There is (always speaking phenomenologically) a gradient in the resistance and in the power of overcoming it, a continuum in "active power" versus the "inertia" of the resistance. The resistance can become insurmountable; in that case we come up against the "it won't budge," "I cannot," "I do not have the power." Obviously, connected to this is the transferred apprehension of action and counter-action outside the sphere of my doings and my abilities. After all, things are "active" in relation to one another, have "powers and counter-powers" in relation to one another, resist one another, and perhaps the resistance one thing exercises is insurmountable, the other "cannot surmount it." [259]

The genuine apperception of resistance presupposes that we are not dealing here with something merely thingly, but with something of the sort that falls within the sphere of my "will," within the sphere of that which I perhaps already have come to know as something that is in my power. In the physical sphere, all my abilities are mediated by the "operation of my Body," by my Bodily abilities and faculties. I know through experience that the parts of my Body move in *that* special way which distinguishes them from all other things and motions of things (physical, mechanical motions); i.e., they have the character of subjective movement, of the "I move." And from the very outset this can be apprehended as something practically possible. Indeed, we have to say in general that only what has this subjective character admits apriori of such an apprehension. Originally, it is only here that the "I will" emerges. Originally, it is here and only here that an imagined will can be affirmed and can become an actual willing. But here I can also come up against resistance. My hand is "asleep;" I cannot move it, it is momentarily paralyzed, etc. I can also experience resistance in the area of the external "consequences" of my Bodily movements. The hand pushes aside what stands in its way, it "gets there." At times it gets there "with difficulty," "with not much difficulty," or "with no resistance." At times it does not succeed at all, the resistance being insurmountable despite all the pushing force.

How does my will take hold when I perform a Bodily activity,

what does it do *immediately*? Do I need to have a knowledge of physiology? From an Objective-physical standpoint, obviously a material state comes first, although I know nothing about it and do not have to. "But how in the world I can do it," one is wont to say, "is a mystery." "Physical causality is a fact, but an incomprehensible one"—that is the opinion one forms, or else it is all explained as mere semblance. To be sure, physiopsychic causality is also said to be a mystery. But does this "mystery" not belong to the *essence* of all causation? But that would mean [26
that it is not a mystery. "Causality" belongs to the essence of the constitution of the thing, and the special character of this causality resides precisely in the experiential apperception. Thus it is necessary to experience the thing as a thing and to determine phenomenologically the causal apperception more exactly in examples from actual experience. To demand anything else makes no sense here.

The same holds in the realm of the causality of the will and the apperception of the Body, the apperception of a thing with "members" which not only are moved but which I move and which consequently can be moved in the "I will." What is first for the will? A presupposition is the apperception of the hand together with its phenomenal position, etc. Research in physiology and knowledge of physiology are not presupposed. Physicalistic and physiological comprehension is something quite different from the practical. In the one case, it is a matter of knowledge and, more exactly, scientific knowledge of the thing as a natural Object in physical (substantial-causal) nature. In the other case, we have practical understanding, understanding of what happens practically rather than of the process in terms of its physical causality. It is a matter of the *practical ground* (the "psychic cause") of the process, its motive. The thing moves *because* "I" have struck it, because I extended my hand and struck it. But if I move my hand involuntary? Why does it move? Because the position of the hand is uncomfortable. Or else "I do not exactly know why," I was not paying attention to it, though the reason does lie in the psychic and its obscure stimulations and motivations.

To be sure, my hand is a thing *too*, and if *I* execute a subjective "I move" and am not dreaming or deceiving myself,

then there is also executed a physical process in nature. Certainly, in the perception of the "I move," the perception of the physical movement in space is also included, and consequently the question of physical causality can be raised here as well. Yet it does not have to be raised, and it cannot possibly come up in the personal attitude, in which alone is posited the active and passive person as the motivational subject and the subject of its surrounding world.[1]

Originally, the "I move," "I do," precedes the "I can do." [261] But there is also a lived "I can," detached from the actual doing. I can "represent" to myself that I am moving my hand which is now at rest, moving it voluntarily or involuntarily. Can I also imagine that I am moving (though not "through" the movement of my hand, not by its means) this table? I can, of course, imagine that the table is moving "mechanically." But its movement can never be my moving of it, if not "through" the motion of my Body, by striking it, etc. I have power over my Body, and I have power in the physical world only on account of my power over my Body. If I represent to myself the movement of my hand in the form, "I move my hand," then I am representing an "I do" and not a merely mechanical motion. But such a representation is not yet an "I can." In the "I can" there obviously resides not merely a representation but, beyond that, a thesis, one which thereby concerns not only myself but also the "doing," not the actual doing but precisely the being able to do.

It is of importance that we elaborate in an exemplary fashion the *contrast* emerging here between possibility in the sense of merely *"logical" possibility*, mere possibility on the basis of intuitive representation, and *practical* possibility as the to-be-able-to.

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[1] One could here have recourse as well to the fact that physical nature and its causality dissolve into motivations of consciousness. But these form a closed group, the indices of which are the things that are posited and theoretically determined, laws of nature, etc. Nor can one say that we have the psychical together with its psychic "causation" in the excess beyond the physical. That would be false, for we have here quite different attitudes: in the one case nature is posited purely and simply and is a theoretical theme. In the other case, nature is posited as correlate of the motivations constituting it. And in the third case, appearing nature is posited but is posited as a field for praxis.

If in phantasy I imagine a mechanical motion or some other natural process, or a thing, or whatever, then I can always modify my consciousness of this free fiction in such a way that a thesis of possibility, related to what has been imagined, arises from it. What can be represented, or, in the first place, what has been represented, is possible; the "object" as such is, as intuitive, a floating substrate of the possibility-predicate; i.e., the intended object is a possible one insofar as it can be intuited. Thus here again we have a "can." A centaur is a possible object. "It" is intuited, it is what is identical in these and in [262] other quasi-perceptions that I can freely carry out. It must indeed be maintained that all intuition allows of being turned into an act which posits the intuited "object," the intended "what," as possible, and which "experiences" it in originary givenness. And a positing of possibility without intuition is an intention which, according to its very sense, finds fulfillment in an intuition or in a variation of the intuition which supplies the possibility-thesis in its "genuine" form.

This possibility is doxical-logical possibility (not formal-logical). Included under this "it is possible" is obviously also the "it is possible that I move my hand," if I represent the movement of the hand and derive from this representation (a neutrality modification) the sense of the thesis of possibility. But I do not thereby have the practical "I can," although it is legitimate to speak of the "to be able to" as regards that general class as well. A centaur *can* exist; the motion of a body is possible: i.e., it can move; the "I move my hand" is possible: i.e., it can be that I move my hand. And so in general: it is possible that A is = it can be that A is. Being possible is being able to be. But that I move my hand, that I do something, is not a matter of the doxical-logical possibility of being. Certainly, that I move the table by acting "immediately" cannot be; that I move my hand "immediately" can be. That is, the one "I can" may be made intuitive, the other not.

But is that all? Does not speaking about the possibility of intuition already point to another region? A movement of my hand is not only an ontological possibility.

Here *various kinds of neutrality modifications* come into consideration. The neutrality modification of a *doxic* consciousness (consciousness of objective being) is a *"mere representation."* In the case of a perception or a memory (originary consciousness of present being or of remembered being), the neutralization results in a neutrally modified intuition. And from every neutralized intuition can be derived originally a theoretical (doxic) possibility, a *being*-possible, which presents itself as a modification of being-certain, of being pure and simple, therefore of that which may be derived from a non- [263] neutralized intuition and, most originally, from a "perception" (present being). In a broader sense, *every* neutrality modification of the doxic sphere admits of being turned into a doxic consciousness of possibility, even if the possibility (the being-possible) no longer has the mode of "evidence," self-givenness.

Likewise, from every *"practical" neutrality modification* one can derive—and perhaps derive originally—a practical possibility. Hence there stand over against one another as correlatives: *representing* (intuition—neutralized intuition) and being (being-representable, being-possible). Similarly, doing and quasi-doing are correlates, and so are action and possible action, just as are fact, the term of the action (as its result), and "possible" fact, possible practical result, *practical possibility*. On the side of the subject, to the "I do" corresponds the "I can do;" just as in the parallel case to the "I believe," "I hold to be true, to exist" corresponds the "I hold to be possible." On both sides, I place myself in the neutrality modification and derive possible being and possible action.[1]

The *intuitive* representation, hence the quasi-perception, that *I* want something, do something, decide in such a way in the

[1] Obviously, these parallels must permeate all basic categories. Joy: to be joyful. I enjoy myself. Quasi-joy: it could be enjoyable, a possible joy, it would be able to bring me joy. Whether, in a given case, I "actually enjoy" myself is not being asserted thereby but only that it could certainly be enjoyable. Or more simply: I take pleasure in something—I place myself, or think myself, into a pleasure. If it is actually a quasi-pleasure, then I can infer from it a possible pleasurableness, a potential pleasure. From a quasi-value I derive a possible value, etc. To actually accomplish a quasi-pleasure is the analogon of an actual intuitive phantasizing (representing to oneself). Empty representation does not include the ability to represent the same "actually." Likewise for the parallels. Thereby, however, the *practical* ability (e.g., as ability to intuit, etc.) also plays its role everywhere.

given situation, choose such a possibility rather than another, obviously presupposes not only the intuitive representation of the current external processes but also the intuitive representation of the relevant value characters and practical characters. Furthermore, it presupposes the originality of these characters and hence, in the case of actual intuition, the neutrality modification of the pertinent acts of feeling and will: it is necessary, therefore, that in the modification I evaluate, desire, will, etc. in this or that way.

So we see that a great deal depends on the distinction treated [264] in the *Logical Investigations* as the distinction between authenticity and unauthenticity in doxic position-takings. I cannot intuitively represent that $2 \times 2 = 5$; i.e., I cannot intuitively represent that I judge, authentically, intuitively, thus with evidence, that $2 \times 2 = 5$. I can, however, represent to myself that I judge that $2 \times 2 = 5$, that is, by accomplishing the thema unauthentically, "unclearly," "confusedly." In particular, in the case of material for propositions which is still unfamiliar to us, which is not graspable as false in immediate insight or in an insight that is easily attainable, or which reveals its falsehood only after a long process of demonstration, it becomes clear to me that such material, in the mode of unauthentic givenness, is compatible with *any* thesis.

This holds, by analogy, for the entire sphere of the acts of reason (the active acts, properly so called) and of their synthetic formations in all spheres, even those of feeling and will. I can conceive that I would value something, desire it, want it as an end or as a means, something which I, upon closer scrutiny, could not value. I can imagine that I could, and that I would, strive for something as an appropriate means, which, upon scrutiny, I would not and could not strive for. In the one case the "I can" is there, in the other it is not. The "I could" means here that I put myself into it in phantasy, hence carry out the neutrality modification of the doxic and valuing acts, and find the relevant thesis of pleasure, of desire, and of will to be compatible with their substratum.

Two kinds of motivations result here. In the case of unauthenticity, I do indeed have compatibility of sense in the mode of "unclarity," hence compatibility of unauthentically accomplished sense (which, however, can be intuitive as to its parts), compatibility with any position-taking whatever, with the thesis and the thetic modifications. On the other hand, the relevant act (the concrete act) does emerge in the nexus of consciousness as "motivated" in some way or other. And that also holds for the neutrality modification. I.e., if I step out of my actual life in a certain way and settle into a "phantasy" life (which comes down to saying that in my actual life is inserted a flight of "phantasy" in which I accomplish a quasi-life), then this [265] phantasy life is precisely unity of life, and it is unity there through motivation. And the problem is to clarify what is specific to *this* motivation; for it is not just any motivation.

We see, however, that we cannot be satisfied with this consideration: I can represent to myself that I would commit a murder, a theft, etc., and yet I cannot represent to myself that I would do so. I could have the representation that I would judge that the sum of the angles in a triangle equals three right angles, and yet I could not judge it so. What sort of antinomy is this?

"I could do it"—that is the neutrality modification of the action and the practical possibility derived from it. "Yet I could not do it"—I am lacking the original consciousness of being able to do this action or of having the power for this action (which, even in the case of a fictional action, is an originary, non-neutralized consciousness); this action contradicts the kind of person I am, my way of letting myself be motivated.[1]

b) The "I can" motivated in the person's knowledge of himself. Self-apperception and self-understanding

I know myself from experience, I know what my own character is like: I have an Ego-apperception, an empirical "self-consciousness." Each developed subject is not just a stream of consciousness with a pure Ego, but each has accomplished a centralization in the form, "Ego." Further, the

[1] *Cf.* on this point, and on the entire following sub-paragraph b), Supplement XI, pp. 340 ff.

cogitationes are acts of an *Ego-subject*, the Ego is constituted out of one's own (active) position-taking, and out of one's own habits and faculties, and consequently is an externally apperceptive unity, the *kernel of which is the pure Ego*. Whence the evidence, "I am." I can certainly delude myself as to my character, but I do have to posit myself with some character or other, and I posit myself as Ego with a determinate character (abstraction made from the horizons of indeterminateness). If I now phantasize, if I settle myself (as the one I am) into a phantasized actuality or into the world given in the neutrality modification, into the familiar world transformed in phantasy some way or other, then I am judging how such and such [266
motives (more precisely: the quasi-motives of this phantasized environment) *would* affect me, how I, as the one I am, would act and could act, how I could, and how I could not, judge, value, and will. In that way I judge, or I can judge, *empirically*, on the basis of my experiential knowledge of myself, with respect to myself, with respect to the Ego constituted for me in empirical apperception as experiential Ego. In analogy with the previous modes of comportment and the previous position-takings as regards their underlying grounds and their motives, I anticipate subsequent modes of comportment. These are not just expectations as conclusions, but instead intentional characters arise here: just as the apperception of a thing arises out of experiential systems of "possible" expectations which nevertheless form a unity apperceptively. In any event, each feature of the intentional object refers back to earlier similar experiences; in the apprehension of a thing there is nothing that, in principle, is new. If there were, then it would already be the start of the constitution of a new stratum of unity.

Nevertheless, can I not think myself into *motivational situations in which I have never yet been* and the likes of which I have never yet experienced? And can I not see, or discover in a quasi-seeing, how I would then behave, although I might behave differently, i.e., although it would be thinkable that I would decide differently, and this in clear representation, whereas in fact, as this personal Ego, I could not behave that way? This is the decisive point. Furthermore, I may already have been repeatedly in similar motivational situations. Yet I am precisely not a thing, a thing that always reacts the same

way in the same circumstances; in view of which it becomes obvious to me that, in principle, things in the same causal circumstances can have the same effects. Earlier I was motivated in this way, now in a different way, and that is precisely because I have become an other in the meantime. The motivation, the effective motives, might be the same, but the power of the various motives is different. For example, in each person the strength of sensuality is quite different in youth than in age. The sensuous substrate, especially that of the sensuous drives, is different. Age becomes circumspect and self-centered; youth is precipitous, easily disposed to yield to noble transports. Old age (having learned through many experiences) is wont to hold back, to ponder consequences. The life tempo of youth is a [267]
quicker one, the phantasy more mobile, while on the other hand experience is slight. Youth has not come to know evil consequences, is not acquainted with danger, still takes fresh original joy in the new, in impressions, lived experiences, and adventures that have not yet been tasted.

Thus the substrata of motivation, the orientations and the powers of the motives are different. How do I come to know them? I do so as the one I am, by means of phantasizing presentifications of possible situations, in which I "reflect" on what kind of sensuous or spiritual stimuli would affect me, what power they would have, how I would therefore decide in such a case, in which direction the pull would be greater, which power would prevail, assuming the situation remains the same. It may very well be that in any given case still other motives will emerge and be operative, that I could feel obscure motives without clarifying them, as I am doing now in the reflection of phantasy. It can be that I am actually "indisposed" toward action, having slept poorly, and thus am feeling listless and weak, whereas I now phantasize myself into a freshness to which would correspond an actual freshness as my present *habitus*, and vice versa. But these are precisely possibilities with equal rights. I, as spiritual Ego, can also become stronger in the course of my development; the weak will can gain strength. Upon reflection, I could then say that I, as I used to be, would not have been able to resist this temptation or would not have been able to do something or other. But at present I can act in

that way and would do so. When I say this I am not basing myself on experience but on the fact that I can test my motives at the very outset and do in fact test them. I can also strengthen the power of my freedom by making it perfectly clear to myself that if I yield, then I would have to despise myself, the subject of the yielding, and this would give such strength and impact to the moment of non-value I was tending toward that I could not do it, could not give in to it. My power of resistance thereby increases.

The judgment of experience and the judgment on the basis of the understanding of the person as the subject of motivation (the subject of actual and possible motivations), i.e., on the basis of the understanding of the possibilities of motivation proper to him, are, however, often connected with one another in form as well, so that experience teaches me which motivating [268] "grounds" are operative in his prevailing orientation of thought, in his well-known forgetfulness, in his habit of indulging in unintuitive representations, and the like. "He would never have acted this way if the true state of affairs was clear to him. He would have been charitable (basically he has a good heart) if he clearly understood the need of the one who appealed to him for help." But he was too much in a hurry, too busy, as I know from experience. That which is operative as a motive harbors in itself all sorts of intentional implications; this itself is a source of important new motivations: to examine the proper sense of the justification of the discovery of the "truth itself" and to let oneself be determined by it in genuine reason. Here reside the pre-eminent values, upon which depends ultimately the *value* of all motivations and of actual deeds. Here reside also sources for fundamental formal laws, which, as is the case with all noetic norms, *are laws of the validity of the motivation*, and to these belong, furthermore, *laws of the power of motivation* and of *personal values*. The highest value is represented by the person who habitually bestows the highest motivational power on the genuine, true, valid, and free decisions.

c) The influence of others and the freedom of the person

The development of a person is determined by the influence of others, by the influence of their thoughts, their feelings (as suggested to me), their commandments. This influence determines personal development, whether or not the person himself subsequently realizes it, remembers it, or is capable of determining the degree of the influence and its character. Others' thoughts penetrate into my soul; they can exercise various influences, either enormous or small, under changing circumstances, according to my psychic situation, the stage of my development, the formation of my dispositions, etc. The same idea has a different effect on different persons in the "same" circumstances. Opposed to one another are *my own* thoughts, ones that "arise originarily" in my mind or that are gained by me myself out of premises (which might perhaps be based on the influence of others), and thoughts that are simply *appropriated.* The same is true of *my own feelings,* ones that have [269] their originary source in me, and the *feelings of others,* ones I have *assimilated* and adopted, but which are not authentic. What comes from others and is "taken over" by me, and is more external or less so, can be characterized as issuing from the other subject, first of all as a tendency proceeding from him and addressed to me, as a *demand*, to which I perhaps yield passively, perhaps reluctantly, but by which I am still overpowered. Alternatively, I might annex it on my own accord, and then it becomes part of me. In that case it no longer has the character of a mere demand to which I yield and which determines me from the outside; it has become a position-taking that issues from my own Ego and is not merely a stimulus coming from the outside and retaining the character of a borrowing of something that came forth from another Ego, of something that has its primal instauration in him. This case is similar to what occurs in my egoistic sphere: instauration and subsequent reproduction as one's own actualized *habitus.* Besides the tendencies which proceed from other individual persons, there are demands which arise in the intentional form of indeterminate generality, the demands of morality, of custom, of tradition, of the spiritual milieu: "one" judges in this

way, "one" has to hold his fork like this, and so on—i.e., demands of the social group, of the class, etc. They can be followed quite passively, or one can also actively take a position with regard to them and make a free decision in favor of them.

Therefore the *autonomy of reason*, the "freedom" of the personal subject, consists in the fact that I do not yield passively to the influence of others but instead decide for myself. Or again, it consists in this, that I do not let myself be "drawn" by any other inclinations and drives but instead act freely and do so in the mode of reason.

Thus we have to distinguish between the *human person*, the apperceptive unity, that we grasp in self-perception and in the perception of others, and the *person as the subject of acts of reason*, whose motivations and motivating powers come to givenness in our own original lived experience as well as in the lived experience, available to us in empathy, of others. Thereby the focus is being directed to what is specifically spiritual, the life of free acts.

d) General type and individual type in understanding persons [270]

The first question here is what is typical in general with regard to the Ego in affection and in action. But after that comes the further question of what is typical in particular and for the individual: what is typical for this human Ego or, more clearly, what is typical in the comportment of this Ego, belonging to this Body, in the actions and affections of its life, a life we are to comprehend.

I can comprehend in a particular case how this Ego is motivated: e.g., this man is now reaching for a cup because he wants to drink, and he wants to drink because he is thirsty. But in its generality, this has nothing to do with his person: it is something universally human. On the other hand, that he, for example, suddenly lowers the cup, without drinking, because he notices a poor child nearby who is hungry and thirsty, and that he hands the cup to the child, this manifests his "good heart" and does pertain to his person. The latter is built up, in conformity with its essence, out of special characters within the

universal type or character, "human subject," and indeed out of such characters which, as the specificities of the lowest level, make up the individual type of this human subject. Every man has his character, we can say, his style of life in affection and action, with regard to the way he has of being motivated by such and such circumstances. And it is not that he merely had this up to now; the style is rather something permanent, at least relatively so in the various stages of life, and then, when it changes, it does so again, in general, in a characteristic way, such that, consequent upon these changes, a unitary style manifests itself once more.

As a result, one can to a certain extent expect how a man will behave in a given case if one has correctly apperceived him in his person, in his style. The expectation is generally not plain and clear; it has its apperceptive horizon of indeterminate determinability within an intentional framework that circumscribes it, and it concerns precisely one of the modes of behavior which corresponds to the style. For example, an "endearing" man will, in certain cases, utter empty endearments, and his ways of talking bear all the while the stamp of his style; but that does not mean that we could guess his precise wording with the quite definite nuances he has in mind. If we are able to do that, [271] then we say the man is a stereotype; once we know him, we soon know the whole arsenal of his endearments (or his witty remarks, if he styles himself a wit), among which we have a choice, unless there are grounds, from association, to prefer definite individual ones.

In sum, a person has, in the broadest sense, a typical character and properties of character. Everything a person lives through enlarges the framework of his pregivennesses, can emerge again in memory whether clearly or obscurely, can affect the Ego and motivate actions. But even without memory, it determines the future content of lived experience according to laws of the new formation of apperceptions and associations. The person is formed through "experience."

The *concept of experience* here is certainly different than the one in which, in nexuses of validity, the question at issue is the foundation of cognition through experience, where the term "experience" serves as a title for acts that are theoretically

founding (Ego-acts of the perceptual grasping of existing objects or of grasping in memory, etc.) or that provide a justification for theoretical acts. Obviously, every such experience has its effects: every active perception, remembering, etc. No less, however, has every inactive one, and the same holds for every judging, valuing, willing. Everything has its effects, though not in all respects, but only within the limitation of its type.

Personal life manifests a typicality, and each personal life manifests a different one.[1] For certain periods, this typicality remains identical, even if the "experiences" (the realm of the *experiential apperceptions constantly being newly formed*) of the person grow, and the domain of his pregivennesses changes as a consequence. Everything indeed has its effects, though not in all respects. On the street, people meet me, cars pass, etc. This has its apperceptive type, within which the bustle of the street is contained, whereas the individual event, instead of occurring in this way, can always also occur differently. All these singularities, which I hardly notice but which predelineate the horizon of my lived experience, do not in the least alter my moral character [272] or my aesthetic character. As regards these spheres, no motivations flow from there. (On the other hand, if motivations arise which do operate in the sense of transforming the "character," there nevertheless prevails a typicality in the succession of the phases of life: the typicality of the ages of life. And in conformity with this typicality, if I have sorted in out intuitively, I can say that if this person finds himself in these circumstances he will behave according to type and that if the circumstances change he will still observe the type.)

That is an experiential apperception, but it presupposes understanding as well. The Ego, the subject of affections and actions, is thereby related to its pregivennesses and is not merely taken as subject of *individual* affections and actions. Indeed, here the universal human (or personal) apperception collaborates essentially. The universal typicality of Corporeality is a presupposition for empathy, and by empathy an Ego-analogon is apprehended. This is already a typicality: the universal

[1] Association and apperception are principles of the typology of the totality of psychic acts.

structure "Ego, pregivenness, affection, etc.", the Ego of a life together with its total living.

It belongs also to what is universally typical that people in general are determined in their comportment by their previous experience. Being disappointed in others makes one suspicious. Repeated disappointment of fine hopes makes one bitter, etc.

Just as different kinds of things in experience generally change in a familiar way and are judged accordingly in the future, the same is true of people. We learn to know Objects according to their kind, and in any given case the behavior of an Object is understandable to us if it follows the general rule of its kind. Therefore we are moving in the domain of intuitive experience when we are seeking to understand. We capture the development of a person if we reconstruct the course of his life and make it intuitive in such a way that the entirety of his development as a man becomes comprehensible in an experiential way, especially with regard to his manner of letting himself be motivated as a subject, together with all the definite actions and passions proper to him. "In an experiential way" means that it occurs there, as it does in human life in general, that the acts of the subject and their motivations present themselves so as to be empirically understandable. That is "knowing a person," "science of the soul," "psycho-logy."

I enter into relationships with various Ego-subjects and come [273] to know the typical moments of their pregivennesses, of their actions, etc., and I *apprehend the latter according to these types*, but it is not as though I first had the types *in abstracto* (just as I do not first have *in abstracto* the type, tree, when I apprehend a tree as a tree); instead, the type becomes pronounced and gets impressed on us in multiple experiences, and it determines an apperceptive form and then a layer in actual apprehension that can be abstracted out. An individual conducts himself in a different way all the time, his actual surrounding world is constantly different, and so is his field of living and latent pregivennesses. Yet he is the same not merely as Bodily type but as spiritual type. He has his empirical peculiarities, and, as spiritual type, he is a comprehensible unity.

I understand the thought and action of an other according to my habitual modes of behavior and motivations, but not every

judgment about the other is based solely on the, as it were, external style of his life, abstracted out of experience, for which I would not have to penetrate into the interior of his motivations or even represent them in a lively way. But I do learn to peer into the interior of the other and to come to know inwardly the person himself, the motivational subject, which is precisely what bursts into view when I represent the other Ego in the way it is motivated.

What is happening when the character-type of a person suddenly lights up for us through some one or other of his glances, positions, or expressions; when we, so to say, "gaze into an abyss;" when the "soul" of the person suddenly "opens itself up;" when we "fathom wondrous depths;" etc.? What sort of "understanding" is that? The answer is certainly the following:

First of all, it would be going too far to claim that empirical understanding is the equivalent of achieving full intuition of the nexuses of experience. Even nexuses of external nature light up very suddenly, before the relations there are analyzed properly, i.e., plainly and clearly in intuition. That only comes afterwards. Similarly, historical nexuses, which may light up in a flash, or even logical nexuses, all manifest themselves prior to explication, prior to the actual subsequent establishment of the nexuses. One speaks here of intuitive "flair," a term which very [27] often signifies just the opposite of intuition, i.e., insight, and is instead a *presentiment*, a pre-seeing without seeing, an obscure, specifically symbolic, often ungraspably empty, premonition. The actual nexus is then but a goal grasped in anticipation, an empty intention, one which is so determined, however, that we follow the tendency, with its determinate direction, and in the fulfillment of it can acquire a chain of actual intuitions (straightforward experiential intuitions or logical evidence, etc.). To see a man does not mean to already know him. To see a man is—as we have found—different from seeing a material thing. Each thing is of a certain kind. If one knows the kind, the rest can be dispensed with. A man, however, has an individual kind, and each man has a different one. According to the universal, he is a man, but his kind as his character, his person, is a unity, constituted in his course of life, as a subject of

position-takings, i.e., a unity of multifarious motivations based upon multifarious presuppositions. And insofar as one knows from experience analogous traits in different people, one can grasp "with intuitive flair" the particular and peculiar complex in question here and the unity constituted, and therein one can have a guiding line for fulfilling the intentions in insightful intuition, by means of an analysis of the actual nexuses. So, in my opinion, this "intuition" as premonition ought not to be confused with actual intuition. What we have here is the success of a more precisely determining apperception, which, like any apperception, offers a guiding line for the confirmation, in the course of experience, of the intentional nexuses, often extremely complex.

But the subject is not a mere unity of experience, although experience and universal type play an essential role, and it is important that this be brought out and clarified. I put myself in the place of the other subject, and by empathy I grasp what motivates him and how strongly it does so, with what power. And I learn to understand inwardly how he behaves, and how he would behave, under the influence of such and such motives, determining him with such and such force, i.e., I grasp what he is capable of and what is beyond him. I can understand many inner correlations, having fathomed him so. It is in this way that I grasp his Ego, for it is precisely the identical Ego of these motivations, ones that have this direction and this power.

I secure these motivations by placing myself in his situation, [275] his level of education, his development as a youth, etc., and to do so *I must needs share in that situation*; I not only empathize with his thinking, his feeling, and his action, but I must also *follow* him in them, his motives becoming my quasi-motives, ones which, however, *motivate with insight* in the mode of intuitively fulfilling empathy. I co-share in his temptations, I co-participate in his fallacies; in the "co-" there lies an inner co-living of motivating factors, ones which carry their necessity with them. Admittedly, there are still unsolved and unsolvable remainders here: e.g., the original dispositions of character, which, however, I can indeed also, by analogy, make clear to myself and understandable. I am phlegmatic for the most part, but occasionally I am incited to vivacity and mirth; they spring

up after indulging in stimulants, for example; they have physical grounds in a modification of my Corporeality. Analogously, someone else is constantly and predominantly disposed toward mirth: he is habitually, and from the first, similar to me after I have had a glass of wine. It is in this sense that I also understand other things. Occasionally I have "brilliant ideas," occasionally scientific thinking progresses easily in me, and broad horizons open up to me—at least I imagine they do. According to this analogy, I represent genius, for instance, by means of quantitative, perhaps even qualitative, augmentation (for which I might again have intuitive grounds).

§ 61. The spiritual Ego and its underlying basis [1]

The underlying bases upon which is built the comprehensively motivated spiritual life of the other, and in conformity to which that life runs its course in an individually typical way, present themselves therefore as "variations" of my own. I come across these bases also when I want to *understand someone's development*. I have then to describe, going from stage to stage, the surrounding world in which he grew up and how he was motivated by the things and people of his environment just as they appeared to him and as he saw them. Here we touch upon [27
facticity, in itself beyond our comprehension. This child takes an original joy in sounds, that child does not. The one is inclined toward temper, the other toward patience. Natural causality enters in as well. Because of a serious fall, someone might become a cripple, and that has consequences for his spiritual life: certain groups of motivations are defunct from then on. We are not interested here in a real-causal analysis of these consequences. But medical knowledge can be of service toward an integration, in the correct way, of the psychic effects that are relevant for subjective development and consequently toward giving an account of them in the attempt to clarify subjective motivations and subjective development. Here the physical is serving as an indication of what is to be integrated.

[1] *Cf.* Supplement XII, §§ 1-3 (pp. 344 ff.)

Hence if we take the personal Ego in its developmental nexus, then we find *two layers*, which perhaps are separable (e.g., the lower level as "pure" animality), we find a two-fold "subjectivity": *the higher one is the specifically spiritual*, the stratum of the *intellectus agens*, of the free Ego as Ego of free acts, including all proper acts of reason, the positive ones and the negative as well. The unfree Ego also belongs here, "unfree" taken precisely in the sense in which it applies to an actual Ego: I allow myself to be dragged down by the sensual. The specifically spiritual Ego, the subject of spiritual acts, the person, finds itself dependent on an *obscure underlying basis* of traits of character, original and latent dispositions, and thereby dependent on nature.

We rejoin here the ancient distinction, which imposed itself so early, between reason and sensibility. The latter also has its rules, and indeed its intelligible rules of harmony and discord; it is a stratum of *hidden reason*, which first of all at least extends as far as the constitution of nature: since indeed all complicated relations of the "if-then," all causalities, can become guiding lines for theoretical, thus spiritual, explications, for clarifications in the form: "In the harmony of experience the doxa of perception is confirmed; in discordance, the posited existence or quiddity is annulled," etc.

In the sphere of the senses, in the sphere of the basis, grasped as extensively as possible, we have associations, perserverances, [277] determining tendencies, etc. These "make" the constitution of nature, but they even extend further, *since* this constitution is also there for spirits: all life of the spirit is permeated by the "blind" operation of associations, drives, feelings which are stimuli for drives and determining grounds for drives, tendencies which emerge in obscurity, etc., all of which determine the subsequent course of consciousness according to "blind" rules.

To these laws correspond *habitual modes of behavior* on the part of the subject, acquired peculiarities (e.g., the habit of drinking a glass of wine in the evening). The question can be asked whether these are properties of the person's "individuality," or whether they do not rather belong on the side of genuine activities. To be sure, it makes sense to speak of

individuality as the *total style and habitus of the subject,* pervading, as a concordant unity, all his modes of behavior, all his activities and passivities, and to which the entire psychic basis constantly contributes.

The nexus of lived experiences of a person is not a mere bundle of lived experiences or a mere "stream" of consciousness in which the lived experiences flow away. Instead, every lived experience is a lived experience of an Ego, of an Ego that does not itself flow away in a stream as its lived experiences do. And there is constantly present an underlying basis which is pre-given to it, to which it is related, or by which it is driven, in various ways. There is also an accomplishment of specific acts and, in unity with that, a constant enrichment of the stream of lived experiences, an enrichment supplied by the Ego itself: its reigning as Ego becomes *eo ipso* a lived experience. This basis of pregivenness refers back, however, to the other one, the one we call the psychic basis of *habitus* with fixed rules.

But at the same time the Ego is an actually unitary *person* still in a higher sense if it possesses a certain pervasive unitary style in the way it decides by judgment and will, in the way it values things aesthetically, but also in the way "sudden ideas" or "inspirations" surge up in the person (e.g., this man has clever inspirations when he is doing mathematics), in the way metaphors come to him and his involuntary phantasy reigns, and also in the way he apperceives in perception, or in the specific way [278] his memory "operates" (he has a good memory). Distinctions come to him easily or with difficulty, he reacts with automatic associations either more quickly or more slowly than another person does, etc. In all this the man has a general type, determinate in manifold ways, and each particular man has his particular individual type. We are dealing here, on the one hand, with the coming and going of lived experiences in general and, on the other hand, with the fact that the Ego is a "position-taking" subject: a subject of willing, of acting, and also of thinking. Should we include in addition: a subject that represents, perceives, remembers, phantasizes? In a certain sense, yes. The subject has objects over against itself; it is a "representing" subject, and that is the foundation for its "comportment" toward the objects.

We have to distinguish intentionality as that according to which we become conscious of objects, i.e., mere consciousness, *representing*, and intentionality as that which makes up the comportment of the acts toward the represented, *"position-taking."* Therefore we distinguish between *consciousness of objects and position-taking,* comportment toward the objects. Subjectivity manifests its individual character in its way of being conscious of objects as well as in its way of taking positions. As to the former, we have to distinguish:

1) the object is there, it is an object of attention (with the various levels of attention)

2) the object is there, one is conscious of it "for itself," it stands out, it is delimited and apperceived, but it is not attended to.

The turning of the attention is also a "comportment," but it is not a position-taking; instead, it is a presupposition for position-taking. Here, too, the subject displays his "peculiarity," i.e., in what it is that rivets his attention and how it does so. One subject jumps easily from object to object, from theme to theme; another one remains attached for a long time to the same object, etc.

On the other hand, concerning the constitution in consciousness of the object prior to the turning of the attention and the taking of a specific position regarding it, we are referred back to the constitution in consciousness of previous objects, to previous acts of attention, and perhaps to previous position-takings; we are referred back to the data of sensation, to the [279] references back and forth which depend on them, etc. Ultimately we arrive at the "obscure," "hidden," representations and representational complexes. Insofar as attention plays a role for this constitution of transcendent unities and multiplicities, we have there implicitly an Ego that is accomplishing some kind of comportment. The ultimate, however, is a *background that is prior to all comportment* and is instead presupposed by all comportment.

Following what we have just said, there is a distinction between the individual character of the Ego-subject as a habitual individual way of self-comportment and the individual character to be found in the interweaving of the backgrounds.

In a certain sense there is, in the obscure depths, a root soil.

The world of things in which spirits live is an Objective world constituted out of subjective surrounding worlds and is the Objectively determinable surrounding world of the spirits. As an intersubjectively persisting rule of possible appearances and, prior to that, of possible complexes of sensation of the individual spirits, this world refers back to a lower level of all spiritual existence. Every spirit has a "natural side." This is precisely the underlying basis of subjectivity: its being conscious of sensations, its having reproductions of sensations, its associations, its formation of apperceptions, and, in fact, its apperceptions at the lowest level, where unities of experience are constituted. To the natural side there belongs immediately the lower life of feelings, the instinctual life, and indeed the function of attention as well, which is a specifically Egological function, just as is the general function of turning toward. These form the bridge to Ego-being and Ego-life in the specific sense. The lower level is the place of the constitution of a world of appearances, or of appearing Objects, the world of the mechanical, the world of lifeless conformity to laws: all these being mere pre-data.

Spirits are the subjects that accomplish *cogitationes*, they stand upon this basis, and they are interwoven in more encompassing nexuses where *motivations in a higher sense* rule, i.e., motivations *of position-taking by position-taking,* genuine *motivations of reason.* In the lived experiences of the lower level a sensitive "soul" manifests itself, i.e., insofar as representational dispositions and habitual properties manifest themselves [280] therein, ones which have nothing to do with the attentive, grasping, position-taking Ego itself (with respect to its position-takings). This is the *field of association psychology.* The sensory soul, the soul of the lower level, is one with the subject of the position-taking; the two form a single *empirical unity*, from which only the unity *of the personal subject* (the position-taking Ego) is set off. This soul is "mine," it "belongs" to my Ego-subject and is inseparably one with it. There is no doubt, then, that it belongs to the person as founding *basis.*

The soul is here not an Objective (natural) reality but instead is *"spirit-soul;"* i.e., soul in this sense is not defined as a real unity in relation to circumstances of Objective nature, thus

psychophysically, or at least does not have to be defined in that way. There is an immanent lawfulness to the formation of dispositions as substratum for the position-taking subject. On the other hand, this regularity is tied up with the psychophysical one, i.e., it can be apperceived as natural, and so both of these are treated in psychology.

Spirit is not an abstract Ego of the position-taking acts but is the *fullness* of the person, the *Ego as human*, the "I take a position," the I think, I value, I act, I complete works, etc. Then there also belongs to me a *basis of lived experiences* and a *basis of nature* ("my nature") which is manifest in the play of lived experiences. This nature is the lower psychic layer, but it extends even into the sphere of position-taking: the position-taking Ego is dependent on its substratum insofar as I, in order to be motivated in my position-taking, must have precisely the motivating lived experiences, and these latter stand in an associative nexus and under rules of associative dispositions. But even the position-takings themselves are subject to inductive rules: with each position-taking, there develop "tendencies" to take up the same position under similar circumstances, etc.

Chapter Three

[281]

THE ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY OF THE SPIRITUAL WORLD OVER THE NATURALISTIC[1]

§ 62. The interlocking of the personalistic attitude and the naturalistic attitude

In apperceiving the "underlying basis" of the spirit as a "natural side," we come to a point where the two attitudes we have kept distinct from one another, namely the naturalistic and the personalistic, or the attitude of the natural sciences and the attitude of the human sciences, or their correlates, the two types of reality, nature and spirit, enter *into relation* with each other.

The flux of the stream of lived experience is subject to the law which has its index in the reality of the soul, as dependent on the Body in nature. The reality, Corporeal body, expresses an intersubjective regulation, one that extends beyond all consciousness of the union of Body and soul. The reality, soul, expresses a second regulation, one that is determinate and is related to the first: the soul is dependent on the Body. Insofar as the spirit is a unity that is related to its surrounding world, and insofar as the surrounding world, at the lowest level, consists in appearances each person first constitutes for himself and then constitutes in a community as communal, components of the regulations of the somatic, soul and nature, enter into the regulation whose index is the spirit. But here an other cut, as it were, is performed by the absolute consciousness, and a particular regulation running through is indicated in it. In its spiritual

[1] On this chapter, *cf.* also Supplements XIII and XIV, pp. 382 ff. and 386 ff.

acts, the spirit is dependent on the soul, insofar as the stream of lived experience lets the acts spring forth from itself (that is, the Ego accomplishes them on the basis of the rest of the stream of lived experience). Thus the spiritual Ego is dependent on the soul, and the soul on the Body. Consequently the spirit is conditioned by nature, though it does not for all that stand toward nature in a relationship of causality. Spirit has an underlying basis, on which it has the dependence of conditionality; as spirit, it has a soul, a complex of natural dispositions which, as such, are conditioned by physical nature and are dependent on it.

[282]

The spirit in its freedom moves the Body and thereby can perform a work in the spiritual world. The works, however, as *factual matters,* are at once things in the natural world, just as the Body is at once Object of the spiritual world (it already is so by the fact that it is a bearer of sense for comprehension) as well as external thing in nature. My Body is not only an appearance for me but it is "animated" for me: in terms of consciousness, it is the organ of my original free movements. From it as given there proceed at any time movement tendencies, to which I can yield or which I can resist, and in yielding I move my hand, my foot, etc., or the whole Body. And all tendencies proceeding from external things, wherever external things become perceptual stimuli (I refer to things as appearances, which alone are stimuli in the phenomenological sense), are mediated by the Body and by Bodily tendencies or by tendencies toward movements which are apperceived as eye movements and thus as *movements of "accommodation" in the broadest sense.* Wherever external things in my sphere of apppearances function as practical stimuli, wherever tendencies arise—directed to me—to move things, work with them, change them, etc., there my Body is mediating and so are the tendencies related to it, tendencies to grasp, lift, push, resist, strike, etc. Here mere tendencies to movement (or free movements as performances) are connected together, and going hand in hand with them, as a new dimension, are *performances of power, exertions of power,* etc.

