NORMATIVITY AND PHENOMENOLOGY IN HUSSERL AND HEIDEGGER

Steven Crowell has been for many years a leading voice in debates on twentieth-century European philosophy. This volume presents thirteen recent essays that together provide a systematic account of the relation between meaningful experience (intentionality) and responsiveness to norms. They argue for a new understanding of the philosophical importance of phenomenology, taking the work of Husserl and Heidegger as exemplary, and introducing a conception of phenomenology broad enough to encompass the practices of both philosophers. Crowell discusses Husserl's analyses of first-person authority, the semantics of conscious experience, the structure of perceptual content, and the embodied subject, and shows how Heidegger's interpretation of the self addresses problems in Husserl's approach to the normative structure of meaning. His volume will be valuable for upper-level students and scholars interested in phenomenological approaches to philosophical questions in both the European and the analytic traditions.

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In memoriam
John Haugeland (1945–2010)
philosopher and friend

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

CITATION CONVENTIONS FOR THE WORKS OF HUSSERL AND HEIDEGGER

References to the works of Husserl and Heidegger are found in the text according to the following abbreviations, which refer to the *Husserliana* series and the *Gesamtausgabe*, respectively. In the text, the German pagination is given first, followed by the English pagination (when I have consulted a translation). In the case of *Sein und Zeit* (GA 2), I have first given the *Gesamtausgabe* pagination, followed by the pagination to the seventh German edition published by Max Niemeyer Verlag (found in the margins both of the *Gesamtausgabe* edition and the English translation), and finally the pagination to the English translation by Macquarrie and Robinson. I have, however, altered all translations as I see fit, without comment. In cases where the texts in question are not yet found in a volume of the respective collected works, the reference will be found in the list of references.

Edmund Husserl

Hua 1   *Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge*, ed. S. Strasser. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963; *Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology*, trans. D. Cairns. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969.

Hua 2   *Die Idee der Phänomenologie. Fünf Vorlesungen*, ed. W. Biemel. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1958; *The Idea of Phenomenology*, trans. W. P. Alston and G. Nakhnikian. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964.

Hua 3   *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie*, ed. W. Biemel. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950; *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book*, trans. F. Kersten. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983.

Hua 4   *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenolo-gischen Philosophie, Zweites Buch: Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution*, ed. M. Biemel. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952; *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Second Book*, trans. R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1989.

Hua 5   *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenolo-gischen Philosophie, Drittes Buch: Die Phänomenologie und die Fundamente der Wissenschaften*, ed. M. Biemel. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952.

Hua 6   *Die Krisis der Europäischen Wissenschaften und die tran-szendentale Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie*, ed. W. Biemel. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954; *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, trans. D. Carr. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970.

Hua 9   *Phänomenologische Psychologie*, ed. W. Biemel. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962.

Hua 11   *Analysen zur passiven Synthesis (1918–1926)*, ed. M. Fleischer. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966; *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*, trans. A. Steinbock. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001.

Hua 17   *Formale und transzendentale Logik: Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunft*, ed. P. Janssen. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974; *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, trans. D. Cairns. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969.

Hua 18   *Logische Untersuchungen, Erster Band. Prolegomena zur reinen Logik*, ed. E. Holenstein. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975; "Prolegomena to Pure Logic," in *Logical Investigations*, vol. I, trans. J. N. Findlay. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970.

Hua 19/1 *Logische Untersuchungen, Zweiter Band, Erster Teil*, ed. U. Panzer. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984; *Logical Investigations*, vols. I and II, trans. J. N. Findlay. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970.

Hua 19/2 *Logische Untersuchungen, Zweiter Band, Zweiter Teil*, ed. U. Panzer. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984; *Logical Investigations*, vol. II, trans. J. N. Findlay. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970.

Hua 25   *Aufsätze und Vorträge (1911–1921)*, ed. T. Nenon and H. R. Sepp. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987; "Philosophy as Rigorous Science," in *Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy*, trans. Q. Lauer. New York: Harper & Row, 1965.

Hua 28   *Vorlesungen über Ethik und Wertlehre 1908–1914*, ed. U. Melle. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988.

Hua 36   *Transcendentaler Idealismus: Texte aus dem Nachlass (1908–1921)*, ed. R. D. Rollinger and R. Sowa. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003.

Hua 37   *Einleitung in die Ethik. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1920 und 1924*, ed. H. Peucker. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Hua 38   *Wahrnehmung und Aufmerksamkeit: Texte aus dem Nachlass (1893–1912)*, ed. T. Vongehr and R. Giuliani. Dordrecht: Springer, 2004.

Martin Heidegger

GA 1   *Frühe Schriften*, ed. F.-W. von Herrmann. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1978.

GA 2   *Sein und Zeit*, ed. F.-W. von Herrmann. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1977; *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson. New York: Harper & Row, 1962.

GA 3   *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, ed. F.-W. von Herrmann. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1976; *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, trans. R. Taft. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997.

GA 5   *Holzwege*, ed. F.-W. von Herrmann. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1976; *Off the Beaten Track*, trans. and ed. J. Young and K. Haynes. Cambridge University Press.

GA 7   *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, ed. F.-W. von Herrmann. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1976.

GA 9   *Wegmarken*, ed. W.-F. von Herrmann. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1976; *Pathmarks*, ed. W. McNeill. Cambridge University Press, 1998.

GA 14   *Zur Sache des Denkens*, ed. F.-W. von Herrmann. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2007; *On Time and Being*, trans. J. Stambaugh. New York: Harper & Row, 1972

GA 17   *Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung*, ed. F.-W. von Herrmann. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1994; *Introduction*

to Phenomenological Research, trans. D. O. Dahlstrom. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005.

GA 19   *Platon: Sophistes*, ed. I. Schüßler. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1992; *Plato's Sophist*, trans. R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997.

GA 20   *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs*, ed. P. Jaeger. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1979; *History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena*, trans. Th. Kisiel. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985.

GA 24   *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, ed. F.-W. von Herrmann. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1975; *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, trans. A. Hofstadter. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982.

GA 25   *Phänomenologische Interpretationen von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, ed. I. Görland. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1977; *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. P. Emad and K. Maly. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997.

GA 26   *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik*, ed. K. Held. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1978; *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, trans. M. Heim. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984.

GA 31   *Vom Wesen der Menschlichen Freiheit: Einleitung in die Philosophie*, ed. H. Tietjen. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1982.

GA 56/57 *Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie*, ed. B. Heimbüchel. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1987.

GA 61   *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles: Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung*, ed. W. Bröcker and K. Bröcker-Oltmanns. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1985.

Introduction

This book outlines and defends a new understanding of the philosophical importance of phenomenology, taking the work of Husserl and Heidegger as exemplary. The crux of this understanding lies in the connection between normativity and meaning, a connection that has been extensively explored in certain strands of analytic philosophy but has not been sufficiently appreciated in the phenomenological tradition. In one sense this is odd, since meaning (in the form of an analysis of intentionality) has been central to that tradition from the beginning. In another sense, however, it is perfectly understandable, since neither Husserl nor Heidegger (nor most of their followers) identified the theme of phenomenology specifically with meaning (*Sinn*). Rather, Husserl understood phenomenology to be a science of consciousness, while Heidegger understood it to be an approach to being. At the same time, both Husserl and Heidegger argued that phenomenology transformed the sense of previous philosophical concepts, so it is not altogether clear how we are to understand terms like "consciousness" and "being" in their writings. As I have argued in *Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning* (2001), and continue to argue in this volume, a careful look at the particular descriptions, analyses, and interpretations offered by each shows that it is phenomenology's focus on the transcendental conditions of the constitution or disclosure of meaning that upsets our understanding of traditional philosophical topics in the ways that exercised Husserl and Heidegger. It thereby also allows us to appreciate why the analytic treatments alone are not enough.

The closer examination of the space of meaning in its character as a norm-governed phenomenon, and of the self or subject capable of experiencing such meaning, is the primary aim of this book. That examination yields a conception of phenomenology that sees in it neither a one-off product of a largely defunct continental metaphysical tradition, nor an appendage that deals with marginal cases of "what it is like" to experience something. The phenomenology I have in view offers a deep and compelling approach to problems of philosophy. In this volume, issues in

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philosophy of mind, moral psychology, and philosophy of action provide the primary focus for illustrating this claim.

Before going further, a word should be said about the concept of "norm" that is in play here. The term is often used in a narrow sense, according to which a norm is an explicitly formulated rule – whether conventional or rationally derived – that serves as the basis for determining whether something (an action, mainly) is permissible or obligatory. When the term is understood in this way, the idea that normativity is central to Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology may well appear perverse. But there is a wider sense according to which a norm is anything that serves as a standard of success or failure of any kind, and it is in this sense that I understand the term here. Thus a legislated statute is a norm, as are rules of games like chess or baseball; but "unspoken" rules, satisfaction conditions, cultural mores, manners, what is "normally" done – in short, whatever it is that *measures* our speech and behavior – are also norms. Kant links the "exemplary universality" of our experience of the beautiful with the normative by invoking the "presence of a rule that we cannot state," and we can understand Platonic *eide* as norms in this sense as well: as ideal exemplars, they stand in relation to the things that share their names as standards for being those things. Like phenomenological "essences," such exemplars are not rules in any sense, but they possess a kind of normative claim that precludes our thinking of them simply as entities that turn up in the world, whether as part of the latter's causal nexus, as social facts, or as elements of the subject's psychological outfitting. It is this that makes the normative a basic concern in phenomenology, since it belongs squarely within the scope of the latter's distinctive sort of anti-naturalism (or anti-objectivism).

Thus the normative is found wherever we can speak of rules, measures, standards, exemplars, ideals, concepts, and so on; wherever distinctions between better and worse, success and failure, can be made. I don't pretend that discriminating between these various sorts of norm is not philosophically important; on the contrary, there is already a robust literature that essays this task, and if my argument goes through, tracing the differences and interconnections among these ways in which the space of meaning is constituted is a significant item on the phenomenological agenda. One example will be found in Chapter 10, where the distinction between the good and the right is touched upon. For the purposes of the general argument, however, only the wider concept of normativity is necessary.

The normative is at stake in the accounts of intentional content or meaning offered in both analytic and phenomenological traditions, and

it guided both Husserl and Heidegger toward the insight that phenom-
enological investigation of intentionality demanded a thorough reorien-
tation in philosophy. But neither thought it particularly striking that it
was meaning's normative structure that accounted for this demand. Thus
while each drew upon the tradition of transcendental philosophy since
Kant to formulate the reorientation, and each contributed phenomeno-
logical analyses to the elucidation of meaning's normative aspect, neither
formulated the issues in precisely this way. There are other philosophical
agendas at work in their writings, and these vie for attention with the one
I am trying to highlight here. I do not intend to minimize the importance
of these other agendas for understanding Husserl and Heidegger, but for
the present, appreciating the philosophical contribution of phenomen-
ology requires that we not simply repeat the words and thought-figures
that operate in their texts but disinter what *we* hold to be the "things
themselves" at stake in their thinking – to the extent that that thinking
is indeed phenomenological. Phenomenological adequacy serves as my
standard of judgment, brought to bear on an examination of the norma-
tive conditions on meaning or intentionality.

The book aims at three interrelated goals: (1) to contribute to our under-
standing of what is distinctive about phenomenology as an approach to
philosophical problems; (2) to present a reading of Husserl and Heidegger
that emphasizes a continuity in both the problems they were concerned
with and the solutions they proffered, while also highlighting (in the case
of Husserl) the gaps in his position that made the Heideggerian move
necessary and (in the case of Heidegger) the limits of standard interpret-
ive approaches that make Heideggerian phenomenology seem irrelevant
to philosophers who do not adopt his terminology and general outlook;
and (3) to address certain questions in philosophy of mind (e.g., the con-
ditions on possession of intentional content), moral psychology (e.g.,
the interdependence of self-responsibility, first-person authority, and
norm-responsiveness), and philosophy of action (e.g., the way meaning-
ful action hangs together with the practice of reason-giving).

Part I sketches phenomenology's place in the tradition of transcenden-
tal philosophy since Kant (Chapter 1), and it provides an overview of the
phenomenologies of Husserl and Heidegger focused on the connection
between normativity and meaning, introducing key technical terms and
disputed problems (Chapters 2 and 3). Part I is thus an introduction to the
argument elaborated in more detail later in the volume. Part II develops
an interpretation of Husserl's phenomenology that shows how the norma-
tive character of meaning is explicitly addressed and also how Husserl's

identification of phenomenology with a philosophy of consciousness distorts some of his insights. Here topics are introduced that provide touchstones for the interpretation of Heidegger in Part III: Chapter 4 elucidates what it means to say that phenomenology is a "first-person" approach to philosophical problems; Chapter 5 distinguishes the phenomenological take on meaning from some standard non-phenomenological directions in semantics. Chapter 6 explores Husserl's struggle to characterize the kind of normativity that, from the first-person perspective, informs perceptual intentionality; and Chapter 7 argues that "phenomenal consciousness" cannot, even on Husserl's own terms, be intrinsically intentional.

What is missing from the Husserlian analyses can be found, as Part III argues, in Heidegger's existential analytic of Dasein. The aim of these chapters is twofold: first, to show that Heidegger's concept of care (*Sorge*) incorporates Husserl's transcendental-phenomenological turn to the "subjectivity of the subject" in such a way that the implications of the latter's understanding of the first-person stance as self-responsibility are fully exploited (Chapter 8); and second, to show how Heidegger's analysis clarifies the possibility of responding to norms *as norms*, and so completes the transcendental project of delineating the conditions that make intentional content, the experience of something *as* something, possible (Chapters 9 and 10).

The most significant claim in Part III is that Heidegger's phenomenological analysis of authenticity as responsibility has consequences for understanding what reason is. Far from presenting us with a picture of the self in which reason plays no role, or only a derivative one, Heidegger's phenomenology shows how reason is inseparable from our being, even though we are not "by nature" rational beings. Some implications of this thesis are then explored in Part IV, with a focus on practical philosophy. In Chapter 11 Heidegger's account of how norms take on normative force is compared with Christine Korsgaard's, with which it has much in common. I argue that Heidegger's conception of the subject as care provides a better basis than Korsgaard's conception of self-consciousness for understanding why we are confronted by what Korsgaard calls "the normative problem." The structure of practical intentionality is further explored in Chapter 12, where Heidegger's distinction between trying to *do* something and trying to *be* something is mobilized to show the limits of any account (here Husserl's) that proceeds on the basis of a combination of intentional acts (or propositional attitudes) such as belief, desire, and will. Finally, Chapter 13 addresses the vexed question of where moral reasoning belongs in Heidegger's ontology.

Taken together, these chapters are meant to marshal textual evidence and philosophical argument in support of an interpretation that seems to me productive for introducing phenomenology into the wider discussion of the philosophical issues at stake in them.

Many chapters in this volume were published previously and were written for very different occasions. Though they all contribute to the aims outlined above, I might well approach the issues differently were I starting from scratch. In preparing this volume I have occasionally modified the originals to make a more readable whole, altered a title, or added a reference, but I have not tried to update them, introduce new arguments, or engage in debates with the most recent literature. And while my argument is based on certain key passages in the texts of Husserl and Heidegger to which I return many times, the price paid in repetition brings with it a certain gain. The interpretation of these passages has so far been relatively neglected in the literature, or else developed in a way very different from the one I propose. Thus repetition can serve, in the different thematic contexts in which it is found, as a form of emphasis and reframing.

There are many topics relevant to my theme in Husserl and Heidegger that have not been taken up here at all. Nevertheless, I have sought to provide what is essential in a way that is not incompatible with any phenomenologically defensible thesis found in their writings. Thus, for instance, though I do not investigate Husserl's phenomenology of time in any detail, nor specifically address Heidegger's concept of truth as disclosedness or his interpretation of Dasein's historicality, closer examination of these themes should not seriously compromise my thesis. On the contrary, a proper understanding of them *presupposes* the account of the elements of Husserl's and Heidegger's thought I present here. Or so I would argue.

A final issue concerns translation. The original versions of these chapters were not consistent on this point – some quoting directly in German, some using standard English translations, some a mixture, and so on. For this volume I have eliminated almost all of the German and have retranslated, consulting existing versions but modifying them without comment. Important nuances have been lost, but because my intention has been to write about Husserl and Heidegger in a way that is maximally accessible to a broad audience, it seemed best to free the argument as much as possible from the particulars of the German language. While attention to the resonances of the original – especially in the case of Heidegger – can enrich our understanding of the issues, I am convinced that such attention would not undermine, but rather support, the thesis advanced here. But that is finally for others to decide.

PART I

Transcendental philosophy, phenomenology, and normativity

1

Making meaning thematic

1   Introduction: phenomenology and phenomenologies

Throughout this volume I shall understand "phenomenology" to be the philosophy of Edmund Husserl and of those philosophers who linked on to it by means of creative (even if often quite critical) appropriation. This defines a very large group, but among historical figures it includes at least Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Emmanuel Levinas, and Jacques Derrida.[1] Husserl designated his mature thought "transcendental phenomenology," but none of these philosophers adopted that designation for their version of phenomenology. Remarks can be found in the works of each that link them to the transcendental tradition, but in general the history of phenomenology appears to be a series of attempts to break free from the "intellectualism" (Merleau-Ponty's term) of transcendental philosophy.

Some might argue, then, that the kind of project ventured in this chapter – an examination of the relation between phenomenology and the transcendental turn inaugurated by Kant – ought to restrict itself to those aspects of Husserl's thought that either draw upon or directly criticize tenets of Kant's Critical philosophy, and several very good studies of this sort have been carried out.[2] But even if later phenomenologists sought to distance themselves from Husserl, they often did so while adopting elements of his transcendental phenomenology. There are few studies that explore whether there might be aspects of transcendental phenomenology that are shared by these otherwise very different thinkers, but that is what I propose to do.

Since I cannot hope to establish such transcendental *bona fides* in a comprehensive way here, the approach will be a strategic amalgam of the

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[1] The historical context is laid out in detail in Spiegelberg 1984. A more limited introduction, but one that highlights transcendental motifs, is Moran 2000. For an attempt to specify what such thinkers have in common as phenomenologists, see Crowell 2002b.

[2] See, above all, Kern 1964 and Brelage 1965.

historical and the systematic. In historical perspective my focus will be limited to Husserl and Heidegger against the background of Kant and neo-Kantianism. But this examination will be "historical" only in a very attenuated sense, since I make no claim to exhaust even the most important historical connections relevant to an understanding of how Husserl and Heidegger belong to the transcendental tradition. Instead, the guiding thread will be systematic. I shall argue that phenomenology – all phenomenology – is transcendental insofar as it *makes meaning thematic* as philosophy's primary field of investigation. Taking as its theme not things but the meaning or intelligibility of things, phenomenology transforms transcendental philosophy by expanding its scope to embrace all experience, not just the cognitive, axiological, and practical "validity spheres" addressed in Kant's three *Critiques*. Thus phenomenology accomplishes a universal generalization of the transcendental turn: inquiry into the (normative) conditions for the possibility of knowledge becomes an inquiry into *intentionality* or "mental content" as such: our experience of something *as* something.

The phenomenological thematization of meaning involves (1) rejecting Kantian representationalism, (2) adopting the neo-Kantian idea that categories are normative, and (3) insisting on the first-personal character of philosophical method. The following section will suggest how these points emerge from Husserl and Heidegger's shared diagnosis of Kant's shortcomings. A similarly shared rejection of the neo-Kantian attempt to reformulate Kant's project as a theory of science provides the background for three subsequent sections which explore the phenomenological approach to meaning systematically from objective, subjective, and existential perspectives.

2   Phenomenology in Kantian context

No doubt Dieter Henrich is right to insist on the ultimately practical or ethical motivation behind Kant's transcendental project:[3] faced with his failure to bring the details of the Transcendental Deduction to complete clarity, Kant warned against taking such details for the heart of philosophy. That lay, rather, in justifying the "idea of freedom" and providing a

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[3] I adopt the phrase "transcendental project" from Genova 1984, which argues that focus on transcendental arguments as the key to transcendental philosophy is misleading, since such arguments make sense only within Kant's overall critical *project*. This point is important for understanding how phenomenology, which unlike Anglo-American approaches to Kant pays little attention to transcendental arguments, can nevertheless be considered a continuation of Kant's project.

"defense of the essential interests of humankind" (Henrich 1994, p. 127). Nevertheless, this defense demanded a theoretical alternative to metaphysical dogmatism and empiricistic skepticism. Details aside, this alternative required a *Revolution der Denkungsart* that consists in positing a radical discontinuity between philosophy and all first-order cognition, whether empirical or metaphysical. Phenomenology is transcendental because it belongs to this revolution.

The discontinuity thesis comes to expression in a passage in which Kant specifies what he means by "transcendental." Asserting that "not every kind of knowledge a priori should be called transcendental, but that only by which we know that – and how – certain representations (intuitions or concepts) can be employed or are possible purely a priori" (1968, p. 96 [A56/B80]), Kant points out that transcendental philosophy is distinguished by the sort of question it asks. First-order inquiries – whether empirical like physics and psychology or a priori like mathematics and metaphysics – are carried out in an *intentio recta* and they establish the real properties of their objects. Transcendental critique, in contrast, asks how it is possible that such first-order thinking *can* yield knowledge, and it deals with objects and their properties only in a reflective *intentio obliqua* concerned with what makes them cognitively accessible. No first-order proposition can contribute to a transcendental account of how it is possible for any such first-order proposition to be an instance of cognition, nor can transcendental conditions of possibility be identified with some special realm of entities or some peculiar property of objects. As Kant put it: "The distinction between the transcendental and the empirical belongs … only to the critique of knowledge; it does not concern the relation of that knowledge to its objects" (1968, p. 96 [A57/B81]). To ask after transcendental conditions of knowledge is not to ask how particular judgments are formed; nor is it to establish whether any first-order judgment is true. These are tasks for first-order sciences. Instead, transcendental philosophy addresses how it is possible that the "ground" appealed to in some first-order practice of justification – for instance, experience – can serve as a norm for such practice.

Thus Kant's project is not concerned with the real relation between a representation and its object but solely with the cognitive claim advanced in it, and the question of how knowledge is possible is not a factual but a normative one. It does not look for some causal connection between mind and world but investigates how a concept can *hold* of something – not "how can something represent an object?" but "how can it do so correctly?" Further, transcendental philosophy is concerned with the normative

ground of knowledge precisely where that ground's claim to normative status involves a puzzle. For instance, the ground of synthetic judgments is experience, that is, the direct intuition of an object. But because some synthetic judgments are known a priori, and because they are known by a subject whose intuition is exclusively sensible (receptive), the normative status of experience appears puzzling. How can it ground the universality and necessity characteristic of a priori knowledge?

So formulated, the transcendental question makes sense only against the background of some specific characterization of the cognitive situation of the knower – that is, a more or less explicit philosophical anthropology.[4] This places a significant burden on any transcendental account of knowledge, for that account must be consistent with the anthropological picture. Rüdiger Bubner denotes this the "self-referentiality" condition: "that knowledge which is called transcendental takes as its object, together with the general conditions of knowledge, the conditions of its own genesis and functioning" (1975, p. 462). Any transcendental account of how we can know synthetic judgments a priori must also explain how such transcendental knowledge is itself possible. According to Husserl and Heidegger, however, Kant's picture of the knowing subject – his cognitive anthropology – renders a non-dogmatic account of the normative (categorial) conditions of cognition impossible.[5]

The problem surfaces at the heart of Kant's Transcendental Deduction of the categories. How are synthetic judgments possible a priori? What is the normative ground of the synthesis they assert? What accounts for the fact that they can be known to hold of objects? Kant answers with an argument that purports to show that such judgments are "the a priori conditions of a possible experience in general" and are thus "at the same time conditions of the possibility of objects of experience" (1968, p. 138 [A111]). Since we are interested here only in the self-referential aspect of Kant's position we need not linger over the details of his argument. The crucial

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[4] This point informs John McDowell's strategic or "therapeutic" transcendental approach, which begins with a contingent picture of our cognitive situation that makes it seem as though perception can play no justificatory role in knowledge and from there moves to replace that anthropological picture with another in which it is no longer puzzling (McDowell 1996).

[5] Husserl speaks here of "Kant's mythical constructions" – his "'faculties,' 'functions,' 'formations,'" which we "are unable to make intuitive to ourselves" (Hua 6, p. 116/114). Heidegger argues that "the anthropology worked out by Kant is an empirical one and not one which is adequate for the transcendental problematic, i.e., it is not pure" (GA 3, p. 206/144). He goes on to suggest that his own "fundamental ontology" of Dasein is meant to address this problem.

question is this: what is it about the "possible experience" mentioned in the first half of the cited passage that allows it to play a normative role in explaining how such judgments hold of objects? Here Kant's anthropological presuppositions prove decisive. Descriptively, Kant has previously established that experience involves two independent sources, sensibility and understanding. But by themselves these sources do not suffice, for experience also involves the (descriptive?) fact of being *owned*, mine. This owned character of experience – the "transcendental unity of apperception," the "abiding and unchanging 'I'," or "self-consciousness" – is the "*absolutely* first and synthetic principle of our thought," and it accounts for "the synthetic unity of the manifold in all possible *intuition*" (1968, p. 142 [A117–18]; p. 146 [A 123]). Thus, anything that can be shown to be necessary for this apperceptive consciousness of unity is thereby also shown to be necessary for any object that can be represented in it.

The problem with this is that it does not satisfy the self-referentiality condition: the concept of "possible experience," which the Deduction establishes as the scope of synthetic a priori knowledge, is so restrictive that transcendental critique cannot count as knowledge. Knowledge of the necessarily owned character of experience is neither a matter of logic nor "an inner experience"; it is an "apperception" that "does not know itself through the categories"(1968, p. 329 [A342/B400]; p. 365 [A402]). If one were justified in assuming an apperceptive grasp of *necessary* ego-unity, one could treat it as a principle by which to delimit conditions of possible experience, but Kant provides no non-dogmatic way to justify such an assumption. The ultimate principle of the deduction remains "a *thought*, not an *intuition*" (1968, p. 168 [B157]), and its claim to normative status as the ground of philosophical knowledge remains a puzzle.

The effect of this objection is to force reconsideration of the anthropological horizon of Kant's theory, and here two very different paths open up. One attempts to preserve the role of subjectivity in transcendental philosophy by improving upon Kant's understanding of it, while the other rejects any such role. The first leads to phenomenology and to some naturalistic, cognitive-science readings of Kant,[6] while the second leads from Hegel to neo-Kantianism and to an interest in transcendental arguments. The first takes its departure from the A-Edition version of Kant's Transcendental Deduction, with its account of how categories originate in a threefold synthesis (apprehension, reproduction, recognition). This may be called the "psychological" reading, since it attributes syntheses

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[6] For instance, Kitcher 1990.

other than purely inferential or logical ones to the transcendental sub-
ject. The second – which may be called the "logical" reading – emphasizes
the B-Edition's insistence on the autonomy of the understanding (i.e., the
purely inferential, categorial character of the experiential synthesis) and
the merely formal character of the unity of apperception.

Through Hermann Cohen's work, the logical reading dominated the
Marburg School of neo-Kantianism, which rejected the genetic "subject-
ive" deduction of the categories as well as the supposedly psychologistic
assumption that sensible intuition provides a contribution to knowledge
independent of the categories.[7] It was against such proposals that Husserl
developed his phenomenological version of transcendental philosophy,
and against them, too, that Heidegger directed his own Husserl-inspired
Kant interpretation.[8] In doing so they adopted the psychological reading,
broadly conceived; that is, they sought to clarify the normative conditions
of experience by reflecting on "consciousness" or "being-in-the-world."
Yet phenomenology is no less committed than neo-Kantianism to the
view that the transcendental subject is not the psychological subject
embedded in the causal nexus of empirical reality. The difficulty, then,
is to understand how the transcendental subject can be concrete – more
than the neo-Kantian formal principle of unity – yet not a nexus of psy-
chological causality and association.

Klaus Hartmann argues that this difficulty indicates a fatal flaw in what
he calls "mixed" transcendental theories, versions of which both Kant
and Husserl offer. Mixed theories combine – and ultimately confuse –
elements of a reflection on the constitution of knowledge with elements
of a transcendental justification of knowledge (Hartmann 1988b, p. 229).[9]
Constitutional reflection starts with "realist" affirmations concerning
"our" nature, which, as regards their own justification, are mere matters
of fact, genetic assumptions, or "metaphorical ordinary-level concep-
tions" (1988b, p. 204). From this constitutional level, mixed theories try
to construct a bridge to a priori or categorial necessity. Kant, for instance,
distinguishes between pure and empirical intuition, pure and empirical
synthesis, etc. But such strategies always fail: the genetic assumptions are

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[7] On the Hegelian background of Marburg neo-Kantianism, see Köhnke 1991; on its for-
    malism, see Brelage 1965.
[8] Heidegger notes that "[w]hen some years ago I studied the *Critique of Pure Reason* anew
    and read it, as it were, against the background of Husserl's phenomenology, the scales fell
    from my eyes and Kant became for me a crucial confirmation of the accuracy of the path
    which I took in my search" (GA 25, p. 431/292).
[9] See also Hartmann 1988c, p. 244.

simply disguised as "a priori conditions of knowledge," though we in fact "do not understand how acts are grounds for truth." The bottom line is that "transcendental acts and syntheses … cannot account for the validity of knowledge" (1988b, p. 200; 1988c, p. 249).

Phenomenology answers this charge with another: "pure" category theories must be dogmatic. Hartmann himself admits that a theory, like Hegel's, which "makes [no] concessions to existential considerations" suffers from "circularity" (1988a, pp. 282, 280). Instead of ignoring the anthropological or subjective, then, phenomenology reconceives its function: it does not, as it does for Kant, serve as a premise in a transcendental argument intended to establish the validity of the categories; it serves, rather, as philosophy's primary datum: the field of intentionality, wherein categorial meaning-structures can be reflectively grasped. For phenomenology, the puzzling relation between the normative and the factual is found in all meaningful experience, all experience of something as something. Thus it transforms transcendental philosophy from an epistemic project of justifying certain a priori principles into a (so to speak) "semantic" project of clarifying intentionality through reflection on the evidence of first-person experience.[10]

In unpacking some implications of this transformation I shall first examine the phenomenological approach to the intentional *object*, in particular its critique of representationalism. Second, I shall take up the *noetic* aspect of intentionality, contrasting the phenomenological approach with the categorial *Geltungstheorie* of the neo-Kantian philosopher Emil Lask. Finally, I shall explore Heidegger's claim that the transcendental account of intentionality requires an existential turn.

3 The intentional object and the critique of representationalism

To open transcendental philosophy to the full range of intentional experience is, in Husserl's terms, to investigate the conditions that make "transcendence" – consciousness of the real in the widest sense – possible.[11]

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[10] For extensive discussion of the implications of this shift see Mohanty 1985.

[11] If we look more closely at what is so enigmatic and what, in initial reflections on the possibility of cognition, causes embarrassment, it is the transcendence of cognition. All cognition of the natural sort, both the *pre-scientific* [my emphasis] and especially the scientific, is cognition that objectifies what is transcendent. It posits objects as existent, claims cognitively to grasp matters of fact that are not "strictly given to it," are not "immanent" to it. (Hua 2, p. 34/27)

For Husserl, transcendental knowledge is any knowledge that contributes to clarifying the enigma of transcendence.

Heidegger introduces a distinction here that will prove important later on, between "ontic transcendence" and "original" or "primal" transcendence. Ontic transcendence is equivalent to intentionality: "Intentionality is indeed related to the beings themselves and, in this sense, is an ontic transcending comportment." In it the subject "transcends" itself toward beings other than itself. But, Heidegger continues, "the problem of transcendence as such is not at all identical with the problem of intentionality. As ontic transcendence, the latter is itself only possible on the basis of original transcendence, on the basis of being-in-the-world. This primal transcendence makes possible every intentional relation to beings" (GA 26, p. 170/135). To see why this is so, it is first necessary to see what a transcendental clarification of intentionality involves.

Intentionality, ontic transcendence, is the experience of something as something. Thus all intentional states involve a meaning (the "as") through which some object is purportedly present to consciousness. But in everyday life consciousness is directed toward the object, not the meaning. To make this meaning thematic, Husserl focuses first on the "natural attitude": in the straightforward gearing into the world characteristic of everyday life I busy myself with things that come to my attention, taking them as simply "there" just as they present themselves. This natural attitude thus involves a pervasive belief in the reality of what shows itself, a belief whose correlate is not this or that aspect or thing but the world, the horizon of all such particular experiences: "'The' world is always there as real; at most it is here and there 'otherwise' than I supposed; this or that is to be struck *out of it*, so to speak, and given such titles as 'illusion,' 'hallucination,' and the like" (Hua 3, p. 63/57). Such realism is what makes the natural attitude a topic for transcendental inquiry.

To speak of "realism" here is to acknowledge that my experience of the world involves a claim to validity and so a normative distinction between success and failure. What presents itself is not only there as something but also as "truly" or "validly" existing. Transcendental inquiry is concerned with how such a normative claim – this consciousness of true being – is grounded. Indeed, experience in the natural attitude is characterized by two distinct normative moments: the (defeasible, hence norm-governed) claim to experience what truly is, and also the (defeasible, hence norm-governed) claim to experience something of just this *sort*. The act of perception in which I experience something as a tree, for instance, somehow involves reference to normative satisfaction conditions that determine what the thing is supposed to be, a certain meaning that establishes how the current experience must necessarily be related to (former and) subsequent experiences *if* the thing perceived is in fact what

it gives itself to be – namely, a tree.[12] More generally, we may speak of the "intentional content" of experience only where it makes sense to talk about how such experience might go wrong. The puzzle – that which demands transcendental clarification – is how this normatively structured content of experience is possible. What *is* "content" or meaning anyway?

In everyday life – and so also in all first-order inquiries – consciousness is directed toward objects and their real properties; that is, toward leafy trees, heavy hammers, stunning artworks, and so on. The meaning thanks to which such objects are there for us as trees, hammers, and artworks, however, is no property of the object. Nor can it be an object immanent to consciousness, a "representation" grasped in psychological reflection, for any such immanent object would have to be given through a meaning, and so on *ad infinitum*. Thus, while it might appear that Kant's concept of *Vorstellung* (representation) – which includes both concepts and percepts (intuitions) – suffices to capture the intentionality of experience, the notion of representation already conceals the phenomenon of intentionality by treating it as a relation between two entities, one subjective and the other objective. The phenomenological approach to meaning avoids the pitfalls of a theory of representation in the modern sense of the "way of ideas."[13] In contrast to all such theories, phenomenology does not locate meaning in the subject but identifies it transcendentally with the object. As Husserl writes:

> In a certain way, and with some caution in the use of words, we can also say that *all real unities are "unities of meaning."* … Reality and world are names precisely for certain valid unities of meaning … related to certain concatenations of absolute, pure consciousness which, by virtue of their essence, bestow meaning and demonstrate meaning-validity precisely thus and not otherwise. (Hua 3, p. 134/128)

The intentional object as it is considered in phenomenological reflection – that is, in a reflection that makes explicit the meaning through which the object is given – is called the "noema." The noema has been interpreted in Fregean terms as an abstract entity that mediates between

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[12] On conditions of satisfaction see Searle 1983, pp. 10–11. Searle's conditions are logical not phenomenological; that is, they reconstruct experience without having to be evident *in* experience. But as Dreyfus (2000) argues, rational reconstruction presupposes that one first get the phenomenology right.

[13] Of course, there are other uses of the term "representation" that do not involve this problem – for instance, it is sometimes used merely to indicate that things are present to me in a certain way or under a certain description. But Kant's usage seems not to be of this sort, and we shall restrict ourselves here to representation taken as a mental entity. Whether this is a fair reading of Kant may be questioned, but we cannot enter into the issues.

consciousness and the external world, but this wreaks havoc with Husserl's anti-representationalism. It is better seen as the object itself considered in terms of its modes of self-givenness.[14] Noematic unities are not unities of objective properties but of ways in which objects and their properties are given. Nor are these ways or modes of givenness mental items that get grouped causally or associatively. From such association no valid consciousness of transcendent objects could ever arise. To yield object-consciousness, modes of givenness must be related to one another through something like a rule: one mode of givenness "implies" another, and it is the consciousness of such "intentional implications" that allows my experience to be an experience of *this* object, an objective identity of a certain sort.

For instance, reflective description of my perception of the file cabinet in my study does not reveal a series of sense data that are formed by a rule imposed by the mind. The rule that establishes its reality is inherent in the perception itself. To see a cabinet from here is to see its visible front side as entailing a back side that is not now seen but would become visible in certain quite specific ways were I to change my location. To say that perception of the front "entails" a back side means that the link between modes of givenness is norm-governed: were I to move to get a better look at the back and discover that there was none (as in a hologram, for example), I would experience the collapse of my intentional object, the invalidity of its claim to be a cabinet. Were experience not governed in this normative way, subsequent experience could never lead me to revise my previous experience; it would simply replace it. The intentional object, then – the noema, the object as it is experienced – is a normatively structured unity of meaning.

Yet the claim that things in the world are unities of meaning is hardly an obvious one. If one understands it as a first-order claim, it will seem to entail either a subjective or a metaphysical idealism. It is, however, a transcendental claim; that is, it "belongs only to the critique of knowledge" and "does not concern the relation of that knowledge to its objects" (Kant 1968, p. 96 [A57/B81]). Phenomenology establishes this point – the transcendental discontinuity thesis – by means of the phenomenological reduction or *epoché*, the significance of which can be appreciated by returning to Husserl's description of the natural attitude.

Everyday life is characterized by a kind of global realism, a belief in the factual existence of what I encounter. Husserl calls this the "general positing" of the natural attitude. As we noted above, this involves a validity claim distinct from the norms that determine one's experience as

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[14]   A fuller discussion of the debates surrounding the noema is found in Chapter 5 below.

being an experience of this *sort* of thing. Thus I can focus on the thing's ways of being given while "bracketing" the existential validity claim. For instance, I need take no stand on whether my belief in the reality of the file cabinet I perceive will be borne out; that is, I can suspend my "positing" of the cabinet as existing, take no stand with regard to its claim to be. And if I can do so in the case of this or that entity, I can do so universally: "We put out of action the general positing which belongs to the essence of the natural attitude; in one stroke, we parenthesize everything that it encompasses with respect to being." In doing so, Husserl continues, "I do not negate this 'world' as though I were a sophist; I do not doubt its existence as though I were a skeptic; rather I exercise an *epoché* in the genuine 'phenomenological' sense." In the first edition Husserl remarks that the *epoché* thus "completely shuts me off from any judgment about spatio-temporal factual being" (Hua 3, p. 67/61). The *epoché* does not deny the being of the world; rather, it is a way of allowing the meaning of that being, its as-structure, to become thematic.

With respect to the phenomenological critique of representationalism, the most important point about the *epoché* is that it sharply distinguishes phenomenology from all naturalistic (or metaphysical) explanations of meaning. Because I take no stand with regard to factual being, I cannot make any judgments that presuppose such being. Hence I must "exclude all sciences relating to this natural world, … make absolutely no use of what they take to be valid. I adopt not a single one of the propositions belonging to them, however evident" (Hua 3, p. 68/61). For this reason, phenomenology can make no use of the concept of representation, that is, a mental entity that is posited by psychology to explain why things show up in the world as meaningful. Descriptively, there is no mental entity that mediates between the act (mind) and its object (world), and since the *epoché* precludes causal explanation, phenomenology has no reason to posit one. Nor is there any reason to posit a *Ding-an-sich*. The intentional object is not something subjective; intentional content is not a function of how we represent the world but of how the object presents itself. To characterize objects transcendentally as unities of meaning, then, is to connect with what the earlier metaphysical tradition called "being in the sense of truth" (*on hos alethes*; *ens tanquam verum*): meaning *is* the object, what the thing is "in truth."[15]

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[15] The argument for the centrality of this notion in transcendental philosophy, and especially phenomenology, is found in Crowell 2001, part I.

The phenomenological reduction thus involves a rejection of what John McDowell calls the "sideways on" view of our experience (1996, pp. 34–36). There are various ways in which an object is there for me in experience, but these ways are not mental representations of the sort about which one might ask whether they could *ever* be veridical. The only justificatory questions that the *epoché* leaves open are those first-order questions that arise within ordinary experience: are the intentional implications that normatively structure the experience of some object fulfilled or disconfirmed by further experiences of the sort demanded by precisely that kind of object? Is my perception of a snake in the corner confirmed by what I see or hear when I move closer, or did I not see a snake, but a rope? These, obviously, are not questions for philosophy to decide; the philosophical task – one that the phenomenological reduction makes possible – is to elucidate the normative structure of meaning, or intentional content, that is presupposed when such justificatory questions are negotiated in experience itself.

Here neo-Kantians like Klaus Hartmann and Heinrich Rickert object that phenomenology, so described, has abandoned the very question that transcendental philosophy was supposed to answer.[16] If phenomenology does nothing more than describe the interplay among intentional contents within first-person experience, then it is in no position to answer the *questio juris*, that is, to explain how we move from reflectively describing truth-*claims* to establishing that and how such claims can deliver *truth*.

It should be admitted that such critics have a point. Phenomenology provides no principle for deducing that some particular experience (or kind of experience) is veridical. Phenomenology does not aim to answer the skeptic, however, but to undercut the motives for skepticism through "presuppositionless" description of the entailments that make up the *logos* of experience itself.[17] For instance, only if one's description of the normative structure of experiential confirmation and disconfirmation is burdened with metaphysical or naturalistic assumptions about subject and object will skeptical arguments based on the idea of the mind as a *forum internum*, or on global extension of the argument from illusion, seem compelling. In phenomenological perspective, failure to recognize this point vitiates the neo-Kantian attempt to answer the *questio juris* with a theory of categories that suppresses any "psychologistic" reflections on

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[16] See Rickert 1922 and 1909.
[17] On phenomenology's stance toward skepticism, see Mohanty 1985, pp. 57–66.

subjectivity.[18] To see why reflection on subjectivity is necessary, we must turn to the noetic side of intentionality and examine Husserl's claim that unities of meaning require a "pure, meaning-bestowing consciousness."

4 Subjectivity: phenomenology between logic and psychologism

We may approach this issue by taking a closer look at a "pure" category theory that, like phenomenology, breaks with Kant's representationalism and thematizes meaning as a transcendental concept, but, unlike phenomenology, sees no need for reflection on intentional acts. Emil Lask, a student of Heinrich Rickert's, arrives at Husserl's concept of meaning (being in the sense of truth), but by a different route. Lask does not start with intentionality, the way objects are given in experience, but with a problem internal to Kant's transcendental logic, namely, the ontological status of categories. On the psychological reading, which Lask rejects, categories are understood as real mental processes, "forms" that subjectively "synthesize" the data of intuition. Such a view cannot explain how categories have cognitive import. But what status do categories have on the logical reading? "The logical is precisely the logical and neither metaphysical nor psychological. But what sort of thing is it then?"[19] According to Lask, Kant never answers this question. Logical categories remain "homeless" in his version of the "two-world" system, since they are neither functions of the mind in the psychological sense nor of things in themselves in the metaphysical sense (2003b, pp. 12/14, 110/131). For this reason Kant fails the self-referentiality test: "In Kant's theory of categories there is no place for the categorial forms of his own speculation, and thus the critic of theoretical reason denies the logical conditions of his own critique of reason" (2003b, p. 216/263).

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[18] Against the neo-Kantian emphasis on the *questio juris* Heidegger writes: "If we were to remain within the Kantian terminology, then we would have to say that precisely *not* a *questio juris* but a *questio facti* lies at the center of the problem of the transcendental deduction" – namely, the question of the transcendental constitution of the subject. Heidegger continues: "Kant speaks of two sides of the transcendental deduction, a subjective one and an objective one." But "he fails to see that by radically carrying out the subjective side of the task of deduction, the objective task is taken care of" (GA 25, p. 330/224).

[19] Lask 2003b, p. 24. This reprint edition of Lask's collected works provides, in square brackets in the text, the pagination of the original edition (Lask 1923). Henceforth references will be given with the page number of the 2003 edition first, followed by that of the 1923 edition. All translations from Lask are my own.

To address this lacuna, Lask highlights the *normative* character of categories, which provides the basis for a genuinely transcendental two-world theory. In transcendental logic, the "totality of the thinkable" is not divided into two realms of entities – mind and world – but into the realm of entities as such (physical, psychical, metaphysical, etc.) and the world of logical forms that constitute their "clarity" or "intelligibility" (2003b, p. 64/75). Following Hermann Lotze, Lask distinguishes between "what is and what is valid, the domain of being and the domain of validity, ontic constructs and valid constructs, between the sphere of reality and the sphere of value, between that which *is* there and *occurs*, and that which *holds* without having to be" (2003b, p. 5/5).

To say that categories are "validities" (*Geltendes*) is to say that they hold. To hold of something is to be true of it; categorial form is the "truth content" (*Wahrheitsgehalt*) of the object. Thus Lask arrives at a transcendental conception of the object similar to Husserl's: an object is constituted by categorial form and that of which it holds; that is, it is a unity of meaning: "*Meaning* [*Sinn*] shall denote the unity, the combination of form and material, the whole which consists of the in itself empty and dependent form together with its fulfilling content. The realm of objects … is a realm of 'meaning'" (2003b, p. 30/34).

On such a view, the entities that in pre-Kantian philosophy make up the totality of what is are merely the *material* for objects in the transcendental sense. For instance, "being the cause of the water's boiling" is not a property (even a relational one) of the flame on my stove. Rather, both the boiling water and the flame are the material of which the category "causality" holds. To hold is to render intelligible, to "illuminate" how it stands with things. As validities, categories have no independent existence; they are nothing but certain ways of being of the material, certain "involvements" (*Bewandtnisse*): terms for logical categories such as "objectivity, being, … reality, existence," refer to the "particular objective involvement" characteristic of some specific range of material (2003b, p. 59/69). By means of such objective involvements the material already stands in the normative space of reasons, categorial space, before I make any judgment about it.

Lask's definition of the object as meaning makes no reference to subjective syntheses or experiences. Nevertheless, the object is not a thing-in-itself, something that transcends all possible experience. It is *erlebt* before it is *erkannt*; experience is an "immediate living in truth" (2003b, p. 160/192). In everyday life we are focused on the object material while the object in the strict sense, meaning, is merely lived *through*. In both everyday and scientific inquiry we make the involvements of the

material explicit – for instance, we discover causal connections or determine the real properties of things – but it is only in transcendental philosophy that the object is grasped explicitly as meaning. Thus Lask, like Husserl, expands the scope of transcendental philosophy to include the satisfaction conditions, or categories, that constitute the intelligibility of pre-theoretical experience: "the most basic logical problems disclose themselves only to a researcher who also incorporates 'pre-scientific' cognition into the domain of his investigation" (2003b, p. 154/186). But this opens Lask's supposedly pure category-theory (transcendental *logic*) to the problem of intentionality, thereby revealing its implicit dogmatism. For there simply *is* no approach to pre-scientific cognition – to the normative structure of what passes below the radar of explicit scientific judgments – without a reflective description of the various experiences themselves. For Lask, the "genuinely transcendent" object "untouched by all subjectivity" is the sole concern of transcendental logic. But without reflection on intentionality one can only *posit* some set of categories that one imagines, for whatever reason, to hold of pre-scientific cognition. To talk of objects as constituted by logical form is empty without an account of how their truth content, their objective involvement, shows itself in experience. Transcendental logic must finally be grounded in transcendental phenomenology.[20]

Husserl and Heidegger offer detailed and complementary accounts of such pre-theoretical involvements. As we saw, the object can be understood phenomenologically as an open set of intentional implications, anticipations of further experiences governed by norms of confirmation or disconfirmation (truth). But these implications are discernable only if one specifies the acts (in Husserl's terms, the "noeses") of which they are the correlates. For instance, the front side of my cabinet does not of itself entail a back side: there *is* no front or back of the cabinet without reference to some act of perception. It is this act that determines the precise sort of confirmation or disconfirmation at issue in the constitution of an object.[21] A perception is confirmed or disconfirmed by the further perceptions of the same thing that are entailed in it, but a memory is confirmed by the evidence of the past perception it entails, not by another memory. For philosophers like Lask and Klaus Hartmann, reflection on acts yields a

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[20] Lask's position anticipates that of John McDowell in many respects. See Crowell 2010.

[21] Mark Sacks emphasizes this point in his account of how transcendental arguments function by moving from the conceptual claim involved in a judgment to the "situated thought" that is presupposed in making it and that provides "the a priori ground for its being true" (2005, pp. 434–60, esp. 443–44). See also Sacks 2000.

mixed transcendental theory that is compromised by empirical or psychological elements. But phenomenological act-analysis is not psychological; rather, it thematizes the *norm-governed* (Husserl calls them the "teleological") relations that hold among acts: phenomena are "ordered in an overall connection, in a 'monadic' unity of consciousness, a unity that in itself has nothing at all to do with nature, with space and time or substantiality and causality, but has its thoroughly peculiar 'forms'" (Hua 25, p. 30/108). It is only from such a perspective that the involvements of the noema come explicitly to light.

One of the categorial involvements of my cabinet, for instance, is its being a thing-with-properties, of which I show myself aware when I move around it to get a better look. To be aware, in this sense, is neither to register data as film registers light nor to make a judgment about a state of affairs. Rather, on Husserl's account, it consists of a synthesis of noetic moments that are founded (*fundiert*) on one another – that is, exhibit asymmetrical entailment relations. Perception presents the cabinet as there all at once (not given in phases that succeed one another, as notes in a melody) and as having certain properties. Nevertheless, this "simple" givenness involves a norm-governed synthesis of perceptual acts upon which it is founded. To see the cabinet as black, for instance, means that my perception is beholden to a norm of "appearing better," that it anticipates a view in which the "true" black presents itself and of which its actual appearance now – not so much black, but "as black would look under the currently bad lighting in my office" – is a proper adumbration. The blackness of the cabinet *must* look silverish in this current act of perception, and it *must* change in a very specific way if I move to a different part of the room, or if the lighting changes. To perceive the noematic involvement captured by the category "objective property" is possible in no other way. Without referring to the rule-governed relation between noeses (the various acts of perception in which the same black color is given), the cabinet's color would appear to change with each new view, and nothing like an objective property could be experienced.[22]

Relations of noetic founding are also constitutive of pre-theoretical involvements such as the cabinet's utility, of which I show myself aware when I pick up the files in order to clear my desk. Seeing the messy desk founds an affect of disgust (i.e., I am disgusted *with* the messy desk), and these together found an act of desire – for a clean desk, for a place where the files will be safe from spilled coffee. On this basis that thing next to

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[22] See Drummond 1979–80.

the desk, the cabinet, is disclosed as potentially satisfying those desires. Such desire may in turn found an act of willing, thanks to which an item on the front of the cabinet is disclosed as a handle to be seized and pulled. These acts are not carried out successively. None is an explicit judgment, and the relations between them are not logical (there is no purely logical connection between, say, perceiving and desiring). Yet their synthesis in my awareness of the cabinet's utility is not a matter of simple association or causality. They are bound by a phenomenologically irreducible kind of entailment.[23] "Pure" or transcendental consciousness – consciousness as thematized under the reduction – can thus be called "meaning-*bestowing*" not because it imposes form on formless material, or because the properties of things are ontologically relative to my acts, but because specific involvements of the noema can show themselves only on the basis of founded relations between noeses.

If one looks more closely at the nature of these relations, however, it becomes questionable whether transcendental subjectivity should be identified with consciousness. Certainly, consciousness is a necessary condition for intentionality. But talk of "acts" and "syntheses" becomes strained when called upon to account for intentional content in the widest sense. In his critique of Husserl, Heidegger argues that acts of pure consciousness are abstractions; their "thoroughly peculiar 'forms'," or normative structure, cannot be understood apart from the practical contexts in which the subject, as embodied agent, is engaged.[24] Thus, in his own reflection on the involvements that constitute the object as what it is Heidegger avoids the term "consciousness" and defines the transcendental subject as "care" (*Sorge*).[25] This is no mere terminological difference.

For Heidegger, categorial involvements cannot be understood in isolation but only as part of a "totality of involvements" (*Bewandtnisganzheit*) that takes the form of a complex of "in-order-to" relations (GA 2, pp. 111–15/83–86/114–17). The noetic correlate of this totality is not an individual act such as perception or desire but a kind of practical comportment. My

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[23] A more detailed discussion of Husserl's account of practical intentionality is found in Chapter 12 below.

[24] Thus, after a lengthy and quite appreciative interpretation of Husserl's analysis of intentional acts, Heidegger insists that this still does not get at the "entity which is intentional" (GA 20, p. 152/110). Husserl understood this point as well: transcendental subjectivity is embodied, intersubjective, temporal/historical, and practical. See Zahavi 2003. However, as I shall argue more fully in Part II of this volume, Husserl never fully reconciled his concept of "absolute" consciousness with this more full-blooded notion of subjectivity.

[25] For an excellent discussion of this move from the perspective of the transcendental tradition, see Gethmann 1974.

cabinet presents itself as in-order-to hold files; that is, it is encountered in light of a norm of what is appropriate, of what a cabinet is supposed to be, a condition that it can succeed or fail in satisfying. But this sort of condition can belong to no act of perception, desire, or will – nor to any combination of them – if by "act" one means, as Husserl did, something like a mental process or propositional attitude. A norm of what is appropriate can be present in consciousness only because it is first there in the exercise of certain abilities, skills, and instituted practices. Grasping the handle in order to open the cabinet involves an act of will, but it is my ability to grasp the handle that distinguishes such willing from mere wishing. The normative moment that constitutes the cabinet as useful for clearing my desk does not arise from my desire to clear my desk; rather, the meaning of that desire points back to the proprieties belonging to the skill I exercise in writing, consulting notes, etc., in light of which the crowd of things on the desk is a hindrance. These skills, in turn, are determined *as* skills within specific practices – such as office work and data preservation – situated within institutions governing the symbolic and legal status of certain scraps of paper, deadlines, and so on. Even perceptual content cannot be clarified solely with reference to acts of perception. When I perceive the cabinet, an unseen back side is entailed only because there is a conditional reference to my ability to walk around the thing, or to keep my eye on it while it moves. Such content also refers to communicative practices, since I could not experience the unseen back side as there *now* without reference to what others could report seeing from behind the cabinet while I remained in front. Heidegger's phenomenology thus suggests how "practical intentionality" provides the conditions of possibility for "act intentionality," for meaning conceived as mental content.

Yet there must be more to the story. If practical intentionality – the skillful ability to accomplish certain tasks or to act in accord with the norms of a practice – were sufficient for meaning, a robot or other machine would be capable of encountering something *as* something.[26] According to Heidegger, the possession of intentional content requires a further condition: I must be able to understand *myself* as *being* up to something at which I might succeed or fail. Thus Heidegger, no less than Husserl,

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[26] There is, of course, much debate over whether machines (thermostats, computers) or non-human animals (wasps, tigers, dogs) can be said to have intentional content, experience something as something. We cannot enter into this literature here, but my own understanding of what further condition must be fulfilled is sketched in the following section and developed more fully in Part III of this volume.

acknowledges the phenomenological importance of subjectivity, the first-person perspective, as a transcendental condition on meaning. But we would move in a circle were we to hold that such self-consciousness or self-understanding is a matter of thinking about myself in a certain way or making myself into an object of reflection. To understand myself as up to something at which I can succeed or fail must instead belong to my very being. Here, finally, we come to the point where the phenomenological account of intentionality, ontic transcendence, calls for completion in an account of "primal transcendence."

5 Existence as primal transcendence: responsiveness to the normative

A thing can be experienced as something only if it is taken to count as such a thing; that is, only if it is experienced in light of some (often not fully explicit) norm of what such a thing is supposed to be. Without this normative moment things would lack "being" (*Sein*) in Heidegger's sense; that is, intelligibility, meaning. Lask and Husserl understood this as the validity claim in all intentional content, an aspect of intentionality which, on pain of infinite regress, can be identified neither with a mental entity nor with a real part of the object. For this reason, first-order inquiry into an entity will never reveal that entity's "being." As Heidegger put it, "one cannot pack transcendence into an intuition, whether aesthetic or theoretical" (GA 26, p. 235/183). We have suggested that Heidegger traces the normative or validity character of our conscious experience back to an existential context of abilities, skills, and practices. Nevertheless, Heidegger also insists that being, meaning, cannot be phenomenologically clarified merely by substituting a "practical" subject for the "theoretical" subject of traditional transcendental philosophy. It may be that one cannot pack transcendence into an intuition, but "even less can it be packed into a practical comportment, be it in an instrumental-utilitarian sense or any other … Transcendence precedes every possible mode of comportment in general, prior to *noesis*, but also prior to *orexis*" (GA 26, p. 236/183).[27] What makes our practical engagement transcendentally

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[27] Here Heidegger underscores that even when, in modernity, "theoretical comportment was apparently supplanted by the practical (primacy of practical reason) … the ancient approach remained directive" – because "the genuine phenomenon of transcendence" was still "localized in a particular sort of comportment" (GA 26, p. 236/184). Hence Heidegger's turn toward existential phenomenology is not equivalent to the "pragmatic" turn in transcendental philosophy advocated, for example, by Karl-Otto Apel.

constitutive of meaning is not simply the fact that it is efficacious or goal-directed. The instrumental rationality inherent in practices can provide the norms that condition intentional content only because it, in turn, is supported by "primal transcendence" as the "ground for … every kind of ontic reason-for" (GA 26, p. 246/191). What I encounter in the world can be held up to norms or standards only because in my very being I must hold myself to standards, that is, understand myself as being something that can succeed or fail. This primal transcendence – responsiveness to the normative *as* normative – is the ultimate ground of all transcendental conditions of possibility, or as Heidegger says, "the origin of 'possibility' as such" (GA 26, p. 244/189).

Here we shall develop this point briefly and flesh it out in subsequent chapters. Practical engagement can yield intentional content only if the normative conditions that make it the specific practice it is can be experienced as such conditions, that is, only if I can respond to them *as norms*, act not just in accord with them but in light of them. The in-order-to involvements of things depend for their disclosure on the norms inherent in abilities, skills, and practices. But a normative moment inhabits abilities, skills, and practices only because they belong to a being who can acknowledge them *as* such conditions. Failing that, abilities, skills, and practices are underdetermined, that is, they cannot be understood as processes governed by norms unless one tacitly trades on how they would be experienced by such a being. In Heideggerian terms, they are what they are only within a "project" (*Entwurf*), an understanding of my *own* being as subject to normative evaluation.

Following Aristotle, Heidegger terms this further condition the "for-the-sake-of-which" (*Worumwillen*) and identifies it with Dasein's "understanding of [its own] being." The instrumentally structured "totality of involvements itself goes back ultimately to a 'towards-which' in which there is *no* further involvement" – that is, to something that is not defined by the instrumental nexus. But "the primary 'towards-which' is the 'for-the-sake-of-which,'" and "the 'for-the-sake-of' always pertains to the being of *Dasein*, in whose being that very being is for it essentially an *issue*" (GA 2, p. 113/84/116). For instance, the practices of being a writer (the long hours at the computer, the wrangling with publishers, etc.) have salience for me – their demands take on normative force – only because I am trying to be a writer. To try is not merely to act in accord with norms (mechanically, as it were) but to be responsive to the normative, to the possibility of living up to the demands of what it is to be a writer or failing to do so. A monkey could perhaps try to write, but it could not try to *be* a

writer; could not, in Heidegger's terms, understand itself as a writer, act in light of writerly norms.

In the phenomenon of the for-the-sake-of (primal transcendence), we find Heidegger's transformation of the transcendental subject, the ground of meaning or "world" in Heidegger's sense: "the basic characteristic of world whereby wholeness" – here Heidegger means the belonging-together (*koinonia*) of things in their "involvements" – "attains its specifically transcendental form of organization is the for-the-sake-of-which" (GA 26, p. 238/185). A particular project – understanding myself as a writer – can establish a particular totality of involvements in which things can show up as pens, paper, and the like, only because I am such that in my being that very being is an issue for me, is at stake for me; only because I *care* about what I am to be. As John Haugeland (1998a) argues, the instrumental normativity of the in-order-to relations in light of which things are disclosed as suitable or useful can function as disclosive only so far as I am beholden to the "constitutive rules" of a certain practice. If I don't care how file clerks are supposed to do things – if I do not try to act in light of the constitutive rules of clerkish practice – I cannot tell whether the various involvements of "this thing here" make it a file cabinet; I can get no grip on what it is supposed to be, and so on the appropriateness or inappropriateness of its various aspects and properties. Being beholden to the rules of a practice is not a passive feature of my being, as though I were programmed to function in accord with them. Rather, it is to *commit* myself to *being* something. And committing oneself, trying, cannot be considered an act of consciousness. As Heidegger writes: "In the projection of the for-the-sake-of as such, Dasein gives itself the primordial *commitment* [*Bindung*]. Freedom makes Dasein obligated [*verbindlich*] to itself in the ground of its essence, or more exactly, gives itself the possibility of commitment" (GA 26, p. 247/192). Transcendental subjectivity, "the entity which is intentional," is not consciousness but commitment.

Here, however, we must note a further crucial distinction, one indicated in Heidegger's remark that freedom is that through which Dasein gives itself the *possibility* of commitment. For commitment is always commitment to the norms of some particular way to be (to the norms of its constitutive practices), be it that of a writer, teacher, father, or whatever. But in order for me to be able to commit to particular norms I must already have understood myself in a normative light, grasped my existence in terms of the very possibility of distinguishing between better and worse, success and failure. Primal transcendence in this "ontological" sense – transcendental subjectivity – is constituted by responsiveness to

the normative *simpliciter*. Heidegger tries to suggest what this means by linking primal transcendence to Plato's idea of the Good, that is, "that on account of which something is or is not, is in this way or that." The "*idea tou agathou*," he writes, "which is even beyond beings and the realm of ideas, is the for-the-sake-of-which" (GA 26, p. 237/184). To give oneself the *possibility* of commitment, then, is to understand oneself in normative terms, that is, in light of "what is best." I can commit myself to being a writer, on this view, only because in being a self at all I have already obligated myself to respond to the normative, to measure as such, and so can be responsible for the measures of this practice or that. And it is only because I am responsible in this way – bind myself to particular norms – that other entities come to be held up to normative standards and are thus disclosed *as* something.

Thus phenomenology – all phenomenology – is transcendental to the extent that it provides an account of intentionality. This involves three stages. First, it recognizes the ubiquity of meaning and the priority of the question of meaning over metaphysical, scientific, or epistemic approaches; that is, it grasps the intentional object as "being in the sense of truth." Second, it recognizes that meaning is not a conceptually or inferentially structured "logical space" that can only be rationally reconstructed; rather, it is the element of embodied practices and experience in which concrete "transcendental" subjectivity is at home. Finally, it recognizes that the transcendental subject is neither a theoretical nor a practical one. The "entity which is intentional" must be understood transcendentally not as a unity of apperception, nor as freedom in the sense of a practically rational agent, but as an entity whose being is defined by responsiveness to the normative as such, to the idea of the good. These are, of course, very broad claims. To make them more precise, and to trace out their implications, we must become more familiar with the outlines of Husserlian phenomenology itself, a task to which we now turn

Husserlian phenomenology

1   Phenomenology and twentieth-century thought

Though the term "phenomenology" was in use prior to Edmund Husserl – it is found, for instance, in Kant and Lambert, and, with a very different signification, in Hegel – it is in its Husserlian form that phenomenology came to exert a decisive influence on twentieth-century thought. To understand Husserlian phenomenology it is pointless to go back to the term's previous uses, since Husserl paid no attention to these;[1] instead, his thinking developed in debates over the foundations of arithmetic and logic carried out in the school of the Austrian philosopher Franz Brentano. Nor is Husserlian phenomenology a static entity. Initially a method for tackling certain epistemological problems, phenomenology became, over the four decades of Husserl's mature philosophical life, the basis for a complete "system" that "has within its purview all questions that can be put to man in the concrete, including all so-called metaphysical questions, to the extent that they have any possible meaning at all" (Hua 5, p. 141/Husserl 1989, p. 408). So understood, phenomenology was to be a platform for generations of researchers who would contribute, as in the natural sciences, to a growing stock of philosophical knowledge. In so doing they would shore up the threatened legacy of European civilization – a culture based not on tradition and opinion, but on rational insight into universally valid truths and values.

The fate of Husserlian phenomenology in the twentieth century turned out quite differently, however. Husserl's project did provide the starting point for several generations of philosophers, beginning with contemporaries such as Alexander Pfänder, Adolf Reinach, and Moritz Geiger, and continuing through Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Emmanuel Levinas, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Jacques Derrida, among many others. Yet in each case adoption of the

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[1] See Spiegelberg 1984, pp. 6–19.

phenomenological approach was accompanied by rejection of much of Husserl's actual doctrine. As a result, though phenomenology remains a vital contemporary movement, Husserlian phenomenology is often treated as a mere historical antecedent.

And yet, it is no exaggeration to say that only now is it possible to see just what Husserl's phenomenology actually *is*. The historical reception – in which Husserl's philosophy is dismissed as an arch-essentialist version of Cartesian foundationalism, a radical idealism that flirts with solipsism, a philosophy of "reflection" that cannot do justice to the realities of the body, history, and sociality – is largely a function of Husserl's manner of working and the difficulties he had in bringing his thoughts to print. Husserl's output is divided into the relatively few books he published during his lifetime – which, after the *Logical Investigations* (1900), mostly have the character of introductions to phenomenology's methods and programmatic aspirations – and a vast store of research manuscripts representing the fruit of Husserl's daily writing schedule: applications of phenomenology to specific topics such as perception, temporality, embodiment, social reality, history, culture, and value. Upon Husserl's death in 1937 this entire output was threatened with destruction at the hands of the Nazis, but a Belgian cleric, H. L. van Breda, smuggled it out of Germany and established the Husserl Archive at Leuven. The editing and publishing of this material – including translation into many languages – has now reached a point where a new picture of Husserl has begun to emerge. What on the basis of Husserl's publications might look to be a confusingly discontinuous series of positions – an early realism, a middle-period Cartesian idealism, a late rejection of Cartesianism – can be seen from the *Nachlass* to be the outgrowth of a sustained, and remarkably consistent, internal development. Further, these manuscripts suggest that phenomenology has far more to contribute to contemporary debates – in epistemology, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and social ontology, for instance – than the traditional picture might lead one to suspect. This is not to say that the "new" Husserl is free of paradox, nor that the standard criticisms get no grip on his thought. But it does mean that presenting Husserlian phenomenology now involves something other than assessing it as a mere precursor.

Since the present chapter cannot hope to take the full measure of Husserl's thought, its goal is to examine what is most distinctly phenomenological about it. What, then, is phenomenology? It is not impossible to give a reasonably concise characterization – if not definition – of Husserlian phenomenology through a series of contrasts. First,

phenomenology is a *descriptive* enterprise, not one that proceeds by way of theory construction. Before one can develop a theory of something – say, an account of how perception is caused by the interaction of eye and brain, or how mental representations must be postulated to explain it – it is necessary, according to Husserl, to provide a careful description of what perception itself is, to get clear about the phenomenon that one is trying to explain. Thus, second, phenomenology aims at *clarification*, not explanation. Phenomenological descriptions neither employ nor provide causal laws that explain the existence of things; instead, they mark those distinctions – such as between memory and perception, or between depictions and signs – that allow us to understand what it is to be a thing of this or that sort. This means, third, that phenomenology is an *eidetic* and not a factual inquiry; it is not concerned to describe all the properties of some particular thing but to uncover what belongs to it *essentially* as a thing of that kind. Phenomenology studies some concrete act of perception only as an example for uncovering what belongs necessarily to perception as such – for instance, that it gives its object "in person," or that it apprehends its object against a co-given background or "horizon." Finally, phenomenology is a *reflective* inquiry; it is not concerned directly with entities, as are the natural sciences, but with our experience of entities. It is committed to the view that descriptive clarification of the essential conditions for being X cannot be achieved by abstracting from our experience of X but only by attending to how X is given in that experience. Of the four features just mentioned, this reflective character is most distinctive of phenomenology, and richest in implications. For it challenges entrenched philosophical theories about mind and world and demands that we attend to how "the things themselves," as Husserl put it, show themselves.

Why did phenomenology – this reflective, descriptive, clarification of eidetic features – have such an extraordinary impact on twentieth-century thought? One could point here to its discoveries about consciousness and intentionality, its critique of the epistemological dilemmas of modern philosophy, the resources it provides for a new ontology or theory of categories; and so on. Yet such contributions themselves rest upon a more fundamental achievement, namely, phenomenology's recognition that meaning (*Sinn*) is the proper topic of philosophical inquiry, one that cannot be grasped with traditional categories of mind and world, subject and object. Here phenomenology shares a motive with the language-analytic philosophy that emerged simultaneously with it. Both movements sought to break free of traditional philosophy, and for the same reason: in order to do justice to meaning. In contrast to early analytic philosophy, however,

phenomenology does not see meaning as primarily a linguistic phenomenon. Rather, it comes into its own when Husserl takes the "important cognitive step" of extending terms like meaning and signification "to all acts, be they now combined with expressive acts or not" (Hua 3, p. 304/294). This allows phenomenology to break decisively with mentalism and representationalism and explore meaning as encountered directly in the world of our practical and perceptual life. The present chapter will examine how this focus on meaning leads to Husserl's most distinctive innovations, and to his most controversial claims.

2   Husserl's breakthrough to phenomenology: intentionality and reflection

Husserl was born on April 8, 1859, in Prossnitz, Moravia. His "breakthrough" to phenomenology came some forty years later, in the *Logical Investigations* (1900–1). Husserl's initial studies had been in mathematics, in which he finished a doctoral dissertation in 1882 in Vienna. While in Vienna he attended lectures by Franz Brentano, whose call for an empirical scientific philosophy based on a kind of descriptive psychology had attracted much attention. At its core was the concept of a "mental phenomenon," which Brentano defined by appeal to "what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call … reference to a content, direction toward an object" (Brentano 1995, p. 88). Drawn by questions in the foundation of number theory, Husserl switched his attention to philosophy and began to explore Brentano's notion of intentionality as a way to clarify the concept of number – a topic on which he wrote his second dissertation, in Halle, in 1887.

While teaching as a *Privatdozent* in Halle until his move to Göttingen in 1901, Husserl continued to study what he then thought of as the psychological foundations of arithmetic, though his first book, *Philosophy of Arithmetic* (1891), already breaks with many of the particulars of Brentano's approach. Especially unclear in Brentano was the relation between the "content" that is bound up with mental acts and the "directedness toward an object" that such acts involve. While his contemporary Gottlob Frege held that the content through which such directedness is achieved is the content, or meaning (*Sinn*), of sentences – a concept or "thought" that has nothing to do with the mental – Husserl wondered how sentences come to have meaning at all. For him, it would not be enough to develop a sentential logic. It would be necessary to show how the intensionality

of terms depends on the inten*t*ionality of consciousness, since no content or meaning is intelligible without reference to the subject who thinks, judges, and perceives. Husserl's breakthrough to phenomenology began the slow – and, as I shall argue in Part II, not fully successful – process of disengaging this appeal to subjectivity from the psychological trappings of its Brentanian origins.

i   *The problem of psychologism*

The birth of phenomenology in the *Logical Investigations* has always had something paradoxical about it. For there Husserl introduces phenomenology as "descriptive psychology," arguing that it is the only way to approach foundational problems in philosophy of logic; yet he does so only after devoting 200 pages to a critique of "psychologism," the view that logic must be founded upon psychology. To get a sense for the dilemma that would exercise Husserl throughout his career, let us take a closer look at this paradoxical breakthrough.

Logical psychologism is a cluster of positions, all of which claim that because the laws of logic are laws of thinking they must ultimately derive from psychological facts and the evolution of human thought processes. Husserl objected to what he saw as the skeptical and relativistic consequences of such a view. Psychologism yields relativism since logical validity is taken to depend on the contingent psychic make-up of the human being, such that a different make-up would produce different laws. And it yields skepticism since, by denying logic unconditional validity, it renders every truth-claim undecidable. Husserl seizes on this last point to demonstrate the self-refuting character of psychologism. As a theory – that is, a set of propositions whose explanatory power comes from the material and logical laws that organize it – psychologism asserts, as true, propositions concerning logic that, if they *were* true, would undermine the epistemic authority of the theory itself (Hua 18, pp. 118ff./I 135ff.). Husserl's rejection of psychologism appears uncompromising: logical laws have ideal validity; they are normative for human thinking because they are necessary conditions for truth as such. Husserl thus places two constraints on any account of logical validity: first, it must preserve the link between logic and the norm of truth; and second, it must be "presuppositionless" in the sense of refusing (on pain of circularity or outright skepticism) to derive logical validity from any contingent fact.

This latter requirement actually rules out any explanation of logical validity at all, if by "explanation" is meant a theory that accounts for

such validity without presupposing it. Husserl acknowledges this point when he claims that "theory of knowledge, properly described, is no theory." That is, its "aim is not to *explain* knowledge in the psychological or psychophysical sense as a *factual* occurrence in objective nature, but to *shed light* on the *Idea* of knowledge in its constitutive elements and laws" (Hua 19/1, pp. 26, 27/I 264, 265). As a descriptive method, phenomenology is appropriate for theory of knowledge in this sense. But, surprisingly, Husserl calls it descriptive *psychology* (Hua 19/1, p. 29/I 262). How did he imagine that it could avoid his own anti-psychologistic arguments?

The answer here – to the extent that the *Logical Investigations* provides one – lies in the fact that Husserl examines cognitive acts (thinking, judging, perceiving, etc.) not as mental items but as possible truth-bearers, that is, in light of the norm of truth. On this view, intentionality is not simply the static presence of a "presentation" in a mental experience (*Erlebnis*) but a normatively oriented *claim to validity*. This claim need not take the form of an explicit judgment, but in every case of a consciousness-of-something it is there.

To say that a mental experience is intentional is to say that it is "of" something, that it refers to something. But such reference cannot be a simple relation between two things – an act and its object – since there are "objectless presentations," such as hallucinations, which possess intentional directedness without an existing object. This led Husserl to recognize that the content of an intentional act is complex, involving both a putative intended object as well as an "intentional object" or manner in which the intended object is given. To avoid infinite regress, the intentional object cannot be another object toward which the act is directed; it must be an aspect of the act itself. Husserl's breakthrough is to see that this aspect is a normative or quasi-inferential structure, not a "psychic" one. The intentional object involves something like satisfaction conditions that must hold of the intended object *if* the claim inherent in the act is veridical. Thus, to say that I currently perceive "a coffee cup" is to say that what I currently experience (these white gleaming surfaces, etc.) is taken as partially satisfying a rule inhabiting my act as its meaning, determining that it is "of" this rather than that. In the *Logical Investigations* Husserl had not yet freed himself from psychological assumptions. For instance, he initially held that this meaning arises when sensory input is formed by an interpretive mental act (*Auffassung*). Yet even here the essential point is attained: relations between acts cannot be understood in causal terms but are functions of meaning. The

two most important of these relations are "founding" (*Fundierung*) and "fulfillment" (*Erfüllung*). Together, they yield the distinctive phenomenological epistemology of *Evidenz*.

ii *Founding, fulfillment, and* Evidenz

In turning to these relations, one should recall that phenomenology is not concerned with particular intentional experiences except as examples of their kind. It aims at the essence of acts and the essential relations between them; it is an eidetic science, not a factual one. In the *Logical Investigations* Husserl defends a strongly anti-empiricist theory of universals, and throughout his career he practiced an "eidetic reduction" in which the factual is probed for its essential constitution by varying a particular example in imagination until the limits of its variability are grasped. There is nothing particularly phenomenological about this reduction, however. It is practiced in eidetic sciences such as geometry and is at work in the conceptual analyst's pursuit of necessary and sufficient conditions. What *is* distinctly phenomenological is the connection Husserl establishes between this method and what he calls "intuition" (*Anschauung*), to which we shall return.

In his analysis of the logic of wholes and parts, Husserl defines the relation of *Fundierung*: when "an A cannot as such exist except in a more comprehensive unity which associates it with an M" then A is "founded" in M (Hua 19/1, p. 267/II 463). Intentional acts exhibit such relations among themselves. For instance, memory is founded upon perception, since the content of a memory (what Husserl calls the "matter" of that act) cannot exist without reference to a prior act of perception. When I remember the cup of coffee I had yesterday the content of this memory is not simply the cup, conceived as an item in the world, but the cup that I drank from, admired, in short, *perceived*. "Having perceived" belongs necessarily to the memory's "intentional content" even when I turn out to be wrong, for that is what distinguishes the memorial act from an act of imagination. The crucial point here is that *Fundierung* is not a real relation – causal, mechanical, psycho-associative – but a meaningful one: neither strictly logical nor inferential (since there is no logical connection between the acts of perception and memory), it is what Husserl calls an "*intentional* implication." Thus it is also not a genetic relation in the causal sense. Husserl will eventually come to recognize a genetic dimension to relations of founding, but the laws of such genesis concern "compossibility" (Hua 1, p. 108/74), not causal sequence.

An important example of a founded act is judgment or assertion, an instance of what Husserl calls a "categorial" act. The sense (or act matter) of the assertion, "my coffee is cold and milky," points back to acts of perception in which cold milky coffee is directly perceived. In an assertion categorial forms (such as part/whole) that "are not genuinely present in the unarticulated percept" but are there as "ideal possibilities" get "articulated" explicitly, thereby constituting a new, founded object, a "state of affairs" (Hua 19/2, pp. 681f./II 792f.). In our example, the categorial forms "is" and "and" bring out ideal possibilities contained in the content of my perception (not the object of perception as a thing in the world but as the intentional content of *this* act of perception); they thus necessarily point back to some intuited founding content. But what can that content be? In the *Logical Investigations* Husserl seems to hold that categorial forms are not "genuinely present in the unarticulated percept," but he later expresses dissatisfaction with his doctrine of categorial intuition, in part because perception's meaningful content seems neither to be that of an unarticulated whole nor something founded upon conceptual or categorial acts. The issue of how to understand such content thus became a spur to the development of phenomenology.

The relation of founding between perception and judgment also illustrates a second, perhaps even more important, phenomenological relation among intentional acts – that of "fulfillment" (*Erfüllung*). For it is not just that the judgment refers back to some perceptual content; rather, it is fulfilled by it. Articulation of the perceptual content is the *telos* of the judgment, the measure of its success or failure. To express this relation Husserl introduces the distinction between "empty" or "merely signitive" acts and "fulfilling" or "intuitive" acts (Hua 19/2, p. 607/II 728). When, in the absence of the corresponding perception, I assert that my coffee is cold and milky, the content of my assertion is presented in an empty or merely signitive way. But if I make the same assertion after raising the cup to my lips, the content is intuitively given and I can experience how this intuition fulfills the sense of the assertion: the very same coffee that is the object of my judgment, and in *just the way* that it is judged by me, is presented "in person," intuitively, by the perception, and I experience this "coincidence" (*Deckungs-synthesis*) of the matter of the two acts. Again, this is not a causal relation between acts, or their objects, but one that pertains to the meaning through which the objects are given in the acts.

