

5 From exile to diaspora: the development of transnational Islam in Europe

Werner Schiffauer

Islam in Europe faces the challenge of defining a role for Islam outside the classic Islamic countries, the *dar al Islam*. This means resituating Islam in three respects: with reference to the country of immigration, to the country of origin, and to global Islam. Situating Islam in the immigration society and in Europe in particular, is complicated by two distinctive features. On the one hand, there is a long tradition (nurtured again and again by both sides) of situating oneself in a structure of alterity, i.e. posing an antagonistic relationship between a purportedly 'Islamic' and a purportedly 'Judeo-Christian' value system. On the other hand, the layers of society supporting Islam are for the most part worker migrants and their descendants. They are newcomers to Europe who assumed their position at the bottom of the professional ladder and slowly worked their way up over generations. Thus, Islam is not only the other religion per se, it was also often the religion of the worker, of the *underclass*, the outsider, and the ghetto-dweller. These two aspects distinguish the situation of Islam in Europe from its situation in other regions where Islam is in the minority.

Secondly, one must establish a reference to the country of origin. The country of origin, and the role religion plays in it, are viewed from the outside and are projected onto the screen of differences to the society of immigration. Things which are not questioned in the home country because they are well established by tradition and on-going practice lose their self-evident character. Thirdly, a new reference to global Islam develops. At least in the countries of the Near and Middle East, there exists an ethnocentric, conditioned and little-considered identification between nation and Islam. While there is a well-established presence of Islam outside the Arab or Turkish nations, being Muslim and Arab-ness or Turkish-ness, respectively, have often been identified with one another. Such linkages begin to disintegrate with migration: in Europe, one is identified as a Muslim and held responsible for events in the entire

Islamic world. One must explain one's positions on corporal punishment, the veil and September 11 even when these phenomena play no role in one's own practice of Islam or in one's country of origin.

Corresponding to the diversity of its references, the Islam being established in Europe also provides extremely diverse images of itself. Attempts to situate itself have given rise to a number of solutions. Indeed, as demonstrated also in the present volume, Islam does not speak with one, but with many voices.¹ However, it is time to take another step beyond the customary (and in the meantime somewhat boring) detection of plural identity or multivocality. Indeed, the diverse voices and positions developing do not stand beside each other without connection, but refer to, supplement, or contradict one another. For this reason alone, they cannot ignore one another because, as Zygmunt Bauman has pointed out, the majority society views them as a collective person, as a community of shared responsibility. They are held accountable for one another. Since the statements or deeds of individual Islamic communities threaten to reflect back on all other Muslims, they must take a position, or even distance themselves, as the case may be. This becomes particularly clear with extreme occurrences, such as the book burning in Bradford or September 11, but it also applies in less dramatic cases. Because this is so, these many voices constitute a place of debates, or fields of discourse. These fields of discourse can be analysed by identifying controversial key issues and describing the constellation of positions derived from them.

This text is concerned with the debates about situating Islam in Europe. It refers in particular to Turkish immigrants in Germany as an example, though the patterns identified here may be found in Muslim communities throughout Europe. The thesis is that the first generation's debate focused on other points, had other themes, and led to other group constellations than did the second generation's debate. In a first step I will examine the attempts by the first generation to define an 'Islam in exile'. For this generation, Europe was *gurbet*, or foreign. The factions that developed reflected perceptions of the role that Islam should play in Turkey. Even if this Islam was Turkey-oriented, it clearly distinguished itself from Turkish Islam, above all in terms of the pointed bitterness with which the factions confronted each other. I will then turn to diaspora Islam which is currently emerging among second-generation immigrants. The debates in the second generation

¹ On the promotion of polyphonic anthropology, see, among others, J. Clifford, 'On ethnographic allegory', in J. Clifford and George E. Marcus (eds.), *Writing culture. The poetics and politics of ethnography*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 98–121.

confront the necessity 'to come to terms with the new cultures they inhabit, without simply assimilating to them and losing their identities completely'.² I want to demonstrate that faction-building arises in this second generation's grappling with the problem of recognition in the host society similar to that typical of other diaspora communities: namely, producing wings with ultra-orthodox, orthodox and individualised positions. Herein lies one of the differences between the present work and that of such authors as Hall, Bhabha, Clifford and Gilroy, to whom, as will become clear, I otherwise owe a great deal. They see the core of diaspora identity in hybridity and view ethnic or religious fundamentalism as a regrettable slip-up. I, on the contrary, view the coexistence of these wings as an almost essential characteristic of diaspora identity.

A theoretical note

My theoretical interest is to draw on the important insights developed on the relationship between power and identity in the discussion of post-colonialism and to render them fruitful for an understanding of the development of Islam in Europe amongst the second and third generation of immigrants. This entails more than applying a theory to a new field. It is indeed not by accident that Islam has up to now been handled as a sort of stepchild in the discussion of diaspora. This neglect is connected with a frequent confusion of normative and empirical content which is in turn a result of the theory's political emphasis. For many theoreticians of post-colonialism, the breaks, complex schisms, distractions, alienation, etc. characteristic of the diaspora situation seemed to provide a chance to overcome the traps of that subject-focus Foucault analysed. The diaspora offered a chance for a creative, cosmopolitan existence, and thus an opportunity to emancipate oneself. The Afro-Caribbean diaspora became in this regard a favourite child; it produced forms of protest in which the European Left could recognise itself, because of the proximity between them. Academics influenced by the student movement could project themselves into it as something they could be enthusiastic about from a leftist revolutionary perspective. The result was a systematic ethnocentric bias of post-colonial theory.

This bias becomes especially clear in the treatment of the culture developed among Muslim immigrants. This diaspora culture was no less radical than that of the Caribbean immigrants. But it was clear that Islamic forms of protest were not those that the European Left associated

² S. Hall, 'The question of cultural identity', in Stuart Hall, David Held and Tony McGrew (eds.), *Modernity and its futures*, Cambridge: Polity Press 1992, p. 310.

with emancipation. An exemplary demonstration of this can be made with reference to the role Paul Gilroy ascribes to the staging of bodiliness in the protest culture:

The body has become, in various ways, a cultural locus of resistance and desires. A sense of the body's place in the natural world can provide, for example, a social ecology and an alternative rationality that articulates a cultural and moral challenge to the exploitation and domination of the 'nature within us and without us'.³

All of this can be precisely applied to the politics of veiling. Yet, it was clearly not *this* form of body politics about which Gilroy spoke so enthusiastically.

Turning to Islamic forms of protest can help overcome the ethnocentric bias of post-colonial theory. It can contribute to a separation of empirical content from normative valuations and thus lead to a more precise empirical analysis. A comparative approach allows for distance and promotes a certain sobriety. The following is based on material collected during a span of over twenty years, mainly in the study of the Turkish diaspora in Germany. However, a recently completed comparative study⁴ shows that numerous insights can, with certain restrictions, also be applied to other European countries.

Islam in exile

The key term for understanding first-generation migrants' religious sentiments is the word *gurbet*, or foreign.⁵ The experience of foreignness has several facets. One is fear of self-loss. The migrant, who is often single, moves into a space in which no one knows him or her. Often used to a high measure of social control, the migrant suddenly finds him or herself in a realm in which social control is practically non-existent. This often leads to feelings of disorientation. Among first-generation migrants, stories circulated about Turkish workers who had 'gone to the dogs' in Germany (i.e. had relationships with women, become alcoholics, and thus lost their perspective on life). Islam offered a certain stable point

³ P. Gilroy, 'Urban social movements, "race" and community', in Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman (eds.), *Colonial discourse and post-colonial theory. A reader*, Hemel Hempstead: Harvester, 1993, p. 407.

