Islamic Thought in Contemporary Pakistan: The Legacy of ʿAllāma Mawdūdī

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Sayyid Abul Aʻla Mawdūdī is a name to conjure with in contemporary Muslim thought and movement. He was a source of knowledge and inspiration, and even those who differed with his method and the movement, do not question the value of his contribution. Mawdūdī's appeal and relevance are due primarily to his impact on the historical situation of which he was a part. He reflected and represented the value and importance of Islam, and stimulated and summoned his fellow Muslims to its revivification and implication. The themes he dwelt upon like the importance of state, the legitimacy of political authority, the unbreakable link between faith and deeds, the need for commitment, integrity, and striving for Islamic revival are vital and relevant for all those who have joined the contemporary Islamic movement as well as for those who wish to understand the increasing momentum of the worldwide Muslim re-awakening. In South Asia, where Mawdūdī's ideas took shape, his influence has been more pronounced. His ideas unquestionably dominate Islamic political thinking in the Indo-Pakistani subcontinent. This has become all the more evident as Pakistani secular nationalism has scored one failure after another, and thereby removed itself from the growing surge of Islamic political thought and action. This sociopolitical study enquires about the value and validity of the ideas of Mawlana Mawdūdī and assesses their relevance to contemporary Pakistan and the Muslim world.

Muslim Identity Formation

Sayyid Abul Aʻla Mawdūdī was born on September 25, 1903 into a respectable family of strong religious traditions at Aurangabad, Deccan, India. Mawdūdī's education was short and unsystematic. He did not attend legendary institutions such as Al-Azhar. In fact, he attained mastery of Islamic sciences outside the regular educational

institutions and obtained certificates from three famous teachers of Madrasah Aliyah Arabiyyah Fatehpuri, Delhi. Mawdūdī produced 67 works, some of them monumental in length and depth, and edited two journals. He founded the Jamaat-e-Islami (the Islamic Party) in 1941 and led it until 1972. The Jamaat has embodied his ideology and has played a significant role in the history and politics of Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, the south Asian communities of the Persian Gulf, Great Britain, and North America.

Sayyid Mawdūdī started with the assumption that the Muslim world is faced with a profound need to assert its identity. Under the circumstances, as ever, a clear conception of the human being, his purpose, and his destiny become of utmost significance. Interpreting Islam in progressive manner, Mawdūdī provided unambiguous answers to these questions. The human being is the vicegerent of Allah, the Creator, the Ruler, and the Sovereign of the universe. It is his duty, his responsibility, to transform the earth, which is his trust in accordance with the values enshrined in the Qur'an and the Sunnah of the last Prophet of Islam.

This designation of mankind as Allah's vicegerent ennobles and sanctifies man, his life, his activities, and his relationships with fellow human beings. Since all are vicegerents they are all equal, which leaves no scope for injustice and oppression, hatred, and greed. It is then the Muslim's duty to struggle hard for the victory of Islam. The goal being the elevation of one's humanity, the methods used to achieve that goal should, therefore, remain subordinate. Activities aimed at eradicating poverty, exploitation and injustice, and at improving the quality of life should be seen as a means and not an end in itself. Clearly then, such a view of life has tremendous significance for the human being's relationship with his fellow beings, with the environment and with the inanimate objects around him.

The concept of vicegerency has another implication. Being a vicegerent and a trustee, the Muslim is to serve Allah, a being bigger than himself, larger than mankind as a whole. The ultimate object of his loyalty is Allah, a transcendental power, a notion that helps to check human arrogance and to control human ego. It reminds man of his humble station in the totality of the cosmos. Given the fact that power in its various dimensions has always been at the very heart of the great conflicts in history, reminding man of his actual condition is of utmost significance and vital for the creation of a sane, rational society.

The identity of man as a vicegerent and a slave of Allah at one and the same time are embodied in the revolutionary concept of *tawḥīd*, which is the foundation of Mawdūdī's scheme of ideas. Through this concept, he reminded men that the spiritual and the material, this world and the hereafter, constitute a single continuum; that there are two fundamental forms of society in existence, one based upon *tawḥīd* and the other upon *shirk* (the assignments of partners to Allah) – the two being in perpetual conflict; and that man's duty as a vicegerent is to be active, to work for the glory of Islam in obedience to and for the sake of Allah. Mawdūdī's entire life was consumed in communicating this idea and in helping man discover his humanity, which is his spiritual essence.

What Mawdūdī said could have been said by those well versed in Islam – the *ulama*. But they were busy either with "amulets, intonations and prayer beads" and thereby sapping the vigor of the Muslim community or with questions concerning the details

of *fiqh* (religious jurisprudence) and distracted the Muslims off the foundations of Islam "until they forget what they were created for and ignored the sublime purposes for which Islam stands."[1] Mawdūdī therefore directed his scathing attack against these traditional figures of authority accusing them of betraying the people and was, in turn, accused by traditional authorities as being the least qualified to provide an interpretation of Islam. The *ulama*'s critique of Mawdūdī was, however, no more than a polemic usually with unsubstantiated accusations.[2]

The problem with the general body of *ulama* was not that they did not understand Islam but that they evinced no recognition that the truth they so clearly saw needed restating in modern times. Their failure was their inability to relate Islam to modernity, to communicate it effectively and to make intelligible or accessible to modern man the inner reality of the faith. Mawdūdī represented this modern trend and carried it vigorously forward. His writings suggest that his primary concern was the modern man. His *magnum opus*, the *Tafhīm al-Qurʾan* was written for the consumption of "middle-class educated Muslims" and therefore, using Urdu as his medium of expression, he tried "to render the flawless Arabic of the original into flawless Urdu."[3] Commanding a masterly prose style, Mawdūdī is one of the most widely read Muslim authors of today.

Mawdūdī, unlike the majority of *ulama*, was alive to the problems of modernity as they confront the Muslim world. All his writings bear evidence of his acute awareness of the situation and problems of the present age. On innumerable occasions he cited in support of his arguments, recent researches in the fields of physics, medicine, archeology, economics, and the like. He covered an extremely wide spectrum of subjects, all vindicating the position of Islam by discussing the matter not merely from an ethical and spiritual viewpoint but also from an economic, political and sociological angle appropriate to the subject matter. He clarified for the modern reader aspects of Islamic approach and explained how Islam furnishes man with definite guidance in political, social, economic and cultural matters. His success in explaining the relevance of Islam in modern tines may be debated and analytical depth of his understanding of modern sciences can be faulted but there is no doubt that he was aware of the importance of issues and problems confronting the modern mind. Mawdūdī's appeal has grown in geometric progression largely among those educated strata of society which are supposed to be modernized in the Western sense of the term.

