

## HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE BODY

It is often assumed that a phenomenological analysis of the body and the embodied subjectivity was only undertaken relatively late, namely in Sartre's *L'être et le néant* (1943) and in Merleau-Ponty's *Phénoménologie de la perception* (1945), whereas the founder of phenomenology Edmund Husserl (1859 - 1938) remained oblivious to these problems due to his quasi-Cartesian background.

This article purports to show the inadequacy of this view, and will indirectly try to demonstrate that there is far more *continuity* between Husserl and the later phenomenologists than is normally assumed<sup>1</sup>.

I will first give a presentation of Husserl's considerations concerning the function of the body when it comes to our basic experience of objects and space. Then I will turn to Husserl's reflections pertaining to the relation between body and (inter)-subjectivity, and finally I will address the question of whether the embodiment of the transcendental subject can be said to express a transcendental necessity. – This presentation more or less reflects the development in Husserl's phenomenology of the body, starting as a mere (but necessary) supplement to his theory of perception and eventually implying a decisive rethinking of a series of transcendental-philosophical groundcategories.

Husserl's analysis of the body is a systematically integrated part of his transcendental phenomenology. It presupposes, in other words, the effectuation of the epoché, and the following presentation will also presuppose a basic acquaintance with

1. See ZAHAVI 1993 for an attempt to disclose some further parallels between Husserl's and respectively Heidegger's and Merleau-Ponty's view of the relation between subjectivity and world.

Husserl's concept of constitution and transcendental reduction. As a preliminary remark, however, it should be emphasized that the following considerations do not express empirical-mundane (not to speak of anthropological) statements. Quite to the contrary, the analysis of the body's function as a condition of possibility for the experience of objects is as well an analysis of the body's function as a condition of possibility for objects of experience – in full agreement with the transcendental-philosophical dictum<sup>2</sup>.

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It is well known that Husserl undertook a systematic and comprehensive analysis of the intentional structure of consciousness, and that in his survey of the hierarchy of foundation existing between the different types of intentional acts he ascribed a privileged status to perception. Less known, however, is the fact that Husserl also addressed the problem of the constitutive function of the body as early as the lectures *Ding und Raum* from 1907, precisely in connection with an extensive analysis of perception.

A predominant feature in Husserl's analysis of perception is his reflections concerning the adumbrational givenness of the perceptual (spatio-temporal) object. When perceiving a (trans-

2. This statement must not be misunderstood, however, as if there were no decisive and fundamental differences between a classical Kantian transcendental-philosophy and a Husserlian transcendental phenomenology. On the contrary. Not only are there divergences when it comes to the areas that are regarded as being of transcendental relevance (a propos an analysis of the body). There are also decisive differences in their respective understandings of the concept of phenomenon, and in the methodology at play (a regressive deduction of the conditions of possibility for knowledge contra a phenomenological investigation of the world's being-sense for (inter)subjectivity).

centent) object it is necessary to distinguish that which appears from the appearance (the intuitively given), since the object is never given in its totality but always in a certain restricted profile (cf. *Ideen* I § 42)<sup>3</sup>. A careful consideration of this apparently banal fact reveals several implications, which are of direct relevance for an understanding of the importance attributed by Husserl to the body.

Every perspectival appearance presupposes not only something that appears, it also presupposes someone that it appears for. In other words, an appearance is always an appearance of something for someone. When it is realized that what appears always appears at a certain distance and from a certain angle, the point should be obvious. Every perspectival appearance presupposes that the experiencing subject is himself given in space. However, since the subject only possesses a spatial location due to his embodiment (3/116, 4/33, 13/239)<sup>4</sup>, Husserl claims that spatial objects can only appear for and be constituted by *embodied subjects*<sup>5,6</sup>. Thus the body is characterized by

3. For more extensive analyses of respectively perceptual and horizontal intentionality see ZAHAWI 1992a, 1992b, 1994.

4. Page references to the *Husserliana* edition are given in the following manner: the first number refers to the volume, the second to the page.

5. Thus Husserl seems to anticipate the reflections in *L'être et le néant* where Sartre writes that our being-in-the-world is literally a bodily being-in-the-midst-of-the-world. One can only constitute the world by entering it, and as Sartre says, the expressions "to enter into the world", "to come to the world" and "to have a body" are equivalent (SARTRE 1943 p. 366). With a formulation that unambiguously points towards MERLEAU-PONTY (1964 p. 152-3), Sartre also calls attention to the fact that the structures of the world imply that one cannot see without oneself being visible (SARTRE 1943 p. 365). See also APEL 1963 for further considerations concerning these aspects.