⁴ W. Schiffauer, Gerd Baumann, Riva Kastoryano, and Steven Vertovec (eds.), *Civil enculturation. nation-state, school and ethnic difference in The Netherlands, Britain, Germany and France*, New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2004.

⁵ On *gurbet* as key term for first-generation migrants, see M. Greve, *Die Musik der imaginären Türkei. Musik und Musikleben im Kontext der Migration aus der Türkei nach Deutschland*, Stuttgart Weimar: Metzler-Verlag, 2003.

against this trend of anomic experiences, not least because one found, in Islam, a community of like-minded people who could give each other mutual support. A second facet of this experience of foreignness was a crisis of meaning. Practically every migrant asks him- or herself at some point what s/he is actually doing in the foreign world which causes so much pain and whether it would not have been better to stay at home. Turkish migrants often expressed this feeling by complaining about the 'coldness' of Europe. Here, too, a religious orientation helps to deal with this question better, even if not to answer it. For example, such disorientation could somehow be eased with the argument that it does not make a difference for a Muslim where he fulfils his religious duty. And of course a community offers a certain degree of 'warmth'. A third, and indeed the most essential, aspect of the experience of the foreign was connected with the beginning of family reconstitution in the early 1970s. This meant, on the one hand, that one was preparing for a longer stay in Europe. On the other hand, it meant that one was now confronted with having to rear children in a foreign environment. One could no longer, as in Turkey, rely on one's children picking up one's own norms and values from the broader environment. *Gurbet* here stands for the fear of losing one's children. In brief, the migration situation forced a refocusing on one's own norms and values. Islam seemed perfect for this:

There is a really big difference between children [who go on the Koran course] and others, as far as upbringing is concerned and respect for their fathers and for you [as a guest]. When a guest comes into the house, the child will respect him. But another child will start babbling on for no reason and it will get on your nerves, even make you angry. . . So, it's all about our traditions and customs. A child learns them at the Koran course. A child doesn't learn them in school.⁶

All of the above gave the first generation's religiosity a decidedly defensive touch; they focused on the maintenance and protection of their own values and life designs in a foreign environment.

These needs were reflected by the founding of mosques everywhere in the Federal Republic of Germany. In many cases, the initiative came from the bottom, from migrants who were not otherwise institutionally organised. The initiators quickly faced the problematic fact that founding an organisation in a foreign environment requires know-how. They had to found an association, formulate by-laws for it, obtain legal advice, etc. This need for practical action was taken up by organisations whose origin was in Turkey and which became active in Germany.

⁶ Interview conducted by me with a Turkish migrant in Augsburg Germany 1978. The quotation is found in W. Schiffauer, *Die Migranten aus Subay. Türken in Deutschland: eine Ethnographie*, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1991, p. 243.

Important among them were the *Süleymancı*, the *Nurcu*, the *Milli Görüş*, and the Idealist Associations often better known as ‘Gray Wolves’.

The *Süleymancı* and the *Nurcu*, forbidden in Turkey, stem from Islamic-brotherhood religiosity. They were founded already in the first years after the Kemalist revolution to posit an Islamic upbringing against what they felt to be an impoverishment of Islam, and they henceforth operated undercover. The *Milli Görüş* was founded in the 1960s with the aim of Islamification of Turkey under the slogan ‘The Just Order’ (*adil düzen*). From this, a series of Islamic-conservative parties have developed (the Party of National Order, the National Salvation Party, the Welfare Party, the Virtue Party, and finally the Party of Well-Being). The sequence of names reflects the precarious legal position of this group in Turkey; its political formations have again and again been prohibited and re-founded under new names. Along with these three Islamist organisations came the Idealist Associations (e.g. the Gray Wolves), the European branch of the rightist nationalistic National Movement Party, which advocates a synthesis of Turkishness and Islam. The *DİYANET*⁷ did not take action on its own in the early years (even if the faithful could turn to the office for help in founding mosques). Thus, the Turkish state largely left this realm to the communities of political Islam. This changed only in the beginning of the 1980s, when Turkey shifted from a policy of effectively ignoring the migrants to a conservative cultural policy whose aim was to increase the tie of Turks abroad to the Turkish state.⁸ The *DİTİB* (*‘Diyamet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği’* – ‘Turkish Islamic Union of the State Office for Matters of Belief’) was founded as the European branch of the *DİYANET*. It stands for an Islam that understands the role of religion as strictly restricted to the private realm. Finally, as the last organisation, came the radical Islamist community of Cemaleddin Kaplan, the later Caliphate State, which split off from the *Milli Görüş* in 1983. It strove for an Islamic revolution in Turkey according to the Iranian model.

By the mid-1980s, the field had been sorted out. Nearly all mosques had classified themselves under one or other organisation. The representation of the Islam of the worker migrants by organisations which (with only one exception) all stemmed from Turkey had far-reaching consequences. The need for a defensive religiosity that turned its back on Europe was taken up and honed into a clear orientation towards Turkey. The communities were distinguished by what role they saw for

⁷ *DİYANET* - The Turkish State Office for Matters of Belief, the administration of Kemalist Islam.

⁸ On the change of state policy, see A. Çağlar, ‘Encountering the state in migration driven transnational fields: Turkish immigrants in Europe’, unpublished Habilitation thesis, Free University, Berlin, 2003.




Figure 5.1 The socio-political outlook of major Muslim organisations in Germany in the 1980s.

Islam in Turkey. Those communities with an affirmative position toward a *laic* (strictly secular) Turkey distanced themselves from those communities which, at least in the 1980s, strove for an Islamist refashioning of the country (see figure 5.1). The latter were individually distinguished among themselves in terms of the strategy they contemplated for the introduction of the *Sharia*. The *Nurcu* and the *Süleymancı* emphasised consciousness raising through Koran courses and training programmes; the *Milli Görüş*, the parliamentary process; and the Caliphate State, in turn, revolution.⁹

With respect to this Turkey-oriented perspective, promotion of a role for Islam to play in Germany was of only secondary importance. This becomes especially clear in the failed attempts to establish religious education in German schools. Such education would have been completely in line with a defensive religiosity. It would have been possible to have German society accept it as well, if the Islamic communities had come together and appeared in unity as a bargaining partner with German institutions.¹⁰ Yet, the opposing interests they had with reference to Turkey made this impossible. This also contributed to the fact that they did not perceive the immigration country as their ‘own’ country, as a space that they could somehow actively participate in shaping. Germany was and remained *gurbet*, the painfully perceived foreign.

⁹ It must also be pointed out that in the 1990s, with the exception of the Caliphate State, all communities renounced the introduction of the *Sharia* in Turkey.

¹⁰ W. Schiffauer, ‘Islam as a civil religion: political culture and the organization of diversity in Germany’, in Tariq Modood and Pnina Werbner (eds.), *The politics of multiculturalism in the new Europe*, London and New York: Zed Books, 1997.

Although oriented toward Turkey, Islam in exile distinguished itself clearly from Islam in Turkey. Above all, the large number of communities competing with one another in Europe in the attempt to represent Islam played a significant role. The monopoly enjoyed by *DİYANET* in Turkey was broken in Europe, even if the largest number of Turkish Muslims remains faithful to it. An already existent latent fractionalisation of Islam found expression in Europe. Due to reasons mentioned above, there was, secondly, a certain shift of power, with groups such as the *Süleymancı* or even the *Milli Görüş* proportionately more strongly represented in Europe than in Turkey. A third remarkable difference was the establishment of the Caliphate State, as there is no corresponding organisation in Turkey. This is a phenomenon that, echoing Anderson's 'long distance nationalism',¹¹ could be called 'long distance religiosity'. With the security and distance of the migration situation, a portion of the faithful developed non-compromising positions that were implausible in Turkey itself.