For phenomenology, therefore, the Body plays an expansive role in the realm of the spirit. What is purely spiritual can be

found in all effective acts, which are partially actions, partially passions. What is Ego-like, what is subjective-spiritual[1] has a special "connection" with its own Body. To be sure, this connection exists primarily with respect to particular data (sensations of movement, tendencies, radiating out from Bodily sensations, toward courses of sensations of movement), which, by being apperceived Bodily, enter into everything related to the Body. Allied with this is also the fact of "expression," which allows us to interpret, on a broad scale, the other's Body as a [283] Body for a spiritual life. The Body, as *my* Body, is something particularly subjective, inasmuch as it *mediates* my perceptions and my actions which extend into the world of things; but it is not only for me that it is such. Also as apprehended by the other it acquires a significance, a *spiritual* significance, inasmuch as it expresses the spiritual (and does not simply intimate the presence of sensibility).

It must always be remembered that every Ego is precisely an Ego in itself, a point of identity, on which "stimuli" operate, from which acts issue forth, which is active or which is passive, which turns to or turns away from, which follows tendencies or resists them; i.e., it is the Ego of the intentionalities, which, even if these intentionalities are not executed, still has a direction, one that proceeds from the Ego and into which then the Ego perhaps enters actively in the mode of the executing Ego. Furthermore, it is to be noted that by essence there belong to the Ego the subjective "domains" to which it is related.

As joined to its Body, the spirit "belongs" to nature. In spite of this association, however, this linkage, it is not itself nature. The spirit has "effects" in nature, and yet *it does not exercise there any causality in the sense of nature*. Causality is a relation between one reality and its correlative surrounding realities. But the reality of the spirit is not related to real circumstances residing within nature; rather, it is related to real circumstances that exist in the "surrounding world" and in other spirits: this, however, is not nature. Something similar occurs in the case of physical things, only it is reversed: they have their real circumstances in one another and, furthermore, in Bodies and in souls, though not in spirits.

[1] It should be remembered that what one has, e.g., appearances, are also subjective, though they are neither passion nor action and do not belong to the Ego as its life but belong to it as field, as medium, as possession.

Thus we have to establish a peculiar relationship between spirit and physical nature, a relation between two sorts of realities, a relation of conditionality yet not of causality in the genuine sense. The same holds for the relation between spirit and soul or between spirit and Body as aesthesiological unity rather than as physicalistic thing. The Body in this aesthesiological sense belongs to the presupposed surrounding world of every personal subject and is the field of his free will. This is a spiritual and a causal relation. I execute my *"fiat,"* and my hand moves "because" I will it. As freely moved by me, the Body is a spiritual reality, and to the idea of its reality there pertains the relation to the Ego as a subject of free movement. [284] And vice versa. The Ego is an individuality, and as such it carries out acts upon acts and brings about Bodily accomplishments and then further ones. Similarly, however, my representing, my phantasizing, my remembering, etc. pertain to my spiritual field, and thereby so does the formation of new apprehensions, etc. The soul is presupposed (as is the Body), but it is at once surrounding world, determining the spirit.

We must indeed say here that the Body is a *two-sided reality* precisely insofar as it is a Body, i.e., abstracting from the fact that it is a thing and consequently is determinable as physicalistic nature. There is constituted then:

1. *the aesthesiological Body.* As sensing, it is dependent on the material Body; but here we once more have to distinguish from the physicalistic Body the material Body as appearance and as part of the personal surrounding world.

2. *the Body for the will,* the freely moving Body. It is something identical, even in relation to the various possible movements the freely active spirit performs with it. There thus results a stratum of reality that is its own.

Consequently the Body as Body presents, like Janus, two faces, and first of all within intuition. It is a reality with respect to nature as the world of things given in intuition and is at once a reality with respect to the spirit. Thus it is a *double reality,* to which pertain two lines of real circumstances. Thereby the aesthesiological stratum is the substrate for the stratum, "free

movement" and is always a presupposition for it, whereas the lower stratum, the aesthesiological, can be separate from motility. An immotile Body, one that only senses, is thinkable as a limit-case, but the question is then whether immotility does not signify the null-point of movement as paralyzed Body—and that is indeed the case.

Similarly, the soul also has two faces:

1. as *Bodily conditioned* it is physically conditioned, dependent on the physicalistic Body. As identical reality, it has its real circumstances in *physis;*

2. as *spiritually conditioned* it stands, with the spirit, in a reality-nexus.

Thus we have *two poles*: physical nature and spirit and, in between them, Body and soul. As a consequence, Body and soul are *"nature in the second sense"* properly speaking only according to the side turned toward physical nature. As appearing, they belong to the spiritual surrounding world; but appearance denotes precisely appearance of physicalistic nature, and that establishes a relation to the physicalistic world. At first, this is valid only for the physical substrate, but as soon as it becomes taken physicalistically, the Body, and the soul, also receive a physicalistically determined transcendence. [285]

On the other hand, the appearing Body (and the stratum determined by sensation there, the stratum of the sense qualities) and the soul belong to the spiritual surrounding world and receive in it such a relation to the Body and to other things that they assume the character of spiritual realities: the person has an effect on the Body in that he moves it, and the Body affects other things of the surrounding world; thereby the person, by way of the Body, acts on these things as things of the surrounding world. The free movement of my Body and the mediate moving of other things is an acting upon nature insofar as the Body-thing of the surrounding world is at the same time determinable as thing of natural science. The effect of the spirit on the Body and of the Body on other things is accomplished as a spiritual effect in the spiritual surrounding world. But, in virtue of the correspondence that holds here, changes in nature in the physicalistic sense are accomplished as well.

We speak of two "faces," two sides of reality, as regards the

Body and the soul, but we must take notice of the correct way to understand that. The Body as something in the surrounding world is the experienced, intuited Corporeal body, and that is precisely an appearance of the physicalistic Body. The latter, and physicalistic nature in its entirety, has nothing to do with the surrounding world, the primary surrounding world at least. That is, we can say as well that it is a *secondary surrounding world.* Just as the evaluated thing becomes a value-Object and then is, as an Objective value, for a second time an Object of the surrounding world, so physicalistic nature, theoretically determined on the basis of the "appearances," is a secondary Object of the surrounding world, the primary Object of which is precisely the appearance. The Body as a thing is substrate for the aesthesiological Body, and with that we have the substrate for the Body to which the will relates, the freely moving Body, and thus the Body stands to the spirit in a relation of causality. Here we are in one homogeneous sphere.

On the other hand, because the Body in the surrounding world is at the same time an appearance of nature in the physicalistic sense, the Body has a second face; it is the point of conversion from spiritual causality to natural causality. [286]

The same holds for the soul, which has its share of nature insofar as it is related to the Body. Physical (material) thing, Body, and soul are constituted in intuition, hence on the one hand as unspiritual, though on the other hand as something which is there for the spirit; or again, on the one hand as "matter" of the lowest level for the constitution of merely physicalistic thinghood, and further, on the other hand, as "spirit-soul," spiritual substrate for the constitution of the soul. These intuitively constituted unities have, for the spirit, a reality side; they are circumstances of the real unity, spirit, and the spirit, in turn, is circumstance for these unities.

It is, of course, not the identity of the thing as reality (of appearance) that is related to the spirit as real circumstance. Instead it is the identity of the Body, which, as freely moving, receives a proper stratum of reality in terms of the will. And likewise it is the soul as dependent on the Body but also as integrating psychic events related to the voluntary movement of the Body or influenced directly by the spirit in some other way.

If we then pass over to "Objective nature," which excludes the spirit as circumstance (since we are abandoning altogether the attitude of the human sciences), nothing is left of the behavior of the subject and we have mere things, aesthesiological dependencies, psychological dependencies, and concomitant Objective realities.

But if we in turn proceed from this attitude to the former, then the spirit, within its own attitude, may produce something, and, in virtue of the parallelism here, dependent changes in the Objective world correspond to it. That they are dependent, however, has to be established Objectively; I can, and I must, come to a conviction about whether or not "in actuality" there corresponds to the movement of the Body an actual movement in nature, etc. From the standpoint of the Objective knowledge of nature, an act (whenever it is said in the human-scientific attitude that "the person is moving his Body") of the *"fiat,"* and indeed as a conscious state, together with the concomitant appearances, etc., enters into the Bodily-psychic nexus. And all this is a state in Bodily-psychic reality. Spirit is not a reality here, however, and it does not at all exist here as spirit; what exists in this case is only the cogito as state, the Ego of it, etc. [2

The distinction between this conception and the spiritual attitude stands out clearly if we now posit theoretically the Ego-side itself (the person and what he has), whereby once again positing Ego-subjects are indeed present, versus the subjects that had become theoretical Objects. We posit other subjects (and ourselves in reflection) in a theoretical way by positing them and ourselves, precisely to the exclusion of all else, as subjects of lived experiences that are states of our subjectivity or theirs, and as subjects of a surrounding world of persons and things, taken here exactly in the way they present themselves to the subject, i.e., precisely as "environing." So these things are not Objects as in natural science—disregarding the case in which the theoretically posited subjects are natural scientists and therefore thought as related to the nature "investigated" by them, which they "determine," whose Objective predicates they seek, etc. But if the subjects investigating nature are themselves Objects, then the nature they investigate is put in

brackets. Aside from this case, the things are correlates of the respective lived experiences; they are the things we see, grasp, and touch, just as we, and other people, see them, grasp them, etc. If others see them differently, then what is seen differently is precisely, as seen by them, their things as correlates, and if they see ghosts, then their correlates are precisely ghosts. If the theoretically posited subjects are posited as investigators of physical and psychophysical nature (to say something about the case we excluded), then, obviously, it comes to be posited that they carry out acts of investigation into nature, that their appearances are, in a certain way, constitutive of "Objective nature," and that they recognize dependencies between what they possess as Objective, their sensations, their acts, etc. and the things of nature. But then Objective nature is bracketed. It is now not posited theoretically itself, but is so only by the theoretically posited Ego. Thereby the *theoretical Object, human being* (the zoological, physiological, psychological Object), which is included in the theoretical positing of nature, is specifically something other than the *theoretical Object, human person.* The human being as an Object of nature *is* not a subject, a person, though to every such Object a person *corresponds;* so we can also say that every one of them "involves" a person, an Ego-subject, *which, however, is never a component part of nature,* contained as a reality in nature, but instead is something that is *expressed* in the environing Object, "human Body." Here the human Body is a mere correlate of the positing of the subject, taken purely as such, something of which we know that it manifests a nature open to Objective research, but which is not now undergoing this theoretical positing. The apprehension may very well be there, but it is not a point through which a theoretical positing travels. Likewise, the subject can simultaneously be apprehended as nature, but this apprehension, which refers back to an apprehending subject, not itself apprehended as nature, is not a point that a theoretical positing passes through; what is so posited is the subject quite simply, which has behind it only the pure subject.[1] [288]

[1] According to our presentation, the concepts I and we are relative: the I requires the thou, the we, and the "other." And, furthermore, the Ego (the Ego as person) requires a relation to a world which engages it. Therefore, I, we and world belong

§ 63. Psychophysical parallelism and interaction

We now take into consideration that which we are calling physicalistic nature, or, more broadly, Objective nature in general, the correlate of *natural science*. The latter, for its part, is an interpersonal, cultural accomplishment in an association of [289] persons and thus presupposes this association, just as the *human sciences* are such cultural accomplishments. The one absolute consciousness, a multiplicity of communicating monads and pure Egos, is then essentially of such a kind that it has a *parallel unity of regulation,* not a mere two-fold regulation but precisely a parallel one, one which ordains the same for two, without altering anything in the matters at issue there.

The one regulation has to do with the natural sciences, the other with the human sciences. They complement and penetrate one another. But they would just be two sides of something one and the same, and would express something one and the same in the two sides, if all the nexuses that present themselves as facts in the human sciences also emerged in natural science,

together; the world, as communal environing world, thereby bears the stamp of subjectivity.

In addition, all science belongs within this nexus; science is an intersubjective activity, a pursuit in the attitude, "Us and what is actual." Science seeks Objective validity; as Objective science it makes assertions about the world straightforwardly, i.e., assertions in which nothing of the "us" is to be found. What is spoken of is only what is Objective: first and foremost, physical nature.

Thereby, however, we constantly find ourselves as persons living in the personal world, in the life-world, and so do the natural scientists, even in the very activity of natural science: it is just that their focus is directed exclusively to physical or zoological nature, etc. The apprehension of the world as nature thus fits within personal apprehension (the personal attitude). In research I can be focused on mere things, but I can also focus on persons in their comportment to them; specifically:

a. persons as spiritually determined by these things, as motivated by them, experiencing them, evaluating them, etc.

b. on the other hand, persons with respect to their real dependence on these things as natural ones, which are apprehended thereby in a two-fold way: 1) as conscious correlates of the comportment of the subject, and 2) as correlates of the natural scientific cognition that determines them Objectively.

In the one case, persons are posited theoretically as they are given, as persons in an association of persons. In the other case, they are posited as belonging to nature, as dependent on the nature of the Body.

simply within a different apprehension. But that is not the case.

The appearing thing is a unity of spatio-temporal causality. One could say it is what it brings about in space. States here are states of force.

The personal individual likewise is a unity: the human being is one and the same in relation to the various circumstances in compliance with which his states change. "Considered absolutely," this means that dependencies exist between the human Body and other things (both leading, considered intersubjectively, to certain nexuses of appearance) that are not physicalistic. That is, if in a consciousness that finds itself in a nexus of intersubjective understanding things are to be able to appear as concordant actualities, then sense data must belong to the appearances, and if these sense data are to be able to be there, then Bodies, too, have to be able to appear and have to have their physicalistic actuality. Therefore, this regulation concerns groups of appearances and is an intersubjective one. Sense data can present themselves only if there exist "in Objective actuality" sense organs, nervous systems, etc. To these correspond possible apprehensions of sensuous data and concomitant intersubjective regulations. Can it now make sense to assume that even the possibility of any apprehension whatever and of all consciousness in general is dependent on the Body and its Bodily-Objective events, or that apperceptions, position-takings [290] of belief, of will, etc. are dependent on the Body in the same sense as the data of sensation are? If we think of monadic subjects and their streams of consciousness or, rather, if we think the thinkable minimum of self-consciousness, then a monadic consciousness, one that would have no "world" at all given to it, could indeed be thought—thus a monadic consciousness without regularities in the course of sensations, without motivated possibilities in the apprehension of things. In that case, what is necessary for the emergence of an Ego-consciousness in the ordinary sense? Obviously, human consciousness requires an appearing Body and an intersubjective Body—an intersubjective understanding.

Let us already presuppose a plurality of subjects in mutual intersubjective understanding, thus a certain "Objectively"

constituted world with "Objective" things, Bodies, and real and Objective spirits. A certain relation of the sensations to the respective Objective Body is thereby already presupposed. And let us assume, as it does actually happen, that my Body is a system of sense organs, related to the central organ B. It is on this that the emergence of sensory phantasms and sensations is dependent.

The question is then whether not only these sensuous contents but also, in the same or in a similar sense, all apprehensions and higher conscious functions can be said to be dependent on B, and whether and to what extent such a dependence would be thinkable. As regards sensations, the dependence means that a certain Bodily state (or, rather, a certain form of Bodily states, admitting the process of metabolism, which removes the individual identity of the elements of one and the same organ, of the same nerves, ganglia, etc., though it maintains the same particular form) has, as its univocal and Objective consequence, a certain sensation in a determinate stream of consciousness bound to its respective Body. Can the same be true regarding all the component parts and moments emerging in the stream of consciousness?

Consciousness of the world is constituted in appearances: more exactly, in Bodily appearances. Sensations occur in certain apprehensions, in certain intersubjective regulations, and here [291] belongs especially the regulation that corresponds to the Objective actuality of those hidden organs of the Body we call the central organ B, the nerve chords, the sensory nerves, etc. And now the occurrence of any sensation S in my consciousness C_m, or in a definite individual's consciousness C_m (that of man M) is to be dependent on the part of that regulation which is here called the determinate state B_s^m of my (the respective individual M) B_m. To the extent that sensations enter into other conscious lived experiences as constitutive moments, all these would be dependent on B_m and its states.

The same holds for phantasms. If now all sensations and phantasms within C_m are dependent in this way on the above-mentioned rule concerning apprehended and apprehendable sensations and in addition on this intersubjective group of possible perceptions (thus of possible theoretical judgments as

well), then why should not all conscious lived experiences within a monadic consciousness C_m, and likewise for every C'_m C''_m etc., be able to depend on precisely such a group B_m that is intersubjective and is taken collectively? Why should that present a difficulty if precisely the psychophysical causation is merely grasped as a certain relation of functional regulations, as we have done here and as we must do?

The main point to be examined here is the question of whether or not the essence of consciousness, which expresses itself apriori in essential laws, resists such a universal regulation. The essence of consciousness in general does raise claims and demands. For example, is it possible, we are asking, for the matter here at issue to be understood in such a way that the cerebral states (states of the B) precede, in an Objectively temporal sense, the corresponding conscious lived experiences, or must not, for reasons of principle, the brain state and its conscious accompaniment be simultaneous, in conformity with the absolute sense of simultaneity? Thereby is not a parallelism given *eo ipso*? Namely, in this way: to every conscious lived experience in *my* consciousness C_m there corresponds a certain state in my B, a certain organic state. On the other hand, to everything without exception that comprises the B there correspond real events of a certain kind in *every* subject, and consequently also in me: certain real perceptual possibilities, which, if not corresponding to this state of the brain B, then to another state in connection with it in a natural-scientific nexus.

The opposite conception would be that such a universal [292] regulation does not exist, or cannot exist, but that, instead, determinate states of B_m pertain only to the sense data in C_m but not to consciousness' noetic aspect, taken in a broad sense, whether entirely or within certain limits. And that can again mean that this noetic element is either accidental, occurring without laws, not determined apriori in a univocal way; or it is indeed determined univocally, though it does not stand in functional dependence or in a relation of parallelism to the physical Body and thereby to physical being in general. If a univocity exists, then the consciousness in question (abstraction made from its hyletic content) can be determined by rules of

inner dependence, rules which prescribe what else must be there in consciousness and must occur in it if certain states are already given and if in them sense data present themselves in such and such psychophysical dependencies.

Here we should also introduce empathy, in virtue of which, in the individual consciousness C_m, with its psychophysically determined content of sensations, there results a simple understanding, one that is not predelineated by psychophysical laws, of the psychic life of the other, which life is then given as existing and determines, by way of motivation, the rest of the psychic life C_m. This is an "encroachment" of one subjectivity on another, mediated by comprehension. A direct encroachment would be excluded. All encroachment, as we are now employing the word, presupposes that the C_m contains in itself consciousness of the other's psychic life C'_m, and this consciousness is, within C_m, what is immediately "operative" in the encroachment. Thereby, however, this action of soul upon soul, of subject upon subject, is always psychophysically mediated, but in quite a different manner. Psychophysical causality is constantly in play, though with the support of peculiar natural laws that are purely psychic. They would be knowable only in intersubjective experience (including self-experience), i.e., by means of knowledge of the general way in which conscious lived experiences constitute individualities in the "monads." These universal empirical cognitions would have their connection with eidetic universal laws pertaining to consciousness in general and to the constitution in consciousness of any individuality whatever.

These are possibilities considered universally. Within the [293]
framework of such considerations, the following important problem also arises: *de facto* there occur Bodies scattered here and there in nature, and that is how we do indeed look at nature. But it would still remain to think through the possibility of what might be involved in that, i.e., whether and to what extent it would be possible for *every* physical thing in nature to be a Body.

The decisive question is now the extent to which what is *essential* about consciousness assigns *limits* to the conceivable possibilities. That there are *essential laws of consciousness* is

indeed an absolutely indubitable truth. Is a thorough psychophysical parallelism *compatible* with them, one that would predelineate for every conscious state C_m a dependency, in a lawful way, on B_m or a parallel in B_m?

The following reservations impose themselves, and we need to examine their pertinence. The changes of B_m are contingent changes, subject to natural laws which could just as well be different ones. Let us assume that all conscious lived experiences, just as they are, may be dependent on B_m for their entire content with its parts and moments and may exist as long as B_m exists. If now, as belonging to the apriori essence of consciousness, there exist certain necessities in the course of its succession — the way, e.g., the modes of retention within the constitution of time are linked (apriori), as succeeding one another necessarily, to various impressions — then these nexuses of the sequence could not be conditioned by B_m and by the sequence of its Objective states. Only that which the essential nexuses leave *open* can be empirically conditioned. For instance, only the sensation could be conditioned, but not what is necessarily linked to it in terms of the retentions. Or perhaps, more precisely, what is conditioned would only be the content of the sensation and likewise, within the predelineated form of the retentional sequence, a content left open by it, that is, differences in clarity and distinctness, etc.; in which respect it is problematic, and to be determined in experience, to what extent the content is conditioned psychophysically. In any case we can say that *if* a modification of consciousness is excluded apriori, if there exists apriori a law of incompatibility, in virtue of which C′ and C″ are altogether incompatible in one consciousness, then what is bound up with C′, which we think as dependent on [294]
B′, is no longer determined purely by a B″ bound up with B′ or, in general, by an interplay of B-states. Instead, there is an absolutely fixed lawfulness that does not have any parallel in the empirical lawfulness of B.

We also have to note the following: every lived experience has its background, its environment in the order of coexistence as well as its environment in the sinking down into the past (through which it is constituted as a unity of the living past precisely in the sinking down). These are apriori relations; it is

this way and cannot be otherwise. Accordingly, we have all sorts of phenomena, the reduction of which to a causal dependence on B-states would be nonsense.[1]

On such grounds, it seems to me, one can *radically refute parallelism,* and the refutation thereby has a completely different style compared to the usual ones which operate with distorted concepts of causality and substance and with traditional prejudices of many kinds, refutations that head directly for interactionism, as if the question of parallelism versus interaction were a radical and exhaustive one. In point of fact, with the rejection of parallelism nothing at all is decided in favor of interaction.

Besides, this is not what comes next. Instead, there has first to be determined how *far* the dependence of C on B extends. Doubtlessly as far as the sensuous substrate of consciousness. Surely the higher consciousness, the properly noetic, becomes *co*-dependent on B, to the extent that it is founded in the hyletic. Surely not only are the sensuous sensations in the [295] stricter sense determined by the Body, but so are the sensuous feelings as well, and the lived experiences of instincts. Surely a good part of individuality also belongs here, namely the sensuous dispositions with their individual *habitus*.

Obviously, how far all this extends can only be decided empirically and if possible by means of experimental psychology. In particular, whether and to what extent the proper character, the rhythm, of the higher consciousness is determined by means of its own empirical-psychological rules as well as according to what is universally human, though not by essential

[1] Furthermore, the following should be brought to validity: it is *thinkable* that there would be no Bodies at all and no dependence of consciousness on material events in constituted nature, thus no empirical souls, whereas absolute consciousness would remain over as something that cannot simply be cancelled out. Absolute consciousness would thus have in itself, in that case, a principle of factual unity, its own rule, according to which it would unfold with its own content, all the while there being indeed no Body. If we join it to a Body, then perhaps it becomes dependent, though in the first place it still retains its principle of unity and does so not just through apriori laws of consciousness in general. Thus it becomes dependent in this, that it is dependent in its own apriori and individual essence, which means that what is in it is indeed conditioned and can in truth not be a mere epiphenomenon of something else. But all this is quite problematic.

laws, i.e., according to what unfolds within the human type (the type of the human species) and within the individual type, or whether these regularities in the type and in the individual are sufficiently grounded in the physical organization by the mere introduction of essential laws: this can by no means be established apriori.

Now we come to the *question of interaction* and especially to the question of the action, the effects, of consciousness, or rather, of the soul, on the Body. Obviously, one may not operate here with mythical concepts of affecting. What "affecting" means in the physical world is sufficiently clear. We are led back to lawfully regulated nexuses of dependence between physical events, and since physical things are what they are as unities of appearances, we are led back to interdependencies of certain intersubjective regulations of consciousness of one and the same type. If we speak of "effects" with regard to the dependencies of sensation, sensuous feelings, etc., this is a type of dependence of an entirely different kind. The occurrence of sensations in a monad is dependent on a physical Body in its environment of nature, thus dependent on a certain subjective and, further, intersubjective regulation of appearances and not merely of sensations. It is doubtless that the existence of sensations in each case refers back to the Body, and since sensations and lived experiences in general have no Objective temporal existence, if not through a relation to the intersubjective Body, so then we are already led to the position that the relation between sensation and Corporeality must be thought of as simultaneous, i.e., that to the sensation must be attributed the Objective time of the corresponding Objective cerebral process.

To speak of a reverse dependency makes no sense unless we [296] assume that the soul has its own causality, an inner empirical lawfulness, in the production of sensations, i.e., a causality that can first of all unfold in itself and can lead to a sensation, to which the state of the B would then be linked as dependent on it. Examples: the voluntary production of hallucinations, or, just as well, the voluntary production of sensations coordinated to certain appearances of things: namely the sensations brought about by the voluntary movement of the parts of the Body. It is problematic that it can ever be decided empirically whether or

not there is an empirical succession in time here, i.e., whether or not the Objective temporal point of the cerebral stimulation, corresponding to the movement of the hand, must be taken as the same identical temporal point of the sensation. Everything depends here on the way of defining the temporal point of a determinate state of consciousness, hence on the question of the sense of a temporal determination of a conscious lived experience.

For the rest, there comes into consideration what was already expounded elsewhere[1]: if I am able to comprehend another individual, look into his depths, then I know how he will allow himself to be motivated; but that is no different from the way I know it as regards myself. Naturally, I say all sorts of things about what I would do in a certain case; that is because I have not become perfectly clear on the circumstances and so always leave many things out of account. For that reason I cannot say, in an entirely definite way, what I would do in the future under circumstances of this or that kind. For until then much will have elapsed in my consciousness, and what has elapsed will extend itself, as motivating, into the time that follows and hence will be co-operative. Needless to say, the future cannot be predicted with certainty, but only hypothetically, by supplying the intermediate parts. On the other hand, the past can be encompassed in the understanding by means of clear memory, and each motivational nexus it had can be comprehended. There pertains to every course of consciousness an individuality that can be understood and "re-felt" as one to which belong precisely these modes of motivation and no others. In this, everyone is distinct from everyone else. Yet that does not amount to univocal necessity in the consequences. Everywhere natural causality, what is Bodily, and what is determined in [297] consciousness by the Bodily play their roles together. In no way do these determinations need to be universal. The B can indeed be a necessary though not sufficient condition. If the latter is also accepted, then the nexus can indeed be spoken of as a necessary one.

[1] *Cf.* pp. 278 ff.

§ 64. Relativity of nature, absoluteness of spirit

From the foregoing considerations, there results a limit to possible *naturalizing*: the spirit can be grasped as dependent on nature and can itself be naturalized, but only to a certain degree. A univocal determination of spirit through merely natural dependencies is unthinkable, i.e., as reduction to something like physical nature, to something, in the entire type of determination, analogous to the goal of univocal determination in natural science. Subjects cannot be dissolved into nature, for in that case what gives nature its sense would be missing. Nature is a field of relativities throughout, and it can be so because these are always in fact relative to an absolute, the spirit, which consequently is what sustains all the relativities.

The spirit is determined through its surrounding world, and it even has a natural regulation insofar as it manifests dependencies of various kinds once it is placed in relation to the nature constituted with reference to the personal world. But this does not prevent its being *absolute, irrelative.* That is to say, if we could eliminate all spirits from the world, then that is the end of nature. But if we eliminate nature, "true," Objective-intersubjective existence, there always still remains something: the spirit as individual spirit. It only loses the possibility of sociality, the possibility of comprehension, for that presupposes a certain Bodily intersubjectivity. We would then no longer have the individual spirit as a person in the stricter, social sense, a person related to a material and, consequently, to a personal world as well. Nevertheless we still have, notwithstanding the enormous impoverishment of "personal" life, precisely an Ego with its conscious life, and it even has therein its individuality, its way of judging, of valuing, of letting itself be motivated in its position-takings.

It is in the spirit's course of consciousness, however, that in every case is manifested the spirit's unity and individuality. If I [298] want to understand these, then I have to investigate this course, reconstruct it. If I want to understand it according to some definite aspect, then I have to extrapolate intuitively the corresponding nexus in the course of consciousness. The understanding is intuitive throughout; the Objectivity that is this "individual" hereby comes to givenness in its own proper being.

I relive the other's spiritual life and, with that, the other's spiritual world, his spiritual Objectivity, and I understand them in their individual significance, their spiritual significance: in terms of the political situation, the spiritual epoch, contemporary literature, etc.

It must not be forgotten here that *individuality in the spiritual sense* is something quite different from *individuality in nature*. A thing has its individual essence as that which is here and now. But this "what" is itself a "universal." That means that each thing is an example of a universality; this is already the case as regards the thing on the level of mere "sense" experience thought as concordant. Any thing can be thought of as repeatable at will. Likewise, physicalistic Objectivity is what it is, and according to each of its determinations, as being subject to laws and determinations, both of which can be formulated mathematically.

The thing as real is dependent on real circumstances; it is what it is in the nexus of real nature, which in itself is constituted as homogeneous throughout.

The purely Objective consideration, which investigates the Objective sense of thingness, requires that things be dependent on one another as regards their states and that they, in their real existence, mutuallly prescribe something to one another, regarding, specifically, their ontological content, their causal states.

The question now is whether a thing, which indeed remains *one* thing under all circumstances, is the identical something of properties and is actually in itself solid and fixed with respect to its real properties; that is, is a thing an identity, an identical subject of identical properties, the changing element being only its states and circumstances? Would this not then mean that according to the various circumstances into which it can be brought, or into which it can be thought to be introduced, the thing has different actual states, but that in advance— [299]
apriori—how it can behave, and, further, how it will behave, is predelineated by its own essence? But does each thing (or, what is equivalent here: does any thing at all) *have such an essence of its own in the first place*? Or is the thing, as it were, always underway, not at all graspable therefore in pure Objectivity, but rather, in virtue of its relation to subjectivity, in principle only a

relatively identical something, which does not have its essence in advance or graspable once and for all, but instead has an open essence, one that can always take on new properties according to the constitutive circumstances of givenness? But this is precisely the problem, to determine more exactly the *sense of this openness*, as regards, specifically, the "Objectivity" of natural science.

Does the "infinity" of the world, instead of referring to a transfinite endlessness (as if the world were something finished in itself, an all-encompassing thing or a self-enclosed collectivity of things, which would nevertheless contain in itself an infinity of things), not rather mean an "openness"? But what is the sense of that?

If, as we may do, we think of nature changed in all sorts of ways, then a nature is always also thinkable in which there would be many of the same things, and indeed things of any content whatsoever as long as it is representable. It is thinkable that there are many things completely the same as to properties and causal states, in coexistence as well as in succession. The one is here, the other there; the one is now, the other then. It is also thinkable that one thing return periodically to the same identical state. What distinguishes two things that are alike is the real-causal nexus, which presupposes the here and the now. And with that we are led back necessarily to an individual subjectivity, whether a solitary or an intersubjective one, with respect to which alone determinateness is constituted in the positing of location and of time. *No thing has its individuality in itself.*

On the other hand, the spirit lives through, takes a position, is motivated. Each spirit has its way of motivation, and, unlike a thing, it has *its motivation in itself*. It does not have individuality only by being in a determinate place in the world. The pure Ego of any given *cogitatio* already has absolute individuation, and the *cogitatio* itself is something absolutely individual in [300]
itself. The Ego, however, is not an empty pole but is the bearer of its habituality, and that implies that it has its individual history.

The lived experiences in the flux of consciousness have an essence that is absolutely their own; they bear their individua-

tion in themselves. Can more than one lived experience be the same, can they be absolutely the same in one flux of consciousness? Are they distinguishable merely by this-ness? And can two lived experiences be distinct merely by the fact that the one belongs to this and the other to that consciousness (monad)? A lived experience now and "the same" lived experience later, "simply repeated," can these be the same in their total essential content? In the now, consciousness has a content of originary lived experiences and a horizon of past ones which is represented in the now in the form of a lived horizon of "primary memory," of retention, and the originary and the horizonal are continuously transformed into one another. Does this medium of lived experience make no difference for a lived experience that is originarily making its entrance, e.g., that of a new sense datum? If it is not a matter of indifference, then the lived experiences are already distinct. For in the "afterwards" this medium is a different one. But, one could object, does the fact not remain that every lived experience, *together with* its horizon, in its full concretion, is thinkable as repeated? Certainly, we answer, I think it as repeated; but I still think it necessarily as an *individual* lived experience that is the *same,* as unique, as one and self-same.

The problem can also be stated as follows: is there a distinction somehow to be made between full, concrete *essence* and individual *existence*? Or, conversely: is not this distinction to be made apriori and everywhere by necessity and must it not be said that, in principle, complete sameness of individuals in the sphere of lived experience is indeed possible, that every lived experience is *"idealiter"* an essential content that has its this-ness, which is not a quality. But is not even this *haecceitas* a universal, inasmuch as every lived experience in itself has its *haecceitas?* One cannot at all ask, however, what distinguishes one this from another this purely as this-es, nor, further, what they both have in "common." That would already be confusing the quality and the this. So would speaking of the "essence of this-ness." This-ness is a *form.* What distinguishes this "something" from another "something" precisely as "something"? "Nothing," insofar as there are no qualities, no substantial contents, which would allow a distinction. The form of the this [301]

is *not a what-ness,* and in that sense is not an essence. It is universal in the sense of the form.

Consciousness has its own essence, one in flux and not determinable exactly; but to it as an idea an "exact" essence can be attributed, and with this positing it receives its determinate this.

Objective thinghood is determined physicalistically but is determined as a this only in relation to consciousness and the conscious subject. All determination refers back to a here and now and consequently to some subject or nexus of subjects.

What is uniquely and originally individual is consciousness, taken concretely with its Ego. All other individuality is appearance and has the principle of its individuation in actual and possible appearing, which, in turn, refers back to an individual consciousness.

Absolute individuation enters into the *personal* Ego. The surrounding world of the Ego acquires its individuation essentially by way of its relation to the Ego that has experience of it and that exchanges its experience with other individuals. For each Ego, any thing has the here and the now as a correlate of intuition. An Ego, or an intersubjectivity *for itself,* constitutes the surrounding world, and if it allows itself to be determined by its "over and against" in the surrounding world, or itself determines this latter actively and perhaps formatively, then this latter has the *secondary individuation of the "over and against,"* whereas the *originary* individuation, the absolute one, resides in the Ego itself. The same spirit cannot be twice, nor can it return to the same total state, nor does it manifest its individuation merely by standing in different nexuses with the same content.

Spirits are precisely not unities of appearances but are instead unities of absolute nexuses of consciousness; more exactly, they are Ego-unities. And appearances are correlates of nexuses of consciousness which themselves have their absolute being. And if appearances are constituted intersubjectively, then we are led back precisely to a plurality of persons who can comprehend one another. A correlate as such has its support in persons and in their lived experiences, and their absolute being precedes the relative being of the appearances. All individuation of the latter [302]

depends on the absolute individuation of the former, and all natural existence depends on the existence of absolute spirits.

But then how is it with the soul and with man as nature? Are these also merely examples of universals? The answer to that has surely to be: no, insofar as the soul is naturalized spirit, and individuality in the specific sense pertains to the spirit. On the other hand, we must indeed say that everything by means of which the soul is determined as a natural reality is exemplary and universal. Individuality does not reside in that which is nature here. Nature is the X and in principle nothing but the X which is determined through universal determinations. The spirit, however, is no X but is that which is itself given in spiritual experience.

SUPPLEMENTS

SUPPLEMENTS

SUPPLEMENT I (to Sections One and Two): Attempt at a step-wise description of the constitution of the merely *material thing*, the Body, the *animate thing* or the living being, and then the *personal subject*, etc.

If we investigate the constitution of the realities *nature* and *spirit*, in their interrelatedness, then we can distinguish *idealiter* the following strata. Complying with the order of constitution, we have to begin with the constitution of the sphere of the mere thing, the sphere of *material nature*. On the lowest level, we can segregate out there sensuous things as correlates of the Ego that has not yet been realized and that is thought of as solitary. It has its sense perceptions together with the concordant perceptual multiplicities belonging ideally to them, in which, by steps (the order of these steps is not a present concern), real things are constituted by means of presentation, things which have to be characterized, given the presupposed lack of higher strata of apperception, as *individual-subjective*. In the case of these *merely material things* it is *precisely these things* which function as *real circumstances*, and on this lowest level, for which no dependence on the Body has yet been taken into account, it is *only* such things: *a material thing is thinkable only as causally related to material things and hence as a member of a material environment*. This statement remains valid even later on, after further realizations have been added, ones which count for us, moreover, only as ideal possibilities and not as ideal necessities.

The next step consists in the introduction of the *Body* of the solitary Ego-subject and of the relations of dependency which hold between it and these realities.[1] Among the individual-subjective things that are constituted first, one is pre-eminent as the *subject's Body*, constituted as an aesthesiological unity, etc. The things which are thought as constituted without reference to the Body as such (but instead only in reference to the Body as one material thing among others), acquire, according to the *new sort of phenomenal dependencies* the Body introduces, a new stratum of apprehension (a stratum belonging essentially to *all* constituted things) and thereby acquire the *rank of mere "appearances"* of the true things presenting themselves in them. The sensuously appearing thing as such, the sense-thing [306]

[1] *Cf.* pp. 63 ff.

(any possible sense-thing), which previously was the thing pure and simple, changes its sensuous quality, its color for example, when I put on blue spectacles; yet the true thing, which here is but presenting itself, does not change its "true" quality. The sensuous quality is not illusion but is that appearance of the true, non-sensuous quality demanded by the given circumstances. The putting on of the blue spectacles changes the "normal" sense-thing; the *circumstances of the seeing* deviate from the ordinary rule. The normal thing counts as the thing pure and simple; i.e., its relation to the given circumstances (within the doxic characterization of "being") does not come to the fore as long as these circumstances remain precisely constant in their ordinary constellation. This normality and abnormality are interchangeable with each other, insofar as the characters of what is ordinary and what is out of the ordinary can exchange roles and the extraordinary become ordinary. In the latter case no privilege of true objectivity is constituted; instead, in the thorough functional dependence of the changes of the sense-things on concomitant changeable circumstances which now happen to be determined as such and such, something *identical* shows itself and "appears" according to these circumstances *as sensually qualified now this way now that way.*

Here also belongs the complex of dependencies of sense-things included under the heading *health and sickness of the Body.* Here, too, there is a kind of *normality and abnormality,* by means of which the manifold of appearances in its entirety, in which a sense-thing appears as unitary, is brought into dependency on the Body, which itself appears as a sense-thing. *Hence in regulated ways all sense-things, together with their sensuous properties, and all their sensuous parts and moments, "involve" the sense-thing, Body.* To the Body correspond apprehensions of a higher level, which at the very outset apprehend in a unitary way what appears here and there (the unity of any given group of sense-things), as the following expressions illustrate: if my eye is in a "normal" state, and if the circumstances are normal—i.e., seeing in "broad daylight" without the interference of any colored medium, etc.—then the object appears to me in the corresponding way; if my eye is in an abnormal state then the object again appears in a different corresponding way, in a way more or less familiar, and, insofar as the latter is the case, in a way which must be further determined in perception, though it is always a regulated way. None of the "sensuous qualities," e.g., the colors, with which "the" object "appears," pertain to it "in itself," but instead each quality pertains to the object "itself" only in relation to [307] certain circumstances. These components of indetermination in the apprehension indicate ways of experiental determination which in actual experience, insofar as it runs its course harmoniously, entail, along with the further determination, also a validation of the apprehension or of the positing of the being of the object of the sense constituted through it. If the object *is,* then it has, over and against all phenomenal colorations, the "Objective" color proper to it. That means it is in this relativism that it is determined how it will (or would) comport itself in experience (as object of its sense). This Objective color is not a sensuous color but is a nonsensuous

unity "presenting" itself as an intentional unity in the manifold of sensuous data related to the respective circumstances. It is only sensuous insofar as it is precisely something intentionally unitary that can essentially be given originarily only as such a unity of sense qualities. The apprehension of the higher level inserts into the sensuous (itself already a "unity" over against a "multiplicity") the *nonsensuous,* which is to a certain extent an *index for a relativism of dependencies of a higher level* or, put noetically, an index for possible, determinately structured, lived experiences which in their actual unfolding were pervaded by consciousness of the ever richer originary givenness of the identical Objective thing. Its *theoretical* determination would take us, of course, in a different direction and would require essentially new series of acts founded in such experiences. The Objectivity of this thing is still essentially related to the individually solitary subject and to the Body constituted for it.

If we bring comprehension and its constitutive accomplishments into the compass of our considerations, then the Ego previously thought of as solitary now grasps certain of "its" Objects as *"other Bodies"* and in unity with them, *other Egos,* which, however, are *not yet thereby constituted as real subjects.* At first new "Objective" physical things in the pregnant sense, i.e., *intersubjective* things, can be constituted, and subsequently can be constituted Bodies as intersubjectively identifiable unities.