6. It is true that the horizontal appearance of my perceptual object (and the implied differentiation between present and absent profiles) is

being present in any experience as the zero point, the absolute "here", in relation to which every experienced object is oriented. In our immediate experience of space (prior to the constitution of objective space) our body possesses a unique position, as the center around which and in relation to which space unfolds itself (11/298). Every spatial orientation and every experience of objects in space thus refers to the indexical "here" connected with our embodiment (4/159, 9/392). Husserl therefore claims that the body is the condition of possibility for other objects (14/540), and that every worldly experience is mediated and made possible by our embodiment (6/220, 4/56, 5/124).

These reflections concerning the body's function as a condition of possibility for perceptual intentionality are radicalized the moment Husserl no longer simply analyses the body in its mere function as a center of orientation, but also starts to examine bodily mobility and its contribution to the constitution of perceptual reality<sup>7</sup>. At first Husserl just calls attention to the

correlated with my being situated in a central "here" (4/158); and it is also true that the object is only given horizontally because it is in principle impossible for any perceiving subject to be situated "here" and "there" simultaneously. This observation does not warrant the conclusion, however, that the horizontal givenness of the object merely manifests the finiteness of the observer – and Husserl is known for his rejection of any anthropological interpretation of the horizontal structure. Ultimately, it is the ontological structure of the object (its transcendence and worldliness) which necessitates that it can only be given for a subject situated in a "here". As Husserl declares in *Ideen I*, even God would have to perceive the object through its adumbrations (3/351).

7. These analyses of the importance of *kinesthesia* for the constitution of spatial objects can be found several places in Husserl's works, but mainly in Part 4. of *Ding und Raum* (with the subtitle "Die Bedeutung der kinästhetischen Systeme für die Konstruktion des Wahrnehmungsgegenstandes") and in Part 1. Chapter 3. of *Ideen II* (with the subtitle "Die Aistheta in bezug auf den ästhetischen Leib). The following presentation cannot do full justice to the complexity of these analyses; a

importance of bodily movements (the movement of the eye, the touch of the hand, the step of the body etc.) for the experience of space and spatial objects (11/299), but ultimately he claims that the perception of spatial objects presupposes and depends upon our kinesthetic experience – that is, our experience of the movements, positions and muscle-tensions of the bodily parts. All perceptual appearances are accompanied by a co-functioning but unthematized kinesthetic experience (11/14), which according to Husserl is presupposed if the appearances are to have an object-reference, that is, are to be appearances of something (4/66, 16/159, 6/109).

Let us turn towards a perceptual object in order to illustrate Husserl's argument. As has just been pointed out, the object always transcends its actual appearance, since it is never given in its totality, but always in a certain restricted profile. Husserl's point is that my constitutive experience of the transcendence of the object (in relation to its individual appearances) and the identity of the object (in the manifold of appearances) can only be established the moment I have the opportunity to see the object from several perspectives. This change of perspective presupposes a movement – our own or that of the object. In both cases, however, for two different adumbrations to be adumbrations of one and the same object there must be a sort of continuity between the two; they must, so to speak, be able to merge into each other; and the experience of this continuity is made possible precisely by kinesthesia. – To phrase it differently: It does not make sense to speak about an appearance (as different from that which appears) unless there are more than one appearance. This plurality of appearances (of one and the same) can only be experienced through a continuous change of perspective made possible by the body's kinesthesia. Thus kines-

more extended examination can be found in CLAESGES 1964. For a contemporary use of kinesthesia as the key to our categorisation of reality, see LAKOFF 1987 Chapter 17.

thesis must be regarded as a condition of possibility for the constitution of the object as an identity in a manifold of appearances (16/189)<sup>8</sup>.

Consequently, Husserl claims that every perception contains a double sequence consisting of a position in a system of movements and a perceptual appearance correlated to this position. This is a theme which he makes use of in his considerations concerning the relationship between horizontal intentionality and kinesthesia. Whereas the actual appearing front of the armchair is correlated with a certain position of the body, the horizon of the co-intended but momentarily absent aspects of the armchair (the backside and bottom etc.) is correlated to my kinesthetic horizon, that is, to my potential of possible movements (11/15). The absent aspects are linked to an intentional if-then connection (that is, if they are aspects of one and the same object). If I move in this way, then this aspect will become visually or tactually accessible (6/164).