Pluralism of this sort provokes a more reflexive relationship with religion than exists in Turkey, as one has an option between various communities. Thus, a situation of competition between religious offers unfolds in Europe, which Peter Berger¹² views as characteristic of modern religiosity.

Greater institutional splintering, however, had a negative impact on the culture of debate. In Turkey, where the political groups existed underground, there was a lively exchange of positions and vigorous culture of debate. In Europe, where the political groups were manifest, the exit option¹³ increased. The boundaries between groups were emphasised as they distanced themselves from, and battled with, one another. So while the disputes between positions were often conducted discursively in Turkey, they were often non-verbal in Europe. The splintered nature of European Islam was at that time viewed with amazement in Turkey.¹⁴

The idea of an exile Islam was explicitly stated, articulated by the various communities during these years. In the *DİTİB* mosques, it assumed the form of a homeland rhetoric. The transmission of Islamic norms and values was identified with socialisation as a Turk and

¹¹ B. Anderson, *Long-distance nationalism: world capitalism and the rise of identity politics*. Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam Centre for Asian Studies (= The Wertheim Lecture 1992).

¹² P. L. Berger, *Zur dialektik von religion und gesellschaft*, Frankfurt am Main: Fischer 1973.

¹³ A. O. Hirschman, *Exit, voice and loyalty*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970.

¹⁴ See for example U. Mumcu, *Rabita*, Istanbul: Tekin, 1987.

transmission of love of the fatherland. Thus, in religious instruction, educational units were offered on topics such as 'We love our fatherland' or 'Loving the fatherland/Duties to the fatherland/Even abroad we think of the fatherland'. The *Milli Görüş* expressed the difference between the 'own' and the 'foreign' with the telling opposition between *dar al İslam*, 'land of Islam' and *dar al harb*, literally, land of the enemy. The dominant term in this opposition is *dar al İslam*. With reference to Turkey, it formulated a political programme. Islam in Turkey enjoys a majority status, but it has been alienated by the Kemalists; the battle for Islamification is more easily conceived as a legitimate one, as it is a matter of repossessing one's own realm. The secondary term, 'land of war', which sounds more militant than is perhaps intended, expresses the fact that in Germany one was in principle in an inimical land, a country to which one could not lay claim and, therefore, could not hope to shape. One need not feel committed to that country. A third formula which raised the point of exile Islam was the term *Hegira*, which was especially popular in the Caliphate State. *Hegira* refers to the young Islamic community's act of emigration to Medina in the year 622, an act made necessary by political repression. Ten years later, this emigration found its conclusion with the triumphant return to Mecca. This definition was particularly popular among Islamic refugees during the state of emergency in Turkey from 1980 to 1983.¹⁵

The development of diaspora Islam

Against the background of the first generation's exile Islam, the second generation's significantly more complex diaspora Islam unfolds. It is more complex because the fractionalisation resulting from Turkey-specific perspectives is maintained, but now overlaid with positions arising from confrontations with the immigration society. As should be demonstrated in the following with the example of Muslims in Germany,¹⁶ the battle for recognition is decisive for the development of this position.¹⁷

¹⁵ In 1980 the military ended the civil unrest at Turkish universities. The clashes between left and right had left over 10,000 dead. A state of emergency was declared and all political parties were forbidden. Many leftist, rightist and Islamist activists were imprisoned or fled to Europe.

¹⁶ The question of the Islamic immigrant's recognition has not been resolved in any European country. The concrete spelling out of the struggle, however, depends on the various political cultures. On this, see Schiffauer et al., *Civil enculturation*.

¹⁷ On the central role of recognition, see above all C. Taylor, 'Die politik der anerkennung', Charles Taylor (ed.), *Multikulturalismus und die politik der anerkennung*, Frankfurt/Main: Fischer, 1992, 13–78; A. Honneth, *Kampf um anerkennung. Zur*

Second- and third-generation Muslims are confronted with the situation that they, unlike their parents, are Europeans. They grew up in one European society or another, passed through its institutions and have built diverse relationships to the society. They are German, English, or French Muslims and not just Muslims in Germany, England, or France. This is nothing to be taken for granted, but a practical relationship, a task or project. They must situate themselves in the given society and develop an understanding of themselves in that situation. However, two factors complicate this task. First, both the immigration society and the first generation of migrants construct the relation between 'European culture' and Islam as a relation between the familiar and the foreign, and thus place it in an oppositional, rather than a complementary, relationship. The second complicating factor is that this relation is not between two parties on an equal footing but is dominated by the European side. Those newly arrived who are struggling to establish a place for their religion are always in a structurally disadvantaged situation with respect to those occupants who define the conditions for admission.

The construction of the 'Muslim Other' has been analysed again and again and therefore need only be briefly mentioned here. Today, it relies primarily on two areas which are considered central to the European community of values. First, there is a suspicion of an inability to embrace democracy and of incomplete enlightenment. It is insinuated that separation of politics and religion is essentially foreign to Islam. The second large area concerns equality of men and women. The Islamic family is seen as a hotbed of authoritarianism, patriarchy, misogyny and domestic violence, as the exact counter model to the 'egalitarian' and 'liberated' European family. Though Islam is principally accorded value as a world religion, at the individual level most Europeans have trouble imagining what valuable contributions Islam could make to European civil society or what Europeans could learn from Islam. Here, distrust is coupled with fear about their own identity; many Europeans are afraid of growing Muslim influence. Perhaps it will help to quote one such perspective, as it comes from a Social Democratic politician with a generally positive position on migration:

I think the question of Islam and Islam classes alike, something I sense as a politician, provokes great fears and concerns in the population. You can sense that in particular when you take part in discussions in Berlin neighborhoods.

moralischen grammatik sozialer konflikte, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1992; and A.G. Düttmann, *Zwischen den kulturen. Spannungen im kampf um anerkennung*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1997.

There are, to formulate it crassly, concerns that Islam, people of Islamic religion in Germany, when they go into the schools, may somehow slowly change the art and nature of our culture, which is completely western.¹⁸

These patterns of thinking determine the debate on very disparate levels. A basic suspicion expressed in most debates on the admission of Turkey to the EU is that the Judeo-Christian value system is incompatible with the Islamic one. The generalised suspicion that Islam is prone to fundamentalism has intensified since September 11. However, it may well be especially decisive that the discourse on alteration has profoundly marked reality in the education system in at least some European countries.¹⁹

All of the above leads to a widespread feeling among the second generation that they are doubly discriminated against, both as immigrants and as Muslims. Europeans would sooner or later come to terms with the immigration of secular Turks or Arabs, but not with the immigration of professing Muslims, a young Muslim of the second generation told me.²⁰

Yet, this debasement would be less problematic if it were not connected with a difference of power separating new arrivals from occupants. This is a matter of demands made by a minority which must be pushed through against prevailing assumptions and wrung from a sceptical majority and often against that majority's opposition. On its own, this would not be so problematic. However, in contrast with many other minorities, Muslims confront an astonishing societal solidarity against them. Unlike other questions concerning immigrants, the Muslim situation has no coalition partner on the left. On the contrary, as far as Islam is concerned, the objections from the left, fed by a mixture of secularism and feminism, are often more intense than those from the right. Thus, many Muslims often feel they are running head-on into a wall when they raise demands, beginning with the construction of mosques, which must be pushed through against the explicit opposition of the neighbourhood and sometimes of the state authorities, continuing with the right to wear Islamic clothing to school or at work, up to the desire that their limits of modesty be respected in swimming and gym

¹⁸ Klaus Böger, Senator for School, Youth-Affairs and Sport, quoted in: Senatsverwaltung für schule, jugend und sport, (ed.), *Islamischer religionsunterricht an Berliner schulen – probleme, fragen, antworten*, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung: Berlin, 2000, p. 4.