Mawdūdī's basic goal in "Muslim identity formation" was to make Islam the supreme organizing principle in the social and political life of the Muslim *ummah*. The concept upon which he based this was *iqamāt-i dīn*, which literally means "the establishment of religion." According to this idea, all institutions of civil society and the state must be totally subordinated to the authority of divine law as revealed in the Qurʾan and practiced by Prophet Muhammad. Islam, which is a universal and comprehensive way of life, is a well-ordered system, a consistent whole with set answers to all problems. Its fundamental postulate is *tawḥīd* and its envisaged scheme of life is known as *sharīʿah* and is established on the bedrock of faith. It is on that foundation that the edifice of moral, social, political, and economic system is created. The ideal Islamic society, to Mawdūdī, consists of people who, through putting their faith in Islam, have liberated themselves from all allegiances except to Allah; such a society would be free and "theo-democratic" and its citizens would be as equal as the teeth of a comb.[4]

Muslims, according to Mawdūdī, belong to the *ummah wasaṭah* (just and balanced community), and, as such, are duty bound to enjoin what is right and forbid what is evil. The Qur'an, he wrote, is not a book of abstract theories and religious enigmas to be unraveled in monasteries and universities; it is a book of movement and agitation revealed to invite the people to the one right way of Allah. Consequently, Islam is the religion of revolutionary struggle and utmost exertion (*jihād*) aimed at shattering the myth of the divinity of demi-gods and promoting the cause of Allah by establishing the Islamic political order. Islam, therefore, is a dynamic force, a worldwide revolutionary movement bent upon transforming the world to be in accord with its tenets and principles to benefit mankind. "*Jihād* is but another name for the attempt to establish the Divine Order; the Qur'an therefore declares it to be a touchstone of belief."[5] In this struggle, there is no room for bystanders, spectators and backsliders, and the venture is so crucial that, neglecting it, "one has no means left to please Allah." To Mawdūdī, *jihād* meant fighting oppression by pen and by involvement in public affairs. Undeterred by time and expediency, he dedicated his life to the cause of Islam. The persisting needling of the government in the renaissance movement he founded and led, and hardships and personal discomfiture he endured on a number of occasions in Pakistani prisons (October 4, 1948–May 28, 1950; March 28, 1953–May 25, 1955; January 6, 1964–October 10, 1964; January 29, 1967–March 16, 1967) and once under the threat of a death sentence by the military tribunal (on May 9, 1953) are perhaps indicative of the significance of the man and his ideas.

Mawdūdī's ideas and writings are nothing new and in that sense he was not an original thinker. He himself disclaimed that he had discovered any new principle or doctrine; he was presenting only what the Qur'an and the Sunnah have taught. He simply reminded his fellow Muslims of the most ancient covenant between the Creator and His creation and of, what is termed in the Qur'an, a "transaction of sale": "Surely, Allah has bought of the believers their persons and their property for this that they shall have a paradise in exchange" (9:111). Mawdūdī did not repudiate the past, he simply renewed it and made it relevant to the present and future. It is in this sense that Mawdūdī emerges as the most systematic thinker of modern Islam. His major contribution, as aptly summarized by Khurshid Ahmad:

> [i]s that he has devoted himself to the socio-politico-cultural aspect of Islam and has discussed those problems which the writers on Islam were avoiding for a long time in recent past. He has tried to meet the new intellectual challenge of the West and has presented Islam in the language of today. In political thought, his main contribution is that he has not only presented the teachings of Islam in a clear, precise, cogent and convincing way but has also interpreted them for our times and has tried to suggest the form which the Islamic tenets can take to crystallise in the world of twentieth century.[6]

Two-Nation Theories

Mawdūdī's political thought was conditioned by the sociopolitical and religious environment in which he lived and operated. The pre-independent Indian environment was

dominated by three major political forces: the British Raj, the Indian National Congress, and the All-India Muslim League. While the British rule was steadily weakening in determination and effective powers, the Indian National Congress was concerned with uniting the Indians for independence. The British and the Congress were determined to preserve the unity of India (though for different reasons) while the All-India Muslim League was wedded to the concept of Muslim nationalism, seeking a homeland for the Muslims of the subcontinent. Indeed, the poet-philosopher of Islam, ʿAllāmah Muhammad Iqbal (1876–1938), had made, in 1930, a proposal for a separate Muslim homeland. Iqbal had a federated India in mind with a consolidated Muslim state as its constituent unit. Ten years later Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876–1948), once hailed as the ambassador of Hindu–Muslim Unity, took up Iqbal's notion of a separate Muslim homeland and enunciated what became known as the "two-nation" theory. He talked of Islam and Hinduism as two "different and distinct social orders" whose adherents can never evolve a "common nationality." He added, "Musalmans are a nation according to any definition of a nation, and they must have their homelands, their territory and their state."[7] Accordingly, the Muslim League in its annual session at Lahore adopted on March 23, 1940 a resolution, subsequently known as "the Pakistan Resolution." It called for the creation of independent Muslim states in the Northwestern and Eastern zones of the subcontinent where the Muslims constituted the majority of the population.

Mawdūdī, however, argued that a national government based on secular or Muslim nationalism would not be qualitatively different from the imperial government of India. Nationalism was an alien concept imported by colonialism to break up the unity of the Muslim world. They likewise injected Western currencies, influence, thought, and all sorts of heresies into the Islamic way of life. Being a divisive phenomenon, a nation state cannot be helpful in bringing about the Islamic sociopolitical system. Mawdūdī, therefore, rejected the existence of Muslim nationalism as incompatible with Islam which is universal. His interest was in *iqāmat-i dīn* establishing the Islamic way of life. The methodology for the establishment of Islam's ascendancy, Mawdūdī argued, was not through the nationalist struggle. He argued that a national struggle may produce a nation-state for the Indian Muslims, but definitely not an Islamic state. He also mounted scathing criticism against the Muslim League for having accepted the West's supremacy in the realm of knowledge, culture, and philosophy. Thus, the Jamaat-e-Islami and the All-India Muslim League were advocating solutions to the Muslim problem from two different perspectives: one passionately involved in a national struggle for independence and the establishment of a separate homeland for Muslims, and the other struggling for the domination of pristine Islam as a complete way of life.