Alle möglichen Abschattungen eines Objektes als Raumobjektes bilden ein System, das Zuordnung hat zu einem kinästhetischen System und zu dem kinästhetischen Gesamtsystem, derart, daß "wenn" eine beliebige Kinästhesie zum Ablauf kommt, "notwendig" gewisse Abschattungen als zugehörige mitablaufen müssen (9/390).

Thus, to phrase it a bit paradoxically, perceptual intentionality is a movement that can only be effectuated by an embodied subject (16/176)<sup>9</sup>.

8. We are, of course, only dealing with a necessary, not a sufficient, condition.

9. Cp. MERLEAU-PONTY 1964 p. 284. Moreover, as LANDGREBE has observed Husserl's considerations about kinesthesia as a condition of possibility for the experience of objects imply a rethinking of the relation between affectivity and spontaneity and in the end between sensation and reason (1978 p. 117).

Even if it has by now been made plausible that the body as the subject's organ of experience plays a constitutive role in any type of perception (4/144, 11/13), the clarification of the actual relationship between subjectivity and body and between lived body and experienced body still remains to be undertaken. Thus Husserl himself emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between the unthematized body-consciousness that accompanies and makes possible every spatial experience, and the thematized consciousness of the body obtained through an act of objectivation. In other words, it is necessary to distinguish the body as subject (*Leib*) and the body as object (*Körper*), and furthermore, it is necessary to clarify their exact founding-founded relationship. My original and immediate relation to my body is not an experience of the body as an object. Quite to the contrary, we are here dealing with a self-objectivation, which just like every other perceptual experience is dependent upon and made possible by the unthematized co-functioning body-consciousness:

Es ist hier zu beachten, daß bei aller dinglichen Erfahrung der Leib miterfahren ist als fungierender Leib (also nicht also bloßes Ding) und daß er, wo er selbst als Ding erfahren ist, eben doppelt und in eins als erfahrenes Ding und als fungierender Leib erfahren ist (14/57. Compare 15/326).

This remark is essential. First of all it contributes to a clarification of the actual relationship between subjectivity and body. Husserl clearly stresses that this relation must not be understood as the presence and activity of the subject in a spatial object (13/240). Quite to the contrary: my original body-consciousness (my concrete self-awareness) implies that the body is experienced as the organ of volition in which subjectivity is immediately active. The function (movement, action) of the body is the activity of the ego (14/540). Thus the constitution of the body (as an object) is not an activity exercised by a disembodied subject, which would thereby acquire a proper vehicle of transportation. No, the constitution of the body as an object

must be understood as the self-objectivation of the lived body. It is enacted by a subject already embodied.

Secondly, in its distinction between the body as constituting and the body as constituted, the above remark throws a new light on the previous considerations. When Husserl spoke about the body as a center of orientation and movement this should not automatically be identified with the position and the movement attributed to our objectified body, since this occurs in an objective space already constituted as being independent of my orientation and movement<sup>10</sup>. Correspondingly, the kinesthetic system (my potentiality of mobility) is originally experienced as a spontaneous field of activity, as an "I can" (11/14). Only in connection with the constitution of the body (as an object), is it interpreted as a system that belongs to specific parts of the body, and Husserl examines in detail this *localisation* of the kinesthetic (and haptic/tactual) sensations, which is the precondition for the constitution of the body as an object (4/56, 5/118). If my hand touches the table top, I have a series of appearances that

10. That there exists a connection between the objectivation of the body and the constitution of objective space should also be obvious. One can speak about objective space, when its coordinates are no longer being experienced as being dependent upon my indexical "here". (This already occurs when one speaks about moving *through* space). To objectify the body – to see it as an object among objects – implies however exactly this suspension of indexicality.