¹⁹ Schiffauer et al., *Civil enculturation*.

²⁰ The picture would, however, be incomplete if one did not also observe that the first immigrant generation fashioned equally distorted images of the West. 'European culture' was constructed as the inversion of their own Islamic-Turkish culture, a hotbed of sexual permissiveness, alcohol and drug abuse, and decayed family ties.

classes. In all these areas, Muslims experience scepticism, reserve, and not infrequently opposition to their demands. It is not at all unusual that they are put off by state agencies despite clear legal requirements, or that they attain their clear legal rights only after long and wearying court battles. The confrontation with power in such disputes also frequently means an encounter precisely with the power of definition. In such disputes, they as Muslims must often tolerate non-Muslims classifying and judging their request, and even themselves, according to whether they conform to the 'true humane Islam' or are 'perverted by fundamentalism'.

It is my thesis that, under the conditions described above, the search for recognition must almost by necessity lead to an agonising conflict-oriented *fight for recognition*. The relation between power and opposing power becomes central in such situations. It makes the development of an identity impossible which is not constantly under pressure to define itself in opposition. Before we turn to the material, we must first briefly sketch out the problem.²¹

The search for recognition is connected with a precarious relationship between same and equal, on the one hand, and other and different, on the other. One wishes to be recognised as equal, because every expression of inequality means exclusion and discrimination. Yet one also wishes to be perceived as something special and unique, or at least to be respected in one's difference. It is clear that tension is present in this double desire for recognition. Indeed, it may well be something impossible to achieve. No sooner is one seen as different and special, than the problem of equality arises; and no sooner is one treated as an equal, than the question arises about the right to be different, the dismay that the dissimilar is handled as similar. This is sometimes raised as a paradox;²² I would not go that far. The relation between equality and difference is indeed unproblematic when the special meets with recognition or at least well-meaning openness and curiosity. That is the case when, as Charles Taylor²³ put it, one's contact with other cultures is based on the assumption that each

²¹ It is not possible, in the framework of this text, to go into all questions that have been discussed in the extensive socio-philosophical literature on the problem of power and recognition. Especially important here are E. Goffman, *Stigma*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1980; H. Bhabha, 'Remembering Fanon: self, psyche and the colonial condition', in P. Williams and Laura Chrisman (eds.), *Colonial discourse and post-colonial theory. A reader*, Hemel Hempstead: Harvester 1993, p. 112–23. J. Butler, *The psychic life of power: theories in subjection*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997, F. Fanon, *Die verdammten dieser erde*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1981.

²² eg. by Düttmann, *Zwischen den kulturen*.

²³ Taylor, 'Politik der anerkennung'.

individual culture has a value (which does not mean according to Taylor that one must ultimately reach the same conclusion). Zen Buddhism, for example, enjoys basic recognition in Europe and certain practices growing out of this background can count on a basically positive reaction from a large portion of the public.²⁴ Someone who belongs to this religious group can play out his uniqueness without the question of equality ever arising. When things are not seen this way, as in the case of conservative Islam, the recognition of difference and the recognition of equality enter into an almost irresolvable dilemma. For then, emphasis on uniqueness occurs at the expense of equality, and vice versa. Emphasis on uniqueness is then no longer viewed as a special or possible contribution to the 'value system', but as a violation of its principles. The next step, exclusion, is then easy to take. With this schema, one easily takes the position that the search for recognition per se is misguided because it leads nowhere.

This sketch must suffice here. The argument allows us to approach the identity dilemmas of the second generation in its confrontation with European society. To drive the point home, European societies make it almost impossible to avoid convolutions, distortions, or self-denials when a Muslim living in Europe seeks to define him or herself as a European Muslim. I would like to demonstrate this by examining the ideal-typical identity options the second generation has developed in their confrontation with European society. In Weberian tradition, I shall let the positions themselves comment on and criticise each other. It should thereby become clear that each position can be read as an answer to the difficulties resulting from the other positions, only to lead to another dead end.

Option 1: The struggle for equality

Perhaps the most obvious demand of a religious minority is the struggle for equality and equal rights. The demand that one's own voice must be taken just as seriously as those of others refers to individual participation in an open civil society. These individual rights include an 'equal treatment, directed by the citizens themselves, of their identity ensuring contexts of life', as Jürgen Habermas put it.²⁵ Indeed, one has the impression that the supporters of this position largely share Habermas'

²⁴ See among others Sigrid Klinkhammer, *Moderne Formen islamischer Lebensführung*, Marburg: Diagonal 2000, p. 253.

²⁵ J. Habermas, 'Anerkennungskämpfe im demokratischen Rechtsstaat', in C. Taylor (ed.), *Multikulturalismus und die Politik der Anerkennung*, Frankfurt/Main: Fischer, 1992, p. 158.

dream when one examines their statements for an implicit ideal of society. This position places the struggle against discrimination, against any form of unequal treatment, in the foreground.

This position is especially plausible for Muslims who regard Islam as a private matter, a matter between the individual and God: in other words, for Muslims who feel somehow close to the *DİTİB*. Aylin Gençel's²⁶ description of such a family is illustrative. The family members profess a 'conscious' Islam. By that they mean an Islam to which one turns by one's own decision and above all an Islam that one acquires individually and independently. The 'conscious' Islam is contrasted with a traditional ('village') Islam taken over from one's parents without reflecting and examining very much on one's own. The family members deduce from their individual devotion to God that there is no compulsion in Islam. 'And it is also not so that one forces the other to anything. Why do I pray the namaz? For my own peace of mind. Why do I fast? I don't fast for you, my mother, the children, or my husband. No, I fast for myself.'²⁷ In family practice, women with traditional veils and women without veils live together, the older members pray regularly, the younger ones don't. The children are sent to Koran class, but the family also tolerates it if a daughter marries a non-Muslim. Such families are sceptical about too strong a position for Islamic communities. They see them as institutions that principally position themselves between the individual and society and often make directorial claims. They accuse the community members of trusting authority too much, of blindly following the imams without thinking for themselves. According to them the dogmatism which reigns in the communities is not compatible with their form of the individual learning of faith.

The ideal of an individual reader formulated here is widespread, even if many would admit that they, unfortunately, do not have time to put it into practice. This goes along with a mutual respect for different readings of Islam. This all serves as a prerequisite for Islam to develop further in a way that fits modernity, which is also the prerequisite for demonstrating the importance of Islam's contribution to modernity. 'The West lags behind the Koran, but we lag behind the West'; this popularly used figure of speech expresses this idea quite well.

For this vision of an individualised religious practice to develop into a convincing model, however, it would be necessary for the aforementioned problem of power and discrimination to be resolved. European

²⁶ A. Gençel, 'Images of Islam in the diaspora – an ethnographic study of a Turkish family in Berlin'. Unpublished Master thesis, Fakultät für Kulturwissenschaften. Europa-Universität Viadrina Frankfurt Oder (2003).