Mawdūdī, however, was vehemently opposed to the Congress that tried to mobilize Muslims in the ethos of secular democracy, and to wean them away from the Muslim League on strictly economic issues. The Congress called for Hindu–Muslim unity-based "composite nationalism," which Mawdūdī felt was impossible to achieve. He argued that if the Muslims accept this type of nationalism and join the Congress, they would be annihilated and absorbed into the Hindu majority. "What was uppermost in my mind," wrote Mawdūdī, "was to keep alive in the Muslims a sense of their separate entity and prevent their absorption into a non-Muslim Community."[8] To Mawdūdī,

Muslims constituted a "brotherhood" entrusted with a comprehensive system of life to offer the world. Were they to practice Islam faithfully, the matter of a national homeland would become "absolutely immaterial." He argued for the Muslim community to turn inward and revive the traditions that once brought it power, glory, and prosperity. In his voluminous writings, Mawdūdī argued that if India's Muslims were to survive as a community, they would have to treat Islam as their "way of life," not merely as a system of faith and worship. They must merge their personalities and existences into Islam. They subordinate all their roles to the one role of being Muslims. Mawdūdī's greatest contribution of the time was that he made Muslims cognizant of their identity and raised in them fervor to organize their polity on the principles of Islam. While opposing Muslim nationalism, Mawdūdī was promoting the cause of "two-nation" theory. He even presented "two-nation" theories of his own. He proposed dividing India into two culturally autonomous democratic entities functioning either as a federation or as a loose confederation. The articles he wrote to that effect were collected and published in his three-volume Urdu book, *Musalman awr Mawjudah Siyasi Kashmakash* (*Muslims and the Current Political Crisis*). His writings provided the Muslim League with much needed intellectual ammunition to fight the nationalist movement. Mawdūdī is therefore recognized as an intellectual force behind the two-nation theory and a front against united Indian nationalism. According to I.H. Qureshi, "Mawdūdī's rejoinder was . . . logical, authoritative, polite and devastating. . . . It did not win him too many adherents and followers, but it did serve the purpose of turning sincere and intelligent Muslims away from the Congress who mostly swelled the ranks of the Muslim League as followers of the Quaid-e-Azam."[9] Contrary to the prevailing view, Mawdūdī did not oppose Pakistan. He, however, opposed the Muslim League and its leadership. His concern then was Islam, and the ability of those who sought to represent it. The period between the founding of the Jamaat in 1941 and the advent of Pakistan in 1947 was spent in mobilizing public opinion for the propagation and adoption of an Islamic ideological concept with a view to transforming India into an abode of Islam.

Islam in Pakistan

Following the Partition of India in 1947, Mawdūdī, along with many party leaders, moved to Pakistan and established the headquarters of the Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan in Lahore. The multiple reinforcing cleavages, elite incoherence, and tortuous and complicated political maneuverings during the formative phase of Pakistan, perhaps, influenced the Jamaat leaders to become active in Pakistani politics.

The Jamaat, according to Israr Ahmad, adopted the following two-point program:

1. To embark upon a comprehensive movement for the implementation of Islamic ideology in order to convert to Islam the newly established state of Pakistan.
2. To bring about a revolutionary change in the political leadership of the country so that the resources of the state are harnessed in the service of Islam.

Israr Ahmad blames Mawdūdī for restricting the scope of Jamaat's activities by its exclusive concern for the Muslims to the exclusion of non-Muslims and for transforming the Jamaat into a nationalist organization serving the cause of Islam in Pakistan.[10] Mawdūdī's reasons for subscribing to an "Islam in Pakistan" thesis were twofold. First, for an ideology to be useful, it must have an empirical import and make reference to particular cases or examples because it is impossible to build a pattern of life merely in the abstract. Second, for an ideology to attract worldwide attention, it must demonstrate its worth by evolving a happy and successful system of life and must present its theories and fundamental principles in operation. Consequently, Mawdūdī thought it essential to have the Islamic state established in one country first so as to be emulated worldwide later.

The Jamaat started an organized campaign to realize the first of the two objectives. On January 6 and February 19, 1948, Mawdūdī delivered two lectures at the Law College in Lahore in which he demanded the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan to accept the following four demands:

1. That the sovereignty belongs to Allah alone and that the state shall exercise its authority as His agent.
2. That *sharīʿah* will be the basic law of the land.
3. That the laws in conflict with *sharīʿah* will gradually be repealed and that no such laws shall be enacted in future.
4. That the state in exercising its powers shall not transgress the limits prescribed by Islam.

The Lahore lectures were followed by a tour of Pakistan in April and May 1948, extensive lobbying with the members of the Constituent Assembly, and a concerted public campaign to press upon the leaders to incorporate the above points into the constitution of Pakistan. On March 7, 1949 the Constituent Assembly passed the Objectives Resolution embodying the four-point demand. With the passage of the Resolution, Pakistan, according to Mawdūdī, in principle took the shape of an Islamic state. It is not the Resolution *per se* but the fact of it being adopted by the government in response to the unanimous demand of the people to lead an Islamic way of life that made it an Islamic state. It would be an exaggeration to credit Mawdūdī and his organization exclusively for the success. However, the organized strength of the Jamaat under Mawdūdī's leadership did play a major role. It may thus be construed as a triumph of Mawdūdī and the Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan.

The Resolution, setting forth the ideals and values, acted as a guide for constitution makers in Pakistan in 1956, 1962, 1972, and 1973 in devising an Islamic order for the country. It was incorporated, with minor modifications, in all the constitutions of Pakistan. The Objectives Resolution was made a substantive part of the constitution by President General Ziyaul Haq through a constitutional amendment that was promulgated on March 2, 1985.

The Objectives Resolution did not produce the desired result. Understandably, the institutionalization of Islam in Pakistan would have jeopardized the vested interests of the feudal and capitalist forces as well as that the of civil–military bureaucracy.

The Jamaat consequently intensified its efforts through public meetings, contacting members of parliament, and mobilizing strong public pressure to make Pakistan a truly Islamic republic. Mawdūdī produced several treatises on Islamic political theory, Islamic law and constitution, Islamic judicial and legal structures and the modalities for ushering in the Islamic political system in Pakistan. It is to the credit of Mawdūdī that he introduced Islamic idioms and concepts into the unfolding national political discourse and launched a vigorous campaign for the Islamization of Pakistan. Mawdūdī coined or popularized concepts like "Islamic ideology," "Islamic politics," "Islamic constitution," "*iqāmat-i dīn*," "*nizam-e-Mustafa*," and "Islamic way of life." These concepts became key elements of Islamist discourse in Pakistan.