We assume first of all *a "normal" Ego-community* and Bodies of "normal," i.e., typically "standard," structure; we assume them in general in such a way that for all Ego-subjects the same sense-things and subjective-Objective things are constituted, differing only in the way they are given—by way of an orientation that necessarily changes from one subject to another. Now, subjects can exchange their "positions." If we think such exchanges as having taken place, then their actual appearances (the actual things in the how of the modes of their sensuous appearance) [308] are exchanged also, always presupposing the same "adaption"—taken here in an enlarged sense that is easily understood. *In this exchangeability, resting on comprehension, is founded the possibility of the identification of Objects originally relative to isolated subjects:* we see the "same" Object, each of us from his own position, but also with the mode of appearance which would be ours if we were, instead of here, there in the other's place. We then add to that the dependencies manifested by the totality of the multiplicities of perceptual appearances which show no concordance from one subject to another, due to abnormal Bodily structuration (e.g., color blindness, congenital deafness, etc.).

Thus the essence of empathetic apprehension includes the sense that my physical surrounding world is the same as the one of my fellow man, that we all have the "same" multiplicities of appearance, with the "same" stock of unities of appearance, with the same regulated modes of givenness according to possible orientations. The only difference is that each subject has a Body which is exclusively his own, with the effect that the orientation which is exclusively his own, along with the corresponding actual appearances, are in principle different than those of the other subject.

To the possibility of intersubjective apprehension (or its noematic content) belongs the characteristic distribution of the ideal multiplicities of appearances of the things of my physical environing world (for the solitary subject) which are required constitutively by it as a spatial world: whereby to each appearing spatial point there corresponds, by means of a free "I move in that direction and make the there into a here, into a center of orientation," the ideal possibility of transforming actual appearances into potential ones in a regulated and motivated way. Thereby I can imagine, for every appearing point in space, how from that standpoint "the" world would look, whereas my Body is always limited in its modes of appearing and in the case of a transposition remains at every point in space bound to this restricted framework. This is expressed by saying: at each point of space I make into a central point, my Body looks similar from a similar position.

On the other hand, the Body is a physical thing and it is imaginable how it, or a body which is physically similar, would look as a center of orientation from any point in space whatever. If to me, being now here, is given in the there a body which from here looks like my Body would look (at least according to the general type, as regarded from here) then it is "seen" as a Body, and the potential appearances, which I would have if I were transposed to the there, are attributed to it as actual; i.e., an Ego as subject is empatheticallly apprehended with the Body, along with those appearances and the rest of the things that pertain to the Ego, its lived experiences, acts, etc. It is an other Ego since those potential appearances [309] remain for me potential and can never be actual in the unity of the stream of my lived experiences; they are incompatible with the actual appearances of things contained in this stream. My Body cannot at one and the same time be both here and there: the appearances which belong to the there can be mine only by means of a change of position, thus only in a possible future.

In the essence of empathetic apprehension is thus included the sense that my physical surrounding world is the same as that of my fellows, that we all have the "same" manifolds of appearance, the only difference being that each subject has his own Body which is exclusively his own and consequently has an orientation which is exclusively his, along with the corresponding actual appearances of the physical surrounding world as a selection out of the common system of possible appearances.

Accordingly each subject has *his* position in the one same space, and each subject, as subject of a freely moving Body, can move in this common space, can exchange his position with that of his congener, and so can exchange his orientations and series of appearances with another's. They are exchanged as the similar is with the similar, not as the identical is with the identical; they are exchanged out of a similar system organized according to a typical content, while each subject yet remains ineluctably distinct from every other by means of an abyss, and no one can acquire identically the same appearances as those of another. Each subject has his stream of consciousness displaying a regularity that encompasses precisely

all streams of consciousness, all animal subjects. The sense-things and the subjective-Objective thing-unities which were previously related exclusively to a single subject now become intersubjective—i.e., intersubjectively identifiable—unities, and the lived experiences of the appearances obtain a new sense-content. That is, the things as correlates of the solitary subject obtain a sense which becomes common for the whole group of communicating subjects: it is the same thing that I see and that the other sees, it is just that we see this same thing "from out of" different points of space. The properties of what is seen are the same, though they present themselves to each one in a correspondingly different way; and so are even the secondary qualities, provided we are all normal perceivers, perceiving under normal circumstances. Moreover, for all subjects, primary qualities are manifest in the secondary, and of course those are Objectively identical. Indeed it lies in the nature of this constitutive state of affairs that communicating subjects, as long as the exchange of descriptive information is not opposed, apprehend the sense-things themselves as intersubjective identities, that they then further apprehend intersubjectively the already higher senses of subjective-Objective thing-unities, and finally, that the supplementation of the interchangeable experiences of these things with similar content by other experiences which are not present as the same in all subjects, and which hence are intersubjectively contradictory with regard to the phenomenal dependence of these differences on a different psychophysical character of the subjects, makes possible a far-reaching constitution of a concordant intersubjective Objectivity, which now at the same time becomes the one valid for any single subject. [310]

Continuing along this path we come then to the totality of relations between Body and soul. Constituted together are the physical thing as nature, the Body as aesthesiological unity, and the soul as a founded reality, thus a non-selfsufficient one, with the Body as its substrate (the Body always thought constitutively only as an aesthesiological unity). In this series we do not come across the personal Ego, although each founded psychic subject is a subject of lived experiences of acts. Concerning the constitution of the personal Ego, it must be considered as having the *Body as field of its free will,* and especially in this respect, that the kinesthetic processes, which already provide essential contributions toward the constitution of the thing of the lowest level, are characterized as free processes, to which are joined, as dependent, processes of other sorts of aesthesiological data. And thereby is connected the possibility of apprehending the *Body as freely moved totality of sense organs,* i.e., as a complex of organs moving freely in mutual coordination. If perception is to be constitutive of a thing, then there must also pertain to it the possibility of Bodily movements as "free" movements.

In this way we come round to the constitution of the personal Ego. Things are constituted for the Ego, but in unity with them the *Ego is also constituted in a certain empirically familiar manner* (thus in a determinate sort of apperception) as it relates itself to the appearing things. The Ego carries out perceptual activities, and here belong essentially Corporeal

"activities." Concerned with appearing things, the Ego directs its sense organs in various ways; it moves its eyes, carries out a changing accommodation, feels with its hand over the surface of the appearing body, etc.

SUPPLEMENT II (to Section Two, pp. 118 ff.)

This old reflection on habituality is still extremely immature; although everything essential is glimpsed, the description is not carried through to the end with precision.

In the first place the doctrine of the pure Ego—before all else as pole—must be [revised?].

Just like any object-pole, the Ego-pole is a pole of identity, a center of an identity, and is an absolutely identical, though non-autonomous, center for affects and actions.

It might already be said of affects (whose domain is the immanent sphere and in particular what is in the foreground there) that their sediment is a passive habituality in the Ego. That is still problematic. The Ego-pole is in [311] any case an apriori center of original Ego-properties. Just as an object has its identity as a pole of relatively or absolutely permanent properties, and just as every property is something identical though non-autonomous (*in* the pole), so the same holds for the Ego. It is a pole of acts, though acts are not properties, nor are they affects. But every act, carried out "for the first time," becomes an "instauration" of a permanent possession *lasting* throughout immanent time (in the sense of a lasting identity). The Ego remains unchanged as long as it remains "of the same conviction," "of the same opinion." To change the conviction is to change "oneself." But throughout change and unchange the Ego remains identically the same precisely as pole. Where should we put the Ego of humors, of states: "I am in bad humor," etc.?

SUPPLEMENT III (to Section Two, p. 149, l. 128)

The localization of the ear noises in the ear

Here we have to attend to a phenomenon of orientation, the analogon of the phenomenon of orientation in vision.

Corresponding to "my" approach or withdrawal (in the free "I move") a visual Object changes its orientation, and likewise so does an acoustic Object, in virtue of an approximative function of different gradient found in the two senses (in the one case the visual "image," retaining its identity, grows in clarity and inner richness of moments when approached, in the other case the acoustic "image"), connected with enhancement in the area of accommodation.

I can stop my ears, more or less completely, just as I can shut my eyes. Appearances that I have without accommodating to them are not Objective ones, nor are appearances which remain the same while the accommodation is changing by my free movement. There is always an optimum of accommodation, and that is the "true" one. For every distance there is a different accommodation.—Null point of accommodation? Is that appropriate to the noise in the ears? Yes, the moving over there, if we call that accommodation in this sphere, the bringing my ear nearer or farther away by moving myself—where that does not alter anything, there I have an Object in the Here. So it is my Body, it is a "subjective tone" in the ear, or it is subjective color appearances which remain unchanged and are localized by me in the eye. But prior to all this insertion in the Body something like that is in itself a null character. That is to be considered further.

SUPPLEMENT IV (to Section Three, pp. 181 ff.)

Our goal, the working out of the idea of transcendental phenomenology in full clarity, requires a penetrating study of the relation between the [312] natural sciences and the human sciences.

The outcome of our previous investigations is that phenomenology maintains a relation to every science. Each science has its object-domain and each has its method, i.e., its proper procedures to appropriate theoretically the objectivities of the domain in question. Such objectivities must first be given; the originarily giving consciousness, which corresponds to them, plays in each science the role of source of ultimate foundation. Together with this are joined the different ways of mediate foundation along with the concomitant noetical principles of reason. All this is material for phenomenological research: all the species of acts which the researcher of any kind of science accomplishes, all the species of meanings which in such acts mediate the relation to objectivities, all the modes of appearances in which these objectivities enter into the researcher's consciousness, all the modes of thoughtful grasping and noetical qualification which emerge therewith—all these become in phenomenology theoretical Objects. Phenomenology does not investigate the objects investigated by the researcher in other sciences; on the contrary, it investigates the total system of possible acts of consciousness, of possible appearances and meanings related to precisely those objects. All dogmatic investigation of objects requires transformation into a transcendental investigation. Here phenomenology, as became clear in our considerations, does not have to deal with each separate object or every individual discipline whatsoever, but it has rather to investigate the guiding lines of the principles of being (regional universalities) or the system of rational ontologies. Once, for example, the phenomenological work is done for the region of being, "nature in general," then it is equally done, in the mode of generality, for all special disciplines of the natural sciences, and only a consideration of the particularities is then needed.

If we now want to pursue further the phenomenological "clarification"[1]

[1] The expression "clarification" can be employed here only conditionally.

of the natural and human sciences, then still other interests are motivating us. Already before engaging ourselves in phenomenology, these sciences and the mathematical disciplines intimately entwined with them are already familiar to us, and they were already formed before phenomenology was established. No matter how much it is for phenomenology a matter of life and death that it draw its method from the data which are its own, we can nevertheless not obviate the danger that habitual methods we have adopted in those dogmatic sciences, and insights about method we have reflectively formed in them, will determine and confuse us at the outset in our attempt to found a pure phenomenology. If it is our concern to assure ourselves of the specifics of the phenomenological method, then we must also become clear about what distinguishes it from that which is apparently identical in the methods of the dogmatic sciences. Hence we are often aware of being [313] forced into considerations of a comparative nature. For instance, phenomenology describes consciousness and correlates of consciousness. But that is precisely what is also done by mundane scientific psychology. How then is phenomenological description related to mundane scientific description? Is phenomenological description distinct from the latter only in that it is eidetic whereas the mundane scientific description is empirical? Is it then the case that every phenomenological description is *eo ipso* transformed into a natural-Objective one when the eidetic attitude is abandoned? Conversely, is it possible that even dogmatic empirical research can become eidetic—insofar as empirical concretions are largely mere single examples of the apriori? Is that actually a transition into phenomenology? From this approach we encounter the question of the *relation between a phenomenology and an ontology* of nature and of the world in general. Natural science is either physical or biological (psychological). What is the special status of the descriptive psychology, based purely on inner experience, which has been demanded repeatedly since the last third of the 19th century, especially since Brentano (psychognosis) and Dilthey (descriptive, analytic psychology)? This psychology certainly accepts the project of a descriptive analysis of consciousness and its data. So it seems that within psychology itself we encounter phenomenology and that eidetic phenomenology has to be inserted into eidetic psychology as a part of it. Doubtlessly, there is an element of truth expressed here (but certainly not the pure truth), and connected with this is the fact that *descriptive psychology offers a genuine and natural point of departure for the working out of the idea of phenomenology*. This was in fact the way which led me to phenomenology. On the other hand, it is to be fully established in a deeper investigation that phenomenology the way *we* understand it—as eidetic, but, at the same time, as resting on the *transcendental reduction*—is in no way descriptive psychology and has, in strict truth, not even one part in common with it. That, however, does not mean to deny the fact that a transcendental-phenomenological attitude can be coordinated with each and every immanent-descriptive attitude by means of certain, essentially available, apperceptive transformations, and so is justified what we said above about the "element of truth" in the rejected view. It is obvious that this not only

holds for *empirical*-descriptive psychology compared with our phenomenology (which is indeed supposed to be an eidetic discipline), but it also applies to eidetic or rational psychology. In other words: the idea of our pure phenomenology does not coincide at all with the equally necessary, although up to now not explicitly realized, idea of a rational psychology [314] (namely with regard to an eidetic-descriptive infrastructure which belongs to such a psychology). The transition from the empirical-psychological to the eidetic-psychological does not require any previous transcendental reduction of the former and consequently does not lead to the eidetic-phenomenological. It is of the highest importance, however, not only for practical and methodological reasons but also for theoretical-scientific and philosophical reasons, to make these relations perfectly clear, and to this task we dedicate our forces.

With regard to the relation of phenomenology to the human sciences, a relation which is surely problematic with respect to psychology, quite analogous questions emerge. There are those who oppose phenomenology to psychology; others want to take them together and unify them. These views are not yet clarified and are, as is well known, the subject of much debate. Only phenomenology can decide here, and specifically by means of phenomenological analyses of the kind we have accomplished up to now, for they are preconditions for the grounding of a systematic science of phenomenology. Phenomenology is highly interested in the decisive solution of these questions, insofar as it is the very element of the life of phenomenology to acquire a fully conscious clarity about itself, and this urgently requires that the sense of human science and psychology be fully clarified. If the characteristic essence of human science is grasped in its purity and if then it is grasped as something other than natural-scientific psychology and the disciplines dependent on it, there results a new way into phenomenology and a much better one, more far-reaching than the way from psychology.

However, the constitution of an eidetics of the *spirit* (rather than of psychic nature in the psychological sense) immediately presses toward the view that phenomenology is a discipline included therein. Again the question arises concerning the justification of such an inclusion. In a more penetrating investigation, the present state of affairs emerges as one that is different than the one which resulted from a comparison of phenomenology and psychology, since here it is clear that in the case of a very broad and at the same time thoroughly concrete grasp of the idea of an eidetics of the spirit, the latter in fact encompasses all of phenomenology, just as—in a certain interpretation, with, so to say, a change of sign—on the other hand it also encompasses all ontologies and all apriori disciplines whatever. In connection with the investigations we have to devote to this problem, we will be able to settle the question that is so important for the self-understanding of phenomenology, the question of the relation between phenomenology and ontology as well as the *question of the relation between the method of phenomenology and the universal scientific-theoretical method of intuitive "clarification" of unclear concepts and principles*. In this relation [315]

it will be shown that the universal task of the clarification of *all* concepts — understood in the universality of principles — and the correlative task, to be accomplished in the most perfect intuition, of the eidetic analysis and eidetic description of *all* objectivities and *all* kinds of unity pertaining essentially to them, coincide with phenomenology. Individual clarification is not a work of phenomenology as a science, individual analysis in the sphere of intuition is not a phenomenological analysis, but it becomes such as soon as it enters into the compass of a systematic analysis and eidetic description of the totality of possible intuitive data. It would then be apparent that (eidetically descriptive) phenomenology has the status of the fundamental philosophical science, hence that phenomenological philosophy and philosophy in general must be one and the same. And in that case it would also become clear that philosophy and intuitive philosophy must equally count as the same, provided the word intuition is given its proper sense. This sense cannot be ascertained before phenomenology, but only through it. More precisely, if one takes into account what resides in the most original sense of philosophical intuition and what kind of intuition and mode of intuitive research is required by it, then, in consistent thinking, one necessarily arrives at the phenomenological attitude and the recognition of a great science, on which all philosophizing must be based if it is to occur at all, precisely phenomenology in our sense. If, however, one goes beyond the idea of an eidetic-descriptive phenomenology, projected originally in the first part of *Ideas,* to a systematic development of all the deductive consequences which reside in it, then one arrives at the universal system of an apriori, which encompasses all conceivable apriori sciences, but as products of phenomenology, founded purely subjectively and eidetically on absolute data. As a further consequence, though now going back to the empirical, hence to what is factual, one comes to a universal system of absolutely grounded sciences which can even be designated as universal and naturally enlarged phenomenology.

SUPPLEMENT V (to pp. 207 f.)

The *pregivennesses of the spirit or of spirits,* of individualities of a higher level *in the life of the spirit.*

We make up a *normal human community,* within which, however, abnormal men can be found and, in addition, levels of various depth.

1.) before all, *normal* intuitive spatio-temporal *nature,* especially the earth and for each circle of men their determinate earthly environment, inorganic as well as organic. [316]

2.) *men and animals* in determinate movable spatio-temporal distributions, constituted this or that way, at rest, working, etc.

3.) *goods:* works of art, implements, etc. Naturally useful things. Works, tools, etc. All of which refer back to spiritual works of the past and the future.

4.) *morals and customs,* laws, religion, language, unions and statutes of

unions, various society units with their particular norms, freely established by the preference of the society (contracts), conventions in these unities, classes, professional circles, etc.

Social personalities, the social forms of community which are not full personalities and which are not societies of will and action (linguistic communities, national communities without a national "will" and their correlates).

Genesis, spiritual origins. Origin of the single individuality, origins of higher spiritual individualities. How the correlative surrounding worlds are constituted in ever new levels, in which what was already constituted becomes a pregiven objectivity. Types of individualities, solitary individuals and social individualities, and how they arise. The human type of an epoch, of a nation, of a professional circle in an epoch, etc.

Biography: description of an individuality in its development. Always already an individual type.

History: description of the unity and development of a sociality enclosed in itself with unitary correlates.

Social transformations, types within a development, types of the socialities which are developing and types of community-formations.

Art and the development of art; science and its development. Development of irreal objectivities as constituted givennesses.

Development of humanity, of the way of its inner life. The type of its individualities, its people, languages, arts, sciences, religions. The directions of development, tendencies of development; ideas as motivations for development, aims of development, God in history.

Development of man as man of a "lower" level. Development of sensibility. Development of nature as correlate. Origin of man out of the animal.

SUPPLEMENT VI (to Section Three, pp. 223 ff.)

Inspectio sui

What do I encounter as *Ego* and what as counter-Ego, as not-Ego, as *foreign to me*?

Things are over and against me, not-I, foreign to me. [317]

Even my Body is over against me — as body but not as Body; what strikes my hand, my Body, strikes "me." — The sting in my hand: I am stung, the sting is unpleasant to me. The warmth of the room flows through my body, is pleasant to me.

Ego as subject of pleasure and displeasure, Ego as subject of "acts." I pay attention, I grasp, I take together by collecting, I compare, I analyze, I believe, I doubt, I am inclined to belief, I decide affirmatively, I reject, I consider, I evaluate, I waiver in my evaluating and then decide, and likewise for willing.

But acts are subjective in quite a different sense than my Body is. My Body is at one time an Object foreign to me, is over and against me just as

much as other things are, when it is taken precisely as a Corporeal body, as that thing there which is in fact a thing like any other. The Body is, however, also the bearer of fields of sensation, etc. If I stick something into a piece of wax, then I do not have any "sting"-sensation in my field of touch, the way I do have if it is my Body that is stung.

Thus *sensations* are subjective, but in quite a different way than acts are. I *have* sensations—it is in quite a different way that I carry out acts. The Corporeal body as bearer of sense-data "localized" in it, as substrate of fields of sensation, is subjective in a metaphorical sense; but in addition it is a field of free movement, and indeed in such a way that in certain fields of sensation free processes are produced, to which then are joined similar ones in other fields as consequences, apperceived, all in all, as "I move my hand, my foot," etc.

But this connection points back to the fact that whatever is in itself completely foreign to the Ego, every thing, is given through "appearances;" and appearances, sensations in unity with concomitant apprehensions, "images," are subjective. But what sort of subjectivity is this? It is of course quite different than that of the Ego-acts. I see a tree, I "have" appearances, images. I look the tree over, I touch it all over: I experience courses of movement-sensations (in the eye; or, for touch, in the moving hand), and these lived experiences are not only lived experiences of courses of events but have the character of an "I do." Everything changeable in the immediate "I do" is originally subjective. Thereby the images do not take their course in just any way, but in a consistent way, as images of one and the same thing and in sequences of fulfillment, tendencies of transition, and to this is connected the stimulus to pay attention, the stimulus to observe from every angle. The Object attracts, stimulates, wants to be considered. I as subject of the voluntary or involuntary "I do."

SUPPLEMENT VII (to Section Three, p. 224 to p. 245) [318]

The Ego and its over-and-against

Everything *originarily proper* to the subject is unified in the Ego and belongs consequently on the side of the Ego. Everything else is over and against it. We have here, with respect to all constituted "things" and "matters," an asymmetrical, non-reversible relation. I can indeed say that the Ego is over and against the thing, but then the "over and against" loses its specific sense. Only an Ego can have an over-and-against in the sense in question here. It can of course also function itself as such an over-and-against. In that case, as Ego it *has* its over-and-against and *is* at the same time an over-and-against for another Ego or is its own over-and-against in reflection. But the non-Ego, the Object that is no subject, is what it is only as an over-and-against, only as something constituted in relation to an Ego or to an open Ego-multiplicity and its originally egological characters.

The Ego is itself *over and against itself,* is itself for itself, is constituted in itself. Each Ego can also be over and against one or more other Egos, a constituted Object for them, apprehended by them, experienced by them, etc. But it is also constituted precisely for itself and *has* its constituted surrounding world as non-Ego, as mere "Objects," which exist only as constituted for an Ego and never as constituting themselves, as Ego. One must never confuse *being-an-Object, in general,* (a special case of which is the peculiar Objectivity of the not-I, and so is the being of the Ego as in an extended sense being-an-Object for itself), with being-attended-to, being the Object of theses, of position-takings, on the part of what exists as Ego. For the latter presupposes the former. I "become" an object for myself—an object of my attention, etc. But I am an Object for myself only insofar as I have "self-consciousness," even if I do not reflect. If I did not have this self-consciousness then I would not be able to reflect. Likewise, prior to every act of attention there is by essence a constitutive consciousness of the objectivity in question.

It is now evident and beyond discussion that what is most proper to the Ego is something experienced in or at the Body, that it is something unified with the Body in the manner of a constituted stratum within a constituted Objectivity. Each such Objectivity and stratum indeed belongs on the side of the not-Ego, the over-and-against, which has sense *only* as the over-and-against of an Ego. Thus if I regard an animal or a man as "nature," then that is, together with the totality of nature and all its bodies, Bodies, and animals, precisely nature, thing, non-Ego.

This is no more than a beginning, however. Much is still lacking for a full understanding of the distinction we are bringing out here between the Ego as person, as subject of its surrounding world, as subject of various objectivities, especially as subject of real nature, constituted for it in such and such a way, and as subject that experiences nature, is affected by it, forms it, etc.—and, on the other hand, the human being as Object of nature, the human subject, with soul and psychic qualities as occurrences in [319] nature. What is lacking is, for instance, an understanding of the relationship between the "pure Ego," earlier taken as a structural moment of all cogitations and afterwards still very much utilized, and the Ego as person, for the pure Ego must indeed be designated the subject of all Objects. What is lacking is an understanding of the insertion into space and time, which the person also attributes to himself, whereas he at the same time posits his Body and all nature as not-Ego over and against himself. Was it not claimed with respect to the psychic Ego that it owes its insertion into the spatio-temporal world to its being founded in the physical Body? Is the psychic Ego not the person in a naturalistic apperception?—precisely an apperception requiring still deeper clarification. In addition, how can the personal Ego, whose essence it is to have its not-Ego over and against itself, apperceive itself as unified with a not-Ego? How can it, while remaining the personal Ego, posit itself over and against the non-naturalized Ego as something naturalized? Furthermore, does not the Ego as person require the Ego as Thou, i.e., an over-and-against that is itself an Ego? Is it just a

matter of the empirical accident of communicative interchange that such words as Ego are coined, words that intimate communicative relationships; or is it a relation belonging to the essence of personal Objectivation (the subjectivating Objectivation) which is thereby expressed? Is this the essence of the person, that it can be constituted only in a personal association; i.e., does the word "person" designate *a kind of being that is in principle relative*—similar to "material thing," which is what it is only within a possible thingly nexus?—

The positing of the fellow man. Let us take the following path in order to progress a step or two. We considered earlier how the Ego finds itself as person. Let us inquire into how we find over and against ourselves our *fellow men* not as natural Objects but as persons, as free Ego-subjects, as partners. Thereby we shall also inquire into how the attitude changes in the transition from the naturalistic to the personalistic consideration of the fellow man. (We think here always of a *consistent* attitude and indeed one that is theoretically interested.) Common to both attitudes is the givenness of the fellow man through comprehension, but that functions differently in the two cases. In the one case, what is comprehended is nature; in the other, spirit. In the one case, what is consistently posited is the other's Ego, lived experience, and consciousness as a real determination of a real human being, built on the fundamental apprehension and positing of material nature, as something really-causally dependent on it, consequently as something attached to it. In the theoretical attitude, accomplishing consistent experience and experiential research, we find here as our thematic domain the *one* nature or world of realities with the real physio-psychic unities (of animal nature) contained in it. In the other case, the Ego, and specifically as person, is "posited purely and simply" and thereby posited as subject of its personal environment, as related, by means of understanding and empathy, to other persons as partners in a social nexus, to which [320] corresponds a unitary social surrounding world, whereas at the same time each one of them has his own environment bearing the stamp of his own subjectivity.

What is the sense of this "pure and simple" positing of the person and of the personal surrounding world as its correlate? For is it not, as one will immediately ask, through the comprehension in which the other person is given that he is posited in relation to his Body and as one with it? Suppose we are within a society. Looking about naïvely, we find in front of our eyes things, Bodies, people. But Bodies are also things; unified with them and expressed in them we find personal life. In empathy we apprehend persons. We address ourselves to them, just as they address themselves to us. We determine them, they determine us. What we have here is not two things, intertwined with each other extrinsically. Rather, what we find here is intrinsically one. The persons are the men themselves who enter into personal relations with us; and Bodies are included in the human unity. All that is correct. Similarly, the unity given in this way is not a naturalistic unity, any more than... (this manuscript continues on p. 245, l. 37).

SUPPLEMENT VIII (to Section Three, p. 248)

It is just like reading a newspaper: the paper imprinted with sensory-intuitive marks is unified with the sense expressed and understood in the word-signs. Likewise in the case of any other literary offering, whether it be spoken, written, etc. It has as it were a sensuous Body for a spiritual meaning that is grasped by way of understanding; "Spirit" and "Body" are unified in a particular way in terms of appearances. The objectivity designated just now as "Body" is altogether something given in pure and simple intuition, in mere secondary qualities; in these and in no others it is "there" precisely for the one who understands, and it belongs to his environment. Only as such an environing Objectivity does it become for him relevant for the functions of "understanding" or "expression" he has to exercise. But the relations are of course not altogether the same, and in addition a more profound analysis shows that all such comprehensive unities refer back to the unity of Body and spirit in the ordinary and most proper sense. But the reference to them can at the same time serve to make clearer the character of the unity which interests us here. The human Body... (continued on p. 256, l. 17).

SUPPLEMENT IX (to Section Three, p. 252)

This applies furthermore also to all human products in visible reality. As [321] products of the animated Body, they are animated just as any thingly process produced, stimulated, or elicited by human agency: a stroke that is aimed, a stick wielded, a book written, etc., take on the spirituality of the Body. The movement of a machine has its spirituality just as the machine itself has. Each work, each product, each action expresses an activity and is characterized as work, as act: one sees how the cigar is rolled, one discovers therein the expression of a manipulation and, on the other hand, the "visible" aim. The handwriting, each stroke in it, its "*ductus*," bears the stamp of the operative spirit. In short, products and works are again psycho-physical unities; they have their physical and their spiritual aspects, they are physical things that are "animated."

SUPPLEMENT X (to Section Three, pp. 259 ff.)

Personal Ego and surrounding world

This will come to be understood still much better if we engage ourselves in a consideration of the *relation of reciprocal determination between the personal subject and its surrounding world:* for example, the personal subject's being determined in function of the values of an Object of the surrounding world, namely through its valuable properties, its beautiful color or form etc., and, conversely, the determination of the Object of the surrounding world by the subject, e.g., by the free movement of the subject, though what is moved immediately is the Body.

First of all, however, we again ask the question: what comprises the *pure and simple positing of the personal subject,* the "spirit;" i.e., in what consists the straightforward attitude towards the personal subject? The answer is: while living in the understanding of the Body which appears in our environment, we posit the spirit, the person, exactly as it is given in *comprehension*, and it is given in comprehension in a way that is essentially analogous to the way in which each of us is given to himself in the *"inspectio sui,"* as "spirit" of his Body and of the rest of his transcendent surrounding world, similarly as subject of the things he sees, of his ever changing appearances of *his* "external" things and again as Ego-subject of his acts and states (in the *"sum cogitans"*) as accomplishing them, as active, passive, receptive, etc. The difference, however, consists in this, that in the *inspectio* I perceive my subjective surrounding world insofar as it is a material world, whereas I do not perceive the subjective material world of the other: I understand it by empathy and I identify it with my surrounding world according to the things we have reciprocally in common. The distinctive characteristic of the material surrounding world consists in its being, in original constitution, the surrounding world of the individual subject, i.e., one constituted in *his* perceptions, and consequently in the appearances of the things as he sees them (and in whatever other sense-appearances of things he has), and finally in his appearances of things as full and complete. Each person has therefore, along with his perceptions and perceptual nexuses, the things of his material surrounding world (they are the same as those which subsequently, from the standpoint of the naturalistic apprehension, come to count as "appearances" of physicalistic things), and these things first come to intersubjective identification in comprehension. And then we claim: we "see" the same things, with the only difference that each one sees them from his own standpoint, with an orientation and, in general, with a mode of appearance which can never be the same as the other's at one and the same time. [32]

In more precise terms, with respect to the same things of the intersubjective material surrounding world, the perceptions of any one person are for essential reasons different in content from the simultaneous ones of any other person; appearing things in their mode of appearance are in principle peculiar to each experiencer in the same present. The situation can also be expressed by saying that in the *most proper sense* each person sees in his perceptions the sensory-intuitive unities constituted in them exclusively, and thus they are his own. It is not through mere seeing (through mere "sense" perception), but through the comprehension founded therein, that the intersubjectively "perceived" thing is constituted originally as a unity of a higher level. Even if this thing is not perceived in the primary and stricter sense—insofar as we understand by perception mere seeing, touching, etc., in which is constituted the mere "sense-thing," bound completely to the individual subject, as a unity in the changing of his, this subject's, changing images (apparencies)—yet talk of perception as regards the intersubjective thing is justified to this extent, that it is constituted *originally* in those founded acts (and in principle only in such ones), and thus, in other words,

it comes to givenness originarily in them. But we are used to designating quite universally any lived experience in which an individual being comes to originary givenness as perception and to employ the word "seeing" accordingly.

We have said that everyone perceives sensorially and on the lowest level *his* subjective surrounding world, insofar as he lives only his own sense-data and his own apprehensions, and no one can live those of another and can never have ones that are completely like another's. This leads to the further consequence that everyone has his stream of lived experience, his acts and states, to which he can, in the *inspectio*, direct his reflective gaze, and everyone has his pure Ego and likewise his personal Ego, which we have distinguished from the pure Ego. Let us think of comprehension, grasping it as actively performed. But in comprehension what each one can grasp is other persons, in unity with the sensory perception of the other Bodies as Corporeal bodies of his physical surrounding world, and he perceives them in an original understanding of their "meaning," and specifically as analogons of his own Ego of the *inspectio*. Thus the other is thereby given again as "Ego," one that encounters its Body as aesthesiological unity, and likewise as the free field of the other's "I move," as center of orientation of his sensuous things, appearing in an eminent manner over and against the things in his environment, things that in general are the "same" as the ones I have over and against me but now are oriented to my Body, the Body given to me as mine. The predominant relations here and the only problematic ones are those of the Ego to its acts, in which it lives and precisely in virtue of which it relates to its surrounding world, the latter determining its comportment and in turn being determined by that comportment. This surrounding world has its universal sense and relations, which first of all arise in comprehension, namely the sense of an "Objective" surrounding world, which presupposes genetically the merely subjective surrounding world as primal constitution. [323]

In this connection we need to consider not only the Objective physical world, but rather we also need to recall the relation in which, again in virtue of comprehension, an Ego arises for an other, a person for another person. The primary cardinal opposition between Ego and non-Ego (as Object foreign to me) prior to all comprehension determines also the cardinal distinctions in the relation between the Ego and the material surrounding world and between the Ego and the personal surrounding world: thus in the last analysis between the Ego and an other Ego, over and against the former and yet still an Ego, precisely an "other." My Ego is given to me in a totally different manner than a physical thing is; it is not adumbrated through sensations, its states are in consciousness, and are lived, as one with their being; they do not merely "present" themselves as unities, which indeed as self-presenting would refer back to lived experiences in which they would appear through presentation. In the nexus of the conscious lived experiences of the Ego as a nexus of absolute givennesses, the Ego manifests itself absolutely; in the flux of its immanent life, in the determinate manner of its immanent course of life, it manifests its empirical

personal unity, its "individuality." Thus the egological states are "absolute" states; that is, they are not merely constituted in relation to absolutes (lived experiences) as intentional unities of them. What the Ego is given to itself as, that is precisely how the other Ego is understood in his Body, in virtue of the analogizing comprehension; it is therefore given in absolute manifestation, in self-manifestation, simply, straightforwardly, without appearances. In that way Ego enters into relation with Ego: as something absolutely self-manifesting with an other absolutely manifest to itself. And just as the individual person is a unity of absolute manifestation, so also is every kind of social unity manifesting itself as a unity of a higher level in the individual persons founding it as subjects of certain nexuses of acts.[1] It manifests itself in states which consist of reciprocal relations of empathy between the individual subjects involved, and likewise these are not unities of appearance nor are they constituted through adumbrational "presentation." All personal unities of a lower or higher level belong together therefore from the radical viewpoint of the *mode of their constitution*, and likewise so do, from another side, all that is impersonal in the surrounding world, all material objectivities; the latter are constituted as relative, the former as absolute.

[324]

The levels of the constitution of Objective reality

In a marvelous fashion, the levels of constitution of reality are built on one another: the individual Ego, encountering only itself absolutely, constitutes in sequences of levels of appearances its "external" world, a world of appearances that is transcendent, though relative, to it. By way of the comprehension of the Bodies appearing to it therein, it grasps other Egos as absolutely self-manifesting unities, it finds itself in an association of personal unities and enters into mutual understanding with them. Along with this is constituted, on the one hand, "Objective" physical nature as an identical unity, and over and against it the subjective worlds (i.e., the separate worlds constituted for the individual subjects posited in a comprehensive relation) which are constituting manifolds. On the other hand, through the interweavings of mutual understanding, social personalities of a higher degree are constituted, related to the common Objective surrounding world as the world to which henceforth all persons find themselves related socially and also as singular individuals. It is the world of their socially significant and perhaps also socially performed labor, and in general it is the world constituted in a manifold of specifically social acts whose sense includes communalities.

However, a world which is still differently constituted is intertwined with it. When persons find over against themselves other persons related to the world they have in common, then they can also carry out those changes in

[1] This is too fast. There are indeed new kinds of unities, in the unities of primordial manifestation, that we call Egos, self-giving, though still in a peculiar manner. This is not "appearance," but is in fact quite analogous to primordial manifestation. This must be examined more closely.

apprehension we have designated as the naturalistic attitude. They can take as one with the appearing Bodies the persons grasped comprehensively in them and can then apprehend these unities in a naturalizing way. What is then given are not the pure, absolutely self-manifesting unities we call persons, related only to the phenomenal Objects constituted as surrounding world, but what is given are in a certain way apperceptive transformations of these, which now themselves have taken on the character of unities of appearance. The personal subject residing in the psychophysical unity—the psychic subject with psychic qualities and states in the sense of natural-scientific psychology—has assumed, in virtue of the new apperception, which requires causal intertwining with the Body, moments that can be constituted only in the constitutive connection with the real that is given through appearances (by means of an adumbrative presentation), and that are hence, even if only in a mediate way, of a natural kind, belonging to the order of appearances. The realm of nature is the realm of the "phenomenal;" that means here the realm of the real unities constituted in or by means of "presentation." The realm of the spirit, however, is the realm of the realities given in absolute manifestation (self-manifestation and manifestation through comprehension), realities having behind themselves only the pure Ego as the irreal, absolute substrate of all manifestation of reality.

[325]

The relation of person to person, of human being to human being, in the world of the spirit is hence essentially different from the relation between human beings in nature; and it is again essentially different from the relation between persons and human beings as natural Objects (e.g., Objects of zoology or of psychology as a natural science). The human being in the personal world (the world of spirit, we also say, as the domain of the human sciences) is the unity of Body as expression of spirit and of spirit as expressed in the Body, as it is given in the personalistic attitude. One can even speak here of a founded unity insofar as the spirit is comprehended on the basis of the perception of the Body (in which, being merely sensuous, the Body is given as a mere sensuous thing), and of course the unity of Body and spirit is also a founded unity.[1]

Pure Ego and personal Ego[2]

It is now time to raise to clarity the distinction between pure Ego and personal Ego presupposed all along. The former is, according to our earlier presentation, the pure subject of each cogito in the unity of a stream of lived experiences, in each of which something absolutely identical steps forth and again steps back, but without being generated or passing away. We grasp this Ego hence in reflection, in which we grasp pure consciousness (the one purified in the transcendental reduction) and from which we take the Ego residing in it but not "manifesting" itself. This Ego is not a reality and so does not have real properties. The personal Ego, on the

[1] The paragraph appended here in the manuscript can be found on p. 259, ll. 5-14.

[2] *Cf.* § 57, bearing the same title (pp. 259 ff.).

contrary, is indeed a reality, and this in conformity with the concept of reality we have fixed and clarified. The original sense of the word "real" refers to things of nature, and nature can be understood here as the nature appearing sensuously in relation to the individual subject, on a higher level it can be understood as the imperfectly Objective nature related apperceptively to an open nexus of "normally" experiencing subjects, or, finally, it can be understood as nature in the sense of natural science, the ultimate and perfectly Objective nature. Spiritual realities stand over against all these levels of natural objectivities that are connected together constitutively. Spiritual "substance" is fundamentally different from thingly "substance," whereby substance is here only another expression for "real object," bearer of real properties. [326]

We already know one aspect of the make-up of the distinction: natural realities are unities of "appearances," and the appearances belong to Ego-subjects, which in turn are themselves apprehensible as realities, but as realities which are unities of absolute manifestation. The latter, however, means that they manifest themselves in absolute consciousness, which, as manifesting consciousness, experiences the apprehension as a state of spiritual unity. What we now need is the clarification of the determinate way in which this manifestion is possible, and what the "real circumstances" here consist in, to which the idea of reality as unity of real properties is related. After all our analyses, the answer is easily given. Already through the relation which belongs to the idea of pure Ego, already through the objective correlate which comes to consciousness in the cogito as its cogitatum, we have a relation to objectivity pertaining to the essence of the pure Ego and consequently to every Ego. For the personal Ego, which is constituted as a comprehensive unity, this means that Ego and surrounding world belong together and are inseparable from each other. The Ego has the surrounding world over and against itself, both as the natural world of things and as the personal world, of which it is a personal member. As we have seen earlier in our descriptions, the Ego carries out, with regard to what is first given in the surrounding world, the things and persons standing over and against it perceptually, certain active modes of comportment: it evaluates, it desires, it acts, it forms things creatively, or it comports itself theoretically in experience and research, etc. Likewise it comports itself as passive, it undergoes "effects" from the things and the persons, it finds itself determined by them to positive or negative evaluation, to a desiring or a rejecting, etc. It finds itself "influenced" by persons, it "complies with them," it accepts commands from them or it gives them commands, etc.

From the standpoint of pure consciousness all this is reduced to intentional lived experiences together with their concomitant intentional correlates, and with regard to all these lived experiences the pure Ego is something identical. As subject of all such modes of comportment, however, the pure Ego assumes a realizing apprehension that can be performed by a new act of the pure Ego in relation to itself and to its past modes of comportment of which it is conscious in memory, or that can also

be performed by a pure Ego in acts of comprehension as regards an other Ego. That is to say, each pure Ego, as identical subject of its pure consciousness, can be apprehended as something which has its determinately specific modes of relating to its surrounding world, its determinate way of letting itself be motivated by it in active and passive kinds of comportment; and everyone who has developed to maturity apprehends himself in that way, is aware of himself as a person.

