This article was downloaded by:[Klípa, Ondrj]
On: 11 April 2008
Access Details: Sample Issue Voucher: Nationalities Papers [subscription number 792106192]
Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954
Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK



Nationalities Papers
Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713439073

The Religious Dimension of Post-Communist "Ethnic" Conflict

Christopher Marsh

Online Publication Date: 01 November 2007
To cite this Article: Marsh, Christopher (2007) 'The Religious Dimension of Post-Communist "Ethnic" Conflict', Nationalities Papers, 35:5, 811 - 830
To link to this article: DOI: 10.1080/00905990701651802
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905990701651802

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf

This article maybe used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

Nationalities Papers, Vol. 35, No. 5, November 2007

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

Downloaded By: [Klipa, Ondrij] At: 16:03 11 April 2008

The Religious Dimension of Post-Communist "Ethnic" Conflict

Christopher Marsh

Common religious, cultural, and ethnic bonds can hold communities together, while differences along these same lines often lead to calls for national independence, complicate nation building, and confound inter-communal peacemaking efforts. In particular, when religious differences exist between groups in conflict there is a marked tendency for such differences to become emphasized. This is not to say that religion is the root cause of all internecine and inter-communal conflict, which certainly is not the case. But conflicts become fundamentally altered as they rage on, and factors that were at the root cause of a conflict at its outset may no longer be the primary causes in later stages. That is, once conflicts have significantly evolved, the *prior* causes may no longer be the *primary* causes.

This may often be the case with religion, as it seems to have a tendency to be very easily drawn upon as a source of imagery and language in the discourse of a conflict and to become melded together with secular motivations. Man's religious nature and impulse to ascribe cosmological significance to daily existence only exacerbate such a tendency. Wars fought over concrete economic and political concerns, therefore, may come to be justified with religious discourse, and labeled *jihads* or crusades, with strong attendant implications. Conflicts that originally emerged as a result of political or economic concerns may come to be understood and "lived" by members of a community or nation in quite different terms. As Peter Berger has pointed out,

> whenever a society must motivate its members to kill or to risk their lives, thus consenting to being placed in extreme marginal situations, religious legitimations become important. Thus the 'official' exercise of violence, be it in war or in the administration of capital punishment, is almost invariably accompanied by religious symbolizations.[1]

In his poignant words, "men go to war and men are put to death amid prayers, blessings, and incantations."[2]

The post-communist world is no exception to such phenomena, and, in fact, it is in many ways an example par excellence. From Chechnya and Nagorno-Karabakh to Bosnia and Kosovo, groups with cross-cutting ethnic and religious attachments have engaged in some of the bloodiest and most impassioned conflicts that the post-Cold War world has seen. These conflicts each have distinct religious components,

Christopher Marsh, J.M. Dawson Institute of Church–State Studies, Baylor University, USA. Email: Chris_marsh@baylor.edu

ISSN 0090-5992 print; ISSN 1465-3923 online/07/050811-20 © 2007 Association for the Study of Nationalities
DOI: 10.1080/00905990701651802

Downloaded By: [Klipa, Ondrij] At: 16:03 11 April 2008

with battle-lines often drawn along the borders of Islam and Orthodoxy, and with religious language invoked often on both sides. It is no wonder that such an environment, where some of the world's earliest Christian nations live alongside ethnic communities of millions of traditionally Muslim peoples, led the Orthodox world to view itself as "the advance-guard of Christianity."[3]

While these examples seem to present a clear-cut pattern among such conflicts, upon deeper inspection the clarity of such a pattern begins to fade. A look at the historical record makes clear that such sharp dichotomies as the Muslim world versus Christendom are not tenable, notwithstanding the *Clash of Civilizations* thesis. One can go all the way back to 1204, when the Crusaders made their way to Constantinople to rape and pillage the center of the Orthodox world, the "new" Rome. Having done the same to the Muslim inhabitants of Jerusalem—and the many Christians who lived in the Holy Land under Muslim rule—the Crusaders did not discriminate on the basis of religion—none were spared from plunder. Jumping ahead to 2004, Moscow—the Third Rome—threw its support behind "Muslim" Abkhazia's secession from "Orthodox" Georgia. Georgia, of course, has been returning the favor by providing refuge to jihadists from Chechnya. Meanwhile, Nagorno-Karabakh's economic lifeline is supplied by Iranian tractor-trailers traveling along the corridor of Armenian-occupied Azerbaijan.

The point is that, from the time of the Great Schism in 1054 to the present, Western and Eastern Christendom have often come to blows, and the Muslim world has frequently been allied with Eastern Christendom against its coreligionists in Europe. Moreover, while many post-communist ethnic conflicts do have distinct religious dimensions, relations between Muslims and Orthodox in many other parts of the post-communist world are nowhere as confrontational as in these war-torn societies. In fact, given similar critiques leveled against "modernity" and secularity, Orthodox–Muslim relations may serve as an example to other parts of the world.[4]

What have been at the center of post-communist conflicts have been issues of identity and culture, whether in the guise of nationalism, ethnicity, or religion. In coming to grips with what it means to be "Russian" or "Chechen," many have found answers in their nation's historic religious tradition. As I have written elsewhere, religion is prone to play such a role when a particular nation has a historic attachment to a religion which is distinct from that of other neighboring nations. For example, Catholic Poles stand in stark contrast to Orthodox Russians, and their independent identity has been historically stronger than that of other nations which are coreligionists of the Russians, such as the Belarusians, despite the fact that all three nations are Slavic. In this way, religion has also played an important role as a national identifier in the Balkans, not only between Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Croats but also between the South Slavs in general and the Muslim Turks of the Ottoman Empire.[5] Likewise, the "ethnic" difference between Serbs, Montenegrins, and Macedonians, who are all traditionally-Orthodox peoples, has always been less salient than that between Southern Slavs who do not share a common religious heritage.

Downloaded By: [Klipa, Ondrij] At: 16:03 11 April 2008

In this article, I explore the role of religion in post-communist "ethnic" conflicts in an attempt to determine whether or not religion contributed in any significant way to the eruption and/or evolution of these conflicts. I begin by presenting some empirical evidence that suggests that religious differences between ethnic groups in conflict is highly correlated with the intensity and duration of such conflicts, with conflicts between nations of differing religious traditions being more intense and protracted than conflicts between coreligionists. I then show how religion has remained an overlooked factor in the study of ethnic conflict in general, and in the bulk of the body of research into post-communist conflicts as well. After briefly reviewing some of the literature in the field to make this point and to explain why this may have occurred, I illustrate several ways in which religion played a significant role in these conflicts. Finally, using a constructivist approach to nationalism and religion, I offer some explanations as to why religion is prone to playing such a role and what this may suggest about the prospects of resolving some of the post-communist world's most intractable cases of communal violence.