Mawdūdī's intensification of efforts for the Islamic system involved him in intense conflicts with authorities. The dispute took many forms: the 1953 riots against the minority Ahmadi community and the *Report of the Court of Inquiry* which followed, bringing into sharp focus the secularist view in polar opposition to the view of the positive Islamic state, and debate over the constitution of 1956 preceded by the formulation of the basic principles of the Islamic state by 31 *ulama*. This was in response to the challenge thrown by the government to the *ulama* to produce a unanimous statement on the nature of the Islamic constitution. In the conference of the *ulama* gathered to produce an Islamic constitution, Mawdūdī took the lead and laid the basis for the productive cooperative effort. "Mawdūdī read his principles first, and these were supported with some additions by the members of the board."[11] There was also heated debate over the constitution of 1962, which initially erased the word "Islamic" from the country's nomenclature but was reinserted later on to read Islamic Republic of Pakistan. "This was due largely to the advocacy of this idea by Mawdūdī that the constitution was so amended."[12]

Although the constitution of 1956 envisioned the law and administration of the state as "modern even broadly secular," it endorsed the concept of an Islamic state and designated Pakistan as an Islamic Republic. It required the Head of State to be a Muslim, contained the preamble based upon the Objectives Resolution and provided for nullification of law repugnant to the Qur'an and the Sunnah. The constitution of 1962 contained somewhat similar provisions though it considerably watered down the Islamic character of the state. This is largely due to the high-handed method of Ayub Khan's military regime.

The Islamic provisions of these constitutions, undeniably, were merely "high-sounding phrases" having no correspondence with the country's sociopolitical and legal set up. It is, however, difficult to ignore their importance as an index to the relevance of Islam as the framework of the state. They also provided evidence of the success of Mawdūdī and his supporters "in getting Islam acknowledged as the basis of Pakistan's constitution. It is not possible for any government to reverse this decision."[13]

Islam as Ideology

In facing contemporary challenges it is not enough to preach sermons and invite people to adopt high moral standards. Rather, it is necessary to bring about fundamental

rupture with conventional norms of life. Mawdūdī argued relentlessly to think within the totality of the Islamic system and recognize its relevance to the contemporary situation. Without moral values as internal to and constitutive of it, the system is bound to aberrate, as it did, and develop an ethic, which run counter to Islam. Consequently, government and political office became an instrument for self-gratification and the brute exercise of power. The present malaise could be corrected only if people are mobilized and a total transformation of society is actualized. This could be done not by borrowing alien ideologies but by the very tradition that other secular ideologies consider as the opium of the masses. But in order to achieve this, Islam has to be presented into the terms of modern reality. Mawdūdī's greatness lay in accomplishing this Herculean task of explaining the real nature of the faith.

Mawdūdī stated unequivocally that Islam is not a religion in the sense commonly understood by Western usage – that is no more than the sum of several beliefs, rituals and sentiments – but rather a system of life that deals with all aspects of man's existence and performance. It is a belief system, a complete way of life, a message and a movement for the establishment of an Islamic order. It is a "revolutionary ideology" consisting of the worship of Allah, belief in the Hereafter, and adherence to the practice of the Holy Prophet. It is comprehensive and total. In addition to its other-worldly dimension, it has a strong this-worldly dimension. Mawdūdī showed righteous discontent and irritation with the partial vision of Islam which predominates the Muslim world. He scorned those who believe that Islam has nothing to do with the cultural, political, economic, legal, judicial and other matters pertaining to this world. The Qur'an teaches not simply "to preach" Islam but "to act upon it, promote it, and actually enforce it."

It is this emphasis on the sociopolitical aspect of the Islamic scheme for human life which distinguishes Mawdūdī from others who looked down upon power, political authority, and action as something beneath them, in itself contemptible and hence to be eschewed. For Mawdūdī, the fusion of religion and politics is the dictate of Islam and cannot be disregarded. The choice between Creator and Caesar simply does not arise. For Islam, there is no Caesar, there is only Allah and His Messenger. The *sharīʿah* incorporates the temporal within the spiritual. There is an added reason for Mawdūdī's emphasis upon politics and authority. While there are ideological orientations and movements in all branches of scholarship and human thought, it is politics that gives ideology its social experience, its practical articulation and meaning. This is hardly surprising since ideology and politics are inextricably intertwined and coterminous such that politics has ideology as its operational framework that gives it its meaning while politics provides a mode by which ideology is translated into practical actions. This gives the ideas their practical relevance in the real world.

According centrality to power and authority in human affairs is also an answer to the problems of inequality and oppression which have dominated all discussions about political and economic structures since the dawn of civilization. To Mawdūdī,

> Whenever corruption is let loose in the world, whatever injustice is done, whenever tyranny or oppression exists, whatever poison flows in the veins of human culture, economic life and politics, whatever misuse of resources and human knowledge for destruction instead of welfare and enlightenment there may be, the reason is bad leadership.[15]

Power and authority are "the decisive factors in human affairs." Just as the train moves in the direction intended by the driver, human civilization travels in the direction determined by those controlling the centers of power. Right, pious leadership ensures good, healthy society. A society in the hands of rebels "drifts towards rebellion against Allah, towards man's exploitation by man and towards moral degeneration and cultural pollution."[15] Human salvation therefore depends upon wresting control of power and authority and placing it in the hands of those who are righteous and committed to following the Divine guidance. Power and authority is desired not for itself but to root out the evils afflicting humanity since, as Mawdūdī said, "Corrupt rule is the root of all evils you find in the world."

Mawdūdī's motive in "politicizing" Islam has been misunderstood and misinterpreted by many and was specifically criticized by "traditional" scholars. Mawdūdī was accused of promoting "*Mawdūdiyāt*," teachings particular only to him, and of encouraging heterodoxy within Islam. Many *ulama* also argued that Mawdūdī had sacrificed the intellectual foundations and the spiritual expressions of the Islamic faith, which had supported individualist tendencies in the past.[16] Far from reducing Islam into a political formula, Mawdūdī sought to sanctify politics by bringing it within the fold of Islam, such that man's political life is always situated within the larger frame of his religious and spiritual life. This is the most reliable defense against the corrupting influence of politics. Muslims have been enjoined by Allah to seek power or to get the support of a ruling authority, Mawdūdī explained:

> so that I may, with the force of the coercive powers of the state, establish virtue, eradicate evil, eliminate surging tide of corruption and vulgarity, set at right the disruption engulfing humanity and administer justice according to your revealed law.[17]

Power thus tamed helps actualize the Islamic system, which is impossible by mere verbal invitation and sermon preaching. It is, therefore, incumbent upon every Muslim to define and apply the relevance of Islam to every single item in human living and create a universal order in which the totality of Islam can be operationalized. Mawdūdī understood and conveyed the very heart of the message of Islam and this is perhaps the reason for his importance and his success in influencing the thinking of Muslim intellectuals all over the world.