Thus one should not confuse movement in objective space with original constitutive kinesthesia. As a tentative illustration of the difference between these two types (or rather interpretations or experiences) of movement, one can compare the experience of a gesture as seen and as felt. While the visual experience in its objectivation of the hand experiences space as something existing independently of the gesture, as something which the hand moves through, the kinesthetic experience does not furnish us with an experience of space independently of the experience of the gesture. Space is experienced precisely as the hand's field of mobility.

is experienced by the touching hand as belonging to the touched table top. When my hand slides over the top, I experience the hardness, smoothness and extension of the table kinesthetically (and tactually). It is, however, also possible to undertake a change of attention so that instead of being preoccupied with the properties of the table, I concentrate on the touching hand, and I then experience sensations of pressure, smoothness and movement, which are not interpreted as being objective properties of the hand, although they are localized in it, but which characterize its activity as an organ of experience, that is, its subjective activity. To summarize: the kinesthetic experience (as well as the tactual – but in contrast to the visual) is characterized by a double-structure. The same sensation can be interpreted in two different ways: as a property of the experienced object, and as a localized sensation in the corresponding experiencing part of the body.

The localisation of the kinesthetic sensations, which in itself does not transform the experiencing organ into an experienced organ, is however only the first step towards the constitution of the body (as an object). This process is radicalized the moment the body makes itself into an object, for instance if one hand touches the other. (The detailed analysis of exactly this relation, which later inspired Merleau-Ponty decisively can be found in *Ideen II* § 36)<sup>11</sup>. Here the touching hand (the experiencing organ) has a series of appearances that is attributed to the touched hand (the experienced organ) as objective properties. That we are now dealing with an experienced organ, and not a mere object, is revealed by the fact that the touched organ is itself able to experience the touch<sup>12</sup>.

11. See for instance MERLEAU-PONTY 1945 p. 109, 1968, p. 113, 1964 p. 24, pp. 176-195, and the article "Le philosophe et son ombre" in MERLEAU-PONTY 1960a.

12. Anyone who has fallen asleep with his arm as a pillow should know how distressing and strange it is to wake up with a numb arm.

Although the body as experienced has properties in common with objects in the world, such as extension, weight, softness, smoothness etc. it is important to emphasize that the objective body as the field of localisation for the kinesthetic and haptic/tactual sensations differs radically from ordinary objects (4/151-2, 16/162). Although our inspection of the body implies its objectivation, it does not imply a total suspension of its subjectivity (for which reason the self-objectivation of the body apparently resembles reflexive self-awareness). This does not imply, however, that it is impossible to view one's own body as a mere object, but this mode of interpretation is according to Husserl not immediately available. Only via another subject's perception of my body (which in many ways is superior to my own (5/112), for instance, when we are dealing with a visual presentation of my neck or my own eyes), and through my appropriation of his view of my body, can I establish this objectifying apprehension of the body (14/62-3)<sup>13</sup>. An objectifying apprehension that – while being made possible by myself as a lived body – ultimately enables a naturalistic conception to conceive the body as being an element that like every other object is embedded within a universal causality.

When one touches the arm it does not respond, so to speak, and could just as well be somebody else's.

Husserl also has some considerations about the special subject-object status of the body which he uses in his analysis of how an embodied subject is able to experience other embodied subjects (for instance 8/62). Since a proper treatment of this problematic would however necessitate an extended discussion of the relation between *Einfühlung*, *Appräsentation*, and *Parrung* (as a specific passiv synthesis), this reference must do. (Compare, however, note 14 below).

13. Again Husserl seems to anticipate Sartre's treatment in *L'être et le néant*. Cp. for instance SARTRE 1943, p. 405. Husserl does not, however, seem to have ever thematized the importance of the mirror image for the self-objectivation, as was done by Lacan and Merleau-Ponty (1960b p. 41-61).

I have until now analyzed the constitutive function of the body. A closer look reveals, however, that the examination has been characterized by a decisive shortcoming. Until now I have only analyzed the function of my own body, but as Husserl emphasizes: the body of the Other is also of decisive importance for *my* constitutive activity. Thus we are confronted with the problem that plays such an important role in the later Husserl's thinking, namely that of the *transcendental intersubjectivity*. It is not possible, of course, to give an exhaustive presentation of this topic here, but it is necessary to make a few comments.