Religious Difference and "Ethnic" Conflict

In reviewing the literature on ethnic conflict in his book *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life*, Ashutosh Varshney agrees with the trend in the field to subsume religion under the larger umbrella category of ethnicity, since "the form ethnic conflict takes—religious, linguistic, racial, tribal—does not seem to alter its intensity, longevity, passion, or relative intractability."[6]

In fact, however, in all cases of separatism after the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, when religious differences existed among the communities involved, the conflicts were more intense (in terms of the number of deaths and internally displaced persons), longer, and more intractable. It was these conflicts in particular that saw immense suffering, ethnic cleansing, systematic rape, and wanton destruction, more so than conflicts that did not involve groups with significant religious differences.

Table 1 lists data on the levels of human suffering as a result of post-communist ethnic conflicts, including data on the number of casualties and displaced persons. While it is quite difficult to determine accurately the resultant human suffering resulting from such conflicts, the relative ranges are rather reliable, so one can draw conclusions regarding relative levels of intensity and conflict. What is apparent from such data is that there is a great range in the level of suffering resulting from these conflicts. The number of casualties ranges from less than 1,000 in Moldova to more than 250,000 in the first Balkan conflict, while the number of displaced persons ranges from a low of 131,000, again in Moldova, to the astronomically high 1.3 million resulting from the war in Bosnia and Croatia, and this number does not take into account the 200,000 displaced persons resulting from the Kosovo crisis.

Downloaded By: [Klipa, Ondrij] At: 16:03 11 April 2008

TABLE 1 Human suffering due to ethnic conflicts

State	Conflict zone	Casualties	Displaced persons
Azerbaijan	Nagorno-Karabakh	20,000	575,000
Croatia	Krajina	80,000	280,000
Georgia	Abkhazia, Adzharia, South Ossetia	6,000	240,000
Moldova	Transdnistria, Gagauzia	<1,000	131,000
Tajikistan	Gorno-Badakhshan	20,000[a]	800,000[a]
Russia	Chechnya	50,000	340,000
Yugoslavia	Bosnia, Croatia	250,000	1,300,000
Yugoslavia	Kosovo	12,000	200,000

[a]Figures are for entire civil war, of which Gorno-Badakhshan's secession was only a part.
Source: Center for Defense Information, Global IDP Project; Human Rights Watch; UNHCR.

All of these conflicts had either a religious or an ethnic dimension to them, and often both. Table 2 offers a summary of the basic ethnic and religious attachments of the majority communities and separatist movements at the center of these conflicts. These differences are often great, though in some cases the differences are rather negligible, at least to outside observers. For example, the ethnic difference between Chechens and

TABLE 2 Ethnic and religious dimension of ethnic conflicts

Separatist movement	Ethnic dimension	Religious dimension
Nagorno-Karabakh	Armenians versus Turkic Azeris	Orthodox versus Muslim
Srpska Krajina	Serbs versus Croats	Orthodox versus Catholic
Abkhazia	Abkhaz versus Georgians	Muslim and Orthodox versus Orthodox
Adzharia	Georgians versus Georgians	Muslim versus Orthodox Christian
South Ossetia	Ossetians versus Georgians	Orthodox Christian versus Orthodox Christian
Transdnistria	Slavs versus Moldovans	Orthodox Christian[a] (MP and UP) versus Orthodox Christian[a] (ROC)
Gagauzia	Turkic Gagauz versus Moldovans	Orthodox Christian versus Orthodox Christian
Gorno-Badakhshan	Pamiris versus Tajiks	Shiite Muslim versus Sunni Muslim
Chechnya	Chechens versus Russians	Muslim versus Orthodox Christian
Republika Srpska	Serbs versus Bosniaks	Orthodox Christian versus Muslim
Kosovo	Kosovar Albanians versus Serbs	Muslim versus Orthodox Christian

[a]Orthodox Christian (Moscow Patriarchate) versus Orthodox Christian (Romanian Orthodox Church).

Downloaded By: [Klipa, Ondrij] At: 16:03 11 April 2008

Russians is great, as these two ethnic communities do not share any ethno-linguistic traits or a religious tradition. The same is the case for other groups in conflict, such as Kosovar Albanians and Serbs, Karabakh Armenians and Azeris, and Abkhazians and Georgians. In some cases, however, religious difference is great (for instance, the only common link between the traditional religions of the groups involved is the Abrahamic tradition), while there is virtually no ethnic difference, as is the case with the Adzharians, who are "ethnic" Georgians who converted to Islam centuries ago. Likewise, in some cases of ethnic conflict, while there may be great ethnic difference between the groups involved, there is only a minor religious difference, such as is the case with the South Ossetians and Gagauz vis-à-vis the Georgians and Moldovans, respectively.

By placing this ethnic and religious information alongside data on the levels of human suffering attendant to these conflicts, one can discern some clear patterns (see Table 3). Not surprisingly, when the level of suffering is extensive or massive, resulting in 10,000–50,000 or more deaths, respectively, the degrees of religious and ethnic difference between the combatant groups are never minor. In each case of ethnic conflict that resulted in massive or extensive human suffering, including the wars in Bosnia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Kosovo, and Chechnya, the religious and ethnic differences between the groups involved were great. The only exception to

TABLE 3 Religion, ethnicity, and conflict

Separatist movement	Religious difference[a]	Ethnic difference[b]	Level of suffering[c]
Chechnya	Great	Great	Massive
Republika Srpska	Great	Significant	Massive
Srpska Krajina	Significant	Significant	Massive
Nagorno-Karabakh	Great	Great	Extensive
Kosovo	Great	Great	Extensive
Abkhazia	Great	Great	Moderate
Adzharia	Great	None	Moderate
Transdnistria	Minor	Great	Low
Gagauzia	Minor	Great	Low
South Ossetia	Minor	Great	Low
Gorno-Badakhshan	Significant	Significant	*Indirect*

[a]Religious difference: great = only commonality is Abrahamic tradition (Muslims and Christians); significant = only commonality is larger religious tradition (Catholics and Orthodox, Shi'ia and Sunni); minor = only distinction is ecclesiastical (e.g. Russian Orthodox versus Romanian Orthodox).