Implied in Mawdūdī's urging to action, to plunge into the exuberant task of creating a humane world order is the recognition that there is inherent in the structure of this world a right socioeconomic and political shape, which is profoundly relevant to the quality of life within it, and that the meaning of dynamism lies in the degree to which these have been actualized. Nevertheless, there has been an apparent failure on the part of Muslims to generate an interpretation of Islam that could serve as a workable theory of politics, economics, and society in the present situation. Breaking the impasse of Muslim quietude and creating an acceptable framework constitutes the most formidable challenge to Muslim intellectuals today. Mawdūdī tried hard and produced a lucid blueprint of an Islamic order detailing the constitutional and legal features around the *sharī'ah* of an Islamic state. He is more explicit than most of his contemporaries in his stand for the principles of electiveness of rulers, their accountability to the ruled, their obligation to consult the elected representative of the people,

and the right of ordinary citizens to criticize all those in power and authority. It must be pointed out that Mawdūdī did not delve into the technical world of the specialist, but has expounded the essentials of Islamic approach in economics, political, cultural, and other fields of activity. The ultimate social, economic, and political goal of Islam is the establishment of justice and elimination of tyranny and oppression. It aims at individual freedom, social dignity, and universal equity, in short, promoting all that is good and proper and preventing all that is harmful and evil.

Islam and the Economy

Islam is not only organically related to politics but is also integral to the economic structure of the state. Mawdūdī mentioned private property, freedom of enterprise, *laissez-faire* etc., as the basic tenets of modern capitalism and recognized an element of truth in these principles for which he has been called "a Muslim Adam Smith" of Pakistan.[18] He, however, found capitalism carrying these principles to the extreme by undue emphasis on self-interest and profit motive, and by legislating usury (*riba*), which caused widespread suffering and privation. The capitalist economy, he wrote, is dominated by an "inhuman evil," usury. Its trade cycle is in the hands of the usurious bankers, brokers, industrialists, and business magnates; unemployment is acute and there is poverty amidst plenty. The communist system, on the other hand, showed some achievements in the sphere of social welfare and state planning but this was achieved at a great cost in terms of human lives. Communism deprived people of their liberty and denied moral values. Corruption became rampant and a totalitarian regime came to be established, which took recourse in extreme repressive measures. Islam cuts the roots of capitalism but unlike communism preserves man's freedom and his link with God. Islam, in other words, is a golden mean between capitalism and communism.

Within certain limits, Islam accepts private property and makes no distinction between means of production and forces of production nor does it aim at equal distribution of wealth. The materialistic concept of economic equality, Mawdūdī argued, is against nature and any artificial imposition of such equality would inevitably fail. Islam, therefore, calls for just and equitable distribution of wealth in the society. Islam ensures economic justice by providing equality of opportunity, which makes formation of static classes or groups impossible. Along with economic justice, Islam uses two methods which put an end to social imbalance and contradictions. First, it puts some restrictions on the earning and accumulation of wealth. For instance, in the means for the acquisition of wealth it makes a distinction between the permissible and the prohibited and imposes obligatory *zakah*, wealth tax, at varying rates. In addition, Islam gives general command of voluntary spending in the way of God and thus establishes the rights of the state and the entire community over an individual's wealth. Second, Islam guarantees social security for those who are unable to earn a livelihood. It is the duty of an Islamic state to arrange for employment, clothing, education, and the like for all citizens.[19]

In the matter of economy, as in others, Mawdūdī gave priority to the non-economic goals of safeguarding the freedom of the individual and his moral and ethical

development. Social justice, equality of opportunity, and cooperation came next in his list of objectives of the Islamic economic system. One lacuna in Mawdūdī's economic thinking is the omission of the role of absentee landlordism in curtailing people's freedom especially in Pakistan. While Mawdūdī realized the menace of monetary *riba* and explained the rationale for its prohibition in Islam, he failed to understand that absentee landlordism is a disguised form of *riba* concerning agricultural land. This omission has resulted in the elimination of the much-needed revolutionary spirit from the Islamic movement in Pakistan. Mawdūdī must have realized this and hence the Jamaat Manifesto for the 1970 elections in Pakistan opened with a categorical statement opposing both landlordism and modern Western capitalism.

In any case, the declared purpose of Islamic economics is to identify and establish an economic order that conforms to Islamic scripture and traditions. Its core positions took shape in the 1940s, and three decades later efforts were made to implement them in many countries. In Pakistan, Malaysia, and elsewhere, governments are now running centralized Islamic redistribution systems known as *zakah*. More than 70 countries have Islamic banks that claim to offer a *riba*-free alternative to conventional banking. Pakistan, Iran, and a few other countries have made every form of interest illegal. They have convinced all banks, including foreign subsidiaries, to adopt, at least formally, Islamic methods of deposit making and loan taking. Attempts are also under way to disseminate religious norms of price setting, bargaining, and wage determination.

Reform and Revolution

Mawdūdī realized that the prevailing iniquitous dehumanizing order cannot be replaced by a humane order unless there is a fundamental change in attitudes and values. Mawdūdī did not think that it is possible or even desirable to bring about societal transformation overnight. Nor did he succumb to the illusion that the road to a new order could be paved merely with pious wishes and good intentions. It is useless to blame the adversary or bewail the times in which one's lot was cast. However heavy the odds, it was the duty of a faithful never to feel helpless. What he should do first is to make a beginning with himself by getting rid of selfishness from his heart. This suggests that change is dependent upon the moral strength of the changing agent. As he puts it boldly

> the human life is governed not by physical laws, but by moral laws . . . the fundamental cause of man's rise and decline and the greatest influence on his destiny is the extent and quality of his moral strength.[20]

To him, the moral being is the human being. Morality is the shield against corruption and temptations to abuse power.

The conviction that the corrupting influence of power can be checked by adhering to moral precepts may seem utopian, unlikely to work in practice. The successful demonstration of "humanity at its best" by some 400 companions of the last Prophet

of Islam in running the state of Medina and Mawdūdī's own success in producing a group of people characterized by personal integrity and unquestioned sacrificial vigor for the cause of Islam was enough to suggest that his method could work. In any case, for Mawdūdī this was the only method. The problem of tyranny, exploitation and injustice had to be tackled at the root. The best way, Mawdūdī argued, is to train all those who volunteer for service to Allah before allowing them to undertake *jihād* and establish Allah's rule on earth. Mawdūdī's stress on the salutary effect produced by the morally upright is a pointer to the lack of these qualities in any existing state and a consequent drift toward unparalleled catastrophe.

The social transformation advocated by Mawdūdī presupposed changes in the minds and hearts of men. The French, Nazi, and Russian revolutions have erred in adopting the tools of hatred and violence and in trying to change men by bluntly reacting against status quo and its wholesale destruction. The need is to tackle the problem of change within man, in his thoughts, motives, and behavior pattern. Such changes cannot be produced overnight. They cannot be accelerated or even anticipated beyond a point. In society, as in the human organism, there is a safe rate of change. Voluntary and peaceful changes may be slow, but they may be more enduring. Non-violent participatory change has occurred throughout history. As Erich Fromm points out, "the liberation of the working class from the status of objects of ruthless exploitation to that of the influential economic partners in Western industrialized society is an example of non-violent change."[21] Such changes, however, have been the exception rather than the rule. But it is the exception that Mawdūdī aimed at. The Islamic revolution aiming at total transformation of society is to be brought about piece-meal beginning with the personal reformation of the individual. Mawdūdī, who spent his life battling against social obscurantism, colonial domination, and national prejudice knew that great, lasting changes could not be ordained at will and at short notice.