²⁷ *ibid.* 44.

societies would have to accept Islam as a voice to be taken seriously. This would require, among other things, a willingness to accept Habermas' demand to separate the universal contents of constitutions from local and particularistic traditions, assuming that such is possible at all.²⁸ In principle, British society, with its attempts to redefine Britishness, has gone further in this than any other European country. In the continental societies, such trends are hardly visible.

This vision of an 'individualised Islam' is closely related to the school of 'liberal' reformism. According to Tariq Ramadan this school is characterised by a strong emphasis on rationality and on the prime value attached to the individual. Adherents of this school express the opinion that because of historical development, Koran and *sunna* cannot be taken as the basis for social conduct any more, and that applied reasoning has to formulate the criteria for social behaviour.²⁹ This type of Islam would accept a pluralism of norms and values and accept individualised paths to the truth. This vision however can only fully develop if the problem of power and discrimination is solved. If this is not the case this position will easily be associated with self-denial, assimilation and weakness. Islam has to be accepted as a voice which has to be taken seriously by European societies if this school is to flourish. This would imply living up to the demand formulated by Habermas to emphasise the universalist contents of the constitutions and not their local and particularist background.

The experience of exclusion and powerlessness confronts supporters of an 'individualised Islam' with the problem of having to fight for their positions. As we shall see in the presentation of the next position, this would, however, mean having to sacrifice some of their basic principles. If they are not prepared to do so, it leads to a rather resigned withdrawal. They then live their Islam in private, as does the family Aylin Gençel described. There, they live in a nearly perfect Turkish world (with a decidedly urban character). They live in Berlin and maintain functional relations with German society. They categorically reject any and all demands to conform:

Well, as for conforming . . . Why should I be obliged to conform? OK, as far as the language is concerned, I can understand . . . But as far as work and living are concerned, and what do I know to what degree I should conform. I don't know, but when I hear that, I feel resistance in myself.³⁰

²⁸ Habermas, 'Anerkennungskämpfe', p. 166.

²⁹ T. Ramadan, *Muslimsein in Europa*, Marburg: MSV, 2001, p. 300.

³⁰ Unpublished interview by A. Gençel 2002.

Option 2: The struggle for the right to difference

Supporters of the second position, labelled 'collectivist committed', start at precisely this point. They consider the individualised position hopeless. Is it really realistic to believe one can live out and maintain his difference in his private space? Hasn't one then already lost from the very outset? This would mean hiding Islam like some sort of stigma of which one must be ashamed. It is clear that European society could easily live with individualised Muslims. Then it does not even have to deal with Islam and will therefore not change. With respect to recognition, in standing up for one's right to wear a veil, for example, one makes no progress this way. A girl with a veil will simply remain isolated. It is therefore necessary to struggle for a public position for Islam. Islamic spaces must be created. Islam must become an accepted way of life in European society. People must come to take Islamic clothing just as much for granted as they do a necklace with a crucifix. An Islamic girl must be able to wear her veil with confidence and pride. Only then will Islamic dress be perceived as something special and no longer as only different, an otherness that one must exclude. In short, while supporters of the first position start with the demand for equality, collectivist committed Muslims put the primary focus on the right to difference and derive from it the demand for equality. They insist on being different and having a right to be different, and they expect the majority society to show respect for this difference. The fight for collective rights for the religious community is central to this position.

Only through collective effort does one have a chance to win the struggle for rights. In contrast, one is lost as an individual. From this point of view, supporters of this position tend from the very beginning to stress solidarity more strongly than do the supporters of the first position. As in other groups as well, community building seems a possible form of resistance politics. What Paul Gilroy notes for 'black Britain' also applies to Islamic communities:

Community, therefore, signifies not just a distinctive political ideology but a particular set of values and norms in everyday life: mutuality, cooperation, identification and symbiosis. For black Britain, all these are centrally defined by the need to escape and transform the forms of subordination which bring 'races' into being.³¹

A strong emphasis on the significance of community life is the conclusion from this. A lively Islam without a lively community life seems

³¹ Gilroy, *Urban social movements*, p. 414.

unthinkable for the collectivists; in the individualised position, they see a pale imitation of a spiritually inspired (*şuurlu*) Islam.

As Anthony P. Cohen³² has shown, community construction requires the construction of symbols on which one has agreed and with which one delineates the boundaries of the collective identity. For collectivist Islam, body symbolism is central. By means of clothing, especially for women, a strong symbol of the difference to the majority society, and to individualised Islam as well, is created. The marker is especially the 'turban', the special form of Islamic veiling that, in Turkey, arose after 1980 and which is clearly distinguished from the traditional veil.³³ This symbol generally stands for a profession of Islamic familialism. What however may appear homogeneous from the outside (and also in self-perception) turns out to be very heterogeneous upon closer observation. As in all other communities, the dress codes provide a commonality of *form*, but much less commonality of content. Thus, one can demonstrate that there are many hidden motives behind the decision to wear the turban,³⁴ which can sometimes be combined, but can also sometimes be separated. The turban can stand for criticism of Western sexual morals and in particular promiscuity, for an ascetic bodily technique, or for a perceived need to profess Islam openly. Especially interesting, and important for our purposes, are contexts in which wearing the turban becomes a prerequisite for argumentative rebellion. This is the case with committed feminist Muslims. At one *Milli Görüş* event, for example, several female speakers took stands clearly and massively against domestic violence and against arranged marriages, and called for women to be active in public life and, to make that possible, for men to participate in housework. It was quite clear that these arguments went too far for many of the men present. Yet the symbolic clarity the women produced with their clothing forced the men to deal with their demands. After the basic point of loyalty was settled one could get down to business with all the more pressure.

A collectivist position is closely related to neo-orthodoxy or *Salafi* Reformism (Ramadan). The emphasis on strong ties to the communities has often a legalist touch. This however is not static. In its self-description it aims at a balance between rationality and revelation. By *ijtihad* one tries

³² A. P. Cohen, *The symbolic construction of community*, London, New York: Routledge, 1985.

³³ N. Göle, *Republik und schleier. Die muslimische frau in der modernen Türkei*. (Berlin: Babel Verlag, 1995).

³⁴ J. Jouili, 'Islamische weibliche identitäten in der diaspora: frauen maghrebinischer und türkischer herkunft in Deutschland und Frankreich'. Application for a PhD thesis, Europa-Universität Frankfurt/Oder (2001).

to find legally correct solutions for the new challenges of the life in Europe. The struggle for the right to difference corresponds to a religious orientation toward the law as it was revealed to Muhammed (as the necessity to insist on the difference is derived from it) and at the same time to accept the necessity of taking into account the new circumstances of a life in Europe when putting religious law into practice. The aim is to maintain Muslim identity and ritual practice, to recognise the European constitutions and to engage oneself in the country in which one lives.³⁵

Such community building is not infrequently accompanied by a strong emphasis on group solidarity. Anyone fighting for collective rights tends to see an important aspect in the development of a counter force in internal unity. As a rule, internal criticism, especially of the community leadership, falls by the wayside. Intense social control is often accompanied by sanctioning of outsiders and dropouts. For fear of exclusion, contradiction is often not publicly formulated, but at best expressed behind one another's backs. It would be a misunderstanding to reduce this to some kind of control from above. This control indeed comes from below and is quite voluntarily exercised, namely by community members who see a guarantee for the cohesion of the community in an intact leadership. In such situations, to borrow Bourdieu's formulation, one of the 'genuine political modes' – in this case the independent formation of one's own opinion – is withdrawn in favour of the other one, the delegation of authority, i.e. the 'choice of speakers and authorities in the sense of a decision for certain ideas, convictions, designs, programmes, plans, which, because incarnated in their reality and credibility in personalities, indeed also depend on the reality and credibility of these "personalities"'.³⁶ The symbolic construction of community and the sanctioning of deviance lend this position a decidedly 'orthodox' imprint.