The meaning of personal apprehension, the correlate of which is personal reality, shows itself, as is the case with every other basic kind of apprehension, in the corresponding experience exhibiting it. If we interrogate this experience, then we encounter throughout a determinate type of comportment toward the common interpersonal surrounding world. On the foundation of the entire stream of lived experience, through which is constituted for the present subject its surrounding world (world of things and personal surrounding world), an identical real Ego-subject manifests itself, and as identical it is manifest in relation to real circumstances: what functions as the latter are exclusively the things or persons and their qualities and relations, etc., of which the subject is *conscious* as objective reality (for instance, what is actually experienced by the subject or what is reproductively given as existing (positional consciousness) either in clear or obscure presentifications or in mediate positing in thought). It is obvious that these things and persons are constituted as intersubjective unities; hence they are not considered merely as constitutive correlates of an individual subject, as exhibitable in the mere multiplicities of experience of this individual subject. The person as such is related to the intersubjectively constituted world, which is one for all subjects and to which the person is joined by means of comprehension. In this intentional world of things and persons (at first subjects, which all subsequently become apprehensible in a real way as persons) reside the real circumstances in which subjects exercise and undergo "causality" and in which they (according to the regulated character of this causality, which is precisely constitutive for the genuine sense of causality and consequently also of substantiality) preserve their identical substance, the identity of the person. [327]

The world as the sphere of influence of persons: that is a constitutive correlation which, as is evident, is connected quite closely with the correlation between reality itself (real substance) and causality in the special sense at issue here. To each reality belongs (for once to use the word in another, somewhat enlarged, sense) a "surrounding world" of realities as the domain of the real circumstances of its influence or, as we can also say, as its field of influence; conversely, each reality then also belongs to the field of influence of its "partners" in this "surrounding world." Hence in our case, too, the correlate of personal reality or substance is its real surrounding world, and the latter is now a dualistic one, composed of things and persons. To be sure, it is evident here that the many kinds of realities are themselves essentially bound to each other by means of a correlation: the reality of persons demands the reality of things, and the reality of things equally demands that of persons.

SUPPLEMENT XI (to Section Three, pp. 277 ff.)

Theme:

The human being apprehended in an inductive-natural way—the empirical real, this human being, this person—is not the Ego of faculties, is not the person himself, and in particular is not the free person. [328]

Thinking of myself in my action, running through it, so to say, quasi-repeating it, I experience the "I am free," "I can do it." But how is that? Not as mere doxological possibility (possibility of phantasy). On the basis of this empty ideal possibility is built (again as ideally possible) a practical consent and the insight that from the *fiat* the action "would come forth" eventually. On the other hand, there exist the ideal possibilities of unfree restraint, distraction, etc. And again, ideal possibilities that in spite of a strong counter-affection, the "I do" still would proceed or that, unimpeded by it, I would act freely and not be deterred. I then grasp the essence of the "I resist," "I engage my Ego-power (power of action)," and of the "I do," "the action has its source in the Ego itself." In precisely this way I grasp the essence of the negative *fiat*: "I refuse to give my practical consent to the distracting stimulus." But also the tension between both these "powers," the upsurge of the activity of the will (the intensity of the power of action, of Ego-power) over and against the mounting stimulus (intensity of affection, of passive power, which is something negative over and against the positive affection and Ego-power).

If both are involved, then something which affects the senses is chosen; where there are no counter tendencies the power of action is minimal.

The question is whether all this is sufficient. *Do I have a consciousness of factual freedom on the basis of the experience* that I acted, or that I often gave my practical consent? Hence in the mode of an experiential apperception?

E.g., freedom: I can weave thoughts, I can choose to think of anything I want, I can frame the hypothesis that it is this way and not that way. I make a beginning and if need be I can change the beginning again into a neutrality modification, and I know with certainty that I can do it, based on experience.

But is it always experience, mere experience? I resist such an assumption.

By immersing myself in the form of neutrality I can relive the restricting power of affection and can, so to say, measure it and accordingly quasi-produce the tension of the active power necessary for there to be an overcoming. But I can also see that I, *as I am factually*, cannot summon this power, it will be beyond me. If I hypothesize, with regard to my empirical Ego, that I could do it, then the operative power does not match it, and if the occasion arises it will surely be found wanting and will certainly be overcome by the passive power.

We can formulate here an antinomy: [329]

Thesis: Every conscious ability is given as a product of experience; the Ego itself, the subject of active faculties, is a product of experience.
Antithesis: There is an insightful, non-empirical ability, such a one, namely, that does not spring inductively from similar experiences of the corresponding action. I have the power to act and I can "see" this power.

If I project myself imaginatively into a temptation, I, being the one I am, can *envisage* what follows that beginning: I withstand the temptation, I deny it my assent, I overcome it, perhaps being reinforced by this or that motive. Or more simply: it is something evil, I *reject* it. This is not mere experiential knowledge, knowledge of the "I am wont to behave in such a way, to make such repudiations, and therefore I will no doubt also do so in the future." That would mean: I have the *empirical property* of deciding in such a way under such circumstances. *But that is not the sense of the faculty we are trying to grasp here,* the "I can." This sense is the one by which the beginning of the situation and the value judgment would motivate me, being the one I am, as a sort of consequent, to decide in this or that way and to act accordingly: whereby it is not claimed that it would be the right thing to do, for I can also find that I would decide in favor of the temptation.

When I judge *another*, for the most part I follow experience. He has repeatedly shown himself to be a blackguard, he will continue to act that way. *But this experiential knowledge is not an understanding of the other.* If I understand him, then I see deeply into his motivations and then I do not need empirical apperception, apperception of the habitual.

Naturally, that must then agree with experience. Experience can raise objections to my apprehension. In that case I would have to consider whether the concordance in experience was not a mere semblance. I might then find that the motives were precisely factually different than I presupposed, the situation not quite the same. If he is the one he is, actually the same Ego, then it is his type to be able to do this and not to do that.

Ego as subject of my decisions and my position-takings, my self-determinations that have arisen from original, instaurating position-takings, my definite positions on these or those questions; and with this is connected: Ego as subject of motivations in the specific sense, that I let myself be motivated by whatever type of motives in such and such a way, i.e., to take such and such a position. As this subject I have my more or less fixed style, although I do not retain these positions in all particulars, a style which necessarily expresses itself on the outside, necessarily puts associations into play, necessarily constitutes associations about myself in my life, so that I have always constituted and continue to constitute of myself, according to my own type, an inductive "outer representation." [330]

How is this related to the Ego of faculties and lack of faculties, the "I can" and the "I cannot"? Here a foundation must be laid carefully first. Precedence goes to the "I do," specificallly the "instinctive" one; then the

originally following "I do!" as "I will," with original success and failure. In repeated success, i.e., through exercise, the practical ability increases. It increases from the "association" belonging peculiarly to this sphere, an analogy with association in the usual sense. In that way is made possible again: willing on the basis of the experiential ability that was previously in consciousness, especially the will that chooses, the rationally premeditative will that considers whether it can accomplish something and what it can accomplish. I know from experience that I have various practical abilities, but I also know that these are not fixed abilities of mine, that they require exercise and are subject to deterioration from lack of exercise or other causes. I have an empirical-inductive representation of my Ego-faculties and can acquire, by imagining myself into other situations, certitude, though only an inductive one, about what I would do. In more precise terms, I do not only have faculties and lack of faculties as related one by one to individual cases, but the apperception of faculties may be transferred to similar cases just as with any apperception, and thus it is in fact apperception according to the usual sense. It is only that it is precisely an apperception of faculties, a practical apperception, analogous to the apperception of being, just as the association of what is exercised, that is in question here, is an analogon of the apperception of being. We must not fail to note that the transfer of an actually experienced "I can and I effect" to a new case is not simply an inductive ontological belief, related to my ability as a fact, but that I experience in practical consciousness itself a possible ability.

The ability or lack of ability, which is not a matter for a position-taking, which precedes it either as valuing or desiring, etc., or leaves it open, positing it only hypothetically, must be distinguished from that ability and lack of ability that is related to position-taking. I have not done that in my text, and so amongst the good things there, there is something essentially flawed.

For we need to establish a fundamental essential distinction, distinguishing all other subjective events (according to the type "I move") from all position-takings. These are not subordinate to the will. I cannot surrender my judgment in the motivation in which it emerges; and likewise with other position-takings. In connection with them I can still do much. I can inhibit, posit hypothetically, etc. A position-taking is not a practical possibility like just any kinesthesis in the system of my kinesthetic "I can." [331]

It is necessary to carry on our reflections here with the utmost care. Suppose I do not have a judgment yet, do not yet have a will, have not yet evaluated. I can proceed to acquire such. I look around for motives and once I have them the decision follows, not in an arbitrary fashion but as a motivated consequence. And it arises prior to the question of the insightful foundation, unless I had already made such a foundation my goal. The way I am, I as the subject of my previous convictions, and the way within this sphere motives determine me precisely as this Ego, that is how the decision is produced. What is most proper to the person resides in the Ego as substrate of decisions and not in the Ego of mere faculties. When I say that I cannot carry out a certain decision, e.g., the decision to commit a murder,

when I say I cannot do something like that, I am saying something about the way I am (and perhaps about how I used to be and how I supposedly will be); all the motives pertaining to a murder as ones which could possibly determine it are not, for me, effective ones. The possibility of a murder is a practical possibility to the extent that I, assuming I desired it, had the ability to carry it out. Each act of the will is related to a practical realm and thus so is this one. And in that sense I can perform almost any wrong act (although, more precisely, many acts which have been carried out by others go beyond my practical abilities, e.g., climbing up facades). But with regard to position-taking, its possibility does not belong at all in the area of practical possibilities. But here we must certainly distinguish between cases of evidence and non-evidence. At all events, as I am, I can predict how I, the one I am, would behave (taking a position) if the occasion arises, provided it is a situation clearly circumscribed and clearly represented by me, whereas, to the extent that the situation is undetermined I will not be able to say anything with certitude.

As subject of position-takings and of habitual convictions I have of course my style, which is inductively operative and which will lead to a corresponding self-apperception, and in this way it is possible to proclaim inductively, both about myself and about others, how the position-takings would transpire. On the other hand, a position-taking is not a mere effect of an association, and even if it is correct that in my consideration of how I would decide in any given case I am dependent on my previous life and my former decisions, yet this dependency does not mean that the answer I would give to such questions has been acquired in an extrinsic inductive way. I depend on motives, in the reactivation of an old decision I depend on my former decision; I am now the one I am as determined by my prior being (by my decisions). And in that way even as personal subject of actual and possible decisions, according to my original peculiar character as well as according to the decisions which have been carried out in factual relations, I am a unity of determinations (a unity of positions and other peculiar characters in them), a unity not based on mere association but preceding it. Because I have a unique character, because I behave according to that character in a regular way, I must become inductively apprehensible and I must be able to become a theme for an inductive consideration. But these are all extrinsic considerations: the inductions are proven correct or incorrect in an external way, but nevertheless they require here a second verification by means of a transition from exteriority to interiority, insofar as I precisely am the one I am, not as nature, but as a position-taking Ego. [332]

SUPPLEMENT XII (to Section Three, pp. 263 ff.)

I. THE PERSON—THE SPIRIT AND ITS PSYCHIC BASIS (CONCERNING THE EGO AS PERSON)[1]

§ 1. The distinction between primal sensibility and *intellectus agens*

The spiritual sphere is the one of "Ego-subjectivities," the sphere of the *cogitationes* which irradiate as activities from the Ego and which within subjectivity itself, and then going beyond it, weave from one Ego-subject to another proper networks of nexuses which (in opposition to real—natural, spatial, thingly—unities) constitute personal unities (persons themselves and personalities at the social level as well as all looser societies). The spiritual sphere has, notwithstanding this nexus proper to it, its underlying basis in the inferior "psychic" and in addition has its immanent teleology in the lawful transformations of the higher into the lower, of the spiritually active into passivities, into a secondary sensibility providing the future Ego-actions with pregivennesses, and at the same time it has predelineated ways of what can properly be called re-production, ways of retransformation back into activities.

All spiritual activity, every Ego-act, shares in what is proper to active intentionality: it is a perceptual grasping, an explicating of the perceived object, an explicating of the directedness to individual features, and the referring of them back step by step to the identical substrate of the features, to "the same," a comparing and distinguishing, a predicating of understanding, a thinking of the universal and an apprehension of the particular under the viewpoint of the universal, a consciousness of what is singular (of what is one and unique precisely in the logical meaning of particular consciousness), a subordination of a particular thought under the general contents thought of as universal. It is an evaluating, and specifically self-evaluating or evaluating for the sake of a foundational value; it is the [333] positing of a goal and the striving for means, etc. All personal "intentionality" refers to activity and has its origin in activities. For it is either an intentionality which has arisen originally and is then active, or it is a "sedimentation" of activities, which as such are meaningful and in their "sense" refer back to the active or constitutive nexuses, and that by means of many levels built one on the other. Each new act, as a new intentionality, constitutes ever new objectivities productively experienced as act-correlates. An act is as it were an intending (in a very broad sense), and every act-formation, such as a predicating, deducing, demonstrating process of thought, or the thinking of a researcher which goes on from hypotheses up to probabilities, and likewise each nexus which evaluates

[1] *Cf.* § 61, pp.288 ff.

unitarily and which is performed by the evaluating subject, or each nexus of acts of the will in the unity of one action, along with the acts which lie at their basis and are essentially foundational for them—all these are act-connections which, even in their often overwhelming implications, make up the unity of one act and bring to consciousness an objective correlate which thereby stands "over and against" the Ego. And all simple or involved acts stand under the point of view of validity or invalidity, and in that way *to all of them belongs the idea of truth* (which in its universalization goes beyond the domain of judgment).

All original productivity, original at least in one or more steps, is act-spontaneity. But every spontaneity sinks down into passivity, and that means here that each objectivity can originally enter into consciousness as productive in its originary constitution (or in the quasi-originary constitution of reproduction, memory, mere phantasy, etc.), or it can come to consciousness as "sensuous" in the form of a passive retrospective consciousness, which, after productive consciousness runs its course, remains behind and admits a retrospective gaze (the most primitive single-rayed spontaneity) upon the object that was just now actively constituted, or a memory can emerge or even a transformation of former productions can occur through the efficacy of psychic laws, etc. In this way objectivity can also be given passively and render possible, according to its character, explications, clarifications, and approximations or can set in motion tendencies in those directions. To all secondary intentionalities we must ascribe such tendencies, and they are tendencies toward "renewal" or toward transformation into spontaneous acts and nexuses of acts corresponding to them.

The spirit has a psychic basis. This shows itself in that the subject-Ego is not relegated to mere retentions and memory reproductions. The sensuous reproduction holds sway also in the form that under sensuously similar circumstances something similar emerges, and in this way sensuous similarity tends to bring it about that new pregivennesses of a sensuously similar kind, which arose productively earlier, arise again, and among them are [334] ones which despite this similarity (and indeed because this similarity is precisely often a merely "extrinsic"-sensuous one) cannot be transformed into the state of originality. In this way can be understood contradictions of various kinds and absurdities, which indeed are presumably given or which, as false and yet unitarily understood and thought, are held to be true. The doxa requires the unitary execution of a production in the verification and only then has its "rights." And the same applies to every kind of thetic quality.

We distinguish here *sensibility* and (let us say) *reason*. In sensibility we distinguish *primal sensibility*, which does not contain any sediment of reason, and secondary sensibility, which arises through a production of reason. Accordingly we distinguish also within reason between *original reason, intellectus agens*, and reason which has been degraded into sensibility.

§ 2. Sensibility as the psychic basis of the spirit

Let us now discourse on sensibility: by that term we understand the "psychic" basis of the spirit, and of the spirit on all conceivable levels, i.e., the underlying basis of the acts of the spirit on all their conceivable levels, from the lowest, which we can exemplify as the simple act of directing a ray of spiritual regard onto something affecting the subject, which it terminates in, grasps, or considers, or as the act of simple turning toward something in active pleasure, etc., up to the highest rational acts of theoretical thinking or of artistic creation or of social-ethical behavior.

What then is this psychic basis? Primal sensibility is composed of the sensuous data, the color data in their visual field of sensation, a field which, before all "apperception," is a unity and can still be found afterwards as a moment of an apperception, namely as a moment of the visual aspect. Likewise, the sensuous feelings are founded in these sensuous data, and so are the sensuous data of the instincts, the instincts not as something supposedly transcendent to consciousness but as primal lived experiences, always belonging to the content of the psychic basis. That is a primal content of sensibility. And to the sphere of sensibility also pertain its own laws, not only essential laws but also factual laws as rules for a quasi-production of ever new sensibilities, in a certain valid sense secondary ones, though not ones originating from reason. (Perhaps a better terminology would result from distinguishing between authentic and unauthentic sensibility and by speaking as regards the latter of intellective or spiritual sensibility and as regards the former of spiritless sensibility.)

Association and reproduction (memory, synthesis, phantasy) belong to [335] sensibility as well. But one will say that that is a general property of all lived experiences—and of acts as well. Admittedly, as they occur here, they function associatively, are subject to the law of retention, and stand under conditions of memory, of transformation, of tendencies to produce similar phantasies, etc. This is now exactly the process of the generation of that secondary intellective sensibility; and then this same process is also decisive for original sensibility. But it does not arise through association. Primal sensibility, sensation, etc. *does not arise out of immanent grounds,* out of psychic tendencies; it is simply there, it emerges. The primally intellective also does not arise "psychically," from association, but from a ray emanating out of the Ego; it is not something foreign to the Ego but is precisely absolute. On the other hand, the Ego presupposes sensibility as affection, as stimulus, first of all primal sensibility, and then the secondary. The Ego always has possessions. Primal sensibility is its primal possession. A second possession is the intentional content of reproduction (originary reproduction as memory) and of the transformation in phantasy taking place in reproduction, passive transformation, self-structuration with an overturned doxa.

In the sphere of this passivity, the sphere of this making oneself by oneself or this coming forth in a new way (a sphere of receptivity: the Ego can look at, encounter, and thence experience stimuli), we have a *primal sphere*

of intentionality, an unauthentic one, since there can be no question here of a genuine "intention toward," for which the Ego is required; but "representation-of," apperception, is already there. To remember something is not merely to have a "weaker" moment of sensation, etc., and the same applies to the constitution of time, which belongs here, and perhaps it also applies to the constitution of the very first level of space (oculomotor unity). The lowest Ego-spontaneity or Ego-activity is "receptivity," and by that I mean that indeed already the constitution of space (and thus also the constitution of the schema) presupposes this lowest spontaneity; but the unity, which arises as a doxic one, is not a spontaneously posited unity but a receptive one. Space is a form of sensibility, having originated in receptivity; thus it is not a form of completely pure sensibility. Sensible nature is constituted in mere receptivity; it is the world of sense-things with its sensible forms of time, space, and substantiality-causality. It would then have to be verified: perhaps reception is a mere spectating, whereas the intentional unity arises in pure sensibility, just as I have always assumed it up to now. In that case what is intentional on the level of the senses would only be a system of lines into which the spontaneous regard of receptivity can penetrate and can be operative as a consideration of the intentional object, just as in the reflective consideration of the aspects, etc.

Thus we have in the sphere of lived experience the immense field of primary sensibility with its network of tendentious nexuses, with its [336] Objective constitutions, and with its rules, which are expressed in the theme: there appears an Objective world that is to be maintained concordantly. And thereby primitive laws hold sway, for instance those of association and reproduction, according to which "representations" arise with the lowest, most original intentionality; every reproduction has its intentionality.—Beyond the sphere of lived experience (in which we class the system of orthoaesthetic and heteroaesthetic lived experiences, including, therefore, illusions, etc.) pertaining to the constitution of the world, we have a fluidum of phantasies. It must be noted that the sensuous representations related to the world of things occur here and there as ordered but run a zigzag course: a series of memories and segments of memory beside the course of perception, which latter runs constantly in the case of waking consciousness, though it is sometimes richer sometimes poorer. In sleep even this is disrupted; in dreaming we have courses of heteroaesthetic lived experiences which are not inserted into the real world.

All this is a proper field of nexuses, ones which run out by themselves as Objective events, though they are subjectively produced. Where is empathy to be accommodated? The regulation of sensibility is (with respect to the sensibility of sensation and also with respect to the sensibility of feeling and every primal sensibility) an intersubjective one. Account must be taken of that in the appropriate place.

Excursus: impression and reproduction

In the universal sphere of lived experience I distinguished earlier between "impression" and "reproduction."

The word "impression" is appropriate only to original sensations; the word expresses well what is "there" of itself, and indeed originally: namely, what is pregiven to the Ego, presenting itself to the Ego in the manner of something affecting it as foreign. Acts are then not impressions in this sense but rather are their opposites. Acts are not reproductions, either, but are origins for possible reproductions. Reproduction signifies certain sorts of modifications, ones which refer back to what is not modified, not derived by laws of reproduction (association). This non-derived ("impression" in the other sense) breaks down into primal sensibility and into Ego-actions and Ego-affections. (The terminology is obviously not very satisfactory.)

The (sensuous) impressions, in their emerging and disappearing, are subject to a certain lawfulness, one that is inseparably intertwined with the laws of reproductions. Factual laws (laws of existence) of sensuous [337] impressions are only to be acquired as psychophysical laws, and that means that only after the constitution of nature, thus after the formation of intentionality, whose correlate is nature, can the rules of existence for the data of sensation be produced through "retrospective interpretation." Thereby the data of sensation are to be understood as data of primal sensibility. These factual laws, according to which possible sensations receive their fixed order and thereby are intersubjectively concordant, presuppose elementary laws, essential laws, and specifically more general ones, which extend beyond primal sensibility: the laws of association and reproduction, of a kind signifying for example: If a set of sensations once existed, and if a similar set again comes up, then there clings to this latter a tendency toward the memory of the earlier similar one, a tendency toward an emergence of the corresponding reproduction. It is likewise with laws of expectation, laws related to protentions, laws of the "advent" of sensations, etc. In addition, a reproduction has the tendency to produce further reproductions: it recalls similar previous impressions and impressional nexuses. If this tendency is fulfilled, then new reproductions arise.

In immanence we find sensations and reproductions endowed with tendencies, "intentions toward," which are fulfilled in the arrival of the "intended" impressions or reproductions. These instincts or tendencies pertain to the sensuous itself and move from the sensuous to the sensuous (from impressions to new impressions, or from impressions to reproductions, from reproductions to other reproductions). The formulation of the ultimate laws is still outstanding. (What is the significance of the occupied fields of sense, of the prevention of the fulfillment of the tendencies toward sense data by means of sense data which precisely occupy the field and contend with them?)

Over and against these tendencies there are others, which are directed to the Ego-subject as *affections*, as tendencies toward a grasping. In addition:

the tendencies toward pleasurable surrender, which proceed from the feeling-sensations intertwined with the sensations (lived experiences), and again those that proceed from reproductive moments of pleasure and displeasure, which pertain to the expected data of sensation, and furthermore the tendencies of desire—an active passivity, as it were (that is, not an activity proceeding from the Ego).

The tendencies lying within sensibility itself have, however, an essential relation to the affective tendencies; that is, the tendencies and intentions adhering to sensibility become *paths of affections*. The "intentional Object," that on which the reproductive tendency is directed, functions as "motivating" and works like a stimulus.

Locke saw something valid: sensation is what is first, insofar as a functioning Ego can only exist if it has a possession, and only insofar as the possession must first affect it, to which the Ego then reacts: all activity of the Ego presupposes affection, even if—in the developed subject—it is not exactly the one of primal sensibility. For afterwards secondary sensibility enters in. But not all Ego activity is mere yielding to an affection, mere receptivity and passivity in the sense of yielding, surrender to the enjoyment of pleasure, suffering as negative pleasure: rather, this passive reaction is an [338] underlying level for a new kind of acts, the free acts, which are genuine Ego-activities, free position-taking with regard to the affections, versus an already passively carried out indulgence within a disapproval of them. Afterwards, it is possible for an act of yielding to be a free act.

§ 3. Development of the Ego—Ego-action and Ego-affection

Let us now look into what pertains to the Ego. There we find certain nexuses, the motivation-nexuses, which are determined by the sensuous lower level but which have their own law. No active Ego-motivations arise through "association" or through "psychophysical lawfulness;" thus they do not arise the way all formations of sensibility do. To be sure, the entirety of natural drives is presupposed, the "natural mechanism." Can it now be said that what proceeds from the Ego and occurs in the Ego as "affecting," in penetrating into the Ego as motivating, drawing it to itself ever tighter—still prior to any yielding—is no longer nature? No, the affection belongs quite certainly in the sphere of nature and is the means of the bond between Ego and nature. Moreover, the Ego also has its natural side. All Ego-actions, just like the Ego-affections, come under the law of association, are arranged in time, work afterwards as affecting, etc. But at best it is the Ego thought of as purely passive which is mere nature and belongs within the nexus of nature. But not the Ego of freedom.

However, mere nature is the entirety of the "mechanical I-do." There arises some sensuous drive, for example the urge to smoke. I reach for a cigar and light it up, whereas my attention, my Ego-activities, indeed my being affected consciously, are entirely somewhere else: thoughts are stimulating me, I am following them up, comporting myself to them as

actively verifying them, approving them, disapproving of them, etc.[1] Here we have "unconscious" Ego-affections and reactions. What is affecting goes toward the Ego, though not toward the waking Ego, the Ego of "conscious" attention, occupation, etc. The Ego always lives in the medium of its "history;" all its earlier lived experiences have sunk down, but they have aftereffects in tendencies, sudden ideas, transformations or assimilations of earlier lived experiences, and from such assimilations new formations are merged together, etc.—just as in the sphere of primal sensibility, whose formations also pertain to the medium of the Ego, to the Ego's actual and potential possessions. All this has its natural course, thus even each free act has its comet's tail of nature: but the act itself has not come from nature (i.e., arisen through mere natural lawfulness) but has come precisely from the Ego. Ego and nature stand in contrast, and every act also has its natural side, namely its underlying basis in nature: what is pregiven as affecting is a formation of nature, though here and there what [339] is of the Ego may have played a role in earlier action. And above all every act has its natural side in that the accomplishment of earlier similar acts brings with it an associative tendency, a natural tendency, to accomplish the act again; that means that under the given circumstances of the affection there is a reproductive tendency directed to the reproduction of what was intended in the previous similar act-comportment, and not only that: it is a tendency directed to this (present) similar comportment itself. Thus a second affection directed to the Ego is bound with the first, and now perhaps the Ego yields; but then the Ego no longer accomplishes the act altogether freely, no longer from original freedom. This should be analyzed more precisely; for there are complexities here. I can decide freely, and at the same time I am following my habitual inclination. I am entirely free if I am not motivated passively, that is, if I do not carry out the consequence through affection but through "rational motives." I must follow the latter and not yield to the affection. Rational motives, values, etc., can themselves, however, motivate me as "pregivennesses" on a second level, or I can freely give in to them, freely decide in their favor.

After all this, it is comprehensible how "nature" develops, how the natural basis of the soul is organized in its development in such a way that "nature" is constituted in it, and that, for example, at first the Ego behaves in general in its reactions as mere nature, and thus an "animal" and purely animal Ego develops, and that for the Ego as active subject of the *cogitationes,* which is identically one throughout all of them, is constituted a new pregivenness: the empirical Ego, which has a familiar nature, i.e., a nature to be learned in experience, and has become in its natural evolution, precisely with its nature, graspable purely according to "natural laws"—all this is now comprehensible.

We can also understand that in constituted nature, the Body and the Body-soul unity are constituted and that the empirical Ego is the Ego of Bodily-psychic nature. The Ego is not itself the Bodily-psychic unity but

[1] *Cf.* pp. 270 ff.

lives in it. It is the Ego of the soul, the Ego to which is related back the psychic lived experiences of the sensory sphere as its possessions, the Ego, on the other hand, which is the constant subject in its "acts," acts which here, however, are mere re-acts, natural reactions in face of the possessions.

But how does the human being develop, i.e., how does the animal Ego develop into the human Ego? How is there constituted for the active Ego a pregiven Ego, which is the free personal subject, with which is then identified my momentarily present ego-cogito? How is it that my cogito, a momentary state, a passing manifestation of this permanent person, becomes an Objectively constituted pregivenness? Do laws, properly speaking, hold as regards the personal (free) subject, and which ones?

They are not empirical laws, laws of association. Those rule only in the [340] sphere of passivity; where they determine the Ego, there they posit nature. They are, one will say, laws of reason. But what are laws of reason, and how do they determine development?

II. SUBJECTIVITY AS SOUL AND AS SPIRIT IN THE ATTITUDE OF THE NATURAL SCIENCES AND IN THE ATTITUDE OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES

§ 1. The reality of the soul and of the human being

In taking up the question of the reality of the soul we need first of all to clarify the place of origin of the concept of reality and the place where reality exhibits itself in its most simple form. Accordingly we go back:

I. to the thing as nature. As such it is an intuitive substance, in the sense of an intuitive unity of real properties. At bottom it is a sensuously intuitive thing, presenting itself through schemata. The schema is the one in it, the one given through sensuous apperception properly understood. On that is built the causal apperception: the sense-thing is grasped as something identical throughout modes of behavior. It is first on the basis of this causal apperception that we designate a thing as real, and here is where talk of reality has its origin. This apperception of the thing as real is synthetic.—On a still higher level the thing is "Objectively" determined through mere "primary qualities," over and against which the intuitively substantial thing is regarded as "mere appearance," related to normal perceivers.

II. But the animal and, in the first place, human beings can also be regarded as reality or nature, and we can here distinguish again between the animal as intuitive unity and the animal as unity of modes of behavior. At the start we remain with the first:

A) the animal of intuition: here we have:

1.) in the sensuous-intuitive sphere of the givenness of the Body, the intuitive Body-substance with its sensuously given properties.

2.) the "psychic life" *expressed* in the other's Body, another subject with his lived experiences, his surrounding world, etc. This is not to be understood as meaning that we have two separate things beside one another: the Body of sense intuition and in addition the representation of something subjective; rather, what we have is an intuition of a *human being*.[1] That means: [341]

a.) expression creates everywhere a kind of unity, thus, for example, linguistic expression and meaning, symbol and symbolized; and there exist hence double-sided unities, which manifest the ever more intimate intertwining of the two sides the more articulated in various ways is the expression, or the expressing, and the more sensuous parts there are that have a meaning function, and specifically within the unity of one meaning.

b.) the expression is appresenting, the expressed is co-existing. What exists in the proper temporal-local sense of a *res extensa* is the Body there as thing of sense intuition. The appresented is co-being along with what exists, and it is co-existing, participating therefore in Objective spatial existence and in space-time in the way that appresentation here accomplishes, and according to which we have a sort of "intuition" of the human being as a Bodily-spiritual unity, which remains preserved throughout the intuitive alterations and spatial movements of the Body-thing as "organism," at least within the empirical limits in which obviously remains the natural intuition of a human being. The corpse bears in itself the representation of a human soul but no longer appresents it; and thus we see precisely a corpse, which was a man, but now no longer is.

B) Let us pass now to the next level of constitution and compare the animal as unity of modes of behavior with the thing constituted as real. Its reality manifests itself in the dependency on circumstances; the thing is relative to other things and in this relation it has its thingly qualities: as causal states and causal properties. It is what it is in the unity of a nature.—

What is the situation, on the other hand, as regards the human being and the animal? Not only is the corporeal Body real, a real physical thing, but

[1] I experience a human being, and this has as components: I experience "externally" the corporeal Body and I experience "inwardly" the psychic. This is an "abstract" distinction. I do not need to consider further the mode of experience, although it is different depending on the object. The inner is original or comes from empathy, but both of these are "inner."—Both outer and inner experience, however, are necessary for the unity of an experience in which an object is experienced: thus for a unity of concatenate determinations. Concatenation pertains in itself to the corporeal Body—that is natural causality—and likewise to the soul—and that is the motivational concatenation, which still has to be discussed. And finally: nature and spirit are necessarily in psychophysical concatenation as a kind of "causality."

1. Expression of an irreal sense: ideal appresentation,

2. Expression of the psychic: real appresentation, the real linked to the real in the unity of a concrete reality.

the soul is too, in concomitant change; i.e., psychic events are joined as existential consequences to real Bodily-corporeal events (which as such stand within the causality of physical nature). That means: the Corporeal body is not a concrete reality for itself; it is only a real human body by means of the fact that changes in the soul occur concomitantly. And likewise the soul is not a reality for itself; rather, it has concomitant changes in the Bodily corporeality: that is, psychic occurrences lead in themselves to consequences in reality.

The question must now be retrieved: is the soul real in the same sense as the Corporeal body, and is the human being a reality composed of two linked realities and thereby also itself given as a reality? Immediately, striking differences appear between the thing and the soul as realities, above all: the latter is not in universal experience constituted *tout court* in [342] the way that what it is psychically is constituted in relation to other souls as members of a psychic universe, the totality of all souls whatsoever. Or: all bodies whatever form a unitary totality of nature, though this does not imply that all souls are connected as a totality of the psychic purely in itself, in the way that the thing of nature is what it is as member of the natural universe.

I apprehend by means of expression, as was expounded earlier, the unity of a human being, that man there, in "outer" experience.[1] In this apperception there lies a system of experiential indications, by means of which an Ego-life, with a partially determinate content and a horizon of indeterminateness and of unknownness, is given as one with the Body and is "there" as bound with it. And in the species of this apperception there lies the fact that from the very start relations of dependency between the psychic and the Bodily (itself interwoven in the causal nexus of physical nature) come to consciousness by way of apprehension, and by means of the corresponding attention there enter into the thematic focus: a) according to the universal type and b) as individuals, present factual structures that belong in the type according to the general style.

In the attitude corresponding to the experience of a human being, in which this bound unity is given as there in space, as spatial and as bound on the spiritual side with the spatial, I have in fact a *double reality*. I, the spectator, and all the others in the human community, find or can find this human being as a unity which in the causality of nature persists as Corporeal body, and to that extent this physical unity, as an organic unity, fulfills certain physical conditions as the Body of a subject, which in its life of sensation and perception, and in its life of phantasy and memory (and then further in an unknown way), is dependent on the physical structures of the Body, and conversely they are influenced by it. (Co-existence as mutual being-with-one-another in a general structure, thus mutual regulation of co-existence and in possible alterations, thus causality.)

[1] *Cf.* Section Two, p. 146, l. 4, to the end of the paragraph, where parts of the following text are repeated word for word. In order not to disturb the unity of this supplement, the sentences in question have not been deleted here.

The Body has a privilege in this unity, and specifically for the following reasons: man is man in spatial nature, and he is in nature only because of the fact that in the first place the Corporeal body is a material thing in nature. Psychic reality is here constituted as a reality in space only through the psychophysical dependencies. The absolute universal form of the world is space-time. Worldly reality is in all cases spatial and is being-in-space: that is, corporeal being. Everything real is corporeal, in all cases corporeal, although not necessarily that alone. There does not exist the same necessity that whatever is real be psychic or have irreal determinations, whereas the [343] latter can be real only through con-junction (appresentation) with corporeality. The soul is given in appresenting expression as a unity. It has its unity in itself, but here it comes into consideration as a unity in a nexus: specifically, within psychophysical causalities I consider an individual sensation, perception, nexus of memory, etc., but these are moments of the subjective stream of lived experience and are states of the "soul," of the empathized unity, which is, as a unity, a seat of causality. Likewise this is the way I would excise an individual physical state, e.g., of the optic nerve, and follow it up to a process in the brain: but it is a process in the brain, the nerve is an organ in the nervous system, and the nervous system is the one of the closed Body, which as Body is a seat of psychophysical causality. This pertains to the essence of the ruling, sense-determining apperception.

The unity of the soul is a real unity through the fact that as unity of psychic being and life it is connected with the Body as unity of the Bodily stream of being, which for its part is a member of nature. It was quite correct when I from the start took the human being as a double reality; it is just that the psychic reality is here what it is (as mundane reality) only through the reality of the Body, which is founding for it. Only in that way does the soul become a member of the one nexus in which the soul enters into real relations (relations of nature) not only with the Body but also with other souls.

§ 2. Psychophysical causality and the causal nexus of things

There is still another question demanding our consideration here. I have attempted to differentiate between psychophysical conditionality and physical causality. A difference is certainly to be found here, namely in this regard, that the physical thing is what it is, i.e., has real properties, only in relation to the causal nexus of physical nature. It pertains to the reality of the thing (to the sense predelineated for the thing, predelineated through the original constitution of the thing) that each thingly property is related to physical causal circumstances and to no others. Things can change as a result of psychic effects, but in that case none of their thingly properties change, only their states change. In the nexus of physical nature, other things and their comportment in the causal nexus as regards some given thing determine what this thing is, which permanent causal properties it will have. The causal properties can persist or they can change, and that depends on the course of nature. To be sure, the exact identity of the thing requires a certain supreme regularity, a most universal natural lawfulness. The form of causality, which stands under strict rules (on a higher level, laws), pertains to the very form of the being of a thing.

For example, to speak more clearly: every thing can, psychophysically [344] understood, function as a stimulus-Object; its physical processes can extend its effects to a perceiving subject: but the "property" of being able to have "effects" on an experiencing subject in this manner gives the thing no inner constituting property,[1] supplies it with nothing that pertains to its nature. The manifold of possible effects on the subject adds nothing to what the thing is, and conversely: the soul does not interfere with "nature," which remains what it "is" whether the soul has effects in it or not. Indeed courses of states of nature arise through these effects, states which were not there before, but still no physical property can change in that way in its fixed style, prescribed to it by its causal lawfulness and determinate of its identity. It depends on the course of natural experience how we will determine the physical thing more exactly, and what we have grasped as its property with regard to the pregiven casual nexus can prove to be a changeable manifestation of a higher property. Even the property assumed to be fixed comes to change insofar as the course of experience brings to light new causal nexuses on higher levels. But psychophysical causality can accomplish nothing in this respect; the thing and the whole of nature are sealed off. Psychical consequences are joined to natural processes, just as psychical causes have consequences in nature, but they are such that in truth they have no influence on nature.

It is clear that the causality of physical nature has in fact a pre-eminent sense. This causality is a constitutive idea for the idea of nature, for the idea of a physical thing: that is, all inner features of the thing as features of a lasting (persistent) being, as features of a duration, are themselves persistent, and each such feature expresses a persistent behavior (a persistent lawfulness of comportment) in the causal nexus.[2] For reasons of principle, the psychic is outside this nexus. Through psychophysical causality there is constituted no constitutive feature whatever of a persistent spatial thing.

§ 3. Possibility of the insertion of the soul into nature[3]

What shall we say then about the reality of the soul? The soul, too, is of course a persistent being. But this persistent being is no "nature;" it is not,

[1] Constituting properties of the thing: properties in which it persists in all its changes of state as the same, which thus belong to it permanently in this changing of states.

[2] Compare this statement with § 32, pp. 134 f.

[3] These analyses are employed in part in Section Two; *cf.* § 32, pp. 134 ff.

as what it is, a complex of persistent properties which are unities of causal nexuses. Thus the soul is not constituted simply inductively-apperceptively. [345] It is the unity of a psychic life, of a stream of consciousness; this stream is the life of an identical Ego, a unity extending through time (through the same time which is the duration of the Body), and the soul has "effects" in *physis* and in turn undergoes effects coming from there; it displays, to be sure, an identity also in the fact that on the whole, under given Bodily-physical circumstances, it "behaves" in its reactions in a regulated way, sensing in this way or that way, perceiving such and such, etc. We mean here also that under given psychic circumstances something in Corporeality changes as a consequence, the hand moves, etc. But if for that reason psychophysical properties are attributed to it as well as something like a nature, then it *is* not in fact this nature, and in principle it is irreducible to nature.

The being of the soul is not "substantial" in the sense of thingly being, and if we relieve it of the idea of substance, as Kant did, then we undoubtedly will have to say that there is no soul-substance. And that means that the soul has no in-itself analogously similar to a "nature;" it has neither a mathematical nature in the manner of the thing of physics, nor a nature like the one of the thing of intuition. The soul is not a schematized unity; and as far as "causality" is concerned, it has to be maintained that what deserves the name "causality" is that functional or lawful comportment of dependency which is the correlate of the constitution of persistent properties of a persistent real something of the type, nature. Thus in the case of the soul and in psychology there can be no talk at all of causality. None of the lawfully regulated functionalities in the factual sphere is causality in that sense. The flux of the life of the soul has its unity in itself, and since the mundane real "soul" belonging to a Body is related to this thingly Body in a functional nexus of mutual dependency, the soul has, to be sure, its persistent psychic properties, which are expressions for certain regulated dependencies in the emergence of what is psychic in its dependency on what is Bodily. The soul is a being that is related conditionally to Bodily circumstances, related in a regulated way to circumstances in physical nature; and likewise the soul is characterized by the fact that psychic occurrences have consequences in nature in a regulated fashion.

On the other hand, the Body too is itself characterized by this psychophysical nexus and its rules: but the Body does not receive any new natural property thereby, just as the soul itself is not, due to such a regularity in psychic existence, a nature and receives no natural properties. The soul is not thereby a mere X of causal properties. But through such a connection with the bodily (which, in the naturalistic attitude, is posited straightforwardly as being), the soul has an interrelatedness of existence with nature, "existence" as event in the world, existence "in" space, existence "in" space-time. And thus the soul has, we can say, a quasi-nature and a quasi-causality, to the extent that we broaden precisely the concepts of nature, substance, and causality and designate as "substance" (real thingly [346]

existence) everything existing related to conditional circumstances of existence and standing under laws of existence and designate as "causal" every property constituted here as conditionally determined. The soul has in itself a proper essence of its own, prior to all the causalities in which it is involved. This essence allows the soul to be considered for itself under abstraction from everything psychic-causal (in opposition to a body, which is causal through and through and has no anterior proper essence of its own). The soul is a worldly real being apriori only as intertwined psychophysically and as united with other souls in a community or as potentially united with them. How the soul is to be posited in its own proper essence is another matter, certainly not as mundane.