Violence and Revolution

Thus, Mawdūdī differed profoundly from the tradition that considers violence as a defining characteristic of revolution. His main point of divergence from that tradition lay in his conception of the evolutionary process. He viewed revolution as involving more than the overthrow of a political regime. Revolution is a process of comprehensive and fundamental change in the system, which requires, first and foremost, changing the man himself, his outlook, his motivation and his personality.

Mawdūdī insisted on the evolutionary approach for carrying out social change. He was opposed to all unlawful, unconstitutional, and subversive acts and distrusted political radicalism of any kind. Respect for law and order was indispensable to the civilized society and hence he cautioned the revolutionaries to resist the temptation of resorting to the methods and techniques of "secret movements and bloody revolutions." Mawdūdī did not believe that anything positive could result from disrupting the social order. Furthermore, creating disorder "is against the wish of Allah." Islamic movement is for the cause of Allah and it should be conducted openly and peacefully even at the risk of courting hardship and miseries.

> Whatever I have done, I have always done it openly within the boundaries of law and exist-
> ing constitution, so much that I have never violated even those laws which I have fought
> hard to oppose. I have tried to change them through lawful and constitutional means and
> never adopted the path of violation of the law.[22]

Mawdūdī justified his predilection for a non-violent approach on theoretical as well as practical grounds. Thus one argument was that it is against the natural order of things to force change: "We should not overlook the basic law of nature that all stable and far-reaching changes in the collective life of people come about gradually." From the practical point of view, if change was to be lasting it had to be carried out slowly; for "the more sudden a change, the more short-lived it generally turns out to be". A perusal of the Qur'an and hadith reveals that the last Prophet of Islam had adopted a gradual but effective approach to translate Islamic ideals into reality. He did admit, however, that the Prophet Muhammad did resort to force but only to resist persecution, and yet no more than 1200 people were killed on both sides in the course of all the wars fought during the Prophet's time. Keeping in view the history of violent revolu-tion in the world, the prophetic revolution deserved to be called a "bloodless revolu-tion." While insisting on the revolutionary approach, Mawdūdī did not rule out the possibility of resorting to force in exceptional cases. Force was to be used to resist ruth-less persecution, which makes the peaceful propagation of Islam impossible. Force is never used to compel anybody to embrace Islam against his will. Its purpose is only to establish conditions conducive to free propagation of Islam.

Force also plays a role in creating an Islamic character in the people but it is to be used only as a last resort. The order of precedence in the Islamic movement would be, first, to reform people's minds through education and preaching. Second, to build their character along Islamic lines. Third, to take steps to prepare strong public opinion which fosters good and suppresses evil. Fourth, to establish such a social, economic, and political order that facilitates doing good deeds and shuns all evil practices. Should all these attempts fail, then force is to be used only "as a last resort" and should be used so openly and mercilessly that it deters all criminal tendencies.

Mawdūdī's evolutionary approach to societal transformation gave priority to a change in political leadership of the country so that the resources of the state are har-nessed in the service of Islam. The revolutionary movement, Mawdūdī contended, has no choice but to capture state authority, for without it the pious order that Islam envis-ages can never be established. Additionally, it becomes impossible for the revolutionary party itself to act upon its own ideals under an alien state system.

> A man who believes in communism cannot order his life on the principles of communism
> while in England or America, for the capitalist state system will bear down on him with all
> its power and it will be quite impossible for him to escape the retribution of the ruling
> authority. Likewise, it is impossible for a Muslim to succeed in his intention of observing
> the Islamic pattern of life under the authority of a non-Islamic system of government.[23]

However, Mawdūdī declared that the capturing of the state power must be accom-plished through constitutional means, i.e., elections, since *sharī'ah* forbids resorting to

unconstitutional means for the transformation of the political system. Consequent upon this decision, the Jamaat took part in almost all elections and failed miserably to capture power. Jamaat's participation in electoral politics had an adverse effect on the moral behavior of its members. The Jamaat degenerated from an ideal Islamic revolutionary party into a right-wing political party, along with the adoption of all the practices that may be objectionable from an Islamic point of view but which are perhaps unavoidable for running a purely partisan election campaign. Some of Mawdūdī's followers, especially the student wing of the Jamaat, did resort to violence. This is interpreted as retaliatory measures occasioned by the use of ruffians and hooligans by secular political elite bent upon denying the Islamic forces a space for open political participation and competition. In general, however, the Jamaat and its supporters did not abandon the democratic method temporarily to attain power by violent means. In the 2002 elections, the Jamaat forged an alliance with Islam-based parties and succeeded in forming a government in the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan.

Islam, Modernity, and Tradition

Mawdūdī saw the need for enlightened Muslims if the Islamic revolution was to succeed. Unfortunately, the Muslims were in retreat. "Their minds and souls have passed under the sway of the West. Their thinking is being molded by Western ideas and their intellectual powers are developing in accordance with the principles of Western thought. . . ."[24] This "dangerous situation" has given rise to two extreme reactions: the "static" and the "defeatist". The "static" Muslim literature opposing technology and scientific progress demonstrated the moral failure of the West and asserted the validity of the Muslim heritage as a whole. These were essentially a reaction against Western criticism rather than a confident statement of Islam. Mawdūdī reproached the "static" religious conservatives for rigorous formalism and for their unwillingness "to comprehend the principles and essential features of the new civilization of the West . . . and to fit these new instruments of progress, in keeping with the principles of Islam, into the educational system and social life of the Muslims."[25] The "defeatist" reaction came from the modernist Muslims, the Westernized elite. They acknowledged superiority of Western culture and values and tried to mold Islam along Western lines. Over time, these two postures hardened, the former leading to dogmatism and the latter degenerating into the subordination of Islamic value systems to the abstract values of science and reason. Least concerned about the existing socioeconomic and political realities of the Muslims, they were rendered only marginally relevant to the welfare of the Muslim community and of the whole human race. The education system the modernists have adopted is an alien one and is causing incalculable damage to the Muslim *ummah*. This education system, Mawdūdī lamented, has produced "brown Englishmen," "Anglo-Mohammedans," and "Anglo-Indians."[26] Thus Mawdūdī argued that allowing such an indiscriminate welcome to everything modern was the greatest danger to the *ummah*, since it would subject the entire nation to psychological enfeeblement.