[b]Ethnic difference: great = different ethno-linguistic family; significant = different ethno-linguistic sub-family (Tajiks versus Pamiris) *or* perceived ethnic difference (Serb versus Croat); minor: no ethno-linguistic difference (Serbs and Montenegrins).

[c]Level of suffering: massive = >50,000 deaths; extensive = 10,000–50,000 deaths; moderate = 1,000–9,999 deaths; low = <1,000 deaths.

Downloaded By: [Klipa, Ondrij] At: 16:03 11 April 2008

this rule is for the conflicts in Bosnia and Croatia, in which ethnic differences were only "significant" according to the scale and definitions used.

This matrix also makes clear that there are several cases which involved groups with greatly different ethnic and religious traditions, but in which levels of suffering were only moderate, that is, deaths remained below 10,000. Finally, in conflicts in which ethnic differences were great but there were only minor religious differences between the groups involved, the level of suffering remained low, with fewer than 1,000 deaths and lower relative levels of displaced persons.

The clear pattern that emerges from this simple exercise is that among the cases of post-communist "ethnic" conflict, massive levels of suffering have *always* been the result of conflicts involving combatants of religious and ethnic difference, while in conflicts involving groups with only minor religious difference—despite even great ethnic difference—levels of suffering have been the *lowest* observed. When post-communist conflicts have been long, impassioned, and protracted, in each case there has been a religious difference between the communities involved. The religious dimension, therefore, does matter at an empirical level.

Religion as an Overlooked Factor

Patterns that are visible at the macro level must be understood and contextualized with information from lower levels of aggregation. Unfortunately, micro-level analysis can often "miss the forest for the trees," and overlook or reject a significant factor due to errors in information gathering, analysis, and interpretation. This may be the case with the religious dimension of post-communist ethnic conflict. Most scholars of nationalism and ethnic conflict—including those who study the post-communist world—tend to neglect, diminish, or reject the importance of religion in communal conflict, despite the fact that the importance of religion in international relations has emerged as one of the fastest growing areas of research in the field today.[7]

The tendency to overlook the role of religion altogether is especially prevalent in the early scholarship on post-communist conflict. While there have been literally dozens of books and hundreds of articles written on the topic, only a very small percentage discuss religion at all, even when dealing with conflicts whose religious components and symbolism are obvious and seem to beg the question. In Thomas de Waal's *Black Garden*, for example, the author finds it significant to discuss how the pronunciation of the word "walnut" in Azeri was used as a way of identifying ethnic Armenians during the massacres that took place, but when it comes to the role of Islam and Orthodoxy, all the author concludes is that other scholars have identified it as a factor, while de Waal himself simply ignores the potential impact of religion on the conflict.[8]

In other studies, religion gets identified as a potential factor, but it is not found to be very relevant.[9] Such is the case with Valery Tishkov's account of the war in Chechnya.

Downloaded By: [Klipa, Ondrij] At: 16:03 11 April 2008

Probably the most profound and thought-provoking book on the subject, Tishkov rejects the idea that religion played a significant role in Chechnya's war for independence from Russia.[10] In support of his conclusion he cites such evidence as low levels of adherence to Islam during the Soviet era, the incompatibility between Wahhabist-Arab culture and Chechen culture (even suggesting that the Chechens would prefer Russification to Wahhabist-Arabization),[11] and the rarity with which Chechen leaders invoked Islamic language and symbolism to justify the war. What is interesting here is that it is not the absence of religious language that leads Tishkov to reject the role of religion in the conflict, but the fact that Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev "rarely discussed religious aspects of the events in Chechnya"—though Tishkov himself quotes from the preface to Yandarbiyev's book on the Chechen War, *Chechnya—Bitva za svobodu*, where the latter refers to the war as "a holy *ghazavat* waged in the name of Allah."[12]

Finally, the relevance of religion is rejected by many scholars, perhaps after serious scholarly consideration, but with the author finding religion irrelevant or not the "primary" issue. Quite often this conclusion is reached because scholars find no scriptural basis for the conflict, or they place causal emphasis on other factors. Here, religion's impact is rejected owing to the fact that it is not properly analyzed and therefore not accurately understood. Such is the approach taken by Svante Cornell in his work on ethnic conflict in the Caucasus. As he explains, for a conflict to be considered religious in character, "it is not enough that the two communities in conflict share different religions. Religion must be on the agenda of the conflict; religion must be the issue of the conflict or the conflict must be understood in clearly religious terms, by at least one of the sides."[13] Cornell also cites the work of Nordquist, who has suggested that religion can be considered to be "involved" in a conflict when either at least one party refers to a religious body of thinking to legitimize the conflict or "the polarization of parties is underpinned *primarily* by religious identity and/or theological perspectives" (emphasis in original).[14] In the case of his analysis of the conflicts in Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Abkhazia, Cornell finds no such religious factor, concluding instead that the conflict was ethno-political in nature with a significant economic dimension.[15]

One noteworthy exception to this general tendency to overlook, neglect, or reject the religious dimensions of ethnic conflict is a 1991 article by James Warhola. In his prescient article, Warhola explores the "tangled nexus of religion, ethnic consciousness, and national assertiveness," and all of the points he raises as emerging trends in the Soviet Union's final days are certainly with us more than 15 years later.[16]

Warhola clearly identifies the tendency for religion to buttress ethnic identity. As he explains, "in certain social contexts, the religious dimension of a group's identity appears to energize a sense of ethnic 'Gemeinschaft' which might not otherwise exist."[17] He further observes that "When national identity is tightly bound with religious attachments, perceived threats to the nation . . . have given rise . . . to a retreat into intensified religious identification."[18] Warhola clearly recognizes the potential for religion to activate communal attachments beyond the effect of ethnic identity

Downloaded By: [Klipa, Ondrij] At: 16:03 11 April 2008

alone, and for religious identity to become more intense once ethnic tensions emerge or a conflict arises.