For Husserl the concrete experience of foreign subjectivity is always an experience of the Other as an embodied subject. Thus intersubjectivity as a concrete relation between subjects is a relation between lived bodies. Furthermore, Husserl claims that the perception of the body of the Other is the first step towards the constitution of an objective (intersubjectively valid) shared world (14/110, 15/18, 15/572), since my experience of something as the body of another must be accompanied by another's experience of the *same* as his own body (13/252, 14/485)<sup>14</sup>. In the experience of the body of another one is confronted with a congruity between one's own experience and the experience of another, – a congruity, which according to Husserl is the foundation of every subsequent experience of intersubjective ob-

14. At times Husserl speaks about our unthematized body-consciousness as being the genetic paradigm for any subsequent object-experience (14/123-6). Giving constitutive priority to this kind of experience rather than to the experience of material spatio-temporal objects has decisive consequences for any account of the experience of another embodied subject, since the direct experience of a co-functioning living body seems to be more fundamental than the experience of another body as an object (this latter being merely a modified and at first abnormal mode of experience). This is a point which Husserl might be hinting at when he claims that the (bodily) relation between child and mother is the most primal of all (15/511, 15/582, 15/604).

jects, that is, objects which are also experienced (experientable) by Others.

Denn in der Geltung der Fremderfahrung, durch die ich die Anderen als für mich seiende habe, liegt schon beschlossen die Mitgeltung ihrer Erfahrung für mich. Schon daß ihr Leib nicht nur Körper ist, als welcher er für mich direkt wahrgenommen ist, sondern Leib, das schließt in sich die Mitgeltung der Wahrnehmung, die der Andere von seinem Leibe hat als demselben, den ich wahrnehme, und das geht so weiter für seine Umwelt als sachlich dieselbe, als welche ich erfahre. Ich kann nicht Andere setzen, ohne mit ihrem erfahrenden Leben auch ihr Erfahrenes mitzusetzen, d.i., ohne dieses vergegenwärtigte Erfahrene in Mitgeltung zu setzen so wie mein eigenes ursprünglicheres Erfahren (14/388).

The reason my experience of objects changes fundamentally when I experience an Other is, in short, that the Other adds a new and radical transcendence to this experience.

Hier ist die allein eigentlich so zu nennende Transzendenz, und alles, was sonst noch Transzendenz heißt, wie die objektive Welt, beruht auf der Transzendenz fremder Subjektivität (8/495).

It is not possible to reduce the world to a complex of private sensations if it is also experientable by other subjects. Thus the transcendence of the world is constituted by its intersubjective experientability<sup>15</sup>, and my experience of this transcendence is mediated by my experience of its givenness for another subject, and therefore founded upon my experience of the Other, or

15. An intersubjective experientability which, however, must not be interpreted objectivistic as a mere epistemic criteria for the acceptance of a mind-independent reality. Husserl's theory of intersubjectivity is a transcendental-philosophical theory of intersubjectivity, and consequently intersubjectivity must be understood as the constitutive precondition for reality and true being.

more correctly, on my experience of the body of the Other. Consequently Husserl can claim that the body (my own and that of the other) is the constitutive precondition for intersubjectivity and communication (8/187, 5/115), and therefore for any type of (intersubjectively valid) objectivity.

That our body as the precondition for perceptual and intersubjective intentionality plays an essential role for the constitution of objectivity is also brought to light by Husserl's reflections on the relationship between lifeworld and science, i.e., in his account of the constitution of scientific objectivity (normality).

Whereas sensual experience is characterized by its dependency upon a normally functioning body (4/56) – for which reason Husserl accentuates the importance of a transcendental-philosophical account of the structures of normality and abnormality linked to the body (9/198-9)<sup>16</sup> – the aim of (natural-) science is to reach an irrelative (non-perspectival) comprehension of the

16. This remark confronts us with a problem apparently connected to a transcendental-philosophical investigation of the body. To what degree does it imply an anthropomorphisme? Is reality suddenly viewed as being dependent upon the human organism – in which case the consequence would be an anthropological relativism? To answer these questions one should bear in mind what aspects of the body Husserl regards as being of transcendental importance. Husserl is obviously concerned with certain formal attributes such as spatiality, mobility and the faculty of articulation, and not with the specific number or composition of arms, heads or eyes. As he writes in the first *Kai-zo*-article:

“Ob der Mensch empirisch so oder anders gebaute Wahrnehmungsorgane, Augen, Ohren usw. hat, ob zwei oder x Augen, ob die oder jene Organe der Lokomotion, ob Beine oder Flügel u.dgl., das ist bei prinzipiellen Erwägungen, wie z.B. solchen reiner Vernunft, ganz außer Frage und unbestimmt-offen. Nur gewisse Formen der Leiblichkeit und der seelischen Geistigkeit sind vorausgesetzt und liegen im Blick; sie als *a priori*

world (6/309). Science must be understood as an attempt to transcend the vagueness and relativity of the bodily (i.e., sensual and practical) experience, and in particular the discrepancies and inconsistencies made possible by this relativity (cf. Locke's famous example concerning whether the lukewarm water is hot or cold) must be seen as a decisive incentive to attain objective knowledge. One should never forget, however, that the bodily mediated experience while being that which science seeks to transcend is simultaneously the foundation of sense that scientific experience rests upon and without which it could never be effectuated.

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Although it has been shown by now that Husserl's examination of the body is thorough as well as fundamental<sup>17</sup>, we are still left with some unanswered questions. If the subject is conceived as an embodied subject, and if a transcendental-philosophical function is ascribed to the body, one is inevitably confronted with the following questions: what consequences do the birth and death of the body have for the subject and the world? Is the existence of the world dependent upon there being incarnated subjects? Is it possible to conceive the subject

notwendig herauszustellen und begrifflich zu fixieren ist Sache der bewußt durchgeführten wissenschaftlichen Wesensforschung" (27/11-12).

Consequently there is a decisive difference between Husserl's use of the body and a theory which would conclude that colours (for instance in the ultraviolet spectrum) which cannot be experienced by human beings do not exist. For a further treatment of this problem compare 13/369 and MERLEAU-PONTY's different solution 1945, p. 455.

17. In contrast to HEIDEGGER, who in *Sein und Zeit* merely announces that he will *not* analyze the connection existing between the embodiment of Dasein and its being in space (Suz, p. 108).

in abstraction from its body? Is it possible for a disembodied subject to exist? The answer to the question concerning the existence of the world depends ultimately upon the ontological implications of the notion of constitution (does constitution imply an (idealistic) production, a (realistic) restoration or ultimately something quite different). I have tried to treat this problem elsewhere, and will not go into detail in this article<sup>18</sup>. Concerning the subsequent questions Husserl's prevalent opinion is – and on this point he differs decisively from Merleau-Ponty – that the ego-pole can exist independently of the body, although we are then dealing with an impoverished subject which has a very limited field of experience (13/464-5, 3/119). Thus death – if the transcendental ego as the source of temporality can neither come into being nor perish – must be regarded as an isolation from the world (13/399) that might be compared to a dreamless sleep (11/379-81).

More interesting perhaps are Husserl's later reflections pertaining to birth, which can be linked to the following questions. What is the modal status of incarnation? Is incarnation a possibility open to the subject or does it express a transcendental necessity? Whereas Husserl in the beginning regarded birth and death as something exclusively pertaining to the empirical ego<sup>19</sup>, he later came to view birth and death (that is, *generativi-*

18. Compare ZAHAVI 1992a, 1992b, 1993.

19. It must, of course, be stressed that the empirical ego and the transcendental ego according to Husserl are not two different egos. As he writes in the Encyclopedia-Britannica-Article:

"Mein transzendentes Ich ist also evident 'verschieden' vom natürlichen Ich, aber keineswegs als ein zweites, als ein davon getrenntes im natürlichen Wortsinn, wie umgekehrt auch keineswegs ein in natürlichem Sinne damit verbundenes oder mit ihm verflochtenes. Es ist eben das (in voller Konkretion gefaßte) Feld der transzendentalen Selbsterfahrung, die jederzeit durch bloße Änderung der Einstellung in psychologischer Selbster-



ty) as more than mere contingent facts. They are, he claims, the preconditions for the constitution of the world (15/171-2). Obviously, to generativity (and thus to the embeddedness in a living tradition) is attributed a constitutive function, and the earlier mentioned problem concerning the modal status of incarnation must be answered by means of a clarification of the actual relation between the subject and its constitutive activity. Is constitution a process that the subject must engage in with necessity (and without which it cannot be conceived)? To what degree is the subject influenced and formed by this activity?