Many Muslim reformers in the past have tried to remedy this sickness. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (1232–1316 AH/1817–1898 CE) and Muḥammad ʿAbduh (1260–1323 AH/1845–1905 CE), to name just two, have been most famous in this respect. They believed that what the system needed was the addition of Western sciences to our existing curriculum of Islamic disciplines. Their view was based on the assumption that Western sciences were value neutral and that they would not do any harm to Islamic values. President Jamal ʿAbd al-Nasser of Egypt put this idea into practice by changing the very character of al-Azhar, but without any fruitful results in the area of modern sciences and technology. Worse still, the traditional Islamic teachings, desperately in need of reform, remained as sterile as ever. The Westernizing Muslim modernists, even if they meant well in their desire to defend Islam, in effect presented a truncated and deformed Islam.

To Mawdūdī, such educational reforms would prove to be unproductive, even counterproductive. What is needed, according to him, is to reorient the system and to Islamize the knowledge. To Islamize, to Mawdūdī, is "to critically analyze the Western humanities and sciences and to bring them into line with the teachings of Islam."[27] It is a process of critical evaluation and appreciation as against blind imitation, and a process of sifting, filtering and reconstruction as against wholesale rejection of Western thought and destruction. The aim is to critically appreciate and reformulate social sciences within the framework of Islam. It is interesting to note that Mawdūdī's definition of Islamization of knowledge and its characteristics, given in 1936, is similar to that propounded in 1982 by the late Dr. Ismail Raji al-Faruqi (1346–1406 AH/1921–1986 CE) in his epoch-making booklet, *Islamization of Knowledge*. According to al-Faruqi, "to recast knowledge as Islam relates to it is to Islamize it." This means: "to redefine data, to rethink the reasoning and relating of the data, to re-evaluate the conclusions, to re-project the goals and to do so in such a way as to make the disciplines enrich the vision and serve the cause of Islam."[28] As conceived by Mawdūdī, Islamization of Knowledge aims at ameliorating the crisis of the Muslim mind by addressing the problem of the body of Western knowledge and Islamic heritage and legacy. Its aim is to provide to the Muslim *ummah* a vision, and an ideologically oriented sound methodology to confront contemporary challenges and to reclaim its lost glory.

Emphasizing science and reason, Mawdūdī urged critical evaluation and assessment of both the Muslim heritage and Western science. He urged that the Muslim heritage be analyzed against its historical background and if the legacy is found to be inadequate or erring, the terms of the divine status of the Qur'an and the normativeness of the Sunnah and their relevance to the problems of the present should be corrected. Attempts at molding the society along Islamic lines would be all the poorer if it did not take the legacy into account and did not benefit from the insights of the ancestors. Extremes of rejection or wholesale glorification is due either to the inaccessibility of the legacy to the modern mind or of the inability of the traditionally trained scholars to discover and establish the relevance of the heritage to the present-day problems. Mawdūdī's call is to break this impasse to facilitate restructuring the world order. Likewise, Western civilization should be subjected to critical analysis from the standpoint of Islam. Its methodology, foundational principles, historical development, and achievements should be surveyed and analyzed. Thereafter, healthy achievements of

Western civilization in terms of its scientific and technological progress, in so far as they are value-free and are in conformity with Islamic principles, should be appreciated, abstracted and assimilated into the Islamic scheme of life. These ideas enabled Muslim intellectuals like Ismail al-Faruqi and others whose "Islamization of Knowledge" project carried forward some of Mawdūdī's key points.

As conceptualized by Mawdūdī, the process of Islamization of Knowledge must tackle the problem of education. He felt strongly that a genuine revival of the *ummah* is possible only if the education system is revamped and its faults corrected. What is actually required is for the system to be formed anew. To this end, Mawdūdī proposed educational reforms for secondary, higher secondary, and university levels. His emphasis, however, was on the university level for which he spelled out the modality for the implementation of his reforms.

The "model university" envisaged by Mawdūdī found its practical manifestations in the 1980s in many parts of the Muslim world especially in the International Islamic University, Islamabad. It is also manifested by the well-managed International Islamic University in Malaysia (IIUM). Established in 1983, IIUM's philosophy is "the integration of religious knowledge and worldly sciences, together with the vision of Islamization of human knowledge. . . . As such the university is not limited to Islamic theological studies but is a comprehensive professional institution of higher learning in which the teaching of all fields of knowledge is infused with Islamic values and the Islamic philosophy of knowledge."[29] This is a fully residential university open to students from all over the world. The conduct of students and teachers is subject to supervision. They are expected to follow the Islamic way of life. At IIUM, "all professional courses are taught in English, but students are required to reach the level of advanced Arabic proficiency. Students taking the *sharīʿah*, Arabic, and Revealed Knowledge courses must, of course, take them in Arabic, but their minor courses are offered in English."[30] It has a well-established "Research Centre" which promotes research of all kinds and encourages scholars to produce textbooks in all fields from an Islamic perspective. Thus, the IIUM can be considered a custodian of the knowledge that aims at producing ideologically sound Islamic leadership. Indeed, the university proclaims itself to be the "Garden of Knowledge and Virtue."

Conclusion

Mawdūdī's primary concern has been the reinstatement of Islamic values through education, legislation, and reform and this is receiving a good deal of attention all over the Muslim world today. Pakistan, the homeland of Mawdūdī, has sporadically been reasserting Islamic values in all realms of society in accordance with the concept of *nizam-e Mustafa*.

Equally discernible is the new trend in Muslim thinking on economic and legal issues. It should be remembered that Mawdūdī has not only written on economic problems but has also inspired quite a number of writers who are now in the forefront of devising Islamic economic models. The core of the new economic thinking revolves around the issue of usury (*riba*) which, according to Mawdūdī, is completely forbidden

in Islam. After a decade of discussions involving the distinction between usury and interest, Muslims are now unanimous in condemning interest as *riba* and have embarked upon experimentation with Islamic banking systems eschewing the use of interest and other kinds of transactions prohibited in Islam. Beginning with the Islamic Development Bank in 1975, some 97 Islamic banks have been established all over the world. Similarly, attempts are underway to modify existing civil, criminal, and personal laws with the help of provisions available in the *sharī'ah*. Mawdūdī's method of returning to core principles in the Qur'an and the Sunnah and reaching a studied opinion as to how the problems confronting the present age should be resolved in their light seems to be more and more acceptable. There are, nevertheless, varying degrees of constitutional espousal of Islamicity as well as differences in the degree to which values enshrined in the Qur'an and the Sunnah have penetrated the interstices of the Muslim social fabric. The basing of legislation on the *sharī'ah* will have no magical effect unless a total transformation of society takes place. This necessitates knowing the righteous path, understanding the present day reality and imposing the one upon the other. This was the mission of Mawdūdī and this is the relevance of his thought for the contemporary situation in the Muslim world.