The subjective, the being of a subject and of its subjective life under the viewpoint of these conditional nexuses, is naturalized subjectivity; it is the "psychic" in the sense of modern naturalistic psychology, which thus considers man as nature and inserts him into the nexus of nature.

§ 4. The human being as spiritual subject

On the other hand, what in life we call a human being and what is dealt with in (is the theoretical theme of) the sciences of life, the sciences of the spirit, and is treated there as subject, and what in the sciences of the objective spirit is treated as spiritual surrounding world, as culture, and especially as a human being, is not that naturalized human being. For as justified as this naturalizing obviously is, and as rightfully as the title nature encompasses the themata of scientific research, to that same extent does this title fail to embrace the specifically spiritual sphere in its spiritual relations.

If I am interested in the human being as a human subject, as a person in a personal association, then he is admittedly also something bound to the Body; he stands there outside in space, he goes places, he sits, speaks to other people who are standing near him in space, etc. But my interest does not go toward nature but precisely toward the subject; and it is only a prejudice to maintain that nature is the true being of the subject. For I cannot study physical things otherwise than as nature, since nature is their essence and the truth of a thing is a truth of nature; if I seek "Objective" truth, then I must pursue physics. But here it is different. To be sure, to make the spirit one's theme means, logically speaking, to make it into an "Object" (object), into a theoretical Object. But this is far from meaning to investigate spirit as nature, and if we nevertheless speak of the "nature of the spirit," we do so by equivocation. For in that case nature means essence, and in this sense one can even speak of the nature of numbers, etc.[1]

[1] The following three pages of the manuscript are used in Section Three; *cf.* § 55, "The spiritual Ego...", p. 226 to p. 231.

§ 5. Empathy as spiritual (not naturalistic) relation between subjects [347]

By means of empathy, all Ego-relations are ascribed to the subject of the other Body, and it is to be noted from the outset in this connection that empathetic apperception first grasps "from the outside" the other's Body as a body like any body and then as a bearer of sensations and of possible effects and thereby at the same time as organ of a subject, a subject who is dependent on this organ for his sensations, perceptions, and for his further subject-acts and dispositions. On the other hand, however, it must also be noted that this realizing apprehension, which here can no longer be considered an "experiential consciousness" or an "apperception," still does not involve my making the natural reality of the other my thematic Object, i.e., taking a human being as a member of nature. Rather, I am, in empathy, directed to the other Ego and Ego-life and not to psychophysical reality, which is a double reality with physical reality as the founding level. The other's Body is for me a passageway (in "expression," in intimation, etc.) toward the understanding of the Ego there, the "he:" he moves his hand, he reaches for this or that, he strikes, he considers, he is motivated by this or that. He is the center of a surrounding world appearing to him, presentified to him in memory, thought about, etc., and included in it is a corporeal surrounding world, which to a great extent he has in common with me and with others. The human being appears, but I am focused on the human subject and on the subjectivity in its subjective comportments, in its nexuses of motivation.

If we have incorporated other subjects into our subjective surrounding world and thereby have *eo ipso* included ourselves in our surrounding world, there then arises the field of social relations of subjectivity: we as personal subjects of common work, common research, technical activity, etc. And in that case there arise the corresponding apperceptions of accomplishments as accomplishments, of individual accomplishments and communal ones, of works, as works of the individual and works of the community, but also the apperceptions of thoughts and feelings, etc. of the individual as motivated by his milieu, through the "influences" of others, whether of others in immediate intercommerce or in the mediate way of understanding their works or by way of tradition, etc.

§ 6. Spiritual Ego and psychological Ego.—Constitution of the Ego as self in self-apperception. Distinction between the original Ego and the self apperceived in self-apperception; the person, the Ego of self-experience, of self-consciousness

In the totality of these spiritual relations of subjects, there is opened up to us a field for another kind of science, different in principle from natural [348] science. There belongs here all observation of people, and all knowledge about people, the study of persons, of societies, and of the formation and

transformation of surrounding worlds for the persons—a complex of disciplines that we encompass under the title of the human sciences.

What is the relation between this study of human and worldly personalities, the study of "us and our world," the world in which we find ourselves, and the study of the soul in the sense of psychology? Let us begin with the first, the study of the spiritual world, which is the naturally given world. Here belong together: the study of persons and the study of individual and communal empirical worlds. Persons, as what they are, are individuals in relation to their subjective pregivennesses, which are intertwined with their external world; this is a common possession, or can be for all normal people.

But there is indeed a distinction to be made: I can study the material surrounding world as a descriptive surrounding world of the normal human being or of the normal humans of an epoch. On the other hand I can also study persons, the types of persons, etc., their character dispositions, etc., and also the essence and development of persons, the development of their apprehensions of the world, their things and positings of things; in short, I can pursue the human sciences. I can, e.g., consider how historical men carried on physics, examine how they conceived the idea of nature and how they came to the knowledge of nature under the guidance of that idea.[1] But I can also enter into physics, for even that is a field of possible activity of the spiritual Ego, in which activity precisely this field arises constitutively: the logical determination of the material object as substantial-causal unity and thus of the whole of nature; likewise Corporeality under the viewpoint of nature, and finally the soul.

In the attitude directed to nature and focused on the soul of the Corporeal body, the theme is the subject as the soul in connection with the Body (the psychophysical subject); however, in the spiritual attitude I have as my exclusive theme purely and simply the subjects and their surrounding worlds. Insofar as these worlds, regarding their structure in physical nature, are common in a typical and normal way, they are not Objective in an absolute and rigorous way; they require mathematization if rigorous Objectivity is sought. This Objectivity, however, is an aim of the work of thought which constitutes new objectivities, the "true" ones of the exact sciences. These do not determine (motivate) the spirit, as long as they do not come to consciousness. Likewise, a tool is determining, as tool, only for the one who has apprehended it as such; or again, for the Chinese a symphony of Beethoven does not exist and is therefore not determining for them. Each object of the surrounding world, e.g., the red poppy, exists for [349] the one who "has" it in view, and this existence is "relative" (a peculiar relativity).

[1] Thus I am now, as before, directed to the world the way it is pregiven, but my theme is especially human beings and humanity, insofar as they are consciously related to the world as their surrounding world, and at present are related to their subjective surrounding world; how they in this present have the field of their present sciences, etc.

But the personal subject is not the mere pure Ego. The personal Ego can be mistaken about its faculties. But in that case it has others. It must have some faculties or other, it necessarily is developing and developed, and it has its necessary genesis (*teleiosis*) I can study. It is always determined through the rhythm of the pregiven possession and of the attention to it and of the occupation with it and by the rhythm of the constitution of a new objectivity and of a new possession for new objectivities.

Is this a study of the "soul" in the sense of modern psychology? The soul is not the Ego[1] which has things and comports itself, is not the personal subject of the faculties, but is that which exists as something psychical inserted in the Body in Objective space and time.[2] And here we touch the main difficulty: to determine this clearly. The spiritual Ego is the reference point for everything, it is the Ego that is related to whatever is spatio-temporal, but it is not itself in space and time. Everything temporal is in its field of view and likewise everything spatial, everything ideal and everything empirical, etc. It is particularly related to a Body it has in a special sense as its own, but it is not something real connected with the Body.

On the other hand, an animal (man or beast) can be considered as a thing in the world, as a real-causal unity. This is the case when the theme is the psychophysical, the subject in the sense of psychophysical psychology: the identical something in the empirical-real connections between the physical Body and what is psychical. Considered in this way the human being is a real unity of two strata in Objective nature. If I plunge myself into what is purely subjective, one of the two strata, and if I remain precisely in the natural attitude, then a man is an identical person related to his field of subjectivity, and the theme is the personal subject together with its subjective field.

Here the question can be raised: is this *personal subject not a "product of a subjective genetic formation"?* It must indeed be thought necessarily as something which develops and which at the very outset of this development already has its definite dispositions. They are manifest in the way the lived experiences proceed in the stream of consciousness. The subject therefore can be understood also as the unity manifesting itself in the stream of consciousness. So here we distinguish: 1. the unity of the person, 2. the self as the unity constituted in me as "Ego," constituted in self-experience, [350] self-apperception, as intended with an open horizon, the true being of which would be the being of the known person. The personal subject as developed is the subject that is conscious of itself; the self as object is a

[1] To be sure, I must distinguish soul and person, but is person not a determination of soul, a unity constituted in it?

[2] Does that mean to be in space and in space-time in the sense of natural science—under the idea of an "in-itself" as substratum of real "truths in themselves"? This "Objective" being-in-itself in contrast to the being of subjective facticity, hence in contrast to the being-relative to me and my "here" and "now," hence at one time idealizing Objectivation, at another time subjectivation.

product of constitution, an "apperceptive" unity. At the beginning of its development, the subject is not an Object for itself and does not have the apperceptive unity, "Ego." But even in the further course of development, this unity is never determined once and for all: I can be more and other than the Ego as apperceptive unity.[1]

To the pure essence of the soul there belongs an Ego-polarizing; further, there belongs to it the necessity of a development in which the Ego develops into a person and as a person. The essence of this development includes the sense that the Ego as person is constituted in the soul by means of self-experience. A personal being is only possible as conscious of itself, and the self of self-experience is, as experienced, an intended self; the true self is the person himself as the person in the present stage of his development. In life the person is transcendent—an inner transcendence which in spite of all self-deception is absolutely irreducible.

On the basis of the natural attitude, we distinguish:

1. The concrete Ego or the soul, investigated according to its psychophysical character: psychological subjectivity: the subject Ego (it does not matter whether and to what extent it is itself thematically apperceived) existing in its "states" (as the states of its subjective real possessions), in its apperceptions and their meaning-contents, and in its acts. It is all that concretely taken together in an empirical-real nexus with the world of things as posited absolutely. Or the subject itself which lives in its psychic life and which is constantly involved in change as regards the content of this life, but which is a unity in this change and develops thereby, taken together with all that is "subjective" about it, though it is bound in a real way to the Body, in which is included the "person in nature."

2. The subject in the nexus of motivation, as person, the spiritual subject or the concrete soul, though not understood as nature, and not the human personal subject in nature or connected with nature in the stricter (physical) sense. It is the subject which not only *is,* but which apperceives itself as subject. The subject as spirit, as person, has self-consciousness or an Ego (which is the same); a soul does not need to have self-consciousness. The subject, however, does not only apperceive itself, but it also apperceives other subjects who likewise not only are but also apperceive themselves, and all these subjects are in spiritual contact; apperceptions of the I and the thou, of the we, emerge, apperceptions which form the foundation of the [351] commerce between persons. Furthermore, each subject has its surrounding world posited by it and given to it, as surrounding world which is ultimately identifiable as the one surrounding world common to all, i.e., *the* world. In relation to the one common surrounding world, personal associations are constituted, which can be considered as personalities of a higher order. In their case as well, we can speak of a "self-consciousness," and we can differentiate, for example as regards a nation, between the

[1] The text which follows in the manuscript is employed in Section Three. *Cf.* p. 264, l. 30 to p. 265, l. 21.

national soul and the nation as national subject in the sense of a self-conscious personality.

What in truth is first in psychology is the soul according to its proper essence and according to its properly essential psychic connections with other souls. But still further distinctions are called for. The world as a universe of experience is a universal inductive unity, a unity of "empirical" interrelatedness, and within it is a special unity: nature. But inductive research regarding the psychic is not limited to the psychophysical. One must and one can project in advance the possible theories of inductive research. But now a basic distinction is still lacking: the distinction between *pure* research of the soul, with stratification in personal research, and the research into the lower level of psychic passivity, which is preparatory because it is concerned with association as a fact of the spirit (which must be distinguished from association as inductive experience).

But here it must be noted that research in the human sciences has as its world the surrounding world in its natural validity but at the same time has this world, in the sense of a subjective surrounding world, as a theme—and only in this way as theme. For the personal researcher, the human scientist, things are and are questioned only as existing things—in the way persons (who are thematic there) intend them.

§ 7. Subjects considered as nature and as spirit

In the anthropological sciences of the spirit we have to do with subjects in the sense mentioned in 2) above, we have to do with persons and personalities. This subject is conscious of itself and thereby is a developed subject at the level of "spirit" in Leibniz' sense. The spirit as unity of the Ego of motivation, as unity of the Ego of faculties, becomes an Object, while I, in empathy, engage in a consideration of what is interior, and the Ego with which I then empathize (i.e., the subject prior to self-consciousness) is brought to clarity by me along with its surrounding world and along with what motivates it in that world. I myself remain in my intuitive world; as Ego I have my environment and I take that which I and my companion have intentionally in common precisely as common. That is what I do in the case of all people who I find in the compass of my environment; I empathize with each one and participate in his doing and suffering and share in his surrounding world, positing it in relation to mine, [352] precisely as long as they are concordant. I posit the Bodies there as things of my environment and on the other hand as expressions of the subjects (who have these Bodies in inner intuition); the subjects stand toward one another in the bond of communication, thus immediately, precisely in accord with their lived experience. In this life of spirits, in their being active and their suffering, as well as in their obscure background, in sleep, etc., their "reality" manifests itself, their unity of spiritual "causality of freedom" and of unfreedom.

But what happens when we decide to investigate the soul and the person

as nature? What sort of direction of focus do we then have? As regards this mode of consideration, the following must be kept in mind: the things of my and our environment I thematize scientifically are not the things there as such, that is, not the things correlative to me and to us, as our over-and-against, but instead I posit them "absolutely." That is, I raise the scientific question of their in-itself, and I investigate this in-itself to the exclusion of all else. Thus I take all environing things, both mine and those of the other subject, as mere appearances, and I now have no interest in these appearances, except insofar as they serve to present to me the in-itself. My theme is henceforth all "things" and the whole world valid for me and for us, yet not as they are factually valid for us, but instead with respect to their true being, and even then not as they are related to us under the idea of our rationality (that is, as if this was an ideal surrounding world), but precisely purely and simply as the one that would be reality "in itself." But since the others and I myself likewise belong together to my surrounding world and to the pregiven surrounding world of everybody and can be considered under the idea of its true being as members of the world, so all appearances have their turn as moments of the real world.

What about the subjects, however? Can I also say here that I take them as mere appearances of subjects in themselves? The Ego which expresses itself here in the intuitive Body, can that be an appearance of a still to be determined X? Can it be so in the sense that every intuitive thing is supposed to be the thing and not an aspect of the thing, an "appearance," which would contain in itself logically a true being, the "mathematical"? Thus a product of thought? In this sense, no; the other subject is given in empathy and manifests itself originally in its irreal absoluteness, and everyone capable of empathy grasps it directly as such, provided he grasps it correctly at all, provided he understands. Thus the human subject is altogether an intersubjective being.

But the question is here not whether subjects are mere unities of presentations in the same sense as physical things, but whether subjects are not given as belonging to the pregiven world precisely in changing subjective modes as apperceived, represented, or meant in such and such a way, so that they, just like everything pregiven as worldly, may be interrogated as to their true sense versus their factical "appearances" and [353] opinions about them. And that is obviously the case. A presupposition for everything here is that we all, in communication and in individual-personal life, as constantly related to the community and to *the* world, "know" that what I experience in the world can be experienced as the same by everyone, whereas we know at the same time that each person has his own viewpoints, modes of appearance, etc. Thus the pregivenness of the world signifies the persistency of a universal world-conviction, a world-possession, which at the same time is a presumption of being and is always givenness of being, indeed as givenness of a being which has its true being only ahead of itself. To be sure, in actual life one need not be conscious of this fact that true being is an idea lying in the infinite.

What else still remains? Indeed only this, that the positing of the

Objective world and first of all, e.g., of physical nature "in itself" (logical-true nature), a positing which ensues when I posit the relative thing of the environment purely and simply, creates, beyond its relativity with regard to me, a framework in which I can insert and must insert the spirit, the subject. Things have a causal essence, absolutely, whether I experience it or not. They are, together with their determinations, without need of me. Subjects, too, have their mundane in-itself, and to a certain degree they have a "causal" essence, whether they know about it or not and whether I know about it or not. There exist, accordingly, psychophysical connections, whether or not they enter into the compass of actual intentionality. Just as Objective nature was discovered by making experienced nature thematic purely as *res extensa,* experienced nature thus becoming a point of departure for the goal of determining theoretically an Objective in-itself of nature unconditionally valid for everybody (in other words, to fulfill a scientific theory of nature and a theoretical-logical determination of experienced being in theoretical operations), so the goal of a truth in itself valid for the whole world had to result, and thereby in the theoretical treatment of psychic subjectivity mathematical nature had to serve as substrate. But, of course, only a transcendental-universal consideration within the human sciences can clarify the sense of the mathematical naturalization and of its precise or more general application to the world and can set its rights.

The human being as an inductive-real psychophysical unity is therefore a legitimate theme, but it must not be substituted for the psychic as the goal of an exclusively psychophysical psychology. The psychic bears in itself the person with his personal surrounding world as it appears and as in each case it is posited as valid by the person. In that case, therefore, all research in the human sciences is directed to a truth which is a component of the truth of the Objective real world (see below). But understood here is indeed the fundamental distinction between a human science functioning in this way (as a positive science in the system of positive sciences) versus an [354] absolute human science. I may completely put out of play my interest in a knowledge of the world, of the pregiven world of realities, and instead of making the world pure and simple my absolute theme, I make myself and my communicative subjectivity my absolute theme as the subjectivity whose comprehensive surrounding world includes that world and its truth, or as that subjectivity which posits the validity of everything valid as being and which is the subject for everything that is Object—its Object—and finally as that subjectivity which itself, if it suited its purpose, would pursue a truth in itself, etc. I posit myself as subject and not as world-Object already when I posit my Body and then everything valid for me as worldly and as being in whatever way, as the experienced of my experiences, etc., as what I possess in knowledge, as my pratical Object, etc.

Here it must be noted that one's personal self-apperception, as well as the apperception experienced by empathy in the other, and the other's apperception are precisely apperception, self-appearance and appearance of others, and it must be noted further that over and against the true

Objective being of the person of the personal world, I have in transcendental subjectivity the counterpole, in which the apperception of one's self and of the Objective pole, "person," constituted therein, is a transcendental product.

And when I, in the act of empathy, experience others, I do not take them only as the experienced of my experiences, as my possession, but as subjects like myself, hence as subjects for their surrounding world, valid for them, and at the same time as subjects for the one same world which in the "appearances" we all have of our surrounding worlds (in the worlds having subjective validity) is, as a result of an all-encompassing validity, valid for each of us as an identical world, showing itself to one in this way, to others in that way. But this self-same world can still be relative, for even if we may all be in agreement on a certain content (as an identical, actually existing world) over and against what is subjective and changing, yet in the progress of history this content itself can indeed change, though we do remain convinced that it is the one identical world that it was always, which only "appeared" to us historically or to people of different cultures at one time in one way, at another time differently. If this manner of consideration is carried out universally and consistently to the end, we then attain the universal and absolute human science—transcendental phenomenology.

But what now is the situation with regard to the *de facto* human sciences? Are they sciences in the transcendental-phenomenological sense, in which is revealed the whole of concrete absolute subjectivity together with its entire life, including what is hidden in it, the life in which is constituted what appears and what is true, what is relative and what is absolutely true (in conformity with an idea which may possibly be justified or only partially justified)? The human sciences are, essentially, personal sciences. They deal with persons in personal associations and with the personal surrounding world, which arises out of personal acts in personal [355] motivations. That requires a very precise characterization and the demonstration that here exists an immense field of overt nexuses, a field in which one can move and can intuit and consequently understand the rationality of motivations, whereas this whole field which can and does exist in the light has an obscure basis which is to be conquered, the underlying basis of passive motivations and constitutions which brings it about that the intelligibility of the human sciences always also retains aspects of unintelligibility. In addition, the human-scientific attitude is lacking in purity to the extent that no distinction is made between world-science, especially natural science and its attitude, and pure human science and to the extent that a science of nature is admitted beside it, lying on the same level, instead of being transformed into human science.

The human being understood as a psychophysical unity is, as theme, as direction of investigation, obviously quite different from the human being taken as subject of intentionality, related to being as (and insofar as it is) intentionally posited actual being. Surely experienced nature is "the same" as Objective nature, but what does that mean upon closer inspection? It means that if I carry out experience while in the theoretical attitude, I am

maintaining, in the further course of natural-scientific thinking, the X of the determinations, originally posited in experience as being, an X to be determined precisely in the consciousness of identity. If, however, I am not in the theoretical attitude but for the rest am living the life of a subject, then the thing stands intuitively before my eyes: it stands there and it determines me, I evaluate it, etc. The life-attitude of the spirit (at least for the most part) is then not an attitude of theoretical determination, and what is the object there is what is intuited in the how of its being intuited, and it is characterized as being or as what is thought in the way it is thought and posited. That which is thus characterized determines me and is in fact not the same as the theoretical "Objective" thing pertaining to another attitude; it is rather an ideal goal for theoretical work, and in this work I do not have the Objective thing itself (that would be the goal as attained), but instead what motivates me is the "idea" of something undetermined which is to be determined, on the basis experience, as intentional goal. The attitude of the subject functioning here is hence different in general from the one of the natural scientist. The personal subject, functioning personally in life, is the subject of active life and has its constituted surrounding world as its concordant possessions; that is to say, it is the subject-Object, the subject in the apperception, person: the personal Ego of self-apperception (of human self-experience) and correspondingly of thou-experience and we-experience. The attitude of the human scientist, however, is again a theoretical attitude; to be specific, the human scientist makes the subject of personal apperception and its surrounding world a theoretical theme and raises the question of what a subject is and what pertains to a subject, while [356] probing deeper, through empathy, into the subject's attitude.[1] The personal subject, and what it possesses, is thereby the one whose true being the human scientist wants to determine, and this true being is a unity in its motivations, a unity which exists in these motivations in their special character and has consciousness (but not theoretical knowledge) of itself as such a unity. As self-conscious Ego, it has an apperception of itself, the original Ego-apperception.

§ 8. Distinction between a psychological and a psychophysical analysis. Positive psychology—naturalistic psychology—human-scientific psychology—inductive psychology

The human being as a psychophysical Object has this in common with the spiritual, that the latter, with all its spirituality, all its comportment and

[1] Thereby I have a personal apperception of others, and I distinguish it from the self-apperception which he has and which I attribute to him by empathy, or from the apperceptive appearances and intentions therein, from the subject-Object itself, the truth of which is sought by human science along with the concomitant true (Objective-subjective) motivations.

being motivated, must be given in the psychophysicist's apperception of the human being and be given as connected with the Body. But the spirit as unity is not the theme of the psychophysicist as such; instead, he investigates what in the life of the spirit, in the having of sensations, in the course of its apperceptions, in the course of its acts, etc. is psychophysically conditioned and, conversely, what in Corporeality depends on the spiritual. The absolute theme of the positive psychologist (or positive anthropologist) is not the spirit as a being in itself and for itself but the spirit as pertaining to the extant world. The spirit taken purely in itself is *also* his theme, as is all psychophysical conditionality and everything empirically inductive which belongs to it as mundane; but this researcher's attitude is precisely a positive one and not the absolute one.

Hence a peculiar change of attitude in relation to the spiritual is the result. In self-experience[1] and in experience of the subject (the spirit) in general, subjects are experienced as being and are given as unities of their modes of comportment in relation to what they possess, their spheres of subjectivity, their surrounding worlds: subject is on one side, and surrounding world is a correlate; the subjective as possession is not the subject. The subject as person is even to be distinguished from the subjective as life. The Ego-subject itself is dependent on its subjective spheres of possessions in the sense of its being affected, etc.: motivation. But in this respect the dependence is not a causal one, or rather, the subject is not an animal in nature. It is not intended and posited as nature and [357] hence is not determinable as nature. It does not make sense to consider it as caused or as itself causing in the natural sense. Cause is an inductive and associative notion. Subjects, on the other hand, affect one another by way of motivation. Psychophysical conditionality exists between the Ego-domain of lived experience, together with all that occurs in it, and nature, first of all Corporeality, and specifically also between, e.g., the Ego-acts, the *cogitationes*, and Corporeality. The subject can be posited in relation to nature itself only in the way that the concrete soul (with its Ego, stream of lived experiences, and acts) pertains precisely in an empirical way to the Body. The Ego-acts come into consideration thereby precisely as events in natural time, in world time: as the "he is investigating," "he is evaluating," etc., i.e., as the respective lived experiences, taken as facts in the world, in world time.

The attitude of the positive psychologist is hence this: he grasps the human being as a whole, but he directs his thematic regard toward the entire realm of the content of lived experiences and toward any other subjective content of the human being, including also the Objects in the

[1] With the science of the spirit (as such and as absolute spirit) the expression "self-experience" assumes a double meaning: self-experience precisely as transcendental or naïvely as human scientific self-experience, and self-experience as mundane self-experience.

latter's surrounding world, taking all these merely as correlates of human lived experience. What in this domain is ruled by psychophysical conditionality is a psychophysical theme. It is obvious that if the human being, Objectified in this way, is posited in nature and if psychology wants to investigate the whole being of man, it must indeed co-investigate the subject and all motivational nexuses; it must co-investigate the genesis of the subject. A complete Objective psychology must obviously encompass everything, including all motivational nexuses. This Objective psychology, just for that reason, does not coincide with purely inductive psychophysics, and the latter again does not coincide with the domain of those investigations which study the human being empirically as a thing—purely according to inductive principles. Psychophysics is by no means a mathematically closed discipline; it is no authentic psychology. It considers the human being extrinsically, purely within the frame of inductive-empirical regularities and indeed psychophysical ones. But this characteristic of the psychophysical, can that be what distinguishes psychophysics from a complete Objective psychology?[1] The soul, as theme of psychology, has properties residing outside of the subjective personal sphere of motivation, e.g., memory-properties, associations, etc., which one can also observe Objectively and establish experimentally, and which on the other hand can in no way be articulated as psychophysical nexuses. Hence the inductive does not coincide with Corporeal-psychic conditionality but is to be understood here as the totality of inductive regularities (and of the regularities of act- [358] comportment as well), which can be established by considering the subject as an Object in the empirical-inductive nexus, in the nexus of "habitual expectation."

But here the question can be raised as to whether one can, in the case of such inductive and yet not psychophysical modes of consideration, also be in a human-scientific attitude. Hence one would have to allow for the possibility of a psychology adopting a human-scientific attitude, proceeding in an empirical-inductive way, and, if need be, experimentally. And in that case, experimental psychology would not necessarily be "natural-scientific" (world-scientific) positive psychology. Under natural-scientific psychology one can understand a psychology which "naturalizes" the soul, i.e., considers it purely inductively like any material reality. There are limits within which this is justified: the soul, the psyche of the human being, comports itself as a thing in empirical regularity according to circumstances and can then be known according to external rules and indices.

[1] Here a clear distinction must be made between: 1) the total range of inductive-empirical nexuses; 2) what is specific to the psychophysical nexuses. Hence inductive psychology is not psychophysics. Even in the human sciences there can be induction, as an extrinsic method, one that is extrinsic to its essence, a method which produces precisely nothing in the way of essential nexuses or understanding.

§ 9. Stream of consciousness, lived experience, and intentional correlates as nexuses of psychic life

Once the "soul" is specified as the theme of psychology and the initial question is raised concerning the relation of the psychological attitude to the attitude of the human sciences, then we have to procure before all, in order to get beyond these difficulties, an overview of everything that can be included under the title "the psychic life of man."

Here we have:

1) in unity with the Body, nexuses of sensations in the fields of sensation, associative complexes, apperceptions, etc.—a unity of the stream of lived experiences as a stream of living through. Every lived experience obtains a position in Objective time, and indeed by means of an Objective connection with the Body as nature, and there exist here, however undetermined, manifold Objective relations of dependence between the physical and the psychical, which pertain to Objective time, to the form of Objective existence.

2) The lived experiences are thereby in and for themselves unities of the immanent stream of time; hence the nexus of the original flux which constitutes the temporal in immanence is different from the immanent intersubjective nexus of sociality.

3) In the intentional lived experiences, the subject of the stream of lived experiences is conscious of this or that "transcendent" being, visible things, intuitive things, things thought of, etc. We speak here hence of three: lived experience, subject of the lived experience, and the Object of the lived experience in consciousness. The title "soul" includes, then, together with the one stream of lived experience, the Ego-subject which pertains to it (now sleeping, now awake, now active in its acts, now affected by some "stimuli" or other, now freely active, now passive). And what is [359] "pregiven" to the Ego-subject are those multiple and intentionally constituted "intuitive" or unintuitive objects, objects toward which it is directed or is not directed, etc. The "objects" are thereby given either in the form of doxic "theses" or with the characters of existing, possibly existing or probably existing, and also as value objects, as objects practically required or practically willed, etc. In a certain way, all that is a part of the stream of consciousness, but it is therein a part as intended, thought, surmised, valued etc. in this noematic form, together with the axiothetic characteristics and their modifications, related to the Ego.

The Ego, however, can also relate itself to its own lived experiences and to itself in the form of "self-consciousness."

§ 10. The spiritual considered psychologically and the question of its "explanation." Two concepts of nature

What about the noematic contents now, the "objects," and the Ego from the standpoint of empirical psychology and psychophysics? The Ego

comports itself to its objects, possibly to itself and its lived experiences — that is in each case to be considered an Objective temporal factum. With the Objective temporalization of the soul the Ego is also temporalized, although it is not itself a real [*reell*] part of the stream of consciousness: everything immanent, so far as it is a part of immanent time, is brought into coincidence with Objective time and along with it likewise is the Ego, insofar as it is the inseparable Ego of that stream. It pertains "always" and "permanently" to it, that each cogito, each affection, has its position in time. The question can be raised as to how the lived experiences as Objective facta are dependent on Corporeality. Here belongs every cogito as lived experience and also the fact that the Ego thereby takes this or that position with regard to the cogitatum, that it comports itself in this or that way to its "objects" (noematically); all this is a fact united with the very lived experiences: the lived experiences in question occur in the stream as this or that cogito. This occurrence is an Objective real fact which can appear as dependent on physical circumstances, just as conversely physical processes can arise in Objective nature as a consequence of the psychic. The spiritual fact (my comporting myself in this way under my noematic circumstances), we can say, is a factum in the stream of consciousness, a factum of psychic being, which is linked to the Body. It can be studied as this factum of nature, hence studied also according to psychophysical conditionalities and according to whatever other empirical-inductive regularities there may be.

The person as such is the central unity of the Ego, a unity which endures through time in the multiplicity of affections and actions. In the course of these temporal Ego-events, the person is constituted originally as person, i.e., as substrate of personal characters, as, in its temporal being, substrate-unity. The way a person is actually constituted, that is how he functions as a motivational subject for new affections and actions. Conversely, the person "manifests" himself to the one who understands him (I myself to myself in the case of self-understanding) by the way he allows himself at any moment to be motivated or by the way he is active. Hence a distinction must be made between original constitution and the understanding-experience within constitution and within what is already constituted, the understanding of which is all the more complete the more the constitution is revealed.

[360]

If one studies the person in his unity, which manifests itself in his acts and affections, then one studies how he "affects" other persons and likewise how he spiritually undergoes effects from them, and furthermore one studies how personalities of a higher order are constituted, how individual persons and collective personalities of a higher level perform, how as correlates of their spiritual performances cultural objectivities and cultural arrangements are constituted, how individual persons, communal personalities, and cultural formations develop, in which forms they do so, in what typicality, etc. Obviously in all that there is also a system of events in "nature" as an empirical-causal spatio-temporal world-order, namely insofar as, to all of that, precisely systems of lived experiences of human

beings correspond as unities in spatio-temporal nature. If, or as long as, these lived experiences are psychophysically dependent and in general are subject to empirical-external inductive experimental rules, then these spiritual facts will also have to be considered under psychophysical and, more generally, natural points of view.

One has to say therefore that a scientific consideration of reality (a complete scientific anthropology as positive science of man) includes a scientific study of the spirit and consequently of spiritual accomplishments, since all that is spiritual is enclosed in a certain way in the nexuses of lived experiences of the individual human being and since these possess to an indeterminate extent, which is precisely to be investigated further, a psychophysical conditionality toward physical nature. More generally: inductively there are empirical facts and in any case, even abstraction made from these, there are facts of the spatio-temporal world, and these remain even where such dependencies do not come into question. In the lived experiences is also included the significance human beings attribute to things of all sorts by means of value predicates, etc., in predicates relating to works, machines, pictures, etc.

Culture is then a title on the one hand for actual things, which the positive scientific psychologist himself encounters as Objective and which he identifies as the intended things of the human being who is functioning here as Object of world-science, and on the other hand, it relates to the meaning-conferring acts of this human being in relation to his intended things. From the standpoint of a consideration of reality it is hence correct to say that value-predicates, practological predicates, and likewise the predicates of sensuous quality, color, tone, etc. are "merely subjective." They are not predicates of "merely subjective" modes of appearance in the sense of the real which is constituted thereby according to real qualities. This merely subjective is, in a very broad sense, ideal or irreal. It is, however, in its way, true being as intended and perhaps is exhibited truth over and against the mere appearances: e.g., the correct color related to our normal experience as human beings. And in another way it is the truth-value of the authentic work of art, which for its part, e.g. in its intuited colors and forms, is founded in the normal truth of being as merely subjective.

[361]

One could say that the psychological is on the one hand consciousness, i.e., the real [*reell*] psychic being in a psychical nexus (= nexus of lived experience), and on the other hand the intentional-psychic being, the intentional correlate in the form of an intended thing with appearance-properties, value characteristics, etc. Thereby however the psychologist as a positive psychologist or as an investigator of nature executes the positing of physical nature[1] as a foundational positing and he participates in the positing, as nature, of the human being who serves him as an Object. But

[1] Nature always refers to the totality of nature in the sense of the universal world of realities.

he justifies his procedure with demonstrative reasons, whereby the thing which was intentionally posited by the person is at the same time valid as an actual thing of nature, at least according to certain circumstances, and for the rest as an actual thing intended or intuited with these or those subjective characters.

It is obvious that every spiritual relation between human beings, and everything which in the spirituality of a higher personality is constituted with regard to what gives to this spirituality spatio-temporal existence in universal nature, is reducible to the singular human beings psychophysically considered and to the nexuses of nature existing between them. Intersubjective spirituality, taken in its purity, is, in world-experience, not for itself but, rather, mundane, hence naturally temporal in virtue of the determinate foundation of the singular subjects, with their individual empathies, in the individual real Bodies. Here "nature" (the world of positivity), which each natural science (positive science) investigates according to one area, is always thought of as the unity of the temporal order of existence, the unity of the order of coexistence and succession, in the one spatio-thingly determined time, the unity of an order of physical and (partially at least) psychical nature, which can be construed[1] and anticipated, as well as, in retrospect, reconstrued. Nature must be a system of univocal determinability of all beings; that is what the natural scientist holds, guided as he is by physical nature as the fundamental domain. This world conceived as nature, the universal Objective world, is the universe of substrates for truths in themselves—this universe thought in a universal [362] science as deductible out of "axioms" or hypotheses is a geometrical and physical paradigm, the latter interpreted in a definite way.

Beyond physical nature, with its closed lawfulness guaranteeing a constant and univocal temporal sequence in the form of a nature "left to its own devices," though on the other hand nevertheless allowing room for spirituality and spiritual effects in what is physical, there must hence still be a psychophysical lawfulness and a spiritual one. As regards the first, it is lawfulness which for certain physical constellations of being (if not, indeed, for everything physical) requires a spiritual "parallel" of a definite essence. As regards the latter, there are structural laws of unity and perhaps laws of the properly essential development of the psyche as immanent psychical laws. All the person's spiritual activity, evaluating, accomplishing, and creating, can be included here, as belonging to the realm of Objective facts in the one temporal-spatial order.

We are therefore dealing here with nature in a double sense:

1) as physical nature, along with the psychic (in the broadest sense) legitimately empathized in it. It is the realm of Objectively real facts versus "merely subjective facts;" it is the totality of all that is given in mere "factual" experience, whose intended Objects of experience have been freed of all merely subjective determinations, freed of all determinations which

[1] That means: can be construed in the sense of the physicalistic model.

do not concord and which do not have to comply with the concordance of demonstration, first within the individual subject and its concordance in its original demonstrations, and then in intersubjectivity. But there must be a necessary and not an accidental concordance, founded apriori in the idea of an "in itself." To the realm of an accidental concordance there also belong the "secondary qualities" as the ones by means of which Objective physical nature "presents" itself to subjects. In physical nature taken in that sense we have hence a universe of factual, Objectively determinable being, free of all determinations which in their proper predicative meaning refer back to subjects and groups of subjects experiencing them, being presented with them, feeling them, taking positions toward them, acting on them, etc.

In the context of this Objective nature, there also belongs the soul as experientially connected with the Body, as an Objective real fact.

2) One can, however, understand nature also as the realm of inductive experiential properties, and there must be such properties if talk of an ordering of the spiritual, of the correlates of lived experience, into nature is to make any sense.

In this way, all that is psychical or all that is personal can be considered under the aspect of a being, an event, a homogeneous process-formation in Objective spatio-temporal nature, and it is thereby always a constituent of what is "psychic" in physical things, in Bodies. Hence the person is [363] thereby also something that occurs in nature (in the Objective nature of natural science), linked with a Body, belonging to what is psychic of the Body, a higher stratum of the Corporeal body as a being in itself.

In this conception there arises a question which is an obvious one in the attitude of natural science, the question of the "natural-scientific explanation" of the psychic, and the sense and legitimacy of this question must be considered. First of all, the meaning of the term "existing" as applied to the psychic (the psychic as existing) must be investigated. The psychic is subjectivity within the experience of empathy; it is there experienced as temporally coexisting with the Corporeal-physical. Every physical Object which has irreal predicates (predicates added on to physical things, such as values) is posited merely as physical. In the natural attitude, it is precisely only the individual that is posited, that which is intersubjectively identical for everyone: on the lowest level as physical nature and, as a further stratum, the "psychical" as co-experienced with it in Objective time. The problem then is how the Objective temporal order of the psychic object of empathy is to be determined according to its manifold content. The physical is, in conformity with its proper ontological sense, through and through inductive-empirical. How far does the inductive-empirical go beyond that? What about the psychic in its own proper character? Is it also something inductive-empirical, or does it not have an apriori essence presupposed by all inductive psychic empirics? And if we hence subtract it by essential necessity from this structure, does there not then remain something still to be investigated that is not inductive-empirical? What kind of distribution of Objective time belongs to the sphere of the interior life which reaches beyond the circle of immediate psychophysical indica-

tion? What kind of distinctions do we need here with regard to the inductive connections? To have broached these questions may for the moment suffice.

§ 11. The human sciences posit subjectivity as absolute.—"Inner" and "outer" experience

We now turn to a consideration of the human-scientific attitude. Instead of assigning the spirit, persons, personal communities, and personal accomplishments to one nature, instead of attaching them to the nature which is at their basis and which is posited (absolutely) as something in itself, it is the character of the human sciences to posit subjectivity as absolute, to acknowledge nature only as the intuitively existing surrounding world, or as a represented, thought, and intended surrounding world of persons, and to take mathematical Objective nature, which previously was the "true reality," only as (what in fact it merely is) a theoretical though rational construction on the part of man as the subject of scientific activities, partially accomplished by individual persons, partially by social personalities.

In the spiritual attitude we have, as given unities, the persons and their [364] surrounding worlds and their activities in relation to these surrounding worlds; we investigate them intuitively and analytically, and we bring them to scientific understanding (based on intuition). Scientifically we go back to the nexuses of the stream of consciousness of the respective Ego along with its sensuous substrata, and we investigate here in intentional research all these connections and the manner in which therein personal unities are constituted by means of a (constituted) determinateness in the surrounding world. The givennesses of the surrounding world, the things of nature and so on, are reduced to constituted unities and intersubjective regulations. In short, all the human sciences acquire an ultimate linkage in phenomenology as empirical phenomenology (modification of transcendental phenomenology). Human science is a science on the basis of sheer intuition, and its theoretical determination does not consist in the construction of an Objective temporal order but in the construction of a subjective order of phenomena according to noetic and noematic motivations in a subjective (though super-individual) temporal order. That is, it consists in an order which posits all immanent streams of lived experience and the intentional correlates in them with their immanent temporal orders in one unitary ordered relation, the index of which is the transcendently constituted Objective temporal order.

Natural science proceeds from outer experience; that is its root and ground, from it all its pregivennesses originate. It works on what is experienced by the subject (or by different subjects in different modes of givenness)—experienced in changing qualities (though this indeed, in spite of the differences in the qualities and the subjective aspects, proves to be the one same actual being)—as the "in itself," the content of the

supra-subjective, the logical invariant for each subject with the same experience, the invariant in relation to all predicates which derive from the manifold subjective circumstances. The "Objective" is what, in the changing subjective elements, in the subjectively changing manifolds, is the invariant "true being," and this is, above all, Objective nature in the first sense, namely physical nature. The broadened second nature arises through externalization, through the regulated linkage of the psychical to the physical.

