

31. The latest example is Peter N. Stearns, *Consumerism in World History: the Global Transformation of Desire* (London, 2001).
32. Marwick, *Sixties*, 257-59, 269-70.
33. *Ibid.*, 185-92, 316, 319-20, 324.
34. *L'Express*, 24 February-2 March 1969.
35. All of these quotations are from *L'Express*, 21-28 September 1968.
36. Herbert Marcuse, "Repressive Tolerance," in *A Critique of Pure Tolerance*, eds. Robert Paul Wolff, Barrington Moore, Jr. and Herbert Marcuse (Boston, 1969), 81-123.
37. Tom Hayden, *Reunion: A Memoir* (New York, 1988), 452.
38. Marwick, *Sixties*, 118, 123-24, 131, 136, 143, 527.
39. Michael Seidman, "The Pre-May 1968 Sexual Revolution," *Contemporary French Civilization XXV*, 1 (Winter/Spring, 2001), 28.
40. Klaus Hildebrand, *Von Erhard zur Großen Koalition 1963-1969* (Wiesbaden, 1994), 381.
41. *Paris Presse*, 23 June 1963; *Figaro*, 23 June 1963.
42. Marsham Papers, Box 2, Division of Rare Books and Manuscripts, Cornell University Library, Ithaca, New York. Among several collections at Cornell, The Challenge to Governance Project Papers and the Perkins Papers are specially useful.
43. Malcolm Burnstein Papers, Box 1 F 1.15, Bancroft Library, University of California at Berkeley. The Free Speech Movement Participant Papers at Berkeley are also very rich on adult-student relationships.
44. Marwick, *Sixties*, 604-8.
45. Information generously supplied by Professor Michael Seidman, University of North Carolina at Wilmington.
46. *Elle*, special issue, 17 June 1968, in "Brochures mai 68," 14 AS. 238, Archives Nationales, Paris.
47. Marwick, *Sixties*, 745.
48. Anna Avallone, "Il mio sessantotto: ricordi di una 'madre' e 'insegnante,'" Archivio Oiaristico, Pieve Sanro Stefano, Tuscany.

## Chapter 2

---

# Understanding 1968: Youth Rebellion, Generational Change and Postindustrial Society

*Detlef Siegfried*

When examining the events of 1968 contemporaries as well as later interpreters have continuously focused on the generational aspect of the revolt, often interpreting it in terms of a "youth rebellion" or a "student revolt,"<sup>1</sup> that is, a sudden uprising of young people subverting essential structures of society. On an international level one of the most influential interpretations of this type was Charles Reich's *The Greening of America*, published in 1970, which immediately topped the nonfiction bestseller list in the United States and constituted a kind of agenda that announced the world's postmaterialistic renewal by means of a youth revolt.<sup>2</sup> The protagonists saw themselves as persons involved in a generational departure. The younger age groups and those with a higher level of education had a tendency to interpret the events of 1968 as involving a substantial part of the young generation—although only a small part was active in the disputes.<sup>3</sup>

Therefore, a point of view that had already come into existence at the beginning of the 1960s completely prevailed by the end of the decade. Hardly any other intellectual trend reflected the *Zeitgeist* more clearly than what was summarized by the term "New Left." For the New Left the entire old classes' economism was passé; instead, politics and culture became the center of attention-spheres in which and through which society could be changed. Their theorists demanded more political participation, freer intellectual and aesthetic development, and a strengthening of the individual. Even among the proponents of radical change in

society, the New Left was in a leading position. The American sociologist C. Wright Mills had given up the notion that the working class could achieve a change in society and viewed the young generation, especially young intellectuals, as a decisive factor for change.<sup>4</sup> The American Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) in particular quickly took up this position and incorporated it into their program, the "Port Huron Statement," which was written in 1962. An avant-garde art movement of the late 1950s and 1960s known as Situationism also attached the same importance to the youth. From the point of view of the Church provos, young urban outsiders would change the world while the proletarians would degenerate watching television. "Third World" revolutionary movements, such as Castrism or the Maoist Cultural Revolution, defined themselves as young movements and were also perceived as such. After his death in 1967, Che Guevara became an icon of youth rebellion, more than any other leaders of such movements. By 1968 the organizations of the New Left had reached a large degree of unity with regard to their general direction. This also materialized in their political praxis and differentiated them substantially from groups of the Old Left. The anti-authoritarian wing of the *sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund* (sDs) increasingly viewed the young generation as a potentially revolutionary subject. In August 1967 leaders Reimund Reiche and Peter Gang opined that every oppositional metropolitan movement should be primarily based on "the young" and deemed that it would be most promising to politicize and discipline "the youth's apolitical position of protest."<sup>5</sup> The "fringe group strategy" (*Randgruppenstrategie*), which was favored by some, focused in praxis on working with young outsiders. People who later on became members of the Red Army Faction, such as Ulrike Meinhof, Andreas Baader, and Gudrun Ensslin were active in this field. At the beginning of 1968, the German SDS defined itself as part of a "revolutionary youth movement," and the International Vietnam Congress that was held in Berlin in February 1968 thought of itself as a congregation of the world's revolutionary youth.<sup>6</sup> The biggest Danish underground paper *superlove* declared a "new class struggle between the old and new generation," and aimed for the transformation of the "unarticulated youth culture into an articulated youth rebellion."<sup>7</sup> Within the American SDS at the end of 1968, an anti-authoritarian Revolutionary Youth Movement formed that aimed to expand the social basis from students to pupils and working class youths.<sup>8</sup> Abbie Hoffman and Jerry Rubin had already formed their Youth International Party ("yippies") who wanted to combine the hippie counterculture with the New Left and placed their hopes entirely on the young generation's revolutionary role. The blurb of Jerry Rubin's manifesto "Do it!" of 1970 does not lack clarity: "Jerry Rubin has written The Communist Manifesto of our era.

'Do it' is a declaration of war between the generations-calling on kids to leave their homes, burn down their schools and create a new society upon the ashes of the old."

Statements like these pointedly expressed a process of generational disbanding that was already in motion-without, however, actually having the rigidly confrontational posturing here being postulated. Nevertheless, much potential for confrontation remained-even when one ignores the fist-waving and war rhetoric. Such expressions were explosive because they were articulated by the generation that had a future leading role. It was clear to the public and the ruling political classes of all countries, not only the Western ones, that the young generation played a larger role than previously, that it shaped the dynamic present a lot more strongly than older generations, and that they would soon be running society's destiny. In France, even the conservative Gaullists had already in 1959 placed their hopes on young people: "France is now the most dynamic country in the old continent in Europe because it possesses the largest number of young people ...," and in 1964 *Paris Match* reported with regard to youths between 16 and 24: "They will be our rulers tomorrow."<sup>9</sup> The horror with which conservatives and liberals from all European countries observed the radicalization of precisely the intellectual youth in the late 1960s stemmed from their awareness that this here was the future elite. Because of the manner in which the students presented themselves to the public, massive criticism was directed towards them, claiming that this future elite did not live up to their exemplary role.<sup>10</sup>