Warhola did not just happen upon these insights; he was clearly led there by the literature on nationalism itself. He references the work of Anthony Smith, whose *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* lists the possession of a portable religion as the number one factor, or the "key" to national survival, along with a high degree of distinctiveness from surrounding peoples and cultural homogeneity. In reference to Smith's typology, Warhola adds that "under certain circumstances, religion may play *the* decisive role in maintenance of ethnic/national identity" (emphasis in original).[19]

Unpacking the Religious Dimension

In each of the examples given above—excluding Warhola—the role of religion as a significant factor in post-communist conflicts was overlooked, diminished, or rejected, despite the fact that other scholars and observers have found quite the opposite. As the introduction to this issue recounts, religious symbols were clearly invoked in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, as they were in Chechnya, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Moreover, evidence suggests quite the contrary to what these scholars have concluded; religious language was clearly invoked—often on both sides, religious identity was certainly relevant, and there was also a rallying of coreligionists from other countries, particularly in the case of jihadists who came to the aid of Muslim societies[20]—including Chechen leader Shamil Basaev, who went to Azerbaijan to fight with his coreligionists.

In both Republika Srpska and Nagorno-Karabakh, the conflicts were effectively framed as one of Christians fighting against the Muslim Turks, who are portrayed as the killers of Jesus and defilers of Christianity. Whether or not Serbs in Bosnia or Armenians in Azerbaijan were active Christians—of course most were not—is beside the point. In both cases, Eastern Orthodoxy is so deeply rooted in these cultures that religion is closely connected to their identity. As Michael Sells shows in the case of Bosnia, for a Bosnian to become a Muslim means to become a Turk, and therefore to betray the Slavic race, for to be Slavic means to be Christian—a phenomenon Sells calls "Christoslavism,"[21] but which would perhaps be better labeled "Orthoslavism," since the Christianity in question is not of the Catholic or Protestant variety.

The same sort of portrayal occurred in Nagorno-Karabakh, an Armenian enclave in Azerbaijan which began its drive for independence in 1988. Here Azeris were referred to simply as Turks; the Azeris were connected in the minds of Karabakh Armenians (and other Armenians for that matter) with the 1915 Armenian genocide, and even with the crucifixion of Christ. One Armenian who fought in the war explained it to me this way: "I wasn't raised in the church, but I was raised an Orthodox Christian nonetheless, and it was clear to me that Christ was Armenian and he was killed by the Turks."[22]

The case of Chechnya puts an interesting spin on this. While Chechens had a long list of grievances, the foremost among them being their 1944 deportation to Central Asia, it

Downloaded By: [Klipa, Ondrij] At: 16:03 11 April 2008

was the lack of Muslim belief in Chechnya that was seen as one of their grievances—the Russians, as the dominant ethnicity of the USSR, were seen as depriving the Chechens of their salvation through Allah. This is something that Valery Tishkov misses, even though he recognizes this in regards to the Chechens' similar attitudes towards being deprived of their language. In fact, Tishkov quotes extensively from a young girl named Kheda who recounts the story of her "romance" with the Chechen language, a language which she had to learn as a second language, though it "had always been with" her.[23] Tishkov's presentation of a similar embrace of Islam, however, is absent, despite the fact that a clear revival of Islam took place soon after the war began, particularly among those engaged in military and paramilitary operations.

In Russia itself resistance to Chechen separatism has also taken on religious overtones. The best example of this is the attempt to canonize a young Russian soldier—Yevgeny Rodionov—who died in the conflict in Chechnya. This 19-year-old foot-soldier was allegedly captured and beheaded by Chechen commander Ruslan Khaikharov in May 1996. Like hundreds of other Russian mothers before and after her, Rodionov's mother traveled to Chechnya to search for her son's remains and learn the details of his ordeal. Apparently after meeting with her son's captor, Khaikharov admitted to killing Rodionov because he refused to renounce his faith and convert to Islam. This story could not be corroborated, however, as required for canonization, because Khaikharov was killed in a Chechen feud soon afterwards. The young soldier's grave, nevertheless, quickly became a popular pilgrimage site for Orthodox believers. The Church resisted canonizing the young "martyr" for years, partly due to the inability to corroborate the story of his death, which is what would qualify him as a martyr. In 2004, however, the Church finally caved in to pressure from its laity and certain outspoken members of its own clergy and canonized the young man as a saint. Today, several more "soldier-martyrs" are being proffered as candidates for canonization.[24]

The case of Gagauzia stands in sharp contrast to those examples in which religious differences exacerbated ethnic tensions. Although the Gagauz are ethnically Turkic, speak a Turkic tongue, and exhibit visible physical differences from the Moldovans and Slavs among whom they live, the Gagauz share a common religious tradition with their neighbors—Eastern Orthodoxy. When the Gagauz sought independence from Moldova in 1991, the conditions there were ripe for a violent conflict. As the situation progressed, however, a political resolution was reached, and the Gagauz settled for autonomy within Moldova. Perhaps here the common religious tradition prevented an effective demonization of the home nation, a point to which I will return below.

The Religious Dimension of "Ethnic" Conflict

Given what we know about the public role of religion, why is the religious dimension of ethnic conflict so often overlooked or incorrectly rejected as a significant factor?

Downloaded By: [Klipa, Ondrij] At: 16:03 11 April 2008

This is not to say that all ethnic conflicts are really religious conflicts. Of course, it is quite difficult to classify communal conflicts as either purely religious or purely ethnic. Moreover, a conflict may be primarily ethnic in nature, but the religious dimension may still be significant and provide unique functions in the dynamic of the conflict. In fact, however, most "ethnic" conflicts rest upon a basis of ethnic, religious, and cultural difference. But when we see such actions as the destruction of religious symbols, the invoking of religious language and symbolism, or other behavior that has clear religious overtones, then the role of religion must be seriously considered in any analysis of such a conflict.

As the examples above illustrate, quite often religion is rejected as a significant factor because the bar is simply raised too high. For a conflict to be solely religious is as rare as it to be solely ethnic. By developing a litmus test for the inclusion of religion as a variable, scholars set themselves up to incorrectly reject a potentially significant variable.

Another reason this has been missed by others, and dismissed by some, is that the roots of many of these conflicts are seen to rest in economics and power politics, as the competition for scare resources and old-fashioned realpolitik are clearly present at the outset of many of these conflicts. Religion and nationalism, scholars of the instrumentalist camp have argued, are then only used to mobilize the masses around such conflicts as the people endure hardship and carry out atrocities against their neighbors. This may in fact be true, but this process may be most effective when a religious difference exists between the groups involved, a point discussed further below.