I have earlier tried to argue that the constitution of perceptual reality presupposes a lived body, and that the constitution of objective space presupposes a bodily self-objectivation (compare also 16/162). At times Husserl also claims that the constitution of the world as such implies a mundanisation of the constituting subject (1/130), and occasionally he speaks about the reciprocal co-dependency existing between the constitution of spatial objects on one hand, and the constitution of the ego and the body on the other (5/128). Thus a central tenet in the later Husserl's reflections on constitution is the assumption that the constituting performance is characterized by a kind of reciprocity insofar as the constituting agent is itself constituted in the process of constitution.

Das konstituierende Bewußtsein konstituiert sich selbst, das die Objektivierung leistende objektiviert sich selbst, und zwar derart, daß es objektive Natur schafft mit der Form der Raumzeitlichkeit, in ihr meinen Leib und psychophysisch eins mit ihm

fahrung zu wandeln ist. In diesem Übergang stellt sich notwendig eine Identität des Ich her; in transzendentaler Reflexion auf ihn wird die psychologische Objektivierung als Selbstobjektivierung des transzendentalen Ich sichtbar, und so findet es sich als wie es in jedem Moment natürlicher Einstellung sich eine Apperzeption auferlegt hat" (9/294).

(dadurch also in der naturalen Raumzeitlichkeit lokalisiert nach Ort und Zeitstelle und Dauer) das gesamte konstituierende Leben, das gesamte *ego*, nach Bewußtseinsstrom, nach Ichpol und Habitualitäten (15/546).

Consequently it is a misunderstanding to believe that the transcendental subject remains detached from its constitutive performance, just as it is a misunderstanding to think that the subject could abstain from its constitutive activity. The subject is only insofar as it constitutes, and this constitution is at the same time the self-realization of the constituting subject. In a more psychological and consequently potentially more misleading terminology: consciousness is characterized by intentionality. A consciousness that does not experience something is unconscious. Contrary to the screen that remains unaffected by the movies shown on it, the subject is affected, formed and concretized by its constitutive experiences.

To understand this line of thought it is important to realize the fundamental transformation that the concepts *world* and *subjectivity* underwent due to the reduction. Husserl often remarks that it is a decisive misunderstanding if one interprets the constitutive correlation as taking place within the traditional subject-object opposition (6/265). Being and consciousness are essentially interdependent, and ultimately one in the absolute concretion: transcendental subjectivity (1/117). Consequently, the "monad" (as the term for transcendental subjectivity in its full concretion) encompasses not only the ego-pole in its streaming intentional life, but also the intended and constituted transcendent objects (1/26, 1/102, 1/135, 14/46). That is, Husserl's notion of "subjectivity" is eventually expanded in a way that makes it surpass or perhaps rather undermine not only the traditional subject-object *opposition* but also the view that seeks to conceive their relation as that of a strict (and static) *correlation*.

A thorough examination of these issues would again force us to give a detailed presentation of Husserl's theory of transcendental intersubjectivity (especially his description of the process

of *monadisation*). Space does not allow for this explication, but it must be mentioned that Husserl considers the establishing of a transcendental intersubjectivity to take place, hand in hand, with a reciprocal self-objectivation of transcendental subjects (8/505, 15/373, 13/480). A self-objectivation that is not prior or subsequent to the "constitution" of the world, but simultaneous with it (1/130). Thus, the self-unfolding and mundanisation (incarnation) of the transcendental subject, the establishing of a transcendental intersubjectivity and the having-of-the-world (*Welthabe*), are parts in an interconnected and simultaneous process:

Ich, das ego, habe also Welt aus einer Leistung, in der ich einerseits mich und meinen Horizont der Anderen, und die homogene Wir-Gemeinschaft in eins damit konstituiere, und diese Konstitution ist nicht Weltkonstitution, sondern die Leistung, die bezeichnet werden kann als Monadisierung des ego – als die Leistung der personalen Monadisierung, der monadischen Pluralisierung (6/416-7, from May 1937. Compare 15/639, 15/368).

In a similar vein Husserl remarks that the world can be seen as the mundanisation of transcendental intersubjectivity (15/403). An approach that can also be found in Fink, who claims that the true theme of phenomenology is neither the world nor a worldless subjectivity, but the becoming of the world in the (self)-constitution of transcendental subjectivity (Fink 1933 p. 370). Thus, no static constitutive correlation exists between transcendental subjectivity and the world. Rather the constitutive performance is to be seen as the self-realization of the constituting subjectivity in the world-realization (Fink 1988 p. 49).