Descriptive natural science, the science of the intuitive forms and orders of classes (which have an intersubjective content provided they are based on a society of normal people), is a natural science only if conceived as a sublevel therein, assigned the task of determining in a theoretical-Objective way, in the sense of an Objective (exact) science of nature, the universal-subjective which belongs to a society of normal human beings. Even all morphology in the human sciences, including the morphology of individual psychology, can be regarded as such a sublevel: hence one aiming at an "Objective" determination, a determination with Objective existence as [365] spatio-temporal existence, which is grasped in the apperception, "outer experience." But the human sciences are based purely and simply on "inner experience," or, formulated in a better way, on phenomenological experience; for inner experience in the sense of psychological self-experience and experience of the other, as these are founded in physical experience, is a form of outer experience, of "nature"-experience. The immanent, that which is found in myself, is then considered thematically as something to be found in the soul pertaining to my Body, as a lived experience, etc. In a certain sense the human sciences thematically use outer experience as well, but just as the science of nature externalizes immanent experience (by means of a naturalized thematic attitude), so the human sciences internalize outer experience. They do not make outer experience thematic as outer, but they make it thematic as an inner accomplishment. The human scientist is not, like the natural scientist, a subject that thematically-theoretically engages in outer experience; i.e., his theoretical attitude does not aim at positing the externally experienced Object as his theme pure and simple, specifically in the sense of what must be determined Objectively and as purely factual, but he aims at positing it as noema of the experience and as belonging to the surrounding world of the experiencing subject or experiencing community, and his goal is to determine this in its subjective nexus. The thesis put into effect here is the phenomenological thesis of experience: "an Ego-subject experiences this or that;" for this thesis, then, there is no difference between the experience of nature, the experience of sensibly intuitive things, sense-things, and the experience of comparable axiological and practical Objectivities. The theme is therefore subjectivity and the Object as such, which, in the subjective, appears, is posited, and perhaps is even theoretically determined. And so in general, the theme is subjectivity both as individual and social, together with all its intentional correlates. Whatever is Objective in natural science is then characterized as a system of distinctive formations of subjectivity, especially of the subjectivity which

investigates nature in a rational way. The human scientist thus goes back precisely one level, back to the subject which investigates nature and so to any subject operative either rationally or irrationally.

The definition of the science of "nature" as a science of Objectivity and the science of the spirit as a science of subjectivity is obviously old-fashioned and trivial. But Dilthey was the first to intuit (although he in no way raised it to theoretical clarity and was not even able to exhibit the distinction in its purity) that there must be two sciences of subjectivity: the one follows the path of psychophysics, or, more clearly, it is a science which determines the spiritual Objectively as nature and in nature, hence determines it Objectively as mundane; the other, which is not a natural science, not science of the spirit based on outer experience, is a science that encompasses all sciences of nature, even the natural-scientific theories of the spirit (natural-scientific psychology, anthropology), as "spiritual formations," but which also acknowledges them as special spiritual formations, next to which there are so many others. The extant empirical human sciences are descriptive-intuitive, because everything spiritual must be given on the basis of intuitive sources themselves and only on the basis of such sources, and not given, like the physical in-itself (of the exact natural sciences), by means of evident thought, as ideal formation. Belonging here are also in a certain way the descriptive "natural" sciences, which present types of spiritual formations and as such pertain to the sphere of subjectivity. What is intuitively given and what is apprehended by means of intuitive concepts is, however, not a sublevel of Objectifying explanation (nature-explanation) but of subjectifying explanation; that is to say, it is a sublevel of the rendering understandable of aspects of the constitutions which structure the formations and of aspects of all motivations which traverse different correlative strata—"motivations" which connect together lived experiences in an intelligible way and motivations which extend between the Ego and its intentional correlates, etc. In a very broad sense, these are purely subjective nexuses of causality, of the because (if) and the then, that are to be revealed in a purely intuitive way. [366]

Hence the attitude of the historian, or the linguist, etc, is a human-scientific attitude, although at any given time only a very limited group of formations and motivational strata come within his thematic focus. It is not the sciences of nature but the human sciences that lead into the "philosophical" depths; for the philosophical depths are the depths of ultimate being.

Insofar as we have actually original intuition, we have precisely what is original. And the actually originally intuited, although the natural-scientific attitude will call it "merely subjective" and will treat it as unimportant and try to eliminate it, as is demanded by the theoretical interest of natural science, is the true in the best sense. It is the absolute, the source of everything. It has absolute self-validity and not merely validity as a constitutive product of scientific experience, which in ultimate truth is still only an index for a regulated subjectivity.

The enormous practical significance of Objectivation, its significance for

the necessary task of the "calculation" of the Objective course of events, made the moderns blind to the primal legitimacy of the givennesses of intuition and blind to the fact that here lies the source of all legitimation, and that this source does not extend into the sciences of nature, but that it alone in its primal form contains truth, and that the development of truth must preserve the form of intuition, whereas the science of nature has a place in the realm of philosophical truth only if it is interpreted as coming forth from that intuitive source and as lying within its subjective significance (and not in the absolute significance which is the result of a dogmatic conception of the world).

§ 12. Nature in the human-scientific attitude. — The human-scientific and the phenomenological attitude [367]

These remarks, though on the whole very useful, are in need of both delimitation and supplementation.

The human scientist, e.g., the linguist or the historian, constantly "partakes of" outer experience; "nature" is there for him, the one nature common to all persons who share a social nexus, experienced by all of them as common, exhibited to all as existent. However, he himself has no theoretical interest in determining this common nature and therefore none in determining psychic nature as it is "bound" to the nature determined theoretically by natural science. His theoretical theme is personal subjectivity in relation to its surrounding world: and intuitively given nature is intuited by the persons as intuitive immediate surrounding world, that is, given to them immediately and precisely intuitively. Perhaps even the nature conceived in natural science is surrounding world, namely surrounding world for the practicing natural scientists, but no further than they know of it in their theories. The human scientist does not need any transcendental-phenomenological reduction to the phenomena of phenomenology, a reduction to the transcendental-pure cogito, to the transcendental plurality of cogitating subjects and to their being as thinking subjects. The experienced world is for him precisely experienced, and experienced in the natural sense, in the sense of practical life; it is lived in the experiencing, in straightforward omni-lateral "experiencing" of the constituted world of things, of human beings and of animals, of things as natural things, of things perhaps as national economic values, universal aids, utilities, etc., and in the "experiencing" of works of art, literary products, etc. The straightforwardly "experienced" world is the one in which persons live related to it in a passive or active way, regarding which they take positions, judge, evaluate, practically transform, etc. The human scientist may not, by an artificial methodology, exclude anything from this sphere. To be sure, the method for a human-scientific psychology of the inner life requires "psychological reduction." But the historical, concretely descriptive, human sciences hold fast to experience and its experiential unities and are in no need of a phenomenological-psychological reduction as a rigorous

method; they do not aim at ultimate, constitutive, elementary analyses, elementary essential laws of intentionality, and the ultimate human-scientific "explanation." For the human scientist everything remains open; and he also investigates it in multiple ways: as a human scientist he investigates human beings, their reciprocal personal associations and their activities, their accomplishments and the results of their accomplishments, etc.

But because his research interest focuses exclusively on personal subjects, individual subjects as well as communal subjects (the latter, for their part, having arisen through the personal influence of individual subjects on each other), and on personal subjective accomplishments, both as performance and as the performed, for him all objectivity (always straightforwardly valid), all nature, and even all other objectivities (including works, goods, etc.) come into consideration only insofar as the objects are the experienced (or in consciousness in some other way) objects of persons or are newly constituted by them in active conscious activities. [368]

Included under the title of human-scientific studies (that is, in our historically elaborated, so-called "human sciences") are those sciences which aim at a clarifying understanding of specifically personal accomplishments as active subject-accomplishments and which investigate their "products" or active formations. But then, for our human scientist, there remains here a sphere of incomprehensibility, which is obviously not purely separate; there remains in human-scientific explanation much that is simply inexplicable and is consequently even characterized as lying outside the realm of the human sciences, as not having originated in effective acts of pregiven persons, mundane beings in their motivational nexus.

It would be the task of the psychology of the active motivations of concrete persons to investigate here what is the apriori and, in general, the empirical of this sphere; on the other hand, psychology would obviously also have to investigate the sphere of passive affections and the passive modes of comportment of subjects, their phantasies, their associations, etc. Human-scientific psychology, however, as altogether directed to ultimate explications, cannot merely be a psychology of active motivations. It cannot be satisfied with having anything left over that is incomprehensible. Concrete-descriptive human science can be self-satisfied, however, because it seeks a concretely intuitive understanding, which is possible without an elemental understanding of ultimate constitution according to essential laws, something that is a universally explicating cognition of phenomenology.

Analogous to this is descriptive natural science and its comprehensibility within description (not over against theoretical natural science as "explaining out of elementary laws"—for intuitive description is here not a description of what is naturally in itself). The intuitive world remains thereby constantly presupposed and posited. But the intuitive world is precisely the world purely as a unity of its interpersonal modes of appearance.

Space "is" indeed "Objective" space, but the scientific interest of the

human scientist is not simply to determine this Objectivity as such, under the idea of an unconditioned Objectivity, or to determine spatial things according to their "true being in itself" as unconditioned and valid for everyone and for all times. The things "themselves" are the ones identified in the here and in the there; they come into consideration, however, only as things of personal subjects, only as appearing in the here and in the there, although they are always identified and likewise qualified as the things now appearing intuitively in such a way. Space is an index for the system of orientations. All things are under consideration according to how they are given in orientation; the subject comports himself to the spatial thing in the process of moving "from here to there," etc. To each subject these oriented things, qualified sensuously in this or that way and often individually qualified in many variations, are pregiven as his surrounding world, and it is a datum that each subject has his aspects of "the" things, his perceptions, etc. [369]

Now a distinction must be made between 1) concrete human science as science of persons, of their personal comportment in relation to their surrounding world, and of this surrounding world itself—universal descriptive science of the subjective, "personal," world. 2) The scientific investigation of personal interiority, of prepersonal mundane constitutive subjectivity hidden in the personal mundane attitude—transcendental subjectivity in the proper sense. Furthermore: the distinction between the concrete (historical) descriptive attitude and science and, on the other hand, a science directed to lawful universality, hence not a mere morphology in facticity, which always remains historical. We arrive then at 1) an eidetics of personal possible worlds and 2) eidetic phenomenology.

If, instead of describing identical things, the way they are given in their intuitive qualities, one undertakes the description of the thing-appearances in their relative noetical sense—i.e., first of all, the manifold appearances of the intuitive things as they present themselves (and are always posited intuitively as identical) for the subject—and if one investigates their nexuses and the way they exhibit themselves phenomenally in the consciousness of the subjects and in the nexus of empathy between subjects and how they emerge in consciousness according to their different levels, how in subjects unities as thing-unities develop apperceptively and become pregivennesses, toward which the subjects can take a position, then one is carrying out the deeper "comprehending" clarification of the being of the surrounding world, which is, moreover, for the human sciences, a pregiven being, and one is performing a phenomenological clarification of the ultimate foundations of the human sciences. Furthermore, this clarification is of a being which is already given, as a factum, naturally utilizing here an eidetic spiritual-psychological "phenomenology" but not a transcendental phenomenology.[1] The attitude toward the already given world is here not [370]

[1] *Transcendental clarification:* the foundation of human science as in its way a positive science is the eidetic science of personal mundaneity (also in the sense of the

changed. That which appears in nature is still posited in a natural way, the only difference is that the theme of the scientific research and of the theoretical determination is subjectivity, and indeed, both here and ultimately, subjectivity insofar as it in a certain sense produces nature, existent nature, as knowledge, as its representation, and as existing in such and such a way, by means of manifold ways of appearance and in modes of consciousness in which it precisely brings this nature intentionally into appearance and to cognitive positing as existing. To this then is joined natural-scientific knowledge, which in this nexus turns into the human-scientific clarification of natural science.

All this is the case without there being an explicit enactment of a "phenomenological reduction," *without there being any break in the positing of natural reality*. All historical personalities, states, churches, etc. are likewise posited in advance, and subsequently they are "explained" in a subjective human-scientific way and thus made intelligible. And in a similar way the pregiven world is made intelligible out of subjectivity, without having put it into brackets.

According to this conception, we would have *in human science several levels of clarification* and, corresponding to them, several disciplines. In the concrete human sciences, persons, personal communities, accomplishments as processes of performing, and formations produced in the accomplishments—all this belongs, if it concerns precisely the personal in the specific sense, to the realm of free subjectivity, active or passive in its proper acts. In order to bring the objectivities in question to givenness, experience is needed—in this case the experience of personal unities and of their formations and the experience of the activities (and their motives) which produce them—in short, what is needed is the sphere of "spirituality," self-integrated and to be characterized especially as a proper mundane sphere of being. In this characteristic lies also the special task of the

ideally mundane); included in it are the foundational cognitions of the method of all sciences as personal accomplishments.—To personal or human science, however, does not pertain the constituting life which unfolds "in" the persons. But there is still more: human sciences, the historically descriptive and the eidetic, always have their factual (or possible) world of the spirit as pregiven, just as in the "nature"-attitude nature is presupposed. The natural attitude in general is: to have the natural world of the spirit pregiven, and to it the nature-attitude and nature itself as theme of knowledge are subordinated.—Now, however, I can exercise epoché; if I do so with regard to the world of the spirit, then consequently also with regard to physical nature, and then to nature in an enlarged sense, what remains? I am the Ego that has my personal Ego as a phenomenon and with it the whole personal world.—And then I arrive at what is new, at absolute transcendental subjectivity and the universe of its phenomena. But if I do not execute the epoché, then I attain only a human science and a human-scientific psychology on the natural soil of the world of spirit, parallel to natural psychology.

physical biology of the organic living being. One must, however, pay attention to the fact that the identical spatio-temporal world of reality co-appertains to the content of the personal surrounding world—but in the way in which it is intuitively determined for the personal community. In order to bring this world to givenness, an originarily giving intuition is needed ("inner" intuition, if need be a reproductive one and then a quasi-originarily giving intuition). This precedes science no matter how much it is incorporated into the ambit of scientific method. One can intuitively bring alive a personality in its work and in its creations without thereby making any kind of scientific claim. To that belongs, above all, description by means of scientifically descriptive concepts. Obviously the morphology of spirituality is included here, developmental morphology as well. [371]

In the production of the constituting intuition there is already at work an understanding; in the corresponding description there is already a scientific understanding—particularly insofar as eidetic necessities of motivation are acknowledged or even are properly elaborated and applied to a given case, and then we have an explanatory understanding. We understand hence concretely and we understand in a scientific way in general by means of a recourse to laws of motivation. We understand individual lines, individual pages, actions, character-properties of personal subjectivity or of objectivities correlative to persons, while other pages remain unknown and not understood. We posit the aim of exposing the unity of the life of the spirit, the large structural nexuses which encompass it, in an intuitive way and according to concepts and motivational laws. But as long as the underlying ground of passivity is outside of this investigation, something irrational yet remains.

Scientific tasks:

1) *The elaboration of personal and thereby universal experience.* Persons as beings in identity, but unknown as to their "history," unknown as to their previous personal life. With simple empathy there arises in experience that which is directly indicated together with a more or less vague evocation of the particular "apprehensions" inserted into the universal apperception, person. The disclosure of personal elapsed temporality, together with its concomitant mundane appearances, intentions, motivations, activities, external and internal actions in their personal nexus—all of which must likewise be disclosed to a certain degree.

To the apperception, person, belongs a personal nexus and the limitless horizon of the history in which each individual personality "develops" in the unity of personal nexuses. Historiography is the elaboration of true history as a concordant historical experience under the idea of a concordance maintaining itself in the progress of the disclosing elaboration of this experience and resulting always in the same truth (experiential truth), but only in a continuously more precise determination. The disclosure results from the actual historical present to which the historian himself necessarily belongs.

Linguistic expression here does not have at first the function of an absolutely fixed conceptuality but is "pictorial" expression which is descriptive in the primary sense, that is, gifted in evoking intuition. Every means to this is legitimate. [372]

2) Science in the pregnant sense, as science which strives for "exactness," requires a *methodology* which determines and fixes what is intuited by means of proper and essential concepts in the absolute identity of the conceptual essences.

This leads to a universal morphology which is in search of stable typological concepts and which at the same time creates for the historical a "natural history" already moving within universalities.

3) *Eidetic idealization:* free variation and the search for essential necessities and essential laws.

To the eidetic theme of personality and personal world there also belongs the identical natural (real) world, but in a double way, just as the idea of a personal world in general is a double one: 1) as morphological idea: idea of an existing personal world, existing within a flux and hence as morphological; to it belongs an open horizon though yet not an infinitude. It is at least questionable first whether, if we or if a personality discloses its horizon and encounters it as infinite, an infinitude can then be claimed as an actual being. —2) We form the idea of a personality which sustains itself into the infinite, together with the corresponding infinitude of the identical real world sustaining itself for the personality. The infinite idea is the idea of a world which exists in itself as a substrate of truths in themselves and absolutely valid. From this idea as norm of knowledge for the living personality taken in its personal (relative) surrounding world, there results the practical goal of an infinite "exact science" striving for this idea by way of approximation.

SUPPLEMENT XIII (to Section Three, especially to § 64)

"Personal subjectivity" as a theoretical theme — over against that subject and subject life which is considered a *reality* unified with physical nature and especially with physical Corporeality, as the point of convergence of psychophysical conditionalities; that is, the subject that now senses red because certain electro-magnetic waves are striking his retina, functioning physiologically in a normal way, are changed into nervous stimulation, and are propagated up to the central nervous system, etc. On the other hand, the "living subject" is the subject of his surrounding world, including his surrounding world of spatial things, but also his world of values and of goods, his personal and social surrounding world. This subject is a person among persons, a citizen of a state, a legal subject, a member of a union, an officer, etc., and, as such, is affected by the Objects now given in his surroundings, feels their force and, in turn, acts upon them. This living subject is the *subject of actual life,* standing towards his congeners in a nexus of empathy, in accordance with which he acknowledges the other and [373]

himself as first experiencing one and the same common surrounding world, though each has his own subjective ways of givenness of this common world.

Thus man in nature as nature, nature as the correlate of the natural-scientific attitude — vs. man as the center of his surrounding world. Let us restrict ourselves to the material surrounding world and consider:

1) the subject in reference to a corporeal thing in the surrounding world, and

2) the subject as nature in a real relation to the same thing: our cathedral, say.

Concerning 1): In the attitude of actual life there is a conscious having by the Ego of Objects as an immediate having-over-against, a consciousness of the presence of the cathedral "in the flesh." If someone else is standing beside me, looking at the cathedral, then I understand this without any further ado. His seeing, which I acknowledge in him by empathy, is equally an immediate having-over-against; the Object is immediately given. With each step that I take, the "view" of the cathedral, its orientation, changes, but I see it itself immediately. The seen regulates everything I do, from it I am affected in all my interests and activities, etc. If I make the man of this life into a theme, then I have to treat him as the subject of his surrounding world, as the center of intentionality in reference to the "existing" Objects he is conscious of.

Concerning 2): In the attitude of natural science, man is corporeally a body among bodies, one of which is the cathedral in a determinate real place in space. I experience myself and the other as *unities of body and soul.* That is, I am now experiencing human beings as psychophysical; and the perceptual appearances in the soul then receive the real sense of last members of a physical-causal and psychophysically conditional process of, for example, this content: electro-magnetic waves, transmitted from the physical body we call "cathedral," are propagated in world-space and act as physical stimuli on my corporeal nerve endings and on those of the other person, etc.

Is this the real truth, and over against it is the living subject's *immediate seeing a mere illusion*? Without entering into an epistemological debate, still it is clear that such an interpretation would be *reversed* to the extent that all psychophysical knowledge, all knowledge of reality, rests on immediate experience. In other words, the nature-attitude is a special attitude *within* life; it is only that I do not take the Ego as the intentional subject of life and this naturally interested life as themes. All that remains in self-forgetfulness. Further, immediate seeing could be an illusion only if it enclosed in its own sense a claim which was refuted by psychophysical truth. That is out of the question. On the contrary: [374]

Simple perception contains in its sense as perception nothing of an apprehension of a causal relation between my soul, my sensations, my appearances, *and the thing.*

I, the seer, also have my Body as something immediately seen, and only in the course of my experience do I become aware that certain of my

(immediately perceived or perceptible) organs are organs of perception, that they really have something to do with the seeing of things, and, last of all, that psychophysical causality obtains here.

The psychophysical conception arises in a special attitude, which subsequently can become a theoretical attitude and a psychophysically scientific one. Likewise, the thematic apprehension of the *thing as nature* (in the sense of natural science—but also already prior to science, though not with thematic consistency) already arises through a special thematic attitude directed to the true being-in-itself of the seen, to what it is in itself: namely, a substrate of causal properties.

Likewise also arises, in an analogous attitude, the conception of *the soul as a reality* in the real world. To this attitude belongs then precisely everything which makes subjectivity a real component of human, psychophysical, reality: thus all of psycho-physical causality.

Is the *theoretical attitude toward nature*—toward the world as the total unity of realities—*the only possible theoretical attitude*? No, it is in fact a special kind of Ego-life and habituality of Ego-life, whereby precisely this itself remains anonymous; another possible attitude is *the one directed to "living subjectivity"* or to the human spirit—in the human sciences.

Every science proceeds from a natural ground; or, better, every science stands on one. Natural science deals with reality and real-causal nexuses; human science investigates natural personal being and life and the nexuses of personal life (Ego-life, active and passive). The "worlds" of the natural and the human sciences are correlative and are not at all incompatible. The life-world of persons escapes natural science, even though the latter investigates the totality of realities, for even the most subtle theory in natural science does not touch the life-world, and that simply because the thematic direction of thought the natural scientist follows is a theoretical path away from the actuality of life, leaving it behind right at the beginning, and only reverting back to it in the form of technology and in the form of an *application* of natural science to life.

The subject of life has things over against himself; that is, to his own life [375] there necessarily belongs an intuitive life-horizon, and to this life as a human life there belongs a horizon of things which are not mere bodies but are instead Objects of value, goods, etc.—that is, everything experienced by the person in apperception, or objects consciously posited in some other way which are his property as lying within the compass of his subjectivity and as affecting—his thinking, valuing, desiring, acting.

The basic relationship in this life-world, which predelineates the point of view of the method, is not causality but motivation. The subject can be motivated only through becoming what he "lives," what he is conscious of in his life, what is given to him subjectively as actual, certain, supposed, valuable, beautiful, good. These characters arise as motivated, just as, on the other hand, they are motivating. The subject of motivation posits himself as such in original self-experience and posits others in empathy-experience. Empathy is not a mediate experience in the sense that the other would be experienced as a psychophysical annex to his Corporeal body but is instead an immediate experience of others.

The same holds for the experience of communication with others, interchange with them. If we see one another with our own eyes, then subject is confronting subject in an immediate contact. I speak to him, he speaks to me; I command him, he obeys. These are immediately experienced personal relationships, although in this experience of others and of communication there are in play special presentifications, and I actually have an original perceptual experience only of my own subjectivity. The indirectness of expression is not the indirectness of an inference from experience. We "see" the other and not merely the Body of the other; he is there for us not merely as a Body, but, instead, his spirit is self-presentified too. He is there "in person."

The life-world is the natural world—in the attitude of natural life we are living functioning subjects together in an open circle of other functioning subjects. Everything Objective about the life-world is subjective givenness, our possession, mine, the other's, and everyone's together. Subject and possessions are not equal; the subjects *are* without qualification, what is not personal is surrounding world, what is lived is lived experience of the surrounding world, and that holds also for what is seen and thought, etc.

How then will life, subjects, and their possessions become scientific themes? They will to the extent that we take them precisely as they are and ask what belongs to them as subjects, as affected by their environment, as passive and as active, and ask, further, what they accomplish and create in their surrounding world and how their surrounding world arises, grows, and develops through their individual accomplishments and in reciprocal motivation as a common accomplishment. Science is a function of a theoretical interest, which itself belongs in the subjective sphere. The theoretical interest can be directed to subjectivity itself as the subject of its [376] surrounding world, as working and accomplishing in the surrounding world, and to the accomplishments as such. The task would be to describe this subjectivity, its life, its working, its creating, its productions as productions, and to explain them in the sense which results from the descriptions.

Individual description, morphological: finally, a universal morphology of the natural world as the common world of a people, of any society whatever. In this surrounding world, which has the validity of a world common to all, causalities also arise, but as intuitive causalities. Everything therein can have an effect, can perhaps also awaken a theoretical interest and lead to the problem of the true being of this world. This is how "Objective science" arises. That itself belongs, together with its cognitions, to the surrounding world of the person who has some part in it. But that is only a special case. The general theme still is and remains subjectivity in general and its surrounding world.

Apriori description: what in general belongs to it. The essential form of a surrounding world and of the alteration of the surrounding world correlated to the essential form of personality. Also, the essential form of the

personal substructures. To the question of essence belongs the necessary structure of the surrounding world with respect to the circumstance that factical subjectivity has a uniformly enduring world, in a universal experience which tends towards concordance, and can have a continuously valid world only in the constant establishment of concordance. That leads to the essential structure of a world that remains intuitive, is enduring, and is valid for everyone. The "transcendental-aesthetic world." The natural concept of the world as such a necessary validity and as a field of all possible sciences. And here reappears human subjectivity as the subject of a surrounding world, as a Bodily-corporeal subjectivity to be investigated in the natural sciences, as psychophysically a Body and a soul, as purely subjective and yet also as the one which is the "living" functioning subject of the life-world, and consequently also its description.

Humans and animals are perceived as Objects of the world. Thereby they become themes of Objective and, in the first place, descriptive sciences. Then what is psychic is co-perceived, co-Objective.

The physical thing is "in itself," and this in-itself is for natural science only a formal-methodical rule of unity, according to which each person standing in the unity of mutual understanding, conventionally related to certain primordially orienting facts (such as the birth of Christ), can construct the intuitive things of his surrounding world (the "appearances"). *The physical thing of the natural sciences has only a formal essence*; it has only its *formula*, and for the rest this is its essence, that, according to this formula, it is a regulated intentional unity of an infinite variety of [377] appearances "of all men."

But each *subject* has an *actual essence* and is not merely something relative (in the harmony of an infinite manifold of systems of appearances which have their ultimate absolute terms of relation in subjects) but instead is something for itself and in itself and is only subsequently, by virtue of communication, for others — others who can understand its essence intuitively, hence "adequately" (namely, in an analogy with degrees of perfection and determination to be carried out on the basis of the intuition of one's own psychic being) as there and as graspable.

SUPPLEMENT XIV (to Section Three)

The human-scientific attitude — the transposition of the natural sciences into the human-scientific attitude.

As will become clear in the following, we conceive of our investigation as a *transcendental-phenomenological* one; hence the human-scientific attitude and its givennesses are described as phenomena within transcendental subjectivity, and it is therefore that use is made of the doctrine of constitution and of elementary structural analyses. Yet what is essential would still have been disclosed, even if the investigation had been carried out in the natural attitude.

As persons we are in relation to a common surrounding world — we are in a personal association: these belong together. We could not be persons for others if there were not over and against us a common surrounding world. The one is constituted together with the other. Each Ego can become a person in a personal association only when, by means of comprehension, a relation to a surrounding world is produced.[1]

Now we want to turn our interest to the world of experience as *communal experience*, and indeed first of all:

Our theoretical interest can be directed to *a given personal association*, a closed one (naturally in relation to its surrounding world), but in such a way that this association comes into consideration only insofar as it is factually related to the surrounding world in its motivations or insofar as the motivational relation of the factual persons to their factual environment can attain intuitive understanding.

Intuitive understanding means here: I as historian, or we as historians working in community, construct out of data of actual experience legitimate presentifications of personal being in personal accomplishments and formations of accomplishment in progressive unification. We exhibit constructively in such systematically unified presentification a common experience which is always expanding, a constructive mediate experience, which, as it progresses, stands firm and does not unravel through discordance. [378]

This kind of experience is one which opens up; it is not a conceptual judgmental inference but an intuitive disclosing, the results of which are not propositions but systematically unified intuitions, whereby what is intuitive-objective there is personal being and life, as it would be, or could be, directly intuitive to the thematic personality or to others in its nexus.

This is hence the *level of history*. It wants to produce intuitive understanding for spirits in relation to their common spiritual surrounding world. (To this a morphology is joined as a universal doctrine of the intuitive structural forms of personalities and personal associations.)

Deeper expositions:

I consider subjects in relation to their surrounding world: how they let themselves be motivated. In this way I come to know them as personalities, as spiritual individuals; I come to know them in their personal activities and in their development, and the same holds for communities in their individuality and in their communal accomplishments. I investigate how they develop, how they form themselves and transform themselves, and I attain from all that, from their being and becoming, from their "history," an intuitive understanding.

With regard to the surrounding world, it is to be noted that on the one hand it is a factual surrounding world, a surrounding world of things,

[1] This paragraph is utilized in Section Three; *cf.* p. 201, ll. 25-33.

experienced in factual experiences, in an individual's experiences and then supplemented in comprehension by exchanges, reports, etc.[1]

But now we have to take into consideration what we said earlier: things, which at first are only things of the surrounding world, communal objects standing over and against us, become spiritual objects of a higher level by means of value apperceptions, practical apperceptions, etc. They are for example communally valuated as comestibles, or as combustibles, as goods for "self-preservation," and they are now precisely "goods;" that is, they enter the surrounding world as objects of a higher order, and they determine, as constituted in these apperceptions, new modes of comportment by means of which new objects can be constituted. We have then in the surrounding world first of all things as mere nature and then all concrete cultural formations as things of a higher level. [379]

a) Interest in the personality itself: now we can consider persons and associations of persons with respect to how they "comport themselves" over and against pregiven persons[2] or things of any level whatsoever in their surrounding world, how they let themselves be "motivated" by them, therein manifesting their individuality, and how they develop thereby according to the style predelineated by their individuality.

b) Interest in individuals' cultural accomplishments and in socio-culture (works of the community): we can, however, also consider them with respect to how they create thereby a surrounding world, how they produce for themselves a cultural world, and how they allow themselves to be constantly determined, by what they have produced, to produce new things, etc.

This gives rise to inquiries of various kinds: ones which study primarily the persons and associations of persons and ones which investigate primarily their correlates, although both belong together. One can, e.g., proceed purely historically and single out the history of the German people or state, whereby people and state as personal unities are the focus of the research. But one can also write a history of German culture, German literature, art, etc. Of course, as we said, both belong together. Likewise morphologies: a morphology of household utensils, of weapons, religions, symbols, etc. Everywhere in this field, research may consider objects only as they are for subjects, as ones which they experience, of which they and

[1] More precisely: first distinction: the surrounding world is on the one hand a surrounding world of things and on the other hand a surrounding world made up of persons and associations of persons. (Opposition: persons and non-persons.)

Second distinction: the objects of the surrounding world in general are either deprived of personally-based significations, or they have these significations, they are culture. Specifically: something is either mere nature or a thing of culture, i.e., something with a spiritual significance, with characters issuing from personal accomplishments.

[2] Even persons are "cultural Objects" of the surrounding world.

their companions have cognition, as ones they let themselves be motivated by.

Research can and may involve here only what allows of being intuitively understood; that is, the objects here are what they are only in personal understanding and are to be brought to givenness as such. All physics and chemistry are thus excluded.

Mere nature, but as surrounding world, considered purely intuitively:

The lowest limit of non-personal objects are mere things. They have the maximum distance from the Ego, they are as foreign to the Ego as could be, and they have the minimum which is in general required for the possibility of things and persons to be constituted in relation to each other. These are the "sensuous" objects, the "mere nature" which stands over and against the spirit as alien to it. If there is posed the scientific task of investigating systematically the spiritual world, then this task includes that of the description of "mere nature." The generally familiar surrounding world of persons has for everyone an open horizon of unfamiliarity. With regard to the intuitive nature which is alien to me, there results the possibility of an intuitive natural-historical investigation which is unhistorical insofar as it was not actually familiar.[1]

But we also know that the world has an open endless horizon: the world [380] in the present sense of our surrounding world of things. The world of things, which stands over and against me, my companions, and my human community as "Objective" surrounding world, is endless, corresponding to the sense of the apprehension of a thing-world. But the world of persons is also infinite—that is, the totality of persons who stand to me, or might stand to me, in a personal relation. The personal environment is an open one, new persons can always enter our experience, others can disappear, and finally there is even nothing preventing Martians from presenting themselves; hence according to ideal possibility we have here "infinities." In this sense one's goal can be to fathom that horizon. The interest can expand to the universe of the persons who communicate with us and to the corresponding universal surrounding world of things. At first according to its aspects as "mere nature," but then also according to spiritual factors. The explorer penetrates unknown territories and makes them known to us by his descriptions. A special group of sciences (descriptive natural sciences) elaborates at first the purely descriptive expansion of the known horizon (universal descriptive research, an investigation of the universal human surrounding world), and this description is worked out prior to the

[1] Here must be added the following: let us start from the personal attitude of common practical life. In it we will be directed onto a *limited* (although open) circle of persons, our family, our social circles, etc. and a *limited* surrounding world.

intervention of exact physicalistic natural science. Those sciences describe our human surrounding world, the world of pure things, animals' surrounding worlds, and in anthropology the anthropological surrounding world. Hence they arise out of a personalistic attitude; we can at least consider them that way. (They can also serve as preliminary stages for natural sciences, for "Objective sciences.") In the surrounding world as our over-and-against, there are human races and in every race these and those peoples, and then, however, also the cultures, sciences, and arts of these peoples, etc. The human sciences are thereby in the end self-related, and that comes from their own specific character. I can as a German or, more generally, as a European (as a person in the society of European life and culture) traverse the horizon of our unitary environing world and describe it. In that case I encounter all European and then all cultures in general, the whole world, all animality, and all humanity, and finally also our science, as a cultural formation of European culture, German culture.

The various types of intuitive causality within the personal world

We study the spiritual life and the spiritual communities with their surrounding worlds not only

1) *in concreto*, we study them not only in their individuality and individual developments, but [381]

2) we also study them morphologically, we investigate the empirical generalities with regard to all personal and non-personal directions.

In both cases it holds that we find: 1) causalities of motivation. Spirits allow themselves to be "determined" to act in ways which document their personalities. And we find: 2) causalities of things among each other as mere physical things, things of nature. The boulder falls and crushes whatever comes in its way. These are causalities which are perceived and are comprehensible and which demonstrate themselves, as is the case with everything that is experienced, by further experience, or by intersubjective agreement. Each in its own way. Material things are given as "appearing" through perspectival presentation, persons are given through their connection with appearing Bodies, but persons, as regards what is individual of them, do not "appear" in that sense.

3) We also have a spirit/thing (person/thing) causality: the personal spirit moves the Body, the hand moves in space among the things there because I move it. This is an immediately understandable state of affairs. Does something physical here enter into a motivational relation? Extreme caution is now called for. Consider: I grasp an eraser, I pick it up in order to erase something with it. The action of grasping, etc., in which the movement in space is included empirically, is motivated by the will to erase. But in this way the physical movement of the hand is not motivated nor is it motivated by the correlate of the will, which makes it an action. Things as such only move mechanically, by being pushed, etc. But things called "Body members" move by voluntary direction, in the "I do," "I work,"

"I open and close my hand," etc.[1] The personal subject performs physical "accomplishments." They have, just as do all personal acts, their motives, but here is a special kind of "because." The physical process unfolds because the Ego of the Body performs it in the way of an action.

It is an important phenomenological task to distinguish the various "becauses." We can correctly speak, at any rate, of a causality of the spirit [382] in relation to the Body, of a personal or free causality.

Conversely, the Body as an Object in the surrounding world determines the spirit: e.g., its presumed beauty determines the Ego to vanity, Bodily pain determines it to ... etc.

What kind of abstract-scientific, nomological, human-scientific (personalistic) investigations are there?

I consider:

a) spirits as subjects, just the way they are, as persons, accomplishing acts relating to their surrounding world. I consider the acts and am led back to the nexuses of lived experiences of the persons. And now phenomenology makes known to me the essence of "consciousness," the essence of all types of acts, the essence of the passive modes of lived experience which found them, and in these nexuses phenomenology again discovers quite specific relations of because and then. I am led to the relations between the "I experience" and the sensations, adumbrations, sense-things, etc., and I am led to the implicated "motivations," relations between kinesthetic series and the concomitant visual data, etc.

[1] Constitutively the Body as a corporeal thing is a unity of corporeal apperceptions and has its horizon of causal properties co-constituted in the current actual apperception or experience.

In the apperception of the Body as a system of Bodily members or "organs," each such Bodily member is constituted as subjectively moveable and also as voluntarily moveable. We have here hence several levels of motivation: the associative system of the bodily thing is motivated by the associative system of subjective kinesthetic movements, which are at the same time apperceived as movements of perceptual organs (the Bodily member as a thing refers to other Bodily members as perceptual organs, because the kinesthetic processes which are at issue here are apperceived as movements of the Body). The systems are empirically associative and the processes appear as immediately subjective (kinesthetic) or as consequentially subjective. Then the "interference" of the will is no longer associative but is founded on the empirical constitutions. Therefore the performing of a subjective movement in the world of things as voluntary movement, the "interfering," is not comprehensible as a merely intuitive physical process, but it has a super-physical stratum. (For the rest, confer what follows.)

Pure phenomenology, or human-scientific psychology,[1] investigates here the constitutive essential necessities and essential possibilities. Empirical science would have to investigate the empirically general rules of factical being. To this the whole empirical psychology of memory and association would pertain, insofar as it leaves aside only all reference to so-called physicalistic and physiological explanations, and thereby all psychological research is conducted as "purely psychological," and what is being pursued is a mere general empirics of the life of the spirit. It is clear that something of enormous significance will be gained by the separation of phenomenological essential nexuses from empirical nexuses in personal life. The acts, the specific *cogitationes,* are performed in a deeper psychic milieu and must be investigated in it empirically.

b) *Natural science within human science*

We remain in the personalistic (human-scientific) attitude. We may be [383] members of a community of researchers in natural science, who on the basis of their theoretical experience of things intend to investigate the "true being" of things according to the sense of thing-apperception. Intuitive being, presumed to be true being, is the being which is constituted in the regulated lived experiences of the experiencers, persons who are in personal association. All Objective nature is indeed reduced to regulations of pure consciousness of the persons who find themselves in the personal association — but as Objectivity of the exact natural sciences and not as Objectivity of the merely factual persons, even in an open community and with an open horizon of intersubjective temporality: that is, as true being, such as it would presumably be exhibited in possible concordant experience henceforth and, in practice, always. On the other hand, modern natural science, particularly in its classical form, constantly idealizes this; it absolutizes the open infinity as infinite (not only externally but also internally infinite) space-time and as infinite divisibility. It produces and uses for that a mathematics of absolute infinities, and it mathematizes nature and its whole structure of being. In doing so it also makes the whole world of the spirit infinite, externally and internally infinite. The truths in themselves of mathematics and the presumed truths of the exact science of nature bear the stamp of the ideality of this infinity. *Aeterna veritas*! (One could ask whether this is not included already in all eidos and in every essential consideration.)

[1] If the investigation, as a reflection on the character of the attitude and research found in the human sciences, is carried out on the natural level, then one cannot introduce any result of phenomenology. But it would then have to be shown that personal research has its levels, and that first of all appears the personal practical world with its patent nexuses of specific personal motivations, and that, however, there belongs to each person an intentionally latent life, the uncovering of which is grasped by the personal being in its concreteness. This is the way to a human-scientific phenomenological psychology, the parallel of naturalistic phenomenological psychology, distinguished from it only by the thematic attitude.

This association of persons is, in spite of its openness, a fixed one on account of its relation to researchers. But in the research of natural science, subjects are not investigated and neither is their consciousness, nor are the actual and possible constitutive lived experiences. Natural science research is directed instead to physicalistic being as documented in experience and also to what is worked out by means of intersubjective exchange of descriptions, i.e., by the methods of the natural sciences in their "Objectivity" ("absolute" Objectivity). In this research we do not posit ourselves, the researchers, and likewise we do not posit other spirits; what are posited are the things of the surrounding world, the things of our spiritual world, and we determine them "Objectively" in their exactly or absolutely true being-in-themselves. We know what this means. We know that physical things are at first "appearances" of individual subjects, that appearances, up to a certain degree, are interchangeable, that distinctions can be made between normality and abnormality, that the individual subject, even with regard to its spiritual states, shows itself to be dependent on its Corporeality, that it can and does make distinctions between normality and abnormality, that, furthermore, the science of the absolute Objectivity of things overcomes these distinctions by taking all possible dependencies into consideration (but also by absolutizing the infinities), and that it pursues [384] the idea of reality in all its aspects.[1] To presuppose "normal" relations is to leave out of consideration certain changeable circumstances and concomitant dependent properties which used to be constant. It is shown that what counts as a thing accessible to many persons, a thing endowed with secondary characteristics, might only be considered an "appearance" of a thing existing in itself and requiring thought to be elaborated, a thing which for its part is an index for the regulations of phenomena. This makes the intersubjective thing of a normal community dependent on motivating "abnormalities," that is, those of the Corporeal and physical organization of the person. *Thus is physics essentially related to physiology and psychology. In more details:*

Among the intuitively given physical things, Bodies have this distinction that psychic data are bound up with them, including those that are the conditions of the possibility of knowledge of things. Bodies can, in a personal community of biological investigators, be investigated as Objects just like any other physical Objects (Objective types, which preserve the type in the process of metabolism, which are formed in development, and which propagate themselves, etc.). Thereby we have a distinction between the Bodies which function on the side of the investigators, functioning in

[1] No account is taken of the problems of biology as physical science (natural science), which of course is not physics in the usual sense, for physical Corporeality, considered exactly, is not reducible to a "construct" out of physical elements but is a "metabolism" and a structure of development, an individual type intuitively given in empirically intuitive types of individuals; in exact reductions to the physicalistic, however, there remains indeed a lawful type.

such a way that they make possible their knowledge, and the Bodies which are their Objects. But the Bodies functioning in research can likewise also be investigated by other investigators, etc. The investigators are spiritually in a "normal" state (they have normal intelligence though perhaps defective senses), and series of lived experiences unfold factually in them, which are series of Objective cognitions and which correspond in their essence to the norms of valid empirical knowledge. In the exchange of their cognitions the investigators experience motivations by which new knowledge becomes possible, etc. The methods themselves are demonstrated as valid in intersubjectively motivated thinking and knowing and as corresponding to the essential laws of valid knowledge for interpersonally constituted series of appearances.