Another reason that religion is often rejected as a factor in ethnic conflicts is that it gets subsumed under the umbrella of ethnicity. In his analysis of ethnic conflicts, Horowitz argues that all conflicts based on ascriptive group identities—race, language, religion, tribe, or caste—can be called ethnic.[25] As Varshney phrases it, "ethnicity is simply the larger set to which religion, race, language, and sect belong as subsets."[26] This mislabeling of a conflict as solely ethnic took place not only in the analysis of conflicts in the Caucasus, but of the Balkan conflicts as well, where the religious dimension of Orthodox Serbia versus Bosnian and Kosovar Muslims was portrayed almost exclusively as an ethnic issue, despite the fact that it was often understood in the region as very clearly having important religious dimensions.[27] It is difficult to conclude that religion is irrelevant in such conflicts when many Orthodox churches were destroyed in the aftermath of the Kosovo crisis for no other reason than their religious symbolism, and were often replaced with mosques.

It is a categorical mistake to subsume religion under the rubric of ethnicity. Religion is qualitatively different from other ethnic identifiers in function, so even if it is considered in the equation, if it is not analyzed properly then religion's actual impact is not likely to be appreciated. An excellent example is Marty and Appleby's discussion of fundamentalism, where they draw interesting parallels between religion and nationalism but fail to see the distinct attributes of religion and how these can impact politics in ways altogether different from nationalism.[28]

Downloaded By: [Klipa, Ondrij] At: 16:03 11 April 2008

National identity can be based on any combination of myriad characteristics, including language, cultural values, shared history, and physical characteristics—just about anything that a group of people feels binds them together and makes them one people. Of the many features that can serve as the basis for a national identity, religion is perhaps the most potent characteristic that can be attached to nationalism. Nothing else relates so directly to matters of ultimate concern such as justice, salvation, and the afterlife quite the same way religion does. It is no surprise, then, that religion has come to reinforce nationalism and national unity in many parts of the world, both historically and today. In many societies religion and nationalism have become intertwined, and in some cases religion has become so bound up with nationalism that it is difficult to see where one ends and the other begins. This is especially true in situations in which there is a national Church to serve as a resource, such as with the fusion between the Russian Orthodox Church and Russian nationalism.

Forms of nationalism that have strong connections with particular religious traditions could very easily be referred to as religious nationalism (and many scholars do).[29] Their distinction from other forms of nationalism is that religion is an important factor in the formation of the nation and the understanding of the nation's distinctive role in history. It is important to bear in mind, however, that religious nationalism is still a form of nationalism, and it is not loyalty to one's religion or religious group, but rather it is an attachment to the nation proper. The line that separates the two may become so blurred, in fact, that in some cases it can be difficult to distinguish between them. It is not uncommon for people of various degrees of belief to fuse their religious convictions with state authority or national aspirations, and for the latter to come to be seen in people's minds as divinely sanctioned, including for purposes of war. In this way, religion is quite often used by political leaders to great effect, as members of the nation or ethnic community are called upon to serve both "God and country."

Religion is also different from other ascriptive identifiers such as race, language, or tribe in several significant ways. Religion is something that is not spoken, like a language, or exhibited, as a way of dress or even one's skin color. Rather, it is something believed, and this puts it in a very special category. Moreover, as such, it can be relatively easily changed, unlike race or native tongue. And often converts to new religious traditions become more committed members and stricter adherents than those raised within the tradition from birth.[30]

In identity formation, religion plays an important defining role in one's construction of self, at least on par with physical characteristics and language. In the writings of sociologist of religion Peter Berger, religion is at the center of how one defines his or her existence, and provides "cosmological significance" to one's life. Following in the Bergerian tradition, Paul Gifford points out that:

> religion provides definitions, principles of judgment and criteria of perception. It offers a reading of the world, of history, of society, of time, of space, of power, of authority, of justice and of ultimate truth. Religion limits or increases the conceptual tools available, restricts or enlarges emotional responses, or channels them, and withdraws certain

Downloaded By: [Klipa, Ondrij] At: 16:03 11 April 2008

> issues from inquiry. It inculcates a particular way of perceiving, experiencing and responding to reality. Religion can legitimize new aspirations, new forms of organization, new relations and a new social order. Every religion involves struggles to conquer, monopolize or transform the symbolic structures which order reality. All these are issues for political analysis, and issues that are missed if questions of the political role of religion are [not asked properly].[31]

Owing to man's nature and desire to make sense of the universe and his role in it, religion helps many people construct their sense of self, it provides cosmological significance to their existence, and offers them the hope of transcendental salvation. These are powerful effects indeed.

Religion and the Escalation of Ethnic Conflicts

Why is it that the bloodiest of the post-communist world's "ethnic" conflicts have involved members of greatly different religious traditions, while conflicts involving communities that share a single religious tradition have avoided escalating to such levels? Does religious identity play any significant role in such conflicts? Is it simply that religion gets drawn upon by politicians and provocateurs to mobilize the masses around the flag—or the cross or the crescent? Wellman and Tokuno have shown that the symbolic and social boundaries of religion tend to mobilize individual and group identity among groups in conflict.[32] The argument I am putting forth here is that, owing to its particular and unique qualities, religion may be more effective than other ascriptive identifiers in mobilizing groups for violent causes, and quite lethal when a religious difference exists between the groups involved.

From a constructivist understanding of national identity, leaders can certainly behave in an instrumentalist fashion and consciously decide to draw upon religious symbolism to wage a war or military campaign that has clear political or economic objectives, but they are constrained in this process by the receptivity of the masses to specific images of the nation and the other, that is, toward those who do not fall within the definition of the nation proper. This is where the key to the role of religion in ethnic conflicts lies, as images of the nation that contain a strong religious component are not only the most effective in forming a national bond but also the most volatile when it comes to separatism and the drive for statehood.