Why are these reflections of relevance for our questions? Because it should be clear that we are no longer dealing with a transcendental subjectivity that could refrain from engaging in the constitutive performance if it so desired, nor could it remain separated and detached from the constitutive process. Quite to the contrary, the constitution manifests a self-realization of the constituting (inter)subjectivity. That is, the transcendental agent

is itself constituted in the process of constitution, i.e., in its letting the world manifest itself. A subject which necessarily must constitute must however necessarily be incarnated, and this embodiment of the subject cannot be understood as a stay in a usable container, which can then simply be discharged at a future time. Quite to the contrary, the incarnation of the subject, and its mundanisation, must be understood as a concretizing self-realization.

It is one thing *ontologically* to ascertain that the subject is incarnated and to account for the implications of this incarnation. It is something quite different and far more difficult, however, to answer the *metaphysical* question: why is the subject embodied. (A distinction which I believe can be linked to the difference between *static* and *genetic* phenomenology). Consequently I will not continue these reflections, since further considerations concerning the modal status of incarnation (which has never been systematically examined by Husserl) would demand an intensive analysis of the immanent teleology of temporality, and this is a task that far exceeds my present abilities<sup>20</sup>.

\* \* \*

I hope that the preceding considerations have been sufficient to illustrate the comprehensiveness of Husserl's phenomenology. The character of the topics that have been examined throughout this article should at least attest to the decisive differences which exist between Husserl's reflections and a traditional Cartesian-Kantian philosophy of subjectivity<sup>21</sup>.

20. Whether this task could ever be carried out without transgressing the phenomenological principle of principles, that is, without utilizing modes of non-intuitive thought, might however be called into question.

21. To do justice towards Kant it should be emphasized that although he neglected the transcendental role of the body in *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, he later changed his view. See HÜBNER 1953.

Let me conclude by adding that the preceding interpretation is based exclusively on published material to be found in Husserliana. It has for a long time been permissible to present a traditional (that is quasi-Cartesian) Husserl-interpretation, as long as one simply added that there might be more refined reflections in Husserl's unpublished research manuscripts. By now so many volumes of the Husserliana have appeared, however, that this excuse is simply no longer viable. Although there are still important aspects of Husserl's thinking yet to be published, more than enough has already appeared to refute once and for all any interpretation oblivious to the decisive differences between a traditional (be it Cartesian or Kantian) philosophy of subjectivity and Husserl's phenomenology.

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## PHILOSOPHIE DE LA NATURE ET ÉCOLOGIE. À PROPOS DE HANS JONAS

"Une ontologie qui passe sous silence la nature s'enferme dans l'incorporel et donne, pour cette raison même, une image fantastique de l'homme, de l'esprit et de l'histoire".

(M. Merleau-Ponty)

Sans doute l'essor des sciences naturelles n'est-il pas pour favoriser l'émergence d'une philosophie de la nature. Parmi toutes les matières philosophiques traditionnelles, c'est en tout cas celle-ci qui brille aujourd'hui le plus par son absence. Or quand une place est désertée, on peut s'attendre à voir des courants s'y infiltrer; l'écologie, détour intellectuel désormais obligé, est vraisemblablement à mettre au compte de ces courants de pensée. Il ne sera pas inutile, dès lors, de rappeler que, quoique ses cris d'alarme soient pertinents, l'écologie ne saurait se substituer à une philosophie de la nature, *a fortiori* à une philosophie tout court. Parmi les réflexions et les théories que l'écologie a suscitées, on retiendra, parmi celles qui ont la prétention philosophique la plus affichée, mais qui sont aussi les plus extrémistes, les théories d'un *droit de la nature* et même d'un *contrat naturel*. Ces extrémismes ont entraîné une réaction humaniste dont on trouve une illustration exemplative dans un ouvrage de L. Ferry<sup>1</sup> consacré à l'appréciation critique des tenants et aboutissants de ce qu'il appelle, en faisant écho à la *deep ecology* éclore aux États-Unis, l'"écologisme profond". Textes à l'appui, il montre – sans difficulté, tant certaines plates-formes écologiques sont franchement hallucinantes, surtout en ce qui

1. L. FERRY, *Le nouvel ordre écologique. L'arbre, l'animal et l'homme*, Paris, Grasset, 1992.