Though Husserl introduces the notion of empty intentions and their intuitive fulfillments on the example of judgments, the distinction cuts across the whole field of intentionality. Perception, for instance, is itself a

combination of intuitively given and emptily intended moments: in perception my coffee cup is given in person, but the intuitively given aspects are limited to the sides I can see of it. The rest is co-intended, but as "hidden from view" and thus with a certain emptiness. This emptiness is not, however, a sheer blank; rather, the content of the perceptual act prescribes certain possible fulfillings for the back side of the cup (e.g., that it will be the back "of a cup") and rules out others (e.g., that it will be a human face). For Husserl, phenomenology has the task of tracing the essential interconnections of fulfillment among acts, reflecting on the interplay of presence and absence in intentional experience as a whole.

Husserl's initial reason for turning to such relations was epistemological, and perhaps the major achievement of Husserl's early phenomenology is his recasting of the old correspondence view of truth in terms of fulfillment. To speak of correspondence is not to adopt an impossible standpoint from which to judge that some mental content maps the thing-in-itself. Rather, it is to recognize the relations of fulfillment between certain categorial acts (judgments) and their founding perceptual contents. Consciousness of truth (the correctness of the judgment) is consciousness of the synthesis of identification between the judgment's meaning and the intuitive fulfillment provided by an act of perception with the same meaning. This yields a phenomenological reformulation of epistemology: not a theory constructed to answer the skeptic but an elucidation of the meaningful relations of foundation and fulfillment that obtain among cognitive acts.

First, the concept of fulfillment permits a *functional* characterization of intuition. Where traditional empiricism defined intuition in terms of sense-perception, phenomenology defines it as "any fulfilling act whatever," that is, any act in which "something appears as 'actual,' as 'self-given'" (Hua 19/2, p. 671/II 785). Husserl's general term for this intuitive epistemic component is *Evidenz*. This does not mean "evidence" in the sense of a trace from which something is inferred; rather it is the self-presence of the thing itself, its self-givenness according to its own type. Thus in mathematical calculations I can operate "emptily" with symbols. But I can also calculate on the basis of *Evidenz*, that is, on the basis of the intuitive self-presentation of the operations (e.g., addition) and their intentional contents (numbers). Though such things are not given through the senses, the distinction between merely empty calculating and "authentic" or intuitively fulfilled thinking remains.

Second, the phenomenological insistence on the epistemic authority of *Evidenz*, together with the structure of presence and absence that

characterizes even intuitive acts such as perception, suggests an intentional, teleological hierarchy among levels of knowledge. Fulfillment itself is a relative notion. If my judgment that the coffee is cold and milky is fulfilled in a corresponding percept, this percept, in turn, is not fully intuitive; it includes emptily intended moments that are also subject to fulfillment. Should they fail to be fulfilled, then my judgment will also fail to be fulfilled. If it turns out that I am only hallucinating (when I try to taste the coffee there is nothing in the cup), my judgment will be undermined. For Husserl, this means that the fulfilling *Evidenz* for the judgment was neither adequate (i.e., complete) nor apodictic (i.e., yielding necessary truth). Obviously, no perceptual evidence could ever be adequate or apodictic, but Husserl believed that such evidence was obtainable in first-person reflection on the meaningful content of mental life. If philosophy is to be a genuinely presuppositionless and founding science, then it must be based on such first-person *Evidenz*.[2]

But this demand led to a major aporia in Husserl's *Logical Investigations*. For even if reflection on intentional acts yields an apodictic ground for elucidating what knowledge and cognition mean, the relation between this intentional sphere and the "intended object" remains obscure. Husserl argues that "the intentional object of [an act] is the same as its actual object, and … it is absurd to distinguish between them" (Hua 19/1, p. 439/II 595), and this has led some commentators to attribute a kind of direct realism to the *Logical Investigations*.[3] But the "sameness" here is merely that of intentional *sense*: Husserl is asserting that the intentional object is not a second, distinct object or mental representation but a certain way in which "the object (period) which *is* intended" is intended (Hua 19/1, p. 414/II 578). The question of whether "the object (period) which *is* intended" is itself given in the act is not settled thereby. Indeed, Husserl writes that "*intentional* objects of acts, and *only* intentional objects, are the things to which we are at any time attentive" (Hua 19/1, p. 424/II 585) – which suggests that the "object (period) which *is* intended" precisely does not belong to our attending experiences but is only "meant" in them. In general, Husserl's anti-representationalist theory of mind does not add up to direct realism. Instead, he saw the question of "the existence and nature of 'the external world'" as "a *metaphysical* question" toward which phenom-

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[2] The importance of first-person *Evidenz* for phenomenology remains, even if this epistemological argument for it is called into question, as I shall argue in Chapter 4 below.
[3] See, for instance, Sokolowski 1974 and Drummond 1990.

enology, as descriptive clarification of the terrain of intentionality, should remain neutral (Hua 19/1, p. 26/I 264).

Yet Husserl's position was not in fact neutral; rather, as the claim that we attend only to intentional objects makes plain, he had not entirely freed himself from psychologistic assumptions. The sphere of intentional implications appears here as something like a circle of light surrounded by a sea of darkness, a sea of the "object (period) which *is* intended" that eludes the reach of reflective *Evidenz*.[4] Soon after the *Logical Investigations* Husserl came to see that this stance wholly undermined the philosophical potential of phenomenology, and, identifying it with the fallacy of naturalism, he abandoned it in favor of a kind of transcendental, or non-metaphysical idealism.

3   Philosophical implications of phenomenology: transcendental idealism

After publishing the *Logical Investigations* in 1901 Husserl moved from Halle to Göttingen. There he fell into a long personal and philosophical crisis, as reflected in these lines from his diary: "I have been through enough torments from lack of clarity and doubt that wavers back and forth … Only one need consumes me: I must win clarity, else I cannot live; I cannot bear life unless I can believe that I shall achieve it" (Spiegelberg 1984, p. 76). The impasse of the *Logical Investigations* was finally overcome with the theory of the phenomenological reduction, which had been developing since Husserl's lecture courses of 1905–7 but which attained systematic expression only in his 1913 *Ideas*. To understand this most controversial of Husserlian notions correctly, it will be useful to recall two related steps: the rejection of naturalism and the reconceived distinction between transcendence and immanence.

i   *Naturalism and the concept of immanence*

By 1911 Husserl had come to see phenomenology as more than an epistemological clarification of logic and mathematics. It was to be a rigorous philosophical science in which the norms governing every sphere of human experience – the evaluative and practical no less than the cognitive – would be rationally grounded and clarified. The greatest danger to

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[4] The image is from de Boer 1978, who provides a full account of this period in Husserl's development.

such a project, as he argued in "Philosophy as Rigorous Science," is "the naturalizing of consciousness, including all intentionally immanent data of consciousness" and with it "the naturalizing of ideas and consequently of all absolute ideals and norms" (Hua 25, p. 9/80). What Husserl means by "naturalism" is essentially what John McDowell calls "bald naturalism" – the claim that "whatever is belongs to psychophysical nature" understood as a domain of "rigid laws" (Hua 25, p. 9/79) – and his arguments against it are essentially those he earlier leveled against psychologism. Now, however, Husserl clearly sees that the normativity of intentional relations exceeds the naturalistic conception of nature, which excludes all but causal relations. Phenomenological reflection on experience concerns itself with questions that involve normative standards. For instance: "how can experiences be mutually legitimated or corrected by means of each other, and not merely replace each other or intensify each other subjectively" (Hua 25, p. 14/87)? If consciousness is understood naturalistically, such questions cannot be answered; but if one takes the normative dimension of intentionality to define what "consciousness" is, the field of "phenomena" opens up, governed by non-causal, quasi-inferential laws. Consciousness in this sense is a "monadic unity" of meaningful relations between acts and their contents; "in itself [it] has nothing to do with nature, with space and time or substantiality and causality, but has its thoroughly peculiar 'forms'" (Hua 25, p. 30/108). Phenomenology thus becomes the study of how the meaningful world of our experience is constituted on the basis of such forms. And because natural science is itself a tissue of meaning, its own theses (and so those of philosophical naturalism) are *founded* upon the meaningful relations uncovered by phenomenology.

But why isn't this world of phenomena a merely subjective, merely "phenomenal," world? In what sense has Husserl overcome the restriction, found in the *Logical Investigations*, to a kind of mental immanence? Husserl's transcendental turn is designed specifically to overcome such mentalism by bringing the "object (period) which *is* intended" into the space of reasons. The key is found in his theory of *Evidenz* and the new concept of *intentional* immanence it makes possible.

In his lecture course of 1907, later published as *The Idea of Phenomenology*, Husserl distinguishes between two senses of the pair "immanence/ transcendence." The first sense is defined in terms of the metaphysical and naturalistic assumptions common to modern philosophy and science, where the mind is a kind of *forum internum*: "genuine" immanence pertains to what is actually "contained" in a mental act, as an idea is supposed to be contained in the mind according to traditional empiricism (Hua 2,

pp. 34–38/27–29). The "transcendent," in contrast, is what is *not* a part of the act, that is, what lies outside the mind. For Husserl, what is genuinely immanent is given to reflection with adequate evidence and so belongs to the proper field of phenomenology. The intentional object (the act-matter or meaning) is clearly immanent in this sense, but the "object (period) which *is* intended" is most often not. It is transcendent and so beyond the reach of phenomenological inquiry. In order to make the object phenomenologically accessible without denying its transcendence by making it a mental content, Husserl introduces a second sense of "immanence," governed not by a metaphysical assumption about mentality but by the concept of *Evidenz*. Evidential immanence is "absolute and clear givenness, self-givenness in the absolute sense," whereas the transcendent is what is in no way self-given. On this view mental processes remain immanent (because they are adequately given), and physical things remain transcendent in the first sense – not adequately given, not part of the mental. But they are not transcendent in the *second* sense, that is, not "in no way self-given." They are indeed given, though inadequately.

Note that Husserl has not here figured out how consciousness can, after all, get outside the mental to grasp the real things that, according to the *Logical Investigations*, lie beyond its ken. He has shown why all such attempts at bridge building are superfluous. The "object (period) which *is* intended" is *given* to consciousness and can be studied in its modes of givenness. "Noematic" phenomenology thus emerges as the study of the modes of givenness precisely of those things that transcend consciousness.

ii   *The noema*

The concept of the noema, which grows out of Husserl's new evidential understanding of immanence, is one of the most disputed in phenomenology. Controversy begins with Husserl's description of the noema as the "sense" (*Sinn*) that belongs to "every intentive mental process" (Hua 3, p. 218/213). Having in this way extended the notion of sense beyond language to all acts, it is tempting to see the noema in the manner of a Fregean *Sinn*, an abstract entity through which the transcendent object, distinct from the noema, is intended. This reading – developed by Dagfinn Føllesdal (1969) and adopted by Dreyfus (1982), Smith and MacIntyre (1982), and others – fits many of Husserl's texts. On the other hand, Husserl also describes the noema as the transcendent thing itself in its manner of being given. "Perception, for example, has its noema, most

basically its perceptual sense, i.e., the perceived as perceived" (Hua 3, p. 219/214). Because the noema includes perceptual moments – not just "this cup" but "this-cup-as-perceived-from-here-in-this-light" – it is difficult to see it as an abstract entity, and on this basis Robert Sokolowski (1974), followed by the definitive work of John Drummond (1990), disputes the distinction between noema and transcendent object. To maintain it is to preserve the kind of representationalism that transcendental phenomenology was designed to avoid.

The dispute over the noema is integral to the dispute over Husserl's transcendental idealism. We shall not be able to settle the matter here, but each side has its strengths.[5] The Fregean interpretation nicely captures the fact that noematic relations are normative rather than associative or causal, but it insinuates a version of representationalism – seized upon by Dreyfus to accuse Husserl of Cartesianism – clearly in conflict with Husserl's intentions (Hua 3, p. 224/219). The competing view – which holds the noema to be nothing but the transcendent thing viewed from the phenomenological attitude – does justice to Husserl's stated aims, but it struggles to explain how the perceptual elements of the noema can stand in normative, and not merely associative or phenomenalistic, relations. However, this was clearly a problem that Husserl himself faced, for he did not take relations within and among noemata to be simply logical. Instead, he sought the origin of logical relations precisely in the sphere of the perceptual.[6] Perception itself is merely *proto*-logical, its content in some ways non-conceptual, relations between noemata only *quasi*-inferential. To say that the noema of my perceiving a coffee cup adumbrates the hidden back side is not, for Husserl, to say that my concept of a cup demands that there be a back side. Of course it does demand it, but perception – its noematic meaning – has a "logic" of its own.

The idealism in which the noema plays such a significant role was publicly introduced in *Ideas I* (1913), and this text governed the reception of phenomenology throughout the century. Here phenomenology expands from a limited epistemological enterprise to a full transcendental philosophy that explores the conditions for the possibility of all "being and validity." The key to this universal scope lies in the phenomenological reduction, which Husserl introduces as a version of the Cartesian strategy of first-person reflection and methodological doubt. This has led many

[5] I shall return to these issues in more detail in Chapter 5 below.
[6] See, especially, Husserl 1973 and Hua 11. I take up the issue of the normative in perception in Chapter 6 below.

to see Husserl's phenomenology as a kind of Cartesianism, subject to the same limitations as its historical model. The final section of this chapter will address some of these issues, but at present we shall concentrate on notions introduced in *Ideas I* that remain in play throughout Husserl's subsequent thought: the idea of the natural attitude and its suspension; the primacy of transcendental subjectivity; and the doctrine of the constitution (*Konstituierung*) of meaning.

iii   *The natural attitude and the* epoché

By 1913 Husserl had come to see naturalism – the uncritical incorporation into philosophy of premises borrowed from other sciences – as an instance of a much more pervasive naiveté that would undermine the effort to establish a radically self-responsible, presuppositionless philosophy. Husserl calls this the "general thesis" of the "natural attitude" and introduces the reductions – the *epoché* and transcendental-phenomenological reduction – to expose the dimension that the natural attitude conceals: the intentional sphere in which the meaning that is taken for granted in the natural attitude is constituted. In describing the natural attitude Husserl makes an important advance beyond the *Logical Investigations*, for he discovers the phenomenon of "world" as *horizon* – that is, he uncovers a kind of intentionality whose correlate is not a specific intentional object but that context wherein any intentional object can show itself. The concept of horizon will play an increasingly important role in Husserl's phenomenology after *Ideas I*.[7]

Husserl attempts to make the natural attitude descriptively evident by pointing out that our everyday way of going about our business – dealing with things of all sorts, other people, engaged in scientific activities, recreation, and so on – involves various modalities of belief. I simply take for granted that what I am dealing with exists and is, more or less, as it presents itself as being. Furthermore, "other actual objects are there for me as determinate, as more or less familiar … without being themselves perceived or, indeed, present in any mode of intuition" – that is, they belong within a co-intended *horizon* of "indeterminate actuality" (Hua 3, p. 58/51–52). The horizon does not merely accompany the entity upon which I am focused; it in some sense belongs to that entity. I would not be perceiving *this* coil of rope did it not carry with it the "internal" horizon of "indeterminate yet determinable" properties that are hidden

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[7] See Welton 2000.

from view, or rest within the "external" horizon that establishes the rope as a "man-made" thing, a "real" thing (and not a hallucination) and so on. These horizontal implications are not, strictly speaking, conceptual or logical, though they are norm-governed; they are intentional implications that go to constitute the thing as it is experienced. But I, in my concern to find a piece of rope to hang a piñata for my children, am aware of none of this. I simply take the rope's reality for granted.

Now this taken-for-granted belief can become challenged: I go to pick up the rope and it turns out to be a snake. Yet – and here is Husserl's point – all such doubt takes place against a horizon, the world, that remains firm. "'The' world is always there as real" even if "this or that is to be struck *out of it*" as an illusion (Hua 3, p. 63/57). The natural attitude is defined in terms of this unshakeable world-belief, which Husserl calls the "general thesis of the natural attitude." Like the later Wittgenstein, Husserl holds that this world horizon is the background that necessarily stands firm whenever I come to doubt something within it; it itself, then, cannot be doubted. Nevertheless, Husserl holds that world-belief can be *suspended* or "bracketed." Such bracketing – a freely exercised refraining from judgment about the existence of the world (and so of all the beliefs that depend upon it, all natural "positing") – is the *epoché* of the natural attitude, the first step in the phenomenological reduction. My ordinary beliefs remain in force – I do not attempt to doubt them, as Descartes did – but I make no use of them. I no longer take them for granted. The question of the real being of what presents itself is explicitly set aside.

But what is the point of the *epoché*? Though Husserl's motivations are complicated, the phenomenologically decisive one is this: Husserl has his eye on the sphere of intentional correlation between act and object, *noesis* and *noema*, that he had uncovered in the *Logical Investigations*. Under the *epoché* my belief in the world-horizon is put out of play, and with it all the explanatory theories (including psychological theories) that depend on it. This has the effect of neutralizing the tendency, inherent in the natural attitude, to treat the sphere of intentional correlation as itself an entity in the world – perhaps falling under the categories of psychology or anthropology – and to take for granted that its laws will be the sort found in everyday and scientific inquiry. The *epoché*, then, has the essentially negative function of inhibiting the ontological assumptions that keep "the life of the plane" from recognizing its dependence on the meaning-constituting "life of depth" (Hua 6, p. 120/118).

It is worth noting that while Husserl held the *epoché* to be absolutely central to phenomenology, many subsequent phenomenologists found

it either unnecessary or impossible. Heidegger, for instance, held it to be unnecessary: phenomenology was destined to be ontology, and as a "bracketing" of existence "the reduction is in principle inappropriate" for providing a positive account of being (GA 20, p. 150/109). Merleau-Ponty, on the other hand, saw that the *epoché* was to "break with our familiar acceptance" of the world in order to thematize it. But he held that a "complete reduction" was impossible: the attempt to bracket the world only reveals its "unmotivated upsurge" (1962, p. xiv). Both objections seem to question the idea that phenomenology can or should be ontologically neutral, but such objections can be hard to assess. Not only do they often run aspects of "the" reduction together that Husserl kept apart; more importantly, the concepts of "being" and "ontology" at work in the objections are already explicitly phenomenological, as resistant to traditional metaphysics and contemporary naturalism as Husserl himself was. In Chapter 3 we shall see how this complicates the usual understanding of Heidegger's criticisms of Husserl.

iv   Transcendental reduction and constitution

In order to disclose the "life of depth" the essentially negative *epoché* must be supplemented by a transcendental phenomenological reduction in which intentional correlation is made thematic. Husserl characterizes this as a reduction to "pure" consciousness, that is, to intentionality purified of all psychological, all "worldly," interpretations and described simply as it gives itself. What shows up in the natural attitude as simply there for me – the hammer I use, the rope I notice in the corner – now comes into view as a unity of meaning (a pure "phenomenon") that is what it is precisely because of its place in the nexus of intentional acts and experiences in which it comes to givenness. The transcendental reduction thus allows phenomenology to study the intentional constitution of things – that is, the conditions that make possible not the existence of entities in the world (the issue of existence has been bracketed), but their *meaning as* existing, and indeed their being given *as* anything at all.

When Husserl speaks of objects being "constituted" (*konstituiert*) by consciousness, he means neither that the mind composes a mental representation from subjective data nor that it creates objects in a causal way. The basic idea is relatively simple. The same entity can be experienced in a variety of ways: this rock, which I kick out of the way as an impediment, is subsequently picked up by my friend in order to pound a stake into our tomato patch; it is then admired by my geologist neighbor

as a fine specimen of Texas granite. The same rock is given each time with a different meaning. According to Husserl, we must attribute these differences not solely to the thing itself (though they do belong to it) but to the consciousness that experiences them in these ways, because only the conscious act explains why at this moment just *these* aspects of the object are experienced, why my experience has *this* content. And since, under the reduction, the object "is" nothing but the rule that governs the various noemata in which it can be given, the object is in this sense constituted by consciousness. Anything that presents itself as something can therefore be analyzed reflectively in terms of the intentionalities that constitute it, the experiences in which it is meaningfully given. Reflection on constitution uncovers normative conditions embedded in experience itself; it does not impose such conditions on experience as logical desiderata. To take something as a hammer is not to be able to define it but to be able to do something appropriate with it, to use it. In Husserl's language, it is to be conscious of an internal and external horizon of co-implications (what is properly expected of things of this kind, what it will do under specific transformations, the social practices of building, and so on). Being a hammer is constituted in such horizons.

v   Transcendental idealism

The doctrine of constitution contains the essence of Husserl's transcendental phenomenological idealism. Constitution is *transcendental* because it is the condition of possibility of something being there *as* something; it correlates what is experienced with the "subjectivity" in which it is experienced. But Husserl argues that this correlation authorizes a kind of idealism because it seems to involve a certain asymmetry between constituting consciousness and the worldly being that is posited in the natural attitude: as a structure of meaning, the latter cannot be (be given) without being constituted, whereas consciousness (understood as "pure" consciousness) is not similarly dependent on the constitution of a world. Because questions of what lies beyond the phenomenologically given are ruled out by the *epoché*, some have argued that this sort of idealism is neutral with regard to traditional metaphysical questions (Carr 1999; Crowell 2001). In particular, it cannot have the sense of a subjective idealism in which the world is my representation. Yet Husserl's text is ambiguous enough to admit of various interpretations. Some – for instance, A. D. Smith (2003) – have understood his references to the "absolute being" of consciousness and the "merely relative" being of worldly

things as authorizing a full-blown metaphysical idealism. Others – for instance, Dan Zahavi (2003) – argue that while Husserl's transcendental reduction is not itself a metaphysical position, it does have metaphysical implications. For example, it rules out the kind of representationalism that invites skeptical thing-in-itself doctrines. Husserl did believe that certain questions often deemed metaphysical are rendered meaningless by phenomenological analysis, and he also developed his own phenomenologically based personalistic metaphysics. Such personalism far transcends anything that can truly be based on phenomenological *Evidenz*, however, so I shall pursue the issue no further here.[8]

As noted in Chapter 1, Husserl's phenomenological idealism is distinct from Kant's transcendental idealism in that, while the latter's concept of transcendental subjectivity is a formal principle arrived at by way of an argument, the former is a concrete field of *Evidenz*, of intentional correlation and syntheses of meaning. For this reason, Husserl comes to speak of "transcendental life" as an anonymously functioning depth-dimension within ordinary experience. In the years following the publication of *Ideas I* reflection on transcendental life leads phenomenology into questions not merely of static correlation, but of the *genesis* of the intentional contents that show up as noemata. In some ways, genetic phenomenology presents a challenge to the idea of phenomenological method as reflective and intuitive – how can one reflect on and intuit what is irrevocably past? – and some have argued that it must incorporate elements of conceptual construction.[9] But it is certain that genetic questions – carried out not as empirical-psychological, but as transcendental investigations – dominated Husserl's later philosophy. This is already prefigured in three notions mentioned in *Ideas I*, though not developed until later.

vi   Temporality, passive synthesis, transcendental ego

First, Husserl suggests that the most fundamental structure of pure consciousness is not intentionality itself but "temporality" as the "necessary form combining mental processes with mental processes" in one continuum, or "stream" (Hua 3, p. 198/194). The rules governing such combination are not those of objective "clock" time, since the latter, as a

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[8] For a discussion of how it fits into the framework of Husserl's philosophy as a whole, see Brainard 2002, pp. 1–32.

[9] For the most developed argument in this regard, see Welton 2000. For consideration of some of the difficulties, see Crowell 2002a.

measurable quantity, requires a standard for measurement, whereas the former, as the ground upon which all such standards are constituted, cannot be standardized. In a series of manuscripts dating from 1905, Husserl analyzed the peculiar structure belonging to consciousness of "inner" time, in which all noematic unities arise within a temporal horizon of *protentions* (non-thematic anticipations of subsequent experiences) and *retentions* (aspects of the just experienced that are not thematically recollected but held in the present as "just passed"), thereby giving current experience its temporal depth. Since intentional acts are themselves constituted *as* perceptions, recollections, judgments, and so on, they too belong within this universal temporal framework. Here Husserl faced a dilemma: if the intentional acts (noeses) that constitute noematic unities of meaning are themselves identifiable unities within the stream of consciousness, what constitutes *them* cannot have the character of an intentional act. Husserl's analysis of temporality thus purports to uncover an "absolute" self-constituting and pre-intentional "flow" of consciousness as the ultimate basis for genetic phenomenology.[10] The descriptions leading to this absolute level are extremely subtle, however, and are disputed by specialists.

A second element of genetic phenomenology, connected with the theory of temporality, is the notion of "passive synthesis." This somewhat paradoxical term belongs to Husserl's "transcendental aesthetic," his account of those elements of intentional constitution that precede the explicit, or "active," syntheses carried out in conceptual thinking and judging. A unity of meaning is constituted every time I judge that "the cup is white," for instance. But Husserl argues that this rests upon a level of pre-predicative synthesis in which the white cup itself is constituted perceptually as an identity of manifold changing aspects. At bottom these aspects involve something that is "pre-given" to consciousness – what Husserl calls "hyletic data," the dimension of sensation. On Husserl's view, the sensuous does not inhabit consciousness as meaningless atoms awaiting conceptual fixation; rather, it is genuinely synthesized, though passively (i.e., without ego-involvement) according to what Husserl, following empiricist psychology, calls rules of "association" – for instance, prominence (in the field), contrast, homogeneity, and heterogeneity (Husserl 1973, pp. 72–76). Through a phenomenology of passive synthesis Husserl hoped to trace the genesis of logic, to show how predicative logical forms are rooted in pre-predicative modes of perceptual

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[10]   The discussion of these matters goes back to Brough 1972.

synthesis. Such investigations have much to contribute to recent debates over non-conceptual content, but the difficulty of distinguishing genuine description from theoretical construction here is evident. Can the norms of conceptual thought be bootstrapped out of content that is not already governed by them? Are the rules of association actually phenomenologically evident? Does it make sense – as Merleau-Ponty, for one, denied – to speak of neutral hyletic data that get passively synthesized as "properties" of objects?

Finally, the turn toward genetic phenomenology has implications for Husserl's treatment of the ego. In the *Logical Investigations* Husserl had denied the necessity of an ego for the stream of consciousness, but by 1913 he came to argue that "each mental process" – each instance of intentionality – "is characterized as an act of the ego" (Hua 3, p. 194/190). Even after the *epoché* – in which the empirical, psychological human subject as an entity in the world is bracketed, treated as a constituted phenomenon – the stream of consciousness is "owned," is centered upon the first-person. But how does this "transcendental" ego give itself in reflection? Husserl never quite brings his views on this matter into line, but he highlights three essential aspects of the ego.

First, the ego shows itself as "ego pole" – a point from which intentional acts "emanate" and to which they "belong" as "its" (Hua 3, p. 195/191). This conception is phenomenologically motivated both by the fact that active synthesis (such as judging) is a matter of an ego "taking a stand," and by the fact that upon reflection I find that even acts in which the ego does not directly take a stand (such as perception) nevertheless involve objects being there for, evident to, a first-person consciousness.

This latter point leads to the second guise of the ego, namely, as a principle of self-awareness. Phenomenological analysis shows that the stream of consciousness – the ongoing awareness of the world around us – involves an awareness of *itself in* being aware of the world. Husserl's commitment to a transcendental ego is in part motivated by this demand. But as Zahavi – following Sartre – has shown, this self-awareness cannot be conceived on the model of an intentional act directed upon the ego engaged in intentional acts. To block the fatal regress, self-awareness must be an original non-objectifying function of intentional consciousness itself. Whether this undermines Husserl's doctrine of a "pure" ego is a matter of some dispute.[11]

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[11] An extensive discussion of the relation between these various senses of "ego" in Husserl is found in Zahavi 1999.

Finally, in his genetic phenomenology Husserl introduces a third conception of the transcendental ego, namely, as the "substrate of habitualities" (Hua 1, p. 100/66). Considered genetically, the temporal stream in which the ego (in the first sense) takes stands and makes judgments not only constitutes a "world" of noematic meaning, but achieves a kind of *self*-constitution: each judgment becomes an "abiding accomplishment" and forever marks the ego as the one who has judged thus; each practical attempt at something becomes the basis for subsequent habits, inclinations, abilities, and skills – "secondary passivities" – that come to characterize a distinct transcendental style. "The ego constitutes itself for itself in, so to speak, the unity of a 'history'" (Hua 1, p. 109/75). At this level, phenomenological reflection on constitution is nothing more than the "self-explication of the transcendental ego" as *monad* (Hua 1, p. 102/68).

Not surprisingly, this has given rise to the objection that phenomenology is not only a subjective idealism but a solipsism as well. Husserl vehemently denied that phenomenology is a metaphysical solipsism (the reduction ensured neutrality there), but he was acutely concerned about the charge of "transcendental solipsism." Isn't the meaningful world as constituted merely "my" world – or, more pointedly, aren't the others who are there in the world with me merely constituted products of my constituting consciousness? We cannot explore the details of Husserl's attempt to solve this problem in the *Cartesian Meditations*, but it points to a larger set of issues that, according to a widespread view, lie beyond the reach of Husserl's phenomenology: the phenomena of *embodiment*, *intersubjectivity*, and the *historicity* of the *lifeworld*. I shall conclude this chapter, then, by sketching something of these disputed horizons, and we shall return to each of them in the chapters that follow.

4   Horizons of Husserlian phenomenology

Ideas I was to be followed by two further volumes, one demonstrating the phenomenological method through constitutional analyses of two major regions of being, "nature" and "spirit" (*Ideas II*), and the other providing phenomenological foundations for the system of sciences (*Ideas III*). These works, however, were never published. In 1916 Husserl moved to Freiburg as the celebrated founder of the phenomenological movement, yet, thanks to his idealistic turn, he was estranged from many of his former colleagues. Though he worked feverishly on topics that would have found their way into the two further *Ideas* volumes – as well as on many other projects – his thought was constantly developing and he brought nothing further to

publication until 1929, when *Formal and Transcendental Logic* appeared. Husserl's Freiburg period, which lasted until his death in 1938, thus has an aspect of painful paradox: no period in Husserl's life was richer in philosophical ideas and none less fruitful in the kind of publication that would show the full scope of phenomenology's contribution to philosophy. As the material from this period becomes better known, however, something of Husserl's achievement can begin to be appreciated.

While developing phenomenological analyses in his research manuscripts, Husserl also devoted attention to phenomenological method. Some commentators argue that these reflections are generally a step behind the analyses, attempts to fit new insights into old methodological commitments.[12] Be that as it may, Husserl did come to identify a "great shortcoming" in the approach to the reduction laid out in *Ideas I* (the so-called "Cartesian way") since, "while it leads to the transcendental ego in one leap, as it were, it brings this ego into view as apparently empty of content" (Hua 6, p. 158/155). In contrast, Husserl began to emphasize how access to the evidential field of intentional syntheses could be motivated through problems arising in phenomenological psychology, and through ontological issues in the foundations of the empirical sciences.[13] It was in Husserl's research manuscripts, however, and not in his reflections on method, that a different picture of transcendental subjectivity began to take shape, one that anticipated – and perhaps in part responded to – issues that were then current in so-called *Lebensphilosophie*. These would send the phenomenological movement off in an "existential" direction in subsequent years.[14] In particular, Husserl struggled to reconcile the idea that the constituting transcendental subject is *embodied*, *social*, and *historical* with the claim that it cannot be part of the world that it constitutes. This "paradox of human subjectivity" (Hua 6, p. 182/178) shows itself in each of the three horizons.

i   Embodiment

Phenomenological analysis shows that constitution of the perceptual world entails more than vision conceived as a mental act; it requires an embodied subject. The noema of my perception of this coffee cup on my

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[12] See, for instance, Welton 2000 and Steinbock 1995.

[13] This issue has received extensive discussion, beginning with Kern 1977.

[14] A very readable account of the "existential" dimension in Husserl's thought is Natanson 1973.

desk, for instance, includes not merely the sides that are currently open to view but also the bottom and back side that are there but not now visible. What does it mean that these out-of-view aspects are "there"? Husserl argues that a disembodied subject would be incapable of entertaining such a sense; rather, to say that they are there but not visible is to say that were I to move around the cup, or move the cup itself, I could bring new facets into view. These facets appear in a specific order keyed to the kind of movements I can make and the kind of manipulations of the cup I can exercise. The noematic rule of the perceptual object's identity, then, refers to an embodied subject, to an "I can" that stands in "conditional" – that is normative, not causal – symbiosis with its environment: reaching out to touch the cup, what it manifests to touch confirms what sight has disclosed, fulfills it evidentially thanks to the "synaesthesia" – or original combination of sensory modalities – that characterizes my bodily engagement with the world. The subject who sees a real world, then, cannot be a disembodied one (Hua 4, pp. 65–75/70–80).

However, the body is itself something seen; it too is constituted as a thing in the world. Husserl responds to this paradox by distinguishing between *Körper* (the body as a constituted natural object) and *Leib* (the "lived body" as a dimension of constituting subjectivity itself). Even after bracketing the *Körper* through the reduction, the first-person experience of transcendental subjectivity retains a unique aspect of embodiment, of the "I can." I *am* my *Leib*. Husserl shows how this identity arises through the reflective arc established in the sense of touch. Embodiment becomes "subject" when, in sensing the world through touch, it at the same time senses itself sensing. Only subsequently does this original embodiment get constituted as a *Körper*, a natural object that "belongs" to me by means of a self-enworlding, or "mundanization," in which I come to understand myself as an animal, a human being, and so on.

Husserl's solution is not without its difficulties. At times he still speaks as though the reflexive self-constitution of the lived body proceeds from an "absolute" ego, and his analysis of the "I can" in terms of systems of kinaesthetic sensations (i.e., those belonging to my own embodied movements) retains elements of an intellectualistic construction. But Husserl went quite far toward demonstrating how embodiment is a normative condition of intentional content. Perhaps it is best to say that he was trying to do justice to two phenomenologically evident facts: first, that the meaning-structure of the world is intelligible only as something given to an embodied subject; and second, that the body at issue cannot be

identified with the body-as-object but must be understood as "egological," that is, the center of a reflexive, first-person point of view.

ii   Sociality

Similar issues arise when Husserl begins to consider the contribution that sociality or "intersubjectivity" makes to the constitution of the world. Returning to our example, what makes it the case that the currently unseen facets of the cup before me nevertheless have the sense of being *currently visible* facets? This cannot be derived from the idea that I could move around the cup to see them, for this would only establish that they were visible when facing me. According to Husserl, it is because I take them as visible for *another* who could now stand where I *would* stand if I moved around the cup. Thus the subjectivity capable of having the intentional content, "visible real thing," is necessarily a social subject; such meaning would remain closed to the solipsist. And since, for Husserl, perception is the bedrock upon which all other constitutive achievements are built, to show that perception is possible only for a social subject is to show that transcendental subjectivity is transcendental *intersubjectivity* (Hua 6, pp. 175, 260/172, 262). The full notion of transcendence – the idea of a real world out there, other than me – depends on there being others for whom it is "there too."

Here again, however, an objection arises: aren't others themselves parts of the world as I find it, subject-objects in the world? If so, are they not also noematic unities whose meaning depends on my constitutive accomplishments? It cannot be said that Husserl worked out a finally satisfactory answer to this problem; it operates as a horizon of his developing thought, and, as in the case of embodiment, he seeks to do justice to two compelling phenomenological demands. On the one hand, the world's meaning makes reference at every turn to a plurality of subjects in communication. The normativity that makes intentional content possible depends on a kind of publicity, and indeed my very sense of myself is as "one" among others "like me." Husserl develops these insights in manuscripts on the "personalistic attitude" (Hua 4) and in several volumes on the social world. On the other hand, no genuine subjectivity is conceivable that would not be the first-person singular, an "I." If transcendental intersubjectivity is genuinely *subjectivity*, then, it must be centered on an individual ego that, to the extent that it *is* individual, is "unique and indeclinable" (Hua 6, p. 188/185). Husserl develops this thought above all in *Cartesian Meditations*, where he shows how transcendental intersubjectivity arises

from a primordial "analogizing" encounter between the embodied ego in its "sphere of ownness" and the body of the other. The other's subjectivity is registered as an irrevocable "absence" thanks to which there arises in me the sense of something being radically "other" – a sense that subsequently attaches to the whole constituted world (Hua 1, p. 137/107).

iii   History

Finally, in reflecting on the cultural crisis of Europe Husserl came to recognize that intentional content of whatever sort, and the meaningful relations it exhibits, involves reference to a historical horizon, to a generational process whereby the constitutive achievements of temporally distant subjectivities come to be "sedimented" in current experience. The world constituted in the ongoing life of transcendental subjectivity – which Husserl now begins to call the "lifeworld" (*Lebenswelt*) – comes to be seen as a complex interplay of memory and forgetting, of faithful transmission and fateful emptying of original experiences and intentional accomplishments. For instance, Husserl explored the intentional implications sedimented in the history of mathematized physics in an attempt to show how such physics – then as now taken to be the model of rationality – had become an empty *techne* obscuring the genuine sources of rationality in transcendental subjectivity.[15] But if one can only understand the meanings that circulate in the contemporary world by recourse to their (intentional, not empirical) history, then transcendental subjectivity itself must be "historical." If constitution takes place not merely along the axis of an individual life but also along the "generative" axis (Hua 6; Steinbock 1995) of cultural worlds embodying specific historical narratives, then the reduction to transcendental subjectivity cannot stop at the sort of individual consciousness with which Husserl began. Nowhere is the tension between the path of phenomenological inquiry and Husserl's early framework for elucidating it – the framework of nineteenth-century psychology – more apparent than in his late forays into the historical lifeworld as the ultimate horizon of meaning.

And yet, it is understandable that Husserl would shrink from what look to be the implications of his historical meditations, insisting that "reduction to the absolute ego as the ultimately unique center of function in all constitution" remains necessary (Hua 6, p. 190/186). For the generative

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[15] For a critical account of Husserl's approach to modern mathematics, see Hopkins 2003 and 2011.

concept of transcendental subjectivity has strayed far from the epistemo-logical considerations that turned phenomenology toward subjectivity in the first place: the demand for first-person *Evidenz*, the interest in reflective description, givenness, and intuition in the service of ultimate philosoph-ical self-responsibility. The line between a truly phenomenological inquiry and a merely empirical one dressed up in philosophical garb – to say noth-ing of a metaphysics of objective spirit in the Hegelian manner – is easily transgressed in Husserl's late work, and it is to his credit as a phenom-enologist that he was keenly aware of the danger. It may be that concrete phenomenological investigations point ineluctably toward a concept of transcendental subjectivity that is richer than the original psychologically forged concept of consciousness – one that would include embodiment, sociality, and historicality. Certainly, later existential and hermeneutic phenomenologists held this to be so. But in the case of history, as in the case of embodiment and sociality, Husserl retained a sharp sense (perhaps sharper than those who followed him) of the twin demands made by the things themselves: meaning comes to us as a trace of sedimented consti-tutive activity, as something bound up with a specific historical genesis; but at the same time it is always and only understood in current inten-tional experience. It is there and there alone that meaning – including the meaning of history itself – is concretely *given*. If philosophy is to recover historical sedimentations of meaning it can only do so by making them current, and if it is to remain phenomenological (beholden to the given as it is given) it cannot abandon reflective analysis of experience.

Many things, of course, escape the "original" grasp of first-person reflection: historical generativity, my birth and death, my early develop-ment, dreamless sleep, the unconscious, and so on. In every case, however, as Husserl insists, "this sort of thing has its manners of ontic verification, of 'self-giving,' which are quite particular but which originally create the ontic meaning for beings of such particularity" (Hua 6, p. 192/188). In other words, if we speak meaningfully of the unconscious, death, and other such things, it is because these things *are* self-given to us in some way, are *not* mere abstract constructs. The challenge of phenomenology is to remain attuned precisely to those modes of givenness. In doing so, however, as I shall argue in Part III, it must go beyond Husserl's own con-ception of it. Most notably, the idea that "consciousness" is the proper name for the field of transcendental-phenomenological reflection cannot be maintained. In order to situate this fundamentally Heideggerian the-sis, the following chapter will provide a brief overview of how the two phenomenologists conceived their relation to each other.

The matter and method of philosophy

"Phenomenology, that's Heidegger and I – and no one else." According to legend Husserl spoke these words in the early 1920s, when he was at the height of his fame in Freiburg and Heidegger, his young assistant, was grappling with the ideas that would become *Being and Time*. In 1927 Heidegger dedicated that work to Husserl "in respect and friendship," writing in a footnote that "[i]f the following investigation has taken a few steps forward in disclosing the 'things themselves,' the author must first of all thank E. Husserl, who, by providing his own incisive personal guidance and by freely turning over his unpublished investigations, familiarized the author with the most diverse areas of phenomenological research during his student years in Freiburg" (GA 2, p. 52/38/489). But in 1923 he was writing privately to Karl Löwith that "I am now convinced that Husserl was never a philosopher, not even for one second in his life" (Husserl 1997, p. 17). And while dedicating *Being and Time* to his mentor, Heidegger was writing to Karl Jaspers that "if the treatise has been written 'against' anyone, then it has been written against Husserl" (Husserl 1997, p. 22). For his part, Husserl struggled to understand how Heidegger's work fit into his own project of transcendental phenomenology and ultimately came to the conclusion that it did not: "my antipodes, Scheler and Heidegger," he wrote to Roman Ingarden in 1931 (Husserl 1968, p. 67).

As these conflicting statements attest – and they could easily be multiplied – the relation between Heidegger and Husserl, one of the philosophically decisive encounters of the twentieth century, cannot be constructed as a simple *pro* or *contra*. Nor is it – at least on Heidegger's side – a matter of uniform development from initial enthusiasm to ultimate rejection. Rather, there is from the start a dynamic of attraction and repulsion in Heidegger's attitude toward Husserl's work, one that has to do not with this or that aspect of philosophical doctrine, but with the matter and method of philosophy as such. Attraction and repulsion are evident in the fact that Heidegger defends Husserl's phenomenology against its neo-Kantian and neo-Hegelian detractors, while rejecting the Cartesian language Husserl

uses to formulate his views. It is evident in the fact that Heidegger pub-
licly acknowledges Husserl's influence only in very general (if formally
generous) ways, while appropriating Husserlian analyses into his own
work without comment. And it is evident in the fact that Heidegger saw
his lectures of the early 1920s as "wringing the neck" of "the old man"
(Husserl 1997, p. 17), while he managed to take over nearly every signifi-
cant Husserlian theme: philosophy as science, as transcendental inquiry;
the centrality of description, intuition, and *Evidenz*; the critique of nat-
uralism and the reduction to meaning; the rejection of traditional meta-
physics; the focus on temporality; the appeal to first-person philosophical
self-responsibility; and so on. To be sure, in taking them over Heidegger
did not leave these themes unaltered. Still, despite its many other sources
(Aristotle, Kant, St. Paul, Kierkegaard, Dilthey) it is not too much to say
that the shape of Heidegger's early philosophy is essentially Husserlian.[1]

Some may dispute this claim on the ground that the apparent connec-
tions between Heidegger's early thought and Husserl's are in fact superfi-
cial, to be explained by the circumstances of Heidegger's academic career.
Needing support for his promotion to a professorship, it is suggested,
Heidegger maintained the fiction of *Symphilosophieren* precisely so long
as was necessary to become Husserl's successor in Freiburg. The curi-
ous attraction and repulsion may then be understood as a natural out-
come of this Oedipal situation – Heidegger aching to "burn and destroy"
Husserl's "sham philosophy" (Husserl 1997, pp. 17, 22) while nevertheless
having to present himself as part of the latter's phenomenological school.
On this view Husserl's influence constitutes a detour in Heidegger's itin-
erary, an academically motivated distraction from the true wellspring of
his thought.[2]

Whatever its merits (and academic politics certainly plays a role in the
Husserl–Heidegger relation), this view entails that one dismiss, or at least
downplay, the achievement of *Being and Time*, which, all agree, brings
with it much Husserlian baggage. To do so, however, is to go further than
Heidegger himself; for though he abandoned the project of *Being and
Time*, he would maintain, as late as 1953, that "its path remains neverthe-
less a necessary one even today, if our Dasein is to be stirred by the ques-
tion of being" (GA 2, p. vii/17). If *Being and Time* remains an achievement
worthy of philosophical attention, then, a look at the issues involved in
Heidegger's relation to Husserl cannot be without profit. Before turning

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[1] I have argued this in detail in Crowell 2001.
[2] See, for instance, van Buren 1994, and the discussion in Crowell 2001, pp. 5–12.

to some of these issues, however, it will be useful to sketch how the intel-
lectual relationship unfolded in its academic context.

1   The academic relationship

In 1963 Heidegger recalled that as a young seminarian (1909–10) he was
"fascinated" by Husserl's *Logical Investigations*, reading it "again and
again without gaining sufficient insight into what fascinated me" (GA 14,
p. 93/75). Husserl was then in Göttingen, and Heidegger, having switched
in 1911 from theological to philosophical studies, was working to define
his own position in the then-current debate between neo-Kantians and
neo-Scholastics over the nature of logic. In his earliest scholarly publica-
tion, "Neuere Forschungen über Logik" (1912), he comments that logical
meaning belongs neither to the domain of empirical science nor to that of
metaphysics but to the "realm of validity," which "in the entire course of
the history of philosophy has never been given its due in a fully conscious
and consequent manner" (GA 1, p. 24). Husserl's refutation of psycholo-
gistic approaches to logic in the *Logical Investigations* provided Heidegger
with ammunition for his 1913 dissertation, a criticism of five psychologis-
tic theories of judgment that ends with the question "What is the mean-
ing of meaning?" (GA 1, p. 171). Two years later, in his habilitation thesis,
Heidegger adopted the language of Husserl's recently published *Ideas for
a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy* to explore the
noetic and noematic foundations of Thomas of Erfurt's theory of categor-
ies and pure grammar. Though ostensibly a work in the history of philoso-
phy, the book seeks to make a contribution to "modern logic" and praises
Scholastic thought for its powerful "moments of phenomenological obser-
vation" (GA 1, p. 202). Heidegger is writing under the nominal direction
of the neo-Kantian Heinrich Rickert, but it is Husserl's theory of "pure
consciousness" in *Ideas* that has provided "a decisive overview of the
treasures of 'consciousness' and has destroyed" the neo-Kantian thesis
of the "emptiness of consciousness in general" (GA 1, p. 405). Though the
neo-Kantian philosopher Paul Natorp had dismissed Husserl's explor-
ation of consciousness as a relapse into psychologism, Heidegger rejects
this accusation. For him, "a purely 'objective' general theory of objects
remains incomplete"; the domain of logically valid meaning cannot be
clarified without bringing "subjective logic" into focus through phenom-
enological investigation (GA 1, p. 404).

   A conclusion added to the habilitation thesis in 1916 points in a differ-
ent direction: logic and its problems can be properly understood only in a

"trans-logical" or "metaphysical" context (GA 1, pp. 405–6). Philosophy of logic must penetrate to the "historical living spirit" and even to what mystics like Eckhart had in view. But though these themes – life, history, spirit – were never abandoned, Heidegger would not develop them under the neo-Scholastic aegis of "metaphysics" but, for the next decade, under the aegis of Husserl's phenomenology. Two things account for this: first, in 1916 the Chair of Catholic Philosophy that Heidegger had hoped to get on the basis of his habilitation went instead to Joseph Geyser, and, in the same year, Husserl came to Freiburg as Rickert's successor.

During the period between 1919, when Heidegger took up teaching as a lecturer after the war, and 1923, when he gave his last Freiburg course before leaving for Marburg, he turned repeatedly to the main theme of Husserl's 1911 programmatic essay "Philosophy as Rigorous Science," namely, the peculiar character of philosophical inquiry, which is cognitive (makes truth-claims) but not "theoretical," not an explanatory system of propositions governed by laws. In the *Logical Investigations* Husserl had argued that philosophy is not a theory that explains knowledge causally but a reflection that clarifies knowledge phenomenologically. Heidegger radicalizes this idea, turning it against Husserl himself. In a 1919 lecture course, for example, he argues that even Husserl's insistence that philosophy abjure theoretical constructions and cleave to what is directly given in experience involves a distortion of the phenomena, since "givenness" is itself already a theoretical construct (GA 56/57, p. 89). The givenness of meaning to consciousness – intentionality as consciousness of objects – conceals its own condition, which Heidegger now begins to call "being." Before being a reflection on intentionality (Husserl's view) phenomenology is to be an "understanding, a *hermeneutic intuition*" (GA 56/57, p. 117), a self-interpreting process in which "factic life" intuits its own being in its practical, pre-theoretical unfolding.

Thus, while Husserl was moving phenomenology toward transcendental idealism, Heidegger was imagining it as a "hermeneutics of facticity." In this notion he linked the Husserlian idea of philosophy as "primal science" with the Aristotelian idea of philosophy as a doctrine of categories, an ontology. As Heidegger tells us, while he "practiced phenomenological seeing, teaching, and learning in Husserl's proximity after 1919," he was simultaneously exploring "a transformed understanding of Aristotle" (GA 14, p. 98/78). Husserl's theory of categorial intuition had made such a reading possible by "for the first time concretely pav[ing] the way for a genuine form of research capable of demonstrating the categories" (GA 20, p. 97/71), but Husserl disputed

Heidegger's view that research into the categories of factic life was the ultimate task of primal science.

Both the demand for an account of the ultimate conditions of intentionality and the turn toward practical comportment of human beings were also part of Husserl's work during this period, work that Heidegger, as Husserl's assistant, knew well, though it remained unpublished for decades. In lectures and research manuscripts beginning in 1905 and collated by Edith Stein in 1917 (to be published under Heidegger's editorship only in 1928), Husserl located the ultimate conditions of object-consciousness in the pre-intentional absolute flow of inner time-consciousness. The structure of this analysis – though not the details – would reappear in Heidegger's *Being and Time*, where temporality is the "horizon" for determining the "meaning of being" in general. Heidegger also knew Husserl's work on "nature and spirit" – meant for the second volume of *Ideas* – in which Husserl argues for the primacy of the embodied, practical comportment of the "person" over any form of purely theoretical attitude. Whether Heidegger was influenced by these analyses, or whether, as he says, Husserl took note of "[Heidegger's] objections from my lecture courses in Freiburg" and "[made] allowances for them" (GA 20, p. 167/121) is a matter of some dispute. What is clear is that Heidegger was not satisfied that Husserl's concept of the person was a phenomenologically adequate categorial account of the "entity which has the structure of intentionality" (GA 20, p. 145/106).

This formulation appears in a lecture course delivered in 1925, shortly after Heidegger had moved from Freiburg to Marburg. In 1917 Paul Natorp had approached Husserl about Heidegger's suitability for a professorship at Marburg, but Husserl (who at that time had had little personal contact with Heidegger) was noncommittal. By 1923, however, Husserl had come to see Heidegger as the great hope for carrying on his phenomenology, so that when Natorp again inquired about Heidegger Husserl was enthusiastic. One of Heidegger's first projects upon finding himself in the capital of Marburg neo-Kantianism was to develop a radically anti-Marburg interpretation of Kant. Reading "the *Critique of Pure Reason* anew and … as it were against the background of Husserl's phenomenology … opened my eyes," he writes in 1927 (GA 25, p. 431/292). For instance, Husserl's concept of intuition allowed Heidegger to grasp the significance of Kant's faculty dualism (pointedly rejected by the Marburg School), and Husserl's approach to inner time-consciousness helped Heidegger recognize, in temporality, the crucial link between the transcendental imagination and the schematism. But at the same time Heidegger was beginning to

settle scores with Husserl, in particular with the transcendental idealism of *Ideas*, which he condemned as a foreign, neo-Kantian transplant into phenomenology (GA 20, p. 145/106).

As the representative of phenomenology in Marburg, Heidegger begins his 1925 lecture course by defending the genuine sense of Husserl's achievement from then-current misunderstandings. Nevertheless, he argues that Husserl's "breakthrough" to phenomenology in the *Logical Investigations* had been compromised by its subsequent subordination to a "traditional idea of philosophy" (GA 20, p. 147/107). Heidegger accuses Husserl of foisting on phenomenology the Cartesian demand for a philosophical science based on absolutely certain foundations, when in fact it yields a radically new approach to ontology. Though Husserl does outline certain ontological determinations of consciousness, Heidegger argues that these are not drawn from the "entity which has the structure of intentionality" but from those aspects of consciousness that make it suitable to become the object of an epistemologically foundational science. That Heidegger's own view of phenomenology as ontology is equally derived from a traditional idea of philosophy – one borrowed from Aristotle, rather than Descartes – is obvious, though like Husserl he will claim that it arises solely from the immanent logic of phenomenology itself.[3]

In 1925, again supported by Husserl, Heidegger became a candidate for Nicolai Hartmann's Chair and, in a rush, submitted the unfinished *Being and Time* for publication. On the basis of galley proofs the Minister of Education deemed it "insufficient," but once it had been published in Husserl's *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung* this judgment was reversed, and in 1927 Heidegger was promoted to full professor. Between 1927 and 1929, when he moved to Freiburg as Husserl's chosen successor, Heidegger continued to develop his reinterpretation of phenomenology. Husserl's marginal remarks in his copy of *Being and Time* show that he was troubled by Heidegger's apparent departures from his own position, but he reports that "Heidegger steadily denied that he would abandon my transcendental phenomenology, and he referred me to his future second volume [of *Being and Time*]" (Husserl 1997, p. 23).

In order, perhaps, to get to the bottom of their differences, Husserl invited Heidegger to collaborate on an article for the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. Heidegger's revisions recast Husserl's original so as to highlight the continuity between ontology and transcendental phenomenology, but Husserl saw only the (not inconsiderable) departures from his

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[3] See Crowell 2002d.

view and the collaboration collapsed. This was effectively the collapse of the academic and personal relation as well. In 1928 Heidegger did contribute an essay, "On the Essence of Ground," to Husserl's *Festschrift*, but the tenor of the piece – with its long historical analyses of the concept of "world" and its attempt to trace the Husserlian themes of intentionality and reason to the "more primordial" ground of "Dasein's transcendence" – was confrontational. So was Heidegger's 1929 inaugural lecture in Freiburg, "What is Metaphysics?" Taking over the Chair of the founder of phenomenology, who had always held philosophy to be rigorous science, Heidegger does not mention phenomenology, sharply distinguishes philosophy from science, and grounds all science in "the Nothing." This lecture begins a chapter in Heidegger's thought where Husserl's influence is mainly absent. The early 1930s were years in which Husserl had little to do with Heidegger, developing his ideas instead in conversation with his former assistant, Eugen Fink, while Heidegger lectured on Nietzsche, Hölderlin, and the pre-Socratics. At Husserl's death in 1938 Heidegger – who in the meantime had become the first National Socialist Rector of the University of Freiburg and, in the wake of controversy, had subsequently retired from public academic politics – did not attend the funeral.

Because both Husserl and Heidegger believed that phenomenology radically transformed philosophical inquiry – standing "opposed to those pseudo-questions which parade themselves as 'problems,' often for generations at a time" (GA 2, p. 37/28/50) – it can be difficult to assess each's claim that the other lacked "radicality." Such a claim is possible only if there is common ground; but if, as each held, the matter and the method of philosophy are inseparable, objections to an account of the matter can always be parried by a claim that the method has been misunderstood. This, in fact, was Husserl's general response to Heidegger's criticisms. The present chapter is not the place to adjudicate such disputes; instead, it focuses chiefly on how *Heidegger* constructed the differences with Husserl. Regarding the matter of philosophy, the dispute turns on the question of whether philosophy is essentially an inquiry into being or a science of consciousness; regarding method, the dispute concerns a nuance in the concept of phenomenological reduction.

2   Contested philosophical issues (1): the matter of philosophy

Heidegger holds that philosophy has "forgotten" the "question of being" (What is being? What does "being" [*Sein*] mean?). What for the Greeks had been the source of deepest wonder has become a desiccated branch

of logic that concerns itself with laws of the empty "something in general." Husserl, for instance, distinguished between "regional ontologies" (the a priori categorial frameworks governing the empirical sciences) and "formal ontology" (the categories governing cognitive "objecthood" as such). Though Heidegger also distinguishes between regional ontologies and ontology proper, he does not construe the latter as a *formal* inquiry; rather, it is the Aristotelian question of the "unity" in the "manifold senses of being," an inquiry into the meaning of being as such. Husserl could make no sense of this question. When, in his 1929 *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, Heidegger writes that "we understand being and yet we lack the concept," Husserl responds in the margin: "We lack it? When would we need it?" (Husserl 1997, p. 465). Beyond the formal category "something in general" there is, for Husserl, nothing to say about being as such, but for Heidegger it is precisely phenomenology's task to overcome such "forgetfulness" and ask about the sense of being presupposed in formal and regional ontologies alike.

By placing phenomenology in the service of the question of being Heidegger had, in Husserl's eyes, failed to grasp its radicality. For Husserl, all objectively oriented science, including ontology, is naive, that is, uncritical with regard to its own possibility. This is not to dismiss such science but to indicate the need for a different sort of inquiry, one that explores the conditions presupposed by objective inquiry.[4] Phenomenology thus takes the form of an investigation into consciousness – not consciousness as the object of the science of psychology, but "pure" or "transcendental" consciousness as the subjective as such, the site where all objectivity, "whatever has for me sense and validity as 'true' being" (Hua 1, p. 59/19), is given. Pure consciousness is not an entity in the world, but subject for the world; its philosophically salient characteristic is intentionality: all consciousness is consciousness *of* something *as* something, thanks to which all entities present themselves with a certain "content" or meaning (*Sinn*). Phenomenology is thus to be an analysis of how that content, presupposed in all scientific and pre-scientific dealings with entities, gets constituted through acts of consciousness and their syntheses. Since such acts condition the givenness of any possible beings, all ontological inquiry presupposes the science of transcendental consciousness.

The deepest differences between Husserl and Heidegger concern this idea of an inquiry prior to ontology, for in *Being and Time* Heidegger

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4 The *locus classicus* for this argument is *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, part II (Hua 17, pp. 155ff./149ff.).

apparently demands something similar. In order to answer the question of the meaning of being one must first clarify the conditions under which it can be raised in a meaningful way – the first of which, Heidegger argues, is that one have something like a pre-ontological "understanding of being" (GA 2, p. 7/5/25). Thus ontology proper must be preceded by "fundamental" ontology – a phenomenological explication of how an understanding of being is possible. This entails examination of that being who is possessed of such an understanding – which Heidegger, using the ordinary German expression for "existence," calls *Dasein*. Just as Husserl's transcendental consciousness is not equivalent to psychological (human) consciousness, so Dasein, though precisely the entity that "each of us is himself" (GA 2, p. 10/7/27), is not equivalent to the *anthropos*. But – and the source of all friction lies here – it is not equivalent to transcendental *consciousness* either. Heidegger acknowledges that Husserl's "formal phenomenology of consciousness" is possible (GA 2, p. 154/115/151), but he argues that such an "analytic description of intentionality in its a priori" (GA 20, p. 108/79) cannot fulfill the larger goal of accounting for the *possibility* of intentionality, the origin of that content through which "there is" something. For consciousness itself rests upon an ontological basis that has the character of "being-in-the-world." Heidegger's fundamental ontology proposes to show how the structures of being-in-the-world make consciousness in Husserl's sense – the intentionality of acts of perception, judgment, imagination, etc. – possible.

Husserl understood the problem of intentionality to be the problem of how a "transcendent" (mind-independent) object can be "there" for consciousness. How is it, for instance, that perception gives its object as a real entity in the world, and what sort of modification of perception is involved when the same object is remembered, hallucinated, or merely imagined? Heidegger, in contrast, held that this kind of ontic transcendence – the meaning of entities as correlates of intentional acts – depended upon an ontological transcendence to which Husserl was blind, namely, the transcendence of Dasein as being-in-the-world. Consciousness of objects is possible because Dasein transcends beings as a whole toward their *being*: because Dasein "understands something like being," individual beings can show up *as* what they *are*. Intentional content cannot be understood as a function of consciousness alone but must be seen as deriving from the structure of being-in-the-world as a whole, that which enables our understanding of being.

This point may be brought out by a series of contrasts between what Heidegger took to be Husserl's views and his own account of the

structures of being-in-the-world. As previously noted, Heidegger traced Husserl's problems to the latter's adherence to a traditional Cartesian idea of philosophy. Heidegger admits that Husserl makes essential advances beyond Descartes (GA 17, pp. 260–62/200–2), yet he argues that Husserl's commitment to a science of consciousness undermines these advances. Heidegger thus formulates his own position as a response to what he sees as Husserl's residual individualism, rationalism (theoretism), and internalism. We may begin with individualism.

For Husserl, the basic structure of intentional experience is the Cartesian *ego–cogito–cogitatum*. Because the "I think" (I judge, I remember, etc.) belongs to every intentional act, the field of meaning is essentially a field of individual consciousness. If one asks about the character of the "I" here, Husserl will point out that there are various attitudes in which the question can be answered. In the personalistic attitude, for example, I grasp myself as a social, practical, valuing, being; in the naturalistic attitude, in contrast, I appear as the bearer of "psychic experiences." But considered in its deepest ("transcendental") significance the ego is a unique, "indeclinable" instance, the genuine first-person irreducible to any third-person descriptions, a monadic spontaneity that "constitutes itself for itself in, so to speak, the unity of a 'history'" (Hua 1, p. 109/75). Here, as we saw in the previous chapter, Husserl not only faces the problem of solipsism but embraces it: though he recognizes that any account of intentional content must refer to a community of egos in communicative interaction (transcendental intersubjectivity), he nevertheless insists that this intersubjectivity must itself be egologically constituted. Heidegger registers his objection at just this point. Agreeing with Husserl that an account of intentional content must make reference to social norms and hence to a social subjectivity, Heidegger argues that this very fact renders contradictory the idea of a pre-social subject, which would have to constitute sociality from its own individuality. As being-in-the-world I am always being-with-others. For Heidegger, then, the problem is not to explain how the social world can be constituted from my "monad," but to explain how anything like *individuality* is possible. On Heidegger's view I understand myself in terms of the typical roles, inherited customs, and standard ways of doing things prevalent in my time and place. I belong to *das Man* (the One), the anonymous "others" from whom, "for the most part, one does *not* distinguish oneself" (GA 2, p. 158/118/154). Because such interchangeability is a condition for intelligibility, Heidegger conceives individuation not as prior to the social but as a modification of it; authenticity does not constitute sociality but merely occupies it in a different way.

Being-in-the-world, then, is not equivalent to the traditional idea of subjectivity as individual consciousness. One philosophically significant consequence is that the understanding of being that makes ontological inquiry possible is not first of all a matter of what takes place in an individual mind but is, rather, an intelligibility that resides in the shared social practices prevalent in a particular culture at a particular historical moment. Such an understanding is not, therefore, a function of a hidden reason, supported by an implicit transcendental logic, as Husserl supposed was the case for the domain of intentional consciousness. Instead, it is groundless, resting upon nothing more than the way things are done. For Husserl, this entailed an unacceptable relativism; for Heidegger, it is a necessary consequence of the fact that Dasein is "care" (*Sorge*) before it is reason.[5]

What this means emerges from Heidegger's criticism of a certain rationalism or theoretism in Husserl's account of intentionality. According to Heidegger, the intelligibility of things derives from Dasein's practical gearing into the world, its "projects." Self-understanding is not initially a theoretical self-awareness but is embedded in these projects – that is, in practices that involve my abilities and skills. Abilities and skills entail norms of success or failure, and because they do, things can show up in significant ways – that is, as hammers that "nicely fulfill" their function, or as bicycles that are "too rickety to ride." On Heidegger's view, the normative conditions inherent in such projects are what make intentionality in the Husserlian sense possible. Thus, to say that Dasein is "care" before it is reason is to say that what things are or mean depends on their involvement in a totality of significance ("world") anchored in my practical concerns – ultimately, in my concern for my own being. Heidegger believes that Husserl misconstrues the character of such experience thanks to a rationalist presupposition built into his focus on intentional *acts*, one that leads him to propose something like a "theory theory" of intentional content.

Thus, for example, Husserl recognizes that our ordinary experience is one of using hammers, tables, and chairs, but he argues that it is phenomenologically founded in something more basic – namely, the thing as merely perceived, an identity in the manifold of perceptual properties such as color, orientation in space, weight, and so on. Upon this basis the thing comes to exhibit its practical and value properties through a series of further act-syntheses that yield our seamlessly rich experience of it.

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[5] These points are discussed in detail in Parts III and IV of this volume.

Using Heidegger's terms, Husserl treats experience as though things were initially given as merely "present at hand" and only subsequently taken up into practical activities. In Husserl's favor, it would appear to be a logical or conceptual requirement that if I use a hammer I also see (or feel) a physical thing-with-properties; indeed, Heidegger himself admits that "'there is' anything ready-to-hand only on the basis [*Grund*] of something present-at-hand" (GA 2, p. 96/71/101). But he denies that the ready-to-hand is thereby founded on the present-at-hand in the phenomenological sense. The logical requirement is not a phenomenologically *evident* one; it is only when our smooth dealings with things break down that the kind of intentionality characteristic of simple perception or explicit propositional determination emerges. To read these structures back into pre-theoretical experience is to exhibit a rationalist prejudice. Husserl's account is thus a "theory theory" in the sense that it substitutes analytic desiderata, based on the demands of a cognitively foundationalist theory, for unprejudiced description of how things show up for us.

In arguing that being-in-the-world is essentially social and practical, Heidegger has undercut two core elements of the Cartesian view of intentional content, to which, he believes, Husserl is committed. Together these imply rejection of a third element, internalism or representationalism. Husserl staunchly maintained that his theory of intentionality had left all forms of Cartesian subjectivism behind, but for Heidegger any appeal whatsoever to consciousness as the ground of intentionality brings with it a kind of representationalism, since it construes our basic openness to the world (which he calls "disclosedness") as a kind of *forum internum* with its own laws and structures. In Husserl this shows up in his theory of the noema, the idea that entities are given by way of noematic "meanings" that are immanent to consciousness. Heidegger's claim that Dasein's understanding of being is equivalent to the disclosedness or revelation of things is meant to undercut this sort of view on ontological grounds.

If internalism is the view that intentional content is sufficiently determined by mental content (what is "in the head"), then it is doubtful that Husserl's theory of the noema is truly internalist.[6] He rejects the idea that intentionality can be explained psychologically, in terms of mental representations. To ground object-reference in the individual psyche ("narrow content") is to court skepticism by severing the way things are given from the things themselves. Husserl's noema is meant to include both, and it is no more in the head than it is in the world; it belongs to "transcendental"

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[6] For a fuller examination of this issue, see Chapter 5 below.

consciousness as such. From this point of view, the transcendent thing is itself immanent to consciousness and can play the role sometimes attributed to external factors in accounting for intentional content. To say, for instance, that the intentional content of my state when I refer to water is partly determined by the micro-structure of that substance, whether that structure is known to me or not, is not to say that such content is determined by something external to the *noema*, since the latter includes within itself reference to an open-ended process of determining that thing – whatever it is – to which I stand in relation by means of its being given in a certain way. From the noematic point of view, a causal theory of reference is not a *causal theory* (i.e., an explanation that supervenes on phenomenological factors) but an explication of how the sense of certain noemata (intentional content) is constituted by reference to a particular sedimented causal history. But while this causal history, as an intentional implication of the noema, belongs within the field of consciousness, this does not mean that the causal history itself is internal to the mind.

Even if Husserl's position is not internalist in the ordinary sense, however, Heidegger finds that Husserl's talk of the "constitution" of the thing by means of a "synthesis" of various intentional acts remains caught in the Cartesian trap. Though he nowhere rejects Husserl's theory of the noema explicitly, Heidegger's argument that intentionality (the "discoveredness" of entities) depends on Dasein's transcendence – that is, on the prior disclosedness of being-in-the-world – involves elements that undermine what Husserl took to be the self-sufficiency of an account of meaning in terms of consciousness. For Heidegger, disclosedness is a matter of three equally necessary aspects of Dasein's being – understanding, affectedness, and discourse – none of which are intentional acts in Husserl's sense. We have already mentioned how understanding functions as "project": the meaning that informs practical activity cannot be grasped as the correlate of an act of consciousness, a noema. But a deeper contrast with Husserl's alleged internalism requires a look at the equally decisive role of affectedness, since by its means the "factic" character of Dasein's disclosedness comes to light.

Affectedness (*Befindlichkeit*) names that dimension of being-in-the-world that manifests itself as affect: mood, feeling, emotion. For Husserl, it is through affect that things have value for us, claim us, and so possess meaning in the sense of weight or bearing. For Heidegger, too, it is through moods that things matter to us, but whereas Husserl saw mood as a distinctive kind of intentional act (with value as its distinctive intentional object), Heidegger links affectivity to the pre-intentional disclosure

of being-in-the-world as a whole. Less formally, it is through mood that the world as a *whole* – the context of significance co-structured by my projects – is opened up as mattering in a certain way. When I am bored it is the world as a whole that is boring, hence individual things in it can strike me as tedious; when I am joyous I am warmly attuned to things as a whole, hence I can find particular things enchanting. At the same time, moods tell me something about myself. As Heidegger puts it, they reveal my "thrownness" or "facticity" – the "burdensome character of Dasein," that "it is and has to be" (GA 2, pp. 178–80/134–35/173–74). Moods thus attest that I am not a pure egological spontaneity but am passively *exposed* to the world. Such exposure marks my being as finite, a designation that Heidegger explores in his analyses of anxiety, being-towards-death, and historicality.

To the extent, then, that Husserl can be seen to claim that nothing essential to the constitution of meaning lies outside (transcendental) consciousness, Heidegger's analysis of affectedness – of the passivity and finitude of being-in-the-world – would seem to contest such internalism. As the way in which the world as a whole comes to matter at all, affectedness yields a condition on all intentional content (exposure to the world, facticity) that cannot itself be conceived as a correlate of consciousness. *Finding* oneself in a world cannot be recovered reflectively as a product of intentional activity; yet it is a condition of possibility for intentionality.

Does this mean that Heidegger should be counted among the externalists who argue that intentional content is partly determined by what lies outside consciousness? Certainly, if consciousness is understood in Cartesian fashion: Heidegger denies that some complex system of mental representations could be identical to the content of our experience. Yet it is not clear that Heidegger's externalism differs radically from Husserl's internalism. For instance, Heidegger's appeal to the world in which I find myself is not equivalent to the metaphysical naturalism typical of externalist theories, which treat the causal and micro-structure that determines aspects of certain intentional content as something unavailable to phenomenology. As he tells us in *Being and Time*, "the 'nature' by which we are 'surrounded' is, of course, an entity within-the-world" (GA 2, p. 280/211/254); that is, it is not the world itself but a kind of intentional content, something that shows up *in* the world. The "nature" of naturalistic accounts is thus immanent to being-in-the-world in much the same way that it is immanent to consciousness for Husserl, and precisely this structural similarity allowed Heidegger to dismiss Husserl's charge that *Being and Time* was merely an anthropologistic misunderstanding

of transcendental phenomenology. Heidegger's emphasis on the factic and worldly character of existence cannot mean that a philosophical account of intentionality is to be supplemented by historical, sociological, anthropological, or biological theories. What then can it mean? With this question, Heidegger's view of the matter of philosophy can no longer be explicated without reference to its method.

3   Contested philosophical issues (2): the method of philosophy

For Heidegger, as for Husserl, philosophical method must be distinct from that of non-philosophical inquiries; it can be neither inductive nor deductive, neither experimental nor dialectical. "Only as phenomenology is ontology possible" (GA 2, p. 48/35/60). Husserl characterized phenomenological method as reflective, intuitive, and descriptive, and in some places Heidegger appears to embrace, while in others he appears to contest, each of these. The focus here will be on the issue of method most closely bound up with the dispute over the matter of philosophy, namely, the issue of Husserl's *reductions*. By means of eidetic, phenomenological, and transcendental reductions Husserl sought to define the specific character of philosophical knowledge, and while Heidegger appears to dismiss them as useless "technical devices" (GA 2, p. 37/27/50), his own position remains within the scope of the reductions save at one crucial point, where an existential moment asserts itself within the framework of what both Heidegger and Husserl call philosophy's "transcendental knowledge" (GA 2, p. 51/38/62).

For Husserl, philosophy is not an empirical but an a priori discipline, a science of "essence." Thus phenomenology might begin with an example drawn from experience, but its goal is not an exhaustive description of the example. Rather, it seeks insight into what is essential to things of that kind, gained by varying the example in imagination until the limits of its variability-within-identity become clear. Husserl terms this process the "eidetic reduction." Many objections have been raised to such a procedure, but there can be little doubt that Heidegger agrees with its outcome. For him philosophical knowledge is eidetic. Early in *Being and Time* Heidegger warns that his analysis of "average everydayness" will "not exhibit arbitrary and accidental structures, but essential ones, which in each of factical Dasein's ways of being persist as determinative of that being" (GA 2, p. 23/17/38). Heidegger does not describe the process whereby he attained knowledge of these essential structures, but his conception of philosophical cognition remains within the scope of the

eidetic reduction. Thus it is quite perplexing to find Heidegger arguing that because Dasein's "what" is "precisely to be and nothing but to be," ideation is "the most fundamental misunderstanding" when applied to Dasein (GA 20, p. 152/110). And should one argue that since Heidegger holds philosophical inquiry to be grounded in factical, historical existence any claim to essential knowledge is incompatible with his position, this would show at most that Heidegger is inconsistent, since he does lay claim to such knowledge.

For Husserl, philosophical knowledge is distinct from all other knowledge in that it may not presuppose the world, and a second, "phenomenological," reduction (or *epoché*) makes this explicit. Often described as a "bracketing of being," the *epoché* would seem to be ruled out by the very nature of Heidegger's enterprise as an inquiry *into* being. Indeed, in 1925 Heidegger specifically rejects the "phenomenological reduction" as a "disregarding" that is "in principle inappropriate for determining the being of consciousness positively" (GA 20, p. 150/109). However, as with the eidetic reduction, the positions of Husserl and Heidegger are not as far apart as they initially appear. For by bracketing of being Husserl means, first of all, that philosophy cannot take over results from other sciences. It can reflect upon scientific claims as *claims* to truth, but in its effort to clarify the essence and possibility of scientific knowledge philosophy may not presuppose the validity of those claims. Heidegger affirms just this point – so contrary to contemporary naturalism – when he argues that philosophy does not "limp along" behind science, investigating its status "as it chances to find it," but rather "leaps ahead, as it were, into some area of being" and "discloses it for the first time in the constitution of its being" (GA 2, p. 14/10/30).

Husserl's reduction of "being" to "phenomenon" might appear to go further, but in fact it merely extends the *epoché* of the positive sciences to the factual claims inherent in everyday experience. For Husserl, to bracket being in order to focus on the phenomenon is to consider the entity precisely as it gives itself without committing oneself to the claims that the entity makes for itself. The *epoché* does not disregard being but sets a specific sort of epistemic commitment out of play. This pen and paper before me, for instance, certainly present themselves as real; but to investigate how this presentation-as-real, as a kind of intentionality, is constituted I need not use my commitment to its reality. In bracketing it I neither deny the reality of pen and paper, nor do I eliminate the possibility of inquiring into what reality means. Because philosophy is not an explanatory factual science, the bracketing of being does not compromise inquiry

into its sole concern: the phenomenon as such. In contrast, a science like psychology must commit itself to the factual existence of what it studies since it aims at laws that explain matters of fact, thus laws that depend on the real existence of the evidence that lies at their basis. If the phenomenological reduction is understood as a bracketing of epistemic commitment, then Heidegger too accepts the reduction. It merely expresses the anti-naturalism he shares with Husserl.

Having focused philosophical reflection on the phenomenon by means of the *epoché*, Husserl proposes a further, "transcendental," reduction whereby the phenomenon's conditions of possibility are disclosed. For Husserl, these conditions lie in "absolute" consciousness, which is said to constitute all being as phenomenon. Heidegger will part company with Husserl on this point, but again not without embracing a good many of the methodological implications of the transcendental reduction.

First, Heidegger informs us of the difference between Husserl's and his own version of this reduction:

> For *Husserl*, the phenomenological reduction … is the method of leading phenomenological vision from the natural attitude of the human being … back to the transcendental life of consciousness and its noetic-noematic experiences in which objects are constituted as correlates of consciousness. For *us*, the phenomenological reduction means leading phenomenological vision back from the apprehension of a being … to the understanding of the being of this being (projecting upon the way it is unconcealed). (GA 24, p. 29/21)

That this is a form of the transcendental reduction becomes clear if one recalls that to lead phenomenological vision back from the entity to the understanding of its being is, for Heidegger, to thematize the conditions for the disclosure, manifestation, of the entity *in* its being. Nevertheless, because the understanding of being depends on being-in-the-*world*, Heidegger's reduction would appear to conflict with Husserl's since the latter attains an absolute – that is, "worldless" – transcendental consciousness. In a famous passage Husserl imagines the "annihilation of the world" in order to argue that while all worldly being is relative to consciousness, consciousness is absolute in the sense that it needs no "real" thing in order to be – "*nulla 're' indiget ad existendum*" (Hua 3, p. 115/110). Heidegger, in contrast, insists that one cannot so much as entertain the *thought* that the world does not exist. In order to locate the true point at which Heidegger parts company with Husserl it will be instructive to examine this famous dispute a bit more closely.

"The question of whether there is a world at all, and whether its being can be proved, makes no sense if raised by *Dasein* as being-in-the-world; and who else would raise it?" (GA 2, p. 269/202/246). Heidegger here targets Kant and, behind him, Descartes' claim that the world, appearing just as it does in experience, might not exist; that it might be a very coherent dream or the product of an evil demon. Though he never says as much, Heidegger appears to target Husserl here as well. But in contrast to Descartes, Husserl nowhere implies that we have reason to doubt the existence of the world. On the contrary, he argues that if the "persistent regularities" of our experience go on without interruption it is *inconceivable* "that the corresponding transcendent world does not exist" (Hua 3, p. 116/111). The evidence for the existence of any worldly thing, and so of the world itself considered as the sum total of worldly things, is never sufficient to establish that existence apodictically; it is always presumptive. But Husserl does not treat this as a reason for the sort of Cartesian skepticism that Heidegger dismisses. In imagining the world's "annihilation" he refers, instead, to a situation in which the above-mentioned "persistent regularities" fail to obtain. In such a case the "being of consciousness … would indeed be modified," but "its own existence would not be touched" (Hua 3, p. 115/110); that is, even if law-governed identities did not present themselves in the ways they do in fact present themselves – namely, such that there are physical things for us – there could still be something like psychic functioning. Indeed, certain stages of infantile consciousness must be very much like this.