The reason for this phenomenon is that religious difference permits an effective demonization of the "other," resulting in what can be labeled killing "in the name of God."[33] This effect is particularly acute with religious traditions that are salvific and exclusivistic. The term salvific implies that a religion promises salvation in an afterlife. Here, Christianity and Islam stand in contrast to religions such as Buddhism and Shinto, in which there is no clear transcendence to a better world. By exclusivistic is meant that one cannot be a member of a certain religious tradition and another simultaneously. One can easily be a Buddhist and Shinto simultaneously,

Downloaded By: [Klipa, Ondrij] At: 16:03 11 April 2008

as claims about exclusive truths are not central to these religious traditions. In Japan today, in fact, the two religions have become quite fused and are drawn upon during different stages in one's life, from birth to death.[34] But this is not the case with exclusivistic religions such as Christianity and Islam. To use a real-life example, the fact that an ethnic Chechen can only speak Russian and not a word of Chechen does not mean that he or she is Russian, but being a member of the Orthodox Christian faith as well would put such a person's Chechen identity in a precarious position. But while one would have a tough time being both Muslim and Christian, one can be a member of two ethnic groups and speak more than one "native" language from birth.

Additionally, if one is to take religion seriously, we must realize that, irrespective of theological sophistication or one's connection to ecclesiastical structures, as part of their universal truth Abrahamic religions have places in their theology for believers of other faiths, whether this be their eventual conversion to the "truth" or an eternity of torment in hell, or somewhere in between. The fact that there is a truth dispute at the center of religious difference is a critical aspect. By preaching a universal truth, noncoreligionists are "evil" to some degree, whether simply because they are outside of the truth, or heretics, or perhaps already "dead" in the eyes of God.[35] I refer to this process as the demonization of the "other." If a person is already dead in the eyes of God, then one is only speeding up the inevitable, or even carrying out the will of God. Moreover, as someone who has rejected Christ or the "truth," there is cosmological justification for such an act. There are certainly historical precedents for such behavior and rationalizations. King Langdarma of Tibet was assassinated in 842 by a Buddhist archer who justified his act by calling out: "I sped you along to your next reincarnation."[36] Likewise, Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Reinhold Niebuhr both dealt with issues of faith and armed resistance against evil, whether in the guise of Nazi fascism or Soviet totalitarianism.

In *Orientalism*, Edward Said argues that the East had to first be constructed in the minds of Europeans as backward, uncivilized, and immoral before the Orient could be conquered and subjugated by the West as part of its civilizing project.[37] In much the same way, religious difference between separatist nations and the states that seek to subdue them may act to demonize the other and make people willing to kill or be killed in the name of their god.

Nationalism, Religion, and Secession in the Post-Communist World

What can we conclude about the role of religion in post-communist conflicts from this brief investigation? I think the best way to understand religion is as a volatile substance. When properly contained, a volatile substance is not dangerous, but when placed in the wrong environment it can become explosive. This may be the best way to understand religion's role in ethnic conflicts, and its volatility seems much

Downloaded By: [Klipa, Ondrij] At: 16:03 11 April 2008

greater than other ascriptive factors of national identity, such as language, skin color, or ethnicity, for the reasons I have tried to outline above.

Moreover, when looking at the role of religion in ethnic conflicts, we must be aware that processes operative at one level may function quite differently at other levels. There are three levels at which religion functions in ethnic conflicts; cognitive, societal, and international, and the relative importance of religion varies greatly at each level. The first is that of cognition, the level at which humans perceive the world around them, make sense of who they are, and develop bonds with each other. At this level, there is a sharp divide between how religious believers and non-believers perceive the world, so much so that non-believers have a very difficult time understanding how people of faith understand their world. While Max Weber argued more than 100 years ago that, within the Calvinist tradition, one's sense of calling or higher purpose drove one to work hard and succeed at business, today, based upon scientific research, we know that one's faith can affect most every aspect of life, from happiness in marriage to recovery from illness.[38]

Such a view might seem persuasive, but when we move beyond the cognitive level the importance of religion diminishes somewhat. At the level of society, religion acts as a bond between people. Groups form around a variety of ascriptive markers, and religion sometimes is part of this equation, and sometimes not. Moreover, religion can sometimes exist at the level of deep culture, and even those who think they are unaffected by religion do not realize how much a particular religious tradition is part of their culture until a different religious tradition begins to make inroads into their societies. Such is the case today in the EU with Islam, for example.[39]

Finally, the importance of nationalism and religion diminishes significantly at the level of international relations. This is where we see old-fashioned realpolitik take over as the primary operative factor. Here religion gets trumped by *raison d'état*, or the rationality of state survival and national interests. A state's political leaders make decisions that are rational for state survival and prosperity, often in ways that run very strongly in opposite directions to those of domestic society. Such actions can generate resentment and negative reactions from the populace. Viewing the world in one way in regards to one's neighbors it might be difficult to think differently when it comes to international relations. I say difficult, because it certainly is not impossible.

When it comes to the cognitive and societal levels, religion can spur on a conflict and lead it to levels not likely to be reached in conflicts lacking a religious dimension. At the same time such a conflict may be raging, relations between a combatant state and external actors who are not direct parties to the conflict may not be influenced by religion at all, for here at the international level realpolitik may be able to contain, dampen or control its effects.

Throughout the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the cases of communal conflict in which there is a religious difference between the ethnic minority and the majority population have witnessed the most virulent calls for separatism and the most violent outcomes. The evidence gathered here suggests that if a religious difference exists

Downloaded By: [Klipa, Ondrij] At: 16:03 11 April 2008

between an ethnic minority and the majority population, given the presence of other factors, including territoriality, competition among elites, and an identity crisis (all post-Soviet peoples faced this, perhaps Russia a little less so), religion is likely to become an important component of the national identity that is formed. Moreover, the battle for independence will be more virulently fought for, will be more bloody, and more protracted. This hypothesis, which here has been explored across the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, is also applicable to other parts of the world.

One thing that seems counterintuitive about this hypothesis is that we know that sometimes the fiercest clashes over religion have occurred between groups that are fighting over what might be considered minor theological issues within the same tradition. As examples one can cite Sunni–Shiite fighting over proper lineage, the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, and the religious wars of England in the 1600s. In these cases it was not great religious difference but proximity that fueled wars. There is a good explanation for such facts, however, that only further corroborates the points raised here. In these cases what was at stake was what Berger has called the "taken-for-granted" character of these traditions. These battles were not wars *between* religions, but rather wars *within* religions for the very soul, if you will, of the religious tradition. Of course, these resulted in new religions emerging, with each side claiming to be the inheritors of the truth.