This tendency to 'defer oneself' seems to be connected with the insight that individualisation represents an important mechanism for a regime to execute discipline.³⁷ The profession of individuality, of independent formation of opinions, can under certain circumstances weaken a cause because it contributes to the isolation, surveillance and individualisation of the individual subject.

Yet here, the dilemmas surrounding collective self-assertion become clear. It arose to build up a counter force in the face of powerlessness and discrimination. Nonetheless, there is a problematic tendency to

³⁵ Ramadan, *Muslimsein in Europa*, p. 298.

³⁶ P. Bourdieu, *Die feinen unterschiede. Kritik der gesellschaftlichen urteilkraft*, Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1982 p. 665. Examples from the communist party, *ibid.* p. 667.

³⁷ M. Foucault, *Überwachen und strafen. Die geburt des gefängnisses*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1991.

copy the power structures on the inside, and all the more markedly the greater the pressure of the society that one is reacting to. Precisely this lets these communities easily become sites of internal authoritarianism. Neo-orthodoxy's very 'trust in authority' frequently appears problematic to supporters of an individualised Islam. On the other hand, according to supporters of neo-orthodox Islam, the individualists' position leads to surrender of self.

Option 3: The rejection of the struggle for recognition

The third position to be found among Muslims of the second generation can be characterised as an anti-hegemonic position. It reproaches both the individualised and the collectivist positions for their search for recognition, whether in the form of recognition of equality or of difference, because it always leads to a dead end. This position is extremely sensitive to the problem of power and identity, as has most clearly been developed by subject-theoretical thinkers.³⁸

As soon as one seeks *any* recognition from the antagonistically oriented society, whether recognition as an equal or as different, one has already surrendered. For then one abandons to the other – to someone who does not belong to the community – the power of defining who is considered a good and who is considered a bad Muslim. This is not only offensive, but also a spiral at whose end lies self-denial because one has ultimately subjected oneself to the value judgements of the other religion. What, however, ask the supporters of this position, legitimates the majority society to usurp the role of judge over Islam at all? Certainly not moral superiority. Indeed, one of the central themes of the magazine *D.I.A.* ['The Islamic Alternative'], which is published by the Caliphate State³⁹ and provides a forum for the revolutionary variant of this position, is to attack the West's moral self-righteousness. What society produced fascism and colonialism and committed genocide against the Jews? The violence characteristic of the West throughout its history, according to the supporters of this position, is today primarily directed against Islam. Israel, Chechnya, Afghanistan and Iraq are again and again raised as examples of imperialist policy. The aim of this policy, they say, is to crush the only voice that opposes the globally valid hegemonic discourse. Anyone who tries to come to terms with the hegemonic power (or to settle down in its shadow), as do the individualists and the neo-orthodox, will

³⁸ Butler, *The psychic life of power*.

³⁹ The magazine appeared from 2001 to 2003, when it was closed down due to increased police pressure.

ultimately squander Islam's potential to be a radical alternative. This can also not be theologically justified. One must maintain the absolute non-negotiability of Islamic positions.

This anti-hegemonic position is related to ultra-orthodoxy. It emphasises purity and authenticity and sets itself apart from positions which are less puristic. The boundaries which are drawn vis-à-vis majority society are also drawn vis-à-vis other Muslims. They are criticised for accepting the rules of the game and betraying Islam. Boundary drawing to the outside produces dogmatism and a tendency to sanction all deviance. This position has a revolutionary and a quietist variant. The revolutionary variant, as represented by communities like the Caliphate State and similar movements,⁴⁰ insists on a revolution in the Islamic world in order to restore the true and pure Islam. These dreamers of a radical global restructuring see Europe as a base for their struggle. Among the Turkish population, the quietist variant is mainly represented by the *Süleymaniye* Community.⁴¹ The ultra-orthodox quietists differ from the orthodox communities in their understanding of *tağdid* (resumption): The former interpret resumption as revival, which requires a return to the origins and strict observance, whereas the latter interpret it as renewal. They emphasise the need for reinterpretation in order to answer the challenges of present society.⁴²

The two other positions decisively criticise the ultra-orthodox position. According to the criticism of an individualised Islam, this position is unrealistic. It is an illusion to think one could opt out of society. Indeed, the anti-hegemonic position denies that living as Muslims in European society means, as Stuart Hall put it, that 'they are irrevocably the product of several interlocking histories and cultures, belonging at one and the same time to several "homes" (and to no one particular "home")'.⁴³ One might also point out that the ultra orthodox are (at least to a certain degree) deceiving themselves in their emphasis on cultural purity and religious absolutism. As has repeatedly been shown,⁴⁴ the proactive revolutionary ultra-orthodox deal with their own

⁴⁰ For example, the *Hizb-al Tahrir*, which have been particularly active in Great Britain and recently also in Germany. S. T. Farouki, *A fundamentalist quest: Hizb-al Tahrir and the search for an Islamic caliphate*, London: Grey Seal, 1996.

⁴¹ Among migrants with Arab or south Asian background in France and Britain, the *Tablighi* movement is the most influential quietist ultra-orthodox community.

⁴² G. Jonker, *Eine wellenlänge zu Gott: der verband der islamischen kulturzentren in Europa*, Bielefeld: Transcript; 2002, p. 179.

⁴³ Stuart Hall. 'The question of cultural identity', in Stuart Hall, David Held and Tony McGrew (eds.), *Modernity and its futures*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992, p. 310.

⁴⁴ A. Al-Azmeh, *Islams and modernities*, London: Routledge, 1993; G. Kepel, *Les banlieues de l'Islam*, Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1987; W. Schiffauer, 'Islamism in the diaspora. The fascination of political Islam among second generation German Turks',

tradition with the know-how they have acquired at European schools and universities. This has a lasting impact on their language and style of thinking. This becomes most apparent when their choice of wording and their positions take up the rhetoric of the radical Left, sometimes down to the last detail. As anybody else, the ultra orthodox are, as Hall puts it, 'irrevocable translators'.

The second criticism from representatives of an individualised Islam concerns the sectarian intolerance of supporters of the revolutionary anti-hegemonic position. An emphasis on purity and authenticity is indeed usually accompanied by a clear policy of exclusion of less pure positions. The ultra orthodox not only draw a border between themselves and the majority society, but also between themselves and other Muslims whom they accuse of getting involved in the system and thus betraying Islam. This demarcation between them and the outside produces an inward dogmatism and places sanctions on all possible deviations from the pure and true faith.⁴⁵ Precisely this tendency towards separation and intolerance appears to other Muslims as a contradiction of Islam's commandment of unity and the principle of openness connected with it.

The collectivist neo-orthodox Muslims would agree with the individualists' criticism in part; however, they would also criticise anti-hegemonic politics for being completely illusory. It would be positively counter-productive for any policies to attempt to create a space for Islam. Ultimately, anti-hegemonic politics would only play into the hands of Islam's enemies.

Ultra-orthodox Muslims gladly counter this criticism with a reference to God's will. God simply cannot want a portion of the faithful to become Westernised and another portion of the faithful to relinquish important positions simply to get on the good side of Islam's enemies. From this perspective, one can hope that God will support those who take God's revelation seriously.

Figure 5.2 lists the three positions of diaspora Islam of the second generation and summarises the criticism.