Such a position does not conflict in any essential way with Heidegger's. First, it does not imply that *Dasein* could be without a world. Being-in-the-world is indeed unthinkable under the conditions of "annihilation" in Husserl's sense, and if Heidegger is right that consciousness depends on Dasein, then consciousness could not be without a world either. Yet, second, one should be proceed here with caution: Heidegger's arguments about the dependence of consciousness on Dasein show only that *intentionality* could not be without Dasein, not that "consciousness" in some other sense could not be. And this is consistent with what Husserl says, since for him too annihilation of the world eliminates intentionality, though not consciousness. Consideration of infants, animals, and other apparently conscious creatures provides some reason to think that consciousness can in some sense exist without "world"; indeed, Heidegger makes just this point when he denies "worldhood" – though surely not sentience – to animals. This suggests that while Heidegger must reject Husserl's claim that the transcendental reduction establishes absolute

consciousness as the ground of an account of intentionality, this is not because the move to a transcendental perspective itself somehow conflicts with the worldly character of Dasein. Dasein's worldliness is *itself* transcendental. What finally forces the transformation of transcendental into existential phenomenology is to be sought in a different direction altogether.

Husserl developed the method of the reductions in order to do justice to what he took to be the fundamental norm governing philosophy, namely, the norm of "ultimate philosophical self-responsibility." Because philosophical inquiry can take nothing for granted – neither from the sciences nor from previous philosophies – it must be radically first-personal. Only what I can validate on the basis of my own evidential insight can stand as actual philosophical knowledge; the assertions of others are initially merely "empty," mere truth-claims that I must demonstrate for myself against the things that "fulfill" them. To take responsibility for evidential fulfillment defines the *practice* of philosophizing. The various reductions, then – including the reduction of one's own being to transcendental consciousness – are meant to stake out the kind of *Evidenz* that measures up to the norm, the first-person experience within which any possible claim to meaning and being must be assessed.

For Heidegger, too, the norm of evidential self-responsibility defines the practice of philosophy. Taking over Husserl's distinction between empty and fulfilled judgments, Heidegger treats philosophical concepts not as material for dialectic – "free-floating constructions" (GA 2, p. 37/28/50) – but as empty or "formal" indications that point toward a first-person "evidence situation" (GA 61, p. 35) in which their claims can be fulfilled or thwarted on the things themselves.[7] Heidegger was more attuned than was Husserl to the way traditional philosophical concepts can distort what the philosopher "sees," so his phenomenology includes a "destruction" (*Destruktion*) – or critical examination – of the tradition that aims at "access to those primordial 'sources' from which the categories and concepts handed down to us have been in part quite genuinely drawn" (GA 2, p. 29/21/43). In speaking of access to primordial sources, however, it is clear that destruction is not an alternative to first-person insight but its handmaid, an approach to tradition that aims to free up, here and now, "those primordial experiences" from which our understanding of ourselves has grown (GA 2, p. 30/22/44). Further, the demand for evidential self-responsibility is built into the structure of *Being and*

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7 On formal indication see Crowell 2001, pp. 129–51.

Time. An inquiry into Dasein (the being possessed of an understanding of being) as the ground of intentionality is, by the same stroke, an inquiry into its own conditions of possibility as inquiry. And because one of those conditions is that I be able to take responsibility for what I see and say, Heidegger must develop the analysis of Dasein beyond the account of its everyday lostness in the anonymity of *das Man* to that point where Dasein can genuinely say "I," that is, recover its "ownmost" self and so *be* responsible to itself. This is the methodological significance of the chapters on death, conscience, and authenticity as resoluteness.

But this has a serious implication for the theory of the transcendental reduction. It is possible for the phenomenologist to bracket her commitment to the existential claim made by any object of consciousness without thereby sacrificing the very possibility of attaining truth, since the phenomenon yields all the basis she needs for the kind of a priori and essentialist truth phenomenology seeks – including truth about meaning and being. However, when the inquiry concerns the transcendental *conditions* of such ontological inquiry – as it does when I am inquiring into my own being as a cognitively responsible being – the being of the inquirer cannot be bracketed. For I cannot bracket my commitment to being a philosopher (to the practice of philosophy as taking responsibility for the distinction between what is truly seen and what is only emptily asserted) without thereby losing the very topic of inquiry. Commitment to being, in the form of carrying out philosophy as evidential self-responsibility, is at this point – but *only* at this point – irreducible. As Heidegger was the first to see clearly, phenomenology must become existential because it is here, in the being of the philosopher, that the matter and method of philosophy become one.

PART II

Husserl on consciousness and intentionality

4

The first-person character of philosophical knowledge

Husserl's phenomenology entered the world not as a philosophical method but as a psychological propaedeutic to logic. In the *Logical Investigations* Husserl criticized logical psychologism as a contradictory attempt to explain logical validity by appeal to psychological facts, but he embraced the idea that the meaning of logical concepts and operators could be clarified through "descriptive psychological" reflection on the mental processes in which such concepts and operators are given (Hua 19/1, p. 24/262). As reflective description, this sort of investigation of mental processes is irreducibly first-personal. Though it is not concerned with an individual mental process in its datable particularity, but rather with its "essence" or type, descriptive psychology is a mode of direct *self*-knowledge. For while information can be gained about mental processes from the third-person point of view, as in Daniel Dennett's "hetero-phenomenology" (1989, pp. 153–58), it is only from the first-person point of view that the "thing itself," the mental process as such, can be given. And only on the basis of such givenness can its distinctive characteristics be described.

From the beginning the first-person character of phenomenology was a point of criticism. Paul Natorp, for instance, spoke of a "logical uneasiness" in Husserl's juxtaposition of logic and descriptive psychology, and he urged Husserl to adopt the kind of constructivism advocated by the neo-Kantians (Natorp 1901). Emil Lask, a student of Heinrich Rickert's, denied that phenomenology's commitment to describing what is "immanent within experience or consciousness" could provide the basis from which genuine philosophical issues might be addressed – for instance, the issue of how conceptual thought could "hold" or be valid for real things independent of the subject (Lask 2003a, p. 351/414). And Rickert himself accused Husserl of a kind of intuitionism that was little better than the *Lebensphilosophie* practiced by "poets" like Nietzsche or Bergson (Rickert 1922). Yet around 1907, when Husserl came to believe that phenomenology was no mere propaedeutic to logic but a genuine "first philosophy," and that philosophical problems could only be solved

if formulated on the basis of phenomenological investigation, he not only retained its reflective, first-person character, but radicalized it by way of a transcendental-phenomenological reduction in which the real world of tables, trees, other people, and artworks is bracketed so as to focus exclusively on the intentional experiences that have such worldly things as their correlates.

Whatever may be said for the project of clarifying logical concepts by descriptive recourse to the mental processes in which they are given,[1] it is not clear why all philosophical questions *as such* ought to be approached through a reflective, first-person method. The question that Husserl's mature phenomenology raises, then, is the question of the relation between philosophical knowledge and the first-person stance. The mere fact that knowledge has some connection to knowing – to acts of thinking, inferring, judging, and intuiting – does not entail that such knowledge can best be pursued by attending exclusively to such acts. Physics and biology, for instance, seem to get along quite well without it, and even psychology tends to shun act-analysis as unscientific introspection. Why should philosophy be any different?

This is the question I shall pursue in the present chapter by tracing a specific development within Husserl's thinking. In the previous chapter we saw that Husserl's demand for a phenomenological reduction had a twofold motivation. Both were epistemological in a broad sense, but, as I shall argue, the first – the idea that reflection on first-person experience has the kind of epistemic (evidential) privilege necessary for a foundational ("presuppositionless") philosophy – is itself only a specification of the second – namely, the idea that philosophical inquiry is uniquely governed by the norm of ultimate self-responsibility. As Husserl understands the practice of philosophy, it can take no particular knowledge as given; thus whatever philosophy asserts, whatever truth-claims it makes, must be its "own" in some sense, something for which it can take responsibility. This second motivation for the reduction yields an entirely different account of why philosophical knowledge is necessarily first-personal.

Husserl himself was never completely successful in separating and distinguishing these two motives, but my aim here will be to do so by drawing upon Richard Moran's reconstruction of first-person authority as a matter not of a special kind of inner perception but of a certain *practical* orientation in which an agent takes responsibility for the beholdenness to reasons of his or her mental states. On the basis of Moran's analysis

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[1] See the discussion of this issue in Martin 2006.

of commitment and avowal, I shall argue that Husserl's view of philosophy as an inquiry that must clarify the very possibility of knowledge requires, even in the absence of all Cartesian assumptions, that it be radically first-personal, that is, both intuitive and reflective. This account of phenomenological method as deriving from the responsibility that characterizes the philosopher as an inquirer – that is, as an agent engaged in a certain kind of cognitive project – will allow us to appreciate some distinctive and controversial features of phenomenology, namely, the reduction (or *epoché*) and the transcendental idealism that results from it. This, in turn, will help us identify one reason for the existential transformation of phenomenology carried out by Heidegger and by Merleau-Ponty, a transformation that does not abandon, but radicalizes, the first-person character of philosophical knowledge.

1   Husserl's epistemic motive: apodictic *Evidenz* and reflection

Husserl's initial reasons for thinking that philosophy demands a first-person method were epistemological. In the *Idea of Phenomenology* (1907), for instance, we read that "theory of knowledge" – which "gives us an ultimate, clear, and therefore consistent insight into the essence of cognition and the possibility of its achievements" – is "the condition of the possibility of a metaphysics" (Hua 2, p. 3/1), that is, of all other philosophical knowledge. Behind this claim is Husserl's distinctive view of philosophy as a cognitively autonomous, "ultimately grounded," enterprise. All sciences assume that the kind of knowledge they pursue is possible, but according to Husserl the demonstration of that possibility lies outside the scope of their methods. It is the task of philosophy, in contrast, to clarify how any knowledge is possible, including philosophical knowledge itself. This classically foundationalist conception entails that philosophy is autonomous in a way that other sciences are not. Where biology can take over molecular theory from chemistry and atomic theory from physics, philosophy can borrow nothing from other sciences that could serve as a premise for demonstrating that such knowledge is possible.

   Now this picture of philosophy has been much contested lately – most notably, perhaps, by a widely prevalent kind of naturalism – and I cannot linger to point out what is distinctive about Husserl's version of it, or to defend it against such criticisms. But even if we grant the picture it is still not at all clear why this foundationalist philosophy must be *phenomenology*, that is, carried out in first-person reflection on "intentional acts."

Husserl's initial answer is essentially Cartesian and turns on the claim that phenomenology provides an epistemically certain field of cognitions on the basis of which the possibility of knowledge in other sciences, and in daily life, can be clarified. To understand this epistemic claim it is necessary to say something about two Husserlian notions: the concept of *Evidenz*, and the idea of a reflective (transcendental, non-positive) inquiry.

The first notion is present already in the *Logical Investigations*. In his descriptive psychological clarification of the concept of knowledge Husserl makes a distinction between judgments that merely "emptily" intend their objects and those that are "fulfilled" in a corresponding intuitive presentation of their objects.[2] A purely logical consideration of judgments as embedded in sentences, one that abstracts from the acts of cognition in which judgments are formed, sees no difference here. But for Husserl no sentence, however true, counts by itself as knowledge. Knowledge is not just truth but the correlate of an act of knowing, and knowing, in turn, demands at least the possibility that a sentence I merely assume or entertain can come to be "demonstrated" or verified, *show itself* as true. Such showing is what Husserl calls the moment of "intuitive fulfillment." Only when I have the experience of such intuitive fulfillment can I be said to know, in the fullest sense, what I claim to know. Obviously I am frequently said to know a great many things for which I currently lack intuitive fulfillment. But on Husserl's view the sense of such knowledge-claims always points back to some modality of intuitive fulfillment. The self-presentation of the object in intuition – where "intuition" is not limited to sense data, or even to sense-perception, but denotes whatever proper form the self-presentation of a type of object takes – is what Husserl calls *Evidenz*: "We speak … of *Evidenz* wherever an assertive intention (a statement in particular) finds verification in a corresponding, fully accommodated percept" (Hua 19/2, p. 651/765). *Evidenz* is what John McDowell calls the moment of "friction" between conceptual thought and the world (1996, p. 11).

Now this concept of *Evidenz* already expresses a commitment to the first-person point of view in the analysis of knowledge in general, insofar as it implies that genuine knowing is rooted in the direct grasp of an object by a subject. But while this suffices to rule out the idea that knowledge could be gained *exclusively* by means of purely constructive or "speculative" methods, it tells us nothing that is specific to philosophical

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2 See Hua 19/2, pp. 582–95/707–18, and the discussion in Chapter 2 above.

knowledge, since it merely highlights a kind of empiricism characteristic of every science. The philosophically relevant point emerges, instead, from the fact that there are "degrees and levels of *Evidenz*" – that is, the various "approximations of percepts to the objective completeness of their presentation of their object" (Hua 19/2, p. 651/765).

Schematically, *Evidenz* can be either "adequate" or "inadequate." An object can give itself in such a way that it partially fulfills the judgment made about it, and in such cases it is inadequate. For instance, when I judge that this cup is cylindrical, perception of the cup shows it as fulfilling my judgment. The judgment intends the cup as a whole, however, whereas perception reveals it from one side alone. It is perfectly possible that the cylinder is not continued on the hidden side, and, were I to get a glimpse of it, my judgment would have to be revised. Husserl argues that no physical (or "transcendent") thing can be given with adequate evidence; hence sciences that thematize such things can contain only presumptive knowledge. On the other hand, if an object gives itself in such a way that it wholly fulfills the intention directed toward it, the *Evidenz* is adequate. For Husserl, the only objects that are given in this way are mental processes themselves, or what he will come to call "immanent" objects (Hua 19/2, p. 648/763). To grasp such objects intuitively is to reflect; thus such *Evidenz* is first-personal in an eminent sense. It is *self*-knowledge. And thanks to the adequacy with which mental processes are given, they possess an epistemically crucial feature for Husserl: knowledge of them is certain (apodictic). Thus if (as Husserl assumes) philosophy requires "ultimately grounded" knowledge, and if the only candidate for such knowledge is what is apodictically given, then one's own self-knowledge, knowledge of one's own intentional mental processes, must be the starting point for any rigorous philosophical inquiry. This is the first epistemic argument for Husserl's claim that philosophy must be pursued in a first-person way.

The second argument is not found in the *Logical Investigations*, however, but arises from Husserl's attempt to move beyond the limits of that work. For it is not enough that philosophical knowledge be apodictic; it must also be presuppositionless, and reflection on mental processes does not necessarily qualify.[3] If in reflecting on them I construe them as functions of brain states, for instance, or in general if I take them to be states of

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[3] "Of course anyone can reflect and bring consciousness within his comprehending view; but that does not yet achieve *phenomenological* reflection, nor is the comprehended consciousness pure consciousness" (Hua 3, p. 119/114).

the human organism, I embed my description in a context that is not itself adequately given. From the point of view of adequate givenness the naturalistic discourse about human beings, psyches, neuronal networks, and the like are interpretive additions, presuppositions. Extending his earlier critique of psychologism, therefore, Husserl came to argue against just this naturalism of ordinary philosophical thinking. He insisted that only if reflection were freed from all such interpretive commitments, only if all assumptions about the nature of mental processes that go beyond how they present themselves in intuitive *Evidenz* were put out of play, could the apodictic grasp of intentional states count as philosophically presuppositionless. The demands on philosophical cognition require that it be based on "pure" insight, borrowing no interpretive assumptions from other sciences or daily life. However obvious they seem, all such assumptions must submit to an *epoché*, or suspension. Wherever an interpretation of an immanent object makes reference to something transcendent (namely, to something that can be given only with less than adequate *Evidenz*), it must be set aside – as when a mental process is taken to be an occurrence in the brain.

But this apparently radical *askesis* has an unsuspected gain. For since any such transcendent object can give itself only as a correlate of some intentional mental processes, the world that is lost through the *epoché* is regained as a "transcendence-in-immanence," as an element (Husserl calls it the "noema") of the apodictically given field of first-person reflection. Philosophical knowledge thus proves to be transcendental: on the basis of apodictic *Evidenz* it clarifies how that which is transcendent comes to be given (constituted) as such in networks of intentional mental processes (Hua 3, pp. 118–19/112–13). It thus shows how knowledge of the transcendent is possible.

Husserl held that the *epoché* implied a kind of idealism, but we shall postpone consideration of that issue until the end of this chapter. For Husserl's early arguments for idealism are bound up with his narrowly epistemic account of the first-person character of philosophical knowledge, and he ultimately came to abandon that account. Attending to the temporal structure of mental processes, Husserl came to see that they could never be adequately given; hence knowledge of them could not be apodictic.[4] Nevertheless, he held fast to the view that philosophical

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[4] In *Cartesian Meditations* Husserl speaks of the "naïveté of apodicticity" (Hua 1, p. 178/151). For a discussion of some of the issues that led Husserl to question his early epistemic commitments, see Welton 2000, especially ch. 6.

knowledge had to be grounded phenomenologically, in a first-person way. Increasingly he defended this view by appeal to the philosopher's radical self-responsibility – the idea that the philosopher can accept nothing as valid that is merely handed down, nothing on authority, nothing that she has not seen for herself.[5] Such a demand is not, according to Husserl, a feature of sciences other than philosophy: while physicists and mathematicians may at times operate on the basis of direct intuitive *Evidenz*, they need not do so, and when they do not, they do not somehow compromise the very character of their knowledge. In philosophy, on the other hand, first-person "seeing" of the matter in question is a desideratum.

But why should this be so, if there is nothing epistemically distinctive about such first-person evidence? And why, further, should philosophy be reflective – concerning itself with the "subjective," the field of intentional mental processes and their correlates – if this is no more adequately given, no more certain, than is the world itself? As already noted, Husserl never really succeeded in answering these questions; that is, he never fully succeeded in disentangling the epistemic justification from the justification based on self-responsibility. But I believe that the two can be disentangled, and I would like to make a start on that now by recasting the issue in terms of Richard Moran's argument that first-person authority is best understood as a conceptual requirement on what it is to be a rational *agent*.

2   First-person authority as commitment and avowal

Husserl's epistemic arguments for the priority of first-person knowledge in philosophy illustrate what Richard Moran calls the "perceptual model" of self-knowledge (2001, p. 13). The perceptual model is a way of accounting for several apparent asymmetries between first-person knowledge of one's mental states and the knowledge that others can have of these same states. The two most important asymmetries are immediacy and authority. Unlike the knowledge that others can have of my mental states, which relies on inferences from behavioral evidence in the widest sense, my own self-knowledge is not inferential, is not based on evidence, and does not depend on identifying myself under some description or another. It thus has a kind of immediacy. Similarly, my reports of such

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[5]   For a recent effort to sort out Husserl's views on this matter see Nenon 2002. Knies 2011 explores the question of how it can be established phenomenologically that this *is* a demand of philosophy as such.

knowledge seem to have a kind of authority not possessed by the statements made by others about them: despite the non-evidential character of self-knowledge, I seem to be in a privileged position to report what I believe. What explains these phenomena? The perceptual model tries to answer by conceiving self-knowledge as a kind of "inner" perception, a peculiar kind of self-objectification, carried out in reflection. Because it is perception and not inference, self-knowledge is certain, and thus also authoritative. Husserl clearly holds a similar view when he argues that the "essence" of any mental process "involves the essential possibility of a reflective turning of regard … In other words, any [mental process] can become the object of a so-called 'internal perception'." Further, for Husserl, "phenomenological method operates exclusively in acts of reflection" (Hua 3, pp. 85, 177/78, 174).

We have seen that Husserl came to doubt a key element of this picture, namely, the idea that self-knowledge could be apodictic; and the claims for the certainty of such knowledge are now pretty much universally rejected. But as Moran argues, once this key idea drops out, the thought that the perceptual model can really account for the asymmetries begins to crumble. For instance, it no longer seems able to explain why we hold such knowledge to be particularly important. The fact that we have special non-inferential (immediate) access to ourselves seems not to distinguish such knowledge in any significant way from that which can be attained by third-person means. And so also the perceptual model fails to account for the *kind* of authority we ascribe to self-knowledge, for that authority includes something like a demand: "we expect and sometimes insist that [a person] take himself to be in a position to *speak for* his feelings and convictions, and not merely offer his best opinion about them" (Moran 2001, p. 26). It is this normative moment for which the perceptual model wholly fails to account, since that model suggests that our fundamental mode of self-awareness is theoretical detachment with regard to ourselves, and that self-knowledge answers primarily to an interest in explaining or describing the "contents" of our minds. But such detached self-observation, while possible, seems not to explain the close normative connection, expressed in the demand for authority, between the report and the person who delivers it.

To address this problem Moran argues that we should approach the immediacy and authority of self-knowledge not from the standpoint of the self as theoretical observer of itself but from the standpoint of the self as agent, the standpoint of deliberation ("making up one's mind"). Once we do so it becomes clear that what is important about first-person

knowledge is not its epistemic certainty but rather its connection to being a rational agent. Beliefs, for instance, are not simple mental contents that just happen to show up; they are "stances" that a person takes toward the world, internal to which is a demand for justification (Moran 2001, p. 114). If I take a purely theoretical interest in them, as prescribed by the perceptual model, I shall miss the peculiar role this demand for justification plays in the structure of belief and so also the precise character of the authority I have over them. I do not, for instance, have authority over my beliefs in the sense that I can alter them at will (2001, p. 119). Rather, it is better to say that I have authority over them because I am *responsible* for their being *responsive* to reasons.

The responsiveness to reasons that characterizes a belief, however, is not simply a matter of its role within an inferential whole – that is, it is not merely a question of its place in logical space or in a web of beliefs. Were that the case, then the importance of the authority and immediacy of self-knowledge would disappear from view. If responsiveness to reasons meant merely that a "rational adjustment of beliefs" somehow took place such that a consistent set of beliefs were the result, it would have no necessary connection to the first-person stance. It could, as Moran argues, "take place below the threshold of consciousness," for instance in "the constant flow of perceptual experience and the updating and revising of the beliefs about one's immediate environment" (2001, p. 110). Nor can a belief's responsiveness to reasons be understood as a psychological matter of fact: it is obviously not psychologically necessary that I abandon one of two contradictory beliefs when the contradiction becomes apparent to me. To conceive a belief's responsiveness to reasons either as a matter of logic or as a matter of psychology is to leave out my *responsibility* for that responsiveness. Only by tracking the nature of such responsibility – invisible to the perceptual model – does the connection between rational agency and first-person immediacy and authority become clear.

Moran approaches the connection between responsibility and belief (and other "reason-responsive" mental states such as desire) by analyzing the phenomenon of the "transparency" of belief. "Ordinarily, if a person asks himself the question 'Do I believe that p?' he will treat this much as he would a corresponding question that does not refer to himself at all, namely, 'Is p true?'" (2001, p. 60). A belief is thus transparent if, in order to determine what I believe, I do not need to consult my psychological state, but only the *object* of the belief. Such transparency characterizes those beliefs that I consider from the standpoint of a deliberating agent – that is, when I stand toward my beliefs not as a neutral observer but as their

author. In such cases, "knowing what I think" is not the end result of a reflective process but of a process in which I adjudicate possible states of the *world* (2001, p. 63). Nor is this result itself simply a matter of making a theoretical determination about a state of affairs; rather, it is to come to a *decision* about what I think, based on such determinations – that is, to make up my mind. To say what I believe, then, is not merely to report on a mental content discovered through reflection, though I can always do this as well (2001, p. 89). Rather, it is to *express a commitment* to taking the world in a certain way.[6]

A report of a belief that exhibits transparency in the above sense is, in Moran's terms, an "avowal." Avowals are thus reports that express commitments (2001, p. 101). In reflection on my beliefs, in contrast – as a mere spectator of my condition – I need express no commitment to the way the world is. Hence it is logically possible that the transparency condition fails: "S is p, but I don't believe that it is." But in that case, my relation to my belief has neither the immediacy nor the authority of genuine first-person self-knowledge. This, according to Moran, is because from the spectator's position the belief's responsiveness to reasons has been compromised. A person might discover through analysis, for instance, that her feelings of anxiety are based on a belief that she was betrayed by her mother. But outside the therapeutic context (in which her beliefs are established on the basis of theoretical evidence) she may find no reason for believing that her mother betrayed her. "So, transparency fails because she cannot learn of this attitude of hers by reflection on the object of that attitude," and her theoretically established belief is resistant to reasons stemming from that object. But as a rational agent "my awareness of my belief is an awareness of my *commitment* to its truth, a commitment to something that transcends any description of my psychological state" (2001, pp. 85, 84). Thus, as Moran argues, "the phenomena of self-knowledge … are themselves based as much in asymmetries of responsibility and commitment as they are in differences in capacities, or in cognitive access" (2001, p. 64).

What distinguishes the stance of the rational agent from that of the self reflecting on itself, then, is that one's mental states are taken as responsive to the world in a normative, and not merely a causal, way. This indicates the conceptual connection between first-person immediacy and authority and rational agency as such – namely, the conceptual connection between rational agency and self-responsibility. In a deliberative stance, a person

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6   The phenomenological implications of this idea of commitment will be extensively treated in Part III below.

treats his or her beliefs not as mental occurrences that can be *explained* in terms of interactions with the world, but as *justified* by the world. An avowal expresses my commitment to the truth of my belief because it takes the world as the set of justifying reasons for my beliefs. To treat my beliefs in light of explanatory reasons is to treat them from a third-person point of view, just as others can treat my beliefs as explanatory of my behavior whether or not the beliefs are true. But to consider my beliefs in light of justifying reasons is to treat them in a distinctively first-personal way – that is, to *decide* about them on the basis of "facts distinct from and independent of [my] beliefs" (Moran 2001, p. 128), to decide what does or does not justify my taking a certain stance toward the world.

Both the immediacy and authority of first-person self-knowledge can be explained on this basis. Immediacy (knowing what I think without having to consult behavioral or other evidence about myself, as others must do) reflects the fact that the evidence relevant to deliberative justification derives from the world: "information about myself that I would gain through inference or evidence about myself is ruled out as irrelevant to the question of what I am to believe" (Moran 2001, p. 134). And authority (the fact that I am in a privileged position with respect to reporting what I believe) expresses the responsibility an agent has for deciding what she believes on the basis of justifying reasons.

Thus first-person authority and immediacy "both stem from the fact that the person's own relation to his attitudes and his intentional actions must express the priority of justifying reasons over explanatory ones" (Moran 2001, p. 128). Why must the person's relation express this priority? Why does an agent have this sort of responsibility? Moran answers that it is a conceptual requirement on personhood, on being a rational agent, and his argument for this, perhaps surprisingly, invokes our capacity to reflect on our mental states. It thus brings us back in an oblique way to phenomenology.

Moran claims that responsibility for what one believes belongs to the essence of rational agency, since "there would be nothing that counted as agency or deliberation at all if a person could not generally claim the conclusion of his reasoning as making it the case that, as a matter of psychological fact, *this* is his belief about it" (2001, p. 120). The reason lies in the structure of deliberation as a kind of reflection. Though the deliberative stance, unlike reflection conceived as inner perception, is beholden to the transparency condition and thus looks to the world for justifying reasons for beliefs, it nevertheless arises precisely because ongoing action has broken down at some point, entailing that I become explicitly conscious of

myself *as* an agent. Such self-consciousness is itself a mode of reflection, as Moran, citing Christine Korsgaard, conceives it: "The reflective structure of consciousness sets us a problem. Reflective distance from our impulses makes it both possible and necessary to decide which ones we will act on: it forces us to act for reasons" (2001, p. 142). As Moran notes, this sort of distancing from one's impulses is not merely a matter of becoming aware of them, but rather of *suspending* their force over me as reasons: "I am not simply free to appraise [them], but also free to choose whether [they] shall be something I act upon or not." And whereas I can appraise the impulses to believe of others, as they can mine, it is only *I* who am in a position to determine what my belief *will be*. The distinctive character of first-person authority as responsibility emerges here, for "only with respect to *my own* state of mind am I in a position to determine *what it is* by deliberative reflection on it" (2001, pp. 144–45).

Thus reflection does not merely make possible a cognitive grasp of one's own mental state, nor even an evaluative grasp of it; it also calls for a "particular first-person *stance* toward the belief in question, the stance of rational agency." Self-responsibility is a condition on rational agency since the stance in question is a staking of myself, taking a stand, committing myself to "how things are out there" (Moran 2001, pp. 149–50). This connection between reflection and self-responsibility is also a central element in Husserl's argument for a first-person approach in philosophy. However, the very idea of responsibility as staking oneself brings with it a challenge to Husserl's thought that leads beyond it, though precisely not beyond its commitment to the first-person stance. It is time, finally, to return to phenomenology.

3   Self-responsibility, first-person authority, and phenomenological method

When we understand first-person authority as a matter of a rational agent's self-responsibility we begin to see why Husserl could retain his emphasis on the first-person stance even after he abandoned the claim that such a stance could yield an epistemically certain foundation. Why should philosophy be pursued phenomenologically – that is, as a methodological intuitionism based on first-person *Evidenz*, direct seeing of the things themselves – rather than through constructions or deductions, if what is grasped in this way is no more certain than what is taken over from others or attained through inference? Husserl's answer is that the methodological insistence on seeing for oneself, the authority of *Evidenz*,

reflects the demand on the knower, conceived as a cognitive agent, that his or her beliefs be responsive to reasons. On Husserl's view, all reasons ultimately refer back to direct seeing for their authority; put otherwise, the concept of *Evidenz* is the root concept from which the notion of a "justifying reason" derives its sense. This is expressed in what Husserl calls the "principle of all principles": "every originary presentative intuition is a legitimizing source of cognition"; further, "each <theory> can itself in turn only draw its truth from originary data" (Hua 3, p. 52/44).

Thus it is because all theory-construction and indirect methods of cognition refer back to a direct intuitive legitimizing ground, that an *ultimately* grounded science – namely, philosophy – must concern itself in the first instance with such direct legitimation. It is not because philosophy requires more certainty than other sciences that it must be carried out phenomenologically on the basis of *Evidenz* and can take nothing for granted; rather, it is because it is committed to ultimate self-responsibility, now understood as the commitment to making *all* one's beliefs beholden to justifying reasons – reasons which ultimately go back to such *Evidenz*.

Nevertheless, this still does not explain the more radical aspect of phenomenology's commitment to the first-person stance, namely, its reflective character. Indeed, the reconstruction of first-person authority in terms of the agent-centered stance of deliberation might suggest that the idea that philosophy should be a reflection on experience is a misguided remnant from the perceptual model. Why must philosophy, on Husserl's view, concern itself with what is available phenomenologically – that is, through reflection on one's *experiencing* of what is experienced, one's *believing* of what is believed, and so on – once the epistemic justification for this has been abandoned? Even though this sort of reflective self-knowledge is possible, it would seem to be of limited value. Given the transparency condition, coming to determine what I believe (or what I perceive, etc.) should be a matter of consulting the world, of determining whether my belief is well founded.

Now *if* it were the aim of phenomenology to discover what I, the reflecting phenomenologist, believe, then reflection on my mental state would be out of place. But that is not what the phenomenologist hopes to learn by way of first-person reflection. Rather, she wishes to grasp the *structure* of experiencing or believing itself, the intentionality in and through which the world (and everything in it) is given in precisely the way that it is given. Following Moran's account of the transparency condition, it might appear that only the world matters. And yet the world – the very *Evidenz* or justifying reasons to which I am beholden in the deliberative

stance – is only ever given for me to be beholden and responsive *to* by means of specific intentional acts or modes of experience. Here too, then, it is because philosophy demands ultimate self-responsibility that it must adopt a reflective method (phenomenology). Philosophy must engage in first-person reflection on experience because it cannot take anything for granted, cannot ignore (as other sciences might) the conditions that make anything like justifying reasons *available* to the deliberating agent. They become available through one or another modality of experience, and experience is always a first-person affair.

This does not mean, however, that the practicing phenomenologist – who is, after all, an agent, someone who carries out a rational inquiry that must yield avowals of some sort – does not respect the priority of justifying over explanatory reasons. She would seek explanatory reasons only if her reflection were in the service of accounting for her own behavior on the basis of her individual beliefs, or of these beliefs themselves on the basis of a causal interaction with the world. But if the phenomenologist wants to learn something about the connection between the world and the experiencing of the world, it is precisely this correlation that is her object. Her own inquiry will obey the transparency condition if what she believes about (say) the way perception gives its object (the essential laws of perceptual presentation) is arrived at not by consulting her *reflection* on the perceiving/perceived structure, but by reflectively consulting *that very structure* itself. Thus the intentional structure of perception is the source of her justifying reasons; the fact that it is given in reflection does not distinguish it in any important respect from objects that do not require reflection in order to be intuitively grasped.

From this it becomes clear that phenomenology's commitment to the first-person method – both as intuitionism and as reflection on experience – can be derived from the demand for ultimate self-responsibility in philosophy. Whether philosophy really makes such a demand is a matter I shall not argue for here, but at the very least we see that the notion of ultimate grounding can retain a sense even if we abandon the idea of an apodictic grounding.[7] To be ultimately grounded is simply to widen the scope of the transparency condition and the commitment to justifying over explanatory reasons in a specific way: since any "worldly" justifying reason will be given through a structure of intentional experience, it will not be fully transparent until that experiential structure – including the way in which the first-order object is given in it – has itself become that

[7] See Crowell 1999.

to which an inquiry makes itself beholden. Just this is what phenomeno-logical philosophy purports to do.

As we noted at the outset, however, phenomenology is no ordinary reflection. Instead, it seeks to become transcendental by employing an *epoché*, or phenomenological reduction, in which the presupposed being of the world is bracketed or suspended. This, in turn, was taken by Husserl to entail a kind of idealism of "absolute consciousness." Does the approach to first-person authority through the concept of self-responsibility shed any light on these controversial elements of Husserl's thought?

Often the motive for the reduction – together with the assertion of the absoluteness of consciousness and the relativity of the world – are explained in epistemic terms: the *Evidenz* in which the transcendent world is given can be doubted (it is not adequate), and therefore it must be bracketed or set aside in a philosophy that wants to build on apodictic foundations. Such an apodictic foundation is located in consciousness, which is said to be given adequately and thus absolutely. But if we are not convinced by such claims to apodicticity, it might seem as though brack-eting the world is an unnecessary and paradoxical procedure, and that no privileged status should accrue to the consciousness upon which we come to reflect. This seems to be how Heidegger viewed the matter in his 1925 critique of Husserl (GA 20, pp. 123–57/90–114). Should phenomenology then renounce – as some believe Heidegger did renounce – these central Husserlian ideas?

The answer is no – or at least not entirely. Both the reduction and phe-nomenological idealism have a valuable philosophical sense apart from the early Husserl's Cartesian arguments for them. Let us begin with the *epoché*, in which I take no stand with regard to the being or non-being of the world and all the things that show up in my intentional experi-ences. The phenomenologist engages in this practice *not* because worldly things are given inadequately and are thus unsuitable for a presupposi-tionless philosophical inquiry, but because such worldly things don't belong to the terrain of philosophical inquiry at all. Once one has con-ceived this terrain as consisting in the (reflectively grasped) intentional structure of mental acts, one has fixed upon an object that, as Husserl says in "Philosophy as Rigorous Science," exhibits its *own* laws – normative rather than causal, intentional rather than natural: "Everything psychical … finds its ordered place within a comprehensive context, a 'monadic' unity of consciousness, a unity that in itself has nothing at all to do with nature, with space and time, substantiality and causality, but has its thor-oughly peculiar 'forms'" (Hua 25, p. 30/107–8). The *epoché* – which entails

a suspension of our everyday practical and theoretical commitment to the being of nature and therefore rules out accepting anything from sciences that do presuppose such being – is meant primarily to block the impulse to explain intentionality in naturalistic terms, thereby allowing one to focus on it in its intuitive self-givenness as justifying reasons for phenomenological descriptions.

If that is so, then the *epoché* is nothing but a consequence of taking seriously the reflective stance dictated by philosophy's commitment to ultimately justifying *Evidenz*; it is simply to make reflection's breach of the transparency condition explicit. For in reflection, as we learned from Moran, the claims of the object are "distanced" and "called into question" – indeed, they are "suspended" (Moran 2001, p. 143). When I am brought up short in the course of my ongoing activity and have to consider some belief of mine explicitly in terms of its justifying reasons – as when, after hearing a ring and picking up the phone only to find no one on the line, I must consider whether the ring was a good reason for believing that I had a phone call – I "suspend that belief and thereby 'delegitimize' it in inference and in its interactions with my other attitudes." I am "denying it a role as a premise in my reasoning or a guide to action," which means "that it no longer has the ordinary inferential or functional role that belongs by nature to a belief of that sort" (Moran 2001, pp. 144–45).

In ordinary deliberation such suspension is localized and remains bound up with non-suspended beliefs about the world, since my aim in deliberating is to come up with a belief that fits the available worldly reasons and get back to work. But if I am concerned with the structure of experience as such – as I am in phenomenological reflection – then the status of the object experienced can remain suspended; that is, I need avow nothing about it at all, commit myself to nothing having to do with its properties and features insofar as they transcend my experiencing of them. Even with the whole world suspended, even if I make no use of any of my beliefs about the world, I can still investigate how the intentional experiences in which the objects of such beliefs are given provide them with the sense or meaning they have – for instance, the meaning of being "justifying reasons." We may go a step further: any phenomenology that sought to "unbracket" the world and make assertions about worldly things would make a methodological error, since it would then seek to establish the properties of objects themselves on the basis of *reflective* evidence. Not only would it thereby compete directly with sciences that construct their beliefs on the basis of examining objects in the world; it would do so on the basis not of the world but the "appearing" of the world in

experience. And that is not the kind of evidence that can determine what properties entities have.

Thus the *epoché* or reduction may be seen to follow from the demand, inherent in the idea of self-responsibility, that philosophy proceed reflectively. On this basis it is possible to see how a certain kind of idealism also follows from the idea of self-responsibility. If phenomenological reflection is beholden not to the object as such but to the meta-object that consists of the first-order object together with the experiencing in which it is given – in short to the full intentional structure – then, if its beliefs about this second-order object are to be responsive to reasons that derive from that object as *Evidenz*, such reflection must *avow* its second-order object, that is, hold what it says about it to be true *of it*, and not of its own act of reflection. But this just means that it will posit its object, in contrast to leaving it suspended. What Husserl calls "immanent being" – that is, "pure consciousness" conceived not as an inner realm but as the object of a reflection on the structure of intentionality – is thus "absolute" being (Hua 3, pp. 100–4/94–98). It is absolute because it will elude suspension in any philosophical reflection. It cannot be suspended without thereby suspending the very possibility of philosophical inquiry, for such inquiry cannot merely describe immanent being but must be practically *guided* by it and so must take it as true, that is, posit it as something that has being independent of one's reflection.

This yields the specific form of phenomenological idealism. The object of non-reflective inquiry (transcendent being) can only be given through the object of reflective inquiry (immanent being) and thus can always be suspended and treated as a function of the latter, that is, as a "unity of meaning" (Hua 3, p. 134/128). It is thus in this sense "relative." The object of reflective inquiry, however, can never be suspended and can therefore not be treated as a function of any higher-order standpoint. It is therefore "absolute." That this kind of idealism entails nothing about the causal dependence of the world upon the mind, or about some metaphysical non-being of the real world, should be obvious.

Nevertheless, a key question arises here. If consciousness or transcendental subjectivity is absolute in the sense that it cannot be bracketed – that is, if phenomenology must posit or avow such being on pain of losing the *Evidenz* appropriate to it – will it not be posited as *part of the world*? How, then, will it escape being suspended when the world is suspended?

Existential phenomenologists like Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty seized on this point to develop modifications in the phenomenological method. Heidegger used it to "reawaken the question of the meaning of

being" (GA 2, p. 1/1/19), while Merleau-Ponty famously argued that "the most important lesson which the reduction teaches us is the impossibility of a complete reduction" (1962, p. xiv). I shall leave for later chapters the task of assessing the meaning of these developments, but we may close by bringing to light one final curiosity about phenomenology's commitment to a first-person method based on the idea of ultimate self-responsibility.

Husserl was quite clear about what he wanted to say about the question raised above: in positing immanent being as absolute I precisely *cannot* posit it as part of the world. This was Descartes' error when he treated the *cogito* – that is, the first-person field of intentional consciousness – as a "tag-end of the world" (Hua 1, p. 63/24). Husserl, in contrast, argues that "no real being, no being which is presented and legitimated in consciousness by appearances, is necessary to the being of consciousness itself" (Hua 3, p. 115/110). Thus, since the world is just such a real being, the phenomenologist's avowal of pure consciousness cannot be an avowal of something that belongs to the world as a part. Considered purely reflectively, consciousness enters into no causal relations with worldly things and exhibits laws of its own, namely, the normatively governed interrelations of intentional acts and their contents that yield the field of consciousness as a holistic context of meaningful unities. It is these laws of intentional meaning-constitution that phenomenology seeks to uncover. Though the very same field of consciousness can also be grasped as part of the world – namely, when it is construed psychologically as a stratum of mental states belonging to the natural kind, "human being" – this interpretation is itself a constituted product of transcendental consciousness and is not the specific object of philosophical reflection. A consistent reflective stance (one that is beholden exclusively to the dyadic intentional structure and does not unsuspend belief in the first-order object) will not mix up these levels of *Evidenz*.[8] It thus posits or avows a being that is not "worldly."

Even if Husserl knew what he wanted to say about this matter, however, this stance remains a paradoxical one. In particular, the question of the "phenomenological onlooker" – the one who reflects on pure consciousness and avows the findings of phenomenology – remained to haunt his, and subsequent, efforts.[9] If we consider this issue in terms of

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[8] That Husserl did not always keep them apart is argued in Crowell (2012).

[9] For a particularly striking example, see Eugen Fink's struggle to define the "pre-being" (*Vorsein*) of the transcendental onlooker (1995), and Husserl's apprehensiveness about Fink's efforts here. Also see the discussion in Crowell 2001, ch. 13.

the agent-centered approach we have been developing, one final twist on phenomenology's commitment to a first-person method comes to light.

Given that one can, but need not, posit intentional consciousness as part of the world, there is a certain sense in which immanent being can indeed remain suspended, for the phenomenologist need take no stand on the question of how consciousness fits into nature, how intentional states are related to brain states, and the like. This move only pushes the question of a "complete" reduction or suspension to a different level, however, for such freedom arises only for one who is committed to the project of ultimate self-responsibility; that is, for one whose agency is precisely the *worldly project* of philosophy itself, the project of uncovering the transcendental conditions of the world. Thus I – this very I who finds himself in the world and whose beliefs are to reflect a commitment to justifying over explanatory reasons – am the ultimate bearer of responsibility and commitment. I cannot "bracket" myself; I cannot conceive of my existence as "non-worldly" without thereby removing the basis for the inquiry as a whole and thus for the disclosure of the putatively non-worldly being of intentional consciousness. I must retain a commitment to my own being as a worldly agent, an inquirer, if clarification of the world is to be able to yield genuine *avowals*.

It is at this point – precisely in the radicalization of the idea of self-responsibility as the meaning of first-person authority – that phenomenology takes an existential turn. Thus Heidegger, in his critical evaluation of Husserl's phenomenology, suggests that if there is "an entity whose *what* is precisely *to be* and nothing but to be," then the *epoché*, as the suspension of our commitment to being, will be inappropriate for the investigation of such an entity (GA 20, p. 152/110). However, we need to consider carefully what is being said here. "To be," in Heidegger's jargon, does not apply to just any entity but only to that entity "in whose being that very being is for it essentially an *issue*" – namely, to Dasein (GA 2, p. 113/84/116–17). And to be an issue for oneself, in this sense, is in turn to be an agent *responsible* for itself in just the way we have been tracking: capable of taking a stand on what it will avow. Here Heidegger does not jettison phenomenology as a first-person method; nor does he abandon the distinction – captured in the *epoché* as a suspension of first-order commitments – between reflective investigation of intentional meaning-structures and "natural" investigation of causally governed relations between entities. Rather he makes explicit the single limit on this procedure we noted in Chapter 3: inquiry is agency, and the agent must avow itself as worldly if it is to clarify the being of the world.

As Heidegger put it in a later engagement with Husserl's thought, the *epoché* is itself a "'wondrous' existential possibility." It is something I *do*, a "possibility of the human being," but "precisely because [the human being] is never merely present at hand," an entity among entities. Rather it is a "comportment, that is, a way of being to which it belongs precisely that it establishes its self [*sich sich selbst verschafft*], and thus never belongs to the positivity of the present at hand" (Hua 9, p. 275). Behind the difficult language we may recognize the fundamental idea we have been pursuing: first-person philosophizing (phenomenology) is both possible and necessary because I, the one who philosophizes, am the kind of entity I am only by taking responsibility for myself, by "establishing [my] self," by taking a stand on myself and thereby on all other things, "making up my mind" about what are to count for me as reasons to believe.

Phenomenological immanence, normativity, and semantic externalism

In 1975 Hilary Putnam published "The Meaning of 'Meaning'," in which he argued that "'meanings' just ain't in the *head*" (1975b, p. 227). In the debate that arose around this thesis in the 1980s and 1990s, the term "internalism" came to be used for the thesis that Putnam criticized, while "externalism" named a cluster of alternative positions. With few exceptions, phenomenologists did not participate in this debate. There were many reasons for this, but one of them, surely, is well expressed by Felix O. Murchada. "Far from being enlightening," Murchada writes, the distinction between internalism and externalism "actually obscures the understanding of both Husserl and Heidegger" (2003, p. 98). The reason, he thinks, is clear: already in Husserl "the reduction … set[s] the very distinction of internalism and externalism aside." Dan Zahavi reaches a similar conclusion: "In my view, the phenomenological analyses of intentionality (be it Husserl's, Heidegger's or Merleau-Ponty's) all entail such a fundamental rethinking of the very relation between subjectivity and world that it no longer makes much sense to designate them as either internalist or externalist" (2004, p. 53).

While I share these views, the concept of phenomenological immanence, which results from the reduction and is crucial to the kind of "fundamental rethinking" Zahavi invokes, remains a difficult one, and it seems to me that the debate over internalism and externalism can provide a useful framework for clarifying it. As I shall argue, what is distinctive about phenomenological immanence is that it is *normatively* structured and so contrasts sharply with the Cartesian-psychological *forum internum* of standard internalism, a conception of "the head" that is shared by standard externalism. In this, phenomenological immanence bears an interesting relation to the "space of reasons" articulated in Robert Brandom's pragmatic inferentialism, which likewise tries to get beyond the assumptions of the internalism/externalism debate. But inferentialism abandons the first-person stance and denies the significance of consciousness for the theory of intentional content. From this almost behaviorist stance, however,

it is impossible to recover the meaningful structure of lived experience at all, and it is therefore worth the effort to see whether the goals of inferentialism might be achieved without the loss its methodological approach entails. I shall argue that by preserving the methodological priority of the first-person stance, phenomenological immanence offers a distinct form of internalism that incorporates, by reconfiguring, externalist intuitions about the necessary connection between mind and world.

The argument proceeds in five sections. After a brief presentation of what I understand by "semantic externalism" (section 1), I examine one particularly stark example of the common picture according to which Husserl is a semantic internalist in contrast to Heidegger's externalist stance (section 2). I then identify where this interpretation goes awry – namely, in its adoption of the Fregean interpretation of the noema – and explore an alternative account that begins to incorporate externalist elements (section 3). But this raises the question of whether such externalism is compatible with the phenomenological immanence to which the transcendental reduction gives rise. A look at the discussion of transcendence and immanence in *The Idea of Phenomenology*, and an interpretation of Husserl's infamous annihilation of the world thought experiment in *Ideas I* that renders it useless as evidence of internalism, provide the answer (section 4). Finally, the importance of retaining the idea of phenomenological immanence – that is, of insisting on the methodological priority of the first-person stance – will be shown in connection with one recent critique of externalism (section 5).

1   What is semantic externalism?

Syntactics concerns the structure of an utterance – that which can remain constant while its content varies – while semantics concerns its "meaning," what is "said." Contemporary philosophical semantics largely derives from Frege's thesis that meaning determines reference. Even Putnam shares this Fregean axiom: "meaning determines extension" (1975b, p. 270). But contemporary semantics divides on the question of how to think about meaning. Internalists hold that it is something like a mental representation or concept, part of the psychological make-up of the speaker. Externalists deny this: "The psychological state of the individual speaker does not determine 'what he means'" (1975b, p. 270). Externalists need not deny that there is some sort of psychological representation – or "narrow content" – but they argue that relying on its descriptive features to determine reference encounters insuperable difficulties. For instance,

everyone agrees that we can be wrong about the properties we think something has. But this is possible only if we can refer to that thing even while being wrong about its properties. By holding that our reference to a thing is determined by the descriptive content of our thoughts about it, semantic internalism seems to rule out that possibility. A second problem concerns modality: the descriptions that provide necessary and sufficient conditions for identification are not supposed to be mere matters of fact; they should apply to things in various possible circumstances. But the usual candidates for descriptive conditions – phenomenal properties such as solidity, color, etc. – fail to preserve modality: "gold" would still pick out gold even if, by some natural change in the world, gold were no longer yellow, or solid, and so on.[1]

Exploiting these and many other examples and thought experiments, an alternative "externalist" approach to semantics arose that distinguished this narrow or psychological notion of content or meaning from something called "wide" content. As Putnam put it, traditional internalist semantics "leaves out other people and the world" (1975b, p. 271). On this view, narrow content provides neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for reference. Instead, the referring function of at least some terms – such as proper names and natural kind terms – is direct. Descriptions may be associated with such terms, but this is a contingent matter that has merely psychological or sociological significance. Such descriptions do not determine what I refer to when I use words. What then does determine reference for the externalist? Though views vary, perhaps the two most influential are the "causal" theory, according to which reference is determined by the wide content of my intentional state, which includes being in an appropriate causal relation to what the term picks out; and the "social" theory, according to which what determines the reference of a term is the way it is used not by me but by experts in my linguistic community.[2]

Semantic externalism is a position in the philosophy of language, but by an easy extension one can speak of "semantic" externalism wherever one has intentional content – for instance, in propositional attitudes like belief and desire, and also in perception. For in every case a *meaningful* relation to the world is established.[3] One can certainly debate whether this notion of meaning picks out a unitary class: are linguistic meaning, the content

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[1] For an elaboration of these and other arguments against what they call the "classical theory," see Margolis and Laurence 1999, pp. 21–23.

[2] For the causal theory see Kripke 1972; for the social theory see Burge 1979.

[3] On this point see Segal 2000, p. 24.

of my beliefs, and the "as-structure" of my perceptions examples of a single genus? If so, can that unitary character be captured by the notion of "conceptual content"? But for present purposes we need not decide such questions, and "semantic externalism" here refers to a theory about intentional content per se, not merely linguistic content.

Can anything more be said, in general, about this content? As already noted, semantic internalists commonly understand it as a kind of mental representation. Suppose I believe that Copenhagen is in Denmark. The state I am in in believing this is a mental state – that is, it is used in psychological explanations of my behavior. It is also, in Fodor's terms, a representational state since it specifies "a relation and a representation such that the subject bears the one to the other" (1982, p. 278). Here the relation is that of believing (as opposed to imagining, hoping, wondering, etc.), and the representation is a certain *way* of taking Copenhagen, or Copenhagen-taken-in-a-certain-way, namely as being in Denmark. Now the debate between internalists and externalists is shaped by the internalist commitment to an understanding of representations that I shall call "ontological." On Fodor's view, for instance, a representation is a distinct *entity*, namely, that entity to which the subject is related in a mental state. How then does such an entity establish a relation to the world? John Searle (1983), who defends a version of classic Fregean internalism, argues that it involves a set of satisfaction conditions, that is, it establishes a normative relation between the subject and a bit of the world such that whether the representation is as it is *supposed* to be depends on some state of the world.

It is this normative aspect that does all the work in semantic internalism, for only by its means can we explain what it is for a mental entity to refer. How then does such normativity come to belong to a mental representation? Internalists are often committed to the idea that it is *intrinsic* to mental representations: these ontological items are simply such as to have normative or semantic properties. Searle, for instance, claims that this is just one of the natural powers of the brain: "Intrinsic intentional phenomena are caused by neurophysiological processes going on in the brain and they occur in and are realized in the structure of the brain" (2002, p. 79). Thus "the 'mind–body' problem is no more a real problem than the 'stomach–digestion' problem" (1983, p. 15). But this answer is really none at all. As John Haugeland notes, Searle has nothing to say about "*how* a physical system might have *normative* properties *intrinsically*" (1983, p. 295).[4]

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[4] Segal alerts us to another problem with this view. To explain intentional content in terms of the satisfaction conditions involved in certain mental states is not to give an account

Thus it might seem that the concept of representation is a dead end for a theory of intentional content, and indeed this conclusion is drawn by pragmatists such as Robert Brandom. Highlighting the fact that intentionality is a matter of someone taking the world to be a certain way, Brandom understands such "taking" as the incurring of commitments in speaking, rather than as possessing some mental representation. Turning the semantic tradition on its head, Brandom shows that representational content is not primitive by reconstructing it in terms of the intrinsic normativity of inferentially regulated discursive practices (Brandom 2000, pp. 46–47). Phenomenology shares Brandom's anti-Cartesian motivation, but unlike Brandom it preserves the methodological priority of the first-person perspective. For this reason it cannot go all the way with pragmatic anti-representationalism, which Brandom calls "expressivism." Rather, I shall argue that the phenomenological concept of immanence yields a *non*-ontological, *quasi*-inferential concept of representation. Representations are not mental items or brain states but ways of taking the world that are defined in evidential – that is to say, intrinsically normative – terms.[5] But before the point of such an argument can become

of the "cognitive content" of those states – i.e., the "properties that account for the role of these states in typical psychological predictions and explanations" (Segal 2000, p. 3). Searle's position fails here because the satisfaction conditions are not *themselves* part of the intentional content of the mental state in question – they are states of the world: "Searle explicitly denies that the thoughts themselves have these conditions as their representational contents." Hence "we cannot identify the suggested [satisfaction] conditions with cognitive contents" (2000, pp. 105–6). But we were trying precisely to explain how *those* contents could establish a relation of reference.

[5] One might argue that it would be preferable to drop the term "representation" in cases where a theory does not posit a mental entity as mediating between mind and world – speaking perhaps instead of "presentations," i.e., ways in which the world presents itself to a subject. However, the concept of a "presentation" does not, while the concept of "representation" does, capture the central point, namely, that in the intentional contexts at issue in the debate things in the world present themselves in *meaningful* ways, *as* something. That a thing merely present itself is not enough; what we are interested in is how it can present itself in a normatively structured way. Hence I prefer to speak here of a "non-ontological" concept of representation, since I want to deny that representation must always take place by means of an intermediary entity while retaining the idea that a thing's "presentation" be assessable in normative terms. The kind of normativity involved here is distinctly phenomenological and calls for fuller treatment than phenomenologists have given it so far. Welton gestures toward it when he talks of world as "a nexus of implications and entailments" that "belong to the order of meaning" (2000, p. 346). But he does not explain what these (non-logical) "entailments" are. Drawing upon Merleau-Ponty, Sean Kelly (2005) has made some progress in spelling out a non-conceptual, while still normatively structured, account of perception, but the suspicion persists that phenomenology has not captured a new *normative* sort of connection, one that is neither mere

clear, it will be necessary to confront a common misunderstanding about the phenomenological position, one that threatens to block any connection between phenomenology and externalist intuitions.

2   Phenomenology and the internalism/externalism debate

Recently the distinction between internalism and externalism has been deployed as a way to contrast Husserl's phenomenology with Heidegger's, and something like a received view seems to be emerging:[6] Husserl is said to adopt internalism, a "mentalistic" conception of intentionality, while Heidegger moves toward externalism. On this view Husserl remains a Cartesian, a methodological solipsist, and an ontological representationalist, while Heidegger breaks with Cartesianism, is a methodological socialist, and dispenses with representations in favor of a direct opening onto the world.

For instance, in one of the most intelligent recent books on Heidegger (one that explicitly highlights Heidegger's transcendentalism), Taylor Carman argues that Husserl is a semantic internalist who explains the "aboutness" of experience by "appeal to ideal or abstract meanings," to noemata construed as Fregean *Sinne* (2003, p. 68). Because the abstract character of *Sinn* is here understood as *ideality*, meaning can have no real connection with the world. Thus Husserl is said to subscribe to methodological solipsism in Fodor's sense: "how the world is makes no difference to one's mental states"; further, intentional content is conceived "in abstraction from social practice and communicative discourse" (2003, p. 56). Neither claim actually holds of Husserl's position, but they arise quite naturally from Carman's widely shared assumptions. These assumptions are best seen by considering the transcendental reduction, the methodological step that Husserl invokes in order to get the sphere of phenomenological immanence into view.

On Carman's reading the reduction consists "in methodologically turning away from everything external to consciousness and focusing instead on what is internal to it" (2003, p. 80). Thus "the ordinary objects of our intentional attitudes drop out of sight," leading to a "rigorous distinction"

"association" nor full-blown inferential "entailment." I use the term "quasi-inferential," then, to signal that phenomenology is concerned with normative, not psychological, connections, while acknowledging that as yet the only clear conception of such connections we have derives from the realm of the conceptual and the explicitly inferential, the language of which phenomenology then employs somewhat metaphorically.

[6] See Carman 2003; Keller 1999; Rouse 2002; Wrathall 2011.

between the "inner and the outer, the immanent and the transcendent" –
that is, between the "ideal or abstract meanings" inhabiting consciousness
and the "ordinary objects of our intentional attitudes," such as chairs, art-
works, solar systems, and other people (2003, p. 80). Curiously, however,
Carman does not see internalism as a *consequence* of this reading of the
reduction, but as *evidence* for it. Where Tugendhat and Merleau-Ponty
argue that Husserl brackets "the objectivity [i.e., positedness], but not the
externality or transcendence, of the world," Carman insists that this mis-
construes Husserl's "subjectivism, and more importantly, the *internalism*"
of his view (2003, p. 83). Evidence for this internalism is said to include
Husserl's annihilation of the world thought experiment: if consciousness
"needs no thing in order to exist," surely this means that intentional con-
tent is indifferent to the way the world is, such that the "ordinary objects
of our intentional attitudes" can drop out under the reduction in favor of
a "domain of transcendental subjectivity as both immanent and ideal"
(2003, pp. 81–82).

The problem with Carman's argument, however, is that it flies in the
face of the very motives that led Husserl to introduce the transcenden-
tal reduction. Primary among these, as we noted in Chapter 2, was the
desire to include the "transcendent" object – the "ordinary objects of our
intentional attitudes" – within the scope of phenomenological reflection.
Whether Husserl succeeded in this or not, getting this part of the story
right is a necessary condition for understanding phenomenology's stance
toward the internalism/externalism debate, since it determines how
"inner" and "outer" are to be understood. Carman is not alone in failing
to appreciate this matter.[7] He can, for instance, turn to Derrida for "an
argument to the effect" that "the internalism that made the reduction pos-
sible … was arguably already present in spirit in the *Logical Investigations*
of 1900–01" (2003, p. 84). But this is wrong. Husserl *was* a methodological
solipsist in Fodor's sense in the *Logical Investigations*, since at the time
his view of consciousness involved an unresolved naturalistic element.
But Husserl later embraced transcendental phenomenology precisely to
overcome this naturalistic Cartesian view. De Boer recognizes the true
situation: "Thus we see that the famous bracketing of the 'external world,'
which is often ascribed to *Ideen I*, is actually found already in the *Logische
Untersuchungen*" (1978, p. 199). While this thesis nominally agrees with
Carman's, de Boer's sense is entirely different. The *Logical Investigations*
presents us with "a psychological theory of knowledge" that "in a certain

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[7] See Keller 1999; Lafont 2005; Philipse 1995; A. D. Smith 2003.

sense remains stuck in 'representationalism'"; Husserl's method here is "reminiscent of Descartes, to whom Husserl was closer at this point than during any other phase of his development" (1978, p. 201). Indeed, the kind of psychological, naturalistic "internalism" that one finds in the *Logical Investigations* signifies a "perplexity" in Husserl's thinking, while "the transcendental *epoché* of *Ideen I* has the function of rendering this pseudo-solution" – Husserl's "bracketing of the 'external world'" in favor of the realm of "purely psychical experiences" – superfluous (1978, p. 199). Thus even if phenomenology was committed to something like standard internalism in the *Logical Investigations*, it did not remain so in *Ideas I*.

A further, very important, point may be drawn from the received view. Carman paints Husserl as an arch-internalist in order to set up a stark contrast with Heidegger's position, which he sees as a kind of externalism because intentionality is made to depend on the "world" of being-in-the-world. But Carman also notes that Heidegger's externalism is "practical," that is, it rejects the psychological concept of the "inner," and so also the ontological concept of representation that is shared by all parties to the internalism/externalism debate. He offers a passage from Heidegger's *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* in support of this point – "For Dasein there is no outside, which is why it is also nonsensical to talk about an inside" (Carman 2003, pp. 128–29) – but he fails to see that deconstruction of the inner/outer dichotomy had already been attained in *Husserl's* phenomenology.

If, with Carman, we call a theory "semantic" if it holds that intentionality is mediated by a representational entity, then neither Husserl nor Heidegger offered a semantic theory. As phenomenologists, however, *both* offer non-ontological theories of representation in the quasi-inferential sense introduced above: the way the world and things in the world are taken in experience is, for each, a function of (as Husserl puts it) their "intentional implications" or (as Heidegger puts it) the "referential totality of significance." On Carman's view there is a major gulf between Husserl and Heidegger on this point: Husserl's "transcendental phenomenon 'world'" is "immanent to consciousness," while Heidegger's "worldliness of the world" is "outside ourselves" in the "circumstances of practical life" (2003, p. 85). But as we shall see, everything depends on what "immanent" means here. To the extent that the circumstances of practical life can be seen as *phenomenological* conditions of the meaningful structure of what we encounter in first-person experience, they cannot be construed naturalistically as third-person data; they must already belong to the reflectively

accessible terrain of normatively integrated "phenomena" – to a kind of immanence.[8] Further, if "internalism" means that intentionality is an intrinsic property of the subject,[9] then Heidegger too is an internalist. As he writes in *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*: "The intentional relation to the object does not first devolve upon the subject with and by means of the extantness of the object; rather, the subject is structured intentionally within itself" (GA 24, p. 84/60).

The real phenomenological contribution to the internalism/externalism debate thus lies in its rejection of the picture of inner and outer that governs that debate and the ontological conception of representation that divides the two camps – substituting for it a concept of meaning that is norm-governed, holistic, and quasi-inferential. But since even Heidegger appeals to a kind of internalist thesis, the main question remains open: how are we to understand the notion of *phenomenological* immanence? A first step is to attack the basic assumption of the received view, namely, that Husserl's noema is a mental representation.

3   The debate over the noema

My goal here is simply to draw a couple of points from the debate over the noema – and the perceptual noema in particular – between representatives of the "California School," who generally follow Dagfinn Føllesdal's Fregean interpretation (Føllesdal 1969), and those of the "East Coast School," influenced by a more Aristotelian reading. Specifically, I shall look at the position laid out by D. W. Smith and Ronald McIntyre, and that of John Drummond. Though each of these authors has added importantly

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[8] In section 4 I shall discuss the character of this immanence in detail. At this point, however, it might already be wondered why the context of normatively integrated phenomena, or "world," should be identified with a kind of immanence at all once we follow Husserl and Heidegger in abandoning the psychological concepts of inner and outer. The reason is twofold. First, Husserl himself uses the term "immanence" to speak about this context, and the aim of the present chapter is to elucidate Husserl's notion. But, second, there is a methodological motivation, to the extent that the phenomenological concept is meant to block purely third-person construals of the normatively integrated space of meaning. To speak of immanence here is to refuse the move to what John McDowell calls a "sideways-on understanding of our own thinking" (1996, p. 35) – i.e., a view not accessible from within that thinking itself. What is necessary and sufficient for a philosophical explication of intentionality is accessible from the first-person perspective and so "immanent" to experience in the relevant sense – which obviously does not entail that it is all "in the head" in the psychological sense.

[9] Searle 1983, p. 26; Segal 2000, p. 11.

to our understanding since the debate began, we can content ourselves here with the original positions.[10]

Smith and McIntyre recognize an externalist element in the perceptual noema, but they argue that "the 'transcendental' foundation of Husserl's phenomenology … is incompatible with letting the object of perception, or any other part of the external world, play a role in perceptual intention" (1982, p. 226). I want to argue, in contrast, that it is precisely the move from the psychologistic position of the *Logical Investigations* to the transcendental position of *Ideas I* that enables a rapprochement between Husserl's theory of intentionality and the indexical, contextual character of perception.

Smith and McIntyre rightly claim that the perceptual noema goes beyond the descriptivism of Frege's *Sinn*, since the latter, as definite description, does not necessarily pick out one *specific* individual, though it does pick out one individual (1982, pp. 211–12). Because they assume that Husserl's theory is an extension of Frege's descriptivism beyond its *de dicto* origins, however, Smith and McIntyre seek to resolve the difficulty of the missing "non-descriptive component of sense" in the perceptual noema by construing the noematic X as a "demonstrative" (1982, p. 213). That is, the X is interpreted as a kind of linguistic sense. Nevertheless even this expedient, on their view, "really offers no solution to the problem" (1982, p. 214). Why not? The sense of a demonstrative includes two moments: one unvarying ("whatever is being pointed out by the speaker") and another indexical or contextual. But this contextual moment, they argue, cannot be captured from the standpoint of Husserl's transcendentalism: "Husserl's basic theory of intentionality requires" that "the 'internal' content of experience" determine the intentional character of perception. Otherwise, "intentionality would no longer be … a purely phenomenological property of consciousness" (1982, p. 217). A genuine externalism can explain "what it is within the occasion of utterance in virtue of which 'this' refers to the relevant object" by appealing to "the speaker's physical relation to the referent" (1982, p. 217). Husserl, in contrast, can appeal only to "the speaker's *intuition* of the referent in perception." He can do justice to indexicality, then, only "if he takes intuition to be a partly contextual, perhaps partly causal, and not purely intentional relation." But, they conclude, "there is no evidence of such a view in Husserl" (1982, p. 217).

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[10] For a fuller treatment of the debate between the California and the East Coast schools, see Zahavi 2004.

It is true that there is no evidence of causal externalism in Husserl, but does this mean that Husserl has no resources for dealing with the contextual elements in intentionality? Smith and McIntyre note that Husserl does take certain contextual factors into account – for instance, the beliefs that are involved as background in any intentional act – but these are said to be merely "*immanent* contextual influences" that "still remain within the bounds of phenomenology," whereas "the transcendent circumstances of an act are a different matter entirely" (Smith and McIntyre 1982, p. 221). But what do "immanent" and "transcendent" mean here? Can the phenomenological be properly distinguished from the non-phenomenological by contrasting the *intuition* of the referent with the "referent itself," or the *beliefs* that make up the intentional context with the "transcendent circumstances" themselves? This sort of flat-footed subjectivism reminds one, at best, of the *Logical Investigations*; it is the very thing that transcendental phenomenology was designed to avoid. Unless we adopt a third-person stance from the outset, the contrast between "what is intuited" and the "thing itself" cannot be a hard-and-fast one, since sometimes the intuition *gives* us the thing itself; sometimes beliefs are evidentially *justified*.

To capture the holistic contextual character of beliefs we may be tempted to follow Robert Brandom's suggestion that we construe them not as mental items but as commitments incurred when assertions are made as part of discursive practices. Such commitments reflect "material inferences" that connect possible assertions with one another (Brandom 2000, pp. 52–57). If I say that Copenhagen is north of Hamburg, I am committed to the "good material inference" that Hamburg is south of Copenhagen. To understand what a person means is to make explicit the commitments entailed in her assertions through the game of giving and asking for reasons. If beliefs can be defined as what I am normatively responsible for within a specific practice, then a belief context is not, as Smith and McIntyre assume, something immanent; it is as external as you like. But it is perhaps more difficult to see how Smith and McIntyre's contrast between "intuition" and the "thing itself" can be similarly recast in non-mentalistic, normative terms. Here Brandom is of no help, since his third-person stance blocks access to the normative *in* perception. Perception is taken to be mere "sentience," that is, "what we share with non-verbal animals such as cats – the capacity to be aware in the sense of being awake" (Brandom 1994, p. 5). And this is something that is supposed to lack any genuine normative structure. For progress here we must return to phenomenology, and specifically to the East Coast interpretation of the noema.

John Drummond rejects Smith and McIntyre's Fregean construal of the perceptual noema as an "abstract and eternal … content," a kind of representation through which reference is somehow achieved. Their attempt to construe the X as a demonstrative pronoun misconstrues Husserl's texts, which "identify this X with the intended objectivity itself" (Drummond 1990, p. 135). If the noema is not that "through" which an object is intended, but the intended object itself, then noematic meaning does not need supplementation by a distinct indexical component: "That innermost moment [the X], belonging to the *Sinn* itself … is the intended object itself considered formally as the bearer of the properties intended in the experience. Thus the formally considered object is a moment within the noema rather than something intended through the noema" (1990, p. 135). The noematic *Sinn* is not "an instrumental entity distinct from the intended object, an avenue of access … such that we must go through *and beyond* the *Sinn* to the object" (1990, p. 136). We go through the descriptive sense to the object, "in the sense that we *penetrate* it. The intended objectivity is contained within the noema just as it is intended" (1990, p. 136). Thus, to think of the noema as abstract is not to conceive it as ideal in the manner of a universal that would need indexical supplement, but as *irreal*, that is, as "the object abstractly considered," as known "through phenomenological reflection" but not "ontologically distinguished from the intended objectivities" (1990, p. 112). This distinctive notion of irreality – the object as considered in phenomenological reflection – designates a quasi-inferential concept of representation that captures what it means to speak of a "way" of taking the world.

Here we shall note only two points, reserving for the next chapter a fuller investigation of the normative in perception. First, Drummond, like Brandom, rejects the ontological account of representation. Unlike Brandom, however, whose reconstruction of representation proceeds entirely in terms of inferential commitments and entitlements implicit in third-person discursive practices, Drummond's phenomenological account allows us to preserve the normative character of perception itself. The perceptual noema is not a phenomenalistic entity but a node of *intentional implications*: the perceived color is an "adumbration of …"; the front side "implies" the unseen back; taking it as a barn "entails" a specific relation to the landscape, the barnyard, and farming practices; all these aspects "refer" us to the unity of the whole, the "object formally considered," and so on. The way the visible front side of a door entails its hidden back side recalls Brandom's idea of material inference, but it is not a function of commitments I incur in asserting or thinking *that* something is a

door. Phenomenologically, these intentional implications belong to the perception itself. Hence the theory is only *quasi*-inferential. And because perception is thus neither mere sentient awareness nor mere differential responsiveness to environmental conditions, but is instead disclosure of a meaningful world, objects themselves, and not just talk about them, are drawn into the normative space of reasons.

This brings us to the second point: once we give up the ontological interpretation of representation there is no reason to see the field of phenomenological investigation as specifically "subjective" or internalist in the standard sense. As Drummond argues, noematic meaning can determine reference only because the referent is inseparable from that very meaning (Drummond 1990, p. 189). So is this equivalent to Putnam's thesis? Is Husserl an externalist? To address this question we must get clear about how a quasi-inferential conception of representation goes hand in hand with a reinterpretation of immanence and transcendence.

4   Phenomenological immanence

Even if Husserl's approach to intentionality does not introduce a mental entity to mediate between the act and its object, it is a representational theory in the sense that it insists that experience has descriptive content: the world is there in some particular way or other, *as* something. Does the world contribute to the content, or is it the case that "how the world is makes no difference to one's mental states"? Carman, and Smith and McIntyre, attribute internalism to Husserl: because the real object is bracketed in the reduction, it can play no explanatory role in the content of my intentional acts. By "explanation" Smith and McIntyre mean a causal account. But is causality the only way the object can make a difference to intentional content? Instead of assuming the naturalistic picture presupposed in talk of causal explanation and mental content, suppose we adopt the transcendental-phenomenological standpoint, with its quasi-inferential understanding of meaning. In that case, the question of whether my intentional content could be the same even if my worldly circumstances were quite different – say, if I were a brain in a vat – takes on a very different character. To see how, we must note the difference between phenomenological immanence and the picture of the mental at work in standard semantic internalism.

Let us recall our discussion, in Chapter 2, of *The Idea of Phenomenology*. There Husserl distinguished the psychological concept of the mental that he had accepted in the *Logical Investigations* (and that

still figures in most standard internalist positions) from a different, "phenomenological," one. On the former view, the mental is a sphere of "genuine [*reell*] immanence" consisting of "acts" such as believing, perceiving, desiring, and so on, which have "genuine abstract parts genuinely constituting them." We need not specify what those parts are (Husserl speaks of "act-quality" and "act matter"; Fodor speaks of "function" and "representation"), since the uncontroversial point is that "the physical thing which [the act] intends, which it presumptively perceives or remembers, etc., is not to be found in the *cogitatio* itself, a mental process [*Erlebnis*], as a genuine part, as something existing therein" (Hua 2, p. 35/27). Corresponding to this concept of "genuine immanence" is "genuine transcendence," namely, that which is not a genuine part of the mental process, not part of the psychological sphere. In standard externalist theories the referent is genuinely transcendent in this sense. What makes Husserl so hard to locate within the debate, however, is that, while preserving the concept of genuine immanence and transcendence, he introduces another conceptual pair – *intentional* immanence and transcendence – which henceforth serves as the basis for his transcendental concept of intentional content.

This new distinction turns on the idea of *Evidenz*, the self-giving of something. *Evidenz* is not defined ontologically but by way of the phenomenological difference between something's being given "in person" and merely being emptily "meant" or intended. Thus, while one could imagine a theory of genuine immanence and transcendence that made no reference to experience, the concepts of intentional immanence and transcendence are irreducibly first-personal: self-givenness refers to modes of *presentation*. The concept of *Evidenz* marks off "an altogether different immanence, namely, *absolute* and *clear* givenness, *self-givenness in the absolute sense*," together with a corresponding concept of "transcendence," namely, what is "not evident," something "posited" but not itself *given* (Hua 2, p. 35/28). Because intentional immanence does not mark off an ontological distinction between regions – between a *forum internum* and an external world – but rests on a normative relation between presence and absence, it does not entail psychological or subjective idealism. An object that is transcendent in the genuine (*reell*) sense is not reinterpreted as something genuinely immanent; yet it can now be seen as immanent in the phenomenological sense, since it can be self-given or evident – not merely emptily posited but there in person. It may not be given adequately, but its genuine transcendence – the fact that it is not a

real part of the mind – provides no reason to assume that its presentation to consciousness is mediated by a genuinely immanent entity or representation. Phenomenological immanence thus makes room for something like externalist intuitions.

Consider the familiar Water/Twater example. In 1750 "water" is given perceptually in person on both Earth and Twin Earth. It is thus to that extent phenomenologically immanent. But it is given with an indefinitely open (internal and external) horizon of more or less emptily co-intended properties, and is, to that extent, phenomenologically transcendent. The term "water" thus picks out, as Husserl says, a node of "teleological interconnections" (Hua 2, p. 58/46), and for me and my twin to perceive something as water will not be to possess an ideal mental content but to respond to the world *in light of* this quasi-inferentially structured pattern of evidential presentation and absence. In 1750, in contrast, neither H_2O nor XYZ is even phenomenologically transcendent – that is, neither belongs to the evidential horizon of phenomenological immanence. Yet because the water I perceive is not an inert datum but an element within a normative ("teleological") space of intentional implications, it adumbrates avenues along which further aspects can become given – if/then "entailments" indicating possible paths for empirical investigation that could eventually disclose something like molecular structure. And it is these intentional links – not my causal contact with a particular substance – that determine what I am thinking about or perceiving.

This permits a certain rapprochement between internalist and externalist intuitions. In 1750 I and my twin can be said to share narrow content in that what we are given in phenomenological immanence, with all the intentional implications *then available*, will be the same. In Brandom's terms, we shall be entitled to the same commitments. However, because the perceptual noema involves an X, "the object formally considered," not all possible aspects of the object *can* be brought to givenness in 1750. When molecular theory develops, together with the relevant technology and practices, more of those aspects will be available, and I and my twin will no longer be entitled to the same commitments. If neither of us is a scientist, we shall have to defer to experts, a deference which is itself phenomenologically entailed by the horizon that has opened up around "water." If we are scientists, we shall be led along *different* inferential paths – I to H_2O, my twin to XYZ – and we shall now have to decide whether there are two kinds of water, or whether we need a new term, or whatever. This is not because we have always been in causal contact with

different substances but because Water/Twater's modes of givenness are caught up in our different contexts of intentional implications.[11]

 Such phenomenological "externalism" may seem little different from mentalistic conceptions of immanence, however. Without an appeal to causality it may still seem that the notion of *Evidenz* would commit phenomenology to a subjective realm in which intentional content remains "in the head," though now in a mysteriously extended sense. Recall the famous annihilation of the world thought experiment in *Ideas I*, for example, which we have touched on in previous chapters. Doesn't it imply that phenomenological immanence is just standard internalism? If consciousness is "absolute being in the sense that by essential necessity immanental being *nulla 're' indiget ad existendum*" (Hua 3, p. 115/110), it would seem that how the world is makes no difference to one's mental states. If so, there is little chance for a rapprochement between phenomenology and semantic externalism. But is it so? Without trying to reconstruct every aspect of Husserl's complex thought experiment, considerable doubt can be cast on the thesis that it commits Husserl to Fodorian internalism if we attend closely to what Husserl means by the following key statement: "It thus becomes evident that while the being of consciousness … would indeed be necessarily modified by an annihilation of the world of physical things, its own existence would not be touched" (Hua 3, p. 115/110).

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[11] The externalist intuition consists chiefly in the idea that there is an indexical/occasional moment to intentional content, such that, as Putnam put it, "meaning indeed determines extension; but only because extension (fixed by *some* test or other) is, in some cases, 'part of the meaning'" (1975a, p. 151). That I am referring to water when I say "There is water on Twin Earth" – that is, that I am not referring to Twater, even when I am on Twin Earth and looking at Twater when I say this – is because the meaning of "water" is linked to the substance that was picked out perceptually on Earth when the term was introduced and which was taken to be some specific thing that could be tested and distinguished from other similar things. The idea of such a test, on the externalist view, is thus part of the meaning of the term, and this explains why my statement is false. Segal argues for an opposing internalist view: my concept of water is not that of a natural kind but a "motley." Thus it is not clear whether "There is water on Twin Earth" is true or false because a motley concept does not pick out any definite thing: there is certainly a watery substance on Twin Earth, and there is no fact of the matter as to whether we should call it another kind of water or give it the name of a new substance (2000, pp. 132–36). The phenomenological approach retains the indexical and historical elements of the externalist view – and in the entailed reference to the horizon of scientific theory and practice it can also accommodate the role the externalist attributes to the test – but it rejects the naturalism that supports the strong reading of "water" as a natural kind term. It thus shares one thing with Segal's concept of a motley: it will be a matter of *decision* as to whether we come to call XYZ a kind of "water" or not.