The fact that the youth and student movement was an international, even worldwide, phenomenon was one of its most prominent characteristics. Student protests were registered in fifty-six countries, especially in Western Europe, the United States, and Japan but also in countries of the so-called Third World, and in Eastern Europe.<sup>11</sup> The global simultaneity of a political cultural impetus for renewal with similar goals, methods, and incarnations, represents an extraordinary phenomenon. Certainly it is questionable whether the description of the network of events of "1968" as a global "revolution" is accurate. At any rate these events did not immediately lead to any profound changes of economic or political systems, in many cases not even to changes of government in the preferred direction. Political cultures and lifestyles, however, did change significantly so that the term "cultural revolution" is probably the most suitable. This "cultural revolution" was not, however, an eruptive and temporarily confined event, as suggested by the terms "revolution," "revolt," and "1968" in general, but more a kind of multilayered phenomenon of a longer duration that showed different points of acceleration and radicalization. This "cultural revolution" was about the radical

secular changes of "affluent societies" (John Kenneth Galbraith), which stretched themselves over the period of the long 1960s, and received a certain dynamic through situational factors and national problems.<sup>12</sup> Without a doubt, conditional factors consisting of global-political upheavals played an important role since the end of Second World War, not to mention the social and cultural historical changes that took place since the middle of the century: the reconstruction of relatively stable national economies, the explosive expansion of consumption, the media and the educational system, and the change of work and social structures. At the same time, a well-developed sense of crisis persisted due to the experiences of the previous decades, and an insecurity about how long the succession of "Golden Years" would continue. In addition, profound processes of national self-realization took place. These represented adjustments to new conditions and shifts in power relations as well as situations of radical change in domestic politics, which were the results of worldwide decolonialization, the fascist past of Germany, Italy, and Japan, the Vietnam War, and racism in the United States. The international character of the "68 movement" thus resulted both from the comparability of situations of radical change, the political demands, the forms of action, and from the similarity of social supporters and their cultural styles. Which is not to say that significant national differences did not exist—for example, with regard to the percentage of young workers or more "apolitical" countercultural elements, to the degree of militancy in the debates, political systems' potential for integration, etc. Whereas the United States, West Germany, France, and Italy witnessed conflicts that bordered on civil war, the protests in Great Britain and in the Scandinavian countries were far less militant. In the corporatist states of Northern Europe the impulses of the student movement were incorporated into society relatively unproblematically, while within single states, strong regional and local differences existed. Larger issues, such as the expansion of horizons beyond national borders, the juvenilization of society and politics, as well as the yearning for stronger political participation remained characteristic.

While Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey recently asserted that the protests at the end of the 1960s constituted "more than a 'student rebellion' or a 'generational revolt,'" the question remains as to the exact meaning of the generational movement and the extent to which the term "revolt" is justified.<sup>13</sup> While the events of 1968 are concentrated in a relatively limited segment of time in reality from 1967 until 1969—they are embedded in a period of accelerated change spanning from ca. 1958 to ca. 1973.<sup>14</sup> My goal in the following is to situate the generational aspect of the network of events of "1968" within the background of this broader period of time—as a radicalization of a process of cultural change, wherein

young people, from the beginning, occupied a trendsetting function—based on the thesis that in the "code 1968,"<sup>15</sup> transformational tendencies of the Modern Age intensified because the young generation constituted the prime proponent of change within society with regard to penetrating consumer society and implementing new cultural standards—for example, concerning consumption of media, sexuality, race relations, education as well as political renewal. In this respect the "social movement" in the narrower sense that also becomes apparent here is only a part of a much more far-reaching mechanism of transformation.<sup>16</sup> For this reason, the view must be directed beyond certain innovative models of order and single protagonists, and instead towards mass trends. In this context it will be assumed that the different political cultures of the various national societies of this time changed very quickly and profoundly in astonishing synchronicity, and that an important motivating force of this transformation consisted of a changing of the generations condensed in the symbol of 1968.<sup>17</sup>

### Juvenilization in Western Societies

The increase in influence of the young generation in Western societies throughout the 1960s can be linked to several factors. The 1950s had already shown that, with the improvement of economic circumstances, youths now also possessed substantial spending power.<sup>18</sup> Primarily in the United States but thereafter also in West European countries, a diverse consumer goods industry exploded which saturated the market for youths with jeans, cosmetics, records etc. The consumer goods industry adopted stylistic elements that came into existence in various youth scenes, enriched them, experimented with new products and in doing so, functioned as synchronizer in the development of a new and diverse international youth culture. In turn, social trendsetters took up these impulses and recombined them into new styles, often in creative ways.<sup>19</sup> As youth cultures became attractive to the older generations, consumerism began to influence the nations' cultural self-image. The global confrontational situation caused by the Cold War formed an important background for contemporary interpretations of the youth's patterns of consumption. In any case it shaped the older generations' point of view, while the youth itself viewed the situation with more equanimity. While there may have been disagreement with respect to whether youth consumerism constituted a weakening of the West or whether it was one of its essential strengths, unity reigned with regard to the fact that the strengthening of young people's intellectual abilities would be a decisive criteria for the victory in the Cold War.<sup>20</sup> Since nobody knew how long

economic prosperity would last, it was especially important to consolidate this belief system among the youth, and educate them to be steadfast democrats who would remain that way in times of economic instability. While material wealth enabled the expansion of the educational system, it received its political direction through its catching up with the supposed lead of the East in the field of education. This is why the hopes for the future were associated more strongly with a well-educated and politically stable young generation than in other times.

In addition, the percentage of young people in the population had increased since the end of the Second World War, in some countries up until to the mid-1960s: the percentage of youths under 15 in West Germany at the end of the 1950s was 21 percent, in 1970/71, 23 percent. In Denmark it decreased slightly during this period from 26 to 23 percent, in France from 26 to 25 percent. In many countries the share of 15- to 29-year-olds increased in the meantime, in Great Britain by 2 percent, and in Denmark, Sweden, and France by 4 percent each. In 1970/71 43 percent of Germany's, 47 percent of Denmark's, 44 percent of Sweden's, 49 percent of France's and 45 percent of Great Britain's population were under 30 years old.<sup>21</sup> In the course of this decade the age group of youths in some European countries became younger in itself. It was a very relevant piece of information for the advertising clients of the West German teenager magazine *Bravo* that between 1963 and 1968 the segment of 21- to 24-year-olds shrank by a third, whereas by 1968 the 14- to 17-year-olds increased.<sup>22</sup> Western societies were young societies, not only due to the high birthrate but also to international processes of migration caused by increasing wealth and mainly mobilized younger age groups. In this way many protagonists of the student movement were young immigrants: in West Germany for example, Rudi Dutschke came from the German Democratic Republic, in Great Britain Tariq Ali was born in Pakistan, and in the United States Mario Savio was of Italian origin.

In comparison to the 1920s, however, the percentage of young people in the 1960s was smaller. Its increasing importance could not be explained only by demographic factors. To a larger extent than ever, relatively young people took on economic or political responsibilities. In Great Britain, but also in Germany, they reached influential positions firstly in the explosively developing mass media and in various branches of the culture industry.<sup>23</sup> In addition, the period of youth was extended due to the large expansion of the educational system. Nearly twice as many people completed a college degree in West Germany and Great Britain in 1968/69 than in 1960, in Sweden more than double as many, in France the amount of students at universities nearly tripled during this period, and in Denmark it more than tripled.<sup>24</sup>

The number of those living in an independent phase between youth and adulthood thus increased significantly. In the Western and Northern European countries the percentage of pupils and students in the total population amounted to nearly 20 percent in 1970.<sup>25</sup> The marriage age of young people between 1960 and 1970 was also lower than in any other postwar decade.<sup>26</sup> In addition, at the end of the decade social realities that had prevailed several years before were legally codified. Young people could now influence basic political decisions and act as sovereign legal subjects earlier than ever before. Great Britain was the first West European country to lower the voting age to 18 in 1968. The Federal Republic of Germany followed in 1970, France and Italy in 1974. In 1972 the European Council of Ministers went a step further and recommended to its member states to lower the age of majority to 18 as well, a trend in all industrialized states reflected by the fact that the limit for adulthood demanded by European Union already existed in nearly all "East Block" states, the GDR included.