The ongoing Islamic reassertion is symptomatic of the crises confronting the world. It is an index, as well, of the fact that the malaise is still unresolved. It nevertheless symbolizes initiative, creativity and a sense of beginning. In the current drive to stress Islamic identity, Mawdūdī's works have played a remarkable role. He succeeded in motivating a large part of the alienated Muslims to identification with Islam. He has laid down ideas and directions that can be followed in carrying forward his *jihād*. Mawdūdī intended to stimulate thought and create an intellectual tradition where critical attitude is the norm. Mastery and assessment of the Muslim heritage, critical analysis of the Western civilization from the standpoint of Islam, and establishing the specific relevance of Islam to the world today is the legacy of Mawdūdī and is essential for the balanced growth of a humane world order.

The Jamaat-e-Islami, based on the teachings of Mawdūdī, is a more politically assertive group that tries to reach both lay Muslims and non-Muslims. Mawdūdī spoke of a universal Islamic movement, inculcating Islamic precepts and praxis among Muslims. Implicit in this message is the need to create an Islamic society based on Qur'anic egalitarian ideals wherever Muslims lived. An avowed intention of the Jamaat-e-Islami is to bring about a revolution in the political leadership of society, reorganize political and socioeconomic life along Islamic lines, and finally, to establish an Islamic state. When Pakistan was created, the Jamaat-e-Islami launched a public campaign to seek popular support for the implementation of the *sharī'ah* and demanded an "Islamic Constitution". Mawdūdī pursued his evangelical goals through non-militant means. He advocated the use of constitutional and legal means to pursue the objectives of the movement. He also advocated training camps to imbibe his adherents with Islamic values. Some of his adherents did resort to violent means, which is attributable to the impatience of the secular elite and their resorting to violence in dealing with Islamic forces.

At the time of Mawdūdī's death (September 22, 1979), Pakistan had already made sufficient progress in promoting the Islamic way of life. The conceptual basis of Islam

has been partly realized, which no government in future would ignore. This is the major achievement of Pakistan's experiment in promoting an Islamic system. This is the legacy of Sayyid Abul Aʿla Mawdūdī.

Notes

1. Abul Aʿla Mawdūdī, *Jihad fi Sabil Allah* (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1962).
2. Abu Athar Afaqi, *Fitna-e-Mawdūdīat per ek aur be lag tabsirah* (Urdu) (Jauharabad: Idara Adbastan, 1976).
3. Abul Aʿla Mawdūdī, *Tafhim Al-Qurʾan*, Vol. I (Lahore: Idarah Tarjumanul Qurʾan, 1978), 6–11. This monumental Urdu *Tafhim* is in six volumes and was written over a period of 30 years from 1942 to its completion in 1972.
4. The term Mawdūdī used to identify the Islamic state is "theo-democracy" which means "kingdom of Allah" administered not by a priestly class – of which Europe had a bitter experience – but by the entire Muslim population in accordance with the *sharīʿah.*
5. Sayyid Abul Aʿla Mawdūdī, *The Islamic Movement: Dynamics of Values, Power and Change*, Khurram Murad (ed.), (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 1984), 79.
6. Abul Aʿla Mawdūdī, *Islamic Law and Constitution*, Khurshid Ahmad (trans. and ed.), (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1967), 34–5.
7. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad (ed.), *Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah* (Lahore: Mohammad Ashraf, 1974), Vol. I, 178, 180.
8. Sayyid Abul Aʿla Mawdūdī, *Jamaat-e-Islami ke 29 Sal* (*29 Years of Jamaat-e-Islami*) (Lahore: Jamaat-e-Islami, 1976), 25.
9. Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, *Ulama in Politics* (Karachi: Maʾarif Limited, 1974), 339, 351.
10. Israr Ahmad, *Tehrik-e-Jamaʿat-e-Islami: Ek Tehqiqi Mutalaʿah* (*The Jamaat-e-Islami Movement: A Critical Study*) (Lahore: Markazi Anjuman Khuddam al-Qurʾan, 1990), 118–21, 123–6.
11. Leonard Binder, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), 216.
12. A.K. Brohi, "Mawlana Abul Aʿla Mawdūdī: The Man, the Scholar, the Reformer," in Khurshid Ahmad and Safar Ishaq Ansari, eds., *Islamic Perspectives: Studies in Honour of Mawlana Sayyid Abul Aʿla Mawdūdī* (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 1980), 301.
13. S. Zakir Ijaz (trans.), *Selected Speeches and Writings of Mawlana Mawdūdī* (Karachi: International Islamic Publications, 1982), Vol. II, 285–6.
14. Mawdūdī, *The Islamic Movement: Dynamics of Values, Power and Change*, 71.
15. Mawdūdī, *Tafhim Al-Qurʾan*, Vol. II, 77.
16. See Muhammad Zakaria, *Fitnah-e-Maududiyat* (Karachi: Kutub Khanah Mazhari, 1976).
17. Mawdūdī, *Let us be Muslims*, Khurram Murad (ed.), (Leicester: The I Islamic Foundation, 1985), 286.
18. Hafeez Malik, "The Spirit of Capitalism and Pakistani Islam," *Contributions to Asian Studies*, 2 (July 1971), 75.
19. See Mawdūdī, *Islam awr jadid Maʾashi Nazariyat* (*Islam and Modern Economic Systems*) (Delhi: Markazi Maktabah Jamaat-e-Islami Hind, 1969) and *Maʾashiyat-e-Islam* (*Islamic Economics*) (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1969).
20. Mawdūdī, *The Islamic Movement: Dynamics of Values, Power and Change*, 94.
21. Erich Fromm, *May Men Prevail* (New York, Doubleday, 1964), 5.
22. *Nawa-e-Waqt*, November 10, 1963 quoted in Maryam Jameelah, *Islam in Theory and Practice* (Lahore: Mohammad Yusuf Khan & Sons, 1978), 334.

23. Abul A'la Mawdūdī, *Jihad in Islam* (Malaysia: International Islamic Federation of Student Organization, 1981), 19.

24. Abul A'la Mawdūdī, *The Sick Nations of the Modern Age* (Lahore: Islamic Publications Ltd., 1966), 10. This work first appeared as an article in the *Tarjuman al-Qur'an*, Lahore, October 1935.

25. Mawdūdī, *The Sick Nations of the Modern Age*, 11.

26. Ibid., 16.

27. Ibid., 17–18.

28. Ismail Raji al Faruqi, *Islamization of Knowledge: General Principles and Work plans* (Virginia: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1402/1982), 15.

29. M. Kemal Hassan, "International Islamic University at Kuala Lumpur," in John L. Esposito, ed., *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 211. M. Kemal Hassan was appointed the Rector of IIUM in 1999.

30. Ibid., 212.