Two things must be kept in mind in considering what Husserl is claiming here. The first is that Husserl does not equate "consciousness" with intentionality. The internalist thesis, in contrast, is concerned exclusively with intentionality. And second, when Husserl identifies consciousness with "immanental being," he is operating with the notion of immanence developed in *The Idea of Phenomenology*, based on the evidential concept of empty intentions and their potential intuitive fulfillment, not the mentalistic conception of the *Logical Investigations*. "Being" is understood in terms of *givenness*.[12] If this is not kept in mind, the very idea of an "annihilation" of the world will be understood naturalistically, leading to irrelevant questions about causal relations between mind and world.

Husserl gives the annihilation in question a very precise phenomenological sense: it is "thinkable that experience might suddenly prove to be consistently refractory to the expectation [*Zumutung*] that its positing of physical things achieve thoroughgoing harmony; that its context might lose its fixed regular organizations of adumbrations, apprehensions, and appearances, and so remain in infinitum – in short, that there might no longer be any harmoniously positable, thus existing world" (Hua 3, p. 115/109). If from the standpoint of phenomenological immanence "world" means the "correlate of certain multiplicities of experience distinguished by certain essential formations," then nothing implies that "there must be some world or some physical thing or other" (Hua 3, p. 114/109). Of course, were an annihilation in this sense to take place, consciousness would certainly be modified, as Husserl says. For it would no longer be consciousness of objects, no longer consciousness of the more or less seamlessly coherent context of our experiences that makes up the world. Nevertheless, even in a case of total breakdown of the rule-governed concatenations of experience there could still be "consciousness," that is, mental activity of some sort. This claim seems plausible if we consider the condition of early infancy, perhaps, or serious psychosis. What Husserl denies is that there would still be *intentional content* without a world. For this reason, no conclusion about Husserl's "internalism" can be drawn from the claim that "no real being … is necessary to the being of consciousness itself" (Hua 3, p. 115/110), since internalism's sole concern is

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12 Note, too, that these reflections – including the connection between being and givenness grounded in the argumentation of *The Idea of Phenomenology* – are offered as phenomenological descriptions that do not depend on the transcendental reduction but prepare the way for it. Thus the argument does not stand or fall with one's stance toward the reduction. See Ricoeur 1967, pp. 16–17. As we shall see in Chapter 7, Husserl employs the same strategy in "Philosophy as Rigorous Science."

with intentional content. It might well be that real being *is* necessary for *intentionality*.[13]

But what about the opening to externalism? How are we to imagine a link between phenomenological immanence and externalist intuitions if, from the very beginning, physical things have been defined by appeal to "concatenations of experience"? Could this ever yield an argument for rejecting the claim that how the world is makes no difference to one's mental states? As I read it, the passage under consideration provides the key tools for constructing such an argument.

Husserl first reminds us of the thesis of phenomenological immanence: "something transcendent is *given*, but in principle only provisionally, by virtue of certain concatenations of experience" (Hua 3, p. 116/110). Concatenations of experience are not constellations of sense data, however, but intentional acts that exhibit quasi-inferential relations among themselves, teleological relations between confirming or disconfirming modes of givenness that obey the (normative) "expectation [*Zumutung*] that its positing of physical things achieve thoroughgoing harmony" (Hua 3, p. 115/109). Now suppose, writes Husserl, that in perceiving and thinking, and in "mutual understanding with other Egos," the subject manages to effect all these concatenations and that, in continual synthesis, "nothing whatever is lacking which is requisite for the appearance of a unitary world." Given all that, he asks, "is it still *conceivable*, and not

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13 There are, of course, texts in Husserl's corpus that appear to oppose this reading. Consider this one: "Intentionality does indeed belong to the essence of consciousness, but the necessity that any sort of transcendent intentional [object] 'really exist,' or equivalently, that conscious intendings of the real are harmoniously fulfilled, does not belong to the essence of intentionality" (Hua 36, p. 79). This seems to say both that intentionality is essential to consciousness, and that no real thing is necessary for intentionality, and so to deny just the claims I am making on behalf of Husserl. In order to sort this matter out, however, one would have to consider carefully that Husserl employs the term "intentionality" for several things that have little to do with the kind of "intentional content" at issue in the internalism/externalism debate. For instance, he conceives the temporal structures of protention and retention that hold the stream of consciousness together even in the absence of constituted reality to be a kind of "intentionality," and in that sense one could indeed not have consciousness without intentionality. But if we restrict ourselves to what might be called "act-intentionality" – that is, the kind of directedness toward objects that we find in propositional attitudes, perception, linguistic practices, and the like – then my claim is that consciousness can exist without *act*-intentionality. And indeed the passage confirms this, since it argues that intentionality does not require that anything transcendent "exist," or *equivalently* that concatenations of experience sustain the evidential implications inherent in them. *Act*-intentionality is not possible without such fulfilled concatenations of experience (such "reality"). My thanks to Thane Naberhaus for alerting me to this passage.

rather a countersense, that the corresponding transcendent world *does not exist*" (Hua 3, p. 116/111)? The rhetorical character of Husserl's question is clear: according to the phenomenological theory of intentional content – grounded in the normative structure of *Evidenz*-relations – it is "countersensical" that a world presented in this way does not exist. The existence of what is genuinely transcendent is not something that has no connection to phenomenological immanence; rather, it is what under certain normative conditions *shows itself in* phenomenological immanence.[14] Husserl's point here is that once we abandon an ontological in favor of a quasi-inferential concept of representation, we must admit that intentionality is *disclosive*. And with that, the Cartesian idea supporting standard internalism – that the world could appear exactly as it does appear while nevertheless not existing – is ruled out.[15]

Whether Husserl's argument is strong enough to establish this conclusion can be doubted, but if the question is whether phenomenological immanence is *supposed* to entail the sort of internalism expressed in the thesis that how the world is makes no difference to one's mental states, the evidence for a negative answer is strong. While Husserl's reduction brackets the question of whether one can *explain* intentional content by appeal to causal chains and the microstructural properties of transcendent entities, he clearly denies that I could have the same content no matter what the world was like. For to have content, in Husserl's sense, is to disclose the world in a certain way. And conversely, it is because the world *is* a certain way that I can disclose (constitute) it thus. If the world were

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[14] Husserl uses this point to argue that while there is no *formal* contradiction in the idea that there could be "a world outside ours" – i.e., a reality that was not part of the normative nexus of evidential connections through which the world of our experience is given – the idea of such a world contains a "material countersense": "If there are any worlds, any real physical things whatever, then the experienced motivations constituting them must be *able* to extend into my experience and into that of each Ego." Such a world would not, then, really be "outside" ours at all. Clearly, Husserl refuses to countenance the idea that there could be worlds, or realities, that *could not* be given through "experienced motivations" that "constituted" – i.e., disclosed – them. The idea of a reality that could not be given in *any* experience is entirely idle (purely "formal"), and ultimately there are "motivations" that can connect *all* experiences, however different, "essential possibilities for effecting mutual understanding." This position simply expresses the phenomenological insight that there can be no ultimate gap between mind and world, subject and object (Hua 3, pp. 113–14/108–9).

[15] Zahavi also makes this point: "Both Husserl and Heidegger argue that such scenarios [sc. of global hallucination: the evil demon, the brain in a vat] presuppose the possibility of distinguishing in principle between the world as it is understood by us and the world as it is in itself, but it is exactly this possibility and this distinction that they reject" (2004, p. 63).

different there would be different concatenations of experience, and so my mental states would also be different. In contrast to what Smith and McIntyre claim about the transcendental standpoint, then, phenomenological immanence does provide resources for accommodating the contextual and indexical aspects of intentional content.

5   Phenomenological externalism

Admittedly, many important questions remain open. It might seem, for instance, that because the quasi-inferential concept of representation is still defined in terms of consciousness, we are ultimately left with only an ersatz externalism. No matter how one twists it, won't this first-person stance imply that meaning is, after all, "in the head"? The externalist will argue that phenomenology cannot have it both ways: unless it abandons the premise that what determines reference must be accessible to phenomenological reflection, it cannot claim that intentionality is genuinely disclosive. That is, externalists deny the phenomenological premise that the subject is *intrinsically* intentional. And if the phenomenologist counters with the claim that intentionality is not, for all that, altogether independent of the world, the externalist will see here merely an unstable amalgam of incompatible points of view. There would appear to be at least a grain of truth to this objection. The annihilation of the world thought experiment, as I have interpreted it, shows that consciousness cannot be intrinsically intentional, since it shows that there can be consciousness without intentionality. If that is true, how can we recast the idea that the *subject* is intrinsically intentional so as to preserve the first-person stance that defines the evidential, non-ontological concept of representation essential to the characterization of phenomenological immanence? I believe that though Husserl recognized what is at stake in this question, he nowhere developed an adequate account of what it takes, beyond mere consciousness, for something to possess intrinsic intentionality. In Part III of this volume I shall argue that Heidegger provides the essential elements in his account of existence as care (*Sorge*). Here, however, in conclusion, I would like to approach this issue by way of another fantasy from the literature on internalism.

Internalism is often explained in terms of supervenience.[16] My phenomenal consciousness, or narrow content, is taken to supervene on my microphysical structure, such that my microphysical twin would have the

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16   See, for instance, Segal 2000, pp. 8–12.

same narrow content I do. Standard externalism shares this assumption but argues that narrow content cannot, for that very reason, be genuinely intentional. Consider, for instance, Davidson's familiar thought experiment (2001). If, through some freak concurrence of conditions, a microphysical twin of myself is created by lightning hitting a certain place in a swamp, this Swampman will have all the narrow content I have, including the thought: "Water is H_2O." Swampman will have all the "prototypical associations" about water that I do – that it is wet, a liquid, satisfies thirst, etc. Further, he will seem to be committed (in Brandom's sense) to everything that I am committed to, insofar as this can be discovered by making things explicit. Nevertheless, according to Davidson it is evident that Swampman cannot be thinking anything at all. This is because Swampman lacks the requisite *history* to be thinking about water. To put this in phenomenological terms, even though Swampman's "concatenations of experience" – memories, current perceptions, etc. – are identical to my own (such that he has a "history" but not a history), this is insufficient to make his experience genuinely intentional: he is not intentionally related to anything. Doesn't this show that phenomenological immanence is merely "disclosive" and not really disclosive?

   Charles Siewert offers an argument meant to show that the externalist begs the question against the intrinsic intentionality of consciousness.[17] If it seems to Swampman that he is thinking, as I do, that his (my) grandmother died in 1980, what more is needed? What condition could determine the difference between *seeming* to me as if I was thinking something and really thinking something? The condition, Siewert argues, would have to meet two criteria: first, that it could be missing from my phenomenal counterpart's situation; and second, that it is essential to genuine thinking (1998, p. 296). But, he continues, if we initially find it difficult to think that genuine thinking could be absent from the counterpart's circumstances (first criterion), we shall have reason to doubt that the difference (the "condition") meets the second criterion. On the other hand, if we think we have found a condition that meets the second criterion,

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[17] The claim that Siewert wants to make room for by means of his argument is that "the phenomenal character of our experience is enough to make us … genuine non-iconic thinkers, and the conditions whose fulfillment would be enough to make it the case that what we think is true do not include any that are rightly regarded as furnishing our phenomenal features with an interpretation" (1998, p. 292). This last part is crucial, since if phenomenal content is understood as *noematic* meaning, it can have an externalist aspect that need not be construed as an "interpretation" as this is understood in causal externalism.

then this, together with our difficulty in conceiving that genuine think-ing is absent, gives us reason to doubt that the putative condition satisfies the first criterion (namely, that it *could* be missing from our phenomenal counterpart's situation). For instance, if we imagine Swampman as really being in the condition that I am when I think that my grandmother died in 1980, we shall have difficulty understanding the claim that he is not thinking anything; thus, the condition that putatively needs to be added to give rise to genuine thought – namely, the appropriate history – will fail to meet criterion two: it will not seem to be essential. But if, on the con-trary, we insist that such a history *is* essential for genuine thought, then, given our difficulty imagining that Swampman is not thinking anything, we must admit that the condition does not satisfy the first criterion: it *could not* be missing from Swampman's situation.

Now Siewert himself seems to opt for the first horn of the dilemma: since phenomenal consciousness is intrinsically intentional, the appro-priate history is not necessary. If we can specify *who* possesses the con-tent, we have all we need to assess its possessor for truth or falsity (Siewert 1998, pp. 303–4). In my case, the truth-conditions of my thought are sat-isfied; in Swampman's case, they are not. But this still leaves it puzzling how the phenomenal content came to have the status of being beholden to norms in the first place, as it must if it is seen to involve something like satisfaction conditions. How, in particular, could Swampman's mental state be understood to be responsive to norms? On Brandom's pragmatic view, such normativity is available only to a being who has engaged in certain practices – for instance, discursive practices – and practices are not sets of mental representations or phenomenal contents, but skills that require an actual history to develop. Hence Swampman, who has learned no skills, cannot have genuine intentional content.

Brandom, then, would grasp the other horn of Siewert's dilemma: we can only imagine Swampman as having the relevant content *if* we imagine him with the proper history. Contrary to Davidson's assumption, we can-not imagine Swampman as having the content I do. I believe that the phe-nomenologist should adopt this view as well. What Husserl's annihilation of the world thought experiment shows is that while consciousness might supervene on microstructure, intentional content does not. As Brandom and existential phenomenologists like Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty have shown, that content depends on an embodied, practical, social sub-ject, and only *such* a subject is intrinsically intentional. Unlike Brandom, however, existential phenomenology holds consciousness to be a neces-sary, though not a sufficient, condition for intentionality. Even if practical

coping and embodied engagement is not a matter of explicit thematization or rule-following, it is not opaque either, not zombie-like or robotic. Nevertheless, if we are to understand the transcendental subject of phenomenological immanence, we shall have to go beyond consciousness.

Husserl understood this point clearly, since his mature work emphasized the "ego of habitualities," the constitutive contribution of the lived body, transcendental intersubjectivity, and the lifeworld. As we shall see in the next chapter, however, these notions are often in tension with other commitments, such as the constitution of the lived body itself in transcendental consciousness or the ultimacy of the "absolute flow" of temporality.[18] The main lesson to be learned from seeing phenomenology in light of the internalism/externalism debate, then, is that we need to move further, and more consistently, in the direction that Husserl was already going: toward an account of what the subject must be – in addition to being a conscious subject – in order to be able to be gripped by the normative at all and so be capable of intentional content.

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[18] See also Crowell (2012).

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The normative in perception

1   Perception as epistemic warrant

Suppose I tell a friend that the rose bush on my front porch is in bloom. If he wonders how I know such a thing, I might respond that I saw it as I left for work this morning. If pressed, I might invite my friend home so he can see the bush for himself. What is supposed to be served by my report of what I saw? It is supposed to provide justification for what I say by grounding it in what I see. But what does "grounding" mean here? My claim about the rose bush is a claim about an entity in the world, and I assume that looking at such an entity warrants the claim, that perceiving it underwrites the truth of what I say. Skeptics have often questioned this assumption, pointing out that perception can be deceptive in many ways; indeed we may have no good reason for holding that any perception delivers the world as it is. When I make a judgment, the object about which I judge becomes a standard against which the judgment may be measured: if the object is as I say it is, then my judgment is true (i.e., does what it is supposed to do as this judgment); if not, not. But the skeptic reminds us that the fact that the *object* is a norm for judgment does not entail that *perception* can serve as warrant for judgments. Only if perception provides reliable access to objects can it serve this role. To show that it does, one might try to establish a connection between the content of perception and a causal process running from the object to the brain. But this has the disadvantage of severing ties between justification and the first-person experience of getting it right. Whether this is a price we are willing to pay for an answer to the skeptic is something that others will have to decide. The sort of approach that interests me here, a phenomenological one, looks for the connection between perception and epistemic warrant in first-person experience.

Even in first-person terms, however, there are ways of describing the content of perception that make it hard to see how it could play such a

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role.[1] One is to take it as what Hume called "impressions of sense," a kind of sensuous givenness entirely distinct from our capacity to judge, reason, and use concepts – part of our "sentience," as Robert Brandom puts it, not our "sapience" (1994, pp. 275–77). As Wilfred Sellars argued, the deliverances of such a pre-rational system cannot hook up in a justificatory way with the conceptually formed content of judgments. If perception is to provide justification, it must afford access to what is referred to in the judgment in a form compatible with the content of the judgment – namely, as something that has a meaning. Thus not only the judgment, but also the perception, must be assessable in terms of possible success or failure. Perception itself must be beholden to norms.

A judgment's beholdenness to norms is inscribed in the act of predication. In saying something about an object, in characterizing it as something, predication establishes the object as a norm of attribution. Thanks to this normative orientation, the judgment has a meaning; in Husserl's terms, it is an "expressive" rather than an "indicative" sign (Hua 19/1, pp. 30–31/I 269–70). An indicative sign is causally related to what it signifies, as smoke indicates fire or a footprint indicates an intruder. But an expressive sign characterizes its signified in a determinate way, that is, it establishes conditions of satisfaction that can either meet or fail the object as it is. If perception is to provide warrant for our judgments, it too must have meaningful content, provide access to the object *as* something; it too must entail conditions of satisfaction that "set up" (posit; *setzen*) its object as a norm. The question that requires phenomenological elucidation, then, is this: what is the normative *in* perception, and how does it come to be established?

It may be helpful here to recall Kant's two-tiered answer to this question. First, perception is receptive – that is, it involves sensibility – and is thus necessarily structured by the a priori forms of sensibility, space and time. To say that perceptual content is necessarily spatial and temporal is to say that space and time are normative for perception, that is, that they establish what counts as perceptual content. Space and time do not suffice to account for perceptual content, however, since we do not perceive

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[1] Here I mean by "content" only that which, in the mental process picked out by the term "perceiving," is (in Locke's phrase) "before the mind." As will be clear in what immediately follows, the notion of content must actually be restricted to something that has a semantic structure, a meaning. It is not necessary to defend this restriction here, since I am not considering third-person accounts of perception, but only first-person ones, in which perception is always "intentional," i.e., *of* something *as* something.

sensations but *things*, "objects." Perception thus involves those norms that establish what counts as an object – namely, the a priori "categories" or "concepts of objects in general" (Kant 1968, p. 126 [A93/B126]). But what is the connection between these two norm-types? Are they independent of one another? Does one arise from the other? Is one reducible to the other? A phenomenology of perception should answer this question.

That this is an important question for phenomenology is clear from the fact that phenomenology holds perception to be the root form of *Evidenz*, the self-givenness of the "things themselves."[2] But interest in it is not restricted to phenomenology. Recently, John McDowell has argued that the connection between perception and justification can be preserved only if we acknowledge that what one "sees" and what one "judges" can be the same, namely, "*that* things are thus and so" (1996, p. 9).[3] So, for instance, I judge that "my rose bush is in bloom," and when I look at it I do not merely see a rose bush; I see that my rose bush is in bloom. My perception, and not just my judgment, has a meaning, and this meaning has a structure identical to that of the corresponding judgment, namely, a *conceptual* structure. McDowell seems to hold that perceptual content must have a conceptual structure since only predication, an operation with concepts, establishes the object as a norm, places it in the space of reasons. But just this point makes McDowell's position elusive, for in perception no such predication takes place. In Kantian terms, perception is "receptive": I simply open my eyes and look around. How, then, does conceptual normativity get a foothold in perception? Whence the suspension between success and failure that would allow us to ascribe a meaning or content to perception? McDowell's answer is mysterious: conceptual capacities are not merely exercised *upon* the givens of perception; rather, "the relevant conceptual capacities are drawn on *in* receptivity" (1994, p. 9). Perception has content because it belongs to creatures who have the

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[2] Husserl's own theory of *Evidenz* – of epistemic warrant – required him to "give the name 'perception' to each fulfilling act of confirmatory self-presentation, to each fulfilling act whatever the name of 'intuition,' and to its intentional correlate the name of 'object'." I shall here ignore this aspect of Husserl's theory and deal exclusively with *sense*-perception (Hua 19/2, pp. 650–51, 671/II 764–65, 785).

[3] In "Avoiding the Myth of the Given" McDowell modifies his view somewhat to distinguish between content that "is not propositional but intuitional" – between content that has the form of a judgment and content that does not – where the former is "discursive" or "articulated" and the latter is not (2009, pp. 260, 262). Both kinds of content remain conceptual, however. Thus, since our concern is with phenomenology and not primarily with McDowell, we shall leave this otherwise welcome clarification out of account.

capacity to reason, even though that content does not arise through expli-cit reasoning.[4]

McDowell is relatively uninterested in explaining how conceptual cap-acities can be drawn on in receptivity. His aim is therapeutic rather than constructive. But phenomenologists concerned with the question of the normative in perception have tried to go further. Daniel O. Dahlstrom, for instance, argues that "Husserl's analyses of passive syntheses" pro-vide a "neglected alternative" between conceptualists like McDowell and information-semanticists like Fred Dretske or Pierre Jacob: "His alterna-tive is not, as it is for McDowell, to extend conceptuality to all levels of intentionality, but instead to identify levels of intentionality in the precon-ceptual yet indicatory syntheses constituting sensory fields" (Dahlstrom 2007, pp. 5, 18). In other words, Husserl's analyses of passive synthesis should explain how perceptual content comes to be norm-governed inde-pendently of conceptual capacities and inferential relations. To this extent Husserl tries to achieve in a transcendental *aesthetic* at least part of what Kant sought in transcendental *logic*.[5] In this he stands directly opposed to neo-Kantians such as Paul Natorp who, in Hegelian fashion, deny that sensibility can supply any norms distinct from logical (conceptual) ones. McDowell, in contrast, might be seen as a neo-Kantian in the Marburg tradition.[6]

In what follows I shall touch on the question of whether a phenom-enology of perception shows that the content of perception can be both non-conceptual and yet responsive to norms. I say "touch on" because the phenomenological literature on perception is vast, and I shall be restrict-ing myself merely to a few central elements of Husserl's phenomenology that pertain to the issue of normativity. Beginning with Husserl's early account of perception, I argue that it conforms, in spite of some of its ten-dencies, to McDowell's idea that our conceptual capacities account for the normative moment in perception. I then consider whether Husserl's later genetic phenomenology, with its analysis of passive synthesis, uncov-ers a non-conceptual, yet normatively responsive, perceptual content, arguing that it too falls short. In a final section I argue that accounting

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[4] McDowell attributes this to our capacity for language, to our general *Bildung*, not to rea-son as such. But the salient aspect of language and *Bildung* here lies in its introduction of the possibility of inferential relations, i.e., reason. Thus there is a certain truth to the claim that even McDowell's revised picture is rationalistic.

[5] Indeed, Husserl himself in several places refers to the phenomenology of passive synthesis as a "transcendental aesthetic." See, for instance, Hua 11, pp. 295, 361/582, 444.

[6] See Crowell 2010 for a development of this argument.

for the normative in perception requires a shift of focus from the temporality of consciousness to embodied agency – a shift characteristic of post-Husserlian existential phenomenology that has been taken up recently by a number of phenomenologically oriented philosophers.[7]

2   Husserl's early (1893–1912) theory of perception: the primacy of the conceptual

I see a candle – a fat cylinder recently lit – burning on a stand on my dining-room table. I see a bit of melted wax run down its side, which I know to be blue but now looks almost black in the shadowy room. I move to get a closer look at where the wax has dripped, to see whether it is dripping uniformly on the side that is currently turned away from me. There look to be no drips on that side, while the blue color stands out more clearly thanks to the light that shines on it from the kitchen. I turn away for a moment to check the source of the light and then resume my inspection of the candle, considering whether it is suitable for the arrangement of the table for dinner later that evening.

If we may take this description as typical of an act of perception, we may remark a few important features. First, perceiving is a temporally extended process that involves what might be called different "moments": the candle seen now from this side, now from that, as I move about it. These moments do not distinguish themselves as individual "pieces" that are simply strung together; we cannot think of them as a series of "snapshots."[8] Rather, they are subordinated to – they are what they are only within – the unity of the temporally extended perceptual act. Second, this unity has, as its correlate, an individual thing given meaningfully *as* something: a candle. Perceiving has intentional content. Third, the candle is there in person, in contrast to the way it would be present in memory or imagination, despite the fact that it has aspects and properties which are not currently in view. It is given throughout as itself, as continually one and the same thing. Fourth, the candle is seen to be qualitied in various ways – a specific shade of blue, a distinct cylindrical shape of a definite size – and, like the candle itself, these qualities are there objectively, they are experienced as belonging to the candle independently of the current perceptual act. Fifth, each property is perceived as constant throughout the act, though it is seen from different points of view in which it appears

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[7] See for instance Kelly 2000; Noë 2004; Thompson 2007.
[8] For a critique of the "snapshot" idea, see Noë 2004, pp. 35–73.

differently. To adapt Charles Siewert's (2006) formulation: the cylinder appears differently from here than it does from over there, but it never appears otherwise than as a cylinder. In Husserlian terms, the candle and its properties appear in "profiles" or "adumbrations" (*Abschattungen*), which change without our perceiving the candle or its properties as having changed.

From this we can also see something of the role that normativity plays in perception. For perception's temporally extended grasp of an identity in a manifold – whether it be the identity of the candle as its unseen sides become visible and the previously visible ones fall out of view, or the constancy of its properties in their changing profiles – presupposes something like an ordering principle, a norm, that establishes that later temporal moments are "of the same thing" rather than of some newly appearing thing. Of course, we can also perceive the emergence of some new thing – the little Santa Claus that was hidden behind the candle now comes into view – but this itself presupposes that perceiving involves a norm by which we determine that the Santa Claus is not itself part of the candle. Thus in perceiving the candle I must *perceptually* be able to determine that the back side, which shows itself to have no drips when I move to view it, belongs to the candle I was previously viewing.

Reference to the norm that governs such belonging is implicit in the act's content. The meaning of my act makes a kind of claim on the world, sets it up as a norm under something like a description, such that my perception is veridical *if* the world includes a candle just as I take it in my perception. But this "taking" is more complicated than in the case of judgment, with its explicit predicative structure. To perceive something as a blue candle is to hold not only that the world contains this candle just as I take it in my perception, but also just as it *would* show itself if I moved around to view it from another angle. The normative in perception supports a peculiar sort of counterfactual, one that is both more familiar and also more obscure than the sort sustained by what is logically entailed by the judgment, "This is a candle." The difference lies in the fact that what is "entailed" by the content of a perceptual act is not inferred, but *perceived*. As Alva Noë puts it, you have a "perceptual sense" of the unseen backside; you don't *see* the back side, but the candle *looks* to have one; it is "present now" in what you see. But this is quite different from "thinking that" it has a back side (2006, p. 26). If such a *perceptual* sense of the back side belongs to the intentional content of my perception, it can only be because that content responds to a norm that operates within perception itself.

Similarly, my experience of the candle as having an objective property – this particular blue color – is governed by a norm, namely, by an optimal way for the color to appear. When I see the color in shadow I grasp it as the very blue of the candle, even though the blue appears differently from here than it does from across the room. And when I move to the back where the lighting is different I get a better look at it, and eventually an optimal view: the real blue, the real cylinder. But this is not to say that the previous views did not see the blue itself; rather, the optimally appearing blue serves as a norm for what it itself *should* look like from here or there, in these or those lighting conditions, and so on. Our question is thus: what is the phenomenological basis for the presence of such normativity in perception?

Beginning in 1893, and continuing through 1905, Husserl sought to account for these features of perception by means of a kind of form/content schema. Though he modified certain aspects of this view after he introduced the phenomenological reduction in 1907, these changes did not affect his approach to the normative in perception. Only in the early 1920s, with the development of genetic phenomenology, did a new approach emerge. It is important, then, to consider Husserl's earlier position in some detail.

Husserl begins by linking the "in person" character of the perceived object to the fact that it is given sensuously. To do so, however, he believes he must posit a distinction between the sensations themselves (*präsentierende Empfindungskomplexe*) and the quality of the perceived thing (*die präsentierte Bestimmungen*) (Hua 38, p. 152). Sensations are not themselves intentional objects; sensing is an *Erlebnis* but not an *Akt* (Hua 38, pp. 23, 25). Thus sensations by themselves cannot "present" anything. To present some quality – the blue of this candle – they require an "interpretation" (*Deutung*), which is achieved through the perceptual act's way of apprehending (*Auffassung*) the sensations *as* something – namely, as presentative of properties of the intentional object, "this candle" (Hua 38, p. 27). Perceptual apprehension, then, includes a meaning, the *Auffassungssinn*, which remains the same through the changing *Empfindungserlebnisse*. Thanks to this meaning, the thing is not merely there in person but there in a determinate way, *as* something, as an object of a particular type.

Husserl's descriptions of perceptual intentionality all draw upon normative vocabulary: perception is not a mere succession of changing sensations but a kind of synthesis that has a "distinctive and particular character" (Hua 38, p. 47); in perceptual experience one set of sensations does not merely replace another but provides a "more perfect view" of the

object; the object is "given more clearly, richly, visually more adequately" (Hua 38, p. 144). The perceptual intention is characterized by a "felt approximation [*fühlbare Annäherung*]" to a "complete" perception (Hua 38, p. 145). The perception as a whole, and in each of its determinations, tends toward a "maximum," an "adequate construction [*angemessene Abbild*]" of the thing or quality in which we attain "not merely an appearance of it" but "the thing itself" (Hua 38, pp. 146, 213, 209, 254). All these descriptive terms presuppose a standard against which relative richness, completeness, clarity, and adequacy can be measured. Now the defining feature of Husserl's early approach to such normativity is its dependence on tools borrowed from his analysis, in the *Logical Investigations*, of the way a *signifying* intention – paradigmatically, a judgment – relates to the perception in which the object it signifies is given. Husserl writes: "We find between the elements [of perception] a peculiar descriptive relation, which I touched upon in another context, where I denoted it as the relation between intention and the *fulfillment* of the intention" (Hua 38, p. 144). Thus Husserl takes a logical relation between concepts and intuitions as his model for the normative in perception.

The first thing to note is that this extension of the notion of fulfillment to perception is not at all obvious. Significative intentionality is general, symbolic, and predicative. Thus we can readily understand what would fulfill a judgment – say, "The moon is at the horizon" – since the concepts involved determine what sorts of experience *could* establish the success or failure (truth or falsity) of the judgment. Perceptual intentionality, however, is individual, non-symbolic, and pre-predicative. It is thus not immediately clear where the relation of fulfillment can get a foothold. How can fulfillment in perception provide "the unity-constituting moment in the succession" of perceptual acts of one and the same thing? For instance, how can the experience of the candle I have from over here count as a better look at it, or as fulfilling something entailed in an earlier moment of the perception? Why is it not merely something that *follows upon* that earlier view? Husserl wants to describe the kind of normativity that is indigenous to perception, but it might appear that he has merely smuggled in such normativity by his use of logical vocabulary to describe the perceptual process.

To test this suspicion we must consider, more particularly, how the intention/fulfillment structure is supposed to work in the case of perception. According to Husserl, the distinction between empty and fulfilled intentions maps onto a descriptive feature of all perception: every perception consists of some determinations that are "directly" or "authentically"

presented and others that are only "indirectly" or "inauthentically" given
(Hua 38, pp. 152–55, 210). For instance, the front side of the candle is dir-
ectly presented by means of the current complex of sensations, while the
back side is only indirectly presented. In the course of my perceiving, the
indirectly given aspects of the object can come to be directly given and so
partially fulfill the anticipation of completeness inherent in the percep-
tion as a whole. But *which* determinations are indirectly presented, and
how do they come to be so?

What makes the case of perception interesting is, as Husserl points out,
the fact that while what is indirectly given – the back side of the candle,
say – is "indeterminate" (*unbestimmt*), this "does not mean that it lacks
determination." The peculiar indeterminacy is not a featureless void but
an "incomplete determinacy" (Hua 38, pp. 58–59). The incompleteness
in question is not to be measured against the idea of the complete object-
ive determination of the thing, the thing with all its properties whether
known, unknown, or even unknowable (Hua 38, pp. 26, 148). The molecu-
lar structure of the candle is not presented or intended, even indirectly,
in my perception of it. Nor does the incompleteness refer to my know-
ledge, to what I might subjectively be said to know or think about the
candle. The incomplete determinacy of the hidden side is, as Husserl puts
it, neither a "fantasy" nor "conceptual thought" – neither an instance of
imagining what it is like nor an instance of judging what it is like (Hua 38,
pp. 150–51). The determinations are there, intended, in a way peculiar to
perception. In Noë's terms again, we have a "perceptual sense" of the back
side. Thus, extending the intention/fulfillment structure to perception
is plausible only if our perceptual sense of the emptily intended hidden
side is determinate *enough* to support the idea of being fulfilled or unful-
filled (confirmed or disconfirmed) by subsequent perceptual experience.
But any degree of determinateness involves a norm that establishes what
the determination is *supposed* to be. Husserl suggests that the incomplete
determinacy of the indirectly presented back side is "mediated" by the
directly presented perceptual properties (Hua 38, pp. 153–54). If this is so,
then these properties must provide the standard for determining what is
indirectly presented. How do they do this?

Husserl's answer is that the presentative contents – the directly
experienced sensation-complexes – do not merely display (*darstellen*)
the corresponding properties of the object but also serve "a referential
[*hinweisende*], symbolizing function"; they "appear in a way analogous
to that of *signs*" – not signs for one particular determination but for a
delimited range of *possible* determinations (Hua 38, pp. 41, 37, 155, 60).

Husserl knows that it could be misleading to speak of "signs" here, since sensation-complexes are not themselves "objects" that "point toward something" (Hua 38, p. 36). Nevertheless, he argues that they exercise a "symbolizing" function insofar as they operate according to the principles of "similarity" and "contiguity" (Hua 38, p. 33). What is directly sensed – this blue sensation – primarily displays the objective blue of the candle, but "mediately" it refers to, indicates, or indirectly presents the hidden side through the principle of contiguity, and presents it, emptily, as blue through the principle of similarity. Thus the applicability of the intention/fulfillment structure to perception turns on the claim that sensations can signify what they don't directly present, thereby opening up the possibility of further fulfillment – a better, richer, more complete look at the thing – by following up what the principles of similarity and contiguity enable us to anticipate.

Despite its initial plausibility,[9] there are obvious problems with such a view, and Husserl himself notes the most important one: even if we accept the idea that sensations can function analogously to signs, "there is nothing that predestines the sensations for such a role" (Hua 38, p. 35). We are thus left to wonder what allows them to signify in the first place. Without an answer to that question we do not know how normativity gets a foothold in perception.

For Husserl, it is the "apprehension-meaning" (*Auffassungssinn*) of the act of perceiving that allows sensations to signify by subjecting them to a particular "interpretation [*Deutung*]" (Hua 38, pp. 27, 150). This apprehension-meaning is supposed to be pre-judicative, something distinctly perceptual, but even Husserl wonders what a distinctly perceptual meaning might be: "Is it not the case that every apprehension is simultaneously an apprehension of a *conceptual* sort?" (Hua 38, p. 192). In some respects the apprehension-meaning seems to have the character of a concept: "That which makes fulfillment possible … is the generic form [*gattungsmäßig Form*]," a form that includes "all" the perceptual object's determinations within itself, whether directly or only indirectly presented (Hua 38, pp. 61, 31). In other places, however, Husserl denies that it is conceptual: perceptual fulfillment, the "closer determination" of the

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[9] Even Noë uses the language of referring, indicating, and implying. Of the perceptual grasp of an event he writes: "In this way, what is present, strictly speaking, *refers to* or is *directed toward* what has happened and what will happen. Just as in a way the front of the tomato is directed toward the back – indicates the space where the back is to be found – so the present sound implicates a temporal structure by referring backwards and forwards in time" (2006, p. 29).

object, "involves nothing of the conceptual" (Hua 38, p. 62). The perception of an object "can be linked" in many ways with "judgment (cognition) by means of general, conceptual representations"; nevertheless, "not everything in the perception is judging in this sense." When I perceive something as a candle, for instance, I "apprehend what is there just as it is, without continually having to classify it," subsume it under a concept in an act of judgment. But here Husserl seems to waver: "Isn't individual apprehension always a cognition, the apprehension of something thus and so determined, of such a type, etc., even if it is not expressible and no subordination (classification) has taken place?" (Hua 38, pp. 195–96).

We have already seen one reason for doubting that the apprehension-meaning is conceptual. Our concept of a house consists of everything necessary for something to be a house, including many things that cannot be presented in perception at all, whether directly or indirectly – for instance, the property of being a dwelling place. The *Sinn* of a perception, on the other hand, includes only perceptual features, both directly and indirectly presented. Perceiving a house from here is said to "imply" (*impliziert*) what can only be seen from there: the roof, the back door, etc. But such "implication" is not supposed to be a matter of what can be inferred from something's being a house (Hua 38, p. 200). Further, in the course of an ongoing perceptual episode in which I successively transform indirectly presented determinations into directly presented ones, Husserl claims that "a cognizing apprehension is carried out" to the extent that the whole process is governed by the "type" (*Art*) contained in the apprehension-meaning. But, Husserl insists, this is "cognizing, interpretive apprehension in another sense" than that which is governed by logical or inferential rules (Hua 38, pp. 192–93). It is "another sense" since thinking, judging, and cognizing are syntheses in which, as Husserl puts it, the ego is actively engaged, whereas perceiving does not involve this sort of mental activity.

Thus the apprehension-meaning accounts for something like a type, a "moment of universality" (standard, rule), in the act of perception, but it is not exactly conceptual, since perceiving does not actively subsume anything under a concept. Further, the kind of articulation that belongs to judgment is absent in perception: my perception of a house includes perception of its roof and windows but cannot be described as perceiving *that* it *has* these parts. These categorial structures are at most implicit in the perception, and only with the judgment does the "fact that" the roof is "part" of the house become a phenomenological datum (Hua 38, pp. 199–200).

In his early phenomenology of perception, then, Husserl does not unambiguously answer his own question: "Isn't every apprehension simultaneously apprehension of a *conceptual* sort?" For he has not clarified the nature of the universality that belongs to such apprehension, and with it the normative in perception.[10] Everything he says about it is compatible with McDowell's proposal that in perception conceptual capacities are receptively "drawn into operation," since even McDowell denies that perception involves active judgment, the exercise of our conceptual capacities. Further, since Husserl, like McDowell, thinks that perception provides evidentiary warrant for our judgments – fulfills them – there must be some sense in which, for Husserl too, perception can be described as seeing "*that* things are thus and so." My judgment that "the house has a tiled roof" is justified not merely by seeing its tiled roof but by seeing *that* the house has a tiled roof.[11] This suggests that Husserl's early position does not succeed in clarifying a kind of perceptual meaning that would be governed by normative relations that are not themselves conceptual or inferential. And since an account of our perceptual sense of what is currently out of view but indirectly presented by what is directly in view depends on how apprehension-meaning is understood, one cannot unambiguously ascribe a phenomenology of non-conceptual perceptual content to Husserl's early work. But is perhaps such a clarification to be found in his later approach to perception as passive synthesis?

3   Passive synthesis, association, and the genesis of meaning

Husserl's mature analysis of perception is found within his larger project of uncovering the transcendental "genesis" of logic. Logic is understood as "the general science of reason"; that is, the science that studies those laws holding among concepts and judgments which flow from their assessibility in terms of truth and falsity. An analysis of perception belongs here because logic is not the *source* of these normative distinctions. Rather, because "consciousness contains a meaning within itself,

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[10] The notion of noematic meaning (introduced in 1913) does nothing to alter the picture, for, as we saw in the previous chapter, it too is ambiguous between a conceptual and a non-conceptual interpretation.

[11] See Hua 19/2, pp. 657–61, 667–70/II 773–78, 782–84, on categorial intuition and perception of states of affairs. For an argument that the *Logical Investigations* contains ambiguities on this point that are clarified in Husserl's later work, see Mooney 2010, and for a criticism of Mooney's solution see Leung 2011. The strongest arguments for treating Husserl's theory of perception as clearly non-conceptual is found in Hopp 2011.

it relates itself … to objectivities, that is, relates itself to something iden-
tical," and thus the question of whether such a relation is a "rational or
an irrational one" arises prior to conceptual activity (Hua 11, p. 253/387).
Thus the phenomenological question is: "What characterizes conscious-
ness (and the meaning immanent to it) in each case as something that
bears within itself truth and true being?" (Hua 11, p. 254/387). Before it
relates itself to things in a conceptual manner through judgments, con-
sciousness is already attuned to the normative distinctions that logic will
thematize explicitly. A phenomenology of logic, then, has the "transcen-
dental" task of "illuminating" the "originary sources" of the norms of
truth-functionality "all the way down to the bottom" in the "passive syn-
theses" of consciousness – that is, to syntheses that do not require active
stand-taking or predicating on the part of the ego (Hua 11, p. 256/390).
If, in Husserl's genetic phenomenology, perception is understood as that
from which conceptual operations emerge, the phenomenology of per-
ception as passive synthesis must already illuminate how normative
relations get established among the intentional contents of conscious-
ness. Here, then, if anywhere, one should find intentional content that
is both meaningful and (as the *origin* of conceptual, logical relations)
non-conceptual.

   In the present context it is impossible to do justice to the way Husserl's
genetic phenomenology both continues and revises his earlier approach
to perception. We must content ourselves with noting two significant
departures. First, in his early theory Husserl conceived the sensuous
aspect of perception as a *non*-intentional stratum of "sense-complexes,"
but genetic phenomenology conceives it as an at least *proto*-intentional
field of "appearance systems" (Hua 11, p. 11/48). And second, Husserl's
early theory was a static analysis of the relation holding between a given
apprehension-meaning and its sensuous fulfillment. But because genetic
phenomenology makes explicit the temporal dimension of the intention/
fulfillment schema, it thematizes the *origin* of such intentional content or
meaning. On the basis of these innovations Husserl purports to uncover
a "primordial lawfulness" (*Urgesetzlichkeit*) already in perception, one
that grounds the laws of logic without being identical to them (Hua 11,
pp. 319–20/606–7). In examining these innovations, then, we need to
see whether the phenomenology of passive genesis really overcomes the
weak point in Husserl's earlier theory – namely, that the supposedly
pre-conceptual normativity in perception was traced to the suspiciously
conceptual apprehension-meaning. Does the new analysis really show
how logical laws arise from "a primordial conformity to law" at the level

of perception that is both genuinely intentional – that is, assessable in normative terms – yet non-conceptual?

Husserl's later work abandons the idea of apprehension-meaning. The intentional object of perception is an "objective meaning" (*gegenständlicher Sinn*), but this meaning does not arise through an apprehension that interprets meaningless elements of sense. Rather, it is now seen to arise from the interplay between anticipation and fulfillment among pre-objective, but proto-intentional, "systems of appearance." These are "referential systems" (*Hinweissysteme*) that operate both at the level of perception proper – thus constituting the inner and outer horizons of perceptual objects – and also at the sub-perceptual level of internal time-consciousness (Hua 11, pp. 5, 11/41–42, 48). Further, Husserl introduces the term "apperception" to designate what he previously called "incomplete determinacy" – namely, the way the hidden aspects of a perceived object are nevertheless present in perceptual experience. "Apperceptions are intentional experiences that have in themselves a consciousness of something as perceived which is not (completely) self-given in them" (Hua 11, p. 336/624). As an example of the "laws of genesis" he mentions the laws that regulate the "formation of apperceptions," that is, the formation of meaningful intentional content. Among these is a law of "motivation," in which what is self-given in the perception does not merely contain that which is not self-given, but rather "*refers* to this other as belonging to it" (Hua 11, p. 338/627). But how can what is self-given motivate some *specific* range of further content such that a meaningful whole or identity is constituted – that is, so that we can speak of "fulfillment" or its failure? What defines the scope of an apperception, establishing what would count as coherent (*einstimmig*) further experience?

One answer would be: the conceptual rule governing the type of object given in the perception. But Husserl is committed to the idea that perceptual content at the level of passive synthesis is non-conceptual. A different answer might be sought in genetic phenomenology's deeper understanding of the body's role in perception. By means of the covariance relation that obtains between my bodily movements and the appearances that accompany them, something like a non-conceptual norm is established, a perceptual optimum that grounds our perceptual anticipation of an incompletely determinate range of further experiences of the same thing.[12] But for Husserl this is only the beginning of an answer. In *Ideas II*,

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[12] For a Husserlian analysis along these lines, see Drummond 1979–80. Husserl's approach is brought into dialogue with McDowell in Barber 2008 and 2011.

for example, he first describes how "in all experience of spatio-temporal thingly objects, *the body* [*Leib*] 'is involved' as the perceptual organ of the experiencing subject" (Hua 4, p. 144/152). But on his view the body is not an *irreducible* aspect of perceptual experience. Instead, "we must investigate the constitution of this corporeality" itself, an investigation that fixes upon the phenomenon of "localization": when I touch my left hand with my right, for example, I do not merely discover tactile properties of the left hand (smooth, soft) but also experience sensations of being touched, "localized" in the left hand. It is by means of sensations of this latter kind (as well as the closely related "kinaesthetic" sensations that accompany my bodily movements) that the body is constituted for consciousness *as* the living body (*Leib*): "[It] is not that the physical thing is now richer, but instead *it becomes body*, it senses" (Hua 4, p. 145/152). Husserl thus believes that to explain the normative in perception it is first necessary to show how the body is constituted in the temporal flow of the appearance systems or referential systems themselves. Before we can turn to the potential found in Husserl's phenomenology of embodiment, then, we must examine this idea.

To account for the norms governing apperceptions, Husserl reflects on the constitution of sensory fields prior to the emergence of object-constituting apperceptions. At the level of the temporal organization of a sensory field – the "lowest level of passivity" – he purports to find a kind of "concordance of meaning-giving" that underlies the perceptual genesis of "objective meaning" (Hua 11, p. 254/388). Dahlstrom summarizes what he (and Husserl) believes to be accomplished by this move, namely, identification of genuinely "non-conceptual yet intentional contents of experience" in which "sensory fields come to be constituted passively (preconceptually) yet with an intentional and, to that extent, epistemically normative structure" (2007, pp. 16, 17). But what provides the normative moment here? As Dahlstrom puts it: "How do these sensory fields manage to be informative and thus have an intentional or proto-semantic character?" (2007, p. 14).

Disappointingly, Husserl's answer appeals to "laws of association." To be sure, such laws are not psychological: "For us the rubric association designates a form and conformity to law of immanent genesis that belongs continually to consciousness in general – not, however, as for the psychologists, a form of objective, psychophysical causality" (Hua 11, p. 117/162). From causal laws no meaningful content could arise. Yet associative laws are not supposed to be conceptual either. At the level of passive genesis "talk of universality is merely a crutch for an indirect description that

points toward the phenomena themselves. For we do not have in mind here logical concepts, on classifying or generalizing universalities" (Hua 11, p. 40/80). Of what sort, then, are the phenomenological laws of association that generate intentional content? Again, Husserl's answer is a familiar one. As Dahlstrom explains: "What makes association a theme for phenomenology and not merely for objective psychology" is its "'indicatory' character" (2007, pp. 14–15). And when Husserl specifies what kind of indication is meant here, we find that we have come full circle: association involves relations of similarity, contiguity, contrast, and so on.[13]

The problem, of course, is that this indicatory structure is no different from what we encountered in the earlier "sign" theory of sense-complexes, where the latter were held to indicate by means of similarity and contiguity. There Husserl admitted that "nothing predestines the sensations" to play a signifying role, and he turned to the apprehension-meaning to explain how sensations are subordinated to the normativity constitutive of perceptual intentionality. The supposed indicatory character of sensations could not account for the normative in perception, nor was Husserl able to articulate an unambiguously non-conceptual, purely perceptual, notion of apprehension-meaning. In his later genetic phenomenology Husserl holds that appearance systems, unlike sensation complexes, are proto-intentional. But if what makes them so is their indicatory character, and if this is traced to the very same associations that proved insufficient in the earlier account, little progress has been made. Thus it is hard to see how the claim that sensory fields have an "epistemically normative structure" is supported by Husserl's actual analyses of passive synthesis. In Kantian terms, the syntheses of "apprehension" and "reproduction" do not add up to *perceptual* content; it is only with the "synthesis of recognition in a concept" that we can speak of a normativity other than the spatio-temporal sort that governs sensations (Kant 1968, pp. 130–31 [A97]).

Even if there is a pre-conceptual level of consciousness where concatenations of sensory fields emerge through associative syntheses of similarity, contrast, and contiguity – and even if all higher-order conceptual

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[13] The clearest discussion of these issues is in *Experience and Judgment*:

> It is the phenomenon of associative genesis which dominates this sphere of passive pre-givenness, established on the basis of syntheses of internal time-consciousness … That association can become a general theme of phenomenological description and not merely one of objective psychology is due to the fact that the phenomenon of *indication* [*Anzeige*] is something which can be exhibited from the point of view of phenomenology. (Husserl 1973, pp. 74–75)

syntheses (such as judgment) presuppose such an organized "pre-given" sensory field – we still do not know how such association can admit of normative assessment, without which talk of intentionality is empty. Association is, at best, a necessary condition of perception. Even if it is not conceived psychologically or causally, association is not the sort of thing that can be said to succeed or fail: contents just are or are not associated as similar, contiguous, or whatever, and by itself this cannot lead to "anticipations" that may or may not be fulfilled. Thus though the sensory fields to which association gives rise are supposed to play an indicatory role, we still have no idea how they can do so.[14]

4   Sensorimotor knowledge and non-conceptual normativity

At this point we should return to the suggestion that the normative in perception is grounded in our bodily engagement with the world. In his early theory Husserl made reference to a "maximum" appearance of something, the perspective which provides the standard for what counts as a better – richer, fuller – view of the thing. But the earlier theory could not explain how this optimal view of the thing's shape or color managed to establish itself *as* optimal, *as* a norm within perception. In genetic phenomenology Husserl believes he can address this issue by appeal to the body. We recall that Husserl described one's ongoing experience of perceptual aspects as guided by a "*felt* approximation" to a "complete perception" (Hua 38, p. 145). It is this idea – namely, that the standard of wholeness does not govern the process conceptually but *feelingly* – which Husserl's later theory links to the body: "The qualities of material things as aestheta, such as they present themselves to me intuitively, prove to be dependent on my qualities, *the make-up of the experiencing subject*, and to be related to *my Body and my 'normal sensibility'*"(Hua 4, p. 56/61).

   As this reference to "my 'normal sensibility'" suggests, however, Husserl does not trace the normative in perception to the body's movements per se but to the correlation between one set of appearances (the "kinaesthetic

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[14] Husserl makes much of the phenomenon of temporally emergent contrast – an unexpected noise, for instance, that stands out from an ongoing background of silence. For him, such contrasts underlie the constitution of what "belongs" and what does not and are thus the basis for subsequent perceptual object-identification. We cannot examine this suggestion fully here, but it should be clear that taken by themselves such contrasting sensations – i.e., *differences* within the sensory appearance systems – can be seen to indicate something only if the ongoing "undifferentiated" flow is *already* indicative, i.e., does not merely flow but "points" to "more of the same." But the question was precisely how it is able to do this.

sensations" that are the conscious traces of such movements) and another (the sensations that adumbrate the properties of the perceived thing). He thus remains within a temporal analysis of consciousness. But we have already encountered reasons to think that this "felt approximation" to a norm – and so also the origin of perceptual meaning – cannot be grounded in consciousness alone, at least if consciousness is understood as a mona-dological "absolute" temporal flow. Such a perspective inevitably elides the role of the body and its responsiveness to those norms that define our capacity to *act*, and I shall argue that it is in these practical capacities that standards for what counts as successful perception find their ground.[15]

Husserl's analysis turns on a distinction between "presenting acts of sensation" (those sensations whose destiny is to adumbrate objective qual-ities of the thing) and the "series of kinaesthetic sensations" upon which the former are "dependent … as motivated" (Hua 4, p. 56/61). This motiv-ational dependency consists in the following: the kinaesthetic awareness of my bodily movements (including the movement of my sense organs) makes up a system of sensations that admits of a distinction between "nor-mal" functioning – "systems of orthoaesthetic perceptions" – and abnor-mal functioning (Hua 4, pp. 58–75/63–80). Instances of the latter include the kinaestheses belonging to my sense of touch when I have burned my finger or tongue, or the feeling of restricted control in my arm when it has "fallen asleep." Here "normal" simply means what is regular or usual; what normally happens. But this provides the basis for a normal appear-ing of *things*, since kinaesthetic sensations are conditionally related to a second system of sensations, which present objective qualities: "*If* the eye turns in this way, *then* so does the 'image'" (Hua 4, p. 58/63). The normal kinaesthesis of eye movement "motivates" a series of sensings of the thing in an ordered way: if I move my eyes this way, then the candle will (i.e., *ought to*) appear in just that way.

According to Husserl, the "ought" here derives from the fact that a normally functioning kinaesthetic system constitutes, as its correlate, a second "system of orthoaesthetic perceptions," namely, the normal appearings of things and their properties. An objective world is possible only if "the subject has its system of orthoaesthetic experiences and has thereby, continuously over against itself, the one spatio-temporal causal

[15] As Joseph Rouse has argued, however, this move, rather than establishing the idea that perception is pre-conceptual, might force us to revise what conceptuality itself *is*: by "taking more seriously the worldly and bodily character of language, and the linguistic character of thought," we would not need "to place limits upon the conceptual domain, but to recognize it as a finite, embodied worldly capacity all the way up" (2005, p. 40).

nature. This again presupposes that its Body is constituted in systems of orthoaesthetic perceptions: thus the Body cannot be pathological throughout" (Hua 4, p. 74/79).[16] Looking at the candle, I have a perceptual sense of the back side because I am feelingly aware of the conditional relation between the kinaesthetic referential system and the system of adumbrative appearances of the thing motivated by it. And within this system, Husserl argues, "there stands out … the 'optimal givenness' in which the thing comes to the fore along with the properties that 'befit it itself'" – that is, the thing seen "in sunlight, on a clear day, without the interference of other bodies that might affect the color-appearance"; seeing it "in air" rather than through water, and so on (Hua 4, pp. 80, 65/75, 60). Normal experience establishes for itself an optimum, a kind of standard of variation: the cylinder appears like this from here and like that from there because these appearings are ordered variations of how it appears optimally, that is, from the *best* angle and in the *best* lighting conditions. Thus there is a kind of norm in perception itself.

Husserl here touches on what Noë calls "sensorimotor knowledge": "We experience the presence of what is out of view by understanding, implicitly, that our relation to what is in view is such that movement of the eyes, or of the body, brings it into view, and such that movements of the thing itself make a sensory difference to what we experience" (Noë 2006, p. 26). What Husserl saw as the relation of conditional motivation between two "orthoaesthetic systems of sensation" is, for Noë, a "sensorimotor coupling": there is a perceptual sense of the hidden sides (and *pari passu* the normally expected appearing of qualities like color or shape in these or those conditions) "because we are coupled with [those hidden sides] in a special, immediate, familiar sensorimotor manner" (2006, pp. 26–27). Such coupling is norm-governed: getting a better look at something depends on knowing *how* to look – that is, being skilled at bringing oneself into the circumstances that will allow the optimal look to emerge. As Charles Siewert glosses it: "To get a better look at something is to do something, to look at it better – it is to exercise relevant sensorimotor skills. Thus what it is for perspectively varying appearances to be 'appropriately related' amongst themselves so as to constitute the appearance of a constant object is something understood only by exercising or enacting these skills" (2006, pp. 15).[17]

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16 Here Husserl makes plain that this system is not just part of the body, but *constitutes* it *as* "living body." Thus, as we noted earlier, embodiment is not primordial but arises from temporal associations within consciousness.

17 For a fuller elaboration of this view see Siewert (forthcoming).

In his frequent references to the "I can," Husserl clearly recognizes this aspect of what we might call "perceptual practice." But, as we saw, he held that the relevant normativity arose from the co-ordination of kinaesthetic with presentative sensations. Practices and abilities like walking around a candle or playing tennis or typing, however, are *bodily* skills that cannot be reduced to covariance relations between systems of appearances in consciousness. The body cannot itself be constituted as a function of temporal associations, nor can the norm of proper functioning relevant to bodily skills be understood as arising from a system of kinaesthetic sensations. For a skill (sensorimotor knowledge) gains its normative sensitivity from its being "out for" something, its trying to accomplish a task, and *trying* is not any kind of sensation. The task in question need not be conceptually mediated – my concept of walking is not involved in my exercise of that skill – but any such task must be responsive to the distinction between success and failure. Thus while sensorimotor knowledge does involve the body's sense or feeling of itself as being appropriately situated within its project, the normative concept of the "appropriate" does not arise from the feeling but from the body's own *way of being*.[18]

It is true that I feel movement toward the optimum, toward the better look. The norm is not established by the feeling, however – nor by any other kinaesthetic sensation or system of sensations – but by the practice itself: it is the skill or ability, and not the feeling which accompanies it, that contains success conditions, even if the skill in question is only that of being able to walk or control one's eye movements. The success conditions for such abilities (looking, walking) – unlike those for games like tennis or practices like using a microscope – are tied to the *facticity* of the body; its feeling of "equilibrium" is keyed to specific contingent features of its make-up: its upright posture, its bi-symmetry, its eyes in front,

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[18] In an important article that deserves more discussion than we can give it here, Hannah Ginsborg draws upon Kant's notion of aesthetic judgment to introduce a concept of "perceptual normativity" that is close to what we are examining in this chapter. The idea is that "perceptual experience … involves the awareness of its own appropriateness with respect to the object perceived"; or, in Kantian terms, that perception is characterized by a consciousness of *exemplarity* – one's ability to take oneself "to be perceiving an object as [anyone] ought to perceive it" (2006, p. 403). For Ginsborg such normativity is not to be traced to our conceptual capacities; it is "primitive." But as I suggest below, and will argue further in Part III, we must take the analysis of perceptual normativity back to our ability to be norm-responsive as such – an analysis that leads first to our bodily skills and practices but ultimately to our nature as (in Heidegger's phrase) "beings in whose being that very being is an *issue*."

and so on.[19] The baseline of perceptual normativity lies here, and not in the feeling of striving for or of having sustained that equilibrium, or in the "orthoaesthetic" sensations that accompany the successful exercise of bodily skills.

To contrast the responsiveness to norms of bodily skills with our responsiveness to conceptual norms, Hubert Dreyfus distinguishes between "success conditions" and "conditions of improvement" (1999, p. 6). Whereas success conditions require a concept – that is, a conception of the end to be achieved by a certain series of bodily movements – conditions of improvement require no such concept. They pertain to a level of bodily comportment that may be bound up with intentional action – that is, action that is explicitly goal-directed, instrumental, and conceptually mediated – but is not structured in the same way. As Dreyfus argues, bodily engagement with the world is normally a matter of unreflective "mindless coping," and it is only when such coping hits a snag that I begin to deliberate and form explicit intentions (1990, p. 3). Phenomenological description of such coping shows that "the body of the performer is solicited by the situation to perform a series of movements that *feel appropriate*, without the agent needing in any way to anticipate what would count as *success*" (Dreyfus 1999, p. 6). In playing tennis, for instance, the player's skill consists in his body's ability to seek and maintain a kind of equilibrium or "optimal gestalt" throughout a rally, reaching to attain optimal contact at the sweet spot, moving effortlessly toward the appropriate position for the next shot, and so on. But "the tennis player cannot represent the optimal gestalt that, nonetheless, directs the movements of his body" (Dreyfus 2000, p. 331). In contrast to Husserl's account, in which perceptual normativity is grounded in the normal kinaesthetic sensations that motivate our perceptual sense of what is to come, Dreyfus sees the motivation moving the other way: the body responds to "affordances" in the total situation as it attempts to maintain its equilibrium.

The optimal gestalt that serves as a norm or condition of improvement for such ubiquitous behavior is not a visual gestalt that is displayed *for* consciousness but a gestalt that holds between the body and its world.

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[19] Hubert Dreyfus notes the implications of this for the project of AI:

> Merleau-Ponty's and Freeman's account of how we directly pick up significance and improve our sensitivity to relevance depends on our responding to what is significant for *us* given our needs, body size, ways of moving, and so forth … If we can't make our brain model responsive to the *significance* in the environment *as it shows up specifically for human beings*, the project of developing an embedded and embodied Heideggerian AI can't get off the ground. (Dreyfus 2007c, p. 265)

And for this reason bodily responsiveness to such conditions of improvement is also the source of a pre-conceptual *perceptual* normativity. As Merleau-Ponty describes it:

> The distance from me to the object is not a size which increases or decreases, but a tension which fluctuates around a norm. An oblique position of the object in relation to me is not measured by the angle which it forms with the plane of my face, but felt as a lack of balance, as an unequal distribution of its influences on me. (Merleau-Ponty 1962, p. 302)

And as Wakefield and Dreyfus write, "our bodies have a capacity to respond to moment-to-moment stimulation in a way which tends to promote an optimal fit between perception and action" (1993, p. 264). This explains how a perceptual optimum can emerge, because it contextualizes the mere feeling of equilibrium by reference to the improvement conditions of a practice, bringing with it an optimum for the things involved in that practice. The perceptual optimum of a tennis ball in flight is relative to the best place for my body to be in order to return it; the optimal view of a painting depends on whether my perceiving it is embedded in the practice of aesthetic appreciation or in that of the restorer interested in its facture; and the kind of optimum that Husserl focuses on – the view of the "real" color or the "real" shape of a thing – belongs, as we saw, to the exercise of those skills and abilities keyed to the body's "default" state of equilibrium: upright, bi-symmetrical, forward-looking, and so on. What Merleau-Ponty calls "motor intentionality" (1962, p. 138), then, is the source of the "*fühlbare Annäherung*" to which Husserl refers: perception is feelingly guided by an optimum because it takes place in the context of practices in which the body seeks to improve its stance in, and by means of, its dealings with things in the world.

Of course, much more needs to be said about how specific normative or conceptual aspects of the perceptual object (e.g., its characteristic of being a thing-with-properties) emerge from such practical coping or trying. But if an approach such as this is on the right track, then it has serious implications for a phenomenological approach to intentionality generally. For if an understanding of the normative even in perception requires appeal to "embodied and embedded" contexts that cannot themselves be understood as constituted correlates of consciousness, this suggests that Husserlian phenomenology's reflection on meaning – that is, on normatively structured experience – is in some tension with its self-conception as a transcendental philosophy of *consciousness*. Indeed, as I shall argue in Part III, the *phenomenologically* salient achievement of Heidegger's

"ontology" lies above all in his recognition that the normativity of mean-
ing – including perceptual meaning – requires a very different conception
of the transcendental subject for whom such meaning is possible. But the
wider point can be made from within Husserl's phenomenology itself, as I
shall argue in the following chapter.

Husserl's subjectivism and the philosophy of mind

1   What is philosophy of mind philosophy of?

In a recent paper which critically examines and rejects several suggestions that have been made for "bridging the gap" between Husserl's phenomenology and neuroscience, Rick Grush concludes on a positive note:

> It should be obvious enough that while I have been highly critical of van Gelder, Varela and Lloyd, there is a clear sense in which the four of us are on the same team. We all believe that an important source of insights for the task of understanding of mentality is what Lloyd describes as "analytic phenomenology," even if we disagree about how to go about harvesting these insights.

As Grush continues, it turns out that phenomenology has a rather central role to play in what is now customarily referred to as the "philosophy of mind."

> The questions *What is a mind? What would some entity have to have, or be able to do, in order for it to be or have a mind?* are, interestingly, questions that are simply not raised by the sciences of the mind. I have invariably been met with puzzled looks when I raise such questions to psychologists or neuroscientists, and it takes a little time and effort to get them to see what the question is! … The point for now is that the tradition Husserl was part of was one that took such questions seriously. The commonality between myself and those I have criticized is that we take that this task is an important one, one that can aid, and be aided by, empirical investigations as carried out by the relevant sciences. (Grush 2006, p. 449)

In this chapter I shall pose these questions – What is a mind? What would some entity have to have, or be able to do, in order for it to be or have a mind? – within the horizon of Husserl's account of intentional consciousness. In doing so I shall touch only tangentially on the issue of whether the task of answering them can be aided by empirical investigations. I am primarily interested in whether such questions demand Husserl's transcendental turn, and specifically his critique of naturalism and embrace

of the transcendental reduction. I shall argue that a phenomenology of mind must respect the distinction between transcendental and empirical inquiry, but in contrast to what I call Husserl's "subjectivism" I shall argue that this distinction need not rule out a kind of "soft" naturalism.[1] From another perspective, the thesis will be that when Petitot *et al.* (1999) argue for a "naturalized phenomenology," they are wrong to think that this necessitates abandoning transcendental phenomenology. What must be abandoned is Husserl's own interpretation of the transcendental reduction, one that imputes to "absolute consciousness" an ultimately constitutive role.

My approach will consist, first, in examining some of the arguments Husserl uses in "Philosophy as Rigorous Science" to buttress his rejection of a naturalistic approach to the philosophy of mind. Though Husserl had already argued for the methodological indispensability of the reduction in 1907, there is no mention of it in this 1911 essay. Instead – and this is the focus of the following section – Husserl is able to distinguish purely *descriptively* between the essence of consciousness, with its "thoroughly peculiar 'forms',"and the essence of nature. On this basis he is able to explicate phenomenological constitution – the central topic of transcendental phenomenology – without requiring a reduction to "pure consciousness." This suggests that transcendental phenomenology is incompatible only with a certain version of naturalism – albeit the most important version, and the one to which Husserl rightly directed his critique throughout his career. It also suggests that transcendental phenomenology need not involve subjectivism – that is, it need not assert a constitutive priority of consciousness over nature.

In the third and fourth sections I shall try to say something about what mind is. Drawing upon Husserl's analyses in *Ideas II* – specifically, his critique of psychophysical parallelism and his analysis of *Geist* as embodied mind – I argue that the genuine contribution of transcendental phenomenology to philosophy of mind is found at the personalistic level, eliminating both the motivation for, and the possibility of, any reduction to absolute consciousness. Consciousness is not the theme of transcendental phenomenology; the normative space of meaning is. It is what philosophy of mind is philosophy *of.*

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[1] Versions of something like a soft naturalism – very different, but both suggestive – are found in McDowell 1996 and Rouse 2002. Two recent collections explore this possibility (De Caro and Macarthur 2004 and De Caro and Macarthur 2010), but the phenomenological approach is not taken up in them.

2   Nature, consciousness, and the normative

By the time of "Philosophy as Rigorous Science," Husserl had expanded his critique of logical psychologism into a general critique of naturalism as a philosophical position. Nevertheless, he continued to believe that "for essential reasons psychology must remain more closely related to philosophy" than other natural sciences, and so he still couched the article's central claim – that philosophical questions must be approached via "a phenomenology of consciousness as opposed to a natural science about consciousness" (Hua 25, p. 17/91) – in anti-psychologistic terms:

> Characteristic of all forms of extreme and consistent naturalism … is on the one hand the naturalizing of consciousness, including all intentionally immanent data of consciousness, and on the other the naturalizing of ideas and consequently of all absolute ideals and norms. (Hua 25, p. 9/80)

To understand how Husserl approaches the philosophy of mind, one must attend to this "on the one hand, and on the other." On the one hand, psychology holds consciousness to be part of the natural order, properly investigated with the empirical methods of natural science. Husserl argues that when this approach is made the basis for addressing *philosophical* questions it "falsifies the sense" (Hua 25, p. 8/79) of those questions and so, as "psychologism," must be rejected. But what is it about philosophical questions that makes this so, and why is the naturalization of *consciousness* the root of the problem? It is because, on the other hand, naturalism, and so also psychologism, naturalizes "ideas" and consequently "all absolute ideals and norms." It is the *normative, ideal* character of what concerns philosophy that rules out any naturalistic approach. Left hanging in this exposition, however, is an explanation of what normativity and ideality have to do with consciousness, a connection suggested by Husserl's reference to the naturalization of "ideas."

   This point is not as trivial as it might seem; indeed, it demands nothing less than an account of what "mind" is, and so of the scope of philosophy of mind. To treat the state of being conscious as a natural state does not, by itself, lead to skeptical and relativistic consequences. It is only when consciousness is taken to provide the key to answering a certain sort of question – questions of *legitimacy* or "validity" – that it must not be understood naturalistically. Husserl's examples show that he holds such questions to be transcendental, that is, concerned with conditions of possibility. For instance, philosophy asks how "experience as consciousness" can "give or contact an object." A mental state such as perception

purports to "give or contact" a *real* thing in the world; that is, it includes a claim to *validity*. The philosophical question is not whether such a claim is valid in this or that case; rather, the puzzle is how it is at all possible that a mental state can have the structure of a *claim*, how it can have content that immanently references the normative distinction between success or failure at giving or contacting the real world. Or again, how can "experiences be mutually legitimated or corrected by means of each other, and not merely replace each other or intensify each other subjectively?" (Hua 25, p. 14/87). How, in other words, is it at all possible that two of my mental states can stand to one another in normative relations of legitimation or correction? Because such questions involve normative distinctions, they require, says Husserl, a "completely different critique of experience" from that which characterizes the self-critical practices of empirical sciences. Naturalism is in no position to answer them because it treats the normative as a simple matter of fact. It does not recognize the problem.

Why, though, should being *conscious* be taken as the royal road to philosophy of mind in this sense? Following Hume, Husserl suggests that it is because "absolute ideals and norms" are *ideas*, that is, "immanent data of consciousness." Thus it seems that philosophy must only avoid naturalizing consciousness; apparently it need not worry about naturalizing the *body*. But is this convincing? In the previous chapter, for instance, we saw that the normativity that structures perceptual content cannot be explicated without appeal to embodied practices, and if that is so, then the threat of naturalism is not limited to the "reification of consciousness" (Hua 25, p. 26/103) – reification of embodied practices is also a threat – and the philosophy of mind will not be exhausted by a phenomenology of consciousness.

This issue will concern us below. For the moment we need to look more closely at the idea that consciousness is of interest to philosophy only because it is somehow bound up with the normative conditions of experience. Husserl's transcendental phenomenology posits a radical distinction between the normative and the natural, but what is the basis of this distinction? In "Philosophy as Rigorous Science" the answer comes in the context of Husserl's "positive and hence principiant criticism of [naturalism's] foundation" (Hua 25, p. 11/83), which is meant to show why naturalism necessarily "falsifies the sense" of philosophical questions. The centerpiece of this exercise is a descriptive and eidetic contrast between "nature" and "consciousness" that is meant to be intelligible to anyone, whether or not they have been instructed in the subtleties of the phenomenological reduction. It is this contrast that provides the basis for the

transcendental distinction. Thus, access to the terrain of transcendental phenomenology is, to this extent, quite independent of any reduction to absolute "constituting" consciousness.

As Husserl describes it, nature is the "spatio-temporal world of bodies"; the psychical, in contrast, is "nature in a secondary sense" (Hua 25, p. 26/103). This is because only bodies are perceivable "in a number of different experiences … as individually identical," which allows for "being experienced by many subjects as individually identical and … as intersubjectively the same" (Hua 25, p. 27/104). Such individually identical spatio-temporal objects of perception, further, "stand there as incorporated in the totality of one corporeal world with its one space and its one time." Nature is in principle "the same" for everyone, a totality conditioned by causal laws: "only in the causal relation to or connection with each other do [particular things] retain their individual identity," and their "physically real properties" are all "causal," that is, determined by "laws of possible changes" which "concern the identical, the thing, not by itself but in the unified, actual, and possible totality of the one nature." Thus, nature as it appears perceptually exhibits "stabilities, changes, and relationships of change," but these are not the strict stabilities, changes, and relationships of change that belong to nature itself. Rather, they "act like a 'vague' medium in which the true, objective, physically exact nature presents itself" (Hua 25, p. 27/105).

Husserl would subtly refine this description over the years, but he always retained its essential features. The consciousness of true, objective nature – the object-domain of natural science – is "motivated" by the law-likeness found in perceptual experience, but such experience nowhere exhibits strict causal law. As Husserl notes in *Ideas II*, nature in the strict sense is "a construction, in *thought*"; it is not perceivable, not perspectival: "the objectively real is not in my 'space' or in anyone else's, as 'phenomenon'" (Hua 4, p. 87/92). Husserl's concept of nature as the "spatio-temporal world of bodies," then, is quite close to what John McDowell calls the "realm of law" in contrast to the "space of reasons": the "logical space of nature is the logical space in which the natural sciences function," and "to place something in nature on the relevant conception, as contrasted with placing it in the logical space of reasons, is to situate it in the realm of law." On this view, as McDowell notes, "whatever the relations are that constitute the logical space of nature, they are *different in kind* from the normative relations that constitute the logical space of reasons" (1996, p. xv). Because Husserl's distinction between the transcendental and the natural tracks this view, the kind of naturalism

Husserl opposes here and elsewhere is pretty much what McDowell calls "bald naturalism," namely, a naturalism that "aims to domesticate conceptual capacities within nature conceived as the realm of law" (1994, p. 73). Bald naturalism holds that mind must be explained entirely in terms of non-normative law, a position that Husserl deems not only false but absurd, countersensical. For essential reasons consciousness cannot belong to nature directly, but only as "associated" with something that does so belong, namely, the body.[2]

   Husserl's eidetic description of "the 'world' of the 'psychical'" contrasts at every point with his description of nature: the unity of the psychical is "monadological" rather than determined by its place in a causal whole; it is "not a unity that could be experienced in several separate perceptions as individually identical"; here "there is no distinction between appearance and being"; it is "phenomenon, not nature" (Hua 25, p. 29/106). A phenomenon is "no 'substantial' unity"; it has no "real" parts, properties, changes, "and *no causality.*" It is not "experienced" in the pregnant sense of the word but is, rather, "vital experience" itself; it is something available only in "reflection," and its identity can be "recalled" but not adumbrated (Hua 25, p. 29/107). Nevertheless the psychical, like nature, is an *ordered* whole. A phenomenon "finds its ordered place within a comprehensive context, a 'monadic' unity of consciousness, a unity that in itself has nothing at all to do with nature, with space and time, substantiality and causality, but has its thoroughly peculiar 'forms'" (Hua 25, p. 30/107–8). The difference between the order of consciousness and the order of nature is apparent already in the natural attitude. This means that the philosophically fatal "reification of consciousness" is not a necessary consequence of our everyday experience of mind and world. Rather, it arises within what Husserl calls the "naturalistic attitude," the attitude of the natural scientist for whom to be is to be governed by causal law. Within the natural attitude, in contrast, the "thoroughly peculiar 'forms'" that characterize conscious experience pose no mystery; they are altogether natural to us.

   What primarily distinguishes these forms from the causal laws of nature is that they order a space of *meaning.* The psychical is *intentional*; it "is 'consciousness-of,' it 'has' a 'meaning,' 'intends' something 'objective,' which latter … permits of being described as something 'immanently objective,' 'intended as such,' and intended in one or another mode of

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2   In sections 3 and 4 below, we shall return to the naturalistic prejudice inherent in this picture. As McDowell says, "the naturalism that equates nature with the realm of law" may itself be part of the difficulty in seeing how "spontaneity relates to nature" (1996, p. 77).

intending" (Hua 25, p. 31/109). The forms of consciousness can estab-
lish an order of meaning only because they have a normative character.
Causal laws establish what is, but they can establish nothing about what
should be, what something is *supposed* to be. Forms of meaning, in con-
trast, necessarily involve this sort of normativity. To "intend something
objective," for instance, is not merely to enjoy some content (e.g., sense
data) but to grasp "the intended as such" in light of what it is supposed
to be, what it is or means to be such a thing. Only on such a normative
basis can I be conscious of something *as* something, such that subsequent
experiences can either "legitimate or correct" it. To "intend something
objective" – to perceive that tree there – is not merely to be causally related
to it; it is to take my experience to be corrigible in a certain way, namely,
in light of the norms of treehood. To possess normative ordering, then, is
the essence of conscious life in the relevant sense, "mind" in contrast to
naturalistic "nature."

Here we should recall Husserl's insistence that a philosophy of mind
must be transcendental. What Husserl calls the "teleologically ordered"
relations between "types of consciousness" (Hua 25, p. 16/90) – for
instance, relations between judging and intuitive evidencing or between
the manifest and hidden aspects of a perceived object; generally, relations
of "fulfillment" (*Erfüllung*) – may be studied by phenomenological psych-
ology, but this psychology does not set itself the philosophical task of
clarifying how normative ordering can belong to mind in the first place.
As Grush noted, psychological and neurological approaches to mind are
curiously uninterested in what mind *is*, what something "must have to
have, or be able to do" in order to be characterized in terms of these "thor-
oughly peculiar 'forms'."

But this brings us back to the question we raised, and set aside, above:
what if transcendental clarification of the normativity in experience can-
not be achieved solely by recourse to what it is to be conscious? Because
Husserl, like John Searle, held that consciousness is intrinsically inten-
tional, he posited a thoroughgoing parallel between the "content" of
phenomenological psychology (as pure science of the psyche) and tran-
scendental phenomenology. But if the normativity in experience were
inseparable from my embodiment there could be no such parallel, since
the body is nothing psychical.[3] And if there is no such parallel, it will be

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[3] Husserl holds that physics constitutes its object-domain – the "purely physical" – by
    means of a certain abstraction from the full contents of everyday experience. He also holds
    that psychology constitutes (or *should* constitute) *its* object-domain – the "purely psych-
    ical" – by means of a "parallel abstraction." For the argument that such an abstraction,

a mistake to think that the transcendental reduction – gateway to a phe-
nomenological clarification of the constitution of meaning – leads to a
non-worldly absolute consciousness.

To what, then, does it lead? On the basis of Husserl's analyses in *Ideas
II*, I shall argue that the "thoroughly peculiar 'forms'" characteristic of
mind arise with what Husserl calls the "person."[4] Husserl often equates
transcendental subjectivity with "absolute consciousness,"[5] but this equa-
tion must be resisted. Transcendental subjectivity is the person, prop-
erly understood; *Geist* – the "personal" ego as *embodied, practical, and
social* – is responsible for the order of meaning. In that sense, the "nature"
of the naturalistic attitude is relative to *Geist.* But as we shall see, aban-
doning the priority of consciousness undermines the idea that mind is
non-natural. Because the body belongs to nature but is also an essential
element in the constitution of meaning, transcendental phenomenology
demands a concept of nature free of naturalistic prejudices. To set the
stage, a brief examination of Husserl's argument against psychophysical
parallelism in *Ideas II* will provide further evidence for why conscious-
ness cannot be absolute (intrinsically intentional), why consciousness and
mind cannot be identical.