Supporters of an individualised Islam criticise orthodoxy for its authoritarianism. Authoritarianism contradicts individualised Muslims' conceptions of a 'conscious' Islam that does not accept direction from authorities but is instead characterised by individual and critical learning

Oxford: Transnational Communities Programme – Working Paper Series, <http://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk>, 1999; W. Schiffauer, *Die gottesmänner. Türkische Islamisten in Deutschland. Eine studie zur herstellung religiöser evidenz*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2000.

⁴⁵ Schiffauer, *Gottesmänner*, especially pp. 155–203.




Figure 5.2 The three positions of diaspora Islam. The texts summarise the criticisms of each position. The direction of the criticism is shown by the arrowheads.

of the scriptures. They criticise ultra-orthodoxy for its sectarian and intolerant spirit, which contradicts what they consider the core of Islam: namely engagement for peace, tolerance and openness.

Supporters of neo-orthodoxy criticise individualised Islam, on the other hand, for its ‘liberalism’ where ‘anything goes’. Individualised religious practice, the neo-orthodox argue, ultimately leads to conformity, loss of self and dissolution. They criticise ultra orthodoxy above all for its unrealistic political stance, in addition to its sectarianism. Ultra-orthodoxy’s politics would ultimately make a politics of positioning in Europe completely impossible.

Supporters of ultra-orthodoxy criticise individualised Islam for its ‘Westernisation’. For them, the positions taken by the individualists have nothing to do with Islam anymore. Profession of a private religion would correspond to Christianity, but not to Islam. Though orthodoxy principally opposes these phenomena of dissolution, it nonetheless submits to the definitive authority of non-Muslims. The ultra-orthodox say the orthodox will sooner or later assume positions that have nothing to do with Islam.

Each of these positions has its own inner logic, and is entangled in contradictions that the other positions mention. My interest was to show that this contradictory nature reflects the inner turmoil of the migration situation and the devaluation Islam experiences in Europe. This leads to an extremely unstable situation. One does not hold one position for good but rather moves from one position to the next. Much depends on the attitude wider society takes vis-à-vis the Muslim community. Exclusion and discrimination will strengthen the ultra-orthodox positions which emphasise that a dignified Islamic life is only possible within an Islamic state and society.

The reception of diaspora Islam in the communities

The second generation's three positions have not (yet) achieved any organisational form, as is the case with corresponding communities of the Jewish diaspora. Much more, there are supporters of all positions in all communities that were established in the first years of migration to Europe. In each community, there are individuals with individualised, orthodox and ultra-orthodox opinions, if in varying proportions. The individualised stance is primarily to be found in the *DİTİB*, and indeed because of this community's avowed profession of an Islam that views religion as a private matter between man and God. The orthodox collectivist committed position, on the other hand, is mostly to be found in the *Milli Görüş*. The ultra-orthodox anti-hegemonic position is represented in the Caliphate State. So while the attitude toward Turkey still remains decisive on the level *between* the organisations, *within* the communities (usually), members of the second generation support positions they developed with reference to the host society. Thus a complex web pattern is woven which also offers the possibility for new coalitions.

The organisations have reacted to this shift in religious 'demand' in varying degrees. The *DİTİB*, which as far as its adherents are concerned could actually be the natural trustee of an individualised Islam, has failed so far with regard to the development of convincing positions of a diasporic Islam. This is because of its character as a state agency and its close ties with the Turkish state. This makes it more difficult for it to develop its own positions in reaction to developments in Europe. It is typical that in 2000, when lively discussions about the establishment of religion courses in Berlin's schools took place, the *DİTİB* found itself unable to participate in the debates. In central questions, such as whether the courses should be in Turkish or German, the organisation was not able to reach a consensus.

In contrast, a change in leadership has occurred in the *Milli Görüş* since the mid-1990s. Leading positions have been systematically filled with members of the second generation, who grew up in Europe. Since then, the top leaders of the *Milli Görüş* have attempted to develop an orthodox diaspora Islam. They have declared the Turkey-related conflicts that divided the communities in the 1970s and 80s to be outdated. Today's task is to create a place for Islam in European public life. In this connection, the community began to make a name for itself with a series of remarkable positions. It advocated courses in Islam in the German language, started a campaign among its adherents for them to acquire German citizenship, and issued statements encouraging the faithful to

send their children (boys as well as girls) to German educational institutions, especially to the higher secondary schools (Gymnasiums). In internal discussions, they tried to determine the role of Islam in the constitutional secular state, their relationship to Christianity, and the role of women in Islam. The difference between diaspora and exile Islam was explicitly driven home when Mehmet Sabri Erbakan, who was the organisation's chairperson from 1999 to 2002, proclaimed in his inaugural address that Muslims in Europe have a privileged situation, because 90 per cent of all Muslims live in conditions of state oppression, material misery, or war. The privilege enjoyed by European Muslims, he said, entails a responsibility towards Islam throughout the world. In the *Milli Görüş*, the impression one gets concerning the development of a diaspora Islam is the opposite of the one created by the situation in the *DİTİB*. While the *DİTİB* lags behind developments in the communities, the leadership of the *Milli Görüş* is on the front line in these developments. At times, one got the impression that the compromises made in an effort to establish itself as an interlocutor went too far for the community's first generation.⁴⁶ The leadership emphasises its growing independence from the Turkish parent party, the current Party of Well-Being (*Saadet Partisi*, SP).

The ultra-orthodox positions are represented above all in the Caliphate State (revolutionary variant) and in the *Süleymancı* community (quietist variant). The Caliphate State, in spite of its prohibition in Germany in December, 2001, is still active. The Caliphate State stands for an Islamist revolutionary pan-Islamism. The dream of its founder, Cemalettin Kaplan, was an Islamic revolution in Turkey, the re-establishment of the Caliphate, and through it the worldwide re-establishment of 'authentic Islam'. In the Turkish Language Association newspaper *Ümmet-i Muhammed* ('The Community of Mohammed'; renamed *Asr-i Saadet* ['The Age of Bliss'] after the prohibition of the community in Germany in 2001), the worldwide repression of Islam is portrayed with special attention to Turkey. Europe plays hardly any role at all in this newspaper; the choice of topics has much more to do with those of a global Islam. This is totally different in the German-language monthly publication *D.I.A.* (*Der Islam als Alternative*, or 'Islam as an Alternative'). The sequence of topics handled alone demonstrates the development of

⁴⁶ Given the leadership crisis in the *Milli Görüş*, it remains to be seen how this development will continue. The charismatic Mehmet Sabri Erbakan resigned in October 2002, officially for reasons of health, but, according to a report in the newspaper *Hürriyet*, because of an affair. His successor, Yavuz Celik Karahan, respected for his theological competence in the communities, is continuing his policies. Yet rumors have arisen that he, too, is involved in a scandal.

an anti-hegemonic position in dealing with Europe. With 'Protection of the five basic values', 'People with rights/People without rights', 'Foreigner', 'Jihad', 'Global Capitalism', and 'Nationalism', the articles address issues that play a central role in European debates. In the *Süleymanci* community, members of the second generation attempted an opening toward society between 1998 and 2000: a move that would have ultimately led the community closer to orthodox positions. These developments were stopped when a leadership change occurred in Turkey in 2000. Ahmed Arif Denizoglu, who now heads the transnational organisation, accused the Muslim communities of Europe of investing their energies in the founding of academies for inter-religious dialogue and neglecting their central task (teaching children in the classical Islamic sciences).⁴⁷

Outlook

As a rule, in discussions on this subject the development of a European Islam is associated with the assimilation of Islam; European Islam will be 'our' Islam, open to negotiation, tolerance and open-mindedness. The aim of this text was to show that such a development is unlikely under conditions of de facto discrimination. Even individualised Islam (which still has the most similarities to the European phantasm) will, in view of the European stance, maintain its resistance, even if this resistance may often be hardly visible since it is expressed through withdrawal. Alongside that, collectivist orthodox and anti-hegemonic ultra-orthodox positions will further develop. There is no such thing as *the* European Islam, but instead a multiplicity of voices implicitly or explicitly dealing with the situating of Islam with reference to Europe, to the homeland, and to global Islam. Yet, there are not only numerous voices, but there are also the dynamics of a process-based nature. This results from the fact that every position developed in search for situation in Europe brings its own problems along with it. But these problems are but thorns that drive the search further.