### Social Mixing and Individualization

A higher degree of social permeability was an essential characteristic of the post-1950s youth generation. In his book *Absolute Beginners*, published in 1959, the British journalist Colin MacInnes showed his enthusiasm for the specific absence of class distinctions in youth subcultures, in which protagonists of various social classes mixed.<sup>28</sup> A similar finding was reached in Germany although MacInnes' tone of euphoria when describing his observations was less shared. In 1962 the West German youth sociologist Friedrich Tenbruck discusses a "decontourization of the social roles," a "radical social release [*Freistellung*]," dangerous since he believed that the costs of individualization would be high and "a virtual gain of liberty" would actually result "in the destruction of the core of personality."<sup>29</sup> Social origin was however by no means irrelevant for young people. Differing traditional and cultural preferences due to social backgrounds still had a strong impact. In fact, under the conditions of mass consumption it continued to be the basis for the development of segmented subcultures partially along the lines of social boundaries, as for example the mods and rockers in Great Britain, hippies in America or *Gammler* in West Germany. The main tendency, however, accurately described by both MacInnes and Tenbruck, was that all in all the new youth cultures disassociated themselves from the adult world and social borders progressively loosened within subcultures. This led to a new mixing of socially determined cultural and political styles, in which the rise of subcultures and the expansion of the "counterculture" which

began in 1967 produced deviating styles that transcended corresponding social connes and reached great masses of people.<sup>30</sup> Some working-class youths incorporated stylistic elements of bohemian origin into their dresscodes and social conduct, while upper-class youths simultaneously discovered stylistic elements of a rather proletarian popular culture.

Oespite the progressive cultural change throughout the 1960s, most observers and protagonists were taken by surprise by the political radicalization that culminated in the years around 1968.<sup>31</sup> Hardly anybody had expected the youth to become politicized in such a far-reaching way, especially in the left-wing direction. Even in 1965 observers considered the American youth to be uncommitted, in 1966 West German youth was thought to be conformist, and the same view prevailed in Oenmark in 1967. And as upwellings began in many places, even in March 1968 directly before the May riots, French commentators stated that things were happening everywhere but in France, where people were sleeping and missing everything. Not least because of their unexpected character the events of 1968 gained the interpretation of a "rebellion." The impression of a surprise emerged because sociologists from San Francisco to West Berlin interpreted the increasing consumption by youth as conformist behavior, political conformity included. Western opinion leaders increasingly accepted young people's informal and experimental lifestyle as a central ideal, but they wanted to correct their assumed political abstinence by a more or less moderate politicization from above.<sup>33</sup> Most sociologists did not notice or misinterpreted the developments because there were no models of interpretation available for these completely new patterns of social conduct. Indeed the satisfaction of basic physical and material needs not only opens up space for cultural experiments but also for the formation of political consciousness, and the so-called "post-modern" principle of montage is not only found in the culture of consumption but also in the political field and did not only point to indifference but also to self-condence. The surprising character of the events of 1968 also had to do with the fact that the new mass cultures had developed into organizational patterns that, up to then, were only known to deviant minorities, in other words not big organizations and associations or even the state, but small circles and informal groups were giving impulses for the ongoing modernization, and represented the cores of the emerging subcultures with the culture industry as their powerful ally.

Young intellectuals played a very important role in these processes of transformation, both as leaders of change within mass culture and as interpreters. Non-academically educated youths did not play such an important role, although young workers, to a varying degree, took part in the activities around 1968. In France and Italy, for example, they

formed the activist core of the strike movement, whereas in the Federal Republic of Germany and in the Scandinavian countries, they obviously became active later and in smaller numbers.<sup>34</sup> The extent to which they were part of different national opposition movements differed from country to country to a certain degree social heterogeneity was even characteristic for these movements but usually the position of leadership was held by peers with a higher degree of school education and often from respectable middle-class families. Having better material prerequisites, they were much more interested in politics and ready for political activity; they also had more foreign experience, spoke more foreign languages and also spoke these more fluently. They also had a larger interest in various elements of popular culture especially in certain genres of pop music, which inspired esoteric debates and enabled yet further claims to distinction.<sup>35</sup> Differentiations are also discernible within the classes with a higher level of education. Not until its escalation and broadening did the political protest movement significantly spread to the younger cohorts of the educated classes. This was only the case since roughly 1967 and to an increasing extent 1968/69, as observed for Germany and Italy for example.<sup>36</sup> Even though the political climate at schools only changed drastically at the end of the 1960s, also the opposition movements of the early 1960s lived off a proportionally high participation of not only university students but also students from secondary schools. For example, already in 1962 students constituted 35 percent of the Danish "anti-nuclear movement."<sup>37</sup> Another indication is that many protest careers began in the early 1960s, even though the movement had its breakthrough at the end of the decade.

The political interest of highly educated youths differentiated them from their peers with a lower level of education. In the 1950s young workers supported rock'n'roll which, as a cultural style, was viewed as something with a rebellious character by the public as well as by the protagonists. At the beginning of the 1960s, however, highschool and university students increasingly discovered such niches and used them for cultural experiments, attaching a notion of rebelliousness and increasing political energy to certain elements of the popular culture that was in and of itself nonpolitical.<sup>38</sup> Whereas popular culture was first and foremost a big social and cultural melting pot, it underwent increasing differentiation beginning in the mid-1960s, due in part to a succession of new styles exported principally from the United States to Europe and in part to an increasing political radicalization primarily among secondary school and university students. Working-class youths were involved in politics to a far lesser degree.<sup>39</sup> A German survey shows that in 1964, the percentage of people who had a negative attitude towards the state stayed at a relatively low level, under 3 percent of secondary school students:

and 5 percent of elementary school pupils. Until 1968, the share of self-proclaimed enemies of the state within the latter group grew slowly, up to 7 percent. In the case of the group of young intellectuals, however, it shot up dramatically to 16 percent.<sup>40</sup> Basically, the protest movements remained "movements of university students and small minorities of youths outside universities." American and German sociologists assumed an "underclass conservatism" which was in strong contrast to the intellectuals' main "progressive" tendency.<sup>41</sup> It is true that at the high point of the student movement, the attitude of West German working-class youths towards the deeds of their peers was more positive than that of their older colleagues. But it cannot be said that a rebellious attitude transcended all class boundaries within the whole generation.<sup>42</sup>