3   Normative forms and the argument against psychophysical parallelism

Psychophysical parallelism holds that all conscious states have their
exactly determined correlates in certain states of the brain, such that the
causal laws governing brain states also explain states of consciousness. It
is noteworthy that Husserl's argument against psychophysical parallel-
ism does not appeal to the normative forms that defined consciousness in
"Philosophy as Rigorous Science" but to certain *non-normative* laws that
pertain to the temporality of consciousness. And for just this reason his
argument proves inconclusive.

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were it possible, would not yield an object-domain that included the "thoroughly peculiar
'forms'" necessary for intentionality, see Crowell 2002b.

[4] In using this term I am simply following Husserl. More systematically, I believe that the
term "person" is inadequate to designate the form of subjectivity that is being investi-
gated, roughly for the reasons Heidegger mentions in *Sein und Zeit* ¶10. "*Geist*" is perhaps
better, and I shall therefore often leave it untranslated in the discussion which follows. A
positive account of "mind" in the relevant sense – as Dasein or "care" – will be found in
Part III of this volume.

[5] See for instance Hua 4, p. 179/189; 281/294; 289/302.

First, Husserl grants that sensory states require a body with sense organs: "As regards sensations, the dependence means that a certain bodily state … has, as its univocal and objective consequence, a certain sensation in a determinate stream of consciousness bound to its respective body" (Hua 4, p. 290/304). Thus the sensuous dimension of experience is fully explained by the causal nexus of the body (or, more particularly, the brain, which Husserl calls "the central organ B"). But, he asks, "can the same be true regarding all the component parts and moments emerging in the stream of consciousness"? Specifically, can it be that "apperceptions, position-takings of belief, of will, etc." (Hua 4, p. 290/303); ego-activity, the *fiat*, the *cogito* – everything Husserl associates with *Geist* – are also correlated to, and ultimately explainable in terms of, brain states? Husserl believes he can "radically refute" such parallelism (Hua 4, p. 294/308).

Earlier in *Ideas II* Husserl noted that higher-order intentionalities such as thinking or willing are not "localized" in the body the way that sensations are (Hua 4, p. 161/153). This already suggests that they are of an entirely different order from sensations, but in the present context it is the temporal form, not the content, of conscious experiences that is made to carry the argument. According to Husserl, the temporality of consciousness has an a priori structure (which means that the temporal relations between given experiences could not be otherwise), whereas the brain operates according to natural laws that are empirical and so contingent. Thus, while "the changes of [the brain] are contingent changes, subject to natural laws which could just as well be different ones," the retentive changes that structure a given perceptual state are necessary, as is the relation between "a lived experience" and "its background, its environment in the order of co-existence as well as its environment in the sinking down into the past" (Hua 4, p. 294/307). Husserl admits that "the [brain] can be a necessary … condition" of conscious states (Hua 4, p. 297/310), but because these brain states could be otherwise – that is, because the natural laws governing their succession could be different from how they are – they cannot suffice to *explain* conscious states. The brain states correlated to a given temporal segment of conscious experience could in principle be different, but the temporal relations between the conscious contents of that segment could not. Thus there can be no thoroughgoing parallel.

We shall not stop here to question the premise upon which Husserl's argument is based – namely, that the laws of nature are contingent. Even if this is granted, the argument has problems. Husserl seems to embrace a kind of functionalism, according to which content at the level of "software"

could be instantiated in any number of "hardware" configurations. But appeal to temporal structure cannot establish anything this strong. It is by no means obvious that the kind of content *we* enjoy could be instantiated in hardware – that is, in a body – that is significantly different from our own. Husserl admits that "how *far* the dependence of [consciousness] on [the brain] extends" – beyond the previously noted dependence of sensation – "can only be decided empirically" (Hua 4, p. 295/308). The "properly noetic" – that is, ego activity rather than the passive syntheses of sensation – "becomes *co*-dependent on [the brain], to the extent that it is founded in the hyletic." But by restricting his argument to what we may call the "pre-personal" processes of temporality, Husserl cannot really rule out the possibility that the dependence of consciousness on the brain might include a good deal of the "properly noetic." If the pre-personal level were all we had to go on, it would be hard to say why the content (as opposed to the temporal form) of thinking, for instance, would be any less amenable to explanation in terms of brain states than sensuous content is. For that, one would have to say something about what distinguishes the nature of *the content* so radically from sensation. In other words, even if it is possible to demonstrate a priori laws at the pre-personal level,[6] it might still be the case that "the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile." The kind of a priori dependencies (non-causal, motivational) Husserl needs to refute naturalism as a philosophy of *mind* are the sort that have the *normative* character he uncovered in "Philosophy as Rigorous Science," not the sort that belong to the "anonymously functioning" subjectivity of the temporal stream.

For instance, the essential connection between memory and perception cannot be explained in terms of a causal relation between an earlier state of the brain and a later one. But this is not because the perceptual act finds its place in an a priori "retentional form," but because the act of memory has a certain "background" that constitutes it as having some particular meaningful content. What is essential to an act of memory is not its causal relation to an earlier perception but the *reference* to that earlier perception in its intentional *content*; not its temporality, but its semantic structure, is decisive here. And an experience can have such a structure only in light of *immanent* norms that establish how the reference can succeed or fail: it is not a memory if it references a perception that is to occur in the future

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6 But note Grush's worries about the "content/vehicle confusion" that often undermines attempts to move from computational or pre-personal processes to phenomenology (2006, p. 418).

or if it references a perception that never took place, and so on. The reason that "the spirit can be grasped as dependent on nature and can itself be naturalized, but only to a certain degree" – that is, that "a univocal determination of spirit through merely natural dependencies is unthinkable" (Hua 4, p. 297/311) – is not that consciousness has an a priori temporal form, but that intentional *content* depends on sensitivity to norms.[7] Those norms are indeed implicated in the relation between the content and its background, but the salient constitutive role of this background does not derive from the temporal structure of consciousness. If the background sufficient to support normativity in experience is embodied, practical, and social, then while "a monadic consciousness … that would have no 'world' at all given to it, could indeed be thought" (Hua 4, p. 290/303), this fact would have no bearing whatsoever on the question of whether consciousness is intrinsically *intentional*.

It is in his analysis of *Geist* that Husserl thematizes the social and practical determinants of intentional content, but he holds that *Geist* is "relative" to an "absolute" consciousness in which it is constituted. Our argument that appeal to pre-personal processes is inadequate to distinguish the order of meaning from the order of nature suggests, on the contrary, that the content of what we might call "phenomenal" consciousness is an abstraction from mind in the sense of *Geist*. But does this not lead transcendental phenomenology back into the arms of naturalism or anthropologism? For Husserl, a phenomenology of *Geist* cannot be transcendental philosophy since it retains a necessary reference to the body and thus to a dependence on nature. However, in the following section I shall argue that this dependence compromises transcendental philosophy *only* if nature is conceived physicalistically, as the space of causal law. But there is no need to see the dependence this way. The body as constituting does not belong to physicalistic nature at all; it is never "seen" or located as a thing among things; rather, it is a moment of transcendental subjectivity in both its passive and active aspects.[8] If this is so, we can avoid the subjectivism that arises from Husserl's own understanding of the

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[7] Husserl himself acknowledges this obliquely when he goes on to claim that "subjects cannot be dissolved into nature, for in that case what gives nature its meaning would be missing" (Hua 4, p. 297/311).

[8] J. N. Mohanty has repeatedly emphasized the sense in which the body must be understood as a dimension of *transcendental* subjectivity. See, for instance, Mohanty 1985, pp. 213–22. More recently, this idea has been elaborated in an Husserlian register by Elizabeth Behnke 2009, and more broadly by Maxine Sheets-Johnstone 1990.

relativity of nature to absolute consciousness, and we can do so without compromising the transcendental character of phenomenology.

4   Transcendental subjectivity, *Geist*, and absolute consciousness

Husserl's account of spirit, *Geist*, which harbors his best insights about the nature of mind as normatively governed consciousness, is introduced through a reflection on the foundations of the *Geisteswissenschaften*, one that complements his earlier reflection on the foundations of the *Naturwissenschaften*. Whereas natural science involves a distinctive "naturalistic" attitude, the *Geisteswissenschaften* operate within what Husserl calls the "personalistic" attitude. Unlike the naturalistic attitude, the personalistic attitude does not arise from a special cognitive interest: it is "an entirely natural attitude, not an artificial one which would have to be achieved and preserved only by special means" (Hua 4, p. 183/192).[9] It thus encompasses the naturalistic attitude within itself,[10] as also the transcendental phenomenological attitude, since the latter too is an "artificial attitude" that must be "achieved and preserved" by the "special means" of the *epoché*. Failure to recognize this point gives rise to an ambiguity in Husserl's notion of transcendental subjectivity – between an embodied and a "pure" ego, the person and "absolute consciousness."

It is no accident that Husserl begins his reflection by invoking Dilthey to introduce a distinction between "soul" and "spirit" (Hua 4, p. 172/181). For Dilthey recognized that "modern psychology, as the natural science of the psychic," is an inadequate ground for the *Geisteswissenschaften*. Why is this? While the term has been translated as "human sciences" and was itself a translation of the term "moral sciences" as employed by John Stuart Mill,[11] the essential point is that such sciences deal with unities of meaning, with that which can be understood (*Verstehen*), with "expressions" of all kinds (Hua 4, pp. 236–47/248–59). In short, they are concerned with

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[9] Husserl goes even further: it is "*not a nature-attitude.*" This means "that what is experienced in it is *not nature in the sense of all the natural sciences* but is, so to say, something *contrary to nature*" (Hua 4, p. 180/189). This is true only if "nature" is understood naturalistically. But this equation of nature with nature understood naturalistically is at the root of Husserl's failure to recognize that transcendental constitution stops at the level of *Geist*, embodied mind, and does not entail an "absolute" consciousness. See Crowell (2012).

[10] Husserl concludes *Ideas II* with a section entitled "The Ontological Priority of the Spiritual World over the Naturalistic" (Hua 4, pp. 281–302/294–316).

[11] For a discussion, see Gadamer 1991, pp. 3ff.

that which presupposes mind, and just this motivates Husserl's distinction between soul and spirit.

  "Soul" is the psyche conceived as a unity that is apperceived through "psychophysical dependencies" (Hua 4, p. 342/354), that is, as indirectly belonging to naturalistically conceived nature through its connection with the body (*Körper*).[12] In this sense, individual experiences – "moments in the subjective stream of lived experiences" – are "states of the 'soul'" (Hua 4, p. 343/354). Thus soul is consciousness conceived as that which we share with other animate organisms, that which the natural science of psychology has in its sights. *Geist*, on the other hand, is not understood as consciousness in this sense; it has forms that go beyond what can be apperceived through psychophysical dependencies. Expression and meaning – the hallmarks of *Geist* – can be understood neither through the strict causality of nature nor through the pre-personal psychophysical conditionalities of the animal psyche or consciousness:

> Beyond physical nature, with its closed lawfulness … there must still be a psychophysical lawfulness and a spiritual one. The first sort of lawfulness demands, for certain physical constellations of being … an essentially definite spiritual "parallel." The second sort, as immanent psychical laws, are structural laws of the unity, and ultimately laws of the properly essential development, of the psychical. (Hua 4, p. 362/372)

Though the language is somewhat confusing, Husserl seems to be indicating a distinction between spirit conceived as indirectly psychophysical, on the one hand, and as "spiritual," with its own "properly essential development," on the other. The first sort of law, which pertains to consciousness as a pre-personal process, is *conditional* (Hua 4, p. 231/243), the second sort, which is proper to spirit, is *motivational* (Hua 4, p. 229/241).

  From this we shall take only the following: because these are two essentially different sorts of lawfulness, the motivational lawfulness of mind cannot be traced back to the conditional lawfulness of consciousness. The reason that psychology as a natural science cannot serve as the ground of the *Geisteswissenschaften* is that the psychophysical conditionalities that pertain to sensation – to pre-personal processes such as temporalization and association – cannot yield the specific sort of motivational relations necessary for meaning, namely, the *normative* forms described in "Philosophy as Rigorous Science." Husserl, however, frequently runs

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[12] Husserl notes that when approached from the outside "the body appears … as a 'turning point' where the causal relations are transformed into conditional relations between the external world and the bodily-psychic subject" (Hua 4, p. 161/169).

these two sorts of lawfulness together. For instance, he first notes that motivation need not involve inference: "If we say that every lived experience of an act is motivated, that relations of motivation are intertwined in it, this is not to imply that every meaning-intending is one 'in consequence of'." As an example of this he offers "the crack of a whip" – that is, something that emerges "quite unexpectedly" in consciousness – and he argues that "even here a kind of motivation can be exhibited, *included in the form of inner time-consciousness.* This form is something absolutely fixed: the subjective form of the now, of the earlier, etc. I can change nothing of it" (Hua 4, p. 227/239).

It may be that I can change nothing of it, but this is a far cry from showing that such lawfulness is a kind of *motivation*. Husserl has in mind what he calls "passive motivation" or "associative motivation" – processes that take place at the pre-personal level of sensation, which "does not belong to the realm of what properly pertains to the ego" but constitutes "the *pre-givennesses* for all of the ego's operations" (Hua 4, p. 212/223; 214/226). However, such so-called "motivation" lacks precisely what characterizes "motivation in the pregnant sense of ego-motivation (motivation of reason)" (Hua 4, p. 223/234) – namely, a normative character. Husserl elides this fact by claiming that association is rational: "The existence of the similar part demands the existence of a similar part complementing it … The demand … is a demand of reason" (Hua 4, p. 223/235). But no argument is given for this, and it is not at all convincing. Indeed Husserl had already hit upon the key point earlier in the text: relations of motivation do not belong to consciousness as such – whether pre-personal or personal – but to the "personal or motivational attitude," a "*practical* attitude" where "what we have … always is the active or passive ego and indeed in the proper intrinsic sense" (Hua 4, p. 190/199).

To tie motivation in the pregnant sense to a practical attitude is to mark the point at which a philosophy of mind parts company with a philosophy of consciousness. In one sense, Husserl was well aware of this, since he describes the constitution of the spiritual world – the world of expression and meaning – as a function of embodied egos and their practices. In another sense, however, Husserl did not sufficiently appreciate the implication of tying motivation to practices, for he also held that such practices could be analyzed in terms of acts of consciousness – acts of desiring, valuing, willing, and so on. But this is not possible, as we may see from the following considerations.

The world constituted in the practical attitude of motivation is the "sur-rounding world" (*Umwelt*), which, as Husserl notes, "is not nature" (Hua 4, p. 283/296). The surrounding world differs from naturalistically appre-hended nature in that it is a world of beautiful, pleasant, and useful things; a world in which I am in communicative communion with others; a world of generations, traditions, and institutions. Such a world is pervaded by an as-structure: "I see coal as heating material … as useful and as used for heating" – that is, I see it in a normative light: "as appropriate for and as destined to produce warmth" (Hua 4, p. 287/197). The transcenden-tal question concerns the conditions that make this as-structure possible. One condition is that spirit be embodied: these meanings are inseparable from our practical engagement in the world, and there is no such thing as a disembodied practice. But Husserl holds, further, that what is essential to practices are certain acts of consciousness – that is, "desiring and prac-tical acts" (Hua 4, p. 187/197).

An object "stimulates me to occupy myself with it" – for instance "to eat it. It is one of the goods belonging to the class of nutrients. I reach for it so I can eat it" (Hua 4, p. 217/228). I experience it as edible, then, because I grasp it through an evaluating perceptual act (it appears to me as a "good"), which is itself founded on an act of desire for "nutrients." This complex of valuing and desiring, in turn, motivates an act of will – I "reach for" it. Or I experience something as a hammer because I have a desire – to build a birdhouse – and I perceive this thing here as useful for achieving that end, which in turn motivates an act of will that constitutes the meaning of my picking it up and using it. This "picking up" is a prac-tical act that depends on my embodiment, but for Husserl the meaning of that act is constituted in consciousness: "One can say that even the 'I strike' or 'I dance' is a *cogito*, but such a one as to co-include in itself a the-sis of transcendence" – namely, a positing of the body as "a substrate of the 'I move' … an object for the subject … a *theme* of his freedom" (Hua 4, p. 218/230, 229). But what does this reduction of practices to acts of consciousness really accomplish for our understanding of the possibility of the "as"? Does it not simply presuppose, in the idea of act-content, the presence of the norm?

Nothing can appear to me as desirable or useful unless it shows up in a context in which a contrast class – the repugnant or the useless – is avail-able; that is, in a context in which the thing can succeed or fail at being what it is supposed to be. As Husserl recognizes, the correlate of an act of desire is the desir*able* – which is to say that such an act already operates

within the normative distinction between what merely seems desirable and what *is* so.[13] But something appears desirable not because I desire it but because it appears to fulfill a need (Hua 4, p. 187/197), and need is not an act; it is a bodily (or spiritual) condition. Or take the case of the useful. The hammer shows itself as useful not when I simply look at it but when I use it – that is, within a practice that implicates it in a certain normatively ordered whole: it is serviceable *for* joining two-by-fours. Were the practice different – were I making a cake – the hammer would not be useful at all. Husserl notes that after I have used it in this way I can simply perceive it ("emptily," as it were) as useful (Hua 4, p. 187/197). But such a perception cannot then be called upon to serve as the act-basis for experiencing the hammer's utility in the original practice, and if that is so, this sort of utility – and the norms that constitute it – cannot be reduced to acts. Thus practices cannot be reduced to acts of consciousness. The hammer is not useful because I desire to build a house; it is useful because it is the appropriate instrument for the job, and I can do the job entirely in the absence of the supposedly foundational act of desire. Indeed, I could very well desire to be elsewhere, to be doing something else, and so on.

  The point is that the norms that enable things to show up *as* something belong to the skills and practices themselves. It is they that contain the success conditions thanks to which things can be appropriate or inappropriate, valuable or valueless – and this on two levels, a functional and an existential: such things as hammers, nails, planes, saws, and clamps are what they are because they belong to a practice (e.g., carpentry) in which they have a proper place or function. Absent that practice there can be no hammers, nails, and the like. But the functional norms of the practice that establish such propriety gain their own normative force from my existential commitment to them, that is, from my *trying* to live up to what it is *to be* a carpenter.[14] Thus something (e.g., a hammer) can succeed or fail at being useful only if *I* can succeed or fail at being *something* (e.g., a carpenter). In a certain sense all of this is conscious – a zombie cannot try to be a carpenter, though it might do everything a carpenter does – but

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[13] So committed is Husserl to the idea that the correlate of an act of desire contains an implicit reference to a norm of reason that he can envision a "formal axiology" based on this fact, one that would run parallel (but not be reducible) to the "formal logic" of cognition. See Hua 28. For an argument why this parallel doesn't work, see Crowell 2005. I treat Husserl's approach to practical intentionality more fully in Chapter 12 below.

[14] The notion of "existential commitment" as I am using it here was introduced and has been developed by John Haugeland. See, in particular, Haugeland 1998a. Its importance will become apparent in Parts III and IV of this volume.

it cannot be analyzed in terms of acts of consciousness. Trying is not a lived experience (*Erlebnis*). Despite his appreciation for Dilthey's insight into the non-psychological foundation of the spiritual world of meaning, Husserl still held that "all that is spiritual is enclosed in a certain way in the nexuses of lived experiences of the individual human being" (Hua 4, p. 360/371). But this cannot be the case: the lived body and its skills – together with practices, institutions, and the like – are in no way enclosed in the nexus of lived experience, that is, in consciousness. Which is not – I hasten to add – to say that such things are not *experienced*.

This suggests that the person – the embodied mind that occupies the nodal point of the normative order necessary for intentional content – is "transcendental subjectivity" (Hua 4, p. 354/365). Husserl, however, clearly holds that the person is merely a constituted achievement of transcendental subjectivity. The person is "the real subject of the real human being," that is, something anthropological, something whose sense presupposes natural kinds, something dependent on nature through the *Körper* (Hua 4, p. 104/110–11). The person is constituted through a *self-apperception* of the transcendental subject:

> Here it must be noted that one's self-apperception as a person … is precisely apperception, self-appearance … and it must be noted further that over and against the true objective being of the person of the personal world, I have in transcendental subjectivity the counterpole, in which the apperception of one's self and of the objective pole, "person," constituted therein, is a transcendental product. (Hua 4, p. 354/365)

But this view is incoherent. My experience of myself as an embodied ego cannot be the result of any kind of constitution, since the body is itself *constituting*; it is not something into which "I" am apperceived. For such an apperception to be possible there would have to be a source, other than embodied practices, of the normativity in light of which the meaning "personal ego" could be constituted. And contrary to what Husserl claims, there can be no further source. In particular, that source cannot be absolute consciousness.

We may begin the argument for this claim with the following observation: the idea that the person is a constituted product of a mundanizing self-apperception presupposes that there is another self who is responsible for such mundanization. And this is precisely Husserl's view: every stream of consciousness is possessed of a "numerically one and unique" "pure ego" which "accomplishes that intentionality by which is constituted precisely I, the man, and I, the person." The pure ego constitutes "that man whom I also designate as I … namely I, the man called so and

so and characterized as such and such" (Hua 4, pp. 109–10/116–17). It is not hard to see what Husserl has in view here. The pure ego is what, in both analytic and phenomenological philosophy, is called "first-personal self-awareness."[15] The fact that I can say "I" and refer infallibly to myself even in the absence of any definite description (i.e., pick myself out even in the absence being "called so and so" or being "characterized as such and such") suggests that there *is* a dimension of transcendental subjectivity that is not captured in our description of the person in terms of its bodily skills and social practices. But this does not mean that this dimension of first-person self-awareness can be said to *constitute* the person. Husserl's own contradictory description of the pure ego demonstrates just this point.

On the one hand, Husserl insists that the pure ego is "immutable" and "does not harbor any hidden inner richness: it is absolutely simple and entirely manifest. All richness lies in the cogito and … its manner of functioning" (Hua 4, p. 105/111). On the other hand, he attributes to this very ego a set of properties, a "*habitus* that … pertains not to the empirical, but to the pure, ego" (Hua 4, p. 111/118). Apparently it is not the case that "the identity of the pure ego" consists in first-person self-awareness as such – that is, in the fact that "with regard to each and every cogito" I can "grasp myself as the identical ego of the cogito." Rather,

> I am even therein and a priori the same ego, insofar as I, in taking a position, necessarily exercise consistency in a determinate sense: each "new" position-taking institutes a persistent "opinion" … so that, from now on, as often as I grasp myself as the same as I used to be or the same as I now am and earlier was, I also retain my themata, assume them as active themata, just as I had posited them previously. (Hua 4, p. 112/119)

It is obvious that an ego that can "grasp itself as the same as [it] used to be" – namely, as the one who earlier instituted a persistent opinion – is an ego that grasps itself precisely "as such and such," that is, under some description. But content or meaning of this sort demands a norm according to which *mis*-identification is possible, and such norms, as we have seen, cannot be derived from acts, from the *cogito*, alone. Even Husserl admits that an ego that is able to grasp itself as the same is "not an empty pole but is the bearer of its habituality, and that implies that it has its individual history" (Hua 4, p. 300/313). But an ego with an individual history

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[15] Zahavi 2005 provides excellent examples of how the analytic and phenomenological treatments of this issue can mutually benefit one another.

cannot be the "absolutely simple" pure ego, devoid of "any hidden inner richness." It can only be the spiritual ego or person.

Does this mean that the transcendental collapses into the empirical or naturalistic? Husserl seemed to think that this would result if one failed to carry through the reduction of the person to absolute consciousness, but this is true only if the person (or mind) is understood in the framework of a naturalistic conception of nature. Only such a framework would *require* us to hold that embodied mind is the self-apperception of a pure ego. For it is only if nature is conceived as a space of non-normative causal law that the "belonging" (Hua 4, p. 283/296) of the body to nature introduces an element alien to its transcendental character, that is, alien to the space of those "thoroughly peculiar 'forms'" that Husserl mistakenly attributes to consciousness alone.[16] If we start with the phenomenological insight into the constitutive role of the body, however, we must ensure that it too, along with consciousness, not be "naturalized" or "reified," that is, we must not treat it as something that *can* show up in the naturalistic attitude. The embodied mind is simply not to be found in "nature" in that sense; the body is no more given as a thing among things than is consciousness, since it too is "transcendentally constituting" subjectivity through and through. What shows up in the naturalistic attitude as consciousness or as body is not what constitutes. And if that is so, then the contrast between consciousness (and its laws) and nature (and its laws) cannot be absolute: it will hold only if nature is understood naturalistically and if consciousness is (wrongly) identified with mind.

Of course, this cure may appear to be worse than the disease. Removing the body from nature in the naturalistic sense will mark a gain in philosophical clarity only if there is *another* sense of "nature" – the nature of a soft (or "hirsute") naturalism – that is sufficiently determinate to distinguish this conception of the relation of mind and world from one, like Husserl's, that posits a "pure" consciousness. Without such a sense, there is merely a verbal difference between embodied mind and the kind of subjectivism we have found in Husserl. Whether we are in possession of such a concept – or can develop one precisely from the resources of transcendental phenomenology itself – is, however, a large question that we must leave for another time.

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[16] "What became available at the time of the modern scientific revolution is a clear-cut understanding of the realm of law," but "we can refuse to equate that with a new clarity about *nature*" (McDowell 1996, p. 78).

PART III

Heidegger, care, and reason

Subjectivity: locating the first-person
in *Being and Time*

1 Introduction

It is the chief task of philosophy of mind to provide an account of intentionality. What this amounts to can be variously formulated: how is it possible that consciousness is consciousness "of" something? How can our mental states have "content"? What accounts for the "as-structure" of our experience? And so on. How one formulates the question is already the outline of an answer, and so debates in philosophy of mind are inseparable from decisions about broader questions of philosophy. One such decision concerns the ontology of, as Heidegger puts it, "the entity which is intentional" (GA 20, p. 152/110). John Haugeland has usefully distinguished between "right-wing" (or individualist) and "left-wing" (or socialist) theories of this entity.[1] Individualist positions, broadly Cartesian in orientation, tend to link the question of intentionality quite closely to aspects of the first-person stance. As we saw in Chapter 5, for such theories content is either "in the head," and then some plausible account of how such content can deliver the world as it purports to do must be given; or else "meaning just ain't in the head," in which case the task is to explain the relation between so-called "wide" and "narrow" content, or why I sometimes seem authoritatively to know what I am thinking about (first-person authority). Socialist positions, in contrast, emphasize the activities of the entity who is intentional, arguing that the as-structure of experience is tied to the normativity inherent in social practices and has little or nothing to do with the mental in the Cartesian (and broadly psychological) sense stressed by the individualists. For these theorists, first-person authority is

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[1] Haugeland concludes his article by acknowledging that all the positions he has examined "are alike in confronting intentionality only from the outside – in the 'third person,' as it were" and notes that an approach from the first-person would require "entirely different strategies and considerations" (1998c, p. 162). The present chapter suggests one such consideration.

either denied outright (Wittgensteinian behaviorism) or else relegated to a non-explanatory role.[2]

If I am allowed an unconscionably gross simplification, I would say that the fundamental issue separating positions in philosophy of mind concerns the place of the first-person in an account of intentionality. In any case this simplification guides the present chapter, for the issue has played an important role in assessing the phenomenological accounts of intentionality given by Husserl and Heidegger. It is often held that the first-person perspective, so crucial for Husserl, occupies no significant place in *Being and Time*.[3] In contrast, I shall argue that first-person authority plays a decisive role in Heidegger's account of intentionality. Indeed, Heidegger's position can be seen as a consistent extension of the trajectory of Husserl's thought sketched in Chapter 4, according to which the epistemic sense of first-person authority is subordinated to its performative sense as an avowal of self-responsibility in the project of philosophy. To make this case I shall offer a "phenomenological interpretation" (in Heidegger's sense) of *Being and Time* in which I show, first, that there is an account of first-person authority in that text and, second, that it is not a mere afterthought but is indispensable for clarifying the "ontic transcendence" whereby we grasp something as something. More specifically, I shall argue that Heidegger's phenomenology of conscience (*Gewissen*) is an account of first-person self-awareness – or the "subjectivity of the subject."[4] This will provide the beginnings of an argument, to be expanded in subsequent chapters, for the claim that the sort of first-person authority embedded in conscience, by means of which we are able to think and act not merely in accord with norms but in light of them, constitutes the origin of reason. The thesis is that for Heidegger, first-person authority is

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[2] This is the position Haugeland describes as "neo-pragmatism", under which he includes Robert Brandom, Wilfrid Sellars, Hubert Dreyfus, and himself (1998c, p. 147). He also includes Heidegger, though in a note appended at a later date he admits that "there is a 'pragmatist' strain *at most* in [Division I of *Being and Time*]. Certainly the larger tendency of the work is profoundly non-pragmatist." In Haugeland's later work he develops this insight through his idea of existential commitment, a first-person condition necessary for intentionality. I take my account to be compatible with his, though if "commitment" is understood as translating Heidegger's *Entschlossenheit*, my concern in the present chapter is with a condition on commitment itself: the care structure as it is revealed in the collapse of practical engagement in the world. See Haugeland 1998a, pp. 339–43, and Haugeland 2000.

[3] In *Being and Nothingness*, for instance, Sartre makes this point in criticism of Heidegger, while Mark Okrent (1988) makes the same point in praise of Heidegger.

[4] Heidegger uses this phrase occasionally to identify the topic of his analysis of Dasein, most frequently when he is comparing it to Kant's project. See, for instance, GA 2, p. 32/24/45.

what transforms factic "grounds" (determinants of my being) into potentially justifying "reasons" (*Gründe*) and explains how it is that Dasein dwells in a world and does not merely function in an environment.

2   Two conceptions of first-person authority

Let us begin by noting why it is commonly held that there is no significant treatment of the first-person (or "subjectivity") in *Being and Time*. One reason is that Heidegger's text is frequently understood as a complete rejection of all things Husserlian. As Heidegger wrote to Jaspers in 1926, "If the treatise has been written 'against' anyone, then it has been written against Husserl" (1990, p. 71). Now consider David Carr's claim that Husserl's "phenomenology is not just about experiences, or even about experiences and their objects, but about the first-person standpoint itself … It is about what it means to be conscious or to be a conscious being, to be a subject, a self, or an ego" (1999, p. 77). If this is essentially correct, as I take it to be, it might seem that in rejecting Husserl Heidegger must lose all interest in "the first-person standpoint itself." Such an impression can only be enhanced if one considers why Husserl is interested in the first-person stance in the first place – namely, because it apparently possesses authority with regard to its contents (intentional experiences), on the one hand, and with regard to its self-awareness (as transcendental ego), on the other. Neither conception of first-person authority seems present in Heidegger's text.

On the matter of Husserl's focus on lived experiences (*Erlebnisse*), for instance, Hubert Dreyfus has argued that Heidegger's account of Dasein as a kind of comportment – skillful coping in the world – renders any appeal to conscious experiences otiose in an explanation of intentionality. The mental – in the traditional sense of consciousness as psychological subjectivity – becomes a rather minor modification of "mindless coping" according to explicit or tacit norms of social or "background" practices. These practices suffice to explain how things can show up as the things they are. Hence, "we are not to think of Dasein as a conscious subject" since any such traditional conception must, according to Dreyfus, reintroduce what Heidegger specifically rejects: the Cartesian "cabinet of consciousness" with its mental representations that are supposed to be foundational for our access to the world (1991, pp. 13, 74–75, 147).[5]

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[5] Frederick Olafson, in contrast, argues that Heidegger does seek a "reconstructed concept of the subject," that is, of "the subject-entity as that for which other entities exist as such" (1987, pp. 27, 32). For a critical discussion see Carman 1994; Olafson 1994a, 1994b.

Similarly, on the question of the authority of first-person self-awareness, Heidegger is apparently quite clear that little is to be gained ontologically from such self-awareness. First, though it is true that the "question of the 'who' [of Dasein] answers itself in terms of the 'I' itself, the 'subject,' the 'Self'" (GA 2, p. 153/114/150), Heidegger is quick to point out that this gives us nothing more than a mere "formal reflective awareness of the 'I'" (GA 2, p. 154/115/151). And it seems obvious, as Dreyfus argues, that "such self-referential consciousness is not the subject-matter of *Being and Time*," since "according to Heidegger such consciousness is a special mode of revealing and a derivative one at that" (1991, p. 57). As Heidegger puts it in *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, a deliberate, reflective "I-awareness" is "only a mode of self-*apprehension*, but not the mode of primary self-disclosure." Primary self-disclosure is a form of self-awareness mediated by social practices: Dasein "never finds itself otherwise than in the things themselves"; it does not "need a special kind of observation" because when "Dasein gives itself over immediately and passionately to the world, its own self is reflected back to it from things" (GA 24, p. 227/159). Even if formal-reflective I-awareness has some sort of authority, it is hard to see how it could be of much philosophical interest.

These arguments are compelling, but to say that the first-person stance does not have its traditional significance in Heidegger's text is not to say that it has no significance at all. It is not impossible that explicit criticism of the Cartesian tradition coexists with an implicit existential reinterpretation of aspects of that tradition,[6] such that there is a recognizable role for first-person authority, but one that is identified neither with privileged access to the content of my mental states as foundational for intentionality nor with a formal-reflective I-awareness supposedly definitive of who I am as "transcendental" ego. This is what I hope to show in what follows.

In presenting Heidegger's existential reinterpretation I shall not focus on the first sense of first-person authority, concerning a special warrant regarding the content of my mental states, but on the second sense, concerning the peculiar character of first-person self-awareness. An outline of a reinterpretation of the first could be developed from the argument presented in previous chapters to the effect that Husserl's concept of first-person warrant does not commit him to representationalism or internalism. Heidegger knew this; see, for instance, his criticisms of Rickert's misunderstanding of phenomenology (GA 20, pp. 41–46/32–36). His remarks about the "cabinet of consciousness" are directed at Nicolai

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6 See, most recently, Shockey 2012.

Hartmann and not at Husserl.[7] Thus, if it turned out that there were a philosophically interesting sense in which reference to consciousness had to figure in an account of intentionality,[8] this would not by itself be an argument against Heidegger's position, since he is not committed to the view that any appeal to consciousness must involve one in the dead end of a "worldless" subject. Nevertheless, because Heidegger is practically silent on any role that this sort of first-person warrant might play in the account of intentionality,[9] the whole argument would require lengthy reconstructions. It is quite different with respect to the second sense of first-person authority, however. For *Being and Time* is explicit about what an existential reinterpretation of first-person self-*awareness* should look like, and it also suggests (though not nearly as explicitly) just why such a reinterpretation is crucial to the account of intentionality. So to this I now turn.

3   A gap in the account of self-awareness in *Being and Time* Division I

For all its usefulness, Heidegger's account of ontologically primordial self-awareness as a "reflection back" from the things with which I am practically absorbed cannot be considered an adequate account of self-awareness. Nor did Heidegger intend it as such. This is because the I who is reflected back in this way is "the 'who' of *everyday* Dasein", and this, as Heidegger says, "just is *not* the 'I myself'" (GA 2, p. 154/115/150). Thus Dasein, as "I myself," must be capable of another – and ontologically no less authoritative – mode of self-awareness, one not subject to Heidegger's objections against the merely formal character of reflective I-consciousness. The trick is to say what such a form of self-awareness can be.

   An approach can be made by recognizing that the everyday mode of self-awareness in which "Dasein understands itself proximally and for the most part in terms of its world" (GA 2, p. 160/120/156) is not a strictly first-personal mode of self-awareness. As Heidegger argues, "the self of

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[7] See von Herrmann 1974, p. 65.

[8] See, for instance, Siewert 1998 and Chalmers 1996.

[9] About Husserl's own investigation into consciousness Heidegger notes that "a 'formal phenomenology of consciousness'" is a legitimate "phenomenological problematic in its own right" (GA 2, p. 154/115/151), but he doesn't tell us what its relation to his own existential analytic would be. Similarly, in *History of the Concept of Time* Heidegger admits that "this consideration [of consciousness as object of a science] is in fact possible" (GA 20, p. 149/108).

everyday Dasein is the *one-self*" (GA 2, p. 172/129/167), and it becomes evident from his description of the one-self that it understands (is aware of) itself in third-person terms – a fact that has implications for his account of intentionality.

Central to that account is Heidegger's claim that things show up as something originally within the context of our practical dealings with them. It is because everyday Dasein engages in goal-directed actions that things show up as fit for the task, useful in order to drive nails, and so on; only so can they be assigned some non-arbitrary significance. About this "assignment" Heidegger emphasizes two things. First, it is holistic: "Taken strictly, there 'is' no such thing as *a* tool. To any tool there always belongs a totality of equipment" (GA 2, p. 92/68/97), since to be a hammer or a pen is to be defined in instrumental relation to other things such as nails or paper. Second, the structure (intelligibility) of this equipmental totality derives from Dasein's own "practical identity,"[10] which Heidegger terms the *Worumwillen*: an "ability-to-be for the sake of which" I myself am (GA 2, p. 115/86/119). This concept is meant to account for the non-arbitrary attribution of goal-directedness to my activity – that is, it is to serve the role of establishing an intention, without which no *unambiguous* assignment of functions to things could be made. Heidegger's innovation here is to locate this intention not in the head but in practices themselves, as ways for me to be (abilities-to-be; *seinkönnen*) in the world. One cannot simply identify this practical identity with role (mother, professor, mail carrier), since not all goal-directed actions belong to socially and institutionally defined practices. Nevertheless, it can serve its function in the account of intentionality only because it, like social role, is necessarily *typical*. Only because my behavior is understood (not only by the other but by I myself) as a type does it have the relation to specific norms *of* that type that render it intentional behavior – that is, assessable in terms of success or failure.[11] Heidegger expresses this fact with the claim that everyday Dasein is governed by "publicness," that it "concerns itself as such with *averageness*,"

[10] I adopt this term from Christine Korsgaard, who defines it as "a description under which you value yourself" (1996b, p. 102). In the following chapters I shall treat it as a synonym for Heidegger's term *Worumwillen* (for-the-sake-of-which) in those contexts where the elements of Heidegger's composite term are not specifically relevant to the argument. A detailed account of the relation between Heidegger and Korsgaard on this point is found in Chapter 11 below.

[11] My discussion in this section is greatly indebted to conversations with Mark Okrent, who makes productive use of the concept of "type" in Okrent 2007. See also Dreyfus 1991, ch. 4, and Haugeland 1998c, pp. 147–53 on conformism and normativity. For an elaboration of the notion in Husserl's phenomenology see Lohmar 2008, part II.

and that it is "diffident" (*abständig*), careful that it *not* distinguish itself from others (GA 2, pp. 168–70/126–27/164–65). For this reason Heidegger designates the self of everyday Dasein the "one-self" (*Man-selbst*).

Heidegger's account of the one-self, then, describes my practical identity as a specific form of anonymity: engaged in the world, I am aware of myself only as "another" or as "anyone" – that is, in third-person terms.[12] As typical, my practices belong within what Heidegger calls a "totality of involvements," and because it is in terms of such practices that I am "reflected back to [myself] from things," *I myself* make sense only within that same totality. I am a *persona* (mask). To the extent that my practical identity is typical – and there can be no other kind – there is essentially no difference between the way things come by their as-structure and the way I come by mine. It is true that Heidegger *signals* a difference between our modes of awareness of things (concern; *Besorgen*), of others (solicitude; *Fürsorge*), and of myself (care for self; *Selbst-sorge*), but Division I does not account for these different phenomenological features of our experience, and because it does not, a gap opens up in its account of intentionality.

The gap appears because Heidegger holds that in order for something to be assigned a definite significance (an in-order-to) in the totality of involvements the latter must "itself [go] back ultimately to a towards-which in which there is *no* further involvement" (GA 2, p. 112/84/116) – that is, it must be anchored in something autotelic, something that does not receive its assignment of significance from something else but "has assigned *itself* to an 'in-order-to'" (GA 2, p. 115/86/119). Without such a being it would be impossible to say whether something was functioning well as a heater or poorly as an air-conditioner; it takes on a definite meaning in light of that for the sake of which *I* am using it. But what or who am "I" here? If I, in turn, am assigned my significance instrumentally, then the totality

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[12] Of course, this does not mean that I take a third-person *stance* toward myself, as when I study myself as an object in the world. The issue concerns, rather, how I understand myself in my practically engaged first-person experience, how my mode of self-awareness is "interpreted" or "articulated" in Heidegger's sense. And on the assumption that practices are primary and are governed normatively by *das Man*, I occupy the first-person stance "anonymously," as "anyone" does. Blattner (2009) has argued that this overlooks the fact that even in everyday coping I do things according to a kind of individual "style," but while this is true, the dialectical point of my argument is that such individuality is possible only because, from the point of view of self-awareness, practices are *not* primary, i.e., the account of self-awareness available from Division I contains a "gap," even in its own terms. The "at stake" character of my stance toward everyday norms will be explored in Chapter 10 below.

of involvements is once again underdetermined and the intentionality of experience has not been explained. For this reason, Heidegger identifies "Dasein's very being" as "the sole authentic 'for-the-sake-of-which'" (GA 2, p. 113/84/117) – that is, as "a 'towards which' in which there is *no* further involvement." And yet, nothing in his account of the kind of self-awareness belonging to the one-self allows us to see why it has no further involvement, why it is not just another instrumentality. For as typical, any for-the-sake-of can also be understood instrumentally: I can be a professor in order to make a living, be a college student in order to avoid the draft, be a father in order to carry on the family line, and so on.

Heidegger is right that the totality of involvements must be anchored in a being in which there is no further involvement – that is, in a being for whom all these instrumental relations can *matter*, a being "in whose being that very being is for it essentially an *issue*" (GA 2, p. 113/84/117). But such a being must be capable of a mode of self-awareness other than the one that characterizes its practical identity. In addition to its everyday (third-person) mode of self-awareness, Heidegger owes us an account of Dasein's first-person awareness of "I myself," an account of the subjectivity that belongs to, but remains invisible in, the one-self. Without it, his account of intentionality remains incomplete. And if third-person self-awareness is necessarily typical, it is not unreasonable to expect that first-person self-awareness will be radically indexical.

Is there such an account to be found in *Being and Time*? In approaching this question I shall begin by considering certain peculiarities of first-person self-reference (saying "I") that any theory must account for. The idea is to take these features of first-person self-reference as indicators of the nature of first-person self-awareness and then see whether anything in *Being and Time* addresses what is distinctive about that nature.[13]

First, the proper use of "I" infallibly picks out the entity it purports to refer to – both in the sense that it cannot fail to refer, and in the sense that it cannot fail to pick out exactly what it purports to pick out. By contrast, in using a proper name or definite description to refer to the same thing, I could always fail in either way. But since the one-self is aware of itself precisely insofar as "it does *not* distinguish itself from others," when *it* says "I" both the definiteness and infallibility of its self-reference remain unaccounted for. It is always prone to a failure of reference or an error of misidentification.

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[13] I borrow this strategy from Zahavi 1999, ch. 1. I have also found Kapitan 1999 and Hart 1999 to be helpful here.

Second, if we distinguish a subjective from an objective use of "I," we note a crucial aspect of first-person self-reference. An objective use (as in "I am bleeding" or "I am six feet tall") presupposes that I have established certain properties as true of an object in the world and that I have identified myself with that object. Thus I could be in error if the object in question turns out in fact not be me. The subjective use (as in "I believe that Heidegger wrote *Being and Time*" or "I feel anxious") involves no such presupposition. I can be wrong about what I feel but not about the fact that it is *I* who feel it. The possession of identificatory knowledge is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for successful use of "I" in these cases. As Castañeda observes, "there is no third-person special characteristic that one has to think that one possesses in order to think of oneself as I" (Zahavi 1999, pp. 5–7). In short, such self-identification is immediate, non-criterial, and non-inferential.

This point will prove crucial for establishing the place of first-person self-awareness in *Being and Time*, since it shows that even though self-identification of the one-self is neither immediate nor non-criterial – that is, the awareness of myself "reflected back from things" is always *as* something (father, professor, etc.) and thus mediated by criteria belonging to these types or roles – this does not mean that, should such criteria be unavailable, I could not intelligibly refer to, or identify, myself.

Finally, use of "I" to designate "I myself" *requires* that I "dispense with every type of third-person reference" (Zahavi 1999, p. 8). That is, I have not mastered the use of "I" unless I understand that it does not, as Zahavi puts it, merely "single a specific person out in a given context" – the person who is speaking – but demands also that I be "aware that it is [I myself] who is referred to." And this sort of self-awareness cannot be captured in any third-person terms since "no matter how detailed a third-person description I give of a person, this description cannot entail that *I* am that person" (1999, pp. 9–10).[14] Hence, the way "I" refers cannot be reduced to

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[14] Tugendhat misses just this point when he argues that "I" can be defined simply as the term "each of us uses to refer to himself." This leads him to the claim that "I cannot identify myself by the use of the word *I*" since "the word *I* designates the ultimate reference point of all identification, though the person referred to by it – the speaker – is not identified; but he is referred to as identifiable from the 'he' perspective" (1986, p. 73). In other words, all identification is criterial, by way of public, third-person descriptions. What is missing is a grasp of the kind of self-awareness entailed in the very *meaning* of "I." This kind of self-identification is not an answer to the question "Who am I?" – as Tugendhat supposes (1986, p. 209) – but rather an encounter with what generates the asymmetry between my *being* the "ultimate reference point of all identification," on the one hand, and the "person … identifiable from the 'he' perspective" on the other. This first-person

any form of the way third-person terms pick out entities in the world. If it could be so reduced it would be impossible to understand the surprise exhibited (to use Nozick's example) by Oedipus when he discovers that he is the very entity to whom he was (successfully) referring all along in third-person terms.

Before showing that Heidegger provides an account of first-person self-awareness that does justice to these peculiarities of self-reference, it may be useful to identify two solutions to the problem which he rejects. The first is Husserl's theory that saying "I" ultimately refers to a unique transcendental ego that eludes all type-concepts, including natural kind concepts. Because the I is identifiable prior to all "worldly" predicates, Husserl takes it to pick out an "unworldly" entity in a sense that supposedly avoids the paradox of a "piece of the world" constituting the world as a whole. Though the situation is complicated,[15] it is clear that Heidegger wants to avoid positing anything like an ego as the referent of "I." Whatever tensions there may be between first- and third-person self-reference will be explained, instead, as existential modalities of the "mineness" (*Jemeinigkeit*) that characterizes Dasein as such.

The second rejected approach is that of Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus*. There the peculiarities of immediate, non-criteriological, non-inferential self-reference do not reflect an entity in or beyond the world, but the "limit" of the world itself. On this view, there *is* nothing of which I am aware when I am aware of myself in first-person perspective, and the whole issue of "subjectivity" becomes a philosophical non-starter. Some have held that this is precisely Heidegger's approach to the issue.[16] Rather than argue against this interpretation, however, I shall try to establish that there *is* an account of first-person self-awareness in *Being and Time* by considering the relation between Division I and Division II of that text.

About this strategy two things should be emphasized straightaway: First, though Division II offers an account of "authentic" being-a-self

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self-awareness does not depend on my identifying myself in terms of any third-person descriptions of who I am.

[15] As we have noted in previous chapters, the relation between the transcendental and the empirical ego in Husserl is disputed. For some recent discussions see Zahavi 1999, pp. 138–56 and Sokolowski 2000, pp. 112–29. For discussions that include Heidegger's stance toward the problem, see Carr 1999; Crowell 2001, chs. 9 and 13; and Crowell (2012).

[16] Like Wittgenstein, Tugendhat denies that the "logic" of "I" has any ontological relevance (1986, pp. 56–76), while Carman uses Wittgenstein's dictum that "nothing in the visual field warrants the conclusion that it is seen from an eye" to gloss Heidegger's supposed non-subjective account of the "mineness" of everyday coping (1994, p. 216).

to complete Division I's exploration of the everyday one-self, it would be a mistake to equate first-person self-awareness with authenticity. As Heidegger tells us, "authentic existence" is "only a modified way in which such everydayness is seized upon" (GA 2, p. 238/179/224). The authentic self's awareness of itself is thus not free of the machinery of third-person description that supports the one-self, as is required by our analysis of first-person self-reference; it too is "reflected back to itself from things." Second, since "the 'one' itself articulates the referential context of significance" (GA 2, p. 172/129/167) – and so, as Dreyfus once argued, all intelligibility is *everyday* intelligibility because the one ultimately "makes … significance and intelligibility possible" (1991, p. 161) – Dasein's first-person self-awareness, like Wittgenstein's "I," cannot be a mode of intelligibility at all. Does this not reduce the very notion to incoherence? If being-in-the-world were equivalent to acting in the world this conclusion would follow, but Heidegger's position is more complicated. While both the one-self and the authentic self are agents, there is a condition in which Dasein no longer acts, a condition in which the one-self *breaks down*. Here we find both the place, and the importance, of first-person self-awareness in *Being and Time*. In this putatively negative phenomenon, where Dasein is not yet the resolutely committed authentic self engaged in the world, there lies a positive phenomenological content – not some further content descriptive of myself that more richly answers the question of who I am, but my very subjectivity.

4   The breakdown of the one-self as first-person self-awareness

Heidegger identifies Dasein's being as "care" (*Sorge*), a term that he analyzes into three inseparable structural elements: existentiality, facticity, and discourse. Here I shall pursue the details of this structure only so far as is necessary to see how the breakdown of the one-self can yield a positive grasp of subjectivity. In subsequent chapters the implications of the argument will be developed more extensively.

Heidegger associates facticity with *Befindlichkeit* (affectedness) and argues that the "primary discovery of the world" is a function "of 'bare mood'," thanks to which the world is there as mattering to us in some way or another (GA 2, pp. 182–83/137–38/176–77). Existentiality, in turn, is associated with *Verstehen* (understanding) – not the thematic understanding of this or that item in the world, but the *self*-understanding Dasein exhibits as it "presses ahead" into that "ability-to-be for the sake of which it itself is" (GA 2, p. 115/86/119). Finally, *Rede* (discourse) is "the

articulation of intelligibility" (GA 2, p. 214/161/203), that is, the onto-logical ground of communication. Now the salient point here is that since the "one" (*das Man*) articulates "the referential context of significance" – the world – as such, the one-self cannot be identified with some limited set of possibilities. All possible ways in which the world can matter, all possible self-understandings or for-the-sake-ofs, and all possible dis-cursive communications belong to the one-self – as public, conforming, normalized third-person selfhood. A genuine first-person self-awareness would thus seem to be strictly impossible.

And so it would be, if self-awareness were necessarily linked to "possi-bility" in Heidegger's sense – something I am able-to-be (*Seinkönnen*), a practical identity. But this is not the case, as can be seen from Heidegger's account of the breakdown of the one-self. This modification of the care structure has special methodological significance, as Heidegger says, because it is "what Dasein, *from its own standpoint*, demands as the only ontico-ontological way of access to itself" (GA 2, p. 242/182/226). And this, I shall argue, is equivalent to providing phenomenological access to subjectivity as the condition of possibility for authentic selfhood – a con-dition that has more in common with what Kierkegaard called "inward-ness" than it does the Cartesian stream of *Erlebnisse* that we share with non-human animals.

First, if everyday Dasein's moods are that whereby the world matters to it, it is in *Angst* that the world is given in such a way that it *no longer* mat-ters at all. Entities in the world no longer speak to me (the pure "that it is" is all that remains); the world is uncanny (*unheimlich*); my involvements with others "recede" until I grasp myself as the *solus ipse* (GA 2, p. 247–50/186–89/231–33). This does not mean that I find myself alone; rather, I discover my subjectivity, a dimension of my being that is irreducible to any "totality of involvements." Only now does it become ontologically appar-ent (though still only negatively) how I can be a "towards-which" that "has *no* further involvement." Second, if all mood has its self-understanding, then the understanding belonging to *Angst* must stand in stark contrast to all those practical identities in which the world matters to me in some way. If things in the world lose all significance, this is because the prac-tical self-understandings that support them have all collapsed. In anx-iety I can no longer press forward into possibilities, can no longer cope in terms of some ability-to-be. But if that is so, how can I be aware of myself, since I am no longer "reflected back to myself from things"? Such a state Heidegger calls "death" – in which I exist as the "possibility of the impossibility of being there" (GA 2, p. 333/250/294). The "impossibility of

being there" does not refer to demise, to my absence from the realm of the living; rather, it indicates that my self-awareness, or self-understanding, is not dependent on any one of my abilities-to-be or on all of them taken together. There is a way that I am which is not an ability-to-be. Since understanding my "finitude" in this sense contrasts with all *possible* concrete practical identities, it is a form of inwardness, altogether invisible – that is, unintelligible – from the standpoint of the one-self. In Heidegger's terms, death is unrepresentable, my "ownmost" possibility.

Finally, Heidegger identifies the third moment of the care structure (discourse) in breakdown as conscience (*Gewissen*), emphasizing its break with the one-self by noting that conscience discourses exclusively in the mode of "keeping silent." However, where the analyses of *Angst* and death yield insights mainly into what the first-person is not, Heidegger's analysis of the two sides of conscience – "what is talked about" and "what is said" (GA 2, p. 362/272/317) – elucidate the contribution of first-person self-awareness to the account of intentionality. By "what is talked about" Heidegger means that "to which the appeal is made"; by "what is said" he means what conscience "gives to understand" about that to which the appeal is made. Analyzing the first, Heidegger provides an existential ontological account of the peculiarities of first-person self-reference; analyzing the second, he shows the philosophical significance of subjectivity. I shall examine each in turn.

5   First-person self-awareness in the call of conscience: radical indexicality

That to which the call of conscience is addressed is "Dasein itself." Now since Dasein is not an entity with properties, the "itself" (Dasein's "mine-ness") must be understood as involving modalized *possibilities* for being itself. To mark this modalization Heidegger distinguishes between the one-self and the "Self." The phenomenon of conscience belongs to the breakdown of the one-self: "And because only the *Self* of the one-self gets appealed to and brought to hear, the 'one' collapses" (GA 2, p. 363/273/317). What Heidegger here misleadingly calls the Self is, I believe, more properly thought as the subjectivity, or first-person self-awareness, of Dasein.[17]

[17]   In spite of Heidegger's aversion to the language of subjectivity, there is even some textual warrant for my terminological preference. For Heidegger notes that the existential

In the language Heidegger uses to describe this Self or subject, it is easy to recognize the peculiarities of first-person self-reference that we identified above. First, according to Heidegger, my awareness of myself as the one addressed in the call dispenses with all third-person identifying descriptions: "Not to what Dasein counts for, is able to do, or concerns itself with in being with one another publicly, nor to what it has taken hold of, set about, or let itself be carried along with," but only the "Self of the one-self gets appealed to" (GA 2, p. 362/273/317). Thus in grasping my Self (subjectivity), I do so in an immediate, non-criterial, and non-inferential way. I am not, in other words, aware of myself *as* anything; nevertheless, I can identify myself. Dasein therefore "knows" itself to be irreducible to any definite description, no matter how detailed – including the comprehensive narrative of its own life. The first-person cannot be absorbed into its own history.[18]

Second, the lack of such identifying descriptions does not make the identification less, but rather more, certain. Conscience, as a kind of first-person self-reference, infallibly picks out its referent. As Heidegger writes, even though "the call passes over *what* Dasein, proximally and for the most part, understands itself *as*," nevertheless "the Self has been reached, *unequivocally and unmistakably*" (GA 2, p. 365/274/319). The call is unequivocal (*eindeutig*) – it always picks out just the thing it aims at – because it is non-criterial: first-person self-reference is a pure indexical, not based on any potentially misfiring definite description or ostension. And it is unmistakable (*unverwechselbar*) – cannot fail to refer – because the call is immediate and non-inferential. In hearing the call I am addressed in such a way that the question of whether there *is* anyone to whom the call is addressed makes no sense.

This unmistakability is the key to the analysis of conscience and shows the existential origin of Wittgenstein's idea that the subject is the limit of the world. Heidegger notes that "when the caller reaches him to whom the appeal is made, it does so with a cold assurance which is uncanny but by no means obvious" (GA 2, p. 368/277/322). Why is it futile to argue with

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analysis of conscience "does justice to the 'objectivity' of the appeal for the first time by *leaving it its 'subjectivity*,' which of course denies the one-self its dominion" (GA 2, p. 370/278/323). Conscience defines the domain of subjectivity, but this is not an inner space of mental representations. As Heidegger explicitly states, "neither the call, nor the deed which has happened, nor the guilt with which one is laden, is an occurrence with the character of something present at hand which runs its course" in the stream of *Erlebnisse* (GA 2, p. 386/291/337).

[18] This point is elaborated in Crowell 2004.

this cold assurance of conscience, to appeal to mitigating circumstances, to try to hide? If we had only Division I to go on the answer would by no means be obvious, since from the public point of view I am exclusively what I do, and those public descriptions can always be misapplied, even by myself. I can always fail to recognize myself in them or be in error about whether they apply to me. In Division II, however, the reason for this cold assurance with which I am identified in the call becomes clear: "when Dasein has been individualized down to itself in its uncanniness, it is for itself something that simply cannot be mistaken for anything else" (GA 2, p. 368/277/322). *For itself* – that is, from the first-person point of view – Dasein is "radically" deprived "of the possibility of misunderstanding itself" because it is not reflected back from things but rather directly confronts the mineness of existence as such.

Thus when Heidegger writes that "the call is precisely never something which *we ourselves* have planned or prepared for or voluntarily performed," the term "we ourselves" is used in the sense of the one-self. The call is neither an intentional act of expectation, desire, or belief, nor a performance by the agent in the world; rather, "It" calls, "against our expectations and even against our will." Yet it "does not come from someone else who is with me in the world" either. The "It" who calls is "from me and yet from beyond me and over me" (GA 2, pp. 365–66/275/320). Heidegger resolves this paradox by appealing to the modalized character of Dasein's being (*Existenz*): it is "Dasein, which finds itself [*sich befindet*] in the very depths of its uncanniness," who is "the caller of the call of conscience" (GA 2, p. 367/276/321). By worldly criteria, such a caller is "nothing at all," and yet "the call comes from that entity which in each case I myself am" (GA 2, p. 367/276/321; 370/278/323). In conscience we learn what it *means* to say "I myself."

Here we locate the place of the first-person in *Being and Time*. It is neither the one-self (who says "I" but not as I myself), nor the authentic Self (a modification of the one-self), but the hidden condition of both. The uncanny "nothing at all" revealed in breakdown and voiced as conscience is Dasein's "basic kind of being-in-the-world, even though in an everyday way it has been covered up" (GA 2, p. 368/277/322). Thus even though the call "to the Self in the one-self does not force it inwards upon itself, so that it can close itself off from the 'exterior world'" (GA 2, p. 363/273/318), this is not because subjectivity is always somehow part of that world or totality of significance. Rather, it is because this image of subjectivity – an "interior" space of representations cut off from the "external" world – is *not subjective enough*. Such an interior psychological space *is* merely a peculiar

part of the world in Heidegger's sense, whereas subjectivity, conscience as Kierkegaardian inwardness, is the hidden condition of the world as a space of meaning.[19] Admittedly, we have not yet discovered what it is about conscience that makes it such a condition, but the second aspect of Heidegger's analysis – his account of "what is said" in the call – provides just that, and with it the philosophical significance of first-person authority in *Being and Time* becomes apparent.

6   Conscience: the origin of reason

Heidegger's great achievement in *Being and Time* is to have demonstrated that care is prior to reason – that *homo cura* is more fundamental than the *animale rationale.* For the philosophy of mind, this means that intentionality is not to be "constructed" according to non-phenomenological "logical" conditions but disclosed phenomenologically as a consequence of the care structure. But the account of intentionality offered in Division I contains, as we saw, a gap: the analysis of practical, goal-oriented action supplies a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the intelligibility (world) upon which intentionality depends. A further condition on intentionality is provided by Division II's account of subjectivity as inwardness, conscience as first-person self-awareness. But why is conscience a necessary condition of intelligibility? The thesis I would like to explore here and in subsequent chapters is that it is because meaning, intelligibility, requires something like the *capacity* for reason, and that conscience is the origin of this capacity.[20]

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[19] In a sentence from *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* that anticipates Heidegger's entire phenomenology, Kierkegaard writes: "This must be constantly borne in mind, namely, that the subjective problem is not something about an objective issue, but is the subjectivity itself" (1971, p. 115).

[20] This does not mean that Heidegger provides a complete account of reason, but he does indicate the ontological place for such an account. Thus it is not true, as Tugendhat states, that Heidegger's account of resoluteness is "an attempt to banish reason from human existence and in particular from the relation of oneself to oneself" (1986, p. 215). Tugendhat recognizes that "Heidegger's concept of self-determination not only admits of extension through a relation to reason but also demands this extension on its own grounds" (1986, p. 215), but because he never considers the analysis of conscience, he conceives this extension as coming from outside the Heideggerian project. On the other hand, to specify such a "relation to reason" immanently, by employing the concept of *phronesis* – as does Øverenget 1998, pp. 223–31 – is to ignore the fact that this sort of practical reason cannot account for its own rationality. Tugendhat, in contrast, clearly recognizes that the "autonomy" analyzed in Division II is what makes possible the step from normativity to validity, from conformity to criticism,

Support for this identification can be gleaned from the word – *Gewissen* –
itself, for it invites the sort of analysis Heidegger offered when he intro-
duced the notion of *Gestell* in "The Question Concerning Technology."
There Heidegger explained that the "*Ge*" prefix signifies a "gathering" that
"primordially unfolds" – not a mere collection but that which delimits the
"essence" or being of what is gathered, that which makes it what it is, "ena-
bles" it (GA 7, p. 20/ Heidegger 1977, p. 19). Accordingly, *Ge-wissen* would
signify a gathering of "knowing"; conscience would be what enables the
various (practical and theoretical) modes of knowing in the broadest
sense, that from which *episteme*, *phronesis*, etc. primordially unfold. It
is instructive to note that this is just the role Heidegger attributes to *nous*
(one sense of "reason") in his *Sophist* lectures (GA 19, pp. 143, 157–65/99,
108–13).

A second consideration ties the notion of conscience to that of reason.
As a call, conscience is something that is heard (*gehört*). Though the call is
"silent," Heidegger insists that it thereby "loses nothing of its perceptibility"
(GA 2, p. 363/273/319). The word he uses here is *Vernehmlichkeit*. To per-
ceive in this way – *vernehmen* – is indeed to hear, but it is a hearing whose
acoustic dimension is subordinated to a responsiveness to meaning, just
as the *Sicht* (sight) of *Umsicht* is similarly subordinated.[21] Now this very
term – *vernehmen* – is the root of the German word for reason (*Vernunft*).
This might suggest that conscience (*Gewissen*) is the gathering-enabling
of knowing and deliberating precisely as the hearing-perceiving (*verneh-
men*) of a call, or meaningful claim, the response to which (*ver-antworten*)
is a unique "possibility" for being: *Vernunft*.

Primary support for the thesis, however, is found in Heidegger's descrip-
tion of "what is said" in the call, namely, the accusation "Guilty!" As he
did with the concept of death, Heidegger formalizes the everyday notion
of guilt in such a way that "those ordinary phenomena of 'guilt' which
are related to our concernful being with others will *drop out*" – phenom-
ena related to everyday "reckoning" as well as to "any ought or law" (GA

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from understanding to reason. These issues will be developed further in Chapter 13
below, in which the Kantian and Aristotelian strains in Heidegger's practical philoso-
phy are examined.

[21] In *Being and Time* Heidegger "formalizes" the notion of "sight" to signify "access in gen-
eral" (GA 2, p. 195/147/187) and argues that everyday coping is not "blind"; it "has its
own sight." That this is not merely a matter of the physiology of the optical organ is clear:
"Dealings with equipment subordinate themselves to the manifold assignments of the
'in-order-to.' And the sight that belongs to accommodating themselves in this way is *cir-
cumspection* [*Umsicht*]" (GA 2, p. 93/69/98).

2, p. 376/283/328).[22] Artificial though it seems, this formalization simply reflects the character of the call as that mode of discourse which articulates the *un*intelligibility of Dasein when, as *Angst*/death, its ordinary ties to the world break down. From this point of view, "being-guilty" is not contingent upon some worldly relation; rather, it is *the* "predicate for the 'I am'" (GA 2, p. 373/281/326), that which articulates the fundamental condition of subjectivity as such, the radically indexical first-person. The call articulates an understanding of one's own being prior to any sense of owing or indebtedness – any sense of having, through one's actions in the world, incurred debts or obligations – because, as Heidegger states, such a mode of being is the condition of possibility for indebtedness and obligation (GA 2, p. 377/284/329). "What is said in the call" articulates the self-understanding (self-awareness) of that being who is the ground of obligation. But in what sense?

When am I indebted to someone? When do I owe someone something? It cannot be simply when I take something that someone has in her possession, or when I receive something from someone. Rather, there must be a norm of appropriate exchange in place. This norm cannot simply be something that is imposed on me from the outside – a behavior that is enforced, say, by social conditioning in such a way that typical and normal behavior results. This could never establish that I *owe* someone something, but only that there has been a failure to conform to what is typical or expected. On Heidegger's account, *being*-indebted cannot merely be a state but is something that I, from a first-person point of view, must be "able-to-be"; and this means that I must be able to acknowledge the norm as normative – that is, as a claim addressed to me – and not merely as a pattern descriptive of "one's" normal behavior. The fact that I can be characterized from a third-person point of view as owing something is ontologically parasitical on being capable of first-person self-awareness in Heidegger's sense.[23] If one says that this ability is made possible by

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[22] This is an example of what Heidegger calls "formal indication," a method that he employs ubiquitously, but mostly tacitly, in *Being and Time*. For discussion of this method, see Crowell 2001, ch. 7. In his 2008 Ph.D. thesis, "Estrangement and Responsibility: Heidegger's Account of Selfhood," Matthew Burch shows how many of the central concepts of *Being and Time* must be understood as formal indications, linking this to Kierkegaard's method of indirect communication.

[23] What Heidegger is getting at here reflects Korsgaard's distinction between criteria of explanatory and normative adequacy: "The difference is one of perspective. A theory that could explain why someone does the right thing – in a way that is adequate from a third-person perspective – could nevertheless fail to justify the action from the agent's own, first-person perspective, and so fail to support its normative claims" (1996b, p. 14).

internalizing the social sanctions that normalize the behavior of the herd, this can be accepted only if one also accepts that this internalization changes everything.[24] For it signifies a being who no longer merely conforms to norms, but who can act in light of them. To act in light of norms, however, is to measure *myself* against a standard of success or failure, to grasp *myself* in terms of the very idea of better and worse – a standard that Heidegger, following Plato, occasionally names "the Good."[25] This is the sort of first-person authority that derives from first-person self-awareness as conscience. In Heidegger's terms, first-person authority is responsibility (*Verantwortlichkeit*). Responsibility transforms a creature who is "grounded" by social norms into a ground of obligation – one who "grounds" norms by *giving* grounds, that is, reasons.[26]

The claim that first-person authority consists in the possibility of grounding as reason-giving is, I believe, entailed by Heidegger's (alas, obscure) description of being-guilty. Heidegger begins with Dasein's thrownness – the fact that Dasein "has been brought into its 'there,' but *not* of its own accord" – and identifies this as the "ground" (*Grund*) of Dasein's "ability-to-be" (GA 2, p. 377/284/329–30). What sort of ground is that? Against the traditional notion of a self-grounding transcendental subject, Heidegger emphasizes Dasein's lack of "power" over this ground: Dasein is "never existent *before* its ground, but only *from* it and *as it*." Being-a-ground in this sense thus means "*never* to have power over one's being from the ground up" (GA 2, p. 377/284/330). Many readings of thrownness – and so of the nature of this ground – have been offered. For instance, it has been read as nature, as the particular social practices into which I am born, as historical situatedness, and so on. Without taking a stand on the correctness of any particular reading,[27] they all take

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24 Nietzsche, one source for this idea, emphasizes that conscience, as internalization of punishment, gives rise to an "uncanny illness." But it also creates the world's first *interesting* animal: "[T]he existence on earth of an animal soul turned against itself, taking sides against itself, was something so new, profound, unheard of, enigmatic, contradictory, and *pregnant with a future* that the aspect of the earth was essentially altered" (Nietzsche 1969, p. 85 [II, section 16]). See Haugeland's discussion of "conformism" (1998c, pp. 147–51; 1998a, pp. 311–13).

25 See for instance GA 26, p. 237/184, and also the essay "On the Essence of Ground." These references will be analyzed in Chapters 9 and 10 below.

26 The fact (which Heidegger emphasizes in his critique of rationalism) that giving reasons at some point gives out is no argument against the claim that the practice of giving reasons – a practice that originates not with normativity as such but with normativity in relation to a creature capable of the first-person perspective – is constitutive of worldhood as the space of meaning or intelligibility.

27 But see the discussion in Crowell 2002c.

such a ground of Dasein to be something that determines, conditions, or explains significant aspects of behavior (for instance, the range of Dasein's possible choices). Because they lie by definition beyond Dasein's power, such grounds belong essentially to third-person accounts; that is, they provide reasons for Dasein's behavior that are not (and cannot be) *Dasein's reasons*. In McDowell's Sellarsian terms, the grounds espied in Dasein's thrownness locate Dasein within the "realm of law" (whether natural or bio-social), not the space of reasons (1996, p. 71).[28] That is, whatever it is that provides the ground of Dasein's "ability-to-be" and brings Dasein "into its 'there'" may indeed normalize behavior, but it is insufficient to generate the sort of obligation analyzed above; it does not provide reasons, grounds in the sense of justifications.

However, while Dasein, as thrown, is grounded in this sense, this does not exhaust the meaning of being-guilty. Heidegger argues that Dasein *is* this thrown ground *only* "in that it projects itself upon possibilities into which it has been thrown"; that is, the Self or subject as such "has to lay the ground for itself," as "existing" it "must *take over* being-a-ground" (GA 2, p. 377/284/330). But what can it mean to say that Dasein must "take over being-a-ground"? Here too there are some usual readings, none of which can be quite right. To say that to take over being-a-ground is to acknowledge my facticity – to adopt a kind of anti-transcendental philosophical humility in the face of my finitude, as it were – does not do justice to the idea of *being* a ground. More promising is the idea that I take responsibility for my facticity, own it, make it my own through the "*choice* of one possibility" (GA 2, p. 378/285/331). But while it is true that Dasein can choose itself transparently, in full knowledge that it thereby waives the choice of other possibilities, this cannot be the whole story. In this way Dasein commits itself to something specific in which it finds itself thrown. But it seems that to take over being-a-ground cannot simply be a matter of entering seriously into a game, so to speak, whose rules and norms are already established *as* rules and norms. If I am right about the kind of grounds that Dasein's thrownness provides, these do not yet suffice to

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28 In this comparison I am not committing myself to the details of McDowell's account, but only to something like this distinction. Compare Haugeland: "To say that biological and social categories are 'emergent' is not to say, of course, that they are incompatible with vapid materialism or exempt from the laws of nature. Quite the contrary: it is only because conformism is itself in some sense a 'causal' process that the emergent social pattern is nonaccidental in the sense required for intentionality" (1998c, p. 151). On the problem of "double grounding" implied in Heidegger's discussion see Crowell 2001, ch. 12.

constitute genuine games, since games involve a sort of free-play in which I play not only according to the rules but in light of them. To stop with the concept of commitment (resoluteness) is to allow the first-person no role in the *constitution* of the space of reasons, when in fact – as I believe Heidegger's text suggests – it is essential to it.

On this reading, to take over being-a-ground would be to stand toward grounds in the sense of given determinants of my being as toward grounds in the sense of potentially justifying *reasons.* This stance emerges when, in breakdown, I grasp the norms and other "givens" of my circumstances (*Lage*) as mere *claims*, that is, as *possibilities* tied to Dasein's "understanding of being" itself. To recognize the character of grounds as possibilities is what Heidegger calls "freedom" (GA 2, p. 378/285/331).[29] Freedom is not essentially the ability to choose between possibilities, but the difference between the third-person and the first-person as such. Animals, one might say, can choose whether to run and hide or stay and fight, but freedom consists in the gap that opens up between any such goal-directed action in the world and the *breakdown* of all practical identities in *Angst*/death, which reveals my having to take over being-a-ground. Yet we must be clear here: it is not the capacity for breakdown itself that is decisive, since animals, too, can break down. When animals break down, however, they lose themselves entirely, have "nothing left." Dasein can break down in this way, as in the extremity of psychosis. But in the existential condition of *Angst*/death Dasein can also discover a hidden resource, its being-guilty, the ability to *take over* being-a-ground. What conditions one is thus exposed as a mere claim, for whose grounding – in the sense of

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[29] Heidegger's position here is quite close to Kant's, well captured by Korsgaard:

According to Kant it follows from the fact that a rational being acts "under the idea of freedom" … that she acts for a reason or on a principle which she must regard as voluntarily adopted. The point here has to do with the way a rational being must think of her actions when she is engaged in deliberation and choice. When you make a choice, you do not view yourself simply as impelled into it by desire or impulse. Instead, it is as if there were something over and above all of your desires, something that is *you*, and that decides which if any of your desires to gratify. (1996a, p. 57)

See also Korsgaard 1996d, p. 94:

If the bidding from outside is desire, then the point is that the reflective mind must endorse the desire before it can act on it, it must say to itself that the desire is a reason. As Kant puts it, we must *make it our maxim* to act on the desire. Then although we may do what desire bids us, we do it freely.

For Dasein, nothing is a mere determinant but is always subject to the measure of the possible.

measuring that claim in light of the normative distinction between bet-
ter and worse – I am called to be responsible. But to be responsible in this
sense, as I shall argue in the following chapter, is the origin of the practice
of giving and asking for reasons.

Conscience is first-person authority as Kierkegaardian inwardness –
invisible (and hence paradoxical) to third-person accounts of identity.
And thus one might think of Abraham when Heidegger speaks (in his
1929 inaugural lecture, "What is Metaphysics?") of the "anxiety of those
who are daring" as "in secret alliance with the cheerfulness and gentle-
ness of creative longing" (GA 9, p. 118/93). What looks like a collapse of
everything that matters instead reveals the condition for the possibility
that anything can matter at all. In this sense, "subjectivity is the truth" –
not because it is the site of an irrefragable evidence, an interior space of
epistemically certain representations, but because, apart from all prac-
tical identity, all *Umwillen*, I am a being through whom obligation – that
is, first of all, self-responsibility – enters the world. This is the positive
meaning of the claim that Dasein is the "sole authentic for-the-sake-of-
which," something "in which there is *no* further involvement," an end in
itself.[30]

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[30] See GA 24, pp. 173–251/122–76, where Heidegger makes the connection explicit between
Kant's notion of the *personalitas moralis* as an end in itself and his own concept of Dasein
as ultimate for-the-sake-of-which.

Conscience and reason

1   Transcendental philosophy and intentionality

According to Kant, transcendental philosophy embodies that kind of knowledge "by which we know that – and how – certain representations … can be employed or are possible purely apriori"; that is, "such knowledge as concerns the apriori possibility of knowledge, or its a priori employment" (1968, p. 96 [A56/B80]). In Kant's language, to say that a representation is "possible" is equivalent to saying that it can be "employed," and that, in turn, is equivalent to saying that it has "content," that is, "relation to [an] object" (1968, p. 100 [A63/B87]). All representations, as such, *purport* to have content, but not all of them *do.* In showing "that and how" representations can have content, transcendental philosophy is concerned with the issue of intentionality, with showing that entities in the world are there for us, how our mental life discloses what there is. At first, however, its approach to this issue seems restricted to showing "that and how" certain representations can have a relation to objects "purely a priori" – that is, without reference to any experience in which objects can be given. In this sense, transcendental philosophy specifically concerns the intentionality of *reason*, where reason is the power of producing representations whose purported content does not derive from experience. How can representations that have their seat purely in thinking be shown to have a relation to an object? Kant answers that this is possible only if the content of such representations can be shown to be the condition for the possibility of intentionality as such, that is, only if it makes "objects" – entities as they are there for us – possible. In fact, then, the *Critique of Pure Reason*'s approach to the question of intentionality is not at all restricted. By showing that and how certain representations are employable a priori it shows how *any* representation could have relation to an object at all.

I open this chapter with some well-known features of Kant's enterprise in order to specify a context for what looks, on the face of it, to be a quixotic task – namely, to argue that Heidegger's fundamental ontology

is concerned precisely with the question that concerned Kant: how does reason make intentionality possible? It is clear that Heidegger aims to give an account of intentionality (he says so in many places),[1] but it seems equally clear that the account turns not on reason but on the understanding of being (*Seinsverständnis*). More concretely, Heidegger traces the possibility of encountering entities as entities not, as does Kant, to the self-determining spontaneity of transcendental apperception, the "I think," but to the thrown-projective "care" structure of Dasein as being-in-the-world. For Heidegger, what Kant mistakenly attributes to reason has deeper roots, and though Kant may succeed in uncovering conditions for a certain kind of intentionality (the regional ontology of nature as the occurrent), this is accomplished only by concealing those deeper roots through an aporetic approach to the "subject" as something equally occurrent. It is not reason, then – the power of combining representations into judgments, the power of subsuming under rules, or drawing inferences – that explains how entities show up for us, but rather Dasein's "transcendence," its "projection of possibilities for being its self" in light of which things can show themselves as what they are.

I do not wish to contradict the claim that Heidegger advances the tradition of transcendental philosophy beyond Kant precisely by recognizing that care is ontologically prior to reason, that Dasein's transcendence is the ground of self-consciousness. But I shall argue that just this priority of care over reason and self-consciousness provides a *better* explanation of reason's contribution to the account of intentionality. Unlike the transcendental unity of apperception, care involves an inner articulation, and my aim is to show reason's place within it.

Here, however, a second objection lies near. For though care is internally articulated, reason is apparently not one of its elements. Whether one takes care to involve "existentiality, facticity, and falling" or "understanding, affectedness, and discourse," reason is conspicuously absent.[2] Indeed, it has long been assumed that Heidegger's ontology occludes reason. For some – those who applaud Heidegger's frequent remarks dismissing *ratio*, *Vernunft*, as "the most stubborn adversary of thinking"(GA 5, p. 267/199) – this occlusion is a welcome departure in the dreary history of Western rationalism. For others – those who associate the putative absence of reason with dangers best emblematized by Heidegger's

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[1] For instance GA 26, p. 168/134: "We must … make intentionality itself into a problem."

[2] For evidence for the latter construal see GA 2, p. 239/180/224, and for the former see the immediately following page of that text.

involvement with National Socialism – the occlusion is symptomatic of the general failure of Heidegger's position. For these critics, Heidegger's attempt to subordinate reason to care ends with his failure to do justice to the normative aspects of our experience.