And yet with all this, this text has not delved into a special source of religious pluralism in Europe. When we have talked about 'Europe' here, we have indulged in a problematic over-generalisation. Actually, the migrants are confronted with very different political cultures in Europe. While the exile Islam of the first generation developed very similar positions throughout Europe, because on the whole it turned its back on Europe, this no longer applies for the positions of the second

⁴⁷ Jonker, *Wellenlänge*, p. 136ff.

generation. The differences between individualised, collectivist orthodox, and anti-hegemonic ultra-orthodox Muslims will in all probability develop differently in England than in France; and in The Netherlands, differently than they will in Germany. The gradual replacement of Turkish, as the language in which the debates are conducted, by the language of the country inhabited will drive this diversification yet further. European Islam, then, will not only continue to have a multiplicity of voices, but it will indeed have an *increasing* multiplicity of voices.

Bibliography

- Al-Azmeh, Aziz, *Islams and modernities*, London: Routledge, 1993.
- Anderson, Benedict, *Long-distance nationalism: world capitalism and the rise of identity politics*, Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam Centre for Asian Studies (= The Wertheim Lecture 1992).
- Atacan, Fulya, *Kutsal Gök. Radikal İslamci bir grubun anatomisi*, Ankara: Baglam Yayincilik, 1993.
- Bauman, Zygmunt, *Modernity and ambivalence*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991.
- Berger, Peter L., *Zur dialektik von religion und gesellschaft*, Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1967/1973.
- Bhabha, Homi, 'Remembering Fanon: Self, psyche and the colonial condition', in Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman (eds.), *Colonial discourse and post-colonial theory. A reader*, Hemel Hempstead: Harvester, 1993, 112–23.
- Bourdieu, Pierre, *Die feinen Unterschiede. Kritik der gesellschaftlichen Urteilskraft*, Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1982.
- Butler, Judith, *The psychic life of power: theories in subjection*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997.
- Çağlar, Ayşe, 'Encountering the State in migration driven transnational fields: Turkish immigrants in Europe', unpublished Habilitation thesis, FU Berlin, 2003.
- Clifford, James, 'On ethnographic allegory', in James Clifford and George E. Marcus (eds.), *Writing culture. The poetics and politics of ethnography*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986, 98–121.
- Cohen, Anthony P., *The symbolic construction of community*, London and New York: Routledge, 1985.
- Düttmann, Alexander G., *Zwischen den kulturen. Spannungen im kampf um anerkennung*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1997.
- Fanon, Frantz, *Die verdammten dieser Erde*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1981.
- Farouki, Suah Taji, *A fundamentalist quest: Hizb-al Tahrir and the search for an Islamic caliphate*, London: Grey Seal, 1996.
- Foucault, Michel, *Überwachen und strafen. Die geburt des gefängnisses*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1991.
- Gençel, Aylın, 'Images of Islam in the diaspora – an ethnographic study of a Turkish family in Berlin', Unpublished Master thesis, Fakultät für Kulturwissenschaften, Europa-Universität, Frankfurt Oder, 2003.

- Gilroy, Paul, 'Urban social movements, "race" and community', in Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman (eds.), *Colonial discourse and post-colonial theory. A reader*, Hemel Hempstead: Harvester, 1993, 404–20.
- Goffman, Erving, *Stigma*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1963/1980.
- Göe, Nilüfer, *Republik und Schleier. Die muslimische Frau in der modernen Türkei*, Berlin: Babel Verlag, 1995.
- Greve, Martin, *Die musik der imaginären Türkei. musik und musikleben im kontext der migration aus der türkei nach deutschland*, Stuttgart/Weimar: Metzler-Verlag, 2003.
- Habermas, Jürgen, 'Anerkennungskämpfe im demokratischen Rechtsstaat', in Charles Taylor, *Multikulturalismus und die politik der anerkennung*, Frankfurt/Main: Fischer, 1992, 147–96.
- Hall, Stuart, 'The question of cultural identity', in Stuart Hall, David Held and Tony McGrew, *Modernity and its futures*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992.
- Hirschman, Albert O., *Exit, voice and loyalty*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970.
- Honneth, Axel, *Kampf um anerkennung. Zur moralischen grammatik sozialer konflikte*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1992.
- Jonker, Gerdien, *Eine wellenlänge zu Gott: Der verband der islamischen kulturzentren in Europa*, Bielefeld: Transcript, 2002.
- Jouili, Jeanette, *Islamische weibliche identitäten in der Diaspora: Frauen maghrebinischer und türkischer Herkunft in Deutschland und Frankreich*, application for a PhD thesis. Europa-Universität, Frankfurt Oder, 2001.
- Kepel, Gilles, *Les banlieues de l'Islam*, Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1987.
- Klinkhammer, Grit, *Moderne Formen islamischer Lebensführung*, Marburg: Diagonal, 2000.
- Ramadan, Tariq, *Die Muslime im Westen*, Marburg: MSV Verlag, 2001.
- Mumcu, Ugur, *Rabita*, Istanbul: Tekin, 1987.
- Schiffauer, Werner, 'Migration and religiousness', in Lithman Gerholm (ed.), *The new Islamic presence in Western Europe*, London: Mansell Pub. Ltd, 1988.
- Die Migranten aus Subay. Türken in Deutschland: Eine Ethnographie*, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1991.
- 'Islam as a civil religion: political culture and the organization of diversity in Germany', in Tariq Modood and Pnina Werbner (eds.), *The politics of multiculturalism in the new Europe*, London and New York: Zed Books, 1997a.
- 'Islamic vision and social reality – the political culture of Sunni Turkish Muslims in Germany', in S. Vertovec and C. Peach (eds.), *Islam in Europe – the politics of religion and community*, London: Macmillan, 1997b.
- Islamism in the diaspora. The fascination of political Islam among second generation German Turks*, Oxford, 1999.
- Die Gottesmänner. Türkische Islamisten in Deutschland. Eine Studie zur Herstellung religiöser Evidenz*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2000.
- Schiffauer, Werner, Gerd Baumann, Riva Kastoryano, and Steven Vertovec, (eds.), *Staat–schule–ethnizität*. Münster: Waxmann Verlag, 2002.
- Civil enculturation: nation-state, schools and ethnic difference in the Netherlands, Britain, Germany and France*, New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2004.

- Senatsverwaltung für Schule, Jugend und Sport, (ed.), *Islamischer religionsunterricht an Berliner schulen – probleme, fragen, antworten*. Podiumsdiskussion am 29.3.2000 in der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Berlin, 2000.
- Seufert, Günter, *Café Istanbul. Alltag, religion und politik in der modernen Türkei*, München: Beck, 1997.
- Taylor, Charles, 'Die politik der anerkennung', in Charles Taylor (ed.), *multikulturalismus und die politik der anerkennung*. Frankfurt/Main: Fischer, 1992, 13–78.