Something quite different is at work in the role of religion in the formation of national identity. These wars are not over what is the true religion, but rather they are being fought over the very definition of who we are, as Huntington has phrased it.[40] Religion is an important cultural identifier in that equation, but it is not the theology that is important, but the "taken-for-granted" image of the nation, one that is closely tied to a particular religion. Berger's "taken-for-granted" understanding of religion is also true for national identity; national elites and intellectuals search to return to a past when their national identity was something that was taken for granted, and they seek to reconstruct that taken-for-granted nature. Of course, this is very much an invention of tradition, as Hobsbawm and Ranger have phrased it, but the religious side to their tradition is itself very important.

Conclusion

The transitions from communist rule in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are inextricably linked to national liberation movements which sought—and indeed continue to seek—the status of sovereign nation-states.[41] These movements not only emerged in the wake of the collapse of communism, some were also major contributors to the demise of the communist regimes, for instance in Lithuania, Georgia, and Ukraine. But below the republic level, other regions quickly voiced their own aspirations for statehood, with the most well-known examples being Chechnya, Kosovo, and Nagorno-Karabakh.

Downloaded By: [Klipa, Ondrij] At: 16:03 11 April 2008

The study of such conflicts has focused almost exclusively on individual cases, with only a very few seeking to discern patterns across all of the cases of post-communist conflict. Those that do have focused primarily on issues such as historical memory, economic conditions, or structural factors. By neglecting to search for meta-patterns, the fact that the bloodiest of these conflicts have occurred between different religious communities has remained overlooked.

An unmistakable pattern exists among the cases of post-communist separatist conflict of Muslims and Christians pitted against each other. In the most well-known cases it has been Muslim groups seeking independence from a majority Christian state, such as Bosnia, Kosovo, and Chechnya, but in the two cases from the post-communist world where Christian minorities have existed within Muslim territories—Republika Srpska and Nagorno-Karabakh—they, too, have sought separatism, and the result has been just as bloody. Huntington's formulation that "Islam has bloody borders," therefore, must be understood in such a context where it is not only Muslims but also Christians who are turning to violence to achieve their objectives.[42]

Conflicts can and do erupt, of course, even in the absence of a significant religious divide. As a rule, however, they were not as bloody as those that included a genuinely significant dimension of religious difference. This is also not to imply that where there is religious difference bloody conflict necessarily follows—such has simply not been the case. The post-Soviet space displays numerous religious communities living peacefully side by side, including Muslims, Christians of various denominations, Buddhists, and others. Further, cases can be cited where regional distinctiveness served as the basis for the pursuit of varying degrees of political autonomy near the point of outright separatism, yet violent conflict was happily avoided. In some of those cases, such as Tatarstan in the Russian Federation, many of the conditions that might have produced violent conflict—certainly including religious differences—were present in abundance, yet warfare did not occur.

In the main, however, an unmistakable pattern exists in the aggregate of ethnic conflicts in the post-Communist space, wherein the most bloody and protracted of these conflicts have involved a religious dimension that in many cases has simply not been sufficiently explored or even appreciated in scholarly discourse. In order to better understand these conflicts, and the role religion plays in them, we must first begin to take seriously religion as a factor in demarcating the lines between the sacred and the secular, the holy and the profane, and the damned and the saved. The subsequent articles in this volume aim to do so, and thus help lay the foundations for a deeper understanding of the role of religion in this frequently slighted, but in fact highly salient factor in the determination of conflict or peace, and strife or civility.

NOTES

1. Berger, *The Sacred Canopy*, 44.
2. Ibid., 44–45.

Downloaded By: [Klipa, Ondrij] At: 16:03 11 April 2008

3. From Gill, *The Council of Florence*, 244, cited in Binns, *An Introduction to the Christian Orthodox Churches*, 217.
4. Payne, "Orthodoxy, Islam, and the 'Problem' of the West"; and McDaniel, "Islamic and Orthodox Conceptions of Wealth and Economics".
5. Marsh, "Religion and Nationalism"
6. Varshney, *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life*, 5.
7. Johnston and Sampson, *Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft*; Hatzopoulos and Petito, *Religion in International Relations*; Johnston, *Faith-Based Diplomacy*; Fox and Sandler, *Bringing Religion into International Relations*; Hanson, *Religion and Politics in the International System Today*; Albright, *The Mighty and the Almighty*.
8. de Waal, *Black Garden*.
9. See Zdravomyslov, *Mezhnatsional'nye konflikty v postsovetskom prostranstve*.
10. Tishkov, *Chechnya*.
11. Ibid., 179.
12. Ibid., 169.
13. Cornell, "Religion as a Factor in Caucasian Conflicts," 46–68.
14. Nordquist, "Religion and Armed Conflict."
15. Cornell, "Religion as a Factor in Caucasian Conflicts."
16. Warhola, "The Religious Dimension of Ethnic Conflict in the Soviet Union," 259.
17. Ibid., 252.
18. Ibid., 253.
19. Ibid., 259.
20. Demoyan, *Turtsiya i karabakhskii konflikt: Istoriko-sravnitel'nyi analiz*. See particularly Chapters 8 and 9 dealing with "Islamic Solidarity as a Factor of Turkey's Foreign Policy" and "Islamic Mercenaries in the Karabakh War."
21. Sells, *The Bridge Betrayed*.
22. Interview with the author, Stepanakert, 17 October 2006.
23. Tishkov, *Chechnya*, 47.
24. Andrew McGregor, "Crescent under the Cross: Shamil Basaev's Orthodox Enemy," *The Jamestown Monitor—Chechnya Weekly* 7, no. 4, 26 January 2006 (http://www.jamestown.org/chechnya_weekly), accessed 25 March 2006.
25. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, 41–54.
26. Varshney, *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life*, 5.
27. Sells, *The Bridge Betrayed*; Powers, "Religion, Conflict and Prospects for Reconciliation in Bosnia, Croatia and Yugoslavia"; Schäfer, "The Janus Face of Religion."
28. Marty and Appleby, "Remaking the State," 620–43.
29. Marsh, "Religion and Nationalism."
30. Yang, *Chinese Christians in America*.
31. Gifford, *African Christianity*, 26.
32. Wellman Jr. and Tokuno, "Is Religious Violence Inevitable?," 291–98.
33. Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God*. See also idem, *The New Cold War?*, in particular his chapter on "Why Religious Wars are Violent."
34. Swyngedouw, "Religion in Contemporary Japanese Society," 49–72.
35. Stark, *One True God*; idem, *For the Glory of God*; Moore Jr., *Moral Purity and Persecution in History*.
36. Shakabpa, *Tibet*, 52f. See also Norbu and Turnbull, *Tibet*.
37. Said, *Orientalism*.
38. Woodberry, "The Economic Consequences of Pentecostal Belief," 29–35.