The classic formulation of this objection is found in *Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger*, where Ernst Tugendhat claims that in Heidegger's attempt to ground propositional truth in the "more prim-ordial" truth of Dasein's disclosedness "the specific sense of 'truth' is lost" (1970, p. 112). The predicate "true" properly applies to propositions because they can be assessed in terms of a distinction between correct and incorrect, measured against the entity as it is in itself. Heidegger argues that for an entity to serve as such a measure or norm, it must show up in a holistic context of significance ("world") that has been disclosed in advance, a disclosedness he terms "ontological truth." Such truth does not stand in normative relation to falsity but to "closed-off-ness." However, Tugendhat argues that because Heidegger provides no explan-ation of what governs this distinction in the way that appeal to the entity as it is in itself governs the distinction between correctness and incorrect-ness, it is pseudo-normative: rather than being something assessable in terms of success or failure, disclosedness is something that merely *occurs*. As a condition for any encounter with entities, disclosedness provides a "*conditio sine qua non*," but the "specific sense of the truth relation" – its distinctive normativity – "is not clarified" (1970, p. 351).

Tugendhat deems Heidegger's subsequent attempt to define the nor-mative content of disclosedness by means of the concept of authenticity a failure, and in this he is followed by many. In the following reading of Heidegger's remarks on conscience – which is where the ontology of rea-son is to be found – I shall argue that Tugendhat and others miss the point. First, however, a better sense for the issues involved can be had by consid-ering a few objections to Heidegger's approach in somewhat more detail.

2   Robert Pippin's criticisms

Let us begin by considering what any explanation of intentionality must provide. Intentionality is philosophically perplexing because by means of it we are not simply in causal interaction with entities but have to do with them *as* something. One way to get at this distinction is to say that to be involved with something "as" something is to be governed by the condi-tions that the thing must satisfy in order to *be* what it is *taken* to be. This means that intentionality is a normatively structured notion, governed by

conditions of success or failure. For instance, for me to experience something as a pen (for it to be the "intentional content" of my "state"), I must be responsive to the rules which constitute something as a pen.[3] Stating what these rules are can be difficult – indeed, *whether* they can be stated at all is a matter of some dispute – but unless it is true that in the face of the thing's failure to live up to (some of) its satisfaction conditions I would admit that my experience had *not* been of a pen, I could not have been involved with it *as* a pen at all.

Now Heidegger appears to have an account of this sort of normativity. In keeping with his rejection of a Cartesian subject whose mental states determine the content of its experience, Heidegger locates the norms governing intentionality not in the individual subject's representations but in social practices. Before being an individual subject, Dasein is a socialized One (*das Man*), constituted by what is "average" (the normal) and thereby caught up in what is normative. It is because I conform to the way "one" does things that entities can become available to me as *appropriate* and so as pens, shoes, eating utensils, and the like. Such normativity simply arises in the course of practices; it is not the result of (and hence not explicable in terms of) reason. Intentionality rests not upon a transcendental logic but upon the de facto normativity of practices.

Robert Pippin, however, has questioned the adequacy of this account, arguing that it explains only how we act in accord with norms, when what really needs explaining is how we can act in *light* of them. By emphasizing "mindless" conformism over any "quasi-intentional features of *taking up* or *sustaining* a practice" (Pippin 1997b, p. 381), Heidegger's account conceals a moment of self-conscious agency that has not been given its due: even to say that I am conforming to a norm is to say more than that it just happens. When Heidegger suggests that in practices I "let" things "be involved," this implies more than simply using things appropriately; it implies that I use them "in light of such appropriateness." Social practices are such that one can be doing them only if one *takes* oneself to be doing them (1997b, pp. 382, 388). The Kantian rationalist will explain the distinction between acting merely in accord with norms (conformism) and acting in light of them by appeal to self-legislation or pure practical reason, and Pippin acknowledges that Heidegger's rejection of such rationalism has some plausibility: "We do of course inherit and pass on much unreflectively, or at least in a way that makes the language of self-imposition

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[3] On constitutive rules, see Haugeland 1998a.

and justification look highly idealized" (1997a, p. 410). Nevertheless he requires that Heidegger provide some account of "the internal structure of … sustaining and reflecting" social practices, without which we cannot distinguish acting in accord with norms from acting in light of them. Because Heidegger does not provide such an account, his appeal to sociality is ultimately aporetic (1997b, pp. 386–87, 378).

Pippin recognizes that such an account should be given in Division II of *Being and Time*, but he believes that "the themes of anxiety, guilt, the call of conscience, authenticity, and resoluteness do not shed much light" on the problem. Because they represent a "total" breakdown of the seamless conformity to the norms grounded in *das Man*, they provide merely an "indeterminate negation" of the conformist self, one that reveals no positive resources for a normatively oriented "sustaining and reflecting" of inherited norms (1997b, pp. 386–87, 390). In short, Heidegger lacks an adequate concept of self-consciousness in Hegel's sense: because these chapters present Dasein's authentic disclosedness not as something it works toward by "reasoning, reflecting, contestation with others" but as an "original event," Dasein's authenticity, its

> "acting for the sake of its own possibility," cannot be rightly understood as acting *on*, or "having" reasons, as if it came to its ends, or could come to them as its own, only by virtue of such reasons. This would be a secondary manifestation for Heidegger and would suggest an unacceptably subjectivist understanding of such activity (as if the subject were the "origin"). (Pippin 1997a, p. 404)

Thus, on Pippin's reading, Heidegger's position offers nothing but the mindless social conformism of the One, the "arch, defensive neo-positivism" of a disclosive event that simply reifies "mentalités, epistemes, 'discourses,' 'fields of power,' and so on" (1997a, p. 410).

But is it true that Division II of *Being and Time* sheds no light on this problem? Can the existential analyses of anxiety, conscience, and resoluteness really be relegated to the scrap-heap of "indeterminate negation"? Pippin's objection challenges us to look again at these chapters to see whether they might yield something like a notion of normatively responsive self-consciousness – something that would illuminate what it means to act in light of norms, or to act on reasons, without implying (as Pippin, following Hegel, does) that authentic disclosedness must be a *consequence* of deliberation, or "reasoning, reflecting, contestation with others." Perhaps critics have been putting the wrong question to these chapters, one that conceals the place that reason already occupies there.

3   Ernst Tugendhat's criticisms

It is in fact possible to identify precisely where the wrong question gets asked if we return to Tugendhat. Elaborating the critical insight underlying his *Wahrheitsbegriff*, Tugendhat has recently argued that "the moral, and indeed the normative in general, does not appear" in *Being and Time*. Of course, *das Man* involves a kind of normativity, but this is entirely "conventional" and so, he argues, compatible with Dasein's being "hardwired" for it. True normativity is distinguished from conventional precisely in that it involves "a claim to grounding," and so includes a "specific depth dimension" of deliberation and reason-giving (Tugendhat 2001, p. 150).[4] Corresponding to this is the existential condition of *Eigenständigkeit*, a kind of freedom constituted by a concern for this depth dimension of reasons. Just this, Tugendhat argues, is absent from *Being and Time*: "it emerges that of the three crucial concepts that were mentioned – deliberation, reasons, norms – not a single one is found in *Sein und Zeit*; they neither occur there, nor is there anything remotely resembling them" (2001, p. 144). The individuality and freedom required for deliberation do appear in connection with authenticity, but precisely there no trace of deliberation and reasoning is to be found; indeed "resoluteness *excludes* deliberation" (2001, p. 158). Hence *Being and Time* provides no account of the depth dimension of reasons.

But just where should we expect reason and deliberation to show up in an account of resoluteness? Deliberation concerns the reasons for what I do, considers which possibilities are "better grounded" (Tugendhat 2001, pp. 149–50). Tugendhat distinguishes between two levels at which the call for deliberation might arise. At the first level – that of moral and prudential deliberation – I consider the relative weight that a given desire should have in the order of my willing. Though I deliberate as an individual, my appeal to reason here ensures that my answer will remain general – an expression of how *one* should live. At the second level, however – that of authenticity as Tugendhat interprets it – it is my set of desires as a whole that is at stake, and I am faced with the question of how *I* should live: in the face of death I ponder whether I have really lived my life or whether life has passed me by. Heidegger's account of resoluteness is said to address this issue. In what sense, then, does it exclude deliberation?

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[4] Following Tom Scanlon, Tugendhat defines a "reason" as "something that speaks for something," where the latter "something" is almost always "a judgment or an intention or an action" (2001, p. 143).

First, there is the trivial sense in which Heidegger's text offers no account of prudential and moral deliberation, but since Tugendhat correctly sees that authenticity is "not equivalent to the question of what is morally right" (2001, p. 157), one cannot infer that *Being and Time*'s ontology excludes such an account.[5] Instead, Tugendhat argues that the *question* to which resolute choice is the answer excludes deliberation, noting that the question of what my life means (who I should be) is not the sort of thing on which deliberation can get a grip. The very singularity of the question seems to exclude the publicity and universality of reason-giving. Because there is no "depth dimension of reasons" to appeal to here, Tugendhat suggests that "ultimate enlightenment lies in realizing the senselessness of the question" (2001, p. 159). He therefore heaps scorn on what he takes to be Heidegger's appeal to guilt and conscience as ersatz norms that would substitute for the impossibility of deliberation (2001, p. 160). But what if authenticity and resoluteness are not intended to supply non-rational standards for a choice where reason can no longer be invoked – that is, in relation to the *ontic* question of who I should be? What if they serve the *ontological* function of clarifying how any answer to that ontic question brings with it an orientation toward reasons, thus making deliberation possible? In that case, Heidegger's identification of resoluteness with existential truth would not, as Tugendhat believes, amount to "an attempt to banish reason from human existence, particularly from the relation of oneself to oneself" (1986, p. 215) but would rather be the account of why reason belongs to that relation.

Tugendhat claims that though Heidegger's concept of resolute choice appears to be an irrational decisionism, it must nevertheless, if it is to be a choice, remain tacitly supported by an orientation toward reasons. A genuine choice "must be able to rest upon justification, that is, it is grounded in the question of truth, even though it cannot be fully resolved in this question" (Tugendhat 2001, p. 217). Heidegger's clinging to the notion of existential *truth* is said to be grudging acknowledgment of this. But what sort of grounding is it that orients choice toward truth and justification even though it cannot be "fully resolved in this question"? How do I come to be so oriented; how do I *enter into* the depth dimension of reasons? Just this – and not the question of how I should live my life – is at stake in Heidegger's ontological discussion of conscience. Consider the issue from another angle: Tugendhat argues that one who deliberates morally seeks those reasons for acting that are reasons for everyone; that is, to do that

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[5] The place of moral deliberation in Heidegger's ontology is treated in Chapter 13 below.

which everyone would be justified in doing. This means that the deliber-
ator is one for whom this "universal justifiability has become a motive,"
and, as Tugendhat notes, how such a thing can become a motive "is not
self-evident" (2001, p. 151). Before the ontologist delves into the practice
of moral deliberation, then, he might well wish to understand how the
actor comes to be concerned with reasons at all. If Tugendhat is right that
Heidegger has little to say about the first, he misses the fact that Heidegger
has much to say about the second. The chapter on conscience does not
supply ersatz criteria for an otherwise irrational choice but articulates our
capacity for entering into the space of reasons.

4   Locating reason in *Being and Time*

Can such an assertion – which certainly does not sound very Heideggerian –
be at all supported by the text of *Being and Time*? It can, but the evidence
will require a good deal of unpacking. In explicating his "formalized"
concept of guilt, Heidegger writes: "The self, which as such has to lay the
ground [*Grund*] for itself, can *never* get that ground into its power; and yet
it has to take over being the ground existingly [*existierend*]." In case this is
not crystal clear, Heidegger goes on to explain: Dasein is

> *not through* itself, but [is] *released to* itself from the ground, in order to
> be *as this* [ground]. Dasein is not itself the ground of its being, insofar
> as this [ground] first springs from its own projection; but as being-a-self
> [*Selbstsein*] it is indeed the *being* of the ground. This ground is always only
> ground of an entity whose being has to take over being-a-ground.[6]

The burden of my argument is to show that taking over being-a-ground
must be understood as including a reference to ground as reason. First,
however, two preliminary comments are in order – one concerning tran-
scendental philosophy, the other what is to be understood by "reason."

   As Carl-Friedrich Gethmann has shown, this passage represents the
crux of Heidegger's transformation of the transcendental philosophy of
Kant, Fichte, and Husserl. Here the transcendental subject, as care, is

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[6] There are a number of ambiguities in these passages. I here provide the German for com-
parison: "Das Selbst, das als solches den Grund seiner selbst zu legen hat, kann dessen
nie mächtig werden und hat doch existierend das Grundsein zu übernehmen." "*Nicht
durch* es selbst, sondern *an* es selbst *entlassen* aus dem Grunde, um *als dieser* zu sein. Das
Dasein ist nicht insofern selbst der Grund seines Seins, als dieser aus eigenem Entwurf
erst entspringt, wohl aber ist es als Selbstsein das *Sein* des Grundes. Dieser ist immer
nur Grund eines Seienden, dessen Sein das Grundsein zu übernehmen hat" (GA 2, p.
377/284/330; 378/285/330).

conceived not as "the constituting entity but as the entity that *facilitates* [*vollziehend*] constitution." In contrast to the transcendental subject in Fichte and Husserl, Dasein's "primal act" is "not the positing of itself as positing, but rather the positing of itself as posited" (Gethmann 1974, p. 141). As our passage indicates, Dasein, as thrown, must acknowledge a ground from which it is "released to itself" and which is, in Gethmann's term, "out of reach" (*unverfugbar*). Thus, as Gethmann explains, Dasein "presents [*stellt dar*] the ground for all entities (positing) and is itself grounded [*begründet*] by means of the ground" (1974, p. 208).

At first glance this threatens to annul the transcendental point of departure altogether.[7] If the so-called transcendental subject is itself grounded in something out of reach – whether reified epistemes, power structures, or capital-B Being – won't the ground that it presents for intentionality simply have the character of a fact? What will keep dogmatism and skepticism from resuming their eternal dialectic? Haven't we simply generated another version of Tugendhat's criticism, namely, that Heidegger's ontology allows no room for the normativity of reason?[8] To respond to this worry it is necessary to recognize that the passage in question entails two distinct notions of ground: ground as *facticity* and ground as *reason*.[9] Taking over being-a-ground – where "being" must be understood existentially as ability-to-be – names the point at which Dasein becomes accountable: the factic ground that remains out of reach is reflected in a normative project of grounding (accountability) that first makes something like reasons *possible*.

What, then, is to be understood by "reason"? The link between the idea of conscience as taking over being-a-ground and the concept of ground as reason is to be found in the character of conscience as a call, that is, in its character as discourse. For reason has a double connection

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[7] This is how it is understood, for instance, in Peter Gordon's (2010) account of Heidegger's "Davos disputation" with Ernst Cassirer. Cristina Lafont's argument that Heidegger's position is unstable on this point will be addressed in Chapter 10 below.

[8] Gethmann recognizes that Heidegger owes us an account of "how something like principles lie in the accomplishment of Dasein's being [*Seinsvollzug des Daseins*]." Unlike most commentators, however, he sees that Heidegger provides the beginning of such an account in the chapter on conscience and guilt, even if there are "gaps between the fundamental-ontological phenomenon of being-guilty and the principle of reason as a transcendental-ontological principle" that can "be closed only through an interpretive further-thinking of the text" (Gethmann 1974, pp. 222, 227–28). The present chapter is an attempt at such "further-thinking."

[9] In Gethmann's terms, "the meaning of grounding [*Begründung*; justification] is first of all co-given through the *Existenz* of the ground itself" (1974, p. 233).

to discourse. First, reasoning is a discursive practice in which something is offered or given – support for one's judgment, justification for one's behavior. Second, that which is given, the reason, is itself something that, in Scanlon's phrase, *speaks for* something else – not in the sense of speaking in place of something but in the sense of telling in favor of it. Corresponding to this double connection is a double normativity: first, as a practice, reason-giving, like all practices, depends on constitutive rules that determine what counts as success or failure (logic and pragmatics); and second, what is given in this practice itself stands in a normative relation to something, namely, that for which it supplies a reason.[10]

The attempt to link conscience to reason by means of its character as a call – that is, as a mode of discourse – may seem unpromising if we recall certain passages about discourse in *Being and Time*. Everywhere Heidegger seems keen to disassociate language from reason – to "liberate grammar from logic," as he puts it (GA 2, p. 220/165/209). Far from seeing an intimate connection between discourse and reason, such as one might find in contemporary attempts to link linguistic meaning to truth-conditions or to spell out the semantics of language with the help of logic, Heidegger argues that the logical forms of language – *apophansis*, predicative assertion – are parasitical on a more primordial sense of *logos* as "letting be seen." Further, "assertion is not a free-floating kind of behavior which, in its own right, might be capable of disclosing entities … in a primary way" (GA 2, p. 208/156/199). Primordial disclosure is, rather, a function of Dasein's pre-predicative involvements.[11] However, the thesis being advanced here is not that the call of conscience is itself a mode of discourse that speaks for something else, a practice of reason-giving that employs predicative assertion. The claim is, rather, that the discourse of conscience is the ontological condition of that practice that explains its double normativity: the rule of accountability inherent in the practice of giving reasons, and the rule of legitimation that underlies speaking for something. To flesh out this claim – and so to read our initial passage with more insight – we must locate conscience within the structure of Dasein's being, care, as a whole.

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[10] It is tricky to specify just what this "speaking for" something amounts to, but it will involve a norm that governs a kind of success or failure. A reason might speak for something by answering the question of why it should be that way, thus being oriented toward the norm of the Good. Or it might be taken as evidence for believing something, in which case it is oriented toward the norm of the True. A justifying reason is not simply a cause, which might bring something about but cannot speak for it.

[11] For more on these issues, see Chapter 10 below.

5 Conscience and the structure of care

Discourse (*Rede*) is one of the three existential structures that go to make up Dasein's disclosedness, that is, that account ontologically for the fact that I am "in" a "world," a context of significance within which things can be encountered in all the ways they are so encountered. The other two structures are affectedness (*Befindlichkeit*) and understanding (*Verstehen*). Together, the three make up the framework of Heidegger's account of intentionality. The broad outlines of Heidegger's position are well known, so I shall only mention them.

First, *affectedness* is that aspect of my being thanks to which things matter to me. I do not inhabit a world in which things are merely arranged around me in neutral fashion; rather, they have a particular salience, they are alluring or repelling or irritating. This is because I am present to myself not first of all through a theoretical reflection but always through the "feeling" of my own having-to-be. I can be disposed in various ways, but I am never without some mood. Second, *understanding* is not a mental operation but an "ability-to-be" (*Seinkönnen*) – skill or know-how – which Heidegger terms the "projection of possibilities for being." It is because I possess such skills and abilities that I can encounter things in *their* possibilities – that is, that things can prove useful or appropriate for the tasks in which I am engaged. Understanding in this sense yields a teleologically structured "relevance totality": things are there in order to accomplish some specific end, which in turn appears as something in order to accomplish some further end, all of which is anchored in an "end in itself," referred back to the being who acts "for the sake of" what it is (practical identity). *Discourse*, thirdly, is what Heidegger calls the "articulation of intelligibility" – namely, the articulation of that intelligibility that has its roots in affectedness and understanding. Though affectedness and understanding are necessary conditions for intentionality, they are not sufficient. For things to be significant they must not merely be useful for something but also *tellable*: what I am doing must be able to be named. Only so is it possible that things can show up as what they are, and without this "as" – one that encodes the normative sense of the "proper" in any given world – we do not have intentionality.

Heidegger initially describes care in its "everyday" modality and argues that the self of everyday being-in-the-world is the One (*das Man*). That is, what makes up the significance of the world into which I am geared is not some content that belongs to my consciousness, in terms of which I represent the world; rather, it belongs to the "public," the always

historically and culturally particular social practices of those among whom I find myself. I conduct myself as "one" does in the roles I adopt, and in telling myself and others what I am up to, I speak as one does: "the 'One' itself articulates the referential context of significance" (GA 2, p. 172/129/167). The conformism that this picture of everyday Dasein evokes correlates to another aspect of everydayness, namely, that my way of gearing into the world is not a function of deliberation but rather a "mindless" coping in which my abilities take the lead. To say that everydayness is mindless is not, however, to say that it is opaque. On the contrary, it is precisely "cleared" (*gelichtet*): a necessary condition for the possibility of encountering things as meaningful is the habitual conformity to public norms, to the normal and average, and to the name.

Though my everyday gearing into the world is not a function of deliberation, deliberation, as a kind of practice, must find *its* ontological clarification at the level of the One. Heidegger analyzes the way that disturbances in the smooth flow of my activities can occasion a transition in my dealings with things: from their being "available" things become merely "occurrent"; accordingly, I no longer simply deal with them but rather – at the extreme – merely stare at them. Such disturbances provide the occasion for deliberation – that is, for technical, strategic, and prudential consideration of what is to be done. It must be possible, therefore, to give an ontological account of deliberation as a specific modification of the care structure. Appreciation of this point allows us to see why the everyday one-self is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for intentionality.

First, when I deliberate about how to go on I do so in terms of some affectedness. Things (including my own beliefs and desires) will present themselves as salient, as "weighty" or not, according to how I am disposed. Upon deliberation I may be less likely simply to act on the face that things show me according to my mood than I would be when geared into the world, but this is simply because the project of deliberation is to deliberate *about* my action. If I am finally moved to act "in spite of" the way I feel about things "because" it is what reason demands, this is possible only if I am so disposed that I can feel the weight of the reasons brought forward. Second, deliberation involves making explicit what belongs to understanding – the in-order-tos grounded in the practical identity at stake in my smoothly functioning practice. I make these elements explicit to the extent that I am able and consider them as indicating how to go on. Such explication is, finally, discursive: I articulate courses of action – weighing evidence and considering reasons for going on in one way or another. Thus deliberation takes place (as did the action from which it

arose) within the constitutive rules of the "world" in which I remain engaged. That is, I deliberate as that which I was understanding myself to be, in terms of my practical identity as husband, as teacher, as American citizen. While only an individual can deliberate, then, I do not deliberate as my ownmost self. Rather, the reasons I adduce and the evidence that I find salient will normally be those typical of the current cultural, historical composition of the One. I deliberate in order to restore equilibrium in a context that otherwise remains fixed; I consider things in light of how *one* ought to go on. This does not mean that my reasoning is nothing but the rationalization of specific cultural conditions, but it does mean that the practice of deliberation, like all practices, is grounded ontologically in what is public, typical, and normative in a given community. In spite of its arising from a disturbance in my smooth gearing-in to the world, deliberation does not disclose any aspect of myself that would not already be governed by the public, anonymous One.[12]

As we saw in the previous chapter, however, Heidegger does consider a more extreme possibility – not the disturbance of everyday coping but its complete breakdown – in which the self is explicitly called into question *as* a self. Here deliberation is impossible because the everyday world on which it depends "has the character of completely lacking significance" (GA 2, p. 247/186/231). Yet it is precisely in light of this liminal mode of being that the sufficient condition of intentionality – the possibility of a genuinely first-person stance – is made evident. As I shall argue, the account of conscience that finds its place here articulates what it means to say "I," such that I – and not only some "one" – have, and can have, reasons about which I deliberate; it explains how *one's* reasons can be *my* reasons. For Heidegger, conscience is not itself a kind of private reason but an ontological condition for distinguishing between external and internal

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[12] Bernard Williams argues that "practical deliberation is in every case first-personal, and the first-person is not derivative or naturally replaced by *anyone*" (1985, p. 68). But Heidegger would respond that though the first-person is not derivative, "the self of everyday Dasein" – including the self who deliberates – "is the *one-self*" (GA 2, p. 172/129/167); that is, it already understands itself in typical ways and so, in a sense, as "anyone." It is true, as Williams argues, that "the *I* of reflective practical deliberation is not required to take the result of anyone else's properly conducted deliberation as a datum" (1985, p. 69), but it nevertheless remains, in Heidegger's terms, "dispersed into the 'One'" and its way of interpreting the situation (GA 2, p. 172/129/167). In the previous chapter I tried to show how genuine first-person self-awareness (and authority) is distinguished from the one-self. In Chapter 10 I shall explore what it means to say that I take over the One authentically when its norms are at stake for me explicitly in authenticity.

reasons, between a quasi-mechanical conformism and a commitment responsive to the normativity of norms.

The liminal condition of breakdown is a modification of the care structure and thus involves the three elements of affectedness, understanding, and discourse. As the sort of discourse that belongs to this modification, conscience will articulate the intelligibility of the self as disclosed through the other two elements: the affectedness of *Angst* and its corresponding mode of understanding, *death*. For our purposes what matters most about these controversial analyses is the way "everyday familiarity collapses" so that Dasein is "brought face to face with itself as being-in-the-world" (GA 2, pp. 250–51/188–89/233).

Anxiety is a distinctive affectedness because it neutralizes the claims things normally exert on me and so also the reasons they provide for what I do. Anxiety "tells us that entities are not 'relevant' at all" (GA 2, p. 247/186/231). This does not mean that significance and reasons disappear; I still register their demands, but they no longer grip me. As Heidegger puts it in "What is Metaphysics?," anxiety reveals the "strangeness" of the fact "*that* they are beings – and not nothing" (GA 9, p. 114/90); beings are simply there, inert. This in turn is because anxiety does not "concern a *definite* kind of being for Dasein or a *definite* possibility for it" but rather "discloses Dasein as *being-possible* as such" (GA 2, p. 249/187–88/232). Things become insignificant, reasons lose their grip, just because I am no longer drawn into the world in terms of some definite possibility, some specific practical identity. "We ourselves … slip away from ourselves" (GA 9, p. 112/88–89), and with that go the constitutive rules which, belonging to our roles and practices, provide the terms in which I understand how to go on. Without these, I am able neither to act nor to deliberate. Conceived as a mode of understanding (ability-to-be), this being individuated down to my sheer "being-possible" is, as William Blattner (1994) has shown, an "*in*-ability-to-be" – that is, "death" as the "possibility of no-longer-being-able-to-be-there" (GA 2, p. 333/250/294). Death is not a matter of bodily demise but an existential condition in which I am no longer able to gear into the world in terms of roles and practices, with the result that things have properties but no affordances, and the motives and reasons the latter once supplied now take on the character of something closer to simple facts, items in the world of which I can take note but which do not move me. The question that arises here is not how they could ever have *been* valid for me (as the one-self I am defined by such validity), but how they could be valid for me now – that is, for the one who genuinely says "I." How can any reason be *my* reason?

This question is answered by the mode of discourse that articulates the intelligibility of breakdown, namely, the call of conscience. What is "given to understand" in the call? Heidegger answers: "Guilty" (*schuldig*) – but such guilt cannot be explained with reference to any law, whether conventional, rational/moral, or divine. Because conscience articulates a condition in which such laws have ceased to make any claim on me and persist merely as facts, inert items that lack normative force, what I am given to understand about myself in conscience cannot be explained through transgression of them. Heidegger expresses this by saying that the term "guilt" must be "formalized" so that all reference to social relations "will drop out," including reference to "any ought [*Sollen*] or law" (GA 2, p. 376/283/328). But can the notion of guilt make sense without reference to any law or ought? To owe someone something it is not enough merely to possess what he once possessed; rather, a law or norm governing exchanges must be in place. But Heidegger's formalization is meant to bring out a further ontological point, namely, that my relation to such a law or norm must be of a certain character. If I am incapable of placing myself under the law – as may occur through various mental or physical incapacities – then I cannot be said to owe something, and *Angst* in Heidegger's sense reveals something like a global incapacity vis-à-vis the normativity of all laws and oughts: existing norms present themselves as mere facts; they have no more normative force than does the code of Hammurabi. It may be true that a valid law obligates me whether or not I recognize it, but the point of Heidegger's formalization is to highlight the way law and ought can come to have standing from the first-person point of view.

Thus the role the analysis of guilt is to play is relatively clear. To say that "[t]his 'Guilty!' turns up as a predicate for the 'I am'" (GA 2, p. 373/281/326) means that it belongs to my radically individualized mode of being, independent of any grasp of myself as this or that (including as rational being or as believer). Further, what conscience gives to understand thereby is "the ontological condition for Dasein's ability to come to owe anything in factically existing" (GA 2, p. 380/286/332). Heidegger thus examines conscience in order to explain how I can come to be *obligated*. Since there is no question about how *one* comes to be obligated (the one-self simply conforms to constitutive rules), Heidegger's concern here is to show how, given the fact that the one-self can break down, something like a responsiveness to norms as norms is possible. If that is so, we have the context necessary for understanding our initial text passage, since Heidegger offers it to unpack his formalized definition of guilt as "being the ground of a nullity" (GA 2, p. 376/283/329). That context, as John Haugeland

correctly sees, is Heidegger's account of responsibility, for which reason Haugeland translates *schuldig* not as "guilty" but as "responsible" – in the sense both of "at fault/culpable and obliged/indebted/liable" (2000, p. 65). Yet "being the ground of a nullity" signifies responsibility in a further sense not noted by Haugeland: that of being *answerable* (*verantwortlich*; GA 2, p. 382/288/334). To see how this discursive sense is already at stake in our passage is to understand how conscience provides an ontological condition on reason.

To make that case I shall argue, first, that conscience accounts for how grounds become reasons in the sense of *my* reasons – that is, that conscience explains my ability to act not just in accord with, but also in light of, norms; and second, that the notion of resoluteness, as the authentic response to the call of conscience, entails the project of *giving* reasons to oneself and to others.

6   Being-guilty and the space of reasons

As a "predicate for the 'I am'," being-guilty as "being the ground of a nullity" is not the simple state of an occurrent entity but a way of existing, a modification of the care structure. The complexity of Heidegger's attempt to explain such being-a-ground arises from the fact that the notion of ground itself is twofold, thanks to the two equiprimordial aspects of Dasein's being: thrownness and projection.

Heidegger first introduces the notion of ground in terms of Dasein's thrownness: Dasein has "*not* laid that ground *itself*" and yet "it reposes in the weight of it, which is made manifest to it as a burden" in its mood (GA 2, p. 377/284/330). What does "ground" mean here? Formally, as Gethmann observed, it is simply what is out of reach, that which the transcendental subject must posit itself as being posited *by*. Less formally, however, several attempts to specify such a ground have been made. Heidegger sometimes suggests that it be conceived as "nature" (or "cosmos") – as *das Übermächtige* – which leads, perhaps, to some form of theological conception (GA 26, p. 13/11). Gadamer suggests that this dimension of Dasein's ground is language and tradition, which is always "*mehr Sein als Bewußtsein*." Dreyfus glosses the notion by appeal to background practices belonging to one's socio-cultural milieu. We need not decide the merits of any of these suggestions, since our concern is with what it might mean to be grounded in any of these ways, and my claim is that such grounds, to the extent that they remain out of reach, cannot be conceived as *reasons*. This is clear if the factic ground is conceived as

nature, for to say that I am grounded in nature is to say that I find myself within a causal nexus over which I have no control: the forces of nature that co-operate in ensuring that I do what I do cannot be confused with the reasons why *I* do it. Nature in this sense lies outside the space of reasons because its constraint on me is not normatively assessable; it simply is or is not.

Something similar holds if the ground is conceived either as history, tradition, or social practices – so long as we insist, with Heidegger, that it functions as factic ground precisely to the extent that it is out of reach.[13] For though we can see that social practices, for instance, must be understood normatively – that is, that they involve reasons in the sense of in-order-tos and for-the-sake-ofs and so are assessable in terms of success or failure – it is not from the point of view of one's everyday coping that we make this judgment. The agent functions within the nexus of such practices in much the way that she functions within the constraints of nature: she acts in accord with norms but not in light of them. Hence such behavior is largely predictable from a third-person point of view. This is the picture of the functioning of norms within social practices we get from Division I, where it is difficult to distinguish human from animal teleological action.[14] Though we might be willing to describe animal behavior as being based on reasons, such reasons would be external: there are reasons for what Larry Bird does on the court, just as there are reasons for what the wasp does, but neither does them *for* those reasons, in light of them. In *Angst* – which is possible for Bird but not for wasp – this difference comes to salience: that in whose grip I was when geared into the world now confronts me as an inert fact, something without normative force.

Robert Pippin is surely right to object that this strikes a false note as a picture of human meaningful activity, but this is not an objection to Heidegger. According to Heidegger, we are never simply grounded by the sort of thrown ground disclosed in mood; instead, though Dasein "can *never* get that ground into its power" it "has to take over being-the-ground existingly" (GA 2, p. 377/284/330). In the structure of my being as care,

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[13] I have discussed these issues in more detail in Crowell 2002c.

[14] This is, of course, something of an idealization. It is only in fully "mindless" coping that the analogy between natural causes and factic social norms is fully compelling. Everyday life, as Heidegger recognizes, exhibits intermediate forms in which, in my ongoing practical engagement in some task, I am responsive to the normative demands on me *as* normative. But this raises the question of how to account for such responsiveness, and I argue below that Heidegger gives such an account in terms of conscience as "taking over being-a-ground." The methodological basis for this idealization is discussed in Chapter 10 below.

my facticity is always ramified by my existentiality – that is, my "projection of possibilities for being a self." What does "ground" mean when it is ramified by existentiality? The answer must be given at an appropriately formalized level. Recall that in *Angst* the concern is not for a "*definite* kind of being for Dasein or a *definite* possibility for it," but rather for "being-possible as such" (GA 2, p. 249/188/232). Thus, taking over the ground existingly may be described formally as a "possibilizing" of the factic ground: what the call of conscience gives me to understand is that that which I can never get in my power, that which grounds me beyond my reach, is nevertheless *my* possibility. This, I argue, means that factic grounds become subject to a choice for which I am accountable; they are thereby taken up into the normative space of reasons.

The argument for this remains largely implicit in *Being and Time*. However, in the 1929 essay "On the Essence of Ground" that Heidegger contributed to Husserl's *Festschrift*, the question that *Being and Time* leaves unspoken is made explicit: "To what extent does there lie in transcendence the intrinsic possibility of something like reason [*Grund*] in general" (GA 9, p. 59/125)? Here Heidegger provides a crucial clarification of how factic grounds enter the space of reasons when Dasein, as "transcendence," takes over being-a-ground (GA 9, pp. 134–35/106). The essay follows *Being and Time* in arguing that the in-order-to relations informing Dasein's practical dealings with things are anchored in Dasein's self-awareness as that "for-the-sake-of-which" (*Worumwillen*) it is so engaged. Here Heidegger calls this "transcendence": the casting of "something like the 'for-the-sake-of' projectively before it." "Although it exists in the midst of beings and embraced by them," writes Heidegger, "Dasein as existing has always already surpassed nature" (GA 9, p. 139/109), and it is by means of such transcendence, or surpassing, that "Dasein for the first time comes toward that being that *it* is, and comes toward it *as* it 'itself'" (GA 9, p. 138/108). In so doing, it discloses a totality of significance ("world") in terms of which entities can "gain entry into world" – show themselves in *their* possibilities – and thereby "come to be 'more in being' [*seiender*']" (GA 9, p. 159/123). We shall understand this "more" as entities' being held up to constitutive standards; thus the essay makes clear what *Being and Time* did not, namely, that the worldhood that makes such standards possible is grounded in the *normative* orientation of Dasein's first-person self-awareness.

Recall that Dasein can come "toward the being that it is" in two ways: the way of everyday Dasein "reflected back from things," and the way it comes "toward it *as* it 'itself'" in the breakdown of the everyday one-self.

Though both are modes of self-relation or self-awareness, the argument of the previous chapter showed that only the latter suffices to explain why Dasein is something like an "end in itself" that can anchor the teleological "totality of involvements" into the intelligibility of a world. In the 1929 essay Heidegger calls this latter orientation "sovereignty," and he glosses it with reference to Plato's *epekeina tes ousias*: what is "beyond beings." This suggests a connection between transcendence (sovereignty) and the Good, so Heidegger asks: "Yet may we interpret the *agathon* as the transcendence of Dasein?" (GA 9, p. 160/124). According to Heidegger, Plato's *agathon* is "that *hexis* (sovereign power) that is sovereign with respect to the possibility (in the sense of the enabling) of truth, understanding, and even being." But this also describes the *Umwillen* of resolute, individuated Dasein, which has grasped itself in breakdown as "I myself." Thus the "essence of the *agathon* lies in [Dasein's] sovereignty over itself [*Mächtigkeit seiner selbst*] as *hou heneka* – as the 'for the sake of …', it is the source of possibility as such" (GA 9, p. 161/124).

By thus equating authentic *Umwillen* with the ancient *hou heneka* and its orientation toward the good or what is best, Heidegger suggests that to "possibilize" factic grounds by taking over being-a-ground is to act in light of a normative distinction between better and worse. By grasping my situation in light of what is best, the factic grounds into which I am thrown become reasons for which I am responsible. Sovereignty over myself is not a matter of self-creation or self-fashioning; nor is it the essence of the good in the sense that whatever I choose is *eo ipso* right. Rather, thanks to sovereignty – the ability to take over being-a-ground – I am able to judge and act in light of the good, in light of what is best; that is, in terms of (justificatory) *reasons*. This does not mean that I must *know* the good; rather, it signifies only the emergence of a *critical practice* in the existing of an entity that is sovereign over itself, an entity for whom the question of what *ought* to be makes sense.

To take over being-a-ground, then – that is, to possibilize what grounds me – is to transform the claims of nature or society (what "one" simply *does*) into first-person terms, into my reasons for doing what I do. Conscience discloses that I am a being for whom thrown grounds can never function simply as causes: because Dasein has been "*released* from the ground, *not through* itself but *to* itself, so as to be *as this* [ground]" (GA 2, p. 378/285/330), grounds take on the character of reasons for which I am accountable. My natural impulses are not within my power, but it is I who make them normative for me, reasons for what I do. My gearing into the world must take place in terms of social practices whose rules

are not within my power and so function essentially as grounds in the sense of causes. However, it is I who transform such functional effectuation into reasons for being – namely, by answering for them as possibilities. If conscience articulates the intelligibility of the first-person stance that emerges in the collapse of the one-self, Heidegger's gloss of the call in terms of being-guilty (responsibility) identifies the ontological condition whereby one's (factic) grounds become my (normative) reasons and thus explains how Dasein can act not only in accord with norms, but also in light of them.

7   Being-guilty and giving reasons

There is, however, a further aspect to the project whereby Dasein enters into the space of reasons through the possibilizing of factic grounds. Heidegger terms such a project "resoluteness" (*Entschlossenheit*), defined as "the self-projection upon one's ownmost being-guilty" (GA 2, p. 393/297/343). To "hear" the call of conscience "correctly is … tantamount to having an understanding of oneself in one's ownmost ability-to-be" (GA 2, p. 381/287/333) – that is, to *be* guilty, to *take over* being-a-ground. With the help of "On the Essence of Ground" we have understood resoluteness as sovereignty, as Dasein's awareness of itself as being-possible, acting for the sake of what is best (*agathon*). But what belongs to such an ability-to-be? On the one hand, I cannot improve on the answer that John Haugeland has provided in terms of his notion of "existential commitment." To be resolved is to take responsibility for the standards inherent in the practices in which I am engaged; only so is it possible for there to *be* practices rather than mere occurrences. For instance, if something can be a rook only because there is a practice, chess, in which it *counts* as such a thing, the idea of "counting" itself depends on my commitment to the game, without which the standards that determine success or failure may have normative authority but would lack normative force. This is not to say that, lacking *my* commitment, there could be no rooks – institutions and practices are social, after all – but neither do these things exist apart from all first-person commitment (Haugeland 1998a, pp. 340ff.).[15]

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[15] It follows that resolve or commitment cannot itself be rationally grounded: I can give reasons for committing myself to something, but those reasons will be normative only to the extent that I have *already* committed myself to them. As Haugeland puts it, "the governing or normative 'authority' of an existential commitment comes from nowhere other than itself, and it is brought to bear in no way other than by its own exercise" (1998a,

On the other hand, this notion of commitment does not tell the whole story, for it does not reflect the specifically discursive aspect that, for Heidegger, belongs to taking over being-a-ground. To be responsible (*verantwortlich*) is to be *answerable* (GA 2, p. 382/288/334), and to be answerable for something is to be accountable for it, that is, to be prepared to *give* an *account* of oneself. Adumbrated here is a necessary connection between resoluteness – as the possibilizing of factic grounds into normative reasons – and the practice of giving reasons. To say that something becomes a reason for me is to say that it speaks for something else, justifies it; and such a thing makes sense only within the constitutive rules of a *practice* of giving reasons. Thus, whatever might be the particular project on which I resolve – whatever it is to which I commit – I always at the same time commit myself to accountability as giving an account (*logon didonai*; *ratio reddende*). The practice of giving reasons has its origin in the call of conscience; it is the "discourse" of an authentic response to the call. Evidence for this interpretation can be found in the 1929 essay as well.

"To what extent does there lie in transcendence the intrinsic possibility of something like ground [*Grund*; reason] in general?" (GA 9, p. 163/125). As we saw, transcendence means that human beings "can be obligated to themselves, i.e., be free selves." And this in turn makes possible "something binding, indeed obligation in general" (GA 9, p. 164/126). Hence freedom – what *Being and Time* calls "taking over being-a-ground" – is the "origin of ground in general. Freedom is freedom for ground" (GA 9, p. 165/127). In unpacking what this latter claim means, Heidegger shows us where the project of reason-giving arises.

There are three ways that "in grounding, freedom *gives* and *takes* ground" (GA 9, p. 165/127), and each of these ways corresponds to one aspect of the care structure. First, there is grounding as "taking up a basis" (*Bodennehmen*) within beings, a kind of "belonging to beings" whereby Dasein is "thoroughly attuned by them" (GA 9, p. 166/128). This factic grounding corresponds to care as *affectedness*. Second, there is grounding as "establishing" (*Stiften*), which "is nothing other than the projection of the 'for-the-sake-of'," that is, Dasein's *understanding*. Formally conceived as taking over being-a-ground, understanding opens up the space of reasons through orientation toward the normative, the *agathon*,

p. 341). When Heidegger says that "only the resolution itself can give the answer" to the question of "what it is to resolve upon" (GA 2, p. 395/298/345) this is not a rejection of deliberation, but a description of its ontological condition.

grasping itself in light of what is best. Neither form of grounding is itself "a comportment toward beings," but together they "make intentionality possible transcendentally in such a way that … they co-temporalize a *third* manner of grounding: grounding as the grounding of something [*Begründen*]." It is this form of grounding, Heidegger insists, that "makes possible the manifestation of beings in themselves, the possibility of ontic truth" (GA 9, p. 168/129).

Now as we would expect, this third form of grounding belongs to *discourse* as the remaining moment of the care structure. First, Heidegger tells us that the "originary" sense of *Begründen* means "making possible the why-question in general" (GA 9, p. 168/129). Thanks to the "excess of possibility" that is given in the "projection of world" – which we have interpreted as the excess, grounded in the for-the-sake-of as *agathon*, that constitutes world as a normative totality of significance and brings entities "more in being" by holding them to constitutive standards – "the 'why' question springs forth" in relation to those beings "that press around us as we find ourselves" (GA 9, p. 169/130). If in *Being and Time* Heidegger defined authentic discourse as reticence – the silencing of the everyday way things are talked about so that the call of conscience can be *heard* – he now makes plain that *answering* the call involves discourse as *Begründen*, answering for oneself and for things. In the face of the collapse of the one-self, Dasein confronts the question, "Why *this* way and not otherwise?" (GA 9, p. 169/130) and thereby becomes accountable.

As Heidegger explains, the "ontological ground of beings" lies in our "understanding of being," which provides "the most antecedent *answer*" to the why-question (GA 9, p. 169/130). But an answer to the why-question is a *reason*. "Because such *Begründen* prevails transcendentally from the outset throughout all becoming-manifest of beings (ontic truth), *all* ontic discovery and disclosing *must* account [*ausweisen*] for itself" (GA 9, p. 169/130; my emphasis). To account, in this sense, is to give reasons: "What occurs is the referral [*Anführung*] to a being that then makes itself known, for example, as 'cause' or as the 'motivational grounds' (motive) for an already manifest nexus of beings" – a referral that is "*demanded*" by the "what-being and how-being of the relevant beings" (GA 9, p. 170/130).[16] And only because there is such a demand can Dasein

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[16] This should not be taken to mean that entities cannot show up unless I give some reason for them propositionally. Rather, "what" beings are and "how" they are *demands* such a practice of "referral." Ontic truth in the sense of the "truth of things" – the self-showing of beings as they are in themselves – depends on Dasein's practical dealings with them, in which constitutive standards are in play. *What* a thing is and *how* it is thus depend on

"in its factical accounting and justifications, cast 'reasons' aside, suppress any demand for them, pervert them, cover them over" (GA 9, p. 170/131). Lest there be any doubt about the matter, Heidegger terms the transcendental answering, which makes this reason-giving possible, "legitimation [*Rechtgebung*]" (GA 9, p. 171/132). Conscience, then, calls one to take over being-a-ground, to answer for oneself, to legitimate by *giving* grounds, that is, reasons. Hence Heidegger concludes his essay by bringing these two elements of conscience (hearing and answering) together in relation to the regrettably undeveloped, but essential, reference to the one *to whom* reasons are finally given and without whom the whole thing makes no sense: "And only being able to listen into the distance" – that is, *vernehmen* as registering the call – "awakens Dasein as a self to the answer of the other Dasein, with whom it can surrender its I-ness" – that is, to whom it must account for itself – "so as to attain an authentic self" (GA 9, p. 175/135).

As we shall see in the following chapter, the possibility of everyday discourse ("communication") rests originally on this proto-act of offering reasons. To respond to the call – and a "free-floating call from which 'nothing ensues' is an impossible fiction when seen existentially" (GA 2, p. 371/279/324) – to become accountable, is to speak to the other, to communicate. When I give reasons and communicate as the one-self, this is a *trace* of my subjectivity, possible only for a creature that can be responsible, can answer the call of conscience. For Heidegger, as for Kant, then, giving reasons is the evidence of first-person authority. Only "I" can do it; the very notion makes sense only for a creature that is not simply a "reflection back from things," a practical identity absorbed in its environment. By opening up a space in which I can recognize something like a claim, my response to the call transforms the "nature" which I share with all conforming herd animals into a meaningful *world*. In this way intentionality, "ontic transcendence," finds its ultimate condition in conscience as sovereignty, first-person authority.

these standards, which have the structure of reasons: this is a hammer *because* it serves thus and so, is produced thus and so, etc. But then, to say what and how beings are is always to imply a reference to these standards and this, when made explicit, *is* to refer them to their grounds, that is, to give reasons. This is just another way of saying that affectedness and understanding alone are not enough to account for intentionality; for "ontic truth" – the manifestation of something *as* something – some relation to "discourse" (in this case, the possibility of offering constitutive standards as reasons) is also necessary.

Being answerable: reason-giving and the ontological meaning of discourse

In a recent paper entitled "Being With," Stephen Darwall nods toward Heidegger's use of the term but follows this immediately with a standard criticism – here attributed to Buber – that Heidegger's conception of *Mitsein* "leaves out an essential element, namely, any 'relation with others … which could breach the barriers of the self'."[1] Darwall proposes to remedy this defect by appeal to the "second-person standpoint," which involves affectively acknowledging the authority of the Other in a way that has moral implications. Darwall's term for the affective aspect is "empathy," and the moral implication is called "mutual accountability" or "answerability." What both Darwall and Buber – and, it must be said, a great many interpreters of Heidegger, sympathetic or hostile[2] – overlook, is that the latter are Heidegger's terms too. In this chapter I shall identify the role that being answerable or accountable plays in Heidegger's analytic of Dasein. I argue that Heidegger's phenomenology of the call of conscience entails that giving reasons (*logon didonai*) belongs to authentic discourse and provides the key to what discourse (*Rede*) means ontologically. Since this flies in the face of received wisdom – what, after all, is more anathema to Heidegger than reason-giving? – I begin by laying my methodological cards on the table. If I am wrong about these matters, then my argument about how to read Heidegger fails; but if I am right, many conventional approaches to *Being and Time* must be reconsidered.

1   How to find the argument in *Being and Time*

Whatever else it is, "fundamental ontology" is a phenomenological account of the conditions that make inquiry into the meaning of being possible. This aim lends Dasein a certain methodological "priority," since

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[1] Darwall 2011, p. 5, citing Heidegger: "['Others'] are neither present-at-hand nor ready-to-hand … *[T]hey are there too, and there with [us].*" Buber 2002, p. 206.
[2] Though not Olafson 1998.

"the question of being is one of its own 'ontic affairs'." What must Dasein be if it is to be possessed of the kind of "understanding of being" that enables it to do ontology? That the question of being is one of Dasein's own ontic affairs turns out not merely to pick out one such affair, however, but to define what Dasein *is*: ontological inquiry is possible only for a being "for whom, in being, that very being is at *issue*" (GA 2, p. 16/12/32). To "exist" (*Existenz*) is to be in such a way that what it is (or means) to be is at issue or in question – *at stake* – not just now and then, but everywhere and always.

This "being at stake" *cannot* be understood as any kind of *Kampf ums Leben*; it is nothing like an instinctual conatus or animal struggle for survival. If life is taken to involve such a struggle, then a living creature can be said to succeed or fail measured against a standard – survival – which it illustrates but whose meaning is not at stake in the struggle. Dasein, in contrast, "understands itself in *terms* of … a *possibility* of itself" (GA 2, p. 17/12/33), that is, it measures *itself* against a standard whose meaning is part of what is at stake in existing *as* that possibility. For instance, to "be" a father is for what it means to be a father to be at issue for me in trying to be one: I do not merely do certain things but commit myself to the possibility of failure. That is, for *me* being a father is a normative status. Even if I cannot define what it means to be a father, I am oriented toward that meaning as toward a measure. That this is not normally a matter of conscious reasoning does not mean that it is anything like the instinctual or environmental processes of life.

To describe what it *is* like is the burden of the peculiarly structured text of *Being and Time*. The structure is peculiar because what comes earlier in the text presupposes what comes later. *Nothing* described in Division I stands on its own but depends on what is established in Division II. In particular, the kind of "disclosedness" that belongs to "everyday" being-in-the-world cannot be understood on its own, as certain pragmatic readings of Heidegger suggest.[3] Thus Division II is not an appendage; it uncovers a possibility of Dasein's being without which there could be no totality of significance, or "world." But the possibility in question is not authenticity, since authenticity is merely "an existentiell modification of *das Man*" (GA 2, p. 173/130/168), a distinctive way in which "everydayness is seized upon" (GA 2, p. 238/179/224). Rather, Division II uncovers a possibility that does not lie on the continuum between authenticity and inauthenticity: the possibility of breakdown, in which

[3] The *locus classicus* of such a reading is Dreyfus 1991.

I can no longer *do* anything but can still *be*. This liminal condition – the unity that is analyzed under the separate headings of *Angst*, Death, and Conscience – is methodologically important because it provides phenomenological clarification of what Dasein's "being an issue" for itself means. For this reason, what is said about the care structure in Division I must be interpreted in light of what we learn about that structure's elements in breakdown.

This methodological gambit informs my approach to being answerable. After describing care's liminal condition, focusing on its discursive aspect, I shall argue that answerability entails reason-giving. The possibility "articulated" in breakdown is being-responsible (*verantwortlich*); but because Dasein is *Mitsein*, to be responsible is to be answerable or accountable *to others*. And this means that whatever other possibility authentic Dasein commits itself to, it is simultaneously beholden to the practice of reason-giving. With this result in hand, we shall reflect back upon Division I and hazard an account of what discourse contributes to making an understanding of being possible.

2   The ontological irreducibility of the first-person point of view

Both authentic and inauthentic Dasein are agents; they *do* things, and the structure of such doing, analyzed in Division I, holds equally of both. But Heidegger also devotes some of Division I and a great deal of the first half of Division II to describing a condition in which Dasein "is" but cannot do anything. If we call this condition "existential death" – the "possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein" (GA 2, p. 333/250/294) – we must remember that strictly speaking the term "death" refers to a mode of self-*understanding* and so to only *one* of the *existentialia* that make up the care structure. To appreciate the role of the phenomenon being described, therefore, we must bring the corresponding modes of affectedness and discourse – namely *Angst* and conscience – into view. Nor can these, in turn, be understood apart from their connection with death.

What systematic role is played by the phenomenon in question? Here I endorse Taylor Carman's claim that Division II is "concerned largely with the ontological irreducibility of the first-person point of view" (2003, p. 267). In contrast to Carman, however, I think that the heavy lifting is done not by the analysis of authenticity but by the analysis of breakdown, which Carman conflates with authenticity in a way that obscures the very

point – about being answerable – we are tracking.[4] But before getting to that we must explore what the care structure's liminal condition tells us about the ontological irreducibility of the first-person point of view.

As we have seen in previous chapters, Division I argues that Dasein's self-understanding – *Entwurf, Worumwillen*, practical identity – is the pivot upon which turns disclosure of the world as a meaningful space wherein things show up as the things they are. That things show up as useful (*zuhanden*) in our everyday dealings with them is possible only because they stand in ordered relations – "in-order-to" relations – to each other: hammers are what they are because they are *good for* driving nails, just as nails are what they are because they are *good for* joining boards, and so on. The in-order-to relations determine what "good" means here, and though it may not be possible to define precisely what such good-ness consists in, without such a measure no entity could show up as any-thing in particular. But instrumentality is not sufficient to establish this measure; the "work" being done must be considered. For instance, if I am building a birdhouse this sledgehammer shows up as useless, inappro-priate; whereas if the work to be done is demolishing the birdhouse, a sledgehammer will be just the thing. What then *is* being done? The world itself does not tell me whether my wielding this sledgehammer is mak-ing a birdhouse (badly) or demolishing one (well). Rather, as Heidegger says, the in-order-to refers to a for-the-sake-of, which "always pertains to the being of Dasein, in whose being that very being is for it essentially an *issue*" (GA 2, p. 113/84/116). Such recourse is necessary, since what is being done (work) can be unambiguously identified only if it involves a being who is *trying* to do it, a being for whom what it is doing is explicitly at stake.

To try, in Heidegger's language, is to act "for the sake of" a "possibility of being a self," where "possibility" means *ability*, *Seinkönnen*. Heidegger suggests we think of this as a kind of know-how (GA 2, p. 190/143/183), but exercising such an ability must be distinguished from the kind of know-how involved in carrying out a task. Making a birdhouse, for instance, is something I am able to *do*, and the steps I follow could, at least

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[4] Evidence that Heidegger distinguishes between authenticity and the liminal condition is found in his characterization of the former not as anxious but as "ready for anxiety" (*Angstbereit*), not as dead but as "anticipatory being *towards* death" (*vorlaufenden Sein zum Tode*), not as hearing the call of conscience but as "wanting to have a conscience" (*Gewissenhabenwollen*).

roughly, be reduced to a recipe. It is thus an ability a robot could exercise. But *trying* is not like that; rather, it involves holding myself to more or less obscure measures of success or failure pertaining to a way of being. Because I am doing things for the sake of *being* a carpenter – because what it means to be a carpenter is at stake in what I am doing – the norms appropriate to *making* a birdhouse come into play in contrast to those that would come into play were I to be doing the very same things for the sake of being an artist, or a demolition expert, or some other practical identity. Such "trying" is what Heidegger calls "understanding": competence over being as existing (GA 2, p. 190/143/183).[5]

Where do the measures of such trying come from? Heidegger argues that to try to be something it is not enough that I form the intention to do so; I must be *able* to be it, and I must be with others in a public world where such behavior is familiar *as* trying to be it. Thus Dasein does what "one" does, because if it did not it would not count as doing anything at all. Of course, doing what one does is not a recipe (though *das Man*, according to Heidegger, tries to make it such), but *I* cannot try to be a father unless I am beholden to some measure of what "a" good father is, what *any* good father *should* be. And I cannot give content to any measure that would deviate entirely from what others do – "others" from whom "for the most part" I do "*not* distinguish [myself]" (GA 2, p. 158/118/154). What it means to be a father or teacher is not mine alone to decide, but only together with those others with whom I am. Thus to have any practical identity (to be able to be anything in particular) is to act as the one-self (*man-selbst*); the normal is the normative to this extent. "Dasein is for the sake of the 'one' in an everyday manner, and the 'one' itself articulates the referential context of significance" (GA 2, p. 172/129/167). But as we have seen, this means that my practical identity is *myself* without being *I myself*, and thus any account of world as a space of meaning which stops with practice will be incomplete, since it will not reach that being whose *own* being (I myself) is at issue.

To see this, recall the distinction between Dasein's being at stake in existing and life's being at stake in a struggle for survival. In the former case, but not the latter, the stakes are determined only insofar as I make myself beholden to a measure of success or failure – and that means, to act not only in conformity to such a measure (as the animal acts in conformity to

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[5] My approach to these matters is deeply indebted to John Haugeland's work. For further discussion, see Crowell, "Competence Over Being as Existing: The Indispensability of Haugeland's Heidegger" (unpublished manuscript).

the measure of survival) but to act in light of it *as* a measure, that is, to take my measure *by* it. But Division I's account of intelligibility cannot capture this distinction. To the extent that I act as "one" does, I cannot essentially be distinguished from an entity who acts in conformity to norms though not in light of them. As Heidegger puts this point, the "one … deprives the particular Dasein of its *answerability*" (GA 2, p. 170/127/165). "I myself" do not take responsibility for the norms according to which I act. And if I subsequently come to answer for myself – the "existentiell modification of the 'one'" which Heidegger calls "authentic" being one's self – this is only because I have been led to do so by the disclosure of my *being answerable* in the breakdown of my everyday self.[6] This disclosure constitutes the ontological irreducibility of the first-person point of view.

3   The liminal condition of the care structure

In determining the existential meaning of conscience, Heidegger begins with the ordinary phenomenon. Everyday Dasein is "in thrall" (*hörig*) to others, and in conscience this "listening" to others is "broken off" (GA 2, pp. 360/271/316). Since as everyday Dasein I do not distinguish myself from these others, conscience calls my everyday self into question. But more technically, as a mode of discourse (*Rede*) conscience is an "articulation of intelligibility," and intelligibility refers back to Dasein's practical identity. Now if, as we have seen, such identities derive from *das Man*, what sort of practical identity remains for conscience – discourse in breakdown – to articulate? A proper understanding of what conscience "talks about" and "gives to understand" turns on the answer to this question.

   To every self-understanding there belongs a certain affectedness (*Befindlichkeit*) or mood, and the "distinctive mood" of breakdown is *Angst*. Thus Heidegger writes that the "caller of the call of conscience" is "Dasein, which finds itself in the very depths of its uncanniness" (GA 2, p. 367/276/321), because uncanniness is the hallmark of the world as revealed in *Angst*. "The world has the character of completely lacking significance" (GA 2, p. 247/186/231); neither things in the world nor "the Dasein-with of others" matter to me (GA 2, p. 249/187/232). To no longer feel "at home" in the world does not mean that I am no longer able

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[6] Of course, everyday being-in-the-world already includes a "game" of being responsible, in which we take responsibility as "one" does, more or less in the manner of idle talk. However, what Heidegger elucidates in the phenomenon of breakdown, and what I am trying to highlight here, is the ontological condition for such a game, that which allows us to distinguish between authentic and inauthentic playing.

to identify things, recognize what they are called; rather, it means that things lose their *grip* on me. The normative force that they normally exert has dissipated; affordances have taken on the inertness of mere social facts. Heidegger describes this affective condition as a radical "individuation" and provides a clue to what that means when he says that "anxiety discloses Dasein as *being-possible*" (GA 2, p. 249/188/232). Normally, I am my possibilities – father, teacher, carpenter – in the typical manner of the one-self. But *Angst* immobilizes all that and reveals me as being-possible (*Möglichsein* = *Seinkönnen*) *as such*. What sort of ability-to-be is that? Heidegger answers with the paradoxical existential definition of death as "the possibility of no-longer-being-able-to-be-there" (GA 2, p. 333/250/294), which is nothing but a description of the way I encounter myself in *Angst*: I am disclosed as "able to be" in such a way that I am "no longer able to be there," where "being there" refers to my ability to gear into the world *as* something. Thus my "ownmost" ability – that which belongs irremediably to "I myself" – is to *be* despite not being *anything*: "indeed," it is to be "as the only one that [I] can be [*seinkönnen*] from out of [myself] as individuated in [my] individuation" (GA 2, p. 249/188/232). Since disclosing the significance of things depends on gearing into the world in terms of some practical identity, the anxious collapse of all my practical identities robs the world of significance. But it does not rob *me* of all significance; there is still a kind of intelligibility in the possibility of the impossibility of gearing into the world. The call of conscience, understood ontologically, is the articulation of that intelligibility.

What is said in the call – "Guilty!" – is inseparable from the *way* conscience calls: "unequivocally and unmistakably" (GA 2, p. 365/274/319) and "without mediation" (GA 2, p. 360/271/316). The latter characteristic explains the former. The call addresses Dasein directly, not mediated by any of its practical identities – "what Dasein counts for, can do, or concerns itself with in being with one another publicly" (GA 2, p. 362/273/317) – and thus it is unmistakable and unequivocal. Were it to address me *as* a father or teacher, I could quibble that it had picked out the wrong person, since in such roles I am not different from others; or I could take its call to be equivocal, given the "ambiguity" (GA 2, p. 230/173/217) that characterizes all public intelligibility. But if conscience articulates the intelligibility of the care structure in breakdown none of this is relevant, and for the same reason it always calls "silently." It "asserts nothing" but is, rather, a kind of "summons" (GA 2, p. 370/279/324).

Nevertheless, the call "gives us to understand" something; the self-understanding that Heidegger terms "death" gets articulated as

"*Guilty!*" Hence "I myself" am guilty. As Heidegger puts it, guilt "turns up as a predicate for the 'I am'" (GA 2, p. 373/281/326) as such – that is, not as a predicate of the "I am" under some further description *as* something. He thus formalizes the notion of guilt – that is, divorces it from any relation to "ought or law" or any relation to our "concernful being with Others" (GA 2, p. 376/283/328) – because ontologically it articulates the kind of possibility that is still left to me after it is no longer possible for me to gear into the world in terms of a practical identity. Heidegger defines guilt as "being the ground of a nullity," where "being the ground" is the formalized core of the ordinary idea of "being responsible for" (GA 2, p. 376/283/329), and he argues that it is because "I myself" am "responsible" in this sense that anything like "indebtedness" becomes possible (GA 2, p. 377/284/329). But how can guilt be the *ground* of indebtedness? The answer is found in the way Heidegger glosses guilt in terms of the other two aspects of the care structure, thrownness and projection.

As a predicate for the I am, guilt means that "the self, which as such has to lay the ground for itself, can never get that ground into its power; and yet, as existing … must take over being-a-ground." In breakdown I discover the sheer "that it is" of things and of myself: that I am "thrown" or "delivered over" to this facticity. This, then, is a kind of ground that belongs to me without me "having laid that ground myself." I "repose in the weight of it" (GA 2, p. 377/284/330). Whether we think of such a ground as the various possibilities for being a self that I inherit from my culture, or as my embodiment, or as my particular social relations, or as a combination of these, the point is that in breakdown these grounds show themselves to be *inert*, mere demands that lack the power to move me. But such factic grounds belong to me *only* in tandem with my transcendence; as Heidegger notes, Dasein "is this thrown ground … *only* in that it projects itself on possibilities," and thus I must (i.e., cannot not) *take over* being-a-ground. Indeed, this is what is at stake in care as such: "to be its own thrown ground" is "that ability-to-be which is the issue for care" (GA 2, p. 377/284/330).

Thus conscience articulates a kind of intelligibility that is grounded in an ability which, unlike my practical identities, is coeval with my being as such – namely, *being responsible* as my ability to take over being-a-ground. But what can it mean to take over a ground that already grounds me beyond and before my power? Recall that Dasein, in *Angst*, discovers its sheer "being-possible." As Heidegger says, in conscience "Dasein makes possible for itself its factical existence" (GA 2, p. 398/300/347). This suggests that to take over being-a-ground is to take up my factic grounds

in light of "possibility," that is, in light of *measure*: *ought* I to act on what otherwise presents itself as my ground? Ontologically, then, to be responsible would mean that I am essentially called to view the givens of my situation as assessable in light of better and worse, that I cannot *not* view them in that way. When I opt to attend my son's Little League game over having a beer with my buddies – both of which belong to my facticity as claims upon me toward which I am inclined – I have made the former inclination my reason by treating it as normatively better than the latter.[7] In so doing I have exercised two *distinct* "abilities-to-be": first, my ability to be a father; and second, my ability to be a *self* by taking over being-a-ground. Thus, to be "I myself" is to stand toward my factic grounds as toward possibly justifying reasons, that is, claims that become *my reasons* through my endorsement of them in light of what is best. Dasein's ability to be oriented explicitly toward what is "best," in this sense, is why the first-person point of view is ontologically irreducible in the account of the understanding of being.

This also explains what Heidegger means by the "finitude" of "freedom." If one can only choose "one possibility" and must tolerate "one's not having chosen others and one's not being able to choose them" (GA 2, p. 378/285/331), the point is not that I must live with my choices and can't go back (though that may be true). Rather, the ontological point concerns the orientation toward measure that belongs to taking over being-a-ground. When I commit myself to what I take to be the best, this relegates the excluded choice to the category of the *worse*. To say that in being a good father I have consigned the possibility of being a good friend to "nullity" means that I have established a certain normative hierarchy between them and have allowed the world to "be" in accord with it.

4   Being answerable

We are now in a position to understand how being answerable, in the sense of being accountable to others in the game of giving and asking for reasons, belongs to authentic discourse. But first we should consider an obvious objection: haven't I just made all this stuff up about reasons? After all, Heidegger says nothing explicitly about reasons or reason-giving

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[7]   It avails nothing to say that this is "one reason too many." The point is not that I necessarily sit around weighing reasons for whether fatherly duty has priority in this case; rather the point is that in following the one "inclination" I am *making* it my reason; I am not *just* following it in the way an animal would follow its instinct.

in the relevant texts of *Being and Time*. True, but as we have already seen, sufficient evidence for the thesis can be found if we consult the contemporaneous essay "On the Essence of Ground" and the lecture course upon which it was based, *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*.

If acting in light of measure as measure is what distinguishes trying, the for-the-sake-of, from animal striving, this is only because in my very being I am called to stand toward my factic grounds as toward possibly justifying reasons. Heidegger makes this point explicitly in his discussion of Plato's *idea tou agathou*. He begins by noting that the principle of sufficient reason involves a relation to "preference" – the "rather than" in the question "why is there something rather than nothing" – and that preference points toward the realm of value. Dismissing the concept of "value" as "ontologically unclarified," Heidegger nevertheless links the principle of reason to Plato's idea of the Good "beyond being" (GA 26, p. 143/116). Later he clarifies this point with reference to his own concept of "transcendence": Plato's "idea of the Good … lies beyond *beings* and *ousia*, beyond the *ideas*" as the condition of their possibility, and this "beyond," or transcendence, allows Heidegger to equate "the *idea tou agathou*" with "the for-the-sake-of-which" itself (GA 26, p. 237/184).

From this, several things of relevance for our thesis follow. First, it confirms the idea that a particular for-the-sake-of – such as being a carpenter – is what it is because it is oriented toward a measure of success or failure (what it is to be a *good* carpenter) – and only thus can things show up in that "world" as *good for* this or that, as *something*. Second, it confirms that in breakdown, when my practical identities have all collapsed, this orientation toward measure remains. Death, as the "possibility of the impossibility of being there," is still a *possibility*: a for-the-sake-of in which "I myself" am for the sake of this very orientation toward measure. And like the *idea tou agathou*, this orientation is beyond beings as the condition of their intelligibility. Thus, third, it confirms our claim about what the call of conscience gives to understand: to *take over* being-a-ground is to take factic grounds in light of the Good, that is, in light of measure as such (what is best). This does not mean that I must "know" what the Good is, but only that to be Dasein is to be *at stake* or at *issue* in this distinctively normative sense.

"On the Essence of Ground" is equally explicit in providing evidence for our claim that seeing things in light of measure is to stand toward factic grounds as toward possibly justifying reasons. As we saw, Heidegger there claims that the liminal condition of the care structure discloses "freedom for ground," and he identifies three types of grounding, which correspond

to the three aspects of the unitary care structure: grounding as "establishing," grounding as "taking a basis," and grounding as "grounding *something*" (GA 9, p. 165/127). Heidegger warns us that the latter, *Begründen*, is not to be understood "in the restricted and derivative sense of proving ontic or theoretical propositions"; it is, rather, the discursive attitude that "makes possible the why-question in general" (GA 9, p. 168/129). "In the projection of world an excess of possibility is given with respect to which, in our being pervaded by those (actual) beings that press around us as we find ourselves, the 'why' springs forth" (GA 9, p. 169/130). Because transcendence as such is oriented toward measure (*tou agathou*), those actual beings that press around us appear *only* as they are assessed against this measure: "why this way and not otherwise." Therefore, "*all* ontic discovery and disclosing" – all having to do with entities *as* anything at all and in any way at all – "must in its way be a 'grounding of something,' that is, it must *account for* itself." Such accounting, Heidegger goes on to say, is a kind of "referral" to "a being that then makes itself known as … 'cause' or as the 'motivational grounds' for an already manifest nexus of beings" (GA 9, pp. 169–70/130). What *Being and Time* described as taking over being-a-ground, then, is here described as the ontological origin of reason. Reason-giving is built into the structure of responsibility; *Begründen* belongs to any understanding of being – an ontological point that is not affected by the fact that "Dasein *can*, in its factical accounting and justifications, cast 'reasons' aside, suppress any demand for them, pervert them, and cover them over" (GA 9, p. 170/131).

But this still leaves open the question of whether reason-giving belongs to authentic discourse. Being answerable, as being accountable, may be inseparable from what it is to be I myself, but *authentic* being a self is something different from this, and it is not obvious how the two are related. To get clearer on this point, some further distinctions are necessary.

First, the call of conscience articulates a certain intelligibility of the self – its "guilt" – but to *understand* the call, to "hear" it, is not to grasp an item of information. It is to understand an appeal, and to understand an appeal is to *do* something. Whether I ignore it or respond to it, I have chosen. Hence "a free-floating call from which 'nothing ensues' is an impossible fiction when seen existentially" (GA 2, p. 371/279/324). When such choice takes the form of "wanting to have a conscience" it is authentic; authentic *being*-guilty is "resoluteness" (GA 2, p. 399/301/348). Thus, second, actually to be responsible, actually to *take over* being-a-ground "resolutely," is something I *do*, a way of being that I am. It is to re-engage the world in terms of some particular practical identity, some concrete

possibility for being, but to do so "transparently" (GA 2, p. 396/299/346), that is, without taking the publicly accepted norms constitutive of that practical identity as normative independent of my commitment to them. I become answerable for them. But does it follow that I am beholden to others in such a way that I "owe" them reasons for what I do? Is authentic Dasein answerable in the sense of being called to give an account *of* itself *to* others? What Heidegger says about authentic discourse might lead one to answer this question in the negative.

After all, he explicitly defines authentic Dasein as "reticent": "the mode of articulative discourse which belongs to wanting to have a conscience is one of *reticence* [*Verschwiegenheit*]" (GA 2, p. 392/296/342). But the implications of this are not so clear. On the one hand, reticence is an appropriate discursive response to the call of conscience because the latter is silent, "never comes to utterance," and – most significantly – "takes the words away from the common-sense idle talk of the 'one'" (GA 2, p. 393/296/343). On the other, though Heidegger describes resoluteness as reticent, he nowhere says that authentic Dasein must remain *mute* at all times. When the call takes the words away from the idle talk of *das Man*, this does not mean that it precludes discourse that is *not* idle talk. What is "idle" about idle talk is precisely that "the 'one' presents every judgment and decision as its own" and so "deprives the particular Dasein of its *answerability*" (GA 2, p. 170/127/165). But in genuinely hearing the call, I recover my answerability: for the normative authority of *das Man* I substitute my own endorsement or rejection as a commitment. But such a stance can certainly speak out, and perhaps must at times do so. To be reticent is to refuse to get caught up in the "hustle" (GA 2, p. 236/177/222) of the ready-made justifications provided by *das Man*. This does not mean, however, that in making myself accountable I am not also called to be *answerable* to others.

Indeed, it is impossible to be accountable to myself without owing an account to others – and this for two reasons. First, since Dasein is essentially *Mitsein*, my relations to others are at stake even in breakdown, and all the more when I re-engage the world resolutely. To say that authentic Dasein is reticent, then, cannot mean that my accountability lacks all relation to the *possibility* of giving an account to others. And second, since to be accountable is to stand toward factic givens as toward reasons, and since by their very structure reasons are (potentially) public, I cannot be accountable for myself without at the same time being accountable to others, indeed to every other. But these claims need to be examined more closely.

First, to say that I owe an account to others does not mean that I repay that debt by chattering endlessly about how I am justified in doing this or that. The term "reticence" suggests the difference between constantly rationalizing one's behavior and being *prepared* to give reasons for (to own up to) the measures at stake in one's behavior. If I go drinking with my buddies and skip my son's Little League game, I may have done so "on impulse," as we say; but if, in contrast, I have done so authentically, then I have made the impulse to drink (or, if you will, my identity as a friend) *my reason*; I (transparently) hold it best that I go drinking. But because Dasein is *Mitsein*, any measure to which I hold myself will stand as an example; that is, it will be a public gesture that involves a normative endorsement. And this very publicity involves my being answerable to others for it. By itself, however, this fact still does not imply that I *owe* an account to others, and if I do, what form that must take.

However, consider what Heidegger says about obligation. When he defined existential guilt in detachment from any "ought or law," he also insisted that being-guilty – that is, taking over being-a-ground – is "the most primordial existentiell presupposition for the possibility of factially coming to owe something" (GA 2, p. 382/288/334). In what sense? In order for me to owe you money, it is not enough that I have money that you once had. It is not even enough that I think it best that I give it back. Rather, there must be a public institution, a framework in which exchanges of money are regulated such that a certain kind of possession *demands* a certain kind of restitution. In short, there must be a *norm* in the sense of an "ought or law." Such a thing is, as we have seen, possible only for a being capable of orientation toward the measure of what is best, since otherwise such "owing" could not be a *lived* commitment,[8] could have no normative force. But more than that is required: my own orientation toward what I

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[8] I borrow this term from Mark Lance, "Life is Not a Box Score: Lived Normativity, Moral Evaluation, and the Is/Ought Distinction." (unpublished manuscript). In his essay, Lance recognizes a distinction between "scorecard commitment" (roughly, a normative status one has that entails an obligation) and "lived commitment," a commitment that exists "as part of [one's] moral psychology" and has a "role in [one's] first-personal projects" (p. 4). To possess a lived commitment is, in my terms, to act *in light of* a norm, where such action is neither merely acting in accord with a norm nor (necessarily) "following" a rule. Thus one can act on a lived commitment "without acting in accord with the corresponding scorecard rule" (p. 5) because in acting in light of a norm or measure the meaning of that measure is always *at issue*. Lance recognizes the importance of his distinction for interpreting *Being and Time* (note 4), but we cannot enter further into the details of his account here.

think is best must itself be amenable to measure: *I* take it that doing X is best, but is it *really* best?

The point here is not to look beyond the Good for this measure but to see that in order for me to owe something, the intelligibility of things cannot depend on *my* for-the-sake-of alone. Even if the first-person point of view is ontologically irreducible, intelligibility does not depend solely on it. For this reason, the example of my commitment inevitably takes on the status of something like a rule, a measure that includes in itself a reference *to* that public character and can be contested not just by force, but *discursively*, in terms of "what is best." Thus my decision about what is best can be assessed *normatively*, as something that would hold (potentially) of all others, or of all other fathers, carpenters, and so on. Because even "I myself" am being-with-others, the "good" that I endorse as my reason becomes part of a practice of discursive exchange in which I owe an account of myself to others. The norm of this practice of exchange is *universality*, that is, the measure of a certain unlimited inclusiveness whose actual scope depends on what is at issue in the possibility in question: all fathers, Americans, professors, human beings. As I shall now argue, this norm of universality – which is embedded in discourse as the call of conscience – is the ontological contribution of discourse *as such* to the possibility of an understanding of being.

5   Discourse, interpretation, and language

Discourse (*Rede*) is the least-well-understood aspect of the care structure. Heidegger links it to the Greek notion of *logos*, but since Heidegger's understanding of the latter is itself complicated, this does not necessarily help much. It is fair to say that in the literature there are two main points of contention: first, the question of how discourse relates to language (*Sprache*), and second, how it differs from interpretation (*Auslegung*). Though interpretive standpoints on these problems are many, for the purposes of this chapter we may approach them through a recent debate that focuses the issues with great precision.[9] On the one hand, Heidegger's claim that discourse is equiprimordial with affectedness and understanding led Cristina Lafont to argue that his position is a kind of

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[9] The debate arose at the time of the translation of Cristina Lafont's *Heidegger, Language, and World-Disclosure* (2000) and was carried on in the journal *Inquiry*, with contributions by Hubert Dreyfus, Mark Okrent, Taylor Carman, and Mark Wrathall, and replies to each by Lafont. The following discussion is based on these sources.

linguistic idealism. Her argument, reduced to its bare bones, is as follows: Heidegger claims that all access to entities is conditioned by our understanding of (the meaning of) their being. Discourse is one condition of any such understanding, where "discourse" names the "ability to talk" – not language itself, but also not "just the ontic property of making noises" either – which is inseparable from the symbolic and conceptual resources of a given natural language (Lafont 2002a, p. 239). Since the "meaning" that gets understood in our understanding of being is what determines access to entities, and since such meaning is both holistic and linguistic (i.e., dependent on particular natural languages), meaning determines reference in such a way that truth and validity are made relative to historically contingent matters of fact. Lafont uses this unacceptable outcome – since "nothing 'essentially factical' should have an absolute authority over us" (2002a, p. 188) – to argue that Dasein's disclosedness, its "understanding of being," cannot be seen as a happening of "truth" and cannot be treated as an a priori condition on our access to entities. Rejecting linguistic idealism, she argues for combining a hermeneutic (holistic) view of meaning with a theory of direct reference, which better explains the possibility of "learning, fallibilism, revisability, etc., … in spite of all our factual determinations" (2002b, p. 244).

Those who endorse the more pragmatic interpretation of Heidegger, on the other hand, front-load the intelligibility of things into non-linguistic practices and draw a sharp distinction between *Rede* and *Sprache*. This involves treating as pre- or non-linguistic Heidegger's notion of "interpretation" – which he discusses prior to the introduction of *Rede* in *Being and Time* and defines as the possibility of "appropriating" what is understood in the context of practice, making it explicit "as" something (GA 2, pp. 197–98/148–49/188–89). Both Taylor Carman (2002, p. 208) and Mark Okrent, for example, invoke the idea of a "practical referring" to gloss the totality of involvements (*Bewandtnisganzheit*) at the heart of Heidegger's analysis of the ready-to-hand (Okrent calls it a "job classification" [2002, p. 201]). Carman holds that in the ongoing activity of carpentering, a hammer "refers" to nails and boards, and that this constitutes a kind of "significance" that is not connected to any kind of "sign" and thus not connected with language (Carman 2002, p. 210). Since language is supposed to supervene on this sort of "practical significance" or intelligibility, the charge of linguistic idealism is misplaced. The "hermeneutic as" targeted by interpretation is prior to any symbolic mediation.