The elaboration of the Objective world means that the sense-qualities of appearing things are eliminated, for they are dependent on the functioning of the Body (and therefore the corresponding perceptual judgments are relative). These dependencies are investigated by sense-physiology, at first as aesthesiology, and then as psychophysics in general.[1] They form a [385] stratum of their own. An abundance of relations remains left over, through which the appearing thing is determined with so much identity that it is identifiable even in deviant sensuous appearances. The things of sensuous qualities are now merely subjective, they pertain to the subjects, and many subjects can have the same sense-things. But in that case they have them accidentally, insofar as they possess Bodies modifiable in such a way that in turn the things appearing to the senses change as such, and indeed they change for different subjects in different ways. Should the thing remain identical, just as it presents itself as identical, then there must also be a distinction made between the thing itself, which is determined not sensuously but rather non-sensuously, i.e., merely through mathematical-physicalistic predicates, and the sense-thing of subjective "appearances," related to the "accidental" subjectivities.

In the purely spiritual attitude (the phenomenological attitude) there is a distinction between precisely:

1) the actually unfolding spiritual life of each subject (with the person constituted therein for itself as pregivenness),

2) the transcendent-natural unities of experience constituted in the subject and constituted in each in its own way (Body—outer thing); and that means: each subject has its "external" experiences and always has its horizon of true being, its constant idea of true nature in itself, and indeed as posited in a rational and up to now ever verified positing, as motivated concordance for the future. Each subject *can* posit this nature *theoretically*, but can also, however, posit itself and all others (theoretically), and can even posit the intersubjective unity of spirits and "bracket" nature.

[1] Indeed not as aesthesiology alone, which knows nothing of sense qualities but only of sense fields. Therefore we have to have recourse to psychology, grounded on the phenomenological method.

Theoretical investigation of the relations which exist here: theoretical positing of nature, theoretical positing and research of spirits (according to 1) in relation to nature, etc.

In the natural attitude, nature is there pre-theoretically, and the others are there and are related to this same nature, and the community of the spirit is there, things which become clear in all purity only in phenomenology. I can pursue theoretical research of nature (natural science) as well as of the spirit in relation to or in nature (naturally directed research into the spirit), and finally I can investigate spirits in relation to their noematic, appearing, presumed (but counting as true) nature, the nature existing in spirituality as verified.

But to this are added other dependencies, those of the higher physiological stratum. Dependent on Bodies are also the reproductions and thereby also the apperceptions.[1] The reproductions stand in the associative nexus of [386] subjectivity. Thereby apperceptions are determined, and that is again significant for the things which stand over and against the subjects and perhaps stand over against several subjects as the same things. What subjects have over against themselves as world depends on their Bodies and on the peculiarities of their psyches. The investigation of these dependencies, however, can be consigned to their own sciences.

a) On the one hand we have the scientific establishment of the Objective actuality of what is experienced by persons, physically experienced or experienced by empathy. The apperceptions and experiences which persons have possess their rights and their legitimation in themselves. This is prescribed by their proper essence. We convince ourselves in the familiar way whether the experienced thing in the course of experience affirms itself as actuality and whether it is confirmed by others or not. It is actual if it affirms itself for all of us and if we may presuppose that it would be affirmed by each new subject of the association. If I would see something and would find it confirmed as consistent in my experience, while no one else who is correspondingly oriented would see it that way, then the others would say I am "sick," or I would say that of them. What we have here is a matter for a special investigation. Likewise I have familiar ways of confirming for myself whether a comprehensive experience is correct or not, of acknowledging whether it is concordantly confirmed or is annulled, and this for each kind of experience. How, e.g., to the noetic essence of the various kinds of experience noetic rules of validity and invalidity belong; how experiential thought is to be verified as valid or invalid; which essential connections exist here—all that is investigated by a phenomenologically-based noetics. What it establishes in general is particularized in the evidence, the insights, we then carry out and live through in clear

[1] There must be a clear distinction made between: 1) The aesthesiological dependencies, the ones of the Bodily localized data of sensation, the ones which, concerning sensuous qualities, come into consideration as the data which present them and motivate them. 2) The functions of presentation itself, which refer back to association and apperception.

experiential thought. The "Objective," mathematical sciences of nature have their own methods to convince themselves of the Objectivity of material being and to determine it as Objective, hence to eliminate what depends on "accidental" subjects. The pronouncements of the sciences do not claim to be predicated by each subject, to be actually judged with insight by each subject, but only, according to a possibility of principle, to be *able* to be verified and to be confirmed by every subject belonging to the same personal association of mathematical scientists. This possibility, however, does precisely not exist regarding the declarations grounded in secondary qualities and in merely subjective determinations, thus having recourse to merely subjective concepts.

b) But totalizing Objective research also requires the investigation of these excluded subjectivities. This is the domain of the Objective (natural-mundane) study of the Body and the soul, related to Objective physics. We have hence, on the one hand, the material thing of Objective mathematical physics, for which all intuitively given things are mere appearances. On the other hand, there are the manifolds correlative to these Objective unities, ones which are validly constituting and others invalidly constituting, and there are also the subjects and the subjective lived experiences, in which again the appearances are constituted (and which are indeed themselves unities) through other unities of deeper levels, up to the ultimate unities and to the very stream of lived experience, with its content of obscure backgrounds and clear foregrounds, and with its specific acts. This whole mechanism of subjects with their lived experiences and their lived correlates calls for an Objective investigation, forming a supplement to the Objective investigation of material nature. The difficulty here lies in attempting to investigate *the subjective* intersubjectively and to determine it intersubjectively. Such determination requires intersubjectively exchangeable concepts. How is that possible? Now, first of all, Objective nature itself is an index for intersubjectively exchangeable concepts, cognitions, and even phenomena. If there were no exchangeable subjectivity, then there would also not be any possible personal association, for there would be no possibility of intersubjective understanding. [387]

Furthermore: a stock of intersubjectively exchangeable phenomena of a particular kind, which are excluded as secondary qualities, is *de facto* available, as descriptive natural history teaches. There are in general far-reaching descriptive groups of propositions which are thereby intersubjectively comprehensible. In connection with what is exchangeable even the merely subjective can to a certain degree be described indirectly and determined. We determine indirectly the vision of the abnormal by means of color analogies, sound analogies, etc. We employ physicalistic means to produce a sensation, e.g., a visual sensation, because an abnormality in general does not extend so far that no optic lived experiences at all would be elicited by adequate stimuli, which hence makes possible an optical empathy within a very general framework, i.e., an intersubjective constitution of visual data. All this has to be examined in detail and its scientific significance brought out. It is obvious that the science of the Objective

being of the Body and of all subjectivities and, in the end, of the spirit itself as subject, proceeds experimentally, whenever it finds possibilities of doing so. It investigates all dependencies in a mundane nexus, in the one Objective world, and, of course, it arbitrarily varies the circumstances, whenever possible, in order to be able to observe the dependent consequences.

Spirits as individual subjects of act-motivation. Carrying out acts and being motivated to do so:

Spirits as subjects that have a soul;[1] that is, subjects that carry out *cogitationes* built on the ground of lived experience, containing in themselves apprehensions and interwoven into more encompassing nexuses, in which motivations in the other sense hold sway. In the lived experiences a natural "soul" is manifest, namely insofar as in them representational dispositions and habitual properties are intimated, ones which do not concern the Ego that takes positions (with regard to the position-taking). Here belongs the realm of association psychology. The natural soul is one with the subject of the position-taking; both form a unique empirical unity, from which only the subject-unity stands out (the unity of the position-taking Ego). This soul is *mine*, it "belongs" to my subjectivity and is one with it. We should even say: it belongs to the person as an underlying basis. [388]

The "soul" is here taken not as Objective reality but as the spiritual soul. That is: "soul" in this sense is not defined as a real unity with reference to circumstances of Objective nature; thus it is not defined psychophysically, or it does not have to be defined that way. There is an immanent lawfulness in the formation of dispositions as substrates for the position-taking subject. On the other hand, this regulation is also connected with the psychophysical regulation, to the effect that both are considered as one in psychology.

Spirit is certainly not an abstract Ego of position-taking acts, but it is I, the full person, the Ego as a human being, the I of the I take a position, the I think, I evaluate, I act, I accomplish works, etc. To me pertains then a basis of lived experiences and a basis of passive nature ("my nature") manifesting itself in the tumult of lived experiences. This passive nature is the psychic in the sense of physiological natural psychology, but it even reaches into the sphere of position-takings themselves, and even these have a natural side and enter into dispositions.

The word "basis," however, means here in addition that the position-taking subject is also dependent on this substrate, insofar as I, in order to be motivated in my position-taking, precisely must have motivating lived experiences, and these stand in an associative nexus and under rules of associative dispositions. But even the position-takings themselves are

[1] This and both the following paragraphs are employed in Section Three, p. 292, l. 21 to p. 293, l. 13; they are included again here because they are not entirely the same.

subject to such rules: there arise "tendencies," in every position-taking, towards similar position-taking under similar circumstances, etc. Nevertheless I am "free." Here we encounter the problems of freedom and of the autonomy of the subject of the position-taking as a free subject versus the psychological associative one. Hence are opposed: the free subject and the subject of drives, of permanent tendencies, of the persistent natural soul.

What sort of an Objective science is it which presents itself within the compass of an attitude directed to the person, within the "spiritual" attitude? And conversely, what sort of Objective science is human science itself? Or, what is the status of the Objectivity of physical, psychic, and [389] psychophysical nature, which, according to what we have expounded of the spiritual attitude, is subordinated without qualification (and thereby loses its absoluteness) to the Objectivity of the specific "objects" (thematic Objects) of the human sciences?

We have on the one hand physicalistic Objectivity, on the other hand the Objectivity of the souls linked to physical Bodies, with their obscure longings, with their apprehensions, their appearances as the correlates of apprehensions, among which also are those which are constitutive of Objective nature, namely the ones which appear and are experienced as the valid substrate for possible Objective knowledge of things.

We are considering here Objectivities which belong together, and which are linked with each other in relations of dependency, and which are consigned to one another. *What does "Objectivity" mean here?* In the broadest sense, it refers to (we are speaking of empirical Objectivity, not of the Objectivity of the idea) a being which in an open personal association is thought as determinable in such a way or as determined in such a way that it is in principle and at any time determinable in an absolute way by every possible Ego-subject of the association of researching subjects.

But in this respect *the being which is experienced through appearances,* or, similarly, any being which, by its real connection with what is experienced that way, assumes the character of an appearing being, even if only secondarily, essentially distinguishes itself from all being for which this is not the case. In this latter respect, obviously what is meant is *the being of the persons themselves.* They are experienced either a) in inspection or b) in the manner of comprehension, the comprehensive grasping of what is inspective, which is a particular modification of inspection.

a) In inspection: the person has "appearances" as his over-and-against; he himself, however, does not appear and is not something dependent on what appears. His relation to appearing being is this, namely, that he "has" it — by the fact that he accomplishes apprehensions in which objects appear to him, to which he directs his focus, to which he comports himself in such and such acts, takes a position, etc. In the manner of this comportment, the person manifests his individuality. The person arrives at an inspective grasping, a self-grasping, when the focus of the Ego is directed to the series of the Ego-affections and Ego-acts, in which it comports itself, as identical, in this or that way to the act-correlates in

question, including the objects it itself posits and experiences as existing objects.

b) The person can also be grasped comprehensively by other persons, however — i.e., grasped as "expression" of a subjective life in a Body. That person's Ego with its stream of lived experiences, and with the stream of acts which flow forth from it, is grasped in empathy; and within the type of the motivations which are thereby co-grasped, in their habitual type, the [390] individuality is also grasped. The other person is grasped in his Ego-life, his Ego-willing, and his Ego-working, etc. Each Ego has its Ego-life, but each is also a person, is an individuality and a distinct individuality.

In principle this Objectivity of the person and of personal objectivities is comprehensible for each person of the association and is accessible to a possible understanding. *This Objectivity* is the field of the *human sciences,* and in general research it is the Object of general human science.

Such a science is possible in the form of an eidetic discipline, an ontology of the spirit, or in the form of an empirical morphology: history or biography. It operates respectively with sheer eidetic intuitions or with empirical intuitions.

Something quite different is the case with physical being and with aesthesiological or psychological being founded on it.

Physical things appear; the experience which presents these things presents them only as they appear, not as they are in themselves. That is: in the method of natural science, experience is the support for a thought process each subject of the association can, in principle, accomplish, and if correctly accomplished it leads in each subject to the same result, to a determination of the intersubjectively identifiable being, a determination which is itself intersubjectively identifiable, over and against the merely phenomenal determinations, which in principle do not have to be acknowledged by each subject of the association.

As to the natural-psychic, to which is subordinated everything merely subjective of the appearing objectivities (of the appearances in the ontological sense, any kind of appearance) as correlate of psychic apprehensions, this is an Objectivity supplementing physicalistic reality and interwoven with it.

This is not valid from the point of view of physics but only because we, if we posit and investigate nature as true Objectivity, then also encounter Bodies as things of physical nature as well as, "in" them, the "psychic," first of all as the Objectively spatio-temporal subjective. Then we find, however, guided by the sense-content of empathy, the psychic as dependent on the Body. (Physical nature was the first; the psychic that which supplements it to make an Objective world. The supplementing depends on the founding.) And now the further articulation is to the point, namely that in the system of the experiential dependencies of the psychical on the physical there is constituted a kind of "reality." But this "reality" is not, without qualification, the entire soul, but instead the soul (the Objective surplus beyond the Corporeal body) has a stratum of reality beyond Bodily corporeality. The soul as a full reality is the whole Objective-mundane

subjectivity, which, as supplement of purely theoretically posited nature, completes the Objective world. These existing subjects, distributed in space and time, are reality insofar as, under changing Objective conditions (circumstances), they comport themselves in a regulated way and accordingly have "real" properties in relation to these rules. Comportment here [391] means the same as it does in the case of things. What exists temporally is changeable; as something real, it is, in the changes, dependent on real circumstances.

Physics requires, therefore, aesthesiological physiology and psychology: since, for example, color as secondary thing-quality depends on the organization of the eye and of the system B, color is then eliminated as non-physicalistic and is taken as mere manifestation of an Objective quality, as manifestation of the physicalistic correlate of color. Precisely thereby, however, the psychic is dependent on the Bodily, since sensation enters into perception; and that then goes further, as has been worked out: in these dependencies a "reality" manifests itself. It is the essence of reality in general to be a unity of dependencies. Already in the intuitive sphere we encounter dependencies of this kind, and they determine an apperception, the apperception of the Body and of the soul, as a founded apperception; and as real unity the animated Body is there intuitively for us, whereby the psychic is given as localized in the Body and as temporalized in the unity of natural time. If we investigate this real unity thematically, specifically aiming at a knowledge "valid for everyone," then we have to determine the Body as a physical-chemical, biological thing and determine the soul in relation to this physicalistic Corporeality (whereby we come back to our earlier presentation).

Psychic reality itself is now to be given intuitively and with respect to its "states." In psychic states, psychic reality is itself given intuitively insofar as we, e.g., experience that "wine brings jollity," etc. But this intuitive psychophysical causality is no more a givenness of "true" causality than an intuitively experienced physical causality (e.g., the breaking of a glass because of its falling) is givenness of the corresponding "Objective" causality. Therefore it is quite different in the case of the causality of motivation.

c) Spirits and persons stand in a causal relation to their Bodies and thereby to the rest of their surrounding world.[1] On the one hand we have the relations of spirit to Body, on the other hand the converse relations.

In the first respect, the Body is in question as the field of the will and furthermore as involuntary "expression" of psychic life. Psychic life is mirrored in sensory-Bodily events; parallel to the latter, which are to be studied experientially, there run psychic events, which are apprehended, in experience, also as causal ones. These are psychophysical causalities in an intuitive sphere. E.g., a man feels ashamed—he blushes because he is ashamed, but he is not ashamed because he blushes. His pulse increases—because he is excited, etc.

[1] The spirit obviously includes here the natural psychic basis, and in general the spirit has indeed its nature and along with this nature is dependent on the Body.

In the reverse direction, there are the dependencies which found what is [392] specifically psychic, namely the ones constitutive of the Body as aesthesiological unity. Further: the experiences of health and illness, whereby, in their contrast, the differences between normal and abnormal Bodily constitution appear, and so do the dependencies of spiritual anomalies on the Bodily ones. Experience here leads us to regard the dependency as a physio-psychic one, as in the case of anesthesia, analgesia, or the various disturbances of speech, etc. Thereby it is shown that not only sensations but also the corresponding reproductions (phantasms) are dependent on the Body, and through it then are mediated all other phenomena founded on it.

All such investigations belong, so far as they take place in the framework of concrete givennesses, in morphology, in the descriptive disciplines of zoology, anthropology, etc.

The matter would be quite different if we first submitted Bodies and the whole of physical nature for itself to an "Objective" exact investigation. A physiology pursuing merely descriptive anatomy, and investigating the concretely intuitive dependencies, belongs completely within morphological anthropology. It is different with a physiology that aims at ultimate Objectivity and substitutes something physicalistic-chemical for everything appearing physically in Corporeality. We are then led to "physics." (No account is taken here of the physical-organic science usually called "biology.")

The Objective world or the universe of nature, along with Objective space and Objective time, in which all Bodies and human beings are included precisely as natural, is therefore the correlate of the natural sciences, and specifically as sciences of transcendent nature; it is hence the correlate of the science of physics in a very broad sense, and furthermore, of the sciences of aesthesiology and psychology.

On the other side, however, stand the quite different sciences of subjectivity: the sciences of the person, of personal associations, of the correlates of persons. The most basic level is the purely "aesthetic" theory of nature, which is not a science of Objective nature in the sense of physics but is a science of phenomenal nature as the common surrounding world of normal people. On higher levels obviously belong here all so-called cultural sciences.

Thus we have a sharp distinction between the natural sciences and the human sciences: natural science investigates reality (substantiality and causality) in the appearing world. Human science investigates personal individuality and personal causality, the causality of freedom and motivation. Thereby, however, the natural sciences, as sciences, are enclosed within the human sphere, the sphere of the spirit. It is not nature itself that is encompassed by the Objectivities of the human sciences, but rather that holds for the science of nature, the science of psychology, etc.; and nature

as correlate, as what is known at each respective level, as "world-image" of science of this or that age, also belongs obviously in human science, in history.

Here we have discovered a remarkable parallelism. Everything human-scientific allows of being transformed into the natural-scientific insofar as intuitive nature is apprehensible as the appearance of an Objective nature and to the extent that each spiritual factum, each person in his acts and states, is apprehensible as "manifestation" of a soul, related to a Body (which expresses it, in another attitude) as a physicalistic thing.

Obviously one must not, as Dilthey did, confuse the opposition of description and explanation with the opposition between the human sciences and the natural sciences. That is, if we oppose description and explanation (and accordingly descriptive and explanatory sciences), then we are taking description as a lower level of explanation. If this opposition makes sense, then we are in the case of both description and explanation directed to the same thing: to something "Objective." Actually, we find in *each* sphere, in the sphere of nature but also in the human sphere, this distinction between description and explanation as normative. *De facto*, however, if we consider the matter more closely, the so-called descriptive sciences are not substrata of the corresponding "explanatory" sciences, and it is of the utmost necessity, at first with respect to the natural sciences, to bring to clarity these obscure relations.

[393]

EPILOGUE

EPILOGUE[1]

Preliminary Remarks [138]

The following pages present, on the whole, the text of the explanatory comments I have added as a prologue to the forthcoming English edition of my *Ideas*.[2] They may also be of use to the German reader of the book (published so far only as a fragment of a greater whole), for in them I speak my mind on the general misunderstandings which have obscured the true sense of my transcendental phenomenology. Under the spell of the thinking habitual in the philosophical tradition, people overlook what is radically new in this phenomenology as to method and field of research. Neither do they understand its claim, by no means extravagant, to have first opened the way, and even to have taken the first steps along the way, on which, in sober research to be conducted in the most radically scientific spirit, all conceivable problems of philosophy must gradually achieve their genuinely original formulation and solution.

To be sure, no account is taken here of the situation of German philosophy (very different from the British situation), with the "Philosophy of Life" striving to be predominant in it, with its new anthropology, its philosophy of "Existence." Thus no account is taken of the charges of "intellectualism" or

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[1] [See the Translators' Introduction above, p. XIV. The pagination followed here is that of the *Husserliana* edition: Edmund Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Drittes Buch: Die Phänomenologie und die Fundamente der Wissenschaften*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952 (*Husserliana* V), "Nachwort," pp. 138-162.—Trans.]

[2] [Husserl is referring to the translation of Book I by W.R. Boyce Gibson; *Ideas: General introduction to pure phenomenology*. New York: Macmillan, 1931.—Trans.]

"rationalism" which have been brought from these sides against my phenomenology and which are very closely connected with my specific concept of philosophy. In this concept, I [139] reinstate the most original idea of philosophy, which, since the time of its first solid formulation by Plato, has laid at the basis of our European philosophy and science and which signifies for them a task which will ever be theirs. For me, philosophy, as an idea, means universal, and in a radical sense, "rigorous" science. As such, it is science built on an ultimate foundation, or, what comes down to the same thing, a science based on ultimate self-responsibility, in which, hence, nothing held to be obvious, either predicatively or pre-predicatively, can pass, unquestioned, as a basis for knowledge. It is, I emphasize, an *idea,* which, as the further meditative interpretation will show, is to be realized only by way of relative and temporary validities and in an infinite historical process—but in this way it is, in fact, realizable. In our positive sciences, in conformity with their historical origin, this idea lives on, no matter how little they themselves actually do justice to it on account of the way they are founded. As a result of this shortcoming, difficulties, as is well known, arose for these sciences in their most recent development, and at the same time a skepticism is spreading which generally threatens to discredit the great project of a rigorous science and, taken more universally, the project of a philosophy as rigorous science. But instead of prematurely yielding to this skepticism, it appears to me to be more proper, and to be the great task of our time, to carry out a radical meditation, in order to intentionally explicate the genuine sense of this idea of philosophy and to demonstrate the possibility of its realization. But this will come to pass in a decisive and productive way only by means of the systematic elaboration of the method of questioning back into the ultimate conceivable presuppositions of knowledge. This questioning back leads at first to universal subjective being and life, which, as pre-scientific, are already presupposed in all theorizing, and from there it leads on—and this is the *most decisive step*—to so-called "transcendental subjectivity" (an old term given a new sense) as the primordial locus of all meaning-giving and validation of being. "Philosophy as rigorous science," and

specifically as universal and absolutely foundational science, may not be given up, unless first is made anew, and with the most radical seriousness, an attempt to actually found it, or again, unless the science of phenomenology, the science of a new beginning, which arose out of such an intention, is thought [140] through with equal seriousness. I cannot engage here in a closer confrontation with the counter-trends of the present, which, in the most extreme contrast to my phenomenological philosophy, want to draw a line between philosophy and rigorous science. I would only like to say expressly that I cannot acknowledge any kind of justification to the objections that have been advanced from those quarters: e.g., my intellectualism, the miring of my methodic procedure in abstract one-sidedness, my failure, in general and in principle, to touch upon original-concrete, practical-active subjectivity, and my skirting of the so-called problems of "Existence" as well as the metaphysical problems. These objections are all based on misunderstandings and, ultimately, on the fact that my phenomenology is interpreted back to a level, the overcoming of which is precisely its whole sense. In other words, they are based on the fact that what is in principle the novelty of the "phenomenological reduction" has not been understood, and consequently neither has the ascent from mundane subjectivity (from man) to "transcendental subjectivity." So it is my critics who have remained mired—in an anthropology, whether empirical or apriori, which, according to my theory, does not at all secure the specifically philosophical ground. And to take this anthropology for philosophy is equivalent to a relapse into a "transcendental anthropologism" or "psychologism." To exhibit this in detail would require an extended treatise of its own.

For the rest, I hold fast to my old conviction that in matters of science what counts is work done rather than criticism, work which in the end remains intact, no matter how much it is misunderstood and how often arguments against it miss the point. What the *Ideas* reports of—as I am still firmly convinced—is indeed work done, in its beginning parts, and to carry on this work steadily has been my endeavor ever since. A book I am now preparing [*Cartesian Meditations*], which is presumably to appear early next year, will, I hope, prove to all

who in this restless age have time for theories, built up objectively in such a laborious and sober way, that transcendental phenomenology in the sense I conceive it does in fact encompass the universal horizon of the problems of philosophy and holds in readiness the method they require. It will be shown, therefore, that my phenomenology actually has within its field of view all questions that can be put to man in the concrete, including as well all so-called metaphysical questions, insofar as they have possible sense in the first place, for it is their original formulation and critical delimitation which is precisely the vocation of this phenomenology. [141]

1.

My *Ideas toward a pure phenomenology and a phenomenological philosophy,* of which only a first volume has appeared, attempts to found, under the heading of *pure,* or *transcendental, phenomenology,* a new science, although one prepared by the entire course of philosophical development since Descartes, a science related to a new *field of experience,* exclusively its own, the field of "transcendental subjectivity." This term does not refer here, therefore, to a product of speculative fabrications; transcendental subjectivity, together with its transcendental lived experiences, faculties, and accomplishments, is an absolutely autonomous domain of direct experience, even if up to now, for essential reasons, it has remained inaccessible. Transcendental experience, within a theoretical and, at first, descriptive scope, becomes possible only by way of a radical transformation of that attitude in which natural, mundane experience runs its course. This transformation of attitude, as method of access to the transcendental-phenomenological sphere, is called "phenomenological reduction."

Transcendental phenomenology is not meant to be founded in that book as an empirical science of the empirical facts related to this field of experience. The facts which at any time present themselves there serve as examples only—for what is most universal—similar to the way empirical examples serve the mathematician. For instance, intuitive factual groups of

beads on an abacus serve merely as examples for an insightful grasping, in pure universality, of, e.g., 2, 3, 4... in general, pure numbers in general, and, related to them, pure mathematical propositions, universal mathematical essences. Thus Book I of the *Ideas* deals with an "apriori" science (an eidetic science directed to the universal that is original-intuitive) which lays claim to the factual field of experience of transcendental subjectivity and its factual lived experiences, but which takes them into account merely as pure possibilities, placing them beside pure intuitive possibilities that have been varied completely *ad libitum,* and then extrapolating, as their "apriori," the indissoluble essential structure of transcendental subjectivity pervading all the free variations. Since the reduction to the transcendental, and at the same time this further reduction to the eidos, is the method of access to the field of work of the new science, it follows (and this is to be emphasized sharply from the start) that the genuine beginning of the systematic disclosure of this science lies in the chapters dealing with these reductions. Only by starting at that point and by following the demonstrations as they proceed step by step, can the reader, participating inwardly, judge whether or not something peculiarly new is actually worked out there—worked out and not just fabricated, drawn from actually universal intuition of the essence and described faithfully. [142]

In that book, eidetic phenomenology is limited to the realm of sheer eidetic "description," i.e., to the realm of the immediately intuitable essential structures of transcendental subjectivity. For this already comprises in itself a systematically self-enclosed infinity of essential properties. And therefore the work does not pretend to be a systematically exhaustive elaboration of the transcendental cognitions that could perhaps be gained by means of logical deduction. Indeed, even the descriptive domain is limited to its more easily accessible level; thus the whole problem of the temporalization of the sphere of immanent time remains excluded. (On that, see my lectures on inner time consciousness delivered in 1905 and published in my *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung,* Vol. IX.) For the second volume of the *Ideas* were reserved the problems of the Ego, the problems of the person as person, and

the transcendental problem of "empathy." Eidetic description is one (but not the only) distinctive feature of the total style of this new apriori science over and against the mathematical sciences. [143] The latter are "deductive" sciences, which means that in their scientific-theoretical style mediate, deductive cognition prevails to an incomparable extent over the immediate axiomatic knowledge that lays the foundation for all the deductions. In the mathematical sciences an infinity of deductions rests on a few axioms. In the transcendental sphere, however, we find an infinity of cognitions that precede all deduction, and what is mediate there (a mediation by way of intentional implication) has nothing to do with deduction and, being thoroughly intuitive, resists any sort of methodic or constructive symbolization.

2.

We must still issue a warning against a misunderstanding that has been so prevalent. If at the very outset of the *Ideas,* by way of anticipation, it is given as the author's opinion (to be grounded in the further parts of the work as announced) that all radically scientific philosophy rests on the foundation of phenomenology and is, in an extended sense, "phenomenological philosophy" through and through, this is not to be taken as meaning that philosophy is in his view solely and entirely an apriori science. The setting of the tasks of Volume I, tasks of a science of the eidetic essence of transcendental subjectivity, does not at all imply (quite the contrary) that a factual science of transcendental subjectivity has already been accomplished. A glance at the sciences of mathematics, those great logical instruments for the factual sciences corresponding to them, would already have forced us to expect just the opposite. For factual science in the strictest sense, truly rational science of nature, only became possible in the first place on the basis of the independent construction of a pure mathematics of nature. It is the same everywhere; the science of the pure possibilities must precede the science of the actual facts and must provide the latter with direction, its concrete logic. The case of transcendental philosophy is no different, even if the achievement of the system of the transcendental apriori has a much higher dignity.

3. [144]

Great difficulties, grounded in the nature of the matters themselves, in general impede the understanding, or even the secure mastery, of the distinction between transcendental phenomenology and "descriptive," or, as is often said nowadays, "phenomenological," psychology. This has led to misunderstandings, and even researchers who consider themselves as subscribing to a phenomenological orientation have been subject to them. Thus some explanations and clarifications should prove useful here. The change of attitude which in the book in question is called the phenomenological reduction (we can now name it more clearly: the transcendental-phenomenological reduction) is carried out by me, the one philosophizing at the moment, from out of the natural attitude, the one in which I experience myself at first as an Ego in the usual sense, as this human person living among others in the world. As psychologist, I in general make my theme this being and life in the mode of an "Ego," and I thematize the person solely with regard to his "psychic" aspect. In the pure turn to the interior, exclusively following so-called "inner experience" (more precisely, self-experience as well as "empathy") and deferring all psychophysical questions which include a relation to human corporeality, I acquire an original and purely descriptive knowledge of psychic life as it is in itself; and the most original is of me myself, for here alone is it purely perceptual. If, as often happens, descriptions which keep purely and faithfully to the data of intuition are called phenomenological, then a "phenomenological psychology" can be said to arise purely on the basis of inner intuition as intuition of what is essentially proper to the psyche. In fact, if the right method is followed here (of which we shall still have to speak later), what results is not simply unselfsufficient typologizing and classificatory descriptions but indeed a vast autonomous science. Yet this will properly come

to pass only if—as is possible even here—the goal is not a factual science of the facts of this sphere of inner intuition but is a science of the essence, i.e., one which investigates the invariant, properly essential structures of a soul or of a community of psychic life: in short, a science that investigates their apriori.

Now if that transcendental-phenomenological reduction is [145] actually carried out, the reduction by means of which the natural attitude, the attitude of inner psychology, is transformed and becomes a transcendental attitude, then psychological subjectivity loses precisely that which gives it the status of something real in the pregiven world of naïve experience. It loses the ontological sense of being the soul of a Body existing in pregiven spatio-temporal nature. For nature, including Body and soul, and the world in general as the totality of what I accept naïvely and straightforwardly as existing, lose, through the phenomenological epoché, this ontological status.

It is here of decisive importance that one have already made it perfectly clear to oneself just what this epoché means, what the significance is of this suspension of belief in the existence of the world of experience, and what kind of theoretical outlook on "pure subjectivity" is thereby first made possible. On the one hand, certain judgments are now excluded, all those that, resting on natural experience, are about this world constantly and altogether unquestionably pregiven as existing. Consequently all positive sciences are also excluded, for they in fact have the source of their verification in natural-mundane experience. It is obvious that psychology is one of their number. On the other hand, by means of this epoché the regard is freed for the universal phenomenon, "the world of consciousness purely as such," the world purely *as* given in the manifold flux of conscious life: that is, *as* appearing *"originaliter"* in a manifold of "concordant" experiences. In these concordances it is characterized, for consciousness, as "actually existing." In its details, however, but only in details, it can happen that this character of "actual being" is overturned and becomes "hollow semblance." This universal *phenomenon,* "world existing for me" (and then also "existing for us") is made the phenomenologist's new field of theoretical interest, the field of a new sort of

theoretical experience and experiential research. He lets himself be governed by the "pure phenomena" as they present themselves in the consistently practiced phenomenological attitude, and he sees opening up an infinite, self-enclosed, absolutely autonomous realm of beings: the domain of pure, or transcendental, subjectivity. In this domain, the corresponding pure or transcendental phenomena replace all the mundane events that [146] were accessible previously in the natural attitude, that is, precisely those occurrences in which what is mundane "is" for him purely and simply or, in other words, has the status of being and perhaps has been verified.

Once this reduction is grasped clearly then one also sees the utter radicality of its effect upon the psychological subject of inner experience and upon this experience itself and thus upon my own Ego, the Ego of the currently practicing phenomenologist. Within my field of transcendental phenomena, I no longer have theoretical validity as a human Ego; I am no longer a real Object within the world which I accept as existing, but instead I am posited exclusively as subject *for* this world. And this world is itself posited precisely *as* I am conscious of it in some fashion or other, *as* appearing to me in a certain way or as believed, predicatively judged, valued, etc. Thus it is posited in such a manner that the certainty of its being belongs itself to the "phenomenon," in no different a way than other modes of what I have in consciousness and its "contents."

Though the phenomenologist, in all his transcendental descriptions, does not pass the slightest judgment about the world and about his human Ego as a mundane being, nevertheless he does constantly make a judgment about his Ego, indeed a judgment affirming its existence; but now this is the transcendental Ego, i.e., the Ego as a being absolutely in itself and for itself, *"prior"* to all mundane being, which only in this Ego first acquires ontological validity. It is evident at once that, despite the transformation of sense affecting the total phenomenological-psychological content of the soul, it is precisely this content that becomes transcendental-phenomenological, just as, conversely, with the return of the natural-psychological attitude, it becomes psychological once again. This correspondence must remain in effect even if, already prior to all interest in the

formation of a psychological science and, in particular, of a "descriptive" or "phenomenological" psychology, a transcendental phenomenology is established from philosophical motives, thus if the transcendental Ego comes into view immediately through the phenomenological reduction and is made the theme of a transcendental description. In this way, there is a remarkable thoroughgoing parallelism between a correctly executed phenomenological psychology and a transcendental phenomenology. To every eidetic, as well as to every empirical, [147] constatation on the one side, a parallel must correspond on the other side. And yet this whole theoretical content, if taken, in the natural attitude, as psychology, as a positive science relating to the pregiven world, is utterly non-philosophical; whereas the "same" content in the transcendental attitude, and consequently understood as transcendental phenomenology, is a philosophical science. Indeed, it even achieves the rank of the philosophically fundamental science, as a science that cultivates, in description, the transcendental ground, which henceforth remains the exclusive ground of all philosophical knowledge.

In fact here reside the greatest stumbling blocks on the path to understanding, for one will no doubt feel it is asking much too much that a mere "nuance," arising out of a simple change in attitude, should have such a great significance and indeed be decisive for all genuine philosophy. The totally unique significance of this "nuance" can become evident only by means of a radical self-understanding on the part of the philosopher with regard to what he properly wants to attain under the title of philosophy and with regard to the extent to which he must want something different in principle from "positive" science, thus something else than domination, in theory, of the pregiven world of experience. In this self-understanding, provided it is actually carried through radically and consistently, there arises a compelling motivation which forces the philosophizing Ego to reflect back on that subjectivity of his own which is ultimately the Ego that does the experiencing in all his natural mundane experience, both the actual and the possible, and further is the Ego that is active in all the person's activity, including the Ego that is the agent of scientific cognition. This is the Ego, therefore, that is already presupposed by every natural self-

cognition in the form, "I, this man in the world, who experience, think, act, etc." In other words, out of this the shift to the phenomenological attitude arises as an absolute requirement in order for philosophy to be able to set its distinctive project on the soil of that experience which is in itself the first and consequently in order for philosophy to begin at all. Thus it is only in the transcendental-phenomenological attitude that philosophy can get underway and can develop as a science in all its further philosophical activity. Precisely for that reason, descriptive apriori phenomenology (visible in my *Ideas* in its actual [148] working) as directly cultivating the transcendental soil, is in itself "first philosophy," the philosophy of the beginning. Only if this motivation, which calls for a very precise and deeply penetrating interpretation, has become a living and compelling insight will it be clear that what at first seems so odd, i.e., attending to the nuance, the nuance that conducts one from a pure inner psychology to transcendental phenomenology, actually is what decides between the being or non-being of a philosophy—of a philosophy which in a radically scientific spirit knows what is required by its distinctive sense, to be grounded in ultimate self-responsibility, knows the required foundation and the required method. It is only on the basis of such self-understanding that we can understand the deepest and genuinely radical sense of psychologism—i.e., its sense as *transcendental* psychologism, as the aberration that has corrupted the pure sense of philosophy by seeking to ground philosophy on anthropology or psychology, i.e., on the positive science of man or, respectively, on that of human psychic life. This aberration is not mitigated even if, following our procedure, a pure inner psychology is worked out as an apriori science. Even then, it remains positive science and can be a foundation only for "positive," "dogmatic" science—but for philosophy, never.

4.

In the reflections to which I have devoted myself these many years, I have pursued various ways, all equally possible, aimed

at exploring, in an absolutely transparent and compelling fashion, such a motivation as presses beyond the natural positivity of life and science and forces upon us, by displaying the necessity of the phenomenological reduction, a conversion to the transcendental attitude. These ways are therefore ones that lead to the beginning of a serious philosophy. They need to be thought through in reflective consciousness, and thereby they themselves belong properly to the beginning, inasmuch as a beginning can in fact arise only in the beginner's self-reflection. It goes without saying that the necessary point of departure for each of these ways is the natural-naïve attitude, for which the world of experience is the "self-evident" pregiven ground of being (that is, its being is never questioned). In *Ideas I* (Part 2, [149]
Chapter 2), I chose the way which at that time seemed to me the most impressive. It proceeds egologically at first, as a self-reflection entirely within the realm of purely inner-psychological intuition, or, as we can also say, as a "phenomenological" reflection in the usual psychological sense. Eventually it leads so far that I, the one reflecting on himself, come to realize that, in the consistently exclusive direction of experience toward what is experienceable purely as inner, toward what is "accessible" to me phenomenologically, I have a proper essence that is self-enclosed and self-coherent. To this essence pertains all actual and possible experience by means of which the Objective world is there for me with all the experiential verifications in which it has for me ontological validity, one that is verified even if never scientifically examined. This essence also includes the special apperceptions through which I have for myself the status of a human being with Body and soul, a human being who lives amid others in the world of which he is conscious as surrounding world, who is engaged with them in this world, who is attracted or repulsed by it, and who deals with it in work or in theory, etc. Reflecting further on myself, I realize as well that my phenomenologically self-enclosed proper essence can be posited absolutely, as the Ego (and I am this Ego) that bestows ontological validity on the being of the world of which I speak at any time. It is for me and is what it is for me only insofar as it acquires sense and self-confirming validity from my own pure life and from that of the others who are disclosed to me in my

own life. I, as this absolutely posited proper essence, as the open and infinite field of pure phenomenological givens and as their inseparable unity, am the "transcendental Ego." Absolute positing means that I no longer have the world as "given" to me in advance or with the status of straightforward existence. Instead, from now on what is exclusively given (as a result of my new attitude) is my Ego, purely as the Ego that exists in itself and that in itself experiences the world, verifies it, etc.

5.