### **"Don't Trust Anyone Over 30"? Relationships Between Generations**

The existence of such social differences does not belie the fact that large segments of the adult generations tolerated or even supported the students' political demands—within reason they also supported their radicalization as elements of a wide-ranging cultural change that led to the youth generally developing a more liberal and permissive style and making participatory demands. All in all, the relationships between the generations were a lot more balanced than the confrontational rhetoric and actual confrontational situations at the peak of the student movement would suggest. Surveys in France, the United States, and the Federal Republic of Germany have shown that most parents got used to their children's increasing freedom relatively quickly. Various clues indicate that relatively harmonious conditions outweighed bitter conflict in family relationships.<sup>43</sup> Counter-examples that were often eagerly picked out by the media and became well known must not be generalized. Only a few parents attempted to subdue their increasingly independent children, usually unsuccessfully.<sup>44</sup> Studies over a long period have shown that in West Germany tolerant models of education had never increased as drastically as between the early 1960s and the mid-1970s.<sup>45</sup>

On the other hand the impression of a conflict between the generations was not completely wrong: relatively harmonious relationships existed in the family unit as well as a generation conflict relating to society as a whole. In fact this simultaneity was an essential characteristic of this period of radical change. Conflicts and processes of detachment in various segments of society increased in the 1960s, they were manifest in many ways, not only in different cultural styles. Political parties underwent a generational change. In many countries new parties were

founded, shaped by youth and almost exclusively positioned left of the Social Democrats. For example, in the Netherlands *Demokraten 66* (named after the year of their foundation, in Denmark) *Venstresocialistene* (at the end of 1967), and also the myriad of leftwing radical groups and small parties mushrooming at the end of the 1960s were nearly entirely assemblies of very young age groups. In order to decode the contradictory relationship between generations, Norbert Elias has suggested differentiating between individual generation relations—those of the private sphere—and social generation relations—apparent in the public sphere.<sup>46</sup> In this way the vexing picture painted by contemporary youth studies becomes clearer: while parts of the older generations had difficulties adapting to the new times and while it was sometimes easier and sometimes harder to succeed them, at the same time, however, it was possible that trust and tolerance dominated the climate of the family unit.

A close examination also shows that everyday life adhered far more strongly to traditions than public discussion on the youth phenomenon would suggest. The mass of young people did relate to the modernization that their avant-garde displayed, with a certain delay and in more tolerable mixtures. As cool as Eric Clapton, as sexy as Brigitte Bardot, as libertarian as Rainer Langhans—many wanted to be a bit of everything, but not too extreme, more for home usage so it could be arranged with other conditions in school, at work and in the parental home. Representative polls at the end of the 1960s show that youths as well as adults idealized certain concepts of youth as the norm. These, however, never needed to be identical with the more traditional everyday life of youths. Most of the elements of a consumer society that the mass of youths incorporated into their everyday life were easily compatible with the adults' concept of modernity. For instance, with regard to fashion, vacation, purchasing of household goods etc., in many cases youths' opinions were a decisive factor for the choice of purchases. Public opinion believed that, with regard to cosmetics, sports goods and technical devices, neither the father nor his wife were the biggest experts but the adolescent children. In this context parents placed their children in leading positions on purpose and explicitly. To a certain degree they felt often insecure, but did not question the authority of youth tastes. A study on the conduct of youths and adults with regard to consumption in 1970 summarized the situation in a formula: "A more youth-oriented paradigm is making its demands without adults being able to adjust with full sails."<sup>47</sup> This resulted in a substantial need for interfamilial communication, which was apparently often satisfied. This study showed that both parties viewed the atmosphere in the family as good, and that parents rejected too harsh a criticism of the youths. In this

respect, it is not that surprising that adults adopted a far more friendly manner and attitude towards their offspring between the late 1950s and the mid-1970s: in 1950 only 24 percent of the questioned West Germans, in 1960 already 44 percent and in 1975 no less than 62 percent replied that they had a favorable impression of the young generation.<sup>48</sup>

In this period the social basis of the new mass cultures had changed thoroughly—from the marginal underclass culture of the "*Halbstarken*" ("rowdies"), which was perceived as inferior and dangerous or the elitist outsiders of a middle-class bohemia, to a celebrated class-transcending lifestyle of an "experimental society."<sup>49</sup>

Most activists of the student movement defended themselves against an interpretation of their political protest as an expression of age-induced energy surplus. The representatives of the liberal "establishment," who were setting the tone, reacted calmly and in an understanding way to the slogan "Don't trust anyone above 30" which had quickly spread from the United States to Western Europe. They believed that the rebellious spirit would evaporate with age. This was also meant as a counter-argument to conservative cultural pessimism. The protagonists of the student movement, however, viewed this stance mainly as a paternalist gesture, an expression of the opinion leaders' "repressive tolerance." Jerry Rubin, the founder of the yippies, responded with an almost postmodern slogan to the fact that many student activists were about to cross the critical 30-year border: "You're only as old as you wanna be. Age is in your head."<sup>50</sup>

The assignment of age was not really arbitrary but constructed and determined by a historical caesura. For Rubin, the middle of the century constituted a generation border—that turning point around 1950 in which for the Western world the continuum of war and crisis of the first half of the century ended and was gradually replaced by political liberalization, economic prosperity and a culture of consumption: "Those who grew up before the 1950s live today in a mental world of Nazism, concentration camps, economic depression and Communist dreams stalinized. A pre-1950s who can still dream is very rare. Kids who grew up in the post-1950s live in a world of supermarkets, color TV commercials, guerrilla war, international media, psychedelics, rock'n'roll and moon walks. For us *nothing is impossible*. We can do *anything*. This generation gap is the widest in history. The *pre-1950's* generation has *nothing* to teach the *post-1950's* [... J."

### Decline of Authority and Incline towards Provocation

Rubin's statement is not only a good example for the almost unlimited optimism that was widespread among the activists of 1968, it also exposes the central argument that questioned the leading function of the older generations as well: their patterns of conduct were no longer adequate. Socialized in the "Age of Catastrophe," they could hardly deliver guidelines for how to find one's way and to behave in the "Golden Age."<sup>51</sup> This point of view is hardly deniable. How does a society mentally adjust to drastically changed material conditions, and which role do generational aspects play in this context? Contemporaries of the 1960s and 1970s already pointed to discrepancies in the development of different spheres of society. In the France of 1968, for example, Régis Oebrigat describes an unusually large difference between the rapid development of material conditions and the habits and values of the population that were only slowly changing. From his point of view, the necessary harmonization of this gulf resulted in the dynamics of 1968, which were full of conflict.<sup>52</sup> In fall 1966, Theodor W. Adorno, faced with the electoral successes of a right-wing radical party in West Germany, stated in a very similar way that one had to reflect on "the collision of modern mass media with a consciousness that by far has not reached that of nineteenth century bourgeois cultural liberalism."<sup>53</sup> Even though these interpretations may seem exaggerated, relevant studies on the long term "change in values" in postindustrial societies do confirm that in this context, processes of cultural assimilation were slightly delayed reactions to changed material living conditions. Those processes described by Daniel Bell, Alain Touraine, Ronald Inglehart and Helmut Klages were sparked by the worldwide boost of material improvement since the end of the Second World War.<sup>54</sup> These adjustments could be conducted by younger people much more quickly than by older people who had grown up under completely different conditions. In this respect, Rubin's, Oebrigat's and Adorno's contemporary observations on a discrepancy between the mentality especially of the older generations and the changed social and material realities are confirmed by sociological research.

As discussed, the adaption of the old to the new did not occur explosively in 1968 but progressed from the end of the 1950s and reached a "starting phase"<sup>55</sup> at the beginning of the 1960s, without leading to the radical change desired by some young intellectuals. It was about a "spreading out" or 'differentiating' of previously underdeveloped patterns of meaning, life or option" which occurred due to the current "change of economic, technological, social and political conditions."<sup>56</sup> Even though one cannot assume that youths' social praxis was pro-

foundly changed in one go, many elements of disintegration were rather strong on the threshold to 1968, for instance with regard to race- or gender relations, acceptance of an autonomous youth culture, sexual conduct etc. The traditional cultural conservatives who tried everything to prevent the radical cultural change in the 1950s no longer had a say in the discourse on the modern age. Conservative modernizers and liberal intellectuals had taken the leading opinion, with "measured judgment" (Arthur Marwick) dominating.<sup>57</sup>

In politics, a change of generations had also been taking place since the early 1960s, as politicians such as John F. Kennedy, Willy Brandt or Olof Palme set off to remove the generation of Eisenhower and Adenauer from power. The speed and extent of these processes of replacement were different in various European countries, however, and overall it is obvious that not only economy, technology and media but also politics and traditional cultural norms were already undergoing a radical change when the student protests escalated. These protests themselves were part of an accelerated development towards "values of self-realization" that began around the mid-1960s.<sup>58</sup>

Here the younger generation took the lead even though this change of values had a grip on all generations. Inglehart quite accurately observed that "due to the wealth that was without example in history and the continuing peace since 1945, younger age groups in Western countries appreciated their higher degree of economic and physical security less highly than older people who had experienced bigger economic insecurity. Vice versa, the priority of members of the younger generation for nonmaterial needs such as a communal feeling and quality of life was higher."<sup>59</sup> "Postmaterialistic" values represented by younger people received a substantially great role in society due to the increasing replacement of the older generation by the younger generation in all fields of society but also by the effects of broadcasting.

There are many factors which speak in favor of interpreting "1968" as an exaggerated expression of this fundamental process of generation succession. This climax cannot only be explained by situational factors alone—such as the Vietnam War or a fascist past—for the structural factors such as norms and values had been undergoing a process of radical change for several years. In his analysis, Norbert Elias pointed out that revolts do not occur when "oppression is strongest but just when it becomes weaker."<sup>60</sup> And the German sociologist Karl Mannheim already concluded in 1928 that a specific element of youthful consciousness of the present did not solely consist in "being closer to current problems," but also "to experience the process of loosening up as a prime antithesis" and to push the development further from this point while "the older generation remains in their earlier position of a new orientation."<sup>61</sup> This

explains why student activists' criticism was so strongly directed against liberals who were striving for a modernization and were in the process of realizing it. Not only conservative and liberal politicians were subjects of massive criticism from the student movement but also nineteenth and twentieth century oppositional movements who had established themselves in the field of power politics. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, as social democratic parties learnt to value the economic potential of capitalism and communist parties dealt more or less critically with Stalinism, many young intellectuals split from these parties. The West German SOS was disassociated from the Social Democratic Party and Trotskyist and Maoist groups led the youth organization of the French Communist Party. In Denmark, the *Socialistisk Folkeparti* splintered off from the Danish Communist Party and became the first party of the New Left, and Henri Lefebvre, E.P. Thompson, Ulrike Meinhof left the Communist Parties of their countries in these years as well.

Expanding the existing limits through provocation was a distinct strategy for popular youth culture, not least for the media. The concert promoter Fritz Rau, for example, who held a key role in importing American popular culture to the European continent, explained the success of his work with "an instinctive evaluation of the just about possible."<sup>62</sup> The situationist-inspired strategy of provocation went further by intentionally pushing the limits too far. The plan was to break through the shell of a supposedly hermetically sealed off society and in this way kick off consciousness-forming processes by nonconformist actions. Such provocations were not confined to political actions but included politics, everyday life, and art.<sup>63</sup> "Revolution is Poetry. There is poetry in all those acts which break the system of organization"—so read the catalog of the famous exhibition of the Stockholm *Moderna Museet* on revolutionary art in 1969, explaining the mechanism in which artistic creativity, social praxis and political change become melted into one.<sup>64</sup>

The results of these strategies of provocation were ambivalent. On the one hand they polarized the population and partially caused massive counter-reactions, which were desired by the protagonists in order to make the existing potential for conflict perceptible by all. On the other hand, they did not always lead to the desired results. In France, for instance, the majority voted for de Gaulle's government in the June elections immediately after the events of May 1968. In the following year Richard Nixon, a Republican politician, became president of the United States. A similar counter-reaction can be observed in the case of the student demonstrations in the Federal Republic of Germany between 1967 and 1969. Until March 1968, a third of the West German population considered the breath of fresh air with which the students revitalized political culture to be positive. Another third believed that it carried the

danger of revolution within and the other third was indecisive.<sup>65</sup> The number of critics grew not so much after the Easter riots following the attempted assassination of Rudi Outschke but rather after the further escalation of violence during the second half of 1968. The percentage of people in favor of a ban of the SOS increased from 19 percent in May 1968 to 57 percent by the beginning of 1969.<sup>66</sup> The share of those who considered the police's reaction too weak also increased strongly from 8 percent in 1966 to 44 percent at the beginning of 1969. In this context it is striking that the youngest age group and persons with a university-track high school diploma supported the demonstrations by far the most, with approximately 60 percent. Substantial generational and social discrepancies and conflicts did therefore exist, although they did not impede the process of cultural change: the relations between the generations relaxed and became less formal on a society-wide basis.

### A Youth Rebellion?

Can one therefore speak of a "youth rebellion"? First of all, such a label already reflects a certain contemporary mindset, making it problematic as a scholarly category. Furthermore, it is not in fact entirely applicable: firstly because intergenerational relations were more equitable than thereby suggested, and secondly because of the varying degrees to which youth of different social classes took part in this "rebellion."<sup>68</sup> As working-class youths were not active to a comparable degree as university students and because those students received the strongest support from more educated adults, some social scientists argued against speaking of a youth revolt in favor of a revolt of the intellectuals—a label which, however, did not survive. Nevertheless, in the character of the young intellectual as an ideal type, two traits that especially shaped the change to a postindustrial society combined: youthful age and intellectual interventionism. Already in 1963, the author George Palocz-Horvath in an international overview discovered what he called a "new race": the "superintellectuals" were an especially cool and critical section of the youth, which never existed before and now figures as a committed proponent of the generational conflict.<sup>69</sup>

Such descriptions do indeed contain appropriate observations, but they also indicate how hard it was to recognize the accelerating forces in the midst of a situation of radical change, one in which obviously known social ties of the individual began to loosen. In this context, it is not surprising that the category "generation" entered the field as it pushed social differences into the background and was in conformity with the self-interpretation of Western societies as socially balanced "middle-class

societies" that had supposedly overcome class division. The interpretation as a "rebellion" was in tune with the *Zeitgeist* in which breaks from the seemingly cemented norms of the preceding 1950s were basically considered legitimate. Furthermore, it was part of a construction which gave meaning to a multitude of more or less synchronous events.<sup>70</sup> The term "youth rebellion," however, was not entirely a construct. On the one hand, the emotionalism contained within this term is more likely a distortion of the overall character of what it wishes to depict. On the other hand, it reflected—in an exaggerated way—actual shifts. Not only did the student movement most clearly formulate a new line of political thinking, its cultural demands and participatory ideas promised a multitude of new chances for upward social mobility; for nonstudents as well. In this context it was a generational movement for upward social mobility that took place within the traditional leading classes as well as between the classes. The reception and rapid expansion of international youth cultures account for the correct impression that the development was taking place on a global level and its major upholders were youths. This significantly invigorated the protagonists' self-confidence. When in 1968 various currents of transformation coincided and "everything seemed to be in motion," the Danish provo and son of the social democratic minister of finance, Ole Grunbaum, uttered the firm conviction that the end of the known order was imminent and that the young generation was accelerating this almost physical process: "Today an 18-year-old knows more about the Vietnam War than a 50-year-old. Nowadays, the majority of youths speak two or more languages, whereas at the same time hardly more than ten members of the *Folketing* (the Danish parliament) regularly read larger international papers and magazines. The youth is much better educated than previous generations and more competent than ever in using their knowledge and ability to acquire power. A decisive reason, however, is that the youth is the only relatively large group in our society that can deal with *wealth* and modern life naturally. Wealth is taken literally. For the youth wealth is not a status symbol, but something they take for granted."<sup>71</sup> The young protagonists did not act according to a plan with a clearly defined aim but they were the first to use the playing fields of consumer society and to explore its borders. Especially the intellectuals among them gave the diffuse structural change of postwar societies a subjective expression and a direction.<sup>72</sup> Between 1967 and 1969, young intellectuals spoke out loud for the first time, articulating their take on the ongoing upheavals: publicly, en masse and simultaneously around the world. This phenomenon is too significant to be simply subsumed into the continuum of the 1960s and its cultural revolution. This is why, even today, the whole long decade of radical change is frequently abbreviated by the figure "1968"—a label which means so much, but explains so little.

Youth were not just agents of abstract structural changes. On the contrary: the dawning era presented each individual with far more opportunities for self-actualization than had ever existed before, and it was young people who exploited these to the fullest. Their activities were symptomatic of an emerging individuality and informality in social relationships, which in the process irritated more than a few of their contemporaries. Hardly anyone could say where it would all lead, but they were united on one final goal: a better life for each and everyone. Everything else was open for debate.

### Notes

1. Ronald Fraser, ed., 1968. *A Student Generation in Revolt* (New York, 1988); Uwe Bergmann, Rudi Durschke, Wolfgang Lefevre, and Bernd Rabehl, *Rebellion der Studenten* (Reinbek, 1968); Erling Bjursrom, *Generationsupproret. Ungdomskulturer, ungdomsroller og tonarsmarknad fran 50-tal till 80-tal* (Stockholm, 1980); Niels Martinov, *Ungdomsopproret i Danmark. Et portræt af arene, der rystede musikken, billedkunsten, teatret, litteraturen, filmen og familien* (Copenhagen, 2000). On 22 April 1968 the French magazine *L'Express* published an article entitled "Europe: Young Rebels" and also in Italy "your revolt" began to appear (Arthur Marwick, "Die 68er Revolution," in *Große Revolutionen der Geschichte. Von der Frühzeit bis zur Gegenwart*, ed. Peter Wende [Munich, 2000], 312-32, here 317; Jan Kurz, "Die italienische Studentenbewegung 1966-1968," in *1968-Vom Ereignis zum Gegenstand der Geschichtswissenschaft*, ed. Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey [Göttingen, 1998], 64-81, here 64.).
2. Charles Reich, *The Greening of America* (New York, 1970). The ride of the German edition was *The World is Becoming Young. The Nonviolent Uprising of the New Generation* (Die Welt wird jung. Der gewaltlose Aufstand der neuen Generation [Vienna, 1970]). The ride of the Swedish translation is also symptomatic: *Towards a New World. How the Youth Revolt Creates a Society that Places Quality of Living before Economic Progress* (Mot en ny värld: hur ungdomsrevolten skapar ett samhälle där livskvalitet garanterar ekonomisk framgång [Stockholm, 1971]).
3. This was shown by contemporary surveys in West Germany: *Ennid-Information*, no. 3 (1969), 2ff.
4. For an inceptive profile of the New Left: George Karsiahcas, *The Imagination of the New Left: A Global Analysis of 1968* (Boston, 1987). Also compare Maurice Isserman, *IJI Had a Hammer. The Death of the Old Left and the Birth of the New Left* (New York, 1987); Lin Chun, *The British New Left* (Edinburgh, 1993). On the intellectual spokesmen see Ron Eyeran, and Andrew Jamison, *Seeds of the Sixties* (Berkeley, 1994).
5. Reimur Reiche and Peter Gang, "Vom amikapitalistischen Prozess zur sozialistischen Politik," in *Neue Kritik*, no. 41 (April 1967), 22, 24.
6. Compare the call for an "international conference on Vietnam" and the final declaration in: *Provokationen. Die Studenten- und Jugendrevolte in ihren Flugblättern 1965-1971*, ed. Jürgen Miermeister and Jochen Sraadr (Darmstadt and Neuwied 1980), 113-15; Lutz Schulenburg, *Das Leben ändern, die Welt verändern! 1968. Dokumente und Berichte* (Hamburg, 1998), 125-27.

7. *Superlove* 5 (March 1968), 4.
8. See Ingo Juchler, *Die Studentenbewegungen in den Vereinigten Staaten und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland der sechziger Jahre. Eine Untersuchung hinsichtlich ihrer Beeinflussung durch Befreiungsbewegungen und -theorien aus der Dritten Welt* (Berlin, 1996), 306f.
9. Arthur Marwick, *The Sixties: Cultural Revolution in Britain, France, Italy, and the United States, c.1958-c.1974* (Oxford, 1999), 97 and 99.
10. As in the reactions of the West German public to student demonstrations: *Ennid-Information*, no. 3/4 (1968).
11. Katsifias, *Imagination*, 44f. Also consult Michael Kidron's and Ronald Segal's overview, printed in 1968. *The World transformed*, ed. Carole Fink, Philipp Gassner, and Dede Junker (Washington D.C., Cambridge, 1998), 14f.
12. See Wolfgang Kraushaar, "Die erste globale Revolution," in *1968 als Mythos, Chiffre und Zitierricht*; Kraushaar (Hamburg, 2000), 19-52. Also compare Immanuel Wallerstein, "1968, Revolution in the World-System: Theses and Queries," *Theory and Society* 1.8 (1989): 431-49; Beate Fierze, "'A spirit of unrest.' Die Achtundsechziger-Generation als globales Schwellenphänomen," in *Der Geist der Unruhe. 1968 im Vergleich Wissenschaft-Literatur-Medien*, ed. Rainer Rosenberg, Inge Miinz-Koenen, and Petra Boden (Berlin, 2000), 3-25. On the character of a "cultural revolution" see Christoph Kleemann, "1968-Studentenrevolte oder Kulturrevolution?," in *Revolution in Deutschland? 1789-1989*, ed. Manfred Hetding (Göttingen, 1991), 90-105; Pascal Ory, "Une 'Révolution culturelle'," in *Les Années 68. Le temps de la contestation*, ed. Genevieve Dreyfus-Armand et al. (Brussels: Éditions Complexe, 2000), 219-24, as well as Arthur Marwick's essay in this edition.
13. Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey, *Die 68er Bewegung. Deutschland-Westeuropa-USA* (Munich, 2001), 10, 1.
14. For the historicization of the long 1960s, in which 1968 is more or less strongly embedded, see in addition to Marwick: Lars Mjølset, "Det lange 1960-tallet i Norden, 10 Nordiskt 60-tal. Uppbrott och konfrontation" (Helsinki, 1990), 14-18; David Fricke, ed., *The Sixties. From Memory to History* (Chapel Hill and London, 1994); FIOk, Gassner, and Junker, 1968; Gilcher-Holtey, 1968; Dreyfus-Armand et al., *Les Années 68*; Axel Schildt, Dede Siegfried, and Karl Christian Lammers, eds., *Dynamische Zeiten. Die 60er Jahre in den beiden deutschen Gesellschaften* (Hamburg, 2000); Jürgen Heldekmann, Jorg Helbig, and Anke Ordepp, eds., *The Sixties Revisited: Culture, Society, Politics* (Heidelberg, 2001).
15. Detlev Claussen, "Chiffre 1968," in *Revolution und Mythos*, ed. Dietrich Hareh and Jan Assmann (Frankfurt am Main, 1992), 219-28.
16. Friedrich Neidhardt, and Dieter Rucht, "The Analysis of Social Movements: The State of the Art and Some Perspectives of Further Research," in *Research on Social Movements. The State of the Art in Western Europe and the USA*, ed. Dieter Rucht (Frankfurt am Main, 1991), 421-64; Ron Eyeran, and Andrew Jamison, *Social Movements. A Cognitive Approach* (Cambridge, 1991).
17. Ronald Inglehart, *The Silent Revolution. Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics* (Princeton, 1977).
18. Compare the classic study for the United States, Eugene Gilbert, *Advertising and Marketing to Young People* (Pleasantville/New York, 1957); for Great Britain, Mark Abrams, *The Teenage Consumer* (London, 1959).
19. Thomas Frank, *The Conquest of Cool. Business Culture, Counter Culture, and the Rise of Hip Consumerism* (Chicago, 1997). In this context also compare my essay, "Oetief Siegfried, Modkultur, Kulturindustrie og venstreflojen i Vestyskland 1958-1973" in *Den Jyske Historiker*, 101 (June 2003): 68-94.

20. In all European countries the debate on the non-materialistic side-effects of a consumer society was closely linked to the question whether they constitute an "Americanization" of national and European patterns of conduct. See Heide Fehrenbach and Uta G. Poiger, eds., *Transactions, Transgressions, Transformations. American Culture in Western Europe and Japan* (New York and Oxford, 2000).
21. Statistisches Bundesamt, ed., *Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1959* (Stuttgart and Mainz, 1959), 21\*; 1973, 29\*. For details on the course of the development see the introduction to this volume.
22. *Bravo-Einkaufi-Panel* Annual 1968/69 (Munich, 1968), 248.
23. For pop-business in Great Britain compare Simon Frith, and Howard Horne, *Art Into Pop* (London and New York, 1987). For France this is impressively described with the example of the "jeune cadre" in Kristin Ross, *Fast Cars, Clean Bodies. Decolonization and the Reordering of French Culture* (Cambridge/Mass., 1995).
24. B.R. Mitchell, *International Historical Statistics Europe 1750-1993*, (4<sup>th</sup> ed., London, 1998), 894ff.
25. In Denmark 18.8 percent; West Germany 18.4 percent, France 19.7 percent, Great Britain 19 percent. Oscar W. Gabriel, ed., *Die EG-Staaten im Vergleich, Strukturen, Prozesse, Politikinhalt* (Opladen, 1992), 492.
26. Marianne Beisheim et al., *Im Zeitalter der Globalisierung? Thesen und Daten zur gesellschaftlichen und politischen Denationalisierung* (Baden-Baden, 1999), 488.
27. Heinz Schafer, *Die Herabsetzung der Volijährigkeit: Anspruch und Konsequenzen. Eine Dokumentation* (Munich, 1977).
28. Colin MacInnes, "Absolute Beginners," in *The Colin MacInnes Omnibus. His three London Novels* (London, [1959] 1985).
29. Friedrich H. Tenbruck, *Jugend und Gesellschaft. Soziologische Perspektiven* (Freiburg, 1962), 38f.
30. Theodore Roszak, *The Making of a Counter Culture: Reflections on the Technocratic Society and its Youthful Opposition* (Garden City, New York, 1969); Walter Hollstein, *Der Untergrund. Zur Soziologie jugendlicher Protestbewegungen* (Neuwied and Berlin, 1969); Helmut Kreuzer, *Die Boheme. Analyse und Dokumentation der intellektuellen Subkultur vom 19. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart* (Stuttgart, 1971); Elisabeth Nelson, *The British Counter Culture 1966-73: A Study of the Underground Press* (New York, 1989); Jonathan Greene, *All Dressed Up. The Sixties and the Counter-Culture* (London, 1998).
31. "Without doubt this problem between the generations is a big surprise in the time after the war, probably the biggest surprise of all unforeseen events." *Wt-lum Sonntag*, 18 May 1969.
32. Klaus R. Allerbeck, *Soziologie radikaler Studentenbewegungen: Eine vergleichende Untersuchung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und in den Vereinigten Staaten* (Munich, 1973); Viggo Graf Blücher, *Die Generation der Unbefähigten. Zur Soziologie der jungen Menschen heute* (Düsseldorf and Cologne, 1966); Ole Bert Henriksen, and Erik Høgh, *Storbyungdom* (Copenhagen, 1970); Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey, *"Die Phantasie an die Macht. Mai 68 in Frankreich"* (Frankfurt am Main, 1995).
33. This tendency was very strong in Germany. See Detlef Siegfried, "Vom Teenager zur Pop-Revolution. Politisierungstendenzen in der westdeutschen Jugendkultur 1959 bis 1968," in *Dynamische Zeiten*, ed. Schildt, Siegfried, and Lammers, 582-623.
34. Such discrepancies are exemplified by Marcia Tolomelli, *"Repressiv getrennt" oder "organischverbundet." Studenten und Arbeiter 1968 in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und in Italien* (Opladen, 2001).

35. Various examples in international comparison can be found in *Jugendwerk der Deutschen Shell, Jugend in Europa. Ihre Eingliederung in die Welt der Erwachsenen. Eine vergleichende Analyse zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Frankreich und Großbritannien*, ed., 3 vols. (Hamburg, 1977). Also Heinz Bonfadelli, *Die Sozialisationsperspektive in der Massenkommunikationsforschung. Neue Ansätze, Methoden und Resultate zur Stellung der Massenmedien im Leben der Kinder und Jugendlichen* (Berlin, 1981), 373f.; Infratest, *Der jugendliche Radiohörer. Nordrhein-Westfalen 1971* (Munich, 1971), 84.
36. Luisa Passerini, "1968 in Italien: Eine Geschichte der 'langen Dauer,'" in *1968 ein europäisches Jahr?*, ed. Etienne François, Matthias Middel, Emmanuel Tertay, and Dorothee Wierling (Leipzig, 1997), 79-88, here 83.
37. Steven Llewellyn Bjerregaard Jensen and Thomas Ekman Jørgensen, *Studentoprøret i Danmark 1968. Forudsætninger og konsekvenser* (unprimed manuscript, Copenhagen 1999), 87f.
38. See Peter Wicke's essay in this volume.
39. For pop culture see Helmut Salzinger, *Rock Power oder wie musikalisch ist die Revolution? Ein Essay über Pop-Musik und Gegenkultur* (Frankfurt am Main, 1972); Simon Frith, *Sound Effects. Youth, Leisure, and the Politics of Rock'n'Roll* (New York, 1981); Sheila Whiteley, *The Space between the Notes. Rock and the Counterculture* (London and New York, 1992); Ron Eyerman, and Andrew Jamison, *Music and Social Movements* (Cambridge, 1995).
40. *Emnid-Information*, no. 9/10 (1969), 13.
41. The first quote is from Günter C. Behrmann, "Politische Einstellungen und Verhaltensweisen Jugendlicher," in *Jugend zwischen Auflehnung und Anpassung. Einstellungen, Verhaltensweisen, Lebenschancen*, ed. Hans-Georg Wehling (Stuttgart et al., 1973), 63-88, here 77. The second quote is from: Walter Jaide, "Über die Unruhe in der jungen Generation," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* B22/69 (31 May 1969): 3-13, here 8ff. Compare Seymour M. Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Basis of Politics* (New York, [1960] 1963).
42. Emnid-Institut für Meinungsforschung, *Junge Intelligenzschicht 1968/69. Politische Meinungen, Einstellungen und Verhaltensbereitschaften* (Bielefeld, 1969), 88.
43. Compare Allerbeck's comparative study of West Germany and the United States, Allerbeck, *Soziologie*. For Sweden, see: Bengt-Erik Andersson, *Generation efter generation. Om tonårskultur, ungdomsrevolt och generationsmotsättningar* (Malmö, 1982). In 1976, 61 percent of West German 22- to 23-year-olds described their relationship to their fathers as "good" or "excellent," in France 62 percent; in Great Britain 68 percent; with respect to their relationship to their mothers the percentage was over 70 percent in all three countries (*Jugend in Europa*, vol. 2, 8f).
44. Marwick, *Sixties*, 382.
45. Thomas Gensicke, "Sozialer Wandel durch Modernisierung, Individualisierung und Wertewandel," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* B 42/96 (11 October 1996): 3-17.
46. Norbert Elias, "Der bundesdeutsche Terrorismus-Ausdruck eines sozialen Generationskonflikts," in Elias, *Studien über die Deutschen. Machtkämpfe und Habitusentwicklung im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, ed. Michael Schroter (Frankfurt am Main, 1994), 300-89.
47. Institut für angewandte Psychologie und Soziologie, ed., *BRAVO, Meinungsmacher Junger Markt* (Frankfurt am Main, 1971), 17.
48. Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, ed., *The Germans. Public Opinion Polls, 1967-1980* (London, 1981), 53.
49. Gerhard Schulze, *Die Erlebnisgesellschaft. Kultursoziologie der Gegenwart* (Frankfurt am Main, 1992).

50. This and the following quote in Jerry Rubin, *Do it! Scenarios of the Revolution* (New York, 1970), 90f.
51. Eric Hobsbawm completely confirms Rubin's contemporary impression from a historiographical view, Eric Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes. The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991* (London, 1994).
52. Debray is quoted in Giovanni Arighi, Terence Hopkins, and Immanuel Wallerstein, "1989-Die Fortsetzung von 1968," in 1968, ed. François Middel, Terry, and Wierling, 147-64, here 149.
53. Theodor W. Adorno, "Erziehung nach Auschwitz," in Adorno, *Erziehung zur Mündigkeit. Vorträge und Gespräche mit Hellmut Becker 1959-1969*, ed. Gerhard Kadelbach (Frankfurt am Main, 1971), 92-109, here 98.
54. Alain Touraine, *La Société post-industrielle* (Paris, 1969); Daniel Bell, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting* (New York, 1973); Inglehart, *Silent Revolution*; Helmut Klages, *Traditionsbruch als Herausforderung. Perspektiven der Wertewandelgesellschaft* (Frankfurt am Main, 1993); Ronald Inglehart, *Modernisierung und Postmodernisierung. Kultureller, wirtschaftlicher und politischer Wandel in 43 Gesellschaften* (Frankfurt am Main, and New York, 1998).
55. Compare Klages, *Traditionsbruch*, 72, pointing out the years 1963 to 1965. The precise periodization of the change of values is left up to historical research, which has only just begun.
56. See, *ibid.*, 15, for the film; Ronald Inglehart, *Kultureller Umbruch. Wertewandel in der westlichen Welt* (Frankfurt am Main and New York, 1989), 22, for the second.
57. Marwick's central argument has been confirmed for West Germany by Uta G. Poiger, *Jazz, Rock, and Rebels. Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London, 2000).
58. For this periodization see Klages, *Traditionsbruch*, 45.
59. Inglehart, *Umbruch*, 77.
60. Elias, *Terrorismus*, 307.
61. Karl Mannheim, "Das Problem der Generationen," in Mannheim, *Wissenssoziologie. Auswahl aus dem Werk* (Neuwied and Berlin, 1970), 509-65, here 539.
62. Kathrin Brigl, and Siegfried Schmidt-Joos, *Fritz Rau. Buchhalter der Traume* (Severin, 1985), 151. On the general role of the media: Todd Gitlin, *The Who's World is Watching. Mass Media in the Making and Unmaking of the New Left* (Berkeley et al., 1980). However, with regard to protest cultures there were substantial national differences. This is shown comparing the United States and Italy: Alessandro Portelli, "The Transatlantic Jeremiad: American Mass Culture and Counterculture and Opposition Culture in Italy," in *Cultural Transmissions and Receptions. American Mass Culture in Europe*, ed. R. Kroes, R.W. Rydell, and D.J.F. Bosscher (Amsterdam, 1993), 125-38.
63. Roberto Ohrt, *Phantom Avantgarde. Eine Geschichte der Situationistischen Internationalen und der modernen Kunst* (Hamburg, 1990).
64. Quoted by Daniel Bell, *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* (New York, 1976), 131.
65. *Emnid-Information*, no. 3/4 (1968).
66. Emnid, *Junge Intelligenzschicht*, 79 and 84.
67. Institut für Demoskopie, Allensbach, *Untersuchungen über die Studentenunruhen in Deutschland* (September 1969), Bundesarchiv Koblenz, Zsg.132/1624, table 13.
68. In the 1970s the last aspect was especially pointed in Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson, eds., *Resistance Through Rituals: Youth Subculture in Postwar Britain* (London, 1976).
69. George Palocz-Horvath, *Jugend-Schicksal der Welt. Eine Dokumentation aus vier Erdteilen* (Zurich, 1965), 214ff. In the Spanish translation of this book which was

- published in 1969, "fate" (Schicksal) had become "hope" of the world (*La juventud, esperanza del mundo* [Barcelona, 1969]) and in 1971 this author finally published: *Youth Up In Arms: A Political and Social World Survey, 1955-1970* (London, 1971).
70. In this context compare the thoughts of Thomas Etzemiller, *Ein 'Rifi' in der Geschichte? Gesellschaftswandel und 68er-Bewegungen in Schweden und Westdeutschland* (Konstanz, 2005).
  71. Ole Grønbaug, *Emigrér. L restykker om det tiltagende kaos* (Copenhagen, 1968), 117. The film quote is from Kjell Ostberg, *1968 nar allting var i rorelse. Sexiøral-sradikaliseringen och de sodala rorelserna* (Stockholm, 2002).
  72. Claus Leggewie, "A Laboratory of Postindustrial Society: Reassessing the 1960s in Germany," in 1968, ed. Fink, Gassert, and Junker, 283.