However, even if we grant that such practical intelligibility does not involve signs, and grant Heidegger's insistence that such interpretation

does not require "making an assertion" (GA 2, p. 198/149/189), can we be certain that it involves nothing of *discourse*? If discourse plays a role in constituting the "as," then we must be prepared to say what that role is, beyond practical understanding. And that returns us to the relation between discourse and language. If discourse is essentially linguistic, then the kind of "signification" made explicit in "practical" interpretation will involve something like linguistic norms. If, on the other hand, discourse is radically distinct from language, how are we to distinguish it from the kind of "appropriation" accomplished in interpretation? Why is it considered an *existentiale* at all?

It is here, I think, that our methodological gambit proves its worth, for we should expect that the best way to approach these issues will be to clarify what is said about discourse in Division I by appeal to what we know about its function in Division II. Specifically, we shall try to mobilize the idea that my being answerable entails owing an account to others as a clue to what *Rede* in general contributes to the intelligibility (the as-structure) of things as analyzed in Division I. And, indeed, in introducing the chapter on discourse in Division I Heidegger alludes to something like our methodological maxim: "The phenomenon of discourse is one of which we have been making constant use already in our foregoing interpretation of affectedness, understanding, interpretation and assertion; but we have, as it were, kept it suppressed in our thematic analysis" (GA 2, p. 213/161/203).

Now this suggests that any reading that assumes there to be a kind of intelligibility to practices as such cannot be right. The account of "practically intelligibility" or significance given in chapter 3 of *Being and Time*, for instance, cannot be understood (as Okrent seems to understand it) as independent of the rest of the account of Dasein – for instance, as roughly equivalent to a kind of teleological space inhabited by wasps or beavers who practically avail themselves of the natural environment in goal-directed ways. Against this, Lafont seems correct in arguing that *Dasein's* "activities cannot be seen as the origin of [its] understanding" but rather "an understanding of the being of entities must be *prior to all activity and experience with entities*" (2002b, p. 235). That is, Dasein's practices are not like those of animals precisely because it possesses an understanding of being,[10] and if discourse is a condition of such understanding, one cannot

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[10] Among many other places where Heidegger emphasizes this point, see the passage from *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, cited by Lafont (2002b, p. 237), where the difference is explained precisely in terms of *Rede* as *logos*.

explain its specific contribution to world-disclosure by adding it to what one supposes is the intelligibility already established by pre-discursive practices.[11]

One thing that makes this whole discussion so vexing is that Heidegger's account of the relation between discourse and interpretation is ambiguous, invoking the notion of "articulation" (*Artikulation*) in two different senses. On the one hand, he argues that "the articulation of what is understood in the interpretive approach to entities that follows the clue of the 'something as something' is *prior* to a thematic assertion about it" (GA 2, p. 198/149/190). Thus interpretation itself – here, a practical ability that need not involve signs, assertions, etc.[12] – accomplishes a kind of "articulation." On the other hand, in defining discourse as "the articulation [*Artikulation*] of intelligibility," he asserts that "the intelligibility of something has always been articulated [*gegliedert*] even before there is any appropriative interpretation of it" (GA 2, p. 213/161/203). Finally, he writes that "that which can be articulated [*artikuliert*] in interpretation and thus even more primordially in discourse is what we have called 'meaning'" (GA 2, p. 214/161/204). So there appears to be a *kind* of articulation that takes place in interpretation itself, but also a "more primordial" one that is accomplished as discourse and "underlies" the former (GA 2, p. 214/161/204).

Of course, from Lafont's point of view the matter is straightforward. All articulation – including any pre-*predicative* making-explicit of the "as" – is governed by the semantic resources of a given natural language. To say

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[11]   The problem is evident already in the way Okrent employs his idea of practical "reference" (2002, pp. 201–2). First, he defines the being of a tool in terms of how it is "*to be used*," where this latter is not just how it *is* used but involves a normative status or function-*type*. Thus its being (meaning) is defined in terms of the way "some Dasein *should* or *ought* to interact with a tool and its environment in certain situations." This makes sense, since the full analysis of Dasein shows it to be a creature capable of first-person responsiveness to measure as measure. Subsequently, however, Okrent asks us to imagine some "mythical … non-linguistic ancestors" and submits that such ancestors "live and comport themselves 'understandingly' in a 'meaningful' world, *in Heidegger's sense* [my emphasis], which in each case has always already been articulated" practically, even though this is not a *linguistically* articulated world. But this simply begs the question, since it is far from clear that we can make phenomenological sense of the "should" or "ought" in respect to the experiences of such creatures.

[12]   "Every preparing, putting to rights, repairing, improving, rounding-out, is accomplished in such a way that what is circumspectively ready-to-hand is taken apart [*auseinandergelegt*] in its in-order-to and concerns us according to what becomes visible in this articulation [*Auseinandergelegtheit*]" (GA 2, p. 198/149/189). The key term here is "circumspectively," which indicates that this interpretive process is *part* of my ongoing practical coping with things.

that "the intelligibility of something has *always* been articulated" – that is, *gegliedert* – "even *before* there is any appropriative interpretation of it" is just to say that any such interpretation takes place in the (factual, historical) context of some particular language, whose semantic resources make up the *Gliederung* in question. Such a reading has the virtue of recognizing the methodological structure of Heidegger's argument: just because one analysis comes earlier in the text than another does not mean that it is independent of the latter. But Lafont's equation of *discursive* articulation (meaning) with the ontic phenomenon of natural language should still give us pause, since discourse is supposed to be the *ground* of such ontic phenomena. Is there another way to preserve the methodological gains of Lafont's reading while not committing to linguistic idealism?

Without trying to disambiguate all these issues, it seems fair to say that the kind of articulation accomplished in practical interpretation is inseparable from discourse, which "underlies" it. Thus there is a *kind* of articulation – discursive articulation – that has articulated the intelligibility of things "even before there is any appropriative interpretation of it." At the same time, Heidegger does not say that in order to encounter something as something we must have talked about it in the sense of making an assertion or must have thought "that things are thus and so." Discourse is not language in *that* sense. What, then, is "discursive articulation"?

Heidegger's answer is straightforward: it is the "fore-conception" (*Vorgriff*), which belongs to all understanding. The understanding that gets appropriated in interpretation is structured by fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception, and Heidegger explains the latter as follows: when I circumspectively interpret, things become "conceptualizable" – to "take as" is to operate with the item in question as a *type* – but in so doing "the interpretation has *already* decided for a *definite* way of conceiving it, either with finality or with reservations; it is grounded in *something we grasp in advance* – in a *fore-conception*" (GA 2, p. 200/150/191). The fore-conception does not first arise with the interpretation; rather, it belongs to understanding, that is, to the for-the-sake-of. Thus any "practical intelligibility" that arises from our practical identities will be structured by this kind of fore-conception. This is what discourse, as an *existentiale*, contributes. The only question is whether it is *equivalent* to a particular linguistic resource ("a *definite* way of conceiving") and so the ontic "lexicon of a particular language" (Lafont 2000, p. 63), or whether there is a different structure involved here – akin (but not identical) to Lafont's distinction between our ability to talk and the language in which we exercise it.

Neither here nor anywhere else does Heidegger say much about *Vorgriff*. This has led either to the neglect of this theme, or to interpretations that seek to bleed the "conceptuality" out of it. This latter is Taylor Carman's approach, whose comprehensive account of *Rede* tries to walk a line between Lafont's linguistic idealist interpretation and radical pragmatists like Okrent and Dreyfus. Carman does not dispute that the intelligibility disclosed in understanding and interpretation already involves discourse, since he argues that interpretive making explicit includes an *expressive* dimension. But in his effort to avoid linguistic idealism he rather obscurely identifies this with "bodily postures and facial expressions" in a way that sounds more like Merleau-Ponty than like Heidegger (Carman 2003, p. 211). This leads to a conclusion consonant with the pragmatists' idea of non-linguistic significance: the *Vorgriff* that belongs to the fore-structure of understanding is "a kind of shared vocabulary of *expressive gestures* that we can recognize in a rough and ready way across a wide variety of disparate situations and contexts" (Carman 2003, p. 215). This is Carman's way of addressing the fact that not only does Heidegger distinguish between discourse and language, he also *grounds* the latter ontologically on the former. What, then, more specifically, is discourse such that it can contribute a *Vorgriff* of "expressive gestures" to understanding?

Carman observes that "what makes an expression" – even a bodily expression – an "expression at all" is its "public intelligibility *in communication*" (2003, p. 215). It is thus the specifically *communicative* moment that constitutes the distinctive contribution of discourse to the understanding of being or intelligibility. But what *is* the communicative moment, understood *existentially*? To begin with, discourse, as communication, involves "norms for *showing* and *saying*" which constitute intelligibility as public and make possible, from the first-person perspective, a "semantic gap" between the way I take things to be and the way they are (2003, p. 235). This is crucial; any intelligibility worthy of the name must involve such a gap. But how does discourse, understood as pre-linguistic expression, manage to introduce such norms? Carman explains this by appeal to Heidegger's account of the "sign" as a "tool for interpretation," one which makes the worldhood of the world explicit without the need for a disruption in the flow of my practices. Then he assimilates his repertoire of "expressive gestures" to signs in this sense: bodily postures and facial expressions communicate because they are signs that allow for a shared being-toward whatever I am working on. Thus, when I shrug my shoulders I am *already* "discursively articulating" or "articulating significantly" the world's intelligibility.

The problem with this is that animals engage in practices, make things, gesture to each other, twitter noisily, exchange information, and so on – but they do not (at least according to Heidegger) have an understanding of being. Their "practices" and "communication" and "gestures" do not add up to being-in-the-world. Animal expression, we may say, lacks precisely the "*norm* for showing and saying" that was to be the contribution of discourse as an *existentiale*. One may argue that this is a prejudice, but one cannot argue that the basis for the semantic gap that constitutes the kind of intelligibility that concerns Heidegger lies in "expressive gestures" (which we share with animals), or that *Vorgriff* is a "shared vocabulary" of such gestures (also found in the animal world) – at least if one claims to be explicating *Heidegger's* position. Here Lafont's comment seems appropriate: "It is hard to imagine that an author genuinely interested in a prelinguistic dimension would choose *Rede*, of all words, to designate it" (2002b, p. 246). Does this mean that we should accept Lafont's account of the distinction (and founding relation) between discourse and language?

Given Heidegger's understanding of the distinction between the ontic and the ontological, Lafont admits that "whatever is *ontologically* relevant about language for the constitution of the being of Dasein, it cannot be the ontic languages themselves" (2002b, p. 239). However, discourse, as the "ability to talk," is always "realized" in some language and is not "something different in kind than those realizations" (2002b, p. 247). This seems correct as far as it goes, but it begs the question of just what this "ability" to talk amounts to. If abilities are norm-governed, Lafont's suggestion leaves us just where we were with Carman's – namely, in need of an explanation of the specific norm that governs talk; or, ontologically expressed, the norm that makes "communicative intent" in *language* specifically intelligible as the ability it is. In conclusion, then, we shall explore the idea that the "norm of publicity," *universality*, which we uncovered in the analysis of being answerable, is the key to Heidegger's concept of *Vorgriff* and explains the specific contribution of discourse, as an *existentiale*, to the understanding of being.

6   Discourse as the appropriation of being-with

What is "communicative intent," understood existentially? In discourse, Heidegger remarks, "the articulation of being with one another understandingly is constituted"; more precisely, in communication "being-with becomes 'explicitly' *shared*; that is to say, it *is* already, but it is unshared as something that has not been taken hold of and appropriated" (GA 2,

p. 215/162/205). So, what does it mean to "take hold" of being-with and
"appropriate" it, make it explicit? Drawing on our earlier account, we
could say: it means to relate to measure (the Good) as *normative* – that
is, as rule-like, potentially holding for everyone, as *universal*. If that is
true, then the first "word" or unit of public intelligibility is "Guilty!,"
since this both articulates the possibility of first-person responsibility
and, as a summons, calls "I myself" into an *explicit* appropriation of my
being-with in the form of owing reasons to others. Only if communi-
cative intent is understood existentially as being answerable to (poten-
tially) all others can we see how orientation toward the Good becomes
a *normative* orientation, something that *das Man* "prescribes" (GA 2, p.
169/127/165), as is required for the kind of public practices that support
the semantic gap necessary for intelligibility. To this extent, the obli-
gation to be accountable is the root of discourse – including authentic
discourse – and is inseparable from it. The specific "norm of showing
and saying" introduced by discourse is universality because the kind of
answerability that I discover in conscience requires the explicit appro-
priation of being-with as such.

On this reading, *Vorgriff* belongs to understanding as the moment
of normativity as such: the anticipation of a shared public form that
lifts the expressions and gestures of groping animality into the clearing
(*Lichtung*) of being (intelligibility). Thus communicative intent, under-
stood existentially, is neither the ability to talk – in the sense of the ability
to exercise grammatical competence in a given language – nor is it that
language itself. There *is* always such a language and, as Heidegger says,
every "language already hides in itself a developed way of conceiving"
(GA 2, p. 208/157/199), but this is not equivalent to *Vorgriff* as an aspect
of the for-the-sake-of. Rather, the latter – discourse as the *appropriation*
of being-with – is *linguisticality* in the sense of an explicit orientation
toward the universal (measure as norm), and it is grounded in my being
answerable. It is true that interpretation has always "already decided for
a *definite* way of conceiving" things, but this ontic entanglement in nat-
ural language does not exhaust the ontological meaning of *Vorgriff*, which
includes "communicative intent" understood as what we are calling lin-
guisticality. Thus Carman is not far off when he writes that discourse
"creates a public space and common vantage point" (2003, p. 240), but it
cannot do this on the basis of a shared vocabulary of expressive gestures.
Rather, such gestures can only communicate in the existential sense if
they show up in the context of a certain *Vorgriff* of communicability –
that is, my normative anticipation of a universally shareable world. This is

the connection with language; for, unlike gestures, language has an explicit "form of generality" – conceptuality – in which (as Levinas says) I *offer* the world to the other so as to make it a "commonplace," a world in common (Levinas 1969, p. 76).

 Thus to attribute linguistic idealism to *Being and Time* is wrong: the meanings that belong to a natural language do not determine reference, since such meanings, like all meanings, are always only *at stake* in my commitments.[13] While my thrownness means that I am always part of some particular community of practices, some particular linguistic community, my responsibility always in principle exceeds those practices, that community, that language. Normativity as such, unlike the Good, entails universality, and any limitation will itself have to be justified through the practice of reason-giving: we drive on this side, you drive on that, and this is justified because the sort of thing that this norm norms requires only that there *be* a norm, not that it be this one or that. The kind of thing that moral norms norm may, in contrast, require not only that there be some norm but that it be some *particular* one. What a good pen is – or a good teacher or father – will likewise be something that will be at stake in our comportments, something for which I am answerable but which is not beyond the pale of revision or rational criticism.

 Thus, to sum up: to take over being-a-ground is to be oriented toward the measure of what is best as such and so to stand toward the given as toward (possible) reasons. But this orientation toward measure entails a norm of universality; this is what it means to say that it is *discursive*. Because Dasein is essentially *Mitsein*, in being accountable for myself I am answerable to others who are affected or could be affected by what I do – whether I dismiss them in lonely heroic isolation or not; whether I am Abraham or not. In this way, "my" reasons belong to a practice of giving reasons, an exchange, and the Good becomes entangled with the

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[13] Mark Wrathall's contribution to the debate comes close to this idea in his explication of the notion of "essence" in Heidegger as something we "know but don't know" (2002, p. 222), which suggests something like a guiding idea that is at stake in our comportments but for that very reason cannot be said to determine what is intelligible for us, in the way that the traditional notion of concept (or "meaning") is supposed to do. However, Wrathall seems to think of this "pre-*predicative*" notion of essence as something "non-conceptual" (2002, p. 223), which cannot be right since it too must involve an a priori *Vorgriff*. Even if essence in this sense is not a "subjectively graspable meaning in advance" (2002, p. 224), it must have that character of linguisticality we have been glossing above: it is *bound up with* the meanings (house, tree, bird) that are embedded in natural language, but only insofar as what it means to be a house, tree, or bird is *at stake* in what I do and say.

Right, is *itself* put "at issue." Only because my orientation toward the Good involves being answerable to others – all others – can the measure of better or worse become publicly *normative* – that is, be part of a sociality that is not merely animal but existential: being-in-the-world as possessed of an understanding of being.

PART IV

Phenomenology and practical philosophy

11

The existential sources of normativity

1   Existential Kantians: Heidegger and Korsgaard

In a recent criticism of Christine Korsgaard, Robert Pippin remarks that a central feature of post-Kantian German thought is the "exclusively practical, non-metaphysical status" it attributes to subjectivity (2003, p. 914). The transcendental tradition – represented here by Korsgaard's Kant-inspired theory – rejects the metaphysical conception of the subject as a substance with certain fixed properties, arguing instead that subjectivity is an achievement, something at which I can succeed or fail. It is easy to see that Heidegger also belongs to this tradition, at least in *Being and Time*. There we read that "the 'essence' of [Dasein] lies in its 'to be'" (GA 2, p. 56/42/67) and that Dasein is a "being for whom, in its being, that very being is an *issue*" (GA 2, pp. 16/12/32). For Korsgaard this non-metaphysical conception of subjectivity underlies an account of normativity, an explanation of how standards – including the standards that measure success or failure at being a subject – can *bind* you, can provide you with reasons for acting in some ways and with obligations that forbid you from acting in others (Korsgaard 1996b, p. 101). Her argument is complicated, but it turns on characterizing subjectivity as self-consciousness: normative concepts do not arise as answers to theoretical questions; rather they exist "because human beings have normative problems. And we have normative problems because we are self-conscious rational animals, capable of reflection about what we ought to believe and do" (1996b, p. 46).[1] Self-consciousness thus gives rise to the normative, and the normative, "obligation … makes us human" (1996b, p. 5).

A similar stance toward normativity can be found in Heidegger. Truth, by all accounts, is a normative notion, a standard for the evaluation of the success or failure of propositions. And Heidegger famously argues that

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[1] "Reasons exist because we need them, and we need them because of the structure of our reflective consciousness" (Korsgaard 1996b, p. 96). Korsgaard's concern is primarily moral norms – the good, the right – but she suggests that her approach provides a general account of normativity (1996b, p. 21), and I shall treat it as such here.

"'[t]here is' truth only insofar as Dasein is and so long as Dasein is …
Before there was any Dasein, there was no truth; nor will there be any
after Dasein is no more" (GA 2, p. 300/226/269). This is not because "there
were no such entities" as are pointed out in true assertions; rather, it is
because such entities could not have had the status of *norms*, since that
status depends on a condition that did not obtain, namely, Dasein's abil-
ity to "bind itself" to entities, be "beholden" to them.[2] More generally,
the concept of being (*Sein*) in Heidegger exhibits a normative structure,
and being cannot be divorced from Dasein's understanding of being
(*Seinsverständnis*): "[O]nly so long as Dasein *is* (that is, only so long as
an understanding of being is ontically possible), 'is there' being" (GA 2,
p. 281/212/255). This does not mean that entities depend on Dasein. But
their "being" – that is, any characterization of them *as* something – is pos-
sible only if Dasein holds them up to constitutive standards, or satisfac-
tion conditions, for being the things they are. "Understanding of being"
just names our orientation toward these standards, or norms, such that
we let them count for us (the entity cannot do so for itself), and in so doing
"being" or "intraworldliness" "devolves" on entities (GA 24, p. 240/169).
Being – the norm for beings – arises because of our nature (understand-
ing of being), and the reasons and obligations that we thereby incur are
"what make us human."

   In spite of this convergence between Heidegger and Korsgaard – one
that is hardly surprising, given their mutual reference point in Kant's phil-
osophy and the fact that Korsgaard admits to developing an "existential"
variant of it (1996b, p. 237) – there is a fundamental difference. Heidegger's
account of why we can and must act in light of norms makes no reference
to self-consciousness. Indeed, the whole thrust of his text is to break with
that rationalistic tradition and provide an ontology of Dasein in terms
of what he calls "care" (*Sorge*). In contrast to Hegel and Kant, Heidegger
does not derive Dasein's understanding of being (its orientation toward
the normative) from its ability to reflect on itself. Indeed, he rejects the
model of mindedness that begins with consciousness, or the mental, as a
repository of first-order intentional states that, in addition, have the cap-
acity to become objects for second-order, or reflective, intentions. Instead,
our openness to the world is conceived as a tripartite "care" structure.
This consists, first, in the affective dimension of our being, "affectedness"
(*Befindlichkeit*). It is because we are always affectively disposed toward the
world in certain ways that things can matter to us; and we are disposed

[2] See Haugeland 1998a.

toward the world in certain ways because we are *exposed* to it – "thrown," in Heidegger's language. It belongs to us, as being-in-the-world, as our "facticity," as what we "have to be." Second, the care structure involves our practical skills and abilities, which Heidegger calls "understanding" (*Verstehen*), in the sense of know-how. Thanks to our exercise of skills the "world" has the character of a teleological context of significance in which particular things can show up as this or that, as "for" something or other. This openness to possibilities is, for Heidegger, the root meaning of "transcendence," or "freedom," and it belongs together essentially with the kind of affective significance characteristic of our facticity. Finally, the third aspect of the care structure, "discourse" (*Rede*), is that thanks to which the world disclosed through facticity and transcendence is not a *forum internum* but a shared, publicly articulated space of meaning.

Given the previously noted proximity of Heidegger and Korsgaard, then, the question arises: does this ontology of care make any real philosophical difference? Why should we prefer one to the other? The present chapter takes up this question. The strategy is to motivate a new look at Heidegger in this context by showing that Korsgaard's reliance on the concept of self-consciousness to explain the origin and nature of the normative leads to logical aporias and phenomenological distortions. Specifically, three problems arise: (1) an equivocation in Korsgaard's attempt to trace the source of normativity to the structure of self-consciousness; (2) an aporia in her conception of humanity arising from this equivocation; and (3) a rationalistic distortion in her phenomenology of action necessitated by the aporia. My primary aim is to lay out the nature, source, and interconnection of these problems. In each case I shall also suggest how Heidegger's ontology of care may provide a better account of the very phenomena upon which Korsgaard draws. While a detailed presentation of Heidegger's position on the sources of normativity is beyond the scope of this chapter, enough can be said, I hope, to indicate the fruitfulness of further dialogue between these two "existential Kantians."

2   Equivocation in the concept of self-consciousness

Let us begin by considering the general shape of Korsgaard's account of how normativity attaches to what she calls "practical identity." This account has much in common with Heidegger's phenomenology of everyday being-in-the-world, yet it is already significant that Korsgaard, though not Heidegger, introduces practical identity as a modification of *animal* agency.

To be an agent, on Korsgaard's view, one's movements must belong to an action – that is, to "an essentially intelligible object that *embodies* a reason" like a sentence embodies a thought. The intelligibility of action arises from two conditions: its teleological character and its expressive character. Put otherwise, an entity counts as an agent if its movements are "efficacious" – that is, oriented toward a goal, done for the sake of a goal – and "autonomous" – that is, expressive of what is "one's own" and in that sense "self-determined" (Korsgaard 2009, p. 104). Animals count as agents because they fulfill both conditions. Animals are efficacious because they act for an end. They do not merely respond differentially to their environment, but, Korsgaard claims, "the animal's movement is responsive to a representation or conception that he forms of the world, or … environment"; for instance, "a perception of something as *dinner* or *danger* – that is, *to-be-eaten* or *to-be-avoided*" (2009, p. 94). We attribute intentional content (and so efficacy) to animal movements, then, not because we attribute full-blown intentions to them, but because we understand such movements in light of the representation of the world we attribute to them. What allows us to attribute such "intentional content," in turn, "is not the presence of an accompanying thought, but rather appeal to the [animal's] form and function" (2009, p. 96). And it is because we ascribe to animals a certain kind of form and function ("a self-maintaining form," and a function "just to be – and continue being – what it is" [2009, p. 93]) that we may see them as fulfilling the second condition for agency: autonomy. Because its movements arise from its function of self-maintenance, we can say that an insect foraging on a leaf is "looking for something to eat"; and in so doing we understand that movement as expressive of its whole being, as "self-determining" and so "autonomous" (2009, p. 107).

The general term for what allows us to assign certain movements to an animal as its own is *instinct* (2009, p. 106). Instinct is whatever belongs to the "self-maintaining form" of the animal, and it provides the "principles that govern his reactions to his perceptions." Instincts determine "what he does in response to what, what he does for the sake of what" (2009, p. 104), but because they arise from the animal's self-maintaining form they are not merely something causally working "in" the animal; rather, they are the animal "itself," and movements determined by them are, to that extent, autonomous, *self*-determined.

Human agency, too, involves the principles of autonomy and efficacy, but here Korsgaard makes a distinction that might seem to render the whole approach through animal agency otiose, for she argues that "there are actually two senses of autonomy or self-determination." The first,

characteristic of animals, is "to be governed by the principles of your own causality" (i.e., by instinct); the second, characteristic of human agents, is "to choose the principles that are definitive of your will" (2009, p. 108). What does it mean to choose the principles that determine my will? What will replace instinct as that which determines – that is, provides reasons for – what I do in response to what, what I do for the sake of what? *Practical identity* provides the answer.

Korsgaard defines practical identity as a "conception" of one's identity, a "description under which you value yourself and find life worth living" (2009, p. 20). Such conceptions are as various as the roles that human beings can occupy: teacher, lover, father, citizen, dog-person, epicure, and so on. Such identities are practical because they are not primarily objects for theoretical contemplation, nor merely social roles that are attributed to us in a third-person way, but are expressed in what we do. For most people, as Korsgaard points out, their practical identity is a jumble of such conceptions, which often compete and conflict with one another. But insofar as you value yourself under a conception you can be said to "identify" with it and so "constitute" yourself in its image (1996b, p. 101). In doing so, you provide yourself with reasons to act in certain ways; practical identity becomes the principle of choice that replaces animal instinct.

Human autonomy involves choosing one's principles, and so arises the consciousness of normativity: I must now act not only in accord with norms but also in light of them; I must act for a *reason*, where "reason" does not refer to an external cause but to "a kind of reflective success," something that I can endorse from the first-person point of view: a "law" I give myself (Korsgaard 1996b, p. 93). Now had I no practical identity – no conception under which I value myself – my choice could get no purchase on reasons; I would have no principle on which to act and so would be incapable of acting at all (1996b, p. 123). By identifying with a practical identity I gain a reason, and practical identities become normative for me to the extent that I identify with them. Because I am a teacher I have a reason to choose to prepare my lecture rather than take a walk in the park, and I have an obligation not to miss class or neglect my paper grading. This is because practical identities involve "constitutive standards" (Korsgaard 2009, p. 32) of success or failure. If I am to be a teacher I must satisfy the constitutive standards for being one, standards that become normative for me *because* I identify with the role, because it expresses "me."

Heidegger's account of everyday being-in-the-world shares many features with Korsgaard's theory of practical identity. First, like Korsgaard,

Heidegger rejects the attempt to define the self in terms of psychological attributes – the flow of *Erlebnisse* – turning instead to the first-person experience of agency.[3] Dasein finds itself in its *practices*, and Heidegger's phenomenology of agency confirms Korsgaard's criteria: practices are both efficacious and autonomous. To begin with, Heidegger notes that our everyday being-in-the-world is not a matter of registering environmental factors through perception and then calculating what can be done with them; rather my engaged coping with things is primary – things present themselves to me as governed by in-order-to relations, and the environment in which practical life takes place is essentially a "totality of involvements" (*Bewandtnisganzheit*) or network of such in-order-to relations (GA 2, pp. 112–15/84–85/116–18). Thus, Dasein's dealings with the world are not mechanical but teleological, that is, efficacious. Further, such efficacy is not automatic but involves a kind of "sight," which Heidegger calls "circumspection" (*Umsicht*) (GA 2, p. 93/69/98). Because circumspection is not a consciously formulated intention, it may be likened to what Korsgaard called the animal's representation of its environment, even though Heidegger would not denote it a "representation." Finally, Dasein's dealings are also autonomous, since their principles are determined by what belongs to the self.

This last aspect of practice turns on the dimension of the care structure Heidegger called "understanding" or know-how. The in-order-to relations that characterize the significance of things encountered in practical dealings cannot be understood unless they are anchored in something that establishes what is being done for what – a "principle," as Korsgaard says. As Heidegger puts this point, "the totality of involvements itself goes back ultimately to a 'towards-which' in which there is *no* further involvement" – that is, to a 'for-the-sake-of-which'" (*Worumwillen*). And, he continues, "the 'for-the-sake-of' always pertains to the being of Dasein, for which, in its being, that very being is essentially an issue" (GA 2, p. 113/84/116). The *Worumwillen* is not itself another aim or goal but a possible way of being a self that constitutes the self-determining principle essential to action. I hammer nails in order to secure boards, but such action always has a self-referential dimension as well: I am *trying* to be a carpenter; being one (practically) is an *issue* for me, is at stake in what I

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[3] Korsgaard claims that Parfit's paradoxical conclusions about personal identity arise because his "arguments depend on viewing the person primarily as a locus of experience, and agency as a form of experience." Korsgaard, in contrast, like Heidegger, argues that "our conception of what a person is depends in a deep way on our conception of ourselves as agents" (Korsgaard 1996c, p. 364).

do. When I try to exercise the skills that define that way to be, try to live up to the demands of the job, I act for the sake of a possibility of my own being, and only so can things present themselves to me in light of *their* possibilities.

Now in animals, as we saw, this principle or self-referential aspect is provided by instinct, and since Heidegger describes everyday Dasein as "absorbed" in the world – not as a reflective chooser but as someone engaged in coping with the environment – one might imagine that the for-the-sake-of belongs to the teleological structure of animal action. But this would be wrong. Instead, the for-the-sake-of corresponds to practical identity. First, though the skills and know-how I exercise do involve bodily capacities, my bodily nature underdetermines them. The norms that give shape to them belong first of all to the social context in which I find myself. My "abilities-to-be" are not instincts but roles and socially recognized practices into which I have been born and according to the norms of which I must act if I am to be recognized as acting at all. So deeply do these socially recognized practices inhere in my everyday way of being that Heidegger can say that ordinarily the actor is not "I myself" but "the one" (*das Man*): in being for the sake of a given possibility (for instance, a carpenter), I do so as "one" does. Like Wittgenstein, Heidegger recognizes that this anonymity and typicality is essential to the normative character of the roles and practices themselves: "The 'one' itself prescribes that way of interpreting the world *and being-in-the-world* which lies closest. Dasein is *for the sake of* the 'one' in an everyday manner." Nevertheless, though *das Man* prescribes these identities, actions done in accord with them are still self-determined since the "one-self" is not someone *other* than me but I myself in my everyday mode (GA 2, p. 172/129/167). Thus, as the for-the-sake-of, I identify with and express a public, normatively structured possibility for being and so provide myself with reasons to act.

Despite the similarities between Korsgaard on practical identity and Heidegger on the for-the-sake-of, however, their views are very different. This becomes evident if we consider why it is, according to Korsgaard, that we need practical identities.

We need practical identities because "our reflective nature gives us a choice about what to do" (Korsgaard 1996b, p. 96). This distinctive form of self-consciousness, whereby we become aware of the workings of incentives within us, "sets us a problem that other animals do not have" (Korsgaard 2009, p. 115). Where the animal's incentive (a "motivationally loaded representation of an object" [2009, p. 109]) is governed by the principle of instinct, *reflective* "self-consciousness opens up a space between

the incentive and the response." And it is "within the space of reflect-ive distance that the question of whether our incentives give us reasons arises" (2009, p. 116). "And so it is in the space of reflective distance, in the internal world created by self-consciousness, that reason is born" (2009, p. 116). Because I am aware of the workings of incentive within me I must ask whether it really gives me a reason to act in a certain way. On what principle do I decide this question? The source of what counts as a reason is my practical identity. Identifying with it, its norms provide me with the principles that, in lieu of instinct, tell me "what justifies what, what counts as a reason for what, what is worth doing for the sake of what" (2009, p. 127).

On Korsgaard's account, then, our self-conscious nature is the source of the normative space in which we operate as humans. This is a powerful account, but the concept of self-consciousness it invokes suffers from an equivocation. On the one hand, self-consciousness is understood to be a mode of self-*awareness*, an essential "structure of our minds that makes thoughtfulness possible." On the other hand, this structure is defined in terms of *reflection*: "The human mind is self-conscious in the sense that it is essentially reflective," where reflection is understood as our abil-ity "to turn our attention onto our perceptions and desires themselves" (Korsgaard 1996b, p. 93): reflective "awareness of our mental states as such," that is, as in "mental space" (Korsgaard 2009, p. 115). Thus, reflection appears to be a higher-order act that reifies a state into a kind of mental item or content of consciousness.[4] However, the attempt to explain the essentially self-aware structure of our minds by appeal to a specific mental act leads to an infinite regress.[5] There is thus a fundamen-tal equivocation in Korsgaard's conception of self-consciousness.[6]

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[4] In Korsgaard's John Locke Lectures, from which *Self-Constitution* (2009) was derived, Korsgaard actually used this sort of language to characterize reflection. In *Self-Constitution*, however, this language is dropped. Indeed there is no extended discus-sion of reflection itself – there is no entry for it in the index – and this suggests that in the period between the lectures and this publication Korsgaard has become more uncomfort-able with the "reflection" theory of self-consciousness. Since, however, *Self-Constitution* provides no account of reflection at all, it is impossible to say whether she has developed a theory that avoids the problems that I am canvassing in this chapter.

[5] See the discussion of the reflection theory of self-awareness in Zahavi 1999, pp. 15–21.

[6] Mark Okrent notes this equivocation as well: the claim that the human mind is "self-conscious in the sense that it is essentially reflective" admits "of at least three dif-ferent interpretations, and Korsgaard gives us little explicit to go on in disambiguating the claim" (1999, p. 49). There is, first, the idea that every intentional state includes a more or less explicit "I think." There is, second, the idea that the human mind is distin-guished by that fact that it must be *possible* for *all* its intentional states to become objects of

Before exploring the problems to which this leads, let us recall how Heidegger handles the same issue. In *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* he admits that the concept of self-consciousness as applied to Dasein is "correct." "Formally, it is unassailable to speak of the ego as consciousness-of-something that is at the same time conscious of itself" (GA 24, p. 225/158). But Heidegger is keenly aware that the sort of self-awareness we have in mind when we speak formally in this way cannot be glossed with the concept of reflection: "The self is there for the Dasein itself without reflection and without inner perception, *before* all reflection." For Heidegger, this sort of self-awareness is built in to the very structure of practical identities; it belongs to the for-the-sake-of that governs Dasein's concernful engagement in the world: "The Dasein does not need a special kind of observation … in order to have the self; rather, as the Dasein gives itself over immediately and passionately to the world, its own self is reflected to it from things" (GA 24, pp. 226–27/159). I am constantly self-aware because I discover myself in what I do: I am aware of myself as a carpenter, father, or teacher because the things that surround me show me the face that they show to one who acts as a carpenter, father, or teacher does. And because I am never without some practical identity, I am always self-aware in one way or another. The concept of reflection as a specific second-order intention does have a role to play in Heidegger's account – for instance, in the theoretical attempt to describe my mental states, or in the case of explicit deliberation – but this should not be confused with the kind of self-awareness, or self-relatedness, that characterizes Dasein as such.

Korsgaard's reliance on the concept of reflection to explain our "self-conscious nature" undermines the argument that is meant to establish self-consciousness as the source of reason and normativity. Through reflection I "distance" myself from my incentives, and this constitutes "expulsion from the Garden, banishment from a world that is teleologically ordered by our instincts" (Korsgaard 2009, p. 118). Reflection cuts me off from the authority of my animal instincts and the principles they provide for my actions, forcing me to adopt a practical identity that can supply me with reasons. But why should reflective distancing have this

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second-order intentions. And finally there is the idea that the human mind is essentially reflective because *some* of its intentional states can become the objects of second-order intentions. As Okrent points out, Korsgaard's central conclusion about the reflective source of the normative problem follows "only if one assumes that our intentions actually have a self-conscious, reflective structure" (1999, p. 51), and it is on the basis of this assumption that I shall here work out my own criticism of Korsgaard's argument.

result? If I reify my states into mental items I do stand at a kind of dis-
tance from them, but not one that would necessarily undermine their
authority. Why should the mere act of objectifying my incentive have the
effect of transforming it into a mere "proposal" (2009, p. 119) and forcing
me to find some reason, other than my animal instinct, for acting on it?
Why don't I simply go on my animal way as before, only now conscious of
the laws of my nature working within me? Thomas Nagel posed a similar
question to Korsgaard: "Why isn't the reflective individual just someone
with more information … How do reasons, laws, and universality get a
foothold here?" (Korsgaard 1996b, p. 201).

Korsgaard believes she has an answer, since for her, to reflect on my
incentives is already to "call them into question" (1996b, p. 93). But this
does not follow. To objectify something might enable me to call it into
question, but it is not itself such a questioning. If reflection is supposed
to explain how I have entered into the normative such that I am banished
from the teleological order of animal nature, one must explain why *all*
objectification is a calling into question. This Korsgaard's ontology does
not have the resources to do. All it provides is animal instincts and their
reflective distancing. If calling my animal nature into question is sup-
posed to yield the kind of sea change that submits my entire being to the
normative problem, such questioning must be there at the pre-reflective
level of self-awareness as such; it cannot be brought in by some particular
second-order intention. On this point Heidegger's ontology of care – his
view of Dasein as a being in whose being that very being is at issue – has a
distinct advantage.[7]

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[7] Okrent also finds Korsgaard's conclusion – that reflective distancing cuts us off from
our own mental states in such a way as to confront us with the normative problem –
under-argued. He reconstructs one possible argument as follows:

> First-order intentions are directed directly on the world, and because of this they
> directly determine action. When you believe that there is a predator in the area, or
> desire to flee a predator, this is a fact about you that specifies how you are related
> to your environment, and, insofar as your intentional states motivate and explain
> action, that fact in turn will have direct consequences for how you behave. But when
> you think that you believe that there is a predator in the area, or think that you desire
> to flee a predator, this is a fact about how you are related to yourself. And nothing
> follows directly about how you will behave from the fact that you have this sort of
> intentional state. (Okrent 1999, pp. 51–52)

Okrent does not attribute this argument to Korsgaard, however, since it would lead to her
conclusion only if she accepted the first view of self-consciousness mentioned above (foot-
note 6), namely, that "all our intentions display a reflective structure" – a view that Okrent

Heidegger, too, identifies a kind of distancing as a condition for being the sort of creature who can be bound by norms, but this is neither a matter of self-objectification nor a passage from an instinctual condition to some other. Rather, the distancing that matters is that whereby my absorption in everyday practices – structured by the practical identities that inform my particular social and historical world and which I inhabit in the quasi-anonymous way that characterizes *das Man* – breaks down altogether. This occurs, according to Heidegger, in moods such as *Angst*, where I find that I can no longer act at all, no longer press forward smoothly into practical possibilities for being, and I confront myself as "pure Dasein," that is, as "being-free *for* the freedom of choosing [myself] and taking hold of [myself]" (GA 2, p. 249/188/232). This is not the sort of reflective distancing that takes place in deliberation, where my identification with a given practical identity can provide me with reasons for doing this rather than that. It lies deeper, revealing me as one who is always essentially in question, at issue, and so as one who must "take over being-a-ground" (GA 2, p. 378/285/331).

To take over being-a-ground is not to pass from some pre-normative ontological condition to one governed by norms; rather, it is to uncover, phenomenologically, the condition that enables me to act not only in conformity to norms (as in everyday coping) but also in light of them – that is, to be responsible, beholden to normative constraints and so offer reasons (grounds) for what I do. What Korsgaard tries to grasp as the passage from mere instinct to genuine consciousness of norms can be understood, in Heidegger's ontology of care, as an aspect of the facticity of my being "thrown" into a world. But such facticity is not put in question for the first time only in the distancing that takes place in *Angst*; it is always already in question since it is bound up, in the unity of the care structure, with the for-the-sake-of, with the issue of who I am to be, my trying to be a father, professor, and so on. The kind of distancing Heidegger appeals to, then, does not explain how the normative emerges from the non-normative

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finds "implausible." But even if we accept this view of self-consciousness, Okrent's reconstruction will not necessarily lead to the desired conclusion. For the aim is to show why it is that making a first-order intention into an object is to call it into question, and Okrent's reconstruction simply assumes that it is. If I merely take note of my first-order intention, I certainly objectify it; but such objectification need not have the structure Okrent attributes to it – namely, that I "*think* that I *believe* there is a predator present," or "*believe* that I *desire* to flee." For these terms introduce a moment of doubt into the process that need not be present in objectification as mere "noticing." One must still, therefore, explain how such doubt or indecision emerges *merely* through reflection.

but identifies a mode of being – freedom, authenticity – without which beholdenness to norms would not be possible. To those who want a naturalistic explanation of normativity, this may seem like a loss. But the fact that Korsgaard's explanation goes through only by means of an equivocation should raise doubts about such naturalizing ambitions. Further reasons for doubt can be gleaned from the aporia that arises, thanks to that very equivocation, in Korsgaard's account of the person.

3   An aporia in Korsgaard's account of the person

Korsgaard's quarry is finally not simply an account of the norms that make us good fathers, teachers, or friends, but of moral norms, those that constitute the rules for "being good at being a person" (Korsgaard 2009, p. 26). She argues that, were there no such norms, all other normativity would be groundless (Korsgaard 1996b, p. 113). Because all my practical identities are contingent there is no sense in which I *must* value myself under their description, and thus they are, in a certain sense, not really binding on me. Moral norms, in contrast, would be norms that bind me come what may. Korsgaard offers a transcendental argument from the possibility of rational action to show that there are such norms. In this, the concept of person – of one's "humanity" as such – plays a crucial role. Let us review the argument.

Action requires that you identify yourself with a particular practical identity, for if you do not, "you will lose your grip on yourself as having any reason to do one thing rather than another." *This* reason, however – that you will have no reason "to live and act at all" – does not stem from your practical identity, but "from your humanity itself." Hence the reason that your practical identity provides you to act in a certain way *is* a reason only "if you treat your humanity as a practical, normative form of identity, that is, if you value yourself as a human being" (Korsgaard 1996b, p. 121). Thus, if there are moral norms – that is, if there are ways of acting that our humanity as such requires (1996b, p. 123) – then we are bound by them if we are bound by *any* contingent practical identity.[8] Our

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[8] Korsgaard's aim is to show that Kant's categorical and hypothetical imperatives are just such conditions for the possibility of agency that arise from our humanity and so provide the principles for universal moral obligations. She therefore must show that my valuing *my* humanity gives me reasons to value *yours* (Korsgaard 1996b, pp. 131–45). We shall not pursue these issues here, since our interest is not in the claims she makes about the scope of moral reasons, but in her analysis of the relation between agency and the idea of humanity itself.

identity as human beings itself provides reasons to act in one way rather than another.

I do not wish to challenge this argument directly. The claim that the normativity of practical identities has its roots in an ontological structure that is not a contingent practical identity seems largely correct. In Heidegger, for instance, one finds that the reasons for acting provided by *das Man* – reasons embedded in anonymous roles and typified practices that are historically contingent and particular – derive their normative force from the fact that Dasein is not identical to any of them but *can* "make them its own" in authentic choice, *can* make them *its* reasons by taking over being-a-ground. If authenticity were not a possibility for Dasein, then inauthenticity would not be one either. But authenticity is not itself some particular practical identity; it is, rather, a way of taking up whatever practical identities one has. Nevertheless, though Heidegger's position shares something deep with Korsgaard's, the latter's appeal to the concepts of "humanity" and "person" to make her case leads to an aporia, a knot in our understanding of just what it can mean to identify with, or value, our humanity as such.

The problem arises because Korsgaard defines the human being as a "reflective animal who needs reasons to act and to live" (Korsgaard 1996b, p. 121). It is this identity, our humanity, that is supposed to provide constitutive conditions for "being good at being a person" (Korsgaard 2009, p. 26). Why is this a problem? If we note that Korsgaard's position is a version of personalistic ontology in the manner of Husserl or Scheler – who approach the human being not in psychological terms (as the subject of "experiences") but as it shows itself "actively involved in history" (GA 20, p. 162/117) as "the *performer of acts*" (GA 20, p. 175/126) – we can derive the beginning of an answer from Heidegger's criticism of these phenomenological versions of personalism.

First, if one asks "how human Dasein is *given* in specifically personal experiences" (GA 20, p. 162/117) – that is, how the agent shows itself in its agency – it turns out that personalistic theories distort the phenomenology of agency. This is because they do not achieve a genuine "idea of the whole" being of the agent (as Heidegger himself tries to do with the care structure) but grasp it instead as a "multi-layered thing of the world" (GA 20, p. 173/125). Personalistic anthropology remains tied to the traditional characterization of human being as rational animal, a characterization in which both elements – animality and rationality – remain only externally related to one another, additively composed. Heidegger argues that such a compositional conception "serves to obstruct the question

of the actual being of the acts, the being of the intentional" (GA 20, p. 171/123). In his discussion of Kant's notion of the *personalitas moralis* in *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, Heidegger indicates two such areas of obstruction.

First, he argues that Kant's multi-layered, merely conjunctive characterization of the agent means that the I of the "I act" is "determined altogether intellectually" (GA 24, p. 200/141). This sounds odd until one remembers that for Kant the identity of the agent is approached from the standpoint of reflective deliberation, which Korsgaard aptly describes as follows: "When you deliberate, it is as if there were something over and above all your desires, something that is *you* and that *chooses* which one to act on" (Korsgaard 1996b, p. 100). Second, Heidegger claims that Kant's ontology of the person cannot do justice to the agent's facticity. On the multi-layered view, facticity appears not as an original determination of the human being but simply as "the extant" or nature, borrowed from an ontology of the present-at-hand (GA 24, p. 218/153).

Korsgaard's idea of the person as animal-plus-reflection obviously exhibits the same multi-layered, merely additive structure that Heidegger criticizes in personalism. However, this is worrisome only if it produces serious problems for her theory. It seems that there are such problems, and that they are the very ones Heidegger identified in Kant. First, Korsgaard cannot do justice to facticity, since her concept of animality oscillates between being part of one's humanity and being something that stands over against it. Second, Korsgaard determines the ego of the "I act" wholly intellectually – that is, as it appears in the standpoint of deliberation. But this produces a rationalistic distortion of the phenomenology of agency. I shall treat the first problem in the remainder of this section and devote the chapter's concluding section to the second.

On Korsgaard's view, the task of the agent is to "unify" itself, something it can do only if it acts in accord with the norms inherent in its humanity. The problem is that humanity, as Korsgaard defines it, is an internally riven concept, an additive composition of animality-plus-reflection in which reflection, as we have seen, is defined as a *break* with animality. Several problems follow.

First, self-unification is said to come about only if, in choosing any practical identity, I also commit to my identity as human: "Since you cannot act without reasons, and since your humanity is the source of your reasons, you must value your own humanity if you are to act at all" (Korsgaard 1996b, p. 123). This is to treat humanity itself as a kind of practical identity. But my humanity cannot be the source of reasons in the way

that a practical identity is – that is, by providing norms that determine a particular way of getting on in the world. Being human in *this* sense is not something I can choose to be, not something, therefore, which I can value or identify with. Korsgaard acknowledges that "[t]he necessity of choosing and acting is not causal, logical, or rational necessity. It is our *plight*: the simple inexorable fact of the human condition" (Korsgaard 2009, p. 2). But this means that it really makes no sense to speak of constitutive rules or standards here. As she admits, "choosing not to act makes not acting a kind of action, makes it something that you do" (2009, p. 1), and so I cannot succeed or fail at being human in this sense. I am it, willy-nilly. In contrast, practical identities such as being a father *do* involve satisfaction conditions that I can fail to instantiate, and so they can give me reasons to do what I do: because I am a father I have a reason to take time off work to coach my son's Little League team, and so on. Though there is no such thing as reasons unless there is humanity – and so humanity is the source of my reasons in that transcendental sense – humanity as the "plight" of having to choose is not by itself the source of any *special* reasons.[9]

Of course, Heidegger's ontology of care also conceives selfhood as an unavoidable task of self-unification, a challenge that is met in the existential stance he calls "anticipatory resoluteness": "Anticipatory resoluteness … includes an authentic ability-to-be-a-whole" (GA 2, p. 420/317/365). As this citation suggests, existential wholeness, or "self-constancy" (*Selbst-ständigkeit*; GA 2, p. 427/322/369), also makes reference to a norm – namely, "authenticity" (*Eigentlichkeit*). Though this is not a moral norm, it is nevertheless one that attaches to my being as such, my "humanity" in Korsgaard's terms. But if that is so, will not Heidegger's position be

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[9] Korsgaard, of course, believes that it is, claiming that the situation of agency is governed by the categorical and hypothetical imperatives. We shall not stop to examine her arguments here. But as Pippin has pointed out, the impossibility of generating any genuine norms from "humanity" in the formal sense is attested in Korsgaard's own admission that "human identity has been differently constituted in different social worlds" and that "the concept of moral wrongness as we now understand it belongs to the world we live in, the one brought about by the Enlightenment, where one's identity is one's relation to humanity itself" (Korsgaard 1996b, p. 117). But this relation to "humanity itself" can only be a relation to "human identity" as constituted in our world – hence more like a contingent practical identity, a description under which you value yourself. For Pippin this means that if the substance of any requirement stemming from "humanity" is "in this manner a question of 'history'," and if we have no way of determining the normative force of some historical version of the conception of humanity, then the fact that there could be some formal requirements is by no means as important as "the fact that the actualization of these requirements is a matter of specific socio-historical concerns" (Pippin 2003, p. 925).

subject to the objection just leveled at Korsgaard, namely, that an aspect of my being that I cannot help but be – that is, being an issue for myself, perpetually oriented toward the wholeness of my identity – cannot really be thought as responsive to norms at all? Doesn't the concept of care, like that of humanity, indicate something I cannot help but be, such that valuing my own care structure could never yield a *special* set of reasons, an unconditional obligation to be authentic, that I could succeed or fail at instantiating?

Heidegger's position here is indeed quite close to Korsgaard's, but there is a crucial difference. Korsgaard's concept of humanity as the plight of having to choose must entail constitutive standards that are both *distinct* from those involved in practical identities and provide reasons that can *compete* with those provided by practical identities. Only so can morality help me choose between practical identities or "test" the reasons to which they give rise. Heidegger's concept of care, in contrast, does not designate something I could value *in addition* to what I find valuable in my concrete practical identities – something like my "capacity to choose" as such. Care is simply the structure of being an issue for myself. This structure admits of normative success or failure – of authenticity and inauthenticity – only to the extent that these norms govern the *way* I live my concrete practical identities, the way I take them up: either as "my own," as chosen by me "transparently" in anticipatory resoluteness (authenticity), or else as "one" does, simply going along with those ways of being in which I find myself, as though I were not responsible for them (inauthenticity). Thus, appeal to authenticity cannot help me choose between practical identities; nor is there any sense in which fulfilling the obligations imposed by my practical identities requires that I do so authentically. I have no unconditional obligation to be authentic. Hence, though authenticity designates a certain constitutive standard for existing, it is not one that can supply reasons that could compete with the reasons that derive from my practical identities. It is just the distinction between following those reasons transparently and following them self-forgetfully, as though they were quasi-natural "givens."

Even if one's humanity could be treated as a kind of practical identity, however, Korsgaard's account of the person would still be unable to supply the necessary conditions for unification of oneself as an agent, since her concept of person is itself internally bifurcated. As animal-*plus*-reflection, humanity is an unstable notion in which the "plus" oscillates between being a mark of identity and a mark of irrecoverable breach. Korsgaard's considered view seems to be that one's animal nature is seamlessly absorbed into

the humanity that is to provide the rules for agent self-unification, but her formulations often betray a revealing tension. For instance, she claims that "[it] is not just as human, but considered as sensible, considered as animal, that you value yourself and are your own end" (Korsgaard 1996b, p. 152). If "animal" were already part of the concept of the person, however, such a contrast between the human and the sensible would make no sense. Indeed, the sentence that precedes the one just quoted is even more revealing: "[Y]our animal nature is a fundamental form of identity, on which the normativity of your human identity, your moral identity, depends" (1996b, p. 152). One already has trouble here with the idea that the normativity of one's human identity *depends* on one's animal identity, for earlier the claim was that normativity arose precisely as a *break* with the teleological imperatives of one's animal nature. What sort of dependence, then, can be meant? Heidegger's ontology of care sees such dependence as the way in which what initially belongs to me "anonymously" thanks to my absorption in *das Man* – the practical identities embedded in the social practices in which I continuously engage, together with the reasons to which they give rise – serves as the ground that I make my own through authentic choice. Thus it does not posit two identities. If one does posit a distinction between animal and human identity, as Korsgaard does, human identity can only be construed as *reflection itself*, which is defined as a break with animal identity.

By construing sensibility as teleological, instinctual animality Korsgaard falls into a dilemma: "humanity" cannot be the name for its integration under the regime of reflection because reflection is precisely what keeps it from functioning in its proper way, namely, as teleological and instinctual. There is no possibility for unifying the self in this model. Animality cannot be part of my humanity, yet it must be if the agent is to be unified as a person. Thus Korsgaard's concept of the person suffers from the same problem Heidegger found in Kant: an erroneous substitution of "nature" for facticity undermines her account of the source of the normative.[10] Without an ontology of care, in which sensibility

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[10] It might be argued that the passages upon which this criticism is based appear in a section where Korsgaard is trying to defend the idea of our obligations to animals, and that if we simply abandon this (perhaps implausible) argument we could treat her formulations here as strained and unrepresentative. But the same tension shows up, even if in less pronounced fashion, in many other passages. At bottom the problem is that to identify with my humanity is to identify with something defined in terms of a break – reflection breaks with animality – whereas this very identification is supposed to yield principles of unity. Okrent makes the same point in order to identify what he takes to be the underlying problem with Korsgaard's whole approach, namely, that she is "trapped between an

already belongs to normatively structured being-in-the-world, a stand-off between the reflective and the animal parts of my being is inevitable; I cannot be unified.

It is clear, then, that Korsgaard's normative concept of humanity is in fact wholly governed by the concept of reflection, by the *deliberating* agent "distanced" from its animal identity. But this provokes the second problem that Heidegger identified in Kant's personalism, for the agent is here conceived entirely "intellectually." This finally prevents Korsgaard from being able to give a coherent account of non-deliberated action. Either it must be seen as a reversion to mere animal instinct, or the structure of deliberation must be smuggled back into it. In opting for the latter, Korsgaard rationalistically distorts the phenomenology of such action.

4   Distortions in the phenomenology of action

According to Korsgaard, our conception of ourselves as agents is derived from the standpoint of reflective deliberation. In choosing, I am governed by a practical identity that provides me with reasons to act, and in so acting I constitute myself. It is from the practical point of view, then, that the idea of the "whole person" makes sense; what is most my own belongs to my practical identity. In contrast, my psychology – my feelings, beliefs, and desires considered as experiences – merely provides material for choice and decision. As Korsgaard puts it, "beliefs and desires you have actively arrived at are more truly your own than those that have simply arisen in you" (Korsgaard 1996c, p. 379). Psychology cannot explain the agent. This is because "[t]he reflective mind cannot settle for a perception and a desire, not just as such. It needs a *reason*. Otherwise, at least as long as it reflects, it cannot commit itself or go forward" (Korsgaard 1996b,

essentially naturalistic insight, that our nature as human animals implies that we must have some practical identity or other, and her commitment to a modern doctrine … the doctrine of reflective distance." But Okrent finds the same flaw in Heidegger's position: "Heidegger is still committed to the Cartesian view that there is a fundamental divide between human being and animal nature … So he is simply blind to the naturalistic basis of the fact that human beings must always have some practical identity or other, and is condemned to a fruitless oscillation between voluntarism and relativism" (Okrent 1999, p. 74). Thus Okrent wants to retain Korsgaard's naturalism together with Heidegger's pragmatic concept of reflection. But to do so he must minimize the significance, in the ontology of care, of Heidegger's analyses of anxiety, guilt, and death, in which something like a "fundamental divide between human being and animal nature" is embedded (1999, p. 73). Whether a Heideggerian ontology without these elements can do justice to the normative question may be doubted however.

p. 93). What are we to say, then, about those instances when the agent does *not* reflect? Is the practical point of view equivalent to the standpoint of reflective deliberation? What account can be given of pre-reflective or non-deliberated action?[11]

It might appear that there can be no non-deliberated action. Our movements can be seen to lie on a continuum from "automatic acts" like salivating at the sight of food all the way to full-blown actions, but a "movement will not be an action unless it is attributable to you – to you as a whole or a unified being – rather than merely to something in you. And the task of deliberation is to determine what you – you as a whole or a unified being – are going to do" (Korsgaard 2009, p. 125–26). If this is right, it might seem that action in which I do not reflect on what I am doing – let us call it "mindless coping"[12] – is not really action, attributable not to me "as a whole or a unified being" but to "something in me": my psychology, my experiences, my perceptions and desires. This would be an extremely odd view, however, since by far the greater part of our practical lives is spent in such mindless coping. So what account of such action does Korsgaard provide? What account of the "unified" human being can she give of an agent immersed in the flow of life? Here she has only two ways to go. Either she must claim that such action is a function of our animal identity, or else she must import the structure of reflective deliberation back into mindless coping.

The first option soon collapses. As we saw, a movement belongs to an action if it is attributable to an agent as her own, as "self-determined." Self-determination is either instinctual or reflective. Unreflective action, then, must be instinctual. But surely one cannot say that mindless coping expresses the animal teleology that would have governed me were I not a self-conscious being. When I gear unreflectively into the world, going about my daily tasks, do I really recover the Edenic garden of nature? Suppose I am simply drawn to do a kind act for my wife – "drawn by affection" as we would say. Are we to imagine that it is not I, but my instinctual animal identity that acts in this case? We cannot appeal to just *any* aspect of my psychology, since Korsgaard relegates much of that to what merely happens "to" or "in" me – that is, to what is not self-determining in the sense necessary for action. But the idea that a non-deliberated action

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[11] For the Husserlian version of this problem, see Chapter 12 below.
[12] This formulation is drawn from Dreyfus: "At the foundation of Heidegger's new approach is a phenomenology of 'mindless' everyday coping skills as the basis of all intelligibility" (1991, p. 3).

cannot be mine unless it stems from the workings of instinct is phenomenologically impossible to maintain.[13]

Nor is Korsgaard tempted by that view. Thus, her only alternative is to treat such action as implicitly involving deliberation. The argument is twofold: first, to say I am moved by affection need not conflict with being motivated by reason, since "to be 'motivated by reason' is normally to be motivated by one's reflective endorsement of incentives and impulses, including affections, which arise in a natural way" (Korsgaard 1996b, p. 127). And second, the idea of reflective endorsement, contrary to appearances, need not involve an explicit act of reflection: "We don't need to think of this, and in fact we shouldn't think of it, as a decision made *prior* to the action: as often as not, it is a decision embodied in the action" (Korsgaard 2009, p. 127). However, while this conception saves the phenomena, Korsgaard's ontology cannot support it. If the person is understood as animal-plus-reflection, and reflection is understood as a second-order intention, the notion of "internalization" – sedimented beliefs, desires, and decisions that you once "actively arrived at" and so go to make up "you" – remains a metaphor whose efficacy depends entirely on Korsgaard's equivocal concept of self-consciousness. Once they are no longer objects of specific choice, but rather sedimented products of such choices, beliefs and desires I have actively arrived at, they seem little different in their ontological (and hence motivational) status from any other element of my psychology. If acting on them in non-deliberative mindless coping is supposed to instantiate the concept of reflective endorsement, this can only be because Korsgaard has smuggled the idea of reflection as a deliberative act into the concept of self-consciousness. Nothing in the phenomenology of action, however, supports the claim that the way mindless coping is solicited by the world is a matter of making decisions.

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[13] Korsgaard's position – that constitutive standards are what we would follow if we were always rational, but we are not always rational – does not easily accommodate the common-sense idea that the supposedly non-rational parts of the soul can be "no less internal to me" than my explicit choices. On this point see Sher 2001 and 2006. Pippin makes a similar point about Korsgaard's example, in "The Normativity of Instrumental Reason," of Tex, a cowboy who – we would say – "chooses" not to let his pals amputate his badly wounded leg. Since Tex will die if the leg is not amputated, Korsgaard cannot say that *Tex* has chosen not to have his leg amputated; rather, she must say that it was the "fear" within him. Tex has "failed" at being a *subject*; and indeed, *Tex* was not there at all, only his "animal identity" was, which exercised control over his actions. Against this, Pippin protests: "While resisting the amputation, Tex is not 'too weak' to be the 'real Tex.' In such resistance he only expresses something, discovers something, of this real Tex" (Pippin 2003, pp. 918–19).

Korsgaard is certainly right, however, to deny that such coping is something automatic, deriving from something "in" me rather than from *me*. When I am drawn by affection to do a kind act for my wife, I am not driven by some blind impulse that operates in accord with norms but not in light of them. I belong wholly within the space of meaning that Heidegger calls "world." The affection is what it is only because it is intentionally directed toward my wife, and she, in turn, is present to me as she is in such action because I am who *I* am, because of my practical identity as her husband. Yet Korsgaard's ontology of self-consciousness cannot clarify these simple phenomenological relations. On the one hand, because she defines the "I" in terms of the one who reflects, and so stands at a distance from all beliefs and desires, it remains a mystery how even the incorporated beliefs and desires can be *me*. At best they can be mental contents that were at one time an object of choice. On the other hand, to claim that because I have a self-conscious nature it is legitimate to describe mindless coping as "embodying" implicit decisions about what incentives to follow is – as Heidegger said of Kant – to abandon phenomenology for a rationalistic reconstruction.

Korsgaard's position represents another sally in the skirmish between Humeans, who see the practical self as a kind of epiphenomenon of its psychological experiences (beliefs and desires), and Kantians, who see experience as nothing prior to its constitution in spontaneity. Given the difficulty that either view has in accounting for the phenomenon of non-deliberative agency, it should not surprise us that this phenomenon was one of the main things that led Heidegger beyond the ontology of modern philosophy – with its Cartesian bifurcation of the self into passive "experiences" and active "self-consciousness" – toward an ontology of care. In Heidegger's terms, Kantians misunderstand facticity, while Humeans misunderstand transcendence. But to understand how the care structure accounts for our beholdenness to norms it is not enough to put facticity and transcendence – psychology and agency – together in an external way. Rather, one must do justice to a point about human beings that Korsgaard notes but mischaracterizes. After arguing that a person is "both active and passive, both an agent and a subject of experiences," she adds that "of course our actions and activities are among the things we experience" while "having experiences is among the things we *do*" (Korsgaard 1996c, p. 363). Korsgaard takes this to mean that "each can be reduced to a form of the other," hence that I can fully grasp my action as something I merely undergo, while I can also fully grasp my experiences as something constituted by me. Yet this seems just the wrong conclusion to draw. The fact

that these aspects have something distinctive about them means that no such reduction is possible and, ultimately, that the distinction is inadequate for understanding the ontology of the creature that possesses both. The kind of subject who can be an agent while being absorbed in the world is a self whose identity is normatively achieved not by overcoming the passivity in its nature in order to constitute itself as a unified person, but rather by overcoming its anonymity to take responsibility for its own self as a task.

Husserl and Heidegger on the intentionality of action

1   Practical philosophy and the crisis

If practical philosophy is that branch of philosophy which analyzes the nature of action, then both Husserl and Heidegger provide elements for a practical philosophy, since both of them offer a phenomenology of action. But practical philosophy also has a normative dimension, concerned with the question of what I ought to do, and the two phenomenologists deal with this as well. The present chapter examines how Husserl and Heidegger conceive the fit between these two aspects of practical philosophy, and the conflicting estimations of the role of reason to which this leads.

For both Husserl and Heidegger, practical philosophy is inseparable from a philosophy of history. Because philosophy has a practical cultural role it must understand its own historical situation, and both Husserl and Heidegger see that situation as one of "crisis."[1] But while Husserl believes that the crisis calls for restoring "the genuine sense of rationalism," in which reason governs not merely our technical-practical cognition of nature but our evaluative and practical lives as well (Hua 6, p. 14/16), Heidegger holds that the technization of reason is itself the outcome of that "genuine rationalism." Thus, while Husserl's phenomenology tends increasingly toward something like the "primacy of practical reason," Heidegger's itinerary is more complicated.

Practical philosophy is the ultimate horizon of Husserl's thinking, since the point of phenomenology as rigorous science is to ground the ultimate norms by which humanity is to orient itself, norms that define rational thinking, feeling, and willing. Philosophers, as Husserl famously put it, are the "functionaries of humanity" (Hua 6, p. 15/17), whose vocation it is to make explicit theoretically the principles that rationally underwrite the normative judgments we make in everyday life. Thus practical reason is primary in Husserl's philosophy because philosophy itself is a vocational

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[1] See Buckley 1992.

practice, one without which scientific theorizing (whether natural or social) would be rudderless.[2]

Heidegger's early work – here represented by *Being and Time* – deepens the phenomenology of practical reason by improving significantly on Husserl's phenomenology of *praxis*. In his later work, however, the necessary connection between *praxis* and reason leads Heidegger to imagine an altogether different response to the crisis. Paradoxically, the normative question ("What ought to be done?") is no longer seen as a *practical* one; rather, it becomes a task for "thinking" (*Denken*). Heidegger's watchword for this paradox is *Gelassenheit*. Thinking cultivates an attitude – neither theoretical nor practical in the traditional sense – in which I suspend the "will to will" so as to remain, in my actions and thoughts, open to what willing both lives from and excludes: the "mystery" (GA 5, p. 265/197). If, from another point of view, Heidegger can call such thinking "the simplest and at the same time the highest" form of acting (GA 9, p. 313/239), it is not a form governed by practical *reason*. "[T]he reason that has been extolled for centuries is the most stubborn adversary of thinking"(GA 5, p. 267/199).

It might seem that subordinating practical philosophy to a philosophy of history – and in particular, to a narrative of crisis – has led phenomenology into a peculiarly German stand-off between stark rationalism and stark irrationalism. Deciding this issue is not, however, our aim. Rather, we shall examine the phenomenology of action itself to see how the relation between will and reason comes to suggest such conflicting paths.

2   The problem of practical intentionality

Whatever else may belong to a philosophy of action, it is the intentionality of action that concerns phenomenology. Action is of interest to phenomenology insofar as it has, from the first-person perspective, a meaning.

Such meaning is partly captured in the idea of doing something "intentionally": I intentionally served the tennis ball, but I did not intentionally put my opponent's eye out with it. But if acting intentionally implies that I have previously deliberated what I shall do, then the *intentionality* of action (the meaning it has from the first-person perspective) is not restricted to actions I do intentionally. For most of the actions I perform in daily life are not deliberated. In sitting down to write this chapter, for instance, I did not deliberate or consider my options; nor did I form a

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[2] On the primacy of the practical in Husserl see Ströker 1987 and Funke 1987.

plan. I got my coffee and sat down to write. My action clearly had a meaning for me – I "knew what I was doing"; I did not have to learn it from an outside observer – but it was not done on the basis of any explicitly formed intention. How is such meaningful, though non-deliberated, action to be understood? What is this kind of *practical* intentionality? Here we find the crux of the disagreement between Husserl and Heidegger.

In the *History of the Concept of Time*, Heidegger criticized Husserl's general approach to intentionality: instead of asking what intentionality *is* – that is, instead of reflecting phenomenologically on "the entity which is intentional" (GA 20, p. 152/110) – Husserl asks "how can consciousness become the possible object of an absolute science?" (GA 20, p. 147/107). Whatever the merits of Heidegger's criticism, it does bring a fundamental issue to light: Husserl holds consciousness – the temporally unified flow of mental processes (*Erlebnisse*) – to be *intrinsically* intentional, the basis for any investigation into intentionality. One might ask how the marks on this page get their semantic content – how they come to have meaning or refer to objects – and for Husserl any sufficient answer must appeal to "meaning-bestowing acts" of consciousness. But the buck stops there. To ask how conscious acts can mean or intend anything is to ask one question too many. For Heidegger, however, this is precisely the question that must be asked. Consciousness – the stream of *Erlebnisse* – is not intrinsically intentional; such a stream is intentional only if it belongs to an "entity which is intentional," namely Dasein.

Of course, that only pushes the question back a step: what is *Dasein*, such that it is intrinsically intentional? The answer to this question constitutes Heidegger's contribution to a phenomenology of *praxis.* It also provides the point of departure for his later self-criticism. Let us begin, then, by seeing how Husserl accounts for practical intentionality in terms of consciousness. We shall then examine the Heideggerian alternative.

3   Husserl on practical intentionality

Husserl treats questions of practical intentionality under the heading of "willing," and he marks the difference between acting intentionally and the intentionality of action by distinguishing between decision-will (*Entschlußwille*) and action-will (*Handlungswille*) (Hua 28, pp. 102ff., 111).[3] The former is the intentional "deciding" (*fiat*) that follows upon a more or less explicit deliberative process; the latter is the will that belongs

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[3] See also Melle 1992.

to the ongoing action itself. Following Searle (1983, p. 84), we may call this "intention-in-action." The key to Husserl's analysis of willing is his claim that intention-in-action has the same categorial structure as decision-will. Only so does it appear plausible that intention-in-action can be understood in terms of conscious acts. Thus we need to look more closely at how the categorial structure of decision-will constitutes the meaning of an action.

An action can have intentional content only if it is assessable against a norm – only, that is, if there is some standard for determining what it is supposed to be, and so what counts as belonging to the action. If there is no such standard, then action cannot be distinguished from mere movement. And the standard must be immanent to the act, since if it is completely external to the experience, then it is irrelevant for an account of practical *intentionality*. Now, it is easy to see how something done intentionally – following upon a decision-will – can have meaning, since my intention itself serves as the norm. A movement of my arm has no intrinsic meaning; it simply takes place. But if that movement follows upon a decision to revise my chapter, it can be assessed in normative terms – that is, as appropriate or inappropriate for realizing my intention. An action, in this sense, is an attempt to realize an intention, and for this reason what belongs to the action must not only conform to the norm but must also be done in light of that norm. To be an act of revising my chapter, it is not enough that my bodily movements realize that goal (as though I were a machine or a zombie). I must also be making such movements *in order to* revise my chapter. Decision-will, then, accounts for the intentionality of action because it determines what I am trying to do, and so establishes a norm according to which what I do is rationally assessable.

But what are we to say about an intention-in-action that does not follow upon a process of deliberation? Whence does it derive its normative orientation? Husserl's account purports to show that the very same acts of consciousness that establish the meaning of actions done intentionally are also responsible for the intentionality of non-deliberated action. There are three such essential act-types: perceiving, valuing, and willing.

To begin with perceiving: my decision to revise my chapter does not merely take place in the world; it takes the perceptual contours of that world into account in distinct ways. I see that the paper is over there, that the pen is full of ink, that the light is rather dim; I hear that the neighbors have quieted down; I feel that the chair I am sitting on is rickety; and so on. On Husserl's view it is crucial that these aspects of the perceptual situation are not merely given but are *taken as* given by me; that is, they

are perceptually *posited*. Such positing is not a matter of linguistically formulating a judgment that the posited is thus and so; I just see that it is. But positing *is* a kind of judgment in the widest sense: "Judgment in general," writes Husserl, is "doxic positing; for example, also perception" (Hua 37, p. 261). Only through such positing can anything be perceived *as* something, as meaningful. There is "an essential relation between objects in general and propositions [*Sätzen*] in general, propositions as pure meanings," because "only propositions are originally normal or anomalous, stand under the ultimate norms [*Ideen*] of truth and falsity" (Hua 37, pp. 260, 268–69). Nevertheless, "every act … carries within it an ideal meaning," because it posits what it intends. Only by being posited do the "natural" deliverances of sense experience become "normable." (Hua 37, p. 144).

A category, for instance, is a kind of norm or rule that establishes which future experiences count as of *the same* object, and only if sensation is "apperceived" (posited) in light of the categorial form, object-with-properties, can it be part of the *intentional* content of my experience (Hua 37, p. 139). Further, what is thus posited must be normatively assessable independent of any participation in my deliberations, for such independence characterizes this positing specifically as an act of *perceptual* intentionality. Thus, I might deliberate on whether there is "enough" ink in my pen to get the job done, but such a quality is not, strictly speaking, perceptual. Before such contextualization, perception of the pen is already "teleologically" oriented toward an objective grasp of what "truly is" – I *take* the pen to be empty, but closer inspection *corrects* that perception: it is in fact full.

The normative in perception helps to explain the intentionality of action, since it explains one way in which it can fail. If there is no ink in the pen that I perceive as full, then be my bodily movements otherwise what they may, I shall fail to revise my chapter. But action requires more than merely perceiving the situation in a certain way; I must be *moved* by it to act. And for Husserl, all motivation stems from feeling: "The practical behavior of human beings is manifestly determined by feeling. Were we to extinguish all feeling from the human breast, all our ethical concepts, concepts such as means and ends, good and bad, virtue and duty and all the ancillary concepts would lose their meaning" (Hua 37, p. 148). Here too Husserl distinguishes between feelings as passively undergone states and feelings as intentional acts. "Just as the data of sense are taken up apperceptively and become the sensible perception of spatial things … so also for sensible feelings, which in feeling-apperceptions based on

external perceptions exercise a transcendental function" (Hua 37, p. 223). By means of a certain apperceptive function, a feeling of dissatisfaction can become a desire *for* something – say, a revised chapter.

Desire thus posits an intentional content, but in a distinctively affective way, namely, as valuable: the chapter-to-be-revised is grasped as *good*. Value-perception (*Wertnehmen*) is, like sense-perception (*Wahrnehmen*), a positing of something as thus-and-so; it is therefore "normable." That is, affective evaluating, like perception, is "a mixture of genuine value-apprehension and value-anticipation, mere value-intending, which may be confirmed or disconfirmed in the further course of experiential running-through of the perceptual object and in a consistent feeling-through [*Durchfühlen*] of it" (Hua 37, p. 223). Unlike perception, however, affective grasp of value has intrinsic motivational force. For Husserl, both aspects of feeling are necessary for practical intentionality. Without the motivating force it would be impossible to explain what distinguishes such intentionality from mere belief – for example, that a revised chapter is good – but if the motivation were not itself subject to a norm, the contribution of feeling to action would not be a matter of intentionality at all.

With these two acts at its basis, the act of will contributes to practical intentionality by positing what Husserl calls a "practical possibility." In deliberating, I posit a possibility – "I could revise my chapter" – in a manner that "belongs specifically to the sphere of will" (Hua 37, p. 231). Such positing is not mere cognitive registration ("It is possible for me to do so; I possess the skill"); rather, it is a kind of preference. But it is also distinct from *affective* preference. "The preferring accomplished by feeling presents one of the affective values as the affectively preferable, as better." For instance, right now I might affectively prefer surfing over revising my chapter. But "the preferring accomplished in willing presents that which has already been evaluated as better as the practically preferable; in it one of the practical possibilities is not merely there consciously as a practical good, just as the other one is also, but as practically the best and ultimately as obligatory" (Hua 37, p. 231). Thus an act of will posits in light of its own norm. What is given to it through *Wahrnehmen* and *Wertnehmen* is apperceived in light of what *ought* to be done. Both surfing and revising my chapter are genuinely valuable; neither desire desires something "incorrectly" in the sense of mistakenly aiming at something bad. But in willing, my affective preference for surfing is assessed against the further norm of what ought to be done. In willing, then, I must be in a position to discern whether my affective preference conforms to the objectively higher value,

which in turn ought (rationally) to motivate what I do. My decision-will is correct if it conforms to this hierarchy, and the action that follows upon it has intentional content because it is assessable in these ways.

Having sketched the categorial structure of acting intentionally, we may return to the original question: if acting intentionally is meaningful because it can be normatively assessed, and if such normativity gets a grip on the action thanks to the three conscious act-types that enter into my decision, how are we to understand the intentionality of those actions that are *not* preceded by explicit intendings?

Karl Mertens has neatly identified both Husserl's answer here and a significant problem with it. On the one hand, Husserl claims that even if an explicit intention has not preceded a given action, phenomenological reflection can distinguish between what I am trying to do and what I actually do (Mertens 1998, p. 132). Thus, intention-in-action has the same categorial structure that belongs to planning and is thus rationally assessable in the same terms. On the other hand, such reflection also acknowledges that intention-in-action lacks the *temporal* distinction between intention and fulfillment that characterizes decision-will. Thus Husserl's answer "relies on a non-descriptive differentiation between will-intention and corresponding fulfilling action" and "no longer follows an authentically phenomenological program." Evidence that Husserl's answer is a construction, not a description, is that on this view it would be impossible for "a volitional action to surprise its agent," whereas "this does in fact happen" (Mertens 1998, pp. 133, 129n. 46).

But then, what is it about such an action that makes it the case that I am trying to do anything in particular? Whence come the norms in light of which I must act if what I do is to possess a genuinely intentional character? What is needed is an approach to the categorial structure of action that arises from a description of *non-deliberated* action, and this is just what Heidegger provides. For Heidegger starts from the phenomenon of *trying* rather than from deliberating and planning. Whereas the latter suggest an analysis in terms of specific acts of consciousness, the former requires a distinction, not found in Husserl's account, between trying to *do* something and trying to *be* something.

Anticipating a fuller discussion below, we might put Heidegger's point this way: intention-in-action depends on what I am trying to do, and trying to do something is a matter of exercising a certain skill or ability. Thus intention-in-action depends not on what I intend (consciously) to do, but on what I am trying to be, since exercising a skill is trying to *be something*. This addresses Mertens' point because, unlike trying to

do something, trying to be something is not assessed in terms of what it (futurally) brings about, but in light of what it (ongoingly) is. In exercising the skills involved in revising my chapter, for instance, I aim futurally at a revised chapter; revising my chapter is what I am trying to do. But exercising such skills is not, in turn, futural; it is a way of *being* a writer, and it is precisely in exercising the skill – not in projecting its future fulfillment – that the intention-in-action is constituted. Nor could any conscious act of future-directed "intending" make my actions be those of a writer. I cannot intend to revise my chapter, then, unless I am already able to be a writer. Nor is this ability merely mechanical; it is an intentional orientation toward the world, responsive to norms.

Heidegger's advance over Husserl thus involves reversing the terms: the intentionality of deliberation does not explain the intentionality of non-deliberated action but is explained by it. To appreciate what this means – and to prepare the ground for Heidegger's later self-criticism – we must look more closely at a key point in Husserl's phenomenology of intention-in-action, namely, the "positing" character of the cognitive, affective, and volitional acts that constitute it. For Heidegger does not dispute that action involves such positing; rather, he claims that because Husserl starts with the phenomenon of deliberation, he overlooks the ontological ground that makes such positing possible: Dasein as *care*.