Downloaded By: [Klipa, Ondrij] At: 16:03 11 April 2008

39. Potz and Wieshaider, *Islam and the European Union*; Hunter, *Islam, Europe's Second Religion*; Savage, "Europe and Islam," 25–50; Fekete, "Anti-Muslim Racism and the European Security State," 3–29.
40. Huntington, *Who Are We?*
41. Hughes and Sasse, *Ethnicity and Territory in the Former Soviet Union*. Lynch, *Engaging Eurasia's Separatist States*.
42. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*.

REFERENCES

Albright, Madeleine. *The Mighty and the Almighty: Reflections on America, God, and World Affairs*. New York: HarperCollins, 2006.

Berger, Peter L. *The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion*. New York: Anchor Books, 1990.

Binns, John. *An Introduction to the Christian Orthodox Churches*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Cornell, Svante E. "Religion as a Factor in Caucasian Conflicts." *Civil Wars* 1, no. 3 (Autumn 1998): 46–68.

Demoyan, Gaik. *Turtsiya i karabakhskii konflikt: Istoriko-sravnitel'nyi analiz*. Yerevan: Yerevan, 2006.

Fekete, Liz. "Anti-Muslim Racism and the European Security State." *Race & Class* 46, no. 1 (2004): 3–29.

Fox, Jonathan, and Shmuel Sandler. *Bringing Religion into International Relations*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.

Gifford, Paul. *African Christianity: Its Public Role*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998.

Gill, J. *The Council of Florence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959.

Hanson, Eric O. *Religion and Politics in the International System Today*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Hatzopoulos, Pavlos, and Fabio Petito, eds. *Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.

Horowitz, Donald L. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985.

Hughes, James, and Gwendolyn Sasse, eds. *Ethnicity and Territory in the Former Soviet Union: Regions in Conflict*. London: Frank Cass, 2002.

Hunter, Shireen, ed. *Islam, Europe's Second Religion: The New Social, Cultural, and Political Landscape*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002.

Huntington, Samuel P. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.

———. *Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004.

Johnston, Douglas, ed. *Faith-Based Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Johnston, Douglas, and Cynthia Sampson, eds. *Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.

Juergensmeyer, Mark. *The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.

Juergensmeyer, Mark. *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000.

Downloaded By: [Klipa, Ondrij] At: 16:03 11 April 2008

Lynch, Dov. *Engaging Eurasia's Separatist States: Unresolved Conflicts and De Facto States*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2004.

Marsh, Christopher. "Religion and Nationalism." In *Nations and Nationalisms in Global Perspective: An Encyclopedia of Origins, Development, and Contemporary Transitions*, Vol. 1, edited by Guntram H. Herb and David H. Kaplan. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2007.

Marty, Martin, and R. Scott Appleby. "Remaking the State: The Limits of the Fundamentalist Imagination." In *Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Polities, Economies, and Militance*, edited by Martin Marty and R. Scott Appleby. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993.

McDaniel, Charles. "Islamic and Orthodox Conceptions of Wealth and Economics." Paper presented at the *Islam and Orthodoxy: Confrontation or Cohabitation?* conference, Institute for Human Sciences, Vienna, Austria, 11–13 March 2007.

Moore, Barrington Jr. *Moral Purity and Persecution in History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.

Norbu, Thubten Jigme, and Colin M. Turnbull. *Tibet*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1968.

Nordquist, Kjell Åke "Religion and Armed Conflict: Some Observations." In *States in Armed Conflict 1989*, edited by Karin Lindgren, Report no. 32. Uppsala: Uppsala University Department of Peace and Conflict Research.

Payne, Daniel. "Orthodoxy, Islam, and the 'Problem' of the West: The Liberation Theology of Christos Giannaras and Sayyid Qutb." Paper presented at the *Islam and Orthodoxy: Confrontation or Cohabitation?* conference, Institute for Human Sciences, Vienna, Austria, 11–13 March 2007.

Potz, Richard, and Wolfgang Wieshaider, eds. *Islam and the European Union*. Leuven: Peeters, 2004.

Powers, Gerard F. "Religion, Conflict and Prospects for Reconciliation in Bosnia, Croatia and Yugoslavia." *Journal of International Affairs* 50, no. 1 (Summer 1996): 221–52.

Said, Edward. *Orientalism*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1978.

Savage, Timothy M. "Europe and Islam: Crescent Waxing, Cultures Clashing." *The Washington Quarterly* 27, no. 3 (Summer 2004): 25–50.

Schäfer, Heinrich. "The Janus Face of Religion: On the Religious Factor in 'New Wars.'" *Numen* 51, no. 4 (2004): 407–31.

Sells, Michael A. *The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996.

Shakabpa, T. W. D. *Tibet: A Political History*. New York: Potala, 1984.

Stark, Rodney. *One True God: Historical Consequences of Monotheism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.

Stark, Rodney. *For the Glory of God: How Monotheism Led to Reformations, Science, Witch-Hunts, and the End of Slavery*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003.

Swyngedouw, Jan. "Religion in Contemporary Japanese Society." In *Religion and Society in Modern Japan*, edited by Mark R. Mullins, Shimazono Susumu and Paul L. Swanson. Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1993.

Tishkov, Valery. *Chechnya: Life in a War-Torn Society*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004.

Varshney, Ashutosh. *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003.

Waal, Thomas de. *Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War*. New York: New York University Press, 2003.

Warhola, James W. "The Religious Dimension of Ethnic Conflict in the Soviet Union." *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 5, no. 2 (Winter 1991): 249–70.

Wellman, James K. Jr., and Kyoko Tokuno. "Is Religious Violence Inevitable?" *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 43, no. 3 (2004): 291–298.
Woodberry, Robert D. "The Economic Consequences of Pentecostal Belief." *Society* 44, no. 1 (November–December 2006): 29–35.
Yang, Fenggang. *Chinese Christians in America: Conversion, Assimilation, and Adhesive Identities*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999.
Zdravomyslov, A. G. *Mezhnatsional'nye konflikty v postsovetskom prostranstve*. Moscow: Aspekt Press, 1997.

Downloaded By: [Klípa, Ondrij] At: 16:03 11 April 2008