If these considerations are pursued with undaunted self-consistency (something that will not suit everybody), transcendental-phenomenological idealism arises, standing in the sharpest possible opposition to all psychologistic idealism. The [150]
presentation of it in the chapter indicated above suffers, I concede, from imperfections. Although it is unassailable in all actual essentials, it lacks, regarding the foundation of this idealism, an explicit taking of a position on the problem of transcendental solipsism, the problem of transcendental intersubjectivity: that is, on the essential relatedness of the world that is valid for me as the Objective world to the other subjects who have validity for me. These supplements were supposed to be supplied by the second volume, meant from the start to accompany the first and which I hoped at that time would appear very shortly after it.[1] The scandal caused by this idealism and its alleged solipsism considerably impeded the reception of the book, as if this outline of philosophy were supposed to contain in some way all that is essential to it. In fact, the book dealt only with one way in which the motivation arises to acquire, from out of the problem of the possibility of Objective cognition, the necessary insight that the very sense of

[1] My lectures at Göttingen in 1910-11 already presented a first sketch of my transcendental theory of empathy, i.e., the reduction of human existence as mundane being-with-one-another to *transcendental* intersubjectivity. See the extensive descriptions in the fifth part of my forthcoming *Cartesian Meditations*. A short précis of the path followed is given in my *Formal and transcendental logic*, § 96.

this problem leads back to the Ego existing purely in itself and for itself, that this Ego as presupposition of all knowledge of the world cannot itself be nor remain presupposed as a worldly being, and that it consequently must be brought to transcendental purity through phenomenological reduction, through ἐποχή with respect to the world's being-for-me. Perhaps I would have done better, without changing the essential coherence of the presentation, to have left open the final decision in favor of transcendental idealism and only tried to make evident the fact that trains of thought of decisive philosophical significance (i.e., ones pressing on toward an "idealism") necessarily arise here and must be thought through unconditionally and that to do so it is by all means necessary to secure for oneself the terrain of transcendental subjectivity. I may not here neglect, however, to declare expressly that I retract nothing whatsoever as regards [151] transcendental-phenomenological idealism and that I still consider, as I did before, every form of the usual philosophical realism nonsensical in principle, no less so than that idealism which it sets itself up against in its argumentations and which it "refutes." The objection of solipsism would never have been raised, given a deeper understanding of my presentation, as an objection against phenomenological idealism itself; the objection would only be against my incomplete presentation of it. For all that, however, it is inexcusable for anyone to overlook the fundamental essentials of the philosophizing whose gateway has been opened in that book: versus the thinking that is rich in presuppositions, having as premises the world and science and various methodic habits of thought descended from the entire scientific tradition, there a radical cognitive autonomy is enacted. For there the validity of everything pregiven as "obvious," and taken for granted, is suspended, and a return takes place to that which is already presupposed implicitly in all presupposing, all questioning, and all answering, and which thereby is necessarily, constantly, and immediately what is, in advance, first in itself. This latter becomes posited freely and expressly as what is first, and indeed with an evidence that precedes all conceivable evidences and that bears them implicitly. Although it is only with the phenomenological reduction, which would consciously convert this radicalism into actual

work, that authentic philosophizing can begin—i.e., precisely a philosophizing which accomplishes work—yet the whole preparatory reflection has already been carried out in exactly that spirit. It is in fact—though still unconsciously—a phenomenological reflection. Accordingly, then, it is a piece of pure self-reflection, exhibiting the most original evident facts; moreover, if it brings into view in them the outlines of idealism (although in an indistinct way), it is still anything but a party to the usual debates between idealism and realism, and so none of the objections found in their wrangling can affect it. Whatever connections have been exhibited there as phenomenologically essential, including the motivations in the direction of "idealism," remain intact notwithstanding all the refinements and supplementations that may prove necessary, just as the reality of mountain ranges and of rivers, described by the first explorer to actually see them, remains intact despite the corrections and [152] supplements later explorers will add to his descriptions. The first preliminary beginning of a new conception of the transcendental problem (serving merely as a motivation toward that goal) must be taken up therefore according to its phenomenological content, one always of fundamental importance, and according to what is predelineated therein with concrete necessity even for the true sense of an Objective being that is knowable only subjectively.

Moreover, transcendental phenomenology is no theory merely there to provide answers to the historical problem of idealism; it is a science that contains its own foundation and is absolutely self-sufficient; indeed, it is the only absolutely self-sufficient science. But it is such only in that, when carried out consistently (as is clear already in the concluding part of the book, so important for a proper understanding), it leads to "constitutive problems" and theories which encompass all conceivable objects that can ever be encountered by us—thus the entire pregiven real world with all its categories of objects, and likewise all "ideal" worlds—and which render them comprehensible as transcendental correlates. This implies, however, that transcendental-phenomenological idealism is not simply a particular philosophical thesis, one theory among others, but that transcendental phenomenology, as a concrete

science, is in itself *universal idealism* carried out as science, even if in it not one word is spoken about idealism. It demonstrates this idealism by means of its own sense as transcendental science in each of its separate constitutive domains.

Now, however, we must not fail to clarify expressly the fundamental and essential distinction between transcendental-phenomenological idealism versus that idealism against which realism battles as against its forsworn opponent. Above all: phenomenological idealism does not deny the actual existence of the real world (in the first place, that means nature), as if it maintained that the world were mere semblance, to which natural thinking and the positive sciences would be subject, though unwittingly. Its sole task and accomplishment is to clarify the sense of this world, precisely the sense in which everyone accepts it—and rightly so—as actually existing. That the world exists, that it is given as existing universe in uninterrupted experience which is constantly fusing into universal concordance, is entirely beyond doubt. But it is quite another matter to understand this indubitability which sustains life and positive science and to clarify the ground of its legitimacy. In this regard, it is a fundamental of philosophy, according to the expositions in the text of the *Ideas,* that the continual progression of experience in this form of universal concordance is a mere presumption, even if a legitimately valid one, and that consequently the non-existence of the world ever remains thinkable, notwithstanding the fact that it was previously, and now still is, actually given in concordant experience. The result of the phenomenological sense-clarification of the mode of being of the real world, and of any conceivable real world at all, is that only the being of transcendental subjectivity has the sense of absolute being, that only it is "irrelative" (i.e., relative only to itself), whereas the real world indeed is but has an essential relativity to transcendental subjectivity, due, namely, to the fact that it can have its sense as being only as an intentional sense-formation of transcendental subjectivity. Natural life, and its natural world, finds, precisely herein, its limits (but is not for that reason subject to some kind of illusion) in that, living on in its "naturality," it has no motive to pass over into the transcendental attitude, to execute, therefore, by means of the [153]

phenomenological reduction, transcendental self-reflection. But all this acquires its full sense only if the phenomenological disclosure of the transcendental Ego has been carried out so far that the experience of co-subjects, which is included in it, has obtained its reduction to transcendental experience, thus if it has been shown that "transcendental subjectivity," as what is given in transcendental experience for the one engaged at the moment in self-reflection, means not only "I as transcendental Ego-self," taken concretely in the life of my own transcendental consciousness, but, in addition, also refers to the co-subjects that present themselves as transcendental in my transcendental life, in the transcendental we-community which is co-presented. Transcendental intersubjectivity is thus the one in which the real world is constituted as Objective, as being for "everybody." This is where the real world gets its sense, whether or not we have explicit knowledge of the fact. And how could we have this knowledge prior to the phenomenological reduction, which is what first brings transcendental subjectivity, as universal absolute being, within the compass of experience? As long as one knows only of psychological subjectivity, posits it as absolute, and yet would explain the world as the mere correlate of this subjectivity, then idealism will be countersensical, will be psychological idealism—the one opposed by an equally countersensical realism. Now, of course, for him who has already secured access to genuine transcendental subjectivity, it is easy to see that the first great idealists of the 18th century, Berkeley and Hume on the one side, Leibniz on the other, had actually already surpassed the psychological sphere in the natural-real sense. But because the contrast between psychological and transcendental subjectivity remained unclarified, and the predominating British sensualism or naturalism could not make the constitution of the real understandable as an intentional accomplishment producing sense and true being for transcendental subjectivity, there thus remained unabated, in the times that followed, the sterile and unphilosophical (occurring on the terrain of nature) battle between realism and idealism. And there remained dominant the insufficient interpretation of the sense which the great idealists actually intended, though, to be sure, as we said, without their being able to mark out clearly, [154]

for themselves and for others, the radical distinction between this sense as a transcendental one and, in opposition to it, the psychological.

The new works I have started to bring out in the past year (my first publications since the *Ideas*) will adduce far-reaching extensions, clarifications, and supplements to what was begun in the *Ideas* and, incidently, prior to that already in the *Logical Investigations,* so that the claim to have actually set into work the necessary beginning of a philosophy "which is to come forth as a science" will not be regarded as mere self-delusion. In any event, he who for decades did not speculate about a new Atlantis but instead actually journeyed in the trackless wilderness of a new continent and undertook the virgin cultivation of some of its areas will not allow himself to be deterred in any way by the rejection of geographers who judge his reports according to their habitual ways of experiencing and thinking [155] and thereby excuse themselves from the pain of undertaking travels in the new land.

6.

There is still one more point that we must address here. In those circles where the phenomenological reduction is dispensed with as a philosophically irrelevant oddity—whereby, of course, the whole sense of my work and of my phenomenology is obliterated, and what is left is only an apriori psychology—it often happens that precisely this psychology that remains over is identified, as to its sense, with Franz Brentano's psychology of intentionality. However great is the veneration and gratitude with which I remember my teacher and his genius, and as much as I consider his transformation of the scholastic concept of intentionality into a descriptive foundational concept of psychology to be a great discovery, without which phenomenology would never have been possible, nevertheless an essential distinction has to be drawn between pure psychology in my sense, a psychology contained implicitly in transcendental phenomenology, and Brentano's psychology. This applies no less to his "psychognosis," which is restricted to pure description within

the realm of inner experience. That is indeed a "phenomenological" psychology, if, as often occurs today, any psychological investigation remaining purely within the confines of "inner experience" is called "phenomenological" and if the term "phenomenological psychology" simply refers to the totality of such investigations. Disregarding its name, this psychology then obviously leads back to John Locke and his school, up to John Stuart Mill. In which case it can be said that David Hume's *Treatise* contains the first systematic sketch of a pure, though not eidetic, phenomenology, and, in particular, Volume I of it is the first sketch of a comprehensive phenomenology of cognition. To be sure, Hume's designation of his work as psychology concealed the fact, which went unnoticed, that Hume was by no means a psychologist in the usual sense and that his treatise is instead an actual "transcendental" phenomenology, though a sensualistically perverted one. Like his great predecessor, Berkeley, it is only as a psychologist that he has been regarded and been influential. Thus, excluding all transcendental questions, it is only this "phenomenological" school as a whole that concerns us here. Characteristic of this school and its psychology is the conception heralded in Locke's metaphor of the pure psyche as a "white paper," i.e., a complex or cluster of data, temporally simultaneous or temporally successive, which take the course they do partially on account of their own rules and partially as governed by psycho-physical rules. The task of *descriptive* psychology would thus be to distinguish and classify the basic kinds of these "sense data," data of "inner experience," as well as the elementary fundamental forms of their combination. And it would then be up to *explanatory* psychology to seek the causal laws regulating the formation and transformation of the data, and in this it would be like natural science and indeed would use a similar method. For those who live in the habits of thought prevailing in the science of nature it seems to be quite obvious that purely psychic being, or psychic life, is to be considered a course of events similar to natural ones, occurring in the quasi-space of consciousness. Evidently and in principle, it makes no difference in this regard whether one lets the psychic data be blown into aggregates "atomistically," like shifting heaps of sand, even though in conformity [156]

with empirical laws, or whether they are considered parts of wholes which, by necessity, either empirical or apriori, can behave individually only as such parts within a whole—at the highest level perhaps in the whole that is consciousness in its totality, which is bound to a fixed form of wholeness. In other words, atomistic psychology, as well as Gestalt psychology, both retain the sense and the principle of psychological "naturalism" (as we have defined it above) or "sensualism," as it can also be named if we recall the use of the term "inner sense." Clearly, even Brentano's psychology of intentionality remains tied to this traditional naturalism, although it has brought about a reformation by introducing into psychology the descriptive concept of intentionality as a universal and fundamental one.

What is essentially new, broken open in transcendentally oriented phenomenology and at the same time a breakthrough for descriptive psychology, transforming completely the face of this psychology, its entire method and its concrete aims, is the insight that a concrete description of the sphere of consciousness as a self-enclosed sphere of intentionality (only in this way is it given concretely) has a totally different sense than descriptions of nature, thus than the exemplary descriptions in the descriptive natural sciences. A concrete description of conscious lived experiences, those of perception, memory, predicative judgment, love, action, etc. also requires by necessity the description of the objects "as such," the "intentional" objects, that one is conscious of in the respective lived experiences, i.e., a description of the objects as they belong inseparably to the lived experience in question as its "objectively meant" (its objective sense). As a further consequence, the description must also take into account the intentional synthesis, whereby one and the same intentional object as such is, in a purely inner-psychological respect, an ideal index for a manifold of modes of consciousness coordinated to it in a strict fashion and whose typicality is correlated, for essential reasons, with the typicality of the intentional object. It is not enough to say that all consciousness is consciousness-of and go on to distinguish by type the various modes of consciousness, in the manner, for example, of Brentano's classification (with which I cannot [157]

agree) with its classes of "representations," "judgments," "phenomena of love and hate," etc. On the contrary, what must be undertaken is an inquiry into the various categories of "objects"—but purely as objects of possible consciousness—and a questioning back to the essential forms of possible "manifolds," ones that are to be joined together synthetically and through whose synthesis, itself something to be described, there arises the consciousness of the identity of the present object of the respective category. One and the same "object in general," as meant object, traverses these manifolds. In the synthesis we are conscious of it as the same one that can and does come to consciousness in descriptively very different manners of appearance, manners of givenness, modes of temporalization, modes of position-taking on the part of the Ego, etc.: i.e., in lived experiences that are extremely varied from a descriptive point of view, though they are all of the same descriptive typology, one pertaining to them by essence (apriori). It is only a first indication, and one that does not say very much, to proclaim that every object is always either represented, or judged, or loved, etc. At this point arises the universal task—discussed at the end of the book in the transcendental attitude—of the disclosure of the phenomenological "constitution" of objects, although it is thought there as projected back on the natural-psychological attitude. [158]

I had to emphasize the distinction between transcendental subjectivity and psychological subjectivity, and so I declared repeatedly that transcendental phenomenology is by no means psychology, not even phenomenological psychology. Unfortunately, the effect upon most professional psychologists was their complete failure to notice the radical psychological reform that is implied in transcendental phenomenology. They interpreted my remarks to mean that the entire transcendental phenomenology of the *Ideas* would be of no concern to them as psychologists. And even the few who realized that something of great psychological relevance was being said there, and who then tried to make it accessible to others, did not grasp the whole sense and the entire import of an intentional and constitutive phenomenology. They did not see that there for the first time, in opposition to naturalistic external psychology, a psychology

was expressed and worked out in which the life of the soul becomes understood in its most proper, originally intuitive essence and that this intuitive essence resides in the constitution, ever new and ever being organized in new ways, of sense-formations in modes of ontological validity; that is, it resides in the system of intentional accomplishments by means of which presently existing objects of the most varied levels, up even to the one Objective world, "are there" for the Ego. Pure inner psychology, the genuine psychology of intentionality (which, of course, is ultimately a psychology of pure intersubjectivity), reveals itself through and through as the constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude. The way from the *Logical Investigations* to the *Ideas* is, provided we deflect our aim from the transcendental-philosophical toward the psychological, the way that leads from a first and still imperfectly elucidated and delimited disclosure of the *task*, to the systematic development of the *art*, of interrogating the subjectivity of consciousness itself and of interpreting it out of itself, out of its own essence, by maintaining a standpoint within it and avoiding the blindness due to naturalistic prejudices. The beginning has necessarily to be a self-interrogation of one's own consciousness, mine, the psychologist's, and then the inquiry leads imperatively [159] from the objective sense, taken as a "guideline," to its modes of givenness of various levels, e.g., those of spatio-temporal orientations, perspectives, etc. And on the other hand it also ascends to the correlative noeses in the realm that is specifically the Ego's. Nevertheless, the interrogation of what specifically characterizes the Ego was not yet broached in the first volume of the *Ideas*.

Moreover, it is not without reason that the reform of psychology first presented itself as a hidden implication of a transcendental reform. For it is the philosophical problem, the transcendental problem, that gives rise to the urgency to attain the most extreme radicalism in the clarification of the ways in which knowledge and its object are related in the life of consciousness itself, and only this urgency leads necessarily to a universal and concrete phenomenology of consciousness, one that takes its primary orientation from the intentional object. In the transition to the natural-psychological attitude it is obvious,

then, that the sense of an intentional psychology is totally different than anything to be found in the Lockean tradition, or for that matter, in the school of Brentano. Even A. Meinong is no exception here, quite the reverse, although some particular doctrines of his, in writings which appeared after my *Logical Investigations*, make contact with my own. Indeed Meinong remains immured in the basic conceptions of Brentano, i.e., in the psychological naturalism of the tradition of Locke—as does the entire psychology of modern times, contemporary psychology included.

7.

For all that, however, the work in question is a philosophical one and does not make the reform of psychology one of its themes, although it cannot be totally lacking in indications for a genuine intentional psychology as a positive science. Furthermore, even as philosophical is its task restricted. It does not pretend to be more than an attempt—the fruit of decades of meditation oriented exclusively to this single goal—to set into [160] motion the radical beginning of a philosophy which, to repeat the words of Kant, "might come forth as a science." The ideal of the philosopher to work out once and for all a systematically complete logic, ethics, metaphysics, etc., which he could at any time justify to himself and to others on the basis of absolutely compelling insight, this ideal I had to forsake long ago and still deny myself today, and for no other reason than that the insight was always, and continues to be, indubitable for me that a philosophy simply cannot begin naïvely at random. That is, it cannot begin the way the positive sciences do, settling on the pregiven soil of world-experience, a soil presupposed as obviously existing. That they do this explains why they all have problems with their foundations and find themselves in paradoxes, which are then supposed to be resolved by a subsequent epistemology, one that actually comes too late, however. It is precisely for this reason that the positive sciences are unphilosophical, are not ultimate and absolute sciences justifying themselves out of ultimate grounds of knowledge. A philosophy with

problematic foundations, with paradoxes due to the unclarity of its fundamental concepts, is no philosophy and contradicts the very sense of philosophy. Philosophy can take root only in radical reflections on the sense and possibility of its own enterprise. Through these reflections it must first of all appropriate, by its own activity, its own proper soil, the absolute soil of pure experience, and must then create, again as self-active, the original concepts that adequately fit the measurements of this soil, and must in this fashion proceed altogether by way of an absolutely transparent method. In such a case there cannot be any unclear, problematic concepts or any paradoxes. The total lack of these reflections—that is, actually radical ones—and the overlooking of the tremendous difficulties of a correct beginning, or the quick and easy concealment of these difficulties, resulted in the circumstance that we have had, and continue to have, many, ever new, philosophical "systems" or "trends" but not the *one* philosophy which, nevertheless, as idea, underlies and sustains all the would-be philosophies. Philosophy on the path of its genuine realization is not like a relatively imperfect science which improves itself by taking its natural course. In the very sense of philosophy there is contained a radicalism of foundation, a reduction to absolute presuppositionlessness, and a fundamental method, by means of which the beginning philosopher secures for himself an absolute ground as the presupposition, which can be made with absolute insight, of all presuppositions considered to be "obvious" in the usual [161] sense. Yet that too must first be clarified through corresponding reflections and disclosed in its absolute binding force. That these reflections get more and more involved as they progress, until finally they lead to a whole science, a science of the beginnings, a "first" philosophy, and that all philosophical disciplines, indeed the foundations of all science, arise out of this ground and root—these things had to remain hidden as long as there was lacking the radicalism without which philosophy cannot be at all and cannot even begin. In beginning naïvely with the presuppositions of positivity it could not help but happen that the true philosophical beginning got lost irretrievably. Since a sensitivity for the seriousness of the beginning was lacking to the philosophical projects of the

tradition, there thus was lacking what is first and most important: namely, the specifically philosophical ground, to be acquired originally through autonomous activity, and consequently that autochthony or rootedness which alone makes genuine philosophy possible. These convictions of mine became stronger and stronger in the course of my work, in the evidence of the results founded one upon the other, step by step. Even if I had to tone down the ideal of my philosophical aspirations practically to that of a rank beginner, at least in my old age I have acquired the perfect certitude that I deserve to be called a *genuine* beginner. If the years of Methuselah were allotted to me, then I could almost hope that I might yet be able to become a philosopher. Now, I was able to pursue further and further the problems arising from the beginning of descriptive phenomenology (the beginning of the beginning) and to elaborate them concretely in parts which were (for me) very instructive. The universal horizon of the work of a phenomenological philosophy has been revealed in its main geographical structures, as it were, and the essential layers of the problems and the essential methods of access to them have been clarified. I can see spread out before me the endlessly open plains of true philosophy, the "promised land," though its thorough cultivation will come after me. This optimism might be met with a smile, but the reader will be able to see for himself, in the fragments presented in the book as the beginning of phenomenology, whether there is not some justification for it. I would love to hope that those [162] who come afterwards will take up these beginnings and will carry them on persistently but will also repair their admittedly great imperfections, imperfections which can hardly be avoided in the beginnings of a science.

Yet, in the last analysis, my book will be unable to help anyone who is already certain of his philosophy and his philosophical method and hence has never come to know the despair of one to whom the misfortune befell of being in love with philosophy and who, as a beginning student, amidst the jumble of philosophies, had to make a choice and became aware that there really was no choice at all, since none of those philosophies were concerned with genuine presuppositionlessness and none had arisen out of the radicalism of an autono-

mous self-responsibility, the radicalism philosophy itself demands. In the present time is the situation much different? Anyone who believes he can appeal to the fruitful bathos[1] of experience in the usual sense, or to the "sure results" of the exact sciences, or to experimental or physiological psychology, or to a constantly improving logic and mathematics, etc., and who believes he can find there philosophical premises, such a one will not be very receptive to my book, especially if he, in the grip of the scientific skepticism of our times, has altogether ceased to accept as valid the goal of a philosophy as rigorous science. Thus he will be unable to muster the intensive interest required, and he will not consider worthwhile the great pains and expenditure of time that are demanded for an understanding, in my footsteps, of this beginning way as I have sketched it out. Only someone who is himself struggling with the beginning of philosophy will react differently, for he will be forced to say to himself: *tua res agitur*.[2]

[1] [Reading *Bathos* for *Pathos*, following the text of the *Nachwort* as originally published in Husserl's *Jahrbuch*, vol. 11.—Trans.]

[2] ["You have a stake in this." Husserl is quoting Horace: *Nam tua res agitur, paries cum proximus ardet. Epist.* I, 18, 84.—Trans.]

INDEX

INDEX

abnormalities, 63, 67, 71 ff., 94, 393
absolute spirit, 90
absolute subject, 180
absolute time, 188
acoustic image, 324
advertence [*Zuwendung*], 25, 231
adumbrations, 62; not the way the pure Ego is given, 111; schema as unity of, 135; 138 f.; 157
aestheta, 60 f.
aesthetic pleasure, 10, 16
aesthetic synthesis, 19 ff.
affective (acts, attitude, interest), 9 f., 14 ff., 224, 349
affects, 98, 112, 232; in Spinoza and Hobbes, 233; 324
ages of life, 266 f., 279, 284
Albrecht, xix
alert consciousness, 114 ff.
analogizing apperception, 176, 336
animal nature: vs. material nature, 30-32; as object of natural science, 96 ff.
animalia, 169 ff.
animals: as founded realities, 35 f.; 96; 101; lack stratum of theoretical thought, 142; playing cat 185 f.; as zoological objects, 192 f.; animal Ego, 350 f.
animating sense, 248-259, 333
anthropologism, 407
anthropology: as positive science, 150, 184, 371, 376, 390; as philosophy of man, 405 ff., 407, 415
apperception: of things, 39 ff., 50 ff.; of the human, 102 ff., 129 ff., 146; of the personal, 195 ff., 381; of the interpersonal, 203 ff.; and motivation, 235 ff.; and empathy, 239 ff., 358; self-apperception, 259-265, 277, 360 ff.; naturalistic, 351; *et passim*.
appresence, 170 ff., 208
Aristotle, 176 n.
art, 4, 10, 191, 255, 328 f.
association: as intra-subjective connection, 143, 233 ff., 263 f., 283 ff., 341-351; as inter-subjective connection, 200-220, 302 ff., 357 ff., 393 ff.
authenticity and unauthenticity, 198, 276, 346 f.
axiological attitude, 9 ff., 204 ff.

beauty, 4, 12-18, 196 ff., 391
Beethoven, 359
Berkeley, 421, 423
Biemel, M., xiii
biology, 381, 401
Body [*Leib*]: significance of abnormalities, 63 ff.; organ of free will, 159 ff., 323; vs. other material things, 165 ff.; bearer of localized sensations, 161 f.; zero point of orientation, 165 f., 224; for the solipsistic subject, 168 f.; unity with soul, 168, 176, 252, 294; as "subjective," 224; as expression of spiri-

tual life, 259, 296; two-sided reality, 297; impenetrability of two Bodies, 216; point of conversion between causality and conditionality, 168, 299; means of all perception, yet itself imperfectly constituted, 61, 167; *et passim.*
book: as comprehensive unity, 248 f.
bracketing, 27, 183, 301, 380
brain, 146, 172 f., 229, 305, 354
Brentano, 326, 422, 424, 427

categorial objects, 7 ff., 23, 26
categorial synthesis, 19 ff.
causality: and reality, 48 ff., psychophysical, 68 ff., 258 ff., 306, 354 ff., 384, 390 ff.; as constitutive idea of material nature, 132 ff.; inapplicable to the soul, 140 ff., 356; the quasi-causality of the psychic, 145, 356; motivational, 227 ff., 241 ff.; vs. the personal attitude, 247; as mystery, 272; causality of reason, 235; causality and spirit, 295 ff., 390 ff.; *et passim.*
centaur, 62, 274
central nervous system, 164, 198, 382
chemistry, 55, 389
child, 101 n., 282, 288
church, 27, 148, 192, 255
closet drama, 251
cogitationes, 103, 263 f., 278, 292, 344, 367, 392
cogito, 5 f., 103-127, 223 ff., 260 f., 337 f.
communal spirit, 209, 255
community, 92, 141, 181, 207 ff., 329, 353, 363, 375, 387 ff.
comprehension [*Komprehension*]: as personal apperception, 201, 217, 240, 245, 254 ff., 295, 306, 311, 321, 335 ff., 387 f.
convictions, 120-126
corpse, 352
culture, 201, 250, 357, 365, 371, 388, 390
death, 186, 326
Descartes, 31, 109, 218, 408
description: vs. explanation, 402
descriptive psychology, 326 f., 423 f.
desire, 104, 121, 160, 197 ff., 269 f.
differential equations, 89
Dilthey, 181 f., 326, 376, 402
doxa, 17, 43, 289, 345 f.
drama, 244, 249, 251, 255
dreaming, 272, 347
drives [*Triebe*], 207, 233, 267, 282, 289, 349, 398
dull consciousness, 114 ff.
duration: of material things, 30 ff., 49-54, 134; in immanent time, 109 f., 120-127

Ebbinghaus, 182
Egology, 181
Ego-pole, 103, 107, 111, 324
eidetic intuition, 97
eidetic phenomenology, 183, 326, 379, 409
eidetic reduction, 183, 187
eidetics, 327, 379
eidos, 392, 409
elasticity, 39, 45, 50 ff.
empathy [*Einfühlung*], 170-180, 208 ff., 239 ff., 362 ff., 381 ff., *et passim.*
empirical Ego, 99, 116, 183, 190, 261 ff., 340, 350
epoché, 29, 380 n., 412, 418
essence, *passim.*
ethics, 233, 427
evidence, 230 ff., 275 f., 286, 343, 418
existence [*Dasein*]: natural, thingly, 30, 35, 69; psychic, 101, 141, 145; personal, 201, 208; spiritual, 292; *et passim.*
explanation: vs. description, 402
expression (of sense) and the expressed, 248-259, 333, 352 ff.
extension, 31-36, 40 ff., 135 f.; vs. spread, 157 ff.

faculty-psychology, 131
family of man, 254

feelings: as original value-consciousness, 6-20; Body as source of stirrings of feelings, 165; sensuous feelings, 194 ff., 207, 243 ff.
fiat, 104, 269 f., 297, 300, 340
flux (*Fluss*) of lived experiences, 109, 126 ff., 139, 263, 294, 335 f. (See also Stream of consciousness.)
fragmentation, 33 ff., 55, 138, 144
freedom: in the kinesthetic, 73, 158 f., 167 f.; vs. powers of the objective spirit, 149; vs. passivity, tendencies and drives, 225, 267, 289, 350; vs. influence of others, 281 f.
friendship, 170, 210

genesis, 209, 226, 263, 267, 329, 360, 368
Gestalt psychology, 424
ghosts, 100 f., 227, 244, 301
God, 90, 329
goods: vs. mere natural things, 4, 19, 102, 225, 328, 384
Gulliver, 127

habit, 143, 193, 235 f., 267 f., 280, 289
habituality, 313, 324, 384
habitus, 118, 279, 281, 290, 308
hidden reason, 289
historians, 10, 241, 376 ff.
historiography [*Geschichtsschreibung*], 381
history: natural things as history-less, vs. psychic reality, 144 f.; individual history, 313, 329, 350, 387; as human science, 388, 399, 402
Hobbes, 233
horizon, 42, 114, 205 ff., 314, 360 ff.
human sciences [*Geisteswissenschaften*]: not mere descriptive natural sciences, 181; grasp motives not causes, 241; as cultural accomplishments, 320; relation to natural sciences, 325 ff., 384, 401 f.; vs. transcendental sciences, 354; and outer experience, 375
Hume, 421, 423
Husserl, E.: *Cartesian Meditations*, 407, 417 n.; *Formal and transcendental logic*, 264, 417 n.; *Inner time-consciousness*, 409; *Logical Investigations*, 276, 422, 426 f.
hyle, 265
hyletic substrate, 160, 305, 308

I as man, 99 f., 115 f., 175
"I can," 13 f., 159, 228, 266 ff., 341
idealism, 417-421
"if-then," phenomenal, 163
imagination, 97 f., 218
immanent time, 109, 119 ff., 138, 188, 215, 324, 370, 409
impact, 42, 48 ff.
impenetrability of Bodies, 216
impressions, 125 f., 307, 348 f.
individuum, 37, 150
inertia, 56 n.
infinity: endlessness vs. openness, 313
inner time-consciousness, 239
inspectio sui, 223, 329, 334
instauration [*Urstiftung*], 120, 124, 281, 324
instincts, 143, 267, 308, 346 ff.
intellectus agens, 289, 344 f.
intentional relation: vs. real relation, 227
intentionality: pure Ego as center, 116, 226 ff.; empirical intentionality, 261; 291; 344 ff.; concept transformed by Brentano, 424 f.; psychology of intentionality, 426
interaction (psychophysical), 302, 308 f.
interest (See theoretical attitude, practical attitude, etc.)
intersubjective motivations, 243 ff.
intersubjectivity, 86, 93, 311, 315, 373, 417, 421, 426
introjection, 175, 177, 184, 186, 216
intuition [*Anschauung*]: sense intuition vs. axiological, 10 ff.; thing of intuition as such, 30 ff.; form of intui-

tion, 86 ff.; always has open horizons, 163; neutralized, 274 ff.; self-intuition, 262 ff.; source of all legitimation, 377; originarily giving, 381; psychology based on inner intuition, 411 ff.; *et passim.*
intuitive "flair" [*Intuition*], 286 f.

joy, 14 ff., 243, 279, 288

Kant, 115, 139, 218, 356, 427
kinesthetic sensations, 23 f., 61 ff., 70, 136, 154 ff., 323, 342
kinetic sensations, 136, 156, 158

Landgrebe, L., xiii, xvi
language, 175, 235, 328
Leibniz, 115, 362, 421
life-world [*Lebenswelt*], 302 n., 384 ff.
lighting, 45, 67, 74, 177
Lipps, 270 n.
lived experience (*Erlebnis*], *passim.*
localization, 36, 61, 153-165, 172 ff., 185 ff., 213, 216, 324
Locke, 349, 423, 427
locus, 35, 406

machine, 333
magnitude, 32 f., 88
materiality, 24, 28, 31 ff., 58, 100, 141, 144
mathematics, 203, 290, 392, 410, 430
mathematization, 145, 359
mechanical motion, 42 f., 167, 229, 271 ff.
medium, 57, 65 f.
Meinong, 427
memory, 122 ff., 262, 275, 283 f., 314, 345 ff., 353 ff.
mere things, 11, 18 f., 27, 191, 200, 225, 319, 389
method: of physics, 89, 242; phenomenological, 96, 189 ff., 405 ff.; phenomenological vs. natural-scientific, 325 ff.; human-scientific, 377 ff., 424; natural-scientific, 396 ff.
Mill, J. S., 423
miracle, 53
mobility, 39, 166
molecules, 54
monad, 115, 118, 302, 306, 309, 314
morphology, 375, 379, 381 f., 385, 387 f., 399, 401
motion, 39, 42, 57, 67, 153, 273 f.
motivation: as law of personal life (vs. causality), 223-293, *et passim.*
Münsterberg, 182
mutual understanding, 86 ff., 194, 202 ff., 217, 240, 336, 386

natural attitude, 22, 69, 184 ff., 251, 360 f., 373, 386, 395, 411 ff., 426
natural history, 214 f., 382, 396
natural science: as excluding meaning-predicates, 3 ff., 27 ff.; objective nature as correlate, 217 ff., 302, 401; vs. human science, 190, 214, 325, 352, 356, 384, 393; psychology as natural science, 181, 184, 423; conception of the person, 373, 383; descriptive natural science, 375 ff., 389; oblivious to the life-world, 384
natural-scientific attitude, 4, 29, 215, 376, 383
naturalistic attitude, 30, 169, 183 ff., 190 ff., 220 f., 294, 337, 356
naturalization, 176, 254, 311, 316, 331, 337, 357, 364, 375
nature-attitude, 189, 215, 380 n., 383
neutralization (neutrality modification), 5, 270, 274-278, 340
noemata, 19, 38, 121, 179, 221, 228, 231, 244, 375
noeses, 116, 121, 426
non-Ego, 265, 330, 331, 335
non-sensuous quality, 320 f.
normal sensibility, 61, 91

objectivating acts, 17 f.
objective spirit, 148, 251, 256, 357
ontology, 97, 326 f., 399

opinions, persistence of, 118 ff.
organism, 36, 185 f., 267, 352

parallelism: psychophysical, 302 ff., 307 f.
passive Ego, 225
passive states, 8
passivity, 13 ff., 22, 104, 225, 234 f., 345 ff., 362, 381
perception: as general objectivation, 16 ff.; as originary experience, 40, 123 f., 170, 275; function of abnormalities in, 63 ff.; one-sided, 54, 185; perceiver's Body as medium, 61 ff., 167, 224, 259, 296; self-perception, 99 ff., 259 ff., 277; visual vs. tactual, 155 ff.; as motivation for judgments, 231 ff.; perceptual harmony and discord, 48, 289; not a causal operation, 383 f.; *et passim.*
personal apperception, 262, 366
personal Ego, 149 f., 193 ff., 213 f., 231, 259 ff., 323, 331 ff., 338, 360, 366
personal properties, 129, 149
personalistic attitude, 147 ff., 183 ff., 259, 294 ff., 332, 390 ff.
personality, 111, 117, 148 f., 362, 372, 381 ff.
phantasms, 143, 304, 401
phantasy, 62, 127, 130, 244 f., 276 ff., 345 f.
phantoms (purely visual spatial forms), 23 f., 39 ff., 100 f.
phenomena: immediately experienced contents, 211, 218, 357, 393; pure, transcendental phenomena, 377, 386, 413 ff.
phenomenological method, 96, 189 ff., 326, 405 ff.
phenomenological psychology, 411, 414, 423, 425
phenomenological reduction, 183, 187, 189, 377, 380, 407 ff.
phenomenology, 85, 97, 181 ff., 295, 325 ff., 374 ff., 391 ff., 405 ff. (See also Pure phenomenology, Transcendental phenomenology, Eidetic phenomenology.)
philosophy, 328, 405 ff.
physicalistic thing, 80 ff., 89 ff., 179, 217 ff., 242, 297 ff., 334.
physics, 49, 89 ff., 193 ff., 215 ff., 356 ff., 389 ff.
physiology, 272, 393 ff.
physis, 134, 298, 356
Plato, 406
practical attitude, 4 f., 15; as personal attitude, 199
practical possibilities, 270 ff., 342 f.
pregivennesses, 226, 283 ff., 344 f., 374, 379
presuppositionlessness, 428 f.
primal presence, 170 ff., 208
primary qualities, 34, 90, 93, 323, 351
primordial manifestation [*Beurkundung*], 50, 59, 131, 135, 139, 188
protention, 268
psyche [*Psyche*], 80, 128, 142, 368, 372, 395, 411, 423
psychic Ego, 98, 102, 128, 141 ff., 184, 255, 331
psychic properties, 129 f., 140, 222, 356
psychoanalysis, 234
psychological Ego, 128, 139, 358
psychological reduction, 377 f.
psychologism, 407, 415
psychology: theory of faculties, 131; as natural science, 181, 327, 337, 357, 368; experimental, 308, 368, 430; as way into phenomenology, 327, 415; as human science, 366 ff., 377 f., 392; phenomenological psychology, 411 ff., 423 ff.
psychophysical parallelism, 302 ff., 307 f.
psychophysics, 368 f., 376, 394
pure consciousness, 118, 124, 188 f., 221, 263, 337 ff., 392
pure Ego, 103-128, *et passim.*

pure phenomenology, 183, 326 f., 392, 408

rational motives, 267, 350
real circumstances, 45 ff., 131 ff., 162 ff., 296 ff.
real properties, 34, 45 ff., 129 ff., 258, 312, 337
real relation: vs. intentional relation, 227
realism, 418-421
reflection: vs. adoption of theoretical attitude, 15 ff.
regional ontology, 97
reproduction, 125 f., 281, 345 ff.
res extensa, 36, 141, 157, 352, 364
residuum (of the reductions), 189
retention, 16, 307, 314, 346
Rickert, 182
rigorous science, 406 f., 430

santonin, 67 f., 78, 80
schemata, 40 ff., 61 ff., 100, 135, 212, 351
secondary passivity, 14, 21 f.
secondary qualities, 34, 81, 93 f., 184, 221, 246, 323, 333, 373, 396
secondary receptivities, 19
secondary sensibility, 345 ff.
sedimentation, 118, 233, 324, 344 f.
self-apperception, 259 ff.
sensations: vs. things and phantoms, 23 ff.; constitutive-representational vs. motivating-kinesthetic, 62 ff., 152; most primitive adumbrations, 138; localized, 152 ff.; doubled, 153 f; ultimate pregivennesses, 224 f.; *et passim.*
sense: as animating, 248-259, 333
sense data, 26, 77, 172 ff., 243, 303 ff., 348, 423
sense-things [*Sinnendinge*], 69 ff., 76 ff., 319 ff.
sensibility, 72 ff.; vs. reason, 289; vs. *intellectus agens,* 344 ff.
Simmel, 182
skepticism, 406, 430
social experience, 210 f.
social personalities, 329, 336, 374
society, 92, 181, 204, 208, 241, 246, 329, 332, 375, 385, 390
solid body, 56 ff.
solipsism, 75 ff.; and constitution of physicalistic nature, 82 f., 94 f., 151, 169 ff.; vs. intersubjective experience, 83 ff.; and constitution of the Body, 168 f.; alleged solipsism of *Ideas I,* 417 f.
solus ipse, 86, 92
soul [*Seele*]: as natural object, 96, 141 ff., 355; vs. pure Ego, 128; reality of, 134, 351 ff., 384; strata of, 142, 292; as united with the Body, 168, 176, 252, 294; vs. spirit, 181 ff.; in the reduction, 412 ff.; *et passim.*
space-time, 145, 188, 215, 222, 352 ff., 392
spatiality, 32, 36, 63, 209, 214
Spinoza, 233
spirit [*Geist*], *passim.*
spiritual attitude, 254, 300, 359, 374, 394, 398
spiritual Ego, 103, 151, 226, 266, 279, 288 f., 295, 358 ff.
spontaneity, 9 ff., 26, 61 ff., 167, 345 ff.
spread [*Ausbreitung*]: vs. extension, 36, 157 ff.
stereoscope, 39
stimuli, 198 ff., 228 ff., 267, 279, 289, 295 f., 346 ff.
stimulatability, 184 f.
Stein, E., xii, xiii
Strasser, S., xiii
stream of consciousness [*Bewusstseinsstrom*], 110 ff., 146, 165, 188, 234 ff.; as unity of motivation, 239; 369 ff. (See also Flux of lived experiences.)
stuff [*Stoff*], 225
style of life, 283
subjective attitude: vs. natural attitude, 69

substantiality, 37, 48, 58, 132, 339, 347, 401
substruction, 178, 242 f.
supernatural realities, 145
surrounding world [*Umwelt*]: not composed of mere things, 191, 195; person as center, 194 ff.; common surrounding world and personal associations, 201, 387; and spiritual Ego, 225 ff., 298, 311, 357; egoistic surrounding world vs. communicative, 203 ff.; theoretical surrounding world, 230; and personal Ego, 333 ff.; *et passim.*

tactile image, 73
technology, 384
telos, 228
temporalization, 188, 213, 216, 370, 409, 425
temptation, 279, 341
theater, 244, 250
theoretical attitude, 4 ff., 332, 365 f., 375, 384
thing in itself, 39, 139
thingly properties, 34, 135, 161, 354
tones, tonal data, 24 ff., 156, 161, 196, 325
touch, 57 f.; priority of, 74 f.; one hand touching the other, 152 ff.; vs. vision, 155 ff.
transcendent time, 126, 215
transcendental Ego, 128, 413 ff.
transcendental intersubjectivity, 417, 421
transcendental phenomenology, 325, 365, 374, 379, 405 ff.
transcendental reduction, 326 f., 337
transcendental subjectivity, 365, 379, 386, 406 ff.

universe, 3, 30, 116, 353, 362, 372 f., 389, 401, 420
use-objects, 29, 191, 197, 225

values: as excluded from nature, 4 ff.; valuing on the part of the natural scientist, 28 f.; theory of values, 230; pre-eminent values, 280
violin-tone, 24, 156, 196 f.
visual image, 67, 74 f., 324
vocalization, 101 n.

weight, 34 f., 49, 153
Windelband, 182
world-image, 84, 94, 402
written marks, 256