4   Husserl and Heidegger on the possibility of positing

Without positings and the normative assessment they enable, neither perceiving nor feeling nor volition can have intentional content. On Husserl's view, these three act-types must be assessable independently of one another, but Heidegger contests this. For him, perceptual and affective life can be normatively assessed only in the context of *praxis* (everyday being-in-the-world). To see why, let us consider each in turn.

Perception involves sensation, but sensations do not exhibit normative relations. They come to do so, on Husserl's view, because the perceiving ego can establish rule-governed correlations between its own kinaesthetic sensations and changing conditions in the visual field, such that color-appearings (say) come to "fluctuate around a norm" or an optimum, the "true" color of the object (Hua 4, pp. 55–75/60–80).[4] What must the ego be, in order to do this? The ego-involvement necessary for

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[4] The phrase "fluctuate around a norm" is Merleau-Ponty's. For an instructive discussion of color, see Murata 1992.

apperceiving an ongoing process of sensation in light of the categorial form, object-with-properties, would seem to involve more than an act of perceiving. The true color is constituted by normal conditions (direct sunlight, clear air) and by a body functioning normally (not diseased or damaged). In both cases, what counts as "normal" cannot be established merely by reference to the act of perceiving. Further, what counts as an optimal view of anything (say, a painting) depends on the project in which the ego is engaged. Mere looking, for instance, will involve different intentional contents depending on whether I am trying to appreciate the painting's aesthetic qualities or to restore a damaged section of its canvas. Thus, it is far from obvious that perceiving, considered as a conscious act, can be intrinsically intentional. Heidegger puts the point this way: it may be that "'there is' something available [*Zuhandenes*] only on the basis of something extant [*Vorhandenem*]," but this does not mean that "availability is ontologically founded upon extantness" (GA 2, p. 96/71/101). Phenomenological reflection on the way things show up in my practical dealings does reveal that they are "there" with perceptual qualities that do not depend on my aims and goals: colors, shapes, and the like. Yet this does not mean that positing them in this way is phenomenologically independent of the context of my practices, as it would have to be if practical intentionality were *founded* on perception.

For Heidegger, perceptual intentionality is not an act of consciousness but "a structure of the self-comporting subject" (GA 24, p. 85/61), and its specific intentional object – the "perceivedness of the perceived" – "belongs to this perceptual intentional comportment" (GA 24, pp. 98/69). It belongs to it because only such self-comporting subjectivity is intrinsically *norm-responsive*. Responsiveness to norms, as I have argued in Part III above, is what Heidegger calls "understanding of being." For instance, if merely perceptual properties of an object (e.g., the true color) – which Heidegger collectively terms the "extant" – are to be "uncovered," there must be a norm, "prescribed in the perceiving itself," through which experience is "regulated and prescribed." This means that "the perceptual uncovering of the extant must already understand beforehand something like extantness" (GA 24, p. 99/70). But while such understanding of extantness is "prescribed in the perceiving itself," it is not prescribed *by perception*; rather "in this understanding what extantness means is unveiled, laid open, or, as we say, disclosed" (GA 24, p. 100/71). To disclose what extantness means is not, however, to engage in "*one* possible kind of cognizing among others" (GA 2, p. 190/143/182), since understanding is not a conscious act but a kind of know-how, an "ability-to-be" (*Seinkönnen*).

Thus "perceivedness is grounded in the understanding of extantness" (GA 24, p. 101/71), where "understanding" is self-comportment, a kind of "competence over … being as existing" (GA 2, p. 190/143/183).

What is true of perception holds of feeling as well. Husserl contrasts passive feeling, which is not intentional, with "affective evaluating," which discloses value-properties of things. "Feelings *mean* something." In "every feeling is to be found an evaluating, which in each case can be a correct or an incorrect one, one that fits the object or is not fitting" (Hua 37, p. 181). The intentionality of feeling is founded on cognitive intentionality – perceptual positing of this object as a flower, for instance – but the "feeling ego" does not treat the value it posits (the flower's beauty) as something separate from the flower. Rather, it "has" the flower "only as that which in itself possesses the value character that is feelingly attributed to it" (Hua 37, pp. 180–81). Though beauty is not a "mere quality like red or blue," the affective experience of beauty admits of rational assessment. But what must the feeling ego be if it is to be capable of positing objective values? In particular, does such positing belong to the act of feeling as such, independent of how the ego is otherwise practically engaged with the object? Are the norms of evaluation (the "good") independent of the norms of *praxis* (the "right")? One may doubt it. For instance, when I take pleasure in using my pen, I affectively evaluate it as good. But such goodness pertains to the function of the pen, what it is supposed to do: it does its job well. Such a value-property is independent of any affective evaluation (I need not take pleasure in it to posit the pen as good); nor is it intelligible except by reference to norms of practice. Thus an ego capable of positing the pen's objective value need not be a feeling ego at all, nor could it be *merely* a feeling ego – any more than an ego capable of positing the color of the pen as the pen's color could be merely a perceiving one.

But perhaps the example is prejudicial. For Husserl, a paradigm case of *Wertnehmen* is the joy and approbation I feel in witnessing an act of mother-love. I do not merely feel joy, but in so feeling *posit* the act as good and valuable; and if I am indifferent to such things I have failed to disclose the objective or true value that the object possesses. But is it correct to say that this is a failure of *feeling*? As in the case of perception, the ego-activity that distinguishes value-positing from mere feeling would seem to involve more than affect alone. Mother-love is a good thing because it is good for a variety of other things – raising children, fostering sociality, or whatever. There are animals who kill some of their young at birth. How am I supposed to feel about that, and would I feel differently were I such an animal?

For Husserl, feeling is subject to rational assessment because the value it posits is given in terms of the categorial distinction between what is genuinely (or "intuitively") grasped and what is merely "emptily" intended, adumbrated as subject to confirmation or disconfirmation in further affective experience (*Durchfühlen*). As I continue to experience the facets of what is exhibiting itself as mother-love, my feeling of approbation maintains itself, continually confirming the act's value. A discordant aspect would, "rationally," yield a feeling of disapprobation. But such confirmation cannot be a matter of feeling alone. Unless I grasp the practical meaning of the act – that is, unless I recognize that the mother is behaving as a mother ought – I shall not even be able to say whether what she is doing is mothering, let alone whether it is good. Husserl might respond that this shows only that correctness of feeling is founded on perception, but as we have seen, perceptual intentionality itself depends on its embeddedness in *praxis*. The norm that serves as the standard for evaluating correctness of feeling must likewise derive from that practical context.

Though the issues are complex, these examples suggest the phenomenological basis for Heidegger's criticism: the norms that make perceptual and affective positing possible do not belong to them as acts of consciousness but only as aspects of practices. By holding acts of consciousness to be intrinsically intentional, Husserl cannot do justice to what it is about the ego that makes positing possible – that is, marks the difference between passive "nature" and the intentional space of meaning. Heidegger insists on a reversal of perspective: it is only by starting with the ego of willing – that is, with the phenomenon of intention-in-action – that the intentional content of perceiving and feeling becomes intelligible.

This reversal is carried out in *Being and Time*, where intention-in-action is termed "circumspection" (*Umsicht*), the kind of "sight" that belongs to Dasein's practical engagement with things (GA 2, p. 93/69/98). What for Husserl were independent strata posited by distinct acts of consciousness are, in Heidegger's holistic account, functions of Dasein's practical comportment. Thus the "practical possibility" posited in willing is not built upon a perceptual and affective grasp of the situation, as it might seem from the standpoint of deliberation; rather perceptual and affective grasp of things *as* thus and so depends on my practical possibility, which Heidegger calls "the work." "That with which we concern ourselves primarily is the work – that which is to be produced at the time." And the work, Heidegger continues, "bears within it that referential totality within which equipment is encountered" (GA 2, p. 94/69–70/99). It can bear such a referential totality within it because the work establishes a

normative space (the in-order-to) for evaluating aspects of my comportment. Comporting myself toward the work – the chapter to be revised – establishes what is appropriate or inappropriate to do, and it is in light of this circumspective concern that perceptual and affective properties of things first come within the scope of the normative, such that they can be posited *as* true, objective, good, and the like.

The pen is "full" of ink; as ready-to-hand the pen is circumspectively posited as truly being full. But the norm that governs such positing is inseparable from the in-order-to: it is *full enough* to last the day. When I pick it up to write, I might discover that the ink was only coating the sides of the hollow tube and that there's really little ink in the pen, thus disconfirming the perceptually posited property. But it makes no sense to say that the act of perception contains such a norm within itself. The same is true of value-positing. Given that I am revising my chapter, things show themselves as "good for" this and that. This fine-tipped pen is good for writing notes in the margin; my revisions proceed smoothly and I am affectively satisfied. Using the same pen for addressing a big cardboard mailing box, however, is accompanied by feelings of frustration. My feeling posits the value of the pen, but its intentional content cannot be assessed apart from a specific practical context. Without such a context, feeling reveals nothing more than what is felt; it does not point beyond itself. As Heidegger argues, affective intentionality is made possible by a prior disclosedness of "being-in-the-world as a whole," such that "entities in the world 'matter' to it in a way which its moods have outlined in advance" (GA 2, p. 183/137/177). It is this affectedness (*Befindlichkeit*) that gives circumspection its axiological tenor. Fearing, for instance, is not the result of a feeling-consciousness that grasps the disvalue of the tiger coming at me; it is a kind of affectedness thanks to which "what we have thus characterized as threatening is freed and allowed to matter to us" (GA 2, p. 187/141/180).

But if Heidegger's notion of the work and its instrumental totality accommodates Husserl's concept of willing as positing of practical possibilities, his phenomenology of intention-in-action (circumspection) goes further. For what I am doing cannot be sufficiently determined by reference to the work alone. Rather, what I am trying to do depends on what I am trying to be. In Heidegger's language, the instrumental "totality of involvements itself goes back ultimately to a 'towards-which' in which there is no further involvement" – namely, to a "'for-the-sake-of-which'," which "always pertains to the being of Dasein." Why? Because only Dasein is a being "in whose being that very being is for it essentially an *issue*" (GA 2, p. 113/84/116–17). Dasein is intrinsically intentional

because its very being is to *try to be* something. This is what Heidegger means by "care" (*Sorge*), and in defining "the entity which is intentional" not as consciousness but as care, Heidegger addresses a serious lacuna in Husserl's account – namely, by providing an explanation of how experience can involve a normative dimension at all.

Only if the ego is defined as being an issue for itself, rather than merely as being conscious of itself, is it possible to account for the normative *force* of norms. It is one thing to be conscious of norms (even to be conscious of them as norms); it is quite another to be gripped by them. Only if the *experiencer* is a being of a certain kind can normative evaluation get a grip on *experiences*. In Heidegger's terms, the experiencer must exist "for the sake of" some "ability-to-be" at which it can succeed or fail. Such existing is not a conscious act but an ability I exercise: trying. For instance, it is only because I am trying to be a writer that the norms governing the instrumental totality around the "work" of revising my chapter exert normative force on me. To try is to exist for the sake of being a writer, to commit myself to the norms that constitute that role or practice. Were I not committed to being a writer, what I am *doing* could not be determined. Am I revising my chapter or creating an artwork? At bottom, the intentionality of willing does not have the form of future orientation; it is not (or at least not exclusively) telic. It is only because I am (ongoingly, "atelically") conforming my behavior to the norms of a certain practice for the sake of which I am, that what I am ("telically") doing can be determined: I am trying to revise a chapter; I am not trying to make an artwork. In this way, even an action that does not follow from deliberation can be said to be oriented toward some specific future fulfillment. Indeed, deliberation is itself a form of practical comportment, and thus the intentionality of decision-will itself depends on care.[5]

Though there is much more to say about Heidegger's account of practical intentionality, this last point brings us to the goal of our examination of Husserl and Heidegger – namely, the goal of identifying, in their respective phenomenologies of willing, the basis for their contrasting estimation of the scope of reason.

5   Practical reason and life as striving

Husserl's account of the relations between reason and will follows from his idea that intentional act-types (perceiving, feeling, and willing) are

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[5] Heidegger's account of deliberation will be further analyzed in Chapter 13 below.

independently normatively assessable. Because perception is teleologic-
ally oriented toward a grasp of what truly is, my practical determinations
of fact are already reasons for me to act in one way or another; that is, I
can appeal to them not merely as explaining my behavior, but as *justifying*
it. The apparent emptiness of my pen is not merely a fact but something
that justifies a certain course of action, a reason for looking more closely.
Similarly, because feelings are teleologically oriented toward a grasp of
what is truly good or valuable, my dissatisfaction at the state of my unre-
vised chapter is already a reason, something that justifies my being moved
to take measures, since being so moved will make the chapter "better."
And finally, because my willing is already teleologically oriented toward
what truly ought to be done, my practical preference for revising my paper
is already a justification for doing so, a reason. My intention-in-action,
then, can be understood as rationally justified insofar as the various com-
ponent acts exhibit the proper normative relations, and when I deliberate,
I am rational if my reasoning correctly takes note of these relations. To do
so is to attempt to "do the best that is possible for me" under the circum-
stances (Hua 37, p. 252).[6]

At this point, however, Husserl's reflection on the relation between rea-
son and will takes a significant turn. For if perceiving, feeling, and willing
each has its own normative *telos*, they are nevertheless all unified *practic-
ally*, since "all life accomplishes itself in striving" (Hua 37, p. 248). Even
animal life is willing and striving in this sense, but for Husserl human life
is "radically different" (Hua 37, p. 239). An animal acts rationally if it does
what it ought to do under the circumstances – that is, if its striving corres-
ponds to the norm of willing. But the fact that the ought can become a *rea-
son* for me means that, in contrast to other animals, I am "self-regulating"
(Hua 37, p. 240). Human willing, like animal willing, is oriented toward
goals but differs in that "it can be oriented toward rational goals, of whose
conformity to norms it can become conscious" (Hua 37, p. 240). And this,
in turn, means that the norms governing willing govern not merely this
or that action but "life as a whole."

When Husserl speaks here of the human "capacity for self-fashioning
[*Selbstgestaltung*]" (Hua 37, p. 240) – for gathering one's life as a whole
under a certain practical norm – he implicitly recognizes Heidegger's dis-
tinction between doing and being. For Heidegger, this distinction informs

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[6] John Drummond has developed a sophisticated account of practical rationality along
broadly Husserlian lines. See, for instance, Drummond 1995, 2006, 2008. Unfortunately,
a critical examination of this important work is beyond the scope of the present chapter.

every action: in revising my chapter (doing) I act for the sake of being a writer. For Husserl, however, this structure makes its appearance only at the meta level: if, in what I do, I "also" act in light of the very possibility of rational regulation – that is, if my willing "is oriented toward rationality" and if my act is "willed *in* its rationality" (Hua 37, p. 251) – then on pain of infinite regress this cannot be a second doing but must be a mode of being; in Heidegger's terms, a *project*: existing for-the-sake-of being rational. It is as though Husserl recognized being rational as the sole for-the-sake-of. And thus for Husserl, too, practical intentionality ultimately depends not on the individual conscious acts of perceiving, feeling, and willing but on a certain ability-to-be – namely, to be rational, to take responsibility for normative assessment.[7]

In keeping with his starting point in the phenomenon of deliberation, however, Husserl conceives this project as something like a *choice* which, when made repeatedly, becomes a *habit*. The concepts of self-regulation and self-fashioning are glossed as acts of consciousness, and for this reason what it means to be rational retains the trace of something futural: an "infinite task" that can be understood only as the goal of history and culture as a whole. Thus practical reason appears both as the practice of reasoning – in which I (ongoingly, atelically) exercise my capacity for rationality more or less successfully – *and* as a system of absolutely fulfilled norms of the various act-types, projected into an infinite future. As early as the 1911 essay, "Philosophy as Rigorous Science," Husserl struggled with the paradoxes of this view of practical rationality: *praxis* requires me to be able to act rationally now, but what it is to act rationally must be determined by science, whose goal is in the infinite (Hua 25, pp. 56–60/140–45). The philosopher is the one who embodies this paradox: the ultimately rational way of *being* is to *do* science, that is, to will the "practical possibility" of theoretically inquiring into our ultimate values and norms. But whatever one thinks about the role of philosophers as functionaries of mankind, this is to misconstrue what is distinctively practical about practical reason.

By recognizing that the for-the-sake-of belongs to the very structure of action, Heidegger is better able to do justice to the practical character of reason. For him, as for Husserl, the reasons we consider when deliberating are grounded in our perceptual, affective, and volitional experiences, even if he denies that the intentionality of these experiences is indigenous

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[7] For a more nuanced account of Husserl's idea of the *telos* of life as a whole, see Melle 2002.

to them as acts of consciousness. My existing for the sake of being a writer provides me with standards of success or failure in light of which I can deliberate about what to do: I perceive that the deadline approaches, so I take that as a reason to work on my chapter; I feel unsatisfied with the second paragraph, so I take that as a reason to make it better; I consider my options for improving it, and I "practically prefer" adding a footnote to clotting the text with examples, so this becomes a reason to do the former. From *within* a particular project of being (a writer, father, philosopher), Heidegger's phenomenology of reasoning and deliberation is largely identical to Husserl's.[8] But if, for Husserl, it is the rational structure of the underlying acts that makes such deliberation and reason-giving possible, for Heidegger there is no such underlying rational structure. It is only because Dasein is a being of a certain sort – a being in whose being that being is an issue for it – that there can be such reason-giving. It is Dasein's capacity for authenticity, not its capacity for deliberation or reasoning, that makes reason-giving possible.

If the deliverances of my perceptual and affective "nature" do not, from the start, have the form of reasons, what must happen if they are to take on such a form? Heidegger's answer appeals to Dasein's care structure. If I can commit myself to being a writer – exercise the skill or ability by conforming my behavior to its standards – this is only because I can take responsibility for those standards, act for the sake of them. The concept of authenticity is meant to capture the ontological ground of such responsibility. More specifically, the question of how perceptions and affects can become reasons finds an answer in Heidegger's analysis of conscience. As we have seen, considered ontologically conscience is the mode of discourse that "articulates the intelligibility" of the sort of self-understanding that characterizes *existing*, the "I am," as such (GA 2, p. 373/281/326). What conscience "gives to understand" is that I am "guilty," where such guilt does not rest on the transgression of any "ought or law" (GA 2, p. 376/283/328). It is prior to all such norms, since it expresses what it means to assess oneself in normative terms at all, to enter into normative space. Heidegger makes this point by defining guilt as existing in such a way that, in being "thrown" into the world, Dasein both can and must "take over being-a-ground" (GA 2, p. 378/284–85/330).

What does it mean to take over being-a-ground? As I have argued above, it means that I take responsibility for my facticity (nature, thrownness) by treating my perceptual and affective experiences as possible reasons for

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[8] See Chapter 13 below.

what I do. Rather than being beholden to the givens of its situation as though they were causes, it is a necessary aspect of a being in whose being that being is an issue for it that such givens are "possibilized," *at issue*. To be at issue is to have the character of a *claim*, and when something makes a claim on me I must "take it over" either by endorsing or by rejecting it. In so doing *I* become a ground. But in what sense does such endorsement or rejection constitute a claim as a *reason*? Again, as we have seen, Heidegger answers this question with reference to Plato's idea of the Good. To take responsibility for one's factic nature is to take it up it in light of the very *idea* of normative assessment: "The essence of the *agathon* lies in its sovereignty over itself as *hou heneka* – as the 'for-the-sake-of …'." Expressed Platonically, "the *agathon* is that *hexis* (sovereign power) that is sovereign with respect to the possibility (in the sense of enabling) of truth, understanding, and even being" (GA 9, p. 160/124). Thus it is because I am the kind of being who can and must exist for-the-sake-of being-a-ground – that is, be responsible, understand myself in light of a measure of better and worse (*agathon*) – that I can take aspects of the world (perceptions, affects) as grounds, that is, as *justifying reasons*. It is not because my experiences have a rational structure that I can act responsibly (rationally) by conforming my practices to the reason inherent in them; rather it is because I can be responsible that I can treat my perceptual and affective experiences as potentially justifying reasons, that is, as things that speak for or against my beliefs and intentions, as positings responsive to norms.

Thus, for Heidegger, practice involves not merely orientation toward a goal but also commitment to oneself as being-for-the-sake-of some practical identity; and this, in turn, establishes a necessary connection between will and reason. To act – whether authentically or inauthentically – is to commit oneself to norms of being (a writer) and doing (revising this chapter), and this is *already* to treat the givens of my situation as reasons. For Heidegger, as for Husserl, being responsible is necessarily connected to being rational, and rationality inheres in the very nature of practice. But it is precisely here that the later Heidegger purports to find a blind spot in his fundamental ontology, one that reconfigures the nexus between conscience and reason. Expressed in a formula, the account of conscience – of responsibility as taking over factic grounds as justifying reasons – does not do justice to the "justice" that such taking-over presupposes, to the norm in whose light the claims that things make on me are taken up precisely as *justifications*, reasons. In *Being and Time*, the precise way in which the givens of my situation become reasons is left unspecified, and Heidegger's gesture toward the *agathon* is little more

than a placeholder. But when the later Heidegger comes to see his own analysis of conscience (*Gewissen*) as complicit with the modern conception of subjectivity as "subjectness," self-securing certainty (*Gewissheit*), he can supply the missing piece: certainty understands itself as beholden to a norm – justice – which is "experienced on the basis of the justifying of security." However, the *origin* of this normative orientation is concealed: "Although this justice prevails as the essence of the truth of subjectivity, it is not … thought within the metaphysics of subjectivity as the truth of being" (GA 5, p. 245/183). The thinking capable of doing justice to justice as the "truth of being" – that is, as that which grants the horizon of will (practice), in light of which things are understood as justifications, reasons – no longer thinks in terms of will and reason at all, nor is it a philosophy of practice.

6   Practical reason and the truth of being

In Heidegger's later works, therefore, the two dimensions of practical philosophy – the ontological account of practical intentionality and the normative question of what to do in the face of the crisis – come apart. One reason for this is that Heidegger comes to believe that Dasein is *not* intrinsically intentional, any more than is consciousness. Dasein derives its openness to the world from the "truth of being," which enables it to be an issue for itself. Indeed, Heidegger criticizes the position of *Being and Time* in the same terms in which he criticized Husserl: rather than provide the ontological ground that makes intentionality possible, *Being and Time* asks how *Dasein* can show up as the object of a science.[9] In doing so it became tangled in what Heidegger now calls "thinking in terms of values," a kind of thinking which signals that things have undergone "a loss of being" (GA 5, p. 101/77). This becomes quite clear in an essay from this period, "The Word of Nietzsche, 'God is Dead'," in which we find a critique of the primacy of practice that came to expression in the phenomenology of *Being and Time*.

For Nietzsche, as for Husserl, life is essentially practical, that is, striving. For Husserl this striving is ultimately oriented toward rational

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[9] As Heidegger puts it in "Letter on Humanism," speaking of *Being and Time*: "In the poverty of its first breakthrough, the thinking that tries to advance thought into the truth of being brings only a small part of that wholly other dimension to language. This language even falsifies itself, for it does not yet succeed in retaining the help of phenomenological seeing while dispensing with the inappropriate concern with 'science' and 'research'" (GA 9, p. 357/271).

norms, while for Nietzsche it aims at "preservation-increase," but this difference is less important than it might appear, because both Husserl and Nietzsche conceive this striving as *value-positing*. Commenting on Nietzsche, Heidegger writes that the "essence of value is based on its being a viewpoint," and "as a viewpoint, value is always posited by a seeing and for a seeing"(GA 5, pp. 227–28/170). In what sense does seeing posit a value? To see something from a point of view is to see something in profile. But as a seeing of something *as* something, this profile must belong to a normatively ordered series of possible future profiles of the same thing. Thus to occupy a point of view cannot mean merely to be passively placed somewhere; rather it must involve a rule, must somehow take a stand on what matters – that is, it must *posit* a value: "Value is value provided it counts [*gilt*]. It counts provided it is posited as what matters." Further, "[i]t is so posited by aiming and keeping one's sight on what must be counted upon [*gerechnet*]" (GA 5, p. 228/170).

Heidegger's explanation of how value belongs to seeing as "viewpoint" holds of his own account of practical "sight" – circumspection – no less than it does of Husserl and Nietzsche. First of all, circumspection grasps things in light of the work to be done; thus it is oriented by a point of view that provides the normative context in which things can be assessed in terms of their appropriateness or inappropriateness. It is thus "a perspective that holds [*gilt*] as to be followed" (GA 5, p. 228/171) and so, in the broad terms of the Nietzsche essay, a value-positing. But since the circumspective point of view rests upon a for-the-sake-of, we should expect that the distinction between doing and being will also be drawn into the critique of "thinking in terms of value." And so it is.

To possess a circumspective point of view oriented toward the work to be done requires that I be for-the-sake-of some possibility for being; that is, that I conform myself to the norms of a practice through its exercise. In the Nietzsche essay Heidegger calls this aspect of the will "commanding" (*Befehlen*). "The will is not a desiring and not a simple striving for something; rather, willing is in itself a commanding" (GA 5, p. 234/175). Commanding has two components. First, to command is to hold sway over the "means" to what is so commanded. "Commanding has its essence in the fact that the master who commands is conscious that he has at his disposal the possibilities for effective action. What is commanded in the command is the realization of this disposal." To will, I must be able to *exercise* a certain skill, not merely "intend" it. But, second, command over the means is possible only for a being who can command *itself*: "In the command the one who commands … is obedient to this disposal

and to the being able to dispose, and in this way obeys himself" (GA 5, p. 234/174).

What does it mean to be "obedient to this … being able to dispose"? In fundamental-ontological terms, "being able to dispose" is a *Seinkönnen* – the ability-to-be for-the-sake-of-which I act. I can see things in light of the work of revising my chapter because I am able to dispose of being a writer, be for the sake of that. To be "obedient" to that is to commit myself to it; my ability to exercise a certain skill becomes *willing* only when I commit *myself* to acting in light of its norms. Thus to command is to "risk" oneself (GA 5, p. 234/175), to be an issue, at stake, for oneself. Willing is a "gathering oneself together for the task at hand," committing oneself to it; commanding. But in doing so, "[will] strives for what it wills not just as for something that it does not yet have. Will already has what it wills. For will wills its willing … Will wills itself" (GA 5, p. 234/175). Here, then, the atelic temporality of commitment is explicitly drawn into the framework of Heidegger's criticism of thinking in terms of values.

The will willing itself marks the place where the fundamental-ontological grounding of practical intentionality is found to be complicit with the "metaphysics of subjectness." It is also here that Heidegger discovers the missing piece in his phenomenology of practical intentionality – namely, an explanation for how responsibility (authenticity as responsiveness to norms as norms) gives rise precisely to reasons, why factic givens become possible justifications. The missing piece is that practice – the will willing its will – expresses the "essence of the subject" as "subjectness": certainty (*Gewissheit*). Subjectness is a "gathering of knowing" (*Versammlung von Wisssen*) and so "is *co-agitatio* (*cogitatio*), the *conscientia*, *Ge-wissen*, *conscience*" (that is, both consciousness and conscience), in which the subject "assures itself of itself, which means that it also constantly assures itself of what it has represented as a particular something"(GA 5, pp. 243–44/182). Reason finds its essence here. Something is a reason if it provides justification, *Rechtfertigung*; and something perceived, cognized, or felt provides justification if it has been taken over as a ground. For the later Heidegger, this means that it has been worked up (*fertigt*) in such a way that it is "made right" (*recht*, *richtig*) for the commanding-assuring of my project – that is, ultimately, for the securing of myself as subject.

This represents a radical transformation of the notion of a reason. For if, in the Husserlian context, a reason *establishes* the correctness of a given claim or intention, here "correctness" (*Richtigkeit*) has a different sense; namely, of something that has been corrected, made right, "normed" for the task: "Correctness consists now in adjusting all that is to be

represented to the standard that is posited in the claim to knowledge," a standard that Heidegger calls "justice [*Gerechtigkeit*]" (GA 5, p. 244/182). As self-securing – that is, as will, as practical – the subject is *in* the right, that is, "it justifies itself before the claim to justice that it itself has posited" (GA 5, p. 244/183).

But to be "in the right" does not mean that the subject is the source of that in whose normative light it stands. For Heidegger, uncovering the connection between conscience, subjectness, and reason shows that the norm from which practice lives – justice – is nothing *necessary*, but only its posited "value." From the point of view of willing, justice as justification is posited but does not *appear*, and its necessity consists entirely in this non-appearance. But this is to say that such a point of view belongs to the crisis of our historical moment, to nihilism as the "loss of being." That justice (and so reason as justification) is the "truth of being" for our time is not something that a philosophy of *praxis* – the philosophy *of* our time – can think. But if that is so, then the normative task – to say what is to be done – must pass from practical philosophy to a thinking that eschews reason as *Recht-fertigung* and cultivates openness to the "mystery" of what grants measures such as justice. Whether such thinking can really float free of the kind of responsibility and commitment analyzed in *Being and Time* without losing all intentional content remains, however, very much an open question.

Heidegger on practical reasoning, morality, and agency

1   Agency and practical reasoning

In his "Letter on Humanism" Heidegger writes: "We are still far from pondering the essence of action decisively enough. We view action only as causing an effect" (GA 9, p. 313/239). Of action, *praxis*, Aristotle noted that it is something "which is itself its end" and thus cannot be understood as a cause that brings something about.[1] Of course, action *does* bring things about, but that does not exhaust its meaning. It can be hard to find a way to talk about that meaning without falling into the language of causing and producing, but unless we do we shall miss Heidegger's contribution to the philosophical elucidation of practical reason. For that contribution does not lie in explaining what makes an action rational, what it is to act according to reason; rather it lies in clarifying, phenomenologically, what it is to be an *agent*. For this reason, if we wish to determine where morality fits in to Heidegger's ontology we should look not to the quality of character (virtue) or to the maxim of acts (duty) but to the nature of agency.

The concept of practical reason has roots in Aristotle's concept of *phronesis*. In contrast to that sort of reason – *episteme*, *theoria* – that has to do with what "is not even capable of being otherwise" (as in mathematics or metaphysics), *phronesis* concerns what is "capable of being otherwise" – above all, human affairs, ethics and politics (NE 1139b, 1140b). While this way of distinguishing practical from theoretical reason has its uses, it is too bound up with the details of Aristotle's metaphysics to be of much help in reading Heidegger.[2] But Aristotle offers another, more salient, way of distinguishing the two. Practical reasoning, deliberation, aims to reach a decision about what to do; it pursues a chain of inference that ceases when the reasoner "has brought the moving principle back to himself and to the ruling part of himself" (NE 1113a), whereby the reasoner becomes

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[1] *Nichomachean Ethics* (McKeon 1941, p. 1026). Henceforth cited in the text as NE, according to the pagination of the Bakker edition of the Greek text of Aristotle; here NE 1140b.

[2] For Heidegger's own discussion of this distinction, see GA 19, pp. 21–60/15–42.

a cause, that is, an *agent*. In the kind of causal thinking Heidegger criticized above, action (that is to say, the act) is identified as the cause that brings about some effect; for Aristotle, in contrast, it is the *agent* who is the cause insofar as he brings about the action. Heidegger registers this distinction with his claim that "the essence of action" is not causality but "accomplishment [*Vollbringen*]" (GA 9, p. 313/239). What then is the relation between practical reason and the accomplishment of action?

Phronesis is the virtue or excellence of practical reasoning; it is that which accomplishes *praxis*. But what makes practical reason itself possible, such that through it there is agency and not merely causality? Aristotle would find this question absurd – we are simply rational animals – but Heidegger tries to answer it. Prior to being *animal rationale*, Dasein is care (*Sorge*); thus Heidegger cannot take rationality for granted but must demonstrate its origin in that being "for whom, in its being, that very being is an *issue*" (GA 2, p. 16/12/32). For Heidegger, the roots of agency do not lie in *phronesis*, but in that which makes *phronesis* possible, namely, *Gewissen*: "conscience" as the "call of care" (GA 2, p. 364/274/319).

  To speak of conditions for the possibility of *phronesis* is to frame the discussion in Kantian terms, and in the matter of practical reason, as in all others, the Heidegger of *Being and Time* seeks to recover the insights of both Aristotelian and Kantian thought by way of phenomenology.[3] Though Kant, too, sees agency as a kind of causality, his understanding of practical reason augments Aristotle in a way that will be decisive for Heidegger's approach to morality. For Kant, "the will itself" *is* "practical reason itself" (Kant 1996, p. 13). Will (*Wille*), in this sense, is a normative notion; not choice itself but its *standard*, namely, whatever reason requires in a given situation. If my end can be attained only by carrying out a certain rationally determined series of actions, to carry out such actions is my *Wille*. But I may not carry them out; I may reason improperly about what is required or I may be inclined not to do what I know I must to attain what I (putatively) desire. These are matters not of *Wille* but of *Willkür*, choice that actually initiates some series of actions.

Kant's approach to morality focuses largely on *Wille*; Heidegger, in contrast, *has* no normative concept of practical reason. *Wille* is always only *Willkür*. The choice of what I ought to do is not normatively grounded in reason. "On what is it to resolve? *Only* the resolution itself can give the answer" (GA 2, p. 395/298/345). I can resolve upon something for a reason, but the normative force of this reason does not derive from its status

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3 Arguments for this claim can be found in Crowell 2001.

as a reason. Hence Heidegger's account of morality cannot be based, in Kantian fashion, on reason's character as law. Because agency is not the cause of some effect but the accomplishment of action, the concept of law is out of place. Nevertheless the determination of morality that arises from Heidegger's phenomenology of agency is closely aligned with his ontological understanding of practical reason. In arguing for this claim I shall develop further the idea suggested in Chapter 10: to be an agent is to relate to factic grounds as to justifying reasons, and because Dasein is *Mitsein*, agency also entails the unconditional – that is, moral – obligation to be *accountable* to others. A Heideggerian agent is thus one for whom practical reason, as reason-*giving*, is a moral obligation.

A leitmotif of my argument arises from dissatisfaction with one widespread interpretation of Heidegger's analytic of Dasein. Since the publication of Heidegger's lectures from the 1920s, it has become something of a commonplace to see *Being and Time* as an existential reworking of Aristotle's practical philosophy.[4] Gadamer's report that Heidegger identified *phronesis* with conscience (1976, p. 201) seems to authorize a reading according to which Division I provides a phenomenology of *poiesis* (making) and *praxis* (acting, doing), while Division II lays out *praxis* in its authentic mode, that is, *phronesis*.[5] But while it is certainly true that Aristotle's *Nichomachean Ethics* is central to Heidegger's thinking, this way of interpreting *Being and Time* is seriously misleading. For it fails to note how the systematic relation between Division I and Division II is governed by Heidegger's appropriation of Kant. Division I does comprise an ontologization of Aristotelian insights, but as such it already encompasses *phronesis*. Division II is only incidentally an account of the *phronemos*; essentially, it is an ontologization of Kantian insights not to be found in Aristotle. Rather than equating conscience and *phronesis*, Division II demonstrates that the former is the latter's *ground*.[6] *Phronesis*

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[4] Franco Volpi calls it an "ontologization of *praxis*" (2007, p. 40). See also Volpi 1988 and 1994, Kisiel 1993, and Vigo 2008.

[5] Heidegger himself says the following: "But it is nevertheless clear from the context … that Aristotle has here come across the phenomenon of conscience. *Phronesis* is nothing other than conscience set into motion [*das in Bewegung gesetzte Gewissen*], which makes an action transparent" (GA 19, p. 56/39). One should note, however, that Heidegger here identifies *phronesis* not with conscience full stop, but with "conscience set into motion." In section 4 below I shall argue that this distinction is decisive for understanding the role of conscience in *Being and Time*.

[6] My interpretation thus both agrees with, and departs significantly from, Hubert Dreyfus' reading of the relation between Division I and Division II. Dreyfus agrees with Kisiel that "Division I elaborates on *techne* (everyday skill) and Division II on *phronesis* (practical wisdom)," but he also holds that Division II's Kierkegaardianism allows Heidegger to

is an intellectual virtue of *praxis*; conscience, in contrast, belongs to an existential situation where neither deliberation nor *praxis* is possible. This is why Heidegger can say that "the existentiell possibility of 'being' *good*" – that is, of acting as the *phronemos* acts – can "subsist" only within "an essential consciencelessness" (GA 2, p. 382/288/334).

To understand what this means is to be in a position to assess the place of morality in *Being and Time*. Thus the following section of the chapter will show how Division I incorporates an analysis of *praxis*; the third section will construct the Heideggerian account of deliberation, together with its virtue, *phronesis*; and a final section will show how conscience provides the condition of possibility for minded action while entailing reason-giving as a moral obligation.

2   "Mindless" coping and the mindedness of action

In *Being and Time* Heidegger breaks with the intellectualistic and Cartesian understanding of the "subject," according to which the intelligibility of action is a function of thinking – of reflecting, planning, and representing to oneself. Thus Hubert Dreyfus once approvingly described the "everyday coping skills" of Dasein as "mindless" (1991, p. 3). In a debate with Dreyfus, John McDowell argued that even when there is no "spontaneity," no explicit reflection and thought, our behavior is not mindless coping but is "minded," that is, infused with the intelligibility that will subsequently serve as the basis for explicit thinking.[7] There are real issues at stake in this dispute, but others are merely terminological. For both McDowell and Dreyfus, action is "worldly" in Heidegger's sense – that is, possible only within a space of intelligibility or meaning. Thus, so long as we keep in mind that the ontologization of *praxis* in Division

recognize a phenomenon unknown to the Greeks, namely, "creation" or the "disclosure of a new world" (2004, pp. 266, 272). But while it is true that Division II provides an account of an aspect of *Existenz* that did not find expression in the philosophical vocabulary of the Greeks, this aspect is not properly understood as a new level of *skill*. As I shall argue below, Kisiel's judgment (partially endorsed by Dreyfus) that "Heidegger, in his account of resolute Dasein in Division II, is working out Aristotle's phenomenology of practical wisdom" cannot be correct, since that working-out is accomplished essentially already in Division I. But Dreyfus is right to see that Division II analyzes "what is required to make possible the virtuosity of the Heideggerian phronimos" (2004, pp. 269, 271). The crux of our disagreement lies in the fact that Dreyfus' reading fails to appreciate the role Kant plays in Division II.

[7] The exchange was occasioned by Dreyfus' APA Pacific Division Presidential Address (Dreyfus 2005), with subsequent entries in *Inquiry*: McDowell 2007a; Dreyfus 2007a; McDowell 2007b; and Dreyfus 2007b.

I is undertaken precisely to illuminate the "worldhood of the world" (GA 2, p. 85/63/91), it matters little whether we indicate the meaningfulness of action with the term "minded" (as we shall do here) or with some other term. It is important only that we understand rightly the relation between the meaningfulness of acting and the "totality of significance" that is world.

Heidegger begins his phenomenology of worldhood by noting that everyday Dasein is not a theoretician but deals with things practically. Things show up as "equipment" (*Zeug*), that is, in light of what they are good for. What they are good for is what they are used for. Thus, to grasp a pen *as* a pen is not to predicate something of it but to use it to write. I "encounter" a hammer *as* a hammer when I wield it in order to drive nails. The nails, in turn, are encountered *as* nails when I use them to fasten plywood to the joists. Equipment is thus possible only in a holistic context of "references or assignments" (GA 2, p. 100/74/105), and these references have a normative aspect: the pen is "appropriate for …"; the hammer is "suitable for …"; the nails are "serviceable for …". Such norms – that is, the standards of appropriateness, suitability, and serviceability – are relative to the work to be done. This fountain pen is appropriate for writing a letter but not for labeling a CD; this claw hammer is suitable for joining two-by-fours to frame a wall but not for joining the corners of a delicate picture frame; these tenpenny nails are serviceable for making a bookshelf but not for making a birdhouse.

Heidegger initially approaches worldhood through a phenomenology of work, that is, what Aristotle calls *poiesis*. This is not the whole story, however, for the work (*ergon*), that which is produced, is not sufficient to account for the norms that constitute the being (intelligibility) of equipment. These latter are relative to the work, but the work itself stands under a further norm, a measure of what it is *supposed* to be. Say I have produced a wooden artifact with huge nails sticking out on one side and another side barely attached by tiny brads. Is it a birdhouse or a work of art? As the former it is a dismal failure, but as the latter it might be wildly successful. And only if I "know" which it is can I encounter the nails as suitable or unsuited. In Heidegger's terms, the equipmental totality can be what it is only within a "totality of involvements" (*Bewandtnisganzheit*) that circumscribes *what* is being done or made (GA 2, p. 111/83/114).

The work belongs to this totality of involvements but it does not exhaust it; what the work is supposed to be refers back to that for the sake of which all these actions are being carried out. Heidegger writes: "But this totality of involvements itself goes back ultimately to a 'towards which' in

which there is *no* further involvement … The primary 'towards which' is a 'for-the-sake-of-which.' But the 'for-the-sake-of' always pertains to the being of *Dasein*, in whose being that very being is for it essentially an *issue*" (GA 2, p. 113/84/116–17). In other words, what is being made is determined by what *I* am *doing*. And what I am doing, in turn, is in an important sense determined by what I am *trying* to do.[8] The standards that govern the as-structure of equipment derive from such trying. Making is minded because in exercising a particular ability or skill I understand myself as up to something. "In understanding a context of relations … Dasein has assigned itself to an 'in-order-to' in terms of an ability-to-be [*Seinkönnen*] for the sake of which it itself is, whether explicitly or tacitly, authentically or inauthentically" (GA 2, p. 115/86/119). To "understand," in Heidegger's existential sense, is to try to *be* something, and in this I can succeed or fail. On this basis I shall hazard the following thesis: for Heidegger, the for-the-sake-of (*Worumwillen*) is the ultimate source of *all* particular norms.

The *Umwillen* is "a possibility of Dasein's being," where "possibility" is not something I represent to myself but something I am in the sense of something I am able to do. Possibility is an *ability* to be, whose modal character derives from the fact that it "is" only in being an *issue* for me, at stake – something I can succeed or fail at being in trying to be it. Being a lawyer, being a carpenter, being a father, teacher, lover, or friend: all of these are possibilities, that is, things that I am up to, capable of; roles and practices I engage in more or less ably. I join these boards in order to make a house, but it is for the sake of being a carpenter that I do it in *just* the *way* I do. Of course, I make the house in order to live in it, but that is not why I exercise myself in just the *way* I do; rather, it is because I am trying to *be* a carpenter, I am trying (and so perhaps failing) to live up to what the practice requires, acknowledging the claims they make on me. Only so do those requirements take on normative force (i.e., actually govern my

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[8] I would like to forestall one objection here. "What I am doing" can be distinguished from "what I am trying to do" in various ways. I might be trying to defuse a dispute between two people by conveying information to one of them, whereas what I am in fact doing is *enabling* that dispute because, unbeknownst to me, the information has implications that fuel it. In such cases (which of course are legion) the distinction between doing and trying is a distinction between third- and first-person perspectives on "the same" action. For our purposes, however, this distinction is irrelevant, since Heidegger's ontology of action is phenomenological, i.e., fundamentally first-personal. This is not the place to examine the validity of such an ontological approach in general, but it should be noted that it does not entail that what I am doing is always what I *think* I am doing. The reasons for this will be spelled out in section 3 below.

behavior). Thus, to understand myself as suspended between success and failure – to exist in a normative space – is possible only because my being is care. Here I shall posit a second thesis: *all* normative force depends on care.

Making (*poiesis*) rests upon this sort of existential possibility. Doing something in just the way I do exhibits my skill, my know-how. I know how a table is made; that is, I am able to make one. Such know-how is not necessarily something I can articulate theoretically, but it is not wholly mechanical either; it is *techne* or art. What distinguishes a carpenter from a carpenter ant is *art*, a kind of mindedness that stems from the way I understand myself in trying to be a carpenter. Carpenter ants can succeed or fail at making something, but only the carpenter can succeed or fail at what he is trying to *be*. The carpenter's skill or *techne* is an *intellectual* virtue, not mere instinct, because to try to be a carpenter is to act *in light* of the norms that govern the practice. The intelligibility of making, then, depends on norms that govern not only the product but the process, norms that govern what it is to be whatever Dasein is able to be.

This shows that Heidegger's analysis of everyday Dasein includes not only the principles of making but the principles of acting (*praxis*) as well. For being a father or a friend is a practical identity, but no one – least of all Heidegger – will confuse these with modes of making something. Being a good friend is not just knowing how to write a congratulatory letter but knowing when to write it, in what sort of medium, the character of the one to whom it is addressed, and so on. I may be able to write a congratulatory letter, but if I do so too late, or by email, or with rhetorical flourishes when its recipient dislikes verbosity, then, even if I have succeeded in making something, I have failed at being a friend. Being a friend is *praxis* – not a property of a subject but an existential project. Like *poiesis*, it involves a kind of know-how, an intellectual virtue; it is minded. Even if I don't think about it thematically, being a friend – that is, trying to be one – is not something I do mechanically; in understanding myself as a friend I act not merely in accord with the norms of friendship, but in light of them.[9] For Aristotle, the intellectual virtue that grasps the normative "light" that governs *praxis* is not *techne* but *phronesis*. Practical wisdom is the ability to carry out some project in the way that it is supposed to be

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[9] To speak of acting "in light of norms" does not entail that these norms are formulated anywhere; they not rules. Thus acting "immediately" (i.e., without explicit deliberation) is not incompatible with acting in light of norms rather than merely in accord with them. See section 3 below, and note 12.

carried out, the way that it is *best* carried out, that is, in such a way that the *praxis* is accomplished.

Thus both *techne* and *phronesis* belong within the scope of the for-the-sake-of analyzed in Division I of *Sein und Zeit*, and we have seen that the normativity upon which both depend derives from the ability to try to be something – that is, from care. If that is so, it should be possible to construct a Heideggerian account of deliberation already on the basis of Division I. Doing so will enable us to see why Heidegger needs Division II: not to describe the *phronemos* in ontological terms as authentic Dasein but to show how minded agency (and so also *phronesis*) is possible at all.

3   Deliberation and *das Man*

For the most part, I am absorbed in the world; *praxis* is, for the most part, simply going with the flow. But it often happens that my projects are disturbed by glitches and snags that disrupt the flow, major or minor breakdowns that make it difficult for me to go on. At such times I am forced to take stock of my situation, to reflect, to consider what should be done. At such times, I am forced to deliberate.

Heidegger says very little about deliberation. This has led one commentator to hold that Heidegger "banishes reason from human existence" and to deny that there is, in *Being and Time*, "anything remotely resembling" the concepts of "deliberation, reasons, norms" (Tugendhat 1986, p. 215).[10] This rather widespread view seems all the more plausible since Heidegger's analysis of choice and resoluteness, in particular, does not mention deliberation. It appears both decisionistic and solipsistic.[11] However, this view fails to understand the transcendental role that the analysis plays, which is precisely to specify the conditions of possibility for the picture of deliberation implicit in Division I. More broadly, the analysis of resoluteness establishes the ontological roots of practical reasoning itself.

Heidegger explicitly discusses deliberation in the section of *Being and Time* devoted to "the ontological genesis of the theoretical attitude," but the gist of the concept was introduced already in section 32 of Division I, "Understanding and Interpretation," which analyzes how the totality

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[10] See also Tugendhat 2001, p. 150. Volpi argues, somewhat less emphatically, that Heidegger's ontologization of *praxis* "produces, so to speak, the dissolution of its specific weight as acting, and the loss of the ethico-political character Aristotle gave to *praxis*" (2007, p. 43).

[11] For the charge of decisionism see Tugendhat 2001. Further oft-cited sources are Habermas 1987 and Wolin 1990. For the charge of solipsism see Volpi 2007, p. 46.

of involvements that is normatively grounded in my project comes to be made explicit: "Every preparing, putting to rights, repairing, improving, rounding-out, is accomplished in such a way that what is circumspectively available is taken apart [*auseinandergelegt*; interpreted] in its in-order-to and concerns us according to what becomes visible in this articulation" (GA 2, p. 198/149/189). Later, Heidegger links this sort of interpretation to the reasoning and reflection that formulates options for action when he defines "deliberating [*Überlegung*]" as "a specific way of bringing the object of concern close by interpreting it circumspectively" (GA 2, p. 475/359/410). He calls deliberation "circumspective" because its aim is practical; one engages in deliberation in order to get on with the task that has been interrupted. Thus, in contrast to "theorizing" – which "thematizes" or "objectifies" things "in such a way that they can 'throw themselves against' a pure discovering" (GA 2, p. 480/363/414) – deliberating *belongs to* the project in which Dasein is already engaged. Theorizing occasions a "change in being" in the entities it objectifies, a change from the available to the extant (GA 2, pp. 477–78/361/412). Deliberating, in contrast, is *embedded* in specific practices and thus draws upon the norms that belong to them. It "receives its 'light' from that ability-to-be on the part of Dasein *for the sake of which* concern exists as care" (GA 2, p. 475/359/410).

In everyday *praxis* I circumspectively comport myself toward things as a doctor, father, teacher, or friend – that is, I try to be these possibilities for being, to act in light of the norms that govern them. Within such comportment, Heidegger writes, "the scheme" peculiar to deliberation "is the 'if–then'; if this or that, for instance, is to be produced, put to use, or averted, then some ways and means, circumstances, or opportunities will be needed" (GA 2, p. 475/359/410). Heidegger does not mention reason explicitly, but he seems to conceive deliberation as instrumental reason. Does this mean that he conceives *praxis* in terms of *poiesis* after all? Can his analysis of deliberation accommodate acting without reducing the latter to a kind of making? Further reflection on Korsgaard's concept of practical identity will help us to see that it can.

Korsgaard defines "practical identity" as "a description under which you value yourself" (1996b, p. 101). To "value" yourself in a *practical* sense is not merely to take satisfaction in contemplating yourself under some description but to be motivated to act in a certain way. To value myself under some description is to act in light of the norms it involves, to want to live up to them and to try to do so. Thus practical identities give us reasons – in the sense of internal or motivating reasons – to do things (Korsgaard 1996b,

pp. 101–2). Because being a father is my practical identity, I have a reason to attend my son's violin recital rather than join the usual Wednesday night poker game with my friends. But don't I already have such a reason just because I *am* a father, even if I don't *value* myself under that description? To the extent that fatherhood is an institutionally defined condition rather than an existential project, I do "have" such a reason; but only if I care about fatherhood will that reason have normative force for me. And if I act on it without caring (say, because it is my duty), I shall still not fulfill the normative demands of being a father. I shall fail to be a good father because good fathers care about being fathers and so feel the normative force of the reasons stemming from their practical identities. They do not merely recognize such norms but are *beholden* to them, committed.

Thus interpreted, Korsgaard's concept of practical identity tracks Heidegger's for-the-sake-of and allows us to see that his account of deliberation need not be limited to the sort of instrumental reasoning characteristic of making. For if practical identities provide me with reasons for acting in a certain way, so too do Heideggerian "projects." This sort of reason is not well expressed as an in-order-to; I do not attend the violin recital in order to be a good father but for the sake of being one. *Phronesis* has to do with this sort of reason, a sort to which the *phronemos* is especially attuned. The importance of this distinction becomes clear if we look into what Aristotle says about choice.

Choice (*prohairesis*) "is the origin of action – its efficient, not its final cause"; and the "origin" of choice, in turn, is "desire and reasoning with a view to an end" – that is, desire and deliberation. Hence "choice cannot exist either without reason and intellect or without a moral state" (NE 1139a). More specifically, minded agency requires "reason and intellect" because it does not merely *tend* toward an end through desire but *chooses* it; that is, acts in light of "that which tends to attain what is good" (NE 1142b), the "sorts of things that conduce to the good life in general," the "things that are good and bad for man" (NE 1140a). To see the end in light of the good is itself a specific sort of practice, one whose excellence, Aristotle says, is "a kind of correctness" other than the correctness of "knowledge and opinion" – that is, other than the kind of correctness pertinent to formulated judgments and propositions. This practice is deliberation or, as Aristotle says, *thinking*, and practical wisdom (*phronesis*) is "correctness in thinking" (NE 1142b).[12]

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[12] Dreyfus is thus right to emphasize that *phronesis* (cultural expertise) is not ratiocination but rather "an immediate response to each situation" (2004, p. 268). But given Aristotle's

But there is no such thing as thinking in general, so deliberation is always thinking "with a view to" some *specific* desired end. If minded agency, *praxis*, concerns the good *life* rather than something made, whence comes its conception of what the good life is? It cannot come from practical wisdom, which is an excellence of thinking and not of what is thought. As Aristotle famously claimed, the end is given by character. For this reason, "choice cannot exist … without a moral state," that is, a character of some kind. Character is something like the *habitus* of my desires as a whole, that whereby I perceive the end (the good) in some particular circumstance where the issue is to bring the moving principle back to myself. Thus character seems close to Korsgaard's motivational sense of "to value oneself," which means that character will always be manifest in some particular practical identity for the sake of which I act: to be a good father, a good politician, a good teacher or friend. In deliberating I shall be guided by the norms of these roles. I shall make them explicit (within the limits of my ability to "think") as that in light of which I act, that to which I am, through my character, beholden – in short, as my *reasons*. Thus the reasons we draw upon in deliberation do not have the structure of instrumental reasons; instead, they provide normative justification for what I do – that is, they state not what must be done but what it is *best* to do in these circumstances, given a particular practical identity.

If it is in light of the norms of my practical identity that I have reasons to act in this way rather than that, then *all* deliberation will be tied, in Heidegger's terms, to *das Man* – the always historically and culturally specific way that things are normally (and in that sense normatively) taken for granted as being. For what counts as being a good father or friend can never be entirely divorced from the public norms that *currently* allow us to recognize fathers and friends. I can only try to be a father if I try to do what a father does – what anyone who is a father should do – that is, only if I do "what one does" (GA 2, pp. 168–69/126–27/164–65).[13] Heidegger's *das Man* embodies this necessarily anonymous, public character of practical

distinction between correctness in thinking and the correctness of explicitly formulated propositions, such immediacy does not exclude deliberation or thinking and can thus be an instance of acting in light of norms rather than merely in accord with them.

[13] There are several interrelated senses in which the phrase "what one does" may be understood – among them: (1) a sociological, third-person sense, the statistical norm, what is "normally" done; (2) a psychological, first-person sense: roughly, my *beliefs* about what the sociologically "normal" *is*; (3) an ontological sense, which I take to be Heidegger's, which involves the philosophically relevant ambiguity between what one really *ought* to do and "what one does" in sense (2).

identities and the norms that govern them. I can try to be a father in my own way, but if in so doing I cannot at all be recognized by others as trying to be a father, then I am not doing anything at all. I can transgress *some* of the norms that "everyone" knows to govern fatherhood (for instance, being the breadwinner) and still succeed in being a father; I may even reshape the norms to some extent.[14] But one cannot simply decide that "fatherhood" will henceforth mean, say, what we now mean by "baseball player." If I transgress too many of the current norms of being a father, I can neither succeed nor fail at being one. To "try" in the existential sense is not a matter of what I *think* I am doing. For even if I think that in pitching and batting I am trying to conform to the norms of fatherhood, that does not mean that I am failing at being a father. It just means that I'm crazy.

Thus we may add a third thesis to those posited in the previous section: one *always* deliberates from within *some* practical identity or other, or some combination of them. They alone give me justifying reasons to do X rather than Y. All practical reasoning – including moral reasoning – thus remains within the scope of current public norms. If, as Heidegger says, "the 'one' itself articulates the referential context of significance" – that is, world (GA 2, p. 172/129/167) – it is the "one-self" (*das Man-selbst*) who reasons and deliberates. Indeed, deliberation is nothing but the "thinking" part of one's practical identity. And since *phronesis* is the virtue or excellence of deliberation, *phronesis* too will always be tied to some practical identity, without which it could have no purchase on what that "good" *is*. This is the basis for Aristotle's claim that "it is impossible to be practically wise without being good" (NE 11144a). One must *be* a good doctor, friend, or citizen in order to possess the virtue of practical wisdom in relation to those things, since only the good father, friend, or citizen possesses the end to be attained in deliberation; only he knows "what makes him do

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[14] This is what is importantly correct in Dreyfus's claim that Heidegger's move beyond Aristotle lies in recognizing the possibility of "a cultural master" who can "disclose new worlds" (2004, p. 272). One need not hold that such "creative transformation" is an ability *toto caelo* distinct from the "expertise" of the *phronemos*, however; Dreyfus himself acknowledges that disclosing new worlds happens when the master "takes up a marginal practice from its cultural heritage and uses it to transform the present." The point is that the world cannot be *altogether* transformed; the new norms, and intelligibility, cannot arise out of whole cloth. But whether there is a radical distinction between expert and master is finally irrelevant, since the systematic role of the analysis of authenticity does not lie in a further development of the "skills and practices" focus of Division I but in an account of what, *beyond* practical abilities, I must be in order to be beholden to norms, to act in light of them.

his work well" (NE 1106a) because only he knows what it *is* to do his work well, where "knows what it is" means, in Heidegger's terms, "is able."

With this we have located the place of *phronesis* in *Being and Time*, but we have not made any reference to the account of authenticity in Division II. This is because authenticity is not a virtue in Aristotle's sense – intellectual or otherwise – but an existential condition in which I act in light of the fact that I am responsible for the normative force of the norms in light of which I act. And though there is a connection between this condition and *phronesis*, it is something for which Aristotle's account has no room. This can be seen if we recall Aristotle's discussion of what a virtue is.

Virtue, Aristotle says, is typically understood to be a "state which is in accordance with right reason." But this is not sufficient, since virtue is "not merely the state in accordance with right reason, but the state that implies the *presence* of right reason." In other words, virtue does not merely act in accord with the norms of one's practical identity but in light of them; that is, it acts with practical wisdom, since "*phronesis* is right reason about such matters" (NE 1144b). But – and this is the payoff of Aristotle's distinction between thinking, on the one hand, and knowledge and opinion, on the other – to act in light of such norms is to be *claimed* by them, to be beholden to their normative force; it is not necessarily to be able to articulate them as principles. The man of practical wisdom, then, acts in light of right reason as though it were inscribed in his character as "second nature" – that is, its normative force will feel as inevitable as what is entirely "by nature." But if it really were inevitable, justifying reasons could not be distinguished from causes and agency would disappear.

Let us recast these points in Heidegger's idiom. Minded agency occupies a continuum between "mindless" coping (inauthenticity) and anticipatory resoluteness (authenticity). At any place on this continuum the agent will be the one-self; that is, he or she will be acting in light of norms that govern a public – and to that extent anonymous and interchangeable – practical identity. The *phronemos* will be more adept than others in the kind of thinking that *praxis* involves; that is, he or she will be able to navigate the intricate demands and implications of the norms of the culture's practical identities more effortlessly than others can. Its nuances and complexities – and not just its platitudes – will be second nature to him or her. What distinguishes such agency from "first nature" is the fact that the *phronemos* is trying to live up to those norms, whereas nature doesn't try. But *this* distinction cannot be captured ontologically with the conceptual tools of Division I because the one-self just *is* the practical identity in which it finds itself. Such a practical identity *is* "first nature"

for it, since the one-self is finally nothing but a third-person anonymous role or practice.

What needs to be accounted for ontologically, then, is that it is *I myself* who acts, I myself who is able to try. As the one-self I have my reasons for what I do, but the one-self as such cannot really be distinguished from the carpenter ant who acts in accord with norms but not in light of them. If action is to be truly minded, intelligent, "one's" reasons have to be able to become "my" reasons in a stronger sense; the agent must be capable of a kind of responsibility that does not have the structure of an Aristotelian virtue. The Aristotelianism of Division I is adequate to the phenomenology of *phronesis*, but it is not adequate to the phenomenology of being I-myself, the genuine first-person stance.

4   Agency, morality, and the essential consciencelessness of action

Where does the Division I account of agency leave Heidegger vis-à-vis morality? Heidegger says very little about morality in *Being and Time*, and if one looks for an account of what our duties are, or of what is morally good or evil, one will find only what seems to be an irritating swerve from the topic. After remarking that "the concept of moral guilt" has not been "clarified ontologically" in previous philosophy (GA 2, p. 375/282–83/328), Heidegger asserts that Dasein's "essential being-guilty is … the existential condition for the possibility of the 'morally' good and for the 'morally' evil – that is, for morality in general and for the possible forms which this may take factically" (GA 2, p. 380/286/332). Heidegger never returns to the question of what is specific to moral guilt; nor does he say anything about the morally good and evil. Under these circumstances, one might try to construct these missing accounts.[15] On the other hand, if one attends to Heidegger's Kantian language here, one might be inclined to see his analysis of "essential being-guilty" as itself a contribution to moral philosophy, in the way that Kant's search for the ground of moral obligation in the *Groundwork* is such a contribution. This will be my approach. Completing the account of minded agency, Division II clarifies how it is that I-myself can be beholden to normative distinctions of better and worse, success and failure, and in so doing it uncovers the ground of a distinctly moral obligation.

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[15]   Some interesting, though very different, starts in this direction have been made by Hatab 2000; Hodge 1995; Marx 1987; Olafson 1998; and Schalow 1992.

What it means to say that being-guilty is the existential condition for the possibility of morality can be approached via Heidegger's putative equation between *phronesis* and conscience. In this regard Heidegger makes two intriguing claims: first, "factically … any taking-action is necessarily 'conscienceless'"; and second, "the existentiell possibility of *being*-'good'" is found only within "an essential consciencelessness" (GA 2, p. 382/288/334). Now if conscience were *phronesis* Heidegger would not be able to make these statements.[16] Even if one takes *phronesis* to be embodied only in the practice of explicit deliberation, it cannot be identified with conscience, since conscience does not deliberate – it does not "try to set going a 'soliloquy' in the self to which it has appealed" but rather discourses "in the mode of keeping silent" (GA 2, p. 368/277/322). It follows that *being*-good is also necessarily conscienceless. For Dasein to "be" something is not to have it as a property but to try to be it, that is, to act in light of its norms. If to be a carpenter, for instance, involves "taking-action" as a carpenter does, then to be a good carpenter is to accomplish, in taking action, an exemplary instance of what it means to be a carpenter. According to Heidegger, then, being-good at *anything* will involve a certain consciencelessness. But what is conscience, such that taking action and being-good essentially exclude it?

The passages about consciencelessness appear among a series of ontological equations in which Heidegger summarizes the phenomenology of conscience that he has provided earlier in the chapter (GA 2, p. 382/288/334). Conscience is a "call," a mode of discourse, and thus something "heard." To hear *discourse* is to *understand*. To understand, in the existential sense, is not to grasp thematically but to be able-to-be, to exercise an ability. Thus to hear is to do something: "Understanding the call is *choosing*." But it "is not a choosing of conscience, which as such cannot be chosen." One cannot choose when the call will call: "it comes from me and yet from beyond me and over me" (GA 2, p. 366/275/320). Instead, "what is chosen is *having*-a-conscience as being-free for one's ownmost being-guilty. *'Understanding the appeal'* means *'wanting-to-*

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[16] How then should we explain Heidegger's claim, noted above, that "*phronesis* is nothing other than conscience set into motion, which makes an action transparent" (GA 19, p. 56/39)? The key point is that conscience and *phronesis* are not equated; *phronesis* is "conscience set into motion." To set conscience in motion is, as I shall argue, to "take over" the "essential consciencelessness" of action. To make action "transparent" in this sense is to act in light of one's responsibility for the normative character (force) of those norms in light of which one acts. Conscience itself, however, belongs to the existential condition in which I *grasp* myself as responsible in this way; it is a mode of self-awareness that is possible only when I do not act.

have-a-conscience'." And it is precisely this wanting-to-have-a-conscience that "becomes the taking-over of that essential consciencelessness within which" all taking-action, all *praxis*, and so also any "existentiell possibility of *being*-'good' subsists."

What does it mean to take over the essential consciencelessness of *praxis*? In taking over – that is, in the choice that constitutes Dasein's understanding the call – "Dasein lets its ownmost self *take action in itself* in terms of that ability-to-be which it has chosen" (GA 2, p. 382/288/334). Taking-over is thus a kind of *doubling* of action: the "ability-to-be which [Dasein] has chosen" is nothing other than the practical identity as which it is engaged in a conscienceless way. Let us call this "choice₁." In hearing the call this is subtended by another doing – "understanding the call is choosing" – in which Dasein "lets its ownmost self" (that is, its "most primordial ability-to-be") "take action … *in terms of*" choice₁. Let us call this "choice₂." But Dasein's "most primordial ability-to-be" is "being-*guilty*" (GA 2, p. 382/288/334).

Wanting-to-have-a-conscience thus transforms everyday *praxis* (choice₁) by taking over its essential consciencelessness in light of my being-guilty (choice₂). Thus, everything depends on what *being*-guilty, in the phenomenological sense, means. As we have seen, Heidegger defines it as "taking over being-a-ground." To take over the essential consciencelessness of *praxis*, then – to understand the call of conscience – is to take over being-a-ground. What this means becomes clear only if we first understand how the phenomenon of conscience falls *outside* the continuum of minded agency, the continuum of essential consciencelessness that stretches from "mindless" coping to authenticity as anticipatory resoluteness, the state of *having* taken over being-a-ground.

Here we can be brief. Together with *Angst* and death, the call of conscience belongs to a liminal condition of the care structure (affectedness, understanding, and discourse), existential breakdown. In such breakdown I cannot act because my affectedness has alienated me from all those practical identities that provide me with the kind of motivational force necessary for minded agency: *Angst* "takes away from Dasein the possibility of understanding itself … in terms of the 'world' and the way things have been publicly interpreted"; I confront myself not as this or that but as sheer "being-possible" (GA 2, p. 249/187–88/232); public norms appear as lifeless facts, without normative force: "The world has the character of completely lacking significance" (GA 2, p. 247/186/231). Belonging to the affectedness of *Angst* is the existential ability-to-be (understanding) that Heidegger calls "death" – namely, "the possibility

of no longer being-able-to-be-there" (GA 2, p. 333/250/294). Death is the form that my self-understanding takes in *Angst*: to be aware of myself as sheer being-possible is to be aware of myself under no description – that is, to understand myself in terms of the "*impossibility* of being-there," where "being-there" means some practical identity. Hence there is a sense in which I can understand myself – that is, "be" someone – even when all my practical identities have fallen away, and with them all their (moral and non-moral) normative motivational force. Death is my ability-to-be *no one*, that is, to grasp myself in a radically first-personal way, to be I-myself as opposed to one-self.

This point is crucial for understanding the analysis of conscience. The third aspect of the care structure is discourse, which "articulates" understanding. Thus conscience, as discourse, articulates the self-understanding that belongs to existential death. According to Heidegger, this self-understanding is expressed as "Guilty!" (GA 2, p. 358/269/314). Such guilt does not derive from the transgression of any "ought or law" (GA 2, p. 376/283/328), since it is *nothing but* the articulation of death "the possibility of the impossibility of being-there"; that is, it articulates the being of first-person selfhood, what it means to be I-myself. And because Dasein's being is to-be, "guilty" is not a property of the subject in the way that, say, the pre-reflective *cogito* is for Sartre. Rather, it is something I must *try* to be. To be guilty is to try to be I-myself, and that, finally, is to try at taking over being-a-ground. This is what it means to take over the essential conscienceless of *praxis*, and it is this that brings comportment its mindedness, its beholdenness to norms as such.[17]

Heidegger glosses *being*-guilty in the following passage: "The Self which as such has to lay the ground for itself can *never* get that ground into its power; and yet, as existing, it *must* take over being-a-ground" (GA 2, p. 377/284/330). This "must" is not the must of obligation; rather, it

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[17] The crux of my disagreement with Dreyfus is found here, for his interpretation depends on seeing *two* kinds of anxiety in Division II, and so two levels of authenticity. I can find no textual justification for this reading. According to Dreyfus, the *phronemos* possesses the "anxiety of guilt" – i.e., "the sense that the everyday social norms of its society are thrown rather than grounded and so have no final authority" – but is not yet "fully authentic" because he does not face "the anxiety of death" – i.e., "that Dasein has to be ready at all times to give up its identity and its world altogether" (Dreyfus 2004, p. 271). While the sort of distinction Dreyfus draws between two kinds of anxiety is phenomenologically intelligible, Heidegger does not sever the meaning of "guilt" and "death" in this way because the point of his analysis is to uncover the ontological condition for what makes *praxis* – *any praxis*, not just some special form – possible, namely, my ability to be I-myself.

expresses the essential structure of selfhood as thrown projection. Dasein can "never come back behind its thrownness," and so the latter is something like a ground that Dasein "has not laid … itself" but "reposes in the weight of." We may think of such thrown grounds as reasons in the sense of causes or given conditions of my being – as, for instance, what Kant calls "inclinations." But Dasein, whose being is essentially an issue for it, does not possess its thrownness, its inclinations, as an apple possesses its color. Rather, Dasein "*is* this thrown ground … only in that it projects itself upon possibilities into which it has been thrown." This is what it means that Dasein *must* take over being-a-ground.

Heidegger continues: in being thrown, Dasein "has been *released* from its ground, *not through* itself but *to* itself, so as to be *as this ground*." Selfhood, being a self, is to be "the being of its ground," a ground that "is never anything but the ground for an entity whose being has to take over being-a-ground" (GA 2, p. 378/285/330–31). Taking over being-a-ground cannot mean that I create myself; my inclinations are not mine to create. Rather to take over the ground into which I am thrown is to see my inclinations in a *normative* light, that is, as "possible" rather than inevitable grounds of my behavior; it is to see them as potentially *justifying* reasons. In taking them over I become responsible for them either by making them my reasons or refusing to do so. Only by "understanding the call" in this sense can Dasein "*be* responsible [*verantwortlich*]" (GA 2, p. 382/288/334).[18]

We are now in a position to understand the concept of authenticity as "anticipatory resoluteness" (GA 2, p. 400/302/349). One might think of it this way: Aristotle has a one-level conception of action – *prohairesis* is choice in the sense of choice$_1$ above. *Phronesis* is excellence in such choices. Heidegger's notion of authentic choice, on the other hand, is two-tiered:

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[18] How does this notion of responsibility square with Heidegger's "formalization" of the concept of guilt as "being the ground of a nullity" (GA 2, p. 376/283/329)? This phrase is often understood as indicating Dasein's "finitude" – i.e., the ontological fact that there are dimensions to Dasein's being over which it has no control (and so for which it cannot be responsible in the ordinary sense). Finitude thus distinguishes Dasein from the hyperbolic claims for the rational, autonomous subject in the transcendental tradition from Kant to Husserl. But while such interpretations are fine as far as they go, they do not go far enough. For Heidegger subsequently *deformalizes* the formally indicative notion of "being the ground of a nullity," articulating it concretely and phenomenologically as taking over being-a-ground, which I interpret to mean treating one's factic grounds as possibly justifying reasons. But to say this is not to say that all action is rational or that Dasein's ability to give reasons does not give out. Inhabiting the space of reasons does not conflict with the idea of finitude, i.e., the idea that I do not reason on the basis of any kind of absolute standard.

the practical identity in light of which I act (choice₁) is accompanied by a "choosing to choose" (choice₂): to be resolute is to act as I-myself, that is, in "anticipation" of the "possibility" of breakdown. More specifically, it is to act in light of what is *disclosed* in breakdown, namely, my responsibility for the normative force of those standards (reasons) in light of which I act. Authenticity is thus "only a modified way in which … everydayness is seized upon" (GA 2, p. 238/179/224), an "existentiell modification of the 'one'" (GA 2, p. 173/130/168).

Anticipation of breakdown – that is, acting as I-myself rather than as the one-self – makes *praxis* "transparent [*durchsichtig*]" (GA 2, p. 406/307/354), so that, though still conscienceless, it contrasts with the self-forgetfulness that characterizes everyday *praxis*. To be authentic is to have a certain stance toward the reasons provided me by my practical identity. This is not the stance sought by the rationalist critics of Heidegger – namely, a grasp of some normative concept of reason that could serve as the measure for all the contingent, historically specific, goods and reasons that derive from practical identities. It is rather my *taking responsibility* for those reasons. I am not responsible for their existence; their existence derives from *das Man*. But in being authentic I make them *my* reasons by taking responsibility for endorsing them. They are *at stake* in what I do. To be authentically I-myself does not mean that I take such reasons to be arbitrary; it means that I recognize their motivational force as stemming from my commitment to them. Stated otherwise, I recognize that the norms embedded in practical identities are simply *claims* to validity, that is, that second nature is not nature. Whether or not such norms can be rationally grounded, they remain at *issue* for me, dependent on my commitment for their status as part of my motivational set.

It follows that no deliberation can justify that commitment rationally. To the extent that practical reasoning is practical – that is, to the extent that it does not simply yield theoretical conclusions but provides reasons that motivate me – such reasoning will always presuppose a prior commitment of some kind, some practical identity to whose norms I am actually trying to live up. Authenticity is simply transparency with regard to this fact, and to be responsible is to take over the one-self as I-myself – that is, to "take over that essential consciencelessness within which alone the existentiell possibility of *being*-'good' subsists."[19] What

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[19] From this point of view we can see that Dreyfus' interpretation sets the bar of authenticity too high, since authenticity is ascribed only to the *phronemos* or the "fully authentic" cultural master (Dreyfus 2004). But while these rare individuals may be authentic, surely Heidegger's concept is not *limited* to them.

are the consequences of this for the question of the *morally* good in *Being and Time*?

If the argument of the previous section is correct, then all deliberation – including moral deliberation – is possible only within the norms of a practical identity and so within a historically specific "world" or culture. By "moral" deliberation I mean reasoning not about what conduces to the good of some particular practical identity but what conduces to the good of "man in general" (Aristotle), what all human beings, simply as such, ought to do. Thus it is the universality of an obligation that makes it specifically moral. But *are* there any obligations that pertain to me simply as being, and not as being this or that? Though the language of obligation is foreign to Aristotle, his idea of a "highest life" for man – a life that cultivates the faculty that makes us human, reason or speech (*logos*) – yields a kind of moral obligation: act so that your action promotes, in yourself and in others, what is highest or best in human being, rationality. For rationality, as mindedness, is the condition of all other goods in their specifically human form. Can anything of this sort be found in Heidegger? Does Heidegger have a doctrine of what is highest in us, and so of the "good for man"?

The short answer is no. Certainly, *authenticity* is not such a good. For Heidegger, as for Kant, the notion of what promotes human flourishing ("happiness") is an "Ideal of imagination," that is, too indeterminate to support practical inferences to what one universally ought to do to attain it (Kant 1964, p. 86). In Heidegger's terms, what one ought to do derives from one's practical identity, and being human is not a practical identity.[20] Even in the case of practical identities, however, "*only* the resolution itself can give the answer" as to what one ought to do (GA 2, p. 395/298/345), because what it means to be, for instance, a father cannot be defined with sufficient specificity to yield more than prudential imperatives in deliberating on how to "bring the moving principle back to myself." Being a father is not a work but an ability-to-be, that is, something whose constitutive norms are themselves always at issue, something whose meaning is itself at stake in what I do. If Dasein's being is care, then no specific "good for man" can be specified, since what it is to be such a being is always at issue. Because this is so, we have no obligation to be authentic or to promote authenticity. Might care nevertheless be the ground of another sort of moral obligation?

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[20] For the argument, see Chapter 11 above.

Kant located the ground of obligation in our nature as rational beings. He could do so – as Heidegger discusses at length in the second part of *On the Essence of Human Freedom* (GA 31, pp. 139–298) – because he took freedom to be a kind of causality and thus modeled moral reasoning on the kind of reasons relevant in a causal context, namely, necessary connections or laws. As distinct from mere natural things, which act according to (causal) laws, rational beings can act for reasons – which means, for Kant, can act according to the *idea* of law (Kant 1964, p. 80). On such a view, to act for reasons at all is to act as though one's maxim expressed a universal law; and this, for Kant, means that there is an obligation incumbent on all rational beings, namely, to consider their maxims in light of the standard of what could *in fact* be a universal law.

We need not enter into the controversies surrounding this conception in order to appreciate Heidegger's modification of it.[21] First, in defining Dasein as care rather than reason Heidegger rejects Kant's equation of freedom with a kind of causality.[22] Thus, acting for reasons cannot *eo ipso* be seen as a way of acting in accord with (putatively) universal law, and Heidegger cannot appeal to the idea of law as a criterion for determining which maxims are morally impermissible. Nevertheless the care structure does entail something akin to Kant's idea that agency involves acting in light of, and not merely in accord with, reasons – namely, Dasein's essential being-guilty. Though it yields no test for the morality of one's maxim, it does yield something like a moral (that is to say, universal) obligation.

To have care as one's being – to be an issue for oneself – means to see things in normative terms, to understand one's factic inclinations in relation to the very idea of "what is best," of better and worse. This is to treat them as only *potentially* my reasons – that is, to treat them as normative reasons rather than causes. But Dasein is essentially *Mitsein*, and thus to be responsible is equally to be *answerable* to others, accountable to them.[23] The constitutive horizon of responsibility – in which alone I can be I-myself – thus includes among its "references" *every other* Dasein, all those to whom I am accountable, that is, all those who may call upon me to justify or give an account of myself. Thus to be I-myself is to be under

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[21] But see Guignon 2011.
[22] Summing up his argument, Heidegger writes: "Freedom is the condition of possibility of the understanding of being, the manifestness of the being of beings." But if that is so, then freedom cannot be thought in terms of causality. "Causality is *one* ontological determination among others. Causality is grounded in freedom. The problem of causality is a problem of freedom and not the reverse" (GA 31, p. 303).
[23] See Chapter 10 above.

an *obligation* to offer reasons to others for what I do. My "nature" as care entails a moral obligation insofar as taking over being-a-ground obliges me to take up the practice of giving and asking for reasons, a kind of meta-practice that thus belongs among the norms of all particular practical identities.

Phronesis always remain tied to concrete practical identities, since these alone provide the necessary "ends" or standards of success or failure. And on Heidegger's view, morally practical reasoning is also tied to such identities, since moral responsibility cannot be defined in terms of reason or law as the criterion for a concrete, but identity-transcending, universal good. Because Dasein is always an issue for itself, such goods are also always at issue. Considered ontologically, then, practical rationality is essentially practical *reasoning* – that is, the dialogical practice of offering reasons to others for what I do and demanding the same from them. What such reasoning "should" find to be the right thing to do cannot be determined in advance by any theory but depends on *actual* argumentation.[24] What it means to be a good father, friend, or carpenter – and so also what it means to be a good person, morally good – is always the substance of "the conversation that we ourselves are." Nevertheless, we do have something like a moral obligation to engage in practical reason-giving, since that is an essential part of what it means to be a social creature who can say "I."

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[24] On this point, compare Habermas